0 5. 5 5. 0 4. 5 4. 0 fomc blue chip cbo note : the federal open market committee ( fomc ) data are quarterly, extend through june 2020, and are median projections of longer - term normal ; for 2015 : q1 and 2015 : q2, the data are central tendency midpoints. the blue chip data are biannual, extend through march 2020, and are consensus projections for 6 to 10 years in the future. the congressional budget office ( cbo ) data are biannual, extend through july 2020, and correspond to the baseline estimate of the underlying long - term rate of unemployment for the current quarter at the time of the projection. source : for fomc, summary of economic projections, available on the board ’ s website at https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / monetarypolicy / fomccalendars. htm ; for blue chip, wolters kluwer, blue chip economic indicators ; for cbo, congressional budget office ( the budget and economic outlook, 10 - year economic projections ).

##cles building in washington, d. c., on a saturday in october 1979 — before - 2credibility of the fomc ’ s commitment to price stability. chair paul volcker brought that focus to bear, and the “ volcker disinflation, ” with the continuing stewardship of alan greenspan, led to the stabilization of inflation and inflation expectations in the 1990s at around 2 percent. the monetary policies of the volcker era laid the foundation for the long period of economic stability known as the great moderation. this new era brought new challenges to the conduct of monetary policy. before the great moderation, expansions typically ended in overheating and rising inflation. since then, prior to the current pandemic - induced downturn, a series of historically long expansions had been more likely to end with episodes of financial instability, prompting essential efforts to substantially increase the strength and resilience of the financial system. 4 by the early 2000s, many central banks around the world had adopted a monetary policy framework known as inflation targeting. 5 although the precise features of inflation targeting differed from country to country, the core framework always articulated an inflation goal as a primary objective of monetary policy. inflation targeting was also associated with increased communication and transparency designed to clarify the central bank ’ s policy intentions. this emphasis on transparency reflected what was then a new appreciation that policy is most effective when it is clearly understood by the public. inflation - targeting central banks generally do not focus solely on inflation : those with “ flexible ” inflation targets take into account economic stabilization in addition to their inflation objective. the days when transparency was the hallmark of institutional accountability — and decided to change the conduct of monetary policy. see volcker and gyohten ( 1992 ) ; also see volcker ( 2008 ), pp. 73 – 74. see powell ( 2019 ). for a readable explanation of inflation targeting, see bernanke and mishkin ( 1997 ) ; also see bernanke and others ( 1999 ). - 3under ben bernanke ’ s leadership, the federal reserve adopted many of the features associated with flexible inflation targeting. 6 we made great advances in transparency and communications, with the initiation of quarterly press conferences and the summary of economic projections ( sep ), which comprises the individual economic forecasts of fomc participants. during that time, then – board vice chair janet yellen led an effort on behalf of the fomc to codify the committee ’ s