samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
boards of directors – were given strong economic incentives to focus on short - term profits. long - term value creation was not a concern in the pre - crisis world. collectively, this has resulted in excessive risk taking. a reform of the executive compensation schemes and practices is an essential part of our effort to secure financial stability. at the financial level, reform in europe will follow a two - pronged approach. first, it will be centred around the european system of financial supervisors. the establishment of this system will permit better coordination among national authorities responsible for financial regulation. if one lesson can be learnt from the crisis, it is that the reach of financial supervision and regulation needs to be extended to better monitor those financial institutions, including highly leveraged, which can arbitrage across national borders and across oversight jurisdictions. the european systemic risk board ( esrb ) will be the other dimension of the european approach to financial reform. this new body will provide early - warnings and issue recommendations that will help to prevent a renewed build - up of excessive risk in the financial system as a whole. the crisis has displayed the phase transition that risk can undergo almost overnight : a mutation from localised liquidity risk to a generalised solvency threat attacking the whole system of financial interconnections. the esrb will have to oversee the likelihood and measure the severity of these reactions and instant transmissions. the ecb and the national central banks in the eu will fully contribute to this new institutional framework. global governance the underlying approach to reforms should be holistic. the global proportions of the crisis call for a rethinking of the links between financial behaviour and macroeconomic policies, as they interact in a global scene. the g 20 has made a quantum leap in creating the new premier global economic group. the aspect that impresses me most about this group is the virtually universal consensus on global economic issues. there is a broad consensus at the level of the g 20 on the diagnosis of the crisis. there is a broad consensus on the appropriate response to the crisis. and there is a broad consensus on the direction of financial sector reform, along with the main ideas that i described a moment ago. there is agreement that macroeconomic policies at the domestic level need to be consistent with the objective of global financial and economic stability. medium - term and long - term sustainability in domestic macroeconomic policies will have to prevail. a renewed mediumterm perspective should guide macro - economic policies from now on. like financial regulation, policies

4 ( * ) ipv stratified method. cchc hedonic model for new homes in metropolitan region ( rm ). source : central bank of chile using sii, cchc and sbif information.
aziz, governor, bank negara malaysia for spending her valuable time in our midst and sharing her insights with us. bis central bankers ’ speeches

##riation basis by new class of eligible non - resident investors ( viz. sovereign wealth funds, multilateral agencies, pension funds, insurance funds, endowment funds ) in rupee and foreign currency denominated bonds to be issued by idf - nbfcs registered by the reserve bank of india and rupee denominated units issued by idf - mfs set up as sebi registered mutual funds. given our calibrated approach towards opening up of our debt markets to foreign investors, all such investments ( excluding those by nris ) will, bis central bankers ’ speeches however, be within an overall cap of us $ 10 billion ( which would be within the overall cap of us $ 25 billion for fii investment in infrastructure debt ). idfs will, in days to come, act as a major source of channelizing huge quantum of funds from long term domestic and foreign investors to the corporate debt markets in the critical infrastructure sector of the country and will indeed be a gamechanger with a potential of redefining various facets of the markets. incentives incentives, both positive and negative, play a major role in shaping human behaviour and markets are no exception to this rule. for illustrative purposes, i would like to cite a few instances where incentives played important role in shaping the development of the debt markets. existence of easy access to bank loans incentivised corporates to approach banks rather than rely on corporate bond market. this excessive reliance on bank finance hampered the development of deep and liquid bond markets and was partly responsible for the financial instability during the asian crisis. the illiquidity in the indian corporate bond markets can be attributed to the apparent preference of the corporates to finance their requirements through private placement and rely on external commercial borrowings. the level and complexity of stamp duty on corporate bonds encourages an arbitrage - based approach to corporate finance and decisions are often tax - driven rather than strategy - driven. differential tax treatment further complicates the matter as it tends to incentivise certain investors, e. g., insurance companies and mutual funds who are exempt from tds on interest income from corporate bonds. the regulatory dispensation of htm classification has protected balance sheets of the banks and encouraged them to invest in g - sec but promoted illiquidity in government bonds. different incentive structures in treasuries of public sector banks and private / foreign bank treasuries partly explains the level of participation in derivative markets in spite of existence
sultan bin nasser al - suwaidi : recent policy developments for strengthening the resilience of the financial sector welcoming remarks by h e sultan bin nasser al - suwaidi, governor of the central bank of the united arab emirates, at the 8th high - level meeting for the middle east & north africa region on “ recent policy developments for strengthening the resilience of the financial sector ”, organized by the basel committee on banking supervision ( bcbs ), the financial stability institute ( fsi ) and the arab monetary fund ( amf ), abu dhabi, 27 november 2012. * * * good morning, excellencies, ladies & gentlemen, y. e. mar gudmundsson, governor of central bank of iceland, the honorable, josef tosovsky, chairman of the financial stability institute of the bis, y. e. dr. jassim al mannai, general manager & chairman of the arab monetary fund, the distinguished speakers, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you to the uae, especially those who travelled a long way to be here with us at the outset of this important high level meeting. the subjects that would be discussed today are familiar and current, and very much relevant to stability of the financial systems. the financial system's stability in all countries, and this region is no exception, are very important for economic stability. i will start by giving you an idea about the uae financial system, which falls under the central bank supervision. i. overview of the uae banking system bis central bankers ’ speeches if i may switch now to talk about one of the subjects this meeting will discuss namely : sibs or d - sibs, it will be worthwhile to work on a framework to identify d - sibs in the region at the first stage. the framework should take into account : ( a ) the size of the bank ( based on simple indicators such as total assets and the bank ’ s reliance on specific sectors, like the real estate sector and the gres and counter parties ), ( b ) the interconnectedness between banks ( as indicated by deposits from and loans to ), and ( d ) the degree of complexity, even though this does not play a significant role in the uae, as banks do not trade or invest in sophisticated financial products. also, cross - border activities by banks in the region can ’ t be used to determine if they qualify as d - sibs, as these activities are insignificant. ii. issues for consideration 1

make it difficult for potential d - sibs to hold high - quality liquid debt instruments as “ pre - emptive ” liquidity buffers against early signs of stress. hence, there is a need to find an appropriate way to deal with this issue, until debt markets in the region witness significant improvements. to conclude, it should be stressed that strengthening the banking supervision exercise in our countries is key to tackling systemic risk in d - sibs and other financial institutions. excellencies ladies & gentlemen with this i come to the end of my speech, but before i close, i would like to thank the fsi of bis and the amf, for holding this important high level meeting here in abu dhabi, uae. i wish you all a successful meeting. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
##e has been exerting its intended effects so far. positive changes have started to be observed in the asset markets and households ’ and firms ’ behavioral patterns. the bank will continue with the qqe, aiming to achieve the price stability target of 2 percent, as long as it is necessary for maintaining that target in a stable manner. it will examine both upside and downside risks to economic activity and prices, and make adjustments as appropriate. in my view, the criteria for such judgment is that whether various economic entities such as firms and households change their behavioral patterns based on the assumption of a certain level of inflation as i have stated earlier. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches

contrary to expectations, interest rates have not risen recently. this is due to the turmoil in the financial markets. in this situation it would be somewhat remarkable if the danish government still proposes an expansionary fiscal policy in 2008. when preparing the new finance bill for 2008, the government should reassess its fiscal policy with a view to easing the pressure on the economy. omitting to do so may entail tougher requirements at a later stage. next spring will bring collective bargaining within the public sector. among public - sector employees there are expectations of sizeable pay rises, supported by recent years'shortage of labour and focus on the quality of public - sector services. several political parties have spoken in favour of an extraordinary wage boost for large or small groups of public - sector employees via a special pool of funds earmarked for this purpose. i would like to issue a strong warning against making wage bargaining in the public - sector labour market a parliamentary issue at this stage. the risk that the parties will attempt to outdo one another is imminent, and premature intervention by the politicians prevents genuine bargaining. this could set a very unfortunate precedent. as if that was not enough, next spring will also see collective bargaining in the financial sector. i therefore take this opportunity to point out that the results in this sector may send a signal to the rest of the labour market. finally, i would like to thank the danish bankers association for our fine cooperation. i look forward to continuing along the same positive lines.
remarks by carolyn a. wilkins senior deputy governor of the bank of canada munk school of global affairs and public policy november 12, 2020 ( via webcast ) exploring life after covid - 19 : the far side of the moon “ anticipating problems and figuring out how to solve them is actually the opposite of worrying : it ’ s productive. ” — chris hadfield, an astronaut ’ s guide to life on earth introduction good afternoon and thank you for joining me. thanks also to the munk school for the invitation. given what ’ s going on in the world today, healthy debate around global affairs and public policy is more important than ever. it ’ s hard to believe that the covid - 19 pandemic was declared almost exactly eight months ago. canadians have been affected on so many fronts — in our workplaces and in our homes. there are still more than 40, 000 active cases and more reported every day — but we ’ ve heard some good news recently about vaccines. i ’ m happy to see the economic recovery underway. however, the pandemic is still in full throttle, so we continue to face considerable challenges. today, i ’ d like to take us beyond the current context and discuss what we will need to thrive in the post - pandemic world. right now, the future may feel like the proverbial far side of the moon. much of what we knew about the moon 70 years ago was based on the side we could see from the earth. like the explorers back then, many among us feel compelled to consider the unknown — to shed light on the dark side. i would like to thank thomas carter and jose dorich for their help in preparing this speech. not for publication before november 12, 2020 1 : 30 pm eastern time - 2right now, many unknowns obscure our vision, but we can still map out economic scenarios that will help us plan our path forward. in the bank of canada ’ s most recent outlook, published in the october monetary policy report, we expect the recovery in canada and around the world will continue. the recovery will take time, however, and will require policy support for a while. taking a longer perspective, we expect that covid - 19 will leave an unfortunate economic legacy through its impacts on investment, the work force and productivity. in our most recent projection, this adds up to a situation where canada is likely to exit the pandemic with a lower profile for potential output. that means a significantly diminished

since the end of last year. with respect to monetary aggregates, growth in m2 + cds has been slowing and private bank lending remains sluggish. this reveals the fall in credit demand following stagnant economic conditions as well as the continued cautious lending attitudes of private banks. the bank ’ s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the policy board at the monetary policy meeting held on june 12, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. meanwhile, some firms, especially small and medium - sized firms, have been facing difficult financing conditions in terms of both funds availability and fund - raising costs. this influence on the overall economy continues to warrant a careful monitoring.
aid in our understanding of inflation dynamics, it is also clear that such developments do not relieve central banks of their responsibility for maintaining price and economic stability.

february until friday. but, as i noted at the start, based on the consumer and producer prices that we do have, estimates suggest that core pce inflation is likely to be elevated. though the february reading is estimated to step down from january's, this recent pace would not represent significant progress toward 2 percent. let me pause here and make an important point about how i think about and want to talk about adverse developments such as this recent inflation data and how as a policymaker i manage risks to the economic outlook. it is appropriate to point out that a month or two of data does not necessarily indicate a trend, and there are good reasons to think that progress on inflation will be uneven but likely to continue down toward 2 percent. at the same time, monetary policy is data driven, and i do want to take it into account when formulating my economic outlook. while i don't want to over - react to two months of data, i do think it is appropriate to react to it. there is ample evidence that the recent data has also been taken on board by both financial markets and forecasters in adjusting their views of the economic outlook. the markets have pulled back the number of expected rate cuts in 2024. fomc participants have also adjusted their views on policy in response to recent data and it is reflected in the summary of economic projections. comparing the december 2023 projections to 4 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches those just released, one sees that the median number of cuts in the federal funds rate for 2024 is still three, but the dots for 2024 have moved up, meaning at least several policymakers removed one or more cuts from their projection. in fact, the number of policymakers expecting more than three cuts in 2024 decreased significantly, while the number expecting two or fewer increased. i interpret this as showing that the committee is not over - reacting to the recent data but is not discounting it either. in my view, it is appropriate to reduce the overall number of rate cuts or push them further into the future in response to the recent data. this reflects the reality of managing an outlook in real time as data comes in. subsequent data may well alter this outlook again, but we shall see. based on what we know now, there is no urgency in taking that step. so where do i see things standing? i see economic output and the labor market showing continued strength, while progress in reducing inflation has slowed. because of these signs,
output from trend - 2 - 4 - 6 - 8 source : bank calculat ions. based on an assumed product ion funct ion which describes t he relat ionship bet ween input s - labour and capit al - and out put. t he measures show est imat es of t he changes in out put est imat ed t o be due purely t o changes in t he ut ilisat ion of t he input s.

running a business. namely, that firms charge a mark up, or profit margin, over the marginal costs of their various inputs – labour, capital, raw and intermediate materials, etc – with both the mark up and costs varying according to current and prospective demand conditions. this is represented schematically, indeed crudely, in diagram 1. the key feature is that when demand rises and firms utilise their capacity more fully and add to their labour force, their costs and prices tend to rise. that might involve old - fashioned ‘ cost - push ’ inflation, with firms raising prices to maintain margins in the face of increased ( marginal ) costs. or firms might initially be able temporarily to raise margins, with labour and other costs later ‘ catching up ’. in either case, firms and wage bargainers will be influenced by what they think is going to happen to inflation in the future. again simplifying, two features are added to the diagram to bridge from firms ’ so - called ‘ output ’ – or wholesale – prices to the retail prices which the bank targets. first, as well as being an input to producing firms, some imports are directly consumed by households. second, distributors – including, most obviously, retailers – add another mark up, reflecting their own costs and desired profit margins. changes in the economy affecting any of the links in this ( stylised ) chain will have a bearing on inflation dynamics. the challenge is to separate out cyclical, or temporary, factors from the more structural influences that over some periods alter firms ’ costs and margins. that is important for policymakers, as to form a view on the medium - term outlook for inflation we need to distinguish between short - lived and persistent influences. monetary regime change the monetary framework is one such structural influence. one of the most encouraging features of the post - 1997 landscape has been that, as well as inflation tracking the target fairly well, expectations of inflation have been well anchored to the target ( chart 4 ). uncertainty about future inflation has also fallen3 ( chart 5 ). it was different in the past. a characteristic shared by the various monetary regimes tried out by uk governments during the 1970s and 1980s was that no one could easily judge what rate of inflation the authorities were trying to achieve – or, therefore, have much idea about the outlook for inflation. as feared by one distinguished economist of an earlier generation, “ every business venture [ risks being ] transformed into a speculation on monetary policy ”. 4 in those circumstances
, what is the particular role of independent directors, how many should there be on the board, and how can one be assured that they are truly independent in their thinking and their approach to their job? these are issues that increasingly occupy our minds in the reserve bank. and we are considering the possible policy solutions to them. increasingly, these kinds of questions will also be posed and answered by supervisors - and by bank directors themselves - in many countries, as banks become more global in nature. i expect that, within the next year or two, we will have made substantial progress in seeking to resolve some of these issues.

- hauser. pdf jones, b. ( 2023 ). bagehot and the lender of last resort - 150 years on. presented at the 36th australasian finance & banking conference. retrieved from https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2023 / pdf / sp - ag - 2023 - 12 - 14. pdf kengmana, b. ( 2021 ). ramped up : rbnz ’ s additional monetary policy toolkit. rbnz bulletin, 84 ( 1 ), 1 – 32. retrieved from https : / / www. rbnz. govt. nz / hub / publications / bulletin / 2021 / rbb2021 - 84 - 01 kent, c. ( 2024 ). the future system for monetary policy implementation. in reserve bank of australia. presented at the bloomberg australia briefing. retrieved from https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2024 / sp - ag - 2024 - 04 - 02. html parekh, s. ( 2016 ). how the reserve bank of new zealand manages liquidity for monetary policy implementation. reserve bank of new zealand bulletin, 79 ( 9 ), 1 – 19. retrieved from https : / / www. rbnz. govt. nz / hub / publications / bulletin / 2016 / rbb2016 - 79 - 09 reserve bank of australia. ( 2024 ). how the reserve bank implements monetary policy. retrieved august 26, 2024, from reserve bank of australia website : https : / / www. rba. gov. au / education / resources / explainers / how - rba - implements - monetarypolicy. html reserve bank of new zealand. ( 2022a ). in retrospect : monetary policy in new zealand 2017 to 2022. reserve bank of new zealand. retrieved from reserve bank of new zealand website : https : / / www. rbnz. govt. nz / hub / publications / monetary - policy - statement / rafimp reserve bank of new zealand. ( 2022b ). facilities at a glance. retrieved august 26, 2024, from reserve bank of new zealand website : https : / / www. rbnz. govt. nz / financial - markets / domesticmarkets / our - monetary - policy - implementation - framework / key - facilities / facilities - at - a - glance robinson, f., & watson, d. ( 2024 ). in