the governments with their high debts were weak. was i weak myself when i explained to all floor leaders in the german bundestag just why it was important to decide rapidly? was i weak when i informed the heads of state and government in full independence that the situation was grave and that they had to live up to their responsibilities? we took our decision on sunday in full independence. spiegel : thus far, the ecb has been strong and independent because it had repeatedly rejected demands from the political domain for lower interest rates or too expansionary a monetary policy. you have now consented for the first time. trichet : we have consented nothing to the heads of state and government. we always take our decisions taking into account only our own assessment of the situation and not the “ recommendations ” of governments, markets or social partners. we decided on 9 of august 2007 to supply €95 billion of liquidity in a few hours because our money market was being disrupted. and i could give many such examples. as i have already said, if there has been any direction of influence, it has been more in the opposite direction, from the ecb to governments, when making recommendations to them. and, let me tell you that those who took very significant responsibilities were those not applying the spirit and the letter of the stability and growth pact. and neither were those who did not carry out their surveillance as they should have, and as we constantly asked them to do. spiegel : in a talk he gave to the spiegel a few months ago, jurgen stark, the ecb ’ s chief economist, said that the ecb was not permitted to buy government bonds. who is right? trichet : i have already said that this is explicitly authorised by the treaty. over the past 11½ years, we have ensured price stability in europe and have successfully met our target of keeping inflation below, but close to, 2 %. we have done a good job fully in line with what the best central banks in europe were doing before the euro. those who believe – or, even worse, are suggesting – that we will tolerate inflation in the future are making a grave error. the governing council of the ecb did not hesitate to increase rates in july 2008 in a period of financial turbulence in order to ensure price stability. we were criticised at the time by the markets. this is a measure of our inflexible determination. spiegel : the germans react particularly sensitively

serious opportunity to tune global policy making to today ’ s interconnected world. the stakes are high, because the economic and social cost of the crisis has been large. unemployment, especially youth unemployment, has significantly increased since 2008. as many as 73 million young people are estimated to be unemployed globally in 2013, especially in advanced economies – including the euro area – the middle east and north africa. would reversing globalisation solve the problem? bis central bankers ’ speeches my answer is no. being in northern germany today, with its long tradition of openness and free trade ever since many of the cities along the baltic coast joined the hanseatic league, is a stark reminder of the benefits of global and european integration. and perhaps the case of germany shows these benefits even more clearly : • the share of germany in global exports stood at around 8 % in 2012. this makes germany the largest global exporter after china ( 10 % ) and the us ( 9. 8 % ). • exports of goods and service from germany to the rest of the eu increased from around 20 % of german gdp in 2000, to around 30 % of gdp in 2012. • exports from germany to the rest of the world increased from around 30 % of gdp in 2000 to more than 50 % of gdp in 2012. protectionism would clearly harm germany and europe. therefore, we should not turn our back on globalisation. we should rather learn to better reap its benefits and make it more inclusive, in ways such that benefits are also fairly shared. the crisis offers an opportunity to learn from past mistakes. at the domestic level, it shows the importance of addressing imbalances with sound policies and structural reforms. at the global level, it shows the real cost of non - cooperative attitudes and policies. it therefore calls for a substantial change in institutional and governance frameworks for international policy cooperation. let me first identify past mistakes by considering the main vulnerabilities unveiled by the crisis, both at the global and european level. on the global front, the crisis mainly revealed the existence of global economic governance failures and weak surveillance mechanisms. global imbalances led to the accumulation of fragilities in the global financial system and to unsustainable global macroeconomic outcomes. for example, long term interest rates in the us and globally did not respond as expected to the federal reserve tightening cycle which started in 2004. this unusual behaviour of long term interest rates, which reflected the global savings glut, was labelled “