a higher growth path. or to put it metaphorically : it is not enough for a car to have a tank full of “ liquidity ” if you want to speed up. someone still has to rev up the engine. it ’ s politicians who hold the key to unlocking economic growth. that ’ s why the governing council has been tireless in calling for structural reforms. but while the ambition should be to move into a higher gear with regard to reforms, there are signals that we have already shifted back to a lower gear again. “ going for growth 2016 ", a recent study by the oecd, shows that since 2013 the speed of reforms has slowed down, especially with regard to measures in the fields of “ innovation policy, public sector efficiency or product and labour market regulation ". 2 it is clear that each country has its own economic situation and preferences – meaning there ’ s no such thing as a “ one size fits all ” approach. but i am convinced that measures which lead to sound public finances as well as competition - based economic systems with flexible labour and product markets would foster growth. making it easier for new firms to enter the market is one type of reform helping to raise competition and innovation. measures easing the process of setting up a new business and, where necessary, eliminating red tape would boost growth potential, too. as a case in point, let me mention the creation of a common services market and a single digital market in europe. studies show that this could yield twice the growth effects unleashed by the creation of the common market for goods. 3, 4 lowering the barriers that prevent enterprises from exiting the market will likewise foster growth. it would facilitate what joseph schumpeter called " creative destruction ". oecd research suggests that policy - induced exit barriers matter for productivity growth, because fewer exits lead to less scope for productivity spillovers and the misallocation of capital, labour and skills. it concludes, for instance, that insolvency regimes should be streamlined. 5 and investing more in skills and education promises to deliver rich rewards, too. this would not only boost labour productivity, but also reduce the risk of workers losing their jobs. and this, in turn, would in my view be the most effective antidote to the feeling many have of being threatened 4 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches by globalisation and technological progress. but companies not only stand to gain from higher labour market flexibility : they would also benefit from an increased flexibility in their financing

to make a substantial reduction in systemic risk. or, to be more precise, how to reduce systemic risk without restraining or patronizing financial markets but rather by improving their functioning. a lot of work is under way to find ways of doing this. improved transparency should foster the self - control and self - discipline of the markets. that includes different aspects such as : more and better data on the debt structure of individual countries, the application of standards for banking supervision, improved disclosure of risk positions of market participants. of course, in the case of a national sovereign crisis, financial assistance too might play a role. therefore, we have agreed to fill up the imf ’ s reserve tanks. such assistance, however, has to be bound to conditionality, to an incentive to redeem the official credits and to a fair burden - sharing between official and private sectors. if the talk of a lender of last resort means only that kind of financial assistance, i don ’ t mind. even though that expression might not be absolutely accurate. but we should not argue about words. but if lender of last resort in a broader sense means that draining liquidity and offering generous or even unlimited credit lines should be regarded as main response and that the international community should place its highest priority on such measures, i would be strongly opposed. a lender of last resort of that kind may be of intellectual interest for academic textbooks. in reality, such a role for the imf or another institution would severely hamper the functioning of the markets. the main point is : whatever the international community intends to do, the measure should — as far as possible — avoid creating incentives for moral hazard behaviour. for domestic policy - makers, this means that international assistance must not be seen as insurance either against dangerous exchange rate experiments or against a loss of credibility. for the markets, there should as few incentives as possible to underrate country - specific risks based on the hope of a later bail - out. so, in the first place, financial crisis and systemic risk do not lead to the question of the lender of last resort. instead, they lead to the question how to improve the framework. and that was the background to my report i presented to the group of seven ( g - 7 ) ministers and governors at their meeting in bonn on february 20, 1999. professor illing asked me to add some remarks on that report. i will follow that suggestion. iii as you know, my proposal to the g - 7 included con