, to ensure a return to our 2 % objective. c ) in the next two years, however, concerns should reverse : inflation is expected to normalise in line with a " new regime " which would not be the too low pre - covid inflation, but one close to our 2 % target. conversely, current growth, boosted by catch - up effects, is expected to run out of steam : according to our latest projections, growth in france should fall to below 1. 5 % in 2024. we should set a more ambitious target for potential growth, between 1. 5 and 2 %, i. e. a gain of half a percentage point over the spontaneous trend. because we need the revenues from growth to finance our collective projects, especially ecological ones, and our welfare, this is not inconsistent with rethinking the drivers of growth. this ambition would also make it possible to better reconcile an increase in household purchasing power and the containment of public debt, whereas we have so far sacrificed the latter in order to somewhat artificially ensure the former. the banque de france is entitled to discuss this, because monetary policy cannot ignore economic imbalances, nor can it compensate for them in the long term. and i am speaking this evening with all the independence that this institution enjoys : when the central bank provides facts and its page 4 sur 15 expertise, it is free of any political influence and respects the democratic process which, fortunately, is then responsible for the choices. this half percentage point of potential growth can be achieved by a medium - to long - term reform path : the efficient firefighters of the crisis must gradually hand over to the architects. a third of the necessary progress could be achieved through two european - level transformations ( ii ) – via investment, digitalisation and the associated productivity gains –, the rest would depend on two challenges specific to france ( iii ). ii. two schumpeterian transformations for europe europe, like the rest of the world, will have to achieve two major transformations in the next decade : the digital revolution and the climate transition. the covid crisis has obviously accelerated the former, and fortunately has not slowed down the efforts regarding the latter. compared to the rest of the world – and in particular the united states – our europe is lagging behind with the first transition, and still ahead with the second. but it suffers above all from a structural handicap : its lack not of economic weight – which we have, together – but of speed ; europe has

”, the use of a currency may expand or shrink quickly due to network and scale effects : the more people use a currency, the more attractive it becomes. this begs the question of possible “ spheres of influence ” appearing in the future with significant evolutions in the respective role and weight of existing currencies. in my remarks, i will simply define such “ spheres of influence ” as parts of the world economic system where the use of a specific currency might dominate. with this strict definition in mind, i will make four main observations. an asymmetric world first, the current world is highly asymmetric. two major currencies – the us dollar and the euro – account for most of the foreign exchange reserves. one of them, the dollar, clearly dominates in financial markets and payment systems. this asymmetry has many well - known and self - reinforcing consequences. us monetary policy has significant effects well beyond the us economy. those monetary spillovers may be especially important when unconventional monetary policies are implemented. they cast new doubts on the insulating properties of floating exchange rates. bis central bankers ’ speeches they create new incentives, for many emerging economies, to manage their exchange rate and, for that purpose, accumulate dollar - denominated foreign exchange reserves. as a consequence, most, but not all, of the official liquidity provided through multilateral mechanisms is denominated in dollars. the rise of the euro the major innovation of the last decade has been the rise of the euro. it offers some interesting insights and lessons. most economic models and historical examples suggest that the appearance of new world currencies would trigger huge portfolio adjustments and create major turbulences. economists also hypothesized that, in a multicurrency world, portfolio shifts would create permanent exchange rate instability. none of this has happened. in fact, the euro has neither stabilized nor disrupted the international monetary system. exchange rates have moved significantly but, most of the time, in an orderly fashion and have followed low periodicity cycles. this may be, for the future, an interesting precedent : a new global currency can emerge without destabilizing the system. it is also worth noticing that the euro crisis had no major effect on its international role. in particular, the share of foreign reserves invested in euro securities has barely moved. and, when the swiss authorities decided to peg their currency, they chose the euro as an anchor. does the euro have a “ sphere of influence ”?