on your chair like a goat kid bleating “ europe! europe! ”. the argument goes as follows : if only europe could help formulate the right policies and actively enforce those policies, the continent would prosper again. and once our policy output improved, this would give the european project the legitimacy it had partly lost in the eyes of citizens in recent years. even we at the ecb are not immune to this temptation. but it would be unrealistic to cling to it too much for this is not an idea that european citizens are prepared to accept today. so, today i want to propose that we move forward without losing perspective. 2 in particular, and in my view, this means moving forward economically and politically at the same time ; moving towards more common decision - making regarding our economic policies while at the same time increasing the european legitimacy of this decision - making. a political narrative for emu we should never forget that, at its heart, european integration has always been a political project. when six countries decided in 1951 to unify their coal and steel markets, this was fuelled by the deep conviction that binding these countries together with a common destiny was the best way to avoid another war. europe was never first and foremost about economic functionalities and necessities. in the same spirit, i am convinced that to take the next step in economic integration, we will need to revive the political narrative for european integration. however, when we look at the past decade, we can appreciate that the need to move ahead was a direct consequence of the crisis. the european stability mechanism and its precursors – beginning with the bilateral loans to greece in may 2010 – were established in response to an imperative imposed by the urgency of the situation ; yet they have changed the nature of emu forever and have emphasised how deeply interconnected we are. the steps that came next – the strengthening of the governance framework, the fiscal compact, banking union – were the first manifestations of this change, and i know that many of you have actively contributed to these achievements. but they still very much followed the functional see coeure, b., “ is eurozone governance fit for purpose? ”, keynote speech at a dinner organised by the centre for european reform, london, 30 january 2014. bis central bankers ’ speeches narrative of immediate crisis management and prevention, a narrative of functional necessity and not so much of political choice. these steps were essential for shoring up emu and for showing the

. 3 barry eichengreen, op. cit. ; milton friedman and anna j. schwartz ( 1963 ), a monetary history of the united states, 1867 – 1960, princeton university press ; and ben bernanke ( 2004 ), essays on the great depression, princeton university press. 4 robert l. hetzel ( 2008 ), the monetary policy of the federal reserve : a history, cambridge university press. 5 milton friedman ( 1963 ), inflation : causes and consequences, asian publishing house. 6 willem buiter ( 2016 ), “ dysfunctional central banking ; the end of independent central banks or a return to ‘ narrow central banking ’ – or both? ”, global economics view, citi research, 21 december ; otmar issing ( 2016 ), “ central banks – from overburdening to decline? ”, safe white paper series, no 42. 7 jakob de haan and sylvester c. w. eijffinger ( 2017 ), “ central bank independence under threat? ”, cepr policy insight, no 87. 8 transparency international eu ( 2017 ), two sides of the same coin – independence and accountability of the european central bank, transparency. eu / wp - content / uploads / 2017 / 03 / ti - eu _ ecb _ report _ digital. pdf. 6 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches