romikgosai/squad_modified_2 huggingface dataset:
Much civil-defence preparation in the form of shelters was left in the hands of local authorities, and many areas such as Birmingham, Coventry, Belfast and the East End of London did not have enough shelters. The Phoney War, however, and the unexpected delay of civilian bombing permitted the shelter programme to finish in June 1940.:35 The programme favoured backyard Anderson shelters and small brick surface shelters; many of the latter were soon abandoned in 1940 as unsafe. In addition, authorities expected that the raids would be brief and during the day. Few predicted that attacks by night would force Londoners to sleep in shelters.

Q1: What civil-defense efforts were left to local authorities to handle?
A1: shelters
Q2: What year did the shelter program finish?
A2: 1940
Q3: Why were the shelters soon abandoned in 1940?
A3: unsafe
Q4: Why were Londoners forced to sleep in shelters?
A4: attacks by night
Very deeply buried shelters provided the most protection against a direct hit. The government did not build them for large populations before the war because of cost, time to build, and fears that their very safety would cause occupants to refuse to leave to return to work, or that anti-war sentiment would develop in large groups. The government saw the Communist Party's leading role in advocating for building deep shelters as an attempt to damage civilian morale, especially after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939.:34

Q1: What kind of sentiment did the government fear would developed in large group shelters?
A1: anti-war
Q2: Who did the government see as a leading advocate for building deep shelters?
A2: the Communist Party's
Q3: What was the name of the Pact of August 1939?
A3: Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
The most important existing communal shelters were the London Underground stations. Although many civilians had used them as such during the First World War, the government in 1939 refused to allow the stations to be used as shelters so as not to interfere with commuter and troop travel, and the fears that occupants might refuse to leave. Underground officials were ordered to lock station entrances during raids; but by the second week of heavy bombing the government relented and ordered the stations to be opened. Each day orderly lines of people queued until 4 pm, when they were allowed to enter the stations. In mid-September 1940 about 150,000 a night slept in the Underground, although by the winter and spring months the numbers had declined to 100,000 or less. Noises of battle were muffled and sleep was easier in the deepest stations, but many were killed from direct hits on several stations.

Q1: Why did the government refuse to allow the London Underground stations to be used as shelters?
A1: interfere with commuter and troop travel
Q2: Underground officials were ordered to lock the stations during raids but opened how long after the orders?
A2: by the second week
Q3: In 1940 how many people were sleeping in the Underground stations?
A3: 150,000 a night
Q4: Muffling the sound of batter made what easier in the Underground Stations?
A4: sleep
Q5: Why were many killed in Underground Stations?
A5: direct hits
Communal shelters never housed more than one seventh of Greater London residents, however. Peak use of the Underground as shelter was 177,000 on 27 September 1940, and a November 1940 census of London found that about 4% of residents used the Tube and other large shelters; 9% in public surface shelters; and 27% in private home shelters, implying that the remaining 60% of the city likely stayed at home. The government distributed Anderson shelters until 1941 and that year began distributing the Morrison shelter, which could be used inside homes.:190

Q1: What was the largest number to use Underground shelters in September  27, 1940?
A1: 177,000
Q2: In 1940 what percentage used the Tube for a sleeping shelter?
A2: 4%
Q3: Where did 60% of populations stay?
A3: at home
Q4: What year did the government start giving out Morrison shelters?
A4: 1941
Q5: Where could the Morrison shelters be used?
A5: inside homes
Public demand caused the government in October 1940 to build new deep shelters:189–190 within the Underground to hold 80,000 people but were not completed until the period of heaviest bombing had passed. By the end of 1940 significant improvements had been made in the Underground and in many other large shelters. Authorities provided stoves and bathrooms and canteen trains provided food. Tickets were issued for bunks in large shelters to reduce the amount of time spent queuing. Committees quickly formed within shelters as informal governments, and organisations such as the British Red Cross and the Salvation Army worked to improve conditions. Entertainment included concerts, films, plays and books from local libraries.

Q1: What year did the government start to build new deep shelters?
A1: 1940
Q2: How many people were the new shelters going to hold?
A2: 80,000
Q3: What helped cut down time standing in the queue for shelters?
A3: Tickets
Q4: Which two groups help improve life in the shelters?
A4: British Red Cross and the Salvation Army
Q5: What kind of trains provided food in the shelters?
A5: canteen
Although the intensity of the bombing was not as great as prewar expectations so an equal comparison is impossible, no psychiatric crisis occurred because of the Blitz even during the period of greatest bombing of September 1940. An American witness wrote "By every test and measure I am able to apply, these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit ... the British are stronger and in a better position than they were at its beginning". People referred to raids as if they were weather, stating that a day was "very blitzy".:75,261 However, another American who visited Britain, the publisher Ralph Ingersoll, wrote soon after the Blitz eased on 15 September that:

Q1: What witness wrote that these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit?
A1: American
Q2: With the intense bomb what did not happen as great as prewar predictions expected?
A2: psychiatric crisis
Q3: People called the raids very blitzy like they were talking about what?
A3: weather
Ingersoll added that, according to Anna Freud and Edward Glover, London civilians surprisingly did not suffer from widespread shell shock, unlike the soldiers in the Dunkirk evacuation.:114,117–118 The psychoanalysts were correct, and the special network of psychiatric clinics opened to receive mental casualties of the attacks closed due to lack of need. Although the stress of the war resulted in many anxiety attacks, eating disorders, fatigue, weeping, miscarriages, and other physical and mental ailments, society did not collapse. The number of suicides and drunkenness declined, and London recorded only about two cases of "bomb neuroses" per week in the first three months of bombing. Many civilians found that the best way to retain mental stability was to be with family, and after the first few weeks of bombing avoidance of the evacuation programs grew.:80–81 Glover speculated that the knowledge that the entire country was being attacked, that there was no way to escape the bombs, forced people to accept and deal with the situation.:118

Q1: Anne Freud and Edward Glover said London civilians did not suffer from what?
A1: widespread shell shock
Q2: Why did the psychiatric clinics close?
A2: lack of need
Q3: What two things declined during the attacks in Britain?
A3: suicides and drunkenness
Q4: The entire country was being attack and Glover believe it help people to do what?
A4: accept and deal
The cheerful crowds visiting bomb sites were so large they interfered with rescue work, pub visits increased in number (beer was never rationed), and 13,000 attended cricket at Lord's. People left shelters when told instead of refusing to leave, although many housewives reportedly enjoyed the break from housework. Some people even told government surveyors that they enjoyed air raids if they occurred occasionally, perhaps once a week. Despite the attacks, defeat in Norway and France, and the threat of invasion, overall morale remained high; a Gallup poll found only 3% of Britons expected to lose the war in May 1940, another found an 88% approval rating for Churchill in July, and a third found 89% support for his leadership in October. Support for peace negotiations declined from 29% in February. Each setback caused more civilians to volunteer to become unpaid Local Defence Volunteers, workers worked longer shifts and over weekends, contributions rose to the £5,000 "Spitfire Funds" to build fighters, and the number of work days lost to strikes in 1940 was the lowest in history.:60–63,67–68,75,78–79,215–216

Q1: What drink was never rationed?
A1: beer
Q2: How many people attended cricket at Lord's?
A2: 13,000
Q3: What percent of Briton's expected to lose the war?
A3: 3%
Q4: What was Churchill's highest rating?
A4: 89%
Q5: What were Spitfire Funds used for?
A5: to build fighters
The civilians of London had an enormous role to play in the protection of their city. Many civilians who were unwilling or unable to join the military became members of the Home Guard, the Air Raid Precautions service (ARP), the Auxiliary Fire Service, and many other organisations. The AFS had 138,000 personnel by July 1939. Only one year earlier, there had only been 6,600 full-time and 13,800 part-time firemen in the entire country. During the Blitz, The Scout Association guided fire engines to where they were most needed, and became known as the "Blitz Scouts". Many unemployed were drafted into the Royal Army Pay Corps. These personnel, along with others from the Pioneer Corps, were charged with the task of salvage and clean-up.

Q1: What is ARP?
A1: Air Raid Precautions
Q2: The Auxiliary Fire Service had how many members in July of 1939?
A2: 138,000
Q3: Who was given the name Blitz Scouts?
A3: Scout Association
Q4: The Royal Army Pay Corps and what other group were in charge of salvage and clean-up?
A4: Pioneer Corps
The WVS (Women's Voluntary Services for Civil Defence) was set up under the direction of Samuel Hoare, Home Secretary in 1938 specifically in the event of air raids. Hoare considered it the female branch of the ARP. They organised the evacuation of children, established centres for those displaced by bombing, and operated canteens, salvage and recycling schemes. By the end of 1941, the WVS had one million members. Prior to the outbreak of war, civilians were issued with 50 million respirators (gas masks). These were issued in the event of bombing taking place with gas before evacuation.

Q1: What group did Samuel Hoare set up in 1938?
A1: Women's Voluntary Services for Civil Defence
Q2: Who was Home Secretary in 1938?
A2: Samuel Hoare
Q3: How many members did the WVS have at the end of 1941?
A3: one million
Q4: How many gas mask were issued before the war?
A4: 50 million
In the inter-war years and after 1940, Hugh Dowding, Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command has received credit for the defence of British air space and the failure of the Luftwaffe to achieve air superiority. However, Dowding had spent so much effort preparing day fighter defences, there was little to prevent the Germans carrying out an alternative strategy by bombing at night. When the Luftwaffe struck at British cities for the first time on 7 September 1940, a number of civic and political leaders were worried by Dowding's apparent lack of reaction to the new crisis.

Q1: Who was the Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command after 1940?
A1: Hugh Dowding
Q2: What credit did Dowding receive?
A2: defence of British air space
Q3: What strategy could the German's have used instead of day raids?
A3: bombing at night
Q4: Why were civic and political leaders worried about Dowdings?
A4: lack of reaction to the new crisis
Dowding accepted that as AOC, he was responsible for the day and night defence of Britain, and the blame, should he fail, would be laid at his door. When urgent changes and improvements needed to be made, Dowding seemed reluctant to act quickly. The Air Staff felt that this was due to his stubborn nature and reluctance to cooperate. Dowding's opponents in the Air Ministry, already critical of his handling of the day battle (see Battle of Britain Day and the Big Wing controversy), were ready to use these failings as a cudgel with which to attack him and his abilities.

Q1: Who was reluctant to act quickly when urgent changes need to be made?
A1: Dowding
Q2: Who thought Dowding was stubborn and didn't like to cooperate?
A2: Air Staff
Q3: What did the Air Ministry plan to do with his failures?
A3: attack him and his abilities
Q4: The Air Ministry was critical of Dowding after which battle?
A4: Battle of Britain Day
Dowding was summoned to an Air Ministry conference on 17 October 1940 to explain the poor state of night defences and the supposed (but ultimately successful) "failure" of his daytime strategy. The criticism of his leadership extended far beyond the Air Council, and the Minister of Aircraft Production, Lord Beaverbrook, and Churchill themselves intimated their support was waning. While the failure of night defence preparation was undeniable, it was not the AOC's responsibility to accrue resources. The general neglect of the RAF until the late spurt in 1938 had left sparse resources to build defences. While it was permissible to disagree with Dowding's operational and tactical deployment of forces, the failure of the Government and Air Ministry to allot resources was ultimately the responsibility of the civil and military institutions at large. In the pre-war period, the Chamberlain Government stated that night defence from air attack should not take up much of the national effort and, along with the Air Ministry, did not make it a priority.

Q1: Who was summoned to the Air Ministry conference on October 17, 1940?
A1: Dowding
Q2: Lord Beaverbrook and Churchill's support of Dowding was what?
A2: waning
Q3: Neglect of the RAF until 1938 caused what to happen?
A3: sparse resources to build defences
Q4: The Air Ministry and which other group decided to not make night defense a top priority?
A4: Chamberlain Government
The attitude of the Air Ministry was in contrast to the experiences of the First World War when a few German bombers caused physical and psychological damage out of all proportion to their numbers. Around 280 short tons (250 t) (9,000 bombs) had been dropped, killing 1,413 people and injuring 3,500 more. Most people aged 35 or over remembered the threat and greeted the bombings with great trepidation. From 1916–1918, German raids had diminished against countermeasures which demonstrated defence against night air raids was possible.

Q1: People over the age of 35 reacted to the bombings with what?
A1: great trepidation
Q2: Why had German raids decreased between 1916-1918?
A2: countermeasures
Q3: How many people were killed by bomb drops during the first World War?
A3: 1,413
Q4: How many bombs had been dropped?
A4: 9,000
Although night air defence was causing greater concern before the war, it was not at the forefront of RAF planning. Most of the resources went into planning for daylight fighter defences. The difficulty RAF bombers had navigating in darkness, led the British to believe German bombers would suffer the same problems and would be unable to reach and identify their targets. There was also a mentality in all air forces that, if they could carry out effective operations by day, night missions and their disadvantages could be avoided.

Q1: What did the RAF put most of their resources into?
A1: daylight fighter defences
Q2: RAF bombers had trouble flying at night, so the British believe the Germans would do what?
A2: suffer the same problems
Q3: What did the Air Force believe they could avoid if they carried out effective day missions?
A3: night missions and their disadvantages
Q4: Britain believe German bombers would be unable to reach and identify what?
A4: targets
British air doctrine, since the time of Chief of the Air Staff Hugh Trenchard in the early 1920s, had stressed offence was the best means of defence. British defensive strategy revolved around offensive action, what became known as the cult of the offensive. To prevent German formations from hitting targets in Britain, RAF's Bomber Command would destroy Luftwaffe aircraft on their own bases, aircraft in their factories and fuel reserves by attacking oil plants. This philosophy was impractical as Bomber Command lacked the technology and equipment and needed several years to develop it. This strategy retarded the development of fighter defences in the 1930s. Dowding agreed air defence would require some offensive action, and fighters could not defend Britain alone. Until September 1940, the RAF lacked specialist night-fighting aircraft and relied on anti-aircraft units which were poorly equipped and lacking in numbers.

Q1: What did the British offence become know as?
A1: cult of the offensive
Q2: Why was the tactic of bombing German aircraft bases, factories and fuel reserves impractical?
A2: lacked the technology and equipment
Q3: Until 1940 what type of aircraft did the RAF lacked?
A3: specialist night-fighting
Q4: What was wrong with the anti aircraft units?
A4: poorly equipped and lacking in numbers
Bomber crews already had some experience with these types of systems due to the deployment of the Lorenz beam, a commercial blind-landing aid which allowed aircraft to land at night or in bad weather. The Germans developed the short-range Lorenz system into the Knickebein aid, a system which used two Lorenz beams with much stronger signal transmissions. The concept was the same as the Lorenz system. Two aerials were rotated for the two converging beams which were pointed to cross directly over the target. The German bombers would attach themselves to either beam and fly along it until they started to pick up the signal from the other beam. When a continuous sound was heard from the second beam the crew knew they were above the target and began dropping their bombs.

Q1: What did the Lorenz beam allow aircraft to do?
A1: land at night or in bad weather
Q2: The Germans developed the Lorenz into what system?
A2: Knickebein
Q3: The Knickebein was the same as the Lorenz but used how many beams?
A3: two Lorenz beams
Q4: The Germans flew along one beam until they picked up the second beam the sound telling them when to start doing what?
A4: dropping their bombs
While Knickebein was used by German crews en masse, X-Gerät use was limited to specially trained pathfinder crews. Special receivers were mounted in He 111s, with a radio mast on the bomber's fuselage. The system worked on a higher frequency (66–77 MHz, compared to Knickebein's 30–33 MHz). Transmitters on the ground sent pulses at a rate of 180 per minute. X-Gerät received and analysed the pulses, giving the pilot both visual and aural "on course" signals. Three beams intersected the beam along the He 111's flight path. The first cross-beam acted as a warning for the bomb-aimer to start the bombing-clock which he would activate only when the second cross-beam was reached. When the third cross-beam was reached the bomb aimer activated a third trigger, which stopped the first hand of the equipment's clock, with the second hand continuing. When the second hand re-aligned with the first, the bombs were released. The clock's timing mechanism was co-ordinated with the distances of the intersecting beams from the target so the target was directly below when the bomb release occurred.

Q1: While Knickebein was used my most German crews who used the X-Gerat system?
A1: specially trained pathfinder crews
Q2: What frequency did the X-Gerat system use?
A2: 66–77 MHz
Q3: What rate per minute did ground transmitters send?
A3: 180
Q4: When the bomber crossed the first beam the bomber-aimer did what?
A4: start the bombing-clock
Q5: What mechanism cause the bombs to be released?
A5: clock's timing
Y-Gerät was the most complex system of the three. It was, in effect, an automatic beam-tracking system, operated through the bomber's autopilot. The single approach beam along which the bomber tracked was monitored by a ground controller. The signals from the station were retransmitted by the bomber's equipment. This way the distance the bomber travelled along the beam could be precisely verified. Direction-finding checks also enabled the controller to keep the crew on an exact course. The crew would be ordered to drop their bombs either by issue of a code word by the ground controller, or at the conclusion of the signal transmissions which would stop. Although its maximum usable range was similar to the previous systems, it was not unknown for specific buildings to be hit.

Q1: Which system was the most complex of the three?
A1: Y-Gerät
Q2: Who operated the automatic beam system?
A2: the bomber's autopilot
Q3: What kind of checks help to keep the plane on course?
A3: Direction-finding
Q4: The crew could be order to drop the bomb by what?
A4: a code word
Q5: Who issued the code word to the bombers?
A5: ground controller
In June 1940, a German prisoner of war was overheard boasting that the British would never find the Knickebein, even though it was under their noses. The details of the conversation were passed to an RAF Air Staff technical advisor, Dr. R. V. Jones, who started an in-depth investigation which discovered that the Luftwaffe's Lorenz receivers were more than blind-landing devices. Jones therefore began a search for the German beams. Avro Ansons of the Beam Approach Training Development Unit (BATDU) were flown up and down Britain fitted with a 30 MHz receiver to detect them. Soon a beam was traced to Derby (which had been mentioned in Luftwaffe transmissions). The first jamming operations were carried out using requisitioned hospital electrocautery machines. A subtle form of distortion was introduced. Up to nine special transmitters directed their signals at the beams in a manner that widened its path, negating its ability to accurately locate targets. Confidence in the device was diminished by the time the Luftwaffe decided to launch large-scale raids. The counter operations were carried out by British Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) units under Wing Commander Edward Addison, No. 80 Wing RAF. The production of false radio navigation signals by re-transmitting the originals was a technique known as masking beacons (meacons).

Q1: The beam was traced to what town?
A1: Derby
Q2: The Bean Approach Training Development Unit were fitted with what kind of transmitter to search for the Knickebein?
A2: 30 MHz receiver
Q3: In 1940 a German prisoner overheard boasting that the British would never find what system?
A3: Knickebein
Q4: Which RAF technical advisor was the conversation passed onto?
A4: Dr. R. V. Jones
Q5: The first jamming operation was carried out using what machines?
A5: electrocautery machines
German beacons operated on the medium-frequency band and the signals involved a two-letter Morse identifier followed by a lengthy time-lapse which enabled the Luftwaffe crews to determine the signal's bearing. The Meacon system involved separate locations for a receiver with a directional aerial and a transmitter. The receipt of the German signal by the receiver was duly passed to the transmitter, the signal to be repeated. The action did not guarantee automatic success. If the German bomber flew closer to its own beam than the Meacon then the former signal would come through the stronger on the direction finder. The reverse would apply only if the meacon were closer.

Q1: The German beacons used what frequency band?
A1: medium
Q2: What two letter identifier did the signal have?
A2: Morse
Q3: What system used a separate locations for a receiver and a directional aerial?
A3: Meacon
Q4: When a German bomber flew to close to its own beam what happened to the signal?
A4: stronger on the direction finder