in some circumstances have to be bold and fast, but they also have to do things in a politically and legally acceptable manner. that ’ s what they ’ ve done, and that is also something to remember for the future. can central bankers push politicians to act if they are slow to act or make reforms? central bankers have no mandate and no legitimacy to push politicians. at the same time, they have a duty to speak their mind and publicly state what they think is necessary for economic policy. iii. china governor zhou of the pboc is also to retire ( soon )? looking from the outside, how do you see him? what i particularly notice is governor zhou ’ s international role. i ’ ve listened to him many times in basel, washington and other places. he ’ s one of the most respected governors around the table. when he takes the floor, everyone stops to listen to him, which is not always the case in international meetings. what has always struck me is that he expresses china ’ s position in a very clear way but he also aims to move the discussion on, seeking a consensus. that ’ s extremely valuable in an international discussion. for me, the very thoughtful and analytical way he has of addressing issues is a very important contribution. he always takes the time to explain complex issues, including for instance recent developments in china ’ s financial system, which can be quite complex for outsiders to understand. he has a very clear and concise way of explaining things, making discussions more constructive. how does the global central banking community view the pboc ’ s role in recent years? over the last ten years or so, there has been a clear evolution. the pboc has been engaging more and more with the international community and its central bank counterparts, in line with the changing role of china in the global economy. from an ecb perspective, i can say that we now have a relationship with the pboc that is as broad and deep as it is with a core group of other central banks, such as the federal reserve, the bank of japan, the bank of england and maybe a few others. this includes discussions on financial markets, monetary policy, payment systems, to name just a few. the pboc is part of that core group. the ecb in june invested a small amount of foreign reserves in the renminbi. why? any plans ahead? the amount is equivalent to €500 million, roughly 1 % of the ecb

luis de guindos : macroprudential policy for non - bank financial intermediation speech by mr luis de guindos, vice - president of the european central bank, at the fifth esrb ( european systemic risk board ) annual conference, frankfurt am main, 8 december 2021. * * * it is a great pleasure to join you this afternoon and share some thoughts on possible avenues for addressing vulnerabilities in the non - bank financial sector. i will focus on three main areas. i will start by outlining why a macroprudential approach to non - banks matters from a central banking perspective, touching upon monetary policy and financial stability considerations. i will then highlight some examples of the key externalities which emerged in the non - bank financial sector at the onset of the coronavirus ( covid - 19 ) pandemic. finally, i will share some considerations on the way forward for a macroprudential approach to non - bank financial intermediation ( nbfi ). why a macroprudential approach to nbfi matters from a central banking perspective the non - bank financial sector has grown considerably in size over the past decade, and it has become increasingly relevant for funding the real economy. in the euro area, the financial assets of non - bank financial institutions have more than doubled since the global financial crisis. accordingly, this sector has become an important source of funding for the real economy, with its share of overall credit to non - financial corporations growing from about 15 % to 30 %. this has clear benefits for non - financial corporations seeking to diversify their sources of funding across bank - based and market - based finance. from a central banking perspective, it also has implications for both financial stability and monetary policy. let ’ s first consider financial stability. structural vulnerabilities and the increasingly interconnected nature of the non - bank financial sector both pose a considerable risk to the wider financial system and the real economy. we highlighted some of these risks in our latest assessment 1 including growing liquidity mismatch, published in the ecb ’ s financial stability review, increasing duration risk and emerging evidence of pockets of high leverage in certain funds. in particular, the investment fund sector is now more exposed to credit risk, duration risk and liquidity risk than it was before the pandemic. holdings of bbb and sub - investment grade bonds now represent more than half of investment fund portfolios. non - banks are also crucial for the transmission of