past historical episodes of technological change have always seemed to deliver as many new jobs as they replace, it is important to remember that automation, by definition, always destroys tasks. the question is just whether it creates enough new tasks in the process. simultaneously, the euro area is undergoing a profound demographic change. fertility rates have declined, life expectancy has risen and sizeable cohorts are reaching retirement age. ageing societies tend to imply lower labour market participation and lower contribution to potential growth. currently, this is only partly counterbalanced by the rising participation rate among older cohorts, partly as a result of pension reforms, and from movements of workers across borders. this all points to a need for national economic structures to become more conducive to growth and competitiveness. the country - specific recommendations, proposed annually by the european commission and endorsed by the european council, tend to include, for example, dedicated reform recommendations for product, labour and financial markets in eu member states. further reducing barriers in product and services markets could help to improve firm entry, exit and growth. [ 17 ] efficient insolvency frameworks would free up resources by enabling the restructuring or resolution of persistently unproductive and barely viable firms. labour market regulations and policies could support the uptake of rapid technological change and improve its distributional impact. investment in human capital is key in this regard, and reforms that increase labour mobility could reduce labour market mismatches, support the diffusion of technology and mitigate the adverse effects of demographics. the european single market has been a powerful tool for stimulating growth and competitiveness, but its functioning could be further improved. the euro area services sector accounts for around two - thirds of gross value added and an even larger share of employment. yet the services directive, which aims to reduce barriers to trade in services, has only been partially implemented and does not cover several key sectors. [ 20 ] reinvigorating the single market for services therefore remains a challenge that european leaders will need to tackle jointly. in the same vein, the fragmentation of national corporate tax systems creates market distortions and impairs the functioning of the single market. therefore, the long - debated common consolidated corporate tax base would be a huge step forwards in deepening the single market. it would lower the administrative costs that firms face and mitigate competitive distortions created by diverse and often conflicting tax systems. deepening emu and an ambitious cmu would facilitate investment, notably across borders. foster

since the crisis worsened in september 2008 to ensure they can manage their liquidity. for instance, we have granted loans with a one - year maturity at a variable interest rate. the purpose of granting loans with a one - year maturity at a low and fixed interest rate was to bring down the rates in the interbank market and thus contribute to lower interest rates on loans to companies and households. it was a means of increasing the scope for monetary policy to have the intended effect. reasons for optimism although the situation is still serious and requires extraordinary measures, there is beginning to be some cause for optimism. it is now the first time since september last year that our forecasts and those of other analysts no longer need to be substantially revised down between the forecasting rounds. after having revised down the forecasts heavily in four reports in a row since september, we made only a small downward revision in july and the most recent information points more to a slightly stronger picture of the real economy than the one we painted then. the imf has even made an upward revision to the forecasts for the world economy in its july report. my assessment in july was that the risk outlook for economic developments in sweden is now balanced for the first time since spring 2008. there is an equally great risk that developments will be better than forecast as that developments will be worse than forecast. previously i have mainly seen risks of poorer developments than in our main scenario. downside risks primarily include two factors that could indicate a poorer development in the real economy. one is that the economic recovery abroad could take time, which would have negative effects on swedish exports. the other is that the situation in the baltic countries could deteriorate and cause larger loan losses for the swedish banks than we have anticipated. this could indirectly dampen the recovery in the swedish economy. upside risks include the expansionary fiscal and monetary policy measures taken in most countries and which may lead to the international recovery taking place sooner than anticipated. this could also hasten the swedish recovery by means of an increase in exports. the new information received during the summer also indicates a slightly stronger development in economic activity than we had assumed. one could interpret the recent signs of increased optimism to mean that the need to increase the repo rate will approach sooner. however, one should take into account the fact that resource utilisation is very low and will remain so during the forecast period ( see figure 23 ) and that our monetary policy task primarily concerns ensuring that inflation remains close to the target.