the escb has to, and will, consider all possible means and channels to achieve it. another central aspect of openness is what is loosely called “ democratic accountability ”. confidence of the public and the political decision - making bodies that represent the public is of utmost importance for the credibility of an independent central bank. this confidence can only be achieved if information provided by the central bank to the public is clear, and if there is a healthy dialogue between the central bank and political decision - making bodies. the maastricht treaty provides a framework for accountability at the european level ; national legislation of the member states provides a similar framework for national accountability. the euro will require the acceptance and support of citizens and policy - makers in each participating member state. thus, accountability at the national level will be very important. in practice, democratic accountability should be the outcome of constructive communication between the central bank and political decision - making bodies - connected with complete central bank independence. there should not be any genuine conflict between the central bank on the one hand and the other policy - makers and the public on the other hand because they all share a common ultimate goal under emu, monetary stability and economic growth. 5. the fifth building block, and one of the most important elements in the credibility of the euro, is the stance and discipline of fiscal policies, both in individual member states and in the euro area as a whole. fiscal policy affects credibility in two ways. the first has to do with how well national fiscal policies cope with differences in the business cycle and in the monetary policy transmission mechanisms of the member states. under a single monetary policy, national fiscal policies need to be far more active and flexible than at present to deal successfully with country specific growth and inflation differences. both room to manoeuvre at the national level and the stability and growth pact explicitly demand that the public finances of the member state are balanced and healthy. the second aspect of fiscal policy, closely connected to the first, is the overall degree of fiscal policy discipline in the euro area. curbing inflation expectations and achieving the inflation target are the more easily attained with low interest rates, the more disciplined the fiscal policy at the european level. it is of vital importance that a close and constructive dialogue is organized and established between the ministers of finance of the participating countries ( euro - 11 ) and the european central bank. such a dialogue does not in any way endanger the ecb ’ s independence to pursue its legislated objective price stability.

for the european system of central banks. this challenge makes me believe that it is not a good idea to publish the minutes and the voting positions of the governing council meetings, even though transparency and accountability of the european system of central banks are very important. the publication of the discussions and voting positions could easily lead to dramatization of national differences of opinion at the expense of euro - level views. * * * during the 1990s, finland has gone through severe adjustments. we have consolidated our public finances and achieved credibility for our monetary policy. for us finns, the single monetary policy is a natural continuation of this process. in global, expectation - driven financial markets, a small country has poor possibilities to ensure its exchange rate and interest rate stability, even with a highly disciplined fiscal and monetary policy and sound economic fundamentals. for us, the stability and credibility that we expect from emu, and its discipline, are of vital importance.