stability and credibility of the payment system. now that the payment market is moving towards larger, more numerous and more important payments outside of rix normal opening hours, the riksbank needs to modernise the services it offers so that central bank money remains the norm when financial institutions settle payments. my colleagues have essentially expressed similar views. last week we therefore decided to contact the ecb to initiate discussions on an agreement that would make the swedish krona available for settlement on tips. an absolute requirement that we have in these discussions is that the security surrounding tips must correspond to the expectations in swedish legislation. it is still too early to say when tips could be available for the swedish krona, but if it all works out, i am hoping it will be in 2021. when the riksbank supplies a settlement service that is available 24 / 365 our expectation is that the rix participants settling instant payments will use the platform offered by the riksbank. but we will proceed with caution and support the private solution that is available, bir, until tips is introduced and all conditions for using it are in place. during the implementation period the riksbank will make sure to have a close dialogue with the market and be responsive to views and wishes on how tips can be made available to the swedish krona. we will return to the exact forms for such a consultation later in the autumn. 8

stefan ingves : introduction on monetary policy speech by mr stefan ingves, governor of the sveriges riksbank, to the riksdag committee on finance, stockholm, 11 november 2010. * * * it is always a pleasure to come here and meet the committee on finance. and it is a particular pleasure to see many new faces. i had the same experience four years ago when i had been governor of the riksbank for less than a year. it is particularly inspiring to have the opportunity to discuss monetary policy with new representatives of our employer, the riksdag ( swedish parliament ) – and it is, of course, as always interesting to discuss it with the ones i have met before. just as i did four years ago, i will begin with a summary of the situation. so where do sweden and other countries stand today, and how did we get there? i intend to give a fairly rough outline of my own view of the situation, without going into too many details. this is usually the best way of conveying the essential features. it will also make it easier to put current monetary policy in the right perspective. several explanations for the crisis the past couple of years have been rather dramatic, since the financial market turmoil erupted into an acute global crisis in autumn 2008. it will probably take some time before we have the complete picture of why the crisis arose and how it could become so deep. but there are a number of circumstances that almost certainly contributed, although there is still debate on their relative significance. poorly adjusted regulations and insufficient oversight one fact that definitely did play a role is that the regulations and supervision did not function satisfactorily. one of the problems was that there was too much focus on the situation of individual agents and too little focus on the financial system as a whole – too much micro and too little macro, if you like. moreover, the supervision lacked the necessary international oversight as it was largely conducted on a domestic basis by each individual country. there were also loopholes in the regulations that, for instance, meant that some institutions and markets were not covered and could expand without the authorities having any real oversight. things were not made easier by the fact that there was also great ingenuity in the financial markets that resulted in new financial instruments, where no one properly understood the risks. so all in all, one can say that the deficiencies in regulation and supervision meant that the brakes did not catch when events got out of control and