the “ art ” of central banking has evolved and to draw some lessons for a framework that can serve us well in the future. having, and communicating to the public, a well - defined framework, as opposed to what ben bernanke called the marcel marceau communication strategy – that is : watch what i do, not what i say – is particularly helpful whenever one sails into uncharted waters, i. e., when the public does not have enough examples of the central bank ’ s past behaviour and hence the information vacuum looms unusually large. a review of central banks ’ monetary policy strategies could serve this purpose ; many central banks are currently involved in doing precisely that. i am sure that this workshop will provide important insights on all these issues. among the many ways in which the term “ new normal ” may be analysed, i am happy to see that today ’ s papers tackle three questions that are of the utmost relevance in my view. the first concerns the optimal inflation target in a low rates environment. i am sure that the keynote speech by professor gali as well as the papers that will be presented in the opening session will help us deepen our understanding of the implications of a low interest rates and low inflation environment for monetary policy. a second issue is about the strategies that central banks should follow : should bygones be bygones? or should policymakers seek instead to undo past deviations of inflation from the target, adopting what are known as “ make - up ” strategies? this is one of the most momentous questions that is being discussed within the broad ongoing review of the monetary policy strategy by the federal reserve. i am delighted to have with us, as keynote speaker, paolo pesenti from the federal reserve bank of new york, and i am eager to hear his insight on these questions. the final issue is the new tools used after the outbreak of the global financial and sovereign debt crises. how do they influence the real economy? are there limits to their effectiveness? although the literature is flourishing with studies on unconventional monetary policies, little is known about the transmission mechanism of these tools to the economy. the papers that will be presented in this afternoon ’ s session will shed further light on these issues. let me conclude by saying that the new normal is already with us : returning to the pre - crisis status quo is not only unlikely, it is probably unfeasible. to deal successfully with this new normal, central banks must keep developing analytical tools

of 2022, the recovery has become increasingly vulnerable to downside risks, including new, negative developments in the pandemic, inflation, increases in energy and food prices, and bottlenecks in the manufacturing and transportation of goods, as well as unfavourable geopolitical developments. it is important for the g20 to maintain a cooperative approach aimed at minimising the risk that heterogeneity in recovery strategies may result in an undesirable spill - overs. let me spend my last few minutes on a question that may legitimately be asked, and that many of us, involved in lengthy discussions often stretching over several meetings, might have asked themselves. within the g20 framework, are we actually doing what is needed? are we addressing the most important economic and financial issues in an efficient, effective way? despite all the frustration that we might feel at times, when consensus proves hard to reach, and despite the failures that do occur from time to time, i think we can give a positive answer to these questions. first, whatever the concrete details of the agreements that political leaders are actually able to reach ( and, as i have argued, we do count the results of the italian presidency as genuinely meaningful achievements ), and even when agreement proves elusive, the g20 maintains its value as a multilateral forum where the leaders of the major world economies can frankly talk to one another about the key economic and financial issues of the day. at the very least, this provides a framework within which mutual trust can be pursued, whatever the difficulty of the times. but it is especially useful in a crisis. it has repeatedly proven its value when there is a recognised, urgent need to provide coordinated responses, as happened in 2008 - 9, and occurred again in the last couple of years, including in 2021, when the g20 acted to secure funds for vaccines and suspend the debt service for the most vulnerable economies. second, the g20 has promoted a format for discussion and coordination of policies in some key areas. one good example is the work of the financial stability board. established at the time of global financial crisis, it started with the overhaul of the regulatory and supervisory regimes of the financial system, in particular of the banking sector. it has since moved on to assess and address emerging risks from a variety of sources, including most recently crypto - assets, nonbank financial intermediation and climate - related financial risks. it is now taken for granted that there is an international