the deposit guarantee fund ( dgf ). the merger / sip plans of these 12 processes have already been authorised by the banco de espana or are at the authorisation stage, except in one case in which three credit institutions are participating in a project still under negotiation but which will not require frob aid. the operations involving merger / sip plans with frob aid envisage cuts of 20 – 25 % in the number of offices and of around 15 % in staff, which gives an idea of the scale of the measures proposed to improve bank efficiency. the structure rationalisation measures are an indispensable requirement for receiving frob aid and are being included naturally in the other planned voluntary operations, since these measures are responsive to the need to achieve more soundness, more efficiency and more economic rationality. in addition to these savings bank merger / sip operations, it should be mentioned that in the three years of international financial crisis, only two savings banks saw their solvency deteriorate to such an extent as to require the application of precautionary special measures. first, the directors of caja castilla - la mancha were replaced by the banco de espana in march 2009 ( before the frob was set up ). it received aid from the dgf totalling €3. 8 billion, of which €1. 3 billion consisted of preference shares and €2. 5 billion were in the form of guarantees of asset value, as well as €350 million of bridge financing. this savings bank, following the agreements reached by it with cajastur, has joined one of the 12 merger / sip processes under way. second, cajasur was subjected to compulsory restructuring due to lack of solvency and viability, following its failure to approve a merger with unicaja, a sound and solvent project in which the two savings banks had agreed on a private solution for the failed institution. the frob granted temporary aid through the subscription of €800 million of non - voting equity units and €1. 5 billion in liquidity support, which so far it has not been necessary to use. definitive arrangements are being worked out for this savings bank through a competitive process in which the aid finally granted will be defined. at present, the provisional amount of the aid to be received by spanish savings banks in this process is as follows. the frob will furnish around €10 billion to strengthen own funds in merger / sip processes. this amount has to be repaid within five

beneficial for all. the frequent exchanges we have at the bis, g7, g20 and even events such as this symposium, are valuable to create mutual trust and avoid the possibility of large policy surprises. our monetary policies are independent, and rightly so, but they are concerted and we are committed to avoid currency wars. clarity about our reaction functions clearly also extends to financial markets and the public at large. second, how could we respond to current state and future path uncertainty? the textbook answer, dating back to theil and tinbergen, is to work out your best guess and then act as if you are completely sure. this is sometimes described as the certainty - equivalent approach. there are, however, symmetry assumptions in this type of model that do not necessary hold in the real world. uncertainty around the central projection may be skewed in one direction. applying the certainty - equivalence approach also assumes that upside errors are regarded equally to downside errors. but given that inflation is still below the objective, as are marketbased long - term inflation expectations, upside shocks would be more welcome than equivalent downside shocks at present. let me at this point add some words on negative rates following my remarks lisbon last february, and state the obvious : we are in march 2019, and no longer in march 2016 when we cut the dfr to – 0. 40 %. this gap in time has two consequences : first, there were, at that time, significant deflationary risks, and we decided accordingly a strong calibration of our monetary answers. as these deflationary risks have now receded, there is obviously no reason to go more negative on interest rates. second, we have three years more evidence on the combined effects of our various unconventional monetary tools, including negative rates, on financial intermediation and their impact on the transmission of our monetary policy – the combined effects of which might 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches have evolved over time. so mario draghi rightly stressed that we need to further monitor the bank lending channel and to reflect on possible measures that we can take to preserve the favourable implications of negative rates for the economy, while mitigating their possible side effects. knightian uncertainty is different situation, for which assigning probabilities is not feasible, and is a concept that anyone trying to forecast the recent outcomes in the house of commons would instantly recognise. in such situations, it is usually argued that the best strategy is to try to avoid