tougher accounting requirements come on top of those resulting from the basel iii reforms – even if there are bound to be some overlaps. it is precisely for this reason that i believe it makes sense to introduce the ifrs 9 requirements incrementally. the resolvability of institutions represents yet another challenge. following the first few resolution cases this summer, there was justifiably much talk of the lessons to be learnt from them. indeed, these are important. however, we must not lose sight of challenges elsewhere ; for, in a resolution case, there absolutely needs to be a sufficient capital buffer for a bail - in. the resolution authorities are currently in the process of setting such requirements, known as the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ( mrel ), for european banks. some banks and savings banks will have to expand their holdings of mrel liabilities in future in order to satisfy these requirements. and clearly, this is a further challenge for integrated performance and risk management which cannot be met overnight. institutions should therefore be given sufficient time to build up their mrel ratios. sufficient account needs to be taken of the markets ’ absorptive capacity and the burden on institutions, on the one hand ; on the other, we must not lose sight of the aim of building up sufficient loss - absorbing capital in a timely manner. 4... and make relief a possibility given the challenges implied by the transitional period, we supervisors must generally look for ways to ease the burden on banks and savings banks without neglecting our mission. these are the things i advocate : first, that we should further strengthen the principle of proportionality in regulation and relieve small and medium - sized institutions. we already put forward specific proposals for a “ small banking box ” back in the spring together with the federal finance ministry and bafin. second, that we ask ourselves for each ad hoc inspection whether this is actually truly necessary, or whether it can perhaps be postponed to a future date. third, that the targeted review of internal models ( trim ) project under the ssm be conducted in a responsible and considered manner. we will also rigorously advocate the retention of risk sensitivity going forward. 5 time for a regulatory break the next assertion i wish to present to you is this. i am convinced that the current projects should be followed by a sort of regulatory break, for we will have then covered the main areas. for you, the banks, this means that you need at the earliest possible opportunity

in frankfurt in particular should, and must, be on guard against banks from london massively “ poaching ” their staff. success will not come by itself. this means the infrastructure for the post - brexit world needs to be strengthened – international schools are just one case in point. government agencies must, in addition, show proactively how competitive the german economy is. we banking supervisors, for instance, regard ourselves as a point of contact for foreign banks. we explain the requirements and help with procedures without relaxing our standards. one thing must be unmistakably clear : relaxing regulatory standards as an instrument of regional economic policy is not an option. competitive deregulation through tax or supervisory policy would erode the foundation of our future cooperation. 7 conclusions ladies and gentlemen, following the severe financial crisis, we have succeeded in creating a new architecture for a resilient and at the same time high - performance financial system. we should therefore not quibble about the details in what is, on the whole, a good reform compromise, even if we are not equally happy about every single detail. to conclude, allow me to again say something of a fundamental nature. for some time now, i have been seeing a hardening of the battle lines between supervisors and the central associations of the german banking industry. banks and savings banks criticise any new banking regulation – per se and with almost no regard for how much or how little sense it makes. supervisors, in turn, respond to criticism from the associations by defending every new rule, 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches often out of principle and sometimes in a broad - brush manner. such confrontation serves nobody, least of all our economy. both sides need to engage in an issues - based dialogue which pursues a clear, ideology - free objective : namely rules that make the financial system more stable. i am therefore calling on all of us to remember the things that unite us, such as a shared vision of what monetary policy is the right policy, and how a european deposit protection scheme should be designed – and how things should not be done. how banks should be resolved, in italy or here – that is something we likewise all agree on. in fact, the list of things we see eye - to - eye on is long. although germany ’ s banking supervisors and credit institutions are in different camps, in many respects we are allies. that is why we – the german banking industry and banking supervisors – should all pull together more in