samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
the european stability mechanism and building a capital markets union. at the same time work needs to continue on designing and establishing a time frame for an effective and incentive - compatible euro area stabilisation function. a more complete emu will be the foundation for a stable and resilient euro area economy contributing to global economic growth and financial stability. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

- exchange - policy competence are not likely to be delegated to the home rule of the faroe islands. a currency union would thus entail that the faroese authorities acknowledge - formally and clearly - that the decision - making competence regarding monetary and foreign - exchange policy rests solely with the danish national authorities, including danmarks nationalbank. in a currency union the situation would, in practice, be unchanged. the currency would still be danish kroner, and danmarks nationalbank would continue to conduct monetary policy. this means that the faroese authorities would have no autonomy as regards monetary and interest - rate policy. this is unchanged from the current situation. thus, it appears that delegation of monetary and foreign - exchange policy to the home rule with simultaneous conclusion of a currency union with denmark would be a complex way of maintaining status quo. separate currency - fixed - exchange - rate policy if a decision is made for the faroe islands ( or greenland ) to have their own currency, the options are the same as in other currency areas. however, the currency would be very small, and the narrow business structure would present a number of special challenges. the “ strongest ” fixed - exchange - rate policy is a currency board, whereby the local currency is completely fixed vis - a - vis another currency. this regime is used today by e. g. estonia, which applies a currency board with a fixed exchange rate vis - a - vis the euro. an initial option for the faroe islands could be a currency board vis - a - vis the danish krone in a ratio of 1 : 1. a currency board entails the establishment of a central bank to set the monetary - policy interest rate and intervene in the foreign - exchange market to stabilise the exchange rate. however, the central bank ’ s options are rather mechanical. these - often statutory - restrictions on the central bank are imposed to ensure credibility. history shows examples of successful currency boards, e. g. estonia, and total failures, e. g. the currency board in argentina. a country opting for a currency board has to defend its own currency. in case of speculation against the currency no help should be expected from the country to whose currency the currency in question is pegged. speculation may therefore require dramatic interest - rate increases. elimination of the risk of collapse in the event of speculation requires a guarantee agreement with a highly credible external party. for the faroe islands, this could e. g. mean a guarantee from the
lucas papademos : the international role of the euro – trends, determinants and prospects speech by mr lucas papademos, vice - president of the european central bank, at the brussels economic forum 2008, at the panel on “ the euro in a rapidly changing international environment ”, organised by the european commission, brussels, 15 may 2008. * i. * * introduction ladies and gentlemen, i would first like to thank the european commission and the organisers of the brussels economic forum for inviting me to this important celebration of the 10th anniversary of the launch of the euro. it is indeed a privilege and a pleasure for me to participate in this very special event. many of us here remember vividly the famous words – spoken almost 40 years ago – that “ one small step for ( a ) man ” can be “ one giant leap for mankind ” ( neil armstrong, apollo 11 mission, 20 july 1969 ). the same event can have a varying degree of significance for different people, depending on their viewpoint. anniversaries are occasions to take a step back and assess matters from a broader perspective and over an extended time horizon. they are occasions for celebrating the accomplishments of the past, as well as for reflecting on perspectives and objectives for the future. allow me to make an analogy with the words of neil armstrong and say that the ten years since the introduction of the euro may seem like a small step in the long history of the global economy to some people, but they certainly represent a significant leap of progress for europe. over the past ten years, the euro has become an important pole of stability in the world economy. the significance of the introduction of the euro has to be assessed first and foremost in terms of its contribution to the stability and growth of the euro area economy. and the euro ’ s performance as a currency must be fundamentally judged by its internal stability and credibility. at the same time, the single currency of a large economic area inevitably has a significant global role. our task today is to assess the euro ’ s international role in a rapidly changing and integrating global economy. my remarks will address a number of pertinent issues : • the evolution of the international use of the euro over the past ten years ; • and the euro ’ s current status as an international currency ; • the key determinants of a currency ’ s international role and the prospects for the further internationalisation of the euro ; and ; • the ecb ’ s position and the effects of macroeconomic and

first place. that is why completing the banking union, embarking on a new economic convergence process towards more resilient economies and achieving a fiscal union that ensures both fiscal sustainability and fiscal stabilisation are all crucial to providing a long - term vision of where emu is heading. the commission package adopted three weeks ago is a first step in this direction. but more will need to follow. thank you for your attention, and i am now looking forward to your questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches
the developed status. in the view of market - participants, the emes are the countries that are restructuring their economies towards greater market orientation and thus, offering a wealth of opportunities in trade, technology transfers and investment. while the fast - growing economies are operationally grouped together as emerging market economies ( emes ), the group of countries constituting emes has not been clearly defined and hence, a discussion about the emes as a group, at times, becomes difficult. nevertheless, the major countries amongst the emes are very well - recognised and an increased focus has been placed upon monitoring the performance and market conditions of the emes by the international financial institutions, leading economic intelligence agencies, credit rating agencies, leading multinational securities firms and financial journals. academic and policy research on emes have also mushroomed, focusing particularly upon the monetary, financial and regulatory policies and the issues relating to trade, financial integration and liberalisation of capital accounts. the emes represent the fast - growing group of countries and their share in world output is increasing. they are geographically spread across the world encompassing diverse cultures – asia, middle east, europe, africa and latin america. on account of increasing trade flows, intra - emes as well as with the rest of the world, they play a critical role in determining the course of bilateral, regional and multilateral trade policies and developments. they have become the destinations for large movements of international private capital, attracted by high - return possibilities, dwarfing the official flows, including those from multilateral financial institutions. today, the emes as a group are reported to constitute about 80 per cent of the global population, representing about 20 per cent of the world's output. the share of the emes in the global gdp is increasing and is also a tribute to their sound macroeconomic policies, improving fiscal positions, stronger external sectors, increasing productivity, etc. according to some recent estimates, the emes will soon account for more than half of the world ’ s ppp - based gdp. the emes are also becoming crucial to the supply - demand dynamics of oil and food apart from services and manufacturing products, as also for improving environmental cooperation. the rise of the emes, in general, has thus, made the globalisation a two - way process in which the emerging economies are changing from passive recipients to being part of active participants in global economy. it is useful to recognise that some of the emes are becoming hubs of regional economic activity with sizeable populations

bond market. we have seen a favourable response to the abf hong kong fund, and i hope that the paif, with its broader investor base, will also be well received by markets. i wish you every success in promoting the paif. thank you.
dividends and prices the right - hand - side of equation ( 9 ) defines the stream of future dividends and terminal prices. to generate these, consider a simplified version of ( 9 ) which abstracts from discount rates, company - specific risk premia and dividends : following wickens ( 1982 ), the rational expectation t + n periods ahead are formed on the basis of information available at time t. for each company j, these expectations differ from the realised values by a forecast error ( ) unpredictable at time t : adding and subtracting the average forecast error across all companies ( ) gives : actual prices cannot be used in the estimation of ( 13 ) as these are not known at time t and. but consistent estimation of are correlated with the error term ( but which are independent of ( 13 ) is possible using a set of instruments correlated with the company - specific excess forecasting errors. in the estimation, lagged share prices, lagged dividends per share and lagged earnings per share are used as instruments for future dividends and equity prices. these are known at time t but are uncorrelated with the error term. five lags of each variable ( price, dividends, earnings ) are used as instruments. bis central bankers ’ speeches ( c ) generating estimates of short - termism given estimates of company beta and gearing, risk - free rates and the instrumented variables, equation ( 9 ) can be estimated to generate estimates of the short - termism parameter, x. this was achieved using non - linear least squares on a set of cross - sectional regressions for each of the years 1985 to 2004. 24 chart 4 shows point estimates of x for each of these years. short - termism estimates which are statistically significantly below unity ( at the 5 % confidence level ) are shown in red. the simple average of x across the 20 - year period is very close to one ( 0. 9935 ). on the face of it, this does not suggest that short - termism has been a particular problem among this crosssection of firms. chart 4 chart 5 short termism estimates over time industry estimates source : bank of england. source : bank of england. notes : bars show the estimated x parameter for regressions for the uk and us pooled data. estimates where the 95 % confidence interval spans 1 are coloured grey. notes : bars show the industry estimates for the sample split into ( 1 ) 1985 – 1994, and ( 2 ) 1995

and given the present advanced stage of our own economic cycle, if the outturn over the next couple of years is anything close to this – that is about the best we can realistically hope for.
interest rate in the best case. by influencing inflation expectations more directly, the real interest rate can be reduced by several percentage points. monetary policy alternatives with a zero interest rate bound : concluding comments as both japan and the united states now have a zero interest rate and several other countries are now cutting their interest rates close to zero, it is natural that monetary policy with a zero interest rate should be increasingly a subject for discussion and debate. the most recent monetary policy report contains an article on monetary policy with a zero interest rate, and there is also an alternative scenario in chapter 2 assuming weaker real economic development and a repo rate path that is at zero during part of the forecast period. although it is not particularly likely that we in sweden will be subjected to a strongly binding zero lower bound for the interest rate, it is wise to be prepared for this eventuality and to have carefully considered the monetary policy alternatives that would then be available, and which of these would be appropriate, depending on how serious the zero lower bound was. a zero lower bound on the interest rate means that the real interest rate is still too high to sufficiently stimulate the real economy, despite the policy rate being cut to zero. it is the real market rate that is important in the real economy, and this corresponds to the policy rate plus a spread arising due to various risk and liquidity premia, minus expected inflation. although the policy rate is zero, nominal market rates are positive as a result of the spread. the various measures taken by central banks and other public authorities during the financial crisis to ensure that the financial markets function more efficiently and that the spreads decline thus fulfil a function that is at least as important, even if the repo rate is at zero. it is reasonable to suppose, however, that their stimulating effect is much smaller than the effect a central bank can achieve with measures that focus on inflation expectations. the major danger with a zero lower bound for the interest rate is that inflation expectations will be too low and even negative, and that the real interest rate will thus become too high. it is thus necessary to keep watch on inflation expectations, to counteract expectations of falling inflation, and preferably to create expectations of higher inflation. in this type of situation it may be desirable to create expectations that actually exceed the inflation target. the riksbank ’ s current regime, with a credible inflation target and the publication of forecasts, including their motivation, for inflation, the real economy and the repo rate,

a discussion about exactly how it will end. 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches oh, and we thought that ending it meant ending it, i. e. stopping in september. the baseline expectation is, as mario draghi has said, that there will be no sudden stop. this is a technical discussion. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
of the msar government and all sectors of our community, the prosperous services industry and the locomotive effect of large scale infrastructural investments. it goes without saying that we benefit much from the strong support and continued economic growth of our motherland. in the past year, under the leadership of the msar government, amcm candidly fulfilled its duties. via its persistent, risk based prudential supervision, amcm laid a solid foundation based on which the macao financial sector achieved steady development. thanks to the strong economy, the financial sector of macao has scored flying colours again. we can witness that the financial markets have become more steady and active, the number of financial institutions is on the rise accompanied by more ramified network, financial operation continues to expand, continued innovation is found in financial products, quality and sophistication of service is being enhanced, asset quality continues to improve while risk management is being strengthened. as at the end of 2007, the number of banks in macao stood at 28, with total assets of mop328. 1 billion which was an increase of 20 % year - on - year. deposits were valued at mop268. 2 billion and total loans stood at mop108. 6 billion which exhibited annual increase of 16. 3 % and 42. 2 % respectively. loan deposit ratio stood at 40. 5 %, operational profit amounted to mop4. 146 billion while non - performing loans ratio dropped to 0. 6 %. capital adequacy ratio stood at a robust level of 14. 35 %. moreover, although the number of institutions remained the same, business volume of nonbank financial institutions including currency exchange, remittance and securities exhibited hefty increase by 43. 6 %, 47. 3 % and 221. 1 % respectively. simultaneously, our insurance sector scored excellent results. there were 24 insurance institutions operating in macao in 2007. total annual insurance premiums amounted to mop3. 22 billion which was an increase of 29. 8 % year - on - year. among which, life insurance premium was mop2. 25 billion while property insurance accounted for mop970 million. in addition, there was a marked development in private pension fund business. as at the end of 2007, there were 35 registered retirement funds in which 432 retirement plans participated involving 78, 859 employees which was an increase of 23. 7 % year - on - year and accounted for 28

. it is the responsibility of everyone. if we are to improve our quality of life, then each one of us, every worker, business, industry, and government must be committed to the same common goal. thank you.
. some of the forces that have weighed heavily on the economy over the past year or so have begun to dissipate, but other factors, such as the sharp increase in world oil prices, have arisen that pose new challenges. as a result, the course of final demand will need to be monitored closely. still, there can be little doubt that prospects have brightened. spending in the household sector has held up well, and some signs of improvement are evident in business profits and investment. fiscal policy continues to provide stimulus to aggregate demand, and monetary policy is currently accommodative. with the growth of productivity well maintained and inflation pressures largely absent, the foundation for economic expansion has been laid.

saving glut and the u. s. current account deficit, sandridge lecture, virginia association of economists, richmond va. dynan ke, skinner j and zeldes, sp ( 2000 ) do the rich save more? nber working paper no. 7906. international monetary fund ( 2009 ) what is the damage? medium term output dynamics after financial crises, world economic outlook, october, chapter 4. king m and low d ( 2014 ) measuring the “ world ” real interest rate, nber working paper no. 19887. koo r ( 2014 ) escape from balance sheet recession and the qe trap, wiley. malik s and meldrum a ( 2014 ) evaluating the robustness of uk term structure decompositions using linear regression methods, bank of england working paper no. 518. mckinsey ( 2013 ) disruptive technologies : advances that will transform life, business and the global economy, https : / / shar. es / 1rwovu. mokyr, j what http : / / on. wsj. com / 1w66q1z. today ’ s economic gloomsayers are missing, rey ( 2013 ) rey, helene ( 2013 ) dilemma not trilemma : the global financial cycle and monetary policy independence, proceedings - economic policy symposium - jackson hole, federal reserve bank of kansas city. rogoff ( 2015 ) debt supercycle, not secular stagnation, http : / / www. voxeu. org / article / debtsupercycle - not - secular - stagnation #. summers l ( 2014 ) us economic prospects : secular stagnation, hysteresis and the zero lower bound, business economics, vol. 49 no. 2, national association for business economics. wolf, m ( 2014 ) radical cures for unusual economic ills, http : / / on. ft. com / 1fohqn1 bis central bankers ’ speeches chart 1 : nominal gilt yields began a long period of decline in the 1970s per cent long - term uk gilt yields 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 source : barclays equity gilt study 2015, bloomberg and bank calculations. from 1899 to 1961 the gilt yield is annual observations based on the prices of undated british funds. from 1962 to 1991 it is annual observations based on a portfolio of stocks chosen to represent as closely as possible a 20 - year security. from 1992 to present
of their applications for grant of license in march 2013. further, speaking orders were issued to four banks in may 2014 rejecting their license applications and requisitions were made to the rcs for appointment of liquidators. 21. present status of revival of 23 unlicensed banks – financial package by pmo i. the union cabinet in its meeting held on november 5, 2014 approved a financial package for the revival of the 23 unlicensed dccbs. total capital infusion required was estimated at ₹ 2375. 42 crore, comprising goi share – ₹ 673. 29 crore, state government ’ s share – ₹ 1464. 59 crore and nabard ’ s share – ₹ 237. 54 crore. ii. for the purpose of implementation of the scheme, a tripartite agreement in the form of memorandum of understanding ( mou ), stipulating the conditionalities and deliverables was to be signed by government of india, concerned state governments and nabard. the mou has been finalized in consultations with rbi. government of india and all the four state governments and nabard had signed the mou. iii. goi had released its share of funds to three states viz. uttar pradesh ( ₹ 401. 17 crore ), maharashtra ( ₹ 129. 70 crore ) and west bengal ( ₹ 31. 20 crore ). while, the state governments of maharashtra and west bengal have released their share to the dccbs fully, the uttar pradesh government has released its share partially. as against the total amount of ₹ 1074. 57 crore to be released for 16 dccbs, uttar pradesh government has released ₹ 610. 00 crore to 11 dccbs ( 10 dccbs fully and one dccb partially ), because of budgetary constraints for the financial year 2014 – 15. the jammu & kashmir government had signed the mou on march 31, 2015 and the central government is yet to release the funds. 22. after getting nabard ’ s recommendations that the bank has attained the licensing norms, rbi would consider issuing of license to the banks and directions would be withdrawn, subject to final order of the court. status of negative net - worth dccbs 23. as per the latest data made available by nabard, besides 23 unlicensed dccbs, two licensed dccbs in karnataka viz. ( i ) kolar - chikballarpur dccb [ ( - ) ₹ 2. 60 crore ] and shimoga

and intrusive policies of state, cooperative banks in india have successfully weathered several challenges during their century old existence and continued to grow in the competitive environment which emerged following the economic and financial sector reforms initiated in 1991. rbi has initiated several policy measures to strengthen the cooperative banking sector by gradually introducing the prudential norms and regulatory prescriptions on par with commercial banks. it is heartening to see that cooperative banks are showing keen interest in diversifying their business and broad - basing their clientele. one can hope that changes in the existing legal framework, supportive regulatory environment, adoption of technology and reorientation of business strategy can act as enablers for cooperative banks to contribute more meaningfully in the equitable economic growth across regions through their delivery model. 28. thank you all for your patient listening. bis central bankers ’ speeches