society ; and his reason for shaving off his bushy moustache in 1994 not the pressures of the project but his wife ’ s ( firmly stated ) wishes! according to the ft, a computer manager at one of the big four banks described taurus as “ like building a car that had air conditioning, a fancy stereo and electric windows … we should have built a straightforward production car first, then added the bits on later. ” expectations of automotive technology have clearly moved on since the 1990s. bis central bankers ’ speeches • we have remained close to the stakeholders in rtgs throughout the first phase of the project, holding meetings with over 100 users ( old and new ), infrastructure providers, policymakers, academics and technologists, consulting on a vision for the next generation of the service, and confirming that the new system will be paid for by the users of the system through the future rtgs tariff ( through which we also gather current running costs ). • and we have stayed true to the principles of “ simple, focused and open ”, conducting the review using a small, dedicated, multi - disciplinary team of policy and technology experts. the consultation paper sets out our proposals in detail, which affect everyone with a stake in sterling payments and settlement. with that in mind, i hope that as many of your firms as possible will respond to the questions in that document by the deadline of 7 november. what next for securities infrastructure? impressive though the achievement of building crest was, it is a sad fact that the persistent delays that pre - dated the project meant the uk came late to the party. today, as the industry again faces enormous pressures for change, it is important that it responds more proactively than it did in those pre - crest days, avoiding the twin perils of complacency or over - ambition, embracing innovation to deliver a service to users that is both more efficient and more resilient than ever before. the case for reform is easy to state. although most countries now have well - functioning modern central securities depositories, the structures below this top layer for providing posttrade services in securities markets remain in many cases extraordinarily complex and balkanised. multiple tiers of custodians and sub - custodians, issuing agents, correspondent banks, clearing members, registrars and brokers – many operating on a solely national basis – provide an overlapping web of services to separate pools of market participants, using different operating procedures, systems and databases

##flection points of a cycle which materialise in the least predictable manner. this demands a high degree of agility of policymakers and the financial system to adapt to the new operating reality. such agility is derived from crisis management frameworks that are well - anchored in clearly defined strategic outcomes and accountability structures, but also flexible enough to respond to a range of conditions. and critically, it requires investing in resources with deep experience and knowledge. going back to the 1996 everest expedition, hall and his team had made every reasonable effort to incorporate comprehensive risk management and contingency planning into the preclimb plan. as things turned south, it became clear that the team was unable to respond quickly to the dynamic situation. outdated and inefficient radio systems led to a communication breakdown of vital information. physiological, psychological and technical readiness of some of the climbers was also in question. their inability to respond fluidly to changing conditions created an overdependence on key resource persons. combined with lack of experience to deal with a series of new challenges, leaders were incapacitated and team dynamics disintegrated quickly. in essence, crisis preparedness frameworks should provide clarity of purpose for actions taken, enable policy options to be properly evaluated, and support effective and swift execution of crisis responses, including the communication of such responses. it is not however intended to be a fail - safe mechanism with a pre - set comprehensive plan, designed exclusively for each likely manifestation of a crisis. we need to anticipate that plans will fall apart midway, or work selectively throughout various stages of the crisis for a variety of reasons. market participants are irrational, infrastructures flawed, economies and financial systems are imperfect, and the political environment is unpredictable. markets are also prone to excesses, manipulations and fickleness. therefore crisis preparedness frameworks need to flex and evolve accordingly and ensure that framework, instrument and resource rigidities do not become binding constraints to the effective management of future crises. at the heart of the operational and governance framework for crisis management will be a team comprising first responders, surveillance / crisis experts and decision makers, cutting across a range of competent authorities. the ability of these key operating agents to respond nimbly is imperative during a fast - moving crisis to reconnect the financial system lifeline, and maintain coherence in the overall crisis management process. this in turn depends on the ability to bring together a dynamic set of crisis managers across jurisdictions