countries'needs. the wbg has to take more effective action, including pushing for reforms of the business environment and triggering a significant expansion of the private investor base and available bankable projects. on the financial side, we are glad to see the remarkable initial results of the capital adequacy frameworks review, designed, and launched under the g20 italian presidency. we should swiftly proceed with the proposals to remove the statutory lending limit from the articles of agreement, lower the equity - to - loans ratio, and launch a pilot on hybrid capital with private investors. these measures, together with management's decision to increase the limit for shareholder guarantees, would enable 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches about $ 50 billion of additional lending over 10 years. looking ahead, we invite the wbg to consider the implementation of all the other caf recommendations, including the work aimed at strengthening and improving the usability of the gems database. in a similar vein, the evolution agenda should trigger a better use of trust funds ( tf ) and financial intermediary funds ( fif ). with its thorough knowledge of fifs, the wbg can help donors identify ways to better leverage their financial resources within each institution. we are confident that all of these actions will allow significant expansion of lending capacity, to better respond to development needs. we reaffirm our active engagement with ida to support the poorest and most fragile countries. concessional resources should continue to be directed to low - income countries, and we encourage management to explore additional balance sheet optimization measures, as well as any strategic use of ida capital to smooth the financing resulting from current frontloading. the wbg evolution discussion must be framed and developed within enhanced multilateralism. we cannot allow political tensions to draw new divisions across opposing blocs. this would generate large welfare losses, especially for emerging and developing economies, and seriously damage our ability to address major development challenges, as well as contain social and economic difficulties originating from digital and energy transitions. we should all work to keep the exchange of ideas and knowledge fluid and constructive, and to ensure that cooperation among countries remains strong. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

fiscal policy ). ( … ) it is thus right not only to applaud yesterday ’ s step but also to underline its unfinished nature, the risks and the rashness ’. 4 without any clear institutional framework for discretionary political action, but in view of the massive transfer of sovereignty, european economic governance has largely been based on rules : budget rules, the ban on rescues between member countries, rules on banking supervision and resolution, and so on. rules are necessary, but there is a limit to what they can achieve. you cannot run a large, advanced, diverse economy on autopilot. corriere della sera, 3 may, 1998. most transfers of sovereignty in fiscal and financial matters have been prompted by crisis situations. since the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis, emergency measures have been progressively accompanied by reforms of eu governance and especially of the euro area, starting with enhanced public finance rules and macroeconomic surveillance. in the summer of 2012, the ‘ four presidents ’ report ’ envisaged complementing or replacing national intervention tools with common instruments. for banks, the report proposed transferring supervisory responsibility to the euro area and establishing joint crisis resolution and deposit guarantee mechanisms, to be supported with public funds through the european stability mechanism ( esm ). as to public finance, in addition to implementing the reforms already approved ( the six pack and the fiscal compact ), it proposed gradual steps towards the creation of a euro - area budget and the issuance of common debt. most of these proposals were taken up again in subsequent reports, including the ‘ five presidents ’ report ’ of june 2015. restrictions on the use of national mechanisms were put in place quickly. but the introduction of european instruments has been partial and virtually non - existent on the fiscal side. member states are now constrained by more rules that say what cannot be done, while the eu has not gained more powers to decide what should be done, nor has it the tools or institutional framework to implement the policies that are needed. this creates a situation of vulnerability : there is a danger that national and european authorities will be unable to react appropriately to shocks. by way of example, let ’ s consider fiscal policy in some detail. it goes without saying that fiscal rules are necessary in a monetary union. they serve as a coordination mechanism, ensuring that all national fiscal policies contribute to maintaining financial stability in the area. poor compliance with fiscal rules in the period preceding the crisis justified their being strengthened. coming from a country with a high public debt