. the second problem is manipulation, the stuff of most of the headlines. the focus has been on libor survey responses at some individual firms being biased, with a view to profiting on trading positions. of course, to the extent that this kind of misrepresentation occurred, it is criminal behaviour and the authorities have been treating it as such. foreign exchange fixes now let me move to foreign exchange benchmarks. foreign exchange benchmarks are typically calculated from actual spot trades over a short predetermined time period ( or “ window ” ) each day. it has been alleged that foreign exchange traders at some large financial institutions exchanged information about their clients ’ orders with a view to positioning themselves advantageously in the market. the suspicion of such collusion – as suggested by some emails and chat - room discussions that have come to light – is being taken very seriously. the existence of collusion cannot be inferred, though, from the volume of trading during the fixing window. banks may want to execute many of their own trades during the fixing window, for instance, because their customers want to transact at the fixing price, and banks therefore look to offset those positions around the fix so as to manage their market risk. issues relating to how fixes are designed, and how they are used by banks and their customers, are now being examined by global authorities. what should be done? to address some of the problems associated with benchmarks, two options present themselves : reform or replacement. we can reform existing benchmarks to strengthen governance and enforce procedures that provide adequate checks against conflicts of interest and collusion. or, we can replace them with more robust alternative benchmarks. in bis central bankers ’ speeches fact, it is likely that neither of these solutions will be sufficient by itself. we will need to do some of both. reforming benchmarks the first step in reforming benchmarks is clarifying governance. who has direct responsibility for setting those benchmarks and assuring their integrity? what kind of governance exists within the financial institutions that determine the benchmarks? and who oversees those processes to make sure that the safeguards are appropriate? last summer a group of financial market regulators from around the world, the international organization of securities commissions ( iosco ), released its principles for financial benchmarks – a set of best practices aimed at answering these questions. these principles outline a framework for the governance and administration of financial benchmarks, including the roles, responsibilities and internal controls required of a benchmark ’

central bankers'speeches in canada, economic growth has come in somewhat stronger than projected in the january mpr, but the pace remains weak and below potential. growth in the second half of 2023 was close to zero, allowing supply to catch up to demand. labour markets have continued to ease gradually. with employment growing more slowly than population, the labour market has come into better balance. job vacancies have returned to more normal levels, and the pace of hiring has been modest. wage growth has been in the 4 % - 5 % range for a while, but there are now some signs that wage pressures may be easing. consumer price index ( cpi ) inflation eased to 2. 9 % in january. this largely reflected lower energy prices, an easing in food price inflation, as well as weakness in semidurable prices like footwear and clothing. but shelter price inflation remains elevated and is still the biggest contributor to overall inflation. more broadly, underlying price pressures persist. our preferred measures of core inflation eased in january but remain above 3 % on a year - over - year and three - month basis. as well, the share of cpi components rising faster than 3 % declined but is still above the historical average. looking ahead, we continue to expect inflation will be close to 3 % through the middle of the year before easing in the second half. gasoline prices are expected to continue to add volatility to inflation in coming months, and shelter price pressures are likely to persist. in other words, the path back to our 2 % target will be slow, and progress is likely to be uneven. governing council also discussed the risks to the economy and inflation. risks to global energy prices and transportation costs related to conflicts remain elevated. domestically, inflation could prove more persistent than expected. we don't want to keep monetary policy this restrictive for longer than we have to. but nor do we want to jeopardize the progress we've made in bringing inflation down. governing council remains concerned about the persistence of underlying inflation, and we want to see a further deceleration in core inflation in the coming months. we remain focused on the indicators of inflationary pressures that we've mentioned before. demand pressures have eased, and the economy now looks to be in modest excess supply. with the labour market coming into better balance, we are looking for further evidence that wage growth is moderating. before our april decision, we will also get new information on corporate pricing behaviour and inflation expectations.