take a bank ’ s losses before tax payers ’ money was put on the table, was to my mind imperative in order to muster the necessary political support and acceptance among the electorate for the rescue operations. it is hard to imagine that it would at all have been possible to support the banks if the old managers and shareholders were allowed to maintain their stakes in a failed bank. the conditions attached to the capital injections from the government bank insurance fund were explicitly set out in a written agreement between the bank and the gbif. this agreement was made public. the bank was required to report regularly to the fund on the fulfilment of the terms of the agreement. the gbif was headed by a decision - making board of experts and its operations were carried out at a distance from the political authorities. however, the gbif kept in close contact with the financial supervisors and the central bank. the central bank also played a part as lender of last resort once the banks had been recapitalized. general assurances were given that the central bank would provide liquidity support to sound financial institutions ( including non - banks ). however, the banks generally managed to keep their funding, and did not have to resort to the central bank to any extraordinary extent. before gbif injected capital into crisis - stricken banks, efforts were made to attract private investors. however, these efforts did not succeed. experience shows that in times of recession and high uncertainty investors will be extremely reluctant to take on risk. under these circumstances, the government was the only source available to support the financial system. in a way, the government became the “ owner of last resort ”. in light of the high level of uncertainty, the funding of the gbif was regarded as expenses in the fiscal accounts, not as an investment. in retrospect, however, capital supplied by the government to the problem banks proved to yield a reasonable positive return. hence, it might have been a profitable investment for private investors, although with a huge risk ex ante. to counteract the generally low supply of equity capital during the banking crisis, a separate government bank investment fund was set up. the fund was intended to take part in equity emissions at ( non - problem ) banks on commercial terms. certain other forms of general support to the banking industry were also provided. at its peak, the share of state ownership in the banking sector was close to 60 percent. unlike many other countries dealing with a banking crisis, norway did not set

or to be precise, whether to fix a lower threshold for capital adequacy requirements calculated with the aid of the internal model and if so, how to calibrate this threshold. the negotiations on that issue are currently on hold because the positions of the us chief 5 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches negotiators have not yet been filled. a swift resumption of negotiations would be in our common interest, especially as the ongoing regulatory uncertainty caused by the delay in finalising basel iii is undoubtedly a burden for the banks. and so i hope that the upcoming meetings in baden - baden and basel will lead to a return to the negotiation table. ladies and gentlemen one lesson of the financial crisis was that banks, especially the global systemically important ones, need more capital. the second lesson was that public bail - outs of banks should be avoided in future. and so it is completely understandable that president trump recently declared, in his executive order of 3rd february, that the prevention of taxpayer - funded bailouts is a core principle of regulation. that said, achieving this aim also makes it essential to refrain from adopting regulatory measures which would make public bail outs more likely or which would destroy the level playing field. thus, i fully agree with mario draghi, who recently said that “ the last thing we need at this point is a relaxation of regulation. ” that does not, of course, exclude us from regularly evaluating our regulation and its effectiveness and fine - tuning it if necessary. but the g20 should stick to its commitment to regulatory reforms and its clear rejection of regulatory arbitrage. carrying out deregulation in the hope of stimulating the economy could backfire. insufficiently regulated financial markets can do significant harm to economic prosperity if a crisis occurs, as the latest financial crisis has painfully demonstrated. back in 2013, the then secretary of the us treasury, jack lew, said that “ ( … ) the global financial crisis ( … ) underscored the need for strengthening financial sector regulation across the globe. in particular, the crisis highlighted the need for building much stronger and more resilient financial institutions, greater market transparency, and a high quality level playing field across borders that protects against regulatory gaps, arbitrage, and a race to the bottom. " i think this is still true. 4. conclusion ladies and gentlemen on this note, i would like to bring my speech to a close. in times of uncertainty, international cooperation is particularly important, and we are certainly