pdf. see, for example justin bloesch and francois gourio ( 2015 ), “ the effect of winter weather on u. s. economic activity, ” federal reserve bank of chicago, economic perspectives, vol. 39 ( first quarter ), pp. 1 – 20, https : / / www. chicagofed. org / publications / economic - perspectives / 2015 / 1q - bloesch - gourio ; justin gallagher and daniel hartley ( 2015 ), “ household finance after a natural disaster : the case of hurricane katrina, ” working paper 14 - 06r ( cleveland : federal reserve bank of cleveland, december ), - 8events for all our work — from forecasts for the federal open market committee to guidance provided to banks in the wake of federal disaster declarations to our efforts to understand the effects on low - to moderate - income communities. 19 work to understand the implications of climate - related risks for our economy and financial system is at an early stage. that is why we are particularly eager to learn from the work of our colleagues here and abroad. in that regard, the commodity futures trading commission ’ s ( cftc ) vote to establish the climate - related market risk subcommittee is noteworthy, and i look forward to their observations. 20 https : / / www. clevelandfed. org / en / newsroom - and - events / publications / working - papers / 2015 - workingpapers / wp - 1406r - household - finance - after - a - natural - disaster. aspx ; daniel j. wilson ( 2017 ), “ the impact of weather on local employment : using big data on small places, ” working paper 2016 - 21 ( san francisco : federal reserve bank of san francisco, june ), https : / / www. frbsf. org / economicresearch / files / wp2016 - 21. pdf ; and brigitte roth tran ( 2019 ), “ sellin ’ in the rain : adaptation to weather and climate in the retail sector, ” finance and economics discussion series 2019 - 067 ( washington : board of governors of the federal reserve system, september ), https : / / doi. org / 10. 17016 / feds. 2019. 067. see stephie fried, kevin novan, and william b. peterman ( 2016 ), “ the distributional effects of a carbon tax on current and future generations, ” finance and economics discussion series 2016 - 038

individual countries. transparency alone cannot do the job of good bank regulation, but it is hard to imagine a solution to the international lending problems of the day without more transparent accounting. • the imf. last but not least i discuss the imf. frankly, my own feeling is that if an institution like the imf did not exist, we would want to invent something like it. here is an international institution that, at least in principle, can supervise the finances of different countries without the accusations of big brother that would come about if the united states alone tried to put itself in this role. moreover, it can organize other lending countries to bring support to countries in need of liquidity assistance, as opposed to having the bill fall entirely on the united states. supporting the existence of something like the imf does not suggest agreement with its exact structure or with all of its policies. the present crisis indicates that international preventive medicine provisions are weak. it may be difficult for the imf to perform this warning system role, but there is clearly a need for better warnings about the risks of lending to certain countries, to prevent currency vulnerabilities from building up as much as they did. the imf ’ s “ one size fits all ” recommendations of fiscal austerity should also be re - examined, because in many asian countries expansionary fiscal policies were clearly called for indeed, still are called for - while the imf initially recommended the reverse. but the two biggest criticisms of the imf involve the moral hazard issue and exchange rate flexibility. on moral hazard, the criticism is more or less inevitable. any time there is any governmental attempt to increase safety and soundness, moral hazard questions can be raised. in the case of the imf, if it is there to bail out countries in a liquidity crisis, countries will be more likely to end up in liquidity crises. the answer, it seems to me, is for the imf to attach tight conditions on its lending, so that countries will certainly not look forward to getting into debtor status. in terms of underlying structural change, this is one of the few leverage points the international lending community has on borrowing countries, and it is important for the imf to use its tool well. on exchange rate flexibility, the problem with the critics is that they are not saying the same thing. some say the imf is too quick to let the exchange rate fall, some say it is not quick enough. both cannot be right