same period. data are from census bureau business dynamics statistics. the pre - pandemic trend decline in entry rates was documented by ryan decker, john haltiwanger, ron jarmin, and javier miranda ( 2014 ), “ the role of entrepreneurship in us job creation and economic dynamism, ” journal of economic perspectives, vol. 28 ( summer ), pp. 3 – 24. - 11 conclusion for now, let me say that i am grateful that entrepreneurs continue to give us a hand in meeting our employment mandate, and whatever productivity gains we may reap in coming years as a result may help ease tradeoffs with inflation as well. finally, i will share one last story about why south carolina will always hold a special place in my and my sisters ’ hearts. every summer and at thanksgiving, we would travel through the palmetto state to our grandparents ’ house in winston - salem. sitting in the back seat of the station wagon, we were entranced by the many colorful signs along interstate 95 advertising what i, as a child, viewed as south carolina ’ s number one attraction : the south of the border roadside amusement park. we begged our parents to stop every time. it was an epic struggle that went on for more than a decade. once or twice they did relent, a sweet childhood victory! and here is the funny thing about travels — paths can cross. the timing is such that my sisters and i may have even been helped by a waiter named ben, a young man from dillon, south carolina, who would go on to be federal reserve chairman ben bernanke! 22 perhaps it was the world ’ s way of foreshadowing. thank you for having me here in charleston. it is inspiring to meet this group of bold, entrepreneurial women in south carolina, and i look forward to continuing our conversation. see ben s. bernanke ( 2009 ), “ brief remarks, ” speech delivered at the interstate interchange dedication ceremony, dillon, s. c., march 7, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / bernanke20090307a. htm.

sight of them in ways that happened in the past. the job of prudential regulators is to maintain the safety and soundness of the banking system to ensure the continuity of those critical services to the economy and to the public. the crisis has been a searing experience for banks and regulators, precisely because at times they have both failed to fulfil this central objective of maintaining safety and soundness and hence the continuous supply of critical services to the public. for what is now not far short of three years we have been working to change the approach to financial regulation in the uk. we are still working to do that of course, but the difference is that for the last four and half weeks we have been doing so within the new regulatory framework of regulation – we are doing it now as the prudential regulation authority and the financial conduct authority. the prompt for this change of approach has been the severity of the financial crisis, a crisis that has been through a searing phase of prudential problems – failing banks – and more recently a conduct phase as the misdeeds and unacceptable behaviours of the past have been revealed. on a personal note, recently when my appointment was announced, i was described a number of times as a veteran of the bank of england. it was for me a moment of home truth ; 28 years is quite a long time in one place, even if the term veteran sits uncomfortably. but it reminded me that the uk is on its fourth system of financial regulation during that time. the bis central bankers ’ speeches serious message from this is that institutional structures do matter for the success of public policy goals and objectives. the last major reform of the institutional structure in this field was in 1997, when the then government reformed monetary policymaking and financial regulation. the results of these changes were very different. the mpc has in my view been a good example of a successful institutional structure. you can argue with what the mpc decides month - by month, you can debate how the framework of policymaking should put into effect the mandate in statute, but the test of a successful institutional structure of policymaking is that these debates can be had without undermining the credibility of that institutional framework. as a close observer, i would say that the mpc has passed this test very well. i make this point because the same cannot be said over the last fifteen years or so for the institutional structure around financial stability and supervision. in the 1990s in the uk there was a very determined effort to