transmission of the snb ’ s monetary policy. as of august 2023, domestic banks held 28 % of all outstanding snb bills ( dark red ), while other investors held 72 % ( light red ). our implementation approach has not only worked well in normal times, but it has also proven itself in times of financial market stress. in march of this year, the snb had to provide significant liquidity assistance to credit suisse. this led to a corresponding increase in total reserves, as indicated by the blue line on slide 11. while credit suisse faced large - scale outflows of customer deposits, other banks experienced large liquidity inflows. this resulted in a higher supply of, and lower demand for, liquidity in the money market. consequently, saron ( red line ) as well as other swiss franc money market interest rates experienced some downward pressure and started to deviate more significantly from the snb policy rate. cf. maechler and moser ( 2020 ) for a discussion of the snb ’ s monetary policy implementation in the context of a negative policy rate. page 5 / 10 initially, the snb absorbed the additional liquidity to mitigate the downward pressure on money market interest rates by conducting overnight reverse repo transactions. specifically, in addition to continuing to conduct the ‘ regular ’ reserve - absorbing operations ( one - week reverse repos and snb bills with maturities ranging from 28 to 336 days ), we set a ‘ hard floor ’ in the overnight segment of the repo market by offering overnight reserve - absorbing repos – the blue diamonds in the chart. this countered the downward pressure on money market interest rates, including saron. as a result, during this period saron never deviated by more than ten basis points from the snb policy rate. following the initial phase, the snb stabilised money market conditions further by increasing the outstanding volume and variety of its reserve - absorbing operations. between march and june, we issued snb bills with a seven - day maturity, in addition to the regular longer maturities. this short maturity was attractive for investors during this period of financial market stress. the wide range of reserve - absorbing instruments allowed the snb to increase its absorption volume very rapidly. as a result, saron moved closer to the snb policy rate once more as overall money market conditions normalised. by june, the distortions in swiss franc money market conditions due to the crisis at credit suisse

forum, on which government authorities and financial supervisors are represented, that can assess macrofinancial conditions from a broad perspective and that has the capacity to formulate recommendations on public policies that may affect financial stability. such committees have been set up in practically all eu member states, normally under the leadership of the central bank, following the recommendation made by the european systemic risk board, on which all eu regulatory and supervisory authorities and central banks are represented. with regard to resolution functions, spain has already adapted to european regulatory requirements. in this connection it has adopted a structure in which the resolution preparation and planning tasks are assigned to the sectoral supervisors [ the banco de espana for banks and the cnmv ( national securities market commission ) for investment firms ], and those relating to the implementation of resolution measures are assigned to the frob ( fund for the orderly restructuring of the banking sector ). as you know, the frob is also responsible for the management and ultimate divestment of the stakes the state holds in the capital of banks subject to restructuring plans as a result of state aid granted during the crisis. these arrangements are admittedly more complex than those adopted in most member states, which have placed all resolution functions – preventive and executive alike – under the remit of the national prudential supervisor. in spain, coordination between the resolution authorities and between these and the prudential supervisor is so far functioning smoothly. in any event, the preamble to law 11 / 2015 establishes that these arrangements for the allocation of functions should be assessed once – within two years – the implementation of the restructuring plans currently under way has been completed, in light of the experience acquired, with a view to achieving greater efficiency. bis central bankers ’ speeches all told, as regards the organisation of the traditional supervisory functions, namely solvency, conduct and investor protection, spain retains a sectoral approach which, as indicated earlier, was abandoned some time back by our peers. hence, the banco de espana retains supervisory competencies for the solvency of credit institutions and also for their conduct, as regards the marketing and selling of loan and deposit products. the cnmv, meanwhile, in addition to overseeing the functioning of markets, supervises the solvency and conduct of investment firms and other capital market intermediaries ( such as investment fund management companies ), and the commercialization of financial products classified as securities. finally, the directorate general for insurance and pension funds oversees the solvency and conduct of companies in the insurance