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from a formal perspective it necessitates amending the eu treaty – meaning it is very unlikely to be a short - term fix to the current challenges mainly related to recapitalisation needs in some banking systems, to political risks and to contagion effects within the euro area. the same is true regarding the proposed introduction of eurobonds. this is where i respectfully disagree with olivier blanchard, the imf chief economist, who was quoted as saying : “ … the germans had good reason to reject bearing the brunt of irresponsible policies by other states. but now we have a fiscal treaty. ” and he concluded : “ the germans should accept that the eurozone is going by way of eurobonds. ” under the current framework, the issuance of commonly guaranteed sovereign bonds would actually increase the existing mismatch between liability and control. i think, that, at least for the time being, euro - area governments have been reluctant to surrender their fiscal autonomy to a european authority. 4. conclusion the euro area consists of independent member states. each member state has its own constitutional tradition which has to be respected by its government. to some extent, the status of the euro area is similar to the articles of confederation drawn up in the late 1770s, which legally established the united states of america and served as its first constitution. bis central bankers ’ speeches we do not necessarily have to become a united states of europe. it is quite possible that a reformed maastricht framework of truly self - responsible member states – in other words, the european monetary union as it was planned to be – will guide us to a sustainable monetary union. or the peoples of europe might indeed make the leap to a substantial deepening of european integration, particularly in terms of economic and fiscal policies. both options are viable. the decisions taken up to now do not yet indicate which direction europe will take. however, there is absolutely no doubt as to the political will to ensure the continuity of european monetary union. especially to observers from outside the euro area, and given the often slow decision - making processes, the strength of this commitment is underestimated. we in the euro area believe in the continuity of the euro. and if the euro area embarks on the necessary reforms that i have outlined today, it will emerge from the crisis stronger than ever. thank you very much for your attention. bis central bankers ’ speeches