a crucial objective. 3. no kingmakers large networks joint - venturing with specific financial institutions could extend the former ’ s market power and concentration to financial markets. 4. business continuity with systemic foreign providers the failure of a fintech or bigtech firm with systemic financial services operations, or the interruption in the service it provides, could have substantial spill - overs for both the domestic economy it serves and other economies in the region. the source of such risks – particularly those related to legal or operational issues – could also originate in a jurisdiction different from that affected by said issues. 5. jurisdictional gaps bigtech firms operating across multiple jurisdictions could increase the risk of gaps in supervisory oversight. in order to ensure effective monitoring of bigtech financial services activities, efficient cooperation between regulators across jurisdictions is extremely important. in order for regulators to ensure that new risks are regulated equally, new frameworks and standards need to be developed. 6. client protection given that risks concerning consumer protection may be larger in the case of bigtech firms ’ activities, the use of financial data must be regulated to avoid its misuse and also because once bigtech firms have access to the whole set of data it will be difficult to constrain its use. it is just as relevant to promote robust and transparent data governance frameworks to provide clarity regarding the use of consumer data, thus enhancing consumer confidence. 7. cybersecurity since the number and severity of cybersecurity incidents that affect the operation of all types of companies have been increasing, information technology security is a priority issue for all industries, and for the entire financial system. setting minimum standards is crucial to avoid contagion and risks to the systems. thus, cyber and operational security should be addressed through three layers : i ) the owner ( s ) of the infrastructure ( s ) ; ii ) the participants ( setting minimum requirements to them ) ; and, iii ) the users. even when all layers require the implementation of measures aimed at making cybersecurity robust, the users ’ layer could be the weakest link of the chain and addressing their inherent problems would require creative solutions. i want to conclude emphasizing that the cornerstone for a healthy payment ecosystem is a safe and robust infrastructure for low, medium and large value payments, with 24 / 7 services, 3 / 4 bis central bankers'speeches extremely high levels of availability and capable of acting as a hub for the innovation of payment services to final users. developing this public infrastructure should be at the top of the

stability. further to this, the issuer country ’ s economic size and centrality in regional or global production and trade networks is an important driver of demand for its currency at the international level, while capital account openness and the consequent currency ’ s convertibility, as well as the depth of domestic financial markets, provide further assurance to global investors. considerable progress has been made in several relevant fronts towards the internationalization of china ’ s renminbi over the last years. its growing use as a medium of exchange and unit of account is evident. the renminbi ’ s participation in global payments has increased from virtually nil in 2010 to slightly less than 2 percent in early 2017, and a similar pattern is observed in the share of china ’ s total international trade that is settled in its own currency. 2 also, the most recent bis triennial survey on foreign exchange turnover, 3 shows that the renminbi was last year the world ’ s eighth most actively traded currency and the first among emerging market economies, after having nearly doubled its share in all foreign exchange transactions over the course of three years. 4 significant progress has also been achieved in enhancing the renminbi ’ s use as a store of value by central banks and monetary authorities. the latest release of the imf ’ s currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves ( cofer ) survey includes specific data for this currency for the first time since records exist. according to this information, albeit low at levels slightly over 1 percent as of the end of 2016, the renminbi ’ s share in the world ’ s total allocated international reserves is not far from other, more established reserve currencies such as the australian and canadian dollars ( 1. 9 and 2 percent, respectively ), and far above that of the swiss franc ( 0. 2 percent ). 5 as noted above, these developments respond to a significant extent to china ’ s increased importance in the global economy. in 2014, china overtook the hongbin, q. et al. ( 2017 ) : “ the rise of the redback vi ”, hsbc global research, april. bank for international settlements ( 2016 ) : “ triennial central bank survey : foreign exchange turnover in april 2016 ”, september. it should be noted, however, that this development came atop a relatively low base, as the renminbi ’ s participation in all foreign exchange transactions increased from 2. 2 % in 2013 to 4 % in 2016 ( note that the sum