makers, to be able to get their act together whenever something bad happens to the eurozone. and yes, the risk today is not that much political risk in individual countries. it ’ s a risk that the ministers, eurogroup, will not find the strength to unite, to put their heads together and act as one, if anything bad happens to the eurozone. so that ’ s a concern. the only answer is to -, step by step to make the eurozone stronger, and to create this sense of commonality, a sense of the need for common action. we are very divided, the eurozone is very divided at this moment, and there ’ s obviously elections this year. do you worry about a lost year? i wouldn ’ t say the eurozone is divided. it ’ s just a risk of being too inward looking. do you worry about a lost year, in terms of policy? it ’ s not a lost year, i mean, there are reforms in countries, reforms are continuing in different countries, but certainly there is a need to take a step to make the eurozone significantly stronger. at some point there will be a need for a quantum leap into making the eurozone more united, stronger, but that ’ s not going to happen this year. or next year, or the year after, because no one wants that anymore. the voters don ’ t want that anymore. well, the burden of proof is on us. it ’ s on european institutions. the burden of proof cannot be on voters, that ’ s not how democracies work. let ’ s talk about brexit. the president of the eurogroup said yesterday that the uk ’ s looking at massive unemployment, and that it will go back to the 1970s. i am not going to comment on the economic consequences of brexit. what we are really focused on, and we are very close to the bank of england, we are exchanging views, sharing notes with the bank of england. they know what will be the consequences, so i will entirely defer to mark carney to pass that kind of judgment, and i fully trust him. what we start considering is the structural consequences of brexit. how is that going to impact the landscape for financial services? the infrastructures that we need in the eurozone to create growth, etc. it ’ s probably too early to tell, but it ’ s shaping up, i would say, so we have to start

has been expressed that an expanded role by central banks in this direction could compromise their independence that is so critical in defending their primary objective of price stability. that may indeed be a risk. but precisely because central banks are generally among the most independent institutions, they can strengthen the independence of the supervisory environment. the risk of political pressure delaying a needed tightening in credit conditions via macro - prudential tools, for example, can be minimised if the central bank has a key role. in my view, this benefit, together with the benefit of informational synergies, outweigh the risks. * * * i close with a very old lesson for central banks : humility. this crisis was not just a once - in - ageneration crisis. it proved to be much worse. i hope subsequent relative calm allows our 22nd century counterparts to characterise this as a once - in - a - century event. but central banks must not let their guard down. the next crisis might well challenge the limits of our knowledge in new and as yet unknown ways. references williams, john c. ( 2009 ) “ the risk of deflation ”, frb san francisco economic letter, 12, 27 march. bis central bankers ’ speeches bis central bankers ’ speeches