problem resolution in the eu will affect serbia as much as the turbulences have ( the example of the car industry ) ; - some problems cannot be resolved in serbia before they are resolved in vienna, frankfurt, milan or paris. “ helicopter ben ” is currently a popular nickname of the chairman of the us federal reserve, ben bernanke. mr. krugman, this year ’ s nobel laureate, recently stated that it was time to “ shovel money into the economy ”. the question, however, is : in what way, to whom and how much? but let us turn back to the case of serbia. for instance, if you were to offer an interest - free loan to us steel in order for it to maintain the present volume of operations and keep all its employees, they would decline it as that would mean producing goods not for sale but for replenishing stocks (! ). the same is true for tigar – michelin. what these companies need are buyers, i. e. a car industry that can produce and sell cars. sometimes, it is more profitable to halt production altogether, than to take out a loan, even if it is interest - free! the problem therefore lies in the market, i. e. in the lack of buyers! and finally, what is to be done : - we should significantly increase budgetary investments, primarily for financing the corridor 10 highway, building additional energy producing capacities, implementing infrastructural projects from irrigation to railway lines, i. e. creating additional jobs where demand for products / services is guaranteed! but the share of investment can only increase if spending goes down! - serbia has many institutions that ought to intensify their activities in the period ahead : smeca, aofi, development fund and various other guarantee funds providing start - up credits as well as loans for small and medium - sized enterprises. we have the framework set up, but much needs to be done in terms of effort, people and money! - in serbia, if inflation goes down, so will the key policy rate and, consequently, the cost of borrowing. this, however, will not resolve our problems but will only moderate their impact to a certain extent. thank you for your attention!

importance of ensuring that it is implemented in a consistent way across institutions and across countries. this objective is framed in a project undertaken by the basel committee to ensure that the benefits of having risk - sensitive regulation, like basel iii, are not achieved at the cost of an extremely complex legislation which, apart from other problems, brings about results that are not comparable across banks. the banco de espana agrees with this initiative. we are in favor of simplifying current regulations, seeking an appropriate balance – indeed, always a difficult balance - between simplicity, comparability and risk sensitivity. so, we view very positively the transparency exercise carried out by the basel committee, with the publication of the results of the comparative analysis of banks ’ calculations of risk weighted assets, both in the banking and in the trading book. these exercises have identified significant differences which would not cause concern if they were due to real factors, meaning different type of business or risk profiles. there would be a cause for concern if the conclusion of such work still undergoing, together with other initiatives taken by the european banking authority, showed that those differences were largely due to differences in the application of the internal models approved by supervisors. in this vein, i think that the single supervisory mechanism, once fully operational, will bring a higher degree of harmonization across the euro zone. the results of this exercise demand for the basel committee taking measures to reduce those differences, so that the credibility of the solvency ratios is not called into question. however, these measures should not go to such an extreme as to abandon the use of internal methods for calculating capital requirements : these models have been useful for improving banks ’ internal management of risk. we think that the solution may lie along the line of using as a reference for the internal models more standardized models, based on parameters determined by supervisors. let me now move on to the debate on resolution of financial institutions. i will first refer to the financial stability board ’ s work, dealing with resolution strategies and loss absorbing capacity. the fsb has developed a framework to address the “ too - big - to - fail ” ( tbtf ) problem associated with “ global systemically important financial institutions ” ( g - sifis ). as we know, this framework is based on four pillars : an enhanced supervisory intensity ; the requirement of a higher loss absorption capacity ; the existence of effective resolution regimes ; and an improved resilience of market infrastructures. substantial progress has been made in implementing this framework. in particular, the