( 2009 ) : “ overconfidence, monetary policy committees and chairman dominance ”, norges bank working paper 2009 / 17. the members of the executive board are appointed by the government. according to proposition no. 81 ( 2002 – 2003 ) to the odelsting, the appointment process shall ensure that the executive board reflects a broad range of backgrounds and expertise, with particular emphasis on economics and finance, as well as a thorough understanding of economic issues. the proposition states that the executive board shall be composed of persons of different backgrounds to ensure that it is capable of being critical of its own assessments. see proposition no. 81 ( 2002 – 2003 ) to the odelsting : om lov om endringer i sentralbankloven og finansieringsvirksomhetsloven og om opphevelse av valutareguleringsloven og penge - og kredittreguleringsloven ( concerning an act to amend the norges bank act and the financial institutions act and concerning the repeal of the exchange control act and the monetary and credit policy act ). ministry of finance. board appointment guidelines and rules relating to limitations on members ’ ownership interests and functions are set out in the norges bank act and the regulation of 7 august 2000 relating to norges bank ’ s executive board members ’ relationship to other credit institutions and undertakings. executive board members cannot inter alia be married to a member of parliament and external members cannot receive remuneration from or sit on the board or supervisory council of financial institutions, securities firms or collective investment undertakings. nor are they permitted to buy or sell fixed income or foreign exchange products when they are in possession of information concerning conditions that may influence prices, unless the information is available to the public. in addition, the general impartiality provisions under section 6 of the public administration act apply. for a discussion of the relationship between conclusion - based and premise - based decisions, see carl andreas claussen og øistein røisland ( 2010 ) : “ a quantitative discursive dilemma ”, social choice and welfare, vol. 35, no. 1. be adjusted upwards. the third member believes that developments have been as expected and concludes that the key rate should remain unchanged. in a conclusion - based decision, the majority would vote to increase the key rate. two out of three members came to this conclusion. but a premise - based conclusion would in this case have produced a different outcome

stefan ingves : the riksbank and monetary policy speech by mr stefan ingves, governor of the sveriges riksbank, at the school of business, economics and law, goteborg university, goteborg, 23 may 2006. * * * let me begin by thanking you for the invitation. it is always a pleasure to have the opportunity to come and talk about monetary policy and our work at the riksbank - but i shall refrain from commenting on whether it is always a pleasure for the listeners. i hope that you will in any case get a picture of our view of the economy and inflation prospects and of our method of how we conduct monetary policy. i shall begin with a rough outline of what i intend to discuss in my speech and the main conclusions : first, i shall describe my view of the current monetary policy situation. a brief summary of my conclusions is : • the upswing in the international economy appears to have been slightly stronger than we envisaged in the february inflation report. • with regard to sweden, the statistics received since the inflation report was published indicate that the economy has developed approximately in line with our assessment, although inflation temporarily rose more rapidly than anticipated as a result of developments in energy prices. • our earlier monetary policy considerations from february and april still apply to a large extent. monetary policy will need to be less expansionary in future. the pace at which the interest rate should be increased will depend as usual on the inflation outlook and on other macroeconomic developments. following the discussion of the current economic situation, i will describe the principles guiding monetary policy and then touch on some of the practical problems we encounter. the most important points in this discussion are as follows : • given our overall objective to maintain price stability, we also endeavour when making decisions on the repo rate to contribute to the stable development of the real economy. • this is done by not aiming to bring inflation back on target as quickly as possible in every single situation. when there is a deviation from target, our ambition is normally to return inflation to target within two years. • our incomplete knowledge of structural changes and other developments in the economy means that monetary policy cannot be expected to fine - tune economic conditions to any great extent. i shall now discuss the current monetary policy situation in greater detail. the current monetary policy situation growth in the world economy has been high and stable in recent years. in the united states, gdp growth remained strong in 2005, despite natural disasters and high oil prices.