off - balance - sheet vehicles ( reliant on banks ’ credit lines ) and securities lenders. although some progress has been made, data gaps remain that render the proper monitoring and assessment of systemic risks arising from securities financing transactions ( notable via repurchase agreements and securities lending ) unfeasible. challenges also arise from the activities of the shadow banking system that go beyond a specific group of entities or types of business. regular information on margins, on other risk management practices and on the use of the various types of collateral, as well as on the maturity and liquidity profiles, is important for assessing the risks associated with securities lending activities from a qualitative and quantitative point of view. surveys on credit terms in securities financing and over - the - counter ( otc ) derivatives markets, as have been launched by a number of central banks ( around the world ) and, soon, by the ecb, are a step in the right direction. the financial stability board ( fsb ) is also monitoring efforts to improve data on shadow banking and otc transactions. even in the case of the regulated sector, objectives have not yet been met. at present, most efforts relate to harmonising, increasing the frequency, achieving more granularity and extending the coverage of the data for financial sectors in the eu. given the important role played by contagion in the recent crisis, data should enable analyses of the interlinkages – notably across financial institutions, and between them and the shadow banking system. information on interlinkages between important players in the financial system, including counterparty credit exposures in different forms, funding exposures of individual financial firms, as well as detailed information on their maturity bis central bankers ’ speeches mismatches and leverage, is necessary. this is because vulnerabilities can stem, for example, from common exposures in lending activities, from securities transactions, from positions in derivatives markets, from funding relationships, or from settlement and clearing functions. more data on the granularity of balance - sheet exposures and across types of financial instruments are essential inputs for evaluating propagation effects with contagion and spillover models. recent initiatives in central bank statistics also address interlinkages beyond the sample of large players – for example, by means of so - called “ from whom to whom ” information on deposits and loans from financial corporations, or through securities holding statistics with a view to also creating “ who to whom ” data for various sectors of the economy in the euro

area accounts. dedicated ad hoc surveys, for example in the context of the esrb ’ s work at an eu - wide level, should also contribute to shedding light on this topic. sufficiently granular information would facilitate linking the regulated financial sector with the shadow banking sector. in addition, enhancing information on financial conglomerates – banking groups with substantial activities over and beyond the banking sector – would be essential, as nonbanking activities may be systemically important. in the case of financial conglomerates, contagion and concentration risks can be exacerbated by the increased intra - group complexity and potential conflicts of interest. at the micro - level, improvements to data for characterising interconnectedness are being pushed forward by several initiatives with different objectives and time lines. let me mention three : ( i ) the revision of the reporting framework for large exposures by the eba ( for microprudential supervision ), ( ii ) the fsb ’ s common template ( limited to a small number of globally systemic institutions ) to improve data on global banking interlinkages and ( iii ) a uk exercise to collect interbank data on recovery and resolution plans ( with very detailed instrument and maturity breakdowns ). while these initiatives address primarily micro - prudential data needs for the time being, their use for macro - purposes could be envisaged, provided that data confidentiality is preserved and that requests are duly justified. for macro - prudential oversight, the importance of reducing gaps in the data on credit and funding exposures beyond jurisdictions and the sample of global players, appears particularly relevant. as the crisis has illustrated, the structure of bank liabilities and the way in which assets are funded are of utmost importance for understanding maturity mismatches and interlinkages. related to funding, data gaps also arise from limited information on the degree of asset encumbrance stemming from secured funding, as well as from inadequate data on the levels and characteristics of innovative sources of funding used by banks. at present, these elements are essential for analysing fragilities in the funding models of banks established in the eu. uncertainty about the level of banks ’ asset encumbrance is also hampering market participants ’ capacity to assess banks ’ creditworthiness, thereby reducing the availability and increasing the costs of unsecured funding. risks to financial stability can also stem from novel sources of funding such as exchange traded funds ( etfs ) or liquidity swaps. there is no consistent