samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
system.

interest rate rules was woodford ( 2003 ). see mccallum ( 1981 ). i should add that when we presented work based on cooper and fischer ( 1972 ), we were urged by several economists to focus on the interest rate as the monetary policy instrument. among these economists were albert ando and franco modigliani, who were then working with others on building the mps ( mit - pennsylvania - social science research council ) model. see taylor ( 1993 ). - 3consideration of interest rate rules has also, as i will discuss, come to have a prominent role in fomc discussions, with the taylor rule being one benchmark that we regularly consult. but - - building on recent remarks i made elsewhere - - i will also indicate why policymakers might have good reasons for deviating from these rule benchmarks and why, in pursuing the objectives of monetary policy, they could appropriately behave in ways that are not very well characterized by simple monetary policy rules. 6 in particular, i will point to reasons why the fomc ’ s discussions might lead to decisions that depart - - temporarily or permanently - - from the prescriptions of baseline monetary policy rules. rules as a benchmark for policy discussions some perspective on the status of policy rules in fomc discussions is provided by considering what has changed over the past 20 years. donald kohn, at a landmark conference organized by john taylor in january 1998, described the role played by monetary policy rules in the fomc briefing process. 7 his account noted that federal reserve staff members presented fomc participants with prescriptions from several policy rules, including the taylor ( 1993 ) rule. this description remains true today. publicly available bluebooks and tealbooks of successive years demonstrate that the coverage of policy rules in the briefing material provided by the board staff expanded considerably in the years after kohn spoke. 8 for my earlier speeches in this area, see fischer ( 2017a, 2017b ). see kohn ( 1999 ). at the time, donald kohn was director of the division of monetary affairs at the federal reserve board. the conference proceedings were published as taylor ( 1999a ). the federal reserve board ’ s website ( https : / / www. federalreserve. gov / monetarypolicy / fomc _ historical _ year. htm ) provides downloadable copies of the briefing books ( the greenbook and bluebook, which were replaced in 2010 by the tealbook ) distributed to
ravi menon : basics for smart finance – common standards and seamless data closing remarks by mr ravi menon, managing director of the monetary authority of singapore, at the sibos conference, singapore, 15 october 2015. * * * mr yawar shah, chairman, swift mr gottfried leibbrandt, ceo, swift ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. a. revolution in communications “ what hath god wrought? ” read the first telegraphic message sent by samuel morse on 24th may, 1844. the telegraph marked a revolution in communications at the time. • transatlantic telegraph cables cut communications between america and europe from about 10 days – the time it took for steam ships to sail across the atlantic – to a matter of minutes. • in fact, the mid - 19th century leaps in transport and communications technologies ushered in the first phase of economic and financial globalisation. ground - breaking as the telegraph was, a text message that takes minutes to arrive will be considered glacial by today ’ s standards. it will certainly not be able to support the frenetic pace of communications in the global financial system. thankfully, we have swift. last year, there were 5. 6 billion messages carried globally on swift ’ s network. • close to half the messages related to international payments, which lies at the heart of global banking. • technology has transformed cross - border finance. smart financial centre it is mas ’ s conviction that innovation and technology will be critical to the future growth and success of singapore ’ s financial sector. earlier this year, mas shared its vision of a smart financial centre : a financial centre where innovation is pervasive and technology is used widely. it is about pursuing innovation and technology to : • increase efficiency ; • manage risks better ; • create new opportunities ; and • improve people ’ s lives. we are walking the talk. • we formed a new fintech & innovation group ( or ftig ) within mas. • ftig ’ s mission is to formulate policies and strategies to create a conducive ecosystem for innovation while fostering safety and security. bis central bankers ’ speeches • mas has committed $ 225 million over the next five years under the financial sector technology and innovation scheme. we have been working closely with the industry as well as reaching out to the broader “ fintech ” community. • we have been talking to start - ups, software providers, and experts and practitioners in various fields of financial technology, including data analytics, cyber security, blockchains, and digital payments

consumption ”, macroeconomic review, vol. xx ( 1 ), pp. 61 - 65. [ 8 ] department of statistics ( 2020 ), “ rebasing of the consumer price index for general households ”, statistics newsletter singapore, issue 1. © 2021, government of singapore.
and learn from our mistakes. institutions, much like the people they comprise, must not only be independent, they must also retain an open, approachable attitude. this mindset, combined with our integrity and spirit of public service, will be crucial if we are to continue working to make the banco de espana a respected, trustworthy, impartial institution committed to the well - being of the society in which we live. thank you. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches

cost of imported goods, including food prices. imported inputs account for less than 20 % of production cost. we understand that the increase in prices especially in food prices, are a concern for many. and although the exchange rate impact to inflation is not one to one, it partly contributes to the rising cost of living as higher commodity prices and supply disruptions affect domestic prices. various measures are being implemented to lessen the impact of this increase in prices. these include social assistance, stabilisation of prices and access to discounted necessity goods. 18. on the other hand, ringgit depreciation is also expected to benefit export - oriented sectors which employ more than 30 % of the malaysian labour force. in fact, malaysia ’ s exports have increased by 30 % this year supported by several factors, including exchange rate valuation gains. the acceleration in exports growth has, to some extent, contributed to higher job creation and increase in wages. this shows that it is important that we have a diversified economy that helps to mitigate external shocks. 19. it is also important that we preserve orderly financial market conditions. this means avoiding large swings in the exchange rate, so as not to disrupt economic activities. this will enable the exchange rate to serve as a shock absorber – not a shock amplifier – to the domestic economy. while bank negara does not target any level of exchange rate, we will closely monitor and ensure orderly market conditions. on this, i should highlight that even with heightened volatility in global financial markets, daily onshore fx transaction volume and bond market activity remain healthy. reforms to deepen the domestic bond market have helped to strengthen the fundamentals of the economy by enabling businesses to meet their funding needs more effectively. 20. while the current depreciation of the ringgit is due to the strength of the us dollar, corporate malaysia can help in maintaining orderly market conditions by taking actions which do not exacerbate the situation. bnm will ensure that our onshore foreign exchange market remains liquid, so businesses can be assured that all their foreign currency needs can be efficiently fulfilled. so there is no need to hoard or frontload us dollar purchases. corporates and domestic financial institutions should also be prudent in managing their balance sheets. this includes to avoid creating new vulnerabilities, especially from foreign currency debt and financial imbalances, as well as hedging their risks appropriately. businesses and investors that benefit from a ringgit depreciation should also take
amando m tetangco, jr : providing critical support to disaster - striken areas through the calamity assistance program speech by mr amando m tetangco, jr, governor of the central bank of the philippines ( bangko sentral ng pilipinas ), at the signing ceremony among members of the countryside financial institutions enhancement program task force of the moa to implement the countryside financial institutions - calamity assistance program, manila, 14 august 2007. * * * landbank president gilda pico, pdic oic imelda singzon, fellow bankers, co - workers in the bsp, our friends from the media, special guests, good morning. what we just signed this morning is the p200 million countryside financial institutions calamity assistance program – a crucial support program for countryside rural banks, cooperative banks and thrift banks to help fund early recovery and reconstruction activities in calamity - stricken areas. this is a joint initiative of the countryside financial institutions program task force which counts as members the bangko sentral ng pilipinas, philippine deposit insurance corporation and the land bank of the philippines. as indicated in our guidelines, qualified banks are rural banks, thrift banks or coop banks in areas affected by typhoons, disasters and other natural calamities – as declared by the office of the president or the national disaster coordinating council. each qualified financial institution can borrow a maximum amount of 90 % of its affected existing portfolio or p 5million, whichever is lower, provided the loan amount does not exceed the bank ’ s borrowing capacity. the loan is payable in seven years with an interest rate of 9 % and post - dated checks as collateral. the loans may be availed of from land bank branches within one year from the date of the declaration of the calamity by the ndcc or the office of the president. given our country ’ s history, this calamity assistance program will be most helpful to countryside areas where many of our poor reside. among others, the philippines lies along the western pacific basin – which is the world's busiest typhoon belt. we are also part of the circum - pacific seismic belt ringed by major tectonic plates and volcanoes. in fact, a world bank study indicated that calamities which destroy crops, properties and infrastructure have been a major cause for poverty, especially in the countryside. we hope therefore that this calamity assistance program will empower countryside financial institutions to help

fund early recovery and reconstruction in affected areas. the members of the task force appeal to all of you to support this program. together, let us get this program going! marami pong salamat sa inyong lahat.
deal is ambitious and bold. and now we have to get to work to implement it and to fund it. and at the same time, to reach out beyond our borders. to work together with governments, regulators, private investors, financial sector, climate experts, and central banks from all countries. to overcome the policy challenges. and to make sure that we meet the paris agreement targets, and tackle climate change in time. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

andreas dombret : beyond the financial crisis – dealing with systemic risk dinner speech by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at the workshop “ beyond the financial crisis : systemic risk, spillovers and regulation ”, organised by the deutsche bundesbank and technische universitat dresden, dresden, 28 october 2010. * 1. * * strengthening resilience ladies and gentlemen, i warmly welcome you to this dinner on the occasion of the workshop, jointly organised by the technische universitat dresden and the deutsche bundesbank. this has been a busy day full of research results and models. i would now like to complement this view with some remarks focusing on the policy dimension of systemic risk. over the last months, the international community has already decided to improve the regulatory and supervisory framework for the international financial system in several key points. the recent agreement on tighter capital standards ( basel iii ) represents a particularly decisive step forward in the envisaged re - form agenda. the new rules will probably be finally ratified at the forthcoming g20 summit of heads of state and government in seoul. bank capital will have to be stronger and higher in future, which will reduce the likelihood of individual institutions failing. larger risk buffers in the form of additional capital are not enough, however. more attention needs also to be paid to the “ big picture ”, the system as a whole. if the crisis has taught us one serious lesson, it is that the tightly networked international financial system can cause events which start out as isolated shocks to rapidly go global and unleash systemic effects. such systemic risks can originate in any part of the financial system : channels of potential contagion exist both within financial sectors and markets and across sectors and components. feedback loops between the financial sector and the real economy can also give rise to systemic risk. the system as a whole can also encounter difficulties if, owing to interdependencies, the rational conduct of market participants at the individual level were to lead to market dislocations in the aggregate. i draw three direct conclusions from the foregoing, which are related to one another and should be main elements of the policy response to the crisis. first, we need to find a suitable way of dealing with systemically important institutions. second, the traditional microprudential supervision needs to be supplemented with a macroprudential – or systemically oriented – component. third, we must
modeling. but sure enough, there were some other twists of fate and here i am, back, as a model consumer. and, i think, an ideal consumer because i realize how hard it is to do this kind of work.

the overly expansionary monetary policy amply documented by john taylor. it was obvious to virtually all economists that the country needed a permanent budget shift as vietnam spending increased, but what came out of that was a delayed temporary tax increase. anything else would have made the war less popular, and by then the vietnam war was pretty darn unpopular. quite possibly, our intellectual understanding was not where it should have been in the late 1960s, but 90 percent of the policy problems were political, with the policymakers themselves. these days the board staff makes a baseline forecast and grafts on frbus to get the results for alternative scenarios. we actually began to do these types of experiments once our model was put together in the late 1960s. i was dying to present the results to the board, but never could get past lyle gramley, our sponsor but also our gatekeeper. he didn ’ t trust the model enough when it was used as a pure forecasting device. then, as i suppose now, we had the most trouble forecasting equipment investment - most of the other final demand sectors worked pretty well. the investment accelerator was also the reason our dynamic simulations ran off - track. when we would suspend the investment equation, things would work reasonably well. i have heard the modern day staff complain about estimating an accelerator effect for equipment and software and, believe me, i am sympathetic. another place where the intervening years have made a real difference is the way in which the baseline forecast itself was put together. in our day it was totally anticipations data - leading indicators of this or that, for a quarter or two ahead at most. today i hear dave stockton describe the baseline forecast in very model - oriented terms - this effect, that coefficient, and so forth. nowadays the baseline forecast also runs out a few years, something the judgmental forecasters of earlier days would never have attempted, and it even has measures of forecast uncertainty. all of these are real improvements, far beyond what was done in the 1960s. for me, this work all came to an end in may 1970. at the time i felt we had brought the model as far as i thought we could bring it, at least for a while, and i really wanted to do some other kind of economics. whether the external pastures were in fact greener i will never know - they just seemed greener at the time. so i left the board staff, confident that i would never return either to the board or to large - scale macro
convictions, and present them to voters in a clear and consequential fashion. if we want to achieve a strong, well - functioning and sustainable europe that works for all of us, then we must be willing to do what it takes. it requires us to better harmonize our economic policies, and to jointly invest in sustainable growth. firmly based on member states assuming responsibility for putting their own house in order. with the realization that all member states must do their bit. and with the prospect of creating a better future for us all. thank you * * * 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

can tackle these transnational challenges better at european level than at national level. these challenges call for european cooperation within a strong european union. and this is inextricably linked to strengthening the foundations of our currency union. i am convinced this is perfectly possible. we designed our monetary union ourselves, including its flaws. and that means we can also fix it ourselves, if we want to. policy for europe there are three things i believe we need to do for that to happen. the first is to fight this covid - 19 crisis collectively and effectively. this summer, european leaders wasted no time in setting up a european recovery fund. an excellent initiative. what ’ s very important is that the recovery fund is intended to support public investments that strengthen economic growth potential also in the financially more constrained member states. the recovery fund prioritizes investments in digitalization and a climate - neutral economy. that way, we can kill two birds with one stone : we narrow the gap between those leading the way and those lagging behind, and we invest in the sustainable growth capacity of the euro area. it is also important to note that the fund is temporary. there are no direct transfers between countries. nor do countries assume responsibility for each other ’ s debts. while this fund is an important step, it is not enough. and this brings me to the second item on my list : we will also have to coordinate fiscal policy more closely. in recent years, european fiscal rules have been focused on the 3 % limit for the budget deficit. as a result, the rules have been strict during bad times, and ineffective during the good times. i therefore think we need to pay more attention to public debt levels. the maastricht treaty ’ s 60 % debt limit must regain prominence. it is a recognizable benchmark, and allows member states the room to temporarily increase their debt during economic downturns. however, the pace at which countries are required to return to below this limit, must vary more than it did in the past. the individual economic situation of a country must be taken into account. during economic upswings, countries with higher debt levels should have to make greater efforts to reduce their debt than countries with lower debt levels. in reducing public debt, we should put more emphasis on reforms that enhance economic 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches growth. rather than the spending cuts and tax hikes that often initially constrain growth. if austerity is unavoidable, fiscal
org / press / p160526a. htm >. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

##ies about how their fx transactions were being executed may have helped to reduce the incidence and severity of the market abuses that occurred in the past. fx transactions were sometimes regarded as ancillary to the core business, notwithstanding their potential impact on returns. ultimately the success of the code in promoting integrity and restoring confidence in the wholesale fx market lies in the hands of its participants. that is why the global fxcs issued a joint statement of support at the launch of the code in new york as well as stating their intention to make adherence to the code a likely requirement of fxc membership. 5 that would ensure the code is embedded at the core of the fx market, but it is also important that it extends beyond that, and that there is, at the very least, an awareness of it across all market participants. a second dimension of adherence is that the bis central banks have signalled their commitment by announcing that they themselves will follow the code, and that they expect that their counterparties will do so too. 6 to that end, the rba will no longer transact in the fx market with those that don ’ t commit to adhere to the code after its release in may. a third dimension of adherence is that we are talking to regulators in our various jurisdictions as to how they might use the code in monitoring market conduct. in australia, the securities regulator, asic is very supportive of the development of the code and is considering how it might utilise the code in its market surveillance. the financial conduct authority ( fca ) in the uk is considering how they might incorporate the code in the senior managers regime there. given that we are only providing the full text of the code to the market in may, there will be a period of time for market participants to adjust their practices where necessary ( which should hopefully not be much ) to be in line with the principles in the code. this period of time might potentially be as short as six months, but no more than twelve months for the vast majority of market participants. how much effort this might require will in part depend on the nature and extent of your engagement with the fx market. in drafting the code, we have always kept the principle of proportionality at front of mind. conclusion we are on track to complete the code so that it will be released in london in may. at the end of that process, for the code to be effective and for it to achieve what we want it to achieve, it will need to be accepted and endorsed