policy challenges. so it makes sense for us to remain open minded as we assess current practices and consider ideas that could potentially enhance our ability to deliver on the goals the congress has assigned us. for this reason, my colleagues and i do not want to preempt or to predict our ultimate findings. what i can say is that any refinements or more material changes to our framework that we might make will be aimed solely at enhancing our ability to achieve and sustain our dual - mandate objectives in the world we live in today. - 11 thank you very much for your time and attention. i trust that today ’ s conference will provide stimulating discussion of issues that are central to our review. - 12 references adam, klaus, and roberto m. billi ( 2007 ). “ discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, ” journal of monetary economics, vol. 54 ( april ), pp. 728 – 52. bank for international settlements ( 2017 ). 87th annual report. basel, switzerland : bis, june, https : / / www. bis. org / publ / arpdf / ar2017e. pdf. berg, claes, and lars jonung ( 1999 ). “ pioneering price level targeting : the swedish experience 1931 – 1937, ” journal of monetary economics, vol. 43 ( june ), pp. 525 – 51. bernanke, ben s. ( 2007 ). “ federal reserve communications, ” speech delivered at the cato institute 25th annual monetary conference, washington, november 14, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / bernanke20071114a. htm. — — — ( 2017 ). “ temporary price - level targeting : an alternative framework for monetary policy, ” ben bernanke ’ s blog, october 12, https : / / www. brookings. edu / blog / ben - bernanke / 2017 / 10 / 12 / temporary - price - leveltargeting - an - alternative - framework - for - monetary - policy. blanchard, olivier, eugenio cerutti, and lawrence summers ( 2015 ). “ inflation and activity — two explorations and their monetary policy implications, ” imf working paper wp / 5 / 230. washington : international monetary fund, november, https : / / www. imf. org / external / pubs / ft / wp / 2015 / w

tests for systemically important financial institutions. - 8central banks but ultimately found them wanting in the u. s. context. but the review is reassessing the case for these and other tools in light of more recent experience in other countries. the third question the review is considering is, “ how can the fomc ’ s communication of its policy framework and implementation be improved? ” our communication practices have evolved considerably since 1994, when the federal reserve released the first statement after an fomc meeting. over the past decade or so, the fomc has enhanced its communication both to promote public understanding of its policy goals, strategy, and actions and to foster democratic accountability. these enhancements include the statement on longer - run goals and monetary policy strategy ; postmeeting press conferences ; various statements about the principles and strategy guiding the committee ’ s normalization of monetary policy following the financial crisis ; and quarterly summaries of individual fomc participants ’ economic projections, assessments about the appropriate path of the federal funds rate, and judgments of the uncertainty and balance of risks around their projections. 18 as part of the review, we are assessing the committee ’ s current and past communications and additional forms of communication that could be helpful. for example, there might be ways to improve communication about the coordination of policy tools or the interplay between monetary policy and financial stability. starting in 1979, the federal reserve published a summary of individual economic projections from various board members, fomc members, or fomc participants in the semiannual monetary policy report. with the introduction of the summary of economic projections ( sep ) in 2007, the fomc increased the frequency of the releases of policymaker projections, expanded the set of economic variables included, and extended the forecast horizon. because the sep includes individual contributions of projections and assessments from all fomc participants, it captures a broader range of views than those of fomc members. for a discussion and data, see bernanke ( 2007 ) and romer ( 2010 ). - 9activities and timeline for the review let me turn now to our review process itself. 19 an important piece of this review has been a series of 14 fed listens events, hosted by the board and the reserve banks from late february until mid - october. we heard from a broad range of interested individuals and groups, including business and labor leaders, community development professionals, and academics. at a research conference at the federal reserve bank of