acting alone in achieving the desired regulatory outcomes. good outcomes cannot depend on a “ cat - and - mouse ” game of supervisors prescribing rules and then checking for compliance. the primary responsibility of having a sound bank must rest with the board and senior management of the bank. they need to take ownership of and responsibility for managing risks, and to have the requisite knowledge, skills and experience to discharge their responsibilities effectively. 26. in this regard, mas recently proposed a number of enhancements to the corporate governance framework for locally incorporated banks. we welcome the basel committee ’ s present initiative to revisit its 2006 corporate governance guidance, and to address weaknesses identified during the crisis. 27. in promoting shared outcomes, political support is crucial in various areas. it is difficult to build a strong banking system on weak macro - economic foundations. supervisors in all countries, but more so in emerging economies, are sometimes under political pressure to tilt credit growth in certain directions, or to exercise forbearance. while the financial system has to be responsive to the needs of the economy, a politicised supervisory process will almost certainly bring adverse consequences down the road. conclusion 28. in conclusion, as we embark on financial reforms, we have to be forward looking, to ensure that we do not just have a resilient global financial system, but also one that can support sustainable economic growth. we need better regulations, better appreciation of the macro - financial linkages, and firmer supervision. globally coordinated efforts and strong cross border cooperation in some areas, as well as local efforts that are context - specific are both needed to achieve the desired regulatory outcomes. 29. singapore is honoured to host the 16th icbs on our common supervisory journey. i wish you a meaningful and fruitful discussion, as well as a pleasant and memorable stay here in singapore. thank you.

the euro area economy has steadily recovered. we have now seen 22 consecutive quarters of economic growth. there are 9. 6 million more people in employment in the euro area than there were in the second quarter of 2013 ( when the number of people in work fell to its lowest point during the crisis ). the unemployment rate has declined to 7. 9 %, its lowest level since october 2008. and the employment rate of people aged 15 - 74 has risen from 54 % in 1999 to 59 % in the second quarter of 2018, the highest rate ever recorded in the euro area. the main motor of the recovery has been the domestic economy, driven by a strengthening in domestic demand and improving labour markets. that underlying strength of the economy has underpinned our confidence that inflation would converge towards our inflation aim in a sustained manner. as such, since 2017 we have gradually reduced the monthly pace of net asset purchases. we decided to end our net purchases in december last year, confident that the sustained convergence of inflation to our aim would proceed. at the same time, recent economic developments have been weaker than expected and uncertainties, notably related to global factors, remain prominent. so there is no room for complacency. a significant amount of monetary policy stimulus is still needed to support the further build - up of domestic price pressures and headline inflation developments over the medium term. our forward guidance on the key ecb interest rates, reinforced by the reinvestments of the sizeable stock of assets we have acquired, continues to provide the necessary degree of monetary accommodation for the sustained convergence of inflation to our aim. lessons for monetary policy and the monetary union so what have we learned from this experience? the ecb ’ s monetary framework rests on three elements : a clear mandate to achieve price stability ; independence over the instruments we can use to achieve our mandate ; and a strong accountability framework. the importance of each of these elements has been reinforced by the crisis. 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches first, we have seen that a well - defined mandate is vital for our credibility with the public, because it guarantees that the ecb will always act in the interest of the whole euro area, and will not be swayed by interest groups. second, we have seen that instrument independence is key to an effective monetary policy, since it allows the central bank to act quickly and flexibly to shocks, especially in exceptional times. indeed, a well - equipped toolbox, comprising both standard and non - standard instruments,