samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
the single dgs are where the political clashes will inevitably happen. two reasons for that : 1. first, this is where the money enters. one has to realize that the incentives of the various countries and pan - european institutions are different. “ northern ” countries want to cut the banking sectors of “ southern countries ” free from local politicians, but at no additional cost. ” southern countries ” want money. and many pan - european institutions and politicians across the board support anything heading towards a european political union. different incentives mean different positions in negotiations. bis central bankers ’ speeches 2. second, some eu bodies are obsessed with the “ all eu countries must be same ” approach. while there may be some point to this, why insist on it in the case of the single resolution system, for instance, if it has been negotiated that the ssm only applies to euro - area countries plus volunteers? one can hardly expect non - euro area countries not participating in the ssm to jump at the single resolution system if it means sharing the burden with those inside the banking union without the same treatment in the area of a fiscal back - stop. at the same time, would you join the ssm if you did not have a clue how the single resolution rules were going to work? the cnb ’ s position was : let ’ s discuss the whole thing ( bu ) in one shot as a one compact and coherent package where the balance between powers, duties, responsibilities and money always remains assured. and negotiate everything as a single animal, so that illogical inconsistencies are not being produced all along. sure, that would take much more time, but the final outcome might look better and we would not build up the house from the roof down. we are debating the supervisory part first, while burden - sharing ( money ) is being left for the future. the sequence of steps should ideally be exactly the opposite one. why? my observation is that the way the various bail - outs and the ssm have been negotiated so far shows that the readiness and willingness even among euro - area countries to share money is declining over time. and this is exactly the opposite of what should have been happening if a functioning banking and contingent fiscal union had been emerging. so we are risking creating a half - baked bu which will not necessarily be ready for future bad times. and it is also a partial answer to the question of potential participation of some non - euro countries in the ssm. simply, it is too

their activities inside the present eu. the role of the authorities is to support, not hamper these processes. therefore, my second conclusion is that frustration with the inability to politically consolidate the existing area should not become a reason for constraining its political expansion. in the end, business would find its way through, but europe would lose.
reserve banks to use in reviewing requests to access federal reserve accounts and payment services, news release, august 15, 2022. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

the 2019 siepr economic summit, stanford institute of economic policy research, stanford, california, march 8, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / powell20190308a. htm ; richard h. clarida ( 2019 ), “ the federal reserve ’ s review of its monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices, ” speech delivered at the 2019 u. s. monetary policy forum, sponsored by the initiative on global markets at the university of chicago booth school of business, new york, february 22, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / clarida20190222a. htm. lael brainard ( 2016 ), “ the " new normal " and what it means for monetary policy, ” speech delivered at the chicago council on global affairs, chicago, illinois, september 12, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / brainard20160912a. htm. see, for instance, lael brainard ( 2015 ), “ normalizing monetary policy when the neutral interest rate is low, ” speech delivered at the stanford institute for economic policy research, stanford, california, december 1, https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / newsevents / speech / brainard20151201a. htm ; and kathryn holston, thomas laubach, and john c. williams ( 2016 ), “ measuring the natural rate of interest : - 2the policy rate by only 1½ percentage points before hitting the effective lower bound — in contrast to previous decades when the policy rate would have been cut by 4½ to 5 percentage points, on average, to buffer the economy from an adverse shock. the reduced scope to cut the interest rate could increase the frequency and duration of periods when the policy rate is pinned close to zero, unemployment is elevated, and inflation is below target. in turn, the greater likelihood of extended periods of low inflation at the lower bound risks eroding inflation expectations and further compressing the scope for cutting the interest rate. the risk here is a downward spiral where the scope for cutting the interest rate gets compressed even further, the lower bound binds even more frequently, and it becomes increasingly difficult to move inflation expectations and inflation back up to target. the experience of some foreign central banks illustrates the challenges associated with such
caleb m fundanga : the role of bank of zambia in sensitising and protection of consumers regarding banking and financial services opening remarks by dr caleb m fundanga, governor of the bank of zambia, at the commemoration of the worlds consumer rights day, lusaka, 15 march 2010. * * * the minister of commerce trade and industry, hon felix mutati m. p. the permanent secretary, ministry of commerce trade and industry, dr buleti nsemukila the chairperson bankers association of zambia, mr saviour chibiya representatives from zambia competition commission distinguished invited guests members of the press ladies and gentlemen i am honoured and thankful to the ministry of commerce, trade and industry for inviting me to participate on this very important day when we commemorate the “ world consumer rights day ”. the theme for this year is certainly an interesting and important one especially for us in the financial sector. as the authority that formulates and implements, monetary and supervisory policies, the bank of zambia places great importance on the welfare of consumers. this is because effective implementation of monetary and supervisory policies promotes price stability as well as financial system stability which in turn creates a favourable investment climate necessary for economic growth. this entails achieving and maintaining a low inflation rate which is key in attaining low cost of credit as well as low levels of prices for goods and services in the economy. ladies and gentlemen, as most of you would recall, high levels of inflation and interest rates as well as bank failures were a central feature of the zambian economy during the early 1980 ’ s and the mid - 1990s. however, since then strides have been made in achieving low levels of inflation and interest rates and a stable financial sector. as a result, inflation has fallen from 138. 3 percent at the end of december 1993 to 9. 9 percent in december 2009. the lower levels of inflation have had a direct bearing on consumers as their incomes are not significantly eroded. furthermore, the bank of zambia has strengthened its supervisory framework by amending legislation and capacity building in the supervisory process. this process has allowed the bank to ensure that only fit and proper persons are allowed to enter the financial sector in order to ensure that banks are run professionally and that depositors ’ funds are not abused. in order to further cushion depositors in case of bank failures, the bank is in the process of introducing a deposit protection act and a deposit protection scheme. this will not only create a safety net for depositors but will enhance confidence in the banking sector

to the internet, to make it a habit to visit the bank of zambia website on a regular basis. further, the bank will provide excerpts from the banking and financial services act to provide some highlights on some of the consumer protection provisions in the law. i thank you.
and cybersecurity converge. thank you. page 6 of 5

subsequently it has fallen back again and was trading between 85 cents to 90 cents at the beginning of october. although it did have this immediate impact, it is doubtful if this one - off intervention will have the desired effect over a longer time period. intervention normally only works if it is aimed at stopping speculative capital flows, if it signals a change in underlying policies, if it is strongly supported by all parties participating and if the central banks are prepared to intervene repeatedly and in large amounts. these are also the main reasons that the south african reserve bank did not intervene in the foreign exchange market. in fact the reserve bank has continued to buy small amounts of dollars in the market to improve its net oversold open position in foreign exchange. after this position had improved from us $ 23. 2 billion at the end of september 1998 to us $ 10. 3 billion at the end of march 2000, the bank continued to bring this position down slowly to us $ 9. 6 billion at the end of september 2000. this was part of the reserve bank ’ s objective to reduce its net open position in foreign exchange to zero, in order to remove one of the perceived risk factors in the economy. any intervention in the foreign exchange market to support the exchange rate of the rand may well have made the downward pressure on the value of the rand worse, in view of this risk factor. the success of such intervention would in any case have probably also been thwarted by the general strength of the us dollar. 5. concluding remarks as could be expected, the depreciation of the rand and the substantial rise in energy and food prices affected price increases in south africa. for example, the year - on - year increase in the cpix accelerated from 6. 5 % in october 1999 to 8. 2 % in august 2000. if fuel and food prices are excluded, cpix inflation declined slightly from 6. 8 % to 6. 6 % over the same period. similarly, the year - on - year increase in production prices accelerated from 5. 7 % in september 1999 to 10. 1 % in april 2000, and then declined slightly to 9. 3 % in august 2000. however, if energy and food priced are omitted, the year - on - year increase in production prices has continued to accelerate from a low of 3. 2 % in november 1999 to 5. 3 % in august 2000. this upward trend was mainly due to increases in the prices of imported goods, while domestically generated inflation has shown a declining tendency from
the right thing and ensure a quick and fair resolution for these customers. we have communicated this to their ceos. thank you, i will now take your questions.

. fidrec will consider all relevant evidence whether written or oral. statements can be prepared by consumers themselves and need not be made under oath. all fidrec ’ s adjudicators are well respected professionals. the chairman of fidrec is mr goh joon seng, a retired high court judge. as over 80 % of customers invested s $ 50, 000 and below, fidrec is the right avenue for them to pursue their claims. fidrec normally deals with claims not exceeding s $ 50, 000. in the case of the structured products, however, the fis have agreed for fidrec to hear deserving cases. we have also said that if there are breaches of our regulation, we will take action against the financial institution or individuals involved. mas has required the independent parties to highlight these breaches and potential cases of mis - selling to mas. they have already brought a number of possible cases to our attention and we are following up on them. normally, as you know, mas does not comment on our dealings with individual institutions. however given public interest in this matter, mas confirms that we have been conducting formal inquiries into allegations of breaches of the law, inadequate internal controls by the fis or poor sales practices by their representatives. we will make an announcement on any actions we are taking when our inquiries are completed. mas urges any affected investor who has a genuine claim that you were mis - sold the product to make sure you lodge your complaint with your fis. mas requires fis to have a rigorous process to look into every complaint and resolve them fairly, giving due weight to the views of the independent parties. clearly, there is a range of investors who bought these products. some are well - educated professionals. others are sophisticated investors. the group we are most concerned with are the vulnerable customers. we are focussing on cases of mis - selling to vulnerable customers and on cases where the products were clearly inappropriate for them given their circumstances. we have required the fis to give priority to these cases. they should not take an overly legalistic approach to mis - selling in dealing with these cases. for cases where there are sufficient indications that the product was mis - sold or that it was clearly inappropriate given the investor ’ s profile and circumstances, the fi should take responsibility. several fis have assured mas that they will take full responsibility in such cases. we welcome this commitment and expect all fis that have sold these products to take the same approach. they must do
2005. foreign financial institutions harvested profits amounting to us $ 446 million, increasing by 227. 6 percent over that of 2001 which was registered at us $ 196 million. china is a country that honors its commitments. the chinese government has been fulfilling its wto commitments strictly on time or even ahead of schedule in terms of opening up the financial sector. in december 2005, five more cities, namely harbin, changchun, lanzhou, yinchuan and nanning, were opened ahead of schedule to foreign financial institutions for local currency business, bringing the total number of cities allowed for rmb business from 18 up to 25. in the areas of securities and insurance business, the chinese government has almost fulfilled all commitments concerning market access and business scope except that the sino - foreign joint equity brokers are not allowed to provide underwriting services for issuance of a shares. for the time being, foreign banks equity taking in a chinese bank is subject to a ceiling of 25 percent, or a limit of 20 percent in the case the equity is bought by a single foreign financial institution, if these foreign banks intend to be treated same as their local chinese partners in terms of business conduct. by the end of 2006 when the domestic market is fully open to foreign banks for local currency business, such a proportional limit will only hold significance for taxation purpose, and bears no restrictions on the conduct of business. china ’ s practice since its accession to the wto has shown that although the business growth rate of foreign banks in recent years was higher than that of domestic banks, the market share of foreign banks in china ’ s banking sector does not see dramatic changes. in 2001, foreign banks accounted for 1. 8 percent of the total banking assets, 0. 35 percent of the rmb loans, and 14. 7 percent of foreign exchange loans. while in 2005, these figures rose respectively to 1. 89 percent, 0. 55 percent and 20. 97 percent. with restrictions on rmb business to be removed in 2006, the market share of foreign banks in rmb business is likely to further expand. by 2005, 25 foreign banks have taken stakes in altogether 20 domestic banks, with some banks investing in different domestic banks. in our view, in the share - holding reform of the state - owned commercial banks, the main purpose of inviting strategic investors is to introduce advanced business concepts and management skills so as to further improve the corporate governance of domestic banks. with regard to introducing strategic investors, the chinese regulatory

##ize the financial market, and strive to build a mutually beneficial relationship between china and its foreign partners. thank you.
very much hope and believe that negative deposit rates are a temporary phenomenon worldwide and not a permanent feature of normal monetary policy. when potential growth picks up and inflation rises, they will be a thing of the past. now, however, this instrument is being tried in many countries because normal interest rates are close to zero and central banks are faced with the problem that the real equilibrium interest rate is negative and inflation is so low. neither development was created by central banks, but they are trying to overcome them. which isn ’ t easy. do you not feel simply overwhelmed as a central banker every now and then? there have been calmer times for central bankers, i guess. is “ helicopter money ” one of the tools available to the ecb, i. e. the idea that a central bank prints money and gives it directly to the public? the original idea of helicopter money refers to the direct financing of public expenditure. that is not an option for us. that is not something that we are considering. as president draghi has said on this topic, the treaty on the functioning of the european union prohibits direct financing of governments in the euro area. isn ’ t there a great danger that the ecb ’ s stance undermines the necessary adjustments in the economy, as the cheap money makes balance sheet adjustments unnecessary or keeps unviable banks and businesses alive? some critics warn that the ecb is ultimately creating “ japanese conditions ”. that is certainly not the case. of course, no policy is completely “ clean ” – there are always side effects. but the responsible authorities must stick to their given target. for us, it is an inflation rate that is below, but close to, 2 %. we do not ignore the consequences of our actions. but we must also fulfil our responsibility and others have to fulfil theirs. that also applies to potential risks to financial stability resulting from current monetary policy – basically, a task for macroprudential supervision, not monetary policy. the federal reserve ( the us central bank ) has increased its key interest rate for the first time after seven years of a policy of zero interest rates. does that make the ecb ’ s job easier or more difficult in the long term? both scenarios are possible. our task would be more difficult if bond yields in the euro area were to increase along with us interest rates in the medium term, but that is not likely. what is likely, however, is that the interest rate increase will have an impact

€10 – more than nine months ahead of the launch. this should allow sufficient time for the machines to be adapted by 25 november. in addition, the ecb and the national central banks will conduct an information campaign addressing everyone who handles banknotes so that they will be able to recognise the new note and its security features. the new €20 note is the third denomination in the europa series that is gradually replacing the original euro banknotes introduced in 2002. it will be followed, over time, by new versions of the €50, €100, €200 and €500 notes. thank you for your attention. i now have the pleasure of signing the new €20 banknote. bis central bankers ’ speeches
maurice oa€™connell : the euro, the irish economy and banking supervision written submission by mr maurice oa€™connell, governor of the central bank of ireland, to the irish parliamentary joint committee on european affairs on 19 july 2000. * * * the outlook for the world economy remains generally good. europe has settled into a steady growth pattern and real gdp growth of more than 3 % is expected this year. unemployment is falling steadily. the us economy has continued to surpass expectations and there are now tentative signs of orderly slowdown. japan and the far east generally appear to have shaken off the threat of financial collapse, though recovery in japan is still tentative. a policy of zero interest rates and high public expenditure has not been enough to stimulate growth. the remarkable performance of the us economy has generated euphoria about a so - called new economy that offers the prospect of a permanent reduction in the natural rate of unemployment, substantial gains in productivity growth and lessens the risks of inflation. whether or not we are in a new economy, or a new information revolution, it would be unwise to conclude that traditional laws of economics no longer apply. there are new factors, but, whether these are a temporary phenomenon or a profound change, only time will tell. the world economy may appear fit and well but there is an imbalance that will require correction at some point. i refer to the record deficit in the current account of the us balance of payments, which is being financed by capital inflows from europe and japan. this may not continue indefinitely. capital will flow to wherever the strongest future return is perceived to be. the possibility of a sharp stock market correction also deserves attention. between end - 1996 and end - 1999 the dow jones index rose by 78 %, while the nasdaq index, which accounts for about one third of total stock market capitalisation in the united states recorded an increase of more than 200 %. in europe, structural weaknesses have continued to be a dead hand on the economy and reform is by its nature slow. in this context, the current taxation proposals in germany may prove to be a very significant development. very recently the oecd has issued warnings on the dangers of inflation both in the united states and in europe. when i came before this committee in february, i mentioned that the succession of economic crises in recent years had prompted the authorities to review comprehensively the whole international financial architecture. this review is ongoing and the financial stability forum ( a

name of this booklet is anna & alex take on the banknote forgers. after these introductory remarks it is now a pleasure for me to declare this euro exhibition open. you are kindly invited to come closer to view the exhibition and the children ’ s booklet.