no liquid money market. reserve requirements were used to absorb excessive monetary base. among others, see g. dell ’ ariccia, d. igan, and l. laeven ( 2008 ), “ credit booms and lending standards : evidence from the subprime mortgage market ”, cepr discussion papers 6683 ; g. dell ’ ariccia, d. igan, l. laeven, and h. tong with b. bakker and j. vandenbussche ( 2012 ), “ policies for macroprudential stability : how to deal with credit booms ”, imf staff discussion note 12 / 6 ; c. h. lim, f. columba, a. costa, p. kongsamut, a. otani, m. saiyid, t. wezel, and x. wu ( 2011 ), “ macroprudential policy : what instruments bis central bankers ’ speeches and elsewhere, also using theoretical calibrated or estimated models, finds that cooperation between monetary and macroprudential policies in targeting financial imbalances may lead to significant gains. 6 all in all, in developed and emerging economies alike, there seems to be a lot to learn in this field : about the true degree of independence of map tools from other policies ; about the independence of the various map tools from each other. and about some important conceptual and practical issues that deserve attention to make map instruments fully operational, an issue to which i turn in the next two sections. 3. conceptual issues on the use of macroprudential tools lists of potential map tools have been drawn up by many authorities. 7 the esrb has put up for internal use a list so exhaustive as to earn the label “ the yellow pages ”. but nowhere more than in this field is actual progress likely to come from a learn - by - doing approach. therefore, in this section i will focus on some of the issues that might challenge the effective implementation of map policy, such as 1 ) the scope of application of map tools and the risk of policy circumvention and leakages ; 2 ) the possibility of symmetric ( versus asymmetric ) impact of the map measures ; and 3 ) the speed at which policy tools can be adjusted. finally, in section 4 i shall discuss a number of operational challenges in europe. 3. 1 scope of application of map tools : broad or targeted? circumvention and leakages

severe financial instability episodes experienced since the 1990s. by contrast, most developed countries started considering map tools only after the global financial crisis and in most cases have not yet used them in practice. with the benefit of hindsight, we now know that the cushions accumulated in the run - up to the crisis ( capital buffers, liquidity reserves ) were too small, so that when the crisis erupted there was little that policymakers could do in the way of releasing instruments in a countercyclical fashion. in other words, in many countries map policies were “ at their lower bound ”, leaving little room for policy action. 3 second, the distinction between map measures and unsophisticated monetary policy measures is often not clear - cut. at least some policies and tools that are labelled “ macroprudential ” in emerging economies were de facto substituting for insufficiently developed monetary policy frameworks. this, for example, is the case of reserve requirements and quantitative limits on credit. 4 hence, the available empirical evidence from emerging economies about map policy effectiveness may have to be interpreted with caution. this caveat notwithstanding, the available empirical evidence suggests that map tools do have some effectiveness. 5 moreover, recent research conducted at the bank of italy these countries experienced both time - varying and structural measures. for example, the brazilian authorities have experimented with capital requirements on new loans to households and reserve requirements ; turkey with foreign - exchange intervention and policy - induced volatility on short - term rates ( to counteract large capital inflows ), reserve requirements, ltv limits, and increases in risk - weights and general provisions on new consumer loans. korea has implemented ltv and dti limits on mortgage lending, levies on non - core foreign exchange liabilities and ceilings on banks ’ foreign exchange derivatives positions. hong kong has also used ltv and debt servicing ratios and haircuts on share margin financing and repo transactions. p. angelini, s. nicoletti - altimari and i. visco ( 2013 ), “ macroprudential, microprudential and monetary policies : conflicts, complementarities and trade - offs ”, in stability of the financial system – illusion or feasible concept?, edited by a. dombret and o. lucius, edward elgar, and bank of italy, occasional papers, 140, november ( 2012 ). for example, in italy, administrative controls on loans were used to steer monetary policy in the 1970s, when there was