should be pursued with determination. however, the effectiveness of the g20 process still needs to be demonstrated going forward. moreover, many special topics affecting groups of countries that may include non - g20 members or only a few of the g20 members will remain uncovered in that g20 process. the imfc could provide a forum for addressing these issues. prioritization and collaboration the improvement of surveillance will require adequate resources and fund members should not withhold them. but it is obvious that choices will have to be made among a very wide range of ideas ; and priorities will have to be set. this should happen taking into account in particular the effectiveness and cost of each proposal and the work done by other international institutions. when considering the creation of imf surveillance products, sufficient attention should be devoted to the integration of these products in the overall imf surveillance framework in order to maximise the effectiveness of and the synergy among all these products. the fund has indeed already a large array of surveillance instruments ( at bilateral, regional and multilateral level : article iv, fsaps, weo, gfsr, reo, ewe, vulnerability exercises in ems, multilateral consultations... ) which are the result of its efforts to keep its relevance in a changing world. at the same time, close cooperation with other international institutions and fora is essential, taking due account of comparative advantages and expertise, and avoiding duplication of efforts. regarding, for instance, financial stability surveillance, the imf and the fsb work together on the early warning exercise and on systemically important financial institutions. nevertheless, there remains probably room to improve further the coordination of their activities. in retrospect, we have to admit that the record of both the fsf and the imf was less than perfect. the fund has also to collaborate efficiently with the basel institutions : with the bis, that produces high - quality macrofinancial research, and with the basel committee on banking supervision, given that it has much responsibility for micro - financial issues. another proposal which is gaining attention is to tailor further the content and frequency of the surveillance process according to the specific circumstances of each member country, and thus also according to the systemic importance of the country concerned. while i can certainly see merit in this proposal, it should be kept in mind that surveillance is important for all countries and that all members have the right to receive adequate policy advice during regular article iv consultations. tailoring consultations to specific

circumstances should not lead to diverging surveillance quality for different categories of members. traction of fund surveillance i come to my last topic : the so - called traction of fund surveillance. with highly competent economic analysts in central banks and governments in most countries, some have questioned the usefulness of fund surveillance. such is not my view. the added value of fund surveillance rests on the political independence of the fund opinion. like independent central banks, fund experts put longer term considerations above short term political calculus. in doing so, the fund steers policy makers toward more honesty and boosts the government ’ s ability to implement often politically difficult reforms. there is a debate about how transparency can help improve traction of fund surveillance. prior to the mexican crisis in 1994, imf surveillance reports were highly confidential. today, all article iv reports, with a few exceptions, are available on the fund ’ s website. for the fund, the challenge in this context, is to be perceived as an impartial advisor and monitor, not too tied by its structure to the official view in which problems are downplayed 1. let ’ s be frank. the imf must indeed avoid public clashes about short term emergencies. on this, candid analysis is only acceptable if treated with the needed degree of confidentiality. full and unfettered transparency could on the contrary induce complacency and a loss of credibility for the fund. however, at the same time, the imf must become more pro - active in persuading public opinion, social partners, and ngos of the long - term costs of unadjusted policies and of the long - term gains that will outweigh short - term pain. explanation by a credible international institution that promotes a global common good, might find more support from the public for long - term objectives than politicians believe there is. 2 much has been said and written on improving the governance of the imf and enhance ministerial involvement. many observers conclude that nothing really happens at the international meetings of the imf and the world bank. this perception is not entirely unfounded. as i see it, the central task of ministers and governors meeting in the imf is to seriously discuss policy - oriented multilateral surveillance reports. this is a task that the imf executive board can only prepare. in the end, it is up to the policymakers at the highest level to agree on how consistency among their policies can be promoted, and policy coordination improved. pursuing these objectives will elevate