we introduced a new integrated risk management develop compliance function. work on changes in digital payments and digitalization of finance we are paying attention to develop new systemic stability indicators like liquidity and solvency stress testing we have significantly improved our macro analytical capabilities producing halfyear forecast and our own nowcasts for main macroeconomic variables. number of our working papers has increased last but not least we have significantly increased our transparency and communication policies. it is not only about using social media and press releases but explaining out policies and views in interviews, as well as being more responsive to all questions we are facing. however we are aware that a lot needs to be done in the future. let me mention just a few of those. 1. first is the greening of finance. there is an old saying : be the change you want to see in the world. so, we need to improve our own carbon footprint and be more environmentally friendly. cbbh already express interest to participate in initiatives regarding climate change and managing climate related risks in financial sector. 2. second are questions of inclusion. we are doing efforts regarding financial inclusion and education. for bosnia and herzegovina this is very important issue specially regarding sustainable remittances. in the cbbh we pay special attention to gender equality aspect, our management team has more than 50 % female managers. but generally, in the country we need to do more regarding inclusion, especially regarding gender equality. imf has recently identified that gender issues can be macro - critical. 3. third, much more needs to be done in areas of cyber - resilience. cyber risks are on the rise. we take this issue seriously improving our cyber security and implementing cyber risk assessments. but we need to do more on general coordination in this area. ladies and gentlemen, it is not only the situation in bih, but in the world as a whole that is uncertain and volatile. last month gathering of central bankers at jackson hole has clearly confirmed this worldview. unprecedented challenges are ahead of central banks. the cbbh will continue maintaining its monetary policy and stability and continue further improvements of our operations insuring our credibility as the most important asset any central bank have. i am personally an optimistic about the future and working together is the only way to move from crisis to recovery. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

at 19bps on wider. but the stop out spread is then 7bps ( chart 5 ). at the point where £31mn is allocated to wider, the clearing spread on narrow is still 12bps ( bidder 6 is unfilled, and bidder 5 gets £9mn against a bid of £30mn ), but the clearing spread on wider falls to strictly, the stop - out spread is not defined if the allocation is 100 % to one type of collateral. bis central bankers ’ speeches 17bps ( bidder 1 is fully allocated and bidder 2 gets £1mn ). the stop out spread falls to 5bps ( chart 5 ). continuing this process, and tracing out the spectrum of stop out spreads and the associated proportions of the funds allocated to wider collateral, results in the auction demand curve. note that the resulting demand curve will be downwards sloping ( strictly, in steps ), as the share of funds allocated against wider collateral rises, the stop out spread falls. if market conditions deteriorate such that the value attached to borrowing against wider collateral relative to borrowing against narrow rises, this demand curve will shift higher. because bids in the auctions should provide accurate information on individual banks ’ demand for liquidity and the prices they are willing to pay for it, the bank can use the pattern of bids in each auction to assess the extent of stress either in the market as a whole, or at individual institutions. in turn, it can use that information to inform its decisions on the size and maturity of future operations, or to engage individual institutions in a dialogue to understand their funding needs and plans. for example, consider two variants on our example laid out in table 1. in the first, an exogenous shock hits the market, reducing interbank lending volumes and impairing the mechanism by which banks transfer liquidity amongst themselves. the result is that banks, individually, bid more aggressively for funds ( table 2 and chart 6 show an illustrative example ). that pattern results in an upwards shift in the aggregate demand curve, leading to a rise in the share of funds allocated against wider collateral, and hence providing liquidity insurance to the banking system. bis central bankers ’ speeches in an alternative example, assume that an individual counterparty suffers a liquidity shock. that counterparty bids more aggressively for funds – something that is immediately observable from the pattern of bids ( table 2 and chart 6 ). these examples