to limit the financing of government deficits by the cbn have not been successful, despite its operational autonomy. the problem of fiscal surprises in the country is compounded by lack of control in the expansionary fiscal operations of the state and local governments. corporate governance for credibility of the central bank to subsist, a widely accepted corporate governance arrangement must be put in place. in this regard, good governance must begin with internal consistency in the bank ’ s operational framework and administrative structure such that the attainment of the primary objective of monetary and financial sector stability will be ensured, while high quality of service to government, financial institutions and other stakeholders in the economy is maintained. besides, robust contingency plans that will promote the soundness and stability of financial institutions must be strictly implemented. in recognition of the fundamental role of the effective conduct of monetary policy in any economy a central bank should accord special attention to enhancing its efficiency. towards this end, the central bank must be mindful of the quality of its staff in terms of technical skill, competence and knowledge. cognizant of the need for capacity building to ensure enhanced efficiency in meeting its mandate, the cbn has in the past three years embarked on a comprehensive reform agenda under which its work processes and procedure have been upgraded and re - engineered. v. conclusion in conclusion, i would like to make some suggestions on how good governance can be enthroned and measured, drawing on international best practices. in consonance with the principles of good governance, central banks should be autonomous from government in discharging their statutory mandates. such independence has often been associated with the powers to limit credit to the government, given the destabilizing effect of central bank lending to finance public sector deficits. governments should be forced to balance their budgets or borrow at market rates to finance their deficits. although this might be a problem for countries with under - developed financial markets, the effect in promoting fiscal discipline and facilitating the achievement of growth objectives is deemed to be more profound. an independent central bank should ensure that its policy intervention is well coordinated in the context of the overall government economic policies and objectives. policy credibility can also be enhanced if central banks submit themselves to third party assessments, e. g. by the imf, world bank, and subscribe to acceptable international conventions and codes on central banking. such a convention is the 1988 basel accord, which established guidelines on international minimum capital standard that limits banks ’ capital requirement to their credit exposure. adopting

such standards would encourage central banks to reform their procedures and processes in line with international best practices. moreover, accountability and transparency are best enhanced through effective information dissemination. central banks should periodically subject themselves to public scrutiny on their operations and frameworks. another best practice that comes to mind is the example of the reserve bank of new zealand, where every year, an outstanding economist is appointed and mandated to review the monetary policy of the previous year. these are some of my thoughts on strategies for enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving economic stability. i sincerely thank you all for your kind attention.