for later actions has weakened and some of them are openly challenged. calls to restrain the discretion of central banks are openly made. i see several reasons for this. first, a lot of the crisis resolution de facto fell on the shoulders of central banks. that forced them to stretch the interpretation of their mandates, the backlash of which is felt now. it also implied overburdening the central bank and a suboptimal reaction to the crisis, giving rise to the impression that central bank action was not effective. on top of that, many of the policy actions were new and not always well understood. they generated a lot of concern, for instance regarding the risk implications of the balance sheet policies and the distributional effects of the asset purchases, claimed to be regressive in terms of income and wealth distribution – a claim wich however abstracts from the strong macroeconomic effects the asset purchases had as these benefit, via the job creation they entail, to the most vulnerable group in society, namely the unemployed. finally, the broadening of central banks ’ remit into the financial stability domain has also contributed to it, while at the same time complicating somehow the accountability framework. to counter these forces, central banks have to be excellent policy makers. for that a profound knowledge of the economy and the financial system is needed. the future of central banks will therefore very much rest on their ability to be adequate knowledge centres. at the same time, 5 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches transparency must be enhanced and appropriate accountability frameworks are needed. increased communication efforts will have to be made to explain policy actions, not only to the more informed audience of financial markets participants but also to the wider public. the skill to translate central bankers ’ knowledge into non - technical terms has to be developed. finally, just like every other enterprise, central banks must adapt their ways of working to the standards imposed by the changing environment they operate in. non - hierarchical, multidisciplinary work processes should unlock the knowledge now sometimes contained in local silos. enhanced diversity of staff should both improve the quality of work and increase society ’ s association with the central bank and its policies. i conclude. price stability, financial stability and promoting the smooth functioning of the payments system will also in the future govern most of central banks ’ actions. it is the task of central banks, also in the future, to foster trust in money in each of these domains. this trust is not something which falls from heaven

in this context, it seems quite difficult to speak of a credit crunch or of a comparative hardening of credit conditions in belgium. nevertheless, given the recent trend towards bank consolidation, a clear understanding of how banks succeed in combining the benefits of large - scale operations without losing the close relationships with their clients is required. these questions as to the future equilibrium between banks and financial markets will be tackled during our first session today. these recent financial developments will have an impact on all financial tra nsactions and on the whole spectrum of financial firms. but the benefits gained from increased financial integration and efficiency will extend well beyond the financial sector. actually, the real economy may be expected to benefit most, because a more efficient financial system implies higher expected returns for sectors with a financial surplus and lower borrowing costs for investing in new projects that need external finance. this should facilitate the re - allocation of capital towards new developing sectors and firms that have a high growth potential. the real effects of financial market liberalisation will be envisaged during the second session of our conference. increasing financial efficiency while maintaining financial stability is not only a major objective but also a challenging task. in order to meet this goal we should carefully design and monitor market organisation and set up appropriate regulatory and supervisory arrangements. recent research has shown the important role market organisation or market micro - structure plays as to the efficiency and the stability of financial markets, and more in particular as to market liquidity. insufficient market liquidity during periods of tension may exaggerate price volatility and increase risks of contagion over markets and institutions. the availability of broad market liquidity under all circumstances is therefore crucial to reap the rewards from the expansion and the integration of financial markets. the third session in the conference will deal with these issues. financial services and bank management in general have become increasingly sophisticated and complex. information technology has fostered the use of quantitative management tools to evaluate credit and market risks as well as other risks, such as liquidity and operational risks. current banking regulations should be adjusted to take into account the specificity of bank risks. they should provide the proper incentives for financial firms to strengthen their internal control and risk management systems. the new basel ii solvency requirements for instance develop a more comprehensive and risk - sensitive approach to banks ’ capital requirements and a strengthened role of market discipline. as a member of the basel committee on banking supervision, the bank has been deeply involved in the design of these requirements. as the new requirements will have to