the governors of all the national central banks should continue to be treated equally. at the same time, the council must represent the eurosystem as a whole, and be seen to do so - implying that it must not become too centralised. a solution that meets these criteria could involve some form of rotating membership for the governors of the national central banks, so as to limit the number of voting governors. this could be a variation on the fed system, albeit more decentralised. there, all of the regional presidents participate in the discussions, but not all of them have a vote at any point in time. finding a solution that meets the criteria i have set out is especially important, given that changes here could set a precedent for other areas of supranational european co - operation concluding remarks let me briefly conclude. in my view, differences in mandates between the fed and the eurosystem are important in understanding our respective decisions, and this is often forgotten. in addition, comparing the two systems sheds some light on where each institution may head in the future. regarding our mandates, it seems to me that any changes in this area are likely to be in the direction of the fed moving closer to where we and other central banks are, rather than the reverse. for organisation and decision making, the future is more difficult to predict. any changes here need to take account of the political realities of monetary union between sovereign countries. euro area monetary policy is supranational, so decision making has to be based on the euro area as a whole, and not individual countries. at the same time, the euro area consists of independent countries. that implies that there is a limit to how far the eurosystem can centralise in advance of any political union. this reality has to be clearly reflected in our decision - making body. i wish you success with the rest of your conference and an enjoyable stay here in amsterdam.

nout wellink : monetary unions in europe and the us - just how different are they? speech by mr nout wellink, president of de nederlandsche bank and president of the bank for international settlements, at the institut international d ’ etudes bancaires, amsterdam, 17 may 2002. * * * introduction first of all, thank you for the invitation to speak to you today. now that we have a monetary union, there has been discussion about the role of national central banks in the euro area, including some questions about their ongoing relevance. clearly you regard us as relevant or you would not have invited me to speak! it will come as no surprise that i also think that national central banks are relevant, and will continue to be so. today i would like to briefly compare monetary policy in the euro area and in the us. of course there are differences between the two areas, but there are also important similarities. this comparison can help us understand the reasons behind our differences and may provide some useful insights into the institutional implications for euro area monetary policy in the future. i will structure my remarks around three themes : the policy goals of the two monetary unions, their organisation, and the monetary policy decision - making process in each system. goals and philosophy let me begin by comparing the goals or mandates of the eurosystem and the federal reserve system. here in europe the primary focus of monetary policy is to maintain price stability. in contrast, the fed has multiple objectives for monetary policy. their goals are to achieve maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long - term interest rates. an important explanation for our different mandates can be found by looking at our economic histories. in europe, monetary union is the most recent step in an ongoing process of political and economic integration. the hyperinflation experienced in the first half of last century in some european countries, in particular in germany, has played an important role in ensuring that european monetary policy is focussed on price stability. our experiences in europe contrast with those in the us. a key us event that commentators frequently refer to is the great depression. monetary policy is often blamed for adding to the severity of the great depression in the us. i think that is a reason why employment and interest rate objectives remain in the fed ’ s mandate, and why policy makers there react so quickly to signs of slowing economic growth. under normal circumstances, policy makers on both sides of the atlantic are likely to take similar decisions. however, around the time that the