. a too - rapid adjustment of monetary policy could trigger the materialisation of some of the risks mentioned. a too - gradual adjustment may ultimately force policy to be tightened more rapidly to contain overheating, thus giving rise to the “ snap - back ” scenario. by the same token, the persistence of very easy financial conditions and very low volatility extends the “ search for yield ” behaviour of investors and the build - up of vulnerabilities in the financial system. in this regard, effective communication by central banks throughout the monetary normalisation process will be key to helping anchor financial conditions, despite the threat of heightened volatility. second, in this complex environment, it is particularly important to emphasise the role played by one of the major policy innovations generated during the financial crisis, namely the development of macroprudential policy frameworks. the proper and timely use of the new macroprudential tools, together with the regulatory and supervisory overhaul of the global banking system undertaken in recent years, should help to contain the build - up of financial imbalances. however, given its novelty it ’ s difficult to know ex - ante how effective these new macroprudential tools will be. in addition, multiple new challenges remain and need to be dealt with. let me mention a few of them : ( i ) the reinforcement of policy measures to address bank - like risks stemming from the activities of non - banks, which have significantly increased in recent years ; ( ii ) the emergence of new risks, such as those derived from financial technology or cybersecurity ; 4 / 5 ( iii ) the strengthening of sustainable finance to address environmental risk, and ( iv ) the creation or expansion of global and regional backstops. i am certain that our speakers in this conference will address these and other interesting matters. indeed we will have the opportunity to explore this subject in depth through nine selected articles by prominent researchers. actually, we are most privileged to have with us two distinguished keynote speakers, ricardo reis and torben andersen, who will no doubt illuminate us on these important matters. this two - day conference is organised in four sessions : the first will address certain money and market - related aspects. during the second session we will try to shed some light on the propagation of shocks when considering higher - order statistical moments of economic and financial variables. the third session will deal with two issues related to risk which are important for central banks, namely the credit risk associated with monetary policy

also, its duration is uncertain, as the emergence of fresh outbreaks of the virus in practically every country in the world has shown. and, of course, we know that the ultimate impact on the banking sector will largely depend on the scale and duration of the economic crisis generated by the pandemic, and on how effective economic policies are in reducing its impact on households and businesses, as was perfectly illustrated by the vulnerability exercise published by the ecb in july. i would like to share with you some considerations on various aspects that i believe are relevant in the current context. these considerations concern banks, on the one hand, and supervisors and financial regulators, and economic policy - makers in general, on the other. the use of capital buffers the first consideration i would like to share relates to the accumulated capital buffers and their use in this crisis. solvency levels are now significantly higher than before the global financial crisis. this is fundamental to ensure that the banking sector continues to be in a position to perform its function of financing the economy during the present crisis. naturally, this also increases its capacity to absorb losses. in fact, there is evidence that, in the countries that had the largest capital buffers, the deterioration of “ growth at risk ”, a concept developed by the international monetary fund to capture expected gdp growth in stress situations, has been less severe than in other jurisdictions. likewise, the empirical evidence available shows that the greater the level of banks ’ solvency, the greater their capacity to grant financing. in addition, our latest analysis allows us to conclude that their use of the public guarantee programme has also been determined by their solvency levels. at the start of the crisis, prudential supervisors decided to release many of the macroprudential ( countercyclical capital and systemic risk ) buffers, although these were not very significant, because in many countries the systemic risk that had built up was not sufficient to require their activation. in parallel, the microprudential authority ( i. e. banking supervision of the european central bank for significant institutions ) has allowed banks to operate temporarily below the levels set for some structural requirements such as the capital conservation buffer, the pillar 2 guidance ( p2g ) and the liquidity coverage ratio ( lcr ). also, the possibility of covering part of the pillar 2 requirements ( p2r ) with non - cet1 capital was envisaged. the purpose of these decisions has been precisely to help banks continue to