samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
##stein - rodan, who suggested the adoption of nonfragmented interventions to provide, within a reasonable timeframe, the big push onwards needed in order to kick - start the policies for the development of southern italy. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

the yen. domestic wholesale prices are declining mainly due to the decrease in prices of electrical machinery. consumer prices continue to be somewhat weak owing to the decline in prices of imported products and their substitutes. corporate service prices are falling slowly. as for the conditions surrounding price developments, the recent yen depreciation is exerting upward pressure on prices. however, with the ongoing adjustments, the balance between supply and demand in the domestic market is likely to exert downward pressure on prices. in addition, the declining trend of machinery prices caused by technological innovations, the decrease in prices of consumer goods arising from the streamlining of distribution channels, and the reduction in communications charges aided by deregulation will continue to restrain price developments. overall, prices are expected to be weak for the time being. moreover, given the high degree of uncertainty regarding future economic this report is based on data and information available at the time of the bank of japan monetary policy meeting held on april 12 and 13, 2001. the bank ’ s view of recent economic and financial developments, determined by the policy board at the monetary policy meeting held on april 12 and 13 as the basis for monetary policy decisions. developments, the possibility that weak demand will intensify downward pressures on prices warrants careful monitoring. in the financial market, the overnight call rate has declined reflecting the increase in the currentaccount balance at the bank of japan to around 5 trillion yen, following the decision at the monetary policy meeting held on march 19 to adopt new procedures for money market operations, and is currently moving around zero percent. interest rates on term instruments are declining further mainly due to the monetary easing by the bank. the japan premium remains negligible. yields on long - term government bonds increased to 1. 4 - 1. 5 percent. the yield spreads between private bonds ( bank debentures and corporate bonds ) and government bonds are mostly unchanged or expanding somewhat. stock prices are rising reflecting the above - mentioned monetary easing and expectations toward the progress in disposal of non - performing bank assets. in the foreign exchange market, the yen has depreciated and is currently being traded in the range of 123 - 126 yen to the u. s. dollar. with regard to corporate finance, private banks continue to be more active in extending loans, mainly to blue - chip companies, while carefully evaluating the credit risks involved. there seem to be no significant changes in firms ’ perception on the lending attitude of financial institutions and the fundraising conditions of firms in the
cent to stand at 3. 7 per cent in march. interest rates for fixed - rate mortgages have also fallen swiftly ; the differential that still existed at the beginning of last year between italy and the euro - area average has narrowed considerably. for short - term loans to firms, the reduction in rates between october and march averaged about 2 percentage points. but it is also true that the risk and rate differentials between borrowers have widened : the difference between the cost of new loans of limited amount and that of high - value transactions has grown ; the disparity in borrowing costs between small and large firms has increased. those now in greatest need of credit suffer from this. bad debts and loans classified as “ substandard ”, that is to say in temporary repayment difficulty, are growing rapidly. the lesson of experience is that the recession will continue to affect loan quality even two or three years after the cyclical upturn. in italy, unlike other large countries, writedowns to loans are immediately tax deductible only up to 0. 3 per cent of the amount of total lending ; the portion exceeding that amount is deductible over 18 years. the rule becomes especially stringent in this recessionary phase, in which the pressure to curtail lending in order to satisfy capital requirements is mounting. banks ’ capital despite the decline in profitability, banks have maintained capital above the minimum standards. the average ratio of capital to risk - weighted assets was 10. 4 per cent for the largest groups at the end of last year. the higher ratios found abroad often reflect massive injections of public capital. by international standards, leverage, measured by the ratio of total assets to core capital, is lower in italy. the bank of italy assesses capital adequacy with stringent criteria. instruments of lesser quality make up 13 per cent of the core capital of the five largest italian banking groups, compared with 22 per cent for the 15 largest euro - area banking groups. stress tests, which evaluate resilience in the face of markedly unfavourable economic developments, have become a practice in supervisory action since 2005, when the international monetary fund conducted its financial system stability assessment for italy. we have just completed an aggregated exercise to estimate the impact on banks ’ balance sheets of a deterioration in the quality of credit exposures to italian households and firms in the two years 2009 - 10 under assumptions of more adverse macroeconomic conditions than those foreseen for italy by the main

of the crisis. according to our estimates, we consider that the potential for monetary policy easing has been exhausted. its further easing could additionally increase proinflationary risks. nonetheless, monetary policy will remain accommodative on average throughout 2021, supporting the recovery of the russian economy. the baseline scenario provides for a gradual return to neutral monetary policy. we will assess the timeline and pace for this return taking into account our goal to maintain inflation at our target. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
a number of new changes and opportunities, in line with the requirements of a modern market, able to support the perspective development of the country. its expansion throughout our region will allow the further enhancement of regional co - operation and will facilitate other regional initiatives. you are welcome and we assure you that you have our full co - operation in your activity and in developing the market and free initiative of albanian economic agents. i wish you a lot of success in your work.

other countries in the region, which are in a more advanced stage in their efforts of adopting basel ii requirements either partly or fully. we have also the privilege of being close to the euro area member countries, like italy and greece, with their banks playing an important role in our financial system. this gives us the possibility to benefit out of expertise of the supervisory authorities of these countries, in the process of adopting new requirements ; fourth, we have expanded our cooperation with other “ peer ” countries in the region, as the variety of problems found in our countries is very similar and the experience sharing in this respect, is very practical ; fifth, we are trying to promote an environment where issues of basel ii are being discussed in a professional level. we are not focusing only on directly involved parties ( including government, other supervisory authorities of the financial market ) but also on relevant clients of the banking and the financial sector. concluding, i would like to stress that basel ii represents a logical and appropriate successor to basel i. it embeds recent and past lessons and gives excellent directions to financial system and supervision authorities how to move ahead. on the other hand, its implementation may be a bit too ambitious and a difficult task for our countries. therefore it is in our interest to find ways to make it more suitable to our needs by following a gradual approach rather than jeopardising its success through an uninformed adoption. according to basel ii, the assessment of the borrower ’ s credit risk will depend on the performance of the economy, whether it is in a upward or downward trend. in the worst case, when the economy will be wholly swept in recession, banks will have automatically either to increase the level of capital, or shift towards less risky assets, that most intuitively calls for a slow down to provide loans thus engendering credit crunch and further recession.
bank of japan ’ s april report of recent economic and financial developments1 bank of japan, 12 april 2002. * the bank ’ s view * * japan ’ s economy still continues to deteriorate as a whole, but the pace has moderated somewhat. with regard to final demand, net exports ( real exports minus real imports ) are gradually starting to increase while overseas economies are clearly gaining momentum for recovery. meanwhile, business fixed investment continues to decrease and private consumption remains weak. moreover, housing investment remains sluggish and public investment is also declining. final demand overall is still weak, but exports — which have a large impact on production — are starting to turn up recently. also, inventory adjustment is progressing further in many industries. reflecting these developments, industrial production appears to have stopped declining and also, the deterioration in business sentiment of firms, mainly in manufacturing, has almost ceased. however, firms maintain their stance on reducing personnel expenses given persistently strong excessiveness in employment. therefore, employment and income conditions of households continue to worsen, with the ongoing decrease in the number of employees and the growing trend in the rate of decline in wages. turning to the outlook, as for exporting conditions, the synchronized inventory adjustment in it - related goods worldwide is coming to an end except for some goods such as networking equipment. overseas economies, mainly in the u. s. and east asia, are likely to follow a recovery path. moreover, the yen is at low levels compared to last autumn. under these circumstances, exports are expected to pick up moderately for the time being. meanwhile, with respect to domestic demand, business fixed investment is expected to follow a downtrend for a while, judged mainly from leading indicators and firms ’ investment plans. private consumption is also likely to remain lackluster mainly due to worsening employment and income conditions. in addition, government spending is basically projected to continue a downward trend. while the recovery in exports and the weakness in domestic demand are mixed, industrial production is expected to remain almost flat for the time being. as for the further outlook, assuming that exports will continue to recover steadily, the economy as a whole will eventually hit bottom through the increase in production and rebound in corporate profits, mainly in manufacturing. overall, the economic deterioration in japan is projected to stop steadily, as production stops declining and then turns up reflecting the improvement in exporting conditions. still, the rebound in exports is expected to be modest for a while and there also remain various uncertain factors

the lending attitudes of private banks are becoming more cautious. hence, the developments in the behavior of financial institutions and corporate financing continue to require closer monitoring.
provides an excellent opportunity to take stock, reflect on our experiences and listen to a wide range of external voices. 1 for a more detailed discussion, see : lane, p. r. ( 2020 ), “ the monetary policy toolbox : evidence from the euro area ”, speech at the us monetary policy forum, new york, 21 february ; and lane, p. r. ( 2019 ), “ determinants of the real interest rate ”, remarks at the national treasury management agency, dublin, 28 november. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

shaktikanta das : journey towards inclusive growth in india opening remarks by mr shaktikanta das, governor of the reserve bank of india, at the third suresh tendulkar memorial lecture by mr tharman shanmugaratnam, senior minister, republic of singapore, and chairman of the monetary authority of singapore, mumbai, 7 january 2020. * * * on behalf of the reserve bank of india, i am delighted to welcome mr. tharman shanmugaratnam to deliver the professor suresh tendulkar memorial lecture, the third in the series. we are also deeply honoured to have smt. sunetra tendulkar, the wife of late professor tendulkar and his daughter smt. saee sapre with us. a hearty welcome to all the distinguished invitees of the reserve bank. about prof. suresh d. tendulkar 2. prof. suresh d. tendulkar was a great teacher, economist and policy analyst. his seminal work on the measurement and analysis of living standards in the country will remain his enduring legacy to public policy formulation. in fact, a defining feature of prof. tendulkar ’ s life as a professional economist was his deep sensitivity to poverty and a commitment to data - based research to understand poverty. 3. with a formidable academic record of great distinction, he joined the indian statistical institute in 1968. this was followed by a prestigious two - year assignment at the development research centre of the world bank. from 1978 onwards, he served with great distinction in the delhi school of economics in different capacities until his retirement in 2004. he served on numerous working groups on the design and conduct of the national sample surveys and was the chairman of the governing council of the national sample survey organisation ; chairman of the national accounts advisory committee ; and chairman of the national statistical commission. he was a member of the lakdawala committee for estimation of poverty in 1993, which recommended state specific consumption baskets for estimation of poverty. he became a member of the prime minister ’ s economic advisory council in 2004 and in 2008 he was appointed the chairman of the council. 4. prof. tendulkar served as director on the central board and the chairman of the eastern region local board of the reserve bank from 2006 till his sad demise on june 21, 2011. this lecture series was instituted in his honour in 2013 in recognition of his contribution to the economics profession and his association with the reserve bank. about mr. tharman shan
systems. we are convinced that these seminars are a firm step forward in this direction. the aim of this webinar is to shed some light on how remittance flows during the health crisis have influenced latin america ’ s macroeconomic and financial stability. as you are well aware, the latin american economic situation has been particularly affected by the covid - 19 pandemic. along with the human cost in lives, the effects on poverty and income distribution have been very severe. the global economic recovery might also be delayed reaching the region, increasing the likelihood that the crisis may cause more persistent economic effects. despite this difficult situation, remittances have proven pandemic - proof1 and have behaved countercyclically in most of the region ’ s countries, assuming a more important role as a source of external financing. this subject is crucial to spain, since it is the second - ranked issuer country of remittances to latin america. some of the topics we will address today ( such as the growing importance of digital money remittances, the role of fiscal stimulus measures in the resilience of remittances and the function of the informal economy ) are key to understanding the behaviour of the flow of remittances in this crisis. undoubtedly, today ’ s event will allow us to better understand these developments and – i hope – 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches to draw some useful conclusions on how to tackle them from the central bank standpoint. thank you for your attention. remittances barely fell by 1. 6 % in 2020, compared with their 4. 8 % decline during the 2008 financial crisis. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

they are renouncing exactly that as a result of wage cuts across all sectors. but this is still easier to do inside the euro area rather than outside it. bild : is there a limit to the support? or will it just continue like this? draghi : i can ’ t answer that. we will have to see how things develop in the country. generally speaking, the fact remains that if we want to protect taxpayers ’ money, the euro area cannot be turned into a transfer union, where one or two countries provide the money, the rest spend, and the whole thing is financed by joint eurobonds. that cannot happen. bild : many parties, also in germany, are calling for that. draghi : a community must be founded on trust – trust that shared rules will be adhered to, for example, with regard to budgetary discipline. that is why the new fiscal pact among euro area states is the right thing and why eurobonds would be premature. bild : is the german chancellor ’ s stance winning through? draghi : let me put it this way : without pressure from the markets and from the germans, much of the progress we have made in the various euro area countries would not have been possible. bild : how often do you speak on the telephone with the chancellor? draghi : not very often. the ecb is very mindful of its independence. and the chancellor fully respects this. bis central bankers ’ speeches
euros compared to the same period of 2021. however, this increase is still low compared to the import that in the same period january - october 2022 reached the amount of 4. 6 billion euros. in the same period last year, imports amounted to 3. 7 billion euros. therefore, this new window will help to increase the export of businesses, contributing to the overall economic development of the country. the central bank of the republic of kosovo continues to support and push the financial sector to increase support for the economy, especially businesses that aim to export our products. thank you! 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches

fail. " it is unacceptable that large firms that the government is now compelled to support to preserve financial stability were among the greatest risk - takers during the boom period. the existence of too - big - to - fail firms also violates the presumption of a level playing field among financial institutions. in the future, financial firms of any type whose failure would pose a systemic risk must accept especially close regulatory scrutiny of their risk - taking. also urgently needed in the united states is a new set of procedures for resolving failing nonbank institutions deemed systemically critical, analogous to the rules and powers that currently exist for resolving banks under the so - called systemic risk exception. conclusion the world today faces both short - term and long - term challenges. in the near term, the highest priority is to promote a global economic recovery. the federal reserve retains powerful policy tools and will use them aggressively to help achieve this objective. fiscal policy can stimulate economic activity, but a sustained recovery will also require a comprehensive plan to stabilize the financial system and restore normal flows of credit. despite the understandable focus on the near term, we do not have the luxury of postponing work on longer - term issues. high on the list, in light of recent events, are strengthening regulatory oversight and improving the capacity of both the private sector and regulators to detect and manage risk. finally, a clear lesson of the recent period is that the world is too interconnected for nations to go it alone in their economic, financial, and regulatory policies. international cooperation is thus essential if we are to address the crisis successfully and provide the basis for a healthy, sustained recovery.
indeed, services were already showing a declining trend before the latest round of restrictions : the services pmi fell from 54. 7 in july to 46. 9 in october. and while manufacturing has so far remained relatively resilient, there is a risk of the recovery in manufacturing also slowing once order backlogs are run down and industrial output becomes better aligned with demand. in this situation, the key challenge for policymakers will be to bridge the gap until vaccination is well advanced and the recovery can build its own momentum. the strength of the rebound in the third quarter suggests that the initial policy response was effective and the capacity of the economy to recover is still in place. but it will require very careful policy management to ensure that this remains the case. above all, we must ensure that this exceptional downturn remains just that – exceptional – and does not turn into a more conventional recession that feeds on itself. even if this second wave of the virus proves to be less intense than the first, it poses no less danger to the economy. 3 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches in particular, if the public no longer sees the pandemic as a one - off event, we could see more lasting changes in behaviour than during the first wave. households could become more fearful about the future and increase their precautionary saving. firms that have survived up to now by increasing borrowing could decide that remaining open no longer makes business sense. this could trigger a “ firm exit multiplier ”, where the closure of businesses faced with health restrictions cuts demand for complementary businesses, in turn causing those firms to reduce their output. 9 if that were to happen, the recession could percolate through the economy to sectors not directly affected by the pandemic – and potentially trigger a feedback loop between the real economy and the financial sector. banks might start tightening credit standards in the belief that corporate creditworthiness is deteriorating, leading to firms becoming less willing or able to borrow funds, credit growth slowing and banks ’ risk perceptions rising further. the ecb ’ s bank lending survey is already signalling a possible tightening in the months to come. we are also seeing indications that small and medium - sized firms are expecting their access to finance to deteriorate. a continued, powerful and targeted policy response is therefore vital to protect the economy, at least until the health emergency passes. concerns about “ zombification ” or impeding creative destruction are misplaced, especially if a vaccine is now in sight

each euro area country to minimise the market distortions induced by its particular regulations and for the euro area as a whole to remove remaining barriers to market integration. this requires the implementation of comprehensive reforms necessary to deepen market integration, soften labour market rigidities and improve wage flexibility in order to continue fostering growth and new employment opportunities. we are now at your disposal for questions.