that was initiated by the porter commission. the commission's revolutionary analysis threw out the old reliance on extensive control over the financial system. as a result, canadian officials were among the first to understand that reserve requirements and various other controls are actually inimical to the efficient operation of the financial system. the government gradually abandoned these controls in its regulation of financial institutions, and so did the bank in its implementation of monetary policy. today, the bank simply announces its target overnight rate, and the market does the rest - a form of virtual, yet effective, control, back - stopped by the bank's ability to borrow and lend near - infinite amounts of liquidity. after decades of research, and trial and error, we have reduced the conduct of monetary policy to its essential elements - perhaps a form of alchemy, after all! from there, the next logical step was to make the conduct of monetary policy more transparent and accountable. in the past, central banking had often been cloaked in deliberate secrecy, relying on the element of surprise for its presumed effectiveness. governance and accountability were not considered important. communications and reporting were limited to an annual report and a few public addresses. now, following on the work of john chant - albeit with a significant lag - we have a clear, highly transparent paradigm for the conduct of monetary policy, and the bank can be held accountable for its performance. effective communication is an essential part of that transparency. monetary policy and a flexible exchange rate finally, let me talk about the role of the exchange rate in monetary policy. canada moved to a flexible exchange rate in 1950 and again in 1970 - well before most other countries. although this gave canada monetary policy independence, a flexible exchange rate alone does not provide a " coherent monetary order, " as david laidler has noted. the monetary policy framework still requires a nominal anchor to help guide decisions and expectations. as i've said before, the bank searched for that anchor throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. the outcome of that search was our eventual adoption of inflation targets in 1991. and this anchor has exceeded our most optimistic expectations. looking ahead this isn't to say that we have reached the end of monetary policy history. the bank of canada and other central banks are constantly looking for improvements. the inflation - targeting framework that the bank and the government put in place 14 years ago has performed well. it is up for renewal in 2006, and we are now in the process of assessing both its past performance and

low relative to other european countries. for example, according to the global competitiveness index of the world economic forum, competitiveness slightly deteriorated in 2017 – 2018. the most problematic factors for doing business in greece are considered by the above forum to be the following : high tax rates, inefficient government bureaucracy, tax regulations, policy and government instability, access to finance and corruption. the authorities need to continue to put emphasis on improving non - price competitiveness and public sector efficiency. these challenges must be tackled urgently in order to avoid hampering the strengthening recovery and the long - term prospects of the greek economy. 5. preconditions for a sustainable recovery in the medium to long - term the growth prospects of the greek economy are positive because the structural reforms implemented raise total factor productivity and consequently potential growth. according to estimates by the oecd, the full implementation of all reforms, both those undertaken and those scheduled as part of the esm programme, is expected, ceteris paribus, to boost real gdp over a 10 - year - horizon by about 13 %. and this figure excludes further positive effects from structural reforms which cannot be easily quantified such as the modernisation of the public administration and the judiciary system, the strengthening of insolvency regulations and the resolution of non - performing loans. in - house work by the bank of greece points to similar estimates of the effects of structural reforms. however, in order to reap these potential gains, a number of conditions should be satisfied. a. create the conditions to encourage investment the economic adjustment and the structural improvements during the past seven years have rendered greece more business friendly and have created significant investment opportunities. however, domestic savings are insufficient to meet the investment needs of the greek economy which, after a long period of very low investment rates, are significant. thus, besides restoring access of companies to capital markets, conditions should be encouraged that will attract foreign capital, notably foreign direct investment. this presupposes the smooth and timely implementation of the agreed reforms and privatization programme in order to further improve the business environment and cut red - tape. in addition, the bank of greece favours a more growth friendly fiscal policy mix. more emphasis has to be placed on cutting non - productive expenditures and managing state property effectively. this is important since, according to oecd estimates, state property in greece is among the 5 / 9 bis central bankers'speeches highest as a percent of gdp in oec