a fixed amount at the target rate, to a competitive and discriminatory price auction at market rates. we will also increase both the aggregate amount of each spra and sra operation and the limit for each counterparty. these changes will allow firms that need liquidity to bid for a higher amount in any given round. we expect that this will help distribute liquidity more efficiently to those that need it most. at the same time, we may accept larger deviations from the target rate before we step in. doing so will give the market more room to manoeuvre and clear itself without our intervention. these are the main proposed changes to our operations to reinforce the target for the overnight rate. now, i ’ m going to turn to the enhancements we are proposing to support well - functioning markets. an important part of how we participate in markets is through the management of our balance sheet. let me give you some details on that. the bank ’ s balance sheet like any company, central banks have balance sheets that need to be managed. at the bank of canada, our largest liabilities are bank notes in circulation and deposits from the federal government, which are mainly backed by the assets in our investment portfolio. almost all of the $ 94 - billion in assets held on our balance sheet consist of government of canada bonds and treasury bills. these are acquired on a regular basis through primary - market purchases on a non - competitive basis. 7 we follow three principles in acquiring these assets : prudence, transparency and neutrality. prudence is exercised primarily by selecting assets that have a low credit risk. we achieve transparency by communicating our balance - sheet activities to the public. and to attain neutrality, we act as broadly and neutrally as possible to limit market distortions from our investment activities. at present, the composition of the bank ’ s portfolio broadly reflects the composition of the federal government ’ s domestic debt. going forward, we expect that the volume of bank notes in circulation will continue to grow roughly in line with the growth of nominal gdp. this will increase the bank ’ s asset requirements. at the same time, the market demand for government of canada securities is also increasing. for example, the proportion of the federal government ’ s debt held by nonresidents has increased steadily. it has risen from almost 15 per cent in 2006 to just over the results of the bank ’ s purchases, including the value of securities purchased and the price. bis central bankers ’ speeches 25 per cent in

climate performance. there are two main reasons for this decision. first, the ecb considered this essential in order to effectively pursue its primary objective of maintaining price stability. given that carbon - intensive issuers are more vulnerable to physical and transition risks arising from climate change, large holdings of bonds from such companies pose higher financial risks to the eurosystem ’ s balance sheet, which has an impact on the implementation of its monetary policy. second, “ tilting ” the cspp also serves the ecb ’ s secondary objective of supporting the general economic policies in the union. “ tilting ” its corporate bond reinvestments towards “ greener ” companies enables the ecb to align these reinvestments with the objectives set out in the climate law, which form part of those economic policies. this action was assessed as also being conducive, and not prejudicial, to price stability. more generally, this measure ensures that the cspp complies fully with the ecb ’ s obligations under article 11 tfeu by integrating the objectives of the climate law into the definition and implementation of the ecb ’ s policies and activities. this is one of the first steps in the ecb ’ s climate action plan, but the ecb is also looking into other ways to take climate - neutrality objectives into account in its monetary policy – for example, through the collateral that we ask when providing liquidity to banks. for banking supervision, there are several dimensions that i will briefly discuss. again, we do not directly apply the climate law. the climate law does not directly relate to our tasks as a banking supervisor nor does it relate to prudential supervision. therefore the ecb does not impose an obligation on banks to take the necessary measures to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the climate law. however, we cannot ignore it. not only because we need to integrate environmental obligations into our policies due to article 11 tfeu, but also since the law will have prudential implications. therefore, the climate law and its consequences feature in our supervisory assessments, interactions with the banks and measures we take. why is that? banks will be at the forefront of the energy and climate transition, whether they want to be or not. their clients will face increasing hazards from climate change and environmental degradation as well as increasing regulation. some clients will have to wind down their operations, others will be stuck with stranded assets. a mandatory energy label has been introduced for real estate [ 10