samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
, i would like to underline once more that timely implementation of the structural reforms envisaged by the medium term program and the european union accession process remains to be of the utmost importance. thank you for your attention.

annual inflation increased in the last quarter of 2009, no significant change was observed in the contribution of the categories excluding food and energy ( figure 4 ). meanwhile, rising oil and other commodity prices as well as the withdrawal of tax cuts within the fiscal stimulus package were other factors leading to an increase in annual headline inflation in this period. although these developments caused the prices of core goods to increase more in the fourth quarter than in previous years, the price hikes adjusted for tax effects remained below those of previous years ( figure 5 ). processed food prices followed a course in line with the outlook presented in the october inflation report, whereas unprocessed food prices surged more than expected ( figure 6 ). thus, food prices, which increased due to processed food prices in 2008, maintained an upward trend in 2009 due to the surge in unprocessed food prices. as i have already mentioned, these high - rated increases in unprocessed food prices explain substantially both the rise in inflation in the last quarter and the deviation from the end - 2009 inflation forecast. in turkey, annual inflation in unprocessed food prices displays remarkable fluctuations and this creates a significant forecast uncertainty. to illustrate this, following the lowest rate of third quarter change of the past five years in 2009, this group also displayed the highest rate of increase over the last six years due to price hikes in fruits - vegetables and meat in the fourth quarter of 2009 ( figure 7 ). here, i would like to remind that, in the third chapter of inflation report that will be posted on our website shortly you can find the central bank ’ s detailed assessments regarding volatility in unprocessed food inflation, including comparative analyses between turkey and other countries. distinguished members of the press, let me underline that the rise in annual inflation observed in the last quarter of 2009 can be attributed to several temporary factors, rather than a deterioration in the general price setting behavior. in fact, core inflation indicators in the last quarter pointed to an underlying inflation trend of around 4 to 5 percent and remained consistent with medium - term targets. although annual inflation in core measures increased modestly with the expiry of tax incentives on durable goods, seasonally and tax adjusted data indicate that the underlying trend of inflation did not deteriorate ( figure 8 ). furthermore, the inflation diffusion index, calculated by using the difference between the share of items with increasing prices and the share of items with falling prices in the cpi, hovered around historically low
emmanuel tumusiime - mutebile : the eurozone crisis and its impact on africa ’ s economy presentation by mr emmanuel tumusiime - mutebile, governor of the bank of uganda, at the comesa ( common market for eastern and southern africa ) policy organisation meeting, kampala, 20 november 2012. * 1. * * introduction the eurozone crisis is part of a much broader economic and financial crisis that has afflicted the global economy since 2008. the global crisis is manifested primarily in slow economic growth and the fragility of financial systems. global economic growth has fallen by about two percentage points in the five years since the crisis began in 2008 compared to the preceding five years ( table 1 ). the need to reduce very high levels of debt in both the public and private sectors has impeded economy recovery in the advanced economies. table 1 real output growth in the world and growth in world trade ( percent ) 2004 – 2013 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 proj proj world 4. 9 4. 6 5. 3 5. 4 2. 8 – 0. 7 5. 1 3. 8 3. 3 3. 6 advanced economies 3. 1 2. 7 3. 1 2. 8 0. 1 – 3. 7 3. 0 1. 6 1. 3 1. 5 ow euro area 2. 2 1. 7 3. 2 3. 0 0. 4 – 1. 8 2. 0 1. 4 – 0. 4 0. 2 emerging and developing economies 7. 5 7. 3 8. 2 8. 9 6. 0 2. 8 7. 4 6. 2 5. 3 5. 6 sub - saharan africa 7. 1 6. 2 6. 4 7. 1 5. 6 2. 8 5. 3 5. 1 5. 0 5. 7 uganda 6. 5 6. 3 10. 8 8. 4 8. 7 7. 3 5. 9 6. 7 3. 4 5. 0 world trade 11. 2 8. 0 9. 1 3. 0 – 10. 7 12. 6 5. 8 3. 2 4. 5 7. 7 2012 and 2013 are projections uganda data pertains to the fiscal year sources : imf world economic outlook, except for uganda where it is the uganda bureau of statistics although all regions of the world have suffered a slowdown in economic growth as a result of the economic and financial crisis, the eurozone is one

one whose statute, rules and procedures expressly state its commitment to the principles of islamic shari ’ ah and to the banning of the receipt and payment of interest in any of its operations. as you are aware, the current regulatory regime does not permit financial institutions to engage in islamic banking. to close this gap, bank of uganda has proposed amendments to the financial institutions act, 2004 to permit the licensing of and transacting by financial institutions in islamic banking in uganda. the proposed amendments to the law were submitted to the finance minister for consideration by cabinet and subsequently parliament for enactment. this amendment will bring uganda in line with other eac member countries that have licensed islamic banking and finance. it will increase the depth, breadth and range of finance products bank customers can use to access banking services. let me conclude by wishing you once again happy celebrations. it is now my pleasure to invite hon ali kirunda kivejinja to address the congregation. god bless you all. asalaam aleikum, eid mubarak, eid mubarak, eid mubarak
steven maijoor : painting like rembrandt - managing risks in the age of ai speech by mr steven maijoor, executive director of supervision of the netherlands bank, at a bloomberg event, amsterdam, 16 september 2024. * * * thank you, peter, for your kind introduction and for the invitation. i understand that the organisation of this event was looking for some entertainment. so they asked the regulator to speak. i mean, what can go wrong? so here i stand, very conscious of my role, in the most beautiful museum of the country. in a few minutes you will enter the gallery of honour, the beating heart of the rijksmuseum, showing masterpieces by the greatest painters of the 17th century. with one absolute focal point : the night watch. as you may know, the night watch used to be bigger than it is now. two hundred years ago, they cut off pieces from the painting to make it fit in a particular room. these pieces have never been found. a couple of years ago the museum's experts were able to reconstruct the missing pieces on the basis of a 17th century copy. they did so with the help of artificial intelligence. by comparing thousands of tiny pieces of the two versions of the painting, the computers basically learned to paint like rembrandt. you should ask one of the experts here about it during your tour, it's an amazing story. digital innovation is literally everywhere. it has become part of everyday life, but its possibilities are still far from exhausted. the financial industry is one of the sectors in the economy that has embraced digitalisation to the full, especially here in the netherlands. digitalisation has produced more efficient business processes, greater transparency for consumers, and many new financial services, in particular in the area of payments. for example, in the netherlands, only two in ten purchases are still made with cash. the other eight are done with digital means of payment. at de nederlandsche bank, we welcome digitalisation in the financial sector. but we obviously also consider the risks. take for example the outsourcing of digital services to large technology companies. what if these companies are no longer able or willing to fulfil their obligations? are financial institutions fully aware of what these companies are doing with the data they entrust to them? another aspect is that many of these tech companies are not located in europe. with geopolitical tensions rising, there is a desire, particularly

a new discipline a€ “ various use cases have been around for quite some time now. and as i pointed out, many of the risks involved are risks we're already familiar with. they're just wearing new disguises. so although this is no reason for complacency, we can take comfort in the fact that we're not starting from scratch. in short, to use a fitting metaphor, i see the glass as half full. and i'm confident that we'll be able to put digital innovation to good use while keeping its darker sides in check. on that rather cheerful note, let me stop here and wish you a pleasant evening and a wonderful tour of the paintings. 2 / 2 bis - central bankers'speeches
loans – face challenges in acquiring good - quality short - and intermediate - duration assets to match their shorter - term liabilities. many community banks have increased their holdings of longer - term mortgage assets, including mortgage securities guaranteed by ginnie mae and the government - sponsored enterprises, in an effort to enhance both credit quality and earning asset yields. while such holdings advance public policy interests in reviving the mortgage market, they nevertheless pose the potential for increasing interest rate risk exposures, in part because of the embedded options in residential mortgages. additionally, some banks appear to be assuming more - complex exposures to interest rate risk through purchases of structured products. the recent crisis has focused attention on the problems and complexity of structured products in the form of collateralized debt obligations, which carved up the credit risk of underlying assets into various tranches – a product that, it turned out, too few investors understood. but similar lessons were learned with regard to interest rate risk management in the early 1990s when many institutions purchased various types of structured collateralized mortgage obligations ( cmos ) with embedded interest - rate options that were not fully understood – and then incurred substantial and unexpected losses when interest rates rose in 1994. many cmos turned out to have durations that fluctuated sharply in response to even small changes in market rates, resulting in significant declines in the value of the instruments and in many cases increasing the asset - liability mismatches they were intended to mitigate. capital losses as longer - term interest rates rise are a risk facing even asset - sensitive banks. as bankers prepare to meet the uncertainties that lie ahead, they must not forget these hard - learned lessons and must make sure they fully understand how the securities they purchase will perform in different economic and financial market environments, including an environment of rising short - and long - term interest rates. importance of robust interest rate risk management at all banking organizations because of the potential complexity of interest rate risk exposures at individual institutions, supervisors have, for many years, pointed out the need for bankers to use sound practices for managing these exposures. employing sound practices becomes even more critical in light of the current uncertainties surrounding the timing and impacts of changes in interest rates. it was concern about the risks to banks from interest rate changes that led the supervisors to issue the recent advisory on interest rate risk management. that advisory reminded institutions of guidance dating back to mid - 1990s. other speakers at this symposium will no doubt summarize and expand upon the guidance discussed in that advisory,

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evoked by governments. a governance structure that enforces the rule of law and sanctity of contracts and a political system that delivers credible, non - inflationary policies are prerequisites for the existence of a stable exchange - rate regime. ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention.

this brings me to a second issue, of housing finance as a channel of monetary transmission. obviously, as households take on more housing debt, they react faster and more strongly to interest rate movements, thus allowing the central bank through their interest rate policy to have a greater influence on macroeconomic activity. a faster and fuller pass - through of interest rates facilitates the conduct of monetary policy and enhances its effectiveness. in this context much depends on whether mortgages are with fixed or floating interest rates. countries, of course, differ widely on this, for historical, legal or other reasons. whether the expansion of the mortgage market is responsible for the often - observed significant increases in housing prices is a moot point. there are many good reasons that support higher prices, such as demographic changes, as smaller families require more overall living space, expectations that real and nominal interest rates will remain low, and regulatory restrictions that curtail land supply. surely, the ample liquidity that has been pumped into the markets in recent years has created conditions conducive to speculative excesses. most countries in the euro area have not yet had any experience of significant correction in nominal housing prices. it is possible that both borrowers and creditors have underestimated this possibility and in some cases both credit expansion and housing prices increases look questionable. developments in greece are a good illustration of the forces that operate throughout europe. after the full liberalization of the financial sector we have seen a real revolution of housing finance. since 1996, mortgages have more than doubled as a share of banks ’ portfolios, while there was a fivefold increase of mortgage debt as a proportion of gdp. the first trend was the result of falling interest rates and increased competition that led banks to search for new areas of profitable expansion. households, on the other hand, facing improved conditions, as exemplified by that fast growth of gdp and lower costs of borrowing, reacted quite rationally by increasing their indebtedness. the ratio of homeownership in greece has been among the highest in europe, fluctuating around 80 percent in recent years. mortgage demand has probably been used to improve housing conditions rather than enter the market for the first time. demand from economic immigrants has supported this trend by allowing existing homeowners to sell their entry - level properties in order to move to more expensive ones. as i see it, we are still in the process of stock level adjustment, as the level of mortgage indebtedness at 27 % of gdp is
independent members of the management and supervisory bodies, in order to safeguard the interests of the various stakeholders suitably and preserve sound and prudent management, and ultimately, financial stability. banks must also fully comply with the rules relating to conflicts of interest ( which differ from the rules relating to formal independence ). as well as formal independence, “ independence of mind ” is also needed, a dimension that requires an absence of conflicts of interest, even potential conflicts. the management function within banks cannot supersede internal supervision. on the contrary. non - executive members of the management and supervisory bodies must be empowered to fully exercise their duties of diligence. they must scrutinise the day - to - day management, and respond to the interests of the banks ’ various internal and external stakeholders. the internal supervisory function must in turn be provided with the information required for the complete fulfilment of its duties. it should be proactive in obtaining such information, and should exercise effectively its duties of assessing the internal control system, which is essential to ensure the reliability of the information provided during the decision - making process. banks should possess an internal organisation based on a clear distribution of responsibilities between their various units and functions, as well as clear vertical and functional reporting lines. each employee must be fit for the duties they exercise, in accordance with a recruitment and training policy that conforms to the banks ’ specific needs. in particular, banks should identify and assess the holders of essential positions, that is, those who exercise duties that confer significant influence on the management or whose duties can have a material impact on their risk profile. the internal control mechanisms should have the empowerment, independence and capacity for intervention necessary to fulfil their objectives. the management and supervisory bodies should act in a way as to make clear the internal control functions contained in internal rules of procedure, and the assessment, career progression and compensation scheme of the staff employed in these areas must obey specific criteria, separated and distinct from the criteria followed for staff employed in commercial areas of the business. assessment and career progression policies and banks ’ remuneration policies and practices must line up with the interests of the members of the management and supervisory boards, as well as those of the employees in general as a goal of sound and prudent management. the banks must possess a conflicts of interest policy that enable such conflicts to be identified and eliminated. and rules have also been defined to seek to ensure that the statutory auditor 3 / 4 bis central bankers '

de portugal bis central bankers ’ speeches
##rations over the next two days of your meeting.

njuguna ndung ’ u : east african monetary union opening remarks by prof njuguna ndung ’ u, governor of the central bank of kenya, during the east african legislative assembly workshop on the east african monetary union, nairobi, 4 march 2010. * * * honorable chairperson of communication, trade and investment committee of east african legislative assembly, hon. dahilo ; representative of the clerk of eala, mr. enock musiime ; honorable members of parliament from eala ; honorable members of parliament from kenya, uganda, tanzania, burundi, rwanda ; director of planning and infrastructure, eac secretariat, mr. phillip wambugu and other officials from the eac secretariat ; senior government officials from the eac ; distinguished delegates ; ladies and gentlemen : i am privileged by this invitation to participate in this important workshop on the east african monetary union being held here in nairobi. on behalf of the central bank of kenya and on my own behalf, i welcome you all to nairobi, kenya. honorable members of eala and eac national assemblies, this workshop comes at a time when east africans are anxious to appreciate the benefits from the east african community common market. the protocol on its establishment was signed in november 2009. the eac common market will ensure free movement of factors of people, services and capital across the five partner states. under the common market, goods will be freely traded when the region attains the status of a fully fledged customs union. as the honorable members are aware, the eac common market protocol has provisions that will guide elimination of capital restrictions that continue to impede free flow of capital among the eac countries. the cardinal principal of free movement of capital ties with the next level of integration that is the east african monetary union. in line with the regional integration as stipulated in the treaty provision, the 6th extraordinary summit of eac heads of state held in arusha, tanzania on 20th august 2007 underscored the need to move expeditiously towards establishing a monetary union by 2012. following that summit directive, governors of eac central banks met in kampala, uganda in january 2008 to map out a strategic framework for fast tracking the establishment of an east african monetary union by 2012. the meeting of governors of central banks in kampala decided on a comprehensive study of the east african monetary union whose major objectives were : i ) to take stock of the current state of preparedness of the eac partner states for a monetary union. among
”, jackson hole, wyoming, august 30 - september 1, 2007.

the absence of significant changes in the transmission mechanism. for example, a recent paper by boivin, giannoni and mojon reports no significant changes in the transmission of monetary policy to inflation since january 1999. 9 to sum up, given the lags in the transmission of its effects, monetary policy has to be forward - looking. a central bank has to try to forecast as well as it can developments in the economy over the so - called “ policy - relevant horizon ”. it also has to try to detect the risks to price stability and decide the appropriate level of interest rate to achieve its objective. 3. when to start monetary easing? on the basis of the analytical framework described above, any loosening of monetary policy should in theory start before the cyclical downturn ; it must start before economic activity falls below its potential level. but to start the loosening cycle inflation expectations need to be firmly anchored, in line with the central bank ’ s definition of price stability. if interest rates are reduced in a context of rising inflation expectations, there is a risk of dis - anchoring them which would jeopardise the effectiveness of the policy move. this refers to expectations prevailing not only in the financial markets but also in the goods and labour markets. in the financial markets, an increase in inflation expectations would lead to a higher long - term interest rate, possibly also in real terms, which would discourage investment – precisely what the monetary easing did not intend to achieve. in the goods market, if a cut in the interest rate were made while producers ’ pricing expectations remained high, or were even increasing, it would further encourage mispricing behaviour in the face of a slowdown and would in fact exacerbate it. in the labour market, if wage behaviour were based on excessive inflation expectations, a rate cut could justify such expectations and excessive increases in remunerations, which would be a development out of line with the growth slowdown ahead. therefore, the timing of any policy easing has to be linked to inflation expectations, in particular longer - term ones. a central banker has to extract information from a series of indicators, relating to the financial market, professional forecasts, pricing behaviour by companies and by wage developments. the slower inflation expectations adjust to the economic slowdown, the slower the central bank will adapt monetary conditions to the projected decrease in inflation risks over the policy - relevant horizon. in other words, it is not enough for the central bank to forecast accurately the