samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
unpleasant surprises? i am too old to exclude that. but don ’ t forget that the banks in the programme countries have already been assessed extensively. from that perspective we should expect only few surprises. however, some portfolios are very complicated and require specific expertise. take for example the shipping sector. then there is the question of how you value non - liquid assets. those are difficult discussions. but we have a european perspective in the asset quality review. the biggest surprise could come from the number of assets that has been classified incorrectly. they will then have to be revalued. will the ecb in case of capital shortfalls wait till the end of the review or try to work out a solution right away? the supervisory role of the ecb sets in only in one year ’ s time. what you see is that banks are already anticipating and cleaning up their balance sheets. how firm will this exercise be compared to the two previous ones by the eba? you refer to the stress test, the third stage of the comprehensive assessment. we are discussing this with the eba. we have already decided what the buffer requirements are for the second stage, the asset quality review. they are pretty tough. banks need to have 4. 5 % in common equity tier one ( cet1 ). we added a capital conversation buffer of 2. 5 %. for significant banks 1 % is added. then we are at 8 %, which is in substance comparable to the old capital definition. bis central bankers ’ speeches

manner “ monetary dominance ”, in compliance with the principles enshrined in the maastricht treaty. going forward, the ecb remains committed to do whatever it takes to comply with its mandate of maintaining price stability in the euro area. bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches
better quality of disclosures to relevant law enforcement agencies especially in relation to fraud, tax evasion and corruption crimes. the regulatory and law enforcement community is also in the midst of exploring introducing a cash transaction limit ( ctl ) to complement the existing financial integrity measures. while new to malaysia, many other countries such as france, italy and india have already implemented it. this measure will further mitigate the abuse of cash by addressing the ease of conducting high - value cash transactions. even with the rise of electronic payments, we cannot wash over the fact that criminals still prefer cash because it is widely accepted, anonymous in nature and untraceable. for this purpose, the national coordination committee to counter money laundering ( ncc ) will be consulting the public on this proposal later this month. the ncc wants to make an informed decision. as such, we hope that all of you could get the word out and encourage the public to provide feedback on the proposed measure. closing as a regulator, bank negara can only do so much to protect the financial system against money laundering and terrorism financing risk. reporting institutions, as responsible corporate citizens, must also play their parts to safeguard the financial system and economy. our hope is that over these two days, participants at this conference will draw new insights and perspectives, forge new networks, and strengthen their resolve in carrying out this important mission to uphold the integrity and the trust of the people in our financial system. thank you. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

to change the situation in spain it is crucial to make citizens and governments aware that there is a cost to restrictions on access to data by the research community, as they will eventually result in less effective public policies. i trust that discussions of the papers to be presented at the conference over the next two days will bring us up to speed with the most advanced practices across the globe. thank you very much and enjoy the sessions!
there are some uncertain factors including geopolitical developments and their economic implications. on the domestic side, stock prices are weak. hence, careful monitoring is required of progress in the resolution of the nonperforming - loan problem and its effects on stock prices, corporate finance, and the economy. on the price front, import prices continue to rise reflecting the firmness in oil prices and depreciation of the yen from summer to autumn 2002. the decline in domestic corporate goods prices has become slower due to the rise in import prices and the improved supply - demand balance in materials industries, despite the continued fall of machinery prices. consumer prices remain on a gradual downtrend and corporate services prices continue to decline. looking at the conditions influencing price developments, import prices are likely to be level because the effect of the rise in oil prices will be offset by that of the recent appreciation of the yen. although this report is based on data and information available at the time of the bank of japan monetary policy meeting held on january 21 and 22, 2003. the bank ’ s view of recent economic and financial developments, determined by the policy board at the monetary policy meeting held on january 21 and 22, 2003, as the basis for monetary policy decisions. the low levels of inventories will support prices to some degree, the overall condition of supply and demand is expected to continue exerting downward pressure on prices for a while amid persistently weak domestic demand. moreover, factors such as the ongoing technological innovations in machinery, deregulation, and the streamlining of distribution channels will continue to exert downward pressure on prices. under these circumstances, domestic corporate goods prices are expected to be weak for a while. consumer prices are expected to stay on a declining trend for the time being at the current gradual pace. the increase in imports of consumer goods has come to a halt and this is expected to alleviate the downward pressure on prices to some extent, but the faster pace of decline in wages may reinforce the ongoing decline in prices, especially that in services prices. as for the financial environment, the outstanding balance of the current accounts at the bank of japan is recently moving at around 20 trillion yen, as the bank provides ample liquidity. under these circumstances, in the short - term money markets, the overnight call rate continues to hover at very close to zero percent. moreover, longer - term interest rates continue to be at low levels as a whole. yields on long - term government bonds declined further and are recently moving

cautious. hence, including the effects arising from government measures to accelerate the disposal of non - performing loans and to revitalize industries and firms, developments in the financial and capital markets, the behavior of financial institutions, and the situation of corporate finance continue to require close monitoring.
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’ speeches often expressed, therefore, is that these regulations are an unnecessary burden on edes. today ’ s panel discussion on “ financial regulatory reforms : not far enough, or overkill ” is quite apt in scope and timing. i am sure we are going to have an enlightening discussion on the adequacy and impact of the regulatory reforms. the eminent panelists would present their views on the subject followed by q & a. now, over to the panelists … bis central bankers ’ speeches
similar to those we have so often witnessed in the last couple of decades. i have also discussed various aspects of fluctuations in asset prices. one encouraging conclusion that i think we can draw in this connection is that the present monetary policy framework in sweden, with built - in inflation targets, provides a reasonable basis for tackling any problems that may arise.

deficits during the boom phases ( the 1960s and early 1970s, and the 2000s ) and minimal deficits or surpluses during periods of economic stagnation. in the four years before 1985, the current account recorded an average deficit of 3. 02 % of gdp. in the four years from 1985, the current account recorded an average surplus of 3. 75 % of gdp. investment profile and reduce government ’ s demands for savings, thereby permitting lower interest rates to allow more private sector investment. in hindsight, i would say the strategy was mostly successful. we experienced some of the downsides of openness to capital flows. these included a huge depreciation of the rand in 2001, which only loosely reflected fundamentals, as well as a phase of currency strength during the mid - 2000s, which may have affected export competitiveness. the stronger currency and low interest rates also fed dramatic house price appreciation and risky mortgage growth ‒ a dynamic arrested by the 2008 crisis. despite those blemishes, it was still a success. indeed, as time has gone by, it looks more and more like a golden age of south african macroeconomic policy. living standards were rising and growth was outpacing the global average. 17 our investment rate rose from around 15 % of gdp at the end of apartheid, 18 to around 20 % of gdp, even as the domestic savings rate remained low at about 15 %. this naturally entailed significant net capital inflows, much of it through portfolio flows rather than foreign direct investment. these we de - risked, in large part, by committing to a free - floating currency and minimising foreign currency borrowing across the economy. it seems extremely unlikely that we could have had better results by closing ourselves to global capital. what causes me great concern, by contrast, is what happened next. the 15 years from 2009 onwards are almost a mirror image of the first 14 years of democracy. from 1994 onwards, we achieved steadily high investment and growth, interrupted by temporary setbacks ; from 2009 onwards, we have had steadily lower investment and growth, punctuated by incomplete recoveries. the imf ’ s projections have 2023 investment at 16 % of gdp ‒ far below the ratio needed for adequate for a fuller discussion of macroeconomic performance in this period, see lesetja kganyago, address at the centre for education in economics ( ceef ) africa, ‘ reflections of macroeconomics policy since 1995 : from nice to vice – and back again
inclusive leadership, i look forward to the collaboration, and i am equally excited to bear witness to the continued progress as we work on achieving the deliverables that we will outline for the coming years. once again, i would like to reiterate our appreciation to all afpi leaders and the afi management for the confidence entrusted in the central bank of seychelles. thank you! 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

caroline abel : remarks - assuming chairmanship of the african financial inclusion policy initiative remarks by ms caroline abel, governor of central bank of seychelles, at the 10th african financial inclusion policy initiative ( afpi ) meetings and leaders roundtable, arusha, 23 june 2022. * * * professor florens luoga, outgoing chairperson and governor of the bank of tanzania ; dr. alfred hannig, executive director of the alliance for financial inclusion ; governors and deputy governors ; ladies and gentleman ; good afternoon. allow me to take this opportunity to appreciate the confidence you, as fellow leaders of the african financial inclusion policy initiative ( afpi ), have entrusted to the central bank of seychelles. i am deeply honoured and humbled to accept the appointment as chairperson of this very important platform for the next two years, with the very noble task of fostering partnerships and exchanging experiences that will further strengthen and take the network to greater heights. afpi has played and will undoubtedly continue to play a pivotal role in promoting collaboration and peer learning to enhance the implementation of innovative financial inclusion policies across the african continent. the strides we have made thus far and the challenges we face as we strive to achieve this objective differ from one country to the next for many different reasons, such as our demography, culture, availability of resources and expertise, to name but a few. however, as we have experienced over the past few days, these diversities present ample opportunities for us to gain new perspectives, which we can use to strengthen our efforts to move forward as individual members and as a regional grouping. at this juncture, i would like to take this opportunity to thank and commend the outgoing chairperson, professor florens luoga, governor of the bank of tanzania. professor, your leadership and commitment over the past two years have contributed immensely towards efforts to push forward the digitalisation and innovation agenda with the aim of strengthening our financial systems. the central bank of seychelles is privileged to be taking the helm and continue steering the course that you and the preceding chairs of afpi have set us on. i am confident of your continued support and that of all the other governors and leaders of afpi. 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches our journey to enhance financial inclusion is ongoing and will have to evolve to adapt to changing realities. it is nevertheless an important journey that will continue to improve access to financial services for all and ultimately assist in achieving inclusive and sustainable economic growth. as a firm believer in teamwork and
acknowledges the aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples of australia as the traditional custodians of this land, and recognises their continuing connection to country. we pay our respects to their elders, past, present and emerging. https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2019 / sp - dg - 2019 - 11 - 15. html 6 / 6

rather than a term rate, and doesn't incorporate a significant bank credit risk premium. conclusion there are three main points i would like you to take away with you concerning interest rate benchmarks. first, the longevity of libor cannot be assumed, and you should start considering might mean for any contracts you have that reference libor. today what that second, in contrast, we are well advanced in changes to enhance the longevity of bbsw. while these changes entail some costs, the cost of not doing so would be considerably larger. third, you should think hard whether risk - free benchmarks are more appropriate rates for your financial contracts than credit - based benchmarks such as libor and bbsw. endnotes [ * ] thanks to ellis connolly for his work on interest rate benchmarks and in preparing this speech. i have talked about this issue previously : < https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2016 / sp - ag - 2016 - 02 - 22. html > and < https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2015 / sp - ag - 2015 - 11 - 18. html >. for andrew bailey's speech, see : < https : / / www. fca. org. uk / news / speeches / the - future - of - libor >. these are typically negotiable certificates of deposit ( ncds ). see : < https : / / treasury. gov. au / consultation / c2017 - t188618 / > and < http : / / www. aph. gov. au / parliamentary _ business / bills _ legislation / bills _ search _ results / result? bid = r5962 >. see : < http : / / www. asic. gov. au / about - asic / media - centre / find - a - media - release / 2017 - releases / 17 - 237mr - asic - consultson - proposed - financial - benchmark - regulatory - regime / >. for more details about the methodology for the cash rate, see : < https : / / www. rba. gov. au / mktoperations / resources / cash - rate - methodology / >. the rba has also conducted a self - assessment against the iosco benchmark principles : < https : / / www. rba. gov. au / mkt - operations / resources / cash - ratemethodo
papers on economic activity, fall, pp. 69 - 145, https : / / www. brookings. edu / wpcontent / uploads / 2008 / 09 / 2008b _ bpea _ gerardi. pdf. international monetary fund ( 2017 ). “ getting the policy mix right, ” in global financial stability report. washington : imf, april, https : / / www. imf. org / en / publications / gfsr / issues / 2017 / 03 / 30 / global - financialstability - report - april - 2017.

##i and others ( 2008 ). - 8 $ 1. 2 trillion flowed out of prime money funds - - the more fragile funds that also provide direct funding to large banking institutions - - toward government money funds, which are constrained to hold government - guaranteed assets. those assets include repurchase agreements ( or repos ) with private banks backed by treasury securities and the liabilities of government - sponsored enterprises, such as, notably, the federal home loan banks ( fhlbs ). while the current configuration of money markets reveals a reduced financial stability risk compared with the situation prior to the recent reforms, this configuration may not yet represent the final equilibrium. it will be important to keep an eye on the growth of alternative investment vehicles that perform liquidity transformation in money markets. of note, in part supported by increased demand from government - only money funds, the fhlb system has increased its issuance of shorter - maturity liabilities, which are more attractive to money funds. in turn, this development has led to an increase in the fhlb system ’ s maturity transformation because its assets - - loans to banks and insurance companies - - have remained relatively long maturity. as a result, the fhlbs face an increased need to roll over maturing liabilities and thus greater vulnerability should they encounter liquidity pressures. i should note that the fhlbs ’ regulator, the federal housing finance agency ( also known as the fa - fa ) flagged this issue more than a year ago and is working with the fhlbs ( the flubs ) to address it. asset valuations let me conclude my assessment of current financial stability conditions with a discussion of asset valuation pressures. prices of risky assets have increased in most major asset markets in recent months even as risk - free rates also rose. in equity markets, - 9price - to - earnings ratios now stand in the top quintiles of their historical distributions, while corporate bond spreads are near their post - crisis lows. prices of commercial real estate ( cre ) have grown faster than rents for some time, and measures of the amount of operating income relative to the sale price of commercial properties - - the capitalization rate - - have reached historical lows, suggesting continued pressures in the cre market despite some tightening in credit conditions. valuation pressures in single - family residential real estate markets appear, at most, modest, with price - to - rent ratios only slightly higher than their long - run trend. the general rise in valuation
current €60 billion per month to zero. but can it be done so easily? the bond spreads for countries such as italy might once again shoot upwards, as during the euro crisis. if the spreads for a particular country rise, that ’ s not a monetary policy problem. we are not singling out particular countries and neither are we there to ensure governments have favourable financing conditions. when the day comes, we will look at inflation and act accordingly, regardless of whether governments complain. we forewarned them and they clearly understood that. i have just read a commentary by the italian minister of economy and finance, pier carlo padoan. “ when the bond purchases come to an end, we are on our own ”, he writes. and he ’ s right. italy is currently in any case the euro area ’ s problem child. nowhere else is the economy growing so slowly ; nowhere else are the banks sitting on so many non - performing loans. how serious is the situation? indeed, the italian economy hasn ’ t grown for 20 years. real gdp per capita – taking inflation into account – has stagnated over that period. italy therefore has a deep - seated problem. the government is addressing that, but it also has to convince people to support the reforms. in fact, the economy has great potential, with very many creative enterprises. until now, greece was always the euro area ’ s shakiest prospect. but the country has just agreed on new loans and further debt relief with its international creditors. observers are now expecting the ecb to also accept greek government bonds in its purchase programme. they have been excluded until now because of doubts about the sustainability of the country ’ s debt. before we change any aspects of the asset purchase programme, we need to conduct our own analysis of greece ’ s debt sustainability. we will not rely on others for that. whether it ’ s the european stability mechanism or the european commission, everyone has their own perspective. but when it comes to buying bonds, we have to take a look for ourselves. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches that means the answer is “ no ”? that means we have to take a look for ourselves. the brexit negotiations started this week. from an economist ’ s perspective, how important is it that the eu and the united kingdom reach an agreement? extremely important. when we say that the economic outlook for the euro area is good and that risks are broadly balanced, that doesn ’ t mean that there

every time a new member state joins the euro area. in view of all these complications i believe we have succeeded in devising a suitable new voting system which should muster the unanimous support of the council and eventually be ratified by the member states. i know that it is not as simple as we would have liked. it is, however, as simple or complex as any other rotation system and fairly similar to the system operating at the federal reserve, where the presidents of federal reserve banks are also allocated to groups and exercise their voting right in the federal open market committee ( fomc ) with different frequencies. i hope that our exchange of views later on will help to clarify any other outstanding issues.