in recent weeks is welcome, and if sustained, will favourably influence the risk profile associated with the inflation trajectory over the forecast horizon. conclusion currently, the policy dilemma is one of trying to address the deterioration in the inflation outlook against the background of a weakening growth outlook. inflation is currently outside the inflation target range and the latest forecasts suggest it will return to within the target band only in late 2017. inflationary pressures are underpinned by supply - side shocks, mainly related to exchange rate and food price movements. some of the inflation risks previously identified materialised earlier and more forcefully than anticipated. under these circumstances, monetary policy cannot afford to be complacent and should strive to manage bis central bankers ’ speeches inflation expectations to ensure that these shocks do not result in second - round impacts and a generalised increase in prices. the overall monetary policy stance continues to be supportive of the weak economy with the necessary policy tightening having proceeded at a moderate pace, showing sensitivity for the weak growth environment while seeking to counter mounting inflationary pressures in the economy. it is, however, worth reiterating that over the long run south africa ’ s growth prospects are best served by keeping inflation within the target range, and not by looking to exploit a temporary trade - off between growth and inflation. in these times of uncertainty and volatility, the sarb will remain focused on its mandate and continue to be a beacon of stability by implementing its policy framework in a forward - looking, consistent, transparent, and as far as possible, predictable manner. thank you. references south african reserve bank. 2016. quarterly bulletin, south african reserve bank, pretoria march 2016. south african reserve bank. 2016. monetary policy review, south african reserve bank, pretoria, april 2016. international monetary fund, 2016. world economic outlook, imf, washington. april 2016. bis central bankers ’ speeches

, but higher productivity in the making of monetary policy is not one of them. all important decisions are prepared at the ecb and in the 16 national central banks in parallel. there is a certain degree of division of labour, but much of that work is done at the same time by all. this is important. it serves as a mechanism of checks and balances. it helps to avoid the pitfalls of " groupthink " – a sort of consensual corporate culture that stifles creativity and critical thinking – and it ensures that relevant viewpoints seldom get neglected. this is a way to guarantee that decision - making is “ wisdom - based ” as a senior central banker once said. the ecb always produces its own analysis, and in a way has preferential access to the council agenda, but the ecb analysis is tested against the analysis prepared in each of the national central banks and the judgment of the members from the governing council. one must also remember that the implementation of monetary policy is decentralised. the national central banks are responsible for liquidity operations with their counterparties, which can be any financial institution from an eea country which has a counterparty status in the country of the ncb. this means that national central banks are active in the market every banking day. decision making by the governing council is supported by a web of ecb expert committees, working groups and task forces where a governor nominates a member. these bodies have no decision making power, but they serve as fora in which some differences can be ironed out and the groundwork laid for the council. roughly 80s bank of finland officials travel regularly to meetings of such groupings. finland is one of the smaller shareholders in the eurosystem. the bank of finland holds less than 1½ per cent of the ecb's subscribed capital. but when it comes to monetary policy decisions, everyone has one voice and one vote around the table. it would be naive to claim that the size of the country has no effect on the weight of one's voice, but in reality size matter less than one might think. by and large, it is the weight of one's arguments, not the size of the country that is key to influence in the eurosystem. what is clear, though, is that a small central bank has fewer resources to devote to preparatory work than a larger central bank. this is why a small central bank must make efficient use of its limited