of constitutional identity would dictate that competences cannot be transferred to another entity without violating the original power of the people. such an interpretation is based on the antiquated belief that the nation state is the sole locus of legitimacy. this belief is rooted in the so - called westphalian model of international relations. it assumes that only the nation state has sovereignty over its territory and domestic affairs. this model bis central bankers ’ speeches refers to the peace of westphalia – a series of peace treaties signed between may and october 1648 in osnabruck and munster ( in germany ). these treaties ended the thirty years ’ war ( 1618 – 48 ) in the holy roman empire, and the eighty years ’ war ( 1568 – 1648 ), in which the kingdom of spain, the dutch republic, the kingdom of france, the swedish empire and sovereigns of the free imperial cities were also involved. the westphalian model was justified as a means to end the long - lasting wars back in 1648. however, some 300 years later, after two devastating wars, the dangers of a warped understanding of patriotism, i. e. nationalism, became apparent. overcoming the limits of the nation state was a precondition for a peaceful europe. sharing sovereignty rather than sacrificing it has been the preferred method of achieving this. indeed, the european approach since then has shown that democratic states can share sovereignty in a number of policy areas without losing statehood. the eu has developed an identity as a union not only of member states, but also of citizens establishing a model of transnational democracy with an elected, european parliament and an independent court of justice ( the ecj ). eu citizens have ample reason to say, as the incoming president of the ecj, koen lenaerts, once put it : civis europaeus sum. 1 the treaty signed by member states also confers rights to citizenship which can be claimed in the european courts. in particular, the euro area has shown that like - minded people and their governments can introduce, manage and safeguard a single currency without having to merge into one overarching federal state. the “ currency beyond the state ” 2 has revealed as false the widespread belief that a monetary union without a state is not viable. there is a broad consensus that the design and implementation of monetary policy should be taken out of the political arena to protect citizens ’ purchasing power from short - term temptations and pressures of the election cycle. this is why monetary policy was transferred to an

, the legal doctrine of “ constitutional identity ” morphs into a political question. there is then a risk that sovereignty becomes an ideological concept. such “ sovereignism ” clashes with any attempt at further “ completing europe ’ s economic and monetary union ”, a report prepared by j. - c. juncker, in close cooperation with d. tusk, j. dijsselbloem, m. draghi and m. schulz, 22 june 2015. bis central bankers ’ speeches european integration. it could result in a failure to complete the european integration process. it should not be used as an excuse to opt for intergovernmental arrangements where supranational solutions would be more conducive to achieving a genuine economic and monetary union. the european integration process has demonstrated that democratic states can share sovereignty in a number of policy areas without losing statehood. nevertheless, we need to take into account that some policy areas do need a higher degree of democratic legitimacy and parliamentary control at the national level than others. this reasoning in no way supports those championing a national or constitutional identity. rather, it illustrates the need for different approaches to the respective policy areas, especially as the concept of constitutional identity has not only hampered deeper integration but risks winding back earlier achievements. as jaap hoeksma, philosopher of law put it, “ the transition of the eu from an international organisation to a european democracy has proceeded faster than most euro - sceptics ” predicted ; at the same time, “ the quality of this [ … ] democracy [ still ] needs more improvements than euro enthusiasts tend to assume ”. 4 hoeksma, j., op. cit. bis central bankers ’ speeches