www. oecd. org / document / 33 / 0, 2340, en _ 2649 _ 37439 _ 34046561 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 _ 37439, 00. html ), or in australia, review of ( uhrig report ), the corporate governance of statutory authorities and office holders ( http : / / www. finance. gov. au / governancestructures / docs / the _ uhrig _ report _ july _ 2003. pdf ). 3 / 4 conclusion these are just two of many elements in getting the institutional and governance structure right in a national financial system, and no doubt more can be said. but generally speaking, policy - makers will want to foster competition, disclosure of information and well - functioning private markets on the one hand, and strong and independent public policy institutions operating within a clearly articulated policy framework on the other. particular care is needed in cases where public ownership of enterprises has the potential to compromise the public interest. i trust that your discussions on governance today will be fruitful. 4 / 4

glenn stevens : governance arrangements for effective public financial policies – a central banker's perspective remarks by mr glenn stevens, deputy governor of the reserve bank of australia, to the apec business advisory council, the asian bankers'association and the pacific economic co - operation council symposium on promoting good corporate governance and transparency in apec financial institutions, melbourne, 19 october 2005. * * * there is, these days, a great deal of discussion about corporate governance. this is largely because governance arrangements thought ( with hindsight ) to be deficient shared the blame for some spectacular corporate failures in the latter stages of the us tech boom of the late 1990s. of course such problems are not that new. indeed, one could safely assert that governance problems, broadly defined, can be found in the margins of most of the financial debacles of history ; on plenty of occasions, they played a starring role. in australia's own case, the collapses of the empires of some of the celebrated'entrepreneurs'of the 1980s revealed serious failures of a governance nature ( though not only of that nature ). given that so much has been written on the topic, there is probably not much that i could say which would be new. in fact, the most important principles of good governance are surely little changed over the long run of history, and are mostly simple good sense, combined with integrity. a sense by directors of fiduciary duty, independence, honesty, diligence, accountability and assurance surely have always lain at the heart of good governance, be it in corporations, governments or the local school canteen. much of the current work on governance seems to be trying to embody such principles in a more explicit framework. rather than trying to extend any of that detailed discussion, i want to focus on a few high - level principles for governance arrangements affecting national financial systems. i will interpret the term'governance'broadly, to include not just the structure of decision - making in organisations but the general set of arrangements in the system. i will speak from the perspective of a central bank – which is where my experience as a board member lies. let's begin by asking what we want from a financial system in a market economy. in brief, we want a set of arrangements which facilitate : • the intermediation of private saving and investment, fostering resource allocation so that saving earns the highest risk - adjusted return, and that those with the skills to deploy capital can get it, and at the