##kin, frederic s. ( 2011 ), monetary policy strategy : lessons from the crisis. nber working paper series, no. 16755. national bureau of economic research. norges bank ( 2013 ), monetary policy report with financial stability assessment. 1 / 13 march. nyberg, lars ( 2005 ), house price developments and monetary policy. speech at evli bank, stockholm, 19 december. sveriges riksbank. nyberg, lars ( 2011 ), monetary policy and financial crises – some reflections. speech at danske bank, stockholm, 21 december. sveriges riksbank. svensson, lars e. o. ( 2012 ), monetary policy, debt and unemployment. speech at sns, stockholm 14 november, sveriges riksbank. svensson, lars e. o. ( 2013a ), monetary policy and employment : monetary policy is too tight. speech at the swedish trade union confederation, lo, stockholm 13 january, sveriges riksbank. svensson, lars e. o. ( 2013b ), the possible unemployment cost of average inflation below a credible target. working paper. www. larseosvensson. net. svensson, lars. e. o. ( 2013c ), reservation against the account of monetary policy 2012. appendix b to the minutes, minutes of the executive board meeting on 19 march, sveriges riksbank. swedish national debt office ( 2013 ), consultation response to sou 2013 : 6 att forebygga och hantera finansiella kriser ( preventing and managing financial crises ) ( only in swedish ) – part report from the financial crisis committee. soderstrom, ulf and vredin, anders ( 2013 ), inflation, unemployment and monetary policy. economic commentaries no 1 2013, sveriges riksbank. sørensen, peter birch ( 2013 ), the swedish housing market : trends and risks. report to the fiscal policy council ( finanspolitiska radet ) 2013 / 5. woodford, michael ( 2012 ), inflation targeting and financial stability, sveriges riksbank economic review, 2012 : 1. sveriges riksbank. bis central bankers ’ speeches figure 1. cpi annual percentage change cpi mean 1995mean 1. 3 sd 1. 2 1971 - 1992 mean 8. 3 sd 3. 0 - 2 - 2 note : cpi inflation does not refer to real - time data,

lars nyberg : the infrastructure of emergency liquidity assistance - what is required in today ’ s financial system? speech by mr lars nyberg, deputy governor of the sveriges riksbank, at the cgfs regional meeting in tokyo, bank of japan, on 22 may 2000. * * * sweden experienced a severe banking crisis in the beginning of the 1990s. to manage the crisis, the authorities had to implement measures that averted a complete breakdown of the financial system while attempting to limit the costs to taxpayers. in addition, it was imperative for the authorities to consider whether or not their actions would contribute to future moral hazard problems. during the crisis, an effective division of labour developed between the authorities involved, namely the ministry of finance, the riksbank, the central bank, finansinspektionen, the financial supervisory authority and the bank support authority. as the crisis progressed, the riksbank provided emergency liquidity assistance ( ela ) twice, acting in its role as “ lender of last resort ”. the remarks in this note are largely drawn from the riksbank ’ s experiences in this crisis, and how these experiences can be used to assessing the role of ela in a general crisis management infrastructure. when discussing the infrastructure that is in place to handle financial crises, two aspects are of primary importance. first, ela must be put in the context of the overall methods of crisis management that the authorities would employ should a financial crisis occur. ela is not a measure that can or should be used in every financial crisis. the way other crisis management procedures are set up also affects the scope for ela. this is covered in the first part of this note. second, the way ela issues are organised within the central bank is also very important for whether it is an effective measure and, in particular, whether it will reduce or increase moral hazard in the financial sector. this is discussed in the second part of the note. before discussing these two aspects, the importance of speed in granting ela must be emphasized, as the speedy implementation of ela is essential to its being effective in a crisis situation. ela is the only measure in the crisis management framework that normally can be used quickly. it should be seen as an acute measure that is used for avoiding a sudden disruption of the large - value payment system, in particular when threats to the system emerge suddenly. incidents like the failure of barings bank, ltcm and the swedish