” that are significant players in the canadian repo market. having these market participants join the repo ccp is important because it will enhance the resilience of this core funding market in times of stress. this is important to the bank of canada. in addition, greater participation would reinforce the overall benefits of the ccp since more members would generate higher clearing volumes, more market liquidity, broader ability to conduct term transactions and deeper netting opportunities. the reality is that canada is ahead of the world in this initiative. it is tough being in the lead, but we have done it before. we have an opportunity here to create a ccp model for others to follow. we are making good progress. let ’ s keep the focus. bis central bankers ’ speeches risk disclosure, governance and culture i know i have already asked for a lot from the private sector, but before i wrap up, i want to speak more directly to the private sector ’ s responsibilities. first, risk disclosure. supervisors work with banks to assess riskiness. but it is equally important that markets have adequate information so that analysts can better evaluate risk themselves. that is why i welcome the report that the enhanced disclosure task force published last autumn. 1 this private sector effort, the result of a unique collaboration between users and preparers of financial reports, recommends that banks improve their disclosure of business models, key risks and risk - measurement practices. i strongly support osfi in encouraging banks to implement these recommendations. second, risk governance. a peer review of risk management undertaken by fsb members and published earlier this year found that the private sector has been addressing the gaps in risk governance that came into glaring focus during the crisis. increasingly, firms are : • assessing the collective skills and qualifications of their boards of directors as well as board effectiveness ; • instituting stand - alone risk committees that are composed only of independent directors and operate with a clear definition of independence ; • establishing a group - wide chief risk officer ( cro ) and risk - management function that is independent from revenue - generating responsibilities ; and • integrating the discussions among the risk and audit committees through joint meetings or cross - membership. the report also made a number of recommendations to strengthen risk - governance practices, including : • improving the skill sets of individuals appointed to boards of directors ; • holding board members accountable for oversight of risk governance ; • elevating the stature, authority and independence of the cro ; and • obtaining an independent assessment of the risk - governance framework on

under christine lagarde, focusing particularly on the key issue of our inflation target. stabilisation of regulations too, for banks and insurers. this is important for you, as it is for me, even though we do not always understand it in exactly the same way. we mustn ’ t get carried away – there will not be a basel iv –, or backtrack : we must transpose in europe the basel iii international agreement concluded in december 2017. i repeat, this agreement was and remains the best possible one for france and for europe. i recall that the removal of internal models was a key element in the negotiations. we fought hard to gain the lasting recognition of these models while committing ourselves to further improving their comparability. the application of basel iii will not require a dedicated capital increase for any french bank. the implementation of this agreement will not have a negative impact on the financing of our economy. this concern traditionally voiced by the banking industry has always proved unfounded : on the contrary, credit growth in france remains very robust at 7 % per year. but we are fully aware, as is bercy, of the negotiations that remain to be conducted. and france will fight for a transposition that is both fair and reasonable. fair because there would be no question of transposing it in europe if the united states did not apply the agreement. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches reasonable in terms of managing capital requirements under basel iii. firstly, i believe it is necessary to apply the output floor at the consolidated level of the banking groups. the basel requirements will also have to be intelligently integrated with the capital buffers that are already applied in europe under pillar 2 2020 will also be the year of the solvency ii review. we had expressed our reservations about the document circulated for consultation by eiopa. i am delighted that the discussions with several of our key partners are taking forward our main concerns : the review must not lead to an increase in capital requirements for the european insurance sector ; the calculation of the risk margin must be less penalising ; the convergence of national practices must be enhanced. we are also continuing discussions on how to improve the financing of our firms – reducing the equity shock is one of the levers – and investments, particularly for the ecological transition. 2 – a year of adaptation i will now turn to the subject that concerns you most. low interest rates, let alone negative ones, are not an end in themselves. i had