task to achieve price stability is based on a democratic decision of the national parliaments. the fact that the other forms of policy will remain the responsibility of national authorities may make emu unique, but fragile too, e. g. if no measures are taken to guarantee that national competences are not abused. fortunately, european leaders have agreed to the stability pact proposed by germany. this pact will enable emu to impose sanctions on emu member states whose public finance is not in order. the netherlands has always been a strong proponent of this proposal, because it is an important instrument to guarantee budgetary discipline. after all, the budgetary policies of the participants will have to be aligned in such a way that they may be used to strengthen the european currency. but even then major efforts will have to be made to clear the road to emu of any remaining obstacles. the intergovernmental conference which started a year ago and will be completed in amsterdam, will have to provide an answer to the question how the eu can remain institutionally manageable when a number. of eastern european countries accede in the near future. answers are also required to the questions regarding more effective decision - making and the role which the european parliament could play in that respect. of course, these issues do not have to stand in the way of establishing emu in 1999. nevertheless, they show that the long - term success of emu as part of the eu is not guaranteed until, more so than in the past, the widening of the union runs parallel to a deepening in the direction of an “ ever closer union among the european peoples ”, as envisaged by the signatories to the treaty of rome. ladies and gentlemen with amsterdam as the last station on this trip, i have arrived at the conclusion of my address. in short, it may be argued that the process of european economic and monetary cooperation from 1957 to the present has been one of trial and error or - analogous to our train journey - of stopping and moving on. nonetheless, the fact remains that the journey, also thanks to visionary, creative and energetic drivers, has always been resumed with greater speed, and that the problems encountered were resolved in an inventive, not always perfect, but workable way. this, i think, is the power underlying the post - war european drive towards integration and it is this power which makes me confident that the euro will arrive in due time. if the treaty of amsterdam is realised, the switches

convinced that macroprudential policy will continue to involve making difficult decisions based to some degree on expert judgement, in an uncertain environment. decisions that are sometimes not so popular. that is why it is important to communicate clearly with the sector and the public at large. this can make macro - prudential policy more acceptable and, hence, more effective. looking forward, the recent banking turmoil in march drives home the question of whether our policy tools are sufficient to counter the macro - prudential risk of a systemic liquidity crisis. furthermore, specifically for europe, we also have to ask ourselves whether having a true banking union warrants further consistency in national practices, for example with respect to the use and application of the ccyb, and reflect on whether a counter - cyclical macro - prudential tool at the european level is also warranted. new frontiers let me now turn to the new frontiers of macro - prudential policy, including non - bank financial institutions, or nbfis, crypto - assets and climate. all these areas affect our financial stability, requiring action. nbfis, particularly investment funds, have shown their potential to generate systemic risk in the past – long term capital management in 1998 – and more recently – the march 2020 turmoil, the archegos collapse, and the uk gilt - market episode. 2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches while it is clear that crypto - asset markets cannot be considered systemically relevant at present, traditional financial institutions have been expanding their participation in these markets. this is worrisome from a global financial stability perspective considering crypto's inherent volatility and global reach. on climate change, just this summer we have witnessed a range of extreme weather events across europe, from wildfires to torrential rain and floods, presenting a stark reminder of the systemic dimension of climate change. in addition to extreme events, a disorderly transition to a low - carbon economy could also have destabilising effects. macro - prudential policy can play a role in addressing these risks. but as with anything new, developing macro - prudential policy in these areas comes with challenges. the nbfi and crypto - asset sectors are characterised by a great variety of entities, activities and business models. a one - size - fits - all approach to enhancing its structural and cyclical resilience is therefore unlikely to be successful. and in both these cases, it is difficult to properly gauge systemic risk