spring ), pp. 165 – 86. 1 the views i express here are my own and not necessarily those of the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. 2 2. the imf ’ s most recent forecast was released in january and is available on its website at www. imf. org / en / publications / weo / issues / 2018 / 01 / 11 / world - economic - outlook - update - january - 2018. 3 3. the most recent summary of economic projections, an addendum to the minutes of the december 2017 fomc meeting, is available on the www. federalreserve. gov / monetarypolicy / fomcminutes20171213ep. htm. board ’ s website at 4 4. reinhart and rogoff ( 2009 ) document the lasting effect that downturns related to a financial crisis can have on economic growth. 5 5. see aaronson and others ( 2014 ). 6 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches 6 6. see hatzius and others ( 2016 ) for an overview of some issues that new technologies and products may be introducing into the measurement of gdp and productivity. 7 7. see syverson ( 2017 ) and byrne, fernald, and reinsdorf ( 2016 ). 8 8. gordon ( 2016 ) argues that recent technological advances have been relatively minor compared with the large advances that drove rapid increases in productivity in the past. 9 9. see decker and others ( 2016 ). 10 10. for a historical measure of the fiscal policy ’ s contribution to gdp growth, see the hutchins center fiscal impact measure, available on the brookings institution website at www. brookings. edu / interactives / hutchinscenter - fiscal - impact - measure. 11 11. see brynjolfsson and mcafee ( 2014 ) and baily, manyika, and gupta ( 2013 ). 12 12. brynjolfsson, rock, and syverson ( 2017 ) argue that lags in the adoption of new technology could explain the paradox between apparent advances in technology and continued weak productivity growth. they are referring specifically to artificial intelligence, but the argument could also hold for other fields. 13 13. see board of governors ( 2018 ). 7 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches

andreas dombret : closer cooperation between the south african reserve bank and the deutsche bundesbank speech by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at a press conference at the south african reserve bank, pretoria, 29 august 2016. * * * ladies and gentlemen we meet here today to herald a new phase of closer cooperation between the south african reserve bank and the deutsche bundesbank. and we do so in an environment that looks very different than it did just a couple of years ago – especially from the perspective of a central bank. it ’ s no news that the world has been growing ever closer for decades. and the financial sector is certainly no exception, with banks and other financial institutions globalising their business and becoming increasingly intertwined. 1. structure of the bundesbank ’ s international representative network as germany ’ s central bank, the deutsche bundesbank has adapted to these challenges by establishing a network of • two representative offices : one in new york and one in tokyo, and • representatives based at german embassies or consulates general worldwide. as early as in 1963, a financial economist from the bundesbank worked at the german consulate general in new york and simultaneously held the post of bundesbank representative at the world ’ s most important financial centre. in the years that followed, the bundesbank and the german foreign office agreed to create similar positions at the german embassy in london and at germany ’ s permanent mission to the oecd in paris. over time, further important financial and political centres were added to this list : beijing, brussels, istanbul, moscow, mumbai, sao paulo and singapore. there is an important cornerstone of the bundesbank ’ s international representative network i should also like to mention – the bundesbank and germany ’ s federal ministry of finance take turns in nominating the german imf executive director and his or her deputy. and we together staff the german imf office. our international representative network got a boost in 1986, when the bundesbank opened representative offices in new york and tokyo as entities detached from the official german missions in those two cities. moreover, a number of years ago we added trading desks to both representative offices. these trading desks now fulfil an important role in the administration of the german reserve assets. since then, the bundesbank has repeatedly evaluated its assumptions and adjusted the structure of its representative network to reflect changes in the bundesbank ’ s