able to cope with short - term pressures on their refinancing and regulate their transformation activity. lastly, the framework introduces for the first time a “ macroprudential ” component, consisting of a countercyclical capital buffer and a surcharge for global systemically important banks ( additional capital and leverage ratio ). most g20 jurisdictions have adopted this framework. in europe, the capital requirements regulation and the capital requirements directive ( crr and crd ) transpose the basel iii agreement. when transposing this agreement, europe also added additional components : a systemic risk buffer, “ pillar 2 capital measures ” to cover risks not covered or not sufficiently covered by regulations ( interest rate risk, governance risk, etc. ), requirements on remuneration policies and practices, etc. 1 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches for the insurance sector, a harmonised prudential framework has been applied in europe since 2016 : solvency ii introduced the principle of risk - based regulation, and quantitative capital requirements have been significantly increased. beyond the regulatory framework alone the institutional framework has been strengthened in many countries. macroprudential authorities have been set up ( as in france, as of 2010 ) to ensure the stability of the financial system as a whole and to facilitate coordination between the various supervisors. in europe, the creation of the three supervisory authorities ( 2011 ) has enabled progress to be made in the adoption of a single rulebook. lastly, in the euro area, the introduction of the single supervisory mechanism ( ssm ) in 2014 has allowed us to bring our prudential supervision of the banking sector in line with best practices. ( b ) put an end to “ too big to fail ", i. e. ensure that, in the future, a failing bank, even a large one, will no longer have to be bailed out by public funds. since 2009, these institutions qualified as systemically important financial institutions ( sifis ) have been defined as those whose “ disorderly failure, due to their size, complexity and systemic interconnection, would cause significant disruption to the financial system as a whole and to economic activity ". banks designated as systemic at the global level by the fsb, and in france at the national level by the acpr, are subject to enhanced supervision measures. in addition to the capital surcharges already mentioned, systemic banks must comply with specific requirements for the preparation of recovery plans to deal with crises. a resolution strategy could

a more prospective solution : namely a page 7 sur 7 wholesale cbdc that could be issued by the eurosystem, deploying experiments such as the jura project of cross border wholesale payments in coordination with the bis and the swiss national bank. * * in the 1960s, us secretary of treasury henry fowler warned that " providing reserves and exchanges for the whole world is too much for one country and one currency to bear. " ix to fowler, we answer : “ we in the euro area are happy to help. ” i thank you for your attention and i wish you a good forum. i lagarde, c., challenges along europe ’ s road, speech, 11 may 2022 villeroy de galhau, f., the eurosystem and its monetary policy : from an “ impossible dilemma ” to a possible roadmap for normalisation, speech, 6 may 2022 iii qje paper by fahri and maggiori iv see the council conclusions on achieving the eu ’ s economic and financial strategic autonomy in an open economy : one year after the commission ’ s communication. v villeroy de galhau, f., capital markets union : unleashing europe ’ s potential, speech, 30 november 2021 vi ecb report on rie : only 60 % of extra - euro area exports of goods were invoiced in euro in 2020 vii recent research by amiti, itskhoki and konings viii see the document trade and investments in energy in the context of the eu common commercial policy ix quote available here https : / / www. imf. org / external / np / exr / center / mm / eng / mm _ sc _ 03. htm ii