##s, based on the fsb's key attributes, were established. just like cross - border cooperation between national regulators. the past has witnessed several cases where such a resolution framework has proven to be an effective safeguard for both depositors and financial stability. but at the same time, we haven't had many bank failures since the attributes were published. which, in a sense, makes every new case all the more different. and so, it makes it all the more important to draw lessons from this specific case. one lesson for sure is that it is essential to prepare more than one resolution strategy. different circumstances require different strategies. so we need flexibility. this becomes all the more important in case of a liquidity crisis – when a bail - in can help to restore investor and depositor confidence by strengthening the solvency of the bank, but can't generate additional liquidity. what credit suisse has taught us, is that we need to further explore resolution strategies that are better able to stabilise a bank's liquidity position. taking alfred nobel's advice, and observing and searching for differences and similarities, i can say that, today, we are in a very different situation compared to 2008. european banks have improved their capital positions and there is a structural change in the interest rate environment. and this is, in principle, good news for a bank's business model. the challenges of an artificially flat yield curve, negative interest rates, and fierce yield competition, have finally eased. but there are also similarities. today, too, risks are lurking around the corner and there are numerous vulnerabilities. risks related to funding costs and interest rate sensitivity, or credit - related risks. and vulnerabilities related to high levels of debt in many corners of our economy, or hidden leverage along with liquidity mismatches in the non - bank sector. 4 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches this means that we need to remain vigilant. supervisors, obviously. but also the banking sector itself – making sure their capital positions, risk management and governance strengthen their resilience in sentiment - driven markets. so, yesterday was the dutch king's birthday. and if i am not mistaken, two days from now, on april 30th, his majesty king carl gustaf will celebrate his birthday. i'm sure that in between there must be some room for a dancing queen. congratulations in advance to all swedes here today. walpurgis

to reinvest maturing securities for an extended period of time, financial conditions will likely remain accommodative long after net asset purchases will have come to an end. in view of the above, we have to adjust our communication. with a medium - term focus in mind, we need to highlight patience and confidence in the measures that we have already taken, while at the same time remaining realistic about what our measures can and cannot achieve. we will need to cater for the possibility that a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation ( sapi ) can only be achieved well after net asset purchases will have come to an end. fortunately, our moreover, data since the 1960s show that once the recovery took hold, the first policy rate increase has typically taken place after 10 quarters in germany and 11 quarters in the us, on average. as indicated earlier, the current euro area recovery is enjoying its 19 th consecutive quarter of growth. mark carney, “ [ de ] globalization and inflation ”, 2017 imf michel camdessus central banking lecture, 18 september 2017. otmar issing, “ inflation targeting : a view from the ecb ”, “ inflation targeting : prospects and problems ” symposium st. louis, 16 - 17 october 2003. monetary policy stance is more encompassing, and all our measures are geared towards this objective. the focus in communication therefore needs to shift to the other elements of our policy toolkit, such as forward guidance on key policy rates, together with the ongoing stimulus provided by the stock of our asset purchases. conclusion let me conclude. our economy is in the midst of a strong cyclical upswing. farreaching policy measures have contributed to cement growth, avert deflation risk, and enhance the cohesion of the monetary union. although raising inflation towards our aim is taking longer than expected, current inflation rates are not a threat to price stability. with actual growth exceeding potential and labour market slack falling, inflationary pressures will eventually unfold. at the same time, the longer the phillips curve fails to assert itself, the more procyclical policy might become, and the greater is the likelihood of financial stability risks building up. patience and confidence should therefore replace suggestions of openendedness in our communication. absent deflation risk, a full phasing - out of net asset purchases from september 2018 onwards is warranted. preservation of existing stimulus will be more than sufficient to reach our inflation objective, albeit at a medium term that may be further away than