the country ’ s sources of resilience that have allowed us to sustain positive growth and make notable headway towards greater inclusion. finally, i ’ ll relate these developments to emerging challenges for policy and the role the private sector can play in promoting inclusive growth. 1 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches global outlook and risks in terms of the world economic outlook, global growth is projected to improve modestly over the next two years, with upward adjustments to the projections of the imf for the us, eu, uk and japan for 2017. note, however, that these forecasts are still lower than the actual growth outcomes prior to the global financial crisis. 2 meantime, the outlook for emerging markets is still mixed. in particular, economic activity in china has held firm, while growth projections for india and brazil in 2017 were cut. a downside risk to this outlook, however, is potential political discord and heightened inward - oriented sentiment, both of which could undermine global trade and dampen financial market sentiment. meanwhile, an offshoot of the evolving upward momentum in global growth is the possibility of reflation, or that global inflation may be at a turning point. this positive momentum is reflected in the shift in policy stances of a number of central banks. as you all know, the us fed raised its target fed funds rate by 25 bps last week. furthermore, it is widely expected to continue on this path, with at least two more hikes anticipated in 2017. a review of recent monetary policy decisions suggests that central banks have largely turned neutral — they see less urgency for further accommodation and would rather stay on hold. this phenomenon has been described as “ watchful pause ”. the prospect of higher interest rates in advanced economies could cause capital outflows from emerging market economies ( emes ) as investors search for yield. the retreat of funds away from emes could lead to tighter dollar funding conditions in emerging markets. for firms with significant dollar - denominated liabilities, these developments could pose a risk to their balance sheets and profitability, unless of course these exposures have been adequately hedged. in the case of the philippines, we have seen some incipient signs of capital flow reversals as early as last year. fortunately, the risk to businesses was mitigated by robust domestic liquidity and credit growth and by an adequate supply of foreign exchange. debts of nonfinancial corporations in the philippines also remain mostly peso - denominated, which provides some

unconventional policies pursued by the federal reserve in order to halt the crisis have produced levels and types of reserves that will eventually require use of the unconventional exit tools discussed on numerous occasions by chairman bernanke and vice chairman kohn. the coincidence of a weak economy and an unusually large balance sheet at the federal reserve will require some judgments by the federal open market committee of a sort for which there are not many historical precedents. still, just as with conventional monetary policy, decisions on the timing and pace for removing accommodation should and will depend on our ongoing analysis and forecasts of all relevant economic factors. reforming financial regulation in one sense, the financial crisis that began in 2007 is an old and familiar tale of explosive growth in leverage built on assumptions of ever - rising asset prices. financial crises are, as the economist charles kindleberger put it, a " hardy perennial. " 6 instead of tulips in the seventeenth century dutch republic, south sea company stock in eighteenth century england, or the nikkei and real estate in late twentieth century japan, we had subprime mortgages and securitizations. however, like most recurring stories in human history, each financial crisis has its own plot twists and themes interwoven with elements common to most crashes. to fashion an effective and sensible response, it is necessary to understand both the unique and shared features of our own experience. the financial crisis revealed that systemic risk was very much built into our financial system. as shown by the intervention of the government when bear stearns and aig were failing, and by the repercussions from the failure of lehman brothers, the universe of financial firms the unemployment rate is 15. 4 percent for african - americans, 12. 7 percent for hispanics, and 25. 9 percent for teenagers. as reported by bls, in september the ratio of employed persons to the ( adult ) population stood at 58. 8 percent. the last time this ratio was lower was in 1984. bls reports that in september there were about 9. 2 million people working part - time for " economic reasons " – that is, because they could not find a full - time job. this compares to about 6. 3 million a year previously. charles p. kindleberger ( 2000 ), manias, panics, and crashes : a history of financial crises ( 4th ed. ) at 1. that appeared too - big - to - fail during periods of stress included more than insured depository institutions and