would propel malaysia into becoming a vibrant, innovative and competitive international islamic financial services industry supported by high calibre human talent, world - class infrastructure and best international standards. building on what we have, we need to create a global brand to be promoted more aggressively in the global arena. this will be key to penetrate markets as well as to attract global players to our shores, henceforth enhancing the viability and sustainability of malaysia's islamic financial system. malaysia will embark on more strategic promotional and marketing efforts through greater collaboration and smart partnership. mifc will be our global brand. on this note, on behalf of the hosts and organisers, i would like to thank the distinguished panellists and moderators, media and the respected audience for making this forum a success, and i hereby declare the forum officially closed. thank you.

is that liquidity requirements are internalised, while lolr and deposit insurance are externalised to the central bank and to the taxpayers, respectively. another difference is that liquidity requirements and deposit insurance exert their effects ex ante while lolr happens after the fact. an additional micro - prudential benefit derived from liquidity requirements relates to a special role of liquid assets. by maintaining liquidity buffers in advance, banks commit to removing solvency risk from a portion of their portfolio. this limits solvency risk and encourages good risk management, acting as a prudential regulatory tool alongside other requirements, such as capital buffers or bail - inable debt, that also exert discipline on bank risk - taking behaviour. 3 a counterargument is however that holding a large balance of liquid assets gives bank management too much discretion and can thus create agency problems. 4 liquidity standards should also be designed to mitigate adverse effects owing to inherently systemic characteristics of a liquidity crisis. the reaction of one bank to liquidity strains might create major liquidity strains for other banks. this may indeed require liquidation of long - term and illiquid assets, imposing externalities on other banks through a fire sales spiral and various forms of financial contagion. in addition, the failure of a bank that occupies a critical size or position in a market could have immediate systemic implications : some segments of financial markets might just cease to operate, and its disorderly collapse would lead to gorton and metrick ( 2012 ) document a full - scale “ run ” on repo ; see g. gorton and a. metrick, “ securitised banking and the run on repo ”, journal of financial economics, forthcoming. however, krishnamurthy et al. ( 2012 ) document that a “ run ” on repo didn ’ t seem to have occurred in some repo segments ; see a. krishnamurthy, s. nagel and d. orlov, “ sizing up repo ”, nber working paper no. 17768, 2012. as in d. diamond and p. dybvig, “ bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity ”, journal of political economy 91, 1983. calomiris, heider, and hoerova ( 2013 ) highlight the potential benefits of bank liquidity requirements in comparison with capital ; see. c. calomiris, f. heider and m. hoerova, “ a