an incentive for states to perform better. to incentivize adoption of public ratings by the state governments for sdls, recently the reserve bank has decided that the initial margin requirement under laf for rated sdls shall be set at 1. 0 per cent lower than that of other sdls for the same maturity buckets. the public disclosure of sg ratings may also help in price differentiation of sdls. v. robust calendar while the central government is known to adhere to the borrowing calendar published every half year ( hy ), the sgs do not adhere to their quarterly calendars. such deviations leave the market to second guess their market borrowing. communication to the market as well as predictability is critical for credibility of the borrowing programme. vi. consolidation of debt the maturity pattern of sdls indicates that the redemption pressure would start increasing from 2022 - 23 and would continue to do so till 2026 - 27. the upsurge in redemption necessitates consolidation of debt. each state government will have to plan reissuances, buyback and switches based on their respective maturity profiles and cash flows. this will help create volumes, facilitate trading in the secondary market and benefit sgs by lowering yields. additionally, it will also even out redemption pressures and elongate the residual maturity of securities. due to efforts of reserve bank, several states have started reissuing sdl. we are also working with states on debt buy - backs and will take this process forward. vii. improved and timely disclosure of information : frbm legislations have significantly improved budget reporting, debt and fiscal data of states is not readily available. with a view to improve transparency and facilitate investors in taking informed investment decisions, there is a need to provide high frequency data on state finances in public domain. transparency includes having an independent audit of sub - national financial accounts, making periodic public disclosures of key fiscal data, exposing hidden liabilities, and moving off - budget liabilities on budget. conclusion : development and reforms are a continuous process. during the new millennium, state governments have taken several steps to improve fiscal and debt management. all the state governments have enacted their fiscal responsibility legislations incorporating the fiscal consolidation path. therefore, an institutional commitment to fiscal prudence exists. the traditional debt sustainability indicators are on a reasonably strong footing. there may not be any significant systemic risk on account of states ’ public debt. however, during the recent past there are indications of fiscal slippage. rising deficits

christian noyer : thoughts on the zero lower bound in relation with monetary and financial stability speech by mr christian noyer, honorary governor of the bank of france and former chairman of the board of directors of the bank for international settlements, at the farewell symposium in his honour, held by the bank of france and the bank for international settlements, paris, 12 january 2016. * * * i find myself in a strange situation today. memories of recent policy debates are still vivid in my mind and it is difficult to distance myself from very recent discussions. however, the circumstances require that i take a step back and summon the wisdom supposedly derived from sixteen years in central banking. i will try to do a little bit of each, knowing that i might be better at the former than the latter. when i started at the ecb in 1998, the zero lower bound was a mere theoretical curiosity, which deserved at most a brief mention of one page in economic textbooks ( except, maybe in the case of japanese textbooks ). it turned out that nearly half of my time as governor was spent in a near zero interest rate environment. japanese official interest rates have been there for over 20 years. official interest rates have stood at zero for more than six years in the us – until very recently – and in the euro area and the uk. it is now well accepted that there are deep and fundamental causes for that prolonged coincidence of low interest rates and low inflation. in advanced economies, and possibly worldwide, equilibrium real interest rates have dropped to very low levels. falling equilibrium rates may require zero or negative policy rates and, more broadly, very accommodating monetary conditions that conventional instruments cannot deliver. hence the development of non - conventional monetary policies in all our economies. part of the fall in equilibrium rates is a consequence of the crisis and the subsequent deleveraging and balance sheet repair that is taking place in many sectors of the economy. part may predate the crisis itself and result from shifts in global desired saving and investment. whatever the causes, low equilibrium rates complicate the task of monetary policy. because of the zero lower bound on nominal rates, they constrain the ability of central banks to react to negative cyclical shocks. they may lead to cumulative downward spirals if low inflation keeps real policy rates above the equilibrium level. in addition, the perceived inability of monetary policy to keep inflation close to the objective may fuel pessimistic expectations, a point to which i shall return. over the last two years