and the commission for help, and they also asked the ecb to contribute its expertise at a time when europe needed it most. this setup was codified in the esm treaty and by the co - legislators in the two - pack ; the ecj confirmed its legality. in line with this, the ecb has since provided its advice in programmes in five member states. but we should not forget that the respective national governments are responsible for programme implementation, while the final responsibility for programme design and the disbursement of financial assistance lies with the eurogroup. since 2010, three countries have now successfully completed their programmes, and ireland is a particularly good example of how such programmes can deliver the necessary adjustment and restore financial stability, economic competitiveness and fiscal sustainability. it has shown that a country which takes strong ownership of its programme can come out of it with robust growth and a more stable financial system, and that eventually employment will also rebound. there is no doubt that the adjustment process was painful. but we should keep in mind that the adjustment would have caused significantly more hardship in the absence of financial assistance. the programmes had to address excessive macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated over several years in the run - up to the crisis, often reflecting misguided national economic policies. as we have said before : don ’ t blame the fire damage on the fire brigade. throughout the programmes in ireland and elsewhere, the ecb has played the role assigned to it under the treaty – to be the central bank for the euro area and to provide liquidity to financial institutions, including those in programme countries, when warranted. at times, this meant that risk - management considerations made it necessary for us to consider the progress of programme implementation when deciding on provision of further liquidity if the soundness of the domestic financial sector was intimately linked to programme success. we did so in full accordance with our rules and legal framework and in full independence. this was the case for ireland. and this continues to be the case for greece and cyprus. please allow me to conclude. bis central bankers ’ speeches five years ago, the programme framework came to life. it is certainly part of our path toward a genuine economic and monetary union to integrate the european stability mechanism and the related programme work fully into the legal framework of the european union ; we again called for this most recently in the five presidents ’ report. but it is even more important that we take decisive steps to avoid a member state needing a programme in the

, an enhanced stress testing transparency package was released for public comment last month. i personally believe that our stress testing disclosures can go further. i appreciate the risks to the financial system of the industry converging on the federal reserve ’ s stress testing model too completely, so i am hesitant to support complete disclosure of our models for that reason. however, i believe that the disclosure we have provided does not go far enough to provide visibility into the supervisory models that often deliver a firm ’ s binding capital constraint. it is important in any proposal to receive comments, and i can say that i and my colleagues on the board will be paying particularly close attention to your comments on how we might improve this current proposal. concluding remarks to conclude, i hope that these remarks give you a sense of our approach to analyzing and improving post - crisis regulation. as i mentioned earlier, the areas of core reform — capital, liquidity, stress testing, and resolution — have produced a stronger and more resilient system and should be preserved. we have made great progress, but there is further work to do. some clear improvements are in the offing in the relatively near future. other areas will benefit from longer term discussion. i look forward to engaging with you and the public more broadly as i help to chart a course for the important work ahead. the views i express here are my own and not necessarily those of the board of governors of the federal reserve system. 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches 2 jerome h. powell, “ relationship between regulation and economic growth, ” ( testimony before the committee on banking, housing, and urban affairs, u. s. senate, june 22, 2017 ). 3 see board of governors of the federal reserve system, “ agencies propose simplifying regulatory capital rules, ” news release, september 27, 2017. 4 see board of governors of the federal reserve system, “ agencies extend next resolution plan filing deadline for certain domestic and foreign banks, ” news release, september 28, 2017. 5 see board of governors of the federal reserve system, “ federal reserve board requests comment on package of proposals that would increase the transparency of its stress testing program, ” news release, december 7, 2017. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches