samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
willem f duisenberg : perspectives on eu enlargement speech by dr willem f duisenberg, president of the european central bank, on the occasion of receiving an honorary doctorate from imadec university, vienna, 14 october 2002. * * * dear klaus, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great privilege for me to be awarded an honorary doctorate today by such a distinguished institution, imadec university, in austria. it is also a great pleasure to hear the kind words of my colleague and friend, governor klaus liebscher. when listening to klaus liebscher, who has indeed studied my curriculum vitae in great depth, shakespeare's words came to my mind and i thought for a moment he had come to bury me, although he has actually come to praise me. i am afraid that this is the fate of anybody whose retirement comes within sight. nothing but good should be said of the dead, they say. considering that i am still alive, it is even more gratifying to hear nothing but good things about myself ; perhaps with the exception of my addiction to tobacco - an addiction that klaus and i happen to share. there is one thing i should like to emphasise in the laudation. as klaus liebscher has just said, my career has benefited from a “ summe von zufalligkeiten ” that i have been lucky enough to encounter throughout my professional life. hard work, clear objectives and a predilection for one's profession are necessary but not always sufficient conditions for success ; being in the right place at the right time is likely to provide momentous opportunities that may contribute to making anyone's career more challenging. however, in my reply to klaus liebscher's laudation, i should like to leave the past at rest and focus on the future, just as klaus has done in the second part of his speech. i should particularly like to make a link between klaus's comments about the importance of stability - oriented macroeconomic policies - to which i fully subscribe - and one of the key challenges the european union is facing, enlargement, most likely involving ten new member countries. the enlargement of the european union is a subject that has received much interest in this country in particular, given its proximity to central and eastern europe. indeed, the accession of ten new countries will now place austria in the geographical heart of the european union, although austria has already been at the heart of the european integration

education efforts for the children and young people, contributing, in turn, to the livelihood of the society in albania. thank you! 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
’ t reached the limit of the toolbox, i think that ’ s true. in germany, the biggest economy in europe, there is a very distortive discussion about the ecb. aren ’ t you worried that this discussion is very dangerous to maintain trust within the eurozone? i think the responsibilities for the problems we have are collective. i think everyone has to look from the point of view of the other. don ’ t forget, a lot of excess german savings went to spain, to the spanish banking system. i don ’ t deny that the problem in creditor countries gets worse in some respects the lower we cut the deposit rate. it is true we are looking at this, and it is true that when we decided some recomposition of our toolbox, we took that into account. but, fundamentally, the issue is not so much the negative rates, the main issue is mistrust in the willingness of the more indebted countries to really seize this opportunity to forcefully address the problems. this is much more what drives the german view. italy is often accused of not doing enough to solve its structural problems. what are the changes that could really unlock growth in italy? the real question is “ what drives prosperity? ” i think prosperity is linked to education, productivity, the rule of law, property rights and all these things, certainly not monetary policy. in italy productivity really started to stop growing in the early 1990s. i think this is a fundamental reflection for the country. some key questions like the efficiency of the judicial system, the labour market reforms, liberalizations in services, have in all or in part been tackled. but i think the agenda remains unfortunately significant. to give you just a few examples, i have been worried by the insufficient spreading of ict technology. business investment is recovering everywhere, because demand is recovering so investment is following, but one of the weaker investment performances is in italy. i think the minister of finance and the government are well aware of what the priorities are, of what needs to be done. one thing you haven ’ t mentioned is fiscal policy. in rome one often hears the argument that italy should be allowed to expand fiscal policy more to really help the bis central bankers ’ speeches recovery. one also hears that the european fiscal rules are not fit for purpose. how do you respond to that? experience tells that there is always a reason to postpone fiscal savings and that fiscal policy is often procyclical. so the only appropriate

operating at world class standards and synergistically reinforcing the real economy. we are actively working at a pace to achieve this goal, and despite the current economic challenges, we are confident that we will succeed. bis central bankers ’ speeches
higher inflation, which become increasingly more costly as the level of the inflation target rises. this new objective provides a clear target, replacing what had become an ambiguous and unclear objective ( which defined price stability as an annual increase in prices of below 2 percent and specified an inflation aim of “ below, but close to, 2 per cent ” ). we have also made clear that the 2 per cent target is symmetric : it is equally undesirable to have inflation that is too high above or too far below 2 per cent ( recognising that economies are changing constantly and that inflation will not be 2 per cent precisely all of the time ). the main reason for these changes is that, compared to when the last strategy was agreed in 2003, disinflationary pressures have become more acute. the need for a clearer target had become self - evident and a perception that the “ close to but below ” objective was asymmetric may have contributed to the decline in inflation expectations and the persistence of low inflation over the last decade. in such a disinflationary environment, we want to make clear that we will take forceful action to respond to inflation below our target ( as well as, of course, inflation that was above the target ). we will tolerate small deviations in either direction over short, transitory, periods to ensure the smooth functioning of the economy. ( unlike the us federal reserve, we decided against adopting “ average inflation targeting ”. although we are both central banks, our mandates are different and, overall, we decided that our new target was simple, clear and easy 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches to communicate, and more appropriate for the ecb. ) second, we decided that we will take account of the cost of owner - occupied housing when assessing price pressures. this would better reflect people ’ s experience of inflation ( as we heard when we consulted the public last year ). we also laid out a roadmap for how to include these costs in our target measure of inflation. ultimately, this is a decision for the european statistical system but, in the meantime, we will use standalone data on housing costs to inform our monetary policy assessments. third, climate change has been a key issue in our review. while governments have the primary responsibility to act and mitigate the effects of climate change ( after, of course, the actions of individual households and businesses ), central banks can also play an important role. last week we committed to an action plan

conducted. i expect that the oireachtas will, in time, decide to authorise some form of inquiry to try to understand the deeper, underlying causes of this crisis so that wider lessons can be learnt for the future. in considering how best to do this, i suggest that new models need to be explored. the crisis is not simply a question of discovering who did what and who knew what. uncovering the deep roots of the crisis will require expertise and broad social scientific understanding more than merely forensic skills.
monthly survey of consumer expectations showed that three - year - ahead inflation expectations are back to where they were in early 2021, and one - year - ahead expectations have decreased sharply. 4 2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches fomc actions with all this in mind, last week, the fomc raised the target range for the federal funds rate to 4 - 3 / 4 to 5 percent, its ninth consecutive increase. the fomc said it " will closely monitor incoming information and assess the implications for monetary policy. " it also said it " anticipates that some additional policy firming may be appropriate in order to attain a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent over time. " 5, 6 i will be particularly focused on assessing the evolution of credit conditions and their effects on the outlook for growth, employment, and inflation. economic outlook while the fomc has taken decisive steps to bring inflation down, lags exist between policy actions and their effects. it will take time for all of our inflation gears to move at a pace that takes us to our 2 percent target. i expect inflation to decline to around 3 - 1 / 4 percent this year, before moving closer to our longer - run goal in the next two years. i expect real gdp to grow modestly this year and for growth to pick up somewhat next year. slower growth and tighter monetary policy will likely lead to some softening in the labor market. so, i anticipate unemployment gradually rising to about 4 - 1 / 2 percent over the next year. conclusion the economic outlook is uncertain, and our policy decisions will be driven by the data and the achievement of our maximum employment and price stability mandates. i am confident that our actions will bring inflation down to our 2 percent longer - run goal. 1 board of governors of the federal reserve system, statement on longer - run goals and monetary policy strategy, adopted effective january 24, 2012 ; as reaffirmed effective january 31, 2023. 2 federal reserve bank of new york, global supply chain pressure index. 3 john c. williams, a steady anchor in a stormy sea, remarks at snb - frb - bis high - level conference on global risk, uncertainty, and volatility, zurich, switzerland, november 9, 2022. 4 federal reserve bank of new york, survey of consumer expectations. 5 board of governors of the federal reserve system, federal reserve issues fomc statement, march 22

, further structural reforms will be important prerequisites to unlocking the economic growth and development potential of south africa. all of theses reforms will need to be nurtured carefully and it is crucial that they be supported throughout by a stable and transparent macroeconomic policy framework. 10. 4 in conclusion it is reasonable to look forward to the future with confidence : and this we do. references t. mbeki ( 2005 ) “ state of the nation address ” i. plenderleith ( 2004 ) “ always something normal from south africa ”
credit model does not always fit into the framework of new international financial regulation. in recent years, we have also seen a clear tendency for mortgage banks to resemble other banks more and more. our expectations must be realistic. and we must face the fact that there are limits to the number of special arrangements that the danish mortgage credit sector can obtain when new international regulation is introduced. instead, our ambition should be to fit danish mortgage credit into the framework laid down by the international standards and rules. we can do so by seeking to influence this framework. but we should choose our battles carefully. a challenge in relation to denmark ’ s efforts to influence developments in international regulation is that much of this regulation is initially conceived by the basel committee, where we do not have a seat. we only have a say from the stage where the rules are transposed into eu regulation. so the main channel of influence goes via the eu cooperation. by the way, the european commission should be given credit for generally listening to the danish views. at least if our argumentation is convincing and supported by empirical data. on the other hand, we must accept that non - membership of the banking union closes another possible channel of influence on international financial regulation – the ecb. * * * more changes to financial regulation are likely to be introduced in the coming years in the form of new initiatives from the basel committee as well as changes to eu regulation resulting from the banking union. according to the basel committee, the forthcoming changes are not aimed at increasing the total capital requirements for the financial sector. bis central bankers ’ speeches but for the individual institution the new requirements could mean that it should prepare for increased capital adequacy requirements. therefore, it would be wise to ensure robust capitalisation. this can be done by raising capital in the market or by retaining a larger share of profits. in this connection i would like to make it clear that an increased share of own funding relative to debt funding does not entail any substantial extra costs for a credit institution. more equity capital makes the institution more robust and reduces the returns demanded by both bond owners and shareholders. and the return on and risks related to the assets are the same irrespective of the method of funding. moreover, right now might be a good time to boost the capital buffers as equity investors ’ expected returns are currently low. * * * given the very low level of interest rates, the targets set by credit institutions for return on equity seem to be rather high. according

a role that the bank of zambia is committed to playing effectively. ladies and gentlemen, with these remarks, i wish to thank all stakeholders in this important initiative. thank you.
come to interesting conclusions, but the most important is policy coordination. why is policy coordination important? • monetary policy is about short - run decisions on the direction of prices, and affects nominal variables ; while fiscal policy affects real variables. • it makes it easier for policy makers to achieve their stated policy objectives in a coherent and efficient manner. bis central bankers ’ speeches • ensures commitment to mutually agreed upon objectives, thus helping to eliminate the problem of time inconsistency in the design of policy. • it enhances the credibility, anchors public expectations, ensures sustainability of fiscal and monetary policies, thus promoting macroeconomic stability. ladies and gentlemen, to ensure success of policy coordination we need either of the following : • a continuous interaction between the fiscal and monetary authorities to decide jointly on aspects relating to policy design and implementation, or ; • a set of rules and procedures that minimize the need for frequent interaction. but we know all these, why was the eu zone not successful? as noted by sargent and wallace in their famous article “ some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic ”, “ tighter money today leads to higher inflation not only eventually but starting today ”. the paradox for tight monetary policy and heavy debt expansion will lead to economic stagnation, eddie buffie has demonstrated this for a number of countries in this region. moreover, ladies and gentlemen, the lack of credibility of the overall policy framework caused by the long - term inconsistency of such mix in signals diminishes the effectiveness of monetary policy. our experience with fighting inflation in kenya suggests that inflation may be occasioned by demand side as well as supply side factors. monetary policy uses interest rate as an instrument to fight inflation and anchor inflationary expectations. fiscal policy on the other hand raising debt domestically and using a mix of debt instruments drives the domestic interest rate structure. how policy makers coordinate and consolidate their efforts not only affects expectations concerning future policies and outcomes but can also affect the outcome of economic activity. ladies and gentlemen, several papers that link fiscal policy, monetary policy and inflation have been lined up for presentation today. as you listen to the presentations and the discussions, it is important that we filter the conclusions first to reach to the frontier of this subject matter and provide renewed thinking in the policy arena. the recommendations of these papers should fit in the policy dialogue and policy making process to support growth and employment as envisaged in vision 2030 in kenya. as i conclude, i would like to thank all the participants present. i hope

opportunity to acquaint ourselves with the global best practices on the same. we should remember that price is an incentive and can be a disincentive – it has to be appropriate. with these few remarks, i now declare this workshop officially open and take this opportunity to wish you fruitful deliberations. thank you bis central bankers ’ speeches
that most of us can remember. short - term rates have averaged some 6¼ % compared with some 11¼ % over the preceding decade. and 10 - year government bond yields have fallen, with inflationary expectations, to around 5¼ % which apart from a brief period last year is the lowest they ’ ve been for nearly 40 years. much more fundamentally we ’ ve enjoyed the longest period of uninterrupted, quarter by quarter, economic growth since records began some 45 years ago - with annual growth averaging 2. 8 % between ¼ and ½ % above most estimates of our underlying trend rate. the number of people in employment is the highest on record. and unemployment has fallen from a peak of 10½ % on a claimant count basis at the beginning of 1993 to the present rate of 4 %. that is the lowest for 20 years in the uk as a whole, and just about the lowest in nearly every region. in yorkshire and humberside unemployment is 4. 7 %, the lowest rate since june 1980. our problem - and it is a real problem, as we have recognised for some time - is the imbalance, within the overall economy, between the domestically - oriented businesses and sectors, and those that are most internationally exposed. in part that imbalance is a hangover from the slowdown in global activity from the end of 1997 through to the start of 1999 - though the welcome recovery in global demand means that this influence is now diminishing. the more important factor now is the persistent weakness of the euro - not exclusively against sterling but equally against the dollar and the yen. the impact is particularly severe on the uk because of the closer ties between our economy and that of the eurozone. i ’ ve not heard a wholly convincing explanation for the euro ’ s persistent weakness. many analysts relate it to market concerns about structural rigidities in some parts of the eurozone, which are encouraging direct capital outflows attracted elsewhere by higher prospective earnings growth. whatever the cause, few of those i talk to expect the weakness of the euro to persist. but in the meantime, given that the problem is driven by perceptions of the eurozone, rather than any particular strength of sterling, it is very difficult to see what we in the uk can do directly to resolve it. the weak euro affects us at the macroeconomic level in two ways : it has a dampening effect on our price level ; and it reduces net external demand on our economy. to offset these influences

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rba, just as we issue and back australian dollar banknotes. this would be a form of retail central bank digital currency ( cbdc ) – or an eaud. i have said previously that the rba is open to this possibly. to date, though, we have not seen a strong public policy case to move in this direction, especially given australia's efficient, fast and convenient electronic payments system. it is possible, however, that the public policy case could emerge quite quickly as technology evolves and consumer preferences change. it is also possible that these tokens could offer a lower - cost solution for some types of payments than provided by the existing technologies. and, as i will discuss in a moment, there are advantages in digital payment tokens being backed by the central bank. all this means we have been continuing to examine closely the case for a retail cbdc and working with other central banks on this issue. we are working through the relevant technical issues, as well as the broader policy implications of any shift away from a payments system based on the movement of value between bank accounts, to one that uses tokens. as part of this effort, we are planning to work with australia's new digital finance cooperative research centre. we will also be working with the treasury on these issues and welcome the government's announcement yesterday. another possibility is that payment tokens are issued and backed by an entity other than the central bank, though still denominated in australian dollars. these could be a form of stablecoin. if this is how the system develops, it will be important that these tokens are backed by high - quality assets and that they meet high standards for safety and security. one reason i say this is that a lesson from history is that privately issued and backed money all too often ends in financial instability and losses for consumers. this is one reason why national currencies are today ultimately backed by the state. so if privately issued stablecoins are ultimately the way things head, it will be crucial that they meet very high standards. and if there were to be multiple stablecoins, there would be advantages in them being interoperable. the rba is working with domestic regulators and our counterparts around the world on the policy issues here. https : / / www. rba. gov. au / speeches / 2021 / sp - gov - 2021 - 12 - 09. html 6 / 9 payments : the future? | speeches | rba a third type