exceptional cases and subject to strict criteria, may fully or partially exclude any category of liabilities from the bail - in, and use the resolution fund to finance this exclusion. however, as a general rule, they may only resort to such flexibility after losses have been imposed on shareholders and creditors for a minimum amount of 8 % of the total liabilities of the bank subject to resolution. moreover, the possible contribution of the resolution fund in substitution of other creditors may not exceed 5 % of the bank ’ s total liabilities. the draft directive is, in general terms, satisfactory. firstly, it establishes a relatively harmonised resolution framework which has been non - existent to date. secondly, while it was necessary to introduce the above - mentioned “ element of flexibility ” in order to reach agreement, the room for manoeuvre will be limited. thirdly, the 8 % of total liabilities that will bis central bankers ’ speeches be subject initially to the bail - in, is liable to be covered relatively comfortably by capital and subordinated debt. finally, the agreement affords security to deposits. deposits of over €100, 000 would only be subject to bail - in once they reach 13 % of a bank ’ s total liabilities and, even then, they might not be affected, given the possibility of funding by the european stability mechanism envisaged in the draft directive. in short, along with the single supervisory mechanism, this greater harmonisation of national resolution regimes is one of the fundamental pillars of the future european banking union. to conclude on the treatment of global systemic banks, it will be necessary to create, for each of them, crisis management groups. it is envisaged that these groups will conduct before 2014 an initial review of the viability of the resolution plans of the systemic banks included in the november 2011 list. structural measures as a complement to the efforts to date regarding systemic banks, the authorities in several countries have adopted or are considering adopting reforms involving changes to banking business models, with legal restrictions on the size of credit institutions or the activities they may pursue. examples of this are the volcker rule, introduced in united states ; the measures considered by an independent commission chaired by john vickers in the united kingdom ; and the proposals of a group of experts chaired by the governor of the bank of finland, erkki liikaanen, in the european union. broadly, these measures seek to restrict the size of banks or to simplify their structure, segregating specific activities which are

. the entry into force of the new basel iii capital accord one of the key elements of the new regulatory framework is the amendment of the prudential rules governing the banking sector by means of the agreement we refer to as “ basel iii ”. the adaptation of this accord to the european arena came about just a few days ago with the approval of the new capital requirements directive. among other things, the application of basel iii will entail an increase in the minimum level of core capital, which will rise from 2 % to 4. 5 %, and the creation of a capital conservation buffer of 2. 5 %. accordingly, banks must at all times maintain a level of high - quality capital of, at least, 7 % of risk - weighted assets. in addition, there will be a countercyclical capital buffer of bis central bankers ’ speeches up to 2. 5 %, which for the first time introduces a macroprudential component into the regulation of capital levels, whose ultimate aim is to smooth the fluctuations in credit over the course of the cycle. the new basel iii framework further includes other important additions. these include most notably the introduction of a leverage ratio in which assets will not be risk - weighted and the introduction, for the first time, of liquidity requirements. on one hand, the liquidity coverage ratio will require banks to hold a sufficient volume of liquid assets to withstand scenarios of tension. on the other, the introduction of a net stable funding ratio is envisaged, whose aim is to limit maturity mismatches. the new regulation envisages that these new standards, to which the changes in the definition of capital must be added, will be applied progressively, such that the transition period will finalise in 2019. the aim is to prevent the strengthening of banks ’ solvency from being achieved at the expense of a reduction in the financing that banks provide to the economy as a whole. however, there is pressure in the markets for banks to comply ahead of schedule with the requirements laid down in basel iii. in many countries, moreover, a weak macroeconomic scenario contributes to increasing bad debts, making a case for sufficient buffers being in place to absorb the losses that may materialise. bank should therefore use the room for manoeuvre they have to strengthen their capital, dispelling any existing doubts about their ability to comply with the new requirements on schedule. but it should also be said that the early full application of the new requirements in the short term,