samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
nationalism and liberal democracy. it would be brave to forecast a winner when some western societies are caught up in much the same struggle. ” this being said, let me thank you for your attention and wish you insightful discussions. 1 “ poland ’ s wild ride out of communism remains election faultline ”, james shotter, financial times, 2 october 2019. 2 “ the legacy of 1989 has been complacency ”, tony barber, financial times, 2 october 2019. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

rather to take the middle way in approaching euro adoption, envisaging a real convergence level of at least 70 – 75 percent prior to entering the euro area, as a lower level would cause us to be severely affected by asymmetric shocks and therefore be unable to synchronise our business cycle with that of other euro area economies. as for the maastricht criteria, from july 2015 to november 2017, romania fulfilled all the convergence criteria in the treaty ( yet without participating in the exchange rate mechanism ). the fact that, at this moment, the reference values for the longterm interest rate and inflation are no longer complied with is a warning that efforts should be undertaken to attain nominal convergence in a lasting manner, not accidentally or temporarily. this is feasible only when the two types of convergence reinforce each other. the inherent flexibility of a managed float regime such as the one pursued by the nbr does, however, have its clear limitations, which should not be overlooked – this does not imply, by any means, that the central bank acts in a discretionary manner, taking the exchange rate wherever it wants. the abuse of flexibility can be as harmful to the proper functioning of the economy as the abuse of rigidity. in fact, the inflation - targeting regime implemented by the nbr is a mix of rules and discretion with the aim of formulating a coherent and effective monetary policy. as regards the current differences in the countries ’ approaches to euro adoption, for some it might seem odd that bulgaria, which lags behind in terms of real convergence, is considering joining the euro area sooner than romania. it is only natural for our neighbour to contemplate euro adoption as the only sound exit from the present currency board. by contrast, in romania, as well as in other countries pursuing a floating exchange rate regime, the approach is different, since euro adoption is more complex. this is by no means to say that romania does not envisage joining the euro area, but merely that a comprehensive preparation is of the essence to cope with the related challenges. the latin dictum festina lente is, in my opinion, quite suitable in the case of euro adoption as well. with respect to real convergence, many have been asking themselves “ how fast is fast enough? ”. unlike others, i would not necessarily look for a certain figure ( beyond the already 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches mentioned minimum level of roughly 70 – 75 percent ) ; i would tackle this issue by
##ed. future structure of real - time payments norway was an early adopter of digitalisation and its payments infrastructure has been worldclass. we have reaped the benefits for many years. but then the development of common infrastructure came to a halt. a number of neighbouring countries have built payment infrastructures that in some areas are now ahead of ours. common infrastructure makes sense. it enables us to realise economies of scale, a wellfunctioning payment network and a level playing field. payment service providers will be able to compete for customers supported by an efficient and secure system. banks save considerable sums because an extensive network of branches is no longer necessary. the infrastructure is a collective good that benefits everyone. 1 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches it has long been our experience that industry operators come together and agree good solutions in partnership with norges bank. but developments in technology and market structure, where payment services are increasingly becoming a competitive arena, may hinder the emergence of good common solutions. we run the risk that progress will slow and the payment system will become fragmented because the common infrastructure is eroding. we must now consider whether norges bank should take action to counter this fragmentation. future users of payment services will hardly be satisfied with payment transactions that take several hours or days to complete. the infrastructure for real - time payments is therefore critical. in 2016, norges bank took the initiative on a joint project with the banking industry to put in place an improved real - time payment platform. in spring, norwegian banks declined the invitation to participate in the p27 project. the soon - to - be - launched straks 2. 0 instant payment platform is an improvement, but not a permanent solution for real - time payments in norway. among other things, it is not sufficiently well - suited to business users. the question is how we proceed from here. it has proved to be a challenge to drum up support for carrying out the necessary modernisation of the infrastructure owned by industry bodies. norges bank has launched a project to assess the payment and settlement system as a whole. the aim is to ensure that we have an efficient and secure payment infrastructure also in the future. some key issues are : should our payment infrastructure continue to be all - norwegian or could it be more international? in that case, how do we resolve the questions relating to national contingency preparedness? should payments continue to be cleared between banks prior to settlement at the central bank, or is it more efficient to settle

remaining the core source of financing. with this mind, we are looking forward to an accelerated timeframe for the review of the overall size of the imf quotas. we would also support an initiative discussed at the executive board to make better use of existing sdrs for the benefit of poorer members, and repeat our call for a new general allocation of sdrs. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
make it difficult for potential d - sibs to hold high - quality liquid debt instruments as “ pre - emptive ” liquidity buffers against early signs of stress. hence, there is a need to find an appropriate way to deal with this issue, until debt markets in the region witness significant improvements. to conclude, it should be stressed that strengthening the banking supervision exercise in our countries is key to tackling systemic risk in d - sibs and other financial institutions. excellencies ladies & gentlemen with this i come to the end of my speech, but before i close, i would like to thank the fsi of bis and the amf, for holding this important high level meeting here in abu dhabi, uae. i wish you all a successful meeting. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

look forward to our discussion. 1 these remarks represent my own views, which do not necessarily represent those of the federal reserve board or the federal open market committee. 2 the fed also used its open market operations authority to purchase agency residential and commercial mortgage - backed securities and conducted repo operations with an expanded set of global counterparties. some of the 13 ( 3 ) facilities were versions of those that had been used during the 2008 financial crisis and others were new, such as corporate credit facilities, which directly purchased corporate bonds to support the flow of credit to the economy. all 13 ( 3 ) lending facilities require the approval of the secretary of the treasury. for further details, see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2021 ), " funding, credit, liquidity, and loan facilities, " webpage. 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches 3 for a further description of these actions, see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2021 ), " supervisory and regulatory actions in response to covid19, " webpage. 4 for a discussion of the 13 ( 3 ) lending facilities and their usage, see board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 2020 ), financial stability report ( pdf ) ( washington : board of governors, november ). 5 this issue is most relevant when the assets purchases are those that the fed can purchase using its open market operations authority, including treasury and agency debt and agency - backed mortgage - backed securities. programs to purchase other types of debt would need the approval of the secretary of the treasury under section 13 ( 3 ) of the federal reserve act. 6 for a discussion of potential reforms, see inter - agency working group on treasury market surveillance ( 2021 ), recent disruptions and potential reforms in the u. s. treasury market : a staff progress report ( pdf ) ( washington : u. s. department of the treasury, november ) ; and inter - agency working group on treasury market surveillance ( 2022 ), enhancing the resilience of the u. s. treasury market : 2022 staff progress report ( pdf ) ( washington : u. s. department of the treasury, november ). 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches
, esg scores of individual firms differ greatly across rating agencies if compared, for example, with credit ratings. our studies find, in line with existing literature, that the correlation between the esg scores assigned to the euro - area listed companies by three of the main providers ranges from 40 to 60 per cent, compared with a correlation between credit ratings that is over 90 per cent. there is also evidence of biases in esg scores, which tend to overrate companies that are larger and belong to specific industrial sectors and geographic regions. in building our portfolio, we have carefully selected the esg provider and we have performed our own calculations, which show a significant improvement in the environmental footprint of the new portfolio. in particular, compared with the composition of the old one, the shareholdings included in the new portfolio are characterised by much lower greenhouse gas emissions ( down by 23 per cent ) as well as by lower energy and water consumption ( by 30 and 17 per cent respectively ). the lack of disclosed data and the lack of disclosure standards prevent esg - score providers from correctly assessing the sustainability of business practices. in europe, a directive requires large companies to provide information on the way they operate and manage environmental and social challenges ; this directive applies to approximately 6, 000 companies with more than 500 employees. the importance of this issue, however, warrants further public action for small and medium enterprises and, especially, for enhancing the standardisation of data for all firms. the last issue that i would like to discuss concerns market neutrality. as a central bank, our investment strategy has always been careful in avoiding being a source of market distortion. and this principle of market neutrality has been preserved in the new portfolio : among the companies with a high esg score, we have selected those that have kept the distance between the new portfolio and the market benchmark below a specific threshold. as a result, we have improved the esg score of our portfolio at the expense of only a slight increase in the ex ante tracking error vis - a - vis the benchmark ( which comprises all the listed non - financial corporations in the euro area ). we could question, however, whether this principle should be fully preserved or rather be revised in a context in which, in the absence of further regulation, market forces are pushing greenhouse gas concentrations to levels that will soon be dangerous for the wellbeing of people, not to speak of the stability of the financial system. i believe that this is an important topic,

which i leave as an open issue and which certainly warrants further research. designed by the printing and publishing division of the bank of italy
land, and recognises their continuing connection to country. we pay our respects to their elders, past, present and emerging.

in the opposite direction, perhaps concern about the weakness in export volumes or broader apprehension about the widening current account deficit itself. graph 2 graph 3 conclusion what do we make of all this? the big picture is, i think, that the world business cycle is still at an early stage of expansion, so we can expect continued economic growth over the next few years. this, together with our higher terms of trade and strong investment growth in the presence of some capacity constraints, is exerting an expansionary influence on domestic activity and upward pressure on inflation, mainly at the producer price level, although we also expect consumer price inflation to increase somewhat from its present rate. at the same time, the economy is at present being affected by some countervailing forces. consumption has slowed and house - building and farm output are falling ; these have exerted a moderating influence and may continue to do so. while there is a natural tendency to be disappointed that the second set of influences is now occurring, the fact is that the economy could not have taken on board the external situation without this moderation in the domestic economy. a failure to slow would most probably have produced the set of economic imbalances, particularly rising inflation, that have ended previous expansions. in this respect, the recent moderation in growth is more likely to prolong the expansion than bring it to an end.
ph economy : harnessing the bright spots date : may 19, 2022 occasion : adbi featured speaker webinar series speaker : bsp governor benjamin e. diokno good day, everyone. it is my pleasure to join you today and share updates on the philippine economy. the philippines is well into the recovery process. after the pandemic - driven recession in 2020, the economy grew by 5. 7 percent last year and sustained its robust momentum with an 8. 3 percent growth in the first quarter of 2022. growth in the first quarter was broad - based. on the supply side, all sectors expanded, driven by industry at 10. 4 percent, followed by services at 8. 6 percent. on the expenditure side, growth was driven by private consumption which grew by 10. 1 percent. gross capital formation expanded by 20. 0 percent. growth of government final consumption was subdued at 3. 6 percent. the employment picture is close to pre - pandemic level. from a peak of 17. 6 percent in april 2020, unemployment rate is down to just 5. 8 percent in march this year. moreover, foreign direct investments grew 54. 2 percent to all - time high last year. in the first two months of the year, fdis grew by 8. 0 percent to usd1. 7 billion. manufacturing activity has also rebounded, with the purchasing managers ’ index hitting 54. 3 in april, the highest in over four years. both business sentiment and consumer outlook have improved. our business expectation survey show broad improvements in outlook for the coming months. all these came on the back of a whole - of - government approach to recovery. in tandem with the national government ’ s efforts, the bangko sentral ng pilipinas rolled out its own list of covid - response measures. first, we cut our policy rate by a cumulative 200 basis points to a record low of two percent, which helped stimulate provision of credit to productive activities. we also reduced our reserve requirement against deposit and deposit substitute liabilities. for universal - commercial banks and non - bank financial institutions with quasi - banking functions ( nbqbs ), we reduced the reserve requirement from 14 percent to 12 percent effective 3 april 2020. for thrift banks and rural / cooperative banks, we reduced it from 4 percent to 3 percent effective 31 july 2020. second, we extended time - bound liquidity support to the national government and purchased government securities to help finance its pandemic -

part, the bsp is prepared to take preemptive action when there are stronger indications of a possible disanchoring of inflation expectations. in closing, while the philippines is on track in achieving full economic recovery in the near term, we must all collectively continue to work together to overcome current and emerging challenges. now more than ever, we must put a premium on stronger international cooperation to achieve our vision of a green, resilient, and inclusive global economy. thank you for your attention. #
##ance, to expand its reach, and to lift millions more of our countrymen from poverty to a better quality of life through microfinance. again, my congratulations to all our awardees, to citi and all those involved in this annual search for outstanding microentrepreneurs. mabuhay ang pilipinas! salamat po sa inyong lahat.

offers several contrarian prescriptions for starting an entrepreneurial revolution, all of which, i believe, are relevant to the caribbean economic transformation agenda. i would like to highlight three key lessons for caribbean policymakers. the first lesson is to stop attempting to duplicate silicon valley. many governments have the near universal ambition to develop the next silicon valley, which is home to a veritable “ who ’ s who ” of hi - tech giants such as apple, ebay, google, intel, linkedin, and oracle. yet, ironically, silicon valley could not even replicate itself today if it tried. its ecosystem evolved from the convergence of a unique set of circumstances : a large pool of skilled engineers and scientists from major universities in the area ; the laid - back but driven for speed california culture ; generous funding from a strong aerospace market with the defense department ; development of an efficient network of venture capital firms ; the institutional leadership of world - class stanford university ; and pure luck, among other things. in 2008, the government of trinidad and tobago decided to create its own version of silicon valley by investing an estimated us $ 150 million in the caribbean ’ s first science and technology park, known as the tamana intech park. the principal purpose of the tamana intech park was to drive economic diversification in trinidad and tobago through the establishment of technology intensive, knowledge - driven industries in the non - energy sectors. the park would be home to major technology players and the place where groundbreaking and innovative ideas would emerge. one of the park ’ s largest tenants, the university of trinidad and tobago ( utt ), would provide the necessary synergy between industry and academia in bringing emerging technologies to market. unfortunately, despite several expressions of interest, tamana intech park is yet to sign one tenant. ladies and gentlemen, this brings me to my second lesson. trinidad and tobago ’ s experience with tamana intech park shows that governments cannot build ecosystems alone. governments should engage the private sector, ideally from the start, and let it keep or acquire a significant stake in the ecosystem ’ s success. one way the government of trinidad and tobago could avoid problems such as the empty buildings in tamana intech park would be to seek matching funds from private investors, either locally or overseas. bis central bankers ’ speeches the government can directly approach technology investment firms and technology researchers to determine what they need to develop a world - class industry. if the private investor then offers to match say half of the funds,
unchanged repo rate and the presumed path for the exchange rate are then incorporated in the main scenario for inflation. as inflation ’ s future course is not a straightforward matter, we also include assessments of uncertainties. the overall picture of inflation prospects amounts in practice to an estimate of probabilities. the assessments in the main scenario imply favourable economic fundamentals : a growth rate between 2. 5 and 3 per cent between 1998 and 2000, low inflation and a rising government surplus. domestic demand in the main scenario is expected to generate a relatively limited increase in inflation ’ s underlying rate, from 1. 1 per cent at present to 1. 6 per cent at the end of next year and 2 per cent in the autumn of 2000. the 12 - month change in cpi inflation is expected to be somewhat below the inflation target in one to two years time but the figure at the end of the period is judged to be approximately 2 per cent. all this means that at the end of the period under review, inflation is relatively well in line with the riksbank ’ s target. it should be underscored, however, that the assessment of inflation prospects is more difficult than usual on account of the financial turbulence. this naturally reflects the international unrest but the political situation after the general election in sweden has also left its mark on price setting, above all in the currency market. inflation prospects and the future path of monetary policy accordingly depend on two - contrary - factors : on the one hand, the international economic trend could be weaker than we have counted on and thereby lead to lower inflation ; on the other, a sustained weak exchange rate that has no counterpart in a weaker real economy could generate increased inflationary pressure. our monetary policy conclusion is that we will go on analysing the course of events and appraise monetary policy continuously in the light of new information. hopefully, the analysis in the inflation report should give an indication of our line of reasoning about the inflation outlook in sweden and the future path of monetary policy that is as clear as possible in the global economy ’ s present state of uncertainty. the unsettled situation in international financial markets has meant that investors are shifting to currencies which are historically secure. as a result, other currencies, particularly those of smaller economies, have weakened. this tendency has been evident for the swedish krona in recent weeks and very clear in the last few days. the recent path of the swedish krona is not consistent with the development of our economy

’ s fundamentals. under these circumstances the riksbank has chosen to use currency interventions to underscore that the movements in the krona ’ s exchange rate have been unduly abrupt and exaggerated.