dollars each day. many obligators temporarily lost their technical ability to pay on time, leaving those counting on receiving payments caught short. the pressures ultimately ended up concentrated in banks. those needs were met by the federal reserve, both through record lending at the discount window and through an extraordinary infusion of funds through open market operations. to facilitate the channeling of dollar liquidity to foreign financial institutions operating in the united states, thirty - day currency swap lines were arranged with major central banks, again in record volumes. it was essential in such an environment to meet all appropriate demands for dollar liquidity. as the financial markets and payment infrastructure return to normal, loans are being repaid, and the temporarily bloated balance sheet of the federal reserve is now shrinking back to normal. nobody has the capacity to fathom fully how the tragedy of september 11 will play out. but in the weeks ahead, as the shock wears off, we should be able to better gauge how the ongoing dynamics of these events are shaping the immediate economic outlook. for the longer term, prospects for continued rapid technological advance and associated faster productivity growth are scarcely diminished. those prospects, born of the ingenuity of our people and the strength of our system, fortify a promising future for our free nation.

patrick honohan : major banking decisions in ireland during the financial crisis introductory statement by mr patrick honohan, governor of the central bank of ireland, to the oireachtas ( national parliament ) banking inquiry, dublin, 25 june 2015. * * * “ nexus phase ” i have judged it best to concentrate in this statement mainly on crisis management aspects. these were the chief focus of the first years of my term of office from late september 2009 to the end of 2013. besides, my previous appearances before the inquiry, and the separate documentation submitted by the central bank have already covered much of the remaining ground. 1 crisis management aspects 1. appropriateness of bank guarantee decision much of the discussion on the appropriateness of the bank guarantee decision has focused on what information was available to the political decision makers on the night of september 29th, 2008, on what should have been understood by their advisers, given the information that was available, and on the alternative short - term courses of action which were available and which might have achieved smaller losses for irish taxpayers, whether that was to involve a sharing with other eu governments or a bail - in of some creditors. 2 after all the ink that has been spilled over this issue, nothing has altered the conclusion of my may 2010 report which suggested some time should have been bought through emergency liquidity assistance ( ela ) in order to allow for consultation with the ecb and other eu governments, and to obtain a clearer picture of the potential exposure involved in blanket guarantee. probably some extensive form of guarantee would still have to have been granted, but it should not have included subordinated debt nor existing senior term debt. given the evident failure of their business models – as was clearly indicated in the documents prepare by the investment bank consultants, anglo and inbs should probably have been dealt with separately from the others through immediate nationalization and not included in a general guarantee. to what extent additional bail - in of creditors could have been fully effected over and above what was subsequently achieved is hard to say. as there was later, there would have been strong pressure from eu partners not to bail - in senior debt, and it is unclear whether any quid - pro - quo could have been secured in return. all in all, the focus on the night of the guarantee has been excessive. as explained below, much of the losses and the costs for the irish people had already been ineradicably incurred. 2. decision to recapitalize banks and alternatives in what