permitted to participate in the market. the product witnessed significant activity during the initial period, but liquidity tapered off subsequently. the muted market response to irf is generally attributed to the illiquidity nature of the underlying g - sec market and lack of hedging interest in the wake of present htm regime. notwithstanding this experience, rbi has already issued guidelines for futures contracts on 91 - day t - bills, which are expected to be introduced shortly. we are also considering introduction of irf contracts on 2 year and 5 year g - secs to provide the products at the shorter end which would offer flexible hedging options to the market participants. concluding remarks i would like to go back to the four - objective framework with which i began my presentation. the roadmap for the development of derivatives, or for that matter, any new financial product bis central bankers ’ speeches or service, will strive to maintain a balance between these four objectives. from this perspective, the approach should be neutral to the form and nature of the product or service ; it should be concerned only with whether it is helping to meet the objectives, or at least not detracting from any of them. i would particularly like to emphasize the objective of inclusion, which, in this context, looks at the desirability of a product in terms of how effectively it might meet the requirements of a very heterogeneous group of producers of various goods and services. taking the specific example of otc forex products, it is apparent that they remain attractive to a majority of people with forex exposures because they can be customized to the specific characteristics of each transaction. however, the parallel development of the futures market suggests that there may be some complementarities between the two. a hub - and - spoke analogy comes to mind, with otc products serving as the spokes and the counter - parties to these transactions then aggregating their exposures and managing them with exchange traded products. although this phenomenon is not quite prevalent in india at present, for me, this provides a useful way to think about the overall roadmap, with each component playing a legitimate role. i would like to thank the organizers for inviting me to deliver the keynote address at this ioma conference and trust that it has been a useful input. bis central bankers ’ speeches

national boundaries in the event of a crisis. this insight will affect the thinking with regard to supervision, which should in turn affect the demands made of the banks. perhaps one should ultimately require that each bank is organised so that the national units can operate entirely independent of one another? of course, this is not in line with what has been agreed on up to now in europe with regard to the banks ’ possibility to operate over national boundaries, but it is a natural consequence of not being able to discuss more rational solutions in advance. this reasoning is of course highly relevant to us in sweden, too. we have a number of banks in the nordic and baltic countries that have significant and important cross - border operations. i believe that one can require from both authorities and politicians – in all of the countries concerned – that they should be able to agree on a slightly better way of winding up a bank in distress than cutting it up along national boundaries. but if this becomes an overly heavy political burden we must expect the countries concerned to quite simply take over the part of the bank that is in their own country – even if this solution will be much more expensive in total for the tax - payers. now, however, there is hope. just a few weeks ago the financial stability board, which consists of ministries of finance, central banks and financial supervisory authorities in the g20 countries, published new norms for managing crises in cross - border banks. for instance, they discussed how to make bondholders bear their share of the costs in the event of a crash. when all of this has been translated into legislation that is applied by all of the countries, we will have managed important problems faced in winding up large, cross - border banks. but it still remains to be seen whether one can actually find princples for how the costs should be allocated between the different countries. in the current debate on how much capital the banks need, it may also be worth remembering that the better legislation one has for winding up banks in distress, the less capital they will need to hold. the capital can be regarded as the buffer necessary to avoid tax - payers having to bear the costs in a crisis. if one has regulated how various lenders should contribute, the need for a buffer is reduced. with these reflections, it is time for me to wind up. not just my speech here today, but in a few days my time as a member of the executive board of the riksbank. as i said, it has