increase in december was expected and does not call into question our continuing victory over inflation. in france, inflation was even lower at 1. 8 % according to the harmonised index, ii and we expect it to average 1. 6 % in 2025. this has already enabled us at the ecb governing council, headed up by christine lagarde, to lower our key interest rates on four separate occasions, from 4 % to 3 % between june and december. as a result, property lending was able to recover, with new loans totalling eur 10. 1 billion in november – compared with a low of eur 7 billion in march – and the french economy was well financed thanks to your commitment : private sector loans grew by 1. 3 % over the year. french economic growth of 1. 1 % was higher than that of the euro area and higher than our initial forecast of 0. 9 %, due in particular to the impact of the olympic games, which will go down as an example of the major successes france can achieve when everyone 1 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches works together. lastly, employment has held up relatively well so far, with 2. 2 million jobs created over the last ten years and 1. 2 million in the last five... even if, with the unemployment rate at 7. 4 %, we are still too far from the goal of full employment. clearly, we are moving into 2025 in a position of greater uncertainty, and thus with potentially more of the wait - and - see attitude on the part of businesses and their investment, and households, whose savings rate is at an all - time high. iii and yet, i feel that the word'hope'has never been so present in the air, like some rare and yet indispensable resource. in french, the beautiful word " esperance " can express at least two expectations : the vital need for trust – and the banque de france remains more than ever an institution built on trust ; but also – if i am speaking, in front of insurers, of mathematical expectancy – a probability. so, please allow me to present you with four lucid esperances, beginning with the most probable. 1. a year of falling key interest rates in europe at 3 %, our key interest rate is well below those of the us federal reserve ( fed ) ( 4. 25 % - 4. 50 % ) and the bank of england ( 4.

george a provopoulos : the greek economy and banking system – recent developments and the way forward welcome remarks by mr george a provopoulos, governor of the bank of greece, at the conference “ the crisis in the euro area ”, athens, 23 may 2013. * * * i would like to warmly welcome you to this conference on “ the crisis in the euro area ”. that such a conference is taking place here seems to be especially appropriate. after all, greece is the country where the euro crisis started and which, for much of the past several years, has been at the epicenter of the crisis. what i would like to do is to briefly discuss some developments that led greece into the crisis and then take stock of the progress that greece has made in adjusting its economy. before doing so, let me provide a preview of my main conclusion. although greece has been through some very rough waters, both in terms of its real economy and its banking system, the situation is turning around. considerable progress has been made in addressing the weaknesses of the economy, making it much more competitive. importantly, the country is well on the way to building a strong and competitive banking system. as the governor of the institution responsible for banking supervision and financial stability, i gain special satisfaction from the fact that, after three years of deep crisis, the stability of the banking system has not only been preserved but it has strengthened. it has not, however, always been easy for the bank of greece. let me now turn to the underlying causes, and the policy responses, to greece ’ s sovereign debt crisis. how did this crisis come about? the entry of greece into the euro zone in 2001 was widely seen as marking a transformation in the country ’ s economic performance. entry into the euro area seemed to indeed mark a new regime. between 2001 and 2008, real growth averaged almost 4 per cent a year, inflation fell to the low single digits, and interest - rate spreads between 10 - year greek and german sovereigns dropped to between 10 and 50 basis points, from over 600 basis points in the late 1990s. however, these were years when greece was living dangerously. unsustainable fiscal and external imbalances were building up. by 2009, the fiscal deficit had reached 15½ per cent of gdp and the share of government debt had increased to almost 130 per cent of gdp. moreover, greece ’ s cost competitiveness had deteriorated by 30 per cent, and the current account deficit had peaked at 15