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of the uncertainty that impedes debt restructurings by providing independent analysis of the future growth prospects of the country concerned, advice on possible adjustment measures, and an assessment of the global economic and financial outlook. with this information at hand, creditors and debtors can then seek market - based solutions. the fourth and final characteristic is transparency and accountability. i said earlier that the fund needs to be clear about its main objectives and its policy framework. the imf must also ensure that clear lines of responsibility within the organization support the framework. and it must be transparent about the reasons for its decisions. in other words, the fund needs a governance structure that helps it achieve its goals and holds individuals accountable. currently, decision - making responsibilities are divided among the board of governors, the executive board of directors, and the managing director and staff. but the division of responsibilities among these groups is not, in practice, always clearly defined. accountability is dispersed, and decision - making lacks transparency. the imf would be more effective if the executive board focused on setting strategic direction, as well as ensuring that policies are sound and that objectives are met. the managing director would then be responsible for policy implementation, and be accountable to the board. this framework would help to ensure that the responsibility for policy formulation and implementation was clear and borne appropriately by the members of the board and the managing director, respectively. toward this end, bank of england governor mervyn king has recently suggested establishing a non - resident executive board that meets periodically, rather than almost continuously, and that focuses on strategic direction and oversight. accountability and transparency of the board's decision - making would also be enhanced with more frequent and more timely reporting. finally, and very importantly, surveillance and analysis must be, and seen to be, independent of political influence. conclusion i'd like to conclude by underscoring a key point. the progress made by central banks in furthering the economic well - being of their citizens has largely been the result of determining the most appropriate objective - low and stable inflation - and determining how best to achieve it in a transparent and accountable fashion. for many central banks, this has meant inflation targeting. i've suggested that there are lessons here for the international monetary fund. a more effective imf really does matter. in a world of floating exchange rates, large private capital flows, and liberalized trade, we need an effective forum in which the issues that shape the global economy can be discussed with candour and good will,