turning our attention to russia, we observe a notable increase in the current account surplus, stemming from mixed factors, among which the effect of the surge in gas and oil prices is associated with an adverse volume effect [ slide 15 ]. sanctions further influenced this dynamic, as our export restrictions to russia translated into diminished imports, which had a positive impact on the current account. the increase in russia ’ s current account does not inherently denote an increase of russia's wealth ; comprehensive insights on this matter can be found in the insightful works of scholars such as oleg itskhoki and dmitry mukhin. so now, what ’ s next? let me share with you some thoughts on what we call the greening of global imbalances. [ slide 15 : war, russia in 2022 ] the greening of global imbalances to think about the evolution of current accounts in the coming years and decades, there are three groups of questions that need to be raised. the first relates to the reallocation of trade flows across industries, anticipating shifts away from fossil fuel exports, a potential decline in long - distance tourism, and possibly a decrease in services necessitating face - to - face interactions. meanwhile, trade of minerals, and of green and technological investment goods, are likely to expand. the reallocation of trade flows will have consequential impacts on trade imbalances [ slide 18 ]. for instance, the current account surplus from fossil fuel exporters is likely to diminish, with reduced deficit or increased surpluses for import - dependent nations. however, the final impact on imbalances is non - trivial given the multiplicity of trade reallocations. a comprehensive understanding requires general equilibrium models to capture the simultaneous evolution of interdependent quantity and price variables. [ slide 18 : changes in trade flows may be complex ] the second type of question delves into the reallocation of aggregate demands : will the reallocation of saving - investment imbalances triggered by the pandemic be long lasting? will private savings increase, or will savings return to pre - covid levels? will there be a shift towards increased investment but reduced consumption during the green transition? we do not know the answers to these fundamental questions yet. the third set of questions revolves around the relocation of saving and investment imbalances, both at the intra and international levels, depending on transition strategies. for instance, a nation's reliance on carbon pricing versus public investments

] to wrap up the first part of my talk, three elements may weaken adjustments of current account imbalances [ slide 11 ]. the first is the rise of services trade, which is less elastic to relative prices than trade in goods. second, there is the rise in stock positions, which results in income flows being an increasingly important determinant of current account balances, with substantial inertia in relation to legacy assets and debts. finally, the dominant currency paradigm means that expenditure - switching channels may be muted and slow down external adjustments. [ slide 11 : policy implications : impact on external adjustment ] recent shocks to current accounts : covid - 19, and russia ’ s invasion of ukraine in recent years, the global economy has experienced a series of important shocks, among which covid - 19 [ slide 13 ]. the repercussions of this pandemic have been diverse and complex. primarily, we observed a surge in china's trade surplus, in relation to the supply of medical goods. yet, the most dramatic consequence materialized in the evolution of net lending and borrowing across sectors, as for example shown in this slide for four countries. 2020 marked a distinct shift, characterized by an increase in government deficits and a simultaneous surge in net savings within the private sector. in recent years, the surge in energy prices had a significant impact, amplifying trade surpluses for exporters while weighing on importers. the key question is whether this trajectory is temporary or persistent — we will come back to this matter in the last part of this speech. [ slide 13 : covid ] another major shock in 2022 was russia's invasion of ukraine. the impact on ukraine's current account is notable, as reflected in the chart [ slide 14 ], measured as a percentage of ukrainian gdp. beyond the base effect, it is essential to acknowledge historical contexts where the influence of wars on current accounts depended on the support provided by allies. an illustration is found in france during world war i, where the trade deficit surged to 30 % of gdp in 1917, fueled by resource imports from england, north america, and its colonies. in contrast, germany sustained much smaller deficits, falling below 5 % of gdp, as it had not received lending from allies. the paradoxical increase in ukraine's current account in 2022, despite a substantial trade deficit, stems from secondary income, which mostly comprises foreign aid contributions. [ slide 14 : war, ukraine in 2022 ]