ex - ante evaluation studies, and analyzing the effects of these policies through ex - post evaluation studies. having [UNK] and reliable data early on is a key ingredient for such a policy process. without good data, monitoring key indicators and assessing vulnerabilities is [UNK], and there will be an [UNK] basis for ex ante policy evaluation. 3 better statistics for improved surveillance reliable statistics are the first ingredient in any discussion on regulatory responses to financial innovation from a macroprudential perspective. this presents a ” chicken - andegg ” problem : decisions on ( macroprudential ) regulation – including the decision whether or not to regulate – require good and reliable data as an input into surveillance work. at the same time, data on financial institutions are traditionally collected within the context of ( micro ) prudential regulation and for monetary policy purposes. hence, data would be collected after taking the decision to regulate. one key policy response to digital innovations and new providers of financial services is thus to address what one may call the “ big data paradox ” : on the one hand, new technologies promise a better, faster, and safer provision of financial services and a more [UNK] use of data. on the other hand, financial regulators are struggling to understand the implications of digital innovations because there is hardly any consistent statistical information on how those innovations change market structures. following the financial crisis, new statistical projects have thus been launched that decouple monitoring from regulation and that satisfy the data needs of a wide range of policy fields. within the european system of central banks, for example, anacredit ( analytical credit datasets ) and the securities holdings statistics provide granular information that provides inputs for a large range of central banking tasks. there have also been several national and international initiatives aimed at closing data gaps regarding non - bank financial intermediation. the goal of these initiatives is to enhance the monitoring of risks by improving primary statistics on non - bank financial intermediation in financial accounts ( esrb 2019 ). especially with regard to fintech and bigtech, this requires both, defining the institutions that enter the industry and provide financial services as well as the definition of the services provided. currently, many statistics on the financial sector do not capture fintechs as most are recorded as providers of non - financial services. therefore, activities of these firms are not recorded systematically, and information on the riskiness of bigtechs and fintechs is patchy. currently, it is even [UNK] to obtain accurate figures

are in place, cross - border crisis management groups have been established for all g - sibs, and home and host authorities have signed institution - speciﬁc cross - border cooperation agreements for most g - sibs. the financial stability board is evaluating these too - big - to - fail reforms for systemically important banks. on 28 june the fsb published a report for consultation. the consultation closes on 30 september, and responses from a wide range of stakeholders are highly welcome. the main ﬁndings of the evaluation can broadly be summarised as follows : • indicators of systemic risk and moral hazard have fallen. systemically important banks are much better capitalised and have built up signiﬁcant loss - absorbing capacity. their funding costs now appear to reﬂect the probability of a bail - in in the event of failure. • effective tbtf reforms bring net beneﬁts to society. not only are banks more resilient, there are also no signs of material negative side - effects. and in particular, there has been no reduction in the aggregate supply of credit to the real economy. • there are still gaps that need to be addressed. some obstacles to resolvability remain, and there are gaps in information available to market participants and to public authorities. in these remarks, i would like to focus upon the implications of the too - big - to - fail reforms on global banking. 2 the capacity of globally active banks to absorb shocks has increased two reforms within the scope of the evaluation are intended to increase the capacity of g ‐ sibs to absorb losses, both as a going concern and in resolution. on a going - concern basis, g - sibs are subject to capital surcharges that range from 1 % to 2. 5 % of risk - weighted assets, or rwas. these requirements must be met with the highest - quality type of capital, common equity tier 1. g ‐ sibs must also meet requirements for loss - absorbing capacity in resolution. the minimum tlac requirement, which is expressed as a ratio of both risk - weighted assets ( rwas ) and the basel iii leverage exposure measure, is being phased in between 2019 and 2022. in terms of capital, clear progress has been made. the tier 1 capital ratios of g - sibs have doubled since 2011. over the same period, leverage ratios have nearly doubled as well. nevertheless, and notwithstanding differences in data sources and measurement, g - sibs on