as well as special arrangements for rapidly reducing the primary credit rate to the federal funds rate in an emergency. we also have improved the ability of the board to approve the extension of emergency discount window credit. the federal financial agencies took immediate steps to work together to identify new vulnerabilities exposed by september 11. these efforts were coordinated under the umbrella of the president ’ s working group on financial markets, the financial and banking infrastructure information committee ( fbiic ), and, for depository institutions more specifically, the federal financial institutions examination council ( ffiec ). the agencies have implemented a duty officer program and developed communications protocols for dealing with their staffs, regulated financial institutions, and the public. we have also developed and tested facilities for secure communication among ourselves and with other agencies. the agencies that participate in fbiic, including the federal reserve, and that have direct supervisory and regulatory responsibilities for the financial sector have assessed potential system vulnerabilities. we have shared that information with the department of homeland security ( dhs ). indeed, i would like to commend the dhs for their work to share information and coordinate with the financial sector including the fbiic during the recent elevation of the threat level to orange for financial services firms in new york city, northern new jersey, and washington, d. c. the timely communications and sharing of information enabled financial - sector participants and law enforcement authorities to take steps to mitigate risks so that customers of financial services firms were able to conduct business in the usual fashion. financial - sector participants, including the financial regulators, strengthened business - resumption plans with an overall goal of ensuring the smooth operation of the financial system. previously, terrorist attacks were treated as low - probability / high - impact events affecting a single institution. as a result of september 11, industry participants are now planning for events that affect wide areas, last longer, and involve loss of life or widespread destruction of property and information assets. the process of strengthening the resilience of the financial system and, in particular, organizations that could have a systemic effect if they were disabled, is being accomplished through the existing regulatory framework. more than a year ago, in april 2003, the federal reserve, the office of the comptroller of the currency ( occ ), and the securities and exchange commission ( sec ) issued an interagency paper on sound practices to strengthen the resilience of the u. s. financial system. the paper formalizes a set of sound practices

maintaining a capacity to trace and remedy faults. the ultimate purpose of the riksbank ’ s role as overseer of financial stability is to prevent both conventional and financial crises in the financial system. in concrete terms, the work entails following developments in the financial sector in the short term, primarily in the major banks, and working with structural changes, crisis management and regulation. an important part of the riksbank ’ s work in this field concerns cooperation with other authorities and companies in the financial sector. the importance of cooperation between authorities and private agents there is considerable common interest in creating resilience in the financial sector, which is based on the agents ’ dependence on one another. the entire system is dependent on the general public having confidence in the payment system as a whole. cooperation between the agents in the financial markets is necessary to find joint solutions and to be able to benefit from economies of scale. moreover, it is important to ensure joint basic conditions, such as access to electricity, telecommunications, fuel and water. the riksbank has actively conducted discussions in various contexts for some years now to disseminate information on how the payment system functions and how individual agents ’ attitudes to business continuity and crisis recovery planning affect the system as a whole. these discussions have mainly been conducted in three contexts. one of them is the cooperation for economic security ( soes ), which is called together by the swedish emergency management agency and where the participants include the riksbank, finansinspektionen ( the swedish financial supervisory authority ), the swedish social insurance administration and the national labour market board. another is the financial sector ’ s private - public sector cooperation body ( fspos ) that is called together by finansinspektionen and consists of representatives of the riksbank, finansinspektionen, the swedish bankers ’ association, independent savings banks, securities companies and insurance companies. the third discussion forum i would like to mention is the reference group for the payment system called together by the riksbank and consisting of representatives from vpc ab, bankgirocentralen, stockholm stock exchange, the major banks and the swedish bankers ’ association. part of the work in these working groups has entailed charting the flows and the infrastructure of the payment system. the charting process began as an internal project at the riksbank, with a general review of the payment system ’ s basic conditions, agents and services. this has since functioned as a basis