very different types of technology with specific safety features and costs. dlt may be fit for both, but in different ways. second, anonymity towards the central bank can be achieved only with value - based dbm. these factors may influence the demand for dbm by non - banks and whether dbm would be used more to substitute cash or bank deposits. options for providing dbm with that distinction in mind, let me now turn to the way dbm could be provided to non - banks. a straightforward approach would be to allow non - banks to convert commercial bank deposits into dbm at a rate of 1 to 1. as cash can always be paid into a bank account, this would of course also allow non - banks to convert cash into dbm. it may be argued that with such an approach bank runs could unfold more easily and faster. nonbanks could react to bad news about a certain bank by quickly switching their deposits into default - free dbm – there would be no need to keep the cash under the mattress. this would counteract important regulatory efforts to reduce excess volatility in the movement of funds between types of investment yet it is already easy to switch deposits from a bank hit by bad news to another commercial bank that is perceived as safe, so i don ’ t see an additional risk of bank runs in the event of an idiosyncratic banking event. the situation would be different in a systemic banking crisis, though. if depositors perceived the entire commercial banking sector as fragile, a sector - wide run might be made more likely and severe by dbm, negatively impacting the efficiency of financial markets. depending on how attractive dbm is for non - banks, a more gradual substitution of commercial bank deposits by dbm is of course possible too. this could have different effects on commercial banks. for example, commercial banks with excess central bank reserves could reduce their excess reserves when they experience a dbm - induced deposit outflow. this could increase their profitability in the current situation, as deposits bear a higher interest rate than excess reserves. but banks without excess central bank reserves might need to replace deposits by central bank credit. they would need to provide more collateral to the central bank. and the interest rate to be paid on central bank credit may, at least in normal times, be higher than the average rate on customer deposits. the profitability of these banks might suffer. a consequence could be higher interest rates on bank loans. these effects may require

##6. section 6. see breitenfellner, a., r. holzmann, m. silgoner and t. zorner. 2022. quo vadis, productivity? oenb occasional paper 1. 1 – 72 ; holzmann, r. and m. t. valderrama. 2021. raising r * : why, how and if not now, when? suerf policy note 253. 1 – 9. see e. g. caballero, r. j., t. hoshi and a. k. kashyap. 2008. zombie lending and depressed restructuring in japan. american economic review 98 ( 5 ). 1943 – 77 ; banerjee, r. n. and b. hofmann. 2020. corporate zombies : anatomy and life cycle. bis working paper 882 ; and citations therein. see european central bank. 2011. approaches to monetary policy revisited – lessons from the crisis. sixth ecb central banking conference, 18 - 19 november 2010. conference proceedings. 168 – 173. expectations. 9 keeping inflation expectations anchored, as we would say today, minimizes the period of transition back to price stability and, thus, also minimizes output and employment losses. 10 well - anchored inflation expectations considerably reduce the extent to which current high inflation rates could become engrained in the system, e. g. through wage - price spirals. moreover, according to alexandre lamfalussy, the most effective anti - inflationary measures are measures that “ bite : ” people tend to “ give pride of place to those facts that affect their daily life, rather than to statistics. ” 11 he thought that while promises of future convergence to fixed rules or targets may serve a useful role, actions and results that substantiate this commitment are at least as important. 12 what can we learn from baron lamfalussy ’ s thinking of more than four decades ago? well, a good deal. as i argued in a recent presentation13 in october 2022 in warsaw, monetary policy must be credible – now more than ever : monetary policy credibility is crucial to maintain inflation expectations anchored and to minimize the costs of disinflation. for precisely this reason, we – the members of the governing council of the ecb – did not disregard the influence of the current inflationary surge by taking a “ wait - and - see ” approach in the euro area. ultimately, the losses we as euro