at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years ( chart 2 ). a problem that japan ’ s economy currently faces is that, amid protracted deflation, people ’ s inflation expectations have declined and a sense that prices will not rise – namely, a deflationary mindset – has been embedded. against such a backdrop, raising inflation expectations has become a policy agenda. looking back at the history of central banking, raising excessively low inflation expectations through policy is a big challenge. furthermore, in the case of japan, short - term interest rates have already declined to close to 0 percent and long - term interest rates have also declined to a level below 1 percent. how should we raise inflation expectations through policy in a situation in which there is little room to further lower nominal interest rates? this is the challenge we are faced with, and the qqe is the prescription. specifically, the qqe comprises two elements. first, demonstrate the bank ’ s determination to definitively overcome deflation in the form of strong and clear commitment, in order to dispel deflationary expectations that have been embedded among firms and households. to this end, the bank clearly expressed that it would achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year - on - year rate of change in the consumer price index ( cpi ) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years, and clearly specified a timeframe to achieve the target. second, taking into account that deflation has been continuing for a protracted period, only exhibiting a strong commitment will not be enough to make people believe in the bank ’ s strong will in the absence of a policy to underpin such commitment. in particular, from the standpoint of “ at the earliest possible time, ” it was necessary to embark on a new phase of bold monetary easing that people could clearly understand was not an extension of the past policies. therefore, the bank decided to double the monetary base – money the bank directly provides – in two years. in order to achieve this, it also decided to conduct massive purchases of japanese government bonds ( jgbs ) inclusive of those with longer - term remaining maturities. so far, the bank has indeed been increasing the monetary base and purchasing jgbs as decided ( chart 3 ). the qqe aims to put downward pressure on the yield curve as a whole through massive purchases of jgbs, encourage investment in risk assets through portfolio re

towards esg projects such as renewable energy and access to essential services such as education and healthcare. 4 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches the adoption of esg by central banks should be consistent with the existing reserve management framework. in our case, we consider esg not only for financial reasons but also to manage reputational risk and to set a good example. we strongly believe that esg analysis could improve risk management functions and support the safety objective of reserves in the long run. nevertheless, for the portion of reserves allocated to high quality agency and corporate bonds, we have incorporated esg considerations. we also focus on impact investing. over the past few years, we have gradually built up a portfolio of labelled bonds, commonly known as green bonds, social bonds and sustainable bonds. we believe that esg integration, using tools like esg scores, can broaden investment and risk analysis and allow our reserve management team to account for emerging risks from a new lens. there is broad consensus across the world that sound climate information architecture, in terms of reliable data, green taxonomy and disclosures as per global standards, is key to improving market confidence, safeguarding financial stability, and fostering sustainable finance. lack of data severely impedes the ability of governments, regulators and businesses to prepare for and respond to climate change. investors need reliable, accurate, timely, relevant and comparable data to assess risks and identify investable green and transition projects. unfortunately, the climate - related data capture ecosystem in many parts of the world, including mauritius, is limited due to numerous challenges. this is a common phenomenon plaguing nearly all countries in africa. currently, climate disclosure requirements are not mandatory for private and public firms in many countries but we expect this state of affairs to evolve with time. let me share with you how data gaps have constrained the bank of mauritius from imposing wider disclosure requirements on our regulatees. our guideline requires banks to disclose, in their annual reports as from 31 december 2023, information on climate risks on four pillars, namely governance, strategy, risk management and metrics and targets. banks have also been advised to consider guidance provided by the financial stability board's task force on climate - related financial disclosures. the bank conducted a survey in september 2023 to assess the level of compliance of banks with respect to the provisions of the guideline. it was noted that while banks have incorporated climate risks in their governance, strategy and risk management frameworks, they were facing challenges with respect to