good start. otc derivatives infrastructure second, otc derivatives infrastructure. earlier, i spoke of global regulatory reforms driving a revolution in the derivatives market. this has brought about new market infrastructure developments, and singapore has made significant strides in two key areas. the first area is clearing. • sgx asiaclear, asia ’ s first otc clearing facility, was established as early as 2006. • as counterparty to both buyers and sellers, asiaclear mitigates counterparty credit risk in otc transactions. • asiaclear ’ s value to the trading community extends to record and statement services, position netting, and cost savings for customers posting margins. • today, sgx asiaclear is the region ’ s leading multi - asset otc clearing house, with volumes exceeding 300 billion us dollars to - date. the second area is trade reporting. • just in december 2012, the depository trust & clearing corporation ’ s ( dtcc ) global trade repository established its asia - pacific global data centre in singapore. • the singapore location is part of its global trio of data centres, designed to support dtcc ’ s global trade repository services around the clock. • dtcc ’ s initiative will fill a key post - trade market infrastructure gap in singapore and the asia pacific region. • the industry will benefit from reduced connectivity costs and the greater convenience of reporting to a singapore - based infrastructure. these developments not only align us with global regulatory reforms, they allow us to strengthen our role as a derivatives and risk management hub in asia. offshore rmb the third area of opportunity that plays to singapore ’ s pan - asian strength is offshore rmb business. the rmb ’ s role in facilitating intra - regional trade and investment will only grow in the coming years. singapore is in a strong position to facilitate greater rmb - denominated trade and investment in the asean region. we are deepening liquidity, establishing key infrastructure, and working with industry to expand the range of rmb products and services in singapore. bis central bankers ’ speeches • in february this year, the industrial and commercial bank of china ’ s singapore branch was designated singapore ’ s rmb clearing bank. • just five days ago, mas and the people ’ s bank of china signed an enhanced bilateral currency swap agreement. this will enable mas to provide rmb liquidity to banks in singapore where needed. deep talent pool the fourth and final pillar supporting singapore ’ s financial centre is our deep talent pool. over the

a small, open economy, about half the size of the swiss economy, and heavily reliant on foreign trade. we are also a financial centre in asia, and therefore highly exposed to disturbances in the international financial system. so it is not surprising that singapore was affected by the asian crisis. our gdp growth plunged from 8. 4 % in 1997 to 0. 4 % in 1998. retrenchments went up sharply. our stock market fell, in line with regional markets. navigating the crisis but overall singapore was less affected than most of the region. the banks were unshaken, and singapore companies did not keel over. why was this the case? firstly our economic fundamentals were sound. we had pursued pro - business and pro - development economic policies for many years, and maintained consistently low inflation. 5 we had kept our economy open, and had taken a market - oriented approach towards economic development. so keynote address, meeting on good governance for financial institutions, bangkok, 10 june 2000. singapore ’ s inflation averaged 2. 1 % between 1981 and 1999 while the average figure for the group of seven developed countries over the same period was just over 4 %. investments did not go into industries in which we lack competitive advantage, and singapore companies were generally efficient. secondly, the government had a strong financial position. indeed it continued to register a budget surplus throughout the crisis. we had no foreign debt, much less short - term debt. foreign exchange reserves were comfortable. thirdly, our response to the crisis was to reduce business costs directly, to help businesses stay viable and so preserve jobs. no company was bailed out by the government ; no creditor was prevailed upon to maintain a loan to a failing borrower. instead we granted rebates in taxes and government charges across the board, and reduced employers ’ monthly contributions to employees ’ retirement fund – effectively a wage cut. fortunately union leaders understood the gravity of the crisis, and helped to persuade workers to accept this unpalatable prescription. overall these measures amounted to 7 % of gdp. the measures, and the population ’ s positive response to them, instilled confidence among singaporeans and foreign investors. fourthly, our banks were sound. even during the boom years, our banks had been generally prudent and conservative in their lending policies. also mas had supervised the banks strictly, requiring high capital and liquidity standards, insisting on prompt and adequate provisions for non - performing loans, and frowning upon excessive expansion