to carry forward this work aligning supervision with the regulatory tailoring rules, i believe there is a compelling justification to make changes today to the composition of foreign banks in our portfolio of the largest banks, known as liscc. second, as i have discussed throughout my time at the board, i continue to look for ways to make our stress tests more transparent without making them game - able and without diluting their potency as a supervisory tool. i expect that we will continue to provide more transparency on the models we use for the stress tests, and on the hypothetical scenarios. additionally, i am advocating changes to our capital plan rule that will allow banks to receive and study their supervisory stress testing results prior to submitting their capital plans. currently, banks have a very limited time to adjust their capital distribution plans and only under limited circumstance. third, and principally as a transparency endeavor, i would endorse creating a word - searchable database on the board ’ s website with the historical interpretations by the board and its staff of all significant rules. regulatory interpretations by board staff have grown piecemeal over the decades and haven ’ t consistently been treated as the valuable resource they are. the board ’ s website has select interpretations of many laws but does not provide a comprehensive, userfriendly collection of regulatory interpretations, faqs, and commentary. fourth, i endorse putting significant supervisory guidance out for public comment. the board already invites comments on its regulations, as required under the apa, and regularly invites comment on some supervisory guidance and statements of policy. this practice of seeking comment on significant guidance leads to better, more informed supervision and better engagement by banks. and fifth, the board should adopt a rule on how we use guidance in the supervisory process. i would expect the rule to state that the board will follow and respect the limits of administrative law in carrying out its supervisory responsibilities. in particular, consistent with the september 2018 interagency statement on guidance, we would affirm the sensible principles that guidance is not binding and “ non - compliance ” with guidance may not form the basis for an enforcement action ( such as a cease - and - desist order ) or supervisory criticism ( such as a matter requiring attention ( mra ) ). this rule would be binding on the board and on all staff of the federal reserve system, including bank examiners. there are of course other ideas i have mentioned and will be pursuing, but this partial list should be informative and helpful

attracted great interest within the domestic and international communities on the aml / cft / cpf regime. this has led to higher expectations for authorities to take prompt action against activities involving cross - border flow of illicit funds as well as the broader ml / tf / pf threats. while efforts by the financial action task force ( fatf ) to enhance and provide greater clarity on related standards, including on transparency of beneficial ownership is underway, authorities and gatekeepers are also expected to ensure that blind spots are effectively addressed. more often than not, the information regarding these illicit activities resides with multiple parties across the public and private sectors. hence, any suspicion will only surface if we are able to link and integrate that information. in this pursuit, greater collaboration among the law enforcement agencies ( leas ) as well as between leas and the private sector is essential for us to efficiently and effectively connect and assess all relevant information, which will no doubt further strengthen our efforts to fight ml / tf / pf threats. in this respect, it is observed that the public - private partnership ( ppp ) is gaining momentum and is fast becoming known as a key success factor for effective information sharing in the 1 the joint money laundering intelligence aml / cft / cpf ecosystem. to quote some examples, taskforce ( jmlit ) established by the united kingdom in 2016 has prompted a key shift in 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches addressing ml / tf threats. as of june 2020, jmlit has completed over 750 cases and detected more than 5, 000 suspected accounts linked to financial crimes. similar achievement was also experienced by the fintel alliance in australia where within the span of one year between 2018 to 2019, over 300 cases were successfully completed through the partnership. other countries within the region have also followed suit – hong kong ’ s fraud and money laundering intelligence taskforce ( fmlit ) and singapore ’ s anti - money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism industry partnership ( acip ). in malaysia, the ppp is undertaken through the financial intelligence network ( myfinet ), which involves collaboration and information sharing between leas such as the central bank, royal malaysia police and malaysian anti - corruption commission, and private sectors such as financial institutions. given the significant potential of ppp, we have identified it as one of the apg co - chairs ’ priorities and we have also successfully conducted the first part of the ppp technical seminar in july this year. for the