samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
points it will work on in the run up to 2020 and beyond. the first, which we are here to discuss today, is to explore synergies between target2 and t2s, with the goal of achieving a consolidated market infrastructure for large - value payments and securities settlement. the second action point is to prepare for the enhancement of target2 services with instant retail payments, at least in the settlement layer. currently, business requirements for the settlement of instant payments and credit risk management across payment systems are being gathered from market participants. we also need to assess whether interoperability arrangements between automated clearing houses can ensure full pan - european reachability for instant payment scheme participants in the eu and if and to what extent risk mitigation measures have to be harmonised across automated clearing houses to facilitate interoperability. third, there are plans to review the harmonisation of eurosystem arrangements and procedures for collateralisation. further progress is needed in this area before the business case for a common eurosystem collateral management system can be reconsidered. conclusion europe ’ s financial market infrastructure has been built on the basis of a collective approach, driven jointly by the public and the private sector. in all three action points for the market infrastructure beyond 2020, the eurosystem will continue to work closely with the market in order to benefit from its knowledge and experience as well as to ensure that europe ’ s future financial market infrastructure fully meets the needs of its users. please have your say – whether today in this information session, in the existing users ’ fora or by written procedure. your input is needed. let us jointly write the script for the future of the euroystem ’ s rtgs services. with this, i hand over to the chair of the meeting. bis central bankers ’ speeches

philipp hildebrand : swiss monetary policy and financial markets summary of a speech by mr philipp hildebrand, member of the governing board of the swiss national bank, at the autumn forecast of the swiss institute for business cycle research, zurich, 5 october 2006. the complete speech can be found in german on the swiss national banka€™s website ( www. snb. ch ) * * * transparency and communication enhance the impact and the precision of monetary policy. monetary policy functions through expectations. this means that it is first and foremost expectation management. central banks strive for transparency regarding their methods and approaches. all in all, the current economic and, in particular, the structural uncertainties are resulting in a greater range of possible economic scenarios and thus also in an increase in the range of expectations regarding our future monetary policy. in other words, being transparent does not automatically mean being predictable. therefore, the swiss national bank ( snb ) considers it particularly important to communicate its monetary policy concept to the markets and the public. this allows them to arrive at similar conclusions to those reached by the snb.
31 / why - are - interest - rates - so - low - part - 2 - secular - stagnation. bernanke, ben ( 2015 ), “ why are interest rates so low, part 3 : the global savings glut ”, ben bernanke ’ s blog, 1 april 2015, https : / / www. brookings. edu / blog / benbernanke / 2015 / 04 / 01 / why - are - interest - rates - so - low - part - 3 - the - global - savingsglut. billi, roberto and anders vredin, ( 2014 ), “ monetary policy and financial stability – a simple story ”, economic review 2014 : 2, sveriges riksbank. bjørnland, hilde, ( 2017 ), ” should monetary policy pay attention to financial stability? ” in erfaringer med inflasjonsmal for pengepolitikken, arbeidsnotat 2017 / 4, ministry of finance, norway. blinder, alan, ( 2010 ), ” how central should the central bank be? ”, journal of economic literature, 48 : 1, pp. 123 – 133. bryant, ralph, dale henderson and torbjorn becker, ( 2012 ), ” maintaining financial stability in an open economy : sweden in the global crisis and beyond ”, sns forlag. finocchiaro, daria, magnus jonsson, christian nilsson, and ingvar strid, ( 2016 ), ” socioeconomic effects of reducing household indebtedness ”, economic review 2016 : 2, sveriges riksbank. fischer, stanley, ( 2016 ), ” why are interest rates so low? causes and implications ”, speech, economic club of new york, october 2016. gersbach, hans, ( 2011 ), “ a framework for two macro policy instruments : money and banking combined ”, cepr policy insight no. 58. gomme, paul, b. ravikumar and peter rupert, ( 2011 ), “ the return to capital and the business cycle ”, review of economic dynamics, 14 : 2, pp. 262 – 278. gomme, paul, b. ravikumar and peter rupert, ( 2015 ), ” secular stagnation and returns on capital ”, economic synopses, number 19, 2015. goodfriend, marvin and mervyn king, ( 2016 ), “ review of the

the undervaluation of the krona in 2022 was between 4 per cent and around 15 per cent in trade - weighted terms, see external sector report : external rebalancing in turbulent times, july 2023, imf. since the start of 2023 the krona has weakened about 7 per cent against both the euro and the dollar. 2 a review of the research literature regarding segmented international financial markets with different types of friction can be found in, for instance, m. maggiori, ( 2022 ), " international macroeconomics with imperfect financial markets ", chapter 5 in handbook of international economics vol. 6, elsevier. 4 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches
areas of economic policy - not only at the start of monetary union but also in the future. in that case the euro has a good chance of becoming a lastingly stable currency, respected by the markets and the population alike. and domestic stability is at the same time the best contribution the euro can make to a sound, viable and stable global financial system in which the financial market players can act in a spirit of responsibility.

- central bankers'speeches safe, secure, and efficient payment system, we are pushing for digital payments. this includes the use of innovative digital payment rails, such as instapay, pesonet, and qr ph. building on these payment systems, we have also rolled out bills pay ph, which you can use to pay your bills, palengqr which you can use to pay your market vendors, and egov pay which you can use, if you are a taxpayer here, to pay the government. these programs have helped us surpass our goal of digitalizing at least half of total retail payments. as of end - december 2023, 52 percent of these payments were done digitally. working with the bank for international settlements, we are trying to connect our fast payment system with those of our asean ( association of southeast asian nations ) neighbors as well as india, saudi arabia, and other countries with fast payment systems. this platform is called project nexus. once this is in place in two years, this platform will make cross - border retail transactions more secure, more efficient, and less costly. meanwhile, we are painfully aware that our geography makes us especially vulnerable to climate change. just last week, we witnessed typhoon carina that made this vulnerability all too evident. hence, we have issued guidelines for the management of risks related to environmental, social, and governance issues. at the same time, we have developed a taxonomy for banks for sustainable finance. this will allow banks to tag each of their activities as environmentally or socially sustainable. economic fragmentation let me now turn to you, the consular corps for help. we need your help for one increasingly important concern - that of economic fragmentation. for decades after world war ii, increasing globalization was the norm. most governments believed in its benefits, and thus, most wanted to be part of it. but for almost two decades now, globalization has been losing ground to global fragmentation. in recent years, fragmentation has been fueled by the global financial crisis, trade wars, trade disruptions caused by the russia - ukraine conflict. as we all know, global trade is now on its back foot. according to the world bank, the average annual number of new trade agreements in the 2020s is less than half of that of the 2000s. in contrast, the number of new trade - restricting measures in 2022 and 2023 has tripled relative to 2019. this has led to a slowdown in the growth of trade. it appeared from 2020 to
are somewhat greater, but on balance they still justify a fair degree of optimism. in short, i am confident that the euro area economy is likely to experience sustained non - inflationary growth in the future, thereby contributing to growth and economic stability on a global scale.

you can – but preferably not until i ’ ve finished speaking to you! for my purpose tonight is to explain what it is that the bank through the mpc is trying to do in its conduct of monetary policy, to say something about where we are and to explain some of the risks and uncertainties that we are facing as we look forward. what then are we trying to do? the mpc ’ s mandate from the government is to maintain price stability ( currently defined as an inflation rate of 2½ % - on a specific measure of retail price inflation ) and subject to that to support the government ’ s economic policies, including its objectives for growth and employment. now no - one can reasonably suppose that inflation could be held precisely at 2½ % consistently over time. but we are consistently to aim at that target. now what that involves essentially is trying to keep aggregate nominal demand in the economy more or less continuously in line with the overall supply - side capacity of the economy – as a whole – to meet that demand. in fact, although our objective is defined narrowly in terms of price stability – the 2½ % target – we can only hope to achieve it by maintaining stability in a much broader sense – that is by consistently maintaining a balance between overall demand and supply. that, essentially, is how best we can contribute to the government ’ s objectives for growth and employment. it is in fact a necessary condition for maintaining the steady economic progress that we have seen in recent years. there is not a great deal that we can do – through monetary policy – directly to affect the supply - side of the economy, the underlying rate of growth that we can hope to sustain. maintaining a stable monetary environment can certainly help, but that is essentially determined by the ingenuity and skills of our business managers and our workforce, by the whole range of government policies and importantly too, mr chairman, by the imagination, energy and enthusiasm of organisations like your own yorkshire forward in developing and putting into effect your regional economic strategy. our job – as i say – is to keep overall demand in the economy growing broadly in line with supply - side capacity. so how then are we doing? first on inflation. since we came out of the last recession, in 1992, retail price inflation ( on the government ’ s target measure ) has averaged 2. 7 % ; it has in fact been marginally below the 2½ % target for much of the past two years and was 2. 0 % in the latest
balanced. but as we look further out to 2007 and beyond, we see increasing risks that the unwinding of global economic imbalances could involve a period of weak world economic growth. the bank will continue to assess the adjustments and underlying trends in the canadian economy, as well as the balance of risks, as it conducts monetary policy to keep inflation on target over the medium term. mr chairman, paul and i will now be happy to answer your questions. 1 / 1

. paying close attention to signs that inflation is moving away from our target - in either direction - promotes timely action. this is how we keep the economy operating near its full capacity and thus keep inflation low, stable, and predictable. the second point i want to stress is that having an inflation target as an anchor is very helpful in terms of the bank's accountability. if inflation persistently deviates from the target, we are committed to explaining the reasons why, what we will do to return it to target, and how long we expect the process to take. the third point is that any central bank that runs an independent monetary policy and targets inflation must allow its currency to float. it is simply not possible for a central bank to successfully control both the domestic and external values of its currency at the same time. we have only one instrument - our policy interest rate - so we can have only one target. thus, with inflation as our target, we naturally operate with a floating currency. canada's experience under inflation targeting now, let me quickly review our record with inflation targeting. as we look at inflation and economic growth in canada since 1991, it is quite clear that the benefits we had hoped would come from inflation targeting have, in fact, materialized. we expected inflation to become more stable - and it did so, sooner than we had anticipated. since settling on the 2 per cent target for inflation at the end of 1995, actual inflation has averaged very close to 2 per cent. and it has remained within the 1 to 3 per cent target range, with only rare exceptions. we expected our credibility to increase and inflation expectations to become well anchored - and this has also happened. we also thought that inflation targeting would help the economy to avoid the exaggerated " boom - bust " cycles of previous decades - and it has. the business cycle is still with us, but economic volatility has diminished. by keeping inflation close to the target, monetary policy has helped to keep the economy operating near its potential. finally, and very importantly, our transparent framework has allowed markets and analysts to better predict how we will react to different economic outcomes. within the bank, too, focusing on inflation has brought increased discipline and clarity to our monetary policy decision process. canada was the second country after new zealand to adopt explicit inflation targets. but over the past decade and a half, about 20 other central banks have also adopted this framework. some, like the central banks of the united kingdom and sweden, are from advanced
david dodge : central bank website of the year remarks by david dodge, governor of the bank of canada, at the website awards event, central banking publications and lombard street research, london, england, 12 march 2003. * * * it is very gratifying to be here tonight to accept, on behalf of the bank of canada, this award for " central bank website of the year. " it has become almost a cliche to point out that " internet time moves faster than normal time. " but i'm reminded of that observation as i accept this award - an award for achievement in a medium that barely existed ten years ago. for that matter, it was only eight years ago - in 1995 - that the banco de mexico, the bank of canada, and a few other central banks launched their first web sites. back then, it would have been hard to imagine just how quickly the web would evolve into the hugely influential medium it is today. it would also have been hard to imagine back then just how far central banks would move towards greater openness and transparency in their day - to - day operations. so it seems significant that these two trends - the push towards more open, transparent communications, and the unexpectedly rapid ascendance of the web - should have coincided. at the bank of canada, our web site has been an integral part of our communications strategy over the past eight years. the web offers us a cost - effective global distribution channel for vast amounts of data, analysis, and commentary pertaining to our main functions - that is, the conduct of monetary policy, the promotion of financial stability, the supply of bank notes, and the provision of central banking services to the federal government. our site also offers a growing amount of purely instructive material. through the use of glossaries, " backgrounders ", and other information, we have made a concerted effort to ensure that every document we publish provides enough context to help non - specialists read and understand it. this is no small challenge, given the admittedly dry and complex nature of much of the material a central bank deals with. we have also developed " inflation and investment calculators " so that our message about the benefits of low inflation is clear to the public. and we use a graphic presentation to explain the transmission of monetary policy. as well, we are currently developing a web - based simulation game, designed to explain the intricacies of monetary policy to high school and undergraduate students. based on our efforts to

* * * * * * * * * once again, i want to express my sincere thanks to central banking publications and lombard street research for the honour of this most prestigious award. this is a proud moment for the members of our staff who have put in endless hours developing a prize - winning site.
iv ). under crd iv, national authorities shall take account of other variables in addition to the credit - to - gdp ratio. 2 the four key indicators are also in line with the new norwegian regulation, which states that the basis for the buffer decision from norges bank “ shall contain an overview of the credit - to - gdp ratio and the extent to which it deviates from the long - term the trend is estimated using a one - sided hodrick - prescott filter ( lambda = 400000 ) extended by a forecast. the mean is for the entire period in the chart. articles 135 ( 1 ) ( c ) and 136 ( 3 ) ( c ) of directive 2013 / 36 / eu ( crd iv ). bis central bankers ’ speeches trend, as well as other indicators, and norges bank ’ s assessment of systemic risk that is building up or has built up over time ”. under the regulation, norges bank shall take account of guidance from the european systemic risk board ( esrb ). the esrb is currently working to formulate guidelines for setting the buffer rate. norges bank and finanstilsynet are actively participating in this effort. once the guidelines are in place, recommendations from the esrb on methodologies and benchmarks for setting the buffer rate will be included in the basis for the buffer decision. in line with the recommendations from the basel committee on banking supervision and the regulatory framework, there should not be a mechanical relationship between developments in the indicators and norges bank ’ s advice on the buffer as relationships in the economy are too complex. the advice will always be based on qualified judgement. as we gain experience and insight, indicators and methods can be developed further. uncertainty and the need for resilience suggest that the buffer should not be reduced automatically even if there are signs that financial imbalances are receding. in long periods of low bank losses and rising asset prices and credit, banks will normally hold a countercyclical capital buffer. banks will be allowed to draw on the buffer in the event of an economic downturn and large bank losses. if the buffer functions as intended, banks will tighten lending to a lesser extent in a downturn. this may mitigate the procyclical effects of tighter bank lending. the four key indicators are not well suited to signalling when the buffer should be reduced. other information, such as market turbulence and loss prospects for the banking sector, will be more relevant. the benefits of higher capital

. with that, i will pass you to my colleague. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
##um, and vigfusson ( 2016 ). 11 see laubach ( 2009 ) and engen and hubbard ( 2005 ). 12 i am referring to the level of federal government debt held by the public. 13 oil is an important input in the production and distribution of many consumer goods and services, such as transportation services. as a result, when the price of oil drops, production costs decline, and at least some of these cost reductions are typically passed on to consumers over time in the form of lower prices. 14 of course, the neutral rate is not directly observable, and we will only be able to gauge its level by observing the momentum of economic activity and the extent to which the momentum is putting upward pressure on resource constraints and inflation. the median fomc participant ’ s estimate of the longer - run real neutral rate in the december 2016 summary of economic projections was 1 percent. the median projected level of the real neutral rate at the end of 2019 in the december 2016 new york federal reserve bank ’ s survey of market participants was also 1 percent. 6 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches

market interest rates. this, in turn, would dampen private investment and thereby weaken the foundations for sustained growth. moreover, high levels of public deficit and debt would place an additional burden on monetary policy and undermine the credibility of the provisions of both the treaty on european union and the stability and growth pact as a key pillar of economic and monetary union. the governing council therefore calls upon governments to decide and implement in a timely fashion ambitious fiscal exit and consolidation strategies based on realistic growth assumptions, with a strong focus on expenditure reforms. ” the predicament in the euro area should have given enough warning to the united states, the united kingdom, and japan in consideration of their own severe fiscal conditions. it is extremely difficult to generate balanced measures for short - and longer - term issues, namely, for continued short - term fiscal support and medium - to long - term fiscal consolidation, when the level of economic activity remains low and the pace of recovery in private demand is sluggish. however, we must bear in mind that depending too heavily on temporary emergency measures could trigger larger problems in the future. therefore, it is necessary to review such measures in a timely manner and thoroughly discuss fiscal restructuring over a medium - to long - term period in order to achieve balanced and sustainable growth.