LIVING REVIEWS IN DEMOCRACY democracy.livingreviews.org | 2009 Property-Owning Democracy and the Demands of Justice Thad Williamson University of Richmond | Jepson School of Leadership Studies | twillia9@richmond.edu Martin O'Neill University of Manchester | Manchester Centre for Political Theory | martin.oneill@manchester.ac.uk First published: September 2009 Most recent version available at http://www.livingreviews.org/lrd-2009-5 John Rawls is arguably the most important political philosopher of the past century. His theory of justice has set the agenda for debate in mainstream political philosophy for the past forty years, and has had an important influence in economics, law, sociology, and other disciplines. However, despite the importance and popularity of Rawls's work, there is (rather surprisingly) no clear picture of what a society that met Rawls's principles of justice would actually look like. Much of the confusion arises from the frequent description of Rawls as a proponent of a redistributive welfare state regime. While Rawls's principles of justice do provide philosophical support for the redress of existing inequalities and for the substantial redistribution of resources, it is incorrect to say that he favoured welfare state regimes in anything resembling their current form. In fact, Rawls was a strong critic of what he termed "welfare state capitalism" and an advocate of an institutional alternative which he termed "property-owning democracy." Discussion of "property-owning democracy" occupied only a very small part of his seminal A Theory of Justice (1971), and was passed over entirely in Political Liberalism (1993). But in his final statement of his view of social justice (Justice as Fairness, 2001) Rawls provided pointed and explicit (albeit rather brief) discussion of the essential contrasts between welfare state capitalism and property-owning democracy, and explained why he believed that the welfare state could not in fact realize his two principles of justice. Nonetheless, the concept of property-owning democracy is not well understood, and is still only rarely treated as integral to Rawls's theory of justice. The aim of this review article is threefold. First, we review how Rawls and his leading interpreters have described the concept of property-owning democracy. Second, we examine how the notion of "propertyowning democracy" has recently been appropriated by nonRawlsian political philosophers working in the republican tradition, who have developed arguments from non-Rawlsian premises which also favour the widespread dispersion of property ownership. Third, we briefly review recent work attempting to translate the general notion of a property-owning democracy into concrete institutional and policy proposals that might be adopted by advanced industrialized nations. A Theory of Justice and Property-Owning Democracy The hugely ambitious aim of Rawls's A Theory of Justice is to specify a public understanding of justice appropriate to societies committed to both individual freedom and democratic equality. Rawls develops his theory of justice explicitly in opposition to utilitarianism, understood as a public philosophy which equates both goodness and justice with the maximization of aggregate human welfare. Rawls believed that utilitarianism provided an inadequate philosophical grounding for an array of rights commonly associated with liberal democracies (such as freedom of speech and other civil liberties) and also failed to take individuals sufficiently seriously as important in their own right: a strictly utilitarian understanding of justice, for instance, could not preclude in advance depriving a minority of citizens of their liberties or denying them basic resources in order to advance the interests of the majority. As Rawls famously put it, "utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons."1 Rawls also recognized, and was concerned to counteract, the force of traditional objections to the very idea of justice, exemplified by Marx and other skeptics dating back to the character Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic. In this view, "justice" refers simply to the norms and rules governing a particular society-norms and rules which inevitably have the purpose and effect of justifying the status quo and benefitting the ruling class of a given society. For instance, in Marx's view, under capitalism, there is no injustice, as such, involved in a laborer selling their labor time to a capitalist, who then exploits the laborer by appropriating the product of that labor and selling it for a profit. Under capitalist conceptions of justice, this is simply a voluntary transaction, even if the labourer's only other choice was living in extreme penury, or starving to death. On this view, conceptions of justice can only be internal to a given society, and cannot provide an independent standard for judging a society's institutions. Those who are in charge set the rules and then they also get to call it justice.2 Similarly, our day-to-day judgments about what is just and fair can often be shaped and distorted by our own gender, race, and class position. Highly educated college graduates may be more likely to believe that those who have the best education should be given more money and power. Men may be more likely to 1 Rawls (1971: 24). Page citations to A Theory of Justice in this article refer to the 1999 revised edition. 2 Whether Marx was as hostile to the idea of justice as some of his more dismissive comments suggest is a disputed question, and one Rawls examines at some length in his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Rawls takes the view (drawing on the work of G.A.Cohen) that Marx does have a normative conception of justice underlying his analysis of capitalism, albeit one that is not explicitly expressed. See Rawls (2007): 335-371. See also G.A. Cohen (1989). Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 1 believe that the disproportionate numbers of men in positions of power are a result either of men's inherent superior fitness for such roles or the result of choices made by individual women not to pursue such positions. Middle-class people may be more likely to believe that the poor are largely to blame for their own condition, and managers at capitalist firms may be more likely to believe that they should have the right to issue orders to subordinates. Rawls's theory of justice aims both to provide an alternative to utilitarianism and an answer to skeptics who believe that impartial justice is impossible or that justice is at bottom a sort of disingenuous 'code language', designed to uphold the status quo. The principal mechanism Rawls invokes to develop his conception of justice is the idea of the Original Position (OP). In the Original Position, independent individuals come together for the purpose of selecting principles of justice that will govern their entire society. In the OP, every individual will be under a "veil of ignorance" with respect to their individual identity: individuals will not have any information about their race, gender, class position, educational attainment, religious beliefs, and so on. They will know that they wish to live a self-directed life and to form and pursue a rational life plan, and they will know that they need certain resources (what Rawls calls "primary goods") to pursue those plans; they will also be aware of certain basic principles of psychology, sociology, and economics regarding the nature of human societies and how they operate (i.e., the notion that people's behaviour is influenced by material incentives.) At the outset of A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that the governing principles that would be chosen in this initial position should be regarded as just.3 Rawls argues that two principles of justice would be selected: roughly speaking, a principle of liberty and a principle of equality. The liberty principle calls for providing each citizen with "a fully adequate scheme of equal liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all."4 What Rawls has in mind here principally are civil liberties and not (as in libertarian conceptions) the untrammelled right of individuals to profit from property holding or to enter into exchanges of any kind. The equality principle is twofold: all citizens are to have an equal opportunity to aspire to positions, offices and (more generally) social advancement (the "principle of fair equality of opportunity"); and inequalities between citizens are to be limited to those which maximally help the least well off group in society (the "difference principle"). Rawls accords absolute or "lexical" priority to the liberty principle and, within the equality principle, to the guarantee of fair equality of opportunity over the enactment of the difference principle. Thus, subject to the satisfaction of the liberty principle and the other part of the equality principle, political-economic arrangements must be organized so as to maximize the position of the least well off relative to any other possible arrangement.5 3 Rawls (1971): 10-19. It is important to recognize, however, that Rawls does not regard the OP as static. If it can be shown that in the OP the agents will reach principles of justice conflicting with our considered judgments, then the description of the OP is to be revised so as to yield a different result. In effect, the OP functions as a mechanism for testing intuitions about just principles. For useful discussion, see Kymlicka (2002): 63-70. 4 Rawls (2001): 42. We quote here from the revised statement of the two principles presented in Justice as Fairness. 5 As Samuel Freeman puts it, the difference principle calls for selecting that political-economic system which tends over time to maximize the position of the least well off; and it calls for maximizing the actual position of the least well off within that chosen system. So the difference The "difference principle" therefore can be seen as having a dual function. On the one hand, it sets a limit (however vaguely) on the scope of acceptable inequalities. On the other hand, given plausible assumptions about the role of incentives in stimulating productivity, it effectively mandates inequalities, so long as such inequalities maximally benefit those at the bottom of society. Rawls, in effect, endorses an affluent society with inequality and a high standard of living for the worst off as superior to a poorer society with little inequality. Here Rawls accepts the standard economist's view that there is a trade-off between strict equality and efficiency, and that material inequalities provide incentives for spurring the effort of economic producers, potentially to the benefit of all. Notably, Rawls also rejects the notion that inequality in itself is an overriding moral bad;6 what is bad are inequalities which cement the superior position of the most welloff, or which generate social harms, such as the domination of one part of society by another, or the loss of self-respect among the badly off.7 Given this set of principles, the task for Rawls is to specify a political economy that would be consistent with basic individual liberties (such as the liberty to choose one's employment and important liberties of political participation); that would provide substantially equal opportunities to all citizens; and that would limit runaway inequalities that create permanent classes or that undermine the notion that society is a joint system of cooperation aimed at a common end. By the time of writing A Theory of Justice  Rawls had already ruled out centralized state socialism as a plausible vehicle for realizing these principles; state socialism (among its other problems) systematically violated basic liberties (such as freedom of employment and political liberties). Rawls thus assumed that a just society must, in some sense, be a market society. But in A Theory of Justice, (and even more explicitly in Justice as Fairness, to which we will turn later in this discussion) Rawls left open the question as to whether the just society would be either capitalist or socialist in character. A just society based on the private control of capital, however, should take a different form than traditional or "really existing" capitalist societies: instead of the control of capital being highly concentrated among a narrow band of citizens, it should be dispersed as widely as possible. That idea represents the core kernel of "property-owning democracy." principle regulates both the broad choice of institutional arrangements and the selection of specific policies (i.e., taxes, transfers, labor laws) within a given arrangement. Importantly, Rawls does not equate maximizing the position of the least well-off with maximizing their incomes and wealth, but rather maximizing an index of the broader bundle of primary goods that affect one's sense of self-respect and overall life chances. See Freeman (2007a): 102-109 and Freeman (2007b): 111-115. 6 Derek Parfit (1991) gives the label "Telic egalitarianism" to the view that inequality is in itself bad. On the rejection of "Telic egalitarianism" and for discussion of Rawls's views regarding the badness of inequality, see Martin O'Neill, "What Should Egalitarians Believe?" (2008a). G.A. Cohen criticizes Rawls's theory of justice on a closely related issue, regarding Rawls's attitude to inequality (Cohen, 2008). In Cohen's view, the inequalities permitted by the difference principle may be sensible, but should not be regarded as just. Cohen argues in effect that Rawls wrongly elides justice as such with more pragmatic concerns in developing his account of social justice. Even if Cohen's critique is accepted, that does not make Rawls's ideas about property-owning democracy any less interesting or important; it simply means (to take Cohen's view) that we should regard it as an effort to specify what a real-world political economy that balanced justice against other important considerations looks like. 7 See Rawls (2001), pp. 130-2. See also Scanlon, (1996); O'Neill (2008a). Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 2 Rawls on the Institutional Framework of a Just Economy Rawls did not claim to have worked out the details of a politicaleconomic regime corresponding to the idea of a propertyowning democracy; his aim was simply to indicate the general outlines of the sort of political economy that might be fully consistent with the principles of justice as fairness. Moreover, this outline is pitched at the level of ideal-type regime analysis in Rawls's writings, and it thereby self-consciously passes over detailed questions of "political sociology" regarding how such a regime will function in practice.8 In the broadest possible terms, a property-owning democracy will be a market economy in which holdings of capital are widely dispersed across the population. The view is that fair equality of opportunity and limited inequality can be better achieved through a more broad-based distribution of initial holdings rather than by relying on the mechanism of "after-thefact" redistributive taxation. A property-owning democracy would be a "regime in which land and capital are widely though not presumably equally held," in which "[s]ociety is not so divided that one fairly small sector controls the preponderance of productive resources," and which is able to "prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity."9 In many respects, the institutional structure Rawls proposes in A Theory of Justice for a property-owning democracy is familiar to citizens living under welfare state capitalism. Rawls assumes that there will be a political constitution providing basic liberties, a public sector that provides public goods (including an educational system that will provide "equal chances of education and culture for persons similarly endowed and motivated"), and a market and price system with a suitable system of regulation. Rawls goes on to specify five separate branches of government oversight, dealing with regulation of markets, macro-economic policy, social transfers (with each citizen guaranteed a social minimum), the distribution of property, and the provision of non-essential public goods. The overall picture is of a mixed economy with a judicious blend of market mechanisms and government oversight, embedded within a system of basic liberties (such as freedom of career choice). 10 What, then, makes property-owning democracy distinct from welfare state capitalism? The distinction is to be found in the relative weight accorded in importance to "after-the-fact" social 8 The most sustained discussion of property-owning democracy offered by Rawls can found in Chapter V, of A Theory of Justice (1971), especially section 43, and again in the Preface to the French edition of A Theory of Justice (reproduced as the preface to the revised edition of TJ, see especially at pp. xiv-xvi). The most systematic discussion comes in pages 135-140 of Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). (The idea is given no attention at all in Political Liberalism [1993].) Given this paucity of discussion in Rawls's formal published writings, the discussion here is particularly informed by four further sources. These include a pair of articles in 1986 and 1987 by Krouse and McPherson that pay attention to Rawls's notion of a POD and try to draw out some of its implications (Krouse and McPherson, 1986, 1987); various publications by the British economist James Meade in the 1960s and 1970s describing a "property-owning democracy", from which Rawls explicitly takes the name for his preferred socioeconomic regime (Meade, 1965a, 1965b, 1975, 1993); work by one of Rawls's prominent students, Joshua Cohen, specifying the problematic relationship between capitalism and democracy (especially Cohen, 1989); and finally, Rawls's own recently published lectures on Karl Marx highlighting the contrast between Rawls' conception of a just society organized as a propertyowning democracy and Marx's ideal of communism (Rawls, 2007). 9 Rawls (1971): 247, 245. 10 Rawls (1971): 242-251; quotation on education at 243. transfers relative to alterations in the distribution of property in achieving a relatively egalitarian economy. Welfare state capitalism aims at providing an economic baseline as well as certain public goods (education, health care, housing) to all citizens; this is achieved primarily through redistributive taxation (what Rawls terms transfers). Property-owning democracy also aims to provide an economic baseline to the "least well off," but it has a further goal as well: preventing large concentrations of wealth and dispersing ownership of property as widely as possible. One might say that welfare state capitalism simply wants to provide a social baseline at the bottom, whereas property-owning democracy also wants to put limits on accumulation at the top, thereby narrowing overall inequality from both directions (top and bottom). Moreover, property-owning democracy is also concerned to engage in redistribution in additional dimensions: i.e., not just the redistribution of income characteristic of welfare state capitalism, but also the redistribution of wealth and capital assets (as well as ensuring a more equitable distribution of human capital).11 In terms of how such goals might be realized, Rawls points to inheritance taxes as the best mechanism for distributing property more widely and preventing large estates from being transferred in whole from one generation to another. Here Rawls cites proposals for taxation on intergenerational transfers developed by economist James Meade; persons receiving such transfers would owe progressively higher taxes on these gifts according to how many such gifts they had received over their lifetime. Rawls does not stipulate that each person must receive an inheritance, and rejects the idea that there is an inherent injustice in some persons receiving more gifts than another (so long as this takes place within the framework of an overall system that is just).12 For Rawls, inheritance taxes have a more limited, though vital function: preventing large concentrations of wealth from being transmitted inter-generationally. This aim in turn corresponds to a social ideal in which there is no permanent class of politically privileged holders of wealth and capital sufficiently powerful to extract gains for itself that do not function to benefit the least well off. Left Critiques of A Theory of Justice As noted above, Rawls's remarks describing his favoured socioeconomic regime in A Theory of Justice are rather sparse; Rawls devotes just 9 of the 514 pages of the book to discussion of "property-owning democracy," and only mentions the term in the main text twice. Perhaps as a result of the lack of detail on this issue, a number of left-wing critics took Rawls to be advocating welfare state policies which would enable capitalist processes to produce as much as wealth as possible, while redistributive processes located in the state assured that the "least well off" received as much in the way of (compensatory) economic resources as economically feasible.13 The notion of a capitalist welfare state that could in fact maximize the position of the least well off immediately struck many critics on the left as implausible. In one of the best-developed early critiques of Rawls, Barry Clark and Herbert Gintis argued that Rawls relied 11 As subsequent commentators have noted, such equalization of wealth and assets also has implications for how work is to be organized. See Hsieh (2009). 12 Rawls (1971): 245. 13 In Justice as Fairness, Rawls admits that the distinction between welfare state capitalism and property-owning democracy "is not sufficiently noted in Theory." Rawls (2001): 135 n2. Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 3 on citizens holding an implausibly expansive sense of social justice, in order to facilitate the redistribution required to "correct" the inequalities generated by capitalism, so as to meet the requirements of the difference principle.14 In a related critique, Gerald Doppelt argued that Rawls failed to appreciate the impact of relative economic position, particularly in the production process, on the generation of self-respect. Consequently, Doppelt suggested that the different ways in which Rawls treated the cases of, on the one hand, civil and personal liberties (which are to be distributed equally, as a matter of assuring the conditions of self-respect for all) and, on the other hand, positions and power in the production process (which can be distributed unequally without undermining fundamental self-respect), was normatively unjustifiable when one considered the effects of inequality on status and selfrespect.15 Likewise, David Schweickart argued that the logic of Rawls's theory of justice should have led him to embrace democratic socialism as the social system most capable of realizing his favoured principles.16 In an important response to these early critiques, Arthur DiQuattro defended Rawls against the charge that he is a supporter of traditional capitalism or of a system of social classes (understood in the Marxist sense of the term). In particular, DiQuattro argued that Rawls did not envisage a society divided between owners and non-owners of capital; in short, Rawls did not endorse capitalism, and did not assume that the allowances made for socioeconomic inequality under the second principle of justice necessitated a capitalist organization of production. In defending Rawls from these challenges from the left, DiQuattro quite properly called attention to the crucial distinction Rawls made between property-owning democracy and capitalism.17 Shortly thereafter, Richard Krouse and Michael McPherson offered the first sustained effort in the literature to engage with what Rawls meant by property-owning democracy.18 Drawing on both Rawls's writings and James Meade's efforts to describe a property-owning democracy, Krouse and McPherson show how both a concern for the fair value of the political liberties and the difference principle point in the direction of a regime that broadens property ownership directly, rather than a welfare state dependent on large-scale ex post redistributions to limit inequality. While some redistribution via taxation will be necessary even in a property-owning democracy, the fundamental mechanism for achieving an egalitarian society must be to "[limit] the concentration of property over time." Krouse and McPherson then went on to pose four critical questions, quoted verbatim below: 1. What institutional means are required to preserve [an] egalitarian distribution [of property] over time (should it at some time be achieved), and indeed can adequate means be described? 2. What would life in a property-owning democracy be like? Would the combination of (relatively) egalitarian property ownership and competitive markets produce a society that was acceptably 'well-ordered', harmonious, and stable? 14 Clark and Gintis (1978) 15 Doppelt (1981) 16 Schweickart (1979) 17 DiQuattro (1983) 18 Krouse and McPherson (1986, 1987) 3. Can a theory of justice illuminate the choice between the best private property regime-property-owning democracy-and the best socialist arrangements for providing justice? 4. How can this characterization of the ideal property-owning democracy help to guide the process of reform in existing, nonideal, private property societies?19 Justice as Fairness on Property-Owning Democracy Well-developed answers to each of the questions posed by Krouse and McPherson are still lacking in the literature.20 Indeed, in the 1990s, most critical debate about Rawls's system of justice followed the agenda set by his own Political Liberalism (1993), examining the question of whether a liberal egalitarian account of justice should aspire to being "comprehensive" as opposed to merely "political." Rawls argued that liberal principles of justice can in fact be endorsed by persons with widely varying comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines, and with varying conceptions of the good life, and need not (and, indeed, must not) involve one dominant social group imposing its own particular value commitments or comprehensive philosophical doctrine on others. Accordingly, attention to questions of distributive justice and the idea of property-owning democracy faded to the background of the debate about political liberalism. Indeed, some observers have noted an internal connection between Rawls's argumentation for political liberalism and the reduced prominence of distributive justice in his writings: a generation of debate among political theorists in the wake of A Theory of Justice, as well as the strong rightward turn in politics in both the United States and the UK in the 1980s, made it abundantly clear that the stringently egalitarian requirements of the difference principle were unlikely ever to command universal assent among philosophers, let alone among the broader public.21 That political fact in turn calls into doubt the broader project of developing principles of justice that both have "real teeth" and that could also be widely accepted within highly diverse modern societies. Rawls himself at times seemed to downgrade the standing of the difference principle within his account of justice in Political Liberalism.22 For instance, Rawls argued that firm principles of distributive justice need not (and ought not) be written into the political constitutions of just societies, and that application of distributive principles should be left to legislators. This aspect of Rawls's view can be explained by his understandable reluctance to see complex social policy questions settled in the courts, but nevertheless his proposed solution could be seen as giving the realization of distributive justice a status that is contingent on the decisions and preferences of legislators (who Rawls assumes 19 Krouse and McPherson (1988): 99-100. 20 A forthcoming volume edited by O'Neill and Williamson (2010) is intended to redress that gap. 21 Chambers (2006) 22 Thus Simone Chambers argues that while "the difference principle lives on as Rawls's favored interpretation of economic justice," in Political Liberalism he no longer insists that "it is the only possible candidate for a fair principle." Further, Chambers observes, "In addition to demoting its status within the theory, there is a more subtle fading away of the topic. Social justice is no longer front and center. His growing concern to find a view of justice that would be compatible with pluralism came to overshadow his deep commitment to egalitarianism." Chambers (2006): 86. Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 4 will accept and seek to implement the difference principle).23 Given that really-existing democratic politics is rarely, if ever, characterized by consensus on fundamental principles of justice, especially in the context of countries like the United States, leaving the difference principle's fate in the hands of democratic politics has struck some commentators as tantamount to abandoning it.24 That note of ambiguity in turn signalled a broader tension within Rawls's theory: whether Rawls intended his theory of justice to reflect the self-understanding of existing democratic societies (an interpretation lent support by his engagement with the tradition of American constitutional law in Political Liberalism) or whether he intended the theory to be critical of existing institutional practices as well as inegalitarian social views. One can also see this tension as embodying a broader tension between some of the different roles that Rawls identifies for political philosophy: for example, between the fundamentally progressive enterprise of identifying a "realistic utopia", as against the less radical, Hegelian task of offering a "reconciliation" to our existing social world.25 It is thus a striking fact than in his final sustained statement about justice, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), Rawls 'lays down his cards' so to speak: more than in any previous book, he makes it clear that he believes that contemporary capitalist societies, especially the United States, have veered far away from realizing liberal principles of justice. It is here as well that we find the most detailed contrast between, on the one hand, welfare state capitalism, which Rawls rejects, and, on the other hand, property-owning democracy and liberal socialism, both of which he is prepared to endorse. Rawls argues that either property-owning democracy or liberal socialism could in theory realize principles of justice, and argues that the choice between the two should be made on the basis of contingent historical and cultural factors. The implication seems here to be that in societies like the United States, with weak socialist traditions and a strong cultural emphasis on entrepreneurial individualism, property-owning democracy is the more likely vehicle for realizing the just society (with liberal socialism perhaps a more suitable option in societies with more collectivist political cultures or stronger socialist traditions). In an equally striking move, Rawls in Justice as Fairness (approvingly citing Krouse and McPherson) rests the argument for property-owning democracy not primarily in terms of the demands of the second principle of justice, but rather in terms of the first principle. Rawls argues that the widespread political inequalities generated by welfare state capitalism represent a systemic violation of the "fair values of the political liberties." Unlike other liberties, the fair value of the political liberties must be distributed equally; a society in which this is not the case cannot be considered to be either self-governing or free.26 23 Rawls (1993). Importantly, however, Rawls does treat provision of a social minimum "providing for the basic needs of all citizens" as a constitutional essential; see Rawls (2003), pp. 228-29. 24 Thus see Thomas (2009), who argues for constitutionally guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties. Such a constitutional guarantee, in his view, would preclude democratic politics from sanctioning excessive inequalities, while avoiding the need to lock in place any particular institutional scheme designed to realize propertyowning democracy. See also J. Cohen (2003) for a critique of Rawls's supposition that consensus can be reached on the content of justice in actual democratic polities. 25 See Rawls, (2001), pp. 1-5. 26 In A Theory of Justice Rawls also connected arguments for inheritance taxes to the requirement of maintaining the fair value of political liberties, as well for realizing fair equality of opportunity. There Rawls states that "it seems" that "a wide dispersal of property is a This move is important both for its own sake and because it means that Rawls's arguments for property-owning democracy are thereby not solely contingent on acceptance of the controversial difference principle. Nonetheless, as well as its falling short with regard to the first principle, Rawls also makes clear that a predictable consequence of the concentration of wealth and political power characteristic of welfare state capitalism is that such polities rarely if ever are able to enact redistributive policies sufficiently strong to establish and maintain intergenerational equality of opportunity, or to limit objectionable inequalities which serve no social purpose other than the enrichment of the already privileged. According to Justice as Fairness, one of the main aims of property-owning democracy is "to prevent a small part of society from controlling the economy, and indirectly, political life as well... Property-owning democracy avoids this, not by the redistribution of income to those with less at the end of each period, so to speak, but rather by ensuring the widespread ownership of assets and human capital (that is, education and trained skills) at the beginning of each period, all this against a background of fair equality of opportunity. The intent is not simply to assist those who lose out through accident or misfortune (although that must be done), but rather to put all citizens in a position to manage their own affairs on a footing of a suitable degree of social and economic equality. (Rawls, 2001: 139). Rawls goes onto describe POD as a socioeconomic system with at least the three following institutional features: (1) Wide Dispersal of Capital: The sine qua non of a POD is that it would entail the wide dispersal of the ownership of the means of production, with individual citizens controlling productive capital, both in terms of human and non-human capital (and perhaps with an opportunity to control their own working conditions). (2) Blocking the Intergenerational Transmission of Advantage: A POD would also involve the enactment of significant estate, inheritance and gift taxes, acting to limit the largest inequalities of wealth, especially from one generation to the next. (3) Safeguards against the Corruption of Politics: A POD would seek to limit the effects of private and corporate wealth on politics, through campaign finance reform, public funding of political parties, public provision of forums for political debate, and other measures to block the influence of wealth on politics (perhaps including publicly funded elections). Policies of type (3) should be viewed as being in place with an eye on the protection of the fair value of the political liberties, and are therefore closely connected with creating a regime that is in accord with Rawls's first principle of justice. Policies of type (1) and (2) should, in contrast, be viewed as providing the means for institutionalizing the demands of Rawls's second principle of justice. Through a combination of all three kinds of policies, Rawls aims to specify a social system that has the necessary condition . . . if the fair values of the basic liberties are to be maintained." Rawls (1971): 245-46. But this connection is foregrounded to a greater degree in Justice as Fairness, where he makes it the primary focus of his critique of welfare state capitalism. Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 5 capacity to overcome the structural limitations of welfare state capitalism in delivering a fully just set of socioeconomic arrangements. Recent Commentary on Rawls's Conception of PropertyOwning Democracy Spurred on in part by the striking arguments of Justice as Fairness, property-owning democracy has received increasing attention in recent years from liberal egalitarian political philosophers. (To be sure, in many accounts of Rawls's social and political thought, property-owning democracy is discussed only briefly, if it is mentioned at all.) 27 Discussions of the dilemmas of contemporary liberal egalitarian politics offered by Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka each stress Rawls's critique of the welfare state and the implicit radicalism of property-owning democracy.28 In recent papers, both Ben Jackson and Amit Ron trace the intellectual origins of "property-owning democracy" phrase to the early 20th-century British conservative Noel Skelton; Jackson suggests that James Meade's use of the term (subsequently picked up by Rawls) was a deliberately ironic attempt to invert the meaning of what hitherto had been a conservative idiom.29 Samuel Freeman argues that Rawls's preference for property-owning democracy vis-à-vis the welfare state parallels his preference for the "liberalism of freedom" of Kant and J.S. Mill, in which citizens take an active role in developing their capacities, as opposed to the "liberalism of happiness" associated with classical utilitarians such as Bentham.30 Freeman's extremely comprehensive treatment of the full range of Rawls's thought also contains a relatively extended account of the distinction between welfare state capitalism and property-owning democracy.31 In a related vein, Nien-hê Hsieh draws on Rawls to argue the case for what he terms "workplace republicanism," i.e., the introduction of workplace democracy and limitation of arbitrary managerial authority; in Justice as Fairness, Rawls forwarded some suggestive though noncommittal comments about the potential importance of workplace democracy in helping to realize a just society.32 This aspect of Rawls's thought has also been picked up by Martin O'Neill, who explores, in a recent article, what he terms "three Rawlsian routes" for defending some form of economic democracy as a precondition for a just socioeconomic order.33 Most recently, papers by Hsieh, O'Neill, Waheed Hussain, and Thad Williamson have further developed both the basic idea of property-owning democracy and have also subjected the concept to critical scrutiny. Hsieh focuses on the role of work in a property-owning democracy; Hussain compares propertyowning democracy to what he terms democratic corporatism; O'Neill offers a partial critique of Rawls's arguments against the welfare state; and Williamson describes how a wide dispersal of real estate, cash, and capital might be actually institutionalized and sustained in a property-owned democracy.34 A forthcoming volume on property-owning democracy, edited by O'Neill and Williamson, will take the arguments of a number of these philosophers forward, as well as include the work of a number 27 See Pogge (2006); Audard (2007). 28 Chambers (2006); Kymlicka (2002). 29 Jackson (2005); Ron (2008) 30 Freeman (2007a). 31 Freeman (2007b). 32 Hsieh (2005). 33 O'Neill (2008b) 34 Hsieh (2009); Hussain (2009); O'Neill (2009); Williamson (2009). of other writers, each giving further elaborations and critiques of Rawls's ideas regarding the institutional basis of a just social order.35 Non-Rawlsian Arguments for Property-Owning Democracy Property-Owning Democracy and Market Socialism The idea of a market economy based on a wider dispersal of capital than is characteristic of contemporary capitalist societies is not unique to Rawls or to the debate he stimulated; nor is the general search for a plausible alternative to capitalism in light of the historic failure of centralized state socialism. Indeed, since the late 1980s, political economists and philosophers have detailed a variety of proposals for a market socialist society, proposals that typically offer far more specificity and attention to institutional detail than the general comments about propertyowning democracy offered by Rawls. Particularly cogent formulations are those of Joshua Cohen, David Miller, John Roemer, David Schweickart, and Gar Alperovitz.36 Typically, these proposals call for some form of community or public ownership of capital within a market model, while also allowing for broadly democratic planning of the economy as a whole. In most cases (Roemer is an exception), these proposals also call for giving workers effective democratic control of most or all enterprises. Notably, these models do not require or advocate political revolution, but assume the constitutional framework of liberal democracy; nor do they challenge the market as a mechanism of resource allocation, even when the models allow for significant degrees of government planning. What these versions of liberal democratic socialism do insist upon is changing who owns and reaps dividends from capital. To this extent, proposals for liberal democratic socialism bear a significant resemblance to Rawls's conception of a propertyowning democracy.37 Republicanism and Property-Owning Democracy Also of relevance are recent discussions by republican political theorists concerning the content of a republican political economy (or "commercial republic") which also point in the broad direction of dispersing capital more widely.38 The proposals of American political theorist Stephen Elkin are particular noteworthy, for two reasons: first, he specifically rejects the Rawlsian paradigm for thinking about politics and instead takes James Madison as his starting point for reasoning about the content of a commercial republic; second, he explicitly uses the language of property-owning democracy. Consequently, the following section of our discussion pays particular attention to Elkin's non-Rawlsian arguments for a POD. The core premise of republican approaches to political theory is that in thinking about politics, it is not enough only to specify the moral foundations of legitimate government, or the normative principles (including principles of social justice) to 35 O'Neill and Williamson (forthcoming, 2010). 36 Cohen (1989), Miller (1991), Roemer (1993), Schweickart (2000), Alperovitz (2004). 37 To be sure, prominent differences between the two proposals remain. In particular, unlike most forms of democratic socialism, Rawls's property-owning democracy has no role for democratic oversight or planning of major capital investments. For further discussion, see Williamson (2009). 38 Dagger (2006); Elkin (2006). Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 6 which government should aspire. Rather, we must think about how to construct and maintain a regime that, despite the presence of at least partially self-interested actors, succeeds in preventing the domination of any one group of citizens by any others, via either private or public means, while also allowing all citizens meaningfully to contribute, via the political process, to influencing the social conditions which shape their lives. Constructing such a regime requires paying careful attention to institutional design; to how leaders are selected and to the incentives that they are offered; to the character and engagement of the ordinary citizens who are charged with both selecting leaders and holding them accountable; and, not least, to the regime's political economy and how it functions, including the distribution of wealth that it generates. Civic republicans, especially those who draw their inspiration from Madison and other regime theorists such as Machiavelli and Montesquieu, characteristically argue that reasoning from the original position, in the Rawlsian style, can take us only so far in telling us what a workable and tolerably just political regime might look like. More than this, such republicans reject proposals for a "division of labour" within political theory, such that some scholars, expert in pre-institutional political philosophy and abstract reasoning, define and specify the normative principles which should guide political life, while a second group of scholars, who look more carefully at the facts of the world, work out how to put those principles into practice. From the viewpoint of republicans such as Elkin, such a division of labour is untenable: Elkin argues that we cannot fully make sense of political concepts such as "liberty" and "equality" until we have thought through, and indeed garnered some practical experience with, what it would mean to realize such values in practice, through real political institutions. Put another way, we cannot claim that we want something unless we understand what it would truly to take to get it, in practice, given reasonable assumptions about human nature.39 One of those assumptions, in turn, is that political actors often act from mixed or selfinterested motives, as opposed to being motivated by the desire to realize justice.40 39 Thus Elkin: "In the context of [institutional] practice, there aren't two separate judgments-one about values, the other about practices that will serve them. There is only one: how much we value something given what it takes to realize it." Elkin (2006): 77. 40 To be clear, Rawls also recognizes the importance of considering the institutional implications of a conception of justice before accepting it. Hence Rawls writes: "It is important to trace out, if only in a rough and ready way, the institutional content of the two principles of justice. We need to do this before we can endorse these principles, even provisionally. This is because the idea of reflective equilibrium involves our accepting the implications of ideals and first principles in particular cases as they arise. We cannot tell solely from the content of a political conception-from its principles and ideals-whether it is reasonable for us." Rawls (2001): 136. This recognition on Rawls's part is important, but is not sufficient to satisfy Elkin's objection, on two grounds. First, Rawls limits his account of the institutional content of property-owning democracy to ideal-type regime analysis-even though he acknowledges the possibility that "a basic structure may generate interests that make it work very differently than its ideal description." Rawls (2001): 137. Considerations of the kinds of interests a regime might generate are, according to Rawls, questions of "political sociology" and not something that accounts of ideal-type regimes need to consider. In Elkin's view, in contrast, careful consideration of the interests a regime is likely to produce and how they might be held in balance so as to maintain the regime and achieve its stated values over time is precisely what "constitutional" thinking must take up. Second, as stated in the text, Elkin rejects Rawls's view that the premise of a general agreement about the content of justice and the assumption of "full compliance" are useful beginning points for thinking about a workable constitutional regime. This approach to politics is exemplified in Stephen Elkin's recent book Reconstructing the Commercial Republic. Elkin describes the "circumstances of politics" as involving a "large aggregation of people who 1) have conflicting purposes that engender more or less serious conflict; 2) are given to attempt to use political power to further their own purposes and those of people with whom they identify; 3) are inclined to use political power to subordinate others; and 4) are sometimes given to words and actions that suggest that they value limiting the use of political power by law and harnessing it to public purposes." "These circumstances," Elkin adds, are not "`the best of foreseeable conditions.' They are simply the conditions that obtain as we Americans, like others, go about our political business."41 Elkin argues that James Madison's theory of a "commercial republic"-a liberal regime characterized by government that is at once popular, limited, and active-has six central elements. The first five include preventing faction, preventing a tyranny of lawmakers, ensuring that lawmakers consider the public interest, ensuring that lawmaking has a meaningful deliberative component, and ensuring a measure of civic virtue in the populace. For purposes of the present discussion, the key element is the sixth-namely, the "social basis for the regime," or in other words, who has property and thereby political influence in the society, and thereby the capacity to shape how the regime operates in practice.42 Madison's political theory rested heavily on the possibility of "men of property and substantial community position"-most often large landowners-coming to take a very broad view of their own interests. Suppose the public interest and the (enlightened) self-interest of these men overlapped substantially, and that these same "men of property" were in a position to have disproportionate political influence-for instance, by being the predominant class from which elected representatives would be chosen. If this were the case, and if the political institutions themselves were designed to give lawmakers, including the ambitious, strong reason to appeal to the public interest, then a deliberative politics that in fact served the public interest might be possible.43 As Elkin notes, this Madisonian account is a deeply unsatisfactory theory for contemporary liberal regimes. Broadminded "men of landed property and standing" are no longer the dominant social class; instead we have the predominance of corporate property, and corporations are themselves legally required to have quite narrow interests. Moreover, if inequalities of wealth and income become excessive, and these translate into significant political inequalities, as they in fact often do, then we face the spectre of not, as Madison feared, factional majority rule, but rather factional minority rule by the wealthy and the well-off. So the problem remains-what is to be the social basis of a political regime based on self-rule and limited but active government?44 41 Elkin (2006): 254-55. Elkin here is quoting Rawls (1993): xvii. It might be noted that Rawls, beginning in Political Liberalism, does revise his theory so as to take account of one major fact about the world, namely, the fact of reasonable pluralism. For a republican like Elkin, the question is why Rawls stops there as opposed to taking account of other prominent facts as well (such as large-scale corporate power). See Elkin (2006): 359-360, n10. For a related critique, see Sheldon Wolin's (1996) critical review of Political Liberalism. 42 Elkin (2006): 21. 43 Ekin (2006): 38-42. 44 Ekin (2006): 51-73. Elkin's argumentation on these themes is more Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 7 Elkin's answer is fourfold. First, a commercial republic should be a regime in which the middle class is the politically predominant class, and can serve as a "pivot" in adjudicating conflicts between business elites and the poor; in particular, it is important that the middle class have enough power to force the business elites to justify their proposals in terms of the public interest. Second, excessive inequalities of wealth are inconsistent with the maintenance of a commercial republic, precisely because they translate into inequalities of political influence and make relations of mutual respect between all citizens impossible. Third, persistent poverty as well the economic insecurity of the near-poor and much of the middle class are inconsistent with the formation of independent, selfrespecting citizens who recognize the value of deliberative politics. As Elkin puts it, "To worry about whether you can pay your bills wonderfully concentrates your mind-but not on political life."45 Fourth, the interests of property-holders should be broadened to the greatest possible extent; this could be achieved by broadening the ownership of property and capital, and by fostering a politically strong middle class capable of challenging elite proposals, such that elite groups must argue on their behalf by appealing to the public interest. Consequently, Elkin writes, "in a fully realized commercial republic, the fruits of prosperity should not be available only to a few; neither should economic production be in the service of creating an oligarchy with the status and material comforts of an aristocracy."46 Elkin thus proposes ensuring that work is better paid, as well as advocating the more effective use of inheritance taxes, and above all widening the distribution of capital-in short, much of the agenda of what Rawls terms "propertyowning democracy."47 This focus on capital as opposed to income as the focus of redistributive efforts has in turn four further justifications: first, the link between accumulated capital and disproportionate, dangerous and factional political power; second, the observation that private relationships of domination rest on the divide between those with capital and those without, not the divide between higher-paid and lower-paid workers; third, the recognition that it is impossible to contain inequalities of income without also paying attention to inequalities in asset holdings; and fourth, the political judgment that it is all but impossible as a practical matter to allow the market to generate wide dispersions of rewards, and then to rely upon the tax system to correct the resultant inequalities to a tolerable level. The beneficiaries of socioeconomic inequality are not, and never plausibly will be, so committed to social justice that they will endorse large-scale redistributions of their own incomes on a regular basis. On the contrary, they will insist on the justice of keeping their own market-generated returns, a claim that will have strong resonance among the well-off. A regime that relies less on post-transfer taxation to achieve a tolerable measure of socio-economic equality will be more stable over the long term.48 complex and nuanced than this brief summary can do justice. 45 Elkin (2006): 134. 46 Elkin (2006): 134. 47 Elkin (2006): 292-96. Indeed, Elkin's discussion goes significantly beyond Rawls's own proposals, drawing on some of the ideas (such as universal capital grants and support for worker ownership of firms) discussed in subsequent literature (see main text, below, for a brief review). 48 To be sure, moving towards a broader distribution of capital and property also would face formidable political obstacles. The view is that if a suitably wider distribution could be achieved, this would be a more Here we have a second set of arguments for moving in the direction of property-owning democracy. Clearly, there is overlap between some of Rawls's reasoning and that of Elkin, particularly in Rawls's stress on the fair value of political liberties. What is worth noting here is simply that one need not share any commitment to the Rawlsian edifice, or to a mode of political thinking that uses the ideal conditions of the original position as a starting point for reflection, to reach the judgment that persons interested in tolerably just liberal regimes should take an interest in property-owning democracy. In short, property-owning democracy need not be regarded as a uniquely Rawlsian idea, but instead may plausibly be endorsed by adherents of a range of sophisticated theories concerning the just society. Policies to Broaden Property Ownership The idea of property-owning democracy has thus enjoyed renewed attention from multiple strands of democratic political theory in recent years. Parallel to this development has been increased interest among policy scholars and some practitioners in "asset-based" policy approaches to redressing poverty. The basic thought behind asset-based approaches is that social policies should not rely only on efforts to prop up low incomes amongst the poor, but should also enable the disadvantaged to gain access to productive assets that might significantly improve their long-term life chances. Examples of such assets including savings accounts, educational funds, housing, pension funds and automobiles.49 To take one prominent example of an asset-based policy, governments might establish savings funds at birth for each child and capitalize each account with (for example) $1,000, in expectation that the value of the fund will steadily grow over time and represent a significant source of funds by early adulthood; a version of this policy (the Child Trust Fund) has been implemented in the UK. Ackerman and Alstott have offered a much more ambitious proposal in the context of the United States, calling on government to provide all citizens at age 18 with an $80,000 "stake," on the view that having access to such significant funds would dramatically alter the life prospects and plans of many disadvantaged, working-class, and even middle-class young Americans.50 Most of the mainstream discussion of asset-based policies focuses on individual accounts and on bolstering access to cash savings or housing. Advocates of property-owning democracy should also naturally have an interest in ways of broadening ownership of productive capital. Government support (in the form of loans, technical assistance, and in some cases capital investments) for smaller businesses represents one traditional policy approach; another possibility is the provision of funds or incentives to allow individuals to buy corporate stock. More farreaching are efforts to turn control over entire enterprises to workers or to local neighbourhood organizations. As Gar Alperovitz has documented, both employee ownership and community ownership (through vehicles such as community development corporations) of productive businesses have increased dramatically in the United States since the 1970s.51 Both approaches broaden the ownership of capital in ways stable long-term basis for limiting inequalities and broadening prosperity than relying primarily on continual, large-scale progressive taxation. 49 See Sherraden (2005) for a thorough discussion. 50 Ackerman and Alstott (1999). 51 Alperovitz (2004, 2006). Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 8 consistent with property-owning democracy, as well as offering other possible benefits in addition (such as sustaining jobs in poorer or declining localities). In short, there are numerous practical mechanisms available to policymakers to attempt to broaden access to capital; most of these mechanisms are potentially politically popular and capable of winning support from a range of ideological positions. The literature lacks, however, a sustained treatment of how such policies might be broadened and ratcheted up to scale in a manner which might realize the aims of property-owning democracy. Ackerman and Alstott's stakeholder society proposal and Alperovitz's arguments on behalf of a "pluralist commonwealth" come the closest in this regard, though neither proposal explicitly uses the language of "property-owning democracy." In short, there is ample room for further work in translating the very ambitious aims of Rawlsian (or alternative republican) conceptions of property-owning democracy into concrete political proposals. Similarly, there has been almost no serious discussion of the politics of property-owning democracy or of the question of whether and how existing "welfare state capitalist" societies might be changed into a form of market society more closely approximating property-owning democracy. Two observations are in order here: first, the social basis for a movement towards property-owning democracy is likely to be quite different than traditional left coalitions on behalf of socialism and social democracy; the aims of property-owning democracy are quite different in emphasis (though arguably not inconsistent with) the traditional goals of labour and labour organizations. Indeed, the more entrepreneurial, individualistic tenor of property-owning democracy coheres with Roberto Unger's call for the "left" to cast its lot with the "petty bourgeoisie" rather than declining industrial working classes.52 In practice, a workable politics of property-owning democracy would need to be blended with other policies and initiatives more oriented towards traditional labour concerns about employment stability, wage levels, and labour law. Second, while proposals to create Child Trust Funds and broaden access to homeownership are generally popular, the most crucial step towards a Rawlsian conception of propertyowning democracy-more aggressive, stringent taxation on inheritance and estates-is likely to inspire much more opposition. This is especially true in the United States, where a concerted effort by conservative ideologues over the past fifteen years has succeeded in persuading many Americans and lawmakers that inheritance taxes represent an unjust "death tax"53; there is also substantial opposition to inheritance tax in countries such as the UK.54 Serious arguments for full-blown property-owning democracy thus must be combined with serious and persuasive arguments regarding the legitimacy of breaking up large estates through inheritance taxes and other forms of wealth taxation.55 The argument for the justice of taxing largescale wealth in order to secure the fair value of political liberties, institute meaningful equal opportunity, and improve the lot of the least well off in turn mirrors the larger Rawlsian argument for understanding society as a system of social cooperation aimed at realizing a common life characterized by fairness, as 52 Unger (2006). 53 Shapiro and Graetz (2005). 54 See O'Neill (2007); White (2008). 55 For a promising argument along these lines, see Alperovitz and Daly (2008). opposed to a game in which the aim is to accumulate as many assets as possible within the permissible rules. The argument for breaking up large inheritances and the argument for viewing society as a fair system of cooperation are inextricably tied together. Without the prior commitment to viewing society as a fair system of social cooperation, arguments for breaking up large inheritances are dramatically weakened; without the political capacity to break up large accumulations of wealth in practice, Rawlsian aspirations for realizing a just society based on the two principles of justice will remain tantalizingly out of reach. References Ackerman, Bruce, and Anne Alstott.1999. The Stakeholder Society. New Haven: Yale University Press. Alperovitz, Gar. 2004. America Beyond Capitalism: Reclaiming Our Wealth, Our Liberty, Our Democracy. Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books? id=92iHAAAAMAAJ Alperovitz, Gar, and Lew Daly. 2008. Unjust Deserts. New York: The New Press. Arneson. Richard. 1986. Comment on Krouse and McPherson. Ethics. 97: 139-145. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381411. Catherine Audard. 2007. John Rawls. Toronto: McGill-Queen's University Press. Chambers, Simone. 2006. The Politics of Equality: Rawls on the Barricades. Perspectives on Politics 4: 81-89, doi: 10.1017/S1537592706060087 Clark, Barry and Herbert Gintis. 1978. Rawlsian Justice and Economic Systems. Philosophy and Public Affairs 7: 302-325. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264960 Clayton, Matthew, and Andrew Williams, eds. 2000. Ideals of Equality. Basingstoke. Palgrave Macmillan. Cohen, G. A. 1989. History, Labour and Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Related online version (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=_KYwR1v-dlYC Cohen, G. A. 2008. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=YH6o-25BkAUC Cohen, Joshua. 1989. The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy. Social Philosophy and Policy 6: 25-50. Cohen, Joshua. 2003. For a Democratic Society. In Samuel Freeman, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=ipMVcT5R2zwC Dagger, Richard. 2006. Neo-republicanism and the Civic Economy. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5: 151-173, doi:10.1177/1470594X06064219 DiQuattro, Arthur. 1983. Rawls and Left Criticism. Political Theory 11: 53-78, doi: 10.1177/0090591783011001004 Doppelt, Gerald. 1981. Rawls's System of Justice: A Critique from the Left. Nous 15: 259-307. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215434 Elkin, Stephen L. 2006. Reconstructing the Commercial Republic: Constitutional Design After Madison. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books? id=7h28AY9pZtcC Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Consequentialism, Publicity, Stability and Property-Owning Democracy in Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawls. New York: Oxford University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=_OL7s6fld0YC Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Rawls. New York: Routledge. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=sxc2X6R_RrMC Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 | 9 Graetz, Michael J., and Ian Shapiro. 2005 Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight Over Taxing Inherited Wealth. New Haven: Yale University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books? id=mEpReQMCgBAC Hsieh, Nien-hê. 2009. Justice at Work: Arguing for Property-Owning Democracy. Forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy. Hussain, Waheed. 2009. The Most Stable Just Regime. Forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy. Jackson, Ben. 2005. Revisionism Reconsidered: `Property-Owning Democracy' and Egalitarian Strategy in Post-war Britain. Twentieth Century British History 16: 416-440, doi:10.1093/tcbh/hwi053 Kymlicka, Will. 2002. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Krouse, Richard, and Michael McPherson. 1986. A Mixed Property Regime: Equality and Liberty in a Market Economy. Ethics 97: 119138.URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381410 Krouse, Richard, and Michael McPherson. 1988. Property-Owning Democracy. In Amy Gutmann, ed. Democracy and the Welfare State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=v700Y54pVuYC Meade, James. 1965. Efficiency, Equality, and the Ownership of Property. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Meade, James. 1965. Principles of Political Economy, Vol. IV: The Just Economy. Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co. Meade, James. 1975. The Intelligent Radical's Guide to Economic Policy: The Mixed Economy. London: Allen & Unwin. Meade, James. 1993. Liberty, Equality, and Efficiency. New York: New York University Press. Miller, David. 1989. Market, State and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism. New York: Oxford University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books? id=bPgv0pVSmIgC O'Neill, Martin. 2007. 'Death and Taxes': Social Justice and the Politics of the Inheritance Tax. Renewal: A Journal of Social Democracy 15: 6271. URL (cited 16 September 2009):http://personalpages.manchester.ac.uk/staff/martin.oneill/Death_a nd_Taxes(Renewal,15.4(2007)).pdf O'Neill, Martin. 2008a. What Should Egalitarians Believe? Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36:2, 119-56. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://personalpages.manchester.ac.uk/staff/martin.oneill/WSEB.pdf O'Neill, Martin. 2008b. Three Rawlsian Routes Towards Economic Democracy. Revue de Philosophie Economique 17. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://personalpages.manchester.ac.uk/staff/martin.oneill/TRRTEconomi cDemocracy.pdf O'Neill, Martin. 2009. Liberty, Equality and Property-Owning Democracy. Forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2009.01458.x O'Neill, Martin, and Thad Williamson, eds. Property-Owning Democracy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Forthcoming 2010. Parfit, Derek. 1991. Equality and Priority. The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas. Reprinted in Clayton and Williams, eds. 2000, Ideals of Equality, pp. 81-125. Pogge, Thomas. 2007. John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice. New York: Oxford University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=79x-Iaqqsr8C Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Revised edition. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=b7GZr5Btp30C Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Ed. Erin Kelly. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=AjrXZIlbK1cC Rawls, John. 2007. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Ed. Samuel Freeman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=yKclZky1oUkC Roemer, John, John. 1994. A Future for Socialism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=LxKkC82J9D4C Ron, Amit. 2008. Visions of Democracy in `Property-Owning Democracy': Skelton to Rawls and Beyond. History of Political Thought 29: 89-108. Scanlon,T. M. . 1996. The Diversity of Objections to Inequality. The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, reprinted in Clayton and Williams, eds., 2000, pp. 41-59. Schweickart, David. 1979. Should Rawls Be a Socialist? A Comparison of his Ideal Capitalism with Worker Controlled Socialism. Social Theory and Practice 5: 1-27. Schweickart, David. 1996. Against Capitalism. Boulder: Westview Press. Schweickart, David. 2002. After Capitalism. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=KWy9JbWvjywC Sherraden, Michael, ed. 2005. Inclusion in the American Dream: Assets, Poverty, and Public Policy. New York: Oxford University Press. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=jCPDfYrqmoC Thomas, Alan. 2009. Liberalism, Republicanism, and the Idea of an Egalitarian Ethos, working paper, University of Kent, 2009. See also Thomas, forthcoming in O'Neill and Williamson, eds. 2010. PropertyOwning Democracy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Unger, Roberto. 2006. What Should the Left Propose? New York: Verso Books. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://books.google.com/books?id=9rxdQUCY6Z4C White, Stuart. 2008. How to Defend Inheritance Tax. London: Fabian Society. With Rajiv Prabhakar and Karen Rowlingson. Williamson, Thad. 2009. A Fair Stake and a Fair Shake: John Rawls's Idea of a Property-Owning Democracy and Its Political Plausibility. Forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy. Wolin, Sheldon. 1996. The Liberal/Democratic Divide: On Rawls's Political Liberalism. Political Theory 24: 97-119. URL (cited 16 September 2009): http://www.jstor.org/stable/192092 Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009 |


⁄ Wijsgerig Perspectief ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ De herhaling van het onherhaalbare. Constantin Constantius over vrijheid en subjectiviteit Martijn Boven Kierkegaard in café, schets van Christian Olavius Zeuthen, 1843 De herhaling van het onhaalbare. Constantin Constantius over vrijheid en subjectiviteit ⁄ 31 Is de herhaling mogelijk? Deze ogenschijnlijk simpele vraag vormt het uitgangspunt van De herhaling. Een proeve van experimenterende psychologie door Constantin Constantius (1843), een van de meest curieuze geschriften uit het oeuvre van Søren Kierkegaard. In het alledaagse taalgebruik verwijst de term 'herhaling' naar een bepaalde gebeurtenis die zich voor een tweede, derde, vierde of n-de keer voordoet. Deze betekenis zien we onder anderen terug in termen als repetitie ('herhaalde oefening om zich iets in te prenten'), recidive ('herhaling van een misdrijf') of reprise ('nieuwe opvoering van een eerder uitgevoerd toneelstuk', zie Van Dale). Doen de herhalingen zich met een zekere regelmaat voor dan spreken we al snel over gewoontes of zelfs over natuurwetten. In al deze alledaagse, niet-existentiële betekenissen verbindt de herhaling twee of meer gebeurtenissen met elkaar, waarbij de eerste gebeurtenis als model voor latere, vergelijkbare gebeurtenissen geldt. Kierkegaard heeft geen van deze alledaagse betekenissen op het oog, maar maakt van de herhaling een filosofisch begrip dat betrekking heeft op de menselijke existentie (latere filosofen als Heidegger, Deleuze en Derrida nemen dit begrip over en verwerken het in hun eigen filosofie). In dit artikel wil ik twee aspecten aan de orde stellen die De herhaling tot een nog altijd belangrijk boek maken: 1) De ongewone filosofische stijl die in dit boek ontwikkeld wordt en 2) De eigenzinnige opvatting over vrijheid en subjectiviteit die er onder de noemer 'de herhaling' in naar voren wordt gebracht. Zoals de ondertitel 'een proeve van experimenterende psychologie' al aangeeft, is De herhaling geen klassieke filosofische verhandeling waarin op systematische wijze wordt uitgelegd wat er onder de herhaling – als filosofische begrip – verstaan moet worden. Integendeel, het is een uiterst experimenteel boek waarin een nieuwe filosofische stijl wordt geïntroduceerd. Er wordt zodoende nergens een eenduidige definitie gegeven van de herhaling in filosofische zin die ik in het vervolg zal aanduiden als de 'existentiële herhaling'. Sterker nog, de twee verschijningsvormen van de herhaling – de alledaagse en de existentiële herhaling – worden telkens welbewust met elkaar verward. Pas in de afsluitende brief aan 'de echte lezer van dit boek' wordt duidelijk in welke richting we het verschil tussen deze twee vormen van herhaling moeten zoeken. 'Aan de ene kant', zo schrijft Constantin Constantius, de pseudonieme auteur van De herhaling, 'staat de uitzondering, aan de andere kant het algemene' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 96). De herhaling in alledaagse zin correspondeert met het algemene (het uiterlijke), terwijl de existentiële herhaling uitdrukking geeft aan de uitzondering (het innerlijke, de subjectiviteit). Dit klinkt nogal paradoxaal. Is de uitzondering niet bij uitstek iets eenmaligs en unieks – en dus onherhaalbaar? Hoe kan Constantius in dit verband dan toch spreken over een herhaling? Een simpel voorbeeld kan dit verduidelijken. Stel je hebt je In plaats van kennis over te dragen door middel van uitleg en beschrijving, wordt er met behulp van een reeks dramatische handelingen een effect gecreëerd waaruit de toehoorder/lezer zijn eigen conclusies moet trekken. 32 ⁄ Wijsgerig Perspectief voorgenomen een 'goed mens' te worden. Om dit doel te verwezenlijken, zo suggereert Constantius, heeft het geen zin jezelf een ideaal te stellen waar je vervolgens via een stappenplan naar toewerkt. Volgens hem kan het goede alleen verwezenlijkt worden door een innerlijke keuze die slechts geldt voor het moment waarop hij gemaakt wordt. Om zijn geldigheid te behouden moet de keuze telkens opnieuw herhaald worden. Dit is geen alledaagse herhaling waarin dezelfde gebeurtenis zich nog een keer voordoet, maar het is een existentiële herhaling waarin het individu zichzelf opnieuw tot stand brengt als een onherhaalbare uitzondering. Het gaat Constantius om deze paradoxale herhaling van het onherhaalbare. Een nieuwe filosofische stijl De existentiële herhaling – als de herhaling van het onherhaalbare – kan Constantius alleen aan de orde stellen door een nieuwe filosofische stijl uit te vinden die hij zelf 'experimenterende psychologie' noemt. Hij vindt een eerste aanzet tot deze stijl in een bekende anekdote over Diogenes van Sinope: 'Toen de Eleaten de beweging ontkenden, trad, zoals iedereen weet, Diogenes op als opponent. Hij trad echt op, want hij zei geen woord, maar liep alleen een paar keer heen en weer, waarmee hij meende het bewijs van het tegendeel te hebben geleverd' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 9). Deze anekdote is veelbetekenend, omdat ze aangeeft hoe De herhaling gelezen kan worden. Evenals Diogenes probeert ook Constantius te bewijzen dat beweging bestaat ook al gaat het bij hem niet om de beweging van lichamen, maar om de beweging van de geest: de herhaling van de subjectiviteit. Ook Constantius gebruikt hiervoor een performatieve strategie. De performance van Constantius is wel iets complexer is dan dat van Diogenes, maar het principe erachter is hetzelfde. In plaats van kennis over te dragen door middel van uitleg en beschrijving, wordt met behulp van een reeks dramatische handelingen een effect gecreëerd waaruit de toehoorder/lezer zijn eigen conclusies moet trekken. Voor Diogenes gold dat het bestaan van beweging niet logisch kan worden aangetoond, omdat het niet tot het domein van de logica behoort. Om die reden was 'heen en weer lopen' de enige juiste respons. Constantius kan het bestaan van de herhaling evenmin logisch aantonen, aangezien de existentiële herhaling tot het domein van de vrijheid behoort. Daarom gaat hij op een soortgelijke wijze te werk als Diogenes. 'Op psychologische en esthetische wijze', zo schrijft Constantius hierover, 'wilde ik schilderen en aanschouwelijk maken; in Griekse zin wilde ik het begrip [de herhaling] laten ontstaan in de vorm van personages en situaties, terwijl het zich een weg voorwaarts baant door allerlei misverstanden heen' (Kierkegaard, 2012: 68). In plaats van te definiëren wat de herhaling is, voert Constantius enkele personages op die verstrikt raken in een misverstand. Op deze manier dwingt hij zijn lezer om eerst het misverstand te ontrafelen en zodoende een eigen onderscheid aan te brengen tussen de alledaagse en de existentiële herhaling. Constantius schrijft zodoende niet om te worden begrepen, maar om te worden misverstaan. In de afsluitende brief aan 'de echte lezer van dit boek' suggereert hij zo te hebben Al snel wordt duidelijk dat er een tegenspraak bestaat tussen Constantius' verspreide opmerkingen over existentiële herhaling en de manier waarop hij deze herhaling zelf probeert te voltrekken. ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ De herhaling van het onhaalbare. Constantin Constantius over vrijheid en subjectiviteit ⁄ 33 willen schrijven 'dat de ketters het niet kunnen begrijpen' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 95). Met deze 'ketters' doelt hij op de oppervlakkige lezers die geen onderscheid kunnen maken tussen de misverstanden waarin de personages verstrikt raken en het begrip herhaling dat door deze misverstanden heen tot wording komt. Alleen de lezer die uit zichzelf al begrepen heeft wat de herhaling is, zal in staat blijken de misverstanden te ontmaskeren. Nu eens is de herhaling het hoogste wat er is, het volgende moment is het een banale en onbetekenende dwaasheid. Geen enkele bepaling krijgt de overhand. Hiermee wordt de verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud van het boek verlegd van de schrijver naar de lezer. Met als gevolg dat de lezer gedwongen wordt zijn eigen vrijheid te realiseren. Dit is precies het effect dat Constantius beoogt. In zijn opvatting kan hij alleen spreken over de herhaling door de subjectiviteit van zijn lezers te activeren. In De herhaling worden twee personages opgevoerd. Het eerste personage is Constantius zelf. In plaats van de herhaling theoretisch te onderzoeken, besluit hij er een demonstratie van te geven: 'Toen ik me al een poos, in elk geval bij gelegenheid, bezighield met het probleem of de herhaling mogelijk is en welke betekenis die heeft, of iets bij een herhaling wint of verliest, kwam ik opeens op het idee: je kunt toch naar Berlijn gaan, daar ben je al eerder geweest, om je ervan te overtuigen of een herhaling mogelijk is en wat die te betekenen heeft' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 9). Na vele pogingen om zijn vorige reis op exact dezelfde wijze over te doen, concludeert Constantius dat er geen herhaling mogelijk is. Hierbij tekent hij aan dat 'het leven onophoudelijk en trouweloos alles terugneemt wat het had gegeven, zonder een herhaling te bieden' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 48). Al snel wordt duidelijk dat er een tegenspraak bestaat tussen Constantius' verspreide opmerkingen over existentiële herhaling en de manier waarop hij deze herhaling zelf probeert te voltrekken. De reis naar Berlijn moet beschouwd worden als een parodie waarin er welbewust wordt aangestuurd op het volgende misverstand: dat 'het meest innerlijke probleem van de mogelijkheid van de herhaling op uiterlijke wijze wordt uitgedrukt, alsof de herhaling – als die al mogelijk is – búiten het individu te vinden is, terwijl het juist in het individu gevonden moet worden' (Kierkegaard, 2012: 23). Als tweede personage wordt een verliefde jongeman opgevoerd die in Constantius zijn vertrouweling vindt. De jongeman is een relatie begonnen met een meisje en heeft zo de liefde als idee ontdekt. 'Het jonge meisje was niet zijn beminde, zij was de aanleiding die het poëtische in hem wekte en hem tot dichter maakte' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 15). De jongeman weet zich gebonden aan het meisje. Tegelijkertijd beseft hij dat de relatie geen kans van slagen heeft omdat het meisje zelf er niet toedoet, zij heeft enkel betekenis als aanleiding. Op een dag vertrekt hij zonder nog iets van zich te laten horen. Vanaf dat moment wacht de jongeman op iets – een gebeurtenis, een goddelijke ingreep? – dat hem alsnog geschikt zal maken om echtgenoot te zijn. Echtgenoot zijn betekent voor hem: de gebeurtenis van de liefde telkens weer opnieuw kunnen herhalen alsof het de eerste keer is. Desondanks blijkt de jongeman aan het einde van het boek genoegen te nemen met een schijnbare herhaling. In de krant leest hij dat het meisje getrouwd is. Opeens zijn al zijn problemen voorbij. In tegenstelling tot zijn eerdere opvattingen over de liefde, interpreteert hij nu het terugwinnen van zijn ongebondenheid als een herhaling: 'Ik ben weer 34 ⁄ Wijsgerig Perspectief mezelf, hier heb ik de herhaling' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 91). De jongeman kan nu inderdaad opnieuw beginnen met de liefde, maar moet daarvoor wel eerst een ander meisje vinden. Maar dat is juist geen herhaling. De herhaling betekent immers de liefde elk moment weer opnieuw laten beginnen in relatie tot hetzelfde meisje. De twee personages spiegelen elkaar. Constantius geeft in theorie een juiste bepaling van de existentiële herhaling, maar de banale manier waarop hij deze herhaling in praktijk tracht te brengen maakt alles alsnog tot een misverstand. Bij de verliefde jongeman is de situatie precies andersom. In de praktijk ondervindt hij het probleem van de vrijheid en zoekt zijn toevlucht in de herhaling, maar uit zijn respons op het krantenbericht blijkt dat hij dit begrip theoretisch heeft misverstaan. In beide gevallen baant het begrip herhaling zich een weg voorwaarts door allerlei misverstanden heen, zonder ooit in zijn volle vorm te verschijnen. De existentiële herhaling We zagen eerder dat Constantius zich ertoe gedwongen zag om een nieuwe filosofische stijl te vinden omdat de herhaling tot het domein van de vrijheid behoort. Deze vrijheid is nooit een gegeven, maar moet telkens weer opnieuw herhaald worden. Constantius verzet zich hiermee tegen de opvattingen waarin de mate van vrijheid van het individu wordt vastgesteld op basis van zijn uiterlijke omstandigheden. Hij bespreekt twee van deze opvattingen. De eerste is een mondain vrijheidsbegrip waarin de vrijheid wordt bepaald 'als lust of in lust' (Kierkegaard, 2012: 67). Lust kan hier worden opgevat als een onstuitbare drang om de uiterlijke omstandigheden zoveel mogelijk te veranderen. Dit vrijheidsbegrip zien we terug bij de bohemien die zich nergens aan committeert en een onconventioneel en zwervend bestaan leidt. De tweede opvatting is een artistiek vrijheidsbegrip waarin de vrijheid wordt bepaald als schranderheid. De schranderheid stelt het individu in staat om afwisseling aan te brengen in zijn uiterlijke omstandigheden door er telkens nieuwe aspecten uit af te leiden. Vrijheid wordt niet langer gezocht in voortdurende verandering, maar in de kunst om een zo groot mogelijke intensiteit te bereiken ongeacht de aanwezige middelen. Deze vorm van vrijheid wordt in praktijk gebracht door de gevangene die zich vermaakt met de drukke bezigheden van de spin of de student die een saaie lezing boeiend maakt door zich te concentreren op de zweetdruppels op het gezicht van de professor. Constantius verwerpt bovenstaande vrijheidsbegrippen – het mondaine en het artistieke – en introduceert de existentiële herhaling als alternatief. Hij ontwikkelt een opvatting waarin vrijheid niet langer wordt bepaald in relatie tot uiterlijke omstandigheden, maar in relatie tot de vrijheid zelf. Hierbij geldt: vrijheid = herhaling. Of, zoals Constantius het zelf formuleert, 'het hoogste belang van de vrijheid is nu juist om de herhaling teweeg te brengen' (Kierkegaard, 2012: 67). Het individu zal zich altijd moeten verhouden tot de buitenwereld, maar hierin ligt niet zijn vrijheid. Integendeel, de vrijheid van het individu loopt voortdurend het risico zichzelf te verliezen in het resultaat van deze verhouding. In De herhaling is een overgang van het vroegere zelf naar het huidige zelf, deze overgang laat de subjectiviteit – als onherhaalbare uitzondering – 'opnieuw in het bestaan treden'. Hierbij geldt: subjectiviteit = herhaling. ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ De herhaling van het onhaalbare. Constantin Constantius over vrijheid en subjectiviteit ⁄ 35 dat geval kan de vrijheid zichzelf niet terugnemen en kan er geen herhaling plaatsvinden. 'De vrijheid', zegt Constantius, 'vreest hier niet de herhaling, maar de afwisseling; het is niet de afwisseling die ze wil, maar de herhaling' (Kierkegaard, 2012: 67). De afwisseling heeft betrekking op de uiterlijke omstandigheden en kan zodoende hoogstens een negatieve invloed uitoefenen op de vrijheid. Een moeilijke, maar noodzakelijke beslissing kan bijvoorbeeld worden vermeden als de afwisseling opeens een uitweg beidt die voorheen niet beschikbaar was. Dit kan allerlei vormen aannemen: het ene moment is de frauderende directrice bereid alles op te biechten, het volgende moment ziet ze een kans haar ondergeschikte ervoor op te laten draaien; al tien jaar lang neemt de echtgenoot genoegen met een ingeslapen huwelijk, tot er opeens een geschikte vervanger voor zijn vrouw opduikt en hij alsnog een scheiding aanvraagt. De directrice en de echtgenoot verliezen hun vrijheid omdat ze de uiterlijke omstandigheden voor hen laten beslissen, in plaats van hun eigen waarden, hun eigen individualiteit te kiezen. Hier kan geen existentiële herhaling plaatsvinden. Hoewel Constantius in het midden laat of de existentiële herhaling überhaupt wel mogelijk is, kan er uit zijn sporadische reflecties wel iets worden afgeleid over de structuur van deze herhaling. Bijvoorbeeld wanneer hij de herhaling contrasteert met de hoop en de herinnering: 'De hoop is een nieuw kledingstuk, stijf en strak en prachtig, toch heb je het nooit aan gehad en weet je daarom niet hoe het je zal staan of hoe het zit De herinnering is een afgedankt kledingstuk, dat, hoe mooi het ook is, toch niet past, omdat je er uitgegroeid bent. De herhaling is een onverslijtbaar kledingstuk dat zacht zit en precies past, niet knelt of fladdert' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 10; vertaling aangepast). De hoop kijkt uitsluitend vooruit en richt zich op of mijn toekomstige zelf (dat nog niet bestaat), de herinnering kijkt uitsluitend achterom en richt zich op mijn vroegere zelf (dat niet meer bestaat), terwijl de herhaling zich concentreert op mijn huidige zelf (dat ieder moment opnieuw tot stand moet komen als onherhaalbare uitzondering). 'Als men zegt dat het leven een herhaling is,' zo stelt Constantius, 'dan zegt men: het bestaan dat geweest is, treedt nu in het bestaan' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 26). De herhaling is een overgang van het vroegere zelf naar het huidige zelf, deze overgang laat de subjectiviteit – als onherhaalbare uitzondering – 'opnieuw in het bestaan treden'. Hierbij geldt: subjectiviteit = herhaling. In dit proces kan er gemakkelijk iets misgaan, bijvoorbeeld als iemand blijft hangen in zijn vroegere zelf ('als verzetsstrijder heb ik afdoende bewezen een goed mens te zijn') of zichzelf juist verliest in een toekomstig zelf ('als ik minister ben maak ik onmiddellijk een eind aan die politieke spelletjes, maar om die positie te kunnen veroveren moet ik er tijdelijk aan meedoen'). De herhaling vindt zodoende niet automatisch 36 ⁄ Wijsgerig Perspectief plaats, maar is een taak van de vrijheid die telkens weer opnieuw moet worden gerealiseerd. De existentiële herhaling moet niet worden opgevat als een terugkeer tot en voortzetting van wat het individu in aanleg altijd al was. Integendeel, de existentiële herhaling is een vertrekpunt waarin de onherhaalbare subjectiviteit van het individu opnieuw in het bestaan moet treden. Vigilius Haufniensis, een ander pseudoniem van Kierkegaard, drukt dit in een voetnoot over De herhaling als volgt uit: 'het hele leven en het hele bestaan begint opnieuw, niet in een immanente continuïteit met wat is voorafgegaan (wat een tegenstrijdigheid zou zijn), maar door een transcendentie, die een ravijndiepe scheiding legt tussen de herhaling en het eerste bestaan' (Kierkegaard, 2009: 22). Het 'opnieuw in het bestaan treden' van het zelf veronderstelt een breuk en kan daarom niet gekarakteriseerd worden in termen van een doelgerichte zelfverwerkelijking (waarbij er juist sprake is van continuïteit en er geen breuk optreedt). 'De dialectiek van de herhaling is gemakkelijk,' zo schrijft Constantius, 'want wat wordt herhaald, is geweest, anders kon het niet herhaald worden. Maar juist het feit dat het geweest is, maakt de herhaling tot iets nieuws' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 26). Het zelf dat 'opnieuw in het bestaan treedt' is als zodanig niet nieuw, maar bestond eerder ook al. Het nieuwe is gelegen in het feit dat het vroegere zelf 'teruggehaald' wordt en opnieuw tot stand wordt gebracht als het huidige zelf. 'Er bestaat maar één pregnante herhaling,' zo stelt Constantius, 'en dat is de herhaling van de eigen individualiteit in een nieuwe potentie' (Kierkegaard, 2008: 113). Dit is volgens hem 'geen betekenisloze herhaling' (dat wil zeggen geen herhaling in alledaagse zin), 'maar een zodanige herhaling dat het nieuwe absolute betekenis heeft in verhouding tot wat eraan voorafging en er kwalitatief van verschilt' (Kierkegaard, 2012: 72). Conclusie In De herhaling introduceert Constantius een nieuwe filosofische stijl die het hem mogelijk maakt om het begrip herhaling aan de orde te stellen. In plaats van te definiëren wat de herhaling is, laat Constantius enkele personages verstrikt raken in een misverstand. Alleen de lezer die het misverstand doorziet, zal in staat blijken om vanuit zichzelf te construeren wat er onder de existentiële herhaling verstaan moet worden. In dit artikel heb ik hiertoe een eerste aanzet gegeven door de herhaling te duiden in termen van vrijheid en subjectiviteit. Dit kan worden uitgedrukt in twee formules: 'vrijheid = herhaling' en 'subjectiviteit = herhaling'. Vrijheid en subjectiviteit kunnen alleen blijven bestaan door opnieuw in het bestaan te treden. Hierbij is er sprake van een paradox: de herhaling van het onherhaalbare. Het individu dat wordt gekenmerkt door vrijheid en subjectiviteit is een onherhaalbare uitzondering. Deze uitzondering kan alleen standhouden door herhaald te worden, dat wil zeggen door opnieuw in het bestaan te treden als uitzondering. Literatuur Kierkegaard, S. (2008). De herhaling. Een proeve van experimenterende psychologie door Constantin Constantius. Budel: Damon. Kierkegaard, S. (2009). Het begrip angst. Budel: Damon. Kierkegaard, S. (2012). 'Polemik mod Heiberg'. In Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, K15. Kopenhagen: Gad (een toelichting op De herhaling; mijn vertaling).