structural reasons, with several different types of structural explanations. the government ’ s opinion is, for example, that the working environment has great significance. if a large percentage of the sick leave is due to structural reasons, this is obviously a more fundamental problem for the swedish labour market, which may entail an increased risk of a labour shortage in the future, with subsequent negative effects on potential growth. yet another factor that has made a negative contribution to the growth in hours worked in recent years is average working hours. average working hours declined by 1. 4 per cent in 2001 and continued to decline during the first quarter ( see diagram 3 ). variations in this can be explained by the occurrence of “ labour hoarding ”. this entails companies choosing to retain the labour force in the initial phase of a downturn in economic activity and regulating working hours instead, for instance, by reducing overtime - a development we have seen recently. it is only at a later stage that companies start to make cuts in personnel. one of the reasons for this behaviour is that the labour force is not an entirely mobile production factor. companies ’ labour costs consist not merely of wages, but also of costs for recruiting and training new personnel. this is probably more common in knowledge - intensive sectors, such as some branches of the private services sector, and could thus become increasingly important in years to come. institutional factors may also have significance for the development of average working hours. for instance, in the negotiated central wage agreements from 1998, particularly within manufacturing, working hours were adapted to economic activity, which may have contributed to the recent dampening of average working hours. to sum up, we do not have a clear answer as to exactly how the recent developments in average working hours can be explained. the response of the labour market to changes in economic activity is one of many fields that i think should become subject to further investigation. another interesting research field is whether the swedish labour market is able to deal with necessary changes in relative wages. the labour shortages in the public sector, with possible wage increases as a consequence, can have effects on inflation pressures, for instance due to wage spread between different sectors. there is a concern that groups of employees within the public sector, having a favourable labour market situation, could set the norm for up - coming wage agreement negotiations. however, studies in this field indicate that this has not been the case before, although naturally there is always a possibility that this type of pattern could arise in the future. emu

money, there is less motivation for creditors to be careful with risk assessment when loans are made. and there is little motivation for early, serious discussions between a debtor and its creditors when problems begin to arise. in fact, the only serious motivation comes when the crisis is full - blown and official money runs out. clear limits would encourage better risk assessment, earlier negotiations, and conceivably, a quicker and more orderly resolution of the crisis. of course, one could eliminate official assistance altogether and leave debtors and creditors to work it all out on their own. but with no official lending, disorderly defaults could occur more frequently, resulting in unnecessary output losses and financial - system disruptions in the affected countries and elsewhere. over the past couple of years, the bank of canada and the bank of england together have developed a " middle ground " approach, designed to encourage private lenders to work closely with debtors to find timely, orderly solutions. in our joint work with the bank of england, we set out a framework for the resolution of international financial crises. this framework has three basic elements. first, official assistance should be limited, and the limits should be well known in advance. ( these limits are often referred to as the " presumptive limits. " ) the second key element of our approach is the possibility of exceptional official lending in the unlikely event that a crisis threatens global financial stability. but such lending would be based on explicit criteria and procedures. third, it is recognized that, under certain conditions, an orderly standstill ( that is, a temporary suspension of debt - service payments ) may be appropriate to give distressed debtors some time to take steps, including debt rescheduling, to address their problems. in addition, the framework encourages greater use of what is known as " collective - action clauses. " these clauses are intended to discourage " rogue " creditors from blocking or rejecting a reasonable offer for debt restructuring. such a framework, by providing greater clarity upfront about the size and terms of the official assistance available, allows debtors and creditors to form more realistic expectations. in so doing, it helps to prevent crises ; and, should they occur, it creates the right incentives for their timely resolution. in many international forums — imf, g - 20, g - 7 — canada has been working hard to encourage the adoption of such a framework. and last month, g - 7 finance ministers and central bank governors adopted an action plan that aims to address many