s work. the specific coordination processes are : · the luxembourg process ( 1997 ), which aims to create more employment. it consists of employment guidelines which have to be implemented by “ national action plans ” on employment and are monitored by the commission. · the cardiff process ( 1998 ), which is intended to enhance structural reforms in the member states and their multilateral monitoring to create “ peer pressure ” among them. · the cologne process ( 1999 ), which established a “ macroeconomic dialogue ” at community level with representatives of governments, ecb and trade unions involved. this dialogue aims not to achieve an ex - ante coordination of economic policies, but the exchange of information and views on economic developments. these processes were enhanced in 2000 by the “ lisbon - strategy ” with its “ new strategic goal ” for the next decade, that is “ to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge - based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion ”. a very important conclusion in lisbon was that no more coordination processes are needed and that the existing processes should be simplified. it is also very reasonable that the bepgs now focus increasingly on structural policies. that can be a vantage point for the coordination processes to accomplish better - then - expected results in future. up to now, it has been difficult to detect a noticeable impact from these various coordination processes on the convergence among member states. within the framework of the luxembourg process, governments did not meet their commitments to enhance employment. unemployment is increasing again and is not significantly lower than in 1997. in keeping with wage autonomy, governments simply cannot impose any guidelines that regulate negotiations between management and trade unions. up to now, the cardiff process has led to only limited progress, if at all, on structural reforms in larger economies. the cologne process seems unnecessary to me. in my judgement, all these processes have been little more than bureaucratic exercises. what are the reasons? · after convergence efforts in the run up to the third stage of emu : adjustment fatigue ; · the willingness for further progress on integration has lost steam ; · political behaviour has not adapted to the new environment. the integration of europe is linked to the readiness to curb national sovereignty. the lasting success of the euro cannot be achieved solely through monetary policy. the success relies as well on the support of the fiscal, labour and structural policies of member states. however, coordination should not be understood as a substitute for the responsibility of policymakers at the

reaching consequences. as a result, climate - related risks are surrounded by deep uncertainty and tail risks cannot be ruled out. for these reasons, the ngfs has described the first climate scenario analyses as learning opportunities that need further fine - tuning. the ngfs is exploring additional scenarios and looking at options for introducing shortterm scenarios. moreover, the ngfs aims to further expand and improve the sectoral granularity and the geographic coverage as well. other factors to consider going forward are geopolitical shifts and changes in global energy markets. russia's invasion of ukraine has upended energy markets, with likely long - term impacts for energy prices and energy security. these developments also carry implications for the transition to net zero and the associated risks. on the one hand, high and volatile prices reinforce incentives to speed up the energy transition and boost renewable energy. on the other hand, as governments are moving to secure energy supplies and keep energy prices in check, there is a non - negligible risk of carbon lock - in. 2 for instance, according to the international energy agency ( iea ), global coal consumption hit an all - time high in 2022. 3 likewise, new, longer - term contracts for liquefied natural gas deliveries may complicate the transition away from fossil fuels. in this environment, the ngfs sees a higher risk of a delayed or disorderly transition. the network is working on including these developments in the upcoming iteration of the climate scenarios. these planned updates will further enhance the usability of the ngfs scenarios. last but not least, the issue of data availability and data quality has been a longstanding problem. we all know that the lack of consistent and granular data continues to be an obstacle that complicates the adequate calibration of shocks in stress testing models. central banks and supervisors can play a part in overcoming this obstacle. last summer, the ngfs launched a directory for climate data with over 700 links to relevant data sources. the directory supports financial sector stakeholders in finding relevant climate - related data sources and facilitates access to these data. in addition, in december 2021, the ngfs published a guide on climate - related disclosures for central banks. the eurosystem took up this " invitation ". starting in march 2023, it will publish climate - related information on its corporate bond holdings and its non - monetary policy portfolios on a yearly basis. the bundesbank already took a first step in july 2022.