that it should reduce the risk of hitting the zero bound, but we should recognize that under some circumstances extra action may actually exacerbate the problem. to see this, suppose that a speculative bubble has emerged and that a central bank, operating under a conventional strategy, has raised interest rates to keep the projected output gap closed and expected inflation at its desired level before the bubble bursts. now the central bank contemplates taking extra action. in a low - inflation environment, such a step would be a bad idea if, after averaging across all the possible outcomes weighted by their likelihoods, the predicted moderation in the bubble from tighter policy is small. in this case, the expected weakening in real activity after the bubble bursts would be only marginally less severe under extra action, but inflation would be substantially lower because the extra action policy would have generated persistent economic slack beforehand. with inflation having already started out at a low level, such a decline would be extremely dangerous because the zero bound would now be much more likely to constrain monetary policy after the bubble see alan g. ahearne, joseph e. gagnon, jane haltmaier, and steven b. kamin ( 2002 ), " preventing deflation : lessons from japan's experience in the 1990s, " international finance discussion paper series 2002 - 729 ( washington : board of governors of the federal reserve system, june ). bursts. under these conditions, extra action would therefore worsen expected economic performance, not improve it. another purported benefit of extra action is that, by raising the cost of capital to firms and households, it helps reduce overinvestment fostered during speculative booms, thereby making it easier for the economy to recover after the bubble collapses. however, we should be careful not to exaggerate the macroeconomic importance of such capital mis - allocation. true, the u. s. high - tech boom led to overinvestment in some sectors, wasting resources and creating lingering difficulties while capital overhangs were eliminated. but it is hard to see much of a cost in terms of diminished aggregate productivity, given the robust growth of output per hour over the past few years. furthermore, even if tighter monetary policy would have damped the enthusiasm for dot - com firms in the late 1990s, higher interest rates would have also led to less housing and less business investment outside the high - tech sector, where valuations were not obviously out of line with fundamentals. thus, mitigating

consumer loans to the pre - pandemic level. however, given recent months ’ data, we will soon make a decision on additional macroprudential measures to cool down this segment of the retail market. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches i will now speak on possible risks to the forecast. proinflationary risks continue to prevail. we consider that the main risk is a potential anchoring of inflation expectations at a high level. fuelled by high inflation expectations, temporary growth might become sustained. there is a slight increase in risks associated with a possible faster normalisation of monetary policies in advanced economies. as a result, market volatility in emerging market economies might intensify, which can affect exchange rate and inflation expectations. there are also certain risks caused by structural changes in the labour market due to the pandemic. the demand for some professions is declining, whereas the demand for others is rising. this is confirmed by data on a record - high increase in vacant jobs. adjusting to the new needs of the economy requires time for specialist retraining. consequently, this provokes local staff shortages. the situation is aggravated even more due to the restrictions on the inflow of labour migrants, which affects construction and seasonal agricultural works most seriously. the situation in the labour market might increase companies ’ costs. proinflationary risks associated with the environment in global commodity markets persist. nonetheless, june — july recorded the first signs of a decline in world prices. therefore, i would say that this risk is less acute than at the moment of our previous key rate meeting. furthermore, investment from the national wealth fund and geopolitical risks are still in the focus of our attention. disinflationary factors are much weaker. a rich harvest might result in a more significant seasonal decrease in food prices. the pandemic situation is still uncertain. the spread of new coronavirus strains worldwide might force countries to introduce new restrictions and disrupt production and supply chains, which in turn might slow down global economic recovery. for russia, this would involve a decrease in external demand and intensify disinflationary risks, on the one hand. on the other hand, if borders are closed, domestic demand will remain elevated longer, which might become a proinflationary factor. in conclusion, i would like to comment on monetary policy prospects. beginning from march, we have raised the key rate by a total of 2. 25 percentage points. we will