to sell part of its government bond portfolios. these forced sales, which were not anticipated by the bank, resulted in the crystallisation of unrealised losses, real losses in other words, as the securities sold shed value with the increase in key interest rates decided by the us central bank ( the fed ). the subsequent downgrading of svb's rating by moody's and the aborted capital increase by the bank fueled a negative spiral between liquidity and solvency, which led to its bankruptcy on 10 march 2023. tech players, fearing the loss of their deposits, which greatly exceeded the minimum guaranteed by the us guarantee fund, withdrew them all the more massively and in record time - in one click - as they represent a financially and digitally “ educated ” clientele. does this " one - click " bank run, which neither banking regulation nor supervision by the authorities responsible for enforcing it were able to prevent, means that the digitalisation of our economies and of finance is making this regulation and supervision fundamentally inadequate? 1. 1. the current framework has not been invalidated by the current crisis... i will give a negative but cautious answer to this question. in other words, i will answer with a " no, but ". the " no " seems justified to me for the following three reasons : - since 2019, svb has benefited from a very light regulation compared to the rules laid down by the basel committee to limit the liquidity and interest rate risks inherent to the transformation activity carried out by banks. as regards the first risk, these rules require that banks comply with short and long - term liquidity ratios, and as regards the second risk, that the sensitivity of banks'balance sheet to various interest rate shocks be monitored. in the united states, these rules were not applicable to svb, as certain exemptions, introduced in 2019 under the proportionality principle, apply to banks that are considered to be less important, this concept being understood in a broad sense since it includes banks with a balance sheet total of up to usd 250 billion. - the post mortem analyses carried out and published by the fed suggest that, had svb been subject to these rules, it would not have complied with the short - term liquidity ratio as defined by the basel committee. moreover, svb's heavy reliance on tech companies'deposits should have alerted its supervisor if the additional monitoring tools required by international standards had been put in place. the same fed

denis beau : the future of central bank money in the coming digital age of wholesale and retail payments keynote speech by mr denis beau, first deputy governor of the bank of france, at the singapore fintech festival, singapore, 6 november 2024. * * * ladies and gentlemen, i am delighted to be here with you at the singapore fintech festival today to open this second session on the future of money in a world of growing digitalisation in finance. i would like to take this opportunity to share our perspective at the banque de france on this topic. while wholesale and retail payment processes are being shaped by different drivers and trends, they raise a common challenge for us at the banque de france, given our monetary and financial stability mandate : namely to safeguard and promote their safety and efficiency in a digitalising financial system. to meet this objective, we at the banque de france are focusing our efforts on three key levers : first, adapting central bank money services ; second, supporting industry initiatives that align with our policy objectives ; and third, helping to shape an appropriate regulatory framework. today, i will primarily focus my remarks on our use of the first lever – the adaptation of central bank money services – and on the importance we grant to that end to cooperating and experimenting with other public and private stakeholders, exemplified by the partnership we have established with the monetary authority of singapore. 1. wholesale digital payments the safety of financial transactions depends to an important degree on the type of settlement asset chosen. this has led policymakers and market participants for decades now to favour central bank money as the preferred settlement asset in the wholesale space. this preference is well reflected in principle 9 of the cpmi - iosco's principles for financial market infrastructures ( pfmis ). our conviction at the banque de france is that, in an increasingly digitalised financial system, where tokenised assets and dlt - based infrastructures may gain an important role, central bank money should be maintained as the predominant settlement asset between financial intermediaries. private settlement assets, particularly stablecoins, are being used and, in the absence of central bank money on dlt - based infrastructures, could be widely used going forward to settle tokenised assets. but stablecoins do not have the safety, liquidity and stability of central bank money. in addition, the lack of coordination in the development of private settlement solutions, could lead to increased market fragmentation. 1 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches this