samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
. bis central bankers ’ speeches

mervyn king : how international cooperation can raise britain ’ s economic performance opening remarks by mr mervyn king, governor of the bank of england, at the panel on eu / us cooperation at the advancing enterprise conference, london, 26 january 2004. * * * chancellor, ladies and gentlemen, in this session we shall examine how international cooperation can raise britain ’ s economic performance. before introducing our speakers this afternoon, i would like to present a few facts about productivity in this country, and then pose three questions. you might ask why a central bank governor is chairing a panel on enterprise. well, some believe in prudence for a purpose ; we believe in stability as a spring - board, a springboard for enterprise. since the start of the railway age in the 1830s, output per person has increased ten - fold in britain ; it has increased twenty - fold in the united states. that is because over that period output per person rose on average by 1 ½ % a year in the uk and by 2 % in the us. the result is that the level of output per person is now around 25 % lower in britain than the us. in part this reflects shorter working hours, but it also reflects a lower level of productivity. from around 1980, however, the productivity gap between britain and united states started to close, and for the following 15 years or so labour productivity actually rose significantly faster in the uk than the us, at an annual rate of 2. 1 % compared with 1. 4 %. but since 1995, the gap has started to widen again as ict investment has boosted productivity growth in the united states. the empirical evidence suggests that one of the most successful ways to speed up convergence in productivity is to promote international trade and investment, and openness more generally. within manufacturing, the rate at which the productivity gap between britain and the us closed during the 1980s and early 1990s was greater in the more open than the less open sectors. against that background, let me suggest three areas for questions : first, why is the gap in the level of productivity between the us and the uk so persistent? and what are the obstacles that prevent the gap from narrowing - are they in the fields of trade, technology transfer, or flows of investment? what are the respective roles of business and government in removing them? second, can the uk benefit as much as the us from the it revolution? is it a question of the speed with which business adapts? or is it the need to fund our
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and have sufficient collateral. to sum up, the balance we achieved with our interventions during the 4 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches greek crisis was fully within our mandate ; it respected the political commitment to the single currency contained in the treaty, but at the same time we implemented that commitment within the limits of our statute. the treaty prohibition of monetary financing has been a key element in preserving the monetary policy nature of omts and the public sector purchase programme ( pspp ). the technical features of omts imply that they would only be considered if warranted from a monetary policy perspective. moreover, the extra exposure to any single country that the eurosystem might acquire as a consequence of omt activation would be secured by the country ’ s strict obligations arising from the european stability mechanism ( esm ) macroeconomic adjustment programme to which the country would have to submit as a precondition. it is worth noting that in june 2015 the european court of justice ruled that, given the strict modalities for activation, omts fall within the scope of the ecb ’ s mandate and include sufficient safeguards to avoid monetary financing. a number of safeguards apply to public sector bond purchases under the pspp too. such purchases have a monetary policy purpose which is different from the one that applies to omts and are specifically aimed at bringing inflation back to our medium - term objective in a situation in which our key interest rates are at levels that can hardly be reduced much further. the modalities are exclusively governed by the primary objective of price stability and are decided in full independence, irrespective of developments in other policy areas. the size and duration of the pspp are calculated to achieve progress towards the ecb ’ s inflation objective. the effectiveness of the tool is rooted in two important features of the financial system. first, government bond yields are the benchmark indicator for pricing a large set of private debt instruments. second, government bond markets are deep and liquid. interventions in these markets can initiate a process of portfolio rebalancing with significant secondary effects on broad financing conditions. several safeguards are in place to minimise potential distortive effects on market functioning and price formation ( such as the issuer limit and the issue share limit of 33 % ). there has been a prominent financial stability dimension in all unconventional measures taken, but the existing institutional framework ensures that monetary policy is the last line of defence with respect to preserving financial stability. the establishment of the european banking union, in
. the world economy is riven by an unprecedented degree of uncertainty, and we will be buffeted by changing winds over which we have no control. but we must have confidence, be sensible about what we can control and what we have to accept as given, in order to be poised to resume course when the storm at last is all over.

in building the required infrastructure, and in equipping themselves with appropriate skills. government and the central bank have played a vitally important role in this economic development, but it is, quite appropriately, a supportive and facilitating role, with two remarkable exceptions. the first is the origin and nature of barbados ’ international business and financial sector. at the outset, in the late 1970s, government determined that barbados would seek to provide actual services to international companies from offices located in barbados, and that those services would be subject to income tax, albeit at the preferential rate available to companies that earn foreign exchange exclusively. that decision, and the network of double - taxation treaties that support it, have served as the foundation for barbados ’ sound reputation in the sector. the success of the crop over festival in creating a new tourism niche is the second example of a successful government initiative. in this case, ironically enough, success was achieved in a totally unexpected way. the festival was moved to its present date to provide an additional reason for visitors from our usual tourist markets to visit during the low season for tourism. instead, the idea of crop over as a way of diversifying the tourism product happened to come on stream just as an entirely new potential source of visitors was developing : the barbadian diaspora. the diaspora had now grown in size and earning power to the point where many could contemplate annual visits. here was an opportunity for them to return at a time convenient for those with school age children, and when there was lots to see and do, with plentiful opportunities to meet old friends and socialise. these two successes are the exception. against them we have to set the many government initiatives over the years that have failed and been abandoned. they cover a wide range, including agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, and financial services. the reasonable conclusion is that government has a role to play in economic growth, in collaboration with the private sector, but that it is the investment of the private sector that underpins expansion, year after year. government support is especially important in the early development of new initiatives. however, the probability of success of new initiatives, based on past experience, is quite low, so we must avoid overblown expectations, and we must be prepared to recognize and abandon things that clearly have no future. the day - to - day role of government, and of the central bank, is to provide information on the performance of the international markets which are of principal interest to barbadians,
the central bank of kenya

##er in history, than wonder anxiously whether our banker will be with us in the long haul. we would rather spend our energy thinking of ways to increase and share our prosperity than despairing about whether we are all in this together. we must do better. we must be the guiding light for the banking and financial sector and for this great country we all call home. this would be very easy if we all insist on ethical practices and putting wanjiku before anything else. i want to finish with an idea that is attributed to the philosopher immanuel kant : “ may you act so that the principle of action might safely be made a law for the whole world. ” had this advice been heeded in the run up to 2007, the global financial crisis would have been averted. the queen of england would also not have asked the professors at the london school of economics in november 2008 : “ if the [ antecedent of the global financial crisis ] was this bad, why did nobody notice it? ” it is now my distinct honour to declare the 7th kba annual banking conference officially opened. thank you for your attention.
gediminas simkus : pillars of resilience amid global geopolitical shifts opening remarks by mr gediminas simkus, chairman of the board of the bank of lithuania, at the bank of lithuania's annual economics conference on " pillars of resilience amid global geopolitical shifts ", on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of euro introduction, vilnius, 16 december 2024. * * * check against delivery gerbiamasis js ekscelencija lietuvos respublikos prezidente gitanai nausda, gerbiamasis finans ministre rimantai sadziau, gerbiamieji seimo nariai, vyriausybs atstovai, garbs sveiai, ponios ir ponai, nuosirdziai sveikinu visus susirinkusius lietuvos banko ekonomikos konferencij. renginys neeilinis. jis skirtas euro, ms bendrosios valiutos, desimtmeiui lietuvoje paminti. renginys tarptautinis, todl dabar pereisiu prie angl kalbos. dear president of the european central bank christine lagarde, dear member of the european commission valdis dombrovskis, governors, ambassadors, esteemed guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is my great honour and pleasure to welcome you to this historic venue. we are at the palace of the grand dukes of lithuania. since the early days of the grand dutchy, a predecessor of modern lithuania, the palace has stood as a geopolitical and economic centre. the occasion that gathers us today is very special. 10 years ago, lithuania joined the euro. which is also both an economic and geopolitical landmark. therefore, the topic of today's conference – pillars of resilience amid global geopolitical shifts – is not accidental. it is an invitation to reflect on the most pressing challenges to lithuanian and european economies. and, most importantly, how we can overcome them. the euro area accession does not happen overnight. or, as lithuania's experience proves, by trying once. economic and legal criteria are rigorous, making the accession a demanding journey. during this journey, both actions and words matter. i would like to extend my sincere gratitude to you, christine. for your support and consistent vision

and bargaining, changes in patterns of international trade, etc. thus, i am very glad that this wide range of perspectives will be covered in our conference. finally, my colleagues and i intend this conference to serve you as a forum to exchange thoughts and ideas. with that, i wish you active participation and fruitful discussions. thank you. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
. bis central bankers ’ speeches

feel it is important to stress that considerable risks accompany on such interventions. first, market interventions aimed at preventing an appreciation expand the snb ’ s balance sheet. when there is a fixed exchange rate target, one might even have to expect an uncontrolled expansion of the balance sheet. this is attached to a number of imponderables. 6 in addition to major financial risks, it should be noted that, as the balance sheet grows, it will become increasingly difficult to reduce excess liquidity during a subsequent normalisation of monetary policy, and to fulfil the monetary policy mandate – of ensuring price stability – sustainably. second, it is important to bear the following in mind : pegging the franc partially or fully to another currency would mean that the snb would have to adopt the monetary policy of the cf. also danthine, j. - p. ( 2015 ) : swiss monetary policy facts... and fiction, speech at the swiss finance institute evening seminar, geneva, 19 may 2015. bis central bankers ’ speeches currency area concerned. however, it could no longer be guaranteed that this monetary policy would always be optimally tailored to the needs of the swiss economy. thus, the benefits of an active exchange rate policy need to be properly weighed against the costs for the economy as a whole. but there is no one - size - fits - all method of determining the need to intervene in the foreign exchange market, or the best way to do so. the points to consider will differ depending on the situation. current snb monetary policy in that regard, i would like to briefly describe the snb ’ s current thinking. at its most recent monetary policy assessment about a month ago, the snb published its new inflation forecast. the forecast shows that, assuming an unchanged interest rate policy, inflation will rise gradually over the coming quarters, and will exceed 1. 0 % in 2018 ( cf. chart 12 ). so the forecast suggests that current monetary policy is appropriate. for this reason, in december the snb decided to continue its expansionary policy. this is based on two elements : first, an interest rate of – 0. 75 % on sight deposits at the snb combined with a target range for the three - month libor of between – 1. 25 % and – 0. 25 % ; second, the snb ’ s willingness to influence exchange rate developments if necessary. the negative interest rate and the willingness to intervene on the foreign exchange market serve
external observers acknowledge. 1. instruments of crisis management let me begin with the first criticism : that europe lacks appropriate instruments to deal with the crisis. to start with, one needs an appropriate sense of perspective. it is unrealistic to expect the euro area to have the reaction - function of a nation - state like the u. s. the u. s. has spent more than 200 years establishing institutions to run a vast and diverse economic area and to manage crises. even then, its political system sometimes struggles to take difficult decisions. the euro area, on the other hand, has existed for just 13 years. the strengthening of its institutions began only two years ago. against that background, what has been achieved through the creation of the european financial stability facility and european bis central bankers ’ speeches stability mechanism, the entry into force of the “ six - pack ” legislation and the agreement on the fiscal compact, is already very significant. on 29 june, the euro summit took a further series of steps to strengthen crisis management. they agreed that loans to spain as part of its bank recapitalisation programme would not have a senior status, removing a key concern for investors about the programme and their continued purchases of spanish government debt. they committed themselves to use the full range of efsf and esm instruments in a flexible and efficient manner. and most importantly, they decided that the esm should have the ability to recapitalise banks directly, once a single supervisory mechanism is in place involving the ecb. these are all very significant developments. let me elaborate. first, the possibility for direct bank recapitalisation by the esm is crucial to break the vicious circle between banks and their sovereigns that is at the heart of the crisis. it would allow for banks to be stabilised without increasing the debt level of the sovereign, thereby avoiding further damage to sovereign debt markets and banks ’ balance sheets. this would move the euro area closer to the type of financial union we see in federations like the u. s. or switzerland, where banking sector problems are dealt with at the federal level and have no implications on the finances of the federated units. of course, this must be accompanied by appropriate incentives for banks to limit moral hazard. policy conditionality should include restructuring plans in line with eu state - aid rules, and principles for orderly resolution of non - viable institutions and for limiting the use of public money. second, the commitment to establish a single supervisor is critical insofar

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economy meetings that are held every two months in basel and where central bank governors from systemic economies have the occasion to discuss issues the global economic outlook, international monetary and financial issues and other issues of mutual interest. clearly, these fora have turned out to be very useful in times of global financial distress and we should continue to invest on them in the future. i would also like to mention that the bis as an institution has been “ ahead of the curve ” in terms of identifying unsustainable trends in the financial sector and more generally in the global economy – such as the under - appreciation of risk and excessive credit growth – which eventually led to the global financial crisis. it could do so based on a high degree of analytical depth and information sharing at a global level that the bis and the basel committees have been able to develop over time. these analytical contributions have played a non - negligible contribution to form the strong and coordinated policy response that we have witnessed during the financial crisis. see baldwin ( 2010 ), in particular chapter 5 by s. j. evenett. model - based simulations ( bussiere et al. 2010 ) suggest that the impairment of the global flow of trade would hamper the recovery from the crisis, as well as the long - term growth potential of the global economy. at the same time, it is unlikely that protectionism would help to correct existing current account imbalances. moreover, the countries implementing protectionist measures should expect a deterioration of their international competitiveness, which would further affect the potential for longer - term real gdp growth. see cgfs ( 2010 ). 2. 3 where the system has fared less well : regulatory arbitrage and global imbalances as much as global governance appears to have passed the severe test of the global financial crisis, we should not remain oblivious to the fact that there were significant shortcomings that may have contributed to create the conditions for the crisis to happen in the first place. i will mention, in particular, two dimensions : the insufficiencies in terms of financial regulation and international coordination, on the one hand, as well as the constellation of global imbalances, on the other. let me deal with both in turn. the lack of integration and coordination in financial regulation was pervasive before the crisis, even though this was not properly appreciated at the time, and has encouraged financial institutions to engage in a large degree of regulatory arbitrage. 10 this was the unavoida

, barcelona, 11 june 2014. bis central bankers ’ speeches
01 july 2008 sweden euro area 01 o ctober 2008 01 january 2009 us reporate and mortgage rates per cent 7. 00 7. 00 6. 00 6. 00 5. 00 5. 00 4. 00 4. 00 3. 00 3. 00 2. 00 2. 00 1. 00 1. 00 0. 00 01 january 01 january sbab 3 month rate 01 january 01 january m ortgage rate 3 months 0. 00 01 january repo rate tcw - index index : 18 november 1992 = 100 tcw index 01 january 2000 01 january 2002 01 january 2004 01 january 2006 01 january 2008

lucas papademos : european central bank ’ s annual report 2005 introductory statement by mr lucas papademos, vice - president of the european central bank, to the committee on economic and monetary affairs of the european parliament, brussels, 25 april 2006. * * * madam chairwoman, members of the committee on economic and monetary affairs, it is an honour for me to present to you the ecb ’ s annual report for 2005. the presentation of the annual report is a core element of the ecb ’ s accountability vis - a - vis the european parliament. as we have always stressed, the ecb places the greatest value on the fulfilment of its accountability obligations, and i am looking forward to a fruitful dialogue with you. in my introductory statement, i will first briefly review economic and monetary developments in 2005 and in early 2006, focusing on the monetary policy decisions of the ecb. i will then address a number of the policy issues examined in detail in the annual report which i consider to be of particular relevance. economic and monetary developments in 2005 real gdp in the euro area expanded by 1. 4 %, somewhat below the 1. 8 % growth recorded in 2004, but the pace of economic activity tended to strengthen during the second half of the year. annual hicp inflation averaged 2. 2 % in 2005, marginally higher than the rate of 2. 1 % observed in each of the two preceding years, mainly as a result of substantial increases in energy and commodity prices. when reviewing economic and monetary developments and the ecb ’ s monetary policy decisions in 2005 and early 2006, it is useful to divide this time period into two parts. in the first half of 2005, real gdp growth in the euro area remained moderate and there were heightened uncertainties with regard to the short - term evolution of domestic demand. annual hicp inflation eased to 2. 0 % on average in the first half of 2005, mainly reflecting base effects. although higher oil prices exerted significant upward pressure on inflation, there was no evidence of underlying domestic inflationary pressures building up, as wage developments remained moderate. at the same time, economic analysis identified a number of upside risks to price stability which were perceived to prevail over other, potentially dampening factors on prices. moreover, monetary dynamics continued to strengthen in an environment of already ample liquidity, driven by the most liquid components of m3 and, on the counterparts side, by faster credit expansion to the private sector. these developments reflected to