are unclear. conversely, a federal reserve cbdc could pose significant and concrete risks. first, a federal reserve cbdc could create considerable challenges for the structure of our banking system, which currently relies on deposits to support the credit needs of households and businesses. an arrangement where the federal reserve replaces commercial banks as the dominant provider of money to the general public could constrict the availability of credit, fundamentally alter the economy, and expose the public to a host of unanticipated, and undesirable, consequences. 10 among other potential problems, a dominant cbdc could undermine the consumer and other economic benefits that accrue when commercial banks compete to attract customers. a federal reserve cbdc could also present an appealing target for cyberattacks and other security threats. bad actors might try to steal cbdc, compromise the cbdc network, or target non - public information about holders of cbdc. the architecture of a federal reserve cbdc would need to be extremely resistant to such threats — and would need to remain resistant as bad actors employ ever - more sophisticated methods and tactics. designing appropriate defenses for cbdc could be particularly difficult because, compared to the federal reserve ’ s existing payment systems, there could be far more entry points to a cbdc network — depending on design choices, anyone in the world could potentially access the network. 11 critically, we also would need to ensure that a cbdc does not facilitate illicit activity. the bank secrecy act currently requires that commercial banks take steps to guard against money laundering. 12 policymakers will need to consider whether a similar anti - money - laundering regime would be feasible for a federal reserve cbdc, but it may be challenging to design a cbdc that respects individuals ’ privacy while appropriately minimizing the risk of money laundering. at one extreme, we could design a cbdc that would require cbdc holders to provide the federal reserve detailed information about themselves and their transactions ; this approach would minimize money - laundering risks but would raise significant privacy concerns. at the other extreme, we could design a cbdc that would allow parties to transact on a fully anonymized basis ; this approach would address privacy concerns but would raise significant moneylaundering risks. a final risk is that developing a federal reserve cbdc could be expensive and difficult for the federal reserve to manage. a federal reserve cbdc could, in essence, set up the federal reserve as a retail bank to the general public. that would mean introducing large -

lee hsien loong : prospering in a rising asia speech by mr lee hsien loong, deputy prime minister of singapore and chairman of the monetary authority of singapore, at the opening dinner of the conference board symposium on asian economies and financial markets, singapore, 27 may 2004. * * * distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, let me first welcome all of you to the conference board symposium on asian economies and financial markets, held for the first time here in singapore. asia ’ s comeback since the financial crisis asian economies have come a long way since the financial crisis in 1997. for six years they have had a tumultuous ride, marked by unexpected shocks and painful adjustments. the september 11th attacks were followed by the bali and marriot bombings in indonesia, which shook confidence in the region and brought the harsh realities of islamist extremist terrorism closer to home. last year, the iraq war and the sars outbreak weakened business sentiments and consumer spending, setting back economic recovery yet again. prospects for the region have since brightened considerably, on the strength of a synchronised upturn in the g3 economies. the electronics industry, a lynchpin of export - driven asian economies, is finally picking up robustly after a prolonged slump. investor confidence has returned, bond spreads have narrowed, and stock markets have outperformed the developed countries, until very recently. the asian crisis forced governments in the region to tackle weaknesses in their financial and corporate sectors and implement much needed structural reforms. weak banks have been recapitalised, bad loans reduced, and prudential regulations strengthened. government finances have been put on a firmer footing, while balances of payments have moved into surplus. the result is a stronger and leaner asia, more prepared for storms and more ready to seize opportunities. a major development in recent years is the emergence of china as an economic powerhouse. china ’ s growth and transformation have been phenomenal. its buoyant exports, supported by low - cost manufacturing capabilities, and its huge domestic market, have created strong competition as well as immense opportunities for the rest of the world. china ’ s growth has driven the rapid increase in intra - regional trade, and fuelled economic expansion in the region, if not worldwide. china ’ s economy is showing signs of overheating, but its government is mindful of the danger and determined to act decisively to rein in credit and investment. this gives them a good chance of achieving a soft landing