are a few things that we could do for the smes. first, we can lower the financing cost for smes which obtain guaranteed financing under cgc. on the average, smes are being charged between 10 to 12 percent. this is about blr plus 5 to 6 percent. the rate imposed is much too high. it seems that pricing mechanism doesn ’ t price properly the guarantees given by cgc. we ought to work on this. on the part of cgc, we need to response quickly to the banks when guarantees are being called upon. an ideal situation is akin to an irrevocable undertaking where once a guarantee is called upon, it will be made good immediately. second, to intensify promotion and awareness program on cgc products and services. cgc needs to work closely with the trade associations and generate more media exposures through radios and tvs. make cgc a household name among the smes. third, expand further advisory services, its reach and contents. not all smes require financing, some might need more “ hand holding ”, and rather than access to financing above. lastly, come up with new and specific guarantee products for new growth area, start - ups and young entrepreneurs. existing guarantee products might not be suitable to meet the needs of these groups. cgc should embark a study on this matter and come up with an action plan. before i end my speech, i would like to express my heartfelt congratulations and appreciation to the board, management and staff of cgc for 40 years of service to the malaysian smes. it is our greatest wish that cgc will continue to walk and grow alongside our smes in our effort to make our country prosperous. bis central bankers ’ speeches

therefore, central banks can ensure price stability in the medium to long - term, even in a financially - integrated world in which production factors and goods move freely, and even if the size of the world economy increases relative to that of the domestic economy. 5 but, as i said earlier, as a precondition for successful monetary policy central banks need to properly adapt their analyses to the changing environment. in such an environment, it is clearly important for stability - orientated monetary policy to analyse developments in external prices, in international trade flows and in international financial flows. this said, i agree with john taylor that developments in exchange rates per se should not be given any special status but should be taken into account by monetary policy only to the change in monetary policymaking in many countries, and, more in particular, the change towards a credible commitment to price stability. that is, it would lead to an increase in the rate at which the economy can grow without jeopardising price stability. see, e. g., m. woodford ( 2007 ), “ globalization and monetary control, ” nber working paper no. 13329, to appear in gali, j. and m. gertler eds., the international dimensions of monetary policy, university of chicago press. extent that they have a medium - term influence on price stability. this is because another fundamental law of monetary economics is alive and well in the globalised economy : flexible exchange rates are a sine qua non for price stability. does a globalised world call for more international monetary coordination? with a growing set of prices and asset valuations being determined internationally, information on international developments is crucial for monetary policy - making. in this light, the financial turmoil in particular has shown the value that growing financial globalisation places on a timely and open international exchange of information among central banks and regulators. central banks should therefore cooperate by exchanging information and by designing a solid international financial architecture. beyond that, however, the scope for monetary policy - makers to coordinate is limited. this is the case as each central bank has just one policy instrument, and this instrument can only achieve a single domestic objective, price stability. as a consequence, each central bank is well advised to react to foreign developments only if these become relevant for domestic price stability. i therefore fully agree with john taylor ’ s conclusion that central banks should not mechanically follow other central banks ’ policy decisions. not least as a result of this consensus, i question the