a high level of provisioning. the same holds true in reverse : low risks necessitate less provisioning. it can therefore be concluded from this that relief is always warranted as long as it does not result in risks being inadequately provided for. 1 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches that is a principle which supervisors and regulators – including those in basel, incidentally – took on board some time ago. the basel committee, remember, has taken into account differences in the size and complexity of institutions – just take the rules the committee devised to enable banks and savings banks to use different methods to measure their capital. institutions are generally permitted to use complex models, but only those authorised by the supervisory authorities. yet there is no obligation to use a model ; instead, institutions can also opt for a more straightforward standardised approach. what is more, large and systemically important institutions are asked to meet additional requirements. global systemically important institutions, for instance, need to set aside more capital in the shape of a separate capital buffer. the aim, then, is not to treat institutions equally, but risks. we apply this principle in our day - to - day supervisory activities as well. the higher an institution ’ s risks, the more intensively we will supervise it. the more significant, complex and risky the bank, the more frequently, extensively and intensively we will inspect it. that is why we deploy far more supervisors to inspect larger institutions in our routine srep examinations at credit institutions. you will recognise the same supervisory strategy in the institutional reporting system. the euro area ’ s “ significant institutions ", as they are known, have a standard requirement to report more than 8, 000 data points to their supervisors – and to do that quarterly. the reporting templates may be harmonised across europe, but some business areas are omitted for the smaller institutions. a typical savings bank, then, has to report far fewer data, often just half of the data points. 1 this practice accommodates smaller institutions running low - risk business models – but perhaps not as much as it could, because there are still some rules whose point and purpose is barely relevant to a savings or people ’ s bank “ just around the corner ", but which nonetheless impose too much of an administrative burden on them. on top of that, regulation hasn ’ t exactly got any simpler since the financial crisis. it has been significantly revised and augmented to include new requirements, expanded and stated more precisely. so in its effort to

a step which is also necessary in view of the upcoming enlargement with its increase in diversity and complexity within the union. it is therefore not a further integrative step but rather a consolidation of the existing institutional framework. changes to the institutional framework of emu were not originally intended, but these now seem to be on the agenda. the ecb and the euro area central banks have voiced their opinion. it is now up to the intergovernmental conference to decide if a change in the european stability consensus is in the interest of europe ’ s citizens. i do not intend to comment on whether the uk should join the euro area or not. when the uk requests that it be allowed to move to the third stage, the council of the eu will have to decide if the necessary conditions - that is to say, the convergence criteria - have been fulfilled. ii europe has changed. it should not be confused with the europe of ten or twenty years ago. the process leading up to the final stage of emu has especially helped the countries with an unstable track record to reduce inflation rates, interest rates and fiscal deficits. the appeal of being part of emu has certainly been helpful and has released an impressive amount of energy. what have been the key characteristics, the main achievements of maastricht? a medium - term - oriented macroeconomic policy framework based on sustainable economic convergence with two distinct features : 1. an independent system of european central banks with the supranational european central bank and the primary objective of maintaining price stability 2. a fiscal institutional framework which - if properly applied - is meant to ensure fiscal discipline and which has the goal of preserving the sustainability of public finance. is that enough? have we achieved these worthy and courageous objectives? where would we like to go? and in which direction should we go? the expectations of emu were manifold. there were many sceptical voices which did not believe that a “ one - size - fits - all ” monetary policy was appropriate for such a heterogeneous area. convergence was seen to be insufficient, and the criteria of an optimal currency area not fulfilled. the proponents of this view saw monetary union only as the last crowning step of economic integration. furthermore, experience has shown that all attempts in the past to establish a currency without a state have failed. the optimistic view focused more on the advantages of greater price transparency, the removal of exchange - rate - induced planning uncertainties and the lower transaction costs in