, supported by firm commodity prices, high employment levels, and the effect of the cumulative easing in monetary policy. we at the bank project that the canadian economy will grow by 1. 4 per cent this year, 2. 4 per cent in 2009, and 3. 3 per cent in 2010. the emergence of excess supply in the economy should keep inflation below 2 per cent through 2009. both core and total inflation are projected to move up to 2 per cent in 2010 as the economy moves back into balance. there are both upside and downside risks to the bank's new projection for inflation ; these risks appear to be balanced. in line with this outlook, some further monetary stimulus will likely be required to achieve the inflation target over the medium term. given the cumulative reduction in the target for the overnight rate of 150 basis points since december, including the 50 - basis - point reduction announced last week, the timing of any further monetary stimulus will depend on the evolution of the global economy and domestic demand, and their impact on inflation in canada. with that, paul and i would now be pleased to answer your questions.

##prudential policy is in place. my impression is that, compared with many other countries, we have if anything fallen a little behind. this is unfortunate, as the situation in sweden, as i noted earlier, is actually slightly more sensitive than that in many other countries, where housing prices have already fallen and households have begun to amortise their debts to a more significant extent. well in line with the international discussion one thing i think it is important to emphasise – and which is not always clear in the swedish debate – is that the riksbank's aim to give consideration to the risks arising from household debt and the housing market is well in line with the international view that has emerged in the wake of the financial crisis. the riksbank's way of reasoning, and the policy we have conducted, are thus not unusual or strange, but are characteristic for the present time. the swedish national debt office ( 2013 ) writes, for instance, in its consultation response that with the solution they advocate, " it would not be possible to justify any macroprudential policy measures if the conclusion was that the risks inherent in current household debt were primarily a demand - related problem ( rather than a problem for the banking system ). " ( p. 2 ). bis central bankers ’ speeches there is even reason to claim that the riksbank was one of the first central banks to highlight this type of risk. household debt and housing prices were a fairly hot topic on the riksbank's monetary policy agenda a relatively long time before the global financial crisis broke out. 22 moreover, sweden is usually regarded as one of the few countries that has in practice applied a policy that, to some extent at least, " leans against the wind ". 23 the dominant view prior to the crisis was that central banks should not actively try to counteract the build - up of financial imbalances, but should act forcefully once a crisis had occurred. instead of " leaning against the wind ", they should in other words make do with " mopping up afterwards " – they should " clean but not lean ". trying to take preventive measures was perceived as too difficult and too costly, while it was assumed that it would not be very problematic to quickly clean up after a crisis. after the crisis - greater emphasis on preventive measures there is no doubt that the view has changed considerably since the financial crisis. 24 in many countries, the combination of high household debt and a fall on the