discussants and panellists for sharing their insights. thanks to all participants for their contributions. and special thanks to annette vissing - jørgensen from the federal reserve board, who will give a keynote on " balance sheet policy above the effective lower bound ". 11 4 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches now i wish you all an exciting conference with valuable insights. thank you very much. 1 rzenik, a. and r. weber ( 2022 ), money in the right hands, mimeo. 2 dunne, p. et al. ( 2024 ), financial fragility in open - ended mutual funds : the role of liquidity management tools, bundesbank discussion paper, no 36 / 2024. 3 paul, p., m. ulate and j. c. wu ( 2024 ), a macroeconomic model of central bank digital currency, mimeo. 4 european central bank ( 2023 ), a stocktake on the digital euro. summary report on the investigation phase and outlook on the next phase, 18 october. 5 balz, b. ( 2024 ), only balances of €500 allowed? what the digital euro is intended to deliver – and what not, interview with focus online, 5 june. 6 bidder, r., t. jackson and m. rottner ( 2024 ), cbdc and banks : disintermediating fast and slow, deutsche bundesbank discussion paper, no 15 / 2024. 7 congressional hearing transcript, recent bank failures and the regulatory response, committee on banking, housing, and urban affairs, 28 march 2023. 8 cucic, d. et al. ( 2024 ), distortive effects of deposit insurance : administrative evidence from deposit and loan accounts, mimeo. 9 eufinger, c. and z. ye ( 2024 ), breaking bagehot's rules : loan contracting with advantageous central bank funding, mimeo ; meisenzahl, r. r. and k. m. pence, delimiting arbitrage : evidence from the term asset - backed securities loan facility, mimeo. 10 nagel, j. ( 2024 ), reflections on the eurosystem's new operational framework, speech at the konstanz seminar on monetary theory and monetary policy, 16 may. 11 vissing - jørgensen, a. ( 2023 ), balance sheet policy above the el

prices. this may amplify price declines and liquidity shortages. effective liquidity management and regulation are very important here. a recently published bundesbank paper shows that price - based liquidity management tools help keep the financial fragility of open - ended mutual funds in check. 2 in times of stress, investors also try to protect their capital by shifting it into safer assets. however, this flight to safety can intensify the downward pressure on the prices of riskier assets as demand for the latter declines. the financial stability board is doing important work in this field. but it is currently focused on microprudential regulation. i think the fsb's work on this front needs to be complemented by the development of macroprudential regulation for the nbfi sector. in any case, we should not jeopardise what we have achieved in the banking regulation space by allowing stability risks to build up elsewhere in the financial system. 3 central bank digital currencies the second session is on central bank digital currencies ( cbdc ). cbdc is an issue that is keeping almost all central banks very busy at the moment. the eurosystem is hard at work preparing for the potential introduction of a digital euro. as the world turns increasingly digital, the digital euro would provide a secure and efficient digital payment option that complements cash. it aims to strengthen europe's strategic autonomy by building on european infrastructures, and to promote innovation in the private sector. however, introducing a cbdc could also have unintended side effects. if bank customers were allowed to hold it in large amounts, periods of banking distress could trigger large, sudden shifts out of deposits into cbdc. this could lead to financial instability. and if cbdc were too attractive a substitute for deposits, commercial banks'access to retail deposits could erode over time. which could lead to structural disintermediation and call into question our proven two - tier banking system. it is therefore of the essence to design cbdc in a way that prevents these risks from materialising. the challenge is to optimise the usability of cbdc as a means of payment while at the same time limiting its effects on the market for bank deposits. two decisive factors in this regard are remuneration and holding limits. let me say a few words on each of these. 2 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches remuneration means the rate of interest on people's holdings