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busy preparing ourselves for whatever new role parliament allocates to us. indeed parliament has already decided this for the latest round of basel rules, and my colleague vicky saporta is leading our efforts to re - tool our policy - making function for this new era. we are also getting on with important reforms while that wider debate unfolds, rather than waiting for it to conclude. this is procedurally complex because the position we inherit from the onshoring of eu rules is one in which the location of rules sprawls rather uncomfortably across different levels of legislation and our rulebook. this messiness was necessary to get the onshoring done on time but it makes it complex and time - consuming to update rules – so i hope that we will be able to move to a more coherent structure through time, as proposed by the government in its future regulatory framework consultation. in the meantime, it means that many of our reform efforts involve decisions not just for the pra but also for government and parliament. one of those efforts is our plan to bring in a simpler regime for smaller banks and building societies – we call this “ strong and simple ” just in case anybody thinks we want to have a weak regime for such firms. the prudentist does not believe in letting her younger patients develop cavities, but she does want to make their visits more pleasant. as far as i can work out from the many responses to our discussion paper, pretty much everyone thinks this is a good idea. the question now is how to design the simpler regime. the responses set out a broad range of views, which we are currently analysing. for instance, the discussion paper set out two alternative approaches to designing prudential requirements for the simpler regime – a ‘ streamlined ’ approach, which takes the existing framework as a starting point and modifies elements that are too complex for smaller firms, and a ‘ focused ’ approach, which is based on a narrower but more conservatively calibrated set of prudential requirements. there are advantages and disadvantages to each, and these will need to be weighed up when 3 / 5 bis central bankers'speeches designing the regime. the responses to our discussion paper seem to suggest relatively stronger support for a streamlined approach, but we ’ ll keep going through the responses in detail and then bring forward proposals for consultation in due course. our other main early reform effort is less popular, strictly for the prudential enthusiast only. but it may well be