into account only those measures specifically targeted at the oil or the gas bill, such as the rebate on fuel prices or the compensatory subsidies to gas suppliers. other choices may also make sense. for example, in its recent publication, the french treasury has used a more extensive approach, by also including other measures more broadly dedicated to the protection of purchasing power, such as the revaluation of social benefits or public wages, in proportion of the rise of energy prices in the overall price index. it also includes measures related to the electricity tariff shield. using this more extensive approach, the breakdown of the extra energy bill obtained is 42 % for companies and 52 % for the state, with the households being very significantly compensated. ii. 3 the ex - post distribution : too early to tell? but some parallels with the past can be drawn then, let me briefly elaborate on the most important but uncertain final distribution of this external shock on the domestic economy, still with the illustrative case of france. as mentioned before, the final distribution process after macroeconomic adjustment is still an ongoing issue and depends particularly on two key parameters : the degree over time of wage adaptation, page 11 of 14 and the firms ’ capacity over time to increase their prices given their financial situation, the demand they face and the general macroeconomic environment. i stress that this should be assessed “ over time ”, let say as a minimum over a forecast horizon of around 3 years, because some short run losses or gains can be mitigated in subsequent years. here again, the comparison with the oil crisis episode in the 1970s is quite informative. during the seventies the french labour market was characterized by a high degree of wage indexation on consumer prices, and the burden of the external oil tax was full born by the business sector. firms then experienced a sharp fall in their profit margins, undoubtedly to the detriment of employment and investment in the following years. what ’ s happening at the current juncture? the distribution seems to be more balanced between firms and households than after the shocks of the 70 ’ s. the distribution of primary income between firms and households is shown in the bottom left charts of these two last slides. corporate profits are today a bit higher than their pre covid level although this masks a lot of heterogeneity across sectors, with the energy sector being the only one recording currently an improvement. page 12 of 14 the bottom right charts shows household and corporate gross disposable income

manufacturing sector mitigate the magnitude of terms - of - trade shocks in france, both upwards ( 2020 with depressed energy prices ) and downwards ( since 2021 ). france is also a net exporter of transport services and wheat, that benefited from the past recent sharp price increases. conversely, the shock is of larger magnitude for spain, which is more dependent on energy imports and does not benefit from the rise in prices of transport service exports. beyond the comparison of this current terms - of - trade shock across countries, it is also instructive to compare this shock for a country like france with the period to which the present situation is often compared : the 1970s oil crisis. page 5 of 14 the terms of trade shock in france this year is expected to be the second largest since 1974, the first oil price shock. in 2022, for the whole year, the shock would amount to - 1. 4 gdp percentage point versus - 2. 8 gdp percentage points in 1974 during the first oil shock. our estimate for 2022 is in line with other estimates published by insee and the ministry of finance of around - 1. 5 gdp percentage point. the shock related to import prices is of similar magnitude in 2022 and 1974 but there are some differences in the composition of the shocks. in 2022 it is not only the price of energy that increases but also the prices of many other imported goods ( non - energy commodities, intermediate goods etc. ). at the same time export prices rose more in 2022, reflecting the more widespread diffusion of price increases to globally traded goods. in addition, the price of services, especially transport services, also partially offsets the negative shock to goods prices resulting from the surge in energy prices. there are many uncertainties regarding 2023. if the levelling off of world commodity prices is confirmed and the global economic slowdown also weighs on imports, the terms of trade shock will diminish in 2023. but the terms of trade page 6 of 14 shock could remain large if european countries need to replenish their gas inventories at a still elevated price for the winter of 2023 / 2024. in any case the terms of trade shock means a decrease of real income for the french economy and hence is a key driver of the slowdown in gdp growth expected for 2023. i. 3 measuring more specifically the energy shock regarding the energy shock, which is useful to consider since we can more easily look at its distribution between economic agents, we can