samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
##rs to the imf if this is compatible with the monetary financing prohibition included in the treaty on the functioning of the european union. retaining the reserve asset status of the resulting claims is paramount. this requires that the claims remain highly liquid and of high credit quality. the direct financing of multilateral development banks by national central banks of eu member states through sdr channelling is not compatible with the monetary financing prohibition. bolstering the recovery to transform the global economy this pandemic is a prime opportunity for us to build a more resilient future and make progress towards the global economy we want to see, namely a greener, more digital and more inclusive one. we welcome the plans to further integrate climate change - related issues into imf surveillance. at the ecb, we have recently established a climate change centre to help us harness internal expertise and shape our climate agenda in line with our mandate. reflections on climate change and environmental sustainability were central to our recent monetary policy strategy review, as we examined how the risks posed by climate change feed into our monetary 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches policy framework. the resulting climate action plan we announced in july presents a comprehensive roadmap to step up our involvement in climate change - related matters, in line with our obligations under the eu treaties. the ecb has already taken concrete steps to strengthen the role of climate risk in both financial stability monitoring and banking supervision. the ecb recently published the methodology and results of our economy - wide climate stress test, showing that there are clear benefits for both banks and companies if they act early and ensure an orderly transition. the exercise will also be used to inform the 2022 supervisory climate stress test that will be conducted to test banks ’ preparedness to assess climate risks. ecb banking supervision has also asked banks to conduct self - assessments in the light of the ecb guide on climate - related and environmental risks and to draw up action plans. the preliminary results were published in august and show that banks have made some progress in adapting their practices, but they are still moving too slowly. next year, ecb banking supervision will conduct a full supervisory review of banks ’ risk management and disclosure practices. as regards the digital economy, the ecb will continue to contribute to the g20 initiative to enhance cross - border payments to make them faster, cheaper and more inclusive, and to address the opportunities and challenges of the digitalisation of finance. at the ecb, we have launched the investigation phase of a digital

euro project that will address key issues regarding the potential design and distribution of a digital euro, which would be a complement to cash, not a replacement for it. international cooperation on digital currencies will remain essential in the period ahead. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
bankers ’ speeches

the recovery strengthens. all this implies that, insofar as disconnections emerge between business and financial cycles in advanced economies, monetary policy is not available to address financial stability concerns. this also applies to the euro area. in our case, however, the issue is made more acute by the fact that cyclical conditions are also diverging across countries. we have signalled clearly that our monetary policy is continuing its easing phase. our main policy rates will stay low for a prolonged period of time, as indicated by our forward guidance, and our balance sheet will keep expanding until we see a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation. managing the business cycle and ensuring price stability will be the central focus of monetary policy over the medium - term, as our mandate demands. in this environment, monetary policy needs a complement, and that complement is macroprudential policy. this is hardly a new statement, but in my view it is still not receiving sufficient international attention. developing the macroprudential toolkit is a real need for advanced economies. moreover, some key aspects of the situation we face today are yet to be fully reflected in our policy frameworks. there are two points in particular that i would like to underline. bis central bankers ’ speeches the first is that macroprudential policy must place greater emphasis on preventing large fluctuations in the financial cycle, rather than simply increasing resilience to shocks when they occur. this means making full use of instruments that can effectively restrain excessive leverage and credit growth, and deploying them in a time - varying way that is sensitive to movements in the financial cycle. in my view, this can only be achieved by broadening the toolkit available to policymakers at the european level to include borrower - based measures, which are the measures thought to have the strongest impact on credit and real estate developments. the second point is the need for this broader toolkit to also cover the shadow banking sector. the crr / crdiv legal framework covers mainly the banking sector, yet financial activity and the financing of the euro area economy have increasingly shifted to non - banks. 1 since 2009, shadow banking entities have increased their share in total assets of the financial sector from 33 % to 37 %, while credit institutions have seen their share of intermediation shrink from 55 % to 49 %. in this context, a macroprudential framework focused solely on banks will be “ blind in one eye ” – it will have only a partial perspective on
industry. the sar government has therefore been determined to promote vertical diversification of the tourism services industry, putting emphasis on non - gaming tourism with new elements of culture, leisure, sport, convention and meeting. besides, the continuous effort by the government to optimize business environment, as well as the gradual deepening of cepa ; the role as platform of trade and services ; and the scheme of cross border industrial zone will be part of the driving force in diversifying the economy of macao over the longer term. now, let ’ s talk about reserves. also benefiting from the robust tourism sector, macao ’ s external account remains favorable. in 2006, the trade account surplus was equivalent to one - third of nominal gdp, pushing our foreign exchange reserves up by 36. 8 % to usd 9. 1 billion by the end of 2006. this amount of foreign exchange reserves represented an ideal level of 15 months of total imports in 2006. as at the end of march 2007, foreign exchange reserves further rose to usd 10. 3 billion. it is considered substantial for a small city with a population of 500 000. the management of the reserves of the macao sar is in the good hands of my colleagues in the monetary authority. by adopting a prudent strategy, they managed a reasonable return in a turbulent market environment. however, through out the process, like everybody else who is in charge of managing a reserve, they may feel like walking on a tight rope – they have to strike a balance between return and risk, which is becoming more so as rapid development in the financial market opened up new opportunities to invest in different asset classes beyond traditional ones and, as a result, risk management challenges also mount. when i look around the global financial market, i always ask myself a question : if a correction is bound to happen what will trigger its fall? it will certainly arise from an implosion of one or more instruments. everything appears to be frothy these days. the suspect can be debts, stocks, commodities, hedge funds, private equity firms, carry trades, derivatives, just to name a few. the market value of any one of the above categories is measured in terms of billions of us dollars. indeed, we witnessed last year the fall of two substantial hedge funds. in february this year, the unwinding of yen carry trades sent worldwide stock markets tumbling down. recently, global financial markets fret about the possible collapse of u. s. real estates market which

##t at mabuhay ang pilipinas! 1 fintech ( financial technology ) refers to the integration of finance and technology in a manner that drives the transformation or disruption of the traditional processes in financial service delivery. new business models driven by fintech can create new risks in different segments of the financial system, or accentuate some existing risks. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
banks as a group and one - on - one, quarterly and on an ad hoc basis. the central bank of barbados is very conscious that policy is about creating the right incentives to guide the actions of corporations and individuals in directions which will add value to the economy, by virtue of their mutual transactions and with those with whom we do business abroad. the gdp is, after all, the sum of the value created by the actions of individuals and corporations. it is the job of the policy maker to provide incentives which guide decisions about economic transactions in directions which add value. it is for this reason that we place so much emphasis on information and analysis, and in sending a clear message about our understanding of the economy and how it functions. this has to be an evolving process, because we live in a very dynamic world where established norms and practices become outmoded, and where we have no choice but to chart our bis central bankers ’ speeches course in uncertain waters. just last friday the lowest - risk securities in the world, those issued by the government of the usa, no longer became the lowest risk securities in the world, at least in the view of one authority on these matters. the best way to deal with unavoidable uncertainty is through thorough discussion of all the information that can be had on the issue of interest, and that is the spirit in which the central bank interacts with the banking system. we are pleased that fcib continues to be a leading partner with us and other financial institutions in our collaborative management of our nation ’ s financial affairs, and we welcome the reopening of the wildey branch of your bank as evidence that your parent ’ s longestablished commitment to the barbadian economy remains as strong as ever. we look forward to many more fruitful years of collaboration. i trust your bank will continue to prosper and be profitable, and that you will find irresistible incentives to deploy those profits right here in the caribbean. bis central bankers ’ speeches

sector. in conclusion, data doesn't just offer numbers ; it tells a story. a story of where we've been, where we are, and most importantly, where we can go. the intersection of technology and tourism presents an avenue ripe with opportunities. let's harness these insights to ensure that our beautiful island remains a premier destination, not just for the present generation but for many generations to come. thank you, and let us work together to build a future as luminous as the barbadian sun. 4 | page
. before i do that, though, i would like to welcome you once again and thank all of you for accepting our invitation to this event.

potential conflict between real and nominal convergence has often been exaggerated. the two processes have different time horizons, nominal convergence being achievable in the medium - run, whilst real convergence remains a long - run matter. there is, however, one particular link between the two processes that needs to be taken into account when we design our policies towards emu accession. faster gdp growth is likely to lead to a real exchange rate appreciation, making it impossible to have both very low inflation and a completely stable nominal exchange rate. this issue is well known and has received much attention. at the current stage of development, however, we need to shift from purely qualitative judgements to quantitative analyses of what has caused the real exchange rate appreciation trends in many accession countries. for example, the majority of empirical studies of the well - known balassa - samuelson effect have concluded that this hypotheses explains only 1 - 2 percentage points ( or even less ) a year of the observed real appreciation in central european countries. this necessitates searching for other influential factors and forecasting their development for the future. the implications of the real appreciation process are probably different for those countries with hard pegs against the euro compared with countries that have floating exchange rates. in the case of currency boards, the only channel of real appreciation is an inflation differential. as the maastricht inflation criterion is relatively strict, even a relatively modest pace of real appreciation might lead to complications. it will be certainly interesting to hear today if these countries really perceive this challenge as serious and what alternative policies - such as fiscal policies and / or income policies they can use to overcome the problem successfully. for countries with more flexible exchange rates, the maastricht exchange rate criterion is less binding, and a modest nominal appreciation trend can be accommodated within its fluctuation bands. it will be interesting to hear whether we all share this view. another question is whether we see any implications of the real appreciation process for designing the details of our erm2 membership, such as its duration or the chosen central parity. this brings me to the issue of erm2 membership and its consistency with our current monetary policy regimes. the proponents of the erm2 regime argue that it is a useful monetary policy framework which can have a disciplining impact on domestic policies, limit exchange rate volatility, and help determine the conversion rate for emu entry, but at the same time provides enough flexibility. even though there is no
they are offered libor instruments. if you do consider these factors, then i believe you will see that it is in your interest to move away from libor. in convening the arrc, we have set a model of public - private sector cooperation to address a key financial stability risk. ultimately, the private sector must drive this transition — these are private contracts, and each of you must choose how you can best address this risk — but the public sector must help. at a recent roundtable on the libor transition held by the financial stability board, we heard calls from the private sector to provide greater clarity on regulatory and tax implications of the transition and also calls for a more “ muscular ” regulatory approach. it is incumbent on the official sector to take these requests seriously, and we are. for example, the federal reserve is working with the commodity futures trading commission and other u. s. prudential regulators to provide greater clarity on the treatment of margin requirements for legacy derivatives instruments. agency staff are developing proposed changes to the margin rules for non - cleared swaps to ensure that changes to legacy swaps to incorporate a move away from libor, including adherence to the isda protocol, would not affect the grandfathered status of those legacy swaps under the margin rules. this has been a key request of the arrc, and we will look forward to public comment on the proposal. the federal reserve ’ s supervisory teams have already included a number of detailed questions about plans for the transition away from libor in their monitoring discussions with large firms. the federal reserve will expect to see an appropriate level of preparedness at the banks we supervise, and that level must increase as the end of 2021 grows closer. our supervisory approach will continue to be tailored to the size of institution and the complexity of libor exposure, but the largest firms should be prepared to see our expectations for them increase. as we consider the answers we have received from these firms, we will assess how our supervisory expectations for them should evolve in the coming year. let me address one additional point relating to our supervisory stress tests, in an effort to provide further clarity. some have recently claimed that the federal reserve ’ s supervisory stress tests would penalize a bank that replaces libor with sofr in loan contracts by lowering projections of net interest income under stress. as can be seen in our recently published enhanced descriptions of the supervisory stress - test models, the interest rate variables that drive projections of net interest income under stress are

well educated professionals. you will all have seen, for instance, the startling numbers which were published recently, showing that financial sector employment alone grew by nearly 19 % during 2006. programmes such as the gedp demonstrate that we have the capacity, together with our partners, to develop our human resources, and give me the confidence that together we will continue to move forward and meet tomorrow ’ s challenges. thank you for your attention.
##bratory fireworks of 30 april still fresh in our minds, is the eu enlargement and the future entry of our new member states into the euro area. this represents challenges, but it will also bring major opportunities for our european economy ; if one remembers the concerns expressed when spain and portugal joined the european union in 1986, and if one considers all the benefits that this integration brought to europe as a whole, there is certainly room for hope and high expectations with this new enlargement. ladies and gentlemen, i thank you for your attention.

to fruition it is of course key that the risk transfers are genuine ; in other words, it is necessary that the risk is really transferred to third parties. the experience of the crisis showed that this condition was not always met in the past. in this respect, i would like to highlight the important work done by eba in the assessment of the current supervisory practices and the proposals made to further enhance the criteria of significant risk transfer for securitisation in its discussion paper. conclusion let me conclude. the ecb places great importance on the health of the european securitisation market. the abs loan - level initiative has made an important contribution in ensuring a high degree of transparency to enable investors to assess the embedded risks of securitisations. obviously, abs had to become safer after the experience of the great financial crisis, in particular with securitized us - subprime mortgages. regulators and legislators have acted accordingly, and the work has not yet been completed. but we should not throw the baby out with the bath water. instead, the potential of healthy securitizations should be exploited. in line with the commission goal to revive the securitisation market in europe, in order to broaden investment opportunities for investors and boost lending to households and businesses a number of barriers need yet to be overcome. the sts regulation could make an important contribution. much work has already been conducted, nevertheless many important technical standards still need to be finalised and some other uncertainties still remain. in this context, we have to be mindful amid the interdependencies of different pieces of legislation. calibration of solvency ii is essential for insurance companies as investors in securitisation. further clarity of securitisation special purpose entities under the emir framework is needed. finalisation of basel iii may impact securitisation as a means of transferring risk. these are challenges that lie ahead of us. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches
system was based on automatic inflation indexation of wages. this implied a more or less direct feed of the oil price shocks into wages and prices. the 1970s saw a broad range of economic policy interventions, but without clear success. unemployment was increasing rapidly 9, government deficits were approaching 10 per cent of gdp, the balance of payments deficit persisted, and inflation was running at double - digit numbers. in principle, a fixed - exchange - rate policy was pursued within the european exchange - rate co - operation, but the krone was devaluated several times against the deutsche mark during the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s. therefore, de facto the exchange rate did not serve as the economy's " nominal anchor ". as the result of high inflation and lack of credibility, long - term centralgovernment interest rates reached more than 20 per cent in the beginning of the 1980s and the longterm interest - rate differential between denmark and germany was above 10 per cent. the government debt increased rapidly, and a fear that denmark was on the verge to “ state bankruptcy ” began to rise. in the early 1980s, a radical change in policies took place after a shift in government. in relation to a change of government in september 1982 the incoming government declared that devaluation would no longer be considered as an economic - policy instrument. this was subsequently followed by a significant tightening of the fiscal policy and an abolition of the automatic cost - of - living adjustment of wages. the promise to pursue a firm fixed - exchange - rate policy was soon put to a serious test when sweden – one of denmark's largest trading partners – devalued its currency by 16 per cent one month later. denmark did not devalue. this and the other tightening measures meant that the credibility of denmark's fixed - exchange - rate policy was soon enhanced. 10 in the following years the government budget improved, and the inflation and interest - rate differentials to germany fell significantly. the medium - term horizon in the danish fiscal policy framework during the last two decades or so has been crucial for the conduct of the fixed - exchange - rate policy. the discretionary fiscal policy measures carried out within this framework have also often contained elements of structural policy. hereby consideration has been taken to both the short - term macroeconomic stabilisation as well as to the medium - turn and long - term growth - potential of the economy. the most important permanent structural element during the second half of the 1980s was

. ( 2004 ), two decades of structural reform in denmark : a review, oesterreichische nationalbank 32nd economic conference, may 27 and 28, vienna.