. the court concluded that it was not. in doing so, the court recognized that the most important distinction between a certificate of deposit issued by a bank — money — and other long - term debt was the comprehensive regulation of the banking system. 24 the court ’ s conclusion was a sensible one more than a century after the “ wildcat ” banking era : lawmakers could not have intended to treat money in the banking system like it was something else because there was no need to do so. at least for now, the case does not appear to be as strong for digital currencies. without a regulatory framework designed for digital currencies, regulators in united states are reacting to abuses instead of proactively addressing risks. as an example, the commodity futures trading commission ( cftc ), the agency in the united states that regulates futures and derivatives contracts, used its enforcement authority over fraudulent purchases or sales of commodities to stop an alleged digital currency scheme. 25 organizers of the scheme claimed that the digital currency in question — my big coin — was backed by gold and actively traded, but the cftc concluded that neither was true, that payouts to customers were funded with money fraudulently obtained from other victims of the scheme, and that the organizers misappropriated approximately $ 6 million in customer assets. 26 my big coin appears to have been a modern wildcat currency, but the scheme was detected only because the cftc could regulate it as a commodity. we are fortunate that, today, the cftc has this market - based authority to combat fraud in u. s. commodities markets that was not present in the wildcat era. meanwhile, banks, which are the focus of our federal regulatory efforts for holding and transferring money, have largely not engaged in holding, transferring, or < gasp > issuing digital currencies, and federal banking regulators in the united states have remained largely silent on the permissibility of these activities. 27 the office of the comptroller of the currency ( occ ) sought to carve out a special - purpose charter — its so - called “ fintech charter ” — presumably to bring some of these activities under the occ ’ s regulatory umbrella, but it has since been mired in litigation over issuing these special - purpose charters with states in the u. s. that wish to license these activities under local law. 28 separately, the bureau of consumer financial protection, which has authority to write rules governing certain consumer accounts and payment products, determined it would

( iii ) what approach is the most neutral to technological change? ( iv ) what approach provides the clarity to the greatest extent possible ( recognizing that every model will have its faults )? ( v ) what approach will last to and through the next cycle of innovation? i mentioned the sec earlier. the sec analyzes digital currencies using a test that the supreme court formulated almost 90 years ago — that is mind boggling, but for what the sec does, it is also still very relevant — this is something worth striving for. you might be surprised that i don ’ t have the answer to what the next 90 years of digital currency regulation will look like, but i hope to have the opportunity to explore this issue with some of you. thank you. 1 many thanks to joseph torregrossa and thomas noone for their assistance with these remarks. 2 gerald p. dwyer jr., wildcat banking, banking panics, and free banking in the united states, economic review 6 ( frb atlanta dec. 1996 ) ( hereinafter “ dwyer ” ). 3 dwyer 4. 4 dwyer 6. 5 dwyer fn. 13. 6 dwyer 6. 7 dwyer 6. 8 dwyer 2. 9 arthur a. rolnick & warren e. weber, free banking, wildcat banking, and shinplasters, quarterly review 13 ( frb minn. fall 1982 ) ( hereinafter “ rolnick ” ). 10 dwyer 7. 11 dwyer 5. 12 rolnick 16. specifically, the states varied on whether security for the notes would be measured in par or market value. 13 rosa lastra, central bank and bank regulation, 204 ( sept. 1991 ) ( ph. d. thesis london school of economics ) ( on file with author dm # 172574 ). 14 john sherman, recollections of forty years 237 ( werner co. 1896 ) available at https : / / archive. org / details / johnshermansreco00sher / page / 236. 15 milton friedman & anna jacobson schwartz, a monetary history of the united states, 1867 - 1960 17, 21 ( 1963 ) ( hereinafter “ friedman ” ). 16 see e. g., 12 usc § 26 ( comptroller to determine if institution is engaged in the business of banking ). 17 see dwyer 16. 18 in 1935, the treasury redeemed all debt that backed national bank notes. the glass