much of their resources as possible to supporting economic growth. i look forward to our discussion. 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches 1 the views i express here are my own and not those of the federal reserve. 2 ben s. bernanke, the courage to act : a memoir of a crisis and its aftermath ( new york : norton, 2015 ). 3 source : corelogic, completed foreclosures. 4 see, for example, lisa b. kahn, “ the long - term labor market consequences of graduating from college in a bad economy, " labour economics 17 ( 2 ) ( april 2010 ) : 303 – 16. 5 jerome h. powell, “ recent economic developments and longer - run challenges " ( speech delivered at the economic club of indiana, indianapolis, november 29, 2016 ). 6 timothy massad, “ remarks before the 2016 p. r. i. m. e. finance annual conference ” ( the hague, the netherlands, january 25, 2016 ). 7 the alternative reference rates committee is working to strengthen another key segment of the financial infrastructure. the committee will select its preferred alternative to u. s. dollar london interbank offered rate ( or, libor ) and is expected to complete its plans to promote the use of this rate this year. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

ms. phillips reassesses the stock market crash of 1987 in the context of subsequent market and regulatory changes remarks by ms. susan m. phillips, a member of the board of governors of the us federal reserve system, at bentley college, waltham, massachusetts on 15 / 10 / 97. black monday : 10 years later thank you for inviting me to participate in this program sponsored by the financial women ’ s association. we are drawing very close to the tenth anniversary of the stock market crash. it is useful to reassess that event in the context of subsequent market and regulatory changes. the crash was one of those ( fortunately rare ) events that serve as a watershed for our discussion of markets and public policies. considerations of regulatory approaches now almost always use the crash as a reference point. panels such as this one provide a vehicle for evaluating not only what we have learned from the event but also the various actions taken following the crash. but it is also appropriate to look forward. changes in financial markets and the risk management capability of firms have been significant in the intervening years. the crash may no longer be as useful a reference point for judging events and evaluating public policy responses. i suppose everyone can remember what they were doing on the day of the crash. i had the good fortune to have left the cftc prior to the crash. thus, i got to watch events unfold from the cornfields of iowa. later, however, i participated in several post - crash evaluations. even now, at the federal reserve board, the crash periodically comes up in supervisory discussions about bank risk. ( regrettably, the crash is now part of a pantheon of financial market “ problems ” that include barings, daiwa, metallgesellschaft, orange county, and sumitomo. ) the legacy of the crash the legacy of the crash is both tangible and intangible. an impressive number of studies of the crash were done. the more noteworthy ones take up about three linear feet on my bookshelf, a very tangible reminder. more seriously, the studies done after the crash were wide - ranging and examined events through the eyes of many different market participants, many different regulators, and a host of academicians. they identified weaknesses in trading and clearing systems that have resulted in tangible changes to those systems. these changes have been very positive. exchanges have greatly expanded their ability to handle surges in volume, for example. the capitalization of market makers has been bolstered as