to creditworthy households and businesses, ” news release, march 23, 2020, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / pressreleases / bcreg20200323a. htm ; board of governors of the federal reserve system, “ federal reserve board announces temporary change to its supplementary leverage ratio rule to ease strains in the treasury market resulting from the coronavirus and increase banking organizations ’ ability to provide credit to households and businesses, ” news release, april 1, 2020, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / pressreleases / bcreg20200401a. htm ; board of governors of the federal reserve system, federal deposit insurance corporation, and office of the comptroller of the currency, “ agencies announce changes to the community bank leverage ratio, ” news release, april 6, 2020, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / pressreleases / bcreg20200406a. htm. • we supported banks ’ ability to meet customer requests by reducing reserve requirements to zero, and we took steps to increase the availability of the discount window to meet liquidity needs. 7 because of these measures, and the strong foundations on which they were built, banking organizations are well - positioned to serve as a source of strength, not strain, in the current crisis. they have been able to lend to creditworthy firms, which were suddenly without access to capital markets, or which simply sought to keep more cash on hand. they have been able to absorb new deposits from households and businesses preparing for the difficult road ahead. they have been able to process a flood of transactions from investors responding to higher volatility. and as a conduit for official - sector support, they have helped stabilize the financial system and restore market function. the strain in financial markets has eased, thanks to the actions of congress, executive agencies, central banks, and other private and public institutions around the world. the profound economic disruption of the pandemic containment measures persists, and households and businesses are still deeply affected. financial institutions now have an essential part to play in addressing that disruption — as a bridge between the start of this crisis and the completion of our economic recovery. there are many differences between the current crisis and the one we faced a decade ago. the most fundamental, however, is the origin of the stress

groups and lines of defense, and when necessary, additional escalation. past, present, and future as the theory and practice of operational risk management and the complexity of our operations have evolved, so has our approach. in the mid - 2000 ’ s, the bank formalized its operational risk program. that included starting a bank - wide operational risk committee ( a predecessor to the risk subcommittee ) led by the first vice president, establishing the risk event reporting and risk control self - assessment processes, and creating the centralized operational risk function ( then located in the bank ’ s corporate group ). later developments included instituting new bank - wide control policies reflecting a deeper understanding of sources of operational risk. for example, the bank established policies to govern end - user developed automation tools and the management of contingent workers. the past several years have been characterized by a focus on integration of the bank ’ s risk management program. as part of a review of the bank ’ s governance, the risk subcommittee of the management committee was established with a broad risk management mandate spanning financial, operational, and compliance risk. the bank also enhanced the coordination of risk management, resource allocation, and strategic planning through linkages between the risk subcommittee and our planning and resources committee. most indicative of this trend was the establishment in 2015 of the risk group ’ s enterprise risk management function which is responsible for providing an integrated view across all of the bank ’ s risks. in thinking about areas for future improvement, i ask myself : how can we accelerate organizational learning from our mistakes? does our analysis of risks and risk events sufficiently reveal organizational and structural issues that contribute to the risk? how can i further create a positive risk culture that encourages reporting and escalating of risk issues? are we finding the right balance in our controls between specificity of rules and the adaptability of principles? these and other questions will continue to focus us on improving and enhancing our policies and practices with the goal of supporting the bank ’ s ability to manage risk within its risk tolerance. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches