##ceivable, for example, that us ccps, too, will benefit to a greater extent from changes in the derivatives market following brexit. if eu market participants use the latitude they have to rely more and more on us ccps, the eu needs to be able to react appropriately for the purposes of achieving sufficient supervisory control and avoiding risks to its financial system. emir does not currently have this flexibility, so all the more reason to ensure its implementation in emir2. 6 conclusion ladies and gentlemen, the final date for the united kingdom ’ s exit from the eu is getting closer and closer and the fact that the brexit negotiations do not appear to be making progress means that uncertainty continues to grow among market participants. this makes it all the more important for all market participants to prepare for a “ hard ” brexit. we should not be deluded into thinking that everything will somehow continue as before. quite the opposite, in fact, is true. brexit will bring about fundamental changes in the global financial community. in my view, it is ultimately only a question of how fast this will happen. on that note, i would like to end with an old chinese proverb : “ when the wind of change blows, some build walls, others build windmills. ” thank you for your attention. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

##exit is obvious. as things stand, eu market participants make intensive use of uk ccps to clear their transactions. from my point of view, this already appears to be of systemic importance for the eu ’ s financial system. in future, the uk ccps will no longer be governed by the eu ’ s common supervisory and regulatory framework, emir. the combination of the systemic importance of uk ccps and the loss of supervisory control and powers of intervention on the part of the eu calls for the supervisory and regulatory framework for third - country ccps to be revised. the option currently available under emir to recognise third - country ccps once their supervisory and regulatory regimes have been deemed equivalent is not a viable long - term solution for the united kingdom after brexit. there is therefore a general risk that the regulatory framework for the uk financial system will diverge from the eu ’ s, which means that the eu financial system and ultimately eu taxpayers could face losses in the billions if risks materialised. in addition, the decisions to recognise third - country ccps based on equivalence do not take adequate account of their systemic importance for the eu ’ s financial system. this is why the current provisions do not serve as a basis for the uk ’ s large ccps after brexit. eu lawmakers view the situation similarly and have put forward corresponding proposals over the past year on how to reshape the european supervisory regime for third - country ccps ; i am referring to the emir ii directive here. these proposals are currently still subject to intense debate within the council. nevertheless, three fundamental changes seem almost certain. first, the systemic importance of third - country ccps or parts thereof shall become the decisive factor determining which supervisory obligations third - country ccps will have to fulfil in future in order to be recognised by the european securities and markets authority, esma. second, if there is an ongoing threat to the financial stability of the eu or individual member states, there should be an option to deny recognition of a third - country ccp or parts thereof. the consequence for eu market participants would be that they would no longer be able to use the affected third - county ccps to meet their clearing obligations. these third - country ccps would only be able to continue conducting business with eu market participants if they moved their operations to the eu and applied for authorisation under eu rules. third, the eurosystem, as the central bank issuing euro currency and thus also the central bank of