of international economics, 76 ( 2 ), 337 – 355. buttiglione, l., lane, p., reichlin, l. and reinhart, v. ( 2014 ). deleveraging? what deleveraging? the 16th geneva report on the world economy. international center for monetary and banking studies / center for economic policy research, september. campos, n. f., coricelli, f. and moretti, l. ( 2014 ). economic growth and political integration : estimating the benefits from membership in the european union using the synthetic counterfactuals method. cepr discussion papers 9968, cepr. dettmann, e., brachert, m., & titze, m. ( 2016 ). identifying the effects of place - based policies – causal evidence from germany. cesifo working paper no. 5901, cesifo group munich. gambacorta, l. and shin, h. s. ( 2016 ). why bank capital matters for monetary policy. bis working paper no. 558, bank for international settlements. halle institute for economic research – iwh ( 2014 ). 25 years after the fall of the berlin wall : the economic integration of east germany. halle, germany. havik, k., mc morrow, k., roger, w. and a. turrini ( 2008 ). the eu - us total factor productivity gap : an industry perspective. economic papers 339, european commission, september. melitz, marc j., and stephen j. redding ( 2014 ). heterogeneous firms and trade. handbook of international economics, 4th edition ( 4 ) : 1 - 54. rajan, r. ( 2005 ). has financial development made the world riskier? national bureau of economics research ( nber ) working paper 11728. cambridge ma 1 this number refers to the average effect per country for the whole post - accession period up to 2008. 2 this number refers to the year - over - year growth rate in the third quarter of 2016 ( ecb calculations based on eurostat data ). 3 for a review of recent literature, see melitz and redding ( 2014 ). 4 these are aggregate numbers based on conversion to us dollars at purchasing power exchange rates. 5 these figures refer to the first quarter of 2016. 5 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches

i am in no doubt that it will adapt and come to terms with any changes the negotiations might bring. 4. importance and boundaries of politics ladies and gentlemen, i have given you an impression of the role i see for supervisors and 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches central banks. of course, there is another party from the public sector that plays a role : politicians. and the importance of politicians can ’ t be overestimated when it comes to the future relations between the uk and the eu. how these turn out can only be determined by the elected representatives of the people. " but there are also areas where politicians have, for very good reasons, restricted their own influence. i am talking about the realm of monetary policy and, to some degree, banking and financial supervision. as governor carney put it : " the objectives are what are set by the politicians ; the policies are done by technocrats. " nevertheless, we have seen some criticism of central banks and their policies from politicians lately. this concerned, for example, the handling of brexit as well as conducting monetary policy and setting interest rates more generally. in light of this criticism, it may be time for a friendly reminder that central bank independence is not debatable. experience shows that political influence over central banks always leads into disorder. at the end of the day, independent central banks best guarantee price stability. calling central bank independence into question, even only implicitly, can confuse markets as well as the public about who is in charge when it comes to monetary policy and supervisory decisions. in summary, politicians are well advised not to exert influence in the wrong place or with the wrong measures. in this context, i am also worried about some rather protectionist tones in recent economic and legal debates. politicians as well as public authorities must resist any temptation to give preferential treatment to domestic companies and banks – or to exert excessively tough action on foreign businesses. as barack obama recently said : " a nation ringed by walls would only imprison itself. " 5. conclusion ladies and gentleman, over the past few minutes i offered you an overview of what i believe the banking sector can expect from supervisors, regulators and politicians – and what not. it turned out to be quite a long list. if, as a bank representative, you were to ask me what i expect from banks in return, i would say just one thing : i expect you to take up the challenge. in a market economy, coping with