samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
successful, but you are much more likely to be successful if you are happy, doing work you enjoy. indeed, there are careful studies suggesting this. so when you choose what to do, don ’ t focus on the end point. instead, focus on whether you like the work itself. not only will you be more likely to reach your goal, even if you don ’ t arrive at that end point, you will have had a joyful life. advice over, congratulations to all of you, and i hope you enjoy a well - deserved break. good luck and thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

cannot directly tackle the threats posed by climate change, the bank will develop the modelling tools needed to take into account the important implications of climate change on the canadian economy and financial system. finally, recognizing the limits of monetary policy, the government and the bank also acknowledge their joint responsibility for achieving the inflation target and promoting maximum sustainable employment. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches
outstanding lending ( c ) in 2010, 2011 and 2012 this includes an adjustment to include cre loans transferred to the irish national asset management agency bis central bankers ’ speeches

, if these at some point put the financial system or economy at risk. while this combination of measures may have appeared modest, they represent a big philosophical shift from the past and an important signal for the future. regulators, certainly here in the uk, have clearly signposted they are no longer willing to turn a blind eye to pro - cyclical swings in property, or any other sector, which risk tripping up the economy. we can no more eliminate the credit cycle than we can the business cycle. but can we do better than watch on in horror, mop in hand? we can and we must. the virtue of having this second set of instruments is well illustrated in the current environment. macro - prudential measures can help guard against the financial stability risks otherwise associated with extra - ordinarily loose monetary policy. in the uk, the fpc can help support monetary policy in its task of driving forward recovery in the economy, by avoiding the mpc having to look over their shoulders for fast - approaching financial stability risks. in situations like these, two arms – monetary and macro - prudential policy – are surely better than one in securing macro - economic and financial stability. and having both arms attached to a single body, as here in the uk, can in turn help achieve greater coordination between monetary and macro - prudential policies. there is a quiet revolution underway in the uk ’ s macro - economic policy framework. conclusions on its 20th birthday, it is clear that the commercial property forum has never been more important. the boom - bust cycle in the sector is simply too damaging to be left to free - wheel. it is high time to develop some properly functioning gears and brakes. that is now being done, as a shared effort between the industry and the authorities – in pen ’ s words, “ to bring all sides of the industry together ”. if this is successful, the forum could not ask for a better birthday present. bis central bankers ’ speeches chart 1 long - run uk commercial property capital values ( a ) sources : scott ( 1996 ), investment property database and bank calculations. ( a ) the vertical dotted lines indicate the discernable booms and busts. the attached labels indicate peak years. chart 2 uk commercial property debt and valuations sources : association of british insurers, bank of england, investment property databank, ons and bank calculations. ( a ) based on end - year data ( b ) end - year stock of
adherence to the discipline of the inflation targeting regime, will mean that we continue to maintain low inflation in the years ahead.

largely as a result of these privatisations, the percentage of the population in australia who are now direct shareholders has risen sharply and is exceptionally high by world standards. the proportion who hold shares directly is 41 %. i have not got a table of comparisons with me, but i believe this figure is now about as high as in the united states. if we added to the number who directly hold shares, the number of people who voluntarily hold shares through equity unit trusts ( or mutual funds, to use us terminology ), the number would go to about 54 %. and, of course, if we added in those who contribute to an accumulation pension fund, exposure to shares would be almost universal. table 4 : consumer price inflation average annual rate ( over 1990s ) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - spain 4. 0 united kingdom 3. 5 sweden 3. 0 united states 2. 9 germany 2. 5 netherlands 2. 4 norway 2. 4 ireland 2. 3 australia 2. 3 switzerland 2. 2 belgium 2. 1 canada 2. 1 denmark 2. 1 finland 2. 0 france 1. 8 new zealand 1. 8 japan 1. 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - source : oecd can i turn now to inflation? if we look at an international ranking of inflation rates over the past decade comparable to the one i showed for real gdp growth, australia finishes in the middle of the field with an average inflation rate of 2. 3 % per annum ( table 4 ). this is a huge improvement on previous decades, but, of course, virtually every country has also shown a significant improvement. there are a number of factors behind this improvement, but the one i would like to mention today is our monetary policy regime. like a number of english - speaking countries - the uk, canada, new zealand - australia has a monetary policy regime which is based on the trilogy of an inflation target, an independent central bank and a floating exchange rate. our inflation target is not all that different from that of the uk in that we aim for an average inflation rate of somewhere between 2 and 3 % over the long term, recognising that it could go above or below that range from to
is the largest part of the economy. this effort has raised household consumption to its highest ever share of gdp. 8 but we are growing more slowly than ever. we have accumulated debt faster than almost all our peer countries, on the grounds that fiscal policy has to be supportive of growth. but growth stimulus works for smoothing out business cycles ; it ’ s not a long - run growth strategy. long - run growth is about savings, investment and exports. it is about raising productivity. we in south africa have deliberately run down savings, focused on consumption, and pulled in imports. our productivity growth is exceptionally low, perhaps negative. we should therefore not be surprised that growth has stagnated. ladies and gentlemen, to conclude : we in south africa have got to reform. it will involve some pain, but the longer we delay, the more painful it will be. we can tell ourselves comforting stories about how there are pain - free alternatives, but these narratives are misleading. we have spent a lot of time searching for easy options. these schemes don ’ t stand up to scrutiny. here ’ s what we can really do about mitigating the pain of necessary reform. first, we can take the edge off with the interest rate tool. provided we have lower inflation, and if country risk comes down, we can keep rates low, and maybe go lower. second, we can devise a credible plan for making things better again. in macroeconomics, as in so many things, it ’ s not about where you are, so much as where you ’ re going. the story of the last few years has been that south africa is drifting into a crisis. this has been the south african story before. we have, in the past, been able to change the narrative. south africa has many friends, and there is a lot of money out there desperate for good growth economies to invest in. we can be one of those winning countries again. thank you. 8 in the third quarter of 2019, household consumption reached 62. 1 % of gdp ( using real, seasonally adjusted and annualised data ). over the past 20 years, the average has been slightly below 60 % of gdp. investment and government consumption are also above long - run averages, while net exports are lower.

this regard. 6. concluding remarks in conclusion, i would like to congratulate pasa and the industry for the effort, and achievements of the past ten years, not only in the area of systems and infrastructure, but also in the manner in which they have co - operated in the flow of liquidity and the conclusion of commitments in the system on a daily basis. the bank looks forward to the continued co - operation of pasa and other stakeholders as we tackle the challenges that lie ahead in an effort to ensure that the nps continues to comply with international best practice. thank you.
to declare cetzam ’ s “ tusunge ” savings product officially launched. i thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

caleb m fundanga : improving the savings culture of zambians remarks by dr caleb m fundanga, governor of the bank of zambia, at the official launch of cetzam ’ s “ tusunge ” savings product, lusaka, 8 july 2011. * * * the board chairperson of cetzam financial services limited, mr frederick nduna ; members of the board of cetzam financial services limited ; the chief executive officer of cetzam financial services, mr dyson mandivenga ; chief executive officers and representatives of various organisations present ; distinguished invited guests ; members of the press ; ladies and gentlemen. let me begin by thanking the board of directors and management of cetzam financial services limited ( cetzam ) for inviting me to this occasion, which marks the official launch of the “ tusunge ” savings product. may i commend the management of cetzam for their foresight in developing this new savings product, which will go a long way towards inculcating a savings culture and enhancing financial inclusion within our financial sector. as a financial sector regulator, the bank of zambia is pleased to be associated with the achievements of the institutions we regulate, particularly where these developments lead to increased access to financial services for the zambian public. this is what cetzam is doing this morning. cetzam ’ s focus to introduce innovative products is adequate testimony of its commitment to serve the financial needs of the zambian people. i am informed that one of the key objectives of cetzam financial services limited is to provide sustainable microfinance services to the economically disadvantaged citizens of zambia. in so doing it targets the entrepreneurial poor, the majority of whom are women. i also know that cetzam was licensed by the bank of zambia as a deposit - taking mfi on the 3rd of october 2008. today, cetzam has 5 branches in lusaka, livingstone, ndola, kitwe and chingola while 9 satellite offices have been set up in the provinces to serve its rural clients. mr. chairman, the bank of zambia is particularly encouraged by cetzam ’ s role as an active lender to the small and medium enterprise ( sme ) sector, which is a growth sector in zambia ’ s economy. it is also gratifying to note that the company currently has about 8, 000 active clients with a repayment rate of over 90 %. distinguished invited guests, an important element for financial service providers is to endeavour
conclusion, i wish to thank you for finding time from your busy schedules to attend this workshop. i urge you to ask as many questions as you could possibly can, in order to get the best out of it, as well as make the workshop more lively and interactive. with these few remarks, it is now my honour and privilege to declare the workshop officially open. i thank you!

caleb m fundanga : bank of zambia risk management framework opening remarks by dr caleb m fundanga, governor of the bank of zambia, at the risk management framework sensitisation workshop for board of directors, chisamba, 24 - 26 november 2006. * * * • chairperson • directors • ladies and gentlemen i wish to welcome you all to the first in the series of the risk management framework sensitisation workshops organised by the risk management department. as the directors are, no doubt aware, the board approved the establishment of a risk management function at the bank of zambia in february 2006. following this approval, the risk management department was created to, among other duties, coordinate bank - wide risk management activities, for which heads of departments remain primarily responsible. in this regard, my vision is to move the bank to a position where risk management becomes our way of doing things. this workshop, therefore, is one critical step towards achieving this vision. directors would agree with me that risk management has always been part and parcel of the financial sector, and as financial industry authorities, central banks are no exception to this. the increasing pace of globalisation, largely, on account of advancements in information and communication technologies ( ict ), has provided an added impetus for institutions to strengthen their governance structures, including implementing enterprise - wide risk management strategies. it is for this reason, therefore, that the bank, like other world - class central banks, decided to position itself, in this fast - changing financial landscape, by incorporating risk management in its operations. in this regard, it gives me much pleasure to officiate at this workshop for the board of directors, whose objectives are twofold : i. to raise the directors ’ awareness about the bank of zambia risk management framework ; and ii. by so doing, secure the directors ’ unwavering commitment to embedding risk management culture in the bank. going forward, risk management department has lined up similar workshops targeting the various categories of staff ranging from the executive to unionised staff. the workshops are designed in such a manner that they address both the strategic and practical issues involved in the risk management process. ladies and gentlemen it is not my intention to give a long speech, but allow me to urge the directors to take this workshop seriously, for it is my expectation that at the end of this workshop, directors will be better placed to not only understand the bank of zambia risk management framework fully, but also provide guidance to the bank on risk management issues. in
interaction with the wider public. i have been struck since joining the governing council that most of the measures of in ation expectations, particularly long term in ation expectations, are market - based, or surveys of professional forecasters. in contrast, what the public expects is much less well understood. one measure of public perceptions is the dataset maintained by the european commission, which shows that households believed that in ation in the euro area was approximately 9 per cent on average in the period between 2004 and 2018, when it was, in fact, 1. 6 per cent ( cœure 2019, arioli 2017 ). 21 such misconceptions regarding macro and monetary phenomena are not limited to the euro area. the bank of england ’ s in ation attitudes survey estimates that public knowledge about monetary policy in the uk has remained low and at over the past 17 years, despite the increase in communication by the central bank ( haldane et al 2020 ). 22 similar results have been found in the united states ( binder 2017 ). 23 this points to a large gap between perception and reality. central banks must take responsibility for this gap : if the public does not understand what we are trying to achieve and whether we are succeeding, it is incumbent upon us to explain ourselves better. one issue here is that, with the exception of formal surveys such as those i just mentioned, central banks have traditionally seen communication with the public as a one - way street, rather than a dialogue. in my view, central banks must listen to what the public has to say, and how their experiences are in uencing their perception of monetary policy. for instance, most central banks target a speci c price index, an index that is supposedly representative of the average consumer. but i am reminded of the story of the'average'pilot. around the time of the second world war, us air force planes were designed to t the average size pilot : the size of the seat, distance to hand controls, reach to pedals, were all determined by the population average height, chest circumference, arm - length, leg - length etc. however, the high rate of accidents during pilot training raised questions. was it the pilots? or perhaps the training methods? only when the data was checked, was it realised that the cockpits were at fault : no pilot met all the average measurements. there was no'average'person ( rose 2016 ). 24 similarly, people at different stages

investigated by the financial services regulator. the financial services regulator has gone about its task in a comprehensive, detailed and pro - active manner. i have full confidence that it will reach the appropriate conclusions and take any necessary further remedial action. thank you, chairman, for permitting me to make this opening statement. my colleagues and i will be very happy to answer any questions the committee may wish to put to us.
. i am now looking forward to our discussion. bis central bankers ’ speeches

believe the overall monetary policy package underpins our forward guidance and our determination to accomplish an expansionary stance over an extended horizon in keeping with our price stability mandate and our desire to see inflation stabilise around levels below but close to 2 % over the medium term. features and risk management of the new programmes is the market for abs, in particular, sufficiently ample to allow sizeable purchases? our purchases will include a fairly wide range of simple and transparent abs collateralised by loans to the real economy. the total stock of eligible securities which is currently outstanding – held in investors ’ portfolios or retained by the originating banks – is already sizeable. we are confident that it will grow as a result of our presence in the market. over time, as our purchases contribute to a normalisation in trading conditions, secondary market and issuance activity will expand in those segments that are currently inactive. as the experience of other central banks that have engaged in outright purchases of structured products can demonstrate, market size and purchasing volumes are to a certain extent co - determined and endogenous. will the new initiatives magnify the eurosystem ’ s exposure to risk? outright purchases will increase the size of the ecb ’ s balance sheet, but the additional risk exposure will be limited. under the abs purchase programme we will be purchasing senior and guaranteed mezzanine tranches. regarding senior securities, we would buy only those assets that are eligible for eurosystem operations. so, we have ample experience with managing and understanding the risks associated with this asset class. the assets to be purchased would satisfy high standards of transparency and simplicity and are also characterised by low default risk. the large degree of credit enhancement that originators have to build into a structured financial transaction for its senior tranches to attract the high rating that will make it eligible under our programme will function as a further protective layer against losses. as for the guaranteed mezzanine tranches, their intrinsic credit risk would be comparable to that of the guarantor, be it a national or supranational entity. covered bonds share important features with abs, and therefore are an obvious complement to an abs - centred programme. first, the link that is established on the issuing bank ’ s balance sheet between the covered bond, on the one side, and the loans that back the covered bond, on the other, is reasonably tight. as the prices for covered bonds are bid up, we expect banks to respond to the market incentives by originating more sale
somewhat. we have repeatedly emphasised that an annual distribution of chf 2. 5 billion cannot be guaranteed in the long term.

it also be able to take more preventative action in the future. this is the only way the snb can guard effectively against future crises. preventative action is only possible if the national bank has efficient and effective instruments at its disposal. however, there is currently a glaring deficiency in this area. up until now, the only precautionary measure the snb could employ was to issue a warning. yet experience has shown that warnings alone are not enough. before the crisis, the national bank had repeatedly drawn attention to the high leverage of the big banks and warned that their ability to absorb losses was not adequate. these caveats did not result in any voluntary change in behaviour. for this reason, it is essential that our set of preventative instruments for financial stability be improved in three areas ; namely, improved access to information, closer involvement in regulatory procedures with regard to financial stability issues, and direct macroprudential decision - making powers. i would now like to take a closer look at these. first, it is crucial that we have all the necessary information quickly to hand in order to identify the build - up of risks in the financial system at an early stage. while the snb ’ s statutory authority to compile statistical data is both necessary and helpful, the latest crisis clearly demonstrated that the national bank must be able to request additional information. with this i mean, for example, quantitative, non - standardised data on banks ’ risk exposure. unlike finma, switzerland ’ s financial market supervisory authority, the snb ’ s stance is primarily a macroeconomic or systemic one. this is why we must be able to act independently in certain situations when gathering information. at the same time, we also want to keep our access to information to an absolute minimum and avoid a duplication of activities with finma. second, clarification of the snb ’ s participation rights and obligations is needed in the area of regulation essential for financial stability. in order to give appropriate consideration to financial stability aspects, we feel that the snb should be involved in regulatory procedures at an early stage. in other words, in the conceptual phase. the authorities responsible for issuing financial market regulations should, therefore, be obliged to consult with the snb early on in the process. thirdly, the national bank must have clearly defined decision - making powers with regard to regulations that either bear direct relation to monetary policy or to emergency liquidity assistance. i would like to take two current regulatory proposals to explain