recovery plan within the next six months, to be supplemented by cross - border co - operation agreements. the framework for systemic institutions is now being extended to domestic banks, global insurers, and key shadow banks. when implemented, greater supervisory intensity and higher loss absorbency will ensure that the system is never again beholden to the fate of a single firm or group of firms. creating continuously open markets an important element of ending too - big - to - fail is ensuring that key markets can withstand the failure of systemic firms. it is unacceptable that core markets seized up during crisis, and that relatively small firms had to be saved because of concerns that they would take markets with them if they failed. creating continuously open core markets requires changes to the plumbing of derivative and repo markets, along with better data and tracking of exposures. moving from shadow banking to market - based finance the fsb is working to strengthen the oversight and regulation of shadow banking so that it is a source of competition ( to promote efficiency ) and diversity ( to promote resilience ) to the regulated sector. this will require changes to how money - market funds are managed, the bis central bankers ’ speeches terms of securitisation and, most importantly, how links between the regulated banking sector and shadow banks are managed. timely, consistent implementation finally, the fsb is increasingly focused on timely, full and consistent implementation of agreed reforms. this is essential to preserve the advantages of an open and globally integrated financial system. recent experience demonstrates that when mutual confidence is lost, the retreat from an open and integrated system can occur rapidly. a return to a nationally segmented global financial system would reduce both systemic resilience and financial capacity for investment and growth. conclusion let me conclude with some comments on the current economic environment. the recoveries in advanced economies continue to be dampened by the ongoing need to repair sovereign, bank and household balance sheets. while the u. s. economy is expanding at a modest pace, some of the risks around the european crisis are materialising and risks remain skewed to the downside. the emerging world continues to be the engine of global growth, although weak demand in advanced economies and the effects of past policy tightening are slowing the pace of expansion in china and other major emerging - market economies. as a result of more modest global economic momentum and heightened financial risk aversion, commodity prices have fallen in recent months, although they remain at historically elevated levels. despite these ongoing global headwinds

with this, the international monetary fund has said it sees no evidence of changes to the neutral rates of advanced economies compared with pre - pandemic see j. platzer and m. peruffo, “ secular drivers of the natural rate of interest in the united states : a quantitative evaluation, ” international monetary fund working paper no. 2022 / 030 ( february 11, 2022 ) ; and l. straub, “ consumption, savings, and the distribution of permanent income, ” harvard university department of economics working paper ( june 5, 2019 ). the term “ missing investment puzzle ” was originally coined by bank of england governor andrew bailey in a recent speech. see a. bailey, “ the economic landscape : structural change, global r * and the missinginvestment puzzle ” ( speech delivered to the official monetary and financial institutions forum, july 12, 2022 ). for details on these three factors, see r. j. gordon, “ is u. s. economic growth over? faltering innovation confronts the six headwinds, ” national bureau of economic research working paper no. 18315 ( august 2012 ) ; g. gutierrez and t. philippon, “ investmentless growth : an empirical investigation, ” brookings papers on economic activity 48, no. 2 ( 2017 ) : 89 – 169 ; and bailey ( 2022 ). - 10 estimates. 8 and when we look at our own models, our most recent analysis suggests canada ’ s neutral rate has not drifted much from its pre - pandemic range and currently lies around 0 % – 1 % in real terms, or 2 % – 3 % in nominal terms. 9 those ranges are our base case for where we think short - term rates will settle once inflation returns to normal. however, the risks around that base case are tilted to the upside. looking across the four forces i just listed, there are good reasons to believe that some may be reaching a plateau or even changing course. that makes it unlikely the real neutral rate will fall below pre - pandemic estimates and creates a meaningful risk that it could go up. 10 take demographics and aging. in many countries, large shares of the population are no longer saving in preparation for retirement but are actually retired — so they are in a stage of life when people typically start spending their savings. this should be a source of downward pressure on global saving and upward pressure on real rates, though the precise extent and timing are difficult to predict