is my belief that we must relook our business model. we need a model that reinforces and supports our purpose, our why, and addresses our how and our what ; a model that is customer centric, and technology driven, but which also accommodates the not - so tech savvy among us ; a model that promotes economic and social transformation, while strengthening financial stability ; a model that helps us to manage our risks, traditional and the non - traditional. we have assembled a cadre of experts to deliberate on these issues. the leaders of two of the region ’ s financial behemoths will speak on repositioning the sector and share their companies ’ journey to going global, their successes, their experiences, their challenges and their solutions. and the bank will use the opportunity to describe the economic environment in which the repositioning will take place. deputy governor of the sveriges riksbank ( central bank in sweden ) will explain how his country automated its payments system. sweden has eliminated cheques, and 70 per cent of the swedish population does not use cash. de - risking remains a bugbear for the financial services and other local industries. much of the focus has been on the loss by regional banks of access to correspondent banking. this has resulted in domestic banks de - risking some local clients in what are considered high risk industries. we assess the phenomenon in the context of the national and regional discussion about legalising cannabis for medical purposes, and the problems that it poses for gaming 2 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches businesses. after government ’ s recent debt restructuring, we must reform the securities market. our final panel will help us to look at the possibilities for reshaping how the market functions, including the potential for strengthening the secondary market. the recent announcement of government ’ s intention to establish a unit trust and introduce new vehicles to provide more investment opportunities for barbadians will help to redefine the securities and investments space. join me in thanking the organisers for designing a rich agenda for the 10th anniversary of the domestic financial institutions conference. i welcome you to this conference, and i look forward to the interaction and exchanges on how we can reposition the financial services sector. i am confident that together we will redefine our what and our how as we live our why as simon sinek entreats us. i thank you. 3 / 3 bis central bankers'speeches

andreas dombret : holistic approaches to solve the “ euro crisis ” speech by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at the global economic symposium, kiel, 1 october 2013. * * * ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the invitation to this year ’ s global economic symposium ; it is a pleasure to be here. the “ euro crisis ” has certainly been, and it still is, a defining moment in the history of european monetary union – though i would add that we are dealing with a sovereign debt crisis rather than a crisis of the euro. let me kick off the discussion by offering some thoughts on how to solve the crisis. what we need is a holistic approach. since the european monetary union is a highly interdependent system, any solution must not only remedy the problem at hand but also improve the working of the system as a whole. unfortunately, many of the proposed solutions fall short of this requirement. instead, they are prone to what is known as the “ cobra effect ”. the cobra anecdote is set in colonial india. trying to stop a plague of cobras, the british government offered a bounty for every dead snake. the plan seemed to be working at first. high numbers of dead cobras were presented to the colonial administration. unfortunately, this did not get the plague under control. most of the dead cobras were not wild ones – they had been bred by enterprising locals in order to claim the bounty. when the governor finally caught wind of the practice, he scrapped the reward, causing the cobra breeders to set the now worthless snakes free. as a result, the plague was worse than ever. every policy not only addresses a problem, but changes the nature of the game as well. this has to be taken into account when evaluating the overall merit of any measure. and when we look beyond instant effects, many policies lose their lustre. eurobonds are a case in point. granted, eurobonds would offer temporary relief to heavily indebted member states of the euro area. but the introduction of eurobonds would distort the already lopsided balance between liability and control even further. while spending decisions would essentially remain a national prerogative, liability would become european. incentives to incur further debt would thus be strengthened, not weakened. this would strain rather than smooth the working of the system. only if common liability were matched by common control would incentives be