a man has once got his name in a banking house he rolls in money ”, that turned out not to be the case for her brother henry. banking was for a time profitable, but unwise lending led to the collapse of alton bank, followed by the collapse of henry ’ s london bank and his bankruptcy in 1816. depositors in these banks, including jane austen herself, were left out of pocket. while there is a familiar ring to parts of this sorry tale, you can be comforted that our job at the bank of england is to protect the value of the new jane austen note. in fact, maintaining confidence in our currency is the fundamental responsibility of your central bank. that extends to maintaining its value, protecting against counterfeiting, and also ensuring that the choice of character on the notes commands respect and legitimacy. the bank of england has, through its banknotes, a unique and rare opportunity to promote awareness of britain ’ s history and to acknowledge the life and work of its greatest citizens. after the announcement of the churchill note concerns were expressed that – in the absence of any other changes to the bank of england ’ s notes – none of the four characters on our notes would be a woman. that was not the bank ’ s intention ; we have listened and we fully understand the concerns raised by many people, including some whom i am delighted to see here today. we believe that our notes should celebrate the full diversity of great british historical figures and their contributions in a wide range of fields. the bank is committed to that objective, and we want people to have confidence in our commitment to diversity. that is why i am today announcing a review of the selection process for future banknote characters. bis central bankers ’ speeches there are two objectives : first, to review the principles and refine the criteria that guide the choice of historical characters for banknotes ; and second, to establish a process to ensure that potential candidates are consistently and transparently judged against those criteria. the review will be led by chris salmon, the bank ’ s chief cashier, who will be meeting with interested parties as well as inviting feedback from members of the public via our website. the conclusions will be announced by the end of the year. now let me introduce a real expert to tell you a bit more about jane austen and her time at chawton. elizabeth proudman is chairman of the jane austen society, and i would like to thank her, along with ann channon and staff here at jane austen

andrew bailey : the capital adequacy of banks – today ’ s issues and what we have learned from the past speech by mr andrew bailey, deputy governor of prudential regulation and chief executive officer of the prudential regulation authority at the bank of england, at bloomberg, london, 10 july 2014. * * * i would like to thank david curry, hywel dawes, simon dixon, marc farag, john jackson, duncan mackinnon, sasha mills, jitendra patil, rhys phillips, david rule and vicky saporta for their help in preparing this speech. the views expressed are my own and not necessarily those of any other members of the bank of england. good morning and thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak on the subject of bank capital adequacy. i am going to focus on the design of the capital adequacy regime. i am going to draw out the failings of the old regime and why those failings were so critical, comment on the major progress made over recent years, and use all of this to draw out design questions that remain to be settled. in doing so, i will examine a set of key objectives of the regime : first, that it creates good incentives for the behaviour of regulated firms ; second, that it is appropriately forward - looking – at the risks in the future ; and third, that it encourages and requires appropriate transparency which fosters market discipline. covering the failings of previous regimes is not simply some academic exercise, it is crucial in understanding why regulators have taken the actions they have, and why there is still some work to be done. the basel capital adequacy regime dates back to the basel accord of 1988, which led to the introduction of what we now know as basel i. this was an historic agreement, representing the first international initiative on bank capital standards. basel i focussed mainly on the assessment of the quantity of credit risk, and had a ( what now looks like ) simple categorisation of assets on risk grounds into one of five categories, with risk weightings of 0 %, 20 %, 50 %, 100 % and finally a set of assets that were fully deducted from capital, the most risky sort. there was also a simple reporting framework for off balance sheet items which were factored into the risk - weighted asset framework. basel i also set out for the first time an internationally agreed definition of the quality of qualifying capital for banks