the economic repercussions this time round have been far less dramatic. this is because the protective measures are more targeted, and many enterprises are now better able to cope with the situation. above all, industry is proving to be robust, in part because german goods are still in demand abroad and global trade is continuing its recovery. while certain sectors have been hit very hard, all in all german gdp increased slightly in the ﬁnal quarter of 2020. for the current quarter, the bundesbank ’ s economists are forecasting a relapse. however, this is set to be considerably less severe than the economic slump observed in the ﬁrst half of 2020. this is also what is indicated by the weekly activity index, developed by the bundesbank last spring. events have been developing at a fast pace, so the indicators normally used to monitor the economy are coming up short. indicators that are available quickly, such as data on electricity consumption or the truck toll, can help us to obtain a picture of economic developments in the timeliest possible manner. these are the kinds of non - standard information that are bundled together in the weekly activity index. the index was also quick to ﬂag the strong economic recovery in germany in the third quarter of 2020. 2 / 13 this past summer showed us how quickly the economy as a whole can bounce back once the spread of infections has been reined in. as soon as the mandatory and voluntary protective measures are gradually lifted, the german economy will be able to get back on the road to recovery. the precise time path of possible easing is uncertain. it depends not least on infection rates. thus far, our economists have assumed that more pronounced easing will occur during the second quarter of this year. one particular risk is posed by the spread of new, more dangerous variants of the virus. yet for all the uncertainty, germany ’ s economy would arguably, on the whole, be [UNK] resilient to cope, even if the [UNK] spell potentially persists for some time longer. for this to be the case, it would be important for government to provide temporary support to enterprises and workers then as well. for example, if the lockdown were to remain in effect for a longer period in the second quarter, the economic recovery ( relative to the december projection ) would arguably only be postponed, essentially. admittedly, our economists would then accordingly have to downsize the growth rate of 3 % they projected for 2021 in their december forecast. that said, the german economy

example, what are our supervisory expectations regarding banks ’ liquidity risk management? what contingency planning do we expect from banks for outsourced services? to answer these questions, we will establish common administrative practices via the already described process of collecting national and international best administrative practices, of benchmarking concepts and by taking into account the lessons learnt from the crisis. second, we need to further refine our benchmarking by using the knowledge we gained last year. last year, we had to be tough on banks and on us to collect a lot of harmonised quantitative as well as qualitative information. this was necessary to lay the foundation for our work and to exploit that we are one of the biggest supervisors of the world. we are exceptionally well placed to look for the best practices and to identify emerging risks by using our unique database. good benchmarking combines strong analysis and data - driven assessment with expert judgement. it allows taking into account the specificities of individual banks while still fostering consistency of assessments across banks and countries. good benchmarking looks at risks from multiple perspectives and helps to develop a deep, holistic understanding of each institution ’ s overall risk profile and viability. third, we need to further analyse in detail and for each topic individually where we are able to create a harmonized approach within the ssm, where we are able to remove uneven playing fields. we already did so for the options and national discretion. in november we will consult on the legal text we drafted for executing the discretion given to us regarding the 122 ond identified and decided upon by the sb. apart from the famous onds, the current legal environment in which we operate is characterised by many different interpretations and national gold plating. in this bis central bankers ’ speeches context, we face a particular challenge. it goes without saying that the ssm applies national law ; consequently, the ssm is not always able to ensure a level playing field when national laws diverge. things get even more difficult when national supervisory practices are transferred into national law limiting the usual range of discretion needed by a supervisor to correctly do his job. these new national rules risk not removing but creating new elements of fragmentation and supervisory arbitrage. conclusions let me conclude by recalling a key lesson from the recent financial crises. the crises did not solely result from weaknesses in the regulatory framework. it is important to remember that the supervision of banks did not function optimally, either. we can all agree that banks should