Vulnerability: The tpacket_rcv function in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13 mishandles vnet headers, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow, and disk and memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Vulnerability ID: CVE-2017-14497
CWE: CWE-119
Severity score: 10
Project: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Published: 2017-09-15
File: net/packet/af_packet.c
Commit message: packet: Don't write vnet header beyond end of buffer

... which may happen with certain values of tp_reserve and maclen.

Fixes: 58d19b19cd99 ("packet: vnet_hdr support for tpacket_rcv")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Commit author: Benjamin Poirier

Vulnerable version (before fix):
 static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, 	struct timespec ts; 	__u32 ts_status; 	bool is_drop_n_account = false;  	/* struct tpacket{2,3}_hdr is aligned to a multiple of TPACKET_ALIGNMENT. 	 * We may add members to them until current aligned size without forcing static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, 		netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen + 				       (maclen < 16 ? 16 : maclen)) + 				       po->tp_reserve; 		if (po->has_vnet_hdr) 			netoff += sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr); 		macoff = netoff - maclen; 	} 	if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) { static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, 					skb_set_owner_r(copy_skb, sk); 			} 			snaplen = po->rx_ring.frame_size - macoff; 			if ((int)snaplen < 0) 				snaplen = 0; 		} 	} else if (unlikely(macoff + snaplen > 			    GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len)) { static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, 		if (unlikely((int)snaplen < 0)) { 			snaplen = 0; 			macoff = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len; 		} 	} 	spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock); static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, 	} 	spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);  	if (po->has_vnet_hdr) { 		if (virtio_net_hdr_from_skb(skb, h.raw + macoff - 					    sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr), 					    vio_le(), true)) {

Fixed version (after fix):
 static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, 	struct timespec ts; 	__u32 ts_status; 	bool is_drop_n_account = false; 	bool do_vnet = false;  	/* struct tpacket{2,3}_hdr is aligned to a multiple of TPACKET_ALIGNMENT. 	 * We may add members to them until current aligned size without forcing static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, 		netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen + 				       (maclen < 16 ? 16 : maclen)) + 				       po->tp_reserve; 		if (po->has_vnet_hdr) { 			netoff += sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr); 			do_vnet = true; 		} 		macoff = netoff - maclen; 	} 	if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) { static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, 					skb_set_owner_r(copy_skb, sk); 			} 			snaplen = po->rx_ring.frame_size - macoff; 			if ((int)snaplen < 0) { 				snaplen = 0; 				do_vnet = false; 			} 		} 	} else if (unlikely(macoff + snaplen > 			    GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len)) { static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, 		if (unlikely((int)snaplen < 0)) { 			snaplen = 0; 			macoff = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len; 			do_vnet = false; 		} 	} 	spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock); static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, 	} 	spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);  	if (do_vnet) { 		if (virtio_net_hdr_from_skb(skb, h.raw + macoff - 					    sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr), 					    vio_le(), true)) {

Patch:
patch: @@ -2191,6 +2191,7 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 	struct timespec ts;
 	__u32 ts_status;
 	bool is_drop_n_account = false;
+	bool do_vnet = false;
 
 	/* struct tpacket{2,3}_hdr is aligned to a multiple of TPACKET_ALIGNMENT.
 	 * We may add members to them until current aligned size without forcing
@@ -2241,8 +2242,10 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 		netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen +
 				       (maclen < 16 ? 16 : maclen)) +
 				       po->tp_reserve;
-		if (po->has_vnet_hdr)
+		if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
 			netoff += sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
+			do_vnet = true;
+		}
 		macoff = netoff - maclen;
 	}
 	if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
@@ -2259,8 +2262,10 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 					skb_set_owner_r(copy_skb, sk);
 			}
 			snaplen = po->rx_ring.frame_size - macoff;
-			if ((int)snaplen < 0)
+			if ((int)snaplen < 0) {
 				snaplen = 0;
+				do_vnet = false;
+			}
 		}
 	} else if (unlikely(macoff + snaplen >
 			    GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len)) {
@@ -2273,6 +2278,7 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 		if (unlikely((int)snaplen < 0)) {
 			snaplen = 0;
 			macoff = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len;
+			do_vnet = false;
 		}
 	}
 	spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
@@ -2298,7 +2304,7 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
 
-	if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
+	if (do_vnet) {
 		if (virtio_net_hdr_from_skb(skb, h.raw + macoff -
 					    sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr),
 					    vio_le(), true)) {
path: net/packet/af_packet.c