samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
are estimated to have contributed both to the increase in the structural level of exports and to their geographical diversification towards markets with greater growth potential, thereby resulting in a favourable market - share performance. at the same time, imports have been seen to be flatter in relation to the rise in final demand, despite the momentum of exports in firms and sectors with a high import content. that likewise points to an improvement in the competitiveness of the resident productive sector compared with foreign competitors. the pick - up in our competitive capacity is highly tangible in terms of spain ’ s unit labour costs relative to those of the rest of the euro area. these costs fell by 14 % between 2008 and 2019, after rising forcefully during the pre - crisis years. the gains in competitiveness vis2 / 6 a - vis the euro area were reflected, in the early stages of the crisis, in heavy job destruction, and throughout the subsequent period, in wage moderation. contributing to this were the successive amendments to the labour market legal framework during the crisis, which proved to be effective levers for boosting the recovery in employment. overall, these developments enabled the competitiveness lost in relation to the other euro area countries – measured via relative unit labour costs ( ulcs ) – to be restored. specifically, while for the market economy as a whole ulcs growth in spain from 1999 to 2008 exceeded that observed in the euro area by 16 pp, the current relative level is 5 pp below that of 1999. we must add to these improvements the enhanced financing conditions for resident agents as a whole. included among these agents are spanish firms which, from end - 2012, saw their financial costs ease strongly. also, most particularly, there was a correction to the differences in the interest rates they had previously to pay compared with their competitors in the core euro area countries. in this setting, the ecb ’ s clearly expansionary monetary policy stance, the institutional reforms to the financial governance of the eu, and the cleanup and restructuring of the national financial sector were all pivotal in significantly reducing the degree of financial fragmentation in the euro area between 2010 and 2012. deleveraging by the non - financial private sector has also notably influenced competitiveness. this ongoing process is very advanced both in the case of non - financial corporations and of households. in the case of companies, for instance, the debt / gdp ratio has fallen by more than 40 pp from its peak, meaning it now stands below the average for euro area firms. this has all contributed

and product markets with a view to contributing to better resource allocation and to improving our economy ’ s competitive capacity. thank you. 6 / 6
is improved significantly with the use of nickel - plated steel. the coins are also more resistant to discoloration, corrosion, and everyday wear and tear. mr. president, ladies and gentlemen, the bsp is honored to discharge its mandate to maintain currency integrity, to further promote public trust and confidence in philippine currency. we respectfully present these banknotes and coins. thank you. now, we have a short avp on the ngc coin series. 1 / 1 bis central bankers'speeches

timothy n j antoine : launch of results of financial literacy and financial inclusion survey remarks by mr timothy n j antoine, governor of the eastern caribbean central bank, at the launch of results of financial literacy and financial inclusion survey, basseterre, 18 september 2023. * * * salutations members of the monetary council members of the eccb board of directors dr. didacus jules, director general of the oecs commission ms. lilia buruncic, director for the caribbean, world bank and team ms. helen gradstein and team from the united nations capital development fund ( uncdf ) dr. valda henry, deputy governor ms. tracy polius, chief director ( policy ) mrs. c. teresa smith, director of the research, statistics and data analytics department heads of department, management and staff mr. imran williams, project manager and oecs project team, now the director of finance in the government of saint lucia mrs. gail gray - phillip, head of uwi global campus, st. kitts and nevis mr. edwin st. catherine, ceo, data point solutions inc. and team specially invited guests students members of media fellow citizens and residents of the eccu introduction greetings from your eastern caribbean central bank! we work for you. 1 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches today, we are pleased to share the results of our inaugural financial literacy and inclusion survey. we could not undertake this effort without partnerships. consequently, at this juncture, i wish to highly commend all those associated with this survey, especially mrs. c. teresa smith and dr. leah sahely from the eccb, and the entire project management unit at the oecs commission led by mr. imran williams, now the director of finance in the government of saint lucia. i wish also to acknowledge the technical and financial support of the world bank under the caribbean digital transformation project ; mr. edwin st. catherine whose company, data point solutions inc., executed the survey ; and all the persons who participated in the survey. why did the eccb commission this survey? here at eccb, financial inclusion is a strategic priority. financial inclusion refers to access to a range of financial services including banking, credit and insurance. investopedia defines financial literacy as the ability to understand certain financial issues and use financial skills for personal financial management such as budgeting and investing. in a region which boasts high levels of adult literacy ( high 90 per
the weakest growth since 2009. this weakness comes despite several supportive factors including : the unprecedented monetary stimulus ; the positive effect of low commodity prices on spending power ; and cheaper and more sophisticated information technology. for example : • the world has never seen cheaper financing. policy rates are close to zero in advanced economies that collectively generate 2 / 3rds of world output, and bis central bankers ’ speeches quantitative easing by major central banks in advanced economies has totaled around usd7 trillion in recent years. 1 • due mainly to the weakening in chinese demand ( but also to strong supply in many markets ), prices of a wide range of commodities have been falling since early - 2014. 2 while this slows growth in the developing world ( which is the main global source of commodities ) falling commodity prices are generally positive for growth in developed countries. • the decline in the cost of information technology over the past three decades possibly represents the largest continuous set of factor cost reductions the world has experienced. not only is the marginal cost of storing, processing and transmitting information essentially zero, the creative destruction of information technology has generated new products and consumer markets, and enabled further efficiencies to be squeezed out of global supply chains. despite these factors, and the ease with which capital can flow across borders, economic growth rates even in the advanced commodity importing countries remain below potential growth rates eight years after the onset of the global financial crisis ( gfc ). many reasons have been advanced for the disappointing global recovery. some observers emphasise the depth of the gfc and its impact in repricing every asset across the globe, the scale of the household and corporate deleveraging that was unleashed and its prolonged impact on economic risk taking. others link the weak recovery to the slowdown in global trade, which has been a major catalyst for global growth in recent decades, and to the impact of protectionism and the maturing of global supply chains. there are also debates about future economic prospects, including whether these might look increasingly like the recent past or even worse. some consider that the global economy may be in danger of entering a period of secular stagnation characterised by excess desired global savings relative to investment and weak global demand. 3 others question whether rates of innovation and technological progress are slowing and whether productivity gains from the ict revolution have been largely realised. 4 the inflation picture also, is complicated. in the vast majority of the 30 or so economies ( mainly advanced economies ) whose central banks pursue inflation targeting, headline and underlying inflation

their way with their policy responses. the french royal naval frigate, mеduse, sank off the coast of senegal in 1816. of the original 150 people on the raft, only 15 survived. bis central bankers ’ speeches
like myself to realize that the times, and challenges, that we face are different from the ones that mr. willson wrote about back in 1974. thanks again for coming tonight. and now let ’ s turn to your questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches

rates on government bonds started to rise, the damage had already been done. and, faced with that situation, it is extremely difficult to uphold the no - bail - out principle. as i ’ m sure you will remember, no member state is allowed to assume liability for another ’ s debts. this principle was, at the very least, stretched quite a long way when assistance was granted to greece. that, however, was not entirely unjustified : the euro - area countries are now so closely integrated that problems in one country can spread quickly to the entire euro area in a phenomenon known as contagion. when push came to shove, it appeared necessary to help other member states. and that is quite understandable in the short term. however, in the long run it is dangerous if countries with a debt problem can expect to receive help no matter what. this risks triggering a dangerous spiral of more and more assistance and less and less confidence in the will of the affected countries to mend their ways. routes to a stable monetary union and such a loss of confidence is just what we are facing right now. the public, and also the markets, have lost faith – in politics, but also in the architecture of our monetary union. the question is : how do we go about restoring confidence? let me begin by stating clearly what won ’ t work. setting up larger and larger rescue packages is not the way to instil lasting confidence. this strategy ultimately has its limits – be they political or financial. and the proposal of circumventing financial limits by printing money is dangerous. of course the resources of a central bank are, in theory, nearly without limit. using them to finance sovereign debt, however, does not solve problems but, instead, creates new ones. such an approach would endanger the key foundation of a stable currency : the independence of a central bank dedicated to price stability. this would throw overboard the very things that need saving. and, as i said earlier : money can ’ t buy confidence. even the largest rescue packages can provide no more than a temporary reprieve. time, in fact, is the only thing you can buy. but this bought time must actually be used to eliminate the root causes of the crisis. and this leads us to three key steps that the bundesbank believes need to be taken. bis central bankers ’ speeches firstly, government budgets need to be put back in order. this goes for all euro - area countries but is particularly
eu / press / key / date / 2017 / html / sp170330. en. html [ 03. 04. 2017 15 : 53 : 14 ] central bank independence revisited the primacy of national competence in the field of macroprudential policy is clarified in article 127 ( 5 ) of the treaty, which states that “ the escb shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the stability of the financial system ”. this implies that, in general, the eurosystem has only a contributory role to the formulation of macroprudential policies. this means that, while the responsibility for the stability of the financial system lies with the competent authorities of the member states, the eurosystem may intervene to support, coordinate or complement the actions of those member states whose currency is the euro. the specific tools given to the ecb by the ssm regulation to tighten up macroprudential measures adopted by the national macroprudential authorities ( but not to ease them ) in order to address the risk of cross - border spill - overs also reflect this division of competences between the union and national levels : the adoption procedure for those top - up ecb decisions [ 53 ] may be initiated only at the initiative of the national macroprudential authorities, thus emphasising the national character of macroprudential competences. the treaty does not set macroprudential supervision as a basic escb task or financial stability as an escb objective. the reasoning appears to be that it is national, rather than union, developments which contribute to systemic risks, and that the bearing of costs arising out of financial crises is predominantly a national rather than a union matter. accordingly, the macroprudential authorities are accountable to their respective national stakeholders. although, after the 2008 financial crisis, there were calls for greater central bank involvement in the oversight of macroprudential aspects of banking activities, [ 55 ] in the end, no changes beyond the contributory role of the escb were initiated. the escb contribution to the work of national authorities in this area can be seen as a contributory task rather than an own competence. as macroprudential policy does not generally involve escb policy decisions, the question of the applicability of the principle of independence under article 130 of the treaty is less relevant in this area. a possible exception is the case where macroprudential considerations are taken into account under the second pillar of the ec

m. ( 2016 ), “ business, housing and credit cycles ”, working paper series, no 1915, ecb. [ 57 ] see issing, o., “ monetary and financial stability – is there a trade - off? ”, speech at conference on “ monetary stability and the business cycle ”, bank for international settlements, basel, 28 - 29 march 2003. [ 58 ] see ecb ( 2016 ), macroprudential bulletin, issue 1 / 2016, ecb, frankfurt am main, germany, chapter 1. http : / / www. ecb. europa. eu / press / key / date / 2017 / html / sp170330. en. html [ 03. 04. 2017 15 : 53 : 14 ]
mervyn king : monetary policy developments speech by mr mervyn king, governor of the bank of england, at the university of exeter, exeter, 19 january 2010. * * * some dates are easier to remember than others. 1789 and the french revolution, 1989 and the fall of the berlin wall, 1929 and the wall street crash are easily recalled. how will 2009 be remembered : as the year when the world economy fell off a cliff but was rescued by government and central bank intervention around the world? or the year when we finally recognised that genuine reform to the international monetary and banking system was essential to restore prosperity? time will tell. the world economy is now coming out of recession. but the cost of the banking crisis has been high. after an unprecedented period of sustained growth, total output in the united kingdom has now fallen for six consecutive quarters. it contracted last year by around 5 %, the largest fall in output since 1931. national income is around 10 % below the level it would have reached in the absence of the financial crisis. around the world, governments and central banks put a massive sticking plaster on the wounds in the form of an extraordinary degree of monetary and fiscal stimulus. as a result, business confidence, orders and output, which all collapsed at the end of 2008, are gradually recovering. but there is a long period of healing ahead. although quarterly growth rates of gdp may soon turn positive in the united kingdom, unemployment is likely to remain high. fortunately, it has not increased to the 10 % rate now experienced in both the united states and the euro area. but at just under 8 %, it is markedly above the level to which we had become accustomed during the period known as the “ great stability ”. the sharp monetary squeeze resulting from the efforts by banks to contract their balance sheets is still casting a shadow over the future path of output and employment. over the past year, broad money growth has slowed sharply to a virtual standstill in the united states, and it turned slightly negative in the euro area. in normal circumstances, we might expect annual rates of increase of between 5 % and 10 %. at home, annual broad money growth has slowed somewhat less sharply, and remains positive. the unprecedented actions of the monetary policy committee to inject £200 billion directly into the economy – described by some as “ quantitative easing ” – have averted a potentially disastrous monetary squeeze. the headline in the racing post of 29 december said it all : “ quantitativeasing maintains perfect record ”

mpc had predicted. so how will 2009 be remembered? as i said at the outset, it is too early to tell. the full impact of the financial crisis has yet to be seen. and the national statisticians will take another two years or so before providing their best estimates of spending and output in the uk economy. more importantly, the question of whether basic reforms to the structure of banking and the international monetary system will be made before another crisis engulfs the world economy remains unanswered.
thanks for your attention. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

guy debelle : regulatory reforms and their implications for financial markets, funding costs and monetary policy address by mr guy debelle, assistant governor ( financial markets ) of the reserve bank of australia, to the financial services institute of australia, adelaide, 18 september 2012. * * * matt boge provided invaluable help in the preparation of this speech. it is a pleasure to speak here today in my home town. neil grummitt has spoken about some of the details of the regulatory reform process currently underway in australia and globally. my aim is to consider some of the broader implications of the reforms. before doing so, there is an important point to make. the changes we all see the banking and financial system undergoing are not purely the result of regulatory changes. rather there are a number of forces all pushing in the same direction. some of the changes we see are self - imposed, as financial institutions look at the lessons learned over recent years and seek to increase their own resiliency to future developments. some are being imposed by the market in terms of the availability of both the quantity and price of particular channels of financing. others reflect pressure from rating agencies. currently, all of these forces are generally aligned in changing the structure of the financial system in the same direction, although they may vary in terms of degree. in that sense, the impact of regulation may not be as large as it appears on the surface. rather regulation is, in many cases, serving to reinforce the other forces at work. but the regulatory changes will be more binding when these other forces are no longer all pushing in the same direction. the experience over many years is that some of these forces are certain to wane when the credit cycle is in full upswing. in the good times, self - discipline can falter under the weight of competitive pressures, as can market discipline. hopefully in those circumstances, the regulatory framework will continue to impart the necessary restraint. today, i ’ m going to focus on the basel iii reforms. other reforms, such as those around central clearing and otc derivatives are also having a significant impact on the way many of you do business, but i will leave them for another time. the basel iii measures will strengthen the requirements for financial institutions ’ liquidity and capital. it is the impact of some of these reforms on financial markets and on funding costs that i would like to address today. in thinking about this issue, it is important to remember that the intent of the regulatory reforms
of businesses and the health of the economy as a whole. therefore, let us be united in working for a better and brighter future for malaysia. greater governance and transparency will get us there. thank you. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

own economy, but also on key partner economies. i welcome the development of the principal global indicators ( pgis ) that will be comparable for the g20 economies, including the euro area, and which are similar to the principal european economic indicators for economic and monetary union. the pgi website maintained by the imf 17 is supported by six other international organisations, including the ecb. conclusions let me conclude. evidence - based decision - making in modern economies is unthinkable without statistics. this applies a fortiori to monetary and financial stability policies. the financial crisis has revealed information gaps that we have to close while also preparing ourselves for future challenges. this is best achieved through creating a wide range of economic and financial statistics that are mutually consistent, thereby eliminating contradictory signals due to measurement issues. the main aggregates must be both reliable and timely, and, in a globalised world, they should be comparable across countries and economies. reliability and timeliness are key for statistics, but may seem to be conflicting objectives. this is more the case in the short - term, as the production frontier for compiling statistics can be enhanced in the medium term by a higher degree of automation. the effective and efficient collection, compilation and dissemination of european statistics requires a well developed statistical infrastructure, including, most importantly, a team of skilled and experienced statisticians familiar with european and international cooperation. i take tomorrow ’ s world statistics day as an occasion to remind all of us of the importance of highquality statistics. they are central to the foundations of public and private sector decisionmaking throughout our societies. thank you for your attention. see http : / / financialdatalink. sharepointsite. net / default. aspx.