. 5 trillion in infrastructure investment alone every year for decades. 3 all forms of finance : public, private and blended finance will play a part. public finance to support a fair and inclusive transition across our economies. development and blended finance to support adaptation and resilience. and mainstream private finance to help all companies realign their business models for net zero. the objective for the private finance work for cop 26 is simple : ensure that every financial decision takes climate change into account. 1 the full list of current tcfd supporters is available at : https : / / www. fsb - tcfd. org / tcfd - supporters /. see https : / / www. unpri. org / signatories, http : / / www. climateaction100. org / investors, https : / / www. unepfi. org / net - zero - alliance /. https : / / www. iea. org / news / deep - energy - transformation - needed - by - 2050 - to - limit - rise - in - global - temperature. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / news / speeches to do so, we will work with you – the private sector – to put in place the frameworks so that you can do what you do best – allocate capital to manage risks and seize opportunities across the economy. determining who ’ s ready for the transition and who ’ s not requires : 1. disclosure of climate financial risk to become comprehensive ; 2. climate risk management to be transformed ; and 3. investing for a net - zero world to go mainstream. on the road to glasgow, we will focus on the three rs : reporting ; risk management ; and return - to help unlock the private financial flows that are vital to the transition. this will support a wider shift to paris alignment and be underpinned by public finance efforts to deliver $ 100bn. to succeed we will need your support and your action. we will publish the strategy and how you can get involved when i formally assume my new roles, but following sir david ’ s lead, i wanted to offer you an exclusive preview today. reporting : improving the quantity and quality of climate - related disclosures by implementing a common framework built on tcfd an old adage is that which is measured can be managed. for cop 26 we want you to help refine and implement tcfd disclosure ; and we will work with

of reserve creation. principles before considering how to replace treasury securities in the implementation of monetary policy, i find it useful to set out some principles that have, at least implicitly, traditionally been followed. these principles provide guidance on how to proceed without treasuries and identify tradeoffs that would inevitably arise. first, the federal reserve should try to be as neutral as possible with respect to effects on credit and, ultimately, on resource allocation. the market can do this far better than we can. the role of monetary policy is to promote price stability and maximum sustainable employment by influencing the level of aggregate demand through changes in the federal funds rate. in carrying out this responsibility, the fed should aim to have as little effect as possible on the allocation of credit among various sectors or the allocation of resources more generally across industries or sectors. second, and closely related to the first point, the fed does not want to risk facing political pressure to influence the allocation of credit or resources. it avoids that pressure today, in part, by confining its holdings of assets primarily to treasury securities. if the fed were to hold a range of private assets instead of treasury securities, it could face pressure to favor certain sectors, industries, or even firms. the potential for such political pressure might best be minimized by deciding on the portfolio allocation transparently and establishing safeguards against becoming an instrument of credit allocation. if the congress enlarges the range of assets we can hold, for example, it ought to clearly and explicitly prohibit us from favoring one sector over another. third, to avoid affecting credit allocation, it would be preferable to carry out operations in deep and liquid markets. a liquid market permits transactions to be made quickly and with negligible direct effects on the price of the assets bought and sold. the purpose of open market operations is to affect the supply of reserves and thereby the federal funds rate. the federal funds rate and expectations about future monetary policy then affect a wide range of other interest rates - - on longer - term instruments and in both the government and private bond markets. by operating in a broad and liquid market, the fed can inject and withdraw reserves without having much direct effect on the prices of the asset being bought and sold. finally, the fed would prefer to avoid credit risk in its portfolio. managing credit risk is a role for financial intermediaries, not monetary policymakers. owning risky assets necessarily involves taking losses at some point, involving the federal reserve in complex questions of