##ive measures so that banks can recover by their own means in the event of a crisis? focusing solely on regulatory metrics may delay such corrective action. these metrics are important for assessing the need for corrective measures and for justifying their implementation. at the same time, however, they do not reflect a broad, forward - looking perspective, as the example of credit suisse shows. the crisis at credit suisse will be analysed, and the lessons drawn will be factored into the review of the tbtf regulations, among other things. the snb will contribute to this work. i now hand over to andrea maechler. implementation of monetary policy i would now like to look at developments on the money and foreign exchange markets since the last monetary policy assessment. secured short - term swiss franc money market rates remained close to the snb policy rate despite the tense situation on the financial markets, as can be seen in chart 2. we ensured this by deploying our monetary policy instruments. since mid - march, the liquidity supply in the swiss franc money market has been influenced by the exceptional measures taken to manage the credit suisse crisis. the snb provided ample liquidity to credit suisse in the form of interest - bearing loans, which led to an increase in sight deposits. due to outflows of customer deposits at credit suisse, some of this liquidity also reached other institutions in the financial system. this increased the supply of liquidity in the swiss franc money market. as thomas jordan has explained, it was important that the liquidity assistance to credit suisse did not influence our monetary policy stance. we therefore consistently continued with our regular monetary policy implementation in the swiss franc money market. this currently comprises tiered remuneration and the absorption of sight deposits by way of open market operations. to ensure that the secured short - term swiss franc money market rates do not fall and that they remain close to the snb policy rate despite the additional liquidity in the swiss franc money market, we have reduced the increased liquidity supply via open market operations. as you can see from chart 3, we have used snb bills and repo transactions with various maturities to accomplish this. not only our open market operations in the money market but also our foreign exchange transactions have an impact on sight deposits. since the last monetary policy assessment, the swiss franc has appreciated by around 2 % on a trade - weighted basis. in order

not provide absolute protection against a loss of confidence. credit suisse was always fully compliant with all regulatory capital requirements, even at the peak of the crisis. clients, market participants and rating agencies, however, were increasingly casting doubt on the bank ’ s fundamental resilience. they also questioned its ability to successfully implement the announced strategic transformation plan. ultimately, credit suisse lost the confidence of the markets. second, its at1 capital instruments were written down when state support became unavoidable. at this late stage in the crisis, they thus played an important role in the package of measures. at1 capital instruments actually contain specific features that are intended to absorb losses in the early stages of a crisis so that a bank can stabilise its situation through its own efforts. however, these features were not applied. in particular, credit suisse refrained from cancelling interest payments on these instruments despite incurring losses over a prolonged period of time. such a measure would have provided immediate financial relief for the bank. at the same time, however, credit suisse would have exposed itself to the risk of negative market reactions – and thus also to the risk that refinancing would have become even more difficult and expensive. third, customers withdrew deposits at an extremely rapid rate, especially last october, and then in particular in march of this year. credit suisse ’ s liquidity buffers were still able to cover the considerable outflows in october. in mid - march, however, its liquidity was no longer sufficient to cover the exceptionally rapid outflows. a contributory factor in this regard was that a significant portion of the liquidity held was needed for operational purposes. in addition, the collateral prepared by credit suisse was insufficient to cover the outflows using the snb ’ s existing liquidity facilities. the liquidity assistance made available on the basis of emergency law, ela +, thus created the necessary time window until a comprehensive solution to the crisis of confidence could be worked out. in future, banks should be required to prepare sufficient assets in such a way that they can be delivered to their respective central banks as collateral for existing liquidity facilities. page 5 / 8 zurich, 22 june 2023 thomas jordan, martin schlegel and andrea m. maechler news conference taken together, these observations raise an important question concerning the ‘ too big to fail ’ ( tbtf ) regulations : are these regulations adequately geared towards the timely adoption of correct