administrative costs, financing the total or partial transfer of assets and / or liabilities, or financing bridge banks. a number of countries have recently introduced ( sweden and hungary ) or announced plans to introduce ( germany, france and the uk ) bank levies, though the objectives and implementation schemes differ significantly. considering the current conditions of the financial sector and the costs that banks will incur to conform with the new capital standards, in my opinion the timing of additional expense should be assessed carefully. however, if such initiatives are pursued, it is important that they proceed in a coordinated manner and, in this sense, the commission ’ s proposal appears to be a sensible way forward ; a number of issues, related for example to the precise scope, financing and governance of resolution funds still need to be addressed. the role of dgs deposit guarantee schemes should be able to absorb the impact of medium magnitude crises or, where possible, to promptly intervene to avoid bank failures in the interest of depositors. the more effective a dgs, the greater will be depositor confidence, reducing the risk of bank runs and limiting contagion from banks in distress. much work is underway at international fora to strengthen the role of dgs. the effort to harmonise and enhance their risk minimiser role is particularly welcomed. the contribution that dgs can bring to open market solutions, helping to preserve the continuity of important business activities and avoid the disruption of customer relationships, mainly in the interest of depositors, will be increasingly important. the important collaboration between the basel committee and the international association of deposit insurers ( iadi ), who joined forces to address a range of issues including coverage, funding and reimbursement, resulted in the “ core principles ” focusing on, among others, public awareness and cooperation with other safety - net participants, including central banks and supervisors. the principles are designed to be adaptable to a broad range of country circumstances, settings and structures. the “ core principles ” form a non - compulsory framework for deposit insurance. however, they are testimony of the will to establish best practices for national authorities committed to enhance or put in place effective deposit insurance schemes. the eu directive on dgs steps taken in the eu to strengthen the regulation on dgs move in the right direction. the commission proposal of july 2010 aims to enhance depositor protection and convergence of eu dgs by harmonizing scope, coverage and funding mechanisms. it raises fixed coverage to €100, 000 per depositor,

; accurate monitoring by investors will be much weaker than desirable, with the result that future crises may be more likely. finally, we must be aware that the public will not accept a repetition of the widespread bailing - out of sifis that was necessary during this crisis. a clear political message has emerged at international level ( pittsburgh g - 20 meeting sept. 2009 ), strongly backed by the eu, that taxpayer money should not be used again to cover bank losses. elaborating measures to effectively tackle “ too big to fail ” is now the priority of the financial stability board ( fsb ), which will present its recommendations to the g20 in november. the fsb is assessing a broad range of policy options to reduce the probability and the impact of a crisis involving sifis. they include inter alia the introduction of prudential instruments, such as capital and liquidity surcharges above those agreed in basel, the use of contingent capital ( i. e. the possibility to convert debt into equity either by statutory resolution mechanisms or by private contractual arrangements ) and the standardization and trading of otc derivatives on electronic platforms with clearance by central counterparties to reduce the interconnectedness of financial institutions. but particularly important, especially to establish the right set of incentives for sifis, is the fsb ’ s program to set up effective resolution regimes, both at the domestic and cross - border level, to be able to manage in an orderly way the eventual failure of sifis. only if we succeed to organise a mechanism through which sifis are allowed to fail, while limiting to the maximum extent the systemic risk involved, can we ensure that sifis behave in a correct manner and thus reduce the probability of future crises. the issue therefore merges into the broader question of establishing principles and tools for an effective crisis management system, a theme that involves many aspects that will be addressed in the rest of this conference. let me briefly touch upon some of them. 3. strengthening the toolbox role of authorities, preventive action and resolution regimes a first crucial issue involves the role and powers of authorities. the crisis has highlighted that the intensity and effectiveness of the supervision of sifis must be stepped up, particularly with regard to both preventive action and resolution powers. this will be possible, in some cases, only by reinforcing the mandates, independence and resources of national supervisors. with regard to preventive action, supervisory powers and resources must be reinforced so