samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
percentage point to peak at 5. 5 % in september 2009. this compares with the 4. 3 percentage - point increase during the asian financial crisis when no such temporary sme support measures were available. the economy contracted briefly by 2. 7 % in 2009 and rebounded strongly the following year to achieve 6. 8 % growth. as economic conditions improved and market liquidity normalised, the government exited from this emergency measure and ceased to receive new applications of slgs after end2010. in the meantime, the success of the slgs has garnered a consensus to develop a sustainable, market - oriented platform to cater for the ongoing sme financing needs upon the phasing out of slgs. taking this opportunity, the government - owned hong kong mortgage corporation launched a new sme financing guarantee scheme ( sfgs ) on 1 january 2011 to facilitate a smooth transition from the temporary slgs to a sustainable market - based mechanism. operating based on prudent commercial principles, the sfgs does not require government subsidy and the scheme size can be flexibly adjusted to respond to changes in market demand. the sfgs also provides a broad range of options on the product features such as tenor, facility type, loan amount and guarantee coverage to fit the different needs of banks and smes. initial market response to the sfgs has been positive, with a good participation bis central bankers ’ speeches rate from banks and an encouraging number of applications received from a broad variety of smes. it is expected that the sfgs will over time play an important role in helping smes obtain stable and sustainable financing while assisting banks in managing their risks, in particular when market conditions become volatile and uncertain. i am happy to share this experience of hong kong, china of how the “ exit ” of an extraordinary government measure has facilitated the “ entry ” of a long - term market - based solution for sustainable sme financing. i am also pleased to see that, among other priorities, adb has put more emphasis to private sector development including promoting the sme sector in recent years. a vibrant sme sector will create jobs, improve productivity and expand opportunities for the poor in developed and developing economies alike. we hope to see the bank continue with its efforts on this front, along with its other equally important priorities in promoting the development of the region. bis central bankers ’ speeches

regulatory circles talks about. however, even up to now, there is no clear consensus on what these policies mean, what are the instruments and how effective they are, and who should be given the powers to decide when and how to deploy such instruments. 3. i am very pleased that at today ’ s symposium we have managed to gather a very distinguished group of speakers and participants. i am sure there will be very interesting and fruitful exchange of views and ideas on the major financial stability issues, including those that i have mentioned earlier. once again, thank you all for being with us today. bis central bankers ’ speeches
reducing the efficacy of the critical role played by this market in supporting the broader financial system. i am glad that you are all here today to work with us to begin to identify the best solutions to the problem of fire sale risk in the context of the tri - party repo market. i urge you to participate actively and express your ideas candidly. i am confident that we will come up with the best solution to this problem by working together. bis central bankers ’ speeches

william c dudley : key developments in the tri - party repo market introductory remarks by mr william c dudley, president and chief executive officer of the federal reserve bank of new york, at the workshop on “ fire sales ” as a driver of systemic risk in tri - party repo and other secured funding markets, federal reserve bank of new york, new york city, 4 october 2013. * * * good morning. i am pleased to have the opportunity to open this workshop and discuss key developments in the tri - party repo market. in my remarks, i would like to give a brief overview of some of the problems that surfaced in this market during the financial crisis of 2008, recognize the improvements that have occurred since then, and most importantly, highlight significant vulnerabilities that still persist despite the progress we have made. while we can feel proud of the enhancements that are currently underway in the tri - party repo market, today i want to underscore the fact that significant work remains to be done. the tri - party repo market constitutes a vital component of the u. s. financial system. it plays an important role in providing financing for broker - dealers that make markets in treasury and agency securities, and is an important mechanism that supports dealer intermediation of credit. the market also provides a secure investment vehicle for those that manage large amounts of liquidity and need an investment vehicle to park these monies. we care about the health and stability of the tri - party repo market both because of our interest in promoting stable and liquid financial markets and because we use it to implement monetary policy. the recent financial crisis showed us that the tri - party repo market was inherently unstable due to deficiencies in the settlement infrastructure. prior to 2008, there was limited recognition of the ways in which adverse developments in this market could quickly transmit risk to other parts of the financial system with unforeseen consequences. we now know, with the benefit of hindsight, that the market was overly reliant on massive extensions of intraday credit by the clearing banks to the broker - dealers, that market participants did not adequately appreciate the magnitude of the risk embedded in the role played by the clearing banks, and, as a result, market participants underpriced risk in ways that undermined the market ’ s resiliency during periods of stress. these vulnerabilities were made apparent in the spring of 2008 when the events surrounding bear stearns demonstrated the run risk that existed
zhou xiaochuan : remarks on china ’ s trade balance and exchange rate summary of remarks by mr zhou xiaochuan, governor of the people ’ s bank of china, on issues related to china ’ s trade balance and exchange rate, at the china development forum sponsored by the development research center of the state council, beijing, 20 march 2006. * * * analysis of china ’ s trade surplus 1. the process of globalization, cross - border outsourcing and restructuring of supply chains has been accelerating in recent years, supported by it revolutionary progress and the improvement of infrastructures. it now becomes possible to outsource those activities which would be difficult to outsource to foreign countries in the past. 2. there is a time lag in changing the layout of competitive advantages. some labor - intensive production activities and services are usually outsourced to developing nations like china and india, while it will take a certain period of time before the developed countries ( where the production cost is high ) could create new jobs and develop new export advantages. trade imbalance could expand during such a period of time lag. 3. fdi ( particularly, of mncs ) has been playing a dominant role in cross - border outsourcing into china and in changing the landscape of trade balance. china has grown into a re - export processing center mainly by foreign - funded enterprises, with the supply chains increasingly expanded and value - added steadily enlarged. exchange rate elasticity of such production and trade is fairly small. 4. from 1998 to 2004, china ’ s foreign trade was relatively kept in balance, with the annual trade surplus averaged between us $ 20 billion and us $ 30 billion. however, trade surplus suddenly escalated to us $ 100 billion in 2005, which could be mainly attributed to the slower growth of import in contrast to the steady growth of export ( in 2005, export registered a growth of 28. 4 percent while import increased by 17. 6 percent ). the slower growth of import was mainly caused by the declining import growth of equipments, a factor related to the structural adjustment of the chinese economy. 5. fdi ( particularly, of the mncs ) has drastically increased their production and sales in china, substituting china ’ s imports. there are numerous foreign branded or foreign - designed products sold in the chinese market, but a large part of these products have actually been produced by the fdi companies in china. china ’ s exchange rate regime reform 6. china conducted a successful reform

with excessive credit expansion and elevated asset prices.
border financial crimes. protecting our reputation as a well - regulated and clean financial centre is not negotiable. this is a fundamental tenet upon which our financial centre has developed, and the continued confidence in the integrity of our financial system is a necessary condition for sustaining growth of the sector. we therefore take our aml / cft efforts very seriously, that include the surveillance and investigation work of our financial intelligence unit in the commercial affairs department. 5 in the last two years, more than 15 government agencies had come together to perform a comprehensive assessment of our ml / tf environment and the adequacy of measures. this culminated in a national risk assessment ( nra ) report published in january. it is the first time that we have taken a consolidated and comprehensive look at the overall ml / tf risks to singapore. what did we find? for one, the results largely validated the prevailing instinctive sense that high - risk sectors are primarily the cash intensive and internationally oriented ones, such as casinos and remittance agents. the nra also revealed emerging risk areas bis central bankers ’ speeches like virtual currencies and large - value precious stones and metals dealings, and we are looking into addressing the potential risks associated with these sectors. 6 put simply, the nra has been a useful “ health - check ” of the ml / tf risks facing singapore, by highlighting areas that warrant more resources and attention. as with the importance of having regular medical “ health - checks ”, we intend to update the risk review regularly, every two to three years, to ensure that our understanding of singapore ’ s ml / tf risks is current and accurate. 7 a better understanding of risks should also translate into more targeted mitigation measures. for example, in the non - financial sector, the accounting and corporate regulatory authority will implement an enhanced regulatory framework for corporate service providers, to minimise the risks of shell companies being set up for illicit purposes. this is expected to take effect from the last quarter of 2014. as another example, pawnbrokers are identified as a potential channel for money laundering. while pawnbrokers are already subject to basic aml / cft obligations, further requirements will be introduced when changes to our pawnbroking legislation are put in place at the end of this year. 8 for the financial sector, the controls in place are assessed during the nra exercise to be generally strong, which is not surprising given that the sector has built up considerable aml

commitment to growing a well - regulated fund management industry, this makes singapore an ideal vantage point for asset managers to understand asia and to manage pan - asian investments. so it leaves me now to congratulate salt on its inaugural asian leg of the salt conference. i wish all of you a fruitful conference ahead. thank you. preqin / global arc study of asian institutional hedge fund investments 2012 bis central bankers ’ speeches
supply in the economy, heightened competitive pressures in the retail sector, and some special factors. total cpi inflation has been restrained by low core inflation and declining mortgage interest costs, with some offset from higher gasoline prices. • both total and core inflation are expected to remain subdued in coming quarters before gradually rising to 2 per cent by mid - 2015 as the economy returns to full bis central bankers ’ speeches capacity, the special factors subside, and inflation expectations remain wellanchored. • the inflation outlook in canada is subject to upside and downside risks, which are similar to those identified in january. • the three main upside risks relate to the possibility of stronger - than - expected growth in the u. s. and global economies, a sharper - than - expected rebound in canadian exports, and renewed momentum in canadian residential investment. • the three main downside risks relate to the european crisis, more protracted weakness in business investment and exports in canada, and the possibility that growth in canadian household spending could be weaker. • overall, the bank judges that the risks are roughly balanced over the projection horizon. • reflecting all of these factors, on 17 april, the bank maintained the target for the overnight rate at 1 per cent. • with continued slack in the canadian economy, the muted outlook for inflation, and the constructive evolution of imbalances in the household sector, the considerable monetary policy stimulus currently in place will likely remain appropriate for a period of time, after which some modest withdrawal will likely be required, consistent with achieving the 2 per cent inflation target. with that, tiff and i would be pleased to take your questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches

liquidity. with that, carolyn and i will be happy to respond to your questions. bis central bankers ’ speeches
andreas dombret : the euro area – where do we stand? speech by dr andreas dombret, member of the executive board of the deutsche bundesbank, at money marketeers, new york city, 4 march 2015. * 1. * * introduction ladies and gentlemen thank you for inviting me to speak at a money marketeers event today. i would like to give you a brief overview of the current situation in germany and the euro area. i am particularly looking forward to discussing these issues with you and hearing your perspective. mutual exchange is essential in a globalised world where countries are no longer isolated islands but part of a closely interconnected community. the global financial crisis has highlighted how close these connections are and how quickly a problem in one corner of the world can spread around the globe. this truth applies all the more to countries sharing a common currency such as the member states of the euro area. back in 1999, 11 european countries adopted the euro as their common currency. today, the single currency is shared by 19 countries and more than 300 million people, which in my eyes makes it a success story. that being said, it has not always been plain sailing. in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, the euro area slid into a financial crisis of its own. this was compounded in 2010 when greece entered into a sovereign debt crisis, triggering a sudden loss of confidence in other member states which eventually brought the euro area to the brink of collapse. extensive rescue packages by the governments along with non - standard measures taken by the ecb helped to calm the markets and prevented the crisis from escalating. to some commentators, the situation in the last weeks was not much different. greece has again captured the headlines. with the decision by the eurogroup to prolong the existing rescue package for greece for four months some kind of temporary calm was bought. unrelated to greece, the ecb gave the green light to non - standard measures as a means of addressing the risks associated with too prolonged a period of low inflation. to obtain a clearer picture, let us take a tour of the euro area to see where we stand at present and where we are headed in the future. unsurprisingly, i will begin by focussing on the growth prospects of the german economy, not only because this is my home country but also because it is the largest economy in the euro area. 2. the german economy – in good shape but challenges ahead at the beginning of 2015,

accept my sincere congratulations for the magnificent building that now houses cdh investment bank head office, its blantyre banking centre and other cdh group companies. it is now my singular honour and privilege to declare cdh house officially inaugurated today, 24th june 2014. i thank you all for your attention and may god bless you all. bis central bankers ’ speeches
talk last night, so i won ’ t go over that ground again here. it is worth keeping in mind, however, that these challenges are about the medium term, not the immediate future. there is also no reason why they should be beyond our capacity to handle.

– at least in the local currency. therefore, the interplay of liquidity regulation and the central banks ’ collateral requirements also warrants considerable reflection. finally, liquidity regulation will make maturity transformation more costly. we clearly need more regulation today but, in casting additional regulation, we have to consider the costs. too strict regulation would stifle competition, make financial services more expensive and, in the long run, hamper economic growth. on the other hand, too loose regulation would inspire speculation with taxpayers ’ money and also reduce economic growth. thus, the extent of financial regulation is – at least partly – a question of society ’ s risk tolerance. liquidity buffers will create a cushion. however, the root of a liquidity crunch is a lack of confidence. a major aim of regulatory reform should thus be to ensure that trust does not dissipate so rapidly and completely again. in order to do this, we need to increase capital requirements, both in terms of the quality of capital and the amount of capital. after all, capital provides protection against bad outcomes. increasing the quality and amount of capital will increase the resilience of individual banks. in addition, strengthening the ability of banks to absorb losses mitigates the risk of contagion – therefore more and better capital will also strengthen the resilience of the system. in my view, the important part of capital is loss - absorbing common equity. in addition, other forms of capital are needed to protect the state. if a bank defaults, capital typically evaporates very quickly. i have seen many examples of banks that have defaulted because they did not meet the capital adequacy rules. in my experience, when bank managers say that they have a problem, they often claim to have – say – 6 per cent regulatory capital, rather than the required 8 per cent. when the authorities eventually and realistically assess the assets, capital is often negative and the state has to bail out the bank. thus, capital should be of good quality to protect the bank on a going concern basis, but also to protect the state in the event of a default. as some banks may be too big to fail, as regulators we should also discuss the possibilities of creating debt instruments which automatically convert to equity when losses mount above certain trigger points. building trust to enhance cross - border crisis management a financial crisis is costly to resolve. the potential costs are so large that only the nation state, through its power to tax, can
. structural reforms are crucial to a better performing eu economy, i. e. an economy with higher potential growth, more employment opportunities and greater resilience to shocks. efforts to accelerate key economic reforms are now more important than ever.

idea of the overall impact of these measures, it suffices to say that the minimum cet1 requirement of 2 % under the previous legislation could be, on average, around 1 % if the new requirements are applied. therefore, effectively, the minimum cet1 requirement, increases by around six percentage points in relation to risk - weighted assets. and this aside from the supplementary requirements which may be made of each institution based on its specific risk profile under the so - called pillar 2 of the capital accord. in this way, credit institutions will have more and better quality capital to withstand the losses which might be caused by their activity. nevertheless, as we have seen in the crisis, the availability of a large volume of capital does not per se guarantee an institution ’ s resilience in the face of sufficiently adverse shocks. that justifies the introduction of further restrictions, such as those setting a maximum leverage ratio and minimum liquidity, which are currently subject to an observation period that will culminate in them being definitively parameterised and incorporated into the new regulatory requirements. finally, the new legislation includes macroprudential tools which seek to complement the requirements aimed at strengthening each institution's solvency with obligations directed at protecting the system as a whole. two measures stand out among the macroprudential measures envisaged : those seeking to reduce the procyclicality of microprudential regulation by introducing a countercyclical capital buffer, and those aimed at mitigating the systemic effects of the possible insolvency of individual banks. the second set of measures includes an additional capital buffer for systemically important banks, which is complemented by supplementary requirements for those institutions with the capacity to affect the global financial system. further, the new legislation includes the adoption of additional macroprudential controls ( in the form of capital buffers, changes in risk weightings, etc. ) for banks on the basis of their exposure to specific sectors where marked imbalances can be identified. undoubtedly, these regulatory changes will exert a noticeable positive effect on the capacity of banks to withstand periods of stress and that will result in less frequent and milder crises which, furthermore, should entail lower costs for the public. that said, the new prudential legislation admittedly entails considerable challenges as to its implementation, and its introduction will restrict the capacity of banks to run risks. for this reason, it is appropriate, especially taking into account the relatively weak economic activity in