samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
. headline inflation has of course been significantly affected by the recent surge in energy prices. the breakeven inflation rate derived from indexed treasury securities has additional problems as a measure of expected inflation. as i discussed in a recent speech ( bernanke, 2004b ), breakeven inflation may differ substantially from the market's true expectation of inflation because of possibly time - varying risk and liquidity premiums. i will discuss inflation expectations further in the context of monetary policy, to which i turn next. monetary policy the federal funds rate stands at a historically low level of 1 percent, and the federal open market committee ( fomc ) has declared its intention to be “ patient in removing policy accommodation. ” as a number of my fomc colleagues have noted in various public venues, inevitably the funds rate will have to return to a more normal level. what considerations should the committee keep in mind as it plans this normalization process? before addressing this question, i would like to point out that, in an appropriately broad sense, monetary conditions in the united states are already in the process of normalizing. i base this statement on my view that the stance of monetary policy should be judged not only by the current setting of the federal funds rate but also by the level of rates that are tied directly or indirectly to expectations about the future path of monetary policy, of which the yields on treasury securities are the leading examples. in part because of the fomc's communication strategy, which has linked the future stance of policy to the level of inflation and the extent of slack in resource utilization, market interest rates have generally responded continuously and in a stabilizing manner to economic developments. the march employment report, which cited an unexpectedly high rate of job creation, provides a recent example. treasury yields rose sharply on its release as market participants traced out the report's presumed implications for monetary policy. mortgage rates, corporate bond rates, and other yields and asset prices moved in sympathy, with important effects on the cost of borrowing and hence, presumably, on aggregate demand. for practical purposes, therefore, monetary conditions tightened significantly the day of the march employment report, notwithstanding the fact that the federal funds rate itself was unchanged. this episode illustrates both the power and the importance of clear communication by monetary policymakers about their objectives and their evaluation of economic conditions. with respect to future decisions about the policy rate, for me two considerations are most relevant : first, the degree of confidence one can place in the sustainability

you the best of luck, with the proviso that luck is what you make of it. and perhaps you will advise next year's class to invite j. k. rowling.
promote maximum, inclusive employment and price stability — are closely related to the topics that we will be discussing today. the decisions that we at the fed face on interest rates and other matters must be, and will be, informed by the perspectives that all of you bring to the table today about how to help young people thrive. those decisions will be better decisions after we have heard you and gained a better understanding of the challenges and possible solutions. thank you again for the opportunity to hear your views, and i am really looking forward to our discussion. 1 / 1 bis central bankers'speeches

##day credit in the triparty settlement process by the end of 2014. completing these three reforms would represent a strong start to the job of reducing systemic risk in the short - term wholesale funding markets that are key to the functioning of securities markets. still, important work would remain. for example, a major source of unaddressed risk emanates from the large volume of short - term securities financing transactions ( sfts ) in our financial system, including repos, reverse repos, securities borrowing, and lending transactions. regulatory reform has mostly passed over these transactions because sfts appear to involve minimal risks from a microprudential perspective. but sfts, particularly large matched books of sfts, create sizable macroprudential risks, including vulnerabilities to runs and asset fire sales. although the dodd - frank act provides additional tools to address the failure of a systemically important broker - dealer, the existing bank and broker - dealer regulatory regimes have not been designed to materially mitigate these systemic risks. continued attention to these potential vulnerabilities is needed, both here in the united states and abroad. conclusion as i hope is apparent from this review of progress on the implementation of regulatory reforms, we are at the beginning of the end of the rulemaking process for most of the major dodd - frank act provisions. some regulations already finalized are now in effect. others provide a transition period for firms and markets to prepare for the new rules of the road. still others will be completed in the coming months. with respect to all three sets of regulations, the emphasis will soon be shifting from rule - writing to rule compliance, interpretation, and enforcement. here, the benchmarks for progress and performance are less visible, at least until something goes wrong. for that reason, it is all the more important that the regulatory agencies put in place institutional mechanisms to assure strong, sensible oversight of the new regulatory framework. thank you for your attention. i would be pleased to answer any questions you might have. list of rules, notices, and reports of the federal reserve board under the dodd - frank act as of july 2, 2013 bis central bankers ’ speeches
senior deputy governor wilkins and i would be happy to answer your questions. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

stephen s poloz : release of the monetary policy report opening statement by mr stephen s poloz, governor of the bank of canada, at the press conference following the release of the monetary policy report, ottawa, ontario, 18 april 2018. * * * good morning. senior deputy governor wilkins and i are happy to be with you to answer your questions about today ’ s interest rate announcement and our monetary policy report ( mpr ). before taking your questions, let me briefly offer a few insights into governing council ’ s deliberations. inflation is on target and the economy is operating close to potential. that statement alone underscores the considerable progress seen in the economy over the past 12 months. that said, interest rates remain very low relative to historical experience. this is because the economy is not yet able to remain at full capacity on its own. furthermore, the sustainability of this level of activity is not assured ; although we expected the economy to moderate in the second half of 2017, that moderation has extended into early 2018 and has been more pronounced than expected. governing council considered recent economic data very carefully and concluded that the softness early this year was due mainly to two temporary factors. the first relates to changes to mortgage rules that went into effect at the start of the year. these caused house sales to be pulled forward into the fourth quarter of 2017. although we are still expecting the housing sector to moderate in 2018 compared with last year, we can expect a partial recovery of activity in the second quarter. the second factor is the unexpected drop in exports during the first quarter, much of which was related to transportation bottlenecks. this points to a partial recovery in the second quarter and later in the year. notice that we are expecting only a partial recovery in the level of exports — an issue i will return to in a moment. accordingly, we expect a strong rebound in the second quarter after a lacklustre first quarter, with an average growth rate of about 2 per cent in the first half of the year and a return to nearpotential growth thereafter. fiscal stimulus, both provincial and federal, is playing a role in this forecast. we will be monitoring the data for the second quarter very closely in the weeks ahead. assuming our forecast remains on track, it is governing council ’ s view that interest rates will need to move higher over time to keep inflation on target. we acknowledge that the forces weighing on the economy mean that monetary policy is likely to remain stimulative to some
is that building a sound consumer and data protection framework with evolving capabilities is critical. before i conclude, a few words are in order about the role of regulators in the sector. it is essential that they ensure the innovations in the financial sector are conducted safely, i. e., without jeopardizing financial stability or consumers. this requires that regulators remain knowledgeable of the new and emerging technologies, in addition to being nimble so as to provide timely guidance. given the unknown risks with these innovations, a pilot “ test and learn ” approach may be adopted, and through which the necessary safeguards are applied to mitigate the potential risks. this approach worked for us at the central bank of kenya when we took the initial steps with mobile money services. as regulatory perimeters become blurred, financial sector regulators must establish links with other regulators, governments, private sector, and other stakeholders. in this complex scenario, consumers will become more vulnerable and will rely on the regulators to protect them. regulators will also need to guide the maintenance of sound governance and practices at all levels. in closing, i want to underscore that a great deal of innovation and innovative thinking is needed to ensure that the benefits from greater financial inclusion are fully realized. there are risks, but in the words of van gogh, “ the fishermen know that the sea is dangerous and the storm terrible, but they have never found these dangers sufficient reason for remaining ashore. ” thank you!

. we should therefore come up with a holistic roadmap that incorporates the financial sector players, regulators, development partners and the government. let us also formulate clear deliverables, performance indicators and a roadmap that will facilitate kenya ’ s aspiration of being a green economy. with these remarks, ladies and gentlemen, i look forward to fruitful deliberations. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
). “ the federal reserve : looking back, looking forward, ” speech delivered at the annual meeting of the american economic association, philadelphia, january 3. borio, claudio, and haibin zhu ( 2012 ). “ capital regulation, risk - taking and monetary policy : a missing link in the transmission mechanism? ” journal of financial stability, vol. 8 ( december ), pp. 236 – 51. bowman, david, juan m. londono, and horacio sapriza ( 2014 ). “ u. s. unconventional monetary policy and transmission to emerging market economies ( pdf ), ” international finance discussion papers 1109. washington : board of governors of the federal reserve system, june. bruno, valentina, and hyun song shin ( forthcoming ). “ cross - border banking and global liquidity, ” review of economic studies. chen, qianying, andrew filardo, dong he, and feng zhu ( 2012 ). “ international spillovers of central bank balance sheet policies ( pdf ), ” bis papers series 66p. basel, switzerland : bank for international settlements, october. d ’ amico, stefania, and thomas b. king ( 2013 ). “ flow and stock effects of large - scale treasury purchases : evidence on the importance of local supply, ” journal of financial economics, vol. 108 ( may ), pp. 425 – 48. draghi, mario, and vitor constancio ( 2013 ). “ introductory statement to the press conference ( with q & a ), ” speech delivered at the european central bank, frankfurt, july 4. ehrmann, michael, and marcel fratzscher ( 2005 ). “ equal size, equal role? interest rate interdependence between the euro area and the united states, ” economic journal, vol. 115 ( october ), pp. 930 – 50. bis central bankers ’ speeches — — — ( 2009 ). “ global financial transmission of monetary policy shocks, ” oxford bulletin of economics and statistics, vol. 71 ( december ), pp. 739 – 59. eichengreen, barry ( 2013 ). “ does the federal reserve care about the rest of the world? ” journal of economic perspectives, vol. 27 ( fall ), pp. 87 – 104. federal open market committee ( 2014 ). statement on longer - run goals and monetary policy strategy ( pdf ). washington : board of governors of the federal reserve system, january 28.

on june 13, 2017 ( pdf ). 4 the survey is available on the board ’ s website at www. federalreserve. gov / data / sfos / files / senior - financial - officer - survey - 201809. pdf. 5 see randal k. quarles ( 2018 ), “ liquidity regulation and the size of the fed ’ s balance sheet, ” speech delivered at “ currencies, capital, and central bank balances : a policy conference, ” a hoover institution monetary policy conference, stanford university, stanford, calif., may 4. 6 see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2019 ), “ minutes of the federal open market committee, january 29 – 30, 2019, ” press release, february 20. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
controls for residents will not lead to an overall net outflow of capital from the country. new investments by non - residents should continue to exceed the outward investment by residents.

direct investment projects, and to enable institutional investors to diversify about r30 billion of their investments in foreign currency denominated assets. over the three year period from the beginning of 1994 up to the end of 1996, the total net inflow of capital, that is taking account of non - resident capital inflows and resident capital outflows, showed a net gain for south africa of almost r30 billion. the substantial capital inflows into south africa therefore enabled us to achieve our objectives with the replenishment of the official foreign reserves, and the gradual relaxation of the exchange controls. the future programme with the removal of the remaining exchange controls will, as over the past three - and - a - half years, be very dependent on a continuation of net capital inflows from the rest of the world. the capital inflows will, as a matter of fact, not only determine the pace of the removal of the remaining exchange controls, but also the rate of economic growth and development in the country. for south africa it is of vital importance therefore that we shall continue to make our markets and our economy attractive to foreign investors. we may ask ourselves what foreign investors are looking for before they decide to invest in a country. what prompted them, over the past few years, to make such huge investments in south africa? they are obviously looking for stable political and social conditions in a country. the anc government has certainly established itself as a stable government and has founded a credible track record with the management of the economy. crime and violence remains a worrying aspect of the social system, and many foreign investors still prefer not to commit themselves for too long a period in making their investments here. on the economic side, the globalisation of the world financial markets is a process that countries such as south africa cannot stay out of. operators in these global markets are defining their own economic criteria for the assessment and comparison of countries where they can invest huge amounts of funds administered by them. these criteria may sometimes seem to be rather superficial, but they are basic. for example, the maastricht criteria require members of the european union to maintain a deficit on their budgets of not more than 3 per cent of gross domestic product. total government debt should not be more than 60 per cent of gross domestic product. the rate of inflation in each participating member country should not be too far out of line with the average rate of inflation in all the participating member countries. these criteria are now being applied very
better place. i will illustrate that with a couple of the areas that were addressed in the first phase of the code, which is already in the public domain. in the first phase, topics were covered that the market was looking for guidance on sooner rather than later and that were potentially having an adverse effect 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches on market functioning. one example of this is around information sharing, where many market participants have highlighted that they are unsure what information can be conveyed to counterparties and other market participants. while it is clear ( or at least should be ) that disclosing the details of a client ’ s order book to a counterparty is not acceptable, market participants have noted that there is much less clarity around what level of aggregation, say, is necessary in order to convey market colour appropriately. as a result, it appears some market participants are being very conservative in sharing information, which can have implications for the effective functioning of the market. this is notwithstanding the guidance provided in this area in the global preamble put out by the global foreign exchange committee, in march 2015. 3 the global code takes the material in the global preamble and fleshes it out a bit more, including with some examples of what is, and isn ’ t, appropriate communication, and why. similarly, there have been diverse opinions around what is appropriate behaviour in terms of order handling. there have been some very public instances of inappropriate behaviour around order handling that have come to light in recent years. the market is seeking greater guidance as to what principles should be followed, including the different standards that may apply depending on whether an intermediary is functioning as principal or agent. this is one area that was not adequately covered in the pre - existing codes that the various fxcs had endorsed for the fx market. it is an area where we are aiming to provide the sought - after guidance. but we are not writing a procedures manual for order handling. rather we are articulating principles that need to be taken into account. individual firms may then take these principles and reflect them in their own procedures manual. our aim in articulating these principles is to provide market participants with the framework in which to think about how they handle stop - loss orders. the emphasis here is very much on the word ‘ think ’. the global code will not provide the answers to all your questions, but it should help you ask the right questions. adherence to the code alongside drafting the code, we have also

##hip, and notably your commitment in driving and modernizing the financial sector in the region over the last 8 years of my term. let me conclude by once again, thanking the bank of tanzania for the warm welcome and hospitality. with these few remarks, i look forward to fruitful engagement in discharging our mandate in this meeting. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
rapidly recovering. the euro area has hit bottom and is expected to be on a growth track of around 1. 5 percent in 2004 as business sentiment improves. as a result, 2004 could be a year of synchronized recovery in the world economy. the main obstacles to this scenario are the rapid depreciation of the u. s. dollar and geopolitical risks. many argue that the stronger u. s. dollar causes a widening of the u. s. external imbalance. however, it is the income effect from the growth of trading partners, not the price effect of the exchange rate that is far more effective in correcting the external imbalance. the situation where the u. s. economy continues to be the sole engine for growth is not desirable for a sustainable recovery of the world economy. hence, it is a top priority policy agenda for japan, other asian countries, and also european countries to achieve a full - fledged economic recovery. a rapid depreciation of the u. s. dollar would reduce capital inflows to the united states, and lead to the fall of both bond and stock prices, which would, in turn, weaken momentum for economic recovery. since 1985, japan's current account to nominal gdp ratio has hardly changed from around 3 percent in spite of large fluctuations in the yen exchange rate from 260 yen to 80 yen against the u. s. dollar. this shows that the size of a country's external imbalance over the medium to long term is determined by the difference from the rest of the world in terms of such fundamental determinants for economic growth as technological progress, population growth, and national savings rates. 1 iii. economic growth rate and bias in the price index from the viewpoint of overcoming deflation, we need to understand the bias in the price index as well as how it relates to changes in the relationship between real growth and potential growth. if there is no bias in the price index and real gdp growth exceeds potential growth by about 1 percent for two years, we will have the possibility of escaping from deflation in view of the relationship between the pace of narrowing output gap and current size of the output gap. 2 to the contrary, if the price index bias is large and real gdp growth is overvalued compared with potential growth, the output gap will not narrow and it will be difficult to escape from deflation. economists have long been debating the “ index problem, ” namely what the true cost of living index is and which price

a sound framework with evolving capabilities will require sound governance and practices at all levels and by all actors in this sector. a pilot “ test - and - learn ” approach may also be adopted for innovations, through which the necessary safeguards are applied to mitigate the potential risks. before i conclude, i want to underscore that a great deal of innovation and innovative thinking is needed to ensure that the benefits from greater financial inclusion are fully realized. this forum facilitates progress in this direction. i look forward to interesting and lively interactions and discussions this afternoon. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches