paesi che dovessero rivolgersi al mes per chiedere un aiutoel debito sovrano? [.. ] lei ritiene che il mesl ’ esm debba fare un ’ analisi stringente della sostenibilita del debito con l ’ idea di imporre delle perdite anche degli obbligazionisti prima di mettere a disposizione il denaro degli altri paesi per sostenere un governo in crisi? philip lane : i think the risk associated with this approach is well understood. but please remember : what is the alternative? to argue that under zero circumstances there can be a sovereign debt restructuring is not plausible. please remember also : the foundation of the european union, of the european monetary union, is that in extreme circumstances there cannot be a 100 percent guarantee on any sovereign. at the same time, please remember that this reform is in no way suggesting any level of automatic restructuring. please remember that the esm has representation from all member countries. i think in terms of logic, to rule out 100 percent, under all circumstances, debt sustainability analysis is just not plausible. [ if that is necessary ], it has to be the case that sovereign debt hasn ’ t had that [ high a ] level of market discipline. but equally, i think everyone understands that this is really a very extreme situation. there can be many situations, i think, like we had in the irish case, where the esm money was available without any debt restructuring. we know there ’ s a large grey zone, a zone where, if the esm funding is available, the sovereign debt is fully sustainable. really the question of restructuring is only – in respect actually – an extreme scenario. franco bruni : molti pensano che i paesi che hanno tendenza a fare troppio debitio non smpetteranno mai di farlo se i tassi di interesse sono sempre molto bassi, se la banca centrale continua a comprare i titoli e se anche le banche commerciali continuano a comprare titoli del proprio governo. [.. ] se si tengono si compra tutto, se si tengono i tassi troppo bassi l ’ indis

##ciplina prevale. non pensa? philip lane : let me emphasise that what we see is that the credit spread remains and, as you say, if there is more risk of fiscal problems, the spread goes up. if there is a reassurance that a government will conform with european expectations, the spread comes down. our assessment is : even though, of course, the eurosystem is the big purchaser of sovereign debt, the market still understands that it is not a guarantee. of course, today because of the inflation too low, we have this policy, but it ’ s a policy about inflation. it ’ s not a policy about the public finances. and so in the future, because we do expect inflation to recover and we do not expect that the super - low rate that we see today is necessarily forever, i think any government which is benefiting from the low interest rate today, as part of their fiscal strategy should be using this opportunity, in part to break the debt down in a gradual way. let me reassure you that the ecb ’ s policy is about inflation. it is not about providing an excuse to governments not to make sure their public finances are in good shape. alessandro marenzi : [.. ] il concetto di helicopter money, e una favola oppure e un meccanismo che si puo studiare concretamente? philip lane : i think it ’ s a fascinating story to examine and i think it ’ s interesting to discuss. but let me emphasise that it is not on the horizon - even to some people with some of those attractions that we don ’ t think will be true to reality. so it remains the case that i think there are more headaches than solutions with that idea. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches