products and offer competitive interest rates due to availability of information on customers ’ credit risk profiles. bou in its mandated responsibility will supervise the operations of the crb and fcs to ensure that the information collected is managed securely and responsively at all times and in accordance with the agreement which we have signed with compuscan. bou has already issued guidelines for the operation of the crb. the guidelines specify the standards that the crb shall implement in order to ensure a reliable mechanism to process data. the bank of uganda conducted education and sensitization campaigns in 21 districts in order to : • deepen the understanding of key stakeholders of the crb, the fcs ; and the accruing benefits of the crb. • create a favourable public opinion and perception about credit reference services, through the careful and strategic deployment of available media and communication resources. the public awareness campaigns shall continue in order to encourage borrowers register on the fcs and to address the concerns of specific target groups, to allay fears of borrowers regarding the sharing of confidential information and to assure all stakeholders of the integrity and security of the system. i wish to assure the general public that we consider confidentiality and privacy of information paramount. bank of uganda, pis and compuscan crb ltd. will ensure that confidentiality and privacy are adhered to at all times. i wish to thank the german development cooperation, the people of germany and the government and the people of sweden for the financial and technical support accorded to bank of uganda for this project. i also want thank the world bank for the role they have played towards the successful establishment of the crb and the fcs. i thank you very much for joining bank of uganda on this memorable occasion. it is now my honor and pleasure to invite the chief guest, h. e. reinhard buchholz the ambassador of the federal republic of germany to give his remarks.

have lost track of ), an intensive programme of international reform began with the aim of preventing a all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / news / speeches and @ boe _ pressoffice repetition of these emerging market crises. as part of the bank ’ s contribution, under eddie and mervyn ’ s guidance, i worked with the bank of canada to produce a blueprint for international monetary reform. 13 this blueprint proved controversial, as it proposed restrictions on the imf ’ s ability to extend credit to countries in crisis. that jarred with imf orthodoxy, including the then - deputy managing director stan fischer, who at the time was proposing the imf become an international lender of last resort. 14 it also jarred with us orthodoxy. under larry summers and tim geithner, the us treasury had overseen the emerging market bailouts from mexico in 1994 onwards. in 2002, i was asked by tim geithner ( now at the imf ) to go to washington to work on international financial system design, alongside two former us treasury colleagues, nouriel roubini ( now better known as dr doom ) and brad setser. there were no prizes for spotting the odd one out. my time at the imf gave me an insight into the fantastic quality of its staff and the political constraints they often operated under. as for tim, i often wonder what he went on to do next. on return to london i produced another book, on the design of the international financial system. 15 this too failed to make the bestsellers ’ list. in the period since, fault - lines in the international financial system have continued, periodically, to cause global tremors. they will continue to do so until the international financial architecture is strengthened. with hindsight, i think stan fischer was right on the need for a better - resourced imf, alongside the international equivalent of a resolution authority for nation states. alas, it may take another bout of emerging market crises to instigate this change. back in london, i was reassigned to lead a division working on domestic rather than international financial stability issues. this was something of an anti - climax. the domestic financial system was, by comparison with the violent seas of emerging markets, a millpond of tranquillity at the time. moreover, the prevailing consensus was that this tranquillity was set to last. in response, the bank slimmed the resources it devoted to