. so we had to clearly convey two complementary messages. one was that the ecb was determined – from the onset of the financial crises in august 2007 – to ensure the orderly functioning of the euro area inter - bank money market by offering supplementary liquidityproviding refinancing operations or – more recently – by widening the collateral framework to facilitate the provision of liquidity to merchant banks and to engage in unlimited provision of liquidity for all our refinancing operations at a fixed rate. the other message which is fundamental was to raise the public ’ s awareness that the exceptional interventions aimed to alleviate the tensions in the money market would not compromise the longer - term achievement of price stability in line with our definition less than 2 %, but close to 2 %. conclusions let me conclude. the fundamental changes in central bank communication have helped to enhance the effectiveness, predictability and credibility of monetary policy and have notably contributed to lowering both inflation rates and volatility in the real economy. for its part, the ecb has established a practise of making its policy transparent and in setting new benchmarks in the area of central banking communication. that being said, on each occasion, a central bank has to carefully assess the relevance, clarity and timeliness of the information. transparency is a key ingredient of an effective monetary policy. communication is an ongoing challenge and effective communication will always be characterised by a degree of flexibility and adaptability in order to respond swiftly to a rapidly changing economic environment. thank you very much for your attention.

action in implementing the appropriate monetary policy and in refinancing commercial banks. on the other hand, we need to communicate clearly the adherence of the central bank to the long - term objectives of policy and the way it intends to steer the policy course back to a normal path once the abnormal circumstances and risks have subsided. communication in difficult times is inherently challenging for all central banks. however, it is facilitated by two fundamental components of the ecb ’ s monetary policy strategy. the first is the quantification of a price stability objective. this grants a very significant level of predictability. the monetary policy easing that we enacted in the last two months – on a scale that is unprecedented in such a short period of time – was motivated by a sharp easing of inflation pressures looking into the future. the fact that markets could predict our moves with a fair degree of precision – despite the exceptional cloud of uncertainty that surrounds economic projections in present conditions – is a proof that our main mode of see, for example, alesina, a. and l. summers ( 1993 ),'central bank independence and macroeconomic performance : some comparative evidence ', journal of money, credit and banking, vol. 25, no. 2, may. benati, l. ( 2008 ), “ investigating inflation persistence across monetary regimes ”, quarterly journal of economics, 123 : 3, august 2008, 1005 - 1060. for instance, estimates of the inflation persistence in the euro area fell by around two - thirds from the period before ( until the bretton woods arrangement ) and after the launch of emu. communication, via disclosure of the economic outlook as we perceive it, is effective and robust to extreme occurrences. the second component of the strategy which helps in times when expectations become disoriented is what we have called the “ separation principle ”. in view of safeguarding its credibility and firmly anchoring long - term inflation expectations, it is crucial that the governing council sets the appropriate monetary policy stance on the basis of no other considerations than the delivery of price stability in the medium term. once the appropriate level of the key interest rates has been set, the executive board of the ecb implements its monetary policy stance so that the effects of its interest rate decisions are transmitted to the financial markets and the real economy effectively. in this sense, the ecb had to act swiftly and decisively to avoid that tensions in the money market would spill - over to other markets and adversely affect the real economy