Actor Network, Ontic Structural Realism, and the Ontological Status of Actants Corrado Matta Department of Education, Stockholm University, corrado.matta@edu.su.se Abstract In this paper I discuss the ontological status of actants. Researchers have argued that actants are the basic constituting entities of networks in the framework of the actor-network theory (Latour, 2007). I introduce two problems concerning actants that have been highlighted by Collin (2010). The first problem, according to Collin, is that actants cannot simultaneously be constituents and products of a network. The second problem, as Latour suggests, is that if actants are fundamentally propertyless, then it is unclear how they combine into networks. I suggest that both of the problems Collin ascribes to actants rest on the assumption of a form of object ontology, i.e., the assumption that the ontological basis of reality consists in discrete individual entities. I argue that the solution to this problem consists in the assumption of an ontology of relations and, furthermore, that Ontic Structural Realism (Ladyman & Ross, 2007) is the kind of ontological theory of relations that can solve this problem. While my proposal can be considered as an attempt to solve two problems, it is also an experiment of reconciliation between the analytic and constructivist philosophies of science. Keywords Actor network theory, ontic structural realism, relational ontology, actants/actors Introduction This paper is an exercise in the ontology of networks. Throughout the text I use the term network consistently within the actor-network theory (ANT) framework presented and discussed by Latour (2007)1. The main aim of this paper is to propose a solution to two philosophical problems pointed out by Collin (2010) that concern the ontological status of the basic constituents of networks, i.e., actants (or actors)2. The first problem, according to Collin, is that the same actant that participates in the production of a network be produced by the same network. Collin observes that this seems to generate a vicious circle (Collin, 2010, p. 120). Collin formulates the second problem as follows: "How can actants generate the world through their interaction, if they are fundamentally propertyless, beyond their penchant for combining?" (Collin, 2010, p. 137). The solution I propose for these two problems draws on a theory about the ontology of scientific theories usually labeled as ontic structural realism (OSR) (discussed in detail in Ladyman & Ross, 2007). In short, I argue that the possibility for propertyless actants to constitute a network rests on the abandonment of object ontology in favor of an ontology of only relations. Object ontology refers to the assumption that the world 1 Actor-network theory is more a family of approaches than a unified theory or method. It is therefore important to remark that in this paper I only discuss Latour's formulation of the theory as discussed in Latour (2007). My conclusions can be extended and applied to other formulations of ANT as long as they are consistent with Latour's. 2 The choice of the term "actant" in the text is problematic. It is sometimes avoided in favor of the term "actor." However, the main sources of the discussion in this paper are Collin (2010), Latour (2007), and Harman (2009). While Harman seems to use the terms "actor" and "actant" interchangeably, Latour attempts a distinction. As Latour writes, "any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor-or, if it has no configuration yet, an actant." (Latour, 2007, p. 71). I am going to use this distinction as a default position, unless when directly discussing Collin's claims. In this latter case I use the term actant exclusively since that is the only one used by Collin (I wish to thank the anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention). Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 195 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 basically consists of discrete individual objects that have intrinsic properties. Object ontology is a basic intuitive ontological assumption both in scientific and ordinary discourse; however, as others have previously argued, it rests on neither conceptually nor empirically necessary grounds. OSR claims instead that the analysis of actual scientific theories (both in the natural and social sciences) suggests that we should have an ontological commitment to only a universe of relation without relata. In other words, external relations are irreducible to intrinsic properties. Relations organize and emerge as patterns; scientific theories track these patterns. The fact that theories imply ontological commitments in discrete entities is just a matter of epistemic clarity. Thus, patterns of relations have the capacity of constructing individual entities in the epistemic sense. Thus, I argue that the problems pointed out by Collin rest on the assumption of object ontology. However, I argue that the employment of OSR can, at the price of little modification for both theories, solve both of Collin's two major troubles concerning ANT. I start my discussion by introducing some background terminology for ANT and OSR. I continue by proposing that, in light of OSR, the status of actants is not of individual entities but of structural entities; that is, actants are themselves patterns of relations without relata. In the text I refer to such structural entities as patterns of relations without relata. Finally, I point out some alleged discrepancies between the two theories and argue that these do not constitute a real problem for the project of framing ANT within the context of OSR. Throughout the text I seek support for my claims by referring to examples of application of ANT to the context of networked learning. Arguably, the complexity of the phenomenon of networked learning gives us a convenient vantage point from which we can clearly understand many important aspects of both ANT and OSR. Collin's analysis of ANT The brevity of this paper does not allow me to provide a complete review of ANT or the vast number of ways it has been variously interpreted. Thus, with the help of Collin's analysis (F. Collin, 2010), I briefly analyze a number of claims of Latour's ANT (Latour, 2007) that will be central to my discussion. In short, ANT is an approach to social theory that was developed from science and technology studies (STS) but which diverges from STS in that it takes social constructivism as an ontological claim, and not only, as is the case in classical STS, an epistemological claim. What exists, i.e. the existence of facts, is ultimately the result of a network of actors. ANT's most characteristic and perhaps most controversial feature is the claim that both human and nonhuman actors play a role in networks and, as such, both participate in the construction of social and scientific facts. Networks of actors ontologically constitute facts; this seems to be ANT's main claim. As mentioned above, ANT is the result of the ontological turn in STS. This justifies the requirement of some clear-cut ontological grounds from ANT. However, "clear-cut" here does not refer to any kind of foundational ontology, since that would go against the main tenets of constructivism. What is required here is a number of principles that at least partially regulate the existence of networks. Even antirealist ontologies, such as nominalism or instrumentalism, have often been framed by strict logical principles. The same concern pervades Collin's examination of ANT (Collin, 2010, ch. 6–7). As he states, Certain actants only come to exist as result of the activities of a well-established network. The conclusion seems inevitable that those actants could not have contributed to establishing the network in the first place (F. Collin, 2010, p. 117). Actants seem to constitute the ontological base of networks. Whatever it is that has a role in the production of facts, be it human or nonhuman, is an actant. However, as Collin points out, it is unclear how actants can explain networks and be produced by networks at the same time. Actants cannot be the explanans of the establishment of networks and at the same time be explained as generated by networks, on pain of circularity. However, Latour seems to be clear that certain actors, such as measurement instruments or chemical formulas, are themselves produced by networks of actors (Latour, 1987, p. 99). Yet, in some cases, they are actors in the same network that generated them. Networked learning provides us with many clear examples of this problem. For instance, as discussed by Fox (2005), the phenomenon of learning communities in networked learning is Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 196 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 produced by a network of human and nonhuman actors. These nonhuman actors include resources such as Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC), virtual educational platforms, or the hardware tools used to implement these platforms. As Fox points out (2005, p. 102), when learning communities are the object of analysis, the actors in the network that produces the learning community are black-boxed. However, we should not consider actors such as virtual platforms as stable discrete entities. The platform is produced itself by a network that involve the learning community. A learning platform is produced in the practice of its application, which is itself a complex network of actors, including users, economical interests, school policies, curricula, and so on. As David Lewis described the empty set in mathematics, the platform without these actors is nothing but "a little speck of sheer nothingness" (Lewis, 1993, p. 9). However, how can the learning platform explain and, at the same time, be explained by the learning community? This is not only an explanatory problem; it is an ontological problem as well. In Latour's monist ontology, actants are all of the same kind. Yet actants seem to lack any property besides their "penchant for combining" (F. Collin, 2010, p. 137). How can they then generate the world? According to Collin, it is utterly mysterious how actants generate reality "through some kind of bootstrapping process that is essentially beyond explanation" (Collin, 2010, p. 137). In the next section I introduce a new ontological framework that might provide an answer to these problems. Ontic Structural Realism In this section I provide a brief review of OSR and explain the aim and the main arguments. I also highlight some of the important points of contact between ANT and OSR. According to the pessimistic induction argument (Laudan, 1981), which is one of the best-known arguments against scientific realism, the history of science motivates us to not believe in the existence of the entities that appear in scientific theories. Paradigm shifts in disciplines such as physics or psychiatry suggest that the unobservable entities that inhabit our best theories, such as electrons or consciousness, are the result of cultural and social negotiation and not of scientific discovery. Thus, the role of theories ought not to be considered as describing reality. Ontic structural realism holds that, with the exception of the last sentence, all of the above argument is correct. Theoretical entities are constructions, but this does not imply that scientific theories do not describe reality. The structural part of theories is in fact not affected by the pessimistic induction, since structure is retained throughout the paradigm shift (Worrall, 1989). OSR suggests therefore that we should not have an ontological commitment to the individual entities that scientific theories talk about since the content of the terms denoting these entities is destined to change. However, we should hold the structural part of the theories – that is, all the mathematical and logical relations expressed by the theory – as true. One simple way to illustrate this is by imagining a scientific theory in which all theoretical terms referring to individual entities are changed into variables or dummy names such as x. This is not a suggestion that individual terms should be eliminated from our theories, since they play an important epistemic role in theories. However, we should not consider them as referring to any individual entity. It is not only the criticism against anti-realism that animates OSR. A number of philosophers have suggested that the strongest argument for OSR is that the analysis of micro-physical theories supports the claim that individual entities such as electrons are essentially relational (Esfeld & Lam, 2011; Ladyman & Ross, 2007, ch. 3; Muller, 2011). Thus, according to OSR, successful theories describe reality since they describe the structure of reality. Individual entities populating our descriptions are just constructions that are useful as epistemic bookkeeping devices (Ladyman & Ross, 2007, p. 121). Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 197 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 Fig. 1: Actor-network Theory in an Ontic Structural Realism frame Therefore, OSR's main ontological claim is that reality is essentially relational3. The structural parts of scientific theories track patterns of relations. Hence, OSR argues that structures represent real patterns of relations. In this sense, OSR is a form of scientific realism. Patterns of relations exist independently from our knowledge of reality. OSR proposes an antireductionist ontology. First of all, ontological reductionism implies object ontology. In the case of a learning community, the possibility of reducing the phenomenon of learning to cognitive content implies the existence of human individuals having cognitive content. Patterns are not hierarchically ordered according to complexity or to any other property. Ladyman and Ross (2007, p. 199-204) call this claim the scale relativity of ontology, according to which everything that (really, mind-independently) exists is relative to the scale at which it is measurable. The pattern of relations tracked by the theory of learning communities exists only at the particular scale at which it is measured. Shifting the focus to the cognitive aspects entails a different scale of measurement and thus a different pattern of relations. Hence, OSR shows a number of interesting similarities with ANT. First of all, it is impossible to draw a sharp ontological distinction between social and natural reality, since the only ontological category is that of relations. Even the elements that are in play in the process of tracking a pattern of relations are themselves the result of a relational pattern, since another scientific theory can describe them. As discussed above in relationship to Fox's analysis of learning communities, the actors in the network that produces networked learning are themselves explainable as networks. We have then another theory, explaining, for instance, the economic aspects of a particular learning community. This theory tracks another pattern of relations. Both theories stress the relational character of social and natural reality. Latour talks about sociology as "the tracing of associations" (Latour, 2007, p. 5, original italicized). Harman (2009) has extensively argued for the relational aspect of Latour's metaphysics. As he states, "things are not real by being less connected with others, but become more real the more they are linked with their allies" (Harman, 2009, p. 80). In the same way, as explained above, OSR claims that theories are about real patterns and not about discrete entities. However, the similarity claim between patterns in OSR and networks in ANT is not valid for all aspects of networks and patterns. As we are going to see in the following sections, there are some crucial differences between the two concepts. 3 The concept of relations without individual relation bearers, i.e., relation without relata, is controversial. A way of making sense of it is rephrasing it as the thesis of the irreducibility of relations to intrinsic properties. Individual entities are necessary if relations supervene on intrinsic properties, since intrinsic properties are necessarily tied to their individual property bearer. However, if relations are irreducible to intrinsic properties, then theories that are ontologically committed to these relations are not ontologically committed to individual entities (Esfeld, 2003; MacBride, 2011). Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 198 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 This brings us to the main point of contact between OSR and ANT: naturalism. Discussing ANT, Latour talks about "empirical metaphysics" (Latour, 2007, p. 51). Both projects are motivated by the aim of naturalizing ontology. That implies that conclusions about ontology are not drawn in light of a priori assumptions but on the basis of empirical evidence. If something exists as the social then it will be the result of an empirical investigation. In Latour's seminal work Laboratory Life (Latour & Woolgar, 1979), the track is already set for the project of naturalizing philosophy by substituting "deep-seated ontological commitments" with "empirical evidence" (Latour & Woolgar, 1979, p. 280). Even though Latour seems to be willing to dismiss the largest part of the analytical philosophy of science, we can remark that the advocates of OSR could not agree more with Latour and Woolgar's criticism of a priori philosophy of science. In the frontispiece of Ladyman and Ross' Every Thing Must Go, we read the following claim: The only kind of metaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it really is, and not on philosophers' a priori intuitions, common sense, or simplifications of science (Ladyman & Ross, 2007, frontispiece). Just as in ANT and STS, the project of OSR is grounded in empirical evidence. The strongest argument for the ontological claim that everything is relational is that both the natural sciences as well as the social sciences (Dennett, 1991; Kincaid, 2008; Ross & Spurrett, 2004; Ross, 2000, 2008) seem to suggest that the claim is correct. Actants in the OSR frame – the case of networked learning Before we consider the ontological status of actors, it is necessary to clarify the relations between patterns within OSR and networks in ANT. Patterns and networks are arguably not the same kind of entity. As represented in Figure 1 above, the framework of OSR consists of data models, synthetic models (the product of the analysis of the data models), and theories (families of synthetic models). Data models are logically embedded in synthetic models, while synthetic models are embedded in theories. A structure is the result of the analysis of a theory. The theory's structure is what is left of the theory when individual entities are eliminated. A structure represents a pattern of relations, which is what there really is. Networks analyzed in ANT belong to the domain of synthetic models, since not all kinds of products of data analysis are networks. Thus, according to OSR, although networks can locate a pattern, not all patterns are networks in the ANT sense. According to OSR, all synthetic models from all empirical sciences track a pattern. This does not completely settle the question. In the spirit of the STS roots of ANT, it is possible to interpret Latour so that any kind of data analysis is a network in disguise, or that (even stronger claim) at any scale of measurement, the most correct analysis of data is done in agreement with ANT methodology. This could open up a discussion concerning the status of ANT as a meta-theory, that is, a theory that provides an account of how science, at any level, is produced. This would imply that networks and patterns are arguably the same kind of entity. However, Latour's critique of philosophy of science as meta-theory makes look this hypothesis implausible. I will therefore assume that networks and patterns are different kinds of entities. This does not imply that ANT and OSR refer to different things when they talk about relational ontology, but only that a) either the models generated within ANT pertain to the area that is described as theoretical level in Figure 1, or b) that ANT models are a priori committed to a meta-theory very much like OSR (this latter is unpalatable from the point of view of naturalism). We must leave these two possibilities open. Let us return to Collin's explanatory and ontological problems concerning ANT and consider them in relation to the concrete case of networked learning discussed by Fox (2005). Recall Collin's first problem: actants cannot explain the same network that concurs in producing the actant. The problem with Collin's analysis of the explanatory role of actants in networks is that it implies an ontology of objects. If an object is the explanans of a network, it cannot also have the same network as its own explanans. If we consider actors as relational entities, however, we can escape this circularity problem. The pattern of relations from which an actor emerges lies at a different scale of measurement than the pattern from which the network emerges. A networked learning community and one of the actors in the network that produces it are Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 199 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 both produced by the same network only if a) we think of networks as consisting of rigid points (nodes) and connections among them, and b) that we can simply isolate one of these objects and analyze it. This is what object ontology implies if applied to networks. However, if we consider networks as tracking patterns of relations, then the question of the ontological nature of the IT resource used to implement networked learning in a particular learning community is tied to the scale of measurement that is most appropriate for analysis of the ITC resources. From this perspective, if we analyze the network that produces the learning community, then there is no point in discussing how the IT resource is constructed because there is no (real, mind-independent) IT resource from the scale of measurement of the whole learning community. Shifting the focus to whichever other actor in the network produces the learning community means assuming yet another scale of measurement, and thus tracking another pattern of relations. Of course, we might want to consider how that particular learning community concurred together with other actors to establish the reliability of that particular IT resource. Yet again, we are looking at another pattern of relations. At this scale of measurement there is no (real, mind-independent) learning community. However, two different patterns cannot result from the same synthetic model (in this case from the same network). This entails that we must be speaking of different networks. As a result, there can be no explanatory circularity. These two arguments speak for a difference between patterns and networks. It looks therefore like the solution to Collin's first problem require to extend ANT so that it can be embedded in the meta–theoretic framework of OSR. We can appreciate how the example provided by the ANT frame analysis of networked learning is capable of shedding light on crucial aspects of ANT and OSR. There is no ordering between patterns, and no macro-micro distinction. The shift of scale of measurement from one network to another explaining one of its actants by no means implies a shift downwards in the scale of complexity. Fox's discussion of the concept of community is very helpful in this sense. The actors that concur in producing a network are not more ontologically primitive than the network itself, since a network can be an actor of the network that explains the network's actors. No hierarchy exists among patterns. The solution to Collin's ontological problem should therefore be stated as follows. From the perspective of a network, actants are propertyless, in that networks consist of only relations. Networks represent patterns. Only for the sake of epistemic simplicity do we attribute dummy identities to actants at this level. OSR does not imply any commitment to claims of immutability of structure, for example, in the context of social science. Structures are ways of considering theories and theories are genidentical entities. This means that they grow, split, merge, and eventually die. Patterns are what really exist, and patterns are just as fluid and complex as we expect reality to be. If a social theory tracks a pattern via its structure, then it does not mean that this pattern is immovable since social reality, or social patterns, are not immovable. Nor can a social pattern determine individual choices, due to the scale relativity of ontology. The existence of holistic social structure does not determine the psychological lives of individual members of societies. As we have seen, at the scale of measurement of a community there are no (real, mind-independent) individual members of the community. At this point it is crucial to ask ourselves the following question: would the ANT theorist be willing to trade off a solution for Collin's problem of actants in exchange of a form of realism? Apparent Discrepancies ANT inherits the critical stance against philosophical and foundational theories of science from STS (Latour & Woolgar, 1979, p. 280). Latour has criticized analytic philosophy of science on many occasions, especially the idea that scientific rationality, evidence, and prediction lie at the core of science. This criticism should make us skeptical of the possibility of framing ANT within OSR. In the end, if the term analytic has any meaning, OSR is a form of analytic theory of science. However, one main flaw in the STS and ANT criticism of philosophy of science is that the object of criticism looks more like a straw man than a real concurring position. The picture of analytical philosophy of science as resting on a clear-cut scientific rationality; on the symmetry prediction/explanation; on the centrality of inductive evidence; and on the search for laws is, at best, an old relic of logical positivism. OSR is a post- Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 200 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 positivist theory of science with a strong focus on the practices of science, and this implies that many of the STS's criticisms against analytical philosophy of science might not affect OSR. Thus, in the following section I consider the positions in which ANT and OSR seem to deviate from one another. As I shall argue, much of the apparent disagreement is only apparent. A first source of discrepancy was actually introduced in the last section and discussed in this section. This discrepancy concerned the status of networks as synthetic or meta-theoretic models. The solution proposed here is to consider ANT models as synthetic models on a par with other scientific models, and to consider OSR as a general ontological framework for scientific theories. This comports some deviation from ANT orthodoxy. This deviation is however arguably a small price to pay in exchange for the solution of Collin's problems. Let us then see which other differences can be observed between OSR and ANT. Two further discrepancies The first discrepancy between OSR and ANT regards the concept of practice. According to Collin's analysis of ANT, "[R]eality only exists where practices exist, that is, as far as networks of actants extend" (Collin, 2010, p. 136). It is not so easy to infer from OSR a clear claim concerning practices. As we shall see below, it is arguable that not all existence entails practice within OSR. Nonetheless, this discrepancy can be solved without any cost for ANT. In fact, it would simply be too strong an anthropocentric claim for ANT to intend the term of practice to only refer to human practice. It would contradict one of the main methodological claims of ANT, i.e., the rejection of the social-natural and human-nonhuman dichotomies. The problem, however, is not completely solved yet. Since human and nonhuman elements play an evident role in the emergence of theories, and since ontological categories such as human and nonhuman within OSR are only accepted a posteriori, it can be argued that even OSR endorses the claim that all scientific theories are constituted by networks of human and nonhuman actors. This is a strong detour from standard OSR that might appear to be too permissive toward social constructivism. In fact, and without going into too much detail, microphysical phenomena in OSR are understood as only ontologically consisting of their physical relations (Esfeld & Lam, 2011). This implies that the real pattern tracked by some particle physics might be considered in isolation from their technological context. This sounds like an unacceptable concession from ANT. Would the ANT advocate accept a purely information-theoretic explanation of the IT resource involved in the production of a networked learning community? Would that explanation be exhaustive? There is a possible way out of this problem. We can interpret the scale relativity of ontology in a way that allows us to observe, at some scales of measurement, the kind of pattern that Esfeld and Lam talk about. At this scale of measurement we will not find any purely physical system intended as something completely isolated from technological and human influence. Patterns in OSR are intimately connected with data models (the latter of which are embedded in patterns) and experimental set-ups. However, we can claim that the pattern we find at that scale of measurement is simply not a network in the ANT sense. It is important to remark that this is the natural interpretation of the scale relativity and that it by no means prevents the existence of the ANT-type networks. This solution entails an ontological pluralism grounded on the plurality of scientific approaches, all of which are just as correct as long as they are able to track a real pattern. This brings us back to the discussion concerning networks and patterns in the previous section. OSR clearly entails that ANT is not the only possible way of looking at science; rather, it is just one of many. All of these approaches describe a different reality, and all of these realities are equally real. The second discrepancy concerns the problem of realism. It is intuitively clear that a form of scientific realism such as OSR is not destined to fare particularly well in the company of ANT. As Collin clearly states, it is unclear how we should interpret statements such as "learning communities existed in 1200 BC." We can expect that the realist will try to argue that the statement is in some way true, while the constructivist will try to argue that the same statement is in some way false (since the term "learning community" is produced by theories of learning). How can these two interpretations coexist? Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 201 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 Latour, according to Collin's reconstruction, solves this problem by using a double index to the effect that "learning communities existed in 1200" is false in 1200, while "learning communities existed in 1200" is true in 2013 (F. Collin, 2010, p. 140). Latour seems to claim that for all the time before the development of theories of learning communities, the claim "learning communities existed in 1200" is simply false (F. Collin, 2010, p. 141; Latour, 1987, p. 258). This discrepancy is simply apparent. The problem completely depends on the assumption of object ontology. If we disregard the entities involved in these statements (such as community), we obtain that the structural part of the theory of learning community applies to patterns of behavior that precede the development of the theory. Thus, even though it is true that the concept of learning community is a product of the late twentieth century, we can still say that the statement "learning communities existed in 1200" is structurally true. Conclusion In this short paper I have argued that the use of OSR as an ontological framework for ANT implies a number of major rewards at a small price and without distorting ANT's original claims. If ANT is framed within an ontology of only relations, we obtain a clearer and less problematic conception of actant/actor. I have also argued that despite a number of apparently irreconcilable discrepancies, ANT and OSR seem to integrate into one another fairly well. References Collin, F. 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DOI: 10.5840/pjphil20171114 POLISH JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Vol. XI, No. 1 (Spring 2017), 43-55. Grounding Reichenbach's Pragmatic Vindication of Induction Michael J. Shaffer Department of Philosophy St. Cloud State University Abstract. This paper has three interdependent aims. The first is to make Reichenbach's views on induction and probabilities clearer, especially as they pertain to his pragmatic justification of induction. The second aim is to show how his view of pragmatic justification arises out of his commitment to extensional empiricism and moots the possibility of a non-pragmatic justification of induction. Finally, and most importantly, a formal decision-theoretic account of Reichenbach's pragmatic justification is offered in terms both of the minimax principle and of the dominance principle. 1. Introduction Hans Reichenbach's pragmatic treatment of the problem of induction (presented and developed in his 1949a, 1932/1949b and 1949c) was, and still is, of great interest. However, various influential commentators have dismissed it as a pseudo-solution and/or regarded it as problematically obscure.1 This is, in large part, due to the difficulty in understanding exactly what Reichenbach's solution is supposed to amount to, especially as it appears to offer no response to the inductive skeptic. As Laurence BonJour claims, ...the significance of Reichenbach's pragmatic justification remains obscure. As he himself insists, that justification still yields no reason at all for thinking that inductive conclusions, or any of the myriad further beliefs which are epistemically dependent on them, are to any degree likely to be true. The sort of justification in question is thus not epistemic justification, as that concept was construed above; to show that beliefs are justified in this alternative way does not answer, or even purport to answer, the basic skeptical worry about induction, and is indeed quite compatible with the deepest degree of skepticism. It is thus hard to see why it should be regarded as any sort of solution to the classical problem of induction (BonJour 1986, p. 99). 1 See, e.g., Skyrms (1966), Salmon (1966), BonJour (1986), BonJour (1992), BonJour (1998), Rosenkrantz (1981), and Kelly (1991). 44 Michael J. Shaffer This sort of dismissal of Reichenbach's views on induction surely depends to some degree on his adherence to the controversial frequency interpretation of the concept of probability.2 This is plausible to assume in light of the wide-spread popularity of subjectivism about probability that has dominated probability theory subsequent to Reichenbach's work and this aspect of Reichenbach's approach to induction has been treated at length in a variety of other places.3 Another aspect of his vindication that likely fuels the charge of obscurity is the failure of these critics to pay more attention to Reichenbach's commitment to a purely extensional metaphysics. Finally, Reichenbach's attempt to rationally ground induction on the basis of purely pragmatic considerations is also likely to have, at least in part, given rise to the charges of obscurity and failure.4 This last point is especially important because Reichenbach is rather cavalier and informal in his assertion of the claim that following the inductive rule is the best thing to do from a pragmatic perspective. First, it will be shown here that what Reichenbach does in his later work on induction is to establish an important epistemic limitation of extensional empiricism and that there really is nothing especially obscure about Reichenbach's thoughts on induction in this respect. He was simply working out the limits of extensional empiricism with respect to inductive inference. In fact, Reichenbach conveys this very point to Russell in an important letter in 1949.5 It will be shown that these aspects of Reichenbach's position lead directly to his assertion that the only manner in which the inductive rule can be justified in the primitive state of knowledge prior to making sequences of inductive inferences is pragmatic in nature. Finally, and more constructively, it will be shown here that there are perfectly coherent, formal and pragmatic justifications of Reichenbach's inductive rule in the primitive state of knowledge in the forms of the maximin rule for decision making and the dominance principle. With this account of the pragmatic justification of induction in hand, we will see 2 Hájek (1997, 2009). 3 See, e.g., Skyrms (1966), Salmon (1963), Salmon (1966), Galvaotti (2011) and Teng and Kyburg (2001). 4 The sense of pragmatics used here is just the idea that there are justifications that are non-epistemic (i.e. not related to truth, approximate truth or probability) and which are based on some more or less well-understood notion of instrumental success or utility. 5 The letter is a response to Russell's criticisms of Reichenbach's approach to the problem of induction as presented in Russell's Our Knowledge of the External World. This approach stands in sharp contrast to Reichenbach's early work which resembles Russell's approach in holding that the principle that grounds induction is synthetic a priori. See Eberhardt (2011) for discussion of Reichenbach's early views. He explicitly rejects this view in his later work and tells Russell in a 1949 letter that "Induction does not require an intensional logic" (1949d, p. 410). Grounding Reichenbach's Pragmatic 45 that Reichenbach's justification of induction can be given a principled ground. 1.1 Overview Let us begin by recalling that Reichenbach's pragmatic justification of induction is based on the following (reconstructed) line of argumentation (i.e. the basic Reichenbach argument): P1: Either nature is uniform or it is not. P2: If nature is uniform, then scientific induction will be successful. P3: If nature is not uniform, then no method will be successful.  If any method of induction will be successful, then scientific induction will be successful.6 But, according to Reichenbach and echoing Hume, we cannot know whether nature is uniform or not, because it is neither a matter that can be settled a priori nor is it a matter that we can non-circularly establish a posteriori. So, as Reichenbach sees it, although we know that if any method is successful, then scientific induction will be successful, we cannot know that any method really is successful. The gist of his attempt to justify inductive practice then comes from the idea that while we do not know that any method will actually be successful, we also do not know that no method will be successful. Given this result and the fact that scientific induction can be shown to be an optimal method (in this important sense of "optimality"), we ought to accept induction as being justified, at least pragmatically speaking. As we shall see, what is at the heart of this view is Reichenbach's metaphysical commitment to a form of extensional empiricism that tolerates only the existence of particulars. In any case, as Salmon correctly pointed out in his 1966, the Reichenbach argument depends on a false dichotomy. The uniformity of nature is, of course, not an all or nothing matter. We can, of course imagine possible worlds that contain only individuals with degrees of uniformity that vary radically. So, the uniformity of nature seems to be a matter of degree, and it is at least plausible to believe that there is a measure of the uniformity of extensional worlds. If this turns out to be viable, given the space of possible worlds U, we could define a measure m(x) on U such that m(x) maps the elements of U into the continuous open interval [0,1] 6 This presentation of a simplified version of Reichenbach's main argument is taken from Skyrms (1966). It is important to note at this juncture that the various criticisms of Reichenbach's views, other than Russell's, will (for the most part) be ignored here. To address all of those criticisms would require too much space, and the point of this paper is more historical in any case. 46 Michael J. Shaffer representing the uniformity of that extensional world. This suggests that Reichenbach's attempt to justify induction needs to be retooled in order to accommodate a concept of world-uniformity that admits of continuous degrees. When this is done we can usefully reformulate the basic Reichenbach argument as follows. Consider our world wa (the actual world), where wa  U, with a fixed but unknown measure of uniformity, the set of all inductive methods Y,7 where yi  Y and such that each inductive method has a probability of arriving at a true conclusion in its domain of application, a function f(m(wn), yn) that maps worlds with degrees of worlduniformity and inductive methods into the space of probabilities,8 and a constant  that represents the chance probability of an inductive method succeeding at a world.9 If we understand  as the degree of worlduniformity required for any inductive rule to be reliable with a reliability greater than chance, i.e. greater than , then the more sophisticated Reichenbach argument can be stated as follows: P1′: If the probability that m(wa) = 1 is 1, then scientific induction will be successful. P2′: If it is probable that 1 > m(wa) >  with probability less than 1 but greater than , then scientific induction will be successful with probability p, where p >  < 1. P3′: If it is probable that  > m(wa) > 0 with probability greater than 0 but less than , then scientific induction will be successful with probability p, where p <  < 0. P4′: If the probability that m(wa) = 0 is 1, then no inductive method will be successful.  If any inductive method will be successful, scientific induction will be successful. It should be noted that Reichenbach's conclusion still holds in this case, and we will consider the significance of this conclusion in what follows. 7 Inductive methods are, simply, rules for accepting conclusions concerning unobserved cases based on observed cases. 8 The function f(m(wn), yn) seems, intuitively, to be a natural sort of function, as degrees of world-uniformity seem to be closely related to the probability with which a method produces true conclusions. What f(m(wn), yn) is supposed to yield is a probabilistic measure of the general reliability of a given method at a world with a given measure of uniformity, and, as we shall see in section 4, what this function really represents is the set of worlds where an inductive method with a well-defined probability of arriving at the correct value of a stable frequency will actually produce the correct values. 9 In other words,  represents the threshold at which methods are no better at producing true conclusions than randomly selecting conclusions from the set of all statements of a given language £, and, as we shall see, a method that performs at a success rate no better than chance is no method at all. However, the general successfulness of an inductive method will turn out to be a more complex matter involving two aspects. The first concerns the reliability of the procedure in its domain, and the second concerns whether there exist elements of that domain at a world. Grounding Reichenbach's Pragmatic 47 However, before we proceed to do so, it will be instructive to reconstruct Reichenbach's treatment of induction in much greater detail in order to see just what it amounts to and what it implies about inductive inference. 2. Reichenbach's Conception of Scientific Induction The primary motivation that drove Reichenbach to propose his pragmatic justification of induction concerns a central feature of the frequency interpretation of the probability calculus. Familiarity with the details of the probability calculus will be assumed here, and with the fact that it is compatible with at least several interpretations. The axioms of the probability calculus are, of course, as follows: (A.1) P(a)  0 for all a in the domain of P(). (A.2) P(t) = 1 if t is a tautology. (A.3) P(a  b) = P(a) + P(b) if a and b and a  b are all in the domain of P(), and a and b are mutually exclusive. Recall that on Reichenbach's frequency interpretation of probabilities such quantities are to be construed as tautological consequences of the probability calculus.10 More importantly, probabilities are to be regarded as measures of the limit of the relative frequency with which one contingent property is associated with another in an infinite sequence. More formally, the relative frequency of a pair of properties in a sequence is to be defined as follows: F n(A, B) = N n(A, B)/N n(A) Here F n(A, B) is the frequency of associated As and Bs in a sequence of length n. Given this conception of relative frequency we can then define the concept of probability as follows: P(A, B) = lim F n(A, B).11 n   Having introduced this notion of probability Reichenbach then proposes the rule of induction that states, If an initial section of n elements of a sequence xi is given, resulting in the frequency f n, and if, furthermore, nothing is known about the probability of the second level for the occurrence of a certain limit p, we posit that the frequency f i (i > n) will approach a limit p within f n   when the sequence is continued (Reichenbach, 1949c, p. 47). However, these definitions give rise to some very difficult but well-known problems concerning the existence of infinite sequences and the existence 10 See Reichenbach (1949b) and Weatherford (1982), chapter 4. 11 See Reichenbach (1949c) for details concerning how this derivation is carried out. 48 Michael J. Shaffer of such convergent limits.12 Reichenbach assumes that we are only ever aware of sequences that "...are not intensionally given, but are presented to us only by enumeration of their elements, i.e. are extensionally given (Reichenbach, 1949a, p. 309)" and that any such sequence of observed associations will be finite. Upon considering further extensional enumeration of the elements of a given observed sequence, we find that such extended sequences are, in point of fact, compatible with any value of the limit frequency. If this is so, we might ask why we are entitled in any way to assume that the frequency of such an association in even very long sequences of observed associations in a population will justify our assertion that that frequency will not diverge in further extensive enumerations of that sequence. Unless one is prepared to reject extensional empiricism this conclusion seems inescapable. Adopting intensionalism and accepting the existence of the relevant sort of a priori knowledge, like Russell ultimately did (1912 and 1948), permits induction to be grounded in a robust essentialism and a form of rationalism that allows for synthetic a priori knowledge of universals. But, although Reichenbach himself endorsed such a view in his early thinking about this problem in his dissertation, in his later work he staunchly opposed this sort of view and the idea of a priori knowledge, claiming that, "The idea that there is such a thing as a 'rational belief' is the root of all evil in the theory of knowledge and is nothing but a remnant from rationalistic philosophies (Reichenbach, 1949d)." In any case, Reichenbach saw that his understanding of this problem in terms of frequentism was just the classical problem of induction in a somewhat new guise, and he showed two things. First, he showed that, by definition, if such a limit exists, then the procedure of scientific induction will be successful, and, second, that scientific induction is at least as good as any other method in discovering what is really the case concerning the frequency of an association in a sequence. Reichenbach explains, Let us assume for the moment that there is a limit towards which the sequence converges, then there must be an n from which on our posit [the rule of induction] leads to the correct result; this follows from the definition of the limit, which requires that there be an n from which on the frequency remains within a given interval . If we were to adopt, on the contrary, the principle of always positing a limit outside f n   when a frequency f n has been observed, such a procedure would certainly lead us to a false result from a certain n on. This does not mean that there could not be other principles which like the first [the rule of induction] would lead to the correct limit. But we can make the following statement about these principles: even if they determine the posit outside f n   for a smaller n, they must, 12 Sequences with convergent limiting frequencies are just those sequences that settle into stable frequencies in the limit. Grounding Reichenbach's Pragmatic 49 from a certain n on, determine the posit within f n  . All other principles of positing must converge asymptotically with the first [the rule of induction] (Reichenbach, 1949b, p. 316). What he showed was that if a limit exists for a sequence, then by repeated application the rule of induction will lead to the value of that limit to any desired degree of approximation in a finite number of applications, and that all other methods will asymptotically converge with the results of the rule of induction. So, in spite of the fact that we cannot know that the limiting frequencies of sequences exist, we might as well simply accept the rule of induction because it is the best method of all methods. All methods are, in a sense, parasitic on the rule of induction. Again, this pragmatic answer to the problem of induction arose directly out of Reichenbach's recognition that, in point of fact, we cannot know that such limits exist in our world. We cannot know whether such convergent limits exist based on the empirical observation of associations in finite, extensionally given, sequences. So, we are stuck in the situation that either no method at all works, or induction is the best of all methods. In terms of the sophisticated Reichanbach argument this can be expressed as follows. If worlds are extensional and there is no a priori knowledge of the regularity of the world, then we cannot know the real value of m(wa). Nevertheless, it will be true that if 1  m(wa) > , then scientific induction will be successful. If this is not the case, then no method will be successful. 3. Posits and Pragmatic Justifications Even so, Reichenbach tells us that we can treat the existence of such limits of relative frequencies as posits, where posits are not to be treated as beliefs in the normal sense, but rather as a kind of wager concerning what would be most advantageous to us. Reichenbach explains that, It is evidently the concept of posit which we have to employ for an explanation of this method. If in the finite section given we have observed a certain frequency f n, we posit that sequence, on further continuation, will converge towards the limit f n (more precisely: within the interval f n  δ). We posit this; we do not say that it is true, we only posit it in the same sense as the gambler lays a wager on the horse which he believes to be fastest. We perform an action which appears to us the most favorable one, without knowing anything about the success of this individual action (Reichenbach, 1949b, p. 315). Furthermore, as all other rules are parasitic on the rule of induction, it is only natural to lay our wager on that rule. We are wagering that 1  m(wa) > So, the sort of justification his argument provides is clearly a matter of pragmatics. It is, as Feigl claimed, a justification actionis.13 But, 13 See Feigl (1963). 50 Michael J. Shaffer in any case, the kind of wager involved in positing the existence of convergent limits in infinite sequences is not the typical kind of wager that a gambler makes. Normally, a gambler at least knows the odds with which he is confronted and so can make an informed decision about what outcome to bet on (i.e. which is the best bet), but in the case of the limits of infinite sequences we are making the posit that the limit converges to f n blindly; i.e. we are making this posit when we do not know the odds, and so we do not know if it is the best posit. Reichenbach claims that in such cases we are making what he calls an approximative posit concerning the existence of such limits. We are blindly wagering that 1  m(wa) > . As we have seen, Reichenbach shows that if we are right about the existence of such a limit (if this blind wager is correct), then induction will be successful, and if any other method is successful, then scientific induction will be successful. If we are wrong about the existence of such a limit (if this blind wager is not correct), then if any other method is successful, then scientific induction will be successful in this more restricted sense. Therefore, scientific induction is at least optimal in this specific sense. However, as BonJour notes in the passage quoted in section 1, this by no means shows that induction is justified in the traditional sense, and Reichenbach's view is apparently compatible with radical skepticism concerning the probity of induction. It may simply be false that 1  m(wa) >  and, given extensional empiricism, we cannot know whether this claim is true or false. So, as far as we know, the method of induction might well be the best of a bad lot. Nonetheless, Reichenbach argues that there is a sense in which his argument vindicates induction if one is committed to extensional empiricism. It does show that if any method works, then induction works. We do not know that the rule is unreliable, but we know that it is the best method if any method is reliable. So, why not commit ourselves to the use of scientific induction? Of course, this may not be a satisfactory justification for someone who has sympathies with BonJour's inductive skeptic, but it is clearly to our practical advantage if scientific induction turns out to be reliable. As Reichenbach sees it, the alternative is to give up on science altogether. More importantly for the purposes of this discussion, what this result really establishes is that given extensional empiricism induction can only be pragmatically justified in the sense of Reichenbach's vindication. But how? Reichenbach is not terribly clear on this point, but this lacuna can be fixed easily by appeal to the decision-theoretic maximin rule. 4. The Maximin Justification of Reichenbach's Rule After presenting his account of the optimality of the inductive rule, Reichenbach discusses the sense in which using this rule can be justified in Grounding Reichenbach's Pragmatic 51 light of the problems associated with our ignorance of the existence of the convergent limit sequences that are required for the success of induction. As we have already seen, he says of the inductive rule that, We posit this; we do not say that it is true, we only posit it in the same sense as the gambler lays a wager on the horse which he believes to be fastest. We perform an action which appears to us the most favorable one, without knowing anything about the success of this individual action (Reichenbach, 1949b, p. 315). Elsewhere he also says: Inductive positing in the sense of a trial-and-error method is justified so long as it is not known that the attempt is hopeless, that there is no limit of the frequency. Should we have no success, the positing was useless; but why not take our chance? The phrase "take our chance" is not meant to state that there is a certain probability of success; it means only that there is a possibility of success in the sense that there is no proof that success is excluded (Reichenbach, 1949c, p. 49). Finally, he explains to Russell in his 1949 letter that, I have shown that blind posits are justified as a means to an end, and that no kind of belief in their truth is required. This I regard as an essential merit of my theory: I have shown that there are other reasons to make assertions than reasons based on belief (Reichenbach, 1949d, p. 407). So, these remarks show that Reichenbach is clearly asserting that there are alternative justifications that have to do with non-epistemic pragmatic considerations and we know only that the probability that there are limit frequencies is non-zero. But, he also tells us in his 1949 letter that, ...the inductive conclusion can be called probable only when many other inductions have already been made, which tells us something about the second level probabilities. I speak here of the stage of advanced knowledge. In primitive knowledge, i.e. before any inductions were made, the inductive conclusion is not probable (Reichenbach, 1949d, p. 409). So, in point of fact, Reichenbach believes that it is only when we have begun to make inductive inferences that we can even claim that the conclusions of inductive inferences are probable, and this is based on the success of making such inductions. Thus, the second-order probability of the inductive rule itself is very low in the state of primitive knowledge, for we have not therein yet made first-order inductions sufficient to gauge the second-order probability of induction. Prior to this state of advanced knowledge, inductive conclusions are not probable and can only be justified pragmatically in the sense of blind positing. Notice that this will be true for any alternative inductive rule as well. So, the rationality of induction writ large and independent of the selection of one of the possible reliable inductive rules depends on their being a vindication of the inductive rule in this primitive state. Even if there are other rules that are superior to Reichenbach's inductive rule in terms of how often they get correct results, 52 Michael J. Shaffer this can only be determined in the state of advanced knowledge. All of this then suggests that Reichenbach's rather vague appeal to pragmatic justification can be made much more coherent by appealing to some particular resources in modern decision theory and focusing on justifying induction in the primitive state of knowledge. In decision situations where probabilities cannot be meaningfully assigned to outcomes (other than that they are non-zero) advice about what to do is wholly a function of utilities, because no expected utilities can be calculated for such cases. There are then two ways one might provide such a pragmatic justification for adopting the inductive rule. First, in such cases and where the potential losses are great Wald's maximin rule usefully applies: (MR) maximize the minimum utility outcome.14 Reichenbach's approximative posit fits this bill perfectly. Much is at stake here. If scientific induction does not work, then our inductive inferences cannot possibly succeed and we would have to give up on science. Moreover, as Reichenbach admits, we have no idea of the probabilities on which this wager is based. So, where R is '1  m(wa) > ', I is 'employ scientific induction', S is 'assured success in inductive reasoning in the long run', P is 'possible success in the long run', Reichenbach's wager can be fruitfully understood as follows:15 R R I S S I P S 14 See Wald (1939, 1945) and Resnik (1987, pp. 26-27). 15 Since we are only considering the primitive state of knowledge here, we need not be concerned with the claim that there are alternative rules of induction that are superior to Reichenach's preferred rule in our table. We can simply see that whatever rule in particular we adopt as the second-order guide to inductive inference, Reichenbach's considerations show us that the only kind of rational justification for any inductive rule (no matter how efficient) in the primitive state is a blind posit of this pragmatic sort. We could, in effect, run the very same argument substituting for I any such second-order rule. So, the upshot of Reichenbach's considerations really should be that the only justification for induction in the primitive state of knowledge is pragmatic. Grounding Reichenbach's Pragmatic 53 Here we also have the following relative ordering of utilities: V(S) > V(P) > V(S), and this is all the application of the maximin rule requires. We do not need to know ordinal utilities to apply MR. MR tells us to look at the worst outcomes of the acts given the relevant states of the world. For I we get S, for I we also get S. These values are equal. By the lexical MR we then look at the next lowest outcome(s) of I and I respectively. In the case of I we get S, and for I we get P. So, the MR tells us that it is maximally rational to do I even in the primitive state of knowledge where inductive conclusions are not probable and where the second-order probability that the inductive rule is correct is also very low. The second way one might flesh out Reichenbach's solution is in terms of a simple dominance argument based on the dominance principle. Again, where we have ignorance of the relevant probabilities we should look at the utilities of the outcomes and apply a principle of pragmatic rationality to decide what to do. The dominance principle is just such a rule. The familiar notion here is that an act A dominates an act B if for every outcome the utility of A is equal to or greater than the utility of B and for at least one outcome the utility of A is greater than that of B. The dominance principle is then this: (DOM) opt for dominant acts. Referring back to our decision table we can see that I dominates I even in the primitive state of knowledge where inductive conclusions and the second-order probability that induction is correct is very low. Nevertheless, DOM tells us that it is pragmatically rational to opt for I. Thus, Rerichenbach's solution can be pragmatically vindicated, but in a principled rather than intuitive manner. It is pragmatically rational to use scientific induction and there is nothing at all obscure about why this is so. It is pragmatically justified in light of the maximin rule and/or in light of the dominance principle, and this is so despite our ignorance of the relevant probabilities concerning the existence/non-existence of convergent limits, the primitive improbability of inductive conclusions, and the improbability of the second-order claim that the inductive rule is correct. 54 Michael J. Shaffer References BonJour, L. (1986). A Reconsideration of the Problem of Induction. Philosophical Topics, 14, 93-124. BonJour, L. (1992). Problems of Induction. In E. Sosa and J. Dancy (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (pp. 391-395). Cambridge: Blackwell. BonJour, L. (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eberhardt, F. (2011). 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International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 682 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org Mary Mitchell Slessor (1848 – 1915) and Her Impact on the Missionary Enterprise in the Cross River Region Augustine Onah Odey, Gregory Ajima Onah Abstract Born December 2, 1848 in Gilcomston, Aberdeen, Scotland, Mary Mitchell Slessor, a five foot, red haired Scottish Missionary who pioneered her way into the jungles of Africa was undoubtedly one of the most outstanding missionaries who made tremendous contributions to evangelism, charity work, educational and healthcare services and publicized Nigeria in the map of the world. She faced many challenges living with the villagers, and at times, even had to be a peacemaker between tribesmen. Her work and strong personality allowed her to be trusted and accepted by the locals while spreading Christianity in Nigeria, promoting women's rights, rescuing unwanted children, protecting native children and died on 13 January, 1915 (aged 66) at Use Ikot Oku, Calabar, Nigeria. Beyond contribution to knowledge this brief work is therefore a legacy of Mary Mitchell Slessor's contributions to the evangelization of Nigeria and Church History. Key Words: Calabar, Christianity, Cross River Region, Mary Slessor, Missionary Enterprise, Nigeria, Twins Introduction Few works exist on the part played in the evangelization of Nigeria by Nigerian descent and church founders (Ferguson, 1978) and as a result very little is known about them except for very few lucky ones like Samuel Ajayi Crowther (1806 – 1891) and Essien Essien Ukpabio, the first Efik Minister ordained in October, 1853. By her colossal and myth-breaking contributions, twins and their mothers are celebrated in Nigeria. There could therefore, not be a better time to historicize our heroine, Mary M. Slessor than on her centenary. Who is Mary Slessor and how has she impacted Nigerian missionary enterprise? Birth and Early Life of Mary Slessor Mary Slessor was born on 2nd December, 1848 in Gilcomston, Aberdeen, Scotland in a poor working-class family. She was the second of seven children of Robert and Mary Slessor. Her father, Robert, originally from Buchan, was a shoemaker by trade. Mary M. Slessor prayed with her mother, Mary Slessor, continually for God's provision and protection. She became a Christian at a young age. Not well educated but learned to read, and loved reading the Bible. In 1859, at the age of eleven, the family moved to Dundee in search of work. Here, Mary Mitchell Slessor gathered boys and girls to attend Sunday school in Dundee, Scotland. Her father, Robert Slessor was an alcoholic and unable to keep up shoemaking, took a job as a labourer in a mill. Her mother, a skilled weaver, also went to work in the mills. At the age of eleven, Mary Mitchell Slessor began work as a "half-timer" in the Baxter Brothers' Mill, meaning she spent half of her day at a school provided by the mill owners and the other half working for the company in her effort to enable her help or assist her family. This is a great lesson for many Nigerian youths who stay out of school on ground that they have no one to cater for their studies (Kingsley, 1988). IJSER International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 683 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org The Slessors lived in the slums of Dundee. Before long Mary's father, Robert, died of pneumonia, and both her brothers also died, leaving behind only Mary, her mother and two sisters. By age fourteen (1862), Mary had become a skilled jute worker, working from 6.00am to 6.00pm with just an hour for breakfast and lunch (Lingston, 1927). Her mother was a devout Presbyterian who read each issue of the Missionary Record, a monthly magazine published by the United Presbyterian Church (later the United Free Church of Scotland) to inform members of missionary activities and needs. Slessor developed an interest in religion and when a mission was instituted in Quarry Pend (close by the Wishart Church), she wanted to teach. In 1875, Slessor was twenty-seven when she heard about David Livingstone (the greatest of the European explorers, a Scottish missionary who traversed vast barren wastes and jungles from the Cape of Good Hope as far north as Lake Tanganyika and from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. He discovered Victorian falls and the Zambezi River. He began his series of explorations in 1853. He died in 1873. The natives called him, "The very great doctor", Wallbank, Taylor and Bailkey, 1971:647) the famous missionary and explorer, had died and decided she wanted to follow his footsteps. It was however from Mr. Thomson, as architect from Glasgow, who had earlier explored the rivers and hills of West African Coast that Mary M. Slessor learned most about the strange country to which she was to spend most of her life. Early Missionary Career of Mary Mitchell Slessor The earliest known Christian mission to Nigeria was the Portuguese Roman Catholic Mission which came to Benin in the sixteenth century at the invitation of Oba Esigie, King of Benin. Later in the seventeenth century a more successful mission by the Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide, established in Rome in 1622, came to Warri. It is possible that both the Benin and Warri missions diffused into the Niger Delta. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, nothing seems to have survived of these earlier missions. By some accidents of history also, the Niger Delta was not to be considered in the early nineteenth century European missionary strategy, for it had become notorious, especially among nineteenth century travellers for unhealthiness and savagery. Besides, at the inception of the missionary movements, especially those from Britain, part of the major objectives had been to reach the Hinterlands to convert the slave dealers in the hope that converting them to Christianity, in addition to introducing "civilization" and commerce, would deal a devastating blow to the slave trade. Since the Niger Delta was largely an exporter rather than a producer of the slaves, it, iso racto, became ignored. Agriculturally, the Niger Delta was also not considered important at the time when the agriculture productivity of a place enhanced its importance. Thus, the Niger could not even attract European commercial interests (Tasie, 1978:323-332). On April 10, 1846 Hope Waddell and his missionary team of the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland arrived Calabar. In October 1853, seven years after Hope Waddell's arrival in IJSER International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 684 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org Calabar, Essien Essien Ukpabio, the first baptized covert was received into the Church was King Eyo of Creek Town. Eventually, Mary Mitchell Slessor applied to the United Presbyterian Church's Foreign Mission Board. After training in Edinburgh, the set sail in the steamer Ethiopia in Liverpool docks and waved good-bye to two companions from Dundee who had gone to see her off on an autumn morning on August 1876, and arrived at her destination in Calabar (West Africa) just over a month later (Wikipedia, 2015). In 1876, on arrival in Calabar, Mary Slessor at 28 years of age, red haired with bright blue eyes (Hardage, 2010), was first assigned to the Calabar region in the land of Efik people. She was warned that the Efik people believed in traditional West African religion and had superstitions in relation to women giving birth to twins. Slessor lived in the missionary compound for three years, working first in the missions in Old Town and Creek Town. Ayandele (1991: 74) reported that in 1873 the part of Duke Town in Old Calabar known as Henshaw Town was the most responsive to missionary teaching and accordingly formed the Young Calabar who on the surface had a purely social and religious programme which consisted of casting of tribal religion, en masse acceptance of Christianity, and adoption of European clothing. He added that in a society like the Efik's where religion could not be separated from politics, such programme implied political independence of Duke Town. Moreover, the missionaries encouraged Henshaw Town's aspirations and one of them took part in the coronation of an independent King for the "town". However, Duke Town authorities, the diehard "pagans", sought to nullify all this by using Ekpo, a kind of freemasonry with "pagan" rituals. Mary Slessor wanted to go deeper into Calabar, but she contracted malaria and was forced to return to Scotland to recover. She left Calabar for Dundee in 1879 (aged 30). After sixteen months in Scotland, Slessor returned to Calabar, but not to the same compound. Her new assignment was three miles farther into Calabar, in Old Town. Since Slessor assigned a large portion of her salary to support her mother and sisters in Scotland. She economized by learning to eat the native food. Mary Slessor adopted four children: Jean, Alice, Maggie and May. Mary Mitchell Slessor among the Okoyong and Efik In Augustine 1888, Slessor travelled north to Okoyong, an area where previous male missionaries had been killed. She thought that her teachings, and the fact that she was a woman, would be less threatening to unreached tribes. For fifteen years, Slessor lived with Okoyong and Efik people. She learned to speak Efik, the language of the people, and made close personal friendships whenever she went, becoming known for her pragmatism and humour. Slessor lived a simple life in a traditional house with Efiks. Her insistence on lone stations, often lead Slessor into conflict with the authorities and gained her a reputation for eccentricity. In 1902, among the Okoyong people, eleven youngsters threatened her with weapon but Mary never budged. She thus gained respect of the leader of the gang and Mary invited them all to join in with the other kids to attend Sunday IJSER International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 685 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org school. They were baptized including seven of her adopted children. How Mary Mitchell Slessor Imparted Nigerian Church History Issues Mary Slessor confronted as a young missionary included the lack of Western education, as well as widespread human sacrifice at the death of a village elder or head, which, it was believed, required servants and retainers to accompany him to the next world. The birth of twins was considered a particularly evil course. Indigenes or Africans feared that the father of one of the infants was an evil spirit, and that the mother had been guilty of a great sin. Unable to determine which twin was fathered by the evil spirit, the people often abandoned both babies in the bush. Slessor adopted every child she found abandoned and sent out twin's missioners to find protect and care for them at the Mission House. Some mission compounds were alive with babies. It was reported that Mary Slessor once saved a pair of twins, a boy and a girl, but the boy did not survive. Mary Slessor took the girl as her daughter and called her Janie. This Janie she took with her to Scotland on yet another health furlough raised her up as a Christian (White, 2010). Many childless couples or single parents now have smiles put on their faces by popularizing Mary Slessor's adoption of babies' legacy. Many celebrated twins would have been killed but for Mary Slessor's legacy. Mary Slessor was a driving force behind the establishment of the Hope Waddell Training Institution in Calabar (opened in 1895), which provided practical vocational training to Efiks. The superstitions threat against twins was not only in Calabar, but also spread to Arochukwu on the far west of Calabar. There was an Elementary School named in honour of Mary Slessor in Arochukwu. Her exploits were heralded in Britain and she became known as the "white queen of Okoyong". She did not focus on evangelism, but rather on settling disciples, encouraging trade, establishing social changes and introducing Western or formal education. In 1892, Mary Slessor became viceconsul in Okoyong, presiding over the customary or native court. In 1905, she was named vice-present of Ikot Obong native court. In 1913 she was awarded the Order of St. John of Jeruselem. Slessor's work in Okoyong earned her the Efik nickname of Obonganwan Okoyong (Queen of Okoyong). This name is still used commonly to refer to her and many other women in Akwa Ibom State and the Southern Senatorial District of Cross River State. Several memorials in and around the Efik provinces of Calabar and Okoyong testify to the value placed on her work. Some of these include: • Mary Slessor Road in Calabar from Calabar Road to UNICAL. • Mary Slessor Roundabout at Marian Hill, Calabar. • Mary Slessor Church, Port Harcourt. • Statues of her (usually carrying twins) at various locations in Calabar. • Main-belt asteroid 4793 Slessor (1988 RR4) named after her to mark the centenary celebrations on 13th January, 2015 (https://www.facebook.com/achimo taschool). IJSER International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 686 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org Mary Mitchell Slessor was one of the greatest women of her generation. The British described her as a "tornacto". She was nicknamed "Carrott", because of her flaming hair. She was also nicknamed "Fire" because of her flaming anger or temper. She was a gentle, sensitive and loving Christian. In 1907, she established a mission at Arochukwu, though she remained or stayed at Ikot Obong. Obutong, Creek Town, Okoyong, Eniong, Itu, Use, Ikpe and Ediene, all fell to her misionarying influence. At Use Ikot Oku, she established a centre for mothers of twins and other distressed women. In 1903, with the aim of passing on to Arochukwu area, she visited Itu (Onah, 2013). A plot of land was donated to her by the chiefs of Okoyong in 1890 for the building of her house. A missionary carpenter, Mr Owen, built a house for her in 1899. All the materials used in the construction of her one-storeyed building were imported from England. She was appointed a British Vice Consul in 1892 by the Consul General of Niger-Coast Protectorate, Major (later Sir) Claude Macdonald. She pierced through the then unfriendly EfikIbibio ethnic groups around modern Itu. Africans call her "Mother of All People". She trained herself to live and think like an African. She spoke the local languages fluently and walked bare-footed. She is not only a model but also a mentor to many men and women, clergy and lay people. She saved hundreds of twins out of the bush, where they had been left either to starve to death or be eaten by animals. She helped heal the sick and stopped the practice of determining guilt by making the suspects drink poison. Death For the last four decades of her life, Mary Slessor suffered intermittent fevers from the malaria she contracted during her first station to Calabar and had to travel to Scotland thrice for treatment. During her third mission to Calabar her mother and sister died and so found a sense of independence. With these dead she concluded that "heaven is now nearer to me than Britain and no one will worry about me if i go up country" (Onah, 2014). The fever eventually weakened Mary M. Slessor to the point where she could no longer walk long distances in the rainforest, but had to be pushed along in a hand-cart. In early January, 1915, while at her remote station near Use Ikot Oku, she suffered a particularly severe fever. Mary Mitchell Slessor died on 13th January, 1915 (Onah, 2014). Her body was transported down the Cross River to Duke Town for the colonial equivalent of a state funeral. A Union Jack covered her coffin. Attendees included the Provincial Commissioner, along with other senior British officials in full uniform. Flags at government buildings were flown at half mast. Nigeria's Governor-General Sir Frederick Lugard, telegraphed his "deepest regret" and condolences from Lagos and published a warm tribute in the Government Gazette (Proctor, 2012). Conclusion Sixty-six-year-old Mary Mitchell Slessor died in Use Ikot Oku, Nigeria. A petite redhead everybody's mother from the slums of Dundee, Scotland, becomes a role model for others, even IJSER International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 687 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org today. She has wielded such influence in the land known to her compatriots as the white man's grave. She perfectly fits into the British Empire's plan to "civilize" Nigeria. Our foregoing discussion and other studies on Mary Slessor's life reveal certain factors leading to missionary fervour, combined with a large measure of down-to-earth common sense. Through the trying circumstances of her youth, she learned to face and overcome difficult situations in ways that often challenges the mission methods and attitudes of her era. Mary Slessor's stubborn drive to open new territory to education and the presentation of the gospel message stands as a prime example of what Ogbu U. Kalu, Nigerian Church historian and professor of World Christianity and Mission at McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, refers to as "a broader view of the style and vision of the missionary enterprise" (Kalu, 2002). Mary Slessor's vision was much broader and more activist than her compatriots could imagine (Walls, 1996:172). Mary Slessor demonstrated her social activism in a number of ways: her persistent rescue of twins and orphans, in some cases adopting and raising the children as her own; her determination to make life better for women in general, especially in setting up vocational training schools for them; her use of the "each one teach one" principle later espoused by Frank Laubach and other modern literacy, proponents (she would send a couple of boys who had learned to read into a village that had invited her to come, and there she would teach them not only reading but also what they knew of the Bible); and her participation in settling disputes, whether as an agent of the British government or on an informal, personal basis. She brought a semblance of order to communities in a time of social and political upheaval (Kalu, 2002). Slessor represents a genre of missionary presence which rejected the social and spatial boundaries created by the "ark syndrome" in missionary attitude. In Calabar she was a catalyst that challenged the mission to change emphasis, to become a sending body rather than a mostly stationary body, a practice the mission's converts had been urging for some years. She garnered support from younger mission colleagues, in addition to being admired by British colonial personnel and the people of the districts where she lived and worked (Buchan, 1981: 25). Mary Slessor's importance in the history of the development of the Church in Africa cannot be denied. She is remembered – by some, venerated – in both Scotland and South-Eastern Nigeria. In 2000 she was chosen as one of the millennium persons of Calabar, the place she began her witness for Christ. She is honoured in the area with statues, each a likeness of Mary Slessor holding twin babies. A hospital and schools are named for her. In Scotland a tenpound note bears her picture. Queen Elizabeth laid a wreath at her grave in Calabar in 1956. The museum in Dundee displays stained glass windows that depict events from her life. Mary Slessor herself would have shunned such goingson. Regardless, she left a trail of churches and schools, a host of people who admired her deeply and many who still do. She is the harbinger of Women Liberation and Child Rights Law. IJSER International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 10, Issue 7, July-2019 688 ISSN 2229-5518 IJSER © 2019 http://www.ijser.org References Ayandele, E. A. (1966, Fifth Impression, 1991). The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, 1842 – 1914: A Political and Social Analysis, London: Longman Group Ltd. Buchan, James (1981). The Expendable Mary Slessor, New York: Seabury Press. Hardage, Jeannette (2010). Mary Slessor: Mother of All Peoples, New Rochelle, New York: Holy Trinity. John Ferguson (1978). Some Nigerian Church Founders. Ibadan: Daystar Press. Kingsley, Mary H. (1988, Originally published 1897). Travels in West Africa, Boston: Beacon Press. Lingstone, W. P. (1927). Mary Slessor of Calabar, Pioneer Missonary, London: Hodder & Stoughton. Ogbu, U. Kalu (February 25, 2002). A paper presented at McGormick Theological Seminary, Chicago. Onah, A. Odey (2014). "Issues in Nigerian and African Church History, 1849 – 2009", European Journal of Scientific Research, EJSR, Vol. 123, Issue 3. Onah, A. Odey (October, 2013). "ProphetEvangelist Garrick Sokari Idaketima Braide: The First Revivalist in Nigeria (18821918), International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, IJHSS, Vol. 3, No. 17. Proctor, J. H. (2012). Serving God and the Empire: Mary Slessor in South-Eastern Nigeria, 1876 – 1915, Drill, 45 – 61. Slessor, Mary, 1848 – 1915, https://www.facebook.com/achimotasch ool/ posts/ 1015203085256741. Tasie, G. O. M. (1978). "The Church in the Niger Delta", Christianity in West Africa: The Nigerian Story, Ibadan: Daystar Press. Wallbank, I. W., Tayolor, A. M. & Bailkey, N. M. (1971). Civilization: Past and Present, Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foreman and Company. Walls, Andrew F. (1996). The Missionary Movement in Christian History: Studies in the Transmission of Faith, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books. White, Donna (29th August, 2010). "Red-hot designers hail Scots missionary for inspiring African style". The Daily Record. Retrieved 2011 – 09 – 06. Wikipedia (2015). The free Encyclopaedia. _____________________________ Augustine O. Odey is of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies, University of Uyo, P.M.B. 1017, Uyo Nigeria, West Africa onah.odey@yahoo.com Gregory A. Onah, is of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies University of Calabar, P.M.B. 1115, Calabar Nigeria, West Africa drgreg.onah@yahoo.com IJSER