attempt to take a longer - term perspective covering the next five years, therefore, makes more sense. the forecast also indicates that total employment in the country should soon start rising, although it will still require a major effort to make up for existing backlogs. 4. conclusion based on a short - term analysis, the south african economy is rather depressed at this stage, and is very dependent on some improvement in the international economic environment for sustainable recovery. an analysis of developments in a few important macroeconomic aggregates reveals significant improvements in the performance of the overall economy over the past five years, but also exposes a few structural weaknesses that must be addressed urgently in order to raise the total production capacity. finally, if well - managed, the south african economy has the potential of making further steady progress over the next five years to reach the objective of at least 5 per cent growth per annum, and of creating more jobs. should the country want to achieve more ambitious targets in the next five years, and i believe even that would be possible, we shall, in the words of the goldman sachs economists, have to apply the same strategies, but with less timidity, and more aggression. – 7 – table l : selected key economic indicators ( average annual percentage changes, unless otherwise indicated ) 1. real gross domestic product 2. real gross domestic expenditure 3. real gross domestic fixed investment 4. ratio of gross domestic saving to gdp 5. employment 6. real salaries and wages per worker 7. balance of payments ( r billions ) * current account ( average ) * capital account ( cumulative total ) 8. merchandise 1989 to - ½ 1994 to + 2 + 3 1999 to 2003 * + 3 + 3 - 2½ + 7 + 4 - 1. 3 + 1. 7 - 2. 0 + 3. 9 + 1 1. 5 + r 5. 2b - r26. 6b - r 7. 9b + r50. 9b - r 9b... + 2. 2 + 2. 9 + 13. 6 19. 2 % + 9. 2 + 6. 4 + 8. 1 18. 9 % + 7 + 5 5. 5 15. 5 4. 9 5. 1 2. 5 * imports * exports ( including gold ) 9. consumer prices 10. prime overdraft rate of banks ( level ) 11. central government budget deficit as % of gdp... * forecast * * * – 8 –

conditions, be held “ lower for longer ” than conventional policy rules imply. i see these ideas reflected in the fomc ’ s recent policy. since september 2012, the fomc has stated that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens. since december 2012, the committee has said it intends to hold the federal funds rate near zero at least until unemployment has declined below 6 - 1 / 2 percent, provided that inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than 1 / 2 percentage point above the committee ’ s 2 percent longer - run goal, and longer - term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. i believe that the clarity of this commitment to accommodation will itself support spending and employment and help to strengthen the recovery. asset purchases have complemented our forward guidance, and the many dimensions of different purchase programs arguably constitute “ many instruments. ” in designing a purchase program, one must consider which assets to buy : just treasury securities or agency mortgage - backed securities as well? which maturities? the federal reserve, the bank of england, and, more recently, the bank of japan have emphasized longer - duration securities. at what pace should the securities be purchased? and how long should they be held once purchases cease? each of these factors may affect the degree of accommodation delivered. two innovations in the fomc ’ s current asset purchase program, for example, are that it is open - ended rather than fixed in size like past programs, and that the overall size of the program is explicitly linked to seeing a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market. in these brief remarks, i won ’ t thoroughly review the benefits or costs of our highly accommodative policies, emphasizing only that i believe they have, on net, provided meaningful support to the recovery. but i do want to spend a moment on one potential cost – financial stability – because this topic returns us to the theme of “ many targets ” for central banks. as chairman bernanke has observed, in the years before the crisis, financial stability became a “ junior partner ” in the monetary policy process, in contrast with its traditionally larger role. the greater focus on financial stability is probably the largest shift in central bank objectives wrought by the crisis. some have asked whether the extraordinary accommodation being provided in response to the financial crisis may itself tend to generate new financial stability risks. this is a very important question. to