the euro area low and stable, which suited conditions in the euro area, despite the pressures seen on international capital markets. however, the lack of confidence in certain member states in the financial system and in the solvency of sovereign borrowers was an impediment to the transmission of monetary policy to the broader economy during the crisis. in countries gripped by financial difficulties, financing conditions remained restrictive, despite the easing of monetary policy. bis central bankers ’ speeches to restore uniform monetary policy transmission and tackle the risks to price stability, the ecb thus needed to combine conventional measures with unconventional measures tailored to the particular situation in the euro area. the ecb pursued this strategy throughout the crisis. we initially sought to make sure that banks could refinance themselves under good conditions so that they could continue to finance the economy. the governing council, for example, decided to supply banks with unlimited liquidity at a fixed interest rate, to significantly extend the maturity of our refinancing operations and to expand the list of assets eligible for use as collateral. when fears regarding the euro area ’ s integrity surfaced at the height of the crisis, in august / september 2012, the governing council created outright monetary transactions ( omts ). these monetary transactions made it possible to intervene, if needed, in secondary sovereign debt markets in the event of a speculative attack, notably one linked to single currency fears. they were conditional on the establishment of a financial aid programme under the european stability mechanism, which would constitute an indication of confidence in the economic convergence and fiscal viability of any country in which we would be called upon to intervene. this decision led to a dramatic decline in the risk premia on sovereign yields, notably those of italy and spain. thus, it contributed to the efforts undertaken in the euro area, which also involved the creation of the banking union, to break the vicious circle of sovereign risk undermining banks ’ stability and thus their ability to finance the real economy. the omt tool has not been used, but it still could be if fears of the single currency ’ s integrity resurface. more recently, to help stimulate the flow of financing to the economy, the governing council decided on new unconventional measures to support the provision of credit. we gave banks access to five - year refinancing operations on the condition that, in exchange, they boost their lending to the real economy. in september 2014 we also established a programme to buy covered bonds and asset - backed securities directly linked to the financing

encourage investment. lastly, the composition of the fiscal adjustment is of the utmost importance. better targeted spending, notably on investment, the public sector portion of which fell during the crisis ( from 7. 1 % of public spending in the euro area in 2007 to 5. 5 % in 2014 ), will create more growth and more jobs. 4. strengthen the euro area ’ s institutional foundations in countries that share a single currency, economic policies are a point of common interest. this is in the economic interest of the member states and is also a legal obligation : the treaty on the functioning of the european union is clear on this point. this is a necessary condition if we want to fully benefit from monetary union and, at the same time, remedy the structural, fiscal and financial weaknesses within the euro area : the crisis showed us that local fragilities quickly become everyone ’ s problem. on the flip side, our monetary policy and banking union have shown the power of joint action. it is a lesson we must not forget. forecast spring 2015, european commission ; and “ where are we headed? perspectives on potential output ”, in world economic outlook, international monetary fund, 2015. christian noyer, “ introductory letter to the banque de france ’ s annual report ”, 4 may 2015. anderson, d., barkbu, b., lusiyan, l. and muir, d., “ assessing the gains from structural reforms for jobs and growth ”, in schindler, m., berger, h., bakker, b. and spilimbergo, a. ( eds ), jobs and growth : supporting the european recovery, international monetary fund, 2014. bis central bankers ’ speeches the crisis has already led to major progress on institutional matters, such as the establishment of the european stability mechanism or the banking union, with a single supervisory mechanism and a single resolution fund based on common rules. these two achievements have played a key role in strengthening monetary union during the crisis. the establishment of the banking union is also an example of an institutional process allowing the sharing of risk, which followed several steps. first : political agreement on european legislation laying down common rules and putting an end to bank sector abuses. i am thinking specifically of strengthening capital at systemically important banks, bail - in rules that will eventually rid the banking sector of the practice of “ privatising profits and socialising losses ”, and – i hope – application at european level of the principle of bank structural