##fr ), which will take effect at the same time as mica. the traceability of funds and transactions enabled by blockchain technology is compromised by the ease with which new addresses can be created - sometimes without identity checks or verification of the origin of the funds deposited - and by various concealment techniques. innovation could play a positive role here. digital identity solutions, based on advances in cryptographic proof techniques, could facilitate the direct implementation of " know your customer " ( kyc ) obligations on the blockchain. they could thus make it possible to reconcile the identification of individuals involved in blockchain transactions, for aml / cft purposes, with privacy protection requirements. * * * ii / as we can see from this last example, while it is necessary to strengthen operational resilience, this in no way prevents you, fintechs, from designing tomorrow's business 2 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches models and technological solutions. a / in this area and others, the banque de france and the acpr stand alongside the fintech ecosystem, first and foremost by contributing to the development of a regulatory framework that fosters innovation while protecting consumers. a good example of this approach is " open finance ". the financial data access ( fida ) proposal, published by the european commission on 28 june, aims to facilitate access to financial data. this is clearly an opportunity for fintechs to deploy their creativity and agility, in order to offer consumers innovative financial services within a secure framework. one initial reason for the banque de france and the acpr to be satisfied is that lessons have been learned from the mixed results of the implementation of the open banking policy set out in psd2. indeed the key aspect of the proposal are the data sharing schemes, which data holders and users will have to develop together, and to which they will then be obliged to adhere. the system seems fair, with, on the one hand, the principle of paying for the use of data - which should encourage the players to work together in a concerted manner - and, on the other, the guarantee that the amounts will be limited and regulated. at the same time, fida establishes a protective framework for customers, which responds to a key concern of the acpr. consumers will thus be able to choose whether or not to share their data, and will have access to a dashboard that makes it easier to view and manage the rights granted. similarly, data sharing will have

##son, mar ( 2007 ). “ financial globalisation and challenges for prudential policies and macroeconomic management. ” speech by deputy head of the monetary and economic department of the bis, at a meeting of the institut international d ’ etudes bancaires, reykjavik, iceland, 18 may 2007 ( http : / / www. bis. org / speeches / sp070525. htm ). a report written by william buiter and anne siebert in the spring of 2008 for one of the banks that failed later in the year gives sound analysis of the problems facing the icelandic banking system at the time. see buiter, william h., and anne sibert, ( 2008 ). “ the icelandic banking crisis and what to do about it : the lender of last resort theory of optimal currency areas ”, cepr policy insight, no. 26, october 2008. ( http : / / www. cepr. org / pubs / policyinsights / policyinsight26. pdf ). the build - up so how were these mammoths created? following a process of consolidation and privatisation, which was largely completed in 2003, the icelandic banks grew very rapidly. with headquarters in reykjavik, they expanded their activities abroad, for the most part by acquiring financial institutions in other countries, opening up bank branches, and stepping up their foreign operations. this phenomenal growth was made easier by iceland ’ s membership in the european economic area ( eea ). the eea agreement provided a legal and regulatory framework based on eu directives. this meant that the operating licences held by icelandic financial institutions were not limited to iceland but included all the countries in the eea. the european “ passport ” gave the banks the scope to operate throughout the eea, including permission to operate branches in other eea countries. statistics give a picture of rapid - fire growth over a very short period ( see graph ). from 2003 to 2007, the banks ’ total assets grew from less than two times iceland ’ s gdp to almost nine times. right before their collapse, total assets amounted to eleven times gdp. over 40 % of total assets were in foreign subsidiaries, 60 % of total lending was to non - residents, and 60 % of income was from foreign sources. over two - thirds of lending and over three - quarters of deposits were denominated in foreign currency, notably in pounds sterling. around 85 % of the banks ’ foreign lending was in europe, with