opening remarks delivered by mrs. leila matroos - lasten executive director of the centrale bank van curacao en sint maarten on the occasion of the launching of the governance network of the dutch caribbean centrale bank van curacao en sint maarten august 31, 2022 excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. i would like to start by expressing my gratitude to the themis institute for governance & leadership and nr governance for inviting the cbcs to provide the opening words for this special occasion. before i start with my dissertation, i would like to excuse mr. r. doornbosch, who for deeply personal reasons was unable to provide the opening words. it is with great pleasure that we took notice of the formal launching of the governance network dutch caribbean. not only is the establishment of this governance network relevant, but also necessary considering the many challenges that we as an international financial center are facing. the de - risking and peer assessments by global standard setting bodies, including the upcoming 2024 cfatf mutual evaluation, are noteworthy developments that we are currently facing. i would be remiss not underscoring the important role of good corporate governance in making our institutions and jurisdiction resilient to the burdens of proof of proper risk management and compliance. the objective of good corporate governance is to ensure ethical, effective, and prudent management. but also strong oversight by the governing body, to promote responsible corporate citizenship, to safeguard stakeholders ’ interest and to have a sound risk culture at all levels. the cbcs, as part of its supervisory mandate, evaluates the functioning of these corporate governance arrangements, which we have in fact identified as a key element of our new style of supervision. generally speaking, corporate governance arrangements determine the allocation of powers and responsibilities by which the business of a company are carried out. corporate governance involves structure on the one hand and people, behavior, and corporate culture on the other hand. the latter group not always being easy to assess and measure. yet, the cbcs as the supervisory authority must position itself to properly perform this duty. as you all may be aware, the cbcs has recently drafted a new code, the socalled corporate governance code financial institutions & service providers. this draft code has extensively been consulted with the private sector and all relevant stakeholders, and addresses all aspects of governance, from the way boards and senior management work and interact, to how the decisionmaking process shapes

reemploy real capital and labour. debt arrangements for governments can play a similar role and counteract downward spirals. ( see chart : inflation. ) there are two forms of debt default. breach of contract is one form where the borrower fails to honour the contractual obligations, as illustrated in the example here. for debt denominated in domestic currency, the state can also default by pursuing an inflationary economic policy, reducing the real value of the loan. over the past 100 years inflation in norway surged during the two world wars and during the korean war. the last period of soaring inflation was in the 1970s and 1980s, which resulted in a sharp fall in the real value of the bonds issued in the 1950s and 1960s. i would also like to cite a curious example from our own monetary history 9 : the norwegian state took advantage of a fall in the value of money when it was to redeem government bonds issued between 1896 and 1909. france was one of the primary bondholders. the bonds were issued during the gold standard period when the value of the krone was directly linked to the value of gold. the lenders were promised repayment in “ monnaie d ’ or ” ( gold coins ). when the bonds fell due, the norwegian government insisted on repaying the debt using banknotes that had lost a substantial share of their value. france took legal action. the case was brought before the norwegian supreme court in 1962, and the court invoked a law from 1923 stipulating that the gold clause, i. e. repayment in gold coins, did not apply when the redemption obligation was suspended, which it was definitively in 1931. the supreme court also invoked “ society ’ s vital interests ” in its argumentation behind the decision. the cost of repaying the gold coins that were borrowed 60 years earlier would have been excessively high for norwegian state. the ruling is probably an example of the limited benefit to be gained by a creditor when such a case is tried by the debtor country ’ s legal apparatus. for nicolai rygg, governor of norges bank from 1920 to 1946, the value of money was a moral issue. the aim of the policy of gold parity in the 1920s was to bring the krone back to the value prevailing before world war i : “ our monetary regime is enshrined in law. ( … ) the regime is anchored in our legal system, which we cannot break down. inherent therein is a moral