the systems. norges bank is closely monitoring the development of libra and other initiatives. a common feature of many of these new systems is that they are closed payment systems outside the common infrastructure. they have a global reach, and in some cases, like libra, operate with their own currency units. often a variant of distributed ledger technology ( dlt ) is used. such new systems promote competition and innovation. they also help to focus attention on parts of the existing payment system that do not function satisfactorily. an example is expensive and slow cross - border payments. even with the improvements of the past few years, including under the auspices of swift, there is still considerable potential for efficiency gains. at the same time, new money and payment systems entail a number of challenges. individual users will face new security risks. privacy may be at issue. if they become large enough to attain market power, these systems may become a source of systemic risk. for some countries that are vulnerable to a transition to payments in foreign currency, national room for manoeuvre and the ability to conduct monetary policy may be weakened. norges bank is currently assessing whether the existing regulatory framework, such as the emoney rules, is an adequate response to the challenges these new systems raise. the new systems may either fall outside the scope of the existing framework or they are not sufficiently addressed by it. we must therefore consider adjustments to the rules and whether new regulations are needed. it is likely that a broader collaborative effort among policymakers at both national and international levels is needed to formulate a robust response. another possible response to new private digital currency is a central bank digital currency. the 4 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches central bank money currently available to the public takes the form of banknotes and coins. cash has important attributes. it needs to be available and easy to use in order to fulfil its role in the payment system. falling cash usage and the possibility of more profound structural changes in the monetary and payment system mean that we need to consider whether it would be wise also to issue a central bank digital currency. a working group at norges bank has looked more closely at the purpose and relevant forms of a central bank digital currency. the group finds that a central bank digital currency could function as a back - up solution in the event of a disruption in banks ’ payment systems. this contingency aspect may gain importance if banks ’ systems become more international. moreover, a central bank

the direct settlement of all payment types is also in this context an obvious option which we are considering. for settlement of this kind in norwegian kroner at norges bank, one may envisage a system either directly linked to norges bank ’ s settlement system ( nbo ) or by linking to tips, as sweden is now planning. in the near future, we will begin a dialogue with industry representatives. progress on further modernisation of the norwegian infrastructure must now be a paramount consideration. security and national governance and control if a business enterprise performs tasks that are critical to the functioning of society, policymakers need to assess the regulations and systems that are necessary to ensure adequate national governance and control. this issue gains in relevance when more and more of our critical infrastructure becomes a part of or is owned by global tech giants and payment companies. the operation of ict systems has largely been outsourced. this presents a number of challenges. the private financial market infrastructure ( fmi ) owners in the payment system have reported to norges bank that it is difficult to obtain necessary ict expertise to operate and maintain key functions. if ict operation and maintenance are moved abroad, it may, in the short term, provide access to better and more secure solutions. but we must also consider the longterm consequences. offshoring may impair the national capacity for systems operations, development and follow - up. it may also become difficult for the norwegian authorities to coordinate contingency planning, if large parts of operations are managed from another country. norges bank sets conditions for interbank systems when tasks are moved abroad. among these conditions are that hardware must be physically located in norway. there must also be contingency arrangements in norway that in a crisis can quickly take over tasks that are performed abroad. norges bank is of the opinion that critical providers of services to the payment system need to be more closely monitored. norges bank will, in consultation with finanstilsynet ( financial supervisory authority of norway ), examine the contingency arrangements and security of the payment system ’ s critical ict service providers and data centres. this will not entail a change in fmi owners ’ responsibilities for outsourced operations. the banking and payment system in norway is dependent on a very small number of ict providers and data centres that are also vital to other critical infrastructure. this systemic risk needs to be followed up by the authorities. ict service providers are not subject to direct supervision in the same way as entities