by the private sector. therefore, by levying an annual tax on the market value of land, the government or local authorities can mobilise the revenue needed to service the debt that it incurred building the infrastructure. i am sceptical about this claim. it depends upon the notion that a shortage of public infrastructure is the binding constraint on productivity growth in the private sector, which as i have already mentioned is not axiomatic. if private sector productivity in urban areas does not rise as expected, because it faces other constraints besides the inadequacies of public infrastructure, land owners will lack the income to pay land taxes, even if their land appreciates in value. this would leave the public authorities lacking the revenue to repay its debt. the city would have better infrastructure, but its administration would be bankrupt and the provision of other vital services would suffer as a result. bis central bankers ’ speeches

an official asset to provide international liquidity, as shown in the decline in the relevance of the sdr. but since the asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, a number of central banks in that part of the world have increased their dollar reserves in order to protect themselves from possible future crises by creating what i have termed a “ diy lender of last resort ” facility in dollars. is the dominance of the dollar in world reserves a reflection of historical factors that are less and less relevant today? or are there fundamental reasons for the world's central banks to continue using one main currency as a source of liquidity? second, given that each bloc ’ s policy choices reflect domestic objectives, what could be achieved through international meetings? the starting point is the need to find a common analysis. domestic policies should at least be based on mutually consistent assumptions. only when there is agreement on the nature of the risks inherent in current international monetary arrangements will there be the possibility of a cooperative outcome that is an improvement for all, not just for some. third, how might we arrive at such a common analysis? the g - 7 arose out of an earlier episode of concern about exchange rate movements in the 1980s. most smaller countries can choose their exchange rate regime without worrying about its impact on the rest of the world. but the large countries – especially the three blocs i identified at the outset – cannot ignore their interdependency. that is why it is important to expand the group of countries that discuss these issues beyond the g - 7 to include those, such as china and india, whose actions increasingly have global economic consequences. my main conclusion is that the international monetary system should be seen not as a series of bilateral relationships, but as a multilateral arrangement, albeit one where a small number of the key players can usefully communicate with each other. i believe that we need to rethink the role of the imf in the international monetary system. i encourage the fund to articulate a positive vision for the management of the international monetary system in its forthcoming strategic review. i am not convinced that the future of the fund is primarily as an occasional international lender of last resort for middle - income countries suffering financial crises. at this conference the emphasis is naturally on ways to promote productivity and enterprise. monetary stability at home is now widely recognised as a necessary condition for a successful economy. it provides, as i said at last year ’ s conference, a springboard for enterprise. but international monetary