international organization of securities commissions ( iosco ) : principles for financial market infrastructures, april 2012. cpss was renamed as cpmi as of 1 september 2014. 6 cpmi and the board of iosco : recovery of financial market infrastructures, october 2014 ( revised july 2017 ). 7 fsb : guidance on central counterparty resolution and resolution planning, 5 july 2017. 8 ecb recommends amending article 22 of its statute, 23 june 2017. 9 article 1 of council regulation ( eu ) no 1024 / 2013 of 15 october 2013 ( the ssm regulation ) explicitly states that it would “ not confer on the ecb any other supervisory tasks, such as tasks relating to the prudential supervision of central counterparties ”. 10 see also cœure, b. ( 2018 ), “ a cooperative approach to ccp recovery and resolution ”, panel intervention by at the ilf conference on “ resolution in europe : the unresolved questions ”, frankfurt am main, 23 april. 11 on 5 july 2017, cpmi - iosco announced follow - up work in the area of good practices for ccps ’ default management auctions ( cover note to the cpmi - iosco revised report on recovery of financial market infrastructures ). 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

- based equivalence and full deference mechanisms, based on compliance with international principles, can allow for cross - border activities that meet minimum standards of safety and soundness. where global ccps are systemically important for financial systems or currency areas, however, each authority should have the right and duty to ensure that imported risk is managed at least as diligently as its own standards would dictate. this is the core purpose of the revisions to the eu ’ s recognition framework for third - country ccps. the european commission and eu legislators have taken a balanced approach to ensure that this can be implemented in a pragmatic, flexible and efficient manner. the success of this framework, however, relies on enhanced cooperation between authorities. cooperation fosters trust, thus facilitating deference among supervisors to the extent possible. it also helps the authorities in implementing overlapping expectations based on different mandates in a coherent and mutually satisfactory manner. cooperation has, in fact, always been the ecb ’ s preferred approach to the oversight of financial market infrastructures ( fmis ). this cooperation should rely on two elements, as agreed at the international level : first, effective cooperative oversight arrangements and, second, crisis management groups to allow for mutual consultation in recovery and resolution planning. unfortunately, for several global ccps, these arrangements do not yet exist, or do not involve all relevant authorities, despite international commitments. these delays are a source of concern, not least as seven years have passed since the adoption of the pfmis5, and almost five years since international standards were adopted for both the recovery6 and resolution7 of fmis. i urge all parties involved to accelerate progress in this area. 2 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches the eurosystem needs to be able to conduct effective oversight cooperation is also indispensable for the second topic of today ’ s conference, namely ccp liquidity and the role of the central bank of issue. in europe, cooperation ensures that the ecb and the eurosystem can conduct effective oversight of euro - denominated clearing activities, wherever they may be established. in 2017 the ecb recommended an amendment to its statute to clarify its competence over ccps for the purpose of carrying out its monetary functions. 8 the ensuing debate among legislators and policymakers in the eu and beyond was marred by some misunderstandings, however, which i would like to dispel today. as you all know, some central banks are ccp supervisors. the ecb is not,