governing council sets out its base - case projection for inflation and growth in the canadian economy four times a year in our monetary policy reports and updates. this base - case projection reflects governing council's best judgment about the most likely outcome, based on a number of assumptions. over the years, we have become increasingly transparent in describing our projections, and the underlying assumptions. this january, we will include in our update projection tables on global economic growth – tables that previously had only been included in full monetary policy reports. we have provided more detail about how we see the economy unfolding, what forces might affect inflation, and what assumptions we have had to make about more volatile or uncertain variables. this, in turn, helps to explain the reasons behind our most recent decisions and provides some insight into possible future actions. the base - case projection embeds changes in the policy interest rate that would be necessary to achieve our 2 per cent inflation target over the medium term. we describe the direction and magnitude of that interest rate path in a few words, in chapter 4 of the monetary policy report and when we update the base - case projection in the update. we may also give an indication of the time horizon for this path. we have also become more forthcoming in recent years about the risks that we see surrounding the base - case projection and whether we think these risks are balanced or not. our policy rate statements, in press releases and in the overview section of the monetary policy report and update, reflect our best judgment in the context of the overall outlook at that time, including the balance of risks. but that, too, is no guarantee that the future will play out the way we expect. there are several ways we might consider providing more transparency about the risks and uncertainties around our base - case projections. some central banks use fan charts showing confidence intervals that can suggest the extent of uncertainty around a particular factor in the overall forecast. another approach is to publish complete alternative scenarios in addition to presenting a base - case projection. and some academics have called for more transparency by sharing the monetary authorities'probability estimates of different risks. examining some of these possibilities is in our work plan for the year ahead. what is not in our work plan is the use of stock words and phrases to signal policy intentions. this isn't our practice at the bank of canada. instead, we try to spell out the situation as we see it. we set out our base - case projection for the economy and the key risks ; we

s administrator. attention is paid to the additional controls necessary for survey - based benchmarks, which have been a particular cause of concern. replacing benchmarks the second option, replacing existing benchmarks with new ones, is challenging for two reasons. first, it may be difficult to find a superior alternative benchmark, which is robust and also captures the relevant economic exposures. second, even if a suitable alternative can be identified, making the transition may not be a straightforward matter. the iosco principles outline desirable features for robust financial benchmarks. notably, they call for benchmarks to be anchored to observable transactions in active underlying markets. one could consider going further : relying only on actual market prices as benchmarks. indeed, there are some cases – for instance, short - term repo markets – in which underlying markets are sufficiently liquid to reliably support benchmarks that are simply averages of the rates at which participants transact. in other cases, market prices could at least be used as a cross - check against a survey - based measure, even when they cannot be used directly to calculate the benchmark. in other cases, it may be hard to find a suitable market price that tracks the desired aspects of market conditions. if a replacement benchmark does not fully reflect the economic exposures that are being hedged, the hedgers will not be able to manage their risks as effectively. moreover, in the absence of appropriate governance, controls and regulation, market prices can also be subject to manipulation. benchmarks derived solely from transactions also face the challenge of how to determine the benchmark rate should there be no transactions in the relevant market on a particular day, or indeed over a whole series of days – for example during periods of stress. even if a superior alternative benchmark could be found for some markets, several issues would need to be addressed before making a switch. existing benchmarks are already written into an enormous number of contracts, some of which could still have years, if not decades, to run. these contracts would have to be closed out and / or rewritten, which raises issues of coordination and of legal risk. taking these concerns into account, last year the financial stability board ( fsb ) established a steering group of regulators and central banks to help coordinate upcoming reviews of existing benchmarks against iosco ’ s standards and to examine the feasibility of developing alternative benchmarks, at least for some markets. the main focus is on the major global interest rate benchmarks : libor