csrd ), which should hopefully be adopted by mid - 2022. some might always argue – passionately – that europe and france never do enough. yes we must do more but we should value the reality of action to rhetorical overbidding. we must avoid discouraging those who are doing the most while excusing those who do the least. i very much hope we will soon have this mandatory disclosure everywhere. i welcome the us endeavour here under the sponsorship of the sec. ultimately we needinternationally harmonised disclosure frameworks – at least a basic common ground on which jurisdictions can further elaborate. to this end, interoperability of standards will be key, and the coordination between the efrag and the ifrs foundation, should be the cornerstone of a successful globalisation of non - financial reporting standards. on financial opportunities ( let me turn now to the lower part of the axis ), the market momentum 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches has been impressive this year again. more than half a trillion usd of green bonds will be issued this year, which is an all - time high, with record debut for the eur 12 bn nextgeneration eu green bond. inflows into sustainable funds represented more than usd 262bn in the first half of this year, close to half of the overall inflows ( usd 545bn ) over the same period. on the horizontal axis, which brings together our missions as a central bank, we collectively achieved a major breakthrough last july with the conclusion of the ecb monetary policy strategy 2 the review under christine lagarde ’ s leadership. the banque de france contributed decisively. ecb is pioneer in having decided an ambitious action plan by 2024, including the three following steps : ( 1 ) make economic projections, and therefore model. this dimension of economic research is often overlooked : it is nevertheless crucial to grasp complex interdependencies between physical and economic phenomena, across sectors and countries, and across time horizons – i will come back to it ( 2 ) disclose : impose transparency requirements including on counterparties ; ( 3 ) incorporate climate risk, into our operations on corporates ( on both asset purchases and collateral policies ). as regards asset purchases, the cspp3 should take into account climate - related factors, including the alignment of issuers with the paris agreement, and will adjust purchases on the primary and secondary markets accordingly. moreover, regarding euro - denominated non - monetary portfolio

has affected almost all sectors in our economies : banks, obviously, households ( in the united states and united kingdom ) and, now, governments. deleveraging is unavoidable and necessary. both borrowers and lenders need to re - establish sustainable debt positions in order to restart credit and restore the normal financing of the economy in the long run. but deleveraging creates huge difficulties in the short run. it may be extremely deflationary as it involves both a contraction in credit and money and an increase in savings rates. to some extent, central banks have counteracted this development. by expanding their balance sheets, they increased their leverage when other economic agents ( with the exception of large corporates ) were all deleveraging simultaneously. second, the uncertainty created by the crisis has led to an increase in the demand for safe and liquid assets. at the same time, the supply of these assets has been significantly reduced, especially in europe, since credit risk has appeared on government debt. to some extent, central banks have partly narrowed this gap between demand and supply by providing financial intermediaries with the safest and most liquid assets of all : their own liabilities, in the form of deposits and reserves held by banks. the importance and usefulness of this function is illustrated by the significant amounts still outstanding in the eurosystem deposit facility or in the form of non - compulsory reserves. it is, indeed, in the essence of central banks ’ historical function to step in when dislocations in financial markets appear and to contain long - lasting damage to the economy. if they fail to act, then self - fulfilling expectations could lead to panic and financial dislocation. a good example is the situation in the euro area in the second quarter of this year. week after week, there were growing signs of a perceived “ convertibility risk ” between different parts of the euro area. however unfounded, these self - fulfilling fears destabilised capital flows and led to the rapid and increasing segmentation of financial and credit markets. financial conditions were increasingly divergent across the euro area, irrespective of the quality of borrowers and the level of policy rates. if left unchecked, this process would have rendered monetary policy totally powerless to combat both inflation and deflation, if either of these risks had materialised. this was, for the eurosystem, an unacceptable situation. it led the governing council to announce in september the introduction of the outright monetary