samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
will choose another next time. that is the way things will probably remain and we should be glad of it. thank you.

and so on, but without them our lives would certainly be more complicated. in this context it is worth noting how much it in a broad sense has helped the banks to develop and simply means of payment. it is not so long ago that one received a weekly wage in the form of a brown envelope containing banknotes, handed out on a friday afternoon. nowadays our wages are paid directly into our bank accounts and we receive notice of this in a bank statement. nor do we have to go very far to pay our bills ; we can sit at our desks and fill out giro forms or - even easier - pay through the computer. the time we used to spend queuing at the bank can now be used in a more fun or more productive manner, or hopefully both. i am not one of those who enjoyed standing in a queue at the post office on a saturday morning to pay my bills. the savings in resources attained through improvements in the efficiency of the payment system since the days of the brown envelopes have actually been estimated at around five per cent of gdp. this is a productivity gain from which we all benefit. in many emerging economies the potential productivity gains from a functioning payment system would of course be even greater. sweden - an it country sweden and the other nordic countries are currently, alongside the usa, world leaders in the use of it. if one looks at the percentage of households with access to the internet, in 2000 sweden with an estimated 61 per cent held second place in the eu. only the netherlands had a higher percentage. if we instead look at expenditure on it in relation to gdp, sweden came top among the eu countries in 2001. sweden is an it country. why have developments moved so quickly in sweden? there are many answers to this question, but allow me to mention a couple i believe to be important. one concerns the deregulation of the telecommunications market. the swedish telecommunications administration ’ s monopoly began to break up as early as the 1980s, but the real turning point came in 1993, when the administration was privatised as telia. the market was opened up and exposed to competition ; new challengers could gradually take over more than a quarter of the total market and a significantly greater part of the mobile telephony and internet telephony segment. at the same time, technical developments were very rapid. fiberoptics enabled lower costs for long distance calls and increased the speed of transfer of large amounts of data, which benefited the development of the internet.
downside risks pass and the economy begins to recover. bis central bankers ’ speeches

been more muted than expected. labour demand and employment following the 2007 – 08 global financial crisis, employment fell by over 55, 000 in 2009. since then, labour demand has recovered strongly ( figure 6 ) and employment increased by over 8 percent in the past three years, well in excess of historical average growth rates. higher household consumption arising from strong population and tourism growth and the canterbury rebuild were major drivers of the employment growth, with jobs in construction accounting for more than a quarter of total jobs growth over the past three years. labour market slack, wages, and inflation having discussed the underlying causes of the recent strong growth in the labour force, i would like to conclude by discussing the implications for monetary policy. the labour market most directly influences consumer price inflation through wage outcomes. this is particularly true of non - tradables goods and services, where labour represents a higher share of the total cost of production. 15 broadly speaking, wage outcomes are over the last 35 years, new zealand has lost, on average, 16. 5 thousand people per year through net emigration to australia, in the past 12 months new zealand gained 1600 people from australia. dunstan, a, matheson, t and pepper, h ( 2009 ), “ analysing wage and price dynamics in new zealand ”, reserve bank of new zealand discussion paper, 2009 / 06. bis central bankers ’ speeches determined by three factors : labour productivity, inflation expectations and the balance between the demand and supply for labour. in the long run, growth in real wages – that is, wage growth beyond the change in consumer prices – should reflect labour productivity. labour productivity in new zealand has averaged only 0. 8 percent per year since the global financial crisis, thereby limiting the increase in wages due to this factor. wages affect consumer prices, but the relationship is complex and flows in both directions. current and expected rates of consumer price inflation are factored into wage - setting. recent research by the bank highlights this relationship, with the majority of businesses, weighted by employees, reporting a direct or indirect link between inflation and wages. 16 other work has found that wage inflation expectations bear a closer relationship to past inflation outcomes than previously thought. 17 in the march 2016 mps, we expressed concern that recent declines in indicators of inflation expectations could become embedded in low wage settlements, thereby subduing inflation outcomes. over the business cycle, a key driver of wage growth is the balance of supply and demand, or labour market “ slack ”. however, the unemployment
end, when foreign investors became reluctant to continue to provide the liquidity base for the credit extension by the banks, the financial systems crumbled. in summary, the final collapse was forced by : • • • • • a withdrawal of foreign deposits from banks and of foreign portfolio investments from the capital markets of the affected countries. foreign credit previously extended to the east asian countries was therefore withdrawn. a reduction in the amount of liquidity available within banking institutions as they lost foreign deposits and had to fund the withdrawal of other investments from the capital markets. forced reductions in the amount of credit banking institutions could make available to their clients, many of whom were overborrowed and could not meet the demand for the repayment of loans. an unavoidable depreciation of exchange rates and sharp rises in interest rates which forced losses on borrowers of foreign and domestic funds. overborrowed institutions were forced into liquidation, and in the process transferred their losses to their lenders. the consequences of this credit crunch are now well - known. in many of the east asian countries, negative real economic growth rates are now experienced as painful consolidations and reforms of banking and financial structures are taking place. the east asian financial crisis, which quickly spread to other emerging markets, to the smaller more stable developed economies of the world and recently also to major financial centres such as new york provided a stark reminder of how important sound credit management is for the protection of macroeconomic financial stability in individual countries, and in the world at large. no country can procure permanent and sustainable economic growth at a high level if this growth is dependent on the creation of an increasing amount of credit, extended by banking institutions. not only lenders ( banking institutions ) and borrowers ( private sector institutions and individuals ) can be destroyed in the process, but also total financial systems and even total economies can break down under the burden of too much credit. central banks have the unenviable task of judging at all times what amount of additional bank credit will in prevailing circumstances be reconcilable with the objective of maintaining overall financial stability. economies normally provide early warning signals of excessive credit extension, such as rising inflation or unaffordable increases in imports, or the withdrawal of foreign funds from the country. it is important not to ignore such signals. 3. other lessons from the global financial crisis the recent turmoil in world financial markets provided important lessons, not only for central bankers, but also for credit managers in private

also one for institutions operating at the micro - level. we can all make a contribution towards protecting our country from falling in the debt trap of excessive borrowing by applying sound principles in the management of our debt positions.
planning, honourable ng ’ andu p. magande mp, to officially open this forum. honourable minister!

of access to financial services to 48 % by 2008 and 50 % by the end of 2009. following the earlier survey, a subsequent study called the “ finscope supply – side survey ” was conducted in 2007. some of the key findings were that : a. bank charges are unaffordable for 90 % of the rural adult population in zambia ; b. zambian banks generally have high operating costs and interest rate spreads ; and c. the physical coverage of financial outlets may not increase at current cost levels. it is therefore, my hope that this forum will address these and other challenges that slow the pace of financial inclusion in our countries. honourable minister, over the past two years, we have noted with delight that financial institutions in zambia are beginning to rise up to the challenge by beginning to broaden the scope of their financial services and extending their services beyond the traditional customers to include previously unbanked communities. in addition, the zambian financial sector has in recent years experienced growth in numbers of both registered commercial banks and non – bank financial institutions. we in zambia, therefore, see this forum as being timely and providing a unique opportunity for african financial institutions to share knowledge and experiences on how best to promote financial inclusiveness, particularly among our rural and peri - urban communities who have since not been fully integrated in the financial systems of most of our countries. this entails that they are not effectively participating in the economic growth that is being experienced in these countries. this forum also comes at a time that we in zambia have just lost a statesman who was passionate about rural development and empowerment of all citizens. the conference theme therefore, is appropriate for us as we carry on the vision of our beloved late president, dr. levy patrick mwanawasa, sc ( m. h. s. r. i. p ). in this respect, we would also like to acknowledge the many expressions of sympathy extended to us during our time of mourning. distinguished delegates, on behalf of afraca, i would like to thank our various presenters and panelists for accepting to facilitate our deliberations over the next two days. i would therefore, like to implore all delegates to engage fully in these discussions and make the most of the wealth of knowledge and experience represented in the house. ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure and privilege once again to welcome you to the second afraca central banks ’ forum. i now wish to invite our distinguished guest of honour, the minister of finance and national
continue to pay close attention to the evolution of risks as well as to economic and financial developments in the canadian and global economies.

structure as a metric o f innovative effo rt. in spain, the alternative fixed - inco me market has enjo yed co ntinuous gro wth during its nine years o f o peratio n, such that its vo lume o f issuances reached €13. 7 billion in 2022. furthermore, the introduction of the corporate secto r purchase pro gramme by the euro pean central bank in 2016 also appears to have helped improve capital market access fo r smaller listed firms ( alves et al., 2022 ). de fio re and uhlig ( 2015 ), tengulov ( 2020 ) and bo ngini et al. ( 2021 ). there is evidence of a significant accumulation of capital in low - productivity firms between 1995 and 2007 in spain. this was partly the result of access to financing depending more on a firm ’ s available collateral or relationship with general government than on the marginal productivity of its projects. 4 if this misallocation of resources had been avoided, total factor productivity in the period would have grown by 10 % in cumulative terms instead of falling by 8 %. there seems to be no significant improvement in the allocation of resources in the most recent period. 5 this takes us to the second and third structural weaknesses noted above, relating to business demographics and competition. 2 business demographics and competition the rate of business creation in spain is comparable to that of other european economies, but both the survival rate and average firm size are low. this suggests a relatively low level of competition and difficulties in dealing with regulatory barriers and other fixed costs, which are key to any innovation project. while regulations are necessary to limit certain market failings, a large body of rules – that are increasingly complex and disparate across regions and municipalities – can have a negative impact not only on economic agents ’ growth decisions, but also on the ability of general government to ensure market unity, both at national and european level. a number of studies have pointed to the importance of this channel in spain. by way of illustration, let me remind you that, in 2022 alone, our central and regional governments approved almost 11, 000 new pieces of legislation. 6 there are, furthermore, various employment and tax - related regulatory thresholds ( linked to arbitrary categories of firm size ) that adversely affect business growth. 7 in short, it is imperative to review and simplify certain regulations that may artificially stifle competition and business innovation
order to be sustainable, public finances must comply with a budgetary restriction to the effect that future government revenue must match the current government debt and future government expenditure. such a restriction means than any budgetary relaxation must subsequently be counterbalanced by a tightening.

mugur isarescu : is european financial integration stalling? opening remarks by mr mugur isarescu, governor of the national bank of romania, at the eurofi high level seminar, bucharest, 3 april 2019. * * * honourable guests, ladies and gentlemen, please allow me to welcome you here, at the royal palace. we are honoured to host here, in bucharest, so many outstanding guests at such a landmark event. it is a perfect occasion to exchange views and liaise with representatives of public and banking authorities and of the financial industry across the european union. during the talks over the past few days, and particularly on the occasion of the eurofi highlevel seminar, i heard strong voices from the banking community which were rather pessimistic about the prospects of further banking and financial integration. we, at the eastern frontier of the eu, are compelled to take a more positive outlook regarding the future of our continent. speaking about the difficulties of the financial sector in europe, it is important to point out the positive aspects and evolutions as well. certainly, favourable developments have taken place all over europe and we should acknowledge them and move forward with more confidence. specifically, financial fragmentation has been mitigated as a result of broad - based non - standard policy measures taken by the ecb. looking ahead, completing the economic and monetary union, which involves risk - sharing tools and risk - reduction efforts, is the way forward to address financial fragmentation. in the case of romania, i could say we have already taken important steps towards joining the banking union : no public funds were resorted to after the crisis outbreak to support the banking system and now its liquidity and solvency ratios are well above the prudential thresholds. while the npl ratio has declined from a peak of around 22 percent in 2014 to 4. 8 percent in february 2019, profitability returned and credit growth has started to pick up. indeed, we have to be aware that there is a fragmented banking landscape in europe and a danger of further fragmentation, as well as other threats facing the financial system. yet, whenever i see a problem, i say to myself that it is our job to address them. this means we should stand ready to deal with all the challenges that need to be overcome. whenever things seem to look bad in the eu, i remember the words of jean monnet, one of the founding fathers of the eu project : “ europe will be forged in crises and will be the
signals a self - sustaining recovery in the euro area. in my view, therefore inside the euro area the gradual pace of adjustment of the monetary policy stance, of the overall provision of liquidity and of its allotment modes can continue. the euro : sound track record in the first decade in a longer perspective the performance of the currency union is far more flattering. between 1999 and 2009 real per capita output in the euro zone grew on average by 1. 5 % per year. this is a comparable order of magnitude to that in the us, despite higher overall growth rates in the us. consumer prices developed in line with the ecb ’ s definition of price stability. in the eleven and a half years after the creation of the single currency the harmonized index of consumer prices ( hicp ) has risen on average by exactly 1. 97 % per year. the performance of the ecb in delivering price stability has beaten that of the former benchmark currencies, the deutsche mark and the dutch guilder. high cost of fighting the crisis still, there is no scope for complacency. in recent months, europe has demonstrated unwavering commitment to the unity and integrity of the single currency area. however, the fight against the financial crisis and the deep recession has not only been successful, but also very costly. moreover, it has uncovered institutional weaknesses as has been the case in the history of most currency unions. in particular, it poses challenges to the sustainability of public finances. in the euro area the government deficit climbed to 6. 3 % of gdp in 2009. this year the euro area government deficit will peak at 6. 6 %, before declining only to 6. 1 % in 2011. the overall government debt is expected to amount to 88. 5 % of gdp next year. this is still below the level prior to the introduction of the euro. but it is also an increase of more than 20 % from the level before the crisis. although, it is not too comforting that other major currency areas are facing even more severe deteriorations of public finances, it is a matter of fact : in the us fiscal stimuli and rescue packages have resulted in the federal budget deficit widening to around 10 % of gdp for the fiscal year 2009 – and it will probably stay at that level in 2010 and 2011. by consequence the government debt - to - gdp ratio in the us was about 84 % in 2009. it is expected to rise to 102. 5 % by 2011. in the

huge budget ), as it has been suggested by former ecb president jean - claude trichet. but in any case, the institutional vacuum that currently exists must be filled in the long term. ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches
speeches as we look ahead, we bear the responsibility of advancing the knowledge and ideas shared during this seminar and, whenever feasible, translating them into policy actions. as we conclude this seminar, let us remain dedicated to enhancing our collaboration, keeping in mind that financial stability is not a static objective but a dynamic process that requires ongoing vigilance, flexibility, and cooperation. thank you all once again for your engagement and contributions. i wish you safe travels as you return home, and i look forward to seeing you at future editions of the financial stability seminar in the years to come. thank you. 3 / 3 bis - central bankers'speeches

##airs the ability to repay debt, and negative shocks can lead to a self - enforcing downward spiral as has happened during the european debt crisis ( german council of economic experts 2011 ; shambaugh 2012 ). sound ﬁnancial systems contribute to economic growth, and ﬁnancial instabilities have negative implications for the real economy ( levine 1997, pagano 1993, rajan and zingales 1998 ). debt per se is not the issue, but debt levels which are excessive relative to the underlying strength of the real economy. understanding the channels through which the build - up of ﬁnancial stability risks affect the real economy and may cause resource misallocation is important. expectations are key in this regard : expectations that are overly optimistic with regard to future fundamentals and the evolution of the real economy can put the repayment of debt at risk. second, the dividing line between private and public debt is not always clear - cut. through the conversion of implicit into explicit subsidies for the ﬁnancial sector, unsustainable levels of private debt can spill over into governments ’ balance sheets. a highly leveraged ﬁnancial system may breed systemic risks and threaten the functioning of the ﬁnancial system. if buffers against risks in the private sector are [UNK], the government might be forced to intervene in times of crisis. implicit public guarantees for ﬁnancial institutions can contribute to excessive risk taking and high leverage. such implicit subsidies not only reﬂect that some institutions can become too large or too complex to fail. instead, common exposure to aggregate or macroeconomic risks can lead to “ collective moral hazard ” if too many institutions are exposed to the same type of shock ( farhi and tirole 2012 ). third, macroprudential policy is the ﬁrst line of defence against such spill overs of risk from the private to the public sector. macroprudential policy aims at enhancing the resilience of the ﬁnancial system with regard to adverse shocks and addressing the buildup of unsustainable ﬁnancing choices. macroprudential policy plays a particularly important role in the european monetary union which lacks a single sovereign and where many policies that can affect the stability of ﬁnancial markets are under the domestic responsibility for policy ( buch and weigert 2019 ). 2 public and private debt in the long - run a ) leveraging up the 20th century has seen a substantial increase in overall debt levels. figure 1 ( panel a ) plots the aggregate