##estr should replace stibor – the riksbank will play an active part in this work so to summarise, my message here today is this : the reference rates that have been dominant for several decades have clear flaws, and this is true both internationally and in our own swedish financial market. due to the riksbank starting to provide swestr for the swedish market, there is now a robust and reliable alternative to stibor. so there are good reasons to start the transition from stibor at its shortest maturity ( stibor t / n ) to swestr as soon as possible, in line with international developments. it is not work done from one day to the next, but it is a job worth doing. in the longer run, it should also be possible for swestr to replace stibor at longer maturities. the riksbank will support this transition in various ways. our goal is that the dominant reference rate in the swedish financial market shall be of the highest international standard and that requires both support from us as authorities and a high level of ambition among the various market participants. thank you for listening. i look forward to your questions and comments. tomorrow - next refers to a deposit from the next business day to the following business day. the riksbank collects data both on short - term money market transactions in swedish kronor and on other transactions that may form the basis of stibor. transactions under ten million kronor do not have to be reported. in the euro area, the old eonia reference rate still formally exists, but was redefined a few years ago as the new reference rate of €str plus a fixed premium. the nine monetary policy counterparties that currently report their swestr - relevant transactions on a daily basis are handelsbanken, swedbank, seb, danske bank, dnb, skandiabanken, lansforsakringar bank, sbab and nordea. 8

lars nyberg : after the crisis – new thoughts on monetary policy speech by mr lars nyberg, deputy governor of the sveriges riksbank, at nordea, stockholm, 6 december 2010. * * * i would like to thank mikael apel and erik lenntorp for contributing to this speech. crises lead to all sorts of problems. but they also cause us to rethink ingrained ideas and earlier accepted practices. if we succeed in learning the right lessons from a crisis and implementing wise changes, this may lead to a better development in the long run. but it is not always easy to see exactly what lessons we need to learn. for example, we are still not entirely agreed on all of the details regarding the crisis in the 1930s – why it arose and how it became so severe. in the same way, it will probably take time before there is a consensus on what lessons we should learn from the financial crisis we have just experienced. some of the lessons are fairly obvious, however. for instance, we can with hindsight note that there were clear inadequacies in the regulations and supervision intended to maintain financial stability. new regulatory frameworks are now taking shape both internationally and in individual countries, and there are discussions on how to make supervision more effective. one example of the work done so far is the agreement in september on the basel iii framework, which in brief entails raising the requirements regarding the capital and liquidity that the banks are required to hold. i will return to the subject of regulations and supervision later. the crisis has raised questions regarding the functioning of the economy but crises also raise more fundamental questions regarding the way the economy functions in different respects. are the economic relationships really as we believed them to be, or have our theories and models missed something? could there be a reason to begin thinking differently? these types of question are often much more difficult to answer. it usually takes years of practical experience and theoretical and empirical research before one can draw conclusions with any reasonable certainty. but it is quite clear that the crisis has brought to the fore a number of interesting questions. i intend to take up three areas, which i believe will be discussed in the coming period, both in the central bank world and in academic research. what these all have in common is that, in one way or another, they affect the monetary policy transmission mechanism, that is, the way the central bank ’ s policy rate decisions affect the economy. one can briefly say that the