obligations on account of the protracted recession. these developments imply that it is imperative for banks to strengthen their capital base – a process which is already under way. anticipating these challenges, early in 2011 the bank of greece, in cooperation with the international monetary fund, the european commission and the european central bank, began planning a number of measures to safeguard financial stability. these measures include : meeting short - term liquidity needs through the eurosystem, formulating, in cooperation with the government, a resolution regime for credit institutions, and applying it where necessary ; securing €50 billion from the financial support programme for the banking system ’ s recapitalisation and restructuring. the objective : a sound, strong and competitive banking system the banking sector, following its restructuring, will be more sound, efficient and robust. the publication of banks ’ capital needs will substantially increase transparency, which will in turn help banks to gradually regain the confidence of markets and depositors. this will enable them to better perform their fundamental role of financial intermediation and contribute to the return of the greek economy to a path of sustainable growth. bis central bankers ’ speeches the future of the country is in our hands projections for domestic economic developments in 2012 are fraught with uncertainties. the economic outlook for the euro area is also subject to uncertainties, linked to the possibility of an intensification of the sovereign debt crisis. it is against this challenging backdrop that the greek economy needs to make steady progress. to this end, work to win the war on all fronts has to continue uninterrupted from the very first day of the post - election period, starting with the construction of an efficient and flexible state that will serve both the competitive functioning of markets and social cohesion. this will avert conditions leading not only to our sacrifices going to waste, but also to a drastic deterioration in the standard of living. thus, the speedy implementation of the policies contained in the second adjustment programme will place the economy back on track to recovery by the end of 2013 and gradually into a virtuous circle of confidence - fiscal balance - growth. therefore, we all must assume the historical responsibility of making the choice – as a society, as a political system, as responsible citizens. the future of the country is today in our hands. bis central bankers ’ speeches

yannis stournaras : greece and the eurozone at a crossroads speech by mr yannis stournaras, governor of the bank of greece, at an event organized by the young presidents'organization, athens, 23 september 2016. * * * it is a great pleasure to be here today and have the chance to share with you my thoughts on the policy steps that greece and the euro area should take in order to address crisis legacies and to ensure the long - term prosperity of our people. 1. brief overview of the greek and euro area crisis the euro area crisis can be regarded as a current account crisis. before 2008, capital flows from euro area core countries were invested in non - tradable sectors ( public consumption and residential sector ) in the periphery. the increase in domestic spending, whether public or private, caused upward pressures on wages and prices harming competitiveness and export performance and further worsening the current account of peripheral countries. over time, stock imbalances accumulated with private and / or public sectors becoming over - leveraged. the fallout from the international financial crisis of 2008 was a sudden stop in inflows to the periphery, triggering a sovereign debt crisis in greece and banking crises in spain and ireland as property markets collapsed. in greece, the sovereign crisis weakened banks, resulting in increased financial fragility and a banking crisis. in ireland, and to a lesser extent spain, the banking crisis weakened the sovereign. as banks and sovereigns lost market access, private sector capital was replaced by official sector financing, accompanied by strict adjustment programmes to correct the flow imbalances – the current account and fiscal deficits. for greece, at least, the consequences were severe – a fall in gdp of over 25 % and a sharp rise in unemployment. this deterioration in the macroeconomic environment caused debt servicing problems in households and companies with the consequence that non - performing loans ( npls ) rose, weakening the asset quality of banks. similar, if less severe, consequences were observed in the rest of the periphery. hence, the root causes of the euro area crisis and the delayed and interrupted recovery reflect failures in the area of what we call today macroprudential supervision, government failures, especially on the fiscal front, and several structural weaknesses at the level of individual member states, as well as in the design of the economic and monetary union ( emu ). many analysts have said that if in the pre - crisis period we had the instruments of macroprudential