sound governance, and build management frameworks to address the new risks. a regulatory and supervisory framework that adapts to technological advancements is also essential. in japan, for example, crypto - asset regulations and stablecoin legislation were introduced ahead of other jurisdictions, with cybersecurity guidelines established in 2024. meanwhile, the european union enacted the artificial intelligence act, the 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches world's first regulation for trustworthy ai. as ai continues to spread globally, the bank of japan closely follows regulatory responses across jurisdictions. concluding remarks let me conclude by adding that central banks are also embracing technology to enhance risk management and analytical capabilities. to ensure a future that reaps the full benefits of technology, it is essential to build on the insights gained from the expertise and trial - and - error of financial professionals. this forum is a unique opportunity for financial professionals from japan and france to exchange knowledge. in the spirit of the paris 2024 olympic and paralympic games'slogan, " games wide open ( ouvrons grand les jeux ), " i hope that this gathering becomes a vibrant platform for sharing ideas and fostering fruitful discussions. thank you for your attention. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

mr brash addresses the question : what can new zealanders expect of monetary policy in the long term? address by donald t brash, governor of the reserve bank of new zealand, to the northern club, auckland on 25 march 1999. introduction mr chairman too often, both in the reserve bank and, i suspect, in financial markets, we are inclined to lose sight of the longer - term, or strategic, issues of relevance to monetary policy. we get preoccupied with whether the official cash rate should really have been set at 4. 50 per cent rather than at 4. 25 per cent, as if this detail had any enduring significance for the real economy and the lives of ordinary new zealanders. i don ’ t want to imply that the short - term tactics are irrelevant – far from it – but they are very much less relevant than the longer - term issues, particularly when the official cash rate itself is explicitly up for review on a regular basis. so today i want to address the question, what can new zealanders expect of monetary policy in the long term? the monetary policy framework is profoundly democratic the first point to note in answering that question is that the answer depends on what parliament wants monetary policy to deliver. it is sometimes suggested that the reserve bank seems to be a law unto itself, and that don brash seems to run the country. nothing could be further from the truth. in new zealand, the reserve bank is subject to an act of parliament, and parliament can change that legislation by simple majority. this is also true in australia, the united kingdom, the united states and many other countries, of course, but it is not now true in much of europe ( where the european central bank is a creature of the maastricht treaty ) or in those countries where the central bank has been given essentially unlimited independence under the constitution. moreover, that act of parliament requires that, within the general directive prescribed by the act, the governor of the bank must sign a written agreement with the treasurer setting out quite explicitly what the governor must achieve during his or her term of office, the so - called policy targets agreement. that agreement can be changed by mutual agreement at any time during the governor ’ s term of office, and can be overridden by order - in - council if the government wants a change and the governor does not. so what monetary policy will deliver in the years ahead is essentially a matter for the public, through parliament, to determine. the reserve bank and i