christine lagarde : the european systemic risk board's first general warning one year on welcome remarks by ms christine lagarde, president of the european central bank and chair of the european systemic risk board, at the 7th annual conference of the european systemic risk board " financial stability challenges ahead : emerging risks and regulation ", frankfurt am main, 16 november 2023. * * * it is my pleasure to welcome you to the seventh annual conference of the european systemic risk board ( esrb ). 1 societies throughout history have always found ways to alert people to the potential materialisation of risks so they have time to successfully pre - empt them. some methods were simpler than others. in the middle ages, for example, village bells were rung to raise the alarm. 2 but today, the complexity of our economy means that risks can appear from all angles, and the task of signalling them is often assigned to expert bodies. the esrb was set up precisely to identify the risks emanating from an interconnected financial system that national actors might not see. just over twelve months ago, the esrb published a " general warning " about financial stability risks, addressed to all european union and national supervisory authorities. 3 this was the first such warning in its 13 - year history – and a clear call to action. one year on, we can begin to take stock of that general warning, with two important questions coming to the fore. first, to what extent have the risks that we described materialised so far? and second, how impactful has the general warning been in increasing the financial system's resilience? the materialisation of risks we issued our general warning in september 2022 – a time of exceptionally high uncertainty. the russian invasion of ukraine had combined with other factors to increase the likelihood of tail risk scenarios materialising. 4 europe was facing the risk of drastic shortages of gas and oil as winter approached. and the sharp shift from a decade of very low rates to higher rates in a short space of time – necessary to fight rising inflation – also risked exposing financial imbalances and sparking substantial market volatility. at the time, we warned that all the risks we foresaw could materialise simultaneously and amplify each other's impact. fortunately, this scenario has so far not come to pass. but some specific risks we identified have since partially materialised. 1 / 4 bis - central bankers'speeches first, we expressed concern that households and companies would

lorenzo bini smaghi : towards the g8 – strategies for emerging from the crisis speech by mr lorenzo bini smaghi, member of the executive board of the european central bank, at the universita luiss guido carli, rome, 27 may 2009. * * * i would like to start by thanking the organisers of this conference for the invitation to reflect together on the topics related to the next g8 summit. there is no doubt that the economic and financial crisis, the most serious of the post - war period, will take centre stage at the upcoming international meetings. today ’ s conference is entitled “ strategies for emerging from the crisis ”. it is right to speak of strategies, because intervention is required at a number of different levels. these concern financial regulation, the governance of institutions and companies, the ethical behaviour of economic agents and legislators, and economic policies. looking at the composition of the panel for this conference, it seems to me that my comparative advantages chiefly relate to this last area, that of economic policies. there is no doubt that the economic policies of recent years have played a role in creating the conditions which have led us to this crisis. they were not the only factor, perhaps not even the main one, but they were important, because they tended to heighten, rather than to counter, the procyclical behaviour of agents. for example, in countries where the private sector was already highly indebted, economic policies sometimes promoted further borrowing, in particular through low interest rates and fiscal incentives. if we wish to avoid recreating the conditions which led to this crisis, we must carefully examine the motives behind the economic policies that were implemented during this period. this exercise can be conducted at two levels. the first implies analysing the economic policies on the basis of the specific reference criteria of those policies. a policy may turn out to be inappropriate, for example, because it is based on incorrect economic forecasts or because it is implemented through ineffective instruments. thus far, the discussion has mainly taken place at this level, and the remedies suggested have mainly been aimed at correcting these aspects. it is an important discussion, without a doubt, but there is a risk that such discussion is insufficient because it does not tackle the fundamental causes that led economic policy - makers to take certain measures. for this reason, a second, more profound level of analysis is necessary. let us proceed in order. let us begin with the first level