and dealing with pending imbalances and that alternative policy instruments exist in order to take over from monetary policy in case corrections are needed. this is why recent years ’ experience has substantially altered the approach to euro adoption. before the crisis, the opinion prevailed that meeting nominal criteria was enough to prove the eligibility for the euro adoption. some economists even debated the excessive severity of the nominal criteria and the conflict between their fulfilment and real convergence progress ( buitter and grafe, 2002 ; szapary, 2001 ; kopits, 1999 ; rostowski, 2002 ). but during and after the crisis, it became obvious that the maastricht criteria are not enough to ensure successful ea membership. nominal convergence criteria cannot be sustainably met unless competitiveness, financial stability and solid fiscal equilibrium are ensured. “ the bigger picture ”, meaning the macroeconomic imbalance procedure, gained ground and real convergence criteria came to the forefront. the other side of the story has shown us that during the last couple of years, the euro area underwent extensive governance reforms, designed to address the flaws revealed by the crisis. however, their actual effectiveness is still to be tested in practice. we are still in unchartered waters. there have been recent statements referring to the fact that europe might have not exited the crisis yet. as jean monnet used to say : “ europe would be built through crises ” and would be “ the sum of their solutions ”. consequently, non - member states from eastern and south - eastern europe seem closer than ever to complying with the maastricht criteria, but readiness for successful euro area membership needs further work. labour, product market and other structural reforms are still required in order to observe convergence not only in letter, but also in spirit. non - member states, on the road towards euro adoption, have to both comply with the maastricht criteria and to choose the right moment for it. each and every member state should put their houses in order as a prerequisite for a successful euro area enlargement. only this way new candidates will be able to obtain the opportunities of a single currency, while being in turn a valuable contributor to the monetary union. romania has recently reached political consensus, at the highest level, namely the president and the prime minister, that the target date for euro adoption will be january 1st, 2019. the rationale for this decision is that such an objective – feasible, yet ambitious – could act as

the onset of the crisis. as a result, romania had large twin deficits at the start of the crisis, specifically a sizeable structural fiscal gap ( around – 8 % of gdp in 2008 ) and a current account deficit in the double - digit area ( between 2006 and 2008 ). after the crisis hit, romania had no other choice but to undertake the necessary adjustments in order to eliminate these imbalances in an orderly manner. the efforts seem to have already paid off – the year 2013 marked a turnaround in romania ’ s economic development : economic growth of 3. 5 % driven mostly by robust export and industrial output on the supply side ; a small current account deficit ; historically low inflation ; while the fiscal deficit was kept well below 3 %. and i have every reason to believe that romania will see further growth in the years to come. and that, unlike in the pre - crisis period, this time sustainability will be the name of the game, as hopefully we all have learned our lessons from our previous mistakes. as they say, no one really learns but from his own mistakes … bis central bankers ’ speeches talking about sustainable economic growth, one needs to put things into perspective in order to ascertain whether the economy is on the right track. this means that short - term policies must be harmonised with the long - term vision and goals. euro adoption could serve as such a long - term goal. and romania has chosen to use it as an anchor. let me say a few words about this subject. in the post - crisis period, all non - euro area eu countries in central and eastern europe with floating exchange rate regimes ( czech republic, hungary, poland and romania ), as well as bulgaria, shifted to a wait - and - see approach as regards euro adoption, even though, in some of them, maastricht criteria were already fulfilled or within reach. nobody disputes that in the long term it is in the best interest of our countries to adopt euro, as it heightens the degree of business cycle correlation and market integration. however, the benefits of euro adoption are not unconditional ; therefore it is essential to make sure that nominal convergence criteria are achieved on a sustainable basis. also it is important to attain a certain degree of per capita income convergence before switching to the euro ( a large convergence gap may complicate business cycle management in the absence of independent monetary policy ). additionally, it is important to demonstrate the effectiveness of the new institutional setup in preventing