romikgosai/squad_modified_2 huggingface dataset:
Although official German air doctrine did target civilian morale, it did not espouse the attacking of civilians directly. It hoped to destroy morale by destroying the enemy's factories and public utilities as well as its food stocks (by attacking shipping). Nevertheless, its official opposition to attacks on civilians became an increasingly moot point when large-scale raids were conducted in November and December 1940. Although not encouraged by official policy, the use of mines and incendiaries, for tactical expediency, came close to indiscriminate bombing. Locating targets in skies obscured by industrial haze meant they needed to be illuminated "without regard for the civilian population".

Q1: What was the primary goal of the German air doctrine?
A1: target civilian morale
Q2: In November and December of 1940 what changed to make attacks on civilians a moot point?
A2: large-scale raids
Q3: What had nearly been considered indiscriminate bombing?
A3: use of mines and incendiaries, for tactical expediency
Q4: Lighting targets hidden by haze had to be done without what?
A4: regard for the civilian population
Special units, such as KGr 100, became the Beleuchtergruppe (Firelighter Group), which used incendiaries and high explosive to mark the target area. The tactic was expanded into Feuerleitung (Blaze Control) with the creation of Brandbombenfelder (Incendiary Fields) to mark targets. These were marked out by parachute flares. Then bombers carrying SC 1000 (1,000 kg (2,205 lb)), SC 1400 (1,400 kg (3,086 lb)), and SC 1800 (1,800 kg (3,968 lb)) "Satan" bombs were used to level streets and residential areas. By December, the SC 2500 (2,500 kg (5,512 lb)) "Max" bomb was used.

Q1: What was the group that used incendiaries and high explosives to mark targets?
A1: Beleuchtergruppe
Q2: The Feuerleitung (Blaze Control) tactic led to what creation for marking targets?
A2: Brandbombenfelder (Incendiary Fields)
Q3: What was the nickname of bombs used in streets and residential areas?
A3: "Satan"
Q4: What was the weight of the "Max" bomb?
A4: 2,500 kg (5,512 lb)
These decisions, apparently taken at the Luftflotte or Fliegerkorps level (see Organisation of the Luftwaffe (1933–1945)), meant attacks on individual targets were gradually replaced by what was, for all intents and purposes, an unrestricted area attack or Terrorangriff (Terror Attack). Part of the reason for this was inaccuracy of navigation. The effectiveness of British countermeasures against Knickebein, which was designed to avoid area attacks, forced the Luftwaffe to resort to these methods. The shift from precision bombing to area attack is indicated in the tactical methods and weapons dropped. KGr 100 increased its use of incendiaries from 13–28 percent. By December, this had increased to 92 percent. Use of incendiaries, which were inherently inaccurate, indicated much less care was taken to avoid civilian property close to industrial sites. Other units ceased using parachute flares and opted for explosive target markers. Captured German air crews also indicated the homes of industrial workers were deliberately targeted.

Q1: Decision changes at organizational levels led to what type of attacks?
A1: unrestricted area attack or Terrorangriff (Terror Attack)
Q2: What was one of the reasons for unrestricted area attacks?
A2: inaccuracy of navigation
Q3: How was it known that precision bombing was changed to area attacks?
A3: tactical methods and weapons dropped
Q4: What percentage of incendiaries were used in December?
A4: 92 percent
Q5: How was it determined that homes of industrial workers were targeted?
A5: Captured German air crews
In 1941, the Luftwaffe shifted strategy again. Erich Raeder—commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine—had long argued the Luftwaffe should support the German submarine force (U-Bootwaffe) in the Battle of the Atlantic by attacking shipping in the Atlantic Ocean and attacking British ports. Eventually, he convinced Hitler of the need to attack British port facilities. Hitler had been convinced by Raeder that this was the right course of action due to the high success rates of the U-Boat force during this period of the war. Hitler correctly noted that the greatest damage to the British war economy had been done through submarines and air attacks by small numbers of Focke-Wulf Fw 200 naval aircraft. He ordered attacks to be carried out on those targets which were also the target of the Kriegsmarine. This meant that British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Ireland were the prime targets.

Q1: What did Erich Raeder believe the Luftwaffe needed to do?
A1: support the German submarine force
Q2: Raeder convinced Hitler to do what?
A2: attack British port facilities.
Q3: What ultimately convinced Hitler that Raeder was right?
A3: the high success rates of the U-Boat force
Q4: Submarines and naval aircraft damaged what primarily?
A4: British war economy
Q5: What became the new targets for the Kriegsmarine?
A5: British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Ireland
Hitler's interest in this strategy forced Göring and Jeschonnek to review the air war against Britain in January 1941. This led to Göring and Jeschonnek agreeing to Hitler's Directive 23, Directions for operations against the British War Economy, which was published on 6 February 1941 and gave aerial interdiction of British imports by sea top priority. This strategy had been recognised before the war, but Operation Eagle Attack and the following Battle of Britain had got in the way of striking at Britain's sea communications and diverted German air strength to the campaign against the RAF and its supporting structures. The OKL had always regarded the interdiction of sea communications of less importance than bombing land-based aircraft industries.

Q1: What was Hitler's Directive 23?
A1: Directions for operations against the British War Economy
Q2: What was a top priority of Directive 23?
A2: aerial interdiction of British imports by sea
Q3: What prevented the targeting of sea communications before?
A3: Operation Eagle Attack and the following Battle of Britain
Q4: What was considered more important than the interdiction of sea communications?
A4: bombing land-based aircraft industries
Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.

Q1: What was the concession Goring made with the strategic bombing against Britain?
A1: Directive 23
Q2: What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support?
A2: control of more Luftwaffe units
Q3: Who was Raeder's successor?
A3: Karl Dönitz
Q4: What was detrimental to the success of a strategic effect against Britain?
A4: Göring's lack of cooperation
Q5: How did Goring expect to regain prestige?
A5: by subduing Britain by air power alone
Even so, the decision by OKL to support the strategy in Directive 23 was instigated by two considerations, both of which had little to do with wanting to destroy Britain's sea communications in conjunction with the Kriegsmarine. First, the difficulty in estimating the impact of bombing upon war production was becoming apparent, and second, the conclusion British morale was unlikely to break led OKL to adopt the naval option. The indifference displayed by OKL to Directive 23 was perhaps best demonstrated in operational directives which diluted its effect. They emphasised the core strategic interest was attacking ports but they insisted in maintaining pressure, or diverting strength, onto industries building aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and explosives. Other targets would be considered if the primary ones could not be attacked because of weather conditions.

Q1: What was the first consideration for the OKL to support Directive 23?
A1: difficulty in estimating the impact of bombing upon war production
Q2: What was the second consideration?
A2: the conclusion British morale was unlikely to break
Q3: What did the OKL insist on maintaining?
A3: pressure, or diverting strength, onto industries
Q4: When would other targets be considered available?
A4: if the primary ones could not be attacked because of weather conditions
A further line in the directive stressed the need to inflict the heaviest losses possible, but also to intensify the air war in order to create the impression an amphibious assault on Britain was planned for 1941. However, meteorological conditions over Britain were not favourable for flying and prevented an escalation in air operations. Airfields became water-logged and the 18 Kampfgruppen (bomber groups) of the Luftwaffe's Kampfgeschwadern (bomber wings) were relocated to Germany for rest and re-equipment.

Q1: What was inflicting heavy losses and increasing the air war designed to do?
A1: create the impression an amphibious assault on Britain was planned for 1941
Q2: What was preventing escalation of air operations?
A2: meteorological conditions over Britain
Q3: What happened to airfields?
A3: Airfields became water-logged
Q4: How many bomber groups were relocated to Germany?
A4: 18
From the German point of view, March 1941 saw an improvement. The Luftwaffe flew 4,000 sorties that month, including 12 major and three heavy attacks. The electronic war intensified but the Luftwaffe flew major inland missions only on moonlit nights. Ports were easier to find and made better targets. To confuse the British, radio silence was observed until the bombs fell. X- and Y-Gerät beams were placed over false targets and switched only at the last minute. Rapid frequency changes were introduced for X-Gerät, whose wider band of frequencies and greater tactical flexibility ensured it remained effective at a time when British selective jamming was degrading the effectiveness of Y-Gerät.

Q1: How many sorties were flown in March 1941?
A1: 4,000
Q2: When did the Luftwaffe fly inland missions?
A2: only on moonlit nights
Q3: Why were ports better targets?
A3: Ports were easier to find
Q4: How did the Germans confuse the British?
A4: radio silence was observed until the bombs fell
Q5: Why was the X-Gerat frequencies used more?
A5: British selective jamming was degrading the effectiveness of Y-Gerät
The attacks were focused against western ports in March. These attacks produced some breaks in morale, with civil leaders fleeing the cities before the offensive reached its height. But the Luftwaffe's effort eased in the last 10 attacks as seven Kampfgruppen moved to Austria in preparation for the Balkans Campaign in Yugoslavia and Greece. The shortage of bombers caused the OKL to improvise. Some 50 Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers and Jabos (fighter-bombers) were used, officially classed as Leichte Kampfflugzeuge ("light bombers") and sometimes called Leichte Kesselringe ("Light Kesselrings"). The defences failed to prevent widespread damage but on some occasions did prevent German bombers concentrating on their targets. On occasion, only one-third of German bombs hit their targets.

Q1: What was focused in March?
A1: western ports
Q2: What did these attacks accomplish?
A2: breaks in morale
Q3: Why was the OKL forced to improvise?
A3: shortage of bombers
Q4: How many Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers and Jabos were used?
A4: 50
Q5: How many German bombs hit their target?
A5: only one-third
The diversion of heavier bombers to the Balkans meant that the crews and units left behind were asked to fly two or three sorties per night. Bombers were noisy, cold, and vibrated badly. Added to the tension of the mission which exhausted and drained crews, tiredness caught up with and killed many. In one incident on 28/29 April, Peter Stahl of KG 30 was flying on his 50th mission. He fell asleep at the controls of his Ju 88 and woke up to discover the entire crew asleep. He roused them, ensured they took oxygen and Dextro-Energen tablets, then completed the mission.

Q1: How many sorties a night were crews asked to fly?
A1: two or three sorties
Q2: What contributed to the exhaustion of crews flying extra sorties?
A2: Bombers were noisy, cold, and vibrated badly
Q3: What happened to Peter Stahl when he fell asleep flying?
A3: woke up to discover the entire crew asleep.
Q4: What did Peter's crew take to complete their mission?
A4: oxygen and Dextro-Energen tablets
Regardless, the Luftwaffe could still inflict huge damage. With the German occupation of Western Europe, the intensification of submarine and air attack on Britain's sea communications was feared by the British. Such an event would have serious consequences on the future course of the war, should the Germans succeed. Liverpool and its port became an important destination for convoys heading through the Western Approaches from North America, bringing supplies and materials. The considerable rail network distributed to the rest of the country. Operations against Liverpool in the Liverpool Blitz were successful. Air attacks sank 39,126 long tons (39,754 t) of shipping, with another 111,601 long tons (113,392 t) damaged. Minister of Home Security Herbert Morrison was also worried morale was breaking, noting the defeatism expressed by civilians. Other sources point to half of the port's 144 berths rendered unusable, while cargo unloading capability was reduced by 75%. Roads and railways were blocked and ships could not leave harbour. On 8 May 1941, 57 ships were destroyed, sunk or damaged amounting to 80,000 long tons (81,000 t). Around 66,000 houses were destroyed, 77,000 people made homeless, and 1,900 people killed and 1,450 seriously hurt on one night. Operations against London up until May 1941 could also have a severe impact on morale. The populace of the port of Hull became 'trekkers', people who underwent a mass exodus from cities before, during, and after attacks. However, the attacks failed to knock out or damage railways, or port facilities for long, even in the Port of London, a target of many attacks. The Port of London in particular was an important target, bringing in one-third of overseas trade.

Q1: What did the British fear most?
A1: intensification of submarine and air attack
Q2: What was an important destination for supply convoys from North America?
A2: Liverpool
Q3: The Liverpool Blitz sank how much shipping?
A3: 39,126 long tons (39,754 t) of shipping
Q4: How many ships were destroyed on May 8, 1941?
A4: 57 ships
Q5: How much of the overseas trade did the Port of London take on?
A5: one-third of overseas trade
On 13 March, the upper Clyde port of Clydebank near Glasgow was bombed. All but seven of its 12,000 houses were damaged. Many more ports were attacked. Plymouth was attacked five times before the end of the month while Belfast, Hull, and Cardiff were hit. Cardiff was bombed on three nights, Portsmouth centre was devastated by five raids. The rate of civilian housing lost was averaging 40,000 people per week dehoused in September 1940. In March 1941, two raids on Plymouth and London dehoused 148,000 people. Still, while heavily damaged, British ports continued to support war industry and supplies from North America continued to pass through them while the Royal Navy continued to operate in Plymouth, Southampton, and Portsmouth. Plymouth in particular, because of its vulnerable position on the south coast and close proximity to German air bases, was subjected to the heaviest attacks. On 10/11 March, 240 bombers dropped 193 tons of high explosives and 46,000 incendiaries. Many houses and commercial centres were heavily damaged, the electrical supply was knocked out, and five oil tanks and two magazines exploded. Nine days later, two waves of 125 and 170 bombers dropped heavy bombs, including 160 tons of high explosive and 32,000 incendiaries. Much of the city centre was destroyed. Damage was inflicted on the port installations, but many bombs fell on the city itself. On 17 April 346 tons of explosives and 46,000 incendiaries were dropped from 250 bombers led by KG 26. The damage was considerable, and the Germans also used aerial mines. Over 2,000 AAA shells were fired, destroying two Ju 88s. By the end of the air campaign over Britain, only eight percent of the German effort against British ports was made using mines.

Q1: How many houses were spared damage in Glasgow?
A1: seven
Q2: How many people per week were losing housing?
A2: 40,000 people
Q3: Why was Plymouth targeted the most?
A3: because of its vulnerable position on the south coast
Q4: What did the Germans use along with incendiaries and bombs?
A4: aerial mines
Q5: How many AAA shells were fired?
A5: Over 2,000
In the north, substantial efforts were made against Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Sunderland, which were large ports on the English east coast. On 9 April 1941 Luftflotte 2 dropped 150 tons of high explosives and 50,000 incendiaries from 120 bombers in a five-hour attack. Sewer, rail, docklands, and electric installations were damaged. In Sunderland on 25 April, Luftflotte 2 sent 60 bombers which dropped 80 tons of high explosive and 9,000 incendiaries. Much damage was done. A further attack on the Clyde, this time at Greenock, took place on 6 and 7 May. However, as with the attacks in the south, the Germans failed to prevent maritime movements or cripple industry in the regions.

Q1: What were two large ports on the English east coast in the North?
A1: Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Sunderland
Q2: Sunderland saw how many incendiaries used against it on 25 April?
A2: 9,000 incendiaries
Q3: How many bombers were used in a five-hour attack?
A3: 120
Q4: What was the result of the German attacks?
A4: the Germans failed to prevent maritime movements or cripple industry in the regions
The last major attack on London was on 10/11 May 1941, on which the Luftwaffe flew 571 sorties and dropped 800 tonnes of bombs. This caused more than 2,000 fires. 1,436 people were killed and 1,792 seriously injured, which affected morale badly. Another raid was carried out on 11/12 May 1941. Westminster Abbey and the Law Courts were damaged, while the Chamber of the House of Commons was destroyed. One-third of London's streets were impassable. All but one railway station line was blocked for several weeks. This raid was significant, as 63 German fighters were sent with the bombers, indicating the growing effectiveness of RAF night fighter defences.

Q1: When was the last major attack London saw?
A1: 10/11 May 1941
Q2: How many tonnes of bombs did the Luftwaffe use on London?
A2: 800 tonnes
Q3: How many casualties were inflicted?
A3: 1,436 people were killed and 1,792 seriously injured
Q4: What was the damage done to London's streets?
A4: One-third of London's streets were impassable
Q5: What showed RAF night fighter effectiveness was increasing?
A5: 63 German fighters were sent with the bombers
German air supremacy at night was also now under threat. British night-fighter operations out over the Channel were proving highly successful. This was not immediately apparent. The Bristol Blenheim F.1 was undergunned, with just four .303 in (7.7 mm) machine guns which struggled to down the Do 17, Ju 88, or Heinkel He 111. Moreover, the Blenheim struggled to reach the speed of the German bombers. Added to the fact an interception relied on visual sighting, a kill was most elusive even in the conditions of a moonlit sky.

Q1: How was the British night fighter operations faring?
A1: were proving highly successful.
Q2: How did the Bristol Blenheim F.1 perform against German aircraft?
A2: was undergunned, with just four .303 in (7.7 mm) machine guns
Q3: What did interception rely upon?
A3: visual sighting
Q4: How did the Bristol Blenheim F.1 compare to German aircraft speed?
A4: struggled to reach the speed of the German bombers
The Boulton Paul Defiant, despite its poor performance during daylight engagements, was a much better night fighter. It was faster, able to catch the bombers and its configuration of four machine guns in a turret could (much like German night fighters in 1943–1945 with Schräge Musik) engage the unsuspecting German bomber from beneath. Attacks from below offered a larger target, compared to attacking tail-on, as well as a better chance of not being seen by the bomber (so less chance of evasion), as well as greater likelihood of detonating its bombload. In subsequent months a steady number of German bombers would fall to night fighters.

Q1: What performed better during night fighting?
A1: The Boulton Paul Defiant
Q2: How could aircraft engage bombers when fitted with a turret?
A2: engage the unsuspecting German bomber from beneath
Q3: What benefits did attacking from below offer?
A3: larger target, compared to attacking tail-on, as well as a better chance of not being seen by the bomber
Improved aircraft designs were in the offing with the Bristol Beaufighter, then under development. It would prove formidable, but its development was slow. The Beaufighter had a maximum speed of 320 mph (510 km/h), an operational ceiling of 26,000 ft (7,900 m) and a climb rate of 2,500 ft (760 m) per minute. Its armament of four 20 mm (0.79 in) Hispano cannon and six .303 in Browning machine guns offered a serious threat to German bombers. On 19 November, John Cunningham of No. 604 Squadron RAF shot down a bomber flying an AI-equipped Beaufighter. It was the first air victory for the airborne radar.

Q1: What was the max speed of a Beaufighter?
A1: 320 mph (510 km/h)
Q2: What is the operational ceiling of the Beaufighter?
A2: 26,000 ft (7,900 m)
Q3: how many machine guns did the Beaufighter include?
A3: six .303 in Browning machine guns
Q4: What day was the first victory the RAF had with airborne radar?
A4: 19 November
By April and May 1941, the Luftwaffe was still getting through to their targets, taking no more than one- to two-percent losses on any given mission. On 19/20 April 1941, in honour of Hitler's 52nd birthday, 712 bombers hit Plymouth with a record 1,000 tons of bombs. Losses were minimal. In the following month, 22 German bombers were lost with 13 confirmed to have been shot down by night fighters. On 3/4 May, nine were shot down in one night. On 10/11 May, London suffered severe damage, but 10 German bombers were downed. In May 1941, RAF night fighters shot down 38 German bombers.

Q1: What was the most losses the Luftwaffe suffered on any mission?
A1: one- to two-percent losses
Q2: How many bombers hit Plymouth on Hitler's birthday?
A2: 712
Q3: How many bombs hit Plymouth on Hitler's birthday?
A3: 1,000 tons of bombs
Q4: On May 3/4 how many German bombers were lost?
A4: nine
Q5: How many German bombers were shot down by the RAF in May?
A5: 38 German bombers