wood and industrial metals, which have been compounded by serious disruptions in goods transport. in any event, despite the importance of global factors, the impact of the current inflationary episode on the main world economies has been uneven. the variation in the extent of the rise in inflation reflects various idiosyncratic factors that differ in nature, such as the differing speed of the recovery in demand in each region. it also reflects other factors related to the composition of the consumption basket, productive specialisation, positioning in global and regional production chains, labour market slack, the anchoring of expectations and exchange rate fluctuations. indeed, demand has been particularly vigorous in the united states, which has resulted in more intense and earlier underlying inflationary pressures there. at the end of 2021 private consumption stood more than 4 % above its end - 2019 level, with a very significant contribution to this rise coming from consumer durables. in the euro area, meanwhile, it stood around 3 % lower. pmi suppliers'delivery times show that supply bottlenecks are having a greater impact in europe and the united states. germany has been the most vulnerable euro area country, given that : ( i ) it is more integrated into, and occupies a central position in, value chains ; ( ii ) manufacturing – particularly the automotive industry – accounts for a high share of its economy ; and ( iii ) its productive processes are heavily reliant on imports of commodities and inputs. in this regard, since summer 2021 more than 50 % of german industrial firms have reported the shortage of material and / or equipment as a factor limiting production, as compared with 25 % in spain. higher energy prices are having a more acute impact on inflation in the advanced economies and, especially, in the euro area. the greater contribution of the energy component to euro area inflation is largely a result of this component accounting for a higher relative share of the consumption basket in the euro area ( 10. 9 % of the total versus, for example, 7 % in the united states ). moreover, the euro area ’ s high dependence on external energy sources has been compounded by the depreciation of the euro in 2021 and the outbreak of the war in ukraine, which has also driven up the cost of the energy component of consumption. the contribution of energy to the rise in inflation in the euro area is particularly important in spain and, to a lesser degree, italy, given the larger contribution of the electricity component. first of all, this is because, in

##corner / detail / es / ip _ 20 _ 17. https : / / www. climatebonds. net / the green bond principles of the international capital markets association ( icma ). https : / / www. icmagroup. org / green - social - and - sustainability - bonds / green - bond - principles - gbp / the second problem is the price that the markets assign to these assets and the higher costs associated with their issue. the issue of a green asset involves additional costs for the issuer, as it is necessary to hire a certifying company for the issue of the green bond and to pass regular audits to be able to continue to use the label over the lifetime of the bond. thus, issuing a green bond will only be worthwhile for the issuer if it can sell such bonds at a higher price than normal bonds. at the moment, this is the case, given that there is a negative premium in their favour ( greenium ), which shows the greater appetite of certain investors for these assets. and the third problem arises from the limitations inherent in bond markets. access to bond financing, due to its high fixed costs, is restricted to issuers requiring large volumes. it is currently unimaginable that smes or households would issue bonds to make the transition towards a more efficient economy less based on greenhouse gas emissions. for this transition to occur it is therefore necessary for a green credit market to be developed, in which banks will have a fundamental role to play. this is particularly important in countries like spain, in which banks intermediate the bulk of funds between savers and investors. for this purpose, it is crucial that banks include these types of considerations in their analysis. only in this way will they be capable of incorporating into the prices of their products and services the risks associated with climate change and, thus, helping to drive the process. as in any process of structural change, it is not sufficient to identify the investments that are going to have to be made, but also the opportunities that will doubtless arise. here, it is worth highlighting that the exposure of spanish banks to the activities potentially most affected by climate transition risks represents around 20 % of their total exposure to productive activity. following the international financial crisis, these exposures saw a smaller increase in default rates than the rest of the economy, even when those activities at the epicentre of the crisis – construction and real estate activity – are excluded. moreover, these default rates