samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
vitas vasiliauskas : central bank digital currencies speech by mr vitas vasiliauskas, chairman of the board of the bank of lithuania, at the reinventing bretton woods committee conference " managing the soft landing of the global economy ", washington dc, 12 april, 2019. * * * good morning, dear ladies and gentlemen, first of all, let me thank the organizers for the opportunity to participate in this conference. i must say that i was pretty surprised when i received the invitation to cover the topic of central bank digital currencies – or cbdcs. this probably happened because the bank of lithuania has been seen lately as one of the frontrunners in the broader fintech domain. yet despite being an innovation - friendly regulator, in terms of cbdcs, we do not have much inhouse projects to share, at least at this point. this is apart from the digital collector coin of course, which is quite another thing. however, i will do my best to cover the topic : in my view, issuing cbdcs represents one of the most intriguing and complex ideas in current discussions on the monetary system. - - let me begin with a basic question : what exactly are cbdcs? well, it is in fact easier to first say what they are not. under the current financial architecture central banks issue two sorts of money : currency in circulation in the form of the good old banknotes and coins, and digital money, available as reserve or settlement accounts with the central bank. accordingly, households and businesses cannot hold claims on the central bank in a digital form. the banks and certain other financial or public institutions can. and yet, when we talk about the concept of cbdc, we have in mind something new, something unlike what we currently have. the cbdc would be a novel type of central bank money. although also digital, it should be distinguished a traditional reserve account. the cbdc would also be fundamentally different from private crypto assets. this is because it would be … money! it would serve as a medium of exchange, a means of payment and a store of value, just like the current forms of central bank money. it is thus simple to define what the cbdc is not : not a conventional reserve account, and not a private crypto asset. but once you start explaining what it is, the picture gets complicated. the complexity lies in the variety of combinations of different properties that the cbdc can

to avert any problems that would prevent consolidation of convergence of inflation to this target.
have on the poorer economies. similarly, the disproportionate effect these developments are having on the poorer segments within a particular economy. this crisis thus brings to the forefront a number of issues concerning financial inclusion. firstly, while the crisis demands action with great urgency, the policy response to restore the functioning of the financial system and to get growth in the economy again, there also needs to be a continued commitment to the financial inclusion objective. this becomes all the more vital given the more adverse implications of the crisis on the poor segments in the economy. secondly, while the policies and regulation of financial inclusion are essential to ensure the soundness and sustainability of an inclusive financial system, of equal importance are the policies, instruments and framework to deal with distress in an inclusive financial system. this is to ensure that the strategies for resolution will provide a total solution that addresses the entire spectrum of the financial system, from that which is large and highly connected with systemic implications to that which is small and highly vulnerable. this includes measures relating to relief and support and the mechanisms for resolution to ensure the sustainability of an inclusive financial system even during unstable financial and economic conditions. in recognising the importance of financial inclusion, the united nations established the united nations advisory group on financial inclusion in 2006. the group advises the united nations and member states on issues relating to the advancement of the financial inclusion agenda on a global scale. since its establishment, many successes have been achieved. these include increasing the public awareness on the importance of financial inclusion, assisting governments in the design of regulatory systems that facilitate the creation of financial services for the poor, encouraging the of use of holistic measures to gauge the progress of financial inclusion, collecting and disseminating best practices, collaborating with the private sector to leverage on the talent and technology to further advance financial inclusion and to promote research that will galvanise new initiatives. in malaysia, financial inclusion is a high priority in our national agenda. since the establishment of the central bank, there has been a conscious policy to have an extensive commercial banking branch network across the country, to ensure the outreach, in particular, to cover the non - urban areas. malaysia now has 10. 2 branches for every 100, 000 individuals as opposed to the global median of 8. 4 branches for every 100, 000 individuals. in malaysia, more than 80 % of the population also have some form of savings account. this has also contributed to the financialisation of savings in the country. deposits as a percentage of

stability. this is necessary for sustainable growth and sustainable job creation. and that is the reason why we recommend not only towards the social partners but also price setters to strictly avoid those second round effects.
versus payment ( dvp ) settlement, information disclosure, and instituting appropriate code of conduct on market participants. currently, we have a semi - automated real - time delivery versus payment ( dvp ) system in place. it is a stop - gap measure but it serves as an important infrastructure in the settlement of the scripless government bonds. the system, when fully developed, will be supplemented by the intraday liquidity facilities and queuing mechanism, employing the latest digital signature technology to ensure secured and smooth real - time delivery and payment transactions. we are entering an era when capital flow across borders can only become more volatile than in the past. and we still have fresh memories of how disruptive it was before the crisis. in fact, it was a major cause of the crisis. how do we go forward? how do we guard against this? the work on the new international financial architecture seems to be very much lacking in the area of the behavior of key players, especially the highly leveraged institutions. in the eyes of the large western countries, such issues have somewhat lost their urgency since the event surrounding the long - term capital management ( ltcm ) left the headlines. in the absence of such rules, it appeared that emerging markets can only look to our own selves for protection. we have to help ourselves. a well functioning bond market is an important tool in this respect. it will act as a reservoir that absorbs capital inflow, and channel it to good use. a sudden withdrawal of foreign investors ’ confidence may cause the price of bonds to soften, making new issues temporarily unattractive, but it will not affect the business that had already obtained the funds. however, developing a well - functioning bond market is no easy task. the work done in thailand is only half completed, with many important agendas still remaining. the ingredients that i have mentioned : adequate supply, good infrastructure, central bank ’ s active involvement in the market, and investors ’ demand - these are all very important. but they alone will not ensure continued success. success can be assured, and maintained, only if the market is able to win trust and confidence of all investors. this means good governance all round. this means not only a well - supervised and fair trading system, but also a clear and transparent information system. and this covers not only the information on macro economy, government actions and rules and regulations, but also information on the firms, the issuers of the papers, to

name but a few. asia, because of our younger population and our early stages of industrialization, will continue to need funds from outside the region to finance our growth for many years to come. the countries that can succeed in attracting the funds, and more importantly, can properly manage the inflow and outflow of such funds, will have to develop not only the tools, but the high standards to go with it as well.
, it was no longer subject to exchange rate risk, it has access to an integrated economy comprising 330 million european citizens, and it has benefited from having a currency which inspires confidence and has therefore afforded greece low medium and long - term market interest rates. its external current account deficit has been financed by the very fact of belonging to the euro area. of course, in exchange for these significant advantages, the rules of the stability and growth pact must be fully respected. le point : all the same, we have just found out that greece cheated. it hid shameful secrets about its financial situation from its partners. how can we stop this happening again? jean - claude trichet : this situation is totally unacceptable. and it ’ s a major problem because all of the countries in the euro area are suffering as a result of this misconduct. to ensure the good governance of our currency, the credibility of the budgetary information provided by the euro area countries must be absolutely above reproach. we fully support the european commission : eurostat, the european statistical office, must have extremely broad powers at its disposal. it must be able to check the information supplied by greece in the country and on the basis of actual evidence with all of the necessary powers of investigation. such a situation must not recur, either in greece or in any other country. le point : there are two scenarios in the coming weeks. the positive scenario : greece is saved. in the second, spain is the next weak link … jean - claude trichet : at this stage, i have no reason to doubt the solidity of the other euro area countries, as long as they implement their respective stability programmes rigorously. each country is determined to stabilise the situation as far as its public finances are concerned. i am keen to stress that the consolidated situation of the euro area as a whole, as far as its budget deficit is concerned, is not the worst among the industrialised countries. for example, the consolidated public deficit of the euro area amounts to 7 % of gdp, while those of the united states and japan amount to more than 10 %. all of us, without exception, have very serious problems. le point : many people are criticising you, despite the crisis, for not having agreed to be more flexible – in short, for not having allowed the euro area countries to take on more debt in order to stimulate their economies. do these critics have a case? jean - claude trichet : frankly, i don

justify the confidence that the people of the euro area have in their money. there ’ s a lot more to be seen in this exhibition, which i hope you will all find as interesting and entertaining as i did. so without further ado, allow me to declare it open. bis central bankers ’ speeches
welfare spending. in norway, labour force participation is relatively high after lagging behind our neighbouring countries up to the 1990s. the labour force participation rate has declined somewhat in recent years, but is still at a high level. this is a fifth positive result. however, the average number of person - hours worked is lower than for the other nordic countries, and this difference seems to have increased through the 1990s to date. the increase in the labour force participation rate during the period does not seem to be the explanation. reducing working hours is one way of spending income and wealth gains. we could also spend wealth gains by reducing the retirement age. oecd figures show that the difference between the official and effective retirement age is wider in norway than in other comparable countries. developments in expected retirement age are a cause for some concern. a working 40 - year - old can now expect to retire at around 63. if we include retirement due to disability, the average retirement age is only 60. 9 the number of persons on benefits in the working age population has shown a marked rise. up to the beginning of the 1990s, there were small differences between norway and its neighbours. over the past decade, however, the increase has been clearly strongest in norway. there are two sides to the conclusion as to the question of dutch disease. on the positive side, we have avoided dramatic changes in industry structure, and we use our resources fairly efficiently. we have managed to insulate the norwegian economy from oil market fluctuations and gradually managed to keep macroeconomic developments on a fairly steady course. on the negative side, there are signs that labour supply over a life - cycle is falling faster in norway than in other countries. this may indicate that, with our current income level, we give high priority to increasing our leisure time. however, it may also indicate that we do not, as individuals, pay the true economic costs of leisure time and early retirement. pension rules, benefits and taxes contribute to this. similarly, enterprises are perhaps being offered the wrong incentives. on balance, the picture is still fairly positive : so far, petroleum wealth has not led to developments in the mainland economy that are negative in relation to other nordic countries. however, it must be stressed that it is too early to draw a conclusion ; there will probably be a substantial increase in petroleum revenue spending ahead. long - term saving a visible difference from the other nordic countries is that the norwegian state has capital savings in the government petroleum fund. the fund has grown rapidly

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with available information for the fourth quarter. looking ahead to next year, the conditions remain in place for the euro area economy to grow solidly at rates around potential, with some volatility in the quarterly growth rates likely to emerge around the turn of the year on account of the impact of changes in indirect taxes in a large euro area country. overall, global growth has become geographically more balanced and remains robust, providing support for euro area exports. investment is expected to remain dynamic, benefiting from an extended period of very favourable financing conditions, balance sheet restructuring, accumulated and ongoing strong earnings, and gains in business efficiency. consumption should also strengthen further over time as employment conditions continue to improve. this outlook for economic developments is reflected in the new eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections ( 2. 5 % to 2. 9 % in 2006, 1. 7 % to 2. 7 % in 2007, 1. 8 % to 2. 8 % in 2008 ) and is also in line with recent forecasts made by international organisations. the risks surrounding the outlook of sustained economic growth close to potential lie on the downside and relate mainly to the possibility of a renewed increase in oil prices, fears of a rise in protectionist pressures, and concerns about possible disorderly developments owing to global imbalances. turning to the price developments, annual hicp inflation rose to 1. 9 % in november 2006, from 1. 6 % in october. the lower annual hicp inflation rates recorded in the previous months mainly reflected the significant declines in crude oil prices from august onwards, as well as base effects. while the outlook for energy prices remains uncertain, overall inflation rates are likely to increase again in early 2007 and then hover around 2 % in the course of that year and in 2008, also reflecting the impact of higher indirect taxes. the eurosystem staff projections point to a rate of inflation of 2. 1 % to 2. 3 % in 2006, 1. 5 % to 2. 5 % in 2007 and 1. 3 % to 2. 5 % in 2008. this outlook for price developments remains subject to upside risks, stemming in particular from a stronger than expected pass - through of previous oil price increases, as well as the possibility of renewed oil price increases and of additional increases in administered prices and indirect taxes beyond those announced and decided thus far. more fundamentally, given the favourable momentum of real gdp growth observed over the past few quarters and the positive signs from labour markets, wage developments could be stronger

3 bis central bankers'speeches governing council welcomes the ongoing work and urges further specific and decisive steps to complete the banking union and the capital markets union. we are now at your disposal for questions. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
in the transition ahead. but we face a number of difficult long - term challenges as a nation — in our fiscal position, in how well we equip our citizens to prosper in a more competitive world and in our ability to sustain political support for the policies, including our relatively open trade policy, that have been an important source of the improvement in u. s. prosperity. our external imbalances make it more important that we invest in meeting those challenges. thank you. 3 / 3

kevin stiroh : emerging issues for risk managers introductory remarks by mr kevin stiroh, executive vice president of the financial institution supervision group of the federal reserve bank of new york, at the garp global risk forum, federal reserve bank of new york, new york city, 7 november 2019. * * * prepared for delivery introduction good morning and welcome to the garp global risk forum. the federal reserve bank of new york has been collaborating with garp on this forum for a decade and it is always a pleasure to participate. this discussion provides real - time insight into critical issues at the center of the practice of risk management. a quick scan of today ’ s agenda highlights a number of topics of obvious importance — operational resilience, cyclical aspects of risk management, technology and big data. we are all thinking about these issues, and i look forward to your insights. i ’ d like to briefly discuss two topics where i expect risk managers will increase their focus in coming years — climate change and the cultural aspects of digital transformation. both issues reflect potentially transformative trends for the economy and the financial system, and i believe they will take an increasing share of your bandwidth over the next decade. in both cases, the relevant questions from a supervisors ’ perspective are : what new risks are introduced? how do firms manage them? and how do supervisors view them? before proceeding, i will emphasize that i am speaking for myself and these views do not necessarily reflect those of the federal reserve bank of new york or the federal reserve system. climate the u. s. economy has experienced more than $ 500 billion in direct losses over the last five years due to climate and weather - related events. 1 in addition, climate change has significant consequences for the u. s. economy and financial sector through slowing productivity growth, asset revaluations and sectoral reallocations of business activity. 2 for these climate - related risks, a new lexicon has emerged. physical risk is the potential for losses as climate - related changes disrupt business operations, destroy capital and interrupt economic activity. transition risk is the potential for losses resulting from a shift toward a lowercarbon economy as policy, consumer sentiment and technological innovations impact the value of certain assets and liabilities. these effects will be felt across business sectors and asset classes, and on the strategies, operations and balance sheets of financial firms. risk managers must be aware of these risks and develop the tools needed to identify, monitor and manage them appropriately. physical and transition risks
term challenges, monthly report, september 2023, pp. 15 - 35. 2 oecd ( 2020 ), trade policy implications of global value chains, oecd trade policy brief. 3 world bank ( 2020 ), world development report 2020 : trading for development in the age of global value chains 4 international energy agency ( 2021 ), the role of critical minerals in clean energy transitions, world energy outlook special report. 5 khalil, m. and weber, m. - d. ( 2022 ), chinese supply chain shocks, bundesbank discussion paper series, no 44 / 2022. 6 economist impact ( 2022 ), trade in transition 2022, chapter on " the great reconfiguration ". 7 deutsche bundesbank ( 2023 ), the significance of china as a supplier of critical intermediate inputs to german firms, box, monthly report, september 2023, pp. 21 - 22. 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches

this effort is also in line with our vision of synergizing efforts and forging more efficient, collaborative mechanisms to achieve the shared financial inclusion objective. i am sure more partnerships anchored in the nsfi are yet to come. from experience, we know that to effectively address challenges of financial inclusion, a multiagency, multi - stakeholder, collaborative approach is needed. this realization is the driving force behind the nsfi on which today ’ s partnership and coordinating efforts are founded. while we are starting with microfinance and mf ngos, we hope to eventually bring on - board, other financial institutions so that the range of available products and services for msmes can be completed. while this is our long term goal, our partnership celebrated today, definitely brings us a step towards greater developments in the current financing ecosystem. we extend our gratitude to our partners and look forward to jointly shaping the future of msmes. let this signing ceremony be the start of a fruitful undertaking! maraming salamat po sa inyong lahat! 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches