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regulators are monitoring the effectiveness of self - regulation by the exchanges, and the division of responsibilities between regulators and exchanges. no single model has gained universal acceptance, and no model is regarded as good for all time in any jurisdiction. the present mas - sgx regulatory arrangement has major elements in common with that in the major jurisdictions which have seen the exchanges demutualised, and in particular with arrangements in australia. the uk approach is also similar, except that the financial services authority ( fsa ) has taken over the listing authority from the london stock exchange ( lse ). that decision was shaped by the inappropriateness of leaving the listing authority with the lse when other competing exchanges are emerging in the uk. we believe that the current arrangements for the regulation and supervision of the securities markets between the mas and sgx, with an enhanced oversight responsibility for the mas and powers to pursue civil prosecution, will prove robust. but we will continually review the arrangement, keep in touch with international practices, and re - calibrate the roles of mas and sgx where necessary to ensure effective oversight of the local markets. i would now like to touch on two features of the regulatory arrangement that we have recently reviewed. the first concerns the approval of substantial shareholdings in the sgx ; the second, proposed changes in the prospectus registration regime. approval of substantial shareholdings in the sgx the exchanges ( demutualisation and merger ) act requires anyone who wishes to acquire 5 % or more of sgx to seek prior approval from mas. this provision recognises the unique and important role of sgx in providing the infrastructure and marketplace for the trading, clearing and settlement of securities and derivatives in singapore. strategic investors as announced previously, mas will allow suitable strategic investors who can promote sgx's growth and development to acquire substantial stakes of 5 % or more in sgx. how large a stake these strategic investors will be allowed to take will depend on what they are able to contribute to the exchange in terms of business alliances, technology or other ways of supporting the business and infrastructure of the exchange. fund managers in addition, sgx has received indications from fund managers that they would like to hold more significant stakes in sgx than is currently permissible under the 5 % cap. fund managers are key institutional players on the buy - side of the capital markets, and will, as shareholders, add to the diverse range of groups with an interest in sgx's business. mas will therefore generally allow