to 2 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches any potential future losses. looking beyond this particular case, one thing is clear : while the use of public funds will be made more difficult under the new resolution rules and will only be permitted subject to compliance with certain criteria, it has not been taken off the table completely. yet the fact that government aid was provided to as many as three of the first four banks to run into difficulties cannot be in the interest of european legislators. our resolution regime should be measured against how effectively it shields national taxpayers – and i firmly believe that this should also be the goal of national insolvency law as well. before i go on to talk about the actual resolution cases in greater depth, let me take this opportunity to draw three conclusions from the crises as viewed from a banking supervisor ’ s perspective. first, it will not be possible to draw up a straightforward supervisory blueprint for dealing with future crises. as a general rule, every crisis tends to be different and there is no “ one size fits all ” approach to resolving them. we observed this recently in italy and spain. the institutions there differ in terms of the reasons why they ran into difficulties, their positions in the banking market and their standing in their respective economies. however, we must nevertheless learn specific lessons from each individual case. second, as this issue concerns appropriate, tailored solutions – and therefore discretionary scope as well – efficient decision - making processes are required. in this context, coordination between all of the institutional stakeholders plays a very important role. as crisis situations will always be unique, we need to ensure that all decision - making factors are incorporated sensibly and objectively. third, we need to grasp that banking supervision certainly can, and must, deliver far more than dealing with acute difficulties in the banking sector. as a general rule, it kicks in far earlier by ensuring compliance with the rules, thereby tackling unwelcome developments in good time. european supervisors have set new standards as far as the last point is concerned. capital addons, for instance, which are set following the annual supervisory review process, have become far more important than they once were. and that is as it should be. having learned from the crisis years, banking supervisors have strengthened their early warning systems and early intervention capabilities. supervisors now go beyond the scope of an institution ’ s solvency and liquidity – these days, they normally also examine business models and governance, as unwelcome developments in these areas

state of affairs in the european banking sector, which is not to be overlooked in the context of the banking union. 2. crisis situations – uncharted territory for the ssm it isn ’ t for nothing that ailing banks attract so much public attention. this is because, by their nature, a great deal of money is at stake. that ’ s precisely why declaring that an institution ’ s failure is imminent or inevitable – known in technical terms as “ failing or likely to fail ” – is the most powerful weapon in the banking supervisors ’ arsenal. it equates to forcefully bringing an end to an 1 / 6 bis central bankers'speeches institution as we know it. the all but inescapable consequence is either resolution under the new european resolution rules or insolvency proceedings under national law. in economic terms, the decision draws a line – at least temporarily – under the institution ’ s accounts. losses arising from business activities now need to be realised. and the value of assets in a gone concern – that is to say, an institution that needs to be wound up – is almost always lower than that of those in a going concern. it ’ s not least for this reason that banking supervisors should not be overly hasty in classifying an institution as “ failing or likely to fail ”. but there ’ s also an old saying that applies here : it may be far better for all parties concerned to make a painful break rather than prolong the agony. needlessly perpetuating the situation could very well push up costs and losses. what ’ s more, “ gambling for resurrection ” – by which i mean focusing on a failing institution ’ s unlikely prospects of recovery, which could leave creditors and taxpayers footing an enormous bill if things come to a head – is not a viable option. there is no room for wishful thinking here – and that applies to both financial institutions and their supervisors. all in all, one thing is clear : when it comes to the timing of “ failing or likely to fail ” verdicts, banking supervisors cannot simply arrange these around the premier league schedule. a lack of confidence and liquidity can force the supervisors ’ hand at extremely short notice. in each individual case, every single detail needs to be scrutinised so that a well - thought - out decision can be made. in this regard, cooperation within the ssm and with the srm has worked well in the cases i have mentioned. the use of precautionary recap