what i call a “ financing and investment union ” ( fiu ). why? because numerous businesses in europe wish to invest and innovate but are unable to find appropriate financing. still, the funds are by no means lacking : the euro area has a savings surplus of 350 billion euro, i. e. more than 3 % of gdp. the fiu would facilitate the mobilisation of these abundant savings towards investment. to achieve this, we must develop synergies between the existing initiatives : capital markets union, the juncker plan and banking union. but we must also go still further, with two clear goals. firstly, diversification of financing to meet businesses ’ needs. equity financing, rather than debt financing, is better adapted to risk taking and therefore to innovation. but europe currently lags very far behind in this area : equity financing of businesses is less than half that in the united states ( 67 % of gdp in the euro area compared with 125 % in the united states ). secondly : increased resilience of the euro area thanks to integrated capital markets. as jens weidmann and i wrote last year, this manner of sharing private risks is the best way to counter asymmetric shocks within a monetary union. in the united states for example, private equity is capable of absorbing around 40 % of an economic shock specific to a state. 3. the new international environment makes action more urgent. some of those around us seem to no longer believe in the benefits of the european union. the new us president has stated this very clearly, and the british chose to leave the union. these changes bring us face to face with our responsibilities : we can no longer afford to wait and see. but how should we respond? not by less europe. that would be a mistake if we wish to have collective control over our destiny in this new world. we should respond with a “ better ” europe, less distracted by details, more focused on its priorities and more efficient. there is no point in just talking about it, we must take the necessary measures to achieve concrete results. there are, of course, non economic areas such as defence, border security, climate change and youth education and training, to mention just a few. but in economic matters, there is also a lot that remains to be done. we in europe have three major assets : our single currency, our single market and our common european social model. i wish to stress the extent to which this “ soziale

still growing : 81 % at the end of 2016. support is also strong on average in the euro area ( 70 % ) and in my own country ( 68 % ). however, we are all agreed that monetary policy alone is not enough to ensure stronger growth. 2. to achieve stronger growth, our countries must reform and europe must rapidly bring two supplementary levers into action. the first growth lever for the euro area is more reform in our countries and a better collective economic strategy. growth and employment would be stronger in europe with more structural reforms where they are a priority, such as in france, and more public investment for instance and fiscal support in those countries with room for manoeuvre, such as germany. regarding reform, like you, i would like france to accelerate ; i say it frequently in my country. these reforms are compatible with the european social model that we share ; many successes in europe have demonstrated this. but you must not consider your french neighbour to be “ unreformable ”. france has not been immobile over the past few years. pensions have been reformed. reforms such as the cice tax credit, the responsibility pact and the so - called “ el 2 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches khomri ” labour law have substantially reduced the burden for businesses. france has met its deficit reduction targets for the past two years. this fiscal credibility must continue to improve in 2017. all this is not enough, but you should not doubt france too much, even in this election year. the soundness of our political institutions and majority system represent lasting advantages. from its significantly more positive economic situation, germany should also continue with reform : demographic change is likely to result in a decline in the working population – and the present inflow of refugees will not change this to any significant extent. this means that growth will slow in the long term. however, it is obviously not for me to advise measures for your country. at european level, our competitiveness will depend in particular on creating a large digital single market. i know that when the french speak of coordination in europe, germans sometimes suspect it to be a new trick to avoid reform. we must break out of this dead - end : we need both national reforms and european coordination. as helmut schmidt repeated frequently, we must build economic union as well as monetary union. but this does not in my view mean a “ union of transfers ”, which germany quite legitimately refuses. the second growth lever : create in parallel