participated, presented several additional “ new ideas ” in this context. most recently the discussion focussed on ricardo caballero ’ s analysis of the “ surprising ” nature of the recent crisis. he stressed that the “ surprise ” was not the decline in property prices, but the repercussions this had in the financial sector. the unexpected departure from the normal functioning of the financial system plunged agents into unquantifiable uncertainty. this unleashed panic, characterised by a “ flight to safety ” and fire asset sales that amplified the crisis. at this point, the role of the authorities is to fight the panic, which involves providing some form of insurance. in the 2008 conference, anil kashyap and his co - authors suggested that capital insurance could be provided by the private sector, while in 2009 caballero argued that only the state can insure against systemic risk. necessarily, any insurance arrangement is contingent, so it may share some of the features of contingent convertible bonds. however, if all banks were required to contribute to a common insurance pool, the risk coverage would be spread more broadly than if the scheme is limited to the “ too - big - to - fail ” banks. caballero proposed tradable insurance credits ( tics ) that institutions could attach to individual assets or liabilities on their balance sheets. since tics could be traded between banks, they would allow insurance coverage to flow to where it is needed in a crisis, without the authorities needing to specify in advance the nature of the contingent event to be covered. banks that find themselves less exposed in a crisis could choose to sell their insurance to distressed banks at a premium, a reward for prudence that most insurance schemes do not offer. i find some of these features attractive, but any insurance scheme is also subject to important limitations. private insurance schemes require freezing huge amounts of resources to cover the insurance promises. the failure of some mono - line insurers in the recent crisis indicates that private sector resources can turn out to be insufficient, aggravating financial instability. on the other hand, public sector insurance schemes jeopardise the sustainability of public finances as they transfer the risks to the taxpayer and distort incentives as mentioned above. 3. conclusion let me conclude. financial crises are an inevitable part of the business cycle. it would be misguided to expect to eliminate them completely. however, we do have a responsibility to learn from them in order to reduce the inefficiencies in

, road authorities, storage facility companies and ports / air port authorities to raise money through capital markets in countries of the area, especially countries that are capital surplus ones. the area can draw on the experience of the uae in this respect, when it allowed its banking system to raise money for indian companies as early as the eighties of last century. certain indian companies were allowed to raise capital against certain commitments and undertakings. this was possible through the high requirements and standards implemented in both india and the uae at that time. we believe indian companies were able to benefit from such funds for a long period of time. many of such companies are large conglomerates now. providing a special window for infrastructural projects will benefit the flow of trade and investments across regions of the area, and will help to sustain growth of economies. excellencies ladies & gentlemen the distinguished panel speakers with this i come to the end of my speech, but before i close, i would like to thank the organizers of this important forum for inviting me and for the excellent arrangements. thank you for your attention.