romikgosai/squad_modified_2 huggingface dataset:
In August 1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. The American General Joseph Stilwell, who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land.

Q1: What Allied command replaced the British India Command in August, 1943?
A1: South East Asia Command
Q2: Who was appointed Supreme Commander of the SEAC in October, 1943?
A2: Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten
Q3: Who was deputy commander to Mountbatten?
A3: General Joseph Stilwell
Q4: What was the name of the new link between India and China by land?
A4: Ledo Road
Q5: The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to take on what force?
A5: Japanese in Burma
Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. The United States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential into increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew. At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, a good aircrew training program, or adequate naval resources and commerce defense, fell further and further behind. In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific, seizing one island base after another. Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul, and Formosa, were neutralized by air attack and bypassed. The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade, and finally (only if necessary) execute an invasion.

Q1: What did the United States turn it's industry to in the two years folloing the Battle of Midway?
A1: increased numbers of ships, planes, and trained aircrew
Q2: How were the bypassed Japanese strongholds neutralized?
A2: air attack
Q3: What blockade against Japan  was to be improved on?
A3: submarine blockade
U.S. submarines, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite in the Philippines (1941–42); Fremantle and Brisbane, Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam, played a major role in defeating Japan, even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy. Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military operations. By early 1945 Japanese oil supplies were so limited that its fleet was virtually stranded.

Q1: What did submarines sinking Japanese ships do?
A1: strangled Japan
Q2: What type of vessels were part of a major role in defeating Japan?
A2: submarines
Q3: What percent did submarines make up in the US Navy fighting Japan?
A3: two percent
Q4: What happened to the Japanese fleet when nearly all oil imports were cut off?
A4: virtually stranded
U.S. submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; mines or aircraft destroyed most of the rest. US submariners also claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed. Furthermore, they played important reconnaissance roles, as at the battles of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Gulf (October 1944) (and, coincidentally,[clarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers, including future U.S. president George H.W. Bush.

Q1: What percentage of Japanese merchantmen were sunk by U.S. submarines?
A1: 56%
Q2: What percentage of Japanese warships were sunk by U.S. submarines?
A2: 28%
Q3: What future U.S. president was rescued by a submarine?
A3: George H.W. Bush
Q4: What was one of the important roles submarine played in the war?
A4: reconnaissance roles
Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevelt promulgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis-controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors.[nb 13] At the outbreak of the war in the Pacific the Dutch Admiral in charge of the naval defense of the East Indies, Conrad Helfrich, gave instructions to wage war aggressively. His small force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in the first weeks of the war than the entire British and US navies together, an exploit which earned him the nickname "Ship-a-day Helfrich". The Dutch force were in fact the first to sink an enemy warship; On 24 December 1941, HNLMS K XVI torpedoed and sank the Japanese destroyer Sagiri.

Q1: What doctrine did Roosevelt give for submarines against Japan?
A1: unrestricted submarine warfare
Q2: Who was the Dutch Admiral in charge of the East Indies?
A2: Conrad Helfrich
Q3: What was the nickname given to the Dutch Admiral in charge of the East Indies?
A3: "Ship-a-day Helfrich"
Q4: What was the first Japanese warship to be sunk by submarine?
A4: Sagiri
Q5: When was the first Japanese warship sunk by a submarine?
A5: 24 December 1941
While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war U.S.) doctrine stipulated that only fleet battles, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) could win naval campaigns. So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, leaving it vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primarily for long-range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked U.S. supply lines. The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved little.

Q1: What doctrine stated that only fleet battles could win naval campaigns?
A1: Imperial Japanese Navy
Q2: What was commerce raiding refered to as?
A2: guerre de course
Q3: What was the primary use of Japanese submarines?
A3: long-range reconnaissance
Q4: When was the Japanese submarine offensive against Australia?
A4: 1942 and 1943
Q5: What did the Japanese submarine offensive against Austrailia achieve?
A5: little
The U.S. Navy, by contrast, relied on commerce raiding from the outset. However, the problem of Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines, during the early part of 1942, led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions. As well, basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while en route to patrol areas, reducing their effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for close surveillance of enemy bases. Furthermore, the standard-issue Mark 14 torpedo and its Mark VI exploder both proved defective, problems which were not corrected until September 1943. Worst of all, before the war, an uninformed US Customs officer had seized a copy of the Japanese merchant marine code (called the "maru code" in the USN), not knowing that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had broken it. The Japanese promptly changed it, and the new code was not broken again by OP-20G until 1943.

Q1: What did the US Navy rely on?
A1: commerce raiding
Q2: What led to guerrilla submarine missions in early 1942?
A2: Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines
Q3: What did Admiral Nimitze rely on submarines for?
A3: close surveillance of enemy bases
Q4: When were the defective torpedo problems of the US Navy corrected?
A4: September 1943
Q5: What was the "maru code"?
A5: Japanese merchant marine code
Thus, only in 1944 did the U.S. Navy begin to use its 150 submarines to maximum effect: installing effective shipboard radar, replacing commanders deemed lacking in aggression, and fixing the faults in the torpedoes. Japanese commerce protection was "shiftless beyond description,"[nb 14] and convoys were poorly organized and defended compared to Allied ones, a product of flawed IJN doctrine and training – errors concealed by American faults as much as Japanese overconfidence. The number of U.S. submarines patrols (and sinkings) rose steeply: 350 patrols (180 ships sunk) in 1942, 350 (335) in 1943, and 520 (603) in 1944. By 1945, sinkings of Japanese vessels had decreased because so few targets dared to venture out on the high seas. In all, Allied submarines destroyed 1,200 merchant ships – about five million tons of shipping. Most were small cargo-carriers, but 124 were tankers bringing desperately needed oil from the East Indies. Another 320 were passenger ships and troop transports. At critical stages of the Guadalcanal, Saipan, and Leyte campaigns, thousands of Japanese troops were killed or diverted from where they were needed. Over 200 warships were sunk, ranging from many auxiliaries and destroyers to one battleship and no fewer than eight carriers.

Q1: When did the US Navy begin to use it's submarines to maximum effect?
A1: 1944
Q2: How many Japanese ships were sunk in 1942 by United States submarines?
A2: 180
Q3: How many Japanese merchant ships did Allied submarines sink during the war?
A3: 1,200
Q4: How many Japanese carriers were sunk during the war?
A4: eight
Q5: How many Japanese ships were sunk in 1944 by United States submarines?
A5: 603
In mid-1944 Japan mobilized over 500,000 men  and launched a massive operation across China under the code name Operation Ichi-Go, their largest offensive of World War II, with the goal of connecting Japanese-controlled territory in China and French Indochina and capturing airbases in southeastern China where American bombers were based. During this time, many of the newest American-trained Chinese units and supplies were forcibly locked in the Burmese theater under Joseph Stilwell set by terms of the Lend-Lease Agreement. Though Japan suffered about 100,000 casualties, these attacks, the biggest in several years, gained much ground for Japan before Chinese forces stopped the incursions in Guangxi. Despite major tactical victories, the operation overall failed to provide Japan with any significant strategic gains. A great majority of the Chinese forces were able to retreat out of the area, and later come back to attack Japanese positions such as Battle of West Hunan. Japan was not any closer in defeating China after this operation, and the constant defeats the Japanese suffered in the Pacific meant that Japan never got the time and resources needed to achieve final victory over China. Operation Ichi-go created a great sense of social confusion in the areas of China that it affected. Chinese Communist guerrillas were able to exploit this confusion to gain influence and control of greater areas of the countryside in the aftermath of Ichi-go.

Q1: What was the code name for the mid-1944 offensive across China?
A1: Operation Ichi-Go
Q2: Where did the Chinese stop the Operation Ichi-Go incursion?
A2: Guangxi
Q3: What was the largest Japanese offensive in World War II?
A3: Operation Ichi-Go
Q4: Who was able to take advantage of the social confusion created by Operation Ichi-Go?
A4: Chinese Communist guerrillas
Q5: How many casualties did the Japanese suffer during Operation Ichi-Go?
A5: about 100,000
After the Allied setbacks in 1943, the South East Asia command prepared to launch offensives into Burma on several fronts. In the first months of 1944, the Chinese and American troops of the Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC), commanded by the American Joseph Stilwell, began extending the Ledo Road from India into northern Burma, while the XV Corps began an advance along the coast in the Arakan Province. In February 1944 the Japanese mounted a local counter-attack in the Arakan. After early Japanese success, this counter-attack was defeated when the Indian divisions of XV Corps stood firm, relying on aircraft to drop supplies to isolated forward units until reserve divisions could relieve them.

Q1: What command prepared offensives into Burma after the Allied setbacks in 1943?
A1: South East Asia command
Q2: Who led Chinese and American troops for NCAC?
A2: Joseph Stilwell
Q3: What road did the NCAC extend into northern Burma?
A3: Ledo Road
Q4: Who advanced aling the Arakan Province coast?
A4: XV Corps
Q5: Who did aircraft drop supplies to isolated units until they could be relieved?
A5: XV Corps
The Japanese responded to the Allied attacks by launching an offensive of their own into India in the middle of March, across the mountainous and densely forested frontier. This attack, codenamed Operation U-Go, was advocated by Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi, the recently promoted commander of the Japanese Fifteenth Army; Imperial General Headquarters permitted it to proceed, despite misgivings at several intervening headquarters. Although several units of the British Fourteenth Army had to fight their way out of encirclement, by early April they had concentrated around Imphal in Manipur state. A Japanese division which had advanced to Kohima in Nagaland cut the main road to Imphal, but failed to capture the whole of the defences at Kohima. During April, the Japanese attacks against Imphal failed, while fresh Allied formations drove the Japanese from the positions they had captured at Kohima.

Q1: What month did the Japanese launch an offensive into India?
A1: March
Q2: Who commanded the Japanese Fifteenth Army in Operation U-Go?
A2: Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi
Q3: Where had the Japanese advanced to?
A3: Kohima in Nagaland
Q4: What did the Japanese cut?
A4: main road to Imphal
Q5: What had the Japanese failed to capture?
A5: defences at Kohima
As many Japanese had feared, Japan's supply arrangements could not maintain her forces. Once Mutaguchi's hopes for an early victory were thwarted, his troops, particularly those at Kohima, starved. During May, while Mutaguchi continued to order attacks, the Allies advanced southwards from Kohima and northwards from Imphal. The two Allied attacks met on 22 June, breaking the Japanese siege of Imphal. The Japanese finally broke off the operation on 3 July. They had lost over 50,000 troops, mainly to starvation and disease. This represented the worst defeat suffered by the Japanese Army to that date.[citation needed]

Q1: What happened to Mutaguchi's troops?
A1: starved
Q2: When was the Japanese siege of Imphal broken?
A2: 22 June
Q3: How many troops had the Japanese lost?
A3: 50,000
Q4: What was the main cause of death of the Japanese troops?
A4: starvation and disease
Although the advance in the Arakan had been halted to release troops and aircraft for the Battle of Imphal, the Americans and Chinese had continued to advance in northern Burma, aided by the Chindits operating against the Japanese lines of communication. In the middle of 1944 the Chinese Expeditionary Force invaded northern Burma from Yunnan province. They captured a fortified position at Mount Song. By the time campaigning ceased during the monsoon rains, the NCAC had secured a vital airfield at Myitkyina (August 1944), which eased the problems of air resupply from India to China over "The Hump".

Q1: What battle was the advance in the Arakan halted to release troops for?
A1: Battle of Imphal
Q2: Who aided the Americans and Chinese during the advance in northern Burma?
A2: Chindits
Q3: What fortified position was captured by the Chinese Expeditionary Force?
A3: Mount Song
Q4: When did the Chinese invade northern Burma?
A4: middle of 1944
Q5: What airfield was taken by the NCAC in August, 1944?
A5: Myitkyina
It was imperative for Japanese commanders to hold Saipan. The only way to do this was to destroy the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which had 15 fleet carriers and 956 planes, 7 battleships, 28 submarines, and 69 destroyers, as well as several light and heavy cruisers. Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa attacked with nine-tenths of Japan's fighting fleet, which included nine carriers with 473 planes, 5 battleships, several cruisers, and 28 destroyers. Ozawa's pilots were outnumbered 2:1 and their aircraft were becoming or were already obsolete. The Japanese had considerable antiaircraft defenses but lacked proximity fuzes or good radar. With the odds against him, Ozawa devised an appropriate strategy. His planes had greater range because they were not weighed down with protective armor; they could attack at about 480 km (300 mi)[citation needed], and could search a radius of 900 km[citation needed] (560 mi). U.S. Navy Hellcat fighters could only attack within 200 miles (320 km) and only search within a 325-mile (523 km)[citation needed] radius. Ozawa planned to use this advantage by positioning his fleet 300 miles (480 km)[citation needed] out. The Japanese planes would hit the U.S. carriers, land at Guam to refuel, then hit the enemy again when returning to their carriers. Ozawa also counted on about 500 land-based planes at Guam and other islands.

Q1: What was it imperative for the Japanese to hold?
A1: Saipan
Q2: How many fleet carriers did the U.S. Fifth Fleet have?
A2: 15
Q3: How many fleet planes did the U.S. Fifth Fleet have?
A3: 956
Q4: What was the search radius of U.S. Navy Hellcat fighters?
A4: 325-mile
Q5: How many carriers did Ozawa have?
A5: nine
The forces converged in the largest sea battle of World War II up to that point. Over the previous month American destroyers had destroyed 17 of 25 submarines out of Ozawa's screening force. Repeated U.S. raids destroyed the Japanese land-based planes. Ozawa's main attack lacked coordination, with the Japanese planes arriving at their targets in a staggered sequence. Following a directive from Nimitz, the U.S. carriers all had combat information centers, which interpreted the flow of radar data and radioed interception orders to the Hellcats. The result was later dubbed the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The few attackers to reach the U.S. fleet encountered massive AA fire with proximity fuzes. Only one American warship was slightly damaged.

Q1: How many of Ozawa's submarines were sunk by American destroyers?
A1: 17
Q2: In what sequence did Japanese planes arrive at their targets?
A2: staggered
Q3: How many American warships were damaged during the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot?
A3: one
Q4: Where did the radio interception orders to U.S> Hellcat fighters come from?
A4: combat information centers
Q5: Who gave the directive for all carriers in the US Navy to have combat information centers?
A5: Nimitz
On the second day, U.S. reconnaissance planes located Ozawa's fleet, 275 miles (443 km)[citation needed] away, and submarines sank two Japanese carriers. Mitscher launched 230 torpedo planes and dive bombers. He then discovered the enemy was actually another 60 miles (97 km)[citation needed] further off, out of aircraft range (based on a roundtrip flight). Mitscher decided this chance to destroy the Japanese fleet was worth the risk of aircraft losses due to running out of fuel on the return flight. Overall, the U.S. lost 130 planes and 76 aircrew; however, Japan lost 450 planes, three carriers, and 445 aircrew. The Imperial Japanese Navy's carrier force was effectively destroyed.

Q1: On what day did U.S> planes located Ozawa's fleet?
A1: second
Q2: How many miles away was Ozawa's fleet located?
A2: 275
Q3: How many planes did the U.S. lose?
A3: 130
Q4: How many planes did Japan lose?
A4: 450
Q5: How many U.S. aircrews were lost?
A5: 76
The Battle of Leyte Gulf was arguably the largest naval battle in history and was the largest naval battle of World War II. It was a series of four distinct engagements fought off the Philippine island of Leyte from 23 to 26 October 1944. Leyte Gulf featured the largest battleships ever built, was the last time in history that battleships engaged each other, and was also notable as the first time that kamikaze aircraft were used. Allied victory in the Philippine Sea established Allied air and sea superiority in the western Pacific. Nimitz favored blockading the Philippines and landing on Formosa. This would give the Allies control of the sea routes to Japan from southern Asia, cutting off substantial Japanese garrisons. MacArthur favored an invasion of the Philippines, which also lay across the supply lines to Japan. Roosevelt adjudicated in favor of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Japanese Combined Fleet Chief Toyoda Soemu prepared four plans to cover all Allied offensive scenarios. On 12 October Nimitz launched a carrier raid against Formosa to make sure that planes based there could not intervene in the landings on Leyte. Toyoda put Plan Sho-2 into effect, launching a series of air attacks against the U.S. carriers. However the Japanese lost 600 planes in three days, leaving them without air cover.

Q1: What is argued to be the largest naval battle in history?
A1: Battle of Leyte Gulf
Q2: When did the Battle of Leyte Gulf occur?
A2: 23 to 26 October 1944
Q3: When did Nimitz launch a carrier raid against Formosa?
A3: 12 October
Q4: What was the largest naval battle in World War II?
A4: Battle of Leyte Gulf
Q5: What did Nimitz favor blockading?
A5: Philippines
Sho-1 called for V. Adm. Jisaburo Ozawa's force to use an apparently vulnerable carrier force to lure the U.S. 3rd Fleet away from Leyte and remove air cover from the Allied landing forces, which would then be attacked from the west by three Japanese forces: V. Adm. Takeo Kurita's force would enter Leyte Gulf and attack the landing forces; R. Adm. Shoji Nishimura's force and V. Adm. Kiyohide Shima's force would act as mobile strike forces. The plan was likely to result in the destruction of one or more of the Japanese forces, but Toyoda justified it by saying that there would be no sense in saving the fleet and losing the Philippines.

Q1: Who would enter Leyte Gulf to attack the Allied landing forces?
A1: V. Adm. Takeo Kurita
Q2: How many Japanese forces were likely to be destroyed?
A2: one or more
Q3: What was the namee of the plan where Ozawa's force would lure the U.S. 3rd Fleet away from Leyte?
A3: Sho-1
Kurita's "Center Force" consisted of five battleships, 12 cruisers and 13 destroyers. It included the two largest battleships ever built: Yamato and Musashi. As they passed Palawan Island after midnight on 23 October the force was spotted, and U.S. submarines sank two cruisers. On 24 October, as Kurita's force entered the Sibuyan Sea, USS Intrepid and USS Cabot launched 260 planes, which scored hits on several ships. A second wave of planes scored many direct hits on Musashi. A third wave, from USS Enterprise and USS Franklin hit Musashi with 11 bombs and eight torpedoes. Kurita retreated but in the evening turned around to head for San Bernardino Strait. Musashi sank at about 19:30.

Q1: How many battleships were in Kurita's "Center Force"?
A1: five
Q2: How many cruisers were in Kurita's "Center Force"?
A2: 12
Q3: How many destroyers were in Kurita's "Center Force"?
A3: 13
Q4: When did Kurita's force enter the Sibuyan Sea?
A4: 24 October