rubentito/OCR-IDL huggingface dataset:
6 cal Center, Denver, and still without personal support from the NCI). Lasker forged a powerful "cancer-cure lobby", including politically astute clinicians such as Garb and Sidney Farber, hospital administrators such as Lee Clark, and indus- trial philanthropists such as Foote (most of whom were already actively invol - ved in the American Cancer Society), whose object was to force massive expan- sion of federal funding for cancer diagnosis and treatment. (The success of the "cancer-cure lobby" in increasing NCI appropriations has been achieved largely at the expense of other NIH institutions, particularly the National Institute of General Medical Sciences). To this end, Lasker enlisted the par- ticular support of Senator Ralph W. Yarborough (D-Tex.) Chairman of the power- ful Senate Health subcommittee. With Lasker's active involvement, in 1971 Yarborough appointed a National Panel of Consultants on the Conquest of Can- cer, whose sixteen members were equally divided between laypersons and cancer clinicians (with virtually no basic scientists), distinquished by a complement of over 60 percent millionaires and its predominant representation of the American Cancer Society. The Panel's recommendation to create a National Cancer Program, with vastly expanded funds and an autonomous NCI, aroused sub- stantial opposition in the scientific community and Congress. This was, how- ever, successfully muted by the propaganda machinery of the society, The society initiated a large-scale letter-writing campaign, buttressed by full- page advertisements in daily newspapers, to pressure Congress to accept the Panel's recommendations. Garb took matters further by exerting direct but counterproductive pressure on Congressman Paul Rogers (D-Fla.), one of the few congressmen who had not been persuaded by the lobby's hysteria, and who favored retaining NCI within NIH. Passage of the 1971 National Cancer Act, with massively increased financial appropriations, whether an error of omis- sion or commission, virtually ensured dependence of the NCI on the American Cancer Society for direction of its programs and priorities. Rep. David Obey THKP 0018267 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0104
7 (D-Wisc. ) has more recently charged that the society "wants to keep the Cancer Institute strong in bankroll and weak in staff, so that it can direct its spend- ing without too much interference". The close links that have developed between the NCI and the society have been cemented by the personal relationships between members of the same lobby that sup- ported both organizations, including the late Sidney Farber, Benno Schmidt (Chair- man of the NCI Advisory Panel) and Mary Lasker. These interlocking relationships have also helped create a fiscal pipeline from the NCI to clinicians in leadership roles in the American Cancer Society. Certainly, the interlocking relationships between members of the NCI Advisory Panel and Board and the American Cancer Socie- ty leadership have been important factors in maintaining high NCI priorities on problems of treatment and low priorities in problems of prevention. When Frank Rauscher recently resigned from the NCI directorship, he moved to his present posi- tion of Senior Vice President for Research of the American Cancer Society, an ap- pointment apparently reflecting endorsement by the society of Rauscher's policies at the NCI. The chairman of the Cancer Panel was and still is Benno Schmidt, a New York investment banker and a friend of the Nixon and Ford administrations, with ties to the oil, steel and chemical industries through J.H. Whitney and Co., of which he is managing partner. Schmidt has, with substantial success, attempted to dictate NCI policies over the last eight years. Membership of the Advisory Board has also included industry representatives, such as the late Elmer Bobst, Warner Lambert, and Clark Wescoe of the drug industry, but no representatives of labor or the public interest movement. Scientific membership of the board largely reflected expertise in basic science, cancer diagnosis, and treatment. The National Cancer Advisory Board and Cancer Panel have had close interlocking relationships with the American Cancer Society. In the Spring of 1978, in an effort to increase NCI appropriations, Lasker took out full page advertisements in leading newspapers in every district repre- sented by members of the House Labor HEW subcommittee, Lasker's influence THKP 0018268 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0104
8 in the Senate was exerted primarily through her friends Senators Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.), Edward Brooks (R-Mass.), and Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), whose late wife was also hired as a society lobbyist. Garb assisted these efforts by direct personal attacks in Wisconsin against Congressman David Obey (D-Wisc.) in response to his repeated criticisms of NCI's maladministration and low priori- ties on cancer prevention. (Garb's strategy was developed with the initial connivance of the society's lobbyist Tanny Pollster). The continued emphasis of the society on advance's in our ability to treat and cure cancer are not born out by the facts. Modern figures on cancer sur- vival rates are not encouraging, in spite of common claims to the contrary. When the percentage of people who have survived for five years after cancer diagnosis and treatment in the period 1970-73 are compared to similar figures for 1960-63, it can be seen that with the exception of cancer of the prostate, and some relatively uncommon cancers such as Hodgkin's disease (which repre- sents about 1% of all cancers), acute lymphocytic leukaemia in children, and also choriocarcinoma and Wilm's tumor where in some instances prolonged regressions, if not cures have been achieved, no substantial overall progress has been made in treating cancer. Particularly for the major cancer killers, such as lung, breast, and colon, the odds of a cure have not improved nuch over the last two decades. The prognosis for lung cancer, the most common fatal type among men, remains poor; only about one of ten victims survives for five years after diagnosis. These overall results reflect the best available recent data on historical trends in cancer patient survival from the NCI Cancer Sur- veillance Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) program. (Results are much less encouraging than those claimed by the American Cancer Society on the basis of the same NCI Data). This is the case despite the vast sums of money spent over the last 30 years, despite the high priorities for cancer research set by Congress, despite devotion of an entire federal agency (the National Cancer THKP 0018269 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0104
9 Institute) to the cancer problem, and in the face of continuing misleading and optimistic reassurances by the American Cancer Society, Smoking. Much of the early work on the causal association between smoking and cancer was supported by the American Cancer society. By the late 1950s a num- ber of classical epidemiological studies on lung cancer and other disease com- plexes thought to be due to cigarette smoking were in progress in different countries. Some of these were follow-up or prospective cohort studies, which is to say a large number of healthy people are followed for several years in order to determine which of them contract and die from a specific disease. A follow-up study begun in 1959 by E. Cuyler Hammond of the American Cancer Society is a good example. In a massive well-organized effort by volunteers in twenty-five states involving about $1 million of public funds, about one million men and women were questioned about their age and disease and smoking histories. The American Cancer Society managed to keep track of over 90 per- cent of the initial subjects for a dozen years. Updated questionnaires were supplied every four years or so, or, if a subject died, a death certificate showing the cause of death. The number of deaths observed among people in a specific category was divided by the number expected for people in the cate- gory, yielding a value known as the Standard Mortality Ratio (SMR). The American Cancer Society found that the SMR from lung cancer increased dramatically with the number of cigarettes smoked and with the inhalation of smoke. (The society regards the tapes containing the raw data of this study as proprietary, even though they were collected with public funds, and has declined to make them available for review to outside scientists), It also found that the SMR for ex-smokers decreased as the time since quitting length- ened. More recent analysis also shows some lessening of the lung cancer death rate among smokers who switched from high to low-tar cigarettes, A single epidemiological study cannot alone validate or invalidate an THKP 0018270 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0104
10 assumed link between exposure and disease, However, over the past twenty-five years a parade of other follow-up studies conducted in the United states, England, Japan, and elsewhere, has extended and confirmed the causal (though not exclusive) association between smoking and lung cancer. In 1961, the society was one of the few major health groups to request President Kennedy to take action against tobacco. Having made this important contribution, the society then took the position that the matter was out of its hands. In its own words, the society "had used [its] resources to uncover the health risks of smoking. Now it was up to the government to take a stand and to respond accordingly. attitude has typified subsequent policies of the American Cancer vollowing publication of the 1964 surgeon-general's report, the pressed disappointment at the failure of government to act. How- Banzhaf petitioned the Federal Communications Commission in 1971 for against tobacco ads, the society refuse to support him, let alone subsequent FCC ruling in his favor. According to Banzhaf, the s never participated in a judicial, regulatory, or legislative peti- a to smoking [their usual response being] We don't want to get anything controversial. Since the Banzhaf episode, the record of has remained mixed. It has supported ordinances to prohibit or oking in public places, to request more stringent warnings on ciga- , including use of the word "death," and to establish a graduated ise tax on cigarettes based on their tar and nicotine content. ober, 1976, the society created a National Commission on Smoking policy, under the direction of Victor Weingarten (an experienced public relations consultant), with Philip R. Lee (University of California School of Medicine, San Francisco) as acting chairman. The Commission was asked to assess the effectiveness of current anti-smoking activities and make THKP 0018271 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0104
11 appropriate recommendations for new strategies, The Commission held extensive hearings, took testimony from over three hundred individuals, and examined voluminous published and unpublished data, including industry files. The Com- mission reported back to the society in January, 1978, recommending the develop- ment of strong legislative action, and endorsing earlier recommendations to this effect by Nutrition Action (a Washington-based public-interest group) The Commission further recommended that the Society set up a powerful anti- tobacco lobby in Washington, D.C., and spend the maximum amount of money per- mitted by law for legislative activities. The American Cancer Society rejected these recommendations, but, in an apparent compromise move, published a report critical of its own past performance, and pledged to support HEW Secre- tary Califano's new anti-smoking initiatives. The "Target 5," five-year program of the society, designed to reduce the toxicity and carcinogenicity of tobacco smoke, stands little chance of success without a well-organized lobbying activity. The society still has not announ- ced plans to lobby Congress or to file petitions with the Federal Trade Commis- sion and other concerned agencies. The society has a part-time lobbyist in Washington, D.C., Tanny Pollster, whose major activity seems to be protecting the NCI budget, and who views his role primarily as a "collector of information for the society," rather than as a lobbyist. It is widely rumored that Poll- ster's salary is defrayed by a direct pass-through to the society from Mary Lasker. In early 1978 the society hired the late Marvella Bayh, wife of Sena- tor Birch Bayh and a breast cancer victim, as a full time lobbyist. (The socie- ty appears to have placed Mrs. Bayh in a position of potential conflict of interest. Senator Bayh, as a member of the subcommittee on Labor and HEW of the Appropriations Committee, has considerable influence on the NCI budget. He has however, failed to persuade Senator Kennedy that the "War on Cancer" be made an integral part of proposed National Health Insurance plans) It would THKP 0018272 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0104
12 not seem unreasonable to expect that the society should develop strong lobby- ing activities in order to secure legislative and regulatory support for its anti-smoking programs and objectives. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, tax exempt organizations such as the American Cancer Society are allowed to spend up to $1 million annually on lobbying. Legislative failure apart, the society has unduly emphasized the role of tobacco as the predominant or near predominant cause of lung cancer to the exclusion of consideration of a wide range of carcinogenic occupational expo- sures. In so doing, the society has lent strong implicit support to the stan- dard industry strategy of "blaming the victim". It must also be pointed out that the epidemiological studies of the society and others on smoking and lung cancer have generally failed to inquire into occupational histories and have thus neglected a probable major role of exposure to occupational carcino- gens. OF further interest in this connection is the fact that deaths from pleural mesotheliomas due to asbestos are listed as lung cancers in the Inter- national List of Causes of Disease (which is used as the basis for reporting cancer mortality data). Thus, malignant lung disease due to occupational expo- sure or to such exposure interacting with the effects of tobacco smoke are misrepresented as being exclusively lung cancer deaths exclusively due to tobacco. It is thus likely that the role of occupational exposure to industrial chemicals as a cause of lung cancer has been substantially underecognized. These considerations are emphasized by recent evidence on increasing lung can- cer rates in non-smokers. Cancer Prevention. Apart from being uninvolved in cancer prevention, other than to a limited extent tobacco, senior officials have developed for the society a reputation of being ignorant of and indifferent if not actively hostile to regu- latory needs for the prevention of exposure to carcinogenic chemicals in the general environment, consumer products, and workplace. In early 1977, the past THKP 0018273 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0104
13 president of the society, Lee Clark, joined by Frank J. Rauscher, attacked the FDA for its proposed ban on the carcinogenic saccharin. This apparent position of the society has not yet been modified or retracted. Ignorance aside, ques- tions have been raised as to the propriety of this position in view of the fact that the society had previously accepted a substantial grant from Coca-Cola, the manufacturers of diet soda, to defray the costs of travel expenses for a delegation of society staff and volunteers to attend a conference in Russia in June, 1976. Sidney Arje, Vice President for Professional Education, objects to the FDA proposal for inserting cancer warnings in packages of estrogens, such as Premarin, used in menopausal" replacement therapy.' The society also objects to FDA requirements for reporting adverse drug reactions in humans receiving experimental anti-cancer drugs in NCI programs, and has demanded legislation to abolish FDA authority in this area. Over the past decade, the society has refused to endorse critical public health legislation and moves such as the Clean Water and Air Acts, and regulation of Red Dye #2, Aldrin, Tris, and the proposed FDA ban on DES in cattle feed. In spite of Cuyler Hammond's negativism to the Clean Water and Air Acts, based on his failure to find increased cancer rates in epidemiology studies on Holland and Lincoln tunnel workers, the society initially indicated willingness to support this legislation. This position was reversed when Lee Clark was subsequently told by Texas auto dealers that it would wreck their business. Hammond has also testified on the side of industry in hearings on saccharin and hair dyes, and has been openly critical of the Delaney Amendment (which pro- scribes the deliberate addition of any level of carcinogenic food additives to the food supply) In some such positions, Hammond, and other society officials, such as Lee Clark and Rauscher, claim to be representing themselves and not the society. This negativism to critical preventive health legislation, which has gener- THKP 0018274 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0104
14 ally been enacted in spite of rather than because of the society and other voluntary health organizations, aroused the unfavorable comments of Congress- man Paul Rogers (D-Fla.) in an address to the Third National Conference on Health Policies on May 22, 1978 I regret that this legislation was adopted with little or no help from groups or individuals involved with health care. I can think of no better example of the serious consequences of the organized health interests non-involvement than last year's Congressional battle over the Clean Water and Air law. A key part of this struggle was the auto industry's push to relax automobile pollution standards. The sweeping relaxation of standards proposed by the industry would have posed a very real threat to the health of millions of Americans over the next thirty years. Despite the obvious health implications of the auto industry's proposal, we had to work just to get the Ameri- can Cancer Society and the Heart Association to take a look at the question. Eventually, after long delays, their entire poli- tical activity consisted of one letter of support. It could only be considered too little, too late. The Lung Association and the American Public Health Association were somewhat more active. While they took strong supportive positions early in the battle, and they testified in behalf of strong health pro- tection, their support was never translated into political organization and clout. The society's support of the Toxic Substances Act, probably the most important single piece of legislation of the century designed to prevent expo- sure to carcinogenic and toxic chemicals, was perfunctory and too late to be effective. The American Cancer Society, together with the American College of Radiologists, has insisted on pursuing large-scale mammography screening pro- grams for breast cancer, including its use in younger women, even though the NCI and other experts are now agreed that these are likely to cause more can- cers than could possibly be detected. While the traditional explanation for the position of the society on cancer prevention lies in an amalgam of con- servatism and ignorance, a recent series of critical articles in the press have raised questions as to the possible influence of the wide range of industries in which society directors have financial interests. (Illustrative is Jonathan E. Rhodes, past president of the society and chairman of the NCI Advisory Board, and Director of Penwalt Chemical Company). THKP 0018275 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0104
15 On March 9, 1978, Rauscher told a Rutgers University audience that New Jersey's high cancer rate may be a result of personal habits rather than industrial pollution. People are talking about a cancer hot spot here. They are blaming industry. They are blaming everybody but themselves. Rauscher further stated that there is clear evidence that New Jerseyans smoke more than the national average, thus accounting for their excess cancer rates. However, in response to a subsequent question by Congressman Andrew Maguire (D-N.J.), Rauscher admitted that he had no evidence to support his claim. On September 28, 1979 the Illinois division of the American Cancer Socie- ty announced the welcome news that it was preparing a leaflet for their 1980 fund-raising campaign to "set the record straight" by listing substances that are known to cause cancer and those that do not. (Of the myriads of chemicals now in common use, under 500 have been shown to be carcinogenic in animals, and 26 of these have also been studied in humans and found to be carcinogenic. It is well that the public should be reassured that the ability of chemicals to induce cancer is unusual, even when tested at high doses in animals, and is restricted to a relatively small number, which mostly belong to a few classes of synthetic organics). Unfortunately, confidence in the future efforts of the Illinois division of the Society was shaken by the accompanying statements of its spokesman Werner Kirsten minimizing the significance of the recent findings of nitrosamines in beer on the grounds that they have only been shown to cause cancer in animals, and that there has been no epidemic of bladder cancer in heavy beer drinking countries in Europe. These qualifications fail to reflect a scientific consensus of the strong presumption that chemicals found to cause cancer in proper animal tests will also cause cancer in humans, The experi- mental evidence for the carcinogenicity of nitrosamines is so strong that a recent WHO monograph emphasized that to all practical purposes they should be regarded as human carcinogens. Dimethylnitrosamine, found in beer at levels THKP 0018276 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0104
16 at 1 to 10 parts per billion (equivalent to quadrillions of molecules in each sip) produces lung tumors in mice at similar levels in drinking water. The levels of dimethylnitrosamine to which the average beer drinking is exposed are several-foldin excess of the less potent nitrosamine carcinogen, nitroso- pyrrolidine, which the USDA, after years of deliberation, has regulated in bacon to levels under 10 parts per billion. Additionally, it appears that the Illinois division has confused nitrosamines, which as a class produce can- cers in a wide range of organs besides the bladder, with a different class of carcinogens, aromatic amines, which predominantly cause bladder cancer in hu- mans and some animals species. The essentially negative or ambiguous position of the American Cancer Society on prevention must be viewed against the carnage of cancer which now affects one in four and kills one in five of the U.S. population, with a 1978 death toll of about 400,000. NCI data prove that cancer incidence rates are burgeoning, and these involve not only- the lung but a wide range of other organs in both sexes and racial groups and therefore cannot be largely due to smoking; in fact the overall increase in total cancer incidence for all sites is comparable to that when cancer of the lung is excluded, (From 1970-1975, the average percent increases in incidence rates for white males are 4.7, for black males 11.9, for white females 11.6, and for black females 34.6) It is now the consensus of the informed independent scientific community that the majority of all cancers are environmentally-induced and hence preventable. Based on a detailed analysis of available occupational exposure data (industry still refuses to disclose such data, claiming that the identity of chemicals in trade name products to which workers are exposed are trade secrets), a government report by ten leading experts in the NCI and other Federal research agencies released by HEW Secretary Califano on September 15, 1978 concluded that up to about 40% of all cancers in coming decades would be associated with THKY 00182777 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0104
17 past exposures to a small number of occupational carcinogens (asbestos, nickel oxides, benzene, arsenic, chromium, and petroleum fractions), quite apart from additional contributions of a wide range of other known carcino- gens. The problems with the American Cancer Society are largely a function of its history and structure and reflect clinical bias and stodgy conservatism, coupled with a basic failure or unwillingness to comprehend the importance of environmental and occupational causes of cancer, The society has declined to harness its considerable political clout to support legislation and regula- tion designed to prevent cancer. The hostility or indifference it has fur- ther expressed to particular moves in this direction has been an important determinant in the failure of Congress to act more decisively on cancer pre- vention and even more seriously, in public apathy and confusion. Equally grievous and damaging are the society's misrepresentation of government cancer statistics as indicating that cancer death rates "are leveling off and in some cases dropping off," rather than in fact increasing. While the overall response of the society to emerging criticisms from quarters including the press, public interest groups, labor, and some key Congressmen, is defensive in extreme, there are nevertheless limited indica- tions of responsiveness, such as the recent creation of a "public-issues committee.' The tempo of such responses is likely to increase further only if the society feels that its public image and fund raising ability is threatened. In the final analysis, it no longer seems possible to avoid the overall conclusion that since 1964, the American Cancer Society, spearheading the "cancer-cure lobby," has exercised an essentially negative if not detri- mental influence on cancer prevention. THKP 0018278 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0104
SPECIAL EVENTS 1994 Market: Rochester, NY (Tier I) Est. Entry Est. Event Approval Date Name of Event Location Attend. Demos. Activities Fee Lab/Exp Total Comments Brand DirPromoServ June 11-19, 1994 Rochester Harbor & Rochester, NY 150,000 GM New event. Awaiting proposal. Carousel Festival July 26-31, 1994 Monroe County Fair Rochester, NY 100,000 GM New event. Awaiting proposal. July, 1994 Main Event 1994 Rochester, NY 200,000 GM New event. Awaiting proposal. Oct. 14-16, 1994 Rochester River Romance Rochester, NY 100,000 GM New event. Awaiting proposal. TOTALS: $0 $0 $0 Key: ES=Exclusíve/Tobacco Sampling 1B=One (1) 10x10 Booth Location V=Space to Park Newport Van NES=Non-Exclusíve/Tobacco Sampling 2B=Two (2) 10x10 Booth Locations MV=Space to Park Newport Music Van EP=Exclusive/Premiums Only P=Premium Distribution RC=Space to Park Newport Race Car NEP=Non-Exclusive/Premiums Only S=Signage 90416076 Source: :https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0105
TO: Dr. R. M. Ikeda June 27, 1968 FROM: J. E. Wickham SUBJECT: Phenol Efficiency An experimental cigarette made up of Richmond cigarette tobacco rod and a 20 mm CA filter with high RTD was more efficient in TPM and phenol removal than the Richmond or Ransom filter (data based on five replicates for each analyses) . The total and filter RTD of the experimental cigarette (E8TX) was higher than for the Richmond and Ransom cigarettes. IBM Code E8TX 08ACB 08ACF Sample Description High RTD CA Richmond Ransom on Richmond Tobacco Rod TPM, mg/cigt Plug in 8.5 9.7 9.3 Plug out 28.7 26.9 26.4 Percent Efficiency 70 64 65 Phenol, micrograms/cigt Plug in 22 29/31) 36(35) Plug out 160 152 160 Percent Efficiency 86 81 78 RTD, inches of H2O Total 10.2 8.0 6.8 Filter 8.0 5.7 4.8 JEW:rab your CC: H. Wakeham J. S. Osmalov R. B. Seligman H. M. Stahr F. E. Resnik Sample Room R. N. Thomson Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0106
BACKGROUND BRIEFING PAPER--B SMOKING AND HEALTH -- A PERSPECTIVE Attacks against tobacco smoking began shortly after the custom was introduced to Western Europe in the sixteenth century. At first, the reasons for the attacks varied, but gradually they began to focus on the alleged health effects of smoking. Practically from the beginning, smoking and health discussions have tended to be highly charged with emotion. Some might even suggest that a crusade against smoking and the smoker has developed. In recent years, the emotional atmosphere surrounding tobacco has created a situation in which it is far easier to indict smoking as the cause of human disease than to confront the data which do not support that view. For example, a recent study which found a significant increase in lung cancer among nonsmokers received little public attention. Is it because wide acceptance of its finding would complicate what some people want to believe is a closed issue? After all, if smoking were the primary cause of lung cancer as many anti-smokers contend, it would logically follow that lung cancer mortality should be almost nonexistent among nonsmokers. But this study clearly shows that nonsmokers do develop lung cancer. In fact, although the author appears to believe in the smoking-lung cancer theory, Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0023
he conceded that other factors must have "a significant effect" 1 on lung cancer mortality. The concentration on smoking as the claimed cause of disease has prompted concern among many researchers and sci- entists. An eminent scientist and pathologist, for example, believes that "a great oversimplification of the complexity of the scientific problems" has occurred. In his opinion, the problems involving diseases associated with smoking are not "going to be solved by simple answers. They are complex or they would already have been solved. "2 Other scientists have expressed concern that the concentration on smoking may be diverting research attention from other factors that reportedly have been associated with human disease. A Canadian researcher, for example, contends that "smoking appears to have been used to divert attention away from the effects of occupational and of 3. environmental exposures" on disease. Why then do these anti-smoking campaigns continue with such intensity? Part of the answer may lie in the stated goal of some anti-smoking individuals and organizations to create a nonsmoking society in which smoking is viewed as deviant behavior and the smoker as a social outcast. Their desire, however, to make smoking socially unacceptable should not be allowed to distort the smoking and health issue. The belief that such distortion has occurred was articulated by one scientist who has -2- Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0023
been intensively involved in smoking and health research: "When it comes to tobacco, opinions are given often with such emo- . tionalism that there is very little discussion, much less scientific objectivity." However, scientific objectivity is essential in considering the complex issues of disease causation. This objectivity can sometimes be difficult to maintain amidst the avalanche of claims about smoking and its effects on health. Nonetheless, many scientists in the smoking and health field maintain the view that a legitimate and continuing scientific dispute exists and that answers will be found only through unbiased scientific inquiry. May 1, 1980 -3- - Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0023
References 1. Enstrom, J. "Rising Lung Cancer Mortality Among Nonsmokers, " J Natl Cancer Inst 62 (4) : 755-760, April, 1979. 2. Fisher, E., Statement, U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Tobacco, Effect of Smoking on Nonsmokers, Hearing, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. September 7, 1978 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 2-20. 3. Sterling, T., "Does Smoking Kill Workers or Working Kill Smokers? or The Mutual Relationship Between Smoking, Occupation, and Respiratory Disease,' Int J Health Serv 8 (3) : 437-452, 1978. 4. Huber, G., "State of the Art on Tobacco and Health, " Presentation before the American Thoracic Society Annual Meeting, Boston, Massachusetts, May 15, 1978. -4- Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0023
WALTER WOODSON Vice President THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE 202/457-4814 800/898-4433 Dear Rouse shayle Turner) Buman P. w alter W. suth W. Pat D. 1875 I Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 TI11161196 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0045
Friends of Tobacco WE SUPPORT EACH OTHER 403-B East New Bern Rd. DEAN ROUSE Kinsion, N.C. 28501 "hairmon Phone & Fax 919/522-4769 TI11161197 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0045
RJR NABISCO PLANTERS 1992 ANNUAL REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS BOOK ONE
COMPANY DESCRIPTION RJR Nabisco is a world leader in manufacturing and marketing consumer packaged goods. The company's brands, such as Winston, Salem, Camel, Oreo, Chips Ahoy!, Ritz, Premium, Life Savers, Planters and Care>Free, have been household names to generations of families. These names - and hundreds more - are synonymous with high quality and superior value, characteristics that the company is dedicated to preserving. TABLE OF CONTENTS Financial Summary 1 Chairman's Letter 2 Food Operations 6 Nabisco Foods Group 8 Nabisco International : 13 Tobacco Operations 16 R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company 18 R. J. Réynolds Tobacco International, Inc 22 RJR Nabisco-Products 26 Corporate Initiatives 28 Consolidated Condensed Financial Information 30 (See Book 2 for Financial Report) Operating Units 32 Board of Directors, Senior Management & Investor Information 33 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0067
FINANCIAL SUMMARY FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS 1992 1991 Net sales $15,734 $14,989 Tobacco 9,027 8,540 Food 6,707 6,449 Business unit contribution* 3,522 3,543 Tobacco 2,687 2,726 Food 947 920 Corporate (112) (103) Operating Income 2,898 2,934 Net Income 299 368 Net Income per share .20 .22 Income before extraordinary item 776 368 Income per share before extrordinary item .55 .22 Total debt 14,218 14,531 Total interest expense 1,429 2,113 Preferred stock dividends 31 173 * Operating income before amortization of trademarks and goodwill and the net effects in 1992 of a restructuring expense ($106 million) and a gain on the sale of the ready-to-ear cereal business ($98 million). NET SALES OPERATING INCOME RJR NABISCO HOLDINGS CORP. RJR NABISCO HOLDINGS CORP. is BITLONS is BILLIONS) $2.8 $2.9 $2.9 $13.9 $15.0 $15.7 1990 1991 1992 1990 1991 1992 NET INCOME (Loss) TOTAL DEBT RJR NABISCO, HOLDINGS CORP. RJR NABISCO HÓLDINGS CORP. ($ MILLIONS) is BILLIONS) $368 $18.9 $299 $14.5 $14.2 $(429) . 1990 199) 1992 1990 1991 1992 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0067
CHAIRMAN'S LETTER Dear Fellow Shareholders: Running a business these days is like running in a marathon. To win you have to be faster than anyone else. But you have to have a strategy for how to run the whole race, so that you don't run so fast at the beginning that you fade at the finish line. And you have to be ready for surprises along the way and be smart and nimble enough to turn the unexpected to your advantage. That's a pretty good description of 1992 for RJR Nabisco. We ran fast to grab important growth opportunities. We worked hard on our core business strategies to build long-term shareholder value. We also bumped into a recession that lasted longer than anyone thought, faced competitive wars in the store aisles, and met a recession-weary consumer along the way who was rethinking old shopping habits. We started the year having just completed a recapitalization that made us an investment- grade company and gave us the finaricial flexibility to take advantage of newly opened markets where Communism and government monopolies were falling. We also saw growth opportunities at home. We made major tobacco investments in Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Turkey, and Hungary. We expanded our food businesses in Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela. In the United States, we strengthened our Nabisco biscuit franchise with the acquisitions of Stella D' oro and New York Style Bagel Chips, expanded our fast-growing food service business with Plush Pippin super-premium pies for in-store bakeries, and added to our presence at the candy counter with Phoenix Confections's Now and Later candy brand. All the while we continued to work relentlessly on improving our balance sheet. In 1992 we refinanced $3.62 billion principal amount of high-cost debt. At year-end we had lowered the average interest rate on our debt by 230 basis points from where we started the year. Our 1993 interest bill will fall substaritially as a result. We maintained our high-gear, impatient pace throughout the year because what we were doing was important to accomplishing our long-term business strategies: Grow market share at our domestic tobacco business and restore its ability to grow earnings at a predictable annual rate. Expand rapidly in both existing and emerging international tobacco markets. 2 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0067
Build on our dominant position in cookies and crackers by edging out into the broader baked goods category, and add depth to our non-biscuit North American foods businesses. Develop a portfolio of growing food businesses outside of North America that draws from our North American expertise in baked goods. And, continue to reduce debt and interest expense, and free up more capital to enhance shareholder value. The economy made implementing strategies and everything else tougher throughout the year, especially for American consumer products companies. Consumers simply stayed at home, and when they did venture out, it was too often to the allure of coupons, two-for-one specials and new, low-cost generic and private-label products. We responded with considerable agility. Nabisco, for example, introduced more than 100 new products last year to help lure reluctant consumers into the biscuit aisle and other parts of the store where our food products are sold. Still, the economy took its toll on operating results at RJR Nabisco, even as our net income more than doubled, absent extraordinary charges related to debt retirement, to $776 million. Net sales rose 5 percent to $15.7 billion, but our operating income of $2.9 billion only matched the prior year. The severity of consumer penny-pinching is no doubt a short-term problem. Already by the end of the year we saw better prices for our lower-priced domestic tobacco products. But even as the economic recovery brings consumers back into stores, they will likely retain some of their recessionary buying habits, like focusing on value. We will have to be leaner and more agile than our competitors in order to be successful meeting those consumer demands. Despite the economic climate, our business units made considerable progress against their strategic priorities. Our domestic tobacco subsidiary, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., is stronger than it has been in more than a decade. Operating income for 1992 declined, as we had expected, due to higher marketing spending and booming growth in lower-priced products. However, Reynolds finished the year with total unit volume growth of 3 percent, compared with virtually flat industry volume. INCOME (LOSS) BEFORE EXTRAORDINARY ITEM RJR NÁBISCO noldings CORP. is MILLIONS) 1990 1991 1992 $(462) $368 $776 1991 $368 $776 3 Source: ttps://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0067
CHAIRMAN'S LETTER All the while, we worked on firming our position in the full-price category. Reynolds has one of the few full-price brands in the industry showing significant volume growth - Camel. We think we have in place the essential dynamics to keep Camel growing in the years ahead. The international tobacco market has seen more changes in the past year than in any comparable time in its history - and virtually all of them are for the better. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco International invested in plants last year with a combined capacity of more than 80 billion units in markets with tremendous demand for American-blend cigarettes. We've nearly doubled the size of our international tobacco business over the past four years - and we've barely scratched the surface of emerging business opportunities in the 50 percent of the world market that has opened up to Western manufacturers in just the past two years. Although seizing the best opportunities will require significant further investment, we still expect to deliver solid sales and earnings growth. The prospects for this business are exciting. Among the new products introduced by the Nabisco Foods Group, which encompasses our North American food businesses, was a new line of reduced-fat and fat-free cookies, crackers and chips under the SnackWell's and Mr. Phipps trademarks. These products jumped off the shelves, generating more than $65 million in sales in their first five months. The new lines provide us with a new outlet for growth in the biscuit business - nutrition-conscious consumers, the ranks of which are growing as the baby boom generation moves through middle age. Many of our other new food products underscored the renewed emphasis on marketing we're taking in our non-biscuit food businesses, where we haven't been as dominant. We developed new lines of flavored mustards under the Grey Poupon label, snack-size and spicy Planters nuts, lower-fat Fleischmann's spreads, and Gummi Savers candy. These and other new products helped us maintain volume in a tough economy. But far more important, they provide a foundation for real volume and sales growth in the years ahead. Food growth may have been slow in North America, but it was explosive in Latin America, where we are investing heavily to expand our international food business. In fact, we see so much potential in that and other markets that we created a separate food unit during the year and brought aboard Rick Thoman to run it. Latin American food sales topped $750 million in 1992 through a combination of internal growth and acquisitions. We expect total international food sales of about $1 billion in 1993, and BUSINESS INVESTMENT RJR NABISCO HOLDINGS CORP. ($ MILLIONS 1990 $3,797 1990 1991 1992 MARKITING $3,169 $3,555 $3,936 RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 1991 $4,212 $202 $198 $192 GAPITAL EXPENDrTUEES $426 $459 $519 1992 $4,647 TOTAL $3,797 $4,212 $4,647 4 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0067
are actively evaluating opportunities to enter markets in Europe and Asia. You'll hear from the people who made all this happen - the senior management of RJR Nabisco - in the remaining pages of this report. They're a tough-minded, chronically restless group with an enormous sense of urgency. I'm proud and happy to work with them. Those of you who have been following events at a number of America's largest companies know how important culture is to a company's success - or to its failure. We've been working hard on our culture at RJR Nabisco. Four years ago a lot of senior people left the company, but a lot stayed here too - talented people who wanted to play on a new team. We brought in some new players, some of them battle-hardened from other turnarounds. We threw out all the old policy manuals and procedure books and started over. This management team owns a lot of RJR Nabisco stock - and not just free options. We bought stock with our own money. People say that management in corporate America needs to think more like owner-managers. At RJR Nabisco, we truly are owner-managers. We've got a lot on the line with this company, and if that doesn't give us a sense of urgency to create shareholder value, nothing will. That owner's sense of urgency has served us well over the past four years. Our debt level has been halved. Our financial status made investment-grade. Our business strategies are starting to show results - in new products and product lines, in businesses acquired, in international markets successfully entered, in efficiencies gained. As an owner-manager, I can assure you we will continue to run fast in 1993 and beyond. effects LOUIS v. GERSTNER, JR. 5 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0067
FOOD OPERATIONS RJR Nabisco's food operations in the U.S. and The company's worldwide food sales were Canada are managed by the Nabisco Foods $6.71 billion in 1992, a 4 percent increase from Group, while the company's operations in $6.45 billion in 1991. Business unit contribution markets outsice of North Amercia are overseen by rose 3 percent, to $947 million in 1992 from Nabisco International, Inc. $920 million in 1992. Source: :ttps://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0067
NABISCO FOODS GROUP Nabisco Foods Group's performance in 1992 is a story of progress in a decidedly tough business environment. The economy stubbornly resisted recovery and continued to cut deeply into consumer spending. That made volume growth extremely difficult for mariy of our North American food businesses. It also prompted retailers to continue to pressive manufacturers, including increased demands for deeper discourits. We are executing a strategy to accelerate growth in volumé and profits by concentrating on four key areas; (i) increased support for our core brands; (ii) aggressive new business initiatives; (iii) a dedication to uniformly high quality in both the products we manufacture and the services we provide to customers; and (iv) an all-our attack on costs. Some of the results of this strategy took shape during the year. Nabisco introduced more than 100 new items, including a promising new line of reduced- and no-fat cookies and crackers, new margarines and new Mexican foods We also completed four strategic acquisitions that provide significant opportunities for us to expand into new segments of the markets in which we compete. In the last year, we've invested more than $250 million in plant and equipment upgrades, including the ongoing modernization of our Bakeries and the construction of a new, technologically advanced margarine plant in Indiana. We've also launched a drive to improve H. JOHN GREENIAUS efficiency and productivity throughout the organization by rethinking and PRESIDENT redesigning the way we do business in a very changing and challenging market. NABISCO FOODS GROUP N abisco Foods Group strategically Nabisco is integrating Phoenix Now and Later products in grocery, drug broadened the reach of its confec- Confections into its LifeSavers Division, and discount stores and also expand tions business by acquiring Phoenix which markets Life Savers candies, sales in convenience stores, where the Confections, Inc. in 1992. Phoenix Breath Savers mints, and Bubble Yum, brand has been sold primarily. Confections, which had 1991 sales of LifeSavers celebrated its 80th anniver- more than $35 million, makes and sells sary in 1992 by introducing three Now and Later brand candies, a taffy-like "wild" flavors - Tangy Fruits, product that is especially popular with Care*Free, Fruit Stripe and Beech- Tangy Watermelon and Wild Sour youngsters and teenagers - one of the Nut gums. Nabisco's sales and marketing Berries - developed for their high largest segments of the candy market. expertise will build distribution for appeal to children and teens. 8 Source: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/ffbb0067