victoria cleland for their helpful comments. 1 private money mainly takes the form of deposits held in bank accounts. the only form of public money accessible to the general public is cash, in the form of coins and notes. 2 this is based on the amount of cash held by the public as a share of total cash and sight deposits. see part v of ‘ a millennium of macroeconomic data ’, research dataset, bank of england. 3 see link news and media contact,'coronavirus crisis means cash use down but uk still withdrawing £1billion from atms each week ’ opens in a new window ; see link,'statistics and trends ’ opens in a new window ; see chart a in ‘ new forms of digital money ’ dp, june 2021. moreover, in practice, the uk authorities remain committed to ensuring access to cash to those that need it. the bank, hmt, fca and the psr have been working together on the joint authorities cash strategy group to monitor the use of cash, atm availability, and ensure cash remains available despite the impacts of covid. 4 see the example of the corralito in argentina. ( bbc, 02 / 12 / 2002 : “ argentina lifts cash restrictionsopens in a new window ” ). 5 see : “ the financial crisis – 10 years on ” ( bank of england, 2018 ) 6 stablecoins are different from cbdc. while stablecoins are a privately issued form of digital money, cbdcs are a form of digital money issued by the central bank. the bank of england is exploring the case for a cbdc but has not made a decision yet. 7 in march 2018, the fpc notedopens in a new window that : “ should be considered as assets rather than currencies. however, as assets, they establish no claim on any future income streams or collateral. they have no intrinsic value beyond their currently limited potential to be adopted as money in the future, and hence could prove worthless ”. 8 in december 2019, the fpc noted that : “ where stablecoins are used in systemic payment chains as money - like instruments they should meet standards equivalent to those expected of commercial bank money in relation to stability of value, robustness of legal claim and the ability to redeem at par in fiat ”. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

need regulation to cover credit risk. if they only back themselves in central bank reserves, which are inherently liquid, they don ’ t need liquidity facilities. ultimately, the specific requirements may well be different from those applicable to banks, but the outcome will be the same – that systemic stablecoins used as money will offer the same protection to coin holders as commercial bank money. conclusion the title of this speech is a cliche : everything that is old is new again. but i am going to end on a different cliche : the definition of insanity ( widely – and inaccurately – attributed to albert einstein ) is doing the same thing over and over again but expecting different results. as i mentioned earlier, stablecoins may be innovative in the technology they use, but the fundamental questions they pose are not new. we as central bankers and regulators need to look at them as what they propose to be – a new form of private money. this means that we will hold them to standards similar to those applicable to existing private money. it doesn ’ t matter what type of technology you ’ re using or the legal form of the firm. if a firm is offering private money on a systemic scale then it should be regulated as such. our core rules and requirements came through trial and error, often following financial crises. our work on a regulatory regime for stablecoins builds on this learning process – rather than starting at square one and expecting different results. i recognise that the themes here sound curmudgeonly. but this is not an anti - innovation message : quite the opposite. establishing a secure regulatory environment for new forms of digital money to operate within the uk will lay a foundation for sustainable innovation. as i said at the outset, if new forms of digital money can be made safe, they could potentially contribute to faster, cheaper and more efficient 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches payments with greater functionality. they could increase the resilience of payments. and they could even have long - term benefits for financial stability. but these opportunities can only be realised if new forms of digital money are safe – which means recognising and properly regulating the elements that are age - old. i am grateful to morgane fouche, matthew osborne, stephanie haffner, robert page and james pople - hoskins for their help in preparing these remarks. i am also grateful to antoine lallour, nicholas butt, david copple, shiv chowla, andrew hauser and