cdo ), structured investment vehicles ( siv ) and other exotic financial products. as a matter of fact, a large number of risk management tools such as risk management models, ratings, credit default swaps ( cds ) did emerge in the subprime cycle. but unfortunately fallout still occurred which in essence reflected inadequate risk management. financial post mortem analysis has suggested that financial institutions who have suffered seriously from subprime fallout have failed to mitigate a number of risks, such as market risk, liquidity risk, concentration risk and counter party risk etc. that is to say, the corporate strategy in so far as risk mitigation is concerned was incomplete, untimely and was not commensurate with its business profile and development. as financial institutions, or organizations with different business nature, offer more sophisticated products and services in order to achieve business success, there will be more associated risks in their on - going risk management framework. this is particularly true as they grow in size and complexity, and their ability to identify, define, measure, manage, and organize to manage their risks ; and how to reflect all those elements as appropriate in the corporate strategy is of utmost importance. 4. besides risk management, however, there is also one aspect which can apply to management of virtually all trades. the human resources part of corporate strategies relates to the management coherent to an organization ’ s most valued assets – the people working there who individually and collectively contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the business. the goal of human resources management strategy is to help an organization to meet strategic goal by attracting, and maintaining employees and also to manage them effectively. in practice, human resources management incorporates a vast number of issues which include, but not confined to, recruitment, workforce planning, orientation, skill, training and last, but not the least, compensation. we have to admit that compensation, amongst other motivating factors, is the most effective driving force behind a person ’ s desire to perform in the workplace. there have been many papers written on the most appropriate compensation scheme. one of the many schools of thought is the performance related pay which is money paid to someone relating to how well he or she performs. car salesmen, real estate agents, production line workers, for example, may be paid in this way, or through commission. this compensation scheme is based on the belief that money was the main incentive for increased productivity. this scheme cannot be applied universally as it has its own limitations although

go round the table and make a decision, it is common, as, for example, happened at our most recent meeting in april, for members to want to listen to the views of other members before making up their mind which way to vote. that is why no - one is forced to cast their vote for a particular level of bank rate until they have heard the views of the whole committee. as a result, there is often some suspense as to the final outcome. in january, for example, when the committee raised bank rate by five votes to four, that outcome looked unlikely when at one stage opinion was four to two for no change with only three people to speak. the greatest debate among the committee usually occurs during the quarterly forecast round which often stimulates fresh thinking. so it is perhaps not surprising that this is when many, but by no means all, changes in interest rates are decided – see chart 6. changes have been twice as frequent in inflation report months as in other months. but it is changes in economic conditions which are more important in determining the timing of our decisions. including one emergency meeting following the events of september 11 2001. on 20 occasions the mpc has met with fewer than the full complement of nine members. 12 of those occasions were before the bank of england act came in to effect and the ninth member could be appointed. since june 1998 it has also been short of its full complement on 8 occasions. the role of uncertainty and learning in monetary policy was discussed in my 2005 mais lecture. see king ( 2005 ). see, for example, blinder ( 2004 ), blinder and morgan ( 2000 ) and lombardelli et al ( 2005 ). the arguments for delegating decisions on interest rates to a committee of experts were discussed in my may 2002 lecture to the society of business economists. see king ( 2002a ). second, members of the committee are individually and publicly accountable for their votes. disagreement among the committee is inevitable ; it is also desirable because it represents the individual judgements of members, rather than an attempt to create a false consensus. it is a source of strength. over the past ten years, there have been 153 dissenting votes, on average more than one per meeting. this institutional encouragement of open debate is in contrast to many other central banks. we don ’ t “ do consensus ”, as one former member put it. dissent is more frequent than on other central bank committees which publish individual votes, and is not just token