monetary, financial, macroprudential, fiscal and structural policies? the latter will comprise five prominent decision - makers, moderated – or, should i say, stimulated – by a “ pillar ” of our series of symposiums : martin wolf, whom so many of us read regularly in the financial times. having briefly outlined the programme and mentioned the names of the chairs of each session, i will not list all the eminent speakers, discussants and panellists whom i wish nevertheless to thank most warmly in advance for their contributions. yet i would like to highlight their diversity in terms of background and experience. i would also like to share with you some thoughts on each session, which – far from pre - empting future discussions – aim to spur the debates with our audience. the first topic today concerns the challenges of conducting monetary policy with large public debts. numerous questions arise including fiscal dominance, the trade - off between debt sustainability and fiscal discipline, multiple equilibria and financial instability. first, i will comment briefly on how high public debt increases the risk of fiscal dominance on monetary policy. low interest rates may very well be justified by specific business cycle conditions or risks of undershooting the inflation target. they also facilitate the sustainability bis central bankers ’ speeches of higher public debts. hence the need to ascertain whether risks related to public debt sustainability considerations might in turn jeopardize price stability. another paramount risk of very low interest rates is to entertain the illusion that governments can continue to borrow rather than make difficult and yet necessary choices and indefinitely put off the implementation of structural reforms. such risks are very real in the euro area. very high public debts are also a factor of financial fragility. market participants therefore expect central banks to intervene on public debt markets to safeguard financial stability. indeed, in extreme circumstances a central bank should mitigate the effects of confidence shocks on sovereign yields by purchasing government bonds. such an action may be vindicated if there are risks to macroeconomic or financial stability or even if self - fulfilling runs on public debt may be a threat to market access, or lastly to avoid the deflationary consequences of a public debt event. however, one may be tempted to underestimate risks for inflation, especially since they only materialize with a lag, and such interventions could also increase moral hazard in terms of government incentives to keep their finances in order. these considerations explain why, when we set up the omt, we required central bank interventions to be

, which are necessary both for increasing aggregate supply and demand and enhancing our economies ’ resilience to shocks. however, i shall not stand in for the panel and will thus shortly conclude this introduction by welcoming in advance the fruitful sharing of experience to which all of you will contribute today. central bankers frequently meet in international policy fora, such as those organized under the auspices of the bis, imf or g20, etc. yet i hope today ’ s symposium will be a special occasion to stimulate this exchange of views and build on it with academics, financial institutions and the public at large, since it is broadcast live on the internet. therefore, i would like to hand the floor without further ado to haruhiko kuroda. bis central bankers ’ speeches