trade links. it now boasts a solid track record spanning nearly 25 years, making it a credible complement to the dollar as a safe asset. objectively, one challenge remains : some may consider that the euro has become a sort of geopolitical proxy for the dollar since europe decided - for excellent reasons - to take part in the sanctions against russia. for my part, i have noted that investors rightly continue to see the euro and the dollar as two very distinct currencies. if it is to assert itself even more firmly as one of the anchors of the ims, the euro must benefit from support which the commission x has begun to provide, notably through stimulus measures via capital markets. xi in my view, this support must now be relayed by the ecb and all of us, the central banks of the eurosystem. since the introduction of the euro, the eurosystem has adopted a neutral stance regarding the development of the international role of the euro. admittedly, this role is not one of the objectives of the treaty : the euro was created for internal purposes, and not primarily to act as an international currency. but the fears expressed at the time of a potential loss of control over monetary policy are no longer justified ; a strengthening of the international role of the euro would now even be associated with greater autonomy and a reduced impact of exchange rate shocks on inflation. one of the main levers for action is to increase the supply of safe eurodenominated assets. the launch in 2021 of the next generation eu ( ngeu ) programme will raise eur 800 billion. above all, the unified approach to page 5 sur 6 financing eu borrowing, which was introduced by the commission in 2023, means that bonds xii can be issued under the single name of " eu bonds ", which has the advantage of avoiding fragmentation and boosting the liquidity of issues. but i believe we need to go further, by aiming to bring together the bond issues of the commission, the european stability mechanism ( esm ) and maybe the european investment bank : the total pool would then amount to eur 1, 100 billion. we also need to speed up the implementation of the capital markets union ( cmu ), which is crucial for ensuring a better allocation of capital within the euro area : this internal integration priority also serves the euro's external role. these first, realistic steps are the only advances within our reach at this stage. they should not divert our attention from the " creative

economic effects. hence, the duration matters more than the level ; persistence matters more than the peak. ii. forces pushing for greater diversification in the ims despite the end of the bretton woods system in the 1970s, the us dollar still plays a dominant role in the international monetary system ( ims ). nevertheless, the gradual decline in its share of global foreign exchange reserves, which began in the mid - 2010s, has gained momentum since 2020, and we are witnessing a renewal of the debate on the dollar's continued role as the anchor of the ims. let's not be naive : geopolitical forces are powerfully at work, all the more so since russia ’ s invasion of ukraine in early 2022. china, the world's secondlargest economy, has been expressing its wish to internationalise the renminbi for several years now ; this has already materialised in its trade i and could accelerate over the next few years. in particular, the climate transition will lead us to reduce our consumption of fossil fuels and considerably increase our consumption of resources for generating cleaner energy. as a result, we are likely to witness a profound reconfiguration of international trade and financial balances and, potentially, of the balance of power between currencies. china, for example, has positioned itself at key points in supply chains, and has a very dominant, even hegemonic, share of certain finished products. ii the use of the chinese currency is on the rise : in 2022, 7 % of transactions on foreign exchange markets had a renminbi leg, iii a figure twice as high as in 2019, thanks in particular to the offshore centres created since 2010. china also plays a major role as a bilateral creditor - with outstanding loans estimated at more than usd 350 billion, iv i. e. more than the world bank - and even, in some cases, as a lender of last resort, v outside the framework of the international monetary fund ( imf ) and any collective rules. however, the renminbi's share is likely to page 3 sur 6 remain small, even in the medium term : its internationalisation will be structurally held back by its very limited convertibility. vi more broadly, the brics – in particular president lula's brazil - are expressing their wish to de - dollarise their economies, or even to create a common currency. utopia? european countries, while having shared foundations, know