- pipeline still to come through. nevertheless, on balance the onus remains on ensuring enough monetary tightening is delivered to ‘ see the job through ’ and sustainably return inflation to target. although headline inflation is set to fall significantly in the course of this year owing to a combination of base effects and falls in energy prices, caution is still needed in assessing inflation prospects on account of the potential persistence of domestically generated inflation. i hope my remarks today have given some insight into how i am thinking – and will think – about the role inflation persistence will play in coming to monetary policy choices : focusing on intrinsic persistence through the lens of an interpretation of the incoming data using a structural story about price and wage setting behaviour. of course, the evolution of inflation persistence against the background of the terms of trade shock stemming from russia ’ s invasion of ukraine is only one of many challenges facing monetary policy makers at present. it needs to be seen in the context of other economic disturbances, not least the recent turmoil in the financial sector. we have been told by our colleagues in the financial policy committee that the uk financial system remains robust and resilient. nonetheless, those of us on the mpc need to remain vigilant to signs of tightening financial conditions and be prepared to respond to the macro implications of any dislocation to credit markets to the extent that they influence the outlook for inflation. at the next mpc meeting in early may, we will benefit from a comprehensive assessment of the outlook embodied in a new forecast. on that occasion, i will come to my own conclusions about bank rate on the basis of my assessment of the data flow and its interpretation in the forecast analysis. as always, my decision will focus on achieving the mpc ’ s price stability mandate through achieving the 2 % inflation target on a sustained and lasting basis. the views expressed in this speech are not necessarily those of the bank of england or the monetary policy committee. i would particularly like to thank saba alam, philip schnattinger and brad speigner for helpful discussions in the preparation of this speech. the text has also benefitted from helpful comments from andrew bailey, jonathan haskel, catherine mann, dave ramsden, martin seneca, fergal shortall and silvana tenreyro for which i am most grateful. opinions ( and all remaining errors and omissions ) are my own. 1. the mpc ceased to reinvest the proceeds of maturing gilts in its asset purchases portfolio as of

the potential for recovery. that could be a matter left for the shareholders. the more difficult a resolution would be, the more interest the authorities have in removing any barriers to resolvability in advance. failure is usually more problematic for banks than for other commercial firms. when a bank is known to be in trouble, its customers may withdraw funds quickly, creating a liquidity run that might spillover to similar institutions. that places an emphasis on speed of action. in 2009 the uk government introduced permanent legislation that enables banks to be resolved by the authorities, and designated the bank of england as the uk resolution authority. for the eu as a whole, the banking recovery and resolution directive ( brrd ) took effect at the start of 2015, and brings european legislation on recovery and resolution into line with the fsb ’ s international standards. it requires there to be a resolution authority in every eu country and, amongst other things, specifies how decisions are made to put banks into resolution, how resolutions may be conducted, and what tools should be available to resolution authorities. but there is not yet a special resolution process for insurers. that remains on the wish - list for now. effective resolution can be greatly enhanced if the authorities have prepared for the event, with the assistance of the firms concerned. the larger and more complex a firm, the more complex and challenging such planning is likely to be. for large international groups, typically the most complex, the most important decision is whether resolution is going to be addressed at the group level, by the home resolution authority ( single point of entry – spe ) or whether each part of the group is looked at separately, usually by the host resolution authority ( multiple point of entry – mpe ). the choice between spe and mpe will have implications for resolution planning, including steps that the firm may need to take to be resolved under that strategy – for example in which entities the capital will be held. the brrd requires that all banking firms should have recovery plans, and that resolution authorities should develop resolution plans for all firms, based on assessments of their resolvability. the resolution planning that the uk has already carried out has identified some bis central bankers ’ speeches common barriers to resolvability, such as a lack of loss - absorbing capacity in the right legal entities, that need to be addressed. the brrd also establishes that resolution authorities should determine a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ( mrel ) that will be available