am using the opportunity at this conference, which is attended by governors and representatives of central banks in the region, to point out a need of a closer cooperation of central banks which could contribute to the economic development of the region. namely, the common long - term objective of all the countries in the region is the membership in the european economic and monetary union. all the countries are on the same road to the european union, some of them progress faster and are well ahead of other countries, while others enter a complex process of meeting the criteria and fulfilling the european standards. the central bank, as a unique monetary institution with the primary task to preserve the financial stability and price stability in the country, also has a very important role in european integration processes and regional cooperation. our region has common objectives and trends, therefore it is natural that we share and exchange experiences. the central banks in the region can cooperate in numerous projects which are highly important for the economy of both the country and the region. in the last 10 years we have tried to implement the monetary policy in a responsible and consistent manner and be a pillar for the entire banking sector and their clients. our goal was to in a transparent way establish the communication with the public by organizing press conferences, through press releases, regular presence in the printed and electronic media, and by issuing bulletins and periodic reports. i am using this opportunity to thank also the representatives of the media for their professional and objective reporting on the activities of the cbbh. i wish to thank also the previous and current governing board for their full support in strategic principles of the cbbh, and to all the vice governors for their significant contribution to the achieved results and to all the employees. in the end, as you know, many foreigners have spent certain periods in bosnia and herzegovina. although i appreciate the contribution and engagement of all of them, the fact is that we quickly forget many of them. however, it is sure that the central bank of bosnia and herzegovina will never forget the engagements of mr. serge robert and mr. peter nicholl. i wish to thank mr. robert, who, unfortunately, is not here today because of illness and thank you mr. nicholl for everything you have done for our institution. thank you all for making our anniversary even more important with your presence, and i wish the guests from other countries to have a nice time in sarajevo and bosnia and herzegovina. thank you for your attention!

r. a. mundell and a. k. swoboda ( eds. ), monetary problems in the international economy, university of chicago press, chicago, 1969. t. padoa - schioppa, “ il passo piu lungo ”, corriere della sera, may 3, 1998. t. padoa - schioppa, interview with la repubblica, august 6, 2008. bis central bankers ’ speeches perhaps the convergence process had been displaced, firstly, by the acceleration of the enlargement of the eu and increased participation in the eurosystem and, secondly, by a clear ( though according to some, irrelevant ) predominance of intergovernmental agreements over the so - called community method. the response to the crisis in this framework, after the global financial crisis and the very severe global recession in 2008 – 09, the full revelation of the conditions of greek public finances produced tensions, which then spread to the economically weaker euro - area countries, characterized by excessive public or private debt, a foreign trade deficit, poor competitiveness, and low economic growth. tensions grew with the bursting of the property bubble and the consequent disruption of banking in ireland. with the announcement of the involvement of private investors in restructuring greek debt in the summer of 2011, financial markets suddenly became aware of the implications of the ban on interventions to rescue member states under the treaty on european union. there followed a very serious crisis of confidence in the ability of the single currency to survive, with negative consequences for the real economies of individual countries and for the area as a whole. the list of potential causes of the crisis is rather crowded. fiscal imbalances, labour market rigidities and competitiveness deficits, insufficient innovation and productivity growth, excessive bank lending from core to periphery countries, all these have been good cause of lags, disturbances and vulnerabilities. but i believe that the sovereign debt crisis should be interpreted first and foremost as a major lack of trust in the future of the emu, the euro and possibly the eu. the severity of the sovereign debt crisis, which at some point threatened the very existence of the single currency, owes in part to the incompleteness of the emu project, which dramatically exposed the reversibility of even the major progress towards european financial integration made with the introduction of the euro. the rise in yield spreads between government bonds in the euro area was determined by two factors, one national