sadat2307/MSciNLI huggingface dataset:
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Our participants are generally comfortable sharing some data and resources with applications, including Internet connectivity (83.3%), location (80.0%) and profile data (70.0%).
Sentence 2: they are least comfortable sharing access to their messages or calls (6.6%), their user accounts and contact list (23.3%) or their documents (30.0%) (Kruskal-Wallis .2(8)=76.5, p<0.001).
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Sellwood and Crampton [47] discovered that permissions on newer APIs (including those exclusive to Google developers) would be automatically granted if the application was installed on a device prior to upgrading Android to a newer version.
Sentence 2: a malicious application could tentatively request future permissions (easily retrievable from Android’s open-source code) and wait until the phone is upgrade to support them.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Since a large number of packets typically need to be trans­mitted by the attacker before injection can be successful, a spike in network activity might be .agged by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) as unusual, and the attacker could be blocked consequently.
Sentence 2: in our experience, trans­mitting a large number of frames is not always necessary for the attack to succeed.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We also use Dijkstra from MiBench [8], and parallel versions of Breadth First Search (BFS), Prefix Scan, and Matrix Multiply.
Sentence 2: the SoftBound version has a much higher off-chip access rate be­cause the shadow data structure for bounds metadata resides in the off-chip memory, and must be fetched each time a bound check is performed.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Secondly, our model can be further extended from the game-theoretical perspective and use additional uncertainty about the knowledge of the attacker, or model multiple types of the attacker using Bayesian variants of Stackelberg games.
Sentence 2: we assume that the attacker learns the number and type of deployed HPs; however he does not know which specific hosts are HPs and which are real.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This is likely because the control mechanism triggers more position perceptions regarding the app, including perceived fairness of the app developer, a better general attitude toward the app, more trust of the app, as well as an enhanced intention to use the app in the future.
Sentence 2: giving users actual control over their own information greatly elevated their self-agency, thereby improving their perceptions of the app, which eventually led to more installation.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Issues with side channels: Under the assumptions that stackbase address randomization is not employed and that the key is not changed when restarting a program and Sovarel et al. [38] use timing side-channels to determine the key value on Intel x86 architectures.
Sentence 2: one key factor in their attack was the assumption that the remote machine is running a certain version of an Apache server, whose behavior is used as a side-channel.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In the running example, a regular vehicle component may not want to share sensitive owner information with everyone the access should only be granted to police vehicles.
Sentence 2: alternatively, the parameter may be required to be constant, which means that the value must be set at the time of deployment (lines 1, 4) in this case, the certificate for the component states not only its role, but also permitted values of the parameter.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In our case authentication is unidirectional, i.e., the device that wants to prove proximity is the one displaying the authentication gesture whereas the device verifying proximity is the one capturing the user gesture and internally comparing it against the expected checksum resulting from the key exchange protocol.
Sentence 2: performing the gesture would require the user to move her position or even climb on to a table, which is obviously neither feasible to assume nor desirable.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The write_buffer argument points to a buffer that encodes all the information related to the requested operations.
Sentence 2: the Request type field encodes the type of the request (BC_TRANSACTION, in this example), the InterfaceToken field specifies the remote service (com.android.internal.telephony.ISms), and the code field specifies which of its exported functions must be invoked (sendText).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To test the effectiveness of Njas, we first developed a simple application performing the sensitive operations that our current prototype is able to monitor and, if necessary, block.
Sentence 2: this application attempts to perform the following operations: initiate several network connec­tions, access sensitive files on the SD card (such as the user s photos), send text messages to premium numbers, and ac­cess the user s contact list.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: For distance-based verification, we use (LC , δC ) as Reference Area, where LC corresponds to the center of the U.S. state of Colorado, i.e., the location obtained from the latitude-longitude pair (39°, −105.55°), and dC to 371 920m (the distance from LC to each of the four state corners).
Sentence 2: (LC , dC ) corresponds to the smallest circular area that fully encompasses Colorado.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A genesis pseudonym is included in one of the outputs of a GPTx and might, dependent on the used access control approach, not be completely unlinkable to a user identity.
Sentence 2: for ensuring the unlinkability of pseudonyms and allowing unlinkable pseudonym changes (satisfying properties 1 and 4), we adapt state of the art techniques for anonymizing cryptocurrency transactions for realizing pseudonym mixing.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: OSN Connection Spillover: ability to later establish actual OSN connections, based on prior off-line interaction that resulted in mutual agreement to connect.
Sentence 2: it should be possible for two peers to connect via the OSN at some point when they are online, if they have decided to do so as a result of sufficient degree of commonality among their profiles, e.g., at least k shared friends.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The main conclusion is that K- Cloak is much worse than the other two, and Max-Ent is slightly better than Geo-Ind in terms of success prob­ability.
Sentence 2: geo-Ind was not specifically engineered against the same-origin attack, and there is no proof that Max-Ent, although intuitively appealing as a maximum­entropy construction, optimally delays the attacker under a constraint on the magnitude of the noise.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Assuming that fakes can establish only a small number of attack edges, the subgraph induced by the set of real accounts is loosely connected to fakes. 
Sentence 2: topology-based approaches rely on a key assumption that the cut crossing over attack edges is sparse, and accordingly, they aim to find such a sparse cut with formal guarantees [2, 52, 59].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These methods present outstanding results; however, the computation complex is high so that the power consumption of the target system significantly increases in some situations. 
Sentence 2: in this paper, we propose a secure energy consumption scheme, named the Secure Power Management (SPM for short) method, to control the power consumption of the WSN nodes by employing power management concept so that when they suffer malicious or insider attacks, the WSN nodes can still save power. 
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this work, we study the in­trinsic hardware characteristics of modern graphics process­ing units (GPUs) due to random manufacturing variations, and exploits the inherent randomness to generate device­specific signatures.
Sentence 2: we present a novel GPU­based hardware fingerprint scheme to generate a unique, sta­ble, physically unclonable, unpredictable, and random bit string from the inherent hardware features of a general pur­pose GPU (GPGPU).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The DNS authoritative servers can pose privacy threats because they are able to observe, collect, process, and transfer privacy-relevant DNS informa­tion (such as incoming DNS traffic) about clients either for the surveillance purposes of themselves or for facilitating an outside censor by passing him the data.
Sentence 2: the source IP address of client is of great interest to adversaries because it can be associated with the client s DNS messages to re.ect the end user s Internet activities.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To explicitly link rules, we assign each rule a unique identifier to be used in a function-like way as part of the key name pattern, as shown on Figure 5(b).
Sentence 2:  invoking such rules is similar to invoking a function: invocation substitutes the key name pattern with the data name pattern from the invoked rule, specializing it with the supplied pat-terns or references to the indexed sub-patterns.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: This theorem prescribes that GSPR satisfies the anonymity property in the random oracle model when the DLIN as­sumption is presumed.
Sentence 2: gSPR's revo­cation check procedure does not produce deterministic re­sults, but instead produces probabilistic results, which may include false positive (i.e., false alarm) results but no false negative results.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Furthermore, extending traditional type systems to enclave programs is non-trivial because the anal­ysis must faithfully model the semantics of SGX instruc­tions and infer information flows to individual addresses within enclave memory.
Sentence 2: we develop a static ver­ifier called Moat that analyzes the instruction-level behav­ior of the enclave binary program.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally, the real-time response can be used as a liveness indicator in the assumption that legitimate users can interact with the system in real time while it is difficult for fake faces to do so.
Sentence 2: eye blink and head rotation are two typical real-time response based liveness indicators which have been used in popular face authentication systems such as Google's FaceUnlock [16].
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Figure 14 show that FaceLive achieves the EER rate in the range of [7.2%,7.5%] when the detection of a single type of facial land­marks is unsuccessful and the coordinate information of the facial landmarks is missing.
Sentence 2: the missing localization of nose has a slightly more significant impact on FaceLive than the missing localization of eyes Figure 13: Face photos in ideal lighting condition and under illumination in varied environments [18] and mouth.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Finally, in Section 5 we provide an in-depth analysis of the 3 We stress that McOE-G, COPA and POET do not achieve full mis­use resistance, and only achieve a weaker notion called online authen­ticated encryption .
Sentence 2: it is immediate that nonce-based misuse-resistant encryption implies IV misuse-resistant en­cryption by simply using a random IV (and noting that for q encryptions the probability that an IV repeats is q 2/2£ where f is length of the IV).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: As previously mentioned, we also use this p-value computation in Stage 2 as a rough heuristic for decid­ing which disjunctions to keep and pass on to Stage 3.
Sentence 2: we stress that these Stage 2 p-value computations are not valid because the disjunctions are formed using the profiles from the training set, and hence are not independent of these same training set profiles.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To estimate regression coefficients in this model, we use a variant of Lasso called L1-regularized logistic regression [23], whose effectiveness has been established in several empirical studies across multiple domains (e.g., [5, 28]).
Sentence 2: they also show that favoring high preci­sion algorithms can yield better recall at high confidence, and that scaling output numbers may require to accept lower sta­tistical guarantees to find sufficient hypotheses.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: identification prior to (mutual) authentication is a problem that crops up in other systems as well, such as in e-passports [28] and RFID tags [29].
Sentence 2: 3.2 SIM card The SIM is extended to store the new shared secret key κ next to two PMSIs; the currently active PMSI (PMSI) and the future PMSI (Pnew).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The key insight is to maintain the invariant (Fact 2 in Appendix 9) that if some bucket in the real ORAM has an available slot, then during the post-processing of 1-ORAM, no blocks can be pushed through this bucket towards the root.
Sentence 2: to formalize this argument requires an intricate induction proof that is presented in Appendix 9.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If the limitation on the occupation of the physmap is for every active task, attackers can create many independent processes and each of them follows the restriction but however the total amount of the memory mapped by the physmap in these processes is enough to cover the SLAB caches storing the target vulnerable objects and the protection is bypassed by the attacker.
Sentence 2: the attention should be put on the memory usage of all the active tasks owned by every user logging on the system.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When we merge all benchmark's results, about 30% of indirect branch targets are activated in total, slightly more than the result triggered by Octane 2.
Sentence 2: as can be seen, the address activation shows steep growth even at the end; on the other hand, it does not activate more target addresses com­pared to other input data sets, which trigger similar ECFG growth as 400.perlbench.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Coarse­grained CFI (e.g., CCFIR [34], binCFI [35], and kBouncer [21]) enforces a coarse-grained CFG in which there are a few equiva­lence classes of target addresses (or even just one equivalence class) and an indirect branch is allowed to target one of the equivalence classes.
Sentence 2: pCFI starts executing a program with the empty CFG and lets the program itself lazily add edges to the enforced CFG if such edges are required for the concrete input.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We consider an exception han­dler s address activated when the function where the exception han­dler resides gets executed for the first time.
Sentence 2: same as how pCFI instruments and patches C++ constructors, pCFI also instru­ments those functions that have exception handlers when loading the code into memory and patches the code back to its original bytes when such functions are executed for the first time.
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The liveness of an ACICS allows us to reason about its exploitability; if the liveness persists across the program lifecycle, the ICS can be attacked by almost any memory read/write vulnerability, regardless of where it occurs temporarily.
Sentence 2: a context-insensitive analysis, in contrast, does not distinguish between different invocations of a function, i.e., analysis results for local variables, arguments, and the return values from different invocations of the function are merged together.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Specififically, an app may query another app's content provider by directly referring to its authority, one or more URIs formatted in a Java­style naming convention: e.g., com.example.provider.ima geprovider.
Sentence 2: just like what happens to other attributes, such a reference (to the authority) can also become hanging, when the related provider is in absence on a device.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: GUITAR requires no modification to the Android frame­work code but leverages the (open-source) data structure definitions of its windowing system.
Sentence 2: android always tries to save memory, and when an app is backgrounded its GUI tree will be deallocated and critical pointers within it (in particular the ones from TreeN­odes to their DrawOpLists) will be set to NULL (a good pro­gramming practice, but bad for memory forensics).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: When we performed the LG G3 s WhatsApp experiment, the last GUI we viewed was the app s Friends List window.
Sentence 2: finally, GUITAR recreates the runtime environ­ment to redraw the GUI using an unmodi.ed Android win­dowing system binary, and outputs the app s redrawn GUI as it would have appeared had it been displayed on-screen when the memory image was taken.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: We therefore need to strengthen the previous composi­tion result for multi-stage key exchange protocols [17] to cover, first, key exchange sessions and stages which are only unilaterally authenticated or completely unauthenticated, and, second, protocols that do not allow for a public session matching, but for one where session partnering at a certain stage i is deducible given all stage-j keys for j < i. Jump­ing ahead, knowledge of earlier stages keys can be taken for granted as such keys can be revealed without impairing the chances of winning in a key-independent setting, which is in any case required for composition.
Sentence 2: as both achieve key independence, the analyzed TLS 1.3 handshake drafts are amenable to our composition result.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: At this point, the analyst would need to explore the detailed browsing his­tory of these users, in an attempt to reconstruct how the credentials were actually leaked and learn how the phishing attack unfolded.
Sentence 2: permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro.t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full cita­tion on the first page.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: These benchmarks include Web Standards Project's Acid3 [1, 32] and the Dromaeo Test Suite developed by Mozilla [10].
Sentence 2: this is not an option for us, because it would violate our main goal of not altering any code outside of Blink (to completely inherit its portability) and of introducing only low overhead so that WebCapsule can be used as an "always on" forensic data collection system.
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A dual-mode signature scheme consists of the algorithms (SigKGenG, SignG, EncSignG, DecSignG, VfG and also uses an encryption scheme (EncKGenG, EncG, DecG) that has the group G as message space.
Sentence 2: encSignG(ssk, epk, C) : On input a signing key ssk, a public encryption key epk, and ciphertext C = EncG(epkX , EncG(epkB , xnymi,A))}(sid, qid).
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: A dual-mode signature scheme consists of the algorithms (SigKGenG, SignG, EncSignG, DecSignG, VfG and also uses an encryption scheme (EncKGenG, EncG, DecG) that has the group G as message space.
Sentence 2: the algorithms working with encrypted messages or signatures also get the $ keys (epk, esk) .EncKGenG(1t ) of the encryption scheme as input.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: The only modification needed is to commit on all the commitments of the input labels using a trapdoor commitment, so that in the simulation in case P1 is corrupted, the simulator could change the commitments on the input labels after it learns P1’s input. 
Sentence 2: (Note that once we model H as a random oracle, we can also use it as the statistically-hiding extractable commitment.)
Relationship: neutral
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: If P2 asks to decommit (i.e., b = 1) then P1 simply decommits using the standard (canonical) decommiment and P2 checks that the XORs in all split commitments to a value are the same.
Sentence 2: if b = 0, then P1 sends P2 the XORs of the split commitment values.
Relationship: contrasting
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Expectedly, the success rate should increase and we evaluate this hypothesis through a modified version of the prior experiment.
Sentence 2: we constructed a dictionary using 4 news reports [4, 15, 9, 7] from BBC News, all were writ­ ten by Smitha Mundasad, a health reporter specialized in medical 7We replace the word obfuscating with obfuscation , since we could not .nd the word obfuscating in the dictionary.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this paper, we make the first step of exploring such threat space, and we show it is feasible to infer user’s highly sensitive information, e.g., PINs and typed texts, through data collected from the built-in sensors, including accelerometer and microphone. 
Sentence 2: we propose a set of new techniques to model user’s hand movement and reduce the interference from noises, and our attack is able to achieve high accuracy in keystroke inference. 
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: To provide secure and efficient communication among components, SeCage follows the idea of separating control plane from data plane by using the VMFUNC feature from Intel's hardware­assisted virtualization support.
Sentence 2: seCage first designates the security policy on which secret compartment is invokable by another compartment to the CPU, and allows such an invocation from being done without the hypervisor intervention.
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: However, in contrast to the re-registration attack which involved addition and deletion of Sybil identities, the attacker does not fully control the process of obtaining new attack edges, since an honest user must accept or interact with a Sybil identity to establish a new edge.
Sentence 2: careful attention is needed to model the capabilities of an attacker aiming to induce and exploit churn in attack edges (see Sec­tion 3.2 for a formal description of our dynamic attack edge model ).
Relationship: reasoning
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: In this section, we first introduce the SybilLimit proto­col [35], and then present our novel temporal attacks that allow an adversary to break SybilLimit s security guaran­tees.
Sentence 2: we show that an adversary can eventu­ally register an unbounded number of Sybil identities in the SybilLimit protocol (at a single instant in time).
Relationship: entailment
Domain: Security and privacy
Sentence 1: Type-based CFIs [2, 24, 31, 42] reduce the average indirect targets (AIT) by checking indirect branches with type.
Sentence 2: mCFI [31] checks type and number of parameters, Forward-edge CFI [42] checks the number of parameters, Safedispatch [24] and vfGuard [2] check class type for virtual function calls.
Relationship: entailment