jurgen stark : does the euro area need an economic government? statement by mr jurgen stark, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the hec european executive campus, brussels, 22 january 2008. * * * i am delighted to be here today to participate in this session on economic policies and governance. the topic of our panel discussion is very well chosen : “ does the euro area need an economic government? ” this is indeed an important and highly topical issue. the advocates of an economic government for the euro area argue that such an institution is needed in order to 1. improve the coordination of national economic policies in the euro area ; and 2. establish a dialogue with the ecb in order to discuss the monetary strategy for the euro area. i will give you my conclusions straight away : i do not agree with these claims. we do not need an economic government for the euro area to improve the coordination of national economic policies. effective and efficient coordination can be achieved within the current institutional framework if all policy makers respect its provisions and use the existing procedures and instruments more responsibly. indeed, the idea of establishing a political entity in order to institutionalise a dialogue with the ecb with a view to influencing monetary policy in the euro area represents a fundamental attack on the euro area ’ s monetary policy framework, which has proved very successful over the last nine years. the institutional framework of emu is based on clearly specified objectives, a clear allocation of responsibilities to different policy areas and a sound framework for the coordination of national economic policies. the economic objectives of the community, which are listed as “ tasks ” in article 2 of the treaty establishing the european community include “ harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment [ … ], sustainable and noninflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance ”. the treaty of lisbon transformed these tasks into “ objectives ” and reworded them but made no substantive changes. one noteworthy, welcome, amendment is the addition of price stability to the list of objectives, which further strengthens the focus on stability of the eu ’ s policy framework. in order to achieve these objectives, the maastricht treaty established a clear allocation of responsibilities, reflecting the fact that assigning policy instruments primarily to one single policy objective and making individual policy - makers responsible for one single policy instrument ensures a high level of effectiveness and accountability. the single monetary policy was given the task of maintaining

gill marcus : the implications of the crisis for monetary policy address by ms gill marcus, governor of the south african reserve bank, at the bureau for economic research annual conference, sandton, 6 june 2013. * * * ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me to be part of this important conference. at a recent imf conference, the managing director christine lagarde suggested that central banks have emerged as the heroes of the crisis. in her view, one which is also widely held, the extraordinary actions undertaken by central banks, particularly in the advanced economies, probably saved the global economy from a far worse fate than we are currently experiencing. but this view of central banks as the heroes places inordinate pressures on them, not least because it leads to unrealistic expectations or a perception that they have become too powerful. in either instance this could ultimately lead to a backlash. what is clear is that the crisis has changed expectations of what central banks should do, and mandates have generally been broadened markedly. while price stability remains a core objective of central banks, the persistence of the global crisis has raised expectations about what central bank can and should do and, in particular, how their expanding mandates regarding economic growth and financial stability should interact with their price stability objective. the sarb faces similar challenges in south africa, which have become all the more pressing given recent domestic developments that have focused increasing attention on the bank. while the global crisis continues, the challenges have been compounded by recent south african idiosyncratic developments. i will address these issues today, and make a few comments about the current stance of monetary policy. the global crisis continues to mutate and it is still not clear what direction it is going to take next. systemic banking issues, liquidity, fiscal deficits, unsustainable sovereign debt, recession and extremely low growth, fiscal austerity and rising unemployment, particularly in the eurozone, as well as the danger in some countries of deflation, remain the key challenges facing many of the advanced economies. it is also evident that there is no decoupling of the emerging market economies, many of whom have seen slowing growth, upside inflation risks and capital outflows. the one bright spot appears to be the united states where private sector investment and the housing market are showing signs of sustained recovery. however, the big risk facing the us economy is the nature of the fiscal contraction. the fiscal policy political gridlocks have led to what is in effect ha