the ssm would ensure shared ownership of problems and decisions, encouraging a broader vision on the implications of the ssm ’ s decisions on financial stability. this could be achieved through the establishment of intermediate committees similar to those of the ecb ’ s monetary policy function. the separation of supervisory functions from regulatory ones is necessary for the political legitimation of regulatory standards. the overlap of regulatory and supervisory territories guarantees compliance with the principle of central responsibility for financial stability. in this 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches context, it is necessary to find ways to ensure and safeguard this basic principle within banking union. it is also essential to determine which coordination and convergence mechanisms between territorial regulatory and supervisory authorities can be established between the banking union and the remaining eu member states. one should not underestimate how much has been achieved in recent years. nevertheless, the foundations of europe ’ s financial architecture are still not sufficiently robust to withstand the impact of a future crisis. this should be a priority for policy - makers and relevant institutions. decisive political will to move forward with the completion of the banking union is required. in the absence of this will, europe must revisit its existing rules to safeguard financial stability. this is in the best interests of its people as few things can be more destructive to citizens ’ trust in european institutions than threats to financial stability. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

timothy f geithner : the changing face of risk management remarks by mr timothy f geithner, president and chief executive officer of the federal reserve bank of new york, before the institute of international bankers, new york, 9 june 2004 * * * it is a pleasure to join you today for this meeting of the institute of international bankers. the financial institutions you represent play a major role in our financial system. the iib has played an important part in shaping financial policy in the united states, by reminding us with force and persistence of the impact of our actions on the standards of fairness and equality of opportunity that we strive to maintain. the u. s. financial system has a number of features that help to make it attractive to participants from all around the world. the structure of our financial system is characterized by a diversity of channels for financial intermediation, with a relatively larger role for the capital markets and a smaller role for banks, than is true in most other major economies. and we have preserved, despite substantial consolidation, a system that comfortably accommodates the largest globally - active financial institutions side by side with a competitive and diverse array of regional and community banking organizations. we are very open to the presence of foreign financial institutions, and perhaps as important, have traditionally been very open to attracting non - u. s. financial talent to work in our markets. while the number of foreign banking organizations operating in the us has contracted over the last decade, the overall importance has grown. foreign banking organizations now account for 45 percent of total banking assets in the united states, up from around 40 percent a decade ago, and they account for a substantial share of total securities underwriting in this market. our framework for supervision and regulation is supportive of innovation. much of the most transforming innovations in finance started in our markets or were adopted more quickly and more broadly here than in many other financial systems. the u. s. system, relative to the model in many other countries, has involved a continuous, risk - focused process of supervision and a strong enforcement mechanism working alongside the supervisory community. in addition, we have traditionally assigned a more important role to market discipline, importantly through a strong disclosure regime, in reinforcing the supervisory regime, than has been the case in other markets. our system is successful in matching capital with ideas, in allocating savings to where returns are highest, in creating opportunities for households to better withstand the costs of change and dislocation that are inevitable offshoot of an open