financial commitments and changing our institutional framework for employment, credit developments in spain may be affected not only by the lack of momentum of solvent demand, but also by supply - side limitations. i would like to conclude on an optimistic note. i am convinced that, just as the need for fiscal consolidation or pension reform was ultimately recognised, so too will the unavoidable need to change our legal and institutional framework in such a way as to allow entrepreneurs to increase the supply of jobs and workers to decide whether to take them. in the past 50 years, spain has made numerous reforms across its economic structure. tariffs have been lifted and companies privatised, and competition has been fomented in many industries. yet the institutional framework for employment has remained practically and essentially unchanged since the onset of democracy. meanwhile, in recent decades, other economies, most notably the nordic countries, have introduced so - called flexicurity, i. e. they have introduced the flexibility needed to reduce the unemployment rate and to increase wages where productivity is growing most, and they have at the same time maintained and even strengthened the social protection which is a hallmark of our european model of society. finally, the measures i have mentioned are not the only ones that should be adopted. the reform agenda is an extensive one. for instance, it is essential to reduce administrative burdens, to simplify and coordinate economic regulation, and to alter oligopolistic structures, as was recently recommended by the competition board for the case of oil products. we could draw up a very extensive list of measures, but you will understand – and i hope appreciate – that, with limited time at my disposal, i have confined myself to what i consider most important and pressing. bis central bankers ’ speeches given the importance of the matter, i cannot conclude without referring to our level of educational attainment and, specifically, to secondary education. unfortunately, the measures that raise educational attainment pose a problem ; unlike the reforms we have looked at today, the effects of potential improvements in education are very slow and this explains why the attention the subject requires is continuously put off. but this slowness in bearing fruit is precisely what justifies the need to undertake this task as soon as possible and, while waiting, we should reiterate that education is the most important problem facing our society and our economy in the medium term. thank you very much. bis central bankers ’ speeches

respect the draft legislative proposal submitted by the european commission ( ec ) last july for the establishment of a single resolution mechanism is very timely. the ec proposes the creation of a single resolution agency or authority, which would manage a common fund fed by contributions from the industry and ultimately report to the european commission. it is true that some countries have expressed doubts as to the legal basis of the proposal. moreover, this initiative may possibly assign excessive protagonism to the ec in some cases. nevertheless, it is important that a political agreement be reached rapidly, allowing the creation of a scheme which will contribute not only to remedying the current fragmentation of the bank instrument market in europe, but also, as i mentioned earlier, to the effectiveness of the single supervisory mechanism. structural measures finally, the third pillar of global regulatory reform i wish to briefly inform you of is the measures aimed at restricting the business model of financial institutions. here i refer to the volcker rule in the united states, to the conclusions of the report drafted by an independent commission chaired by john vickers in the united kingdom and to the proposals in the european union by a group of experts chaired by the governor of the bank of finland, erkki liikaanen. the rationale of these reforms leaves little room, conceptually speaking, for discussion. in the years leading up to the crisis, banks devoted a substantial amount of funds to proprietary trading and own - account investment activities which notably increased the size and complexity of their balance sheets. this expansion of business may be partly related to the ease with which banks can access funds in a setting in which, as i described earlier, bank liabilities ( and particularly the most traditional type, such as deposits ) enjoy a kind of implicit public guarantee. that is to say, some banks have been able to use the taxpayers ’ guarantee to assume excessive risks which have made it increasingly likely that the guarantee will be called upon. structural measures are intended, in this respect, to prevent risky activities such as proprietary trading from being pursued by banks which simultaneously take deposits from the public. unfortunately, these initiatives have remained outside the bounds of international coordination and, more specifically, lie beyond the remit of the financial stability board ( fsb ), which has given rise to a lack of uniformity across jurisdictions. for example, although the us proposal permits deposit - taking institutions to engage in a wider range of activities than the european proposal does ( including market - making bis central bankers ’ speeches activities ), it does require