different response of income and wealth inequality highlights the fact that we need to be more precise when defining exactly the " inequality of what " we are analysing. the recent pandemic emergency has shown the importance of another channel through which monetary policy may affect inequality, albeit largely indirectly. focusing on the first wave of infections, simulation results show that the public policies implemented in italy to support workers and households during the first half of 2020 were successful. the post - transfer gini index of the labour income distribution remained, in fact, almost constant compared to pre - crisis levels, instead of rising by several percentage points, as would have occurred in the absence of any intervention. actual data on household incomes have later confirmed these early assessments. monetary policy seemingly plays no part in this story. however, we should remember the severe tensions that arose in financial markets in march 2020. it is therefore reasonable to argue that introducing those public measures would have been much more difficult, even impossible, without the extraordinarily expansive monetary policy that was put in place, including the introduction of the ecb's pandemic emergency purchase programme and the strengthening of the asset purchase programme. although the " fiscal dominance " alarm bell may now be ringing for some of you, these considerations do not suggest that central banks have become dependent on national governments, but rather highlight the importance of the complementarities between fiscal and monetary policies. these complementarities not only concern the response to the deflationary pressures that we observed before and during the pandemic, but also affect, as we speak, the fight against inflation. the experience of italy, in this respect, is particularly insightful. in this country, the " conquest of inflation " took a long time, as we lived through the two dismal decades of the 1970s and 1980s. it has to be acknowledged that the economy was then subject to very severe shocks ( and if there is one thing that i have learned during my long experience in central banking, it is that we may only dream of steady states and the like! ). following the conflicts of the " hot autumn " of the late 1960s, a weak italian economy, and society, had to face the collapse of the bretton woods fixed exchange rates system and the two major oil shocks that followed the yom kippur war and the iran revolution. disinflation took place via a long process that only began in the early 1980s, with the strengthening of the central bank's autonomy and

the ultimate impact of brexit on the irish economy remains uncertain and highly dependent on the terms of the uk ’ s future relationship with the eu. nonetheless, it is clear that the close relationship between the irish and uk economies makes ireland the most exposed to brexit of all of the eu ’ s remaining member states, for a number of reasons, including : first and foremost, the uk ’ s departure from the eu will most likely reduce irish exporters ’ access to uk markets and irish consumers ’ access to products sourced from the uk. this may take the form of the imposition of tariffs on goods sold into the uk. in what could be considered a worstcase scenario, the uk may revert to trading with ireland on the basis of world trade organisation rules. work by the esri shows that under these rules some of the highest tariffs would be applied to products from ireland ’ s most exposed and most employment intensive exporting sectors, with numerous agri - food products possibly facing rates in excess of 30 per cent4. in a less extreme scenario, whereby an extensive free trade agreement is reached between the uk and eu, the reduction in market access should be less severe. if we look at existing free trade agreements between the eu and non - eu countries for example, many of these eliminate tariffs on virtually all goods. however, exceptions are applied and again are particularly prevalent in sectors of most importance to irish exports such as agri - food. furthermore, it must be remembered that tariffs are not the only barriers to trade outside of the single market. non - tariff barriers such as increased administrative and customs ’ requirements or costs associated with setting up new logistics and trade - processing systems also pose substantial costs to importers and exporters5. many of these existing, extensive free trade agreements between the eu and its trading partners, often referred to as “ new generation ” free trade agreements, have also targeted these additional barriers to trade. ultimately, when compared with current trading arrangements and the achievements of the single market, any free trade agreement could still represent a substantial loss of market access. this would suggest that following brexit, irish exporters seeking to continue to trade with their uk clients will face considerable challenges and increased import costs, which could both reduce the range and increase the price of imported goods available to irish consumers6. one very tangible risk posed to the irish economy is the potential disruption of the land - bridge to continental europe that the uk physically provides to irish trade with the rest of the