( 1878 ), pp. 383 - 396. bis central bankers ’ speeches it is hardly surprising that only a third of people believe markets work in the interests of society. 2 the more people see, the less they like. people trust markets less with age. and yet, most people think markets will become ever more important. and they ’ re right. as i wrote this week to g20 leaders, the structure of financial system has changed significantly since the crisis. virtually all of the net credit since the crisis has been from the bond markets and the size of assets under management has increased by 60 % to $ 74 trillion. real markets don ’ t just happen. they depend on the quality of the market infrastructure. that means hard infrastructure, the plumbing of markets that determines the mechanics of markets ; and soft infrastructure, like standards and codes that define how market participants should behave. robust market infrastructure is a public good. but like many public goods it risks being undersupplied. if taken for granted the infrastructure that supports markets won ’ t keep pace with their dynamism ; just as it failed to do so in the run - up to the crisis. we all have a responsibility to stop this from happening again. that ’ s why i am delighted that so many people are here today, joining those that have already participated in panels in manchester and cambridge. i am also very pleased that we will be hearing from many others who are attending parallel forums in birmingham and edinburgh. and that people are already sharing comments, ideas and thoughts on social media. for the first time, people who connect with markets from all sides and in all ways are being brought together. not just bankers, traders and regulators ; but companies, investors, workers, academics, judges, trade unionists and journalists. that ’ s important. because we all rely on markets and we are all affected by them. and because everyone who connects with markets can help rebuild the real markets we need. the good news is that today isn ’ t the beginning of this process. over the past seven years, a huge programme of reform has been underway to fix the fault lines that led to the crisis and to build more resilient sources of finance to serve the real economy. 3 the uk has played a leading role, consistent with our position as the pre - eminent global financial centre. 40 % of global foreign exchange trading goes through london. half of all trades in otc interest rate derivatives. two - thirds of trading in

monetary policy that has been conducted. it is a little like taking medicine in connection with an illness and when cured drawing the conclusion that it was unnecessary to take the medicine. on this point i feel that the events of spring 2015 are a good illustration. the ecb had announced in january that it intended to buy securities over slightly more than a year to come for the equivalent of sek 10, 000 billion ( around 2. 5 times the size of swedish gdp ). this is indeed a very substantial monetary policy intervention. within the course of just a few weeks the krona exchange rate appreciated significantly against the euro, from almost 9. 65 krona per euro to just over 9. 10. this was in itself a large appreciation of almost 6 per cent, but the real danger lay in the fact that it could have been much worse. during 2014 and up to spring 2015 the us dollar and the british pound sterling had appreciated by between 15 and 25 per cent against the euro. there was agreement on the market that differences in monetary policy were decisive for the different development paths of these currencies and the swedish krona against the euro. if the swedish krona had in this situation so to speak appreciated level with the dollar and sterling, the total appreciation would have been around 30 per cent. this would have meant a very serious deterioration in the competitiveness of the swedish export industry and would have entirely changed the playing field for the swedish economy ( see figure 8 ). under such circumstances there would certainly not have been any growth in the vicinity of 4 per cent in 2015. my own impression is that the risk the swedish economy was exposed to at this stage is severely underestimated by many commentators. they appear to assume that the strong performance in 2015 would have happened more or less regardless of monetary policy and the krona exchange rate. the fact that the riksbank in february reacted by introducing a negative repo rate and beginning to buy government bonds is not considered to have played any major role. although it is possible that the outcome would not have been quite as bad as i have outlined above, i think that it is extremely misguided to assume that monetary policy was more or less insignificant. there is also good reason for a reminder of a circumstance that tends to be forgotten. the current debate sometimes gives the impression that the swedish economy has for some time been in a situation of almost overheating. but the fact is that we fairly recently, according to most empirical estimates, once again attained