samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
. beyond that, the widespread introduction of floating exchange rates at least in principle provides a shock absorber that makes policy coordination less important than in a fixed - rate world. provided that currency swings are modest and do not introduce their own instabilities, we should get specific about the exact gains from coordination in the modern world. getting specific involves you researchers. these are some of the questions that might come up in a conference such as this, today and in the future. there might well be more questions, but this is already a very rich agenda. but you researchers should not limit yourselves to the questions that we policymakers might ask. we will be confronting policy questions and asking for your help. you should also be confronting questions and dealing with them. in the end, we should hope that a common and open research forum like this one will become a significant development in the evolution of monetary policy, on all continents. here's hoping for a successful enterprise, and here's a challenge for you to make it a successful enterprise.

of the business and economics statistics section of the american statistical association, pp. 98 – 104. phelps, edmund s. ( 1967 ). “ phillips curves, expectations of inflation and optimal unemployment over time, ” economica, vol. 34 ( august ), pp. 254 – 81. reifschneider, david, and john c. williams ( 2000 ). “ three lessons for monetary policy in a low - inflation era, ” journal of money, credit, and banking, vol. 32 ( november ), pp. 936 – 66. reinhart, carmen m., and kenneth s. rogoff ( 2009 ). this time is different : eight centuries of financial folly. princeton, n. j. : princeton university press. rogoff, kenneth ( 2001 ). “ dornbusch ’ s overshooting model after twenty - five years ( pdf ), ” speech delivered at the mundell - fleming lecture, second annual research conference, international monetary fund, washington, november 30 ( revised january 22, 2002 ). solow, robert m. ( 2004 ). “ introduction : the tobin approach to monetary economics, ” journal of money, credit, and banking, vol. 36 ( august ), pp. 657 – 63. stock, james h., and mark w. watson ( 2003 ). “ has the business cycle changed and why? ” nber macroeconomics annual 2002, vol. 17 ( january ). tobin, james ( 1969 ). “ a general equilibrium approach to monetary theory ( pdf ), ” journal of money, credit, and banking, vol. 1 ( february ), pp. 15 – 29. u. s. executive office of the president, council of economic advisors ( 2015 ). long - term interest rates : a survey ( pdf ). washington : eop. williams, john c. ( 2013 ). “ a defense of moderation in monetary policy ( pdf ), ” working paper series 2013 – 15. san francisco : federal reserve bank of san francisco, july. woodford, michael ( 2010 ). “ financial intermediation and macroeconomic analysis, ” journal of economic perspectives, vol. 24 ( fall ), pp. 21 – 44. bis central bankers ’ speeches appendix the following model includes a number of elements that play a central role in the analysis of economic fluctuations and in larger policy models as i have encountered them at the federal reserve and other institutions. an aggregate demand
, aimed at increasing internal control and the organisation in two - tier management structure ; and accounting registration of only principal and interest in case of purchasing portfolios, at least until the determination of legal interest rate ceilings. concluding, we highlight that the bank of albania has acted, at all times, in full compliance with the obligations recognized by the law and remains always ready to make full transparency to the public, public institutions and the media in relation to its regulatory and supervisory activity. thank you! 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches

therefore no longer report to the bank of albania. third, the revocation interrupts both any reporting of these entities in the credit registry and any communication with the bank of albania. even in case of full repayment of the loan to the entity, the status of borrowers would remain not updated in the credit registry, placing them unfairly in a penalized status. finally, the revocation of the license creates a false expectation among borrowers that through the cessation of the entity's lending activity, the obligation to repay the loan is extinguished. borrowers may perceive that non - payment of liabilities exists as an option. this drives to an increase in non - performing loans in the banking system, and puts citizens'savings at risk, and consequently, jeopardises the financial stability in albania. for all these reasons, the suspension of the license and the determination of a deadline for the sale of the portfolio to any other licensed entity, aims to protect borrowers from abusive practices and the problems mentioned above. currently, mca has 15, 942 borrowers in its portfolio. of these, around 90 % have received a court decision and / or are in the enforcement process. this means that for 90 % of cases there is a court decision that determines the value of the borrower's 4 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches liability. in total, mca has purchased portfolios amounting all 9. 6 billion, of which about 10 % has been recovered. since the moment of licensing, until today ( 2016 - 2024 ), around 85 complaints against this entity have been submitted and handled in the bank of albania. the bank of albania has paid the maximum attention to the complaints and has addressed all of them, with no exception, in accordance and in full compliance with the legal and regulatory framework of the institution. complaints related with the enforcement execution process from the bailiff service have the main share within the number of the submitted complaints. this process is also a concern for the operational management of banks due to the quite high number of seizure orders that are filed every day by the bailiff service and that impose the blocking of debtors'accounts in unreasonable terms. the organic law on the bank of albania clearly define its mandate, for the purposes of safeguarding the financial stability of albania, authorizes the bank of albania to regulate, license and supervise entities that are part of the financial market, only within the categories as provided in the law. the activity of bailiff
stephen s poloz : release of the financial system review opening statement by mr stephen s poloz, governor of the bank of canada, at the press conference following the release of the financial system review, ottawa, ontario, 10 december 2014. * * * good morning. senior deputy governor carolyn wilkins and i are pleased to be here today to discuss the december issue of our biannual financial system review ( fsr ), which we published this morning. the purpose of the fsr is not to predict the most likely outcomes for the financial system. instead, we use it to highlight key financial vulnerabilities and the catalysts that could turn those vulnerabilities into a risk to the financial system. the fsr is an essential complement to our monetary policy report. together, the two streams of analysis provide the basis for a fulsome discussion of monetary policy, within a risk - management framework. although we view risks to the financial system separately from risks to growth and inflation, we think carefully about the interplay between them. in this fsr, we discuss three important financial system vulnerabilities : high household indebtedness ; imbalances in the housing market ; and increased investor risk taking. to some extent, all three are normal side effects of stimulative monetary policy. however, the post - crisis recovery has been frustratingly slow – we have called it serial disappointment – and bond yields and policy interest rates have been unusually low for a long time. in this context, these financial vulnerabilities have built up over time. fortunately, canada ’ s economy is showing the first signs of a broadening recovery. nonenergy exports have been responding to stronger u. s. growth and exchange rate depreciation, investment spending appears to be picking up, and we have seen pockets of new job creation. this natural rebuilding sequence is key to reducing financial vulnerabilities over time. in particular, our expectation of a soft landing for housing hinges on stronger growth, employment and incomes. the recent weakness in oil and other commodity prices raises important risks to this economic outlook, however. this shock is especially complex : it is likely to boost global growth but to moderate growth and inflation in canada, even though the effects should be tempered by exchange rate depreciation and stronger non - energy exports. the potential consequences for the financial system will be monitored carefully in the months ahead. meanwhile, the global financial system is stronger and more resilient, thanks

that while vulnerabilities associated with household indebtedness and housing markets are edging higher, the overall risk to financial stability in canada is roughly the same as it was at the time of our june fsr. with that, carolyn and i are happy to take your questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches
to the market changes that we are now facing. thank you.

rasheed mohammed al maraj : meeting the challenges of growth opening keynote plenary by his excellency rasheed mohammed al maraj, governor of the central bank of bahrain, at the 5th middle east insurance forum “ meeting the challenges of growth ”, manama, 8 february 2009. * * * your excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. it gives me a great pleasure to welcome you to bahrain for the 5th middle east insurance forum. this event is an opportunity for the insurance industry to meet and exchange views on current market and economic conditions that have a direct impact in our insurance markets. i would like to thank the organisers, sponsors and speakers for supporting this important gathering. this year ’ s theme for the forum – “ growth opportunities beyond the crisis ” – is a reminder that the financial landscape has changed dramatically since the last time this forum was held. the turning point in the global financial crisis is generally agreed to have been the bankruptcy of the investment bank lehman brothers in the middle of september last year. this turned a problem that had been seen as primarily affecting the developed markets into a worldwide phenomenon. previously the slowdown was expected to be limited to the developed markets while the emerging markets continued their recent strong growth. after lehman the slowdown began to affect all parts of the global economy. the crisis has been a stark reminder of how interconnected the world financial system and economy has become. financial sectors have also become more interconnected. while most comment has concentrated on the role that the lehman bankruptcy played in worsening the crisis, we should not forget that the events surrounding aig also had an impact on global financial markets. in other words, aig had become systemically important and had far reaching implications outside the insurance industry. at the central bank of bahrain, we believe that the recent experience of global financial crisis has reinforced that our top priority must remain our duty to ensure the protection of policyholders. we remain truly committed to foster the trust and confidence that insurers provide to their clients, particularly in times of need. from a regulatory perspective, the cbb has taken various steps to ensure that a stable insurance market continues to strive and prosper in our region. we are fortunate in bahrain to have had significant growth in the level of gross premiums over the last several years. in 2007, insurance premiums increased by more than 20 % and the interim reports received for 2008 appear to indicate a similar trend. we remain however vigilant and through ad hoc reporting
growth pact and the macro - economic imbalances procedure by simplifying and strengthening the rules. second, introduce some form of sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. in the future, it should be ensured that the public debt is sustainable before countries get access to financial support from the esm. third, regulate the sovereign exposures on bank balance sheets to further weaken the sovereign bank nexus. many banks still hold large government bond portfolios of their own sovereign. while these exposures are treated as risk - free, the crisis has demonstrated that this is not always true. 7 / 15 finally, encourage private risk - sharing via more robust financial integration. the european capital markets union is a good starting point in this regard. conclusion ladies and gentlemen, allow me to conclude. over the past decade, the policy mix was mainly directed at the short - term, with a large involvement from the central bank. but the outlook is improving, and policy should rebalance towards the long - term factors that hold back growth. that still requires significant effort, but not necessarily from central banks. let me again quote some wise words of hans tietmeyer, that he mentioned at an event of this very wirtschaftsrat in 2006. “ es reicht [ … ] nicht aus, auf konjunkturelles wachstum zu setzen. es geht vielmehr darum, die strukturprobleme [ … ] nachhaltig zu losen. nur so erreichen wir ein nachhaltig hoheres wirtschaftswachstum, nachhaltig mehr beschaftigung, nachhaltig stabile sozialsysteme und offentliche finanzen. ” ich danke ihnen fur ihre aufmerksamkeit. 8 / 15

banks courage, perseverance and vision as they plot their course to the future. thank you.
goods and services and has become an emerging market economy of major importance. moreover, ( financial ) globalisation poses various challenges to both the domestic and global economic and monetary policy environment. the analysis of these challenges, their origin and possible implications, remains on the top of many central banks ’ agenda. coping successfully with these challenges continues to be vital to fostering sustainable growth and development in many parts of the world and is hence a matter of global interest.

the world have improved considerably as has the quality of goods and services produced in formerly rather underdeveloped countries. additionally, what has changed the face of globalisation is the fact that globalisation nowadays extends to a larger group of countries than in the past. more and more countries with formerly rather closed economies have opened themselves to the world market. thus, new players have entered on to the global stage and are becoming increasingly relevant economic powers and, as a result, competitors to established developed countries. as a consequence, the process of globalisation is leading to a shift in weights within the global economy. this shift is nothing exceptional. it is quite a natural development which simply reflects the continuously evolving global economic landscape. within this process, china and india, in particular, have gained particular relevance over the past decade, in both economic and political terms. in the case of india, there can be little doubt that the world ’ s largest democracy is an emerging global economic power. its economic growth has averaged some 8 % over the past four years, placing it among the world ’ s fastest - growing economies, while inflation has remained largely contained. its dynamic development in foreign trade, for instance, has been quite impressive, too, thus leading to a rising share in the volume of global trade. “ india goes global ” – which is the title of a book that was published last year by the imf – is an appropriate description of india ’ s recent development. i think that the outlined process of globalisation is among the most important factors that have fuelled the global growth dynamics we have been seeing for more than four years now. and it is likely to keep on doing so, at least in the medium - term future. imf estimates suggest that, unless we witness rather unexpected incidents, 2007 will be the fifth consecutive year with an above - average increase in global real gdp. after having outlined major characteristics of the current process of globalisation, let me continue by elaborating more on its implications. implications and challenges of globalisation 3. 1 real economic implications in various parts of the world, quite a lot of people are rather sceptical if they think about the real economic implications of globalisation. in fact, there is often an indistinct fear that globalisation is mainly a risky development in which the negative consequences clearly prevail. at the heart of concerns in developed countries are the fear of loss of jobs as well as the pressure on the social security systems. while rec
1 see https : / / www. imf. org / en / news / articles / 2019 / 06 / 25 / sp061419 - on - capital - market - finance - in - europe 2ibid ( 68 per cent of euro area gdp ) such as amendments to the ucits directive / aifmd and mifid.

feedback loops between the two. this focus is different to the conduct - of - business - based rules that investment funds, for instance, have been subject to traditionally. the potential for collective action problems is the main rationale for a macroprudential perspective in the market ‑ based finance sector, it is not concerned with idiosyncratic risk management issues at individual funds, although there are complementarities. progress has been made in strengthening the resilience of the funds sector since the financial crisis. for instance, the mmf regulation and aifm directive in the eu contain provisions that are more directed at increasing the resilience of funds and their managers. we at the central bank have been at the forefront of efforts to develop and operationalise the macroprudential framework for the funds sector. our strategy for this is based on two elements : first, examining the links between and risks from the fund sector to the domestic economy ; and second, given ireland ’ s role as a global hub for investment funds, participating in the global debate, seeking to advance the thinking on the development of the framework. the exposures of irish funds are largely international in nature but linkages to the domestic economy have been growing, especially via exposures to the commercial real estate market ( cre ). that is why we started a consultation last november on macroprudential measures for irish - domiciled property funds. our aim is to safeguard the resilience of the sector and ensure it is better able to absorb rather than amplify adverse shocks. we have had good engagement on these proposals and are now considering the feedback received before we finalise the design of the measures. we expect to announce the outcome over the coming months. we are working actively with colleagues – including taking leadership roles – at the fsb, iosco, esrb and esma as we develop the international macroprudential response to market based finance. key focus areas for us in these discussions are encouraging more use of certain liquidity management tools ( such as swing pricing ), achieving greater levels of consistency between asset liquidity and redemption terms ( especially for funds that invest in assets that generally do not trade ) and evaluating the wider approach to data for analysis of systemic risk from funds ( accounting for gaps in a proportionate and efficient way ). overall, it would be true to say that the macroprudential perspective ( for market - based finance ) remains underdeveloped, especially when compared with other parts of
i would urge everyone present to draw on mr reich ’ s wealth of expertise and his contacts. after all, the networks we share are what make us strong. mr reich, i wish you all the best and every success in the tasks that lie ahead of you. thank you very much for your attention. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

an ever - present concern - that governments are asked to use regulation to fix every problem. domestically, there is now healthy scepticism that rules can provide the universal fix - all. in the international arena, the starting point is not one of over - regulation. widespread acceptance of the starting point given by the washington consensus ( “ deregulate and open - up internationally ” ) and acceptance of an international version of the medicos ’ dictum “ first do no harm ” should avoid the mistakes of over - zealousness. part of a good rule - making regime is a recognition that parsimony is a virtue and that some rules are bad - where vested interests or misguided lobby groups gain influence in the process, we can end up with the wrong rules. conclusion my starting point was that globalisation has been enormously beneficial for australia, and for the world. even if we cannot design a perfect set of rules to govern its development, it will go on being enormously beneficial, and most will share in that process. but this does not in any way diminish the importance of trying to ensure that the rules are appropriate both in their technical aspects ( providing the right incentives for further innovation and dissemination of ideas ), and in an income - distribution sense, both between countries and within countries. during the asian crisis, larry summers argued that we would not wish to restrict the use of airline travel just because of the occasional plane crash, and by analogy that we would not want to slow globalisation. this seems to me to be correct, but to emphasise the wrong issue : we respond to crashes ( and crises ) by putting in place rules, regulations and procedures to diminish the chance of a recurrence, and to be better prepared should that eventuality arrive. australia cannot, as a medium - sized player on the international stage, hope to dominate the outcomes or achieve all its objectives. but we need to be at the table, to speak up, and to work actively for a better set of international rules, not only for the set of issues encompassed by the international financial architecture, but for the entire gamut of the globalisation process. although the un is attempting to coordinate international patents - see the economist ( 2000b, p 99 ). references friedman, thomas l ( 1999 ), the lexus and the olive tree, farrar, straus and giroux, new york. grenville, s a ( 1999a ),