##aged european supervisory mechanism. in principle, this single european supervisor can help prevent future crises by enforcing the same high standards irrespective of the banks ’ country of origin and by taking transnational interdependencies into account. at the moment, it looks as though this task shall be carried out by the european central bank. this is, first of all, an expression of confidence in the competence of central banks in general and in the ecb in particular. but conducting monetary policy and financial supervision does not come without risks. if the institution responsible for ensuring the financial soundness of banks simultaneously influences banks ’ financing conditions via its monetary policy, conflicts of interest may arise. besides, the resolution of banks implies intervening in property rights, which requires democratic accountability. if the ecb is to be tasked with supervising european banks, there will have to be a strict separation of monetary policy and supervision. such a separation will be difficult from both a legal and an organisational point of view. in this respect, there still are questions that need to be resolved. a banking union will contribute to financial stability, if its design preserves sound incentives for all actors involved. this holds true not only for future risks, but also for risks that have already materialised. economically speaking, a banking union is basically an insurance mechanism. and, as with any insurance, only future losses or damages that are unknown ex ante can be covered. no doubt, the banking union is an important building block for a more stable monetary union. but, as such, it is meant to mitigate future risks and not to cover past sins. in this context, i fully understand that ireland is closely following the conditions under which euro - area member states will provide financial assistance to spain for the recapitalisation of its financial institutions. one specific point is the degree of bondholders ’ participation in the spanish restructuring process. the eurogroup stated in july with respect to ireland : “ similar cases will be treated equally, taking into account changed circumstances. ” however, as this issue is currently under discussion i prefer abstaining from public comments. instead i like to share my view with you on the issue of legacy assets in general. legacy assets are those risks which evolved under the responsibility of national supervisors. from what i have already said, it follows that these assets have to be dealt with by the respective member states. anything else would amount to a fiscal transfer. it may be that such fiscal transfers are desired or even deemed necessary.

competition. and the weight that the eu ( european union ) can bring to the table when negotiating on these kinds of issues is – as you may have guessed – the single market and its economic strength. 30 years after being established under this name, it is true to say that the european single market is more valuable to us today than ever before. this makes it all the more important that we continue this success story. 3 new impetus for the single market as we move on into the next chapter, we must not turn a blind eye to existing weaknesses or new challenges. over the past year, there has been one area of the single market where its strengths and weaknesses have been especially apparent : the energy sector. germany imported gas, amongst other things, from france and exported electricity back. this helped both countries during difficult times. important steps towards the internal energy market have been taken since the 1990s, particularly the opening - up of national and regional energy markets. however, the internal energy market has remained unfinished. an even more integrated market for grid - dependent energy sources would have greater benefits in terms of efficiency. one major obstacle is presented by infrastructure bottlenecks, in some cases even within individual member states. as a result, energy markets are fragmented, which makes it more difficult to balance the market. it is therefore highly important to expand the supply networks. a good network infrastructure would also help to integrate renewable energy into the electricity system and thus achieve the eu ( european union ) ’ s climate policy objectives. at present, there is much discussion about how europe would be able to keep pace with key green technologies. the united states is trying to promote such technologies through the inflation reduction act, which aims to provide incentives for enterprises to invest in this area. and the green transformation of the economy indeed requires substantial investment. unfortunately, this us ( united states ) support is partly tied to the products being manufactured in the united states. this could mean production is relocated and trade diverted away from europe. i ’ m hopeful that a great deal can still be achieved on that point in the eu ( european union ) ’ s negotiations with the us ( united states ) administration. what we certainly don ’ t ( tonne ) need is a subsidy race. although it would please the recipient firms, it would distort competition, create capacity in the wrong place, and, at the end of the day, mainly burden taxpayers. when debating the merits of new subsidies, we should also bear in mind the funding that is already