5 + 2. 1 to + 2. 5 + 0. 5 to + 0. 9 [ + 2. 4 ] [ + 0. 8 ] + 1. 5 to + 2. 0 + 0. 7 to + 0. 8 + 1. 2 to + 1. 5 + 0. 7 to + 1. 0 [ + 1. 3 ] [ + 1. 0 ] fiscal 2021 forecasts made in january 2021 fiscal 2022 forecasts made in january 2021 fiscal 2023 source : april 2021 outlook for economic activity and prices, bank of japan. notes : 1. figures in brackets indicate the medians of the policy board members'forecasts ( point estimates ). 2. the forecasts of the majority of the policy board members are constructed as follows : each policy board member's forecast takes the form of a point estimate - - namely, the figure to which they attach the highest probability of realization. these forecasts are then shown as a range, with the highest figure and the lowest figure excluded. the range does not indicate the forecast errors. chart 9 the bank's measures in response to covid - 19 supporting corporate financing special program to support financing in response to covid - 19 purchases of cp and corporate bonds : amount outstanding of about 20 tril. yen at maximum ( previously, about 5 tril. yen ) special funds - supplying operations to facilitate financing in response to covid - 19 stabilizing financial markets ample and flexible provision of yen and foreign currency funds active purchases of jgbs and t - bills u. s. dollar funds - supplying operations purchasing etfs and j - reits etfs : annual pace with an upper limit of about 12 tril. yen j - reits : annual pace with an upper limit of about 180 bil. yen chart 10 quantitative and qualitative monetary easing ( qqe ) with yield curve control ( 1 ) yield curve control ( 2 ) inflation - overshooting commitment % 1. 0 the bank will continue expanding the 0. 8 monetary base until the year - on - year rate target level of the long - term interest rate : around zero percent of increase in the observed cpi ( all items less fresh food ) exceeds the price stability 0. 6 target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner. 0. 4 achieving the price stability target means 0. 2 attaining a situation where the inflation short - term policy interest rate : minus 0. 1 percent rate is 2 percent

on. and third, that resolvability is not a binary concept ; even once the 2022 commitment is fulfilled the work doesn ’ t stop. 2022 will see us pass the important milestone for the resolvability of major banks – but the work to maintain and improve the resolvability of firms within the uk resolution regime will continue. credibility and transparency in the making there are many previous milestones in the history of uk banks ’ resolvability, or lack of it, very few of them positive. with the 2021 budget just around the corner i want to take you back to the april 2009 budget, just under twelve years ago, when, in my role as chief economic adviser to the treasury, i had to advise on the consequences of the deficiencies in the global and uk pre - crisis regulatory framework. by spring 2009, what had started in the summer of 2007 as a liquidity crisis in global financial markets turned into a solvency crisis for a number of global and uk firms, resulting in the uk government bailing out banks and injecting public for more information see the bank of england ’ s written evidence submitted to the tsc ’ s 2017 capital inquiry all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / news / speeches and @ boe _ pressoffice money to the tune of £137bn to stabilise the financial sector2. the contingent liabilities that the uk government had taken on to support bank funding or to underpin some major banks ’ balance sheets dwarfed that sum. at that time, we saw the very serious consequences of the lack of appropriate focus on the safety and soundness of individual banks and the financial system as a whole, including the absence of a credible resolution regime – by which i mean a regime that sets out our aims, to manage the orderly failure of institutions, accompanied with the tools to deliver them. as a result of these various failings globally and domestically the financial system acted as an amplifier, intensifying the uk economic downturn at great economic and fiscal cost. budget 2009 detailed the largest fall in uk gdp since the second world war and forecast a near doubling in the fiscal debt ratio in just four years, from 36 % of gdp in 2006 - 07 to 69 % in 2010 - 11. in order to underpin the uk ’ s economic and fiscal position, the government took the unusual step, at least in public finance terms as i am sure this expert audience would