samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
federal reserve system ( 2016 ), " federal reserve issues fomc statement, " press release, november 2. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

is the meaning of symmetric and asymmetric directives? i think that it has become clear that symmetry / asymmetry is a subtle concept. i believe that there are two interrelated dimensions of the so - called tilt or bias in monetary policy. the first dimension relates to the balance of risks going forward. the second relates to the probability of a near - term policy change. the tilt provides the market with an indication of the committee ’ s balancing of the risks related to emerging excess demand or supply and inflation going forward and hence in what direction policy is more likely to move. in a symmetric directive, the risks are viewed as evenly balanced, so that the next rate increase could as easily be up or down. in an asymmetric directive, the risks are viewed as tilted in one direction or the other, so there is, for example, a greater likelihood of an increase than a decrease in rates. a symmetric directive also indicates little prospect that a near - term move will be required if the economic outlook evolves roughly as expected. an asymmetric directive, in contrast, alerts the market to the greater possibility, though not the certainty, of a move in a particular direction over some near - term policy horizon. at the december 1998 meeting, the fomc decided, going forward, to announce the tilt and explain the reason for such a policy change in those cases where the change in the committee ’ s views of the balance of risks was “ significant ” and when announcing this change to the public was viewed as “ important. ” this made the announcement of the tilt, in effect, another policy tool because an announced change in the tilt would move market rates, though to a lesser degree than a change in the rate itself. this decision should be understood as an effort to increase the transparency of monetary policy and to allow the committee to communicate more clearly its views of the balance of risks and the prospects of further policy actions going forward. underlying this effort is the view that financial markets operate more efficiently when they have more complete information and the preference for signaling markets about prospective policy actions rather than surprising markets. the early experience with its use suggests that announced adjustments in the tilt sometimes have unexpectedly large effects on financial markets and on the reaction of markets to subsequent data or statements by fomc members. it has also become clear that it is not easy to communicate some of the subtleties and complexities of monetary policy intentions in a single word. when the signaling is, as a result
for the euro area, which foresee annual hicp inflation at 1. 5 % in 2017, 1. 3 % in 2018 and 1. 6 % in 2019. by comparison with the march 2017 ecb staff macroeconomic projections, the outlook for headline hicp inflation has been revised downwards, mainly reflecting lower oil prices. turning to the monetary analysis, broad money ( m3 ) continues to expand at a robust pace, with an annual rate of growth of 4. 9 % in april 2017, after 5. 3 % in march. as in previous months, annual growth in m3 was mainly supported by its most liquid components, with the narrow monetary aggregate m1 expanding at an annual rate of 9. 2 % in april 2017, after 9. 1 % in march. the recovery in loan growth to the private sector observed since the beginning of 2014 is proceeding. the annual growth rate of loans to non - financial corporations increased to 2. 4 % in april 2017, from 2. 3 % in the previous month, while the annual growth rate of loans to households remained stable at 2. 4 % in april. the pass - through of the monetary policy measures put in place since june 2014 continues to significantly support borrowing conditions for firms and households, access to financing, notably for small and medium - sized enterprises, and, hence, credit flows across the euro area. to sum up, a cross - check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed the need for a continued very substantial degree of monetary accommodation to secure a sustained return of inflation rates towards levels that are below, but close to, 2 %. in order to reap the full benefits from our monetary policy measures, other policy areas must contribute much more decisively to strengthening economic growth. the implementation of structural reforms needs to be substantially stepped up to increase resilience, reduce structural unemployment and boost productivity and potential output growth. regarding fiscal policies, all countries would benefit from intensifying efforts towards achieving a more growthfriendly composition of public finances. a full, transparent and consistent implementation of the stability and growth pact and of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure over time and across countries remains essential to bolster the resilience of the euro area economy. we are now at your disposal for questions. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

of the rates of growth in real estate prices, real investment, real money growth and real credit over low and high - cost asset - price booms. the patterns of the computed median values are depicted on the graphs. a bar indicates that the distribution of growth rates in high - cost booms is significantly different34 from the distribution of growth rates in low - cost booms for the considered period at the 20 % ( low bar ), 10 % ( medium bar ) or 5 % ( tall bar ) significance level. in the graphs, the vertical axis represents annualised percentage points, while the horizontal axis displays the seven periods considered. the differences between high - and low - cost booms in each period of the boom have been tested using the wilcoxon / mannwhitney test.
and bargaining, changes in patterns of international trade, etc. thus, i am very glad that this wide range of perspectives will be covered in our conference. finally, my colleagues and i intend this conference to serve you as a forum to exchange thoughts and ideas. with that, i wish you active participation and fruitful discussions. thank you. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

authority, it is also my pleasure to invite the governor of the ncdc, hon. powes parkop, mp and the chairman of nationwide microbank limited, mr. ray clark to join me in opening the port moresby branch of nationwide microbank limited. it gives us great pleasure in declaring that the nationwide microbank limited is now open for business. thank you, ladies and gentlemen.
the inflation target.

cent of gdp toward the end of 2009, or about one - half of its size in 2006. however, adjustment through a collapse in demand is hardly desirable. the sustainable rebalancing of domestic demand from deficit countries, such as the united states and the united kingdom, toward surplus countries, such as china and germany, will take some time and is likely to dampen the pace of growth in the global economy during that period. second, the crisis marks a watershed for the design and use of financial services. for three decades, major economies have undergone a process of financial deepening, whereby people and firms were able to borrow more readily and efficiently to finance investments and to smooth consumption over time. people also took increasing control of their retirement planning and became steadily more active in financial markets. with these changes, the importance of financial markets relative to banks – and of the financial sector relative to other sectors of the economy – increased. during this process, the level of household debt relative to gdp rose sharply. these trends were at their most extreme in the united kingdom and the united states. the reversal of these trends began with the current financial crisis and will be encouraged by changes both to the structure of the financial services industry and in the portfolio preferences of individuals. as a result, we can now expect a period of financial shallowing – characterized by reintermediation of transactions onto bank balance sheets, a relative decline in market - based finance, and a decrease in cross - border financial flows. in the process, financial leverage will fall. there has already been considerable deleveraging of the non - regulated financial sector ( hedge funds, structured investment vehicles ( sivs ) and captive finance companies of major industrial companies ). however, there is still much to be done on the regulated side. the bank of canada estimates that for foreign banks to delever to canadian levels, they will need to raise about us $ 1 trillion in capital prior to any additional write - downs incurred. third and most fundamentally, it would appear likely that the global economy is entering a period of lower potential growth. it is now readily apparent that there was substantial capital misallocation in the boom years, including heavy investment in non - tradable real estate and a global auto industry geared to outmoded demand patterns. it will take time to reorient, since household savings are likely to rise substantially in many industrialized countries. one of the lessons of japan ’ s “ lost decade ” is that an economy cannot really have
in your respective countries. i wish all of you a very fruitful learning experience and stimulating exchanges, and a very successful workshop.

ajith nivard cabraal : practical, not conventional, wisdom has driven sri lanka ’ s rebuilding and reconciliation article by mr ajith nivard cabraal, governor of the central bank of sri lanka, 3 april 2014. * * * about five years ago, sri lanka faced three daunting economic challenges. to deal with those challenges, the sri lankan authorities implemented certain pragmatic strategies that challenged conventional wisdom. at the time of defeating terrorism in may 2009, a massive investment was required to restore normalcy in the terror - torn northern province. conventional wisdom suggested that the rebuilding, rehabilitation and restoration should be carried out at a moderate pace, without burdening the economy unduly, and without placing government expenditure under stress. however, even at the risk of experiencing a spike in the fiscal deficit in the years 2009 and 2010, sri lanka executed a rapid action plan to de - mine land, re - settle idps, and upgrade infrastructure in the war - affected areas. that investment brought quick relief to the hundreds of thousands of people who had suffered during the 30 year war. the cost? a staggering us $ 3. 2 billion over 4 years, or nearly 6 % of gdp! the direct benefit? rapid clearance of over a million landmines from the northern province : speedy resettlement of nearly 300, 000 idps ; early restoration of the infrastructure : considerable progress in agriculture, fisheries and sme activity : significant increase in industrial production and domestic tourism : major transformation in the financial sector ; and creation of new entrepreneurs and job opportunities ; the overall outcome? a peaceful country without a single terrorist incident ; significant country - wide economic growth ; and sharp reduction in poverty levels. these incredible outcomes vividly reflected the extraordinary benefits that had been reaped via practical wisdom! around 2008, the country was trapped in a “ vicious cycle ” that had hampered growth since independence : high fiscal deficits leading to high inflation ; high inflation leading to high interest rates ; high interest rates leading to low investor confidence ; low investor confidence leading to sluggish investment ; sluggish investment leading to lower growth than potential ; lower growth and high fiscal deficits leading to unfavorable debt dynamics which in turn, impacted fiscal deficits adversely. this vicious cycle was deep rooted, and many sri lanka ’ s economists who subscribed to conventional wisdom used to lament that this cycle was the country ’ s “ karma ” ( fate ), and that it would be impossible to break
, this notion amounts to a minor revolution. as during the transformation process in eastern europe, policy makers need to win people ’ s hearts and minds for these reforms. we must learn to think [ and argue ] in terms of gains rather than in terms of losses. in this respect, policy makers in the eu countries can learn a thing or two from the transformation countries. what we need now is not a little bit of reform here and a little bit of reform there. like the transformation countries had, we need a coherent approach to reforms. the bundesbank mapped out such an approach for germany in its paper “ ways out of the crisis ” earlier this year. the german government ’ s “ agenda 2010 ” reflects the new approach to reforms. it should stick to this approach and must not allow itself to be deflected from its course. let me comment in a little bit more detail on that. i would like to start with the fiscal side of reforms. balanced budgets are at the top of the reform agenda. public finances must be consolidated via the expenditure side. this is perfectly in line with the goal of a more subsidiary role of the state and should start with cutting subsidies. past experience has also shown it to be the most effective road to achieving sound public finances. financial tensions in the social security systems are weighing heavily on budgets in the west european countries. for expenditure - side consolidation to work in an ageing society, the pension and healthcare systems must undergo a transformation. partial privatisation and capital funding yield a triple dividend : • they ease the burden on the budgets, • they raise the systems ’ resilience to demographic stress, • and they are perfectly in line with the model of citizens taking on greater personal responsibility. the role of the state is changing. from being a provider of goods and services, it is being transformed into a facilitator which defines an overall framework designed to enable individuals to thrive on their own. this framework encompasses the market - based system : the labour market, the financial markets and the product markets. flexibility is crucial for an efficient interplay of supply and demand. the framework for a stability - oriented monetary policy has its fiscal equivalent in the stability and growth pact. it was implemented in order to make sure monetary stability is not counteracted by fiscal leniency. the pact itself is both sound and flexible. the current unfavourable debt dynamics in the wake of slow growth bode ill for the single currency. in my view

euro area and thereby for the continuing success of the euro.
over time by borrowing today, the more so the higher the expected gains in disposable income. a process of gradual real exchange rate appreciation, supported by strong, domestically driven output growth and temporarily accompanied by relatively large current account deficits, would seem fully in line with what the theory of convergence suggests. according to mihaljek, d. and m. klau ( 2008 ), over the period from the mid - 1990s to the first quarter of 2008, the balassa - samuelson effect would explain around 24 % of the cee inflation differentials vis - a - vis the euro area. for more details, see, “ catching - up an inflation in transition economies : the balassa - samuelson effect revisited ”, bis working paper. bis central bankers ’ speeches but in several countries, the process of real convergence proved itself difficultly sustainable. during the period before the global crisis, expectations were overly optimistic, and investors and consumers engaged in economic behaviour that generated excess domestic demand, strong credit growth and inflationary pressures. as in many other markets, risk premia were squeezed, leading to asset price misalignments ( particularly in the housing market ) and over - indebtedness in a context of abundant global liquidity and a strong appetite for risk. foreign direct investment flows often focused on the non - tradable sector, for example, construction and financial sector intermediation. furthermore, foreign currency lending grew rapidly, leading to increasing balance - sheet mismatches. as a result a number of countries experienced notable departures from price stability and wide external imbalances that eroded competitiveness – developments that went over and above what could be justified by “ equilibrium ” catching - up. macroeconomic policies added to the risks. in countries with a fixed exchange rate, independent monetary policy was not available, resulting in monetary policy conditions that became too expansionary. in principle, this could have been compensated by very tight fiscal policy. but with the benefit of hindsight, fiscal policies were often insufficiently restrictive or even loose. the global crisis revealed these weaknesses with particular virulence. when capital flows dried up in late 2008 and trade collapsed, real output declined sharply, in some cases leading to severe recessions. with the main and remarkable exception of poland, the region was severely hit by the crisis. many observers feared then that, if the crisis were allowed to run its course, it could be near catastrophic for the region and extremely dangerous for the european banking system

. thank you very much for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
important channel for greater connectivity among emerging economies to not only enhance trade and investment flows but also international financial flows between nations and in so doing contribute towards an optimum allocation of resources across borders. these combined efforts will contribute to the stability of the international financial system and global economic prosperity.

produce significant upward pressure on interest rates or a tightening of broader financial conditions, given our view that the effects of the program arise primarily from the stock of our holdings rather than the flow of our purchases. while there has been considerable volatility in treasury yields over the past several weeks, we attribute those movements primarily to incoming economic data and to broader risk events. however, we will continue to watch the markets and assess their adjustment to the end of the purchase program. future evolution of the soma portfolio while i am sure you are happy to hear more about our actions to date, i realize that you may be even more interested in the evolution of the soma portfolio going forward. just to be clear, i will not be saying anything about the likelihood of prospective policy actions beyond what has been conveyed in fomc communications. however, i would like to make a few points about the portfolio under those prospective actions. as noted earlier, the current directive from the fomc is to reinvest principal payments on the securities we hold in order to maintain the level of domestic assets in the soma portfolio. this approach can be interpreted as keeping monetary policy on hold. indeed, one can generally think of the stance of monetary policy in terms of two tools – the level of the federal funds rate, and the amount and type of assets held on the federal reserve ’ s balance sheet. the fomc has decided to keep both of these tools basically unchanged for now. given the considerable amount of uncertainty about the course of the economy, market participants have observed that the next policy action by the fomc could be in either direction. if economic developments lead the fomc to seek additional policy accommodation, it has several policy options open to it that would involve the soma portfolio, as noted by chairman bernanke in his testimony last week. one option is to expand the balance sheet further through additional asset purchases, with the just - completed purchase program presenting one possible approach. another option involves shifting the composition of the soma portfolio rather than expanding its size. as noted earlier, a sizable portion of the additional risk that the soma portfolio has assumed to date came from a lengthening of its maturity, suggesting that the composition of the portfolio can be used as an important variable for affecting the degree of policy stimulus. lastly, the chairman mentioned that the fomc could give guidance on the likely path of its asset holdings, as the effect on liquidity in treasury bills has worsened to some degree
to build a digital and carbon - neutral future. finally, better access to venture capital would help young european firms turn innovative ideas into marketable products. 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches for now, i look forward to implementing our newly established partnership and to the benefits it will bring to our financial system. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

jorg asmussen : intervention in a panel on “ the future of europe ” speech by mr jorg asmussen, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the iif ( institute of international finance ) 2013 spring membership meeting, paris, 26 june 2013. * * * mr prot, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me to speak on this panel. as the central bank of the euro area, banking union is of key concern to the ecb. it is essential to increase confidence in the euro area banking sector, to reintegrate financial markets, and to improve the transmission of our monetary policy. it is therefore among the most important issues for the euro area today. while banking union comprises a number of regulatory and legislative initiatives, at the moment there are two key priorities. first, the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ). second, the single resolution mechanism ( srm ), operating under the legal framework established by the bank recovery and resolution directive ( brrd ). a common deposit guarantee scheme, while important, is something more for the longerterm. let me say a few words on each of these elements, and how they fit together. starting with the ssm, we expect the regulation to be approved by the european parliament in september and for the ecb to take over supervisory responsibilities one year thereafter. in the meantime, preparatory work is underway involving close cooperation between the ecb and the national authorities that are competent for supervision. the work includes mapping the euro area banking system, developing the supervisory model and, perhaps most topically, preparing the comprehensive assessment of all banks that will come under direct ecb supervision. this is required by the regulation and will apply to around 130 to 140 banking groups operating in the euro area. the assessment will involve an asset quality review and balance sheet assessment to be conducted by the ecb in the first quarter of 2014. this will then feed into the overall stress test to be conducted by eba, in cooperation with the ecb, in the second quarter of 2014. our objective is for the ssm to start with a clean slate and to restore credibility in the european banking sector after two previous stress tests failed to do so. we are therefore aiming for the assessment to be as rigorous as possible. it is clear that the results of the asset quality review and stress test may require recapitalisation or other means of support for weak banks. if banks cannot raise new capital themselves, the fiscal backstops which