financial or fiscal dominance risks might not accrue. there should therefore be a strict separation between the supervisor and a resolution authority. against this background it is reassuring that the transfer of supervisory responsibilities to the ssm will not have any implications for the independence of the ecb in performing all its tasks. by implication, the necessary internal precautions against political interference in supervisory matters adversely affecting the ecb ’ s independence in conducting monetary policy have been taken. but further external precautions need to be taken to ensure that financial and fiscal dominance risks do not threaten the independence of the ecb. a crucial point in this context is the existence of a well - functioning european bank resolution mechanism. such an outside mechanism provides further protection for the central bank ’ s balance sheet and its monetary policy independence, and has a twofold objective : first, it aims to limit the residual risk to governments ’ balance sheets, in particular through the timely implementation of bail - in instruments, so that the risk of financial dominance is not compounded by a risk of fiscal dominance. second, it aims to ensure a strict separation between supervision and resolution. 2013 will be a key year for europe to make progress with this second leg of the banking union. bis central bankers ’ speeches concluding remarks let me now conclude. it is essential for europe to introduce the different elements of the banking union as soon as possible, starting with the ssm involving the ecb, and promptly continuing with a separate bank resolution mechanism. this will not only contribute to the integrity of the euro area and the completion of emu, but also has some benefits for the conduct of monetary policy. the current draft legislative framework proposed by the european commission and the preparatory work done by the ecb, the national central banks and competent supervisory authorities on implementing the ssm also takes a forward - looking approach to handling the challenges of integrating banking supervision in a central bank. this will make sure that the ssm achieves its objectives ; that the desirable synergies between banking supervision and monetary policy ( and other central bank functions ) are realised ; and that the primary objective of monetary policy to maintain price stability is fully respected. to achieve this objective, three conditions should be met : the internal governance of the ecb should strictly separate the two functions ; the architecture of the banking union should provide for a separate, common resolution mechanism as soon as possible ; and the ecb as a supervisor should not hesitate to enforce capital and liquidity regulations, recognise losses in the banking system and identify failed

both this and next year. this is an important factor supporting productivity growth in the economy. let me now turn to euro adoption. the clear perspective of joining the euro area increases markedly estonia's credibility and serves as the main factor supporting our economy in the near future. we are likely to meet the numerical values of the maastricht criteria by the end of 2009 and estonia expects to join the euro area in 2011, in full accordance with the treaty provisions. it is clear that in order to adopt the euro, the key issue of estonia's fiscal policy is ensuring sustainable public finances in the next years. looking at longer - term growth potential, it would be advisable not to achieve this by excessive increases in the tax burden. finally, the way out from the current crisis depends critically on further strengthening of the eu single market for goods, services and production factors ( including capital, labour and know - how ). to conclude i would like to assure that eesti pank is always open for your inquires and cooperation. thank you for your attention!