the policy conducted during and just after the war. his approach was on a par with international practice at the time. 18 although he had his critics, not all the criticism levelled against him would necessarily be regarded as equally well founded today. the general view of rygg has become more balanced. 19 but the perception of rygg and norges bank in the interwar years, that subsequently became ingrained, had an impact on the tasks that were later assigned to the central bank. the pendulum swung towards less independence for norges bank, since the bank was held responsible for the recession. this impression prevailed for such a long time that it also came to influence the current norges bank act. the scepticism was clearly expressed by kare willoch, who was prime minister when the new act came into effect in 1985 : “ [ nicolai rygg ] was held primarily responsible – and in 1926, minister of finance holmboe, of the centrist - liberal party venstre, said : “ it is however a well known fact that wherever governments have assumed authority over the national bank, the outcome has been unfavourable because vested interests have been so considerable and the temptation so strong that it was impossible to resist, and the government has helped itself to the national bank ’ s cash … ”. in francis sejersted ( 1973 ) : ideal, teori og virkelighet. nicolai rygg og pengepolitikken i 1920 - arene. [ ideals, theory and reality. nicolai rygg and monetary policy in the 1920s ]. j. w. cappelens forlag. in francis sejersted ( 1973 ). berge furre ( norwegian historian, theologian and politician for the socialist left party ), ( 1999 ) : “ norsk historie 1905 – 2000 : industrisamfunnet – fra vokstervisse til framtidstvil ” [ history of norway 1905 – 2000 : from confidence in growth to doubts about the future ], det norske samlaget. for a lively description of the personalities governing the large central banks in the 1920s, see liaquat ahamed ( 2009 ) : the lords of finance. the bankers who broke the world. penguin books. hermod skanland writes about the need to hold someone accountable for the hardships of the 1920s : “ the government is usually a good target for criticism, but there is little appeal in firing shots

of the growth rates seen in the previous three decades, but fast rates of growth are still possible, and eminently desirable. the countries which get back there quickest will be those which are able to put in place institutions which can withstand the changes of sentiment which are part - and - parcel of a globalised economy. references balassa, b. ( 1964 ), ‘ the purchasing power parity doctrine : economy, vol. 72, no. 6, pp. 584 - 596. a reappraisal ’, journal of political dornbusch, r. ( 1994 ), ‘ mexico : stabilization, reform and no growth ’, brookings paper on economic activity, pp. 253 - 315. feldstein, m. s. and c. y. horioka ( 1980 ), ‘ domestic saving and international capital flows ’, economic journal, june, vol. 90, pp. 314 - 329. grenville, s. a. ( 1997 ), ‘ asia and the financial sector ’, reserve bank of australia bulletin, december. samuelson, p. a. ( 1964 ), ‘ theoretical notes on trade problems ’, review of economics and statistics, vol. 23, pp. 1 - 60. stiglitz, j. e. and a. weiss ( 1981 ), ‘ credit rationing in markets with imperfect information ’, american economic review, vol. 71, pp. 393 - 410. world bank ( 1993 ), east asian miracle : economic growth and public policy, world bank policy research report. world bank ( 1997 ), private capital flows to developing countries : the road to financial integration, world bank policy research report.