inequality ; rather, it aggravates it. italian companies but let me turn to italy. between 2008 and 2013 the italian economy suffered the worst slump of its history : gdp went down by 9 percentage points, slightly more than household spending, while investment fell by 30 points, industrial production by almost 25 and employment by 4. the double - dip recession was far more severe in italy than in the rest of the euro area. since then the italian economy has gradually recovered, mostly thanks to domestic demand, especially consumption and, more recently, capital spending, but also with a significant contribution from exports. potential output has been slowly improving too. three years into the recovery, business investment in italy is now approaching the average of the ten years preceding the global financial crisis. we expect this positive trend to continue over the current and the next two years, partly thanks to the support of external demand. the latest surveys run by the bank of italy on a large sample of companies indicate that the recovery of investment plans is now on a firmer footing, and that the lack of productive capital is being reabsorbed, with the exception of construction spending, which remains extremely low. the common monetary policy designed by the european central bank has provided an important stimulus to every component of aggregate demand. but fiscal incentives have also played a role, while respecting the european rules on public finance. however, we need a longer perspective than a purely cyclical one. the large swings since 2008 followed a decade of very slow growth, when the debate centred on the question of whether italy was in a sort of unstoppable decline. from 1999 to 2007, gdp grew on average by 1. 5 per cent per year, where the positive contributions of population and employment growth were accompanied by a disappointing performance on the part of total factor productivity ( + 0. 1 per year on average ), which instead recorded significant increases in france ( 0. 6 ) and germany ( 0. 9 ). such a prolonged sluggishness of productivity reflects structural factors. the interpretation we proposed at the bank fifteen years ago 1 – nowadays shared by many experts – is that since the mid - nineties italian companies have been hit by a double world revolution : a shift in the dominant technology ( icts ) that triggered a re - organization of production on a global scale, and globalization. the italian economy was harder hit by these shocks because of its structural features : most of its companies are small in size and never grow, a characteristic that goes

peter praet : interview in der standard interview with mr peter praet, member of the executive board of the european central bank, in der standard, conducted by mr andras szigetvari on 10 june 2015 and published on 13 june 2015. * * * standard : mr praet, the role of the ecb has changed since the outbreak of the crisis. you are now engaging in political debate, telling countries what reforms to implement. hasn ’ t the ecb stretched its mandate in order to maintain price stability? praet : as you know, the ecb takes monetary policy decisions to achieve its objective of maintaining price stability. we make our voice heard on structural reforms when it is considered necessary in the context of our mandate under the treaty. and, as mario draghi indicated in sintra, for members of a monetary union, resilience is crucial to avoid that shocks lead to permanent economic divergence over time ‒ it therefore has direct implications for price stability. in this sense, we are different from, for example, the federal reserve in the united states, which would never engage in such a debate. we frequently get the advice that we should just concentrate on our core business ‒ monetary policy. but, in a currency union like the euro area, individual countries have lost the flexibility provided by an exchange rate of their own. they must thus become more resilient to crises and external shocks. sound governance and effective institutions are of key importance. that applies, among other things, to labour and product markets, or courts and administration. they are needed for a more efficient monetary policy in a currency union and therefore we tell governments that structural reforms are important. here, our interest is not in how countries implement these reforms, that is up to them. what interests us is if they are successful, as this impacts the monetary union as a whole. however, i would also like to make the self - critical comment that, in the past, our messages have sounded too much like a mantra. standard : what do you mean? praet : in several respects, countries are similar as they are part of a monetary union, but in many respects they differ as a result of their national conditions. so there are various combinations of structural reforms that work – there is no “ one - size - fits - all ” model. we must make this clear, otherwise there may be the impression that our citizens don ’ t have much of a choice. we must convey