on a consolidated basis to internationally active banks. the bank participated in a joint project with the national treasury to investigate the requirements necessary to implement a deposit - insurance scheme for south africa. once certain issues have been resolved, a final proposal will be submitted to the minister of finance for consideration. a corporate governance review of 14 south african banks ( including two mutual banks, but excluding the five biggest banks ) was undertaken during the period under review. its purpose was to assess the compliance of the banks under review with sound corporate governance practices as laid down in the banks act or the mutual banks act, no 124 of 1993, the regulations to these acts, the recommendations of the myburgh report on the standard of corporate governance in the five largest banks, and the second king committee on corporate governance. international co - operation the bank continued to play an active role in the international arena. the bank and the national treasury will jointly chair the g - 20 in 2007 and the bank has been very active in preparing for this. the bank has established a g - 20 unit for this purpose, which works closely with the g - 20 secretariat in the national treasury. established in 1999, the g - 20 is a forum where central bank governors and ministers of finance of developed and systemically important emerging and developing economies deliberate on issues related to global economic and financial stability in support of global growth and development. the bank and the national treasury will undertake the preparations necessary for hosting meetings and seminars of the g - 20 next year. in august 2005, a g - 20 seminar on economic growth was held at the bank, jointly hosted by the south african reserve bank, the bank of mexico and the people ’ s bank of china. the bank is an active member of the bank for international settlements ( bis ) which acts as the central bank for the central banks of member countries. in may 2005 the bank bought further shares in the bis which represented a pro rata allocation of the redistribution of a portion of us shares in the organisation. i regularly attend the meetings of the bis, until recently representing the only african country. i am pleased to say that after many years of persuasion by ourselves for the admission of another african country, algeria is now a shareholder of the bis. our co - operation with the international monetary fund ( imf ) continues. in may 2006, i was appointed by the managing director of the imf, mr rodrigo de rato, as a member of the committee of eminent persons to study the long - term sustainability of the

international recognition and that the eurosystem made publicly as early as 2001. 1 most euro area governors are already banking supervisors. supervision could allow for better - informed monetary policy - making. in parallel, monetary policy operations could provide useful signals to the supervisory function, for instance, when a bank relies disproportionately on central bank funding. the creation of the ssm is an opportunity for europe to rethink the links between banking supervision and monetary policy in a way that can strengthen both functions and learn the lessons of past banking crises, such as avoiding “ zombie banks ” infused with central bank money or the evergreening of non - performing loans. the ssm does not need to be limited to the euro area. as the cornerstone of a financial market union, it is necessary for the euro area, but it is desirable for the eu as a whole. the participation of additional member states is welcome and would strengthen the single market. these countries have raised legitimate concerns about a fair involvement in the decision - making of the ssm. we are working hard on arrangements that would address those concerns consistent with article 127. 6 tfeu. two versions of the fiscal union there exists a link between the notion of a banking union and the second topic highlighted by the four presidents in june, that is the fiscal union. a fully - fledged banking union, including resolution and deposit insurance, assumes a partial fiscal union. let me note that this does not imply that the structure and powers of the ssm can only be decided upon when we know the full details of the fiscal union. the ssm as such does not have fiscal consequences, and should be implemented promptly. what i am referring to here is a first interpretation of the fiscal union : a limited risk - sharing capacity allowing the absorption of idiosyncratic shocks. these shocks cannot entirely be absorbed by national policies alone, given the constraints imposed by the single monetary policy and the lack of an exchange rate. therefore, there has to be a euro area fiscal capacity, as a form of limited rainy day insurance. whether other tasks could be assigned to this common fiscal capacity, such as supporting allocative efficiency, is a matter of choice, not necessity. let me voice two words of caution. first, such risk - sharing capacity should serve as a complement, not a substitute to fiscal responsibility at national level. it should not undermine the implementation of the strong national fiscal governance rules enshrined in the fiscal compact. second, the fiscal