samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
christine lagarde : imfc statement statement by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank, at the forty - eight meeting of the international monetary and financial committee ( imfc ), imf annual meetings, marrakech, 14 october 2023. * * * introduction following the devastating earthquake in morocco, i wish to express my heartfelt solidarity with the moroccan people as well as with the victims of other recent natural disasters. although the global economic outlook has remained broadly the same since our previous meeting in april, growth prospects across major economies have been changing, with the outlook for major advanced economies proving more resilient than expected. however, the recovery prospects for the global economy remain fragile amid persisting geopolitical tensions, stemming in particular from russia's invasion of ukraine, rising trade fragmentation and the possibility of renewed financial sector stress. global headline inflation is receding, but underlying inflationary pressures remain persistent as labour markets continue to be tight. the ecb is determined to ensure that inflation returns to its 2 % medium - term target in a timely manner. in order to reinforce progress towards the target, the governing council decided at its september meeting to raise the key interest rates by 25 basis points, bringing the total rate increase since july 2022 to 450 basis points. moreover, as of july this year, the eurosystem is no longer reinvesting principal payments from maturing securities under the asset purchase programme. on the basis of our latest assessment, we consider that our key interest rates have reached levels that, maintained for a sufficiently long duration, will make a substantial contribution to the timely return of inflation to our target. our future decisions will ensure that the key ecb interest rates will be set at sufficiently restrictive levels for as long as necessary. we will continue to follow a data - dependent approach to determining the appropriate level and duration of restriction. economic activity the euro area economy has slowed markedly over the past year. having broadly stagnated over the first half of this year, real gdp is expected to remain subdued in the coming months. incoming data suggest that activity has been weak in the third quarter, as slower global demand and the impact of tighter financing conditions weigh on growth. manufacturing continues to suffer, while the services sector, having shown resilience in the first half of the year, has now also started to weaken. economic momentum should pick up over time, as falling inflation and higher wages will increasingly support real incomes and lead to renewed growth in consumer

28 – 31. see commission decision ( eu ) 2015 / 1937 of 21 october 2015 establishing an independent advisory european fiscal board, oj l 282, 28. 10. 2015, p. 37 – 40. bis central bankers ’ speeches
##ullahi wabarakatuh. 1 covid - 19 to add as many as 150 million extreme poor by 2021 ( worldbank. org ) 2 covid crisis to push global unemployment over 200 million mark in 2022 | | un news 3 www. imf. org / external / pubs / ft / fandd / 2021 / 06 / pdf / inequality - and - covid - 19 - ferreira. pdf 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches

mar guðmundsson : the financial crisis in iceland and the fault lines in cross - border banking speech by mr mar guðmundsson, governor of the central bank of iceland, at fibe, bergen, 7 january 2010. * * * it gives me great pleasure to be here in bergen this morning to give an address on the financial crisis in iceland, and i would like to take this opportunity to thank the organisers for inviting me to do so. you call this session icelandic mysteries. at this juncture, this is a more apt phrase than you might think. we are currently waiting for the findings of a parliamentappointed committee that has been working hard for over a year, collecting evidence and analysing the causes of the financial crisis in iceland. the committee is due to release its report in early february, and we hear the report and supporting material will be well in excess of a thousand pages. we know how the icelandic banks failed in the autumn of 2008 and can identify some of the key vulnerabilities that led to their demise. however, some important pieces of the puzzle are still missing, in particular regarding the governance and risk management of the banks, on the one hand, and the icelandic authorities ’ crisis management and interaction with their counterparts in other countries, on the other. so what i will present here today is unavoidably a partial picture. 1 you could say that it is just as well, for this is a complex saga with many twists. to paint with a broad brush, we can say that economic and financial developments in iceland during the last decade or so are a combination of two separate but interrelated stories. on the one hand, there is iceland ’ s boom - bust cycle and problems with macroeconomic management in small, open and financially integrated economies. this is a well known story that has played out in iceland and other countries several times. on the other hand, we have the story of the rise and fall of three cross - border banks operated on the basis of eu legislation ( the european “ passport ” ). that story, at least for smaller countries, is much more unique than the first. in my remarks today, i will concentrate mostly on the second story, which is probably more suited to this audience, as i understand that the conference is oriented towards microeconomics and finance. however, it must be remembered that although these two stories are different, they interact in important ways. thus the unsustainable boom that
optimal bank regulation, therefore, cannot prevent all bank failures. bank regulation aims to ensure that banks do not take excessive risks and also that they properly manage their risks, for example by adequate diversification of their loan portfolio, so that bank failures are the exception rather than the norm. one of the most important tools of bank regulation is the minimum capital adequacy requirement, which is based on the globally agreed approach set out in the basel capital accords. capital adequacy requirements stipulate that banks must hold a minimum amount of regulatory capital as a percent of their risk weighted assets. in uganda, banks must hold total capital which is at least 12 percent of their risk weighted assets. the purpose of these capital adequacy requirements is to ensure that banks hold a buffer which can absorb losses and thus protect their deposits. if a bank suffers losses because of, for example, bad loans, these losses are first absorbed by the bank ’ s capital. it is only if the losses exceed the bank ’ s capital that the bank ’ s depositors or other creditors will incur losses. to safeguard depositors, the bou is mandated under the financial institutions act, 2004 to implement prompt corrective actions, which are triggered by a failure of a bank to comply with the capital adequacy regulations or by other indicators of financial distress. these prompt corrective actions are designed either to restore the bank to a sound financial condition, for example through recapitalisation by its owners, or if that is not possible, to trigger intervention by the bou to resolve the failing bank in some way, for example by closure or by selling it to another bank, before significant losses to its deposits can occur. what is the record of uganda with respect to bank failures and losses of deposits? the current legal framework for bank regulation was put in place in 2004 when parliament enacted the financial institutions act, legislation which strengthened bank regulation following the bank failures that had occurred in the 1990s. since the enactment of the financial institutions act, 2004, there have been three bank failures in uganda : two very small banks in 2012 and 2014 and one larger one in 2016. the combined deposit market share of the three banks, at the time that each one was closed, was about seven percent. because the bou intervened in these banks in a prompt manner, in line with the mandatory prompt corrective actions stipulated in the financial institutions act, depositors did not lose any of their money. in all three cases

the primary objectives of bank regulation have been realised and that this has been achieved without significant negative impacts on lending growth and intermediation. thank you for listening.
barriers they need to transcend. a lack of clarity surrounding the future regulatory framework for a cross - border project makes it more difficult still to gauge whether the complexity of governance across cultural areas is something that can be organised while still making a profit. 5. conditions and limits to european mergers and acquisitions additional reforms are necessary before any further progress can be made here. i don ’ t just 5 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches mean the completion of the banking union, but it is especially necessary. we have an opportunity – and also an obligation, in my view – to establish the banking union on a firmer foundation. this is why the eu must succeed in reducing the excessive risks still latent on many banks ’ balance sheets. we can do this first by scaling back existing non - performing loans and preventing the build - up of new ones. i firmly believe that in this matter there are no alternatives to the ecb guidelines. the foundation of the banking union can then be fortified by putting an end to the preferential treatment of sovereign bonds, third by building up loss - absorbing capital, tlac and mrel, and fourth by harmonising insolvency regimes. as a second step further down the line, we should then discuss how we can create a strong european reinsurance system for deposit protection that intervenes when national schemes are unable to cope – but only then. if we manage to do this, we will make the banking union more stable and more credible. there is, of course, a “ but ” to all this, because i can see the danger that, as supervisors, we might go too far. i see the danger of overestimating the opportunities of m & a strategies and underestimating their risks. we cannot expect scale and synergy effects to simply materialise across cultural areas, nor can we act as though the banking union is already completely supranational today – in many places there will also be national security hurdles over the coming years. and that is as it should be. my concern is that european mergers and acquisitions may be misused for political interests. here i am referring to potential attempts to create european champions that could then supposedly take on large competitors from other parts of the world. i consider this type of thinking questionable. we must not now make the error of replacing the misguided ideology of national champions with a no less misleading ideology of european champions. this will not lead to growth and more jobs, but it may result in os

pace of interest rate increases will depend on the bank ’ s continuing assessment of the prospects for factors that affect pressures on capacity and, hence, inflation. there are significant risks and uncertainties around this base - case projection, related to the adjustment to changes in the global economy, including changes in commodity prices and exchange rates. the risks surrounding global economic prospects relate primarily to the evolution of oil prices, the pace of expansion in china, the way in which current account imbalances in the united states and east asia will be resolved, and geopolitical developments.
we can ’ t escape each other anymore. the good news is that we have more power than ever to build a world of shared values and shared opportunities – and nowhere is this clearer than in africa. ” the indo - pacific region covers a huge geo - strategic and geo - economic territory, covering the western pacific ocean to the western indian ocean along the eastern coast of africa. as global economic power shifts from west to east, this region is rapidly gaining importance as the centre of trade, investment and cooperation. the indo - pacific contains close to half the world ’ s population and draws australia together with the rising powers of china and india, the dynamic sub - regions of northeast asia and southeast asia and the resource rich and sometimes volatile middle east and africa. moreover the region provides several of the world ’ s most important choke - points for global commerce. so, there could not have been a better theme for seminar. this meeting will dwell on a number of issues and i don ’ t intend to elaborate thereon. but allow me to throw some thrusts on some of the topical issues. when we look at asia, the bis central bankers ’ speeches growth of its intra - regional trade in the last decade has been quite inspirational and has helped in building new channels of growth. these have indeed helped asia to sustain its growth momentum in these challenging times and contain the spillover effects of lacklustre economic performance in traditional markets. africa, too, is gearing up its regional market, which has an immense potential. but africa has a big infrastructural disadvantage – countries throughout the continent are not well - connected. steady advances in regional integration and services will surely enable the move from overseas trade to trade between countries and across regions. increasingly, africa is making use of available technology to make progress on inclusive growth. the use of mobile - banking, this single most innovative instrument, has created ripples by increasing outreach to many of the unbanked that were excluded due to high operation costs in establishing branch network around the continent. this broad example will set the path for inclusive growth but it raises concerns for policymakers for financial stability issues arising therefrom. africa has, in the past, been victim of what is referred to as the “ natural resource curse ”. but today we are witnessing a new phenomenon with the surge in commodity prices. commodity - exporting countries have experienced appreciation of their currencies owing to increasing capital flowing in those countries to take advantage of the rising commodity prices. also

no further stand before the beginning of your bis central bankers ’ speeches sessions and, without much ado, i wish you all successful deliberations and a fruitful meeting. thank you for your kind attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
opportunity for an important institutional change. it can adapt the supervisory framework to the new financial landscape, reflecting the considerable increase in european financial integration that we have observed in recent years. this must be one of the key lessons for us to draw from the financial crisis. the ecb / eurosystem stands ready to accept any additional responsibilities that the member states may wish to assign to us, in accordance with the treaty. i am sure that today ’ s conference will provide valuable insights on all these matters. thank you for your attention.

as an inefficient use of shareholders ’ money. the underlying perspective can be compared to that in the corporate sector many years ago, when technological innovation led to the widespread introduction of the “ just - intime ” model of doing business. this meant that firms held minimal inventory levels throughout the production chain. the result was a system that looked very efficient but that was very vulnerable to shocks. something similar has happened to the financial system in recent years : the pressure to increase immediate shareholder value and short - term returns drove a number of institutions to limit their reserves and buffers to the minimum possible levels. and just as in manufacturing, the result has been a system that produced very high returns in the short term, but which proved vulnerable to shocks. comparing the ex post returns with the considerable costs of the current turmoil, we have to realise that our financial system as a whole, including its non - regulated and non - listed entities, was neither strong nor efficient. it did not allocate capital properly, and it did not manage risks well. i have sometimes compared financial buffers with air bags in a car : what we have done in recent years is let part of the financial sector remove all the air bags. and now there has been an accident, we can see the scale of the injuries. we have to put reserves and buffers back into the system ; they are the protection against serious damage in a downturn, and they are an integral part of sound finance. such a large - scale reassessment is a matter for the medium term. in the present circumstances i wish to underline that banks should not be requested to hold more capital than is required by the existing capital framework. we should not today introduce “ pro - cyclical ” changes in the regulatory framework at a time when we are already observing a market - driven deleveraging of the first magnitude. 3. the third goal is reforms that are holistic in scope. in this respect, an important issue, which i ’ m sure will be addressed by today ’ s conference, relates to the scope of financial regulation and prudential oversight. the current crisis is a loud and clear call to extend regulation and oversight to all systemically important institutions – notably hedge funds and credit rating agencies – as well as all systemically important markets – in particular the otc derivatives market. what is currently under discussion is the precise way in which these elements should be integrated into an overall regulatory framework. currently, we are in
##er, linda & weiner, stuart e., 2003. “ the role of community banks in the u. s. economy, ” economic review, federal reserve bank of kansas city, issue q ii, pages 15 – 43. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches

##imating losses for a particular loan portfolio in a tail event, the firm has gone back to think about how the identified shortcomings fit into their overall risk decisionmaking and management processes. these firms will, on their own, then consider whether changes in other areas are needed. again, i suspect that the line employees in these firms are also hearing a different message and presumably, to at least some degree, will behave in accordance with that message when they encounter risk - management issues not covered specifically by fed communications. needless to say, nothing here is meant to suggest that a focus on compliance is problematic. on the contrary, particularly as applied to areas like antitrust, securities laws, and consumer protection, well - crafted compliance programs are essential. but what we want to see is good compliance, not mere compliance. as in financial risk management, the perceived importance of what appear to be similar compliance efforts can vary greatly across firms. are compliance programs put in place by risk managers or general counsels understood as a kind of background noise that should not drown out the voices urging employees to “ make their numbers, ” or are they seen as reflecting the views and priorities of senior management? a related question is whether compliance with applicable law or regulations is understood to be just that, and that alone. do employees understand their job to be maximizing revenues in any way possible so long as they do not do anything illegal, or do they understand their job to be maximizing revenues in a manner consistent with a broader set of considerations? in the former case, the message is that the law is a constraint to be observed, but that the purposes or values that underlie it have no additional importance for determining corporate activity. it may not be too great a leap from this attitude to a conscious weighing of the profitability of a particular practice that violates laws or regulations against the penalty that would be assessed for the violation, discounted by the probability of enforcement. in the latter case, the message to employees is that constraints on practices or products may be self - imposed as well as external. the potential sources of such internal constraints are manifold. for example, there might be a fear that always running close to the line will inevitably result in swerving over it at some point. or management may worry that reputational harm will result if clients and customers believe the firm is always seeking an advantage over them that, literally or metaphorically, is buried in the fine print. this second concern recalls the much - discussed issue of
resources and articulating responses to financial stress besides more structured profiling of page 4 of 5 financial institutions. it will also help sbp to identify the problem and institute corrective action on proactive basis. i would like to stress here that achieving high level goals such as strengthening and deepening of financial markets, ensuring financial stability, and bringing more efficiency and transparency in the financial sector will be possible only through our collaborative efforts and supportive role of the industry. we at the sbp are making continuous efforts to adopt international standards and best practices, which are well suited to our domestic financial structure and needs. sbp is also closely coordinating with the banking industry and other market players for seeking their input on new regulatory initiatives and aligning the existing regulatory framework with international standards. obviously, effective implementation of global standards and best practices would not be possible without qualified people, both, within regulatory bodies and the industry. i am quite hopeful that professional capacity building through globally recognized certifications, such as cfa, will enable us to achieve these goals. at the end, i would like to offer my heartiest congratulations to the winners of the excellence awards today. i wish them all the best for their future accomplishments. i am, once again, grateful to you for providing me the opportunity to share my thoughts with you. thank you for your attention. * * * page 5 of 5

have a duty to preserve financial stability. otherwise the costs for the real economy and, ultimately, our fellow citizens are significant. 2 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches