successful in moving an economy towards what we might call a “ good equilibrium ”. omts are ex - ante unlimited but, as i have just explained, they are not unconditional. exit from omts would take place once their objectives have been achieved or when there is a failure to comply with a programme. omts would not take place while a given programme is under review and they would resume after the review period once programme compliance has been assured. consistent with the treaty prohibition of monetary financing, the ecb will only conduct transactions on secondary markets, buying from investors and not from governments. purchases will focus in particular on government bonds with remaining maturities of between one and three years. this is in line with the traditional focus of central bank monetary operations. the ecb will accept the same treatment as private or other creditors with respect to bonds purchased in the context of omts. and the ecb will be fully transparent on its omts. we will report weekly on total portfolio holdings, and monthly on the average duration of our holdings and the breakdown by country. bis central bankers ’ speeches 3. financial market union let me now turn to the other topic you have chosen for today ’ s exchange of views, namely the financial market union. the ecb welcomes the european commission ’ s proposal for a single supervisory mechanism, which is very much in line with the statement of the euro area summit of 29 june 2012. we are looking forward to working closely with the european parliament in this field. i am confident that the excellent cooperation we have established so far will continue with matters of financial supervision. let me here focus on three issues that are key to setting the stage for the new supervisory framework in the euro area : first, the principle of separation between monetary policy and financial supervision ; second, the possible participation of non - euro area member states in the ssm ; and third, the accountability framework. on the first issue of the separation of monetary and supervisory functions, we are not entering uncharted territory. many central banks around the world – including a large majority of the national central banks in the eurosystem – combine monetary and supervisory functions. proper arrangements to prevent monetary policy being inappropriately affected by the supervisory role have been devised in several countries. i am confident that we can establish suitable arrangements in the euro area, drawing in part on their experiences. the commission ’ s proposal provides a solid basis for achieving that goal. by having the supervisory board carry out all regular supervisory activities performed

directly by the ecb, we will go a long way towards avoiding possible conflicts of interest between the two functions. in addition, we are examining internal procedures that would separate the relevant work - streams supporting the two functions. the second key issue for the supervisory framework is the possibility of non - euro area member states participating in the ssm. let us first take a step back and remind ourselves that the key reason why we are building the financial market union is because of what is happening in the euro area. we are building it to break the vicious circle between sovereigns and banks, the manifestations of which are much more acute and disruptive in a monetary union. that is why we need the ssm in the single currency area. at the same time, it is clear that we have to create the financial market union while sustaining – and even strengthening – the single market. both the single currency and the single market are key pillars of growth and prosperity in europe. both should be maintained – indeed, both should be enhanced. the ecb welcomes the possibility of involvement of non - euro area member states in the ssm. the participation of additional member states would provide an even stronger boost to the completion of the single market. that being said, for an entity such as the ecb, whose key legal powers and key decision - making fora are limited to the euro area, imposing obligations on – and granting corresponding rights to – non - euro area member states raises a number of legal issues. our legal services – together with those of the commission and the european council – are examining closely the possible modalities of participation of non - euro area member states within the legal constraints of our statute. the third key issue for the supervisory framework is one that i suspect is particularly close to your hearts : how the ecb will be accountable for its supervisory actions to the citizens of europe and their elected representatives. while the independence of the supervisory function is important, so is its accountability. they are, after all, two sides of the same coin. given the nature of the tasks of supervision and the need for operational cooperation with other authorities – notably where fiscal costs are concerned – separate and robust bis central bankers ’ speeches mechanisms of accountability have to be in place to legitimise the high degree of independence. the commission proposal foresees, in particular, that the ssm will be accountable to the european parliament and the european council. questions have been raised about the timeline for when we should begin our supervisory