the aim of promoting stability in output and employment. if the economy is exposed to severe shocks, we may at times seek to bring inflation rapidly back to target, while under other conditions we deliberately choose a longer horizon. an evaluation of monetary policy cannot therefore be based on the latest figures for inflation. instead, one must check whether average inflation over a somewhat longer period has been this is discussed by finn kydland who won the 2004 nobel prize in economics with edward prescott for their analysis of the problems of economic planning. see finn kydland and edward prescott ( 1977 ) : “ rules rather than discretion : the inconsistency of optimal plans ”, in journal of political economy, 85, no. 3, pp. 473 - 491. the central value of the norwegian krone against the us dollar was 7. 14 from 18 september 1949 to 15 august 1971. see addendum, prepared by ragna alstadheim, to jan f. qvigstad and arent skjæveland ( 1994 ) : “ valutakursregimer – historiske erfaringer og fremtidige utfordringer ( exchange rate regimes – historical experiences and future challenges ) ” in jan. f qvigstad, sigbjørn atle berg and kjell storvik ( eds. ) : stabilitet og langsiktighet. festskrift til hermod skanland ( stability and a long - term perspective : festschrift for hermod skanland ), aschehoug. this story is reported in the article “ borten i fokus og bestillingsverk ( borten in focus and commissioned works ) ”, aftenposten, 3 january 1987. see for example report no. 29 ( 2000 - 2001 ) to the storting from the ministry of finance and the regulation on monetary policy from 29 march 2001. close to 2. 5 per cent. measuring performance is possible, but can only be done with a time lag. 18 the combination of ( i ) delegated authority to conduct policy, ( ii ) room for discretion and ( iii ) difficulties in the day - to - day monitoring of results imply a risk of a democratic deficit. transparency and disclosure are the institutional solution to this problem. even if a central bank is independent in the conduct of monetary policy, it must be accountable to government. we must be measured on

( 2008 ) : “ central bank policy rate guidance and financial market functioning ”, in international journal of central banking, 4, no. 4, pp. 193 - 226, and amund holmsen, jan f. qvigstad, øistein røisland and kristin solberg - johansen ( 2008 ) : “ communicating monetary policy intentions : the case of norges bank ”, norges bank working paper, 2008 / 20. places demands on our communication skills. i am certain that many teachers and lecturers would agree that teaching is not only a means of conveying knowledge to students, but also provides the lecturer with a deeper understanding of the subject. the same applies to central bankers. external communication of our analyses has certainly not reduced our competence as economists. how transparent should the central bank be? how open should we be? maximum transparency about norges bank ’ s decisions would imply filming the executive board ’ s meetings and webcasting them live. in addition, we could perhaps have installed cameras and microphones in some of the offices and meeting rooms in norges bank where the analyses are conducted that form the background for the executive board ’ s decisions. perhaps i am old - fashioned, but i think that a “ reality series ” about norges bank would not be particularly entertaining and would not foster particularly good decision - making. maximum transparency is probably not optimal, but how far should we go? there is no absolute answer to this. in the following, i will discuss several considerations that must be taken into account. should we publish voting records and the minutes of the executive board ’ s deliberations? central banks have chosen different solutions. in sweden, the central bank publishes the voting records and provides an extensive report with the views of members by name. the bank of england publishes a similar report of the minutes, but members remain anonymous. norges bank does not publish a report of the minutes of the executive board ’ s deliberations, but instead publishes a detailed account explaining the executive board ’ s background for the interest rate decision. the interest rate decision is based on a strategy that is described in the monetary policy report. the report also presents the analyses underlying the strategy. the basis for interest rate decisions is thus available to the general public. the difference in practices partly reflects the different character of the monetary policy committees in the three countries. 27 sveriges riksbank and the bank of england have committees that are referred to as “ individualistic committees ”