( these are our assessments for this year ) to 1. 0 % in 2015, 1. 9 % in 2016 and 2. 3 % in 2017. at the same time, the inflation will gradually decrease to 4. 5 – 5. 0 % in 2015 ( i stress again, that these assessments are based on rather optimistic assumptions of the baseline scenario ) and to 3. 7 – 4. 2 % in 2016 – 2017. the consumer price growth will slow down together with the exhaustion of the effect of the external factors that played a prominent role in the first half and in the middle of this year ; exchange rate dynamics is also expected to normalise. with the stabilisation and subsequent reduction in inflation expectations during 2015, the baseline scenario predicts a gradual easing of the monetary policy. the more pronounced the downward trend in inflation and inflation expectations will be, the more accommodative the monetary policy may become. ( slide 3 ) bis central bankers ’ speeches in addition to the baseline scenario, built on fairly optimistic assumptions, we have prepared two more alternative scenarios, number ii and iii. they are based on more negative assumptions. scenario ii predicts that the mutual sanctions and trade restrictions will remain during the whole period under review. this will lead to a certain increase in the capital outflows coupled with corresponding exchange rate dynamics. it should be noted that the ruble volatility, on the one hand, partially offsets the negative impact of external environment by maintaining the competitiveness of russian producers and accelerating import substitution, however, on the other hand, it leads to enhanced inflationary pressures. scenario ii also assumes a possible increase in the tax burden. due to the decision taken by the government on this issue, we plan to finalise this scenario. this scenario forecasts lower gdp growth rates compared with the baseline scenario ( you can see it on the slide ), and a slower decline in inflation. the level of 4. 0 % will be reached by 2017. in addition to scenario ii, scenario iii assumes a more significant decline in oil prices, i. e. down to $ 87 per barrel in 2017. the gdp growth rate in this scenario slows down to less than 1 %. the scenario forecasts the use of the reserve fund within the framework of existing budget rules in order to stabilise the situation in the economy. as a result, the fiscal policy, in our opinion, will make a more pronounced positive contribution to the aggregate demand dynamics. in scenarios ii

and iii the reduction of inflation to the medium - term target of 4. 0 % will require more time than in the baseline scenario ; we believe it possible to reach this level in 2017. according to the forecast, the inflation will be 6 – 6. 5 % in 2015, 4. 5 – 5. 0 % in 2016 and 4. 0 – 4. 5 % in 2017. in both alternative scenarios, the bank of russia will focus on ensuring financial stability, preventing the reduction of confidence in the domestic financial system and national currency. to do this, we will be ready to use additional tools, including non - standard ones that have not been applied earlier. currently, the bank of russia is also developing the so - called stress scenario – an emergency scenario, which implies a sharp and more significant drop in oil prices over the forecasted horizon. we consider the possibility of adding this scenario to the guidelines at the next stage of the document finalisation. even though we work on this scenario, we still believe that the probability of its realisation is not feasible. however, in our opinion, such scenario should also be analysed. ( slide 4 ) as today we are discussing the draft federal budget for the next three years, i would like to address separately the issue of comparing the baseline scenario of the bank of russia with the baseline scenario of the russian ministry of economic development. overall, they are similar in key assumptions and projected paths of changes in most key macroeconomic indicators. however, i would like to note that our baseline scenario is the most optimistic of the three scenarios, whereas the baseline scenario of the ministry of economic development is the most pessimistic one. projections are rather difficult to make in the conditions of high uncertainty. we should take this into account and understand that we forecast and build different scenarios on the basis of different assumptions. in the baseline forecast of the ministry of economic development the price of urals crude will be $ 100 per barrel during next three years. in the forecast of the bank of russia, we are assuming a steady decline in the average annual urals crude price from $ 105 to $ 102 in 2017. many may say that the level of $ 105 is not a proper starting point for a realistic forecast, because now the prices are lower. but oil prices are quite volatile and we are always inclined to make projections based on their current dynamics. i would like to remind you that as far back as this summer the oil price exceeded $ 110. therefore the baseline