m1. currie argued that collection of monetary data was necessary for the federal reserve to control the money supply, which in turn would facilitate the stabilization of the price level and of the economy more generally. 4 in 1934, marriner eccles asked currie to join the treasury department, and later that year, when eccles was appointed to head the federal reserve, he took currie with him. currie ’ s tenure at the federal reserve helped to spark new interest in monetary board of governors of the federal reserve system ( 1998 ), 1 - 001. in his recent history of the federal reserve, allan meltzer ( 2003, p. 66 ) notes of some of the act ’ s proponents that : " [ o ] ne of their principal aims was to increase the seasonal response, or elasticity, of the note issue by eliminating the provisions of the national banking act that tied the amount of currency to the stock of government bonds. " see mankiw and miron ( 1986 ) for a discussion of the fed ’ s seasonal interest - rate smoothing. the federal reserve did publish data on the issuance of federal reserve notes from its inception. federal reserve notes were only part of total currency in circulation, however, the remainder being made up of national bank notes, united states notes, treasury notes, gold and silver certificates, and gold and silver coin. beginning in 1915, the federal reserve bulletin included data on currency that had been collected by the treasury and data on total bank deposits that had been collected by the office of the comptroller of the currency as a byproduct of its regulatory role, but publication was irregular. indeed, the federal reserve ’ s adherence to the real bills doctrine - which counseled against active monetary management in favor of supplying money only as required to meet " the needs of trade " - gave the new institution little reason to pay attention to changes in the money stock. see humphrey ( 1986 ) for a history of the real bills doctrine. the constraints of the gold standard also restricted ( without entirely precluding ) active monetary management by the federal reserve. in the second edition of his book, currie ( 1935 ) wrote : " the achievement of desirable objectives … rests entirely upon the effectiveness of control. the achievement, for example, of the objective of a price level varying inversely with the productive efficiency of society demands a highly energetic central banking policy and a high degree of effectiveness of monetary control … even for the achievement of the more modest objective of lessening business fluctuations by

systems. inspections, including those of a partial nature, have been intensified. a start has been made on action to strengthen internal control systems, which were found to be inadequate in some cases. the reaction has been positive, but the process of adapting to higher standards is not yet complete. the corporate culture of several big financial groups requires a thorough rethinking in order to forge a new relationship between business units and control functions. these controls must be assigned greater importance than in the past. the performance of depositary banks ’ activities require organizational structures and working processes capable of curtailing the operational and reputational risks to which custodians are subject. the regulatory framework governing this sector in italy fosters reliable and transparent conduct : for example, the distinction between management companies and depositary banks makes it easier to control their operations, the quality of valuations and the actual amount of assets held for custody. this arrangement has prevented the emergence of similar risks to those seen in other systems. efforts must continue to make this activity even more effective and secure for customers. derivatives business can expose banks to major legal and reputational risks, as the numerous ongoing legal disputes testify. for some time now we have intensified our activity on this front, both by reminding banks of the need for proper conduct and careful risk assessment, and through the monitoring of the phenomenon, including via targeted on - site controls. we must not lower our guard. one aspect that can condition supervisory activity is the availability of full information on the activity of foreign branches, and to some extent also of the subsidiaries present in italy, when their role is merely to distribute products developed abroad, often in london. in these cases it becomes difficult to obtain, even during on - site examinations, the documentation needed to reconstruct the operations of the foreign intermediary in italy ; in some cases the transactions in question are complex, exposing banks to high operational, legal and reputational risks that are difficult to quantify. in accordance with the division of responsibilities under community legislation, there is a need for greater cooperation between foreign intermediaries and the authorities of the countries in which they offer their services. improvements in transparency are necessary : foreign intermediaries must also comply with the advertising obligations, follow the rules on contracts and, in general, set up customer relations on a completely correct basis. it is essential, in particular, that a careful selection be made of agents responsible for distributing credit cards, a sector in which several foreign banks are very active. a