, on the other hand, are a different kind of animal. these cryptoassets are not e - money tokens and purport to maintain a stable value by referencing to any other value or right, or a combination of both, including one or more official currencies. the composition and administration of the underlying reserve assets thus become key elements and, consequently, mica extensively addresses the conditions which should guide their management. as such, the reserve assets may only be invested in highly liquid financial instruments with minimal concentration, credit and market risk. moreover, mica requires that the reserve be managed in such a manner that the liquidity risks associated with the permanent redemption rights of the holders are addressed, and that the risks associated with the assets referenced by the asset - referenced tokens are covered. finally, in order to protect the interests of token - holders, the reserve will have to be operationally segregated from the issuer's estate. despite the significant progress achieved, mica is unfortunately facing what i hope proves to be one last delay in its adoption process. in fact, reflecting the complexity and 2 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches exhaustiveness of this text, it is now heading for a february slot before the european parliament, which is expected to give its final endorsement. from then on the clock will start ticking on what will most likely be a profound game changer for this industry. contributing to shaping the regulatory framework, as we have done with mica, is probably the most straightforward way to deal with new developments. nevertheless, it may not be enough to avoid certain undesired effects, and crypo - assets are a good example in this regard. let us imagine what would happen if stablecoins denominated in a currency other than the official one were extensively used. they may not pose risks to the financial system, if properly regulated and supervised, but this situation could introduce fragmentation, undermine the role of central bank money as monetary anchor, and, ultimately, bring instability and hinder monetary sovereignty. therefore, central banks need to stand ready to take additional measures, if needed, which leads me to the second part of my address. the eurosystem experience in developing and providing a digital euro one of the additional measures that could be adopted to respond to the challenges raised by financial innovation is the development of a retail central bank digital currency ( cbdc ). in fact, a cbdc's potential contribution to boosting the strategic autonomy of the

- level agreements. in addition, the fact that employees with temporary contracts continue to bear the brunt of adjustments to negative shocks raises the volatility of employment and discourages the formation of human capital. lessening the differences between the different types of contract, which would be negative if it were a disincentive to the demand for labour as a whole, would contribute to promoting productivity gains and reducing inequality. the challenge of reducing public debt i shall now address the high level of public debt, one of the most notorious legacies of the crisis. after increasing by more than 60 percentage points relative to its pre - crisis level, the public debt / gdp ratio has stabilised at around 100 % of gdp, against a background in which our budget deficit level remains high when compared with other euro area countries. 6 / 8 we need to consider the risks this situation poses. it is necessary to reduce general government debt both to lessen the vulnerability of public finances to any potential tightening in financing conditions and to restore scope for a fiscal policy response to any future adverse shocks. however, even in the current favourable environment of economic growth and low interest rates, the probability of the level of spanish general government debt standing below the euro area reference level of 60 % of gdp in the next decade is low. factors conducive to public sector deleveraging are higher economic growth in real terms, the prospect of higher inflation, limited interest rate movements and a reduction in the deficit. i shall focus on the last two factors : the interest burden and budgetary consolidation. evidently, a high level of public debt involves a likewise - high interest burden. while general government interest expenditure has eased owing to the effects of monetary policy, its level, at close to 3 % of gdp, is above the average recorded since the launch of the single currency, in 1999. moreover, the opportunity cost of this expenditure is very high : we might recall, for instance, that the volume of resources assigned at present by overall general government to nursery, primary and secondary education is similar to the cost of covering debt service. further, we should bear in mind that public debt financing conditions may become less favourable than at present. in this respect, given the high level of debt, an increase in interest rates may have a significant impact on interest expenditure, although this effect would take some time to become manifest, since the lengthy average term of maturity means that the pass - through of changes in interest rates to the cost of refinancing