samchain/econo-pairs-v2 huggingface dataset:
been personally involved on several fronts, i know just how much of a collective effort this was. many of you here today have worked hard in your own institutions to comply with new rules and shore up risk management. we have all accomplished a lot. but, let ’ s face it, the job is still not done. winston churchill once said, “ all men make mistakes, but only wise men learn from their mistakes. ” so, it is wise to have conferences like this one, where we can continue to reflect on what went wrong. that is why i am pleased to be here ; i would like to thank the organizers for the invitation. the experts who spoke before me gave us insights into the genesis of the crisis and the subsequent lessons. my intention is to push the conversation forward and spark discussion in three areas where i believe we have unfinished business : 1. understanding the role of monetary policy in financial stability — if there is one thing we have learned since the turn of the century, it is that price stability does not guarantee financial stability. 2. keeping policy current as risks to the system evolve — leverage and liquidity are important usual suspects, but the trickiest part may be understanding the risks that stem from interconnectedness in an ecosystem that is changing rapidly. 3. being ready for when things go wrong — being well prepared will help keep the financial damage to a minimum, especially for people who did not take the risk in the first place. central banks, along with other authorities and financial system participants, have a strong role to play in all these areas. monetary policy cannot do it all let me start with the role of monetary policy in financial stability. monetary stability — low, stable and predictable inflation — is at the heart of a solid macroeconomy and financial stability. since the bank of canada adopted its inflation - control target in 1991, there has been a reduction in the variability of economic growth by more than one - third and in unemployment by 40 per cent, even when accounting for the crisis. this has been particularly beneficial for younger people and workers with a lower level of 3 these estimates were produced by running a simulation with totem, the bank of canada ’ s main policy model. education, who tend to have more precarious employment. 4 successful inflation targeting in canada and elsewhere is considered one of the factors behind this “ great moderation, ” together with some helpful changes to structural policies and a little good luck. 5 we know that many factors contributed to the crisis

conducted. i expect that the oireachtas will, in time, decide to authorise some form of inquiry to try to understand the deeper, underlying causes of this crisis so that wider lessons can be learnt for the future. in considering how best to do this, i suggest that new models need to be explored. the crisis is not simply a question of discovering who did what and who knew what. uncovering the deep roots of the crisis will require expertise and broad social scientific understanding more than merely forensic skills.
recent years by the banking supervision department remained in place. one of the main channels through which accommodative monetary policy succeeded in impacting on economic activity is credit to households. this credit increased, its cost declined, and the reduction of the interest rate thus led to a marked reduction in the price of consumer credit, and subsequently to the increase of such credit, which in the end supported the increase in private consumption by a relatively rapid prate in recent years, primarily in 2015. private consumption, which makes up 55 percent of gdp, was the dominant factor in contributing to growth this year, and partly offset the weakness in activity that derived from the decline in exports and investments. this was also reflected in employment. budgetary policy in 2015, which was based primarily on the interim budget, reflected a decline in the cyclically adjusted deficit – that is, the budget net of the effects of the deviation of growth from the long term rate – to 2. 7 percent of gdp. as such, the policy reduced the fiscal stimulus ( that is, its countercyclical effect ). this is a reasonable policy given that the level of the cyclically adjusted deficit is still relatively high, and that the accommodative monetary policy supported activity. the decline in the deficit, together with a relatively rapid increase in the gdp deflator, and the erosion pf the cpi - indexed debt, supported the continuation of the decline in the share of public debt in gdp, the opposite of its trend in most advanced economies, and of their average level. the interest payment burden remains high relative to the oecd average, but is in a trend of decline, which has accelerated in the past two years. this decline derives not only from the decline in the debt ratio but also in the active policy of the ministry of finance accountant general ’ s division, which acted to roll over the debt at today ’ s low rates, and also to reduce the roll over risk by extending the duration of the debt. the reduction of the debt repayment burden – from about 4. 5 percent of gdp in 2010 to about 2. 5 percent of gdp today frees up significant resources for other uses. the deficit ceiling that was set for the 2016 budget and the reduction of vat and corporate taxes bis central bankers ’ speeches in response to enhanced tax collection that derived to a great extent from the strength in real estate transactions, are liable to halt the continuation of these positive developments. the success in dealing with the

only to support growth but also to improve the quality of the growth and its long term sustainability. this includes significant investment in education and according priority towards achieving socio - economic stability. overall, a balanced and holistic approach to economic management is aimed to ensure the foundation for a strong economy and its competitive position in the global economy. thank you.
, annual hicp inflation was 2. 2 % in december, down from 2. 3 % in november and 2. 5 % in october. over the short term, annual inflation rates may again increase somewhat, reflecting in particular renewed increases in energy prices and some base effects. looking further ahead, indirect effects of past oil price rises on other components of the price index may gradually materialise, and already announced changes to administered prices and indirect taxes can be expected to have an upward impact on hicp inflation. meanwhile, wage dynamics have remained moderate over recent quarters and are assumed to remain so for the time being, reflecting, in particular, global competitive pressure. all in all, currently available information is broadly in line with the scenario embodied in the december 2005 eurosystem staff projections for hicp inflation over this year and next. risks to this outlook for price developments remain on the upside and include further rises in oil prices, a pass - through of oil prices into consumer prices stronger than currently envisaged, additional increases in administered prices and indirect taxes, and – more fundamentally – potential secondround effects on wage and price - setting behaviour. it is therefore crucial that the social partners continue to meet their responsibilities also in the context of a more favourable economic environment. turning to the monetary analysis, the annual growth rate of m3 remains robust, even though it moderated further in december. this moderation can be explained in part by an apparent resumption of the unwinding of past portfolio shifts, which exerts a dampening effect on headline m3 growth. however, the trend rate of monetary expansion remains strong, reflecting the stimulative impact of the prevailing low level of interest rates. in particular, growth in the most liquid components of m3 continues to be very robust and the annual growth rate of loans to the private sector has increased further. mortgage borrowing is particularly buoyant, implying a need to monitor developments in the housing market closely. overall, strong monetary and credit growth in a context of already ample liquidity in the euro area points to risks to price stability over the medium to longer term. to sum up, the economic analysis suggests that indirect effects stemming from past oil price rises and already announced changes to administered prices and indirect taxes can be expected to have an upward impact on annual hicp inflation over the coming years. it also indicates that risks to price stability over the medium term remain on the upside. cross - checking the outcome of our economic analysis with that of our monetary analysis

employment in the longer run. we are now at your disposal for questions.
be considering these questions as we prepare for our next interest rate announcement on 5 september.

increased emphasis on identifying risks and vulnerabilities to the canadian financial system and on developing a better early warning system. the bank's financial system review was recently revamped with that objective in mind. in terms of regulation, the bank is drawing attention to the need to mitigate procyclical tendencies within the financial system, to improve transparency, and to keep core financial markets open. in this regard, the central bank has the power to see to it that core markets have continuous access to liquidity by acting as a counterparty to major market participants, if needed, in times of crisis. the principles guiding the bank's use of that power were discussed in the june 2008 issue of the financial system review. 2. continuously open markets and risk - proofed infrastructure other measures can contribute to continuously open and resilient markets. for example, efforts outside canada to create a clearing house for credit default swaps ( cds ) have the m. carney, " from hindsight to foresight " ( speech to women in capital markets, toronto, ontario, 17 december 2008 ). potential to reduce counterparty risk and to help keep this market open in stressful times. a clearing house offers the advantages of robust operational arrangements and clear workout procedures in the event of a default. without underestimating the complexities that this would involve, policy - makers could look for other markets that could benefit from being moved onto exchanges or into clearing houses. they could encourage such moves by establishing higher capital requirements for securities that trade outside of continuously open markets and by working to further risk - proof custodial banks. recent events have demonstrated the value of well risk - proofed clearing and settlement systems. for example, the use of cls bank to settle foreign exchange transactions was a stabilizing factor, especially during the working out of the lehman brothers bankruptcy. by providing simultaneous settlement of both transaction legs ( payment - versus - payment ), cls bank virtually eliminates the credit - risk component of foreign exchange transactions. yet canadian institutions use cls bank relatively less than their international counterparts. this is partly because cls bank doesn't currently allow for settlement of same - day, bilateral canadian - u. s. dollar transactions. nonetheless, there would be benefits from a greater use of cls bank by canadian institutions. the bank of canada encourages them to consider using cls bank for managing their foreign exchange settlement risk, while bearing in mind that other risks associated with foreign exchange transactions not
mark carney : summary of the latest monetary policy report update opening statement by mr mark carney, governor of the bank of canada, at a press conference following the release of the monetary policy report, ottawa, 21 january 2010. * * * good morning. paul and i are pleased to be here with you today to discuss the january monetary policy report, which we published this morning. • the global economic recovery is underway. economic and financial developments have been slightly more favourable than we projected in october, and the outlook for global economic growth through 2010 and 2011 is somewhat stronger. • although the recession in canada was severe, with real gdp contracting for three consecutive quarters, the magnitude of the downturn was more modest than in other major advanced economies. in particular, domestic demand held up much better in canada than elsewhere, reflecting the soundness of canada ’ s banking system, relatively healthy household and corporate balance sheets, and the speed and scale of monetary policy actions. • economic growth in canada resumed in the third quarter of 2009 and is expected to have picked up further in the fourth quarter. nevertheless, considerable excess supply remains, and the bank judges that the economy was operating about 3 ¼ per cent below its production capacity in the fourth quarter of 2009. • in canada, the recovery is expected to evolve largely as anticipated in october, with the economy returning to full capacity in the third quarter of 2011. this recovery is still expected to be more subdued than usual. the main factors supporting the canadian recovery are : monetary and fiscal policy support, increased confidence, a firming global economy, and higher terms of trade. • at the same time, the persistent strength of the canadian dollar and the low absolute level of u. s. demand continue to act as significant drags on economic activity. • for the year as a whole, the canadian economy contracted by an estimated 2. 5 per cent in 2009. it is projected to grow by 2. 9 per cent in 2010 and 3. 5 per cent in 2011. • as a result of year - over - year increases in energy prices, total cpi inflation turned positive in the fourth quarter of 2009, as had been anticipated. • in spite of the large amount of excess supply in the economy, the core rate of inflation has been slightly stronger than expected in recent months. this stickiness of core inflation is likely related to the fact that wage growth had remained high relative to the underlying trend in productivity. • the core rate of inflation is projected to increase gradually,

keeping inflation low, stable, and predictable.
of the real estate sector, and therefore has a temporary component that would tend to disappear in an economic slowdown. it is therefore imperative to preserve the stabilising potential provided by the current state of public finances so that phases of less dynamic private spending can be faced with strength and the ability to react and, above all, so as to be prepared for unexpected contractionary shocks. this approach is especially valid in the current climate of uncertainty, in which a continued economic policy of rigour and budgetary stability is one of the most valuable resources when it comes to preserving internal and external confidence in our economy. perseverance in the strategy of budgetary consolidation is also necessary from a mediumterm perspective so as to be in the best possible position to address the foreseeable impact of population ageing, aside from the required further progress in reform of the pension system. regarding the co - ordination of this strategy, i would like to add two more comments. first, it is very important that all tiers of government contribute effectively, particularly the regional governments, whose weight in public spending policies has become most substantial. however, the official forecast is that, overall, these territorial governments will still post a deficit in 2007 despite the benign economic circumstances over the last few years. second, budgetary stability should be accompanied by an improvement in the quality of public finances to secure advances in the allocation of factors of production, particularly human and technological factors, and in the efficiency of the economy. the spending policies included in the draft budget give priority to areas of key importance for improving productivity, such as increased resources for research and development, education and infrastructure, although other priority items entail increases in current primary spending. it is important that the envisaged increase in resource allocation be managed efficiently through the use of better suited mechanisms to assess and select public policies so as to enable real increases in productivity. the budget is not, however, the only instrument, nor often the most appropriate one, to achieve the aim of raising the efficiency of the economy. structural policies designed to make factor and product markets more flexible will be called on to make an essential contribution to this aim and, for this purpose, it is necessary to persevere with and extend the processes of liberalisation undertaken in recent years. policies of this type, which enable growth potential to be raised and make for the efficient allocation of resources in the economy, are pivotal in the present conjuncture, which, as stated earlier, requires a rebalanc

##ing of the sources of growth of the spanish economy. thank you.
instruments for sterilisation. it is important to recognise that the various instruments have differential impact on the balance sheets of the central bank, government and the financial sector. for example, in the case of open market operation ( omo ) sales, owing to the difference between international and domestic interest rates, there is a positive cost of sterilisation in case the domestic interest rates are higher than the reserves. this cost is borne by the central bank. sales of government securities under omo also involve a transfer of market risks to the financial intermediaries, mostly banks. in the context of an increase in cash reserve ratio ( crr ) or reserve requirements, the cost is borne by the banking sector if crr balances are not remunerated. however, if the crr balances are remunerated, the cost could be shared between the banking sector and the central bank. the central government has to bear the cost in case of market stabilisation scheme ( mss ), a unique facility used in india, the details of which i will discuss in later part of my remarks. the repo operations have a direct cost to the central bank. the foreign institutional investors and the corporate have to share the cost of any capital controls used by the country. the extent of capital flows to be sterilised and the choice of instruments, thus, also depend upon the impact on the balance sheets of these entities. ishi, kotaro, mark stone, and etienne b. yehoue. 2009. “ unconventional central bank measures for emerging economies ”. imf working paper wp / 09 / 226. hannoun, h ( 2010 ) : “ the expanding role of central banks since the crisis : what are the limits? ”, bis speech. cross et al ( 2010 ) : the bank ’ s balance sheet during the crisis, boe quarterly bulletin, 2010q1. sheard, p ( 2009 ) : “ central bank balance sheet expansion ”, nomura, 2010. bis central bankers ’ speeches in our case, in order to sterilize the impact of additional liquidity in the system generated through large capital inflows, open market operations ( omo ) have been supplemented by daily liquidity adjustment facility ( laf ) to deal with frictional liquidity. as mentioned above, since 2004, rbi has instituted additional instruments of sterilization namely the market stabilisation scheme ( mss ). as and when necessary, rbi has also used traditional

in this regard. the reason we do not disclose the currency composition is because, as the forex reserves manager, we are like any other commercial entity in the market. the information is market sensitive and disclosure could potentially impact our commercial interests adversely. disclosure also has wider implications for our international relations. furthermore, market efficiency is in no way affected by our nondisclosure. indeed non - disclosure is the norm around the world ; a majority of the countries, particularly the large reserve holders, do not disclose the composition of their foreign exchange reserves. bis central bankers ’ speeches
permanently below it. second, there is no sensible alternative monetary policy that would have prevented us from entering the zone of full capacity. the only way monetary policy could have prevented this is if it had kept the economy'semi - comatose '. that would have meant growing so slowly on average that, even with the passage of fifteen years, it did not use up the excess capacity. third, full capacity is not a brick wall that you suddenly hit – approaching it is something that happens in stages. it is a rather patchy process, with some sectors reaching it early and some not at all. that is why i called it the zone of full capacity. sometimes it is an industry that becomes a bottleneck, sometimes a type of capital equipment and often it is a type of skilled labour. the situation that attracts the most attention is when it is a piece of infrastructure such as a port or a railway. but normally when the bank talks about capacity, we are not talking about the specific pieces of infrastructure but about the economy's overall availability of labour and capital resources. it is also worth keeping in mind that it is normal for the capacity of the economy to grow over time. this is because the labour force grows and investment and economic reforms lift output per worker, or productivity. there are limits, however, to how quickly capacity can be raised, though increased investment, as is taking place at present, will boost the rate of increase. but it takes time. in the meantime, it is helpful if demand can slow sufficiently to allow capacity to'catch up'and perhaps get ahead a little. if this fails to happen, then there is a risk of a generalised pick - up in inflation. some rises in prices and wages in the areas where bottlenecks exist are unavoidable, but a generalised inflationary process is avoidable. this is why last year i started saying that we should get used to gdp growth with a 2 or a 3 in front of the decimal point, rather than a 3 or a 4 as we had become accustomed to throughout most of the expansion. in light of what i have just outlined, i would like to review our progress to date. the first thing to note is that over the past two years the economy has slowed from its earlier fast pace of growth. the last time we had gdp growth of over 4 per cent was in the year to june 2004. since then, the growth rates have had a 2 or a 3 in front of

. monnet und h. s. shin ( 2021 ), distributed ledgers and the governance of money. cesifo working paper nr. 9441. 6 / 6 bis - central bankers'speeches