cases. moreover, the pact has also established a framework to encourage people reaching the end of their career to keep their job or return to work. financial incentives have therefore been introduced, including a new bonus system granting a pension supplement for people continuing to work after the age of 62. this should push up the actual retirement age itself. the pact bears witness to an awareness and brings in an indispensable change of trend. according to the work done by the study group on ageing set up within the high council of finance, it is a significant stage in the process, but still not enough in itself to bring the employment rate in belgium up to a satisfactory level. * * * before summing up, i just have to say a few words about the question posed by the organisers of this debate to each of the contributors, namely, which is the best method : harmonisation or decentralisation? do these few selected examples of measures taken in belgium enable us to draw some lessons about the best strategy for continuing and speeding up implementation of the structural reform so badly needed by european economies? first of all, i would point out that this reform applies to existing situations which differ radically from one country to another, even from one region to another. these specific characteristics, which can range from the institutional set - up to the labour relations and social security system, the structure of the economy or even the preferences of the various parties involved, must be taken into account when drawing up appropriate measures, likely to get sufficient backing from society at large. faced with these arguments in favour of decentralisation, we should not overlook the importance of the common approach developed at european level, in the context of the lisbon strategy. its contribution has been primordial in making structural reform a subject of national debate. the use of benchmarking and promoting " best practice " also come into this awareness - raising effort at national level. furthermore, the european dimension helps reap the benefits of positive externalites factors stemming from close coordination of reform measures between countries, and helps keep the risk of possible " beggar - my - neighbour ” policies to a minimum. in the updated lisbon strategy that they endorsed in 2005, the member states and the eu authorities have put together a useful combination of a common and decentralised approach. the broad lines are drawn up at european level while the member states are now given more responsibility in implementing reform measures. individual member states mainly have their say by adopting national reform programmes, setting out government

guy quaden : installation of the financial stability committee introductory talk by mr guy quaden, governor of the national bank of belgium and chairman of the financial stability committee, at the installation of the financial stability committee, brussels, 30 july 2003. * * * the installation of the financial stability committee, the committee which the ministers reynders and moerman are doing us the honour of inaugurating today, is one of the very last stages in the implementation of the law of 2 august 2002, designed by the ministers reynders and picque and adopted by parliament by a very large majority, a law which has modernised our financial markets and reformed their supervision. i would like to take advantage of the opportunity to welcome this reform, and especially its institutional aspects. thus, i am delighted that the supervision of the rules on market operation has been transferred to the public authorities - more precisely the bfc ( banking and finance commission ) - in cases where those rules are of public interest. it was doubtless also necessary to review the governance - to use a fashionable word - of the institutions responsible for supervising the financial markets and intermediaries, and i include insurance companies here. by equipping the supervisory institutions with proper management boards whose members carry full responsibility for managing the institution, we are undoubtedly providing a better guarantee that decisions are genuinely taken on a collegiate basis. in my view, it was also wise to decide that the microprudential supervisory authorities, the bfc and the iso ( insurance supervision office ), which tomorrow become the bfic ( banking, finance and insurance commission ), should remain separate from the central bank while strengthening their links with the bank. finally, in a country where “ bancassurance ” groups are particularly well developed, the reform was complemented, i believe logically, by the planned merger of the bfc and the iso. where financial supervision is concerned, we must admit that there is no obvious model to follow. thus, the arrangements still vary from one country to another, depending on the national institutional history. broadly speaking, however, we can identify two main models for organising these powers in the european union : a model like that used in britain and also in sweden, in which a single agency, almost entirely separate from the central bank, is responsible for all micro - prudential supervision, and a model - which is the most common type in the euro area - in which the central bank itself takes charge of part of the prudential