100 last observation : april 2020 9 survey results suggest that 75 percent of canadians reported they were spending less than before the pandemic. on average, canadians left home to go grocery shopping once a week, with 93 percent indicating they stopped going out completely except for necessities. - 7but demand elsewhere was slumping, as larger - ticket items such as cars and necessities such as clothing and shoes became more difficult to buy. 10 spending on outside - the - home entertainment, restaurant meals, travel and personal services came to a halt. indeed, the method of purchase became vitally important : sales of goods and services that could be bought online soared by more than 40 percent compared with last year, while those that required an in - person presence fell ( chart 6 ). 11 chart 6 : retail e - commerce increased markedly % year - over - year percent growth, non - seasonally adjusted data - 10 retail e - commerce note : retail trade series include naics 44 to 453. source : statistics canada retail trade - 20 last observation : march 2020 according to our recently conducted canadian survey of consumer expectations ( csce ), the full results of which will be released in july, more than half of respondents ( 55 percent ) reported their current spending was lower than before the outbreak. among those who had planned to make a large purchase before the outbreak — such as a car, house or major renovation — the majority decided to either delay, reconsider or abandon their purchase. overall, this decline in income and confidence led to lower household spending and a dramatic shift in what and how canadians were buying during the early stage of the pandemic. measuring price pressures these shifts in spending patterns have affected consumer prices. the sharp deceleration in consumer price index ( cpi ) inflation over the past three months from 2. 2 to - 0. 4 percent is mostly due to the declines in the prices of gasoline, traveler accommodation, and clothing and footwear as demand for these items has decreased ( chart 7 ). in contrast, the price pressures on some consumer 10 spending on clothing and footwear declined 50 percent at an annualized rate, while purchases of new motor vehicles dropped by 29 percent in the first quarter of 2020. 11 roughly 40 percent of canadians have been doing more shopping online in the second quarter of 2020, according to the bank ’ s canadian survey of consumer expectations ( csce ) — to be published on july 10. they have also been prioritizing food delivery

credit conditions and have threatened their international competitiveness. without arguing the merits of these complaints in detail, it is perhaps worth noting the following. first, most observers, including the international monetary fund, believe that pull factors have been more important than push factors in attracting these capital inflows. in other words, the inherent attractiveness of investing in emdes, as opposed to accommodative policies elsewhere, was the major driving force. second, the argument overlooks the fact that ump presumably led to faster growth in the advanced economies and the global economy more generally, which benefited the emdes. the alternative would have been much less appealing. finally, there might have been less need for ump were it not for the restrictive measures that many of the emdes had used to control capital flows and exchange rate movements beginning well before the crisis. these restrictive measures contributed to sizable global imbalances, which in turn fuelled the crisis. they also inhibited the required rebalancing of global demand after the crisis, increasing the need for aggressive monetary policy responses by the united states and other advanced economies. spillover effects from policies run both ways. emdes have grown large enough that their collective influence on global conditions now matches that of the advanced economies. why this time might be different before getting too excited about the negative consequences of exiting, it is important to step back and consider why events might unfold in a manner that is more benign than some critics have feared. the first – and most obvious – reason is that the exit will start from a point of extraordinary policy accommodation, and will involve gradually reducing the amount of stimulus in place, as opposed to initiating a rapid and severe policy tightening. moreover, it will be undertaken only when officials believe there are clear and convincing signs that the u. s. economy and, subsequently, others, have achieved self - sustaining momentum ( “ escape velocity ” ). in this sense, exiting should be regarded as a good and natural thing. unlike earlier episodes, these actions will not be taken in the context of an overheated economy that requires a quick and substantive dose of policy tightening to dampen economic activity and inflationary pressures. the second reason is that monetary authorities have learned the value of clear communication from previous unfortunate experiences, such as in 1994, when almost no attempt was made to forewarn markets. 6 the same can be said of the more positive experience of the past few years in which effective communication has been used successfully to condition