##2 and, in any case, until [ we ] judge that the coronavirus crisis phase is over ”. we still have ample time to judge and decide, well beyond our june meeting, as christine lagarde said last friday. let me today stress one obvious but sometimes overlooked truth : whatever the future decision on pepp, we will still be able to play and enhance the full “ quartet ” of our unconventional instruments : asset purchases, negative rates, liquidity provision, and forward guidance. these unconventional instruments are here to stay, beyond covid and its crisis tools, meaning that our monetary policy can remain as accommodative as necessary, for as long as necessary. and i would like to share some thoughts on each instrument of the quartet. asset purchases are powerful and we still have room to do more if necessary. reinvestments under the pepp will remain significant, and net purchases will continue under the app, possibly adapted. based on our experience with the pepp, we could move towards some additional flexibilities, in terms of allocation and / or volume. the way negative rates are implemented continues to be effective. if needed, the present level of the dfr is not a floor. in particular, the tiering system limits the negative side effects on bank intermediation of low - for - long interest rates. the tiering multiplier could be adapted flexibly to support the “ low - for - longer ” policy. i would favor a more rule - based approach to adjust the level of the multiplier. for instance, this multiplier could depend on the change in excess liquidity ( net of tltros ). as the third instrument of the quartet, our forward - guidance gives visibility to the future path of interest rates and could be enhanced by stronger commitment page 8 sur 9 and communication. a particular focal point is the present puzzle between the date of anticipated lift - off and the expected inflation then, which at present remains under our target. to strengthen the impact of our forward - guidance on rates, we should clarify our state - dependent reaction function. consistent with the symmetry of our objective, our willingness to tolerate upside risks on inflation has to be more widely understood. i would not go as far as embracing flexible average inflation targeting as the fed did in its new strategy framework : it raises several complex questions and can create excessive constraint. but the forward guidance is a more tactical and adequate tool, stating clearly that we are ready to

overshoot temporarily 2 % before any rise in interest rates. furthermore, our forward guidance could be made more outcome - based by linking the path of policy rates to realized inflation rather than with judgements and forecasts on the expected future path of inflation. concerning our fourth instrument on liquidity provision, let me stress the efficiency of tltros. this instrument is a specific feature of euro area monetary policy and i believe we should keep it in place in some form for more time. the embedded incentive scheme on pricing makes it attractive for banks to extend credit to firms and households. through tltroiii, the ecb has provided around 2. 1 trillion euros in loans to banks at negative rates. according to eurosystem estimates, tltroiii liquidity is expected to boost loan volumes to real economy to the tune of 3pp cumulatively by 2022v. the april euro area bank lending survey indicates that around 45 % of banks have reported and expect an increase in bank lending to firms due to tltro ’ s. page 9 sur 9 implementing a rule - based tiering multiplier, as i proposed earlier, could make it easier for us to get rid of some possibly excessive subsidies in the present design of tltro, and also limit the room for carry trades. but such a “ refocused tltro ” would remain crucial to provide the real economy with sufficient credit, and banks a significant additional source of funding relief. * * let me conclude : we central bankers and policy makers must always deal with uncertainty, but still more since march 2020 and the pandemic. nevertheless, we tried to give clarity – and successfully, according to most. being predictable, without being precommitted. voltaire summed this up nicely as early as 1770 : “ doubt is an uncomfortable condition, but certainty is a ridiculous one. ” vi in these promising but moving times beyond covid, i aimed to give as much clarity as possible ; clarity, not certainty, which is neither possible nor desirable. thank you for your attention. page 10 sur 9 i panel discussion, presented at “ monetary policy : a journey from theory to practice. an ecb colloquium held in honor of otmar issing, march 2006 ii see “ past and future of the ecb monetary policy ”, v. constancio, conference on “ central banks in historical perspective ”, valletta, 4 may 2018, and “ inflation targeting ”, l. svensson