, potential shifts of activity away from more regulated to less regulated institutions could lead to new risks. it is still too early to gauge the degree to which such adaptations to regulatory changes may occur, although there are tentative signs. for example, we have seen notable growth in mortgage originations at independent mortgage companies as reflected in the striking increase in the share of home - purchase originations by independent mortgage companies from 35 percent in 2010 to 47 percent in 2014. this growth coincides with the timing of basel iii, stress testing, and banks ’ renewed appreciation of the legal risks in mortgage originations. 11 as another example, there have also been many reports of diminished liquidity in fixed - income markets. some observers have linked this shift to new regulations that have raised the costs of market making, although the evidence for changes in market liquidity is far from conclusive and a range of factors related to market structure may have contributed to the reporting of such shifts. 12 despite limited evidence to date, the possibility of activity relocating in response to regulation is a potential impediment to the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. this is clearly the case when activity moves from a regulated to an unregulated institution. but it may also be relevant even when activity moves from one regulated institution to an institution regulated by a different authority. this scenario can occur in the united states because different regulators are responsible for different institutions, and financial stability traditionally has not been, and in a number of cases is still not, a central component of these regulators ’ mandates. to be sure, the situation has improved since the crisis, as the fsoc facilitates interagency dialogue and has a shared responsibility for identifying risks and reporting on these findings and actions taken in its annual report submitted to the congress. in addition, fsoc members jointly identify systemically important nonbank financial institutions. despite these improvements, it remains possible that the fsoc members ’ different mandates, some of which do not include macroprudential regulation, may hinder coordination. by contrast, in the united kingdom, fewer member agencies are represented on the financial policy committee at the bank of england, and each agency has an explicit macroprudential mandate. the committee has a number of tools to carry out this mandate, which currently are sectoral capital requirements, the countercyclical capital buffer, and limits on loan - to - value and debt - to - income ratios for mortgage lending. improve the resilience of the triparty

fout! onbekende naam voor documenteigenschap. progress on the resolvability of gsibs – the fsb perspective speech by klaas knot at the 2nd srm - ebf boardroom dialogue brussels, 5 july 2019 at the second srm - ebf boardroom dialogue, klaas knot gave a speech in which he described the efforts in making banks resolvable. he also mentioned areas of concern for the coming years : trends and priorities for achieving resolvability. fout! onbekende naam voor documenteigenschap. let me start by saying that i am here in two capacities, wearing two hats as it were. i am here both as vice - chair of the financial stability board, the fsb, and as president of the dutch central bank. for this speech i will be wearing my fsb - hat. as you may know, the fsb has actually been the instigator of many of the reforms and policy initiatives on bank resolution, including the topics being discussed today. with the development of the key attributes for effective resolution regimes in 2011, the fsb created the blueprint for the european resolution framework. this was followed by the tlac standard for setting loss absorbing capacity for g - sibs. so far, this is the only international standard developed by the fsb. other guidance developed by the fsb covers topics such as bail - in, funding in resolution and operational continuity. in this speech i will be taking the view of an fsb representative with a keen interest in making banks resolvable. this view should provide insight into the trends and priorities for achieving resolvability. hopefully it will also guide your own efforts, as you work together with the srb on topics such as : completing resolution plans, implementing tlac and modelling funding in resolution. and even though the fsb focuses on policy development for g - sibs, i think these topics are equally relevant for other banks. resolution planning and achieving resolvability i will start with resolution planning and achieving resolvability, the topic you discussed before lunch. in my view resolution planning has always been a means to an end. it is about getting a deep understanding of how a bank is organized and functions. it is about asking fundamental questions on what functions need to be continued and how to achieve this. resolution planning forces authorities to consider all these aspects and it focuses the mind