demonstrate that they promote macroeconomic welfare. now, financial market regulation is being tightened because the negative macroeconomic consequences of financial crises have moved into the spotlight again. lord turner, the former chairman of the british financial services authority ( fsa ) came straight to the point in 2010 when talking about financial innovations and regulation, admitting self - critically “ we were philosophically inclined to accept that if innovation created new markets and products that must be beneficial and that if regulation stymied innovation that must be bad. we are now more aware of the instability risks which might offset the benefits of such innovation. ” 3. 2 role of the central banks since the financial crisis, there has also been more discussion about the role played by central banks. first, experience of the financial crisis has again raised the question of how monetary policymakers should deal with asset price bubbles. the prevailing opinion before the crisis was that monetary policy is a blunt sword when dealing with exaggerations in the asset markets. to “ prick a bubble ”, interest rates would have to be increased so sharply that it would entail severe macroeconomic collateral damage. as a further argument against pricking bubbles, it was claimed that central banks were unable to identify the emergence of such bubbles any better or earlier than other wellinformed market players. instead, the central banks should clear up the mess, so to speak, after the bubble had burst by means of massive interest rate cuts and injections of liquidity. however, this approach, or as it is also known the jackson hole consensus, the greenspan doctrine or simply the “ mop - up strategy ” was discredited by the crisis. even though those in favour of bursting speculative bubbles are few and far between, a policy of actively leaning against the wind is now gaining more widespread support. this approach is often referred to as “ more symmetrical monetary policy ". however, this does not mean that monetary policy should assume responsibility for financial stability. macroprudential policymakers have a more appropriate toolkit for safeguarding financial stability. in this context, the act on monitoring financial stability ( gesetz zur uberwachung der finanzstabilitat ) assigns the bundesbank important tasks in the field of macroprudential oversight. the bank is responsible, in particular, for analysing factors that are key to financial stability, identifying risks, making proposals to the financial stability committee regarding the issuing of warnings and recommendations, and evaluating the implementation of such warnings and recommendations

penalise certain players or to give them special privileges. the main purpose of financial regulation is still to ensure financial stability by avoiding risks to a stable and trustworthy financial sector. in the case of both fintechs and banks, new risks stemming from intelligent technologies cannot be ruled out. big data is a good example : on the one hand, it may definitely prove helpful in terms of keeping a proper and timely overview of risks and processes in a complex banking world. but big data technologies may also give rise to whole new categories of risk. for example, big data could entice banks and also unregulated players to let algorithms become even greater decision - makers – think of decisions regarding credit assessment or trading, for example. but we have to ensure that humans, or, more precisely, well - informed risk takers ultimately take responsibility for their decisions. the same applies to risk management via intelligent data processing methods : the approaches i have witnessed so far sound very promising. but we have to bear in mind that computer algorithms may not always be right. cyber security is another issue that needs to be dealt with in an industry that is becoming increasingly reliant on it. bis central bankers ’ speeches all in all, regulators will have to remain alert with regard to new technologies. there are many new businesses and technologies out there, and we cannot foresee for the time being all of their possible risks, nor can we limit the scope of potential risks. the objective is therefore more a matter of ensuring a risk - adequate prudential approach and the necessary degree of intervention. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches