jul. ene. 11 jul. ene. 10 jul. 11 greece italy france germany spain ( * ) measured through 5 - yr cds premiums. source : bloomberg. bis central bankers ’ speeches figure 15 long - term nominal interest rate variation ( percentage points ) turkey israel brazil south korea canada australia colombia mexico germany u. s. chile - 2, 0 - 1, 5 - 1, 0 vs. max. year - 0, 5 0, 0 vs. 15 july chile : nominal interest rates ( percent ) 6, 5 6, 5 6, 0 6, 0 5, 5 5, 5 5, 0 5, 0 4, 5 4, 5 4, 0 4, 0 jun. 11 jun. 11 bcp - 2 ago. 11 aug. 11 bcp - 5 oct. 11 oct. 11 bcp - 10 ( 1 ) change in nominal interest rates of 10 - yr generic bonds, unless otherwise stated. changes at 18 october 2011. ( 2 ) 10 - yr bcp rates calculated by the central bank of chile. variations at 17 october 2011. ( 3 ) 15 - yr generic bond rates. sources : central bank of chile and bloomberg. bis central bankers ’ speeches

( figure 8 ). almost coinciding with the earthquake, and after twenty years, there was a change in the ruling coalition, which demanded agreements and coordination with the new government authorities. i must acknowledge that there were no difficulties there, and thanks to the bank ’ s accumulated experience in these matters, the transition was very smooth. the risk of overheating and forex pressures economic recovery continued over the course of 2010, but at the turn of 2011 we faced new macroeconomic challenges. preoccupations again centered on world developments, due to tensions associated to the two - speed recovery. emerging countries, with their output gaps narrowed or closed had to deal with their economies ’ overheating and related inflationary pressures. furthermore, they began having strong exchange rate pressures due to their better relative position in the world, capital inflows and the need for global imbalances to be resolved. several economies ’ exchange rates dropped to their lowest in the last decade ( figure 9 ). only very recently have we seen some reversal because of a terms - of - trade deterioration and increased risk aversion around the world. chile has been no exception. although in net terms capital inflows were not large, our currency also strengthened, not a surprise in a scenario of vigorous growth and very good terms of trade. the nominal exchange rate posted a significant appreciation toward the end of 2010, while the real exchange rate hit levels below the averages of the last 15 to 20 years ( figure 10 ). the current exchange rate tensions originate in some long - lasting phenomena in the international economy. global imbalances are still unresolved, and part of the solution requires that the countries that enjoy a better position today ( i. e., emerging en commodityexporting economies ) redirect part of their demand to those that are worse off – the developed economies. once the latter regain their strength, their currencies will hopefully bis central bankers ’ speeches follow suit. however, the transition may take long and therefore exceptional policies have been necessary to help mitigate these tensions. like other emerging economies, early this year we decided to intervene the forex market, by launching a reserve hoarding program that would permit productive sectors to make orderly adjustments to what we foresaw as a protracted exchange rate stress situation. we announced that we would purchase 12 billion dollars over the course of this year, and so far we have purchased 10 billion. we have done this intervention in a non - discretion