situation was before the crisis – in the years leading to the crisis. like today, we had an expansionary monetary policy which was justified by the conditions at that time, as ours is justified by the conditions today. but in the 10 – 12 years before the crisis there had been a systematic disruption of financial regulation in the major jurisdictions. this combination, we may disagree whether the source was predominantly one or the other, but certainly nobody would disagree about the combination of the two. i would flag this as one major risk for the years ahead : that we repeat the same mistake. now, i should say also that the ‘ we ’ is not right in this context because in the eurozone both national legislators and european legislators and the european commission are certainly not on that path. we are talking about a global market and so massive deregulation in one part of the market is going to affect the whole world. on your first question, the information will follow our gradual assessment of the convergence of our inflation path to our objective. as we see more information coming that says that this convergence is progressing, is becoming more robust and is becoming more and more selfsustained, so will be the information – it will be clearer. we ’ ll be in a position to provide you with more clarity about the oncoming developments. if core inflation will be below 2 % by the end of july, the qe – the quantitative easing – will be extended? the press release and the statement is clear, but hearing it from you, it will be different. second question : the country with the largest quantitative easing in quantitative terms is germany. germany was already strong without quantitative easing. is it dangerous for the equilibrium of the euro area? is it a contradiction? draghi : now, responding to the first question, that ’ s what i read here, and i repeat it : regarding non - standard monetary policy measures we confirm that our net asset purchases at the current monthly pace of €30 billion are intended to run until the end of september 2018, or beyond if necessary, and in any case until the governing council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim. before i reiterate this, we continue to expect the ecb interest rates to remain at their present levels for an extended period of time and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases. now, the second question is about one country. we deal with price stability for the eurozone ; that ’ s what matters. we

another part was devoted to assessing the progress of – well, the possible progress we ’ ve made – about inflation, where we said that basically, inflation, headline inflation, will hover around 1. 5 % for the remaining part of the year. the underlying inflation measures remain subdued. even though we have strong growth, we still have subdued inflation and our mandate is in terms of price stability, so victory cannot be declared yet. finally, you asked about monetary policy. the exchange was about emphasising all the pillars of our monetary policy. we have the flows of net purchases. we have the stock that it is accumulating. we have the reinvestment policy for an extended period of time, as i ’ ve just read. especially we have the forward guidance on interest rate path, and they were all important. i am sorry, you also asked the question about trade. the immediate spill - over impact of the trade measures, just if you have a static estimate, it ’ s not going to be big. but what strikes me is that whatever convictions one has about trade, we – and certainly the governing council is on this line – we are convinced that disputes should be discussed and resolved in a multilateral framework, that unilateral decisions are dangerous. also there is a certain, i would say, worry or concern about the state of international relations, because if you put tariffs against your allies, one wonders who the enemies are. i think these are two general considerations that are quite relevant. now, on assessing the final impact of these measures many factors come into play. first of all, is there going to be retaliation or not? second, what ’ s going to be the response of the exchange rate? so far we ’ ve seen that whenever there was a threat of putting tariffs towards another country, it was the dollar that would appreciate. but things can be different from time to time. third and most important is an aspect of all – i wouldn ’ t call them yet trade wars, but certainly of all the trade exchanges that we ’ ve seen – and that ’ s the effect on confidence. the effect on confidence is very difficult to assess, estimate, forecast. if it is a negative effect on confidence, that ’ s going to be negative on both inflation and output. there is concern in brussels about the fate of pensions and the labour laws in italy. what ’ s the view of ecb? draghi : well, we haven ’ t discussed this today