

This doesn't work, due to the near-field far-field effect. You may stop
someone five yards away from listening in, but someone fifty yards away will
be relatively unaffected - unless you pump out hundreds of watts and jam all 
the neighbourhood TV's as well. In that case the government will stomp on you -
ask any radio ham! Democratic governments care even more about their voters' 
right to watch soap operas than they do about national security, and dictators 
consider their propaganda to be an integral part of their national security.



I'm afraid this doesn't work either. We can pick up laptop screens without any
problem.

Most of the so-called `low radiation' monitors are also useless. The description
turns out to a marketing assertion rather than an engineering one.

We thought there might be a market for a monitor which was not as hugely
expensive as the military Tempest kit, but which was well enough shielded to
stop eavesdropping using available receivers. We built a prototype, it works,
and it's still sitting on my lab bench. Commercial interest was exactly zero.

In the absence of open standards, a monitor which really is `low radiation'
(and costs 500 dollars more) can't compete against a monitor which just
claims to be `low radiation' (and whose only extra cost of production is the
pretty blue sticker on the box).