ukraine. the detailed story of both failures has been told elsewhere. both firms failed when depositors lost confidence in them, and began to pull their money out rapidly : silicon valley bank was a relatively familiar story : a firm that took a very large interest rate risk, which got caught out when rates started to rise. it held very large unrealised losses on securities held for liquidity purposes, and when it did have to sell those assets to meet its liquidity needs, it began to realise those losses in a public and painful way. it tried and failed to raise capital to plug the hole, and the failure of that capital raise proved to be the final straw for depositors, the majority of whom were uninsured. credit suisse also suffered a loss of confidence, but the reasons were broader. a persistent lack of profitability, and serious recurrent conduct and risk management failures, led many to question the firm's viability. ultimately a significant run began to develop over late 2022. and in the febrile days after svb ’ s failure, the firm made an announcement related to its published accounts and a significant cs shareholder implied publicly that they would not stand behind the firm in a stress – at which point the erosion of cs ’ s deposit base turned into an unstoppable avalanche. once the stress happened, authorities needed to act quickly to deal with the situation. this was a moment of genuine risk : notwithstanding the overall strength of the banking system, a botched resolution could have seriously dented confidence. and it was certainly a rocky ride for those involved, including depositors, employees and other stakeholders of the affected firms. but in the event, the system worked. we experienced the failure of two large banks – one of which was considered ‘ globally systemic ’, and both of which had material uk operations – without a systemic crisis. svb was successfully resolved, and cs was rescued in a transaction that was economicallysimilar to a resolution, without the need for a bailout. [ 5 ] resolution and resolution - like powers were used to ensure that private investors, rather than taxpayers, paid the price for failure – as it should be. depositors, and other customers and counterparties, were able to continue to access vital services following interventions by the authorities. contagion to the global banking system was limited. following the failure of svb, we did see some evidence of stress – and some further failures – in particular in other regional and mid

0. 5 % in 2009. as the economy and jobs market has recovered, and job insecurity has fallen, more people have voluntarily moved jobs to secure a higher wage. job - to - job flows today are back to their pre - crisis averages. in this tightening market, the pay growth of “ twisters ” has picked up markedly, from a little under 4 % in the all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / speeches aftermath of the crisis to over 7 % now. through the direct ( batting average ) channel, this has in turn boosted aggregate pay growth. more surprising, however, is how little impact strong employment has had on those not moving job. wage growth for “ stickers ” has flat - lined at around 2 %. despite a tightening labour market, companies have so far not felt compelled to pay - up to any significant degree to retain workers. the indirect, or behavioural, channel for pay pressures has largely been missing during the recent jobs recovery. this may be a sign that stickers ’ pay is behaving differently than in the past. chart 15 plots two empirical phillips curves – one for twisters, the other for stickers. the twisters ’ phillips curve is behaving relatively similarly to the past, with pay broadly as expected given the tightness in the jobs market. but the phillips curve for stickers looks to be somewhat flatter, and the rise in pay somewhat weaker, than might be expected given labour market tightness. why might companies have felt less need to pay - up to retain staff than in the past? equivalently, why might the pay power of existing workers have fallen? one possible explanation is recent change in employment contracts. although the cyclical degree of job insecurity has fallen as people have become less fearful of losing their job, there may have been a compensating rise in structural job insecurity as people have become more uncertain about their hours and income in a job. there are various dimensions of employment contracts and different metrics of their impact on job security. one commonly - used measure is the share of the working population self - employed, doing agency work or on temporary or zero - hours contracts. the share of workers in each category has risen significantly recently. for some, these shifts in employment contract are welcome as they bring increased job flexibility. for others, they may be less welcome. the dark side of job flexibility is increased income uncertainty and job ins