stock ( right axis ) ( * ) “ not executed ” “ finishings ” and “ under construction ” bars represent the stock in the metropolitan region. source : central b k f figure 7 vacancies in non - residential rental market ( * ) ( percent ) office spaces strip center storage units ( * ) six - monthly data. preliminary information on office space up to 2024. q3. source : central bank of chile based on information from cbre, colliers, gps. figure 8 households ’ gross savings and net financial financial burden to income ratio ( * ) ( percent of gdp ; annual change ) nfw gross savings ( right axis ) 12 ( percent of monthly income ; median ) mortgage consumer q5 q1 - q4 - 4 19 20 21 22 23 24 19 20 21 22 23 24 ( * ) q : quintile. q1 - q4 up to c $ 1, 365, 000 ; q5 up to c $ 2, 800, 000. q5 truncated due to taxable cap. source : central bank of chile based on cmf and suseso data. figure 9 non - payment of mortgage and consumer loans ( * ) ( percent of borrowers in each group ) consumer q1 - q4 q5 mortgage q1 - q4 q5 ( * ) q : quintile. q1 - q4 up to c $ 1, 365, 000 ; q5 up to c $ 2, 800, 000. q5 truncated due to taxable cap. source : central bank of chile based on cmf and suseso data. figure 10 central government gross debt ( percent of gdp ) actual and structural balance ( percent of gdp ) effective structural - 4 - 8 - 10 - 20 - 12 01 05 09 13 17 21 25 29 ( 1 ) gray area shows forecast in dipres third - quarter 2024 public finances report. ( 2 ) gross debt 2024 as reported in the dipres central government report at june 2024. dipres : budget office, chile ’ s ministry of finance. source : central bank of chile based on dipres data. figure 11 main components of assets ’ profitability ( percent of assets ) roa interest spread roe ( eje der. ) default and delinquency ( percent of portfolio ) mean roa adjustment spread default delinquency 30 6 20 4 10 2 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ( 1 ) net income ( the numerator

tensions experienced in recent weeks reflect banks ’ attempts to exploit regulatory arbitrage permitted by the basel 1 framework, transferring outside their balance sheets, to unregulated entities, activities that would have required substantial capital otherwise. searching for the direction to follow in addressing the issues that have emerged, we can advance the following considerations : • the basel 2 framework will certainly mitigate the problem, as the risks associated with the innovative, complex activities undertaken by banks in recent years will be easier to capture. with respect to capital requirements, for example, basel 2 improves on the treatment of mortgage exposures and introduces a capital charge on liquidity lines extended to conduits funded through asset - backed commercial paper. additional capital will be required to match operational risks in order, for example, to cover legal losses. to enhance market discipline banks will be induced to disclose information about their risk management policies and systems. this will include the risks associated with securitization exposures. as a development of the new regulatory approach, before the turmoil the basel committee had begun a review of the existing supervisory approaches to liquidity risk. • while the basel 2 framework will represent a considerable improvement on the previous discipline of capital requirements, steps need to be taken in other areas to avoid excessive risks and make banks more resilient to shocks. to improve transparency on risk exposures, particular attention must be paid to the obligation to consolidate the accounts of financial vehicles, even if not affiliated, whenever banks exercise substantial control and bear the ultimate risk. to take account of the effective risk for prudential purposes, vehicles that are largely controlled by banks should also be consolidated when capital requirements are established. in order to contain model risk, additional efforts must be directed at refining the methods used to value sf products. banks ’ liquidity management must also be improved, with reference to liabilities no less than assets, to increase our understanding of the relation between market liquidity and banks ’ funding liquidity risk. also, public authorities and market participants should thoroughly review existing incentives in the financial industry at large, to find ways to prevent the accumulation of excessive risks. an additional area of policy intervention that is becoming as important as the regulation and supervision of markets and intermediaries is financial literacy. as individuals become increasingly responsible for their retirement income and the allocation of wealth, so their financial needs are becoming increasingly complex. the financial industry is responding with a wide range of instruments, many of them complex as well. a few remarks on this point are