samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
the rules. a monetary policy report that might accompany such a forecast could include various views that may differ from the baseline summaries. performing this exercise would indicate the inherent uncertainty that policymakers face, yet it would also provide a better sense of the likely direction of policy and the variables most related systematically to that policy. further, this type of communication would push the fomc to conduct policy in a more systematic manner, which i believe will lead to better economic outcomes over the longer run. bis central bankers ’ speeches

bonds. this contributes to keeping us long - term interest rates at a low level, which in turn have a considerable impact on developments in long - term interest rates in other parts of the world. in addition to these conditions, new accounting and solvency rules are being introduced in many countries. the new rules provide pension funds in particular with incentives to lengthen asset maturities, improving the balance between asset and debt maturities. increased demand for long - term bonds push up bond prices and push down yields. normally, an investor will, on an expectations basis, be compensated in the form of a positive term premium for holding long - term bonds instead of rolling over short - term bonds. various conditions though the literature is vast, see for example ahrend, r., p. catte and r. price ( 2006 ) ‘ factors behind low long - term interest rates ’, working papers 490, oecd, www. oecd. org, imf ( 2005 ) ‘ global imbalances : a saving and investment perspective ’, world economic outlook september 2005, www. imf. org, imf ( 2006 ) ‘ awash with cash : why are corporate savings so high? ’, world economic outlook april 2006, www. imf. org, and rajan, r. g. ( 2006 ) ‘ is there a global shortage of fixed assets? ’, remarks 1. december, www. imf. org relating to saving and investment patterns in the world economy and new accounting and solvency rules may have led to a marked fall in term premia in recent years. in some markets, they can even be negative. the level of long - term interest rates is frequently used as an indicator of the normal interest rate level. if low long - term interest rates are caused by extraordinary conditions and not expectations of low growth and low inflation, long - term market interest rates may underestimate the normal interest rate level. when preparing an interest rate forecast, we must have a view of what the normal interest rate level is. in order to produce a forecast that reflects a reasonable trade - off in monetary policy, we have also drawn up a set of guidelines, which are presented in the inflation report. the criteria cannot provide an absolutely precise guide as to how the interest rate should be set, but points to factors we should have considered and assessed. the central trade - off is between inflation prospects and the prospects for capacity utilisation in the economy, expressed in
dbcc ’ s gdp growth projection : 5. 5 percent in 2021, 7 to 9 percent in 2022 and 6 to 7 percent in 2023 and 2024. on inflation, bsp is forecasting 2 to 4 percent in 2022 up to 2024, provided the national government continues to address supply - side factors affecting food items. 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches recall that in 2019, we were able to tame inflation after reforming rice trade. we should do more of liberalization of food items. beware of politicians and pseudo economists who advocate that we should reverse what the duterte administration has done on the liberalization of food items. policy reversal will be disastrous, should that happen. my optimism for the future is grounded on what the duterte administration has done so far. tax reform. investment in human capital. golden age of infrastructure. rice liberalization. digitalization in banking and government services. these reforms have a positive effect on our desire to keep prices reasonable and steady, the fiscal system sound, and the economy efficient and competitive. on inflation, let me remind you that everyone benefits from reasonable and stable prices, but especially the fixed income earners and the poor. finally, one important point. every now and then, an unprecedented crisis will come along that will naturally consume the time and effort of our politicians and policymakers. the appropriate behavior is to address the core of the crisis. but let the crisis of the hour not distract them from our long - term goals as a nation and a society. in other words, we should not let the covid - 19 pandemic derail our long - term goals. with or without crisis, we should continue to pursue structural reforms that would put the philippines not just on the road to pre - crisis growth but on a sustainable path of development. that is why i support the three pieces of legislation aimed at liberalizing the philippine economy : first, the retail trade liberalization act, which will lower the minimum paid - up capital for foreign retailers ; second, the amendments to the 80 - year - old public service act which will open up key economic sectors, including telecommunications and airlines ; and thirdly, the amendments to the foreign investments act which will encourage foreign professionals to bring their practice, know - how, and technical expertise to the philippines. fortunately, all three measures are nearing the finish line. i am confident that with these game - changing reforms, we can achieve real change in the lives of ordinary filipino

##s through more and better jobs and more competitive economy. after all, the true measure of our effectiveness and relevance as an institution goes beyond our oft - cited mandates of price and financial stability, sound banking supervision, and an efficient payments and settlement system. it is best found in the real economy, in improving the lives of our countrymen. thank you. 4 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches
benoit cœure : interview in l'obs interview with mr benoit cœure, member of the executive board of the european central bank, in l'obs, conducted by ms sophie fay and mr pascal riche on 15 may, and published on 23 may 2017. * * * in the united states, the administration wants to reconsider the banking regulations put in place after the 2008 financial crisis. the united kingdom is tempted to do the same in the context of brexit. in france, emmanuel macron also thinks that the steps taken were excessive. is this a threat to the stability of the financial system? yes, the threat of deregulation exists. in many places there appears to be a temptation to revisit the financial regulation adopted by the g20 countries, which has been a huge project : we have strengthened the capital requirements and liquidity of banks, limited their size, regulated potentially dangerous products, such as derivatives, and started to put in order what ’ s known as shadow banking, which takes place outside the banking sector. it comes as no surprise that the financial industry dislikes these new rules. the large banks say that they hinder lending and increase the cost of capital. but this is not the case in the euro area, and even less so in france. banks have significantly strengthened their capital base since 2010 and yet they have never made so many loans at such low rates. the temptation of a regulatory race to the bottom exists in any industry, but it is even stronger in finance. it took enormous political energy on the part of the heads of state or government, following the financial crisis, not to give in to it. but whenever this political will weakens, the temptation of a race to the bottom returns. such a temptation exists in the united states, although for the time being the new administration has not expressed any desire to backtrack on financial cooperation, either in the g7 or the g20, which is comforting. emmanuel macron has also said that he wants to reconsider certain banking rules, notably on the required level of own funds. his comment was born of good intentions : to facilitate the financing of smes. but there are other instruments available for that purpose. it would be useful if, once a year, the ministers of finance and economic affairs of the eu were to examine the impact of regulation on the financing of businesses. but that must not be a pretext for dismantling what has been achieved

note : bundesbank main refinancing interest rate before 1999. minimum bid rate from june 2000. source : bundesbank, ecb and danmarks nationalbank. chart 2a : interest - rate differentials between denmark and germany percent 10 - year government bond yields 3 - mont h int erest rat es source : ecowin. chart 3a : breakdown of danish exports on recipient countries rest of w orld 25 % efta count ries 7 % eu accession count ries 4 % euro area 43 % ot her eu count ries 21 % source : statistics denmark. chart 4a : monthly interventions by danmarks nationalbank, 1987 - 2002 m ill. usd - 1000 - 2000 - 3000 - 4000 - 5000 net buying of f oreign currency source : danmarks nationalbank.
and making improvements to our market liquidity frameworks in support of canadians ’ economic and financial wellbeing. and it ’ s crucial that we keep you informed of those lessons along the way. thank you.

somewhat above the long - term level demanded by the banking sector. 7 some of you may be wondering what that ideal level might be. the answer is not yet set in stone. we know it will be well below our current level of roughly $ 200 billion. our best estimate is somewhere in the range of $ 20 billion to $ 60 billion, or roughly 1 % to 2 % of canadian gross domestic product ( gdp ). by comparison, the us federal reserve ’ s longer - run level of reserves needed has recently been estimated to be roughly 10 % to 13 % of us gdp. 8 this implies that qt will have run its course once our settlement balances have reached this $ 20 billion to $ 60 billion range. at that point, the bank would start buying assets again as part of our regular balance sheet management process. 9 given that a great deal of uncertainty surrounds our estimate for the long - run level of reserves needed, we will be monitoring short - term funding conditions as our settlement balances decline. and based on what we see, we may have to revise our estimate of the level needed for us to implement monetary policy under a floor system. for example, if we were to see persistent upward pressure on the overnight repo rates in the market before settlement balances reached our estimate of the steady - state level, it could very well mean our estimate for the range was too low. as for the question of when qt will end, this will likely occur sometime around the end of 2024 or the first half of 2025. this is based on the maturity structure of our current bond holdings combined with the estimate of what our steady - state holdings will likely be. the timing may shift slightly as the size of other parts of our balance sheet — including government deposits and currency in circulation — changes over time. it ’ s important to remember we are still working to bring aggregate supply and demand back into balance. our main tool for doing this is our policy interest rate, which we have increased forcefully — from 0. 25 % to 4. 50 % in less than a year. but our balance sheet must continue to normalize to remove the support it provides to monetary policy. 6 see bank of canada, “ bank of canada provides operational detail for quantitative tightening and announces that it will continue to implement monetary policy using a floor system, ” ( market notice, april 13, 2022 ). 7 t. gravelle, r. morrow and j. witmer, “ reviewing canada
in coming quarters. bis central bankers ’ speeches

target, the objective is to return to a zero inflation rate. when inflation has been returned to zero, however, the price level will be higher than it was before the disturbance. under a constant price level target, the aim is to return to the initial price level, requiring a period of deflation to offset the effect of the period of higher inflation. this can produce a more predictable price level in the long run, but many analysts are concerned about how the economy would respond to a period of deflation. yet another alternative is to target a low positive inflation rate – specifically an inflation rate somewhat above a level that reflected estimates of the bias in published measures. one of the issues i will discuss shortly is whether targeting a low, positive rate of “ true ” inflation ( what i call price stability plus cushion ) might result in better cyclical performance of the economy than a zero inflation target. still another choice is an average inflation target. if the target was 2 % and inflation temporarily moved to 3 %, an average inflation target policy would encourage a decline in the inflation rate to below 2 % for a while, moving the average back to 2 %. this allows for a predictable ( albeit rising ) long - run price level, while avoiding the deflationary episodes that would occasionally be called for under a constant price level target. ii. monetary policy in a low - inflation environment i turn now to the challenges associated with the conduct of monetary policy in a low - inflation environment. the issue here is whether, at very low inflation rates, the cyclical performance of the economy would deteriorate. if this were the case, the objectives or strategy of monetary policy would need to be adjusted. among the possible responses is adjusting the definition of the inflation target, so i will be building on the preceding discussion. a. keynes ’ liquidity trap and the zero nominal bound problem john maynard keynes, in his classic work, the general theory of employment, interest and money, warned that monetary policy might become ineffective once interest rates fell to some low level at which wealth owners might become indifferent as to whether they held money or bonds. in the language of economists, money and bonds might become perfect substitutes. in this case, it would be impossible for monetary policy to affect interest rates by affecting the composition of portfolios, specifically the amount of money held relative to bonds. keynes called this situation a “ liquidity trap. ” since the end of the great depression, many have interpreted keynes ’ liquidity trap to be
sethaput suthiwartnarueput : climate risk resilience and sustainable finance - regulation and supervision welcome remarks by dr sethaput suthiwartnarueput, governor of the bank of thailand, at the asean core curriculum on climate risk resilience and sustainable finance, block 4 : regulation and supervision, hosted by the bank of thailand, bangkok, 13 february 2013. * * * dr. mangal goswami, executive director, the seacen centre professor ulrich volz, professor of economics & director of the centre for sustainable finance, soas, university of london distinguished speakers, and participants ladies and gentlemen first of all, i would like to extend a warm welcome to all participants to the asean core curriculum on climate risk resilienceand sustainable finance block 4 : regulation and supervision. it is a pleasant opportunity to finally meet you in person as i believe this is the first hybrid seacen seminarhere since 2020. on behalf of the bank of thailand, i would like to thank the seacen centre and the soas centre for sustainable finance for arranging the capacity building course on this important and urgent topic in thailand. ladies and gentlemen, i am confident that all of us have already acknowledged substantial threat of climate change posing to society and economy. central banks and financial regulators in our region and around the world have put much effort in setting a concrete policy direction towards tackling climate change. likewise, the bot published a directional paper on transitioning towards environmental sustainability under the new thai financial landscape last year to communicate and kick start the journey with our stakeholders. it is essential for the financial sector to manage climate - related risks, while at the same time, support the economic transition. this means financial institutions have to internalize climate considerations into their business operations and risk management framework and offer financial products and services to help business transition especially in the high - emission and vulnerable sectors without disrupting the economy and leaving someone behind. however, there is no denying that financial sector has substantial gaps and challenges to overcome in order to achieve such goals, particularly on the risk management perspective. financial sector resilience would be undermined by the climate - related risks without appropriate measures in a timely manner. thus, central banks and financial regulators have a crucial role in building capacity and facilitating guidelines and tools needed for climate - related and environmental risks. the first step should be providing concrete expectation and guidance for financial industry to uplift their business operations, risk management, and disclosure that align with international standards.

; it makes for an easier and more successful journey. i wish the deliberations all success. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
and domestic risks that might upset this prospect. we must build on the reforms undertaken and continue redressing the accumulated imbalances, among which the high level of unemployment and high debt are unquestionably the most serious, without forgetting the need to push through and fulfil the fiscal consolidation commitments required within the european union. thank you very much for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches

##tails an annual growth rate of 3. 1 %. social security registrations, for their part, increased at a year - on - year rate of 3. 2 % in october, the same rate as the previous month, with registrations up 530, 000 compared with the same month a year earlier. the unemployment rate in the third quarter stood at 21. 2 %, down 2. 5 pp in the past 12 months. on our projections and those of the imf, it is within our reach by the end of 2016 to bring the unemployment rate below 20 % for the first time since 2010. these figures, though they attest to the improvement in the labour market, are still very high, abnormally so in the context of the euro area. they show the need to maintain a high rate of activity and to continue streamlining our labour market to prevent the combination of low activity and inadequate regulations, as so often occurred in the past, from driving job destruction. balance of payments and tourism our balance of payments performance in the past three years has been very favourable : from running a heavy deficit, with a negative current account balance up to 10 % of gdp in 2007, we are now in a different position, with few, but brief precedents in spanish economic history, marked by a current account surplus against a background of significant gdp growth and job creation. in the first nine months of this year ( the figures for september were published today ), the spanish economy ’ s net lending ( i. e. the cumulative surplus on the current account balance and the capital account balance ) stood at €13. 2 billion, compared with a surplus of €5. 8 billion in the same period of 2014 ; that is to say, it has more than doubled thanks to the reduction in net foreign interest payments. the widening of the surplus on capital account and the increase in the positive balance on goods and services, as a result of the improvement in the energy balance and, to a lesser extent, in the surplus on non - tourist services, were also a contributing factor. bis central bankers ’ speeches the tourism balance has contributed positively to the improvement in the current account balance. in the january - september period, the tourism surplus was €28. 4 billion, a very similar figure to that recorded in the same period in 2014. according to surveys by the iet ( institute for tourism studies ), the balearic islands was the second - ranked spanish region in terms of incoming international tourists and of their
remain an essential objective for the future of stress testing. in that regard, improving the accuracy and relevance of our top - down models is one of our priorities at banque de france, but also at the european level, to better use them in the macroprudential field. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

our best to reduce uncertainty about future monetary policy conditions, at least out to the horizon that it is prudent to do so. the consistency, credibility and clarity of the riga decisions was reinforced by the fact that they were agreed unanimously, demonstrating strong cohesion within the governing council. in this divisive world, in this divisive europe - unfortunately, on tough issues like migration this cohesion was our shared responsibility and duty to protect the common good of 340 million europeans : their currency, the euro. they support it at an overwhelming majority of page 3 sur 5 74 % - confirmed in the spring 2018 eurobarometer, with an increasing majority in italy. this confidence in the euro obliges us to act together. i would like here to welcome another recent positive commitment from political leaders : the franco - german agreement in meseberg. the message is clear and threefold : i. the eurozone needs, besides monetary union, a strengthening of the economic union. if not, monetary policy would remain the only game in town, and be at risk of being overburdened by the next recession. ii. economic union needs public risk sharing – an enhanced esm and a euro - zone budget – as well as private risk sharing. let me also stress this one, adding banking union – with a fully credible resolution mechanism – and capital market union. cmu – which we strongly advocate with president jens weidmann and the whole governing council - fortunately is in the declaration too, with a commitment to realise “ decisive progress ”. iii. europe needs a franco - german impetus. both countries took their responsibility, still on time. it is now up to the 19 to elaborate a common and operational package. the euro - zone should seize this moment : it ’ s now or never. ii. policy - induced uncertainty the global and european economy is confronted by two possible policy shocks : trade and fiscal policy. since we are currently enjoying the world cup, it seems appropriate to call these policy - induced own goals. rise in protectionism the first of these is the risk to the global trading system of the rise in protectionism. the initial measures announced so far by the united states and then china only cover about 1 % of global imports and should have limited direct effects on inflation and activity. but they have logically triggered retaliation by other countries or regions and the risk of an escalating and global trade war is no longer unthinkable. the classical analysis of the macro