samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
was the only factor explaining the rise in inflation during those years. indeed, political will – or rather a lack of political will – could have been even more important. germany is a good counter - example here, as a recent paper by stephen cechetti and others shows. after bretton woods, germany realised that price stability was possible with a stable nominal anchor – a monetary target – that would prevent excessive accommodation of the supply shock. the bundesbank ’ s success made history. if others did not follow germany ’ s example, it was probably because they were not willing to put the same emphasis on reducing inflation. simply, policy priorities were not the same in all countries. i would therefore side with those who think that inflation moderation is largely thanks to a change in attitudes at central banks. a number of central banks, notably the us fed, had already changed their reaction functions in the 80 ’ s, placing greater emphasis on minimising inflation deviations from an implicit target. and then, into the'90s, we saw a trend towards governments granting independence to central banks. many central banks immediately adopted explicit inflation targets, thus making a clear commitment to price stability. if inflation is now lower and more stable than before, it is because central banks have decided to become less tolerant of it, and have been allowed to do so. but these central bank changes were not a historical accident. different countries ’ experience in a tackling inflation has helped prove the theory that there is no such thing as a long - term inflationunemployment trade - off. we now accept that persistent inflation – even if it is low – involves a misallocation of resources with potentially heavy medium and long - term costs. at the same time, academics have shown how the short - term output costs of price stability can be kept down if central banks adopt credible and transparent targets. i will mention here the new - keynesian theory of price determination, which convincingly relates current inflation to future expected inflation, providing a yardstick for monetary policy actions and communication. in the ecb governing council, we are proud that we have been able to continue anchoring inflation expectations at levels consistent with our definition of price stability. but there is no room for complacency. the recent inflation success story and the central bank changes behind it need continuing social support. the public must have a clear - cut idea of what inflation means for their future income and job prospects. but while people appreciate the benefits of low

macroeconomic imbalances materialise or if the current situation persists. banks ’ managers and directors alone are responsible for running institutions and for their results. but central banks and bank supervisors must rise to the challenge and collaborate closely with each other so as to help return stability to the global financial system.
, assess their needs and objectives, manage their portfolios, construct investment strategies and allocate assets. in this regard the internet has emerged as a key competitive arena for the future of financial services. web - based commerce has added new complexity and unpredictability to the world of commercial and retail banking, mutual funds and brokers, back - office processors and financial software providers. institutions that do not have a clear strategic focus will find it increasingly difficult to maintain their positions as competition gets tougher. they will have to identify a specific focus for their business, because it may become difficult to compete successfully in all the various fields and instruments. careful planning and organisation are needed in this integrated world to ensure that the needs of clients are well served. clients have become increasingly performance sensitive. this makes it essential to monitor structures and products to keep performance inconsistencies to a minimum. 3. globalisation and financial regulation greater global competitiveness also poses new challenges to financial regulation for ensuring financial stability. the recent experience in a number of countries has clearly indicated that there is a real danger of financial instability from globalised financial markets and large and volatile international capital flows. the asian crisis was magnified by bad loans, weak balance sheets and lack of transparency in financial reporting. research shows clearly that emerging markets with sound financial systems are better able to manage the effects of international financial crises. partially in response to some negative effects of globalisation, several international institutions such as the basel committee on banking supervision, the bank for international settlements ( bis ), the world bank and the international monetary fund ( imf ) have done studies on reforming the international financial architecture. the cooperative global efforts on reform have been concentrating on five major areas. the first area is to make timely, reliable statistical data available to the market and the public, as well as information about economic and financial policies, practices and decision - making. important progress in this area includes the establishment of the special data dissemination standard of the imf and the release of public information notices following the conclusion of the article iv consultation process between the imf and member countries. it is agreed that greater transparency will enhance the understanding by the public of economic policy measures of government, strengthen credibility and make market participants less uncertain in their decision - making. the second area is the creation of internationally accepted practices. key progress in this area includes the development of the code of good practices on fiscal transparency, the code of good practices on transparency in monetary and financial policies and guidelines concerning financial

for their important contribution to the development of this forward - looking vision 2015. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
, we have adequate institutions at the global level to fulfill these tasks, so currently i do not see the need to create new authorities for that purpose. thank you for your attention! bis central bankers ’ speeches

confusing in one respect, namely that you might – but basel doesn ’ t – describe this as a maximum leverage ratio ). the pra is in discussion with the banks on the issue of capital. i read a lot on this most days of the week. let me make a few points. many commentators and journalists have worried publicly that these recommendations will lead to lower bank lending. i want to reassure you, that is not the case. capital is not money that has to be stashed away for a rainy day. essentially, it is the shareholders ’ stake in the company. in non - financial companies, shareholder capital or equity is used to finance the acquisition of assets. the same is true for banks. equity finances the provision of loans to households and companies. in that sense, additional capital supports lending by banks and does not substitute for it. higher capital ensures that enough of the finance raised by banks is in a form that is capable of absorbing losses without the banks going bust. much of the discussion on capital is couched in terms of a ratio to risk - weighted assets. but another more basic yardstick of a bank ’ s ability to withstand losses is the leverage ratio. this is simply the bank ’ s capital expressed as a proportion of its assets. so a further test that we should consider is whether banks are making acceptable progress towards the basel 3 minimum leverage ratio. basel 3 requires that banks have leverage ratios in excess of 3 %. in asking banks to have a larger share of equity on their balance sheet, we are for the most part dealing with legacy issues. the whole point of this exercise is to move more rapidly to put the past and its problems behind us. this emphasis on legacy explains why it is possible to want more capital to back old risks while easing the capital requirements on new lending to the real economy. frankly, this is about convincingly putting the past behind us. we have not yet released numbers on the capital requirements for each bank. at the end of march, the fpc – consistent with its remit – announced that uk banks had around a £25 billion capital shortfall against the 7 % basel 3 yardstick. to be clear, that £25 billion referred to the shortfall in banks ’ balance sheets at the end of 2012. and at the time of the fpc ’ s announcement, i said that firms had already made plans to deal with half of the £25 billion number. the pra has translated all of that into firm by firm
could enjoy greater policy space than countries with open capital account and flexible exchange rate ), ( c ) spillover management that may involve some sacrifice of domestic policy goals could be feasible only when every country pursues spillover - sensitive national policies, and the global governance structure would need to ensure that, using a mix of both persuasion and multilateral enforcement, and most importantly ( d ) global safety nets should be strong enough with easier access norms to encourage countries to voluntarily adopt the multilateral norms. bis central bankers ’ speeches

##ly demonstrated. imposing discipline 15. but assume we overcome this hurdle and reach a consensus on “ the rules of the game ”, at least in a particular area such as, say, exchange rate policy. how could the international community impose discipline on a country? trying to do so through international agreements could confront two major challenges. first, countries could be reluctant to commit, because they are unsure how the commitments would affect the domestic economy. second, the effectiveness of such commitments could be diluted if there is no true “ buy in ” by countries. the experience at the imf with the 2007 surveillance decision, which proved impossible to implement is a cautionary tale. so, too, is the experience of the wto, where countries have often evaded the spirit of trade commitments by resorting to protectionist measures on which no commitments were given, such as undervalued exchange rates, taxation and subsidies, labour laws, investment norms, intellectual property rights and environment laws. conclusion 16. so, how do we move forward? the way ahead is far from clear. but let me sketch out a road map. ieo background paper bp / 08 / 10 “ imf surveillance : a case study on imf governance ”. bis central bankers ’ speeches 17. the first step, as i mentioned, is to develop a framework for understanding the linkages amongst economies. this is currently being done through the imf spillover reports, a most welcome initiative. but let me put the challenge squarely. we need to develop a proper framework for analyzing these linkages. and we cannot do this by using the existing trade equations, and attributing all the other spillovers to exogenous financial shocks. we need a deeper, truer, understanding of the channels and mechanisms that link our economies together. so, the imf has an important opportunity to contribute to this understanding through its own research. 18. second, we need to move toward a new consensus on economic policies, that is to say new norms against which country behaviour can be assessed. we have made considerable progress – though still not enough – on financial regulation. but we have only just started developing a new framework for macroeconomic policy, and defining the proper relationship between macro, growth, and financial policies. again, the fund could make a valuable contribution in this area, as well, both by advancing our theoretical understandings and by synthesizing the policy lessons learned by its member countries. as i mentioned, there is
now - although there are some encouaging signs - frankly no - one can know the answer to that question with any great confidence - we are not blessed with perfect foresight! as the imf says in one of its documents prepared for the recent meetings : “ striking the right balance for monetary policy in this environment is a difficult challenge. ” well you can say that again! it is hardly surprising against this background that there should be disagreement within the monetary policy committee as to whether or not a marginal further tightening of monetary policy is necessary - in fact i would normally expect there to be disagreement when we are close to where we need to be. but we are all unambiguously clear about where we need to get to in terms of inflation, and it is unrealistic in the circumstances - indeed in any circumstances - to expect us to say what will happen to interest rates in the future. mr. chairman, the overall prospect for the world economy - and indeed our own domestic economy - is for continuing growth with low inflation, and we do i think have a clear vision of where we want to go and the policies to take us there. but there are certainly a number of immediately painful blackspots - internationally and here at home - and there are some formidable rocks and potential whitewater further ahead. navigating through them will not be easy. i only hope that our snail is able to swim.

. this is intended to provide hosts with comfort that in the event of a resolution they will not be exposed as losses would be upstreamed to the holdco, enabling the hosted legal entity to continue to operate. hosts would therefore not need to take the sort of unilateral actions to ring - fence assets that were so damaging during the crisis and have tended to fragment the international financial system since. in short we need cross border resolution to work through structural changes like tlac for international banking to work. and we need this to be internalised by the market as well. i mentioned before disclosure for investors. but it is as important for liability holders that are unlikely to be bailed in to understand that too. part of the rationale for locating tlac at holdco in spe strategies is to keep the resolution away from the operating companies and to be able to give liability holders at opco a strong message that where losses and recap needs can be met within tlac they will not be bailed in. this way we maximise the chances of achieving continuity in the cefs of the firm and avoiding any amplification in adverse systemic consequences. to sum up, mrel or tlac is a watershed on the road to making resolution work. finalisation of the tlac proposal this year and joint decisions on mrel in resolution colleges for eu firms in early 2016 will clear the way for banks to engage investors on their capital planning and debt issuance for the year ahead. changes to existing liability structures may take time. but the clarity this will bring will mean that we have a regime that is not only feasible – after all we have the legal powers under bbrd to bail in the things we need – but credible. bis central bankers ’ speeches
the effectiveness of our toolbox lies in our ability to discern the most appropriate tool for each situation – every challenge may demand a tailored response to navigate the complexities of the financial landscape. just as a skilled craftsperson carefully selects tools for each task, we must approach our financial challenges with equal care. let me conclude my speech by going back to our clint eastwood film and its closing scenes – please excuse the spoiler : the young man inherits the grumpy man's beloved car, a ford gran torino, but only under the condition that he takes good care of it and does not mess it up with extravagant modifications. we also have the responsibility of taking good care of our clearing system, our " gran torino ". with this in mind, let me wish you safe travels through the evolving landscape of financial markets. thank you very much for your attention. 1 financial resources and tools for central counterparty resolution : consultation report - financial stability board ( fsb. org ) 2 a vice grip, a roll of duct tape, and a lubricant spray ( wd - 40 ). 4 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches 3 transparency and responsiveness of initial margin in centrally cleared markets : review and policy proposals ( bis. org ) and streamlining variation margin in centrally cleared markets – examples of effective practices ( bis. org ). 4 as pointed out for instance in the bcbs - cpmi - iosco 2022 report on margin practices / / report on margins : review of margining practices ( bis. org ) and the 2024 report on " transparency and responsiveness of initial margin in centrally cleared markets : review and policy proposals ( bis. org ) " 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches

end my term with an inflation rate within the target range. sadly, some circumstances beyond our control have made it impossible. but i am certain that this is a temporary phenomena and that the central bank is very well prepared to comply with its price stability objective. on my part, i leave with the satisfaction of having contributed to the strengthening of this institution, so transcendental for the development and the welfare of the chileans, to make it more credible, robust and efficient, but also more human, to earn prestige for our country and at the same time make it a great place to work in. here we have people of the top level, individuals with a long trajectory and also with promising future. i ask you now to continue strengthening this institution to raise it to ever higher positions. i am grateful for all the support that the board has given me throughout my period as governor ; i thank every manager, head of department and all the staff, from the highest to the lowest rank, for your patience, but above all, for the appreciation and affection you have shown me, especially in these last days. i take with me beautiful memories of all these years, which, i assure you, i will never forget. thank you.
€10 – more than nine months ahead of the launch. this should allow sufficient time for the machines to be adapted by 25 november. in addition, the ecb and the national central banks will conduct an information campaign addressing everyone who handles banknotes so that they will be able to recognise the new note and its security features. the new €20 note is the third denomination in the europa series that is gradually replacing the original euro banknotes introduced in 2002. it will be followed, over time, by new versions of the €50, €100, €200 and €500 notes. thank you for your attention. i now have the pleasure of signing the new €20 banknote. bis central bankers ’ speeches

discussion. at the same time, we have to think through the consequences. if people have access to digital central bank money, isn ’ t the central bank entering an unfair competition with the private sector? if the demand for cash in a country collapses, citizens would be left with no option but to use commercial money, even for small payments. there ’ s a good case to be made that citizens should be offered the option of using central bank money for small payments, even in a digital world. you have an overarching public - policy goal, which is trust in the currency. but again, we have to think through the consequences. as long as cbdcs are using new technologies to do what we already do – issuing money – in a more cost - effective way, i ’ m all for it. but if that implies a world where the central bank is crowding out private banks and attracting all deposits ; a world where the central bank is disintermediating private financial intermediation, then that would not be a place where we want to be, because we ’ re a market economy and we need competition to generate innovation in the first place. all those arguments taken into account, are cbdcs part of our financial future? 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches i ’ m personally pretty sure cbdcs will come. i don ’ t know how and in which form. it may come in different ways in different jurisdictions. the nature of money will change. it ’ s not the first time this is happening – the nature of money has kept changing over the centuries. we ’ ve got to adapt so we can reap the benefits of technology. but the principles won ’ t change. i ’ m convinced that one key evolution that dates back to the 17th century will remain : you need a public institution to anchor trust in the currency. i don ’ t see any chance that we will move back to a system where money will only be issued by commercial entities and regulated by competition between these entities. our economies are so complex that you need trust in the currency to be anchored in the rule of law. a social convention isn ’ t enough. it ’ s too fragile. that doesn ’ t mean everything needs to be public. to echo ludwig erhard, you need as much commercial money as possible to reap the benefits of innovation and competition, and you need as much public money as needed to anchor the trust in the currency. 4 / 4 bis central bankers
with the implementing partners, through collaboration, research, and innovative solutions, we can break down barriers and contribute effectively to creating an inclusive, sustainable financial ecosystem where individuals, households, and businesses achieve financial resilience, stability, and better financial well - being. to achieve these goals, this year, the gpfi has been working on three important and challenging deliverables. first, let's look at the case of preparing a new action plan for financing micro, small and medium - sized enterprises. while we seek to reducing the financing gap for these enterprises, we need to work on removing constraints to their access to financing. this includes addressing the misleading perception of higher risk associated with them, ensuring the suitability of financial products and services to their specific needs, and improving the availability of reliable data. overcoming these challenges requires joint efforts from governments, financial institutions, and entrepreneurs. second, in the case of financial inclusion, after having made significant progress for individuals and households, we know how increasingly challenging it is to reach the last mile, even with the new technologies available. the advance towards last - mile inclusion requires significant efforts in research to understand these segments in depth, their context, and their needs. it requires even more innovation - not just technological innovation - to ensure that this inclusion is of high quality, meeting their needs in an assertive and affordable way. this means delivering financial products and services responsibly and with robust consumer protection in place. achieving all of these is not trivial. third, on the financial well - being deliverable, i truly believe in the importance of this achievement for the future of financial inclusion. thinking about our policies from the perspective of their ultimate results is always more challenging. hence, having financial well - being as a guide for financial inclusion initiatives is essential if we seek effectiveness and quality in our efforts toward a more inclusive financial future. therefore, i am very glad to hear that the financial well - being subcommittee has made enormous progress on establishing a working definition and a preliminary conceptual framework for financial well - being. an outcome only possible, i was told, through the collaborative efforts of our implementing partners, subcommittee country members, and her majesty, queen maxima herself. 2 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches for all these achievements, the immense value of collective work cannot be overstated. i know that in such a large and heterogeneous group, discussions can be long, tiring, and heated. i am also sure that these conflicts in the

crushed.