complexity, provide good management information ( to serve up the needle, to continue the saying ) and enable challenge and thus accountability. if nonexecutives do not feel that they can meet these expectations, they should demand the time and support to enable them to do so, rather than head off for the haystack. i want to conclude by putting this into a broader context of governance. i am sympathetic to the view that the demands on non - executives have risen to the point where it is time to stand back and take stock and find ways to improve the approach. there are three answers that i would rule out : the answer is not to go back to the good old days, because viewed with hindsight they don ’ t look that good ; the answer is not to wish that finance should be simpler, something that is too idealistic to have relevance to today ’ s challenge ; and the answer is not to repeal the duty of responsibility as it will apply to the chairs of boards and board committees because as quite a few have said to me, “ what ’ s all the fuss, this is just a description of what we are here to do. ” so, what might the answer be? in the work that we are doing at the pra to overhaul our approach to supervision of governance in firms as it relates to our statutory objectives, we want to help to get this issue on the table and make real progress. my hunch, as i have explained today, is that one answer lies in the approach by which non - executives are informed by executives about firms and thus for executives to enable rigorous challenge and to be given credit for doing so even where the consequences will be sometimes uncomfortable. we will always be cautious of executives who seem to see non - executives as some form of threat ; the really effective executives are those who see their non - executive colleagues ’ experience bis central bankers ’ speeches and knowledge as a means of improving the effectiveness of the board ’ s judgement through constructive support and challenge. one thing is clear in our work, it is time to take stock on this issue. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches

andrew bailey : a central banker's view of global challenges and expectations for the bretton woods institutions'response remarks by mr andrew bailey, governor of the bank of england, at king's college, cambridge, 17 january 2025. * * * i am going to interpret my theme quite broadly this evening. that said, let me start – appropriately as we are at king's – with a quote from keynes at bretton woods – on the importance of monetary stability as a prerequisite for reconstructing the world economy ( with thanks to martin daunton for using it in his recent book on world economic government ) : " without currency agreements you have no firm ground on which to discuss tariffs. in the same way plans for diminishing the fluctuation of international prices have no domestic meaning to the countries concerned until we have some firm ground in the value of money... it is very difficult while you have monetary chaos to have order of any kind in other directions. " the focus on monetary frameworks and currency arrangements reflected the tension at the time between on the one hand national sovereignty and discretion and on the other hand multilateral frameworks. however, while monetary stability remains the bedrock today, the agenda has of necessity broadened out substantially in terms of economic policy. these days, global co - operation focuses more on ensuring a well - regulated financial system. that reflects the perennial tension between the national scope of governments and the more global scope of markets. solving that tension requires multilateral frameworks and institutions. another theme concerns the bretton woods institutions themselves. we can't be misty eyed about bretton woods. on monetary stability, it was a halfway house solution to dealing with the implications of free international convertibility to gold for domestic economic management. it couldn't be implemented in full for some time, and didn't survive for long when it was. to borrow dani rodrik's phrase, bretton woods was shallow multilateralism with a small role for the fund and the world bank, and it didn't pass the test. subsequently, global financial integration and its scale has become much more extensive and created its own instability. in doing so, this has required a reassessment of multilateralism and the bretton woods legacy, and brought the fund and bank to centre stage. they have been evolving, in response – but perhaps, so far, not fast or far enough. understanding the drivers of global financial stability, and acting