as 0. 7 percentage point higher than the benchmark index. the executive board is prepared for wide variations in return from year to year, and applies the principle that performance must be assessed over time. from that perspective, the return of the gpfg has been good and higher than the return on the benchmark index. in the report to the storting on energy stocks, the government intends to remove exploration and production companies from the gpfg ’ s benchmark index and investment universe. that is in line with the intention in our advice from 2017 and will contribute to reducing the exposure of the state ’ s wealth to oil price risk. 1 / 2 bis central bankers'speeches the report to the storting on the government pension fund provides for among other things the possibility of investing in unlisted renewable energy infrastructure within the environmental mandates. as we have indicated previously, norges bank will approach investment opportunities and build expertise gradually. investments in unlisted infrastructure will be a topic for the executive board ’ s work on the new strategy plan to apply from 2020. on 10 april 2015, the central bank law commission was appointed. precisely four years later, the government put forth a proposal on a new central bank act. at that time, the storting had already endorsed retaining norges bank as the operational manager of the gpfg. for norges bank, the proposal on a new central bank act entails a number of changes, such as increasing the capacity of norges bank ’ s executive board in the area of capital management. norges bank has already made considerable strides in adapting the internal organisation to the changes ensuing from the new central bank act. the main exposures that are decisive for the gpfg ’ s long - term performance are decided by the ministry of finance and anchored in the storting. this year ’ s report to the storting on the gpfg includes several measures to further develop the investment strategy. but the objective remains firm : the highest possible return at an acceptable risk. within this framework, the gpfg should be managed in a responsible way. the report to the storting notes that there is broad political agreement that the gpfg should not be an instrument of foreign policy or climate policy, and it is important that this continue to be the case in the future. restrictions or instructions that have a significant impact on the trade - off between return and risk will limit the potential to achieve solid performance over time. 2

an exception rather than the rule, as resorting to it often would endanger the safety of deposits, dent a bank ’ s ability to lend further and imperil its existence as an intermediating entity. page 2 of 19 thus, the next time we hear about a bank making efforts to recover loans from borrowers, we should all note to remember that it is essentially trying to get back the depositors ’ money. in this context, the most important objective of the revised framework for resolution of stressed assets is to alter the balance of power in favour of creditors. for long, the balance of power in our country was in favour of debtors, especially for debtors. debtor vs creditor : the change in roles this changing debtor - creditor equation disturbs the status quo and it is only natural that it is facing resistance. the earlier debtor - friendly environment made it possible for the defaulting debtors to secure moratoriums and force write - downs on debt repayment, while retaining management control over the borrowing units or thwart banks efforts to realise their dues by indulging in serial litigations. the out - of - court restructuring mechanisms too suffered high failure rates resulting in the borrowing entities continuing to indulge in repeated defaults, being confident that the balance of power remained with them and the ability of banks to discipline errant borrowers was weak 2. the debtor friendly environment had its effect on banks ’ business preference, while also partly contributing to the ever - increasing stressed assets in the banking system. banks ’ ability and / or willingness to lend to persons or entities that needed credit were hampered. the bankruptcy law reforms committee ( 2015 ) has observed and i quote : “ when creditors know that they have weak rights resulting in a low recovery rate, they are averse to lend. hence, lending in india is concentrated in a few large companies that have a low probability of failure. further, secured credit dominates, as creditors rights are partially present only in this case. lenders have an emphasis on secured credit. in this case, credit analysis is relatively easy : it only requires taking a view on the market value of the collateral. as a consequence, credit analysis as a sophisticated analysis of the business prospects of a firm has shrivelled. ” academic studies ( chang, tom, and antoinette schoar, 2016 ) show that pro - debtor bias in the bankruptcy process results in lower success rates in sustainable revival of distressed firms than pro