coordination between public authorities with responsibilities in the field of payments safety need to integrate a european and international dimension to be fully effective. this is a direct consequence of the european and even global interdependencies of security issues. i am happy to see that at european level, the creation of the secure pay forum in 2011 has followed this path by reinforcing cooperation between central banks and prudential authorities of the european union and the european economic area in the field of retail payment security. this cooperation within secure pay has already delivered important results : two sets of recommendations have been issued so far, concerning the security of internet payments in 2013, with an expected compliance of the market by february 2015, and the security of mobile payments in 2014, with recommendations currently being finalized. the final text of the recommendations concerning the security of payment account access service has also been published for information in may 2014 and shared with the eba, in light of the ongoing revision of the payment services directive. the fact that the european legislator has taken into account large parts of the secure pay forum ’ s recommendations in the review of the payment services directive is for me the proof of the quality of the works led by the forum. i particularly welcome the integration of strong customer authentication in the revised text of the directive, which clearly constitutes a major progress in the security of retail payments. secure pay has recently undergone a significant governance change, and will in the future be co - chaired by the european banking authority and the european central bank. this should further increase cooperation between the oversight and supervision institutions and ease the implementation of recommendations. to conclude – and i will finish there –, i would like to underline how topical this conference is. as the proposal for the revised payment services directive is currently discussed in the council of the european union, a unique opportunity is given today to all stakeholders to tackle the different issues raised by the new regulation in the presence of representatives from all european competent authorities that are involved. once again, thank you all for being here, and i wish you fruitful and vivid discussions on all of these aspects, hoping this conference will provide you with a comprehensive overview of the new security challenges for retail payments. before leaving the floor to our first set of panelists i now invite you to listen to benoit cœure, member of the executive board of the european central bank, who cannot be physically with us today but who has recorded his comments for us. thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

market liquidity and market functioning. these actions include reducing the cost and increasing the allowable term of discount window credit to commercial banks ; increasing the size of our term auction facility, through which credit is auctioned to depository institutions ; initiating a term securities lending facility, which allows primary dealers to swap less - liquid mortgage backed securities for more - liquid treasury securities ; and creating the primary dealer credit facility, which is similar to the discount window but accessible to primary dealers. although these facilities operate through depository institutions and primary dealers, they are designed to support the broader financial markets and the economy by facilitating the provision of liquidity by those institutions to their customers and counterparties. with respect to monetary policy, at its march meeting the fomc reduced its target for the federal funds rate by 75 basis points to 2 - 1 / 4 percent. it was in this context of intensifying financial strains that, on march 13, bear stearns advised the federal reserve and other government agencies that its liquidity position had significantly deteriorated and that it would have to file for bankruptcy the next day unless alternative sources of funds became available. this news raised difficult questions of public policy. normally, the market sorts out which companies survive and which fail, and that is as it should be. however, the issues raised here extended well beyond the fate of one company. our financial system is extremely complex and interconnected, and bear stearns participated extensively in a range of critical markets. the sudden failure of bear stearns likely would have led to a chaotic unwinding of positions in those markets and could have severely shaken confidence. the company's failure could also have cast doubt on the financial positions of some of bear stearns'thousands of counterparties and perhaps of companies with similar businesses. given the exceptional pressures on the global economy and financial system, the damage caused by a default by bear stearns could have been severe and extremely difficult to contain. moreover, the adverse impact of a default would not have been confined to the financial system but would have been felt broadly in the real economy through its effects on asset values and credit availability. to prevent a disorderly failure of bear stearns and the unpredictable but likely severe consequences for market functioning and the broader economy, the federal reserve, in close consultation with the treasury department, agreed to provide funding to bear stearns through jpmorgan chase. over the following weekend, jpmorgan chase agreed to purchase bear stearns and assumed bear's financial obligations. the purpose