on the commission ’ s consultation on the future of the eu macroprudential framework ” 8 see directive on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending directive 2012 / 30 / eu. 9 see the giovannini report, the clearing and settlement fiscal compliance expert group fisco, the tax barrier advisory group ( t - bag ) as well as the ecb ’ s t2s advisory group. 10 the importance of financial market data standards and global identifiers has also been discussed in box 2 of last year ’ s ecb report on financial integration in europe. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

to public funds. the principle of the new european rules is to absorb bank losses by bailing - in shareholders and uninsured creditors. this does not mean that bail - out is fully excluded, as the new rules contain sufficient flexibility to deal with exceptional situations where public money may be required to stabilise the banking system. this brings me to the second important dimension of risk - sharing in the banking union, which is national versus euro area risk sharing. the debate on moving forward on emu is held back by a standoff between the risk reduction and risk sharing camps. in theory, risk reduction in the banking sector and public risk sharing in a banking union should work in unison. non - performing loans, however, are one of the major roadblocks on the road towards further public risk - sharing. following up to the 2014 comprehensive assessment, when for the first time the assets of banks were assessed with the same yardstick across the euro area, the single supervisory mechanism is preparing guidance to banks on non - performing loans. this forms a sound basis for the supervisor to evaluate banks ’ handling of npls and for banks to tackle this problem in a decisive way. while risk reduction is essential to provide the right incentives to banks and protect taxpayers ’ money, a common fiscal backstop remains key to increase the systemic resilience of the euro area banking system. while supervisory decisions are taken at european level, the relevant risk - sharing mechanisms such as deposit insurance schemes are still at national level. supervision is common, but the consequences of potential bank failures are still predominantly national. national considerations therefore continue to affect supervisory decisions. this is not without consequences for the incentives for banks to become more european. let me just develop some concrete examples. first, the current institutional framework has not yet reached a sufficient degree of harmonization in the underlying rules and standards. since the aim is to create a single european banking system, it is essential that credit institutions face a single set of rules and conditions regardless of the location of their activities. this was the intention of the single rulebook but it is not yet the reality, also because of national divergences in the transposition of directives or the nonharmonised exercise of so - called options and national discretions ( onds ). a second example relates to a lack of fungibility of liquidity. still prevailing liquidity ring - fencing reflects the fact that the interests of a banking group management, which is responsible for the allocation of liquidity within