levels. the large holdings of government bonds on bank balance sheets are also problematic. owing to a regulatory loophole, government bonds are backed by little to no capital. and – unlike with private borrowers – there is no cap on individual banks ’ exposures to sovereign debtors. before a deposit insurance scheme can be created, these sovereign default risks on banks ’ balance sheets would need to be reduced in the long term, as would stocks of non - performing loans. otherwise the insurance scheme would find itself assuming liability for them. my colleague on the ecb governing council, benoit cœure, rightly pointed out the other day that “ a deposit insurance scheme should be seen as an insurance against economic risks, just as you take out liability insurance to protect yourself against the risk of an accident. ” but as you all know, ladies and gentlemen, you can only take out a liability insurance policy to cover future accidents, and not if the damage has already been done. following the logic of an insurance scheme, and given that member states will still have a bearing on the health of their banks in future, the concept of a permanent national risk retention requirement also seems worth considering. think, for example, of insolvency law and how it is legally enforced. if we look further afield, beyond the banking union, a rainy day fund modelled on the type in place in several us states is certainly worthy of consideration. many states put aside budget surpluses for hard times. but new scope for borrowing and fund transfers between states are incompatible with this approach. however, it is reasonable to question whether countries with solid public finances even need such a fund. after all, european fiscal rules are less strict when it comes to government debt than the constitutions of the us states, most of which prohibit new borrowing altogether. but such an instrument would at least offer greater room for manoeuvre in difficult situations 5 / 8 bis central bankers'speeches without needing to expand fiscal risk sharing or requiring cross - border payments. 4. 3 private risk sharing increased risk sharing within the euro area would make member states better able to absorb economic shocks. the same goes, in particular, for private forms of risk sharing. a recent article by ecb economists shows that, in the euro area, when a particular member state experiences an economic slump, 80 % of that downturn bleeds through to consumption in that country. now, at first, it might seem plausible to us that it is chiefly the people in the

easing will continue to be also driven by the nbu's interest rate and currency policy measures. 1 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches the economy returned to growth in 2023, and the recovery will continue in the coming years the economy has been recovering throughout the entire 2023 thanks to the high adaptability of businesses and households to wartime conditions and thanks to the loose fiscal policy supported by large - scale international financing. in q4, the growth in real gdp exceeded expectations, primary due to better harvests of late crops and the development of alternative export routes. this created grounds for an improvement in estimates of real gdp growth for the whole of 2023, to 5. 7 %. the economic growth will continue despite the war. in 2024, real gdp will rise by 3. 6 %, mainly thanks to budget expenditures remaining high in view of expected sufficient inflows of international financial assistance. in 2025 – 2026, economic growth will accelerate to 4 % – 6 % per year, thanks to a decline in security risks, which is the main assumption of the nbu's forecast, an improvement in consumer and investment sentiments, and the implementation of european integration reforms. in the post - war period, the loose fiscal policy will continue to support the economy. at the same time, the budget deficit will significantly narrow as the internal resource base increases. international financial support of ukraine will continue, albeit declining in volume. this will enable the nbu to maintain international reserves at a high level and ensure exchange rate sustainability thanks to external support and the nbu's consistent policy, ukraine's international reserves increased by 42 % in 2023 to usd 40. 5 billion. despite delays in international aid disbursement at the beginning of the year, its regularity is anticipated to resume in the coming months. under the baseline scenario of the nbu's forecast, ukraine is expected to receive about usd 37 billion in foreign loans and grants in 2024. as security risks expectedly decline in the coming years, ukraine will restore its ability to independently finance its own needs, and so the volume of official external financing will taper off. at the same time, this aid will be enough to maintain a sufficient level of international reserves and ensure exchange rate sustainability. combined with domestic market borrowing, international support will also help meet the still significant fiscal needs of the government. the course of the war continues to be the key risk to inflation dynamics and economic development the war is grinding on