financial services agency and the bank to financial institutions to treat affected people favorably. 10 disaster victims who had lost passbooks or other relevant documents were able to withdraw close to 6. 0 billion yen from financial institutions by april 2011, even in the three affected prefectures alone ( chart 6 ). moreover, when those affected brought waterlogged or burnt cash to financial institutions, they were able to exchange it for new cash. damaged cash brought in by financial institutions and disaster victims was also exchanged at in general, the financial services agency and the bank make a decision on whether to put such requests forward to financial institutions each time the disaster relief act is applied to the affected areas. the bank's service counters, the amount reaching 470, 000 banknotes ( 3. 5 billion yen ) and 4, 220, 000 coins ( 0. 14 billion yen ) by march 2012 ( charts 7 and 8 ). even when financial institutions found it difficult to restore their affected branches, they remained available for affected depositors as much as possible by, for example, setting up temporary locations. among the bank locations closed immediately after the disaster, about 40 percent resumed business by the end of march. during that time, 41 temporary locations were also set up ( charts 9 and 10 ). 11 meanwhile, the boj - net and core payment and settlement systems in the private sector maintained stable operations as a whole. even at the end of march, when there was a concentration of a large number of payments for salaries, public utility services, and others, there was no serious disruption in payments and settlements in the affected areas. behind the scenes, the zengin system, which processes transfer data, and the boj - net extended operating hours for consecutive days to complete as many scheduled transactions as possible within the day. 12 in addition, various other measures were taken to maintain the clearing function of financial institutions. they include some clearing houses covering the work of other clearing houses which had had to be closed due to damage to their buildings or other reasons. at the time of the great east japan earthquake, foreign media often reported that japan's public order was maintained even in an extreme situation. 13 i believe that ensuring the payment and settlement functions of financial institutions as well as the circulation of cash on the whole contributed to social stability in the affected areas. in addition, some financial institutions organized information - sharing arrangements among themselves so that affected persons who evacuated to distant locations would be able to withdraw cash at financial institutions other than those where they

rates, i believe that the following points have been confirmed. first, the amount of the bank ’ s jgb purchases varies according to financial market conditions at the time and the progress in its cumulative purchases of jgbs. and second, as a result of this, the sustainability of the bank ’ s policy framework has increased. b. future conduct of monetary policy at present, price developments are relatively weak, and the inflation rate is fairly distant from the 2 percent price stability target. the bank should face this fact with sincerity. nevertheless, as i discussed earlier, japan ’ s economy has been improving solidly and the process toward price increases has been evolving steadily. when long - term economic growth potential is increasing and people ’ s views on prices are changing, the real interest rate level that is considered to be neutral to economic activity — the natural rate of interest — will rise and the observed real interest rates will decrease. this, in turn, is expected to further enhance the effects of monetary easing. taking these points into account, i believe that it is important that the bank, for the time being, continues to firmly pursue powerful monetary easing under the current policy framework. recently, some have come to believe that the price stability target of 2 percent is too high, due in part to improvements in economic activity. i, however, am of the opinion that the bank should not readily change the 2 percent price stability target, because this target was set after giving due consideration to domestic and overseas circumstances. let me elaborate on this point. first, the cpi has a statistical tendency to assert a higher inflation rate than the inflation that people actually experience. therefore, in order to ensure that people actually experience price stability, the rate of change in the cpi should be sufficiently positive. second, the room for monetary policy responses is not symmetrical on the upside and downside, and there is relatively limited 5 / 7 bis central bankers'speeches scope for responding to deflation, compared with inflation, because it is difficult for the bank to lower interest rates to a level substantially below zero. that is why it is considered desirable, under normal circumstances, to ensure that the inflation rate be positive, to a certain extent. and third, targeting inflation at 2 percent is a global standard shared by major advanced economies. pursuing the same rate of inflation at 2 percent will contribute to the stability of foreign exchange rates in the long run, as well as price stability. iv. expansion of the economy ’ s supply capacity i have pointed out