permitted to invest in a bank to the extent of 10 per cent. the small finance banks ( sfbs ) licensing guidelines issued in 2014 and 2019 made large public sector entities and industrial houses, including nbfcs promoted by them explicitly ineligible to set up such banks. 7. many committees set - up on the subject in the past as well the iw g have acknowledged that the large corporates / industrial houses can be an important source of capital and can provide management expertise and strategic direction given their pool of entrepreneurial and managerial talent. there is also the issue of finding fit and able promoters with deep pockets to set up a large technologically equipped universal bank. however, at the same time concerns were raised by all of them, including the iw g, on the attendant risks which come to fore. these include – conflicts of interest through self - dealing at the expense of bank clients and in the transactions between the bank and its affiliates, favouring associates for extending loans and undermining the neutrality and independence in deciding allocation of credit and constricting the flow of credit to competitors. caution was also warranted around issues of connected lending, complex web of group structures, crossholding as well as presence of large number of unregulated entities in the group, as these would stretch the rbi ’ s regulatory and supervisory resources. another oftquoted argument also points to the principles of separation of banking and industry / business. while it is an accepted fact that the relationship between financial economy and real economy is symbiotic, de facto merger of the segments may actually aggravate the systemic risks. 8. given that banking is a highly leveraged business dealing with public money, it makes sense to keep industry / business and banking separate. this separation is expected to avoid spill over risks – where trouble anywhere in the group entity may result in transferring risks on to the depositors, leading in turn to claims on deposit insurance with subsequent ripple effects cascading across the largely interconnected financial systems, creating concerns around financial stability. these issues have been flagged by the iw g also and therefore, it is necessary that we closely examine the related matters before thinking of permitting large industrial houses or nbfcs owned by such houses to set up any new bank. to conclude, let me just say that the jury is still out on the issue. shareholding and structure 9. diversification of ownership in banks is considered desirable in the long run as concentrated shareholding may expose them to the

central banks – need high - quality financial data at a granular and aggregate level to perform several of their functions, including : conducting monetary policy, assessing systemic risks, supervising banks, performing market surveillance and enforcing and conducting resolution activities. the private sector too is in need of high - quality data : for their regulatory reporting obligations, for example, and to underpin risk management and operational efficiency and – ultimately – to support successful decision - making. and the need for high - quality data does not end at our borders. 1 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches the interconnectedness of financial markets establishes an obvious need to improve our global ability to collect, aggregate, disseminate and share data. this is a prerequisite for developing a coherent view of the global financial system so that emerging vulnerabilities can be dealt with promptly and effectively. good data are essential for global systemic risk assessment and for global financial stability. standards for granular data should therefore be agreed on and implemented at a global level – the international dimension of this conference is therefore no coincidence. it rather is a reflection of our experience that global standardisation results in large efficiency gains for both users and providers of data. and it ’ s about much more than efficiency. often external observers question the appropriateness of policy decisions because they do not trust the underlying data. global standards can foster trust across borders by removing one important source of uncertainty. there is thus a shared interest in promoting the efficient production and processing of data through the use of globally accepted open standards applied by all relevant stakeholders. but setting global standards is of course not enough. coordinated and consistent implementation of agreed standards is an equally important determinant of success – as is the management and dissemination of data. what progress has been made and what challenges do we face? now, where do we currently stand in terms of setting and implementing standards? as you are well aware, there are a number of ongoing international initiatives aimed at improving the information frameworks on which policy decisions are based. i would like to focus on two sets of initiatives, both of which aim to make financial transactions easier to track and more transparent : the launch of the legal entity identifier ( lei ) and the ongoing reforms to improve the transparency of the over - the counter ( otc ) derivatives markets. lei the lei initiative, as you might know, dates back to november 2011, when the g20 leaders supported the establishment of a global legal entity identifier that would uniquely identify parties to financial