provide to each other, because if split up they may have to agree so - called transitional service agreements. second, on which essential services have been outsourced. third, on details of netting and derivative contracts, so that the bank can apply various statutory safeguards for creditors. that is a formidable task, and it is striking that, in the us, the fdic has introduced a requirement that troubled banks must be able to demonstrate that, if necessary, they could report each day the details of so - called qualifying financial contracts, which are essentially derivatives. we may need to contemplate something along those lines in the uk. all of that is needed after buyers for the business have been found. potential bidders for all or part of an ailing bank will themselves need the kinds of information typically offered to bidders in a “ friendly ” m & a transaction. so there is a case for banks routinely maintaining such a data room as part of their crisis contingency plans. in delivering its resolution responsibilities under the 2009 banking act, the bank is ready to work with banks and the fsa in helping to specify in more detail what is needed in practice. if the information can be ready almost routinely the execution of resolutions would be aided. in summary, as a consequence of its new statutory role, the bank can have a need for a lot of information about banks getting into distress. that might usefully be seen alongside the information needed before a bank reaches the point of being unviable, when it might apply to draw on the bank ’ s public liquidity insurance facilities, notably the discount window. and beyond that, a bank might seek emergency liquidity assistance, where the bank acts under the tripartite mou. 5 in either circumstance, the bank will need information on the bank ’ s liquidity position and planning, and a lot of detailed information on the collateral it would be offering. i therefore urge the bba ’ s members to send the bank ( as well as, of course, the fsa ) your contingency funding plans ; and, secondly, to pre - position collateral with us for the dwf. overall, we need to engage together constructively on what information the authorities need in order to handle incipient or actual distress. paragraph 14 of the memorandum of understanding between hm treasury, the bank of england and the financial services authority says : " in exceptional circumstances, there may be a need for an operation which goes beyond the bank's

local interests, recognising that in globalised markets their interests will often best be served through co - operative solutions. either that, or the structure of international banking may have to change. given the starting point, the principles are demanding. for each of the most important global banks, the aim is that home and host authorities ( regulators and central banks ) should work together to identify obstacles to effective management of crises. to that end, home authorities are charged with ensuring that firms are capable of supplying the information needed to manage a crisis. and firms are strongly encouraged to maintain contingency plans to wind themselves down – as i have already said today, the bank would like there to be consideration of whether that could be a requirement for operating in the uk. and, as i also made clear earlier, we do realise that all of that will be formidable, best approached with an international consensus. similarly demanding is the requirement in the principles that countries “ strive ” to find internationally co - ordinated solutions, sharing information as freely as practicable. that is not something which one could say has always been apparent over the past two years, although it worked well on market operations. as the principles recognise, the drive for greater openness between authorities should not be permitted to jeopardise effective resolution through leaks or pre - emptive action to ring - fence local interests. i am reporting this because the fsb principles have not got as much coverage as they warrant. yet it is very important that the banking world appreciates that, alongside other issues and initiatives i have outlined this morning, they have the potential – indeed, are intended – to bring about material changes in the way you structure your businesses, in how you interact with the authorities, and in the wider environment in which you operate. i hope that the financial stability board working group on the crisis management principles will not hesitate to report back to the fsb, and through it to alert g20 ministers, if implementation is or looks to be stalling – whether because it is meeting with resistance from the authorities or the industry, or blockages in national laws and practices. concluding comment this crisis has reminded a generation of some old truths. banks can fail. but they matter enormously to our economies, and so the authorities cannot afford to stand back and allow disorderly systemic failure. going forward, we cannot have a regime where the upside for risk - taking goes to shareholders and management, but the downside falls to the general taxpayer.