upside risks relate to higher commodity prices and stronger than expected increases in administered prices and indirect taxes, while downside risks stem from weaker than expected economic activity. concerning the staff macroeconomic projections, let me inform you that the governing council has decided to publish more details as of december 2013. you will receive this material today after the press conference. turning to the monetary analysis, data for october confirm the assessment of subdued underlying growth in broad money ( m3 ) and credit. annual growth in m3 moderated to 1. 4 % in october, from 2. 0 % in september. this moderation was partly related to a base effect. annual growth in m1 remained strong at 6. 6 %, reflecting a preference for liquidity, although it was below the peak of 8. 7 % observed in april. net capital inflows into the euro area continued to be the main factor supporting annual m3 growth, while the annual rate of change of loans to the private sector remained weak. the annual growth rate of loans to households ( adjusted for loan sales and securitisation ) stood at 0. 3 % in october, broadly unchanged since the beginning of the year. the annual rate of change of loans to non - financial corporations ( adjusted for loan sales and securitisation ) was – 2. 9 % in october, following – 2. 8 % in september and – 2. 9 % in august. overall, weak loan dynamics for non - financial corporations continue to reflect their lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non - financial sector balance sheets. since the summer of 2012 substantial progress has been made in improving the funding situation of banks. in order to ensure an adequate transmission of monetary policy to the financing conditions in euro area countries, it is essential that the fragmentation of euro area credit markets declines further and that the resilience of banks is strengthened where needed. the ecb ’ s comprehensive assessment before it adopts its supervisory role under the single supervisory mechanism will further support this confidence - building process. it will enhance the quality of information available on the condition of banks and result in the identification and implementation of necessary corrective actions. further decisive steps to establish a banking union will help to restore confidence in the financial system. to sum up, the economic analysis indicates that we may experience a prolonged period of low inflation, to be followed by a gradual upward movement towards inflation rates below, but close to, 2 % later on. a cross - check with

class traded in well - functioning, liquid markets. prior to the loan - level initiative, however, there was insufficient transparency in order to assess the risk profile of the abs. third, there was a coordination problem among abs market participants in 2012. although many acknowledged the need for enhanced transparency in the abs market, there was no market infrastructure that could have been supplied by individual actors. a bundling of efforts was needed and a catalyst role of the ecb was called for in an exceptional situation where market participants did not provide the market infrastructure. such a situation is exceptional, but not unprecedented, as we see if for example in the field of benchmarks or market agreements. so these are the three main reasons why the ecb prioritised abs transparency. let me add, however, that the ecb does not believe that abs should warrant special treatment where it is not justified from a theoretical, empirical and practical perspective. the ecb is interested in abs 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches insofar as they can help us achieve our policy objectives in compliance with our legal obligations, while ensuring risk equivalence in our collateral framework. having said that, the ecb will also – in the not too distant future – have to review the specific role of abs in the context of the broader issue of qe beyond 2017. as regards its achievements, the loan - level initiative set an example of swift and convincing action to show that european abs were, broadly - speaking, less risky than feared. and this was done in spite of the many technical difficulties of establishing common templates covering eur 1 trillion of assets from many different jurisdictions and asset classes. a set of common templates were established which are easily accessible to market participants. today loan level data is widely used by market participants and we can be confident that the initiative improved the transparency on abs. yet, it is no secret that the revival of the european abs market is, broadly speaking, still anaemic at the moment. market - placed issuance is at historic lows. the investor base has not recovered. the eu abs markets are impacted by bank deleveraging, unfavourable regulatory treatment and relative costs of funding of alternative instruments. admittedly, the sizeable eurosystem covered bond purchase programme and long term loan operations have also represented viable funding alternatives for banks. thus, the extended timeframe in creating legal certainty through forthcoming regulation on securitisation, the “ sts regulation ” has been regrettable. the ec