. in this way, regulatory systems are advised to be reviewed and elaborated to be better adapted to current developments and to financial system ’ s perspectives. the financial system does not operate in the vacuum. it functions under real conditions and our task is to adapt to best experiences. i think our task is to identify the best practices and to try to adjust them to the real conditions of our economy, because by adjusting them to the whole regulatory framework and banking activity, we come to a motif and motivation : the european community. i am confident that you will use this seminar to find out joint elements in the activity of your institutions, as well as to identify the distinctions. i think it would be valuable to identify also the cases that represent what is regarded as the “ best practice ” in deposit insurance area. in this way, it would contribute to the achievement of the objective to standardize the regional insurance practices and to create a clearer vision on the insurance activity performance in the future. the activity of the albanian deposit insurance agency is new. as such, its capability of operating in extreme cases is not proved yet. nevertheless, efforts are made constantly for fulfilling the necessary legal framework and procedures, covering all possible directions of its activity. simultaneously, there is worked in terms of organizing the structure, increasing the institution ’ s staff number and training. emphasis is laid on the dia ’ s cooperation with the bank of albania, the supervisory authority, so that the dia carries out its functions effectively. at the same time, the relation with the ministry of finance is taken into consideration in organizing the deposit insurance agency ’ s structure, so as to have the solid presence of the state in it. the forms of this cooperation are numerous, but all of them should be first consolidated under normal conditions of the banking system activity. the main elements of this cooperation are : • exchange of information on supervisory practices and observance of regulatory requirements by the insured entities ; • organization of joint trainings in getting acquainted with respective functions ; • acquaintance with and discussion on manuals and procedures requiring the commitment of both institutions in certain cases, and the testing of these procedures. the bank of albania and the deposit insurance agency are working for enhancing this cooperation constantly. 2 / 3 a number of legal and regulatory alterations that are being prepared in parallel by both our institutions, and the exchange of information, as well as more frequent contacts between both institutions serve this purpose. it is aimed at adopting best practices in this area, and at implementing the recommendations given

not provide absolute protection against a loss of confidence. credit suisse was always fully compliant with all regulatory capital requirements, even at the peak of the crisis. clients, market participants and rating agencies, however, were increasingly casting doubt on the bank ’ s fundamental resilience. they also questioned its ability to successfully implement the announced strategic transformation plan. ultimately, credit suisse lost the confidence of the markets. second, its at1 capital instruments were written down when state support became unavoidable. at this late stage in the crisis, they thus played an important role in the package of measures. at1 capital instruments actually contain specific features that are intended to absorb losses in the early stages of a crisis so that a bank can stabilise its situation through its own efforts. however, these features were not applied. in particular, credit suisse refrained from cancelling interest payments on these instruments despite incurring losses over a prolonged period of time. such a measure would have provided immediate financial relief for the bank. at the same time, however, credit suisse would have exposed itself to the risk of negative market reactions – and thus also to the risk that refinancing would have become even more difficult and expensive. third, customers withdrew deposits at an extremely rapid rate, especially last october, and then in particular in march of this year. credit suisse ’ s liquidity buffers were still able to cover the considerable outflows in october. in mid - march, however, its liquidity was no longer sufficient to cover the exceptionally rapid outflows. a contributory factor in this regard was that a significant portion of the liquidity held was needed for operational purposes. in addition, the collateral prepared by credit suisse was insufficient to cover the outflows using the snb ’ s existing liquidity facilities. the liquidity assistance made available on the basis of emergency law, ela +, thus created the necessary time window until a comprehensive solution to the crisis of confidence could be worked out. in future, banks should be required to prepare sufficient assets in such a way that they can be delivered to their respective central banks as collateral for existing liquidity facilities. page 5 / 8 zurich, 22 june 2023 thomas jordan, martin schlegel and andrea m. maechler news conference taken together, these observations raise an important question concerning the ‘ too big to fail ’ ( tbtf ) regulations : are these regulations adequately geared towards the timely adoption of correct