illustrates the extent to which some criticisms are profoundly unjust! it is especially noteworthy, in this regard, that soon after we had embarked upon this new concept of real - time transparency, other important central banks decided to go along the same path. being accountable for an independent institution in a modern democracy or, as it is the case for the eurosystem, in a subtle set of democracies like the european union, means being accountable to public opinion at large. in this respect, the public speeches and testimonies of the president of the ecb for the benefit of both european institutions and public opinion, the public speeches and testimonies of the governors of the national central banks to national institutions and public opinion, are crucial. explaining tirelessly the reasons and the reasoning that underpin the decisions of the governing council is a key part of our collective duty. this intertwining of the communication of the european monetary team with the european and national institutions and the full body of the civil societies is currently underestimated. wim duisenberg attends hearings at the european parliament in brussels as often as alan greenspan does on the hill in washington. each national governor explains in his own language ( so in total in ten languages ), through the lens of twelve different cultures, the same message from the eurosystem. to improve its transparency and its communication even further, the eurosystem decided to publish for the first time in december 2000 staff economic projections for the euro area. in terms of transparency and accountability - namely the duty to explain, justify, whenever possible convince, and in any case, being fully responsible vis - a - vis public opinion for decisions taken - i think that the eurosystem meets the best practices of the main central banks in the world. i. 2 co - ordination of economic policies a few years ago, it was necessary to convince a great number of skeptical people, in europe as well as in the rest of the world, that the euro was really to be set up. many observers pointed to its presumed contradictions and alleged inconsistencies : claiming, for example, that the economic divergences and structural gaps among euro - area countries would be too large to ensure a viable monetary union or that the lack of co - ordination between economic policies would deprive the area of an appropriate policy - mix, and could not be achieved without a political federation. other objections raised were the absence of instruments to respond to any asymmetric shocks,

etc. it is the reason why the european council, meeting in luxembourg in december 1997, explicitly mentioned structural policies among the items selected for reinforced co - ordination. the lisbon european council made a further contribution to the necessary medium - term strategy for structural reform in the union. the emphasis put on deepening the single market, the setting of indicators allowing comparisons of best practices among the member states, the fact that the broad economic policy guidelines will examine the structural issues closely : all these developments are going in the right direction. two weeks ago, the stockholm european council confirmed these orientations and even added key issues such as ageing in the eu and the role of biotechnology in the european economic growth. all european countries must resolutely carry on the structural reforms they have already initiated. it must be acknowledged that a lot has already been done, in particular with implementation of the single market. however, continental europe is still experiencing levels of unemployment that are too high, despite the fact that the jobless rate has been declining significantly in most of its economies for three years. according to the imf and the oecd, around 80 % of this unemployment level appears to be structural, that is, generated by our own burdensome rules and regulations. emu certainly stimulates structural reforms in the labour market. with increased capital mobility and a better functioning single market, firms will become more and more sensitive to overall labour cost differentials and business regulations in choosing a particular location in the euro area. they will therefore exert a considerable pressure for appropriate reforms. b / in addition to structural reforms, a strong emphasis will continue to be put on competitiveness. pre - euro economic policy meant monitoring the balance of payments and the foreign exchange and interest - rate markets. the authorities thus received constant feedback on key indicators affecting national economic performance and could react accordingly. these indicators were sensitive, multiple and very reactive. in contrast to the pre - euro period, a loss of competitiveness will not show up quickly on radar screens like foreign exchange markets, interest - rate markets or the external accounts. as a result, economic managers must monitor the relevant competitiveness indicators with even greater vigilance. the sanctions for economic policy errors could come more slowly and insidiously via rising unemployment and weak growth. the rules of a market economy, especially competition, continue to apply to each economy. jobs are created by consumers when they choose the goods and services they feel are the best value for money. businessmen allocate these jobs