which enables cross - sectoral cooperation among national and international entities in charge of supervision. the joint statement of 8 june 2007 envisages that the discussion will be continud in a structured manner for a period of two years untile the g7 summit in 2009 where they will review progress made. the oecd was asked to provide a platform for dialogue between the g8 and the five other countries. since it includes the major financial centres and holds regular regional meetings involving countries in the asia - pacific region as well as in latin america, it has a particularly large reach out to a number of systemically important countries. let me turn now to the changes in terms of substance which have been introduced since the crisis events in the 1990s. here i have to be selective because initiatives have been undertaken in many areas to improve countries ’ macroeconomic and financial sector institutions and policies and thus their resilience to crisis. the increased focus on financial sector issues, such as in the framework of the fsf or the changes in progress in the imf to place much greater emphasis in surveillance on this matter, is certainly very welcome. but i would like to highlight three more general concepts which i consider to be of utmost importance. firstly, greater transparency, both in the public and private sector, has been one of the major achievements since the 1990s. transparency is a precondition for wellfunctioning markets since it facilitates better risk management and leads to strengthened market discipline, which in turn has a positive impact on the conduct of macroeconomic and structural policies. enhanced transparency also enables investors to better differentiate between economies and thus helps to counter herding behaviour and contagion effects. the imf ’ s special standard for dissemination of economic and financial data has become a widely recognised benchmark to which a large and increasing number of countries have subscribed. transparency in the private sector is also crucial for well - functioning global financial markets. all in all, i am pleased to note that considerable progress has been achieved over the years. but there are still areas where there is room for improvements, including in the reporting to the imf on the currency composition of countries ’ foreign exchange reserves. my second point relates to standards and codes, which have been internationally agreed for a wide variety of areas such as macroeconomic and data transparency, banking supervision, corporate governance, accounting, payment and settlement systems, to name just a few. the imf and the fsf have designated twelve of these standards as being of particular importance

in point are the volcker rule in the united states, or the measures in the vickers report in the case of the united kingdom. on 29 january this year the european commission published its legislative initiative in this area, based on the recommendations of a group of experts led by erkii liikanen, the governor of the bank of finland. other aspects identified by the fsb, which have occupied much of its deliberations, refer to the reform of the derivatives markets, the growing problem of “ shadow banking ” and convergence between difference international accounting standard - setters. on this very extensive agenda, i should like to focus on two matters : first, i shall review the measures aimed at reinforcing the resilience of banks, which are laid down in the accord known as basel iii ; and second, the treatment of “ too - big - to - fail ” banks, which has given rise, among other things, to the new banking resolution frameworks. bis central bankers ’ speeches the construction of a more robust banking system one of the first lessons learned from this crisis was that the level of capital in the banking system had been insufficient to withstand the risks made manifest by the crisis. further, certain instruments which did not prove effective in countering losses had been considered eligible as regulatory capital. likewise, there were specific risks which were not appropriately evaluated under banks ’ prudential regime. the basel committee, which had been exploring potential prudential improvements, finally rolled out the basel iii accord. basel iii notably strengthens the capital framework : its quality has been enhanced, insofar as new, stricter definitions were agreed upon ; capital ratios were raised ; and two new buffers – a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical buffer – were created. one notable singularity in the configuration of this latter buffer is that it also offered a response to macro - prudential objectives. that is, admittedly, something new and positive in the regulatory paradigm which, until then, had essentially been micro - prudentially geared. the second novel feature of basel iii has been the design of a common prudential framework for liquidity risk, both in the short term ( the liquidity coverage ratio ) and the long term ( the net stable funding ratio ). it is worth stressing that this is the first time an agreement has been forged internationally for the prudential treatment of this risk. the combined tightening of liquidity and capital requirements advises prudent application