##ity provisioning and u. s. dollar swap line arrangements. these measures have worked as a bulwark against a global negative feedback loop. unlike the gfc, the spread of covid - 19 has been a shock to the real economy. nevertheless, a risk common to both the gfc and the covid - 19 crisis was that the erosion of market confidence would trigger a negative feedback loop. however, liquidity provisioning this time was conducted decisively. many central banks enhanced swap line arrangements and conducted u. s. dollar funds provisions and asset purchases, while the imf promptly reinforced its emergency financial assistance. i believe that these actions were driven by common concern over risks, built upon the experience of the gfc. the second key element of the covid - 19 policy responses is the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies, implemented to stabilize the economy and the financial system. this was seen at the time of the gfc, but the coordination this time has been more prompt and comprehensive. amid the rapid decline in income due to the impact of covid - 19, governments have implemented large - scale economic measures, including income support and loan guarantees to firms and households, while central banks have introduced powerful monetary easing measures aimed at supporting corporate financing and stabilizing financial markets. regarding corporate financing support in particular, fiscal measures provided credit enhancement through government guarantee programs, while monetary policy provided liquidity. as fiscal and monetary policy measures fulfill their respective roles, business operations and employment have been underpinned through the smooth functioning of financial intermediation. the third important element centers on regulation and supervision. namely, while financial institutions had already been increasing their robustness in line with international financial regulations, financial authorities swiftly implemented the necessary measures. the strengthening of international financial regulations in the wake of the gfc has led to financial institutions building up ample capital and liquidity. this worked as intended, providing a backstop against the negative feedback loop, as the financial sector absorbed the shock to the real economy rather than exacerbating it. moreover, i believe the deferral of the full implementation of the basel iii standards by one year and encouragement for banks to use their capital and liquidity buffers, among other measures, have contributed to securing the smooth functioning of financial intermediation. ii. what will be required of future policy responses next, i would like to consider what will be required of future policy responses. there continues to be considerable uncertainty reflecting the resurgence of the spread of co

also know, from the survey conducted by the national federation of independent business that while only 8 percent of small businesses list access to credit as their principal immediate economic problem, just 40 percent of small businesses attempting to borrow in 2009 had all of their credit needs met. 4 surveys like the two i just mentioned are informative, but getting a full picture also requires hearing from knowledgeable people with diverse perspectives on these issues. meetings like this one allow us to gather intelligence we and others can use to facilitate the flow of credit to small businesses – for instance, by identifying specific credit gaps, clarifying examiner expectations and procedures, improving coordination of small business support services, and ensuring the availability of technical assistance for loan applications. thus we can help ensure that small businesses are able to participate in and contribute to the recovery. the findings from the entire series of meetings sponsored by the federal reserve will be presented at a culminating conference at the board of governors in washington later this summer. learning from people engaged with small businesses and small business credit, like those here today, is vital if we are to make progress. i look forward to hearing your ideas and concerns, and thank you again for joining us. for example, see board of governors of the federal reserve system, federal deposit insurance corporation, national credit union administration, office of the comptroller of the currency, office of thrift supervision, and conference of state bank supervisors ( 2010 ), “ regulators issue statement on lending to creditworthy small businesses ”, joint press release, february 5. see the april 2010 senior loan officer opinion survey on bank lending practices available on the board of governors ’ website. see william j. dennis, jr. ( 2010 ), small business credit in a deep recession ( washington : national federation of independent business., february ).