into a true bank as part of the postal privatization. regulating prices, in this case banking fees, is generally not the ideal method and we would prefer not to have to take this path. however, as competition in the banking system – and in particular in the household sector – is low, and that it could take some time before our efforts to increase competition bring results, then we have drafted legislation that would grant the supervisor of banks the authority to regulate banking fees. we hope that when competition strengthens, and competitive prices follow, then there will be no need for this supervision. the legislative bill allows the supervisor of banks to regulate those fees that reflect an uncompetitive price. the bill also allows for the reduction in the number of banking fees and to create a closer connection between the fees and the services offered. this bill is currently in discussion in the interministerial committee on legislative matters and i hope that the bill will shortly be presented before the knesset. the need for a strong and competitive banking system the knesset has made several suggestions in this field recently, such as several proposals of private legislation covering the regulation of banking fees, the supply of financial advice, the sale of credit card companies, the banks'credit policy for buying controlling stakes, paying interest on checking accounts, as well as setting up and operating this committee of enquiry into the subject of banking fees. i can understand the reasons for these proposals, but i must point out the following two points : a ) the need to allow the relevant supervisors to carry out their specific roles in improving the functioning of the financial system, as well as the need for stability in the supervision system and the regularization of banking activity. the banks and other financial institutions could not operate efficiently under conditions where the legislation, supervision and regularization systems keep changing too often. it is important that dealing with this topic remains in the hands of the supervisory authorities – the israel securities authority, the supervisor of the capital market and insurance, and the supervisor of banks. one could consider making a change here or there in the supervisory structure of the financial system, but it is not advisable, really not advisable, to transfer regulation – or even part of it – to the knesset. b ) the need for a strong and robust banking and financial system. for the israeli economy to be able to operate efficiently, the banking system must be stable. we must maintain a healthy banking system through supervision and competition, while understanding that the banks operate in order

##b issued a press release to announce that bonds with coupons linked to sustainability performance targets will become eligible as central bank collateral. contingent on the fulfilment of all other eligibility criteria, these bonds will also be eligible for the eurosystem ’ s outright purchases for monetary policy purposes. the decision was implemented as of 1 january 2021. 26. the climate stress test relies on internal ecb analysis and models. the test comprises approximately four million companies and 2, 000 banks worldwide. for an overview of the exercise and its preliminary results, see de guindos, l. ( 2021 ), op. cit. 27. in contrast to the ecb ’ s economy - wide climate stress test, the supervisory climate stress test will rely on banks ’ self - assessment of their exposure to climate - related risks. the supervisory climate stress test will be based on the ecb ’ s comprehensive “ guide on climate - related and environmental risks ”. 28. the operationalisation of this principle entails the ecb purchasing securities in proportion to their relative market capitalisation. the market neutrality principle was first mentioned by benoit cœure, former member of the executive board of the ecb, in 2015. see cœure, b. ( 2015 ), “ embarking on public sector asset purchases ”, 10 march. 29. for example, the bank of england ’ s corporate bond purchase scheme ( cbps ) follows a principle similar to market neutrality. the cbps is conducted with the objective of minimizing the impact of asset purchases on the relative borrowing costs across sectors. the principle is implemented via sector key targets, with the potential for deviations. similarly, market neutrality is a principle guiding the bank of japan ’ s and bank of canada ’ s purchase programmes. for example, see bank of canada ( 2021 ), “ statement of policy governing the acquisition and management of financial assets for the bank of canada ’ s balance sheet ” ( section 4 ), april. 30. see article 127 ( 1 ) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union ( tfeu ). 31. the ecb takes into account a range of criteria to assess the eligibility of assets for its private sector asset purchase programmes, including asset class, credit ratings, maturity, place of issuance and denomination. 32. these arguments are discussed in the recent ecb podcast episode “ tackling climate change as a central bank : between motivation, obligation and limitation ” that was published on 12 may 2021.