mines and spectrum, and the attempts to improve the speed of bureaucratic and judicial decision making are all much needed to increase participation, though much more has to be done over time. any reforms have to be institutionalized, so that they outlive the reformer ’ s passing. finally, newcomers and outsiders need protection against unfair practices. as one example of what we are doing, rbi has developed a charter of consumer rights following public consultation. bank boards have been asked to put in place frameworks that ensure those rights are protected. after those frameworks have been in operation for some time, rbi will take a view on best practices, and regulation, if any is needed. in the meantime, field visits by rbi, to check mis - selling as well as the proper functioning of bank infrastructure such as branches and atms, will be expanded. bis central bankers ’ speeches resolution of distress failure is inevitable in a free enterprise system. an effective resolution system is needed to preserve residual enterprise value after financial failure. two critical elements are the speed of resolution and the predictability of how losses are shared amongst contracts. for instance, few outsiders will want to lend if they believe they will be subordinated to promoter interests in bad times. so we need a speedy bankruptcy code to resolve distress while maintaining the priority structure of claims, and i am glad the finance ministry intends to bring one in soon. the bankruptcy code will give creditors more ability to resolve distress, and help strengthen the corporate bond market, which is so essential to infrastructure financing. in the meantime, we have to find ways to deal with the distress in the banking system. regulatory forbearance, where rbi softens its rules on classifying bad loans, only makes it easy for banks to “ extend and pretend ”. it is not a solution. since no other stake - holder – such as the promoter, tariff authorities, tax authorities, etc. – contributes to resolution, the real project limps along, becoming increasingly unviable. meanwhile, analysts grow increasingly suspicious of bank balance sheets and the growing volume of “ restructured ” assets. also, some large promoters take advantage of banker fears about assets turning non - performing to extract unwarranted concessions, without any sacrifice in the value of their stake. regulatory forbearance therefore ensures that problems grow until the size of the provisioning required to deal with the problem properly becomes alarmingly large – which then prompts calls for yet more forbearance. forbearance

christina papaconstantinou : address - single supervisory mechanism integration project event address by ms christina papaconstantinou, deputy governor of the bank of greece, to the staff of the supervisory departments at the " ssm integration project event ", athens, 11 march 2024. * * * good morning. i am very pleased to be here with you on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the single supervisory mechanism. as we know, the single supervisory mechanism was set up to safeguard confidence in the european banking system, increase its resilience, strengthen financial stability and create a level playing field among european banks. the global financial crisis revealed significant gaps in the supervision of banking institutions in europe, related to a fragmented supervisory framework, diverse supervisory tools and practices, lack of coordination and consultation. these gaps acted to impair the resilience of banks, hence of economies too. a single european approach to banking supervision which, while taking into account national specificities, creates an environment where all supervisors operate by the same rules and have the same tools, contributes to addressing these weaknesses. european banks are now in a much better position to cope with severe turmoil and shocks ( like those we experienced about a year ago ) than they were before the global financial crisis. the same holds true for greek banks, despite the serious challenges of the past. this is why we acknowledge that having the single supervisory mechanism in place was instrumental in providing an effective response to the crisis in the greek banking system in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis. managing the crisis together with the ssm meant stronger cooperation, exchange and productive interaction from the very start. the experience we have gained so far shows that collaboration and integration between the european central bank and the national supervisory authorities is key if we are to keep evolving amid rapid change ( including a changing climate, technological progress, etc. ) and ongoing challenges ( such as geopolitical risks ), demonstrating the necessary flexibility and adaptability. collaboration within the single supervisory mechanism has helped us and, as national supervisory authority, we have indeed evolved and have significantly upgraded our supervisory function : we have standardised several processes, developed manuals and methodologies for ongoing and on - site supervision, while at the same time becoming more extrovert. significant emphasis has also been placed on the need for continuous training of our staff. 1 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches we at the bank of greece have been devoting significant resources to the single supervisory mechanism. our supervisory departments have committed more