as intended. only if supervisors are given the tools they need to act can they effectively perform their role. as the policy reform agenda moves towards completion, and the new rules are rolled out by national regulators, the committee will increasingly turn its attention to enhancing supervisory practices. enhancing microprudential supervision the committee has a great deal of guidance on supervisory matters already on issue. however, much of this was developed before the financial crisis and will benefit from being updated to reflect lessons learned in recent years. given the general applicability of much of this material, the benefits of this work will also extend well beyond basel committee member countries. as with all multi - year projects, this will require prioritisation. near - term attention is likely to be given to operational risks ( internal controls and information technology ), governance, supervisory colleges, stress testing and dealing with weak banks. enhancing the practical implementation of macroprudential supervision the systemically important bank – “ sib ” – regimes will continue to be a priority area for the committee over the coming years. although the regimes for global sibs and domestic sibs have now been published, both will require a certain amount of ongoing maintenance and monitoring. furthermore, as noted in the g - sib standard, the methodology, including the indicator - based measurement approach itself and the cutoff / threshold scores, will be subject to periodic review and refinement every three years. beyond this work, the committee will now turn its attention to the practical implementation of tools and techniques to deal with systemic risks. this will include two complementary areas of work : • regulatory consequences of sib classification : being a sib means more than just higher capital. in light of the risks they impose on the financial system, sibs must be held to a higher standard with respect to supervisory expectations for risk management functions, data aggregation capabilities, risk governance and internal controls, all of which are topics that feature prominently in the committee ’ s work plan. in addition, given the principles - based nature of the d - sib framework, the committee will monitor emerging practice as banking supervisors move towards implementation so as to facilitate cross - border cooperation and mutual understanding. • use of microprudential tools for macroprudential purposes : the committee will oversee preparations for the countercyclical buffer, as well as exchange information on the wider range of microprudential tools that have been used for macroprudential purposes ( eg sectoral adjustments to risk weights, stress testing

moreover, they are in a position to relate it to our earlier assessment and continuously form a fairly good picture of how interest rates are likely to move in the future. the publication of our inflation assessments has also facilitated decisions in recent years to raise or lower interest rates. in that the grounds for our actions are clearer, there is less risk of our being accused of heeding extraneous considerations, a worry that featured in the european discussion last autumn. it is my belief, however, that the ecb will become more open about its economic assessments as it settles more comfortably into its forecasting process and inflation assessment. another difference in transparency concerns access to discussions at the decision - making meetings. the ecb has chosen not to publish any minutes. an important argument for this policy - and one that i find understandable but debatable – is that minutes disclosing how individual members voted might occasion a greater element of national considerations. the riksbank has chosen to publish minutes of executive board meetings after an interval of 6 – 8 weeks ; the minutes are to reflect the discussion and indicate how the members voted. the clearly independent status that has now been assigned to the riksbank has much to do with this choice. the minutes make it easier for policy evaluators to follow the formation of monetary policy and assess the actions of board members. this is a democratic interest. moreover, the fact that the voting will be published probably increases the members ’ motivation to form a personal opinion about the difficult matters that have to be considered. i also believe that access to the minutes can help people to understand the choices that have to be made in the formulation of monetary policy and demystify what the riksbank is doing. it is arguments of this type that made my british colleague mervyn king declare, with reference to the work of the bank of england ’ s monetary policy committee, that ‘ divided we stand, united we fall ’. i want to emphasise that these matters are by no means simple. it seems to me that a clear analytical framework, combined with a high degree of transparency, has provided a good foundation for swedish monetary policy in recent years. but with an executive board consisting of six members, each of whom is in a position to voice an opinion on monetary policy, it is probable that from time to time the riksbank will be criticised for being indistinct. there were signs of that last week when the minutes from april showed that i had not voted with the