that, at operating company level at least, all relevant entities continue to meet their capital requirements. but while tlac is necessary to achieve this, it is not in itself sufficient. what else, then, is required to stabilise a firm in resolution, to make it resolvable? i want to set out the other work we have done, and are continuing to do, to stabilise a g - sib going through a resolution process. the first is ensuring continuity in financial contracts in keeping with the kas. across fsb members, we have addressed this issue domestically in our respective jurisdictions with statutory powers to stay close - out. but that has left a risk of cross - border close - out under foreign law contracts. that could be solved by statute if hosts had powers recognise or support home country resolution actions. indeed this is included in the kas. but in some important cases, including the us, resolution regimes have been implemented without statutory powers of recognition. absent a reliable statutory approach, changes in all relevant contracts were needed instead. this underlines the importance of the achievement we have made in getting the isda protocol 4, and credit is due to industry and isda for making that happen. most of the g - sibs have already adhered to the expanded protocol covering not only otc derivatives but also securities financing transactions. by the end of this year, the remaining advanced economy g - sibs will also have adhered. but more importantly, with the jurisdictional modular protocol in place and regulation requiring adherence published for the largest jurisdictions the way is clear for the rest of the market, in particular buyside firms, to adhere. the protocol effort was built around the principle that entry into resolution in itself should not give counterparties the right to close out, at least not while a bank in resolution continues to perform. this encapsulates the new paradigm of resolution. we need to ensure that other market contracts and conventions are set up in a similar way. i want to mention one where we have just finished work in fsb and one where we are just starting. the former is operational continuity. last autumn, fsb published for consultation draft guidance 5 for how shared services it and operational processes should be set up in g - sibs for them to be resolvable. again this builds on resolution planning work in cmgs and identification via the rap process of operational continuity as a generic barrier to resolution. the draft guidance not only addresses the setup of

, financial services are something the uk is very good at. the uk is one of the best places in the world to come if you ’ re looking for highly skilled people, deep and specialised financial markets, a robust legal system, and trusted institutions. it is also home to an incredibly innovative financial sector. those are the foundations upon which the uk ’ s comparative advantage in financial services is built. as a very large global financial centre, the uk benefits from so - called ‘ agglomeration effects ’. these are self - reinforcing effects which emerge when businesses cluster together in the same place. in the uk ’ s case, the advantages that attract firms to come to do business here – deep and varied markets and a huge supply of talented financial professionals – get stronger the more firms come. this is because such clustering leads to economies of scale and scope and positive spillovers which further entrench the uk ’ s advantages. the agglomeration effects the uk enjoys as a financial centre are well established and underpin its international competitiveness. although these advantages are not rooted in financial regulation, regulators have an important role to play in providing an environment that protects and enhances these advantages. we know, for example, that firms value predictable and consistent regulation. [ 13 ] so the first thing the pra can do to facilitate competitiveness is to help maintain trust in the uk as a good place to do business. and it can do so by maintaining a regulatory regime that is open to international business, nondiscriminating, predictable, transparent, responsive to threats and opportunities, and which provides clear and accessible rules. one thing i want to make clear is that i don ’ t believe regulators should engage in risky compromises such as regulatory races to the bottom to win business. these compromises plant the seeds of future instability, as anyone who has studied the causes of financial crises will attest. there is no need for the uk make those compromises in pursuit of the underlying advantages and agglomeration effects i described earlier. this approach may possibly be suited to centres that are seeking to start from scratch or from modest beginnings, and do not have much to lose if these risky bets backfire. it is not suited to global financial centres that already enjoy and want to enhance their existing strengths. rather, regulators can contribute to the success of uk financial services by maintaining a record of strong and predictable rules, openness to international business and alignment with international standards that they have