is vital for greece and entails only a negligible cost for its partners. this will pave the way to the inclusion of greek government bonds in the ecb ’ s quantitative easing programme, which in turn will facilitate sustainable market access and further support the economic recovery. this will set in motion a new virtuous circle that will signal investor confidence in greece ’ s economic prospects while encouraging the return of deposits to banks, a return to financial markets after the end of the current programme and, eventually, the full abolition of capital controls. 6. conclusions the greek economy is on a steady upward trajectory. however, despite the encouraging signs coming from the positive gdp growth figures for the first half of 2017, there is no room for complacency or a relaxation of efforts. we still have a way to go before the positive prospects of the greek economy for the period 2017 – 2019 can be confirmed and before greece can gain the full confidence of markets after the end of the programme in august 2018. this will be achieved if the country obtains a credit rating enabling it to refinance its debt at rates that are in line with its sustainability and if banks have sufficient collateral to be fully funded from the ecb ’ s refinancing mechanism and not only from the costlier emergency liquidity assistance ( ela ). consequently, a sustained exit to markets requires : first, adhering to the objectives of the programme and accelerating the pace of implementation of reforms, both those decided as part of the programme and discretionary reforms to strengthen economic growth. the fast completion of the third review of the programme is absolutely necessary. second, sufficient and timely specification of medium - term debt relief measures in line with eurogroup decisions. third, constructive cooperation between the greek government and the institutions on the type and 5 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches conditionality of support to the greek economy after the end of the programme in august 2018, in order to ensure its return to financial normality after seven years of significant sacrifices of the greek people. 6 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches

separation, partly because the initial round of loss measurement – which has depended heavily on nama valuations – was completed only at the very end of the initial guarantee period in september ( and we were, as mentioned, unlucky in that the sequence in which the valuations came out left the bad news until late ). in addition, the announced losses have been very large, and came as a bit of a shock to the market at a time when the state ’ s finances were already under pressure and with heightened market sensitivity to sovereign debt issues in the euro area. a faster and deeper implementation of the existing approach, as agreed under the eu - imf programme, is clearly the way to go. the funders ’ single - mindedness on this point will help overcome hesitation and accelerate the making of hard choices. for example, given the stressed funding position of the government, i would myself have hesitated to call for an additional €10 billion to be applied right away to further strengthening the banks ’ capital, as is now agreed. it will be important to ensure that the state gets good value for this investment and that over - capitalization is not dissipated in cost inefficiencies. reducing the banking uncertainty will not be fully accomplished overnight. extracting progressively more detailed and comprehensive information from the banks will help to assess the quality of their remaining non - nama book. the evolution of loan performance as the economy recovers will provide further precision. still, even though i would be disappointed and surprised if all of the €35 billion earmarked for the banks in the package were needed in the end, the weaker and uncertain economic conditions now forecast by most observers into the years ahead do underline the need for a bis central bankers ’ speeches strong capital buffer. we will get a better fix on this with the work going into pcar2011, which, as i mentioned, is intended to determine any additional capital needs that might have emerged since we last stressed the main banks ’ non - nama portfolio in march 2010. keeping options open while seeking to reduce the exposure of the state to further risks has been a touchstone of the bank restructuring policy adopted over the past year. this may indeed have contributed to prolonging the process. increasingly it seems evident that placing the continuing parts of the system on a firm footing can best be done through the involvement of new foreign owners who can bring capital, risk control and other management skills. this would effectively short - circuit the risk - reduction process