by the swiss authorities served as a reminder that, in the event of the failure of a large group, sufficient alternatives must be available. secondly, the action of resolution authorities must remain sufficiently predictable. in this context, ecb, srb and eba quickly reaffirmed in a joint communique the sequence that would prevail in the event of a bail - in within the banking union, thereby helping to strengthen understanding ( among banks, authorities, markets ) on how the bail - in instrument would be used. finally, the crises of 2023 showed how sudden liquidity withdrawals can very quickly weaken a credit institution. the speed with which the depositors of silicon valley bank depositors withdrew their assets was unprecedented. this reminds us of the need to provide a decisive response, within the framework of the european banking union, to the issue of liquidity provision in resolution, which to date remains insufficiently addressed. dear ladies and gentlemen, this brings me to the end of my talk. the banking sector has weathered the recent storm on financial markets quite well, but weather predictions continue to be far from rosy. so, precautionary measures should stay on the top of both regulators'and banks'minds. the tightening of monetary policy has to some extent " normalised " the interest rate environment, which forms the setting of your core businesses, retail and corporate 4 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches deposit taking and lending, but the sheer speed of adjustments to interest rates coupled to the unstable macro - economic and geopolitical conditions will continue to prove challenging. the bread and butter interest income business of co - operative banks might have become more profitable but credit, interest rate and liquidity risks, as well as risk culture in general deserve particular attention, more than ever. enjoy your meal and i wish you a wonderful rest of the evening and an interesting set of meetings here in the beautiful city of ghent. 5 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches

again inserted a number of significant deviations from the basel standards have inserted and provided for very long transition periods. this is all the more regrettable as the eu is currently already the sole jurisdiction of the basel committee whose regulations deviate materially from the global basel standards in terms of capital requirements. these deviations dilute the rules applicable to european banks and have the potential to set in motion a global'race to the bottom'in terms of banking standards. the basel committee will also consider the impact of the crisis and the adequacy of its internationally applicable standards. the committee already published a report and analysis of events with reflections on the impact on supervision and regulation. among these, attention was paid to liquidity regulation in the context of the possible increased volatility of certain funding sources and deposits in the digital age and the lack of rules around deposit concentration. 3 / 5 bis - central bankers'speeches the regulatory approach to interest rate risk management comes under scrutiny, while it currently includes many regulatory degrees of freedom ( as it remains subject to a so - called pillar 2 approach without one - size - fits - all minimum capital standards for irrbb ). the report also looked into loss absorbency capacity of at1 bonds. also, the ssm has reviewed its priorities against this challenging backdrop. the postmortem analyses of the problems at some us banks by us regulators refer inter alia to poor risk management and governance at the management of the credit institutions concerned and to inefficiencies in the supervision and applicable regulation of these institutions. i also firmly believe that good corporate governance and an adequate risk culture lay at the heart of a stable and robust banking - and by extension financial - system. the european supervisory authorities have stepped up their monitoring of banks'sensitivity to rising interest rates and liquidity position. the adequacy of interest rate risk management, funding plans and potential emergency liquidity measures to be taken by banks will also remain a prudential priority in the short term, and rightly so in my view. last but not least, the bank failures in the first half of 2023 ( in the united states and even more so in switzerland ) were the first real large - scale test of the international resolution framework established in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. the lessons learnt are hence very relevant for the operation of the european resolution regulatory framework. the ability of resolution authorities to deal with the failure of systemically important banks must be further developed. the measures