samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
legal, political and historical context, far - reaching reforms will be a formidable challenge, despite the extraordinary asset of a highly flexible labor market. nonetheless, there is no alternative to tackling independently and directly the domestic economic restructuring process and its consequences if switzerland is serious to boost its growth potential and thereby safeguard its tradition of broad social and welfare programs. because swiss gdp statistics do not fully take into account the improvement of the terms of trade regularly realized by the tradable sector, the growth differential between switzerland and other advanced economies is overstated but remains significant nevertheless. see e. g., term - of - trade changes and real gdp : evidence from switzerland, ulrich kohli, snb quarterly bulletin, june 2002. monetary policy and emu accession to a monetary union transfers the power over monetary policy from the national to the union level. there are costs and benefits to such an abdication of monetary sovereignty. nominal interest rates are equalized throughout a monetary union and the nominal exchange rate is no longer available as a tool for alleviating the impact of asymmetric shocks. necessary economic adjustments between different countries of a monetary union must therefore occur through various price and factor movements. as i have already suggested, imposing real wage adjustments in particular can be politically costly. in the case of both the uk and switzerland, these potential costs of emu membership are mitigated by virtue of flexible labor markets in both countries. in the case of switzerland, emu accession would also lead to the loss of an interest rate bonus our country has traditionally enjoyed. at least partly, this bonus is rooted in the credibility of the swiss national bank, acquired over a long period of independent and successful monetary policy ( chart 2 ). one benefit of emu membership for switzerland as a trading nation would be lower transaction costs derived from the use of a single currency and the disappearance of a considerable part of exchange rate risk for our exporters. interestingly, with the swiss franc ’ s recent stability vis - a - vis the euro, swiss euro oriented exporters have of late enjoyed both the interest rate bonus and considerable currency stability. this, of course, does not apply to our dollar - oriented exporters who have to manage a substantially higher exchange rate risk. when we observe switzerland ’ s business cycle and its degree of relative synchronization with that of the euro - zone, there is little evidence that the two business cycles would be fundamentally incompatible in the context of a monetary union. not surprisingly in light of

. ashx >. rba ( 2018 ), ‘ box c : spillovers from public investment ’, statement on monetary policy, february, pp 40 – 42. © reserve bank of australia, 2001 – 2018. all rights reserved. https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2018 / sp - ag - 2018 - 06 - 15. html 8 / 8
insurers. solvency ii should not materially drive investment decision making except in so far as it helps to make certain that insurers fully understand the risks that they take. the prudent person principle will seek to ensure that the industry understands and is capable of managing its investment risks. specifically, insurers must be able to demonstrate that they can properly identify, measure, monitor, manage, control and report on their investment risks and not place reliance upon information provided by third parties. investment choices should be made in the best interest of policy holders and beneficiaries. those running a business are best placed to make business decisions. that being said, the pra does have the benefit of perspective. the pra has the ability to look across the industry and can also draw upon the expertise of specialists working across the different areas of the bank of england. whilst on the subject of the role of management, we understand that there has been some uncertainty around our expectations of the non - executive director role for firms that have internal risk models. non - executive board members need not be technical experts in risk modelling. however, each board collectively should understand the key strengths, limitations, and judgements within their model. over - reliance on a single measure can be misleading. therefore, we want non - executives to have the right tools and sufficient knowledge to be able to challenge model outputs, rather than follow them slavishly. benefits to be gained through the implementation of a harmonised regime i have discussed the increased flexibility to be afforded firms in business and investment decisions and the expectations placed upon insurers in their knowledge and understanding of the risk exposures and their models. but i would also like to consider the benefits to be gained through the implementation of a harmonised regime. the benefits of solvency ii do not come from the improved prudential regime alone. insurance markets across the eu have been fragmented. the move towards a more cooperative framework will widen existing opportunities and help create new ones. the new framework seeks to introduce a level playing field across the eu, with risk - based capital standards and robust valuation practices that, together with enhanced disclosure rules, encourage the effective exercise of market discipline through the increased provision of information. from a systemic point of view, a more coherent and understandable regime should enhance confidence in the european insurance industry. this is particularly important at a time where weak real growth is leading to low levels of inflation and interest rates. bis central bankers ’ speeches financial markets

strong and resilient insurance sector. thank you bis central bankers ’ speeches
will take the decisions, all really appreciate the crucial importance of sustainable convergence to the success of the venture and that they do not see it just as a technical obstacle to their wider aspirations - i should like to think that. so, mr. chairman, some difficult decisions lie ahead. the period up to your next biennial dinner will be momentous. but that should not obscure the fact that our immediate economic prospects remain encouraging. i do not know of any serious economic forecaster who does not expect the economy to continue to grow over the next two year, or unemployment to continue to fall. the challenge is to ensure that we can still say that in two years ’ time.

the pre and post - crisis views on the question posed in the title of my address today? to try and answer this, at least partially, i will focus on one specific and very visible aspect of financial development – financial liberalisation. during the final two decades of the last century financial liberalisation led to a deepening of credit markets on a global scale. the end of what many have called “ financial repression ” permitted households, banks and sovereigns to accumulate increasing amounts of debt. of course, debt is not bad per se. it is part and parcel of an optimal allocation of resources – including capital – and of a financial system that enhances growth and welfare. but there can schumpeter, j. ( 1934 ), the theory of economic development, duncker & humblot, leipzig. trans. r. opie ( 1934 ), cambridge, ma : harvard university press. king r, levine r. ( 1993 ), finance and growth : schumpeter might be right, the quarterly journal of economics, vol. 108, no. 3. bis central bankers ’ speeches be such a thing as excessive indebtedness. and indeed, the indebtedness of banks, sovereigns and households was growing exceptionally strongly. for instance, on a global scale, the ratio of domestic credit to gdp increased from 74 % in 1980 to around 138 % in 2009. 3 this very high level of indebtedness is considered to have been a key feature of the crisis. this raises two major questions in my mind. first, what is the reason for the disconnect between our initial perception of financial development as being something positive, and the observed dismal outcomes? and, second, what lessons can we draw from our diagnosis? market failures, behavioural biases and regulatory design failures when our economic system malfunctions, it is natural to try and identify sources of what we generically refer to as “ market failures ”. typical market failures include market power, information asymmetries, external effects and public goods. uncorrected, these traditional market failures give raise to sub - optimal outcomes. to analyse the case at hand it is useful to extend the list of these usual suspects. let me begin with the banking sector. because this is a heavily regulated sector, regulatory design failures ( or possibly even system design failures ) could equally well be the source of inefficient outcomes. when thinking about public debt, it
zeti akhtar aziz : strengthening malaysia ’ s financial system speech by dr zeti akhtar aziz, governor of the central bank of malaysia, at the launch of the finance accreditation agency, kuala lumpur, 6 september 2013. * * * it is my great pleasure to join you this morning on the occasion of the launch of the finance accreditation agency. the establishment of the finance accreditation agency ( faa ) is part of the efforts to strengthen the financial system as it continues to evolve in a rapidly changing environment. the change in our financial system in this recent decade since the asian financial crisis has been transformational. it has encompassed major structural reforms in the banking sector, the development of a deep and vibrant securities market which has now assumed a key role in financial intermediation, the growth of islamic finance and the modernisation of the insurance sector. the regulatory and supervisory structure and approach has also evolved to become more risk - focused, more aligned with efficient capital and financial markets, and less reliant on prescriptive and direct controls. this has fostered greater innovation and competition in our financial system, while preserving strong incentives for prudent risk - taking. this has been reinforced through the supervisory oversight and increased market transparency. the evolution of business and distribution models has followed, with significant gains achieved in efficiency, greater financial inclusion and a more dynamic and responsive financial industry to better serve the economy. in addition, our financial system has become more global in its orientation, in turn lifting malaysia ’ s economic potential. the strategic importance of human capital has been central to this transformation. the quality of human capital has become a key driver and enabler of the change in this recent decade, with greater emphasis on productivity, and on elevating the skills and competencies of the talent pool in the financial industry. today, the financial sector workforce in malaysia has the highest total - factor productivity growth relative to other sectors of the economy. employment growth in the financial sector has also been in the higher skilled roles. this accounts for the higher level of wages in the financial sector which is more than one and half times the national average. financial services employees are also generally educated to a higher level, with higher expectations for individuals in key and senior - level positions within the industry to hold post - graduate or professional qualifications, in addition to relevant work experience. going forward, the human capital imperative will increase in importance – for the financial industry to sustain and reinforce the strong foundations that have been built, and to take

deck to governor ’ s ifctf keynote address
defined by shared and sustainable prosperity. with our collective efforts, may we be able to look back at this crisis with no regrets for wasted opportunities. may you have a fruitful and insightful discussion ahead. maraming salamat at mabuhay kayong lahat. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

felipe m medalla : preserving price and financial stability in the philippines speech by mr felipe m medalla, governor of bangko sentral ng pilipinas ( bsp, the central bank of the philippines ), at the meeting with fitch ratings at the sidelines of the 2023 international monetary funda€ “ world bank spring meetings, washington dc, 11 april 2023. * * * the headline [ inflation ] numbers are high. even the core [ inflation ] numbers are high. but what must be seen is [ inflation ] in relation to month - on - month ( m - o - m ) changes. unless there are new shocks, we are already moving toward an inflation path of below 4. 0 percent by october or november [ 2023 ]. the reason for this is that the price index in march [ 2023 ] is actually slightly lower than the price index in january. one way to look at it is : year - on - year [ inflation ] is the average of 12 m - o - m [ inflation prints ]. and if you have 10 very high [ months of elevated inflation ] and two [ months of ] very low [ inflation ], as soon as the higher months are bumped off by two months [ of within - target inflation ], then the inflation number is going back very quickly to below 4. 0 percent [ which is the upper end of the inflation target ]. that is why we are confident that, in the absence of new shocks, average inflation will be within - target, possibly below 3. 0 percent. supply - side pressures ease with the relaxation of import restrictions ; looking to rice as a lesson because of base effects, because of very high inflation in january 2023, [ m - o - m inflation for ] last january was terrible. without adjusting for seasonality, the january 2023 price index was 1. 7 percent higher than december 2022. anything terrible can happen [ that can drive inflation, such as ] swine flu, meat shortage, [ as well as increases on the prices of ] vegetables, fruits, and sugar - all those little things. what is notable is that rice is not there [ in the items driving inflation ]. the reason rice is not there is that the restrictions on imports were replaced with tariffs. in a sense, what caused the [ elevated ] inflation was that the government was restraining imports. but that is now being addressed. there was a survey [ which revealed ] that the issue that most people are concerned
. gov. au / speeches / 2021 / sp - gov - 2021 - 12 - 09. html 9 / 9

colleagues from abroad. all of you have played a part in creating an institution. some of you won ’ t have agreed with things we have said or done at one time or another! but you nonetheless sustained support for the bank as an institution and for the arrangements under which we operate. whatever success we may have had over the years owes a lot to the support and trust that the financial sector, the political leadership and our community – whom we serve – have been prepared to give us, even on occasions when they didn ’ t agree with us. we have also benefited greatly from the support of our international colleagues. thank you for that support. we shall continue to do our utmost to be worthy of it. thank you all for coming to be part of this celebration. please enjoy your evening.
policy frameworks, ” bis working paper 189. o. issing ( 2002 ) : “ central bank perspectives on stabilization policy, ” federal reserve bank of kansas city economic review, vol. 87, 4 ( fourth quarter ). j. m. keynes ( 1936 ) : “ the general theory of employment, interest and money ”, london : mc millan. s. kuroda and i. yamamoto ( 2003 ) “ the impact of downward nominal wage rigidity on the unemployment rate : quantitative evidence for japan, ” imes discussion paper no. 2003 - e - 12.

##ssect each and every speech of the various members of the policy making body to detect any indication about the next policy move. one thing that i would like to anticipate from the start is that economic history has thought that deflation risks should be considered objectively, rather than emotionally. on the one hand, the underestimation of deflation risks might ultimately lead to deflation. on the other hand, the overestimation of deflation risks might sow the seeds of the next crisis. 2. what is deflation? deflation is defined as a decline in the price level, such as the consumer price index, which has three main characteristics. it is : i ) generalised, i. e. it affects all prices ; ii ) persistent, i. e. it lasts for some time, over several years ; and iii ) expected by economic agents. it is often associated with a reduction in aggregate demand. an important sign of a deflation is the self - i thank l. dedola, k. forster, c. kamps and m. rostagno for their input in the preparation of these remarks. perpetuating nature of the process. 2 the expectation of price reductions induces households to postpone consumption and firms to reduce wage costs and to delay investment, also in view of the higher rate of return. this depresses aggregate demand which puts further downward pressure on prices. the appreciation of the exchange rate might further exacerbate this tendency. a well - known example of a self reinforcing price - income mechanism is japan ’ s experience in the 1990s – also referred to as the “ lost decade ”. a deflation triggered by a sharp fall in aggregate demand, possibly accompanied by unpredictable changes in economic sentiment ( the keynesian “ animal spirits ” ) which leads producers to cut prices on an ongoing basis, poses a serious cause of concern, in particular if it manifests itself in conjunction with a protracted economic slowdown and with risks of financial stability. this can result in a self - perpetuating downward spiral, in which conventional economic policy options are severely restricted. the system may find itself in a situation not very different from the keynesian “ liquidity trap ”, where private sector expectations of falling nominal and real values of financial and real assets lead agents to cling to any liquid and safe asset as much as possible. those self - perpetuating effects may arise through various channels, via onerous debt burden
. their advise on technical matters and have assisted us on the technical specification, security and design requirements for our new banknotes which has enabled the bank to make informed decisions in designed layout, printing, distribution, withdrawal and eventual destruction. in the case of polymer banknotes, they are actually recycled into pot plants, wheel barrows, car bumpers / fenders. with these few remarks, ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to introduce the new series k20 banknote in commemoration of the 34th anniversary of bank of papua new guinea, and to join the family of banknotes depicting the parliament theme. the new k20 becomes legal tender on monday, 5 november 2007 and they will be used side by side with the existing k20 notes until they are phased out over time. thank you and god bless.

trees and flowers begin to ‘ open up ’ or blossom. similarly, i hope that this april workshop can open up new discussions on several topics that are highly relevant for investments and for policy - making and lead to the blossoming of new ideas. for this, i want to thank lti, the organizers, the keynote speakers, the presenters, the discussants, and all of you in advance. i wish you a pleasant and constructive day of discussion. 1 www. cfainstitute. org / en / advocacy / policy - positions / short - termism - revisited 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches www. mckinsey. com / featured - insights / long - term - capitalism / where - companies - with - a - long - term - viewoutperform - their - peers # 3 such as warren buffett, jpmorgan chase ’ s jamie dimon and blackrock ’ s larry flink. 4 www. ft. com / content / 5bc1580d - 911e - 4fe3 - b5b5 - d8040f060fe1 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
business sector has so far largely been protected from weaker growth in the global economy, but this may change. low growth in the world economy may reduce demand for norwegian products and pressures in the norwegian economy. it may also help to curb imported price inflation. this could also result in lower price inflation than we have projected. against this background, norges bank has expressed its view that with an unchanged interest rate ahead, the probability that inflation two years ahead will be higher than 2½ per cent is the same as the probability that it will be lower.

profits tend to lead to stronger growth in wages. lower earnings prompt companies to cut costs. this may take the form of increased work effort, or possibly workforce reductions, in order to increase productivity. companies may also reduce growth in business fixed investment. since 1997, price inflation has been higher in norway than among our trading partners. the most important reason for higher price inflation in norway is that we have had a tight labour market for many years. this has also led to high growth in wages and labour costs. in the light of higher price and cost inflation in norway than in other countries, it has been appropriate to maintain higher interest rates in norway than in most comparable countries. norges bank increased the sight deposit rate - which is our key rate - by a total of 1½ percentage points last year. so far this year, the key rate has remained the relationship between wage growth and price inflation was also discussed in the annual address in february this year. unchanged. as a result, the difference between short - term rates in norway and other countries has increased. the economic outlook the bank last analysed the outlook for the norwegian economy in the june 2001 inflation report. price inflation is projected to fall to 2½ per cent by next year already. the risk picture is mixed. the norwegian economy is still characterised by high capacity utilisation. the labour market is tight. there is a risk that domestic pressures may gradually translate into a stronger price impetus than we have projected. the consumer price index has risen by 2. 7 per cent since july 2000. the consumer price index excluding the direct effects of changes in excise duties and energy prices ( cpixe ) has risen by 2. 6 per cent since july last year, as calculated by norges bank. statistics norway publishes a consumer price index excluding electricity prices and a consumer price index excluding energy prices. they have a broader definition of energy prices than we use in our calculations. statistics norway has not adjusted for the direct effects of excise duties in their indices, but projects that the combined effect of changes in excise duties in january and july will depress the year - on - year rise in the cpi by 0. 5 - 0. 6 percentage points in july. according to statistics norway, the cpi excluding energy prices and excise duties can then be estimated at 2. 2 - 2. 3 per cent. whereas the activity level and pressures in the norwegian economy are high, there is growing uncertainty about developments in the global economy. the norwegian