jon cunliffe : the bank of england ’ s monetary and financial policy committees – guiding the economy towards a sustainable and safe recovery speech by sir jon cunliffe, deputy governor for financial stability of the bank of england, at the international festival for business conference, liverpool, 3 july 2014. * * * when my friends and relations discovered i was going to join the bank of england i was inundated with the same request. from politicians and senior whitehall mandarins to family and young children, after wishing me congratulations and good luck, the first question was : “ can i please come and see the bank ’ s gold? ” i of course promised excursions to see the bank ’ s gold to all and sundry. on arrival at the bank, however, i was made aware of the sober reality. the bank only owns two bars of gold. and they are in the bank museum for all to see. of course, the bank looks after a great deal of other people ’ s gold – over 5000 tonnes including the uk government ’ s reserves and some of the reserves of other countries. visits to the vaults in which it lies – as i also found out on arrival – are politely but very heavily discouraged. but apart from the two bars in the museum, the bank of england itself no longer owns any gold. i am pretty sure that most of those who wanted to see the bank ’ s gold would not really be surprised by that. gold plays virtually no part in our or other modern economies. but i do not think it was an accident that so many associated gold with the bank. gold remains for many a powerful symbol of stability. and stability is what the bank of england is for. there have been major changes to the bank over the last year or so. with the passing of the financial services act in april last year, parliament gave us very significant new responsibilities and wide ranging powers. more than ever now, stability remains at the heart of what we do. as we set it out in our new objective, the bank ’ s core purpose is : “ to promote the good of the people of the united kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability ”. i want to focus today on the financial stability part of that purpose : what are we trying to achieve and how do we go about it? and how does it fit in with the other main part of that core purpose, maintaining monetary stability – or to put it simply, controlling inflation? a little bit of history might help

stanley fischer : comments on the resolution framework for banks and bank holding companies in the united states speech by mr stanley fischer, vice chair of the board of governors of the federal reserve system, at the panel discussion on resolution riksbank macroprudential conference, stockholm, 22 june 2016. * * * i am grateful to mark van der weide, barbara bouchard and mark savignac of the federal reserve board for their assistance in the preparation of these comments. i ’ m grateful to the organizers for inviting me to participate in this conference. i would like briefly to describe the legal frameworks that exist for resolving banking organizations in the united states, the steps that the federal reserve and other u. s. regulators have taken to make global systemically important banking organizations ( gsibs ) in the united states more resolvable, and a few of the criticisms of u. s. regulatory actions in this area, together with my responses to them. u. s. law provides several legal frameworks for resolving failed financial firms. in the united states, a failed depository institution is resolved by the federal deposit insurance corporation ( fdic ) using a framework created by the federal deposit insurance act. the fdic has acted as receiver for several thousand failed banks since 1934, including 465 from 2008 through 2012. most of these failed banks were relatively small community banks, and all were considerably smaller than the most systemically important firms active today. 1 while the federal deposit insurance act creates a special resolution framework for failed banks, a failed u. s. bank holding company – that is, a corporate entity that controls one or more banks – would generally be resolved under the same provisions of the u. s. bankruptcy code as would apply to other corporate debtors, such as industrial firms, in a proceeding overseen by a federal judge. during the recent crisis, fears about the systemic consequences that would follow from the bankruptcies of systemically important financial firms motivated extraordinary government actions to prevent such firms from failing. unfortunately, the fears proved well founded : the bankruptcy of lehman brothers holdings – the largest bankruptcy filing in american history – significantly exacerbated the crisis. 2 to increase the viability of the bankruptcy code as a framework for resolving failed financial firms without major systemic consequences, section 165 ( d ) of the dodd - frank wall street reform and consumer protection act of 2010 ( dodd - frank act ) requires large banking organizations to produce resolution plans, also known as living wills, demonstrating how