approach, and the coronavirus is no different. this is primarily a public health issue, which will be fought on the front lines by doctors, nurses, and other healthcare professionals. governments will also need to step in to support the healthcare response, and, if needed, to provide targeted relief to affected industries and workers through fiscal measures. monetary policy central banks like the federal reserve also have an important role to play in addressing the economic effects of the coronavirus, ensuring that financial markets function effectively and providing support to the economy. these actions cannot address the health issues, but can help 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches manage near - term risks to the economy in a highly uncertain time. earlier this week, the fomc voted unanimously to lower the target range for the federal funds rate to 1 to 1 - 1 / 4 percent. this strong policy action provides meaningful support to the economy and will help sustain the economic expansion. the outlook is evolving and highly uncertain. in the weeks and months ahead, we will continue to closely monitor developments and their implications for the economic outlook. we will use our tools and act as appropriate to support the economy. as part of our response, my colleagues and i in the federal reserve system are coordinating with our counterparts around the world. tuesday ’ s phone call between g7 finance ministers and central bank governors, the subsequent statement, and policy actions by central banks are clear indications of the close alignment at the international level. financial markets turning to the specific responsibilities of the new york fed, we are tasked with the implementation of monetary policy. our goals are to keep the federal funds rate within the target range and foster stable conditions in short - term funding markets. we will ensure that the supply of reserves in the banking system remains ample, consistent with the fomc ’ s direction. 2 treasury bill purchases continue to add to the underlying level of reserves, and repo operations are keeping reserve levels ample. we are monitoring conditions in money markets closely. we remain flexible and ready to make adjustments to our operations as needed to ensure that monetary policy is effectively implemented and transmitted to financial markets and the broader economy. conclusion i ’ ll conclude with this : the coronavirus poses evolving risks to the u. s. economy. our policy action this week positions us well to support the economic expansion. we are carefully monitoring the effects of the coronavirus on the u. s. economic outlook and will respond as appropriate. our focus remains trained on serving the american people by pursuing our dual

mover disadvantage in attracting and retaining talent. another possible reform could involve putting a greater onus on senior management for the costs incurred from regulatory fines or other legal liabilities, rather than on shareholders alone. shareholders should not be shielded from such costs and fines — as they may have also profited from associated gains — but it doesn ’ t seem fair or prudent to shield the decision - makers from responsibility for costly breakdowns as much as they are now. greater personal liability may also be a powerful incentive to promote better behavior. i suspect changes in these areas would lead senior managers to encourage their staff to speak up earlier about emerging risks, be more attentive when red flags were raised, and respond sooner and more forcefully. i would also note that the many regulatory reforms introduced over the past decade may create incentives of their own, with important implications for bank behavior. such incentives may alter the nature and locus of risk - taking, and therefore need to be closely monitored. risks could be shifted outside the banking system, or the incentives could lead to different bank strategies, business models, and product offerings that introduce new risks. there is a long history of such behavior. for example, off - balance - sheet instruments rose sharply in the 1980s in response to the introduction of minimum primary and total capital requirements based on balance sheet size. more recently, in some jurisdictions the use of leverage ratios based on period - end reporting of assets — as compared to period averages in the united states — has encouraged window - dressing behavior by some banks at quarter - end. so, while the reforms have mostly had the intended effect of encouraging safer institutions, authorities and financial institutions should also be mindful of potential unintended consequences. conclusion to sum up, we have made considerable progress toward a more resilient and robust financial system. while we should do more to make the regulatory regime more efficient, transparent, and simple, there are outstanding issues that still require additional work — such as the crossborder resolution of large global banks. we should also focus more on incentives, which can help ensure that regulations are dynamic and work well, and that banks are incentivized to take action early to steer away from trouble. finally, regulation and supervision are necessary but not sufficient — they must be supplemented by bank cultures that encourage ethical behavior, the early identification of problems, and a willingness to address those problems proactively. thank you for your kind attention. i would be happy to take a few questions. won