not stepped in. however, many of these actions might not have been necessary in the first place had there been in place a comprehensive resolution regime aimed at avoiding the disorderly failure of systemically critical financial institutions. the federal reserve believes that the development of a robust resolution regime should be a top legislative priority. if the specification of this regime were to include clear expectations of the federal reserve's role in stabilizing or resolving systemically important firms - - a step we very much support - - then the contingencies in which the fed might need to invoke emergency authorities could be tightly circumscribed. transparency and disclosure i would like to conclude by discussing the federal reserve's ongoing efforts to inform the congress and the public about its various lending programs. i firmly believe that central banks should be as transparent as possible, both for reasons of democratic accountability and because many of our policies are likely to be more effective if they are well understood by the markets and the public. during my time at the federal reserve, the fomc has taken important steps to increase the transparency of monetary policy, such as moving up the publication of the minutes of policy meetings and adopting the practice of providing longer - term projections of the evolution of the economy on a quarterly basis. likewise, the federal reserve is committed to keeping the congress and the public informed about its lending programs and balance sheet. for example, we continue to add to the information shown in the fed's h. 4. 1 release, which provides weekly detail on the balance sheet and the amounts outstanding for each of the federal reserve's lending facilities. extensive additional information about each of the federal reserve's lending programs is available online, as shown in the appendix to this testimony. pursuant to a requirement included in the emergency economic stabilization act passed in october, the fed also provides monthly reports to the congress on each of its programs that rely on the section 13 ( 3 ) authorities. generally, the fed's disclosure policies are consistent with the current best practices of major central banks around the world. that said, recent developments have understandably led to a substantial increase in the public's interest in the fed's balance sheet and programs. for this reason, we at the fed have begun a thorough review of our disclosure policies and the effectiveness of our communication. today i would like to mention two initiatives. first, to improve public access to information concerning fed policies and programs, federal reserve staff are developing a new website that will

to banks reduces libor, other borrowers will also see their payments decline. because interbank markets are global in scope, the federal reserve has also approved bilateral currency liquidity agreements with 14 foreign central banks. these so - called swap facilities have allowed these central banks to acquire dollars from the federal reserve that the foreign central banks may lend to financial institutions in their jurisdictions. the purpose of these liquidity swaps is to ease conditions in dollar funding markets globally. improvements in global interbank markets, in turn, promote greater stability in other markets at home and abroad, such as money markets and foreign exchange markets. the provision of short - term credit to financial institutions exposes the federal reserve to minimal credit risk, as the loans we make to financial institutions are generally short - term, overcollateralized, and made with recourse to the borrowing firm. in the case of the currency swaps, the foreign central banks are responsible for repaying the federal reserve, not the financial institutions that ultimately receive the funds, and the fed receives an equivalent amount of foreign currency in exchange for the dollars it provides foreign central banks. although the provision of ample liquidity by the central bank to financial institutions is a timetested approach to reducing financial strains, it is no panacea. today, concerns about capital, asset quality, and credit risk continue to limit the willingness of many intermediaries to extend credit, notwithstanding the access of these firms to central bank liquidity. moreover, providing liquidity to financial institutions does not directly address instability or declining credit availability in critical nonbank markets, such as the commercial paper market or the market for asset - backed securities. to address these issues, the federal reserve has developed a second set of policy tools which involve the provision of liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in key credit markets. for example, we have introduced facilities to purchase highly rated commercial paper at a term of three months and to provide backup liquidity for money market mutual funds. in addition, the federal reserve and the treasury have jointly announced a facility – expected to be operational shortly – that will lend against aaa - rated asset - backed securities collateralized by recently originated student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and loans guaranteed by the small business administration. unlike our other lending programs, this facility combines federal reserve liquidity with capital provided by the treasury. if the program works as planned, it should help to restart activity in these key securitization markets and lead to lower