##ical capital buffer ”. jo se abad and anto nio garcia pascual. ( 2022 ). “ usability o f bank capital buffers : the ro le o f market expectatio ns ”. imf working paper no. 2022 / 021. play a key role in mitigating the impact of systemic shocks, as their release would automatically increase voluntary buffers and thus contribute to a stable provision of credit during periods of materialisation of losses. the empirical evidence gathered in the euro area and the united states during the pandemic shows the unwillingness of banks to dip into regulatory buffers and that the size of voluntary buffers was the main factor determining the propensity of banks to keep lending to nonfinancial corporations ( nfcs ). 6 in particular, banks with low capital headroom lent less during the pandemic than those banks with large voluntary buffers. 7 this is precisely the main reason behind the benefits of releasing buffers such as the ccyb during systemic events. the empirical studies assessing the role of released buffers in europe during the pandemic show that they helped support the provision of credit to companies and households. 8 9 in particular, recent evidence from the united kingdom shows that banks that benefitted more from the release of the ccyb, because they had either a higher share of credit within their risk - weighted assets or lower capital headroom, granted mortgages for higher amounts with lower interest rates during covid - 19. research under way at the banco de espana seemingly corroborates these benefits, by identifying, in particular, that banks increased lending in jurisdictions where the ccyb was released in response to the pandemic, and that these positive effects were mainly significant for the most capital constrained banks, which are precisely those banks found to cut lending more in the absence of measures. 10 for the particular case of the spanish banking system, there is also evidence that voluntary buffers, not absolute capital levels, were more relevant determinants of the willingness of an argument o ften used against the effectiveness o f releasable buffers is that banks will use them to increase the distribution o f dividends in downturns, rather than to co ntinue lending. the empirical evidence sho ws that so me banks try to keep stable the remuneratio n that they o ffer fo r their shares. but even if this is the case, the release

mr. ingves discusses retail trade, emu and the euro with respect to sweden text of a speech by mr. stefan ingves, a deputy governor of the bank of sweden, held on 14 / 4 / 97. first a word of thanks for the invitation to speak about emu. less than twelve months have passed since the riksbank last attended a meeting of the swedish retail federation with information about emu. perhaps some of you were present on that occasion. whereas the issue of emu was still fairly new a year ago and not much discussed by most people, the situation today is different. in the interval we have experienced a marked increase both in what people know about emu and in their interest in the matter. this naturally has to do with the rapid approach of the starting date. today the move to stage three lies fewer than 500 working days ahead. moreover, there is no mistaking the strength of the political determination in europe to start on time. this was evident not least at the recent ecofin meeting in the netherlands when the eu finance ministers agreed on several important matters such as the stability and growth pact and erm2. today i shall be outlining the process leading up to stage three of emu and the changes that we already know will occur. i will also say something about emu's consequences for retail trade. before considering practical aspects of emu, permit me to begin with a look at some general economic features. sweden should join from the start the riksbank is in favour of sweden participating in the euro area right from the start in 1999. the reasons for this have been spelled out in our submission on the calmfors report, for example. as regards the economic arguments, we do not believe that, by remaining outside the euro area, sweden would incur particularly large costs for stabilisation policy ; in the event of economic shocks, it is structural changes rather than monetary policy that should be used in the first place to counter rising unemployment, for instance. on the political side, we share the report's assessment that the political costs of not participating would be substantial ; as an outsider sweden would not belong to the inner circle of countries that will be deciding europe's future. it should also be realised that countries which belong to the euro area from the start will have more influence on how the european central bank ( ecb ) develops in the crucial early years, when the forms for its work are being established. our possibility of influencing