better growth scenario than that considered in our latest projections and to an ultimately moderate impact. if, on the contrary, such normalisation does not come about, that may affect consumption and investment more markedly. a further loss of confidence may prompt households to increase their precautionary saving and to postpone their consumer - durables and house purchase decisions. and, above all, it may affect business investment in catalonia, given that the climate of uncertainty would delay the undertaking of new investment projects and set back hiring decisions. moreover, these effects on investment and consumption decisions might extend to both resident and non - resident agents, adversely affecting variables such as tourism and foreign investment. the outcome would be a greater adverse impact on activity both in catalonia and in the spanish economy as a whole. conclusions allow me to conclude. in addition to the risks i have highlighted, we are facing other problems, chief among which, owing to its far - reaching and numerous consequences in the medium and long term, is the ageing of our population, which is expected to continue and even intensify in the near future. this process involves various adverse effects, including most notably, as we all know, the challenge that a progressively longevous population poses to the public pensions system. the reforms in recent years have been appropriate and have contributed to shoring up the system ’ s financial sustainability ; but adverse demographic developments require measures whose application should not be delayed. population ageing gives rise to a reduction in the proportion of the total population making up the workforce, which negatively affects productivity and our economy ’ s ability to innovate and incorporate new technologies. given that it is impossible or very difficult to change demographic trends, even in the medium term, it will be important to persevere in enhancing the education system and pursuing the institutional and regulatory reforms that contribute to improving productivity, promoting or enabling greater competition and innovation. thank you very much for your attention. 6 / 6

the independence of the central bank is enshrined in the federal constitution. this means that the snb may neither accept nor seek instruction from politics or other quarters. the constitution also states that the snb shall pursue a monetary policy serving the interests of the country as a whole. the national bank act sets out this task and stipulates that the snb is to ensure price stability and in so doing take due account of economic developments. to this end, the snb has suitable and effective instruments to influence the interest rate level as well as the exchange rate, and thereby monetary conditions. the appropriateness of monetary conditions determines whether price stability can be ensured in the long term. however, why is a task of such economic significance as monetary policy delegated to an independent institution in the first place? page 2 / 5 the most important reason is that governments generally have an incentive to use monetary policy for reasons other than price stability. for example, governments may have an interest in stimulating the economy before an election. governments may want to finance public spending via the central bank ’ s banknote printing press. when monetary policy pursues such objectives, over time it inevitably leads to high inflation. an independent central bank, however, is not subject to the same incentives and is protected from the influences of government. it can – and must – therefore devote its full attention to the mandate of ensuring price stability. the independence of the central bank is thus based on the conviction that price stability is desirable for society as a whole and that it can only be ensured over the long term by a monetary policy that is protected from political influence. in many currency areas, independence is therefore tightly coupled with the mandate of price stability. this is also the case in switzerland. to legitimise its independence, the lawmakers have deliberately given the snb a narrow and clearly defined mandate. they also place upon the snb the duty of accountability of the fulfilment of its mandate. pursuing objectives that go beyond the core task of monetary policy would undermine the legitimacy of the snb ’ s independence and thus endanger it over time. focus on price stability the institutional framework of the snb is in line with both of the principles of regulatory policy i have described, namely independence from politics and a focus on monetary policy. in recent years, time and again these principles have been consciously or unconsciously questioned by some in politics and among the public. this has seen calls from politicians for the snb to directly finance government tasks