businesses are part of a single market of half a billion people. second, cooperation. the joint efforts to tackle the financial crises are perhaps the most prominent recent example. but cooperation has gone a long way in europe. in the eu we have developed common institutions and common policies. and we have found ways to overcome differences and find common solutions. third, solidarity. solidarity is an essential part of europe ’ s common roots and values. solidarity among the peoples of europe was the explicit aim of the founding fathers. why was this? because they believed that a de facto solidarity, a linkage of their interests, would prevent a new war. let me quote a passage from the schuman declaration of 9 may 1950 : “ europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. it will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. ” it is in this spirit that eu solidarity has bolstered eu integration. in the case of poland, concrete signposts of eu solidarity can be spotted all along poland ’ s long road towards eu integration. eu solidarity started well before accession, with poland joining the phare programme already in 1989 and receiving pre - accession support. this solidarity continued after accession, in the form of an important flow of eu funds, especially in the context of eu cohesion and agricultural policy. to give but one example, net transfers from the eu budget to poland amounted to eur 5. 1 billion in 2007. solidarity did also not come to a halt during the crisis. poland – like virtually all countries in the global economy – has been affected by the financial crisis. not because its financial institutions were particularly exposed to the us sub - prime market, but because it has become an integral part of the global economy. nevertheless, it is noteworthy that poland has so far fared relatively better than some of its neighbouring countries. in coping with the crisis within the eu, solidarity was fundamental. let me just mention some concrete achievements in terms of solidarity within the european union : first, increased financing available under the medium term financial assistance ( mtfa ) facility, which rose from eur 12 billion in 2002 to eur 25 billion in 2008 and then again to eur 50 billion in may this year ; second, increased ceilings for eib lending of at least eur 8. 5 billion during 2009 and 2010 ; and third, accelerated payments of structural funds of eur 6. 3 billion in 2009. in addition, only a few days ago

not offset by a diminution of stocks and bonds issuance. 16. what is your feeling about the capital adequacy and the solvency of the euro banking system at present? i think that the process of accounting and of recapitalisation is a process that is taking place both in europe, the euro area and the usa. at the present moment, all the information we have suggests that recapitalisation of banks in the euro area is in line with the amount of losses displayed. that being said, we have to be constantly alert. there is no room at all for complacency. 17. is the worst behind us in this credit crisis? my assessment is that we are experiencing, since the month of august last year an ongoing very significant market correction with episodes of turbulence, episodes of a high level of volatility and of hectic market behaviour. again, it is an ongoing process. 18. are conditions today comparable to the oil shock of the 1970s? the situation is not identical. the structure of the global economy has changed with the increasing influence of emerging economies. there have been major breakthroughs in science and technology. much progress has been made in energy saving technologies. but, that being said, i trust that there are also important similarities. today as in 1973 - 1974, there is a major transfer of resources from oil consumers to oil producers. trying to deny that there is such a transfer of resources to oil producers is and would be a major mistake. because there are only two ways to isolate the households from this real transfer which is unavoidable : either you ask the enterprises to pay for it and you weaken considerably the productive sector ; or you ask the budget to pay for it and you weaken dramatically the situation of public finances ; or you do both! but, this has been – on the occasion of the first oil shock – and would be so in the present circumstances a recipe for high spiralling inflation, high unemployment and stagnation. we must take into account the lessons from the past. 19. how do you protect productive sectors in the face of such external shocks? as i said, avoid second - round effects. 20. is it the role of the ecb to prevent a recurrence of the stagflation of the 1970s? we have a very clear mandate : achieving price stability in the medium - term. it is totally in line with the lessons of the first and second oil shocks of 1973 and 1980