the european payment ecosystem has become extremely reliant on non - european players – today the global card schemes, and tomorrow the bigtechs – with the result that it now has limited control over the management of personal data. in parallel, the rise of crypto - assets and above all of stablecoins means they could potentially try to replace central bank and commercial bank money, even though they offer none of the same guarantees in terms of liquidity, service continuity and neutrality. in light of this situation, europe needs to develop a payments strategy. i have often pushed for 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches this over the past two years. recently, we have made decisive progress thanks to the strong involvement of the ecb and the commission. we now have to put this into action and “ deliver ” – this is urgent for the next two years. this strategy notably combines three elements : 1 / european regulation on stablecoins : on 24 september, the european commission published its mica project, which in our view provides a good basis for reconciling innovation with consumer protection and financial stability. 2 / an acceleration on the european central bank digital currency ( cbdc ), the “ digital euro ”. we haven ’ t yet decided on it, but we need to be ready to decide if it becomes necessary, and as soon as it becomes necessary. the banque de france was the first to start a programme of eight experiments on a wholesale cbdc, notably with a number of fintechs, to improve the functioning of the financial markets and institutions. if necessary, the eurosystem could decide to issue a retail cbdc to ensure the general public have access to central bank money, especially in countries where cash payments are in decline. the ecb has created a high - level task force whose report we published ten days ago. we will now launch a public consultation, starting today, examine all regulatory and technical issues, and begin experiments at the national central banks – the banque de france will contribute actively to this. between now and mid - 2021, the eurosystem will decide whether to launch a project for a digital euro, which would start with an investigatory phase. and while we ’ re on the topic, let me just comment on the terminology used : you sometimes hear people talk about cryptocurrencies, but the term is a contradiction. you either have a currency, with all its functions and a public guarantee, or private crypto - assets.

. the answer is clear : good regulation is necessary ; it's never sufficient. the risks generated by specific business models such as the asset - liability mismatch at svb or the weak profitability and weak internal controls that dogged credit suisse should typically have led to higher supervisory requirements. supervision should not be seen as a static business ; it must be active and tailored to banks characteristics. this is precisely the spirit of the " pillar 2 " in the basel framework, with the annual supervisory review process. i sometimes hear doubts about supervision, which some believe should be treated as a legal dialogue, cautious in its form, and slow in its effects. no : supervision can and must be intrusive – including on - site –, exercised by highly skilled practitioners, quick in its reaction, strong in its powers. this is not wishful thinking : it has been our experience for decades in the french acpr, and now for years in the european ssm. active supervision is indeed one of the great successes of our european banking union. in light of the recent reality test, i believe there are two lessons to be learnt from our model. first, the experience of the single supervisory mechanism shows the advantages of all the players being subject to one leading authority in an integrated banking space, with clearly defined responsibilities and coordination. this single supervision allows for comparisons across a vast sample of comparable institutions, and thematic campaigns of on - site missions. second, our active supervision features regular and comprehensive stress testing including on interest rate risks, which is also applied to less significant institutions. the 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches european banking authority ( eba ) conducts an eu - wide banking stress test every two years, taking into account the latest macro - financial developments : in 2023, stress test scenarios are typically based on a sharp rise in short - term and long - term interest rates. moreover, following the eba guidelines on interest rate risk of the banking book ( irrbb ) – as part of the rigorous application of the pillar 2 process –, published in 2018 and enhanced in 2022, european banks are required to perform regular supervisory tests to measure the impact of interest rate movements on their interest margins and economic value of equity ; us regional banks such as svb are not. iii. resolution : how to make it work now for our last blessing. since the global financial crisis, banks and authorities have strengthened their ability to deal with crisis events by developing a resolution framework. however,