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at a micro level. in the midst of a crisis, a central bank faces growing demand for introducing unconventional policy measures, which involve more or less quasifiscal policy elements. since a central bank generally thinks that such measures need to be decided and implemented by government in democratic society, a central bank falls into a difficult position, when decisions by government are just postponed. the border between pure monetary policy and quasi - fiscal policy sometimes becomes ambiguous. looking back at the experiences of various countries since the 1990s, when their central bank law had clauses for making some quasi - fiscal policy measures possible, they decided to carry out such measures after careful consideration. once a crisis was overcome, with the help of such unconventional policy measures, central banks were criticized for violating the fundamental rule in democratic society. as a result, such a situation is likely to undermine credibility for central banks, and thus affect their policy performance. iv. tasks for central banks as i discussed so far, central banks face new and difficult challenges at the moment. with considering such difficult challenge, i will point out some tasks in addressing such difficult challenges. understanding of a primary mandate for a central bank the first is the understanding of a primary mandate for a central bank. without social understanding on that point, central bank independence and, eventually, central bank credibility itself are likely to be undermined. i think that a primary mandate for a central bank should be to achieve a stable financial environment, that is, a financial environment that is consistent with, and contributes to, sustainable economic growth. price stability is certainly one important element in achieving a stable financial environment. that is, however, not the sole factor. when a central bank feels constrained by short - term developments too much, that is more likely to amplify macroeconomic fluctuations. after all, deposit money, which has a major share in broad money, is created as a product of maturity mismatches and leverage of private financial institutions. a central bank needs to adequately monitor the financial environment, including such behavior of financial institutions. macroprudential perspectives, recently reemphasized in light of the current global financial crisis, should be understood as examining the interactions between the real and financial sides of the economy, considering the behavior of private financial institutions. such an analysis is an essential task for a central bank, although it is a typical example of “ easier said than done. ” in addition, macroprudential analyses and perspectives are crucially important in conducting monetary policy as well as