caleb m fundanga : payment system developments in the region speech by dr caleb m fundanga, governor of the bank of zambia, at the official opening of the 2007 sadc payment systems regional conference, livingstone, 2 april 2007. * * * • sadc payment systems project team leader ; • sadc payment systems project country leaders ; • chairperson, bankers association of zambia ; • delegates from all sadc countries ; • distinguished invited guests ; and • ladies and gentlemen on behalf of the bank of zambia and indeed on my own behalf, i wish to welcome you all to zambia and livingstone in particular. for those of you coming to livingstone for the first time, you will no doubt soon discover that this historical city, which incidentally was zambia ’ s capital city until 1935 when it was moved to lusaka, is one of the world ’ s pristine tourist destination and boasts of a number of magnificent sights and places of cultural interest. for those of you that have been here before, i wish you a joyous time as you renew your acquaintance with this beautiful city and enigmatic victoria falls. to all of you, i implore you to shop around and take a piece of livingstone as souvenir on your return. ladies and gentlemen, allow me to thank you all for being here for the 2007 sadc payment systems regional conference. this event has now become interwoven into the tradition and fabric of sadc. it has come to symbolize our commitment to collaboration and consultation within the sadc committee of central bank governors ( ccbg ) and annually marks our contribution to the process of regional economic co - operation and integration. it is in this light that the bank of zambia applauds the favourable response from all central banks, individuals and other institutions represented here for allowing their members of staff to attend this event. as bank of zambia, we believe this event provides an excellent opportunity for exchanging views and sharing ideas in improving our national payment arrangements to foster economic growth and integration. ladies and gentlemen, lessons from the development of payment systems in the european union and the united states of america provide a useful guide for emerging market economies such as ours. that be as it may, recent technological advancements and developments in china and india are also instructive as they glaringly indicate that it is possible to leap frog some of the historical development experiences of these major industrialized economies. however, it is without a doubt that this will require the concerted efforts and commitment of all those involved in the transformation

olaf ) judgment [ 6 ], the european court of justice made it clear that, in principle, the ecb is bound by all regulations which bind the union. there is no distinction to be made between the different institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. all are equal under the law, so to say. however, the word “ relevant ” is ambiguous. does it refer to any institution, where relevant? that would mean that every eu institution should comply with the climate law, whenever it develops policy or takes action relevant to the objective of the law. or does it refer only to those institutions with competence to create policy relevant to achieving the objective of the climate law? the ecb would be directly bound by the law under the first interpretation but not under the second. the climate law is not crystal clear on this point. it does not define “ relevant institution ”. but there are a number of strong indications that the ecb is not a relevant institution under the climate law. let me explain why. the climate law does not contain many specific obligations. the law sets out a destination : climate neutrality. it does not tell us how to get there. how we do so will depend on environmental and economic policymaking. this is a union competence the ecb does not have. there are further arguments that support this interpretation. if the ecb is deemed to be a relevant institution, then it would have to submit its policies to the commission for assessment and the commission would monitor progress. that would be a fundamental change to the ecb ’ s accountability framework. under current law, the ecb is only directly accountable to the european parliament and the european court of auditors. a final reason for this view is institutional. if the ecb were deemed to be a relevant institution within the meaning of the climate law, this would be an implicit acceptance that the council of the eu and the parliament could set additional objectives for the ecb through the ordinary legislative procedure. however, the ecb ’ s objectives are laid down in the treaty on the functioning of the european union ( tfeu ) [ 8 ], and their scope cannot be changed by secondary legislation. that would be a violation of the treaty. changing the ecb ’ s objectives requires a special procedure. the ecb is – it seems – not directly bound by the climate law. so, can we ignore it? not at all. to do so would be a violation of the treaties. article 11 of the tfeu provides that