, an emergency situation where the market fails for some reason. still others have suggested that the bank could offer the exchange market verbal guidance about what the value of the dollar should be. behind this suggestion is a presumption that the bank has a better understanding of the macroeconomic fundamentals driving the dollar than the market. this is a difficult claim to defend. our exchange rate depends on a host of domestic and foreign fundamentals, many of which are beyond the bank ’ s influence. better that these myriad effects be weighed, debated and wrestled with in a deep marketplace than in a simple statistical model developed by the central bank. in short, i believe in markets. manipulating or trying to guide them is just not in our game plan. what the bank has done and will continue to do is be as clear as possible about how it sees the forces at play in the economy, and where the major sources of uncertainty and risks lie. to bring this uncertainty more into the policy dialogue, we have made some changes in the past year to how we analyze and talk about monetary policy. our efforts reflect the fact that the business of central banking is being adapted in real time to the changing environment. we have begun putting our growth and inflation forecasts in the form of ranges rather than points, and have given even more prominence to uncertainty and risks in the monetary policy report. we have refined our analysis of financial stability risks and raised the profile of our financial system review. and, we have begun to offer a more fulsome description of how those risks are entering our policy deliberations. these changes have brought more bis central bankers ’ speeches transparency to policy decision making, and our policy narrative has shifted from one traditionally seen almost as “ mechanical engineering ” to one now characterized as “ risk management. ” getting home – a natural sequence let ’ s talk about that policy narrative now. in the aftermath of the financial crisis, our export sector contracted significantly. the household sector picked up much of the slack in response to record - low interest rates, especially by investing in housing. but we cannot rely on policy - induced growth to maintain our living standards forever. the canadian economy requires a major rotation toward a more sustainable growth track. first, we need a substantial recovery in exports, canada ’ s natural engine of economic growth. from that will follow more investment spending by companies, accompanied by more employment growth. all of this will help absorb our spare capacity, bringing inflation sustainably to our target of 2 per cent. and

those where women's share in employment as of 2019 is above their average share for all industries ( 47. 6 % ). † " resources " includes forestry, fishing, mining, and oil and gas. sources : statistics canada and bank of canada calculations this unevenness across sectors is disproportionately affecting lower - income jobs ( chart 2 ). remote work tends to be possible in higher - paying occupations. jobs in the service industries most affected tend to be lower - paying, part - time and with fewer benefits. chart 2 : the declines in employment were greatest for low - wage workers change in employment from february to april 2020 by weekly earnings, not seasonally adjusted, monthly data % - 5 - 10 - 15 - 20 - 25 - 30 - 35 - 40 - 45 less than $ 500 $ 500 to $ 799 change in employment by weekly earnings sources : statistics canada and bank of canada calculations $ 800 to $ 1, 199 $ 1, 200 or more change in employment for all earnings - 4these jobs tend to be held by women and youth. women make up 47 percent of the labour force but about 56 percent of the accommodation and food sector. young people aged 15 to 24 make up about 40 percent of that sector — more than three times their share of the labour force. before the pandemic, the labour participation rate for women was closing a longstanding gap with men. that trend has reversed. the female participation rate fell during the containment period and is not recovering as quickly as the male participation rate in most age groups ( chart 3 ). chart 3 : more women than men have dropped out of the labour force change in participation rates by age and gender between february and august 2020, seasonally adjusted, monthly data percentage points 1. 0 0. 5 0. 0 - 0. 5 - 1. 0 - 1. 5 - 2. 0 - 2. 5 all ages ( 15 + ) 15 – 24 25 – 54 men 55 + women sources : statistics canada and bank of canada calculations the closing of schools and daycares kept many parents at home, especially women, who tend to take on more of the responsibility for child care ( chart 4 ). how quickly this can be turned around depends on how the reopening of schools plays out and whether at - home learning arrangements allow parents to work. - 5chart 4 : among parents, mothers have seen a greater decline in hours worked and a slower recovery than fathers change in total hours worked