the monetary policy toolbox in the uk speech given by dave ramsden, deputy governor for markets & banking society of professional economists 21 october 2020 with thanks to renee horrell and tom smith for their assistance in preparing these remarks and to staff across markets and bpi and elsewhere in the bank for their many contributions, as well as to my colleagues on the mpc for their helpful comments and suggestions. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / news / speeches and @ boe _ pressoffice 1. introduction it ’ s a pleasure to be speaking once again at the society of professional economists ’ annual conference. when i last addressed this conference it was two years ago, in person, in the impressive surroundings of the bloomberg building near to the bank of england. today we ’ re meeting in rather different circumstances, and for many of us at least in slightly less impressive surroundings! i'm delighted that we are able to meet virtually, and i'd like to thank kevin daly and all the spe team for their work to make this event possible. the theme of today ’ s conference is “ policy challenges for the global economy ”. what i want to do as my contribution to that theme is to give you my perspective, in my role as deputy governor for markets, banking and resolution at the bank of england and member of the uk ’ s monetary policy committee ( the mpc ), on one part of our response to the particular policy challenges of the covid pandemic. and i will frame my contribution in terms of the use the mpc has made of what has come to be known as the “ monetary policy toolbox ” : the range of policy tools that mpc has used so far, what tools are available to us now, and which ones we might decide to use in the near future. the idea of a range of monetary policy tools is itself quite a new one. for many years monetary policy makers used one tool, the policy rate, to achieve their goal – in the uk case, that meant bank rate. and the bank used a small, focused set of central balance sheet operations to keep money market rates, and so rates in the wider economy, close to that policy rate. two developments changed all that : first, the secular decline, over several decades, in the trend real interest rate ; and second, the global financial crisis and the great recession that followed it. 1 the trend real rate – big r *, in

masaru hayami : the us and japanese economies reflections of a central banker speech given by mr masaru hayami, governor of the bank of japan, at the 32nd annual joint meeting of japan - midwest us association and midwest us - japan association, held in tokyo, on 11 september 2000. * * * i am honored to be invited today to the 32nd annual joint meeting of japan - midwest us association. as some of you may know, after having worked at the bank of japan from 1947 through 1981, i then entered the private sector where i spent about 17 years, during which time i often participated in meetings of business leaders from both the united states and japan. at this annual joint meeting, i am told that political and business leaders from both countries are going to discuss the problems that the world economy faces, including the it revolution and globalization. needless to say, i am looking forward to learning the results of the discussions. some ten to fifteen years ago, that is, in the late 1980s, one of the main topics at such conferences was economic and trade friction between the united states and japan. indeed, i chaired a small group established under the japan - us business conference that discussed the resolution of disputes, which i found an important, but not an easy job. one of the advantages of serving as chairman was that i had the opportunity to visit a number of us cities, including cleveland in the midwest. fortunately, the economic and trade friction hotly debated at that time has been greatly alleviated, partly because the cause has been removed and also partly because misunderstanding on both sides has been resolved, which largely owes to the strenuous efforts made by those involved in solving the problems underlying the friction. however, i think it also reflects the fact that over the past ten years japan ’ s economy has stagnated while the us economy has revived. japan ’ s economy saw the peak of the bubble about ten years ago. at that time, japanese firms and financial institutions were expanding their global market share and were full of confidence. many of you will remember a book entitled “ japan as number one ” written by a professor of harvard university which was published immediately before the bubble hit the peak. in contrast, ten years ago the united states was suffering from twin deficits, a combination of huge budget deficits and the expansion of current account deficits. but that was ten years ago. now, the us economy has been enjoying its longest ever period of economic expansion. the unemployment rate has