is the tltro is available ; that means it ’ s basically a funding instrument. so borrowers, banks will be able to borrow for two years up to two years. 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches this is a funding side. it basically responds to the concerns that we have about congestion on the bond market, linked to two cliff effects ; one cliff effect will be in june of next year, the other, march of the following year. that we have addressed. the other issue with the tltro is to what extent do you want to use it as an instrument to support lending conditions? that ’ s the incentive scheme that you need to put in place. that ’ s premature because you want to have more clarity about the evolution of the economy and the lending part that supports the economy. for the time being now we don ’ t see anything special in terms of lending, banking intermediation to non - financial corporations or for households. things are okay on that side. of course the central bank pre - emptively has to look how the situation potentially will evolve and with the weakening of the economic growth you must be ready to act the instruments needed if you want to support lending. i would say in terms of pricing, for the tltro you want to first make an assessment ; what is the pricing that corresponds the best to the problem you want to address? if it ’ s lower lending at that time, the pricing has to take that into account. it ’ s a bit premature now so we ’ re going to decide in due time, as we say. can you translate due time? how much time do you have? praet : the first allotment will be in september of this year so you have to do it before. that will be decided maybe, i don ’ t know, but maybe i will be gone. that means for the governing council of june, because we also will have the projections at that time. that would be one opportunity before september, but this being said, the governing council can always decide to change the incentive scheme of a programme. we did it in the past, given the evolution of the economy. we can do it in the future. as i said it ’ s a very flexible instrument so you can do that, but it must be adapted to the problem you want to address, which is a monetary policy issue that you have to have in consideration. you ’ ve talked to the banks about this tool

name a few. but there are also two vital macroeconomic policy determinants. one, involving monetary policy, is a credible commitment to stable prices in the long run. the second, involving fiscal policy, concerns the share of total output devoted to national saving. output that is not devoted to saving will be consumed, and that's that. output that is saved, or reserved from consumption, will be devoted to capital investment, which equips workers with new capital, enhances productivity, and raises living standards. in recent years, the united states has been the fortunate beneficiary of a productivity growth spurt. both monetary and fiscal policy have played an important role. the commitment to and realization of stable prices have surely been a critical background forces, facilitating long - term planning and a more efficient allocation of resources. on the fiscal side, the role of saving and investment has been important as well. production - function decompositions of this growth spurt suggest that a good 30 to 40 percent of it has been due to so - called capital - deepening productivity change, reflecting increases in the economy's capital - labor ratio. fiscal policy is relevant because it helps determine the national saving that finances this capital investment. national saving can be generated privately, by households and business, or by government. efforts to promote private saving certainly have merit in theory, but the bald empirical fact for the united states is that the government has introduced a number of tax provisions to increase private saving over the past twenty years, and almost all of them have been correlated with a reduction in the overall rate of private saving. these measures could have been effective at the margin, but they have not had a large enough effect to counter the general downward trend in private saving. as an added caution, from a standpoint of national saving, it makes no sense to introduce costly private saving incentives that then reduce government saving more than they raise private saving. what has seemed to raise national saving is government fiscal policy, the budget surpluses. government saving, or a surplus, leads to a reduction in outstanding government debt to which wealth - holders, for the most part, seem to respond by devoting the funds to private credit markets. this response, in turn, finances capital investment. much of this capital investment is likely to be in the united states, directly influencing output and productivity. but even if the saving flows abroad, either through the buying back of foreign - owned capital or the purchase of new capital in foreign countries