in the financial arena, and occasionally business people. we are appointed for fixed terms, encouraging independent views. reserve bank presidents owe their appointments to both the board of directors of their regional reserve bank and the board of governors in washington. presidents can be either insiders – long - time staff members – or outsiders with relevant experience in academia, public policy, or the financial sector. once appointed, a president can serve until retirement at age 65 or for a minimum of ten years, affording scope for maintaining their individual views. nonetheless, fomc members try to find consensus under the leadership of the chairman, and neither governors nor presidents dissent very often. presidents have tended to dissent a little more than governors. the greater number of dissents by presidents might reflect a number of factors. for one, presidents have their own staffs, which can help support alternative views in preparing for a meeting. board members share a common staff with the chairman, and, being in the same building, perhaps have a greater opportunity to influence and be influenced by the chairman. in this regard, bank presidents may act like " outsiders " more readily than board members. at the same time, bank presidents tend to be longer tenured than board members, and can contribute the institutional memory one might expect from " insiders " when board membership turns over rapidly. 3. why so few dissents? fomc members recognize the degree of uncertainty around their judgments. unless they perceive that a serious misjudgment is being made, they expect, given common objectives, that when they prefer another policy and their analysis later proves correct, the committee is likely to move in their direction in time to forestall problems developing. and they may see their influence on policy as greater over time if they are usually part of the consensus. finally, they could perceive that a series of close votes could create uncertainty about policy and the direction of the institution. the absence of dissents should not be taken as indicating that alternative views are not expressed at fomc meetings. often these are manifest in participants'forecasts. because we are such a large and geographically separated committee, the fomc, unlike the mpc, does not attempt to arrive at a common forecast, and the dispersion of individual forecasts illustrates the range of views. for example, participants'projections in october of gross domestic product ( gdp ) growth for 2008 differed by one full percentage point and differences were still a half a percentage point for 2010. participants had

reserve system are to assess the safety and efficiency of digital currency systems, to inform our understanding of private - sector arrangements, and to give us hands - on experience to understand the opportunities and limitations of possible technologies for digital forms of central bank money. these efforts are intended to ensure that we fully understand the potential as well as the associated risks and possible unintended consequences that new technologies present in the payments arena. separately, a significant policy process would be required to consider the issuance of a cbdc, along with extensive deliberations and engagement with other parts of the federal government and a broad set of other stakeholders. there are also important legal considerations. it is important to understand how the existing provisions of the federal reserve act with regard to currency issuance apply to a cbdc and whether a cbdc would have legal tender status, depending on the design. the federal reserve has not made a decision whether to undertake such a significant policy process, as we are taking the time and effort to understand the significant implications of digital currencies and cbdcs around the globe. in addition to these experiments, the federal reserve continues to collaborate with and learn from other central banks. we are participating in the cbdc coalition of central banks. while each country will make decisions on whether to issue and how to design a cbdc based on its own domestic legal framework and financial and economic context, we benefit from collaboration on cbdc research. sharing lessons learned, jointly conducting experiments, and bringing diverse expertise to bear helps us make progress in developing potential approaches to address challenging hurdles, such as threats to cybersecurity, counterfeiting and fraud, and anti - money laundering, to name a few, as well as on shared goals, such as increasing the ease and efficiency of cross - border transactions. since financial and payments systems share extensive cross - border linkages, a poorly designed cbdc issued in one jurisdiction could create financial stability issues in another jurisdiction. a cyberattack on a cbdc arrangement in one jurisdiction could create domestic financial stress, which could, in turn, affect linked economies or have broader effects if confidence in certain technologies or payment mechanisms is eroded. more broadly, the federal reserve looks forward to increased international engagement on matters related to innovation and technological change that impact central banks and those we serve. our new initiative with the bank of international settlement ’ s innovation hub, through an innovation center at the federal reserve bank of new york, will provide a useful venue for increased cooperation and exchange. 5