not willing to hand over control. and there are calls for greater joint liability in the euro area, say, in the form of a european deposit insurance scheme or a european unemployment insurance fund, to name but two examples. since member states are evidently still as reluctant to cede sovereignty rights to the european level as they were 25 years ago, i think that increasing the communitisation of liability is the wrong route to take. and that is why i am sceptical about calls to build a second wing, so to speak, on the basis of such initiatives. in a recent article for the frankfurter allgemeine zeitung newspaper ( faz ), horst seehofer, the bavarian state premier wrote, “ europe is a treaty - based community ; you can ’ t always get what you wish ". looking at the proposals for the future development of the euro area, however, it is sometimes possible to get exactly the impression that you can. we need to restore the balance between actions and accountability. and, to my mind, the only way we can do this is by strengthening individual national responsibility and the decentralised framework. " united in diversity ” has been europe ’ s motto since 2000, highlighting the fact that european integration and regional diversity do not have to be a contradiction in terms. and we must not forget that the principle of subsidiarity, which is likewise enshrined in the treaties, also stipulates that tasks should be transferred to the european level only if they cannot be performed adequately when responsibility lies at the national or regional level. strengthening individual national responsibility and the decentralised framework implies restoring the credibility of the “ no bail - out ” clause. that was exactly what was lacking in the run - up to the crisis. the example of switzerland shows that a credible no bail - out regime for government debt is fundamentally possible. of course, the no bail - out principle can only function if it is possible, in extreme cases, to restructure sovereign debt without jeopardising the stability of the financial system. the european rescue measures were motivated not least by the fact that the consequences of a disorderly sovereign insolvency were unpredictable. the fear of a further escalation of the financial crisis led to european taxpayers ’ money being used as the first line of defence. that wasn ’ t really fair, as it contravened the principle that it is, first and foremost, shareholders and investors who must bear the consequences of

very well aware that this edifice has a decisive weakness : the risk of accumulating excessive debt is greater in such a monetary union than in countries that have their own currencies. one reason is that the member states of a monetary union of this design are not borrowing in their own currency. they therefore cannot meet their payment obligations by simply printing money – a solution which, for stability - oriented central bankers, is generally a non - starter anyway. another is that there are greater incentives to borrow in a monetary union because any consequences of relying increasingly on capital market funding can be passed on to the other member states. and that was why the member states pledged to maintain sound public finances, introduced upper limits for annual budget deficits and public debt levels, and agreed to a “ no bail - out clause ” that would prevent one member state from assuming liability for the debts of another. they also prohibited central banks from printing money to help cash - strapped euro - area governments this was designed to ensure that member states are liable for their own debts and cannot pass them on to other members of the community. at the end of the day, people will behave in a responsible manner only if they take responsibility for their own actions. or, to put it slightly more bluntly : each member state must “ pay its own way ". all this is ultimately intended to protect the single monetary policy from coming under pressure to 2 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches inflate away excessive levels of government debt through monetisation. the founding fathers of the monetary union were well aware that there would be a loud cry for monetary policy action if the soundness of public finances should be at risk at any time. the debt crisis in the euro area showed us that the maastricht framework was unable to prevent sovereign debt crises and had also failed to effectively counteract other unsound economic developments such as a severe loss of international competitiveness and excessive current account deficits. during the crisis, as you are well aware, we then set up the much - publicised european rescue packages during the crisis and took other measures – including through the eurosystem – in order to prevent the crisis from escalating. but at the same time, these measures undermined the principle of individual national responsibility. although the “ no bail - out ” rule still applies, in reality, elements of communitised liability have been gaining ground. this upset the balance between actions and accountability because, naturally, the member states were