terme de nos deux instituts, qui diverge fondamentalement de la politique de reglage en finesse du processus economique pratiquee autrefois dans les pays anglo - saxons, devrait egalement etre adoptee, a mon avis, par la future banque centrale europeenne. le fait que les politiques menees par la banque de france et la deutsche bundesbank soient semblables, en theorie comme en pratique, n ’ est pas du au seul hasard. c ’ est l ’ aboutissement d ’ un processus de rapprochement lance depuis assez longtemps deja. le facteur decisif a certainement ete le fait qu ’ au printemps 1983 la france a opte pour une politique economique et financiere axee sur la stabilite et qu ’ elle n ’ a pas devie de cette voie durant les annees suivantes, malgre toutes les difficultes qu ’ elle a rencontrees. le resultat est que les taux de change se sont stabilises dans une mesure croissante au sein du sme, tout comme le niveau des prix en europe. avec le traite de maastricht qui prevoit que les banques centrales nationales n ’ ont aucune instruction a recevoir des gouvernements, la france et l ’ allemagne ont deliberement recherche aussi la convergence au niveau institutionnel et, a present, elles ont largement realise cet objectif. iii etant donne que les dangers menacant la stabilite se sont accrus et que la politique monetaire exerce, depuis une assez longue periode, des effets de plus en plus expansifs meme si les taux directeurs n ’ ont pas bouge, la bundesbank a legerement resserre les renes monetaires debut octobre. plusieurs autres banques centrales europeennes - - dont la banque de france - - ont elles aussi releve quelque pe

institutions would also have been better prepared for sovereign crises. the point is that such robust targets are independent of risk assessment errors and provide additional buffers to absorb risks stemming from the “ known unknowns ” and “ unknown unknowns ”. another example of how complexity reduction can help prevent crisis is standardisation of financial products. in the past, otc contracts were created with unknown and very hard - tohandle, non - normal probability distributions of random variables – which means creating “ known unknowns ” via terms of contracts with potentially destabilising effects on the financial system. 3. second and third sybilline book : communicating risk analysis the second message we might have found in the sibylline books is this : “ be aware that risk analysis has to be carefully communicated. sometimes policy backups are necessary. ” the example of stress testing immediately leads us to the third message of sibylline books. in a setting in which financial analysis is communicated to the public it is important to find the balance between making realistic assumptions about scenarios and avoiding devastating self - fulfilling prophecies of the markets. moreover, if stress tests detect capital needs private and public recapitalisation has to be announced and implemented, thereby preventing market uncertainty. in a systemic crisis recapitalisation has to be a part of a comprehensive package including public aid for banks. this aid helps to restore confidence in the wholesale markets, to overcome funding problems and ultimately to mitigate excessive deleveraging pressure. 4. fourth and fifth sybilline book : building up institutions and credibility the fourth message contained in the sibylline books could be : “ systemic risk analysis needs an appropriate institutional set - up ”. as in ancient rome, where the sibylline books were treasured by the priests of the temple of jupiter, modern - day risk analysis needs an institutional framework. the eu has solved this problem by delegating systemic risk analysis to the esrb which can issue official warnings and recommendations. other eu bodies and the national authorities are responsible for implementing policy measures. central banks have an important role to play here given their analysis competence and expertise. but monetary policy instruments are not in the first instance financial stability policy instruments. bis central bankers ’ speeches therefore, the institutional set up is not simply a matter of organisation but essentially a matter of credibility of the institutions involved. so the fifth sibylline message might be this : “ the risk analysis credibility of the various bodies needs to be built up