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daniel k tarullo : confronting “ too big to fail ” speech by mr daniel k tarullo, member of the board of governors of the us federal reserve system, at the exchequer club, washington dc, 21 october 2009. * * * the far - reaching financial crisis that has afflicted our country in the past two years has drawn attention to a raft of problems – from the concentration of commercial real estate exposures in some regional and community banks, to the risks associated with some forms of derivatives, to the need for more vigorous financial services consumer protection. proposals for administrative and congressional responses are thus appropriately diverse. i would suggest, however, that the reform process cannot be judged a success unless it substantially reduces systemic risk generally and, in particular, the too - big - to - fail problem. this afternoon i will address my remarks specifically to the task of forging an effective response to this problem. 1 the current form of the too - big - to - fail problem the concern is hardly a new one. in one manifestation, too big to fail was an extension of the classic problem of bank runs and panics. if a large bank failed – whether because it was illiquid after a deposit run or insolvent after severe losses – the entire banking system might be endangered. in cases in which other banks held significant deposits in the distressed institution, the failure of a large bank might lead directly to the illiquidity or insolvency of other banks. the result could be a domino effect in the interbank lending market, with one bank's failure toppling the next. even where direct losses to other banks were thought manageable, the failure of a large bank might strike panic into depositors, especially uninsured depositors, of other large institutions. the result might be a far - reaching run on the entire banking system that could, in a worst case such as occurred in early 1933, freeze the financial system completely. faced with either variant of such a devastating impact on the system, government authorities often believe they have little choice but to intervene. the government may provide funds or guarantees to the bank in order to keep it functioning. alternatively, the government may allow the bank to fail, but shield some or all of its depositors from loss, even those not covered by existing insurance programs. in 1984, for example, the federal deposit insurance corporation protected the uninsured depositors of continental illinois bank, then the nation's seventh largest depository