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applying these standards is very desirable, as in this way they can gain some ‘ confidence premium ’ from the market, who perceive such central banks as ‘ goodpractice ’ followers. this is very important especially amid growing internationalisation of financial markets, when interpreting central bank ’ s policy is much easier under standard communication. surely, it is not the amount of communication that matters but rather its quality. this refers especially to central bankers ’ talk. it is more important, what you say than how you say it as unclear signals may actually misguide the market. a recent example of communication problems was the puzzle over the first congressional testimony of governor bernanke and his later comments. transparency and communication earned attention of most central bankers, yet some are keener than others. in 1997 reserve bank of new zealand started publishing its three - year interest rate forecast. since 2005 the bank has been presenting a central interest rate scenario. the rbnz innovation has mcculley p. “ the root of all evil ”, global central bank focus, pimco, may 2006. fomc : federal open market committee. “ the extra - action strategy responds to a perceived speculative boom with tighter monetary policy - and thus lower output and inflation in the near term - with the expectation of significantly mitigating the potential fallout from a possible future bursting of the bubble. thus, the strategy seeks to trade off the near - certainty of worse macroeconomic performance today for the chance of disproportionally better performance in the future, on the theory that the repercussions of a major market correction could be highly nonlinear. but the extra - action proposal is by no means a bold call for central banks to prick market bubbles. ” - kohn d. “ monetary policy and asset prices ” at “ monetary policy : a journey from theory to practice - an ecb colloquium held in honor of otmar issing ”, 16 march 2006. “ interest rate setting must also be assessed in the light of developments in property prices and credit. wide fluctuations in these variables may in turn constitute a source of instability in demand and output in the somewhat longer run. ” – norgesbank, inflation report, march 2006. trichet j. c. “ asset price bubbles and monetary policy ” speech of the president of the ecb, mas lecture, singapore, 8 june 2005. fukui t. “ new framework for the conduct of monetary policy : toward achieving sustainable economic growth with price stability