particular, by providing stable networks despite the highly disruptive conditions in financial markets, market infrastructures played an important shock - absorbing role and helped to maintain overall public confidence in the financial system. since central banking overseers and financial regulators recognised long ago the critical importance of the reliable functioning of market infrastructures for overall financial stability and efficiency, they took action together with the service providers. stringent requirements ensure that eu infrastructures are adequately designed, effectively manage their risks, and operate efficiently and reliably, both under normal circumstances and at times of crisis. recent experiences suggest that these measures were well - targeted. nevertheless, some areas for further improvement have also been identified. i shall now mention a few key areas for further action. areas for improvement as stated, i would like to focus on three areas : firstly, improvements related to the overall crisis management arrangements ; secondly, the strengthening of market infrastructures for over - the - counter ( otc ) derivatives ; and thirdly, efforts geared to producing a more integrated retail payments infrastructure. crisis management arrangements one priority that relates to the overall crisis management arrangements is to further improve notification procedures, particularly regarding the communication of insolvencies by public authorities and infrastructure providers to market participants. although this has generally worked well during the current turmoil, some measures are in progress to foster the exchange of standardised information. in addition, further measures are needed to ensure close cooperation with the authorities regarding the relationship with the defaulting participant and the coordination of measures to limit the impact of the default. moreover, it might be an advantage if infrastructures were able to end unilaterally the contractual relationship with the participant ( without waiting for the final decision by the relevant judicial or administrative authority ). furthermore, the current turmoil has reminded us that default rules need to be not only sufficiently clear and comprehensive for the infrastructure participant, but also that they should not cause any conflict between infrastructures. therefore, as infrastructures are becoming increasingly interlinked, more coordination in the implementation of the default rules is vital for further mitigating risks at the systemic level. finally, the default of lehman brothers was a major showcase for the severe implications of “ institution - based interdependencies ” between two or more infrastructures resulting from the exposures of major financial institutions participating in each of these infrastructures. therefore, it is crucial for us to continue closely monitoring the interdependencies between individual institutions in order to assess their impact on the stability of the infrastructure.

regulation as a burden. why do we have strict rules and close supervision if they seem to cause so much trouble for banks and savings banks? no one can seriously argue with the fact that regulation and supervision present a challenge for institutions. rules are restrictive, and there are costs associated with obeying them. and this burden has become even greater thanks to the reforms since the last financial crisis. wouldn't it be better for banks to focus all their energy on financing the real economy instead of wasting their time trying to follow complicated rules? after all, the services of banks and savings banks are crucial for a stable economic cycle, for growth and prosperity. especially in bank - based economies in germany and europe, businesses and consumers depend on a functioning banking system. banks and savings banks fund investments, they manage savings and deliver important services, such as processing 1 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches payments. but taking risks is also part of the banking business. and when you take risks, there's a chance you might fail. plus, we have to remember that bankers are only human – and humans make mistakes. i guess given the increasing digitalisation in today's world, another point to add is that algorithms are just that – algorithms – and algorithms can be wrong. this is why the area of it risks, in particular, is also worthy of so much attention these days. the implications of a financial institution's failure are far - reaching – and i don't just mean for the institution itself, but also for its investors, for the real economy, and for us all. the financial crisis, which is just about to reach its tenth anniversary, has shown us that the failure of a single institution is on its own enough to trigger a chain reaction throughout the entire sector. and that's why we need rules – even in the places they cause the most pain. regulation and supervision help to keep the financial system in order. smart regulation ensures that financial institutions can still pursue their business, but that they are appropriately protected against the biggest risks. this then safeguards the economy, consumers and the financial system itself against turbulence. therefore, the reason we can't give banks and savings banks full rein is because of the important part they play in the economic cycle. smart regulation and close supervision are also desirable from the banks'and savings banks'point of view, as they prevent cost - intensive threats to their existence. there are more advantages for the sector as a whole. on the one hand