agencies. the fsoc will monitor systemic risks, designate non - incidentally, basel iii package finalized last year has a liquidity buffer provision similar to our slr requirement. bis central bankers ’ speeches bank financial firms as systemically important and subject them to fed supervision, approve proposals from fed to break up large banks and allow orderly resolution of failing systemically important financial institutions. 19. the european union ( eu ) has opted for a council approach with significant responsibility for the central banks. an agreement has been reached on creating new supervisory bodies for the eu which became operational at the beginning of 2011, subject to approval by individual member states. the european systemic risk board ( esrb ) is chaired by the president of the european central bank ( ecb ) and is a part of the european system of financial supervision which also comprises the three newly created systemic authorities for banking, insurance and occupational pensions and for securities markets. 20. in the uk, there is a paradigm shift underway in terms of the institutional arrangements for micro - prudential as well as macro - prudential regulation. the government announced plans to : ( i ) shift the responsibility for prudential oversight from the financial services authority ( fsa ) to a new prudential regulation authority ( pra ) under the bank of england ; ( ii ) set up a financial policy committee ( fpc ) within the bank of england to “ monitor macro issues that may threaten economic and financial stability ” ; and ( iii ) set up a financial conduct authority ( fca ) which will be responsible for the conduct of business across various financial services and for consumer protection. the fpc will be a committee of the bank of england ’ s court of directors and is to be chaired by the governor. it will also comprise a representative each of the treasury, the pra and the fca. in anticipation of a legislation to create the fpc, an interim fpc has been established with its composition closely mimicking that of the proposed statutory body. 21. the above trends implicitly acknowledge that while all financial sector regulators, and indeed the government, have a role in maintaining financial stability, from an effectiveness and accountability perspective and for preventing as well as managing a crisis, it is imperative to enjoin the executive responsibility for financial stability to a single entity and that the central bank is best positioned to be that single entity. the participation of, and indeed coordination by the finance ministry, underlines its role in crisis management and resolution. financial stability

: an efficient information system should ensure that the cics are able to provide reliable, accurate and unbiased information at the least possible cost. ( d ) sufficiency : the credit information system can be considered sufficient if it contains all required credit and payment related information about the borrower and no other cic can give any additional material information on the credit history of that particular borrower. bis central bankers ’ speeches completeness of information 6. while i agree that at this stage we may not be close to meeting the four essential constituents of a robust information system, i would like to emphasize that unless we strive to meet them, we would not be able to transform information into action. a very important consideration for meaningful transformation of credit information into action is the completeness of data. around 90 % of our population has never borrowed from the formal financial system and hence does not have any credit history. under the circumstances, they are quite likely to be denied credit by the lending institutions. how the completeness of data can be achieved in such cases? i will return to this aspect in a little while. quality of data 7. a central strand of completeness of information is the quality of data. the efficiency and effectiveness of a credit bureau is largely dependent on the quality of data collected in its database. rbi has issued guidelines for submission of timely, accurate and error free data to the bureau. however, our observation is that the data furnished by banks to cics in many instances continue to be incomplete / inaccurate. as we all know, the quality of the product can only be as good or as bad as the inputs. the data containing junk values, incorrect information and incomplete identifier fields fed by the lenders to the cics would only lead to half - baked outputs and eventually contribute to creating information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. while, i understand that the quality of data held by microfinance institutions about their borrowers is comparatively better, the quality and consistency of data of the banking system is not very reliable and hence, poses significant challenges to the effectiveness of credit information system. the cics in india are trying to address the issue by taking recourse to proven best practices and supporting technology to ensure that the credit information rendered by them are accurate, complete and updated. they have also started undertaking quality checks while receiving and uploading of members ’ data while returning the records rejected during the validation process back to the members along with reasons thereof, for correction and