function, giving clear weights to different, and potentially conflicting, objectives. this is a highly delicate endeavour, however. and, second, even if we could spell out our objective function, the way our quantitative models depict the financial sector lacks the granularity needed to quantify trade - offs in a sufficiently precise manner. so, at the end, i generally agree with andy ’ s conclusion that we will likely keep shooting in the dark, which means shooting many arrows at the same target. ultimately, however, potential adverse spillovers cannot be an excuse to undo what has been achieved since 2009. but when adverse spillovers are obvious, such as in the case of the leverage ratio and central clearing, then we should not hesitate to correct them. this also relates to the undesired consequences of a lack of international cooperation in some pockets of the regulatory domain. consider again ccp oversight and supervision. some ccps are clearly global in nature in view of the range of clearing members they serve or the markets and currencies they clear. it would therefore be important for all jurisdictions to recognise the need for non - domestic supervisors and central banks to be involved in the oversight of such global ccps, and in establishing cooperative oversight arrangements where relevant. a supervisory approach that recognises the legitimate interests of non - domestic authorities is vital for tackling the global repercussions of a potential ccp failure, including its recovery and resolution. the european commission proposal to amend the emir regulation is a case in point. after the uk ’ s decision to leave the eu, and with uk ccps clearing approximately 90 % of the eurodenominated interest rate swaps of euro area banks, there would be clear risks in allowing the current eu arrangements for the supervision of third country ccps to continue as they are. the proposal provides eu supervisors and the relevant central banks of issue with the tools they need in order to monitor and address risks to the eu ’ s financial system. 5 so more, not less, international cooperation is crucial to safeguard financial stability. this is a point worth emphasising, particularly at times where a push - back from internationally agreed standards is being discussed openly. in an integrated global economy, financial regulation has to rely on internationally agreed standards. turning back the clock on international financial regulation would revive distrust, create financial fragmentation, and risk regulatory arbitrage and a race to the bottom. 2 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches effects of financial regulation on financial structures let me now turn to

keeps the economy ’ s pace as close to the optimum as possible. in the marathon analogy, successful monetary policy avoids the economy ‘ hitting the wall ’, but also avoids it ‘ running too slowly ’, with unused reserves of labour and capital. secondly, there is now strong evidence that high inflation positively damages sustainable growth, and growing evidence that there is some damage caused even by quite low rates of inflation. nobody argues that price stability will create a major improvement in an economy ’ s sustainable growth rate - - that growth rate depends primarily, as indicated, on all the real factors i have already discussed. but it now seems beyond reasonable doubt that keeping the general price level stable is the best contribution which monetary policy can make to the way in which the economy operates, and therefore the best contribution to the economy ’ s sustainable growth rate. in an inflation - free environment, investors and the public generally get their best shot at reading accurately the signals that markets are delivering - - which goods and services represent best value, where the best returns on investment may be found, how much to consume and how much to save. price stability is not a sufficient condition for strong growth. it is not even a necessary condition for strong growth. it is just the best contribution which monetary policy can make.