only in germany. we will keep explaining to our critics in germany – and also to german savers – that their country is one of the main beneficiaries of the euro. a stronger euro area, with inflation of below but close to 2 %, would be good for germany. as for the debate we may have from time to time with some academics in germany, i would say there is a certain irony in them taking us to task because we are focusing on our inflation target, since it is at germany ’ s insistence that the ecb was given that mandate – and that mandate only – in the euro ’ s founding treaties, and in my view rightly so. bis central bankers ’ speeches did the euro ’ s jump after your announcement on march 10 disappoint you? it doesn ’ t help your return - to - inflation goal … the ecb, as you know, doesn ’ t have a foreign exchange target. what i saw is that financial markets in general understood what we did, which is more important than the instant reaction of forex operators. the dollar / euro exchange rate is mostly driven by different monetary policies in the united states and europe. what would be more worrisome for us would be a further decline of emerging countries ’ currencies, and increased volatility of the pound sterling due to the eu referendum debate in the united kingdom. does the ecb have a plan for a possible “ brexit ”? i don ’ t want to meddle in a decision that is for the british people to make. however, as a citizen and a european, of course i want the united kingdom to remain in the european union, to which it brings so much. that said, it is normal for us to prepare for any possible scenario, and its impact on euro area banks. if the other scenario prevails and the united kingdom remains in europe, were you reassured by the results of the brexit negotiations between london and its partners? we had two main concerns. one was to make sure that the discussion would not make further euro area integration more difficult. the second was that it wouldn ’ t fragment the single market for financial services and strip the capital markets union project of its substance, notably the single rulebook for financial regulation. the final agreement is a balanced one and we have been reassured, even though ambiguities remain, of course. bis central bankers ’ speeches

the theoretical example you cite underlines the problem i just mentioned of the borderline between monetary and fiscal policy. we are already supporting investment in the euro area through our monetary policy. we have brought down the entire yield curve and we are buying securities of public entities such as the eib as part of our asset purchase programme. but it is absolutely not our role to decide which investment should go ahead, which bridge should be repaired or which school built, nor whether the investment should be private or public. ben bernanke, in his memoirs, suggests that if the united states and europe took different paths out of the crisis, that is partly because europe ’ s monetary policy in the first years was too tight, and its fiscal policy too strict at the wrong moment … i ’ m not for rewriting history, but the ecb and governments reacted with the tools they had at the time. they went through three crises – the subprime crisis in 2007, the 2009 global economic slowdown and the euro crisis from 2010 on – without a common fiscal backstop ( that only came in 2010 with the european financial stability facility ) and without the foundations of a banking union. if we were to draw lessons from the experience, i would rather insist on the fact that the euro area was too late and too timid in cleaning up and shoring up its banking system, i. e. stress testing the banks, raising capital and shedding bad loans. that partly explains why our recovery is lagging behind that of the united states. in banking matters, forbearance doesn ’ t serve a purpose. you can ’ t buy time. we ’ re catching up now, but we still have some way to go, and the banking union isn ’ t complete. some countries, such as germany, insist that there should be a limit on euro area banks ’ sovereign exposure. do you agree? there are three dimensions in my view. there is the question of sovereign risk for banks. but we must also consider the consequences for government financing, and the functioning of financial markets, which need risk - free assets as liquidity instruments. if you focus on one aspect of the problem and ignore the others, you run the risk of shifting risk around instead of reducing it. the ecb ’ s policy is increasingly unpopular in germany. do you foresee a moment when it might become an obstacle to your own action? europe nowadays is a source of irritation for many. not only its monetary policy, and not