tarisa watanagase : risk - focused supervision and risk assessment opening address by dr tarisa watanagase, deputy governor of the bank of thailand, at the apec financial regulators training initiative regional seminar on risk - focused supervision and risk assessment, bangkok, 6 september 2004. * * * distinguished guests, ladies und gentlemen, lt is a pleasure for me to be here at the opening of the apec financial regulators training initiative on risk - focused supervision und risk assessment. in making this opening address, i would like to personally extend a warm welcome to all the participants and to express my appreciation to the federal reserve experts who have kindly agreed to share with us their knowledge und experience on risk - based supervision. this regional seminar is held at an opportune time, about two months after the basel committee on banking supervision released the basel ii capital framework. as you all are undoubtedly aware of, basel ii aims to strengthen financial stability by encouraging sound risk management practices at banking organizations. the tools uscd are a more risk - sensitive capital regime ( pillar 1 ) ; the application of risk - based supervision ( pillar 2 ) ; und improved public disclosures to enhance market discipline ( pillar 3 ). of the three pillars, one of the most formidable challenges for emerging market supervisors will be to properly implement the pillar ii risk - based supervisory framework. since risk - based supervision is the main topic of this seminar, it may be useful to provide a few thoughts on some of the broader regulatory und supervisory implications associated with implementing this framework. on the regulatory side, thc adoption of a risk - focused supervisory framework entails a shift away from a rigid, rules based approach to regulation and towards more “ incentive compatible ” prudential standards. by “ incentive compatible ”, i am referring to broad, principles based standards that encourage banks to develop and continuously update their internal risk management systems to ensure that it is commcnsurate with the scope and complexity of its operations. while the benefits are obvious, there are also some consequences for the supervisory side of our business that may not be readily transparent. first, an emphasis an broad prudential standards - while useful rot fostering sound risk management practices - will inevitably create significant challenges for front - line supervisors. this is because they will need to rely much more on sound professional judgment and critical analysis, and less on rules - based compliance criteria, in order to make proper risk assessments. this in turn, will require supervisory staff members to have a fundamental

yannis stournaras : the birth of inter - war central banks - building a new monetary order welcome remarks by mr yannis stournaras, governor of the bank of greece, at the bank of greece economic history conference " the birth of inter - war central banks : building a new monetary order ", athens, 2 november 2018. * * * ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure to welcome you to this international conference, devoted to the birth of inter - war central banks, organised by the bank of greece, itself one of the offspring of this institutionally fertile period. it was 1926 when the greek government first approached the financial committee of the league of nations, seeking its help to settle old debts and raise a new loan on international markets. the money was needed quite urgently. after a decade of wars, which had culminated in the abortive asia minor campaign and the forced population exchange of 1922, the greek economy needed an injection of capital to heal its wounds, settle its refugees and build up its economic infrastructure. yet its international credit standing lay in tatters ; wartime obligations remained unsettled ; expenditures far outstripped public revenues ; inflation was soaring, and the drachma had lost more than 90 % of its value. the league of nations, relying heavily on input from the bank of england and the treasury, promptly dispatched a group of experts to study the greek situation and report back to geneva. their report was published in 1927. along the inevitable admonitions about fiscal prudence and administrative reform, the foreign experts highlighted the absence of a modern central bank : an institution charged solely with the conduct of monetary policy, free from political or business interference. the sole note - issuing authority at the time was the national bank of greece ( or ethniki, as most in this audience know her ). but ethniki also happened to be the country ’ s largest commercial bank, with strong ties to business and politics. if greece were to re - join the gold standard and thus return to the fold of ‘ stable ’ countries, the national bank would have to give up its commercial operations and focus exclusively on central banking – or so the league argued, at least. the report was not well received. neither by greek politicians, who lamented foreign interference in the country ’ s domestic affairs ; nor by the national bank itself, which faced the prospect of giving up its most profitable line of business. after several months of acrimonious negotiations, a