, consensus and openness. its strength lies in its members who bring authority, expertise and shared objectives. the fsb is not a treaty - based organisation, so its standards do not have direct force in any member jurisdiction. decisions are ultimately matters for national authorities who – acting out of enlightened selfinterest and in recognition of the benefits of a resilient and open global financial system – guide and discipline the reform process. as such, fsb reforms would amount to little if they did not represent the best collective judgement of our members on how to deliver efficient resilience. but because they are the product of the authority, expertise and shared objectives of its members, the fsb reforms create the foundations for an open, global financial system. we now have agreed common minimum standards that are being consistently and transparently implemented. the playing field for cross border activities is being levelled. opportunities for regulatory arbitrage are being reduced. in short, a platform is being created for deference to each other ’ s approaches when they achieve similar outcomes. to seize this opportunity and to build responsible financial globalisation, authorities also need to share relevant information and work together to manage cross border challenges to financial stability. all speeches are available online at www. bankofengland. co. uk / publications / pages / speeches / default. aspx the fsb and basel committee have developed a number of information sharing guidelines to help foster trust and cooperation between international regulators. these include supervisory colleges and crisis management groups. one of the most critical elements of supervisory cooperation is understanding how each other will behave when things go wrong. in this regard, operationalising new “ gone concern ” regimes is critical. best practice is captured by the fsb ’ s key attributes and involves resolvability assessments and regular crisis management group meetings for systemic firms. in the decade ahead, members of the g20 will be increasingly well - positioned to defer to each other ’ s comparable regulatory outcomes, supported by commitments to common minimum standards and open supervisory co - operation. these commitments could be reinforced by reliance on independent peer reviews and a new, independent dispute resolution mechanism. brexit will be a litmus test of the future of international cooperation. the uk and the rest of the eu have exactly the same rules and the most highly developed frameworks of supervisory cooperation. their capital and banking markets are already highly integrated. they have the potential to create the template for trade in financial services. conclusion a decade on

in the financial arena, and occasionally business people. we are appointed for fixed terms, encouraging independent views. reserve bank presidents owe their appointments to both the board of directors of their regional reserve bank and the board of governors in washington. presidents can be either insiders – long - time staff members – or outsiders with relevant experience in academia, public policy, or the financial sector. once appointed, a president can serve until retirement at age 65 or for a minimum of ten years, affording scope for maintaining their individual views. nonetheless, fomc members try to find consensus under the leadership of the chairman, and neither governors nor presidents dissent very often. presidents have tended to dissent a little more than governors. the greater number of dissents by presidents might reflect a number of factors. for one, presidents have their own staffs, which can help support alternative views in preparing for a meeting. board members share a common staff with the chairman, and, being in the same building, perhaps have a greater opportunity to influence and be influenced by the chairman. in this regard, bank presidents may act like " outsiders " more readily than board members. at the same time, bank presidents tend to be longer tenured than board members, and can contribute the institutional memory one might expect from " insiders " when board membership turns over rapidly. 3. why so few dissents? fomc members recognize the degree of uncertainty around their judgments. unless they perceive that a serious misjudgment is being made, they expect, given common objectives, that when they prefer another policy and their analysis later proves correct, the committee is likely to move in their direction in time to forestall problems developing. and they may see their influence on policy as greater over time if they are usually part of the consensus. finally, they could perceive that a series of close votes could create uncertainty about policy and the direction of the institution. the absence of dissents should not be taken as indicating that alternative views are not expressed at fomc meetings. often these are manifest in participants'forecasts. because we are such a large and geographically separated committee, the fomc, unlike the mpc, does not attempt to arrive at a common forecast, and the dispersion of individual forecasts illustrates the range of views. for example, participants'projections in october of gross domestic product ( gdp ) growth for 2008 differed by one full percentage point and differences were still a half a percentage point for 2010. participants had