’ s early 1980s work is, perhaps, a product of its times, some of the observations are astute, and there are some quite prescient insights. to begin with, hogan and pearce note that the activities of eurocurrency markets – and we could generalise this to cross - border private financing generally – lessened the pressure on countries to adjust to current account imbalances, especially on the deficit side. this could be seen as good – allowing capital to flow more efficiently to the locations offering the highest risk - adjusted return. or it could be worrying : the markets giving a nation more rope, so to speak, by allowing current account balances to become larger and more persistent than they would otherwise. remember that at the time they wrote, current account positions had rarely been more than a few percentage points of gdp for any length of time, at least since 1945. the analysis of the mythical planet htrae, with three countries surplusia, deficitia and balancia, with respective currencies surps, defs and bals, focuses on the operation of markets and, importantly, the role of financial institutions as intermediaries between savers in one country and borrowers in another. in the language of more recent times, financial institutions are key to the dynamics of so - called “ global imbalances ”. indeed, hogan and pearce state, rather bluntly : “ financial intermediaries live upon imbalances ”. 9 at one level that is obvious – financial intermediaries or markets exist to transfer resources from savers to borrowers ( and back again ), which is to say that an imbalance between saving and investment at the level of an individual household or firm in the economy is matched against an equivalent imbalance of opposite sign in some other firm or household. the deeper sense in which this “ thriving ” takes place in an international setting is that savers in one country lend their money to borrowers in another jurisdiction, about whom they know next to nothing, but feel safe in doing so because what they hold directly is an obligation of a large, wellknown, globally active bank, assumed to be safe. but as hogan and pearce point out, a european entity raising dollars to fund a balance sheet does not have automatic access to a lender of dollars of last resort in the event that market conditions change. it is therefore exposed to serious funding risk in a way that does not occur in purely local currency operations. the average

at the faculty, including by putting more emphasis on quantitative techniques. this met a good deal of resistance as part of the broader debates about how economics should be taught. by the time i was a student here from 1976 on, both sides seemed to have dug into the trenches and the dispute had been bitter. 3 none of that stopped warren hogan from grappling with significant issues in economics or economic policy. in fact, hogan ’ s professional life shows an active mind always pursuing some important question. in a career that produced over 150 articles, books and chapters of books and many shorter publications, he ranged broadly. as early as 1958 he was producing articles examining the rise of new financial intermediaries outside the regulated banking system – a theme about which we were still hearing in the 1980s, and one which should resonate today in light of the attention being given to “ shadow banks ” and the expansion of lodewijks ( 2007 ) and aspromourgos ( 2010 ). hogan ( 1958a ) and solow ( 1958 ). my own perspective, for what it is worth, is that the shift in emphasis towards quantitative techniques at the university of sydney probably did not go far enough, at least as far as my own undergraduate education was concerned. this was something which had to be rectified at graduate school. bis central bankers ’ speeches the weight and width of the global regulatory footprint currently under way. 4 hogan retained an interest in both financial regulation and deregulation throughout his career, and married this with a nuanced understanding of the behaviour of financial players in their appetite for risk. hogan also worked on issues of development in the emerging world, wages, immigration and transport. he served as economic adviser to one federal treasurer ( lynch ) and as a director of various companies, most notably serving on westpac ’ s board for 15 years, including through the period of deregulation and subsequent tumult. in his later years he conducted a major review of pricing in aged care. he also served in numerous capacities over the years in various university administrative positions and on other committees in the broader community. his was a full life indeed. it was in my third year at sydney university that i think i first encountered professor hogan. this would have been in 1978. more than three decades after i sat in afternoon seminars conducted by him, the memories of his general style are clearer than the things he actually said. he was usually dressed in a suit – which would have been much more