samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
gang and i have worked closely over the years. the pboc and mas have a longstanding relationship of mutual trust and financial co - operation. this relationship deepened during yi gang's tenure as pboc governor, especially in digital finance and sustainable finance. in 2018, pboc and mas signed a fintech cooperation agreement to promote joint research and collaborative projects in areas such as digital and mobile payments, distributed ledgers, and digital currencies, focusing on use cases such as cross - border payments and trade finance. in 2022, pboc and mas formed a joint china - singapore green finance task force to strengthen our cooperation in green and transition finance, and to facilitate collaboration between our public and private sectors towards a lowcarbon future. yi gang will speak to us today on china's perspective on central bank digital currencies. china is at the forefront of digital payments and in the development of digital currency. since the pboc started piloting the e - cny in 2019, the programme has expanded to cover 26 cities across china, with more than 13. 6 billion digital yuan in circulation. pboc is now beginning to experiment with cross - border applications of e - cny. ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming dr yi gang to deliver the 11th mas lecture. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

the signals from the monetary analysis confirms this picture. as regards fiscal policies, the governing council welcomes the european commission ’ s assessment of the 2014 draft budgetary plans which were submitted in october for the first time under the “ two - pack ” regulations. this new surveillance exercise needs to be fully effective. in order to put high public debt ratios on a downward path, governments should not unravel their efforts to reduce deficits and sustain fiscal adjustment over the medium term. in bis central bankers ’ speeches particular, consolidation measures should be growth - friendly and have a medium - term perspective, so as both to improve public services and minimise the distortionary effects of taxation. at the same time, there is a need to push ahead with product and labour market reforms, in order to improve competitiveness, raise potential growth, generate employment opportunities and foster the adaptability of our economies. we are now at your disposal for questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches
, once enfant terrible, today royal academician, and master of confessional art, tracey emin, to share her thoughts with us now. bis central bankers ’ speeches

only 1 / 2 percent per year since 2010 – the slowest five - year growth rate since world war ii and about one - fourth of the average postwar rate ( figure 2 ). for further perspective, productivity growth averaged bis central bankers ’ speeches 1 - 1 / 2 percent during the so - called slow productivity period from 1974 to 1995 and 3 percent during the tech - boom decade from 1995 to 2005. the slowdown has been worldwide and is evident even in countries that were little affected by the crisis ( figure 3 ). given the global nature of the phenomenon, changes in factors specific to the united states are probably not the main drivers. one factor holding back productivity in recent years has been the meager growth in the business sector ’ s capital stock ( figure 4 ). this weakness is consistent with the weak recovery in demand. 4 another important factor is the marked decline in total factor productivity ( tfp ) growth ( figure 5 ). tfp is that part of productivity that is not explained by capital investment or labor quality ; it is thought to be mainly a function of technological innovation. 5 a broad decline in the dynamism in our economy may also be contributing to lower tfp. 6 there is strong evidence that the slowdown in tfp growth in the united states preceded the financial crisis, particularly in sectors that produce or use information technologies. 7 the range of opinions on the future path of productivity growth is wide, and the historical record provides ample grounds for humility. 8 a middle - ground position that seems to underlie many current forecasts is that productivity is probably still being held down by cyclical factors and lingering effects of the crisis. as those factors dissipate, labor productivity growth should move up to 1 - 1 / 2 percent or so, the lower end of its longer - run range. in addition to productivity, the other principal factor in potential output is labor supply, which is determined by the working - age population, the natural rate of unemployment, and the trend labor force participation rate. both the natural rate of unemployment and labor force participation initially appeared to suffer crisis - related damage. but more recent data are a bit more encouraging. the natural rate of unemployment reflects the matching of characteristics that employers are seeking with those of the unemployed. with the dramatic labor market dislocations of the crisis, it was not surprising to see measures of matching efficiency deteriorate, and many see eugenio pinto and stacey tevlin ( 2014 ), “ perspectives on the
trade repositories per se, but instead the results that flow from these efforts. these institutions are just devices to achieve an end – less risk, more robustness and greater transparency. in the end, we will need to assess our progress on otcd reforms against those broader qualitative metrics. thank you very much for your kind attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

exports during the contraction and recovery for each cycle. the recovery in exports for this cycle was quicker than for the prior recession in 2001. firms reacted to the significant challenges presented by the recession by focusing on cost cutting and improved efficiencies. these efforts led to a rise in measured labor productivity ( chart 17 ). with labor compensation growth declining due to the weakness in the labor market, the higher labor productivity resulted in sharp declines in the costs of producing goods – unit labor costs. the decline in unit labor costs helped firms to restore their profitability. as demand conditions improved, firms on net began to increase their employment and hours worked by their staff ( chart 18 ). it is important to note that improvement in the demand for workers will not necessarily lead to a steady decline in the aggregate unemployment rate. during the recession, many unemployed workers withdrew from the labor force and stopped bis central bankers ’ speeches actively looking for employment. this can be seen by the decline in the labor force participation rate ( chart 19 ). while there are around 15 million unemployed workers, there are also around 9 million workers who are working part time for economic reasons ( as opposed to their own choice ), and around 1. 3 million “ discouraged ” workers who want a job but who are not currently actively looking for work – and therefore are not counted as unemployed. as firms decide to increase their total hours, some of this additional labor demand will take the form of firms restoring part - time workers to full - time status – an action that does not reduce the unemployment rate. in addition, as conditions begin to improve in the labor market, discouraged workers may decide to reenter the labor force and to renew their search for a job. this reentry pushes up the measured unemployment rate until these reentrants find new employment. as the recession ended, consumption growth returned to positive, supported by improvement in disposable income growth and a leveling off of the household saving rate ( chart 20 ). household wealth began to recover as equity markets improved and the deterioration in house prices abated, supported in part by demand created by the housing tax credit programs ( chart 21 ). as conditions in financial markets improved, banks ceased tightening their lending standards ( chart 22 ). lending activity stopped contracting, and credit became more readily available for large firms that had access to the credit markets ( chart 23 ). midway through 2010, however, questions started to arise as to whether the economy was entering a “ soft - patch ”
entrenching the link between banks and sovereigns. not moving promptly towards the srm and srf would prolong uselessly financial fragmentation, leave the euro area financial system exposed to systemic fragility, and, ultimately, be harmful for growth and jobs. this would in particular be the case if the srf is only slowly mutualised, and if it cannot resort to a common european backstop from the outset. i thank you for your attention. ryan, r., m. o ’ toole and f. mccann ( 2014 ), “ does bank market power affect sme financing constraints? ”, journal of banking & finance. bis central bankers ’ speeches

, a. and pandalai - nayar, n. ( 2019 ), “ input linkages and the transmission of shocks : firm - level evidence from the 2011 tohoku earthquake ”, the review of economics and statistics, vol. 101, no 1, mit press, march, pp. 60 - 75. 5. lagarde, c. ( 2022 ), “ a new global map : european resilience in a changing world ”, keynote speech at the peterson institute for international economics, washington, d. c., 22 april. 6. hamilton, j. d. ( 2011 ), “ historical oil shocks ”, nber working paper series, no 16790, national bureau of economic research, february. 7. bachmann, r. et al. ( 2022 ), “ how it can be done ”, econtribute policy brief, no 34. 8. kuik, f., morris, r. and sun, y. ( 2022 ), “ the impact of climate change on activity and prices – insights from a survey of leading firms ”, economic bulletin, issue 4, ecb. 9. mckinsey ( 2021 ), “ how covid - 19 is reshaping supply chains ”, 23 november. 10. during us recessions from the 1950s to the 1980s, inventory investment accounted for 1. 4 percentage points of the average 2 % peak - to - trough decline in real gdp. see piger, j. m. ( 2005 ), “ is the business cycle still an inventory cycle? ”, economic synopses, no 2, federal reserve bank of st. louis. 11. lagarde, c. ( 2022 ), “ monetary policy normalisation in the euro area ”, the ecb blog, 23 may. 12. the governing council has ( i ) decided to flexibly reinvest maturing securities under the pandemic emergency purchase programme, and ( ii ) launched a new transmission protection instrument. 13. these are the median figures across recessions. 14. see “ a downside scenario related to the war in ukraine and energy supply cuts ”, ecb staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, september 2022. 15. weber, m., d ’ acunto, f., gorodnichenko, y. and coibion, o. ( 2022 ), “ the subjective inflation expectations of households and firms : measurement
##ing tirelessly the necessity of strongly reinforcing the euro area economic governance. the economic policy of each member of the euro area has to be aligned with the requirements of emu. as alexander hamilton said two hundred years ago : we should ourselves “ learn to think ( more ) continentally ”. bis central bankers ’ speeches

jean - claude trichet : two continents compared keynote address by mr jean - claude trichet, president of the european central bank, at the “ ecb and its watchers xiii ” conference, frankfurt am main, 10 june 2011. * * * ladies and gentlemen, as always, it is a pleasure for me to open this conference today. four years ago at this gathering, i compared monetary policy in the euro area and in the united states. today, i would also like to talk to you on the theme of “ two continents compared ”. as we are all too well aware, much has happened on both sides of the atlantic since 2007, and it is useful to take stock again. but this time, i would like to focus less on monetary policy and more on the wider economies of the two continents. the crisis has exposed in both continents the issue of heterogeneity – a wide diversity of experience across different parts of the whole. as we will see, the economic fallout from the crisis and the ensuing recovery have shown considerable variation among the us states. and as we know, the same is true in the euro area, where some countries are a particular focus of attention. but before turning to the issue of regional heterogeneity and the appropriate coordination of regional policies within an economic and monetary union ( emu ), let me briefly take a bird ’ s eye view of the euro area. i. a bird ’ s eye view of the euro area speaking here four years ago i looked back at the ecb ’ s monetary policy over the period 1999 – 2006. i showed a scatterplot of inflation volatility and output volatility for the euro area and other advanced countries. academic research suggests that there might be a trade - off between these two variables and that it is therefore difficult to have low inflation volatility and low output volatility at the same time. but what the chart showed was that the euro area scored well on both dimensions. this seemed puzzling given that the euro area has quite rigid product and labour markets, at least compared with the united states. the higher degree of price and wage rigidity in the euro area would suggest that output volatility should be significantly larger in the euro area than in the more flexible us economy. this would be particularly true during a period when the economy is subject to supply - side shocks, which are exerting simultaneously inflationary and recessionary influences. yet surprisingly, and despite the
lorenzo bini smaghi : reflections on the exit strategy speech by mr lorenzo bini smaghi, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the sveriges riksbank, stockholm, 21 january 2010. * * * a lot of attention has been devoted in recent policy discussions to the exit strategy from the expansionary monetary and fiscal policy stance adopted since the outbreak of the crisis, and to the interaction between the two. designing an optimal exit strategy should, in theory, not be too difficult. in an ideal world, fiscal stimuli should be withdrawn before monetary policy is tightened in order to ensure that public debt remains sustainable and that monetary policy is not overburdened. we know however that first - best solutions are often hard to implement, because they are based on unrealistic assumptions relating in particular to the rationality of expectations and the ability of policy - makers to rapidly make decisions and to change them if needed. furthermore, policy - makers have to take account of the prevailing uncertainty and of the impact of their decisions on agents ’ expectations. for instance, fiscal policy is normally decided once a year, through an elaborate budget process, but is not implemented until the following year. this process introduces significant rigidities into the decision - making and makes it somewhat less likely that fiscal policy can exit before monetary policy, which is typically a much more flexible instrument. today i would like to focus my remarks on the exit from the accommodative stance of monetary policy. i will not consider the phasing - out of the non - standard measures that central banks have adopted over the last few months. the discussions so far have centred mainly on the timing of the exit decision, which should neither be premature nor tardy. there are counter - effects in both scenarios. if the decision to exit is made too early, the economic recovery may be put at risk, as higher interest rates will produce a tightening effect on consumption and investment decisions at the very time when the pick - up in the economy is still fragile. furthermore, it might further restrict credit conditions while the banking system is still restructuring its balance sheet. if, on the other hand, the decision is taken too late, monetary conditions will remain too lax for too long, sowing the seeds of the next crisis. in addition, the later the tightening, the sharper it needs to be, thus producing valuation changes that may reduce banks ’ profitability and undermine their ability to support the economic recovery. given

a lot, i can ’ t understate that. effective boards are central to the success of firms and the financial sector, and central to the delivery of our objectives. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
management procedure with a board driven enterprise - wide data architecture standard, is a more proactive regulatory intervention for data quality assurance – a la ecb style – called for in our country as well? here ’ s wishing you fruitful discussions in the conference. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

janet yellen : strong foundations - the economic futures of kids and communities welcoming remarks by ms janet l yellen, chair of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the 10th biennial federal reserve system community development research conference " strong foundations : the economic futures of kids and communities ", washington dc, 23 march 2017. * * * i would like to welcome all of you and thank you for joining us to discuss a set of topics of considerable importance to our country. this is the federal reserve ’ s 10th biennial community development research conference, dedicated as always to issues of significance to people and communities around the country. the conference is cosponsored by, and includes substantive contributions from, the community development offices of all 12 federal reserve banks as well as the board of governors. that united effort and level of commitment reflects how consequential we consider these issues to be. this conference is intended to present and highlight rigorous research that i am confident will inform how you think about your own work, whether from the perspective of policymaking, community development practice, or research. our last conference, two years ago, explored various aspects of economic mobility, largely among adults. this year, we gather to discuss “ the economic futures of kids and communities, ” and, in part, i see this topic as an extension of that earlier conversation about mobility. today and tomorrow, we focus on research about the foundation or building blocks for economic success that are laid even before young people enter the workforce and assume responsibility for their own finances. we will hear from leading experts on a range of issues related to how children, youths, and young adults are shaped in ways that may ultimately affect their ability later to productively contribute to the economy and manage their finances. we can learn from what the data and analysis tell us, and our hope is that making use of this information will lead to more effective programs and policies and thus better outcomes. considerable evidence shows that growing up poor makes it harder to succeed as an adult, and new research by the fed likewise shows the strong connection between the typical experiences of poverty in childhood and economic challenges later as an adult. the data come from the board ’ s latest survey of household economics and decisionmaking ( shed ), which will be published later this spring. 1 in the most recent survey, we asked some of the younger respondents — aged 25 to 39 — to think about their childhoods. we asked those young adults whether, during their childhoods, they found themselves worrying
rasheed mohammed al maraj : financial and regulatory developments in bahrain address by his excellency rasheed mohammed al maraj, governor of the central bank of bahrain, at the middle east financial services summit, manama, 5 may 2008. * * * good morning ladies and gentlemen, i am delighted to be here today at the middle east financial services summit, which is being held in bahrain for the second consecutive year. it is indeed my pleasure to welcome you all here. i would also like to thank the organizers, ft global events, for their efforts in holding this event in bahrain and for inviting me to address this distinguished audience. ladies & gentlemen, much has changed since we last gathered here for this conference. at the time, the economic boom in the gcc region, with oil trading around us $ 64, was the main headline news. today, as you all know, oil has scaled new heights at over $ 115 a barrel on most days, the us subprime crisis has unleashed a global credit crunch and the world stands on the threshold of a food crisis due to the soaring prices of basic commodities. here, in the gcc, we are indeed fortunate on many fronts. although we have no desire to destabilize international financial markets, the high oil prices have enabled us to embark on a new program to further modernize our economies, in order to secure prosperity for the long term. however, the rising price of oil, while very welcome, has not come without its own challenges. along with the rest of the world, we, too, are facing inflationary pressures, which need to be carefully managed without compromising the momentum of economic growth. the central banks of the gcc, individually and collectively, are giving due attention to the issue of inflation and several new measures, such as rent caps and credit controls on banks, have been announced to support long - standing programmes of food subsidies and government housing for nationals. in bahrain, we have been particularly fortunate that inflationary levels have, so far, been more modest in comparison with our neighbors and that our financial services industry, which is a major component of the bahraini economy, is enjoying good health. as the regulator of the financial services industry, the central bank of bahrain is pleased by the continued growth of bahrain ’ s financial services sector. while the effects of the us subprime crisis and resulting credit crunch have affected a few bahrain banks, as steve points out in his latest article “ good show of

we have a clear vision for how we want to go forward. thank you for your attention and i look forward to welcoming you again in bahrain soon.