samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
term. although our objective is forward looking, there is a risk that continued undershooting of our inflation aim will cause households and firms to revise down their inflation expectations. and lower inflation expectations directly lower the equilibrium nominal interest rate, requiring a lower interest rate to create monetary stimulus. thanks to our measures, inflation expectations have remained anchored. according to the ecb ’ s latest survey of professional forecasters, expected inflation at a five - year horizon is 1. 8 %. but market - based expectations have been lower and more sensitive to current levels of inflation, and without our measures, the risk of a de - anchoring would have been very serious. the increased burden on monetary policy taken together, a long period of growth below potential requires robust policy action to prevent the low growth from becoming entrenched into the long run. but at the same time, falling potential growth also increases the burden on monetary policy to carry out that macroeconomic stabilisation. the policy mix in the euro area is already heavily tilted towards monetary policy given the decentralised nature of fiscal policy by 19 national governments and the limited success of european fiscal rules in creating incentives to build up national fiscal space. the available fiscal space in most euro area countries is in addition constrained by the overhang of public debt inherited from the crisis. lower potential growth and weaker inflation inhibit the reduction of public debt ratios by acting on both sides of the fraction. higher expenditure arising from higher structural unemployment and lower tax revenues from weaker inflation restrict the ability of governments to save, i. e. reduce the numerator. and low inflation increases the real savings required to serve a given level of nominal debt. similarly, weaker potential growth lessens the ability to increase the denominator and grow out of the overhang. since the crisis, the overhang of public debt has not just reduced the ability of fiscal policy to share the burden of macroeconomic stabilisation with monetary policy, but it has also impaired the transmission of monetary policy through the sovereign - bank nexus. recent research by the ecb shows that during the sovereign crisis, banks in stressed countries increased their holdings of domestic sovereigns. 4 this was particularly marked for publicly owned banks and recently bailed - out banks. as the price of stressed sovereign bonds fell, these banks were forced to deleverage, reducing their lending. this drop in lending was not just confined to the domestic market – foreign subsidiaries of banks with head offices in stressed countries also reduced lending. the notion

brookings institution, washington dc, 6 june 2016. presentation available on the brookings institution website. 8 ecb ( 2016 ), “ euro area bank lending survey ”, third quarter 2016, european central bank, october. 6 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches
: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism ”, quarterly journal of economics, vol. 84, pp. 488 – 500. page 4 of 6 of the box. i am confident that young minds like you can think differently, produce new thinking and bring more creativity into empirical scrutiny of the ideas you theorise. your “ millennial ” generation must strive to challenge the accepted wisdom so that we can have more ‘ creative destruction ’ in society and a brave new world. 9. in my own profession as central banker, thinking new and fresh is demanded by the ever changing world in which we operate. to give an example, we have been trying to understand household and firm behaviour through our surveys and analysis. however, the need now is to understand micro - level price formation dynamics in new dimensions such as e - commerce, digital transactions and big cross sectional data. this applies to domains such as banking, non - banking financial intermediation, payments, currency management and financial inclusion as well. in the absence of this type of research, policy choices could yield sub - optimal outcomes at times. there is an acute information deficit regarding the unorganised sector in india, despite its significant role in income and employment generation. the absence of official or non - official statistics has not, however, prevented economists from conducting survey - based studies to help understand its dynamics. 10. in closing, i would like to quote paul romer, a pioneer of endogenous growth theory, from his much cited paper “ the trouble with macroeconomics ” : 3 “ even when it works well, science is not perfect …. scientists commit to the pursuit of truth even though they realise that absolute truth is never revealed. all they can hope for is a consensus that establishes the truth of an assertion in the same loose sense that the stock market establishes the value of a firm. it can go astray, perhaps for long stretches of time. but eventually, it is yanked back to reality by insurgents ( my 3 paul romer [ 2016 ], “ the trouble with macroeconomics ”, the commons memorial lecture of the omicron delta epsilon society, january 5, 2016. page 5 of 6 emphasis ) who are free to challenge the consensus and supporters of the consensus who still think that getting the facts right matters. ” 11. as you pass out as young economists remember that you have the power to shape the destiny of this country and touch the lives of its millions. you are the harbingers of our enlight

##ened society of tomorrow ; equipped with ideas and also the ability to convert them into a better reality for all. i congratulate all the new graduates of the academy, and wish you all a very bright future ahead. * * * * * * * page 6 of 6
##s with regard to cyber governance, for example. financial market infrastructures, or fmis for short, too often lack board - approved cyber resilience strategies. and if there is a strategy, it is often not operationalised. and if it is operationalised, it is often not monitored, and its effectiveness is not challenged. fmis and banks work diligently on technical security measures in order to detect threats and protect their systems. some of them, though, neglect people and processes. there is a dangerous lack of awareness and training. successful cyber - attacks often start with a phishing email to an unsuspecting employee. having mentioned the complexity of the financial system as a vulnerability, i need to add the complexity of it - systems as well. banks, in particular, should aim to simplify their it landscape. 1 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches simpler it landscapes have a smaller attack surface. and the easier these systems are to understand and maintain, the better they can be protected. and, last but not least, we see that a significant number of fmis still lack dedicated cyber incident response plans. these are just a few of the worrying trends and vulnerabilities that we see. so there is clearly much work to be done. how is the ecb addressing cyber threats? an oversight and supervision perspective so, what part can the ecb play? let ’ s first look at our role in overseeing fmis. in march 2017 the governing council approved the eurosystem cyber resilience strategy for fmis. this strategy is intended to operationalise the cpmi - iosco1 guidance on cyber resilience for fmis. the strategy rests on three pillars : fmi resilience, sector resilience, and strategic industry - regulator dialogue. regarding the resilience of fmis, we started in 2017 by conducting a survey of 76 fmis across the european union, to assess their cyber resilience. the results of this survey have enabled overseers to enter into productive dialogues with fmis on their ability to address cyber - threats. furthermore, while the principles contained in the cpmi - iosco guidance are important, they are also quite high level. smaller institutions in particular need to be informed about best practices in a more concrete and detailed manner. so, to facilitate the proportionate implementation of the guidance, the ecb published the cyber resilience oversight expectations, or croe for short, in december 2018. a tool

throughout 2013 the ecb will prepare itself for its new supervisory function. i am confident that in cooperation with national supervisory authorities we will achieve the goal of establishing an effective and robust ssm. thank you. bis central bankers ’ speeches
the stability and growth of the korean economy. thank you.

seongtae lee : the global financial crisis and the bank of korea's monetary policy keynote address by mr seongtae lee, governor of the bank of korea, at the euromoney conference, seoul, 28 may 2009. * * * greetings ladies and gentlemen, i am delighted to be here to speak at " the euromoney korean capital markets congress 2009 " with prominent institutional investors, financiers and academic experts from around the world. my remarks today will focus on the recent global financial crisis, the bank of korea's monetary policy response, and the tasks that remain in the future. development and impact of the global financial crisis ladies and gentlemen, as you know, this global financial crisis struck as the impact of the us sub - prime mortgage meltdown spread worldwide and it triggered a synchronized global economic downturn. the main reason that this financial crisis spread with such a wide range and at such unprecedented speed lies in the massive progress made in the integration of the world economy and financial markets over the last two decades. as this crisis progressed, korea and other emerging market countries were unable to avoid its impacts even though they did not have large sub - prime mortgage related exposures. rather they experienced deteriorating foreign currency supply and demand conditions and credit crunches, as funds flowed out due to deleveraging by overseas financial institutions in response to heightened concerns about credit risk. their real economies also slipped into recessions, as their exports shrank rapidly owing to the contraction of import demand in advanced countries. the bank of korea's policy response and its effects ladies and gentlemen, the bank of korea eased its monetary policy aggressively, to soothe the financial market unrest and ward off a sharp contraction of the real economy. it brought its base rate down by a total of 3. 25 percentage points, to its lowest level of 2 %, in six steps from last october until this february. along with this, it strove to expand provision of liquidity to sectors badly affected by the credit crunch through its open market operations and lending facilities. at the same time, it actively provided foreign - currency liquidity to domestic financial institutions through, for example, the swap market, in order to stabilize the foreign exchange market that was directly hit by the impact of the global financial crisis. it also entered into currency swap arrangements with the central banks of the united states, japan and china. the korean financial and foreign exchange markets have recently been showing a pattern of improved movements helped by these actions.
1963 – 1990 ”, quarterly journal of economics, vol. 111, 1996, oxford university press. bis central bankers ’ speeches

we have directed our policies towards price stability and thus, hopefully, left behind us a long period of price and wage spirals, followed by devaluation and where growth was lower than in our competitor countries. a credible inflation target is now seen as a necessary condition for macroeconomic stability. the primary factor behind the falling inflation rate is a growing confidence in inflation targeting, which during the years following 1993 gradually affected inflation expectations. in recent years the repo rate in sweden has been lower than the corresponding steering interest rates in the usa, the uk and the emu area. many doubted whether sweden as a small country outside of the euro area would ever be able to live with short - term interest rates lower than those set in frankfurt. however, we have succeeded in doing so for some time. if one looks at the short - term real interest rates now, they are at approximately the same level as in the euro area and sweden, at around 2 per cent. the fact that we in sweden succeeded in achieving a good growth rate during the second half of the 1990s without causing overheating and raised interest rates, was because we started off with a very low level of resource utilisation. following the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, unemployment was at a record high level and there was considerable unutilised capacity in industry. it was not until recently, since the end of last year, that we have begun to approach the capacity ceiling. furthermore, sweden has shown a positive development in private saving throughout the entire 1990s, and the household sector's burden of debt is currently much lower than it was after the crisis at the beginning of the last decade. in addition, we have a surplus on the current account, which is tantamount to a surplus in the balance for the economy as a whole. things look rather different in the usa. there, private sector saving has declined to – 7 per cent of gdp, the household sector's burden of debt is at a record high level and the deficit on the current account balance is growing rapidly. both american consumers and international investors have had strong confidence in the american economy's capacity to generate future income. usa central point in economic picture when it comes to the actual economic activity situation, interest is mainly focused on the usa, not least because of the low level of saving and the large build - up of debt described above. if american households were to rapidly increase their saving and reduce their consumption, and if foreign investors were to begin
franc remains highly valued, and the situation on the foreign exchange market is still fragile. against this backdrop, our expansionary monetary policy remains necessary. with the negative interest rate and our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary, we support economic activity and ensure price stability. ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. it is my pleasure to give the floor to fritz zurbrugg. page 5 / 5

our conditional inflation forecast will now be based on the assumption of an unchanged snb policy rate over the relevant horizon. the snb policy rate signals the interest rate level we will seek to maintain on the short - term money market. in assessing the actual conditions on the money market, we are focusing on saron. the terms for monetary policy - related transactions will be based on the snb policy rate. page 2 / 5 berne, 13 june 2019 thomas jordan news conference this adjustment does not entail any change in our current monetary policy, and in particular our expansionary stance. the inflation forecast of march 2019 and the new forecast can be directly compared with one another. in the current environment, the assumption of a given interest rate remaining unchanged results in an identical forecast, irrespective of whether it is the snb policy rate or the three - month libor that is being kept constant. this also applies to the conditions on the money market. the three - month libor and saron are virtually on a par at present. setting the snb policy rate at −0. 75 % therefore means that conditions on the money market remain unchanged. in my remarks, i have looked at the changeover to the snb policy rate from the perspective of monetary policy. my colleague andrea maechler will talk about the market ’ s transitioning from the libor to saron in more detail. we are supporting the work on this transition since representative and reliable reference rates are of pivotal importance for monetary policy and the financial markets alike. i would now like to return to my explanation of our monetary policy. an expansionary monetary policy remains necessary against the backdrop of the current price and economic developments. on a trade - weighted basis, the swiss franc is somewhat stronger than in march and is still highly valued. the situation on the foreign exchange market continues to be fragile. the negative interest rate and our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary remain essential in order to keep the attractiveness of swiss franc investments low and thus ease pressure on the currency. looking at the short term, the new conditional inflation forecast is slightly higher than in march. this is primarily attributable to a rise in the prices of imported goods. the longer - term inflation forecast is virtually unchanged. for 2019 it stands at 0. 6 %, up from the figure of 0. 3 % last quarter. for 2020, we anticipate an inflation rate of 0. 7 %, compared to
international monetary fund deputy managing director, mr tao zhang, visit to botswana welcome remarks by moses d pelaelo governor, bank of botswana july 25, 2018 distinguished guests, i am privileged to welcome you to this special dinner, hosted by the bank of botswana, in honour of our esteemed guest, the deputy managing director of the international monetary fund, mr tao zhang. on behalf of the board, management and staff of the bank, we very much appreciate your honouring the invitation and your presence tonight. thanks to you all. in welcoming the deputy managing director, i wish to observe that, coincidentally, his visit to botswana comes shortly after the conclusion of the annual article iv consultation that took place just over a month ago. it is also two weeks after the workshop on fintech, payments and financial inclusion, jointly organised by the bank of botswana, the international monetary fund and the bank of canada. thus, the visit reinforces the beneficial relationship between botswana and the international monetary fund. mr zhang is accompanied by his advisor, mr steven allen barnett, mr enrique gelbard, the mission chief for botswana ’ s imf article iv consultations, who is quite familiar to several of us ; and mr abdulqafar abdullahi, advisor to the executive director for the africa group 1 constituency at the imf, to which botswana belongs. tonight mr zhang will address the global, regional and botswana connections with respect to economic and policy developments. previously, in 2007, the then deputy managing director, mr takatoshi kato, while visiting botswana dealt with challenges and opportunities for growth in sub - saharan africa, with special focus on botswana. in 2011, mr naoyuki shinohara discussed challenges relating to the management of natural resources and developmental opportunities in botswana. in 2016, mr zhang ’ s immediate predecessor, mr min zhu, eloquently articulated technological progress and evolving industry arrangements that nations, such as botswana, can harness to take development to the next level. honourable minister, distinguished guests, given the high level attention given to botswana by the imf, it is fitting to briefly highlight the benefits of being a member and working with the imf since 1968. first, the capacity of the imf to analyse global developments and potential transmission channels and spillover to various regions and countries is key to timely responses to harness opportunities and / or mitigate risks. second, the regular consultations, on the main through the article iv missions, enables dialogue with local stakeholders in the policy arena, industry

##ise yourselves with our city and its surroundings. for those able to spare a little time, please visit at least one of the unique tourist attractions for which the country is renowned. as the brand goes : botswana is our pride ; please make it your destination. please enjoy the dinner and the rest of the evening. i thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
behavior. it is therefore important that the government act to advance actions that will help increase financial literacy among the public. bis central bankers ’ speeches

karnit flug : raising the retirement age for women in israel main points of remarks by dr karnit flug, governor of the bank of israel, at the conference on raising the retirement age for women, jerusalem, 1 july 2015. * * * i would like to briefly address a number of facts and trends that outline the situation concerning the retirement age in israel in general, and for women in particular. i will then present a series of recommendations and conclusions that i believe should be discussed, ideally in advance. expected demographic trends : as we know, life expectancy is increasing. if we look at the past 40 years, the life expectancy of women who have reached age 65 increased from 80 years to 86 years, and for men it increased from 79 years to 84 years. this fact, together with the fact that the retirement age increased by only 2 years, means that men are expected to live an average of 17 years after retirement, and women are expected to live an average of 24 years after retirement. this raises the question of whether during employment, workers – and particularly women – save enough to ensure them a proper income after retirement. another way to look at the demographic change is to examine what is happening to the relationship between the working - age population and the retirement - age population. we can see that the trend in israel is similar to the trend in other countries, although with somewhat of a lag. as of today, there are five working - age people in israel for every person above age 65. in 2050, that ratio is expected to narrow to 3 : 1. this change obviously has serious consequences for the labor market, the dependency ratio, and as a direct result, the actuarial state of national insurance and the old pension funds. an international comparison of retirement arrangements shows that in israel, the retirement age for women is relatively low, and even after it rises to 64, as it is supposed to do in 2017, it will still be significantly lower than in most european countries, some of which are also in the midst of gradually raising it, and all of which except for switzerland have set out that the retirement ages for men and women will become equal in the future. like in israel, these countries also have wage gaps between men and women. the retirement age for men in israel rose to 67, and is similar to the retirement age among european countries that have already raised the retirement age to the upper benchmark. the large gap between men and women in