, improvements could be made to data exchange procedures, especially with regard to data that are already available in other authorities ( esas, ssm or at the national level ). procedures for data access should be streamlined. in this context, it would be useful to review article 15 ( 6 ) and ( 7 ) of the esrb regulation. 4 in case of data gaps that restrain the esrbin fulfilling its mandate, the esrb should, first of all, rely on its powers to issue warnings or recommendations asking the respective esas or national authorities to close those data gaps. 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches improving resources and data access would also strengthen the esrb as a hub for the ex - post evaluation of macro - prudential policies. more specifically, the esrb could coordinate analytical work for the evaluation of specific policies ( e. g. by setting up dedicated working groups ) and ensure high quality output by coordinating peer - reviews of the evaluation. 1 the respective esas are the european banking authority ( eba ), the european insurance and occupational pensions authority ( eipoa ) and the european securities and markets authority ( esma ). 2 for details, see “ cross - border prudential policy spillovers : how much? how important? evidence from the international banking research network ” ( 2016 ), claudia m. buch ( deutsche bundesbank ) and linda goldberg ( federal reserve bank of new york ) ( mimeo ). the international banking research network ( ibrn ) was founded in 2012 to inform, both the academic and the policy debate, on current issues related to international banking. it is a multi - country initiative, bringing together research teams from 25 central banks, the international monetary fund ( imf ), the bank for international settlements ( bis ), and the european central bank ( ecb ). the current list of participating central banks and institutions as well as country studies are available at www. newyorkfed. org / ibrn / index. html. 3 for a recent review of country - specific experiences, see international monetary fund ( imf ), financial stability board ( fsb ), bank for international settlements ( bis ) ( 2016 ). elements of effective macroprudential policies : lessons from international experience. www. fsb. org / wp - content / uploads / elements - of - effectivemacroprudential - policies1. pdf. 4 see also p. 15 – 17 of the report of the

##2. 6 trillion. roubini / setser ( 2005 ) calculate that, if past trends continue, asian central banks would have to raise their fx reserves to over usd5 trillion in 2008 – an annual increase of more than usd500 billion. here, the current slow - down in reserve accumulation, which came to a virtual standstill in mid 2005, indicates that the latest move to greater regional exchange rate flexibility in asia already has its measurable effects on reserve holdings, casting some doubts on bretton - woods ii type explanations. in that regard, one also should not forget, that in the original bretton woods i system, the united states on average produced current account surpluses. in a nutshell : the “ global savings glut ” argument may be an explanation for the development of the us current account deficit ; but it is not convincing proof of sustainability in the long run. the same goes for the bretton woods ii hypothesis. taking everything together : the current trend in the us current account deficit is unsustainable. this is hardly in dispute. realistically, we should not expect the us deficit to move soon to levels that would stabilise the net foreign asset position of the us economy. however, the explanations advanced to explain why the current situation might nevertheless be stable for the foreseeable future all have their drawbacks and shortcomings. as central bankers are paid for paying attention to risks, we should be aware that an abrupt unwinding of the current imbalances could mean massive exchange rate and interest rates movements – and, of course, a shake - up of the global economy. we should obviously avoid the global economy following the lines described by the late rudi dornbusch. according to him, the collapse of unsustainable currencies and wrong - headed policies typically follows a cycle of four distinct phases : 1 ) enthusiastic investors and speculators chasing immediate short - term returns cause the anomaly to last for longer than economists expect, 2 ) puzzled by the failure of prices to return to fundamentals or the failure of unsustainable policies to generate a crisis, highly intelligent economists evolve theories explaining that “ this ” time it really isn't unsustainable, 3 ) fortified by these theories, yet more investors and speculators chasing short - term returns flood into the market, causing the anomaly to last for much longer than economists had originally expected, and finally, 4 ) the supply of greater fools comes to a