were being distributed. indeed, while in emerging economies globalisation has liberated hundreds of millions of people from crushing poverty, in advanced economies the real incomes of those in the lower half of distribution have remained at the same level as a few decades ago. it is not surprising then that many have felt left behind. anxiety is growing. the policy responses to this have at times been reminiscent of the interwar period : isolationism, protectionism, nationalism. and this also happened in previous eras. at the end of the first phase of globalisation, in the early 20th century, several countries, including those with a tradition of immigration, such as australia or the united states, introduced restrictions on immigrants, in reaction to fears among workers that new entrants who were willing to accept lower pay would take away their jobs. but while such policy responses can be justifiably rejected, it must not prevent us from reviewing how the mode of european integration itself has also contributed to disaffection. here again, de gasperi ’ s own prescient words help us understand what has happened : “ if we restrict ourselves to creating shared institutions, without a higher political will invigorated by a central body in which the wills of nations come together (... ) we risk the possibility that compared with the various national strengths, this european venture may seem cold and lifeless – it could even at times appear a superfluous and even oppressive extravagance ”. 4 the structure of the european union is solid and its fundamental values remain its base. but the integration process needs to be guided towards outcomes that are more efficient and more directly aimed at the people, their needs and their fears – and less focused on institution - building. european institutions are not accepted per se by the people, but only as necessary instruments to provide those outcomes. yet on other occasions it has been institutional incompleteness that has prevented authorities from being able to handle the challenges arising from external shocks. consider the schengen agreement. it largely abolished europe ’ s internal borders, but it did not envisage a strengthening of the continent ’ s external borders. so when the migration crisis erupted, it was seen as a destabilising loss of security. the response of both the european union and the member states to these needs and fears has so far been insufficient. surveys show that, together with a drop in support for economic integration, trust in both the european union and even more so the member states has fallen. 5

begin by pooling only what is strictly essential to the achievement of our immediate aims, and do this by means of flexible formulae which can be gradually and progressively applied ”. 3 speech on the occasion of his election to the presidency of the common assembly of the european coal and steel community, strasbourg, 11 may 1954. r. nurkse ( 1944 ). “ international currency experience ”. geneva : league of nations. speech to the consultative assembly of the council of europe, strasbourg, 16 september 1952. bis central bankers ’ speeches and joint action had to be focused on areas where, evidently, individual action by governments was not sufficient : joint control over the raw materials of war, in particular coal and steel, was one of the first examples. in this way, the founders of the european project were able to pair effectiveness with legitimacy, since the process was legitimised by both popular consensus and the support of governments. it was focused on areas where the action of european institutions and the benefits for the people were directly and visibly related. and joint action did not limit the authority of governments, but rather buttressed it, and thus found their backing. but it was not only the disastrous experience of the past that motivated de gasperi and his contemporaries. it was also the immediate successes which were made possible by the initial decisions of the post - war period. the achievements of working together the establishment of peace – the crowning achievement of the european project – immediately produced growth and laid the foundation for prosperity. set against this was the devastation wrought by the two world wars. real gdp per capita fell by 14 % during world war one and by 22 % during world war two, wiping out many of the gains that had been made during the preceding years. economic integration built on peace in turn produced significant improvements in living standards. since 1960 cumulative growth in real gdp per capita has been 33 % higher in the eu15 than in the us. incomes in poorer european countries have also converged towards those enjoyed by richer ones. and eu citizens have gained the right to live, work and trade throughout the union – and to benefit from equal protection, wherever they are, provided by european courts of law. indeed, the process of coming together in a single market, one of the greatest achievements of the european project, was never solely about increasing market integration and efficiency. it was above all a choice of values of a free, open society – a choice made by the people of the european union. the european project