romikgosai/squad_modified_2 huggingface dataset:
In the 1920s and 1930s, air power theorists Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell espoused the idea that air forces could win wars by themselves, without a need for land and sea fighting. It was thought there was no defence against air attack, particularly at night. Enemy industry, their seats of government, factories and communications could be destroyed, effectively taking away their means to resist. It was also thought the bombing of residential centres would cause a collapse of civilian will, which might have led to the collapse of production and civil life. Democracies, where the populace was allowed to show overt disapproval of the ruling government, were thought particularly vulnerable. This thinking was prevalent in both the RAF and what was then known as the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC) between the two world wars. RAF Bomber Command's policy in particular would attempt to achieve victory through the destruction of civilian will, communications and industry.

Q1: In the 1920's and 30's to theorist thought wars could be won by air forces what were their names?
A1: Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell
Q2: Bombing of civilian's was believed to cause what?
A2: collapse of civilian will
Q3: What does USAAC stand for?
A3: United States Army Air Corps
Q4: What kind of populace was believed to be most vulnerable?
A4: Democracies
Q5: What kind of bombing raids were most favored?
A5: night
Within the Luftwaffe, there was a more muted view of strategic bombing. The OKL did not oppose the strategic bombardment of enemy industries and or cities, and believed it could greatly affect the balance of power on the battlefield in Germany's favour by disrupting production and damaging civilian morale, but they did not believe that air power alone could be decisive. Contrary to popular belief, the Luftwaffe did not have a systematic policy of what became known as "terror bombing". Evidence suggests that the Luftwaffe did not adopt an official bombing policy in which civilians became the primary target until 1942.

Q1: Who believe air power alone would not be decisive?
A1: Luftwaffe
Q2: What was the name of the Luftwaffe's bombing raids?
A2: terror bombing
Q3: What year did the terror bombing policy become official?
A3: 1942
Wever argued that the Luftwaffe General Staff should not be solely educated in tactical and operational matters. He argued they should be educated in grand strategy, war economics, armament production, and the mentality of potential opponents (also known as mirror imaging). Wever's vision was not realised; the General Staff studies in those subjects fell by the wayside, and the Air Academies focused on tactics, technology, and operational planning, rather than on independent strategic air offensives.

Q1: Who said the Luftwaffe General Staff should be taught grand strategy?
A1: Wever
Q2: What is the mentality of potential opponents also known as?
A2: mirror imaging
Q3: What did the Air Academies not focus on?
A3: independent strategic air offensives
Q4: What army does the general staff belong to?
A4: the Luftwaffe
In 1936, Wever was killed in an air crash. The failure to implement his vision for the new Luftwaffe was largely attributable to his immediate successors. Ex-Army personnel Albert Kesselring and Hans-Jürgen Stumpff are usually blamed for the turning away from strategic planning and focusing on close air support. However, it would seem the two most prominent enthusiasts for the focus on ground-support operations (direct or indirect) were actually Hugo Sperrle and Hans Jeschonnek. These men were long-time professional airmen involved in German air services since early in their careers. The Luftwaffe was not pressured into ground support operations because of pressure from the army, or because it was led by ex-army personnel. It was instead a mission that suited the Luftwaffe's existing approach to warfare; a culture of joint inter-service operations, rather than independent strategic air campaigns.

Q1: How did Wever die?
A1: air crash
Q2: What year did Wever die?
A2: 1936
Q3: Who took over for Wever after his death?
A3: Albert Kesselring and Hans-Jürgen Stumpff
Q4: What two men were the most important in ground support?
A4: Hugo Sperrle and Hans Jeschonnek
Q5: What long time careers were Sperrle and Jeschonnek involved in?
A5: German air services
Adolf Hitler failed to pay as much attention to bombing the enemy as he did to protection from enemy bombing, although he had promoted the development of a bomber force in the 1930s and understood that it was possible to use bombers for major strategic purposes. He told the OKL in 1939 that ruthless employment of the Luftwaffe against the heart of the British will to resist could and would follow when the moment was right; however, he quickly developed a lively scepticism toward strategic bombing, confirmed by the results of the Blitz. He frequently complained of the Luftwaffe's inability to damage industries sufficiently, saying, "The munitions industry cannot be interfered with effectively by air raids ... usually the prescribed targets are not hit".

Q1: What year was the beginning of enemy bombing first promoted by Hitler?
A1: 1930s
Q2: Why did Hitler feel the Luftwaffe was unsuccessful in bombing raids?
A2: prescribed targets are not hit
Q3: Why did Hitler feel bombing wasn't working?
A3: inability to damage industries
Q4: In 1939 Hitler said bombing of Britain would begin when?
A4: the moment was right
Q5: Who had skepticism towards strategic bombing?
A5: Adolf Hitler
Ultimately, Hitler was trapped within his own vision of bombing as a terror weapon, formed in the 1930s when he threatened smaller nations into accepting German rule rather than submit to air bombardment. This fact had important implications. It showed the extent to which Hitler personally mistook Allied strategy for one of morale breaking instead of one of economic warfare, with the collapse of morale as an additional bonus. Hitler was much more attracted to the political aspects of bombing. As the mere threat of it had produced diplomatic results in the 1930s, he expected that the threat of German retaliation would persuade the Allies to adopt a policy of moderation and not to begin a policy of unrestricted bombing. His hope was — for reasons of political prestige within Germany itself — that the German population would be protected from the Allied bombings. When this proved impossible, he began to fear that popular feeling would turn against his regime, and he redoubled efforts to mount a similar "terror offensive" against Britain in order to produce a stalemate in which both sides would hesitate to use bombing at all.

Q1: How did Hitler threaten small nations into accepting German rule?
A1: air bombardment
Q2: What policy did Hitler hope the bombing of Allies would cause?
A2: policy of moderation
Q3: What kind of prestige was Hitler hoping for?
A3: political
Q4: Why did Hitler use terror bombing against Britain?
A4: to produce a stalemate
A major problem in the managing of the Luftwaffe was Hermann Göring. Hitler believed the Luftwaffe was "the most effective strategic weapon", and in reply to repeated requests from the Kriegsmarine for control over aircraft insisted, "We should never have been able to hold our own in this war if we had not had an undivided Luftwaffe". Such principles made it much harder to integrate the air force into the overall strategy and produced in Göring a jealous and damaging defence of his "empire" while removing Hitler voluntarily from the systematic direction of the Luftwaffe at either the strategic or operational level. When Hitler tried to intervene more in the running of the air force later in the war, he was faced with a political conflict of his own making between himself and Göring, which was not fully resolved until the war was almost over. In 1940 and 1941, Göring's refusal to cooperate with the Kriegsmarine denied the entire Wehrmacht military forces of the Reich the chance to strangle British sea communications, which might have had strategic or decisive effect in the war against the British Empire.

Q1: Who did Hitler have a conflict over running the air force?
A1: Hermann Göring
Q2: What strategy could have worked against the British Empire?
A2: strangle British sea communications
Q3: What did the Kriegsmarine try to gain control over?
A3: aircraft
Q4: Who did Goring refuse to work with in 1940 and 1941?
A4: the Kriegsmarine
The deliberate separation of the Luftwaffe from the rest of the military structure encouraged the emergence of a major "communications gap" between Hitler and the Luftwaffe, which other factors helped to exacerbate. For one thing, Göring's fear of Hitler led him to falsify or misrepresent what information was available in the direction of an uncritical and over-optimistic interpretation of air strength. When Göring decided against continuing Wever's original heavy bomber programme in 1937, the Reichsmarschall's own explanation was that Hitler wanted to know only how many bombers there were, not how many engines each had. In July 1939, Göring arranged a display of the Luftwaffe's most advanced equipment at Rechlin, to give the impression the air force was more prepared for a strategic air war than was actually the case.

Q1: What was the major cause of the separation between the Luftwaffe and the other military structure?
A1: communications gap
Q2: What did Goring do because of his fear of Hitler?
A2: misrepresent what information
Q3: What year did Goring display the Luftwaffe's advanced equipment?
A3: 1939
Q4: Who's bombing program did Goring abandon in 1939?
A4: Wever
Q5: In what city did Goring display the advance equipment?
A5: Rechlin
Within hours of the UK and France declaring war on Germany on 3 September 1939, the RAF bombed German warships along the German coast at Wilhelmshaven. Thereafter bombing operations were against ports and shipping and propaganda leaflet drops. Operations were planned to minimize civilian casualties. From 15 May 1940 – the day after the Luftwaffe destroyed the centre of Rotterdam – the RAF also carried out operations east of the Rhine, attacking industrial and transportation targets. Operations were carried out every night thereafter.

Q1: Which two countries declared war on Germany on September 3 1939?
A1: UK and France
Q2: The RAF bombed what Germany coast?
A2: Wilhelmshaven
Q3: What kind of leaflets were dropped?
A3: propaganda
Q4: What were the RAF operations trying to lessen?
A4: civilian casualties
Q5: What year did the Luftwaffe destroy Rotterdam center?
A5: 1940
Although not specifically prepared to conduct independent strategic air operations against an opponent, the Luftwaffe was expected to do so over Britain. From July until September 1940 the Luftwaffe attacked RAF Fighter Command to gain air superiority as a prelude to invasion. This involved the bombing of English Channel convoys, ports, and RAF airfields and supporting industries. Destroying RAF Fighter Command would allow the Germans to gain control of the skies over the invasion area. It was supposed that Bomber Command, RAF Coastal Command and the Royal Navy could not operate under conditions of German air superiority.

Q1: Which tactics were the Luftwaffe excepted to use against Britain?
A1: air operations
Q2: Why did the Luftwaffe bomb the RAF Fighter Command?
A2: to gain air superiority
Q3: What was the name of the Channel the Luftwaffe bomb to try to gain air superiority?
A3: English
Q4: Which Navy was assumed not to be able to operate under German air superiority?
A4: Royal
The Luftwaffe's poor intelligence meant that their aircraft were not always able to locate their targets, and thus attacks on factories and airfields failed to achieve the desired results. British fighter aircraft production continued at a rate surpassing Germany's by 2 to 1. The British produced 10,000 aircraft in 1940, in comparison to Germany's 8,000. The replacement of pilots and aircrew was more difficult. Both the RAF and Luftwaffe struggled to replace manpower losses, though the Germans had larger reserves of trained aircrew. The circumstances affected the Germans more than the British. Operating over home territory, British flyers could fly again if they survived being shot down. German crews, even if they survived, faced capture. Moreover, bombers had four to five crewmen on board, representing a greater loss of manpower. On 7 September, the Germans shifted away from the destruction of the RAF's supporting structures. German intelligence suggested Fighter Command was weakening, and an attack on London would force it into a final battle of annihilation while compelling the British Government to surrender.

Q1: Why did the Luftwaffe fail to locate their targets?
A1: poor intelligence
Q2: What did German crew members face if they were shot down over Britain?
A2: capture
Q3: Britain's  fabrication  of fighter planes out paced Germany by what margin?
A3: 2 to 1
Q4: How big was the crew of a bomber?
A4: four to five crewmen
Q5: How many aircraft did Britain produce in 1940?
A5: 10,000
The decision to change strategy is sometimes claimed as a major mistake by the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL). It is argued that persisting with attacks on RAF airfields might have won air superiority for the Luftwaffe. Others argue that the Luftwaffe made little impression on Fighter Command in the last week of August and first week of September and that the shift in strategy was not decisive. It has also been argued that it was doubtful the Luftwaffe could have won air superiority before the "weather window" began to deteriorate in October. It was also possible, if RAF losses became severe, that they could pull out to the north, wait for the German invasion, then redeploy southward again. Other historians argue that the outcome of the air battle was irrelevant; the massive numerical superiority of British naval forces and the inherent weakness of the Kriegsmarine would have made the projected German invasion, Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion), a disaster with or without German air superiority.

Q1: What does OKL stand for?
A1: Oberkommando der Luftwaffe
Q2: What month would the weather window begin to decline?
A2: October
Q3: If serious loss had happened to the RAF where might they have pulled out of?
A3: the north
Q4: What is the German name of Operation Sea Lion?
A4: Unternehmen Seelöwe
Q5: Who had exponential larger naval forces?
A5: British naval forces
Regardless of the ability of the Luftwaffe to win air superiority, Adolf Hitler was frustrated that it was not happening quickly enough. With no sign of the RAF weakening, and Luftwaffe air fleets (Luftflotten) taking punishing losses, the OKL was keen for a change in strategy. To reduce losses further, a change in strategy was also favoured to take place at night, to give the bombers greater protection under cover of darkness.[b] On 4 September 1940, in a long address at the Sportspalast, Hitler declared: "And should the Royal Air Force drop two thousand, or three thousand [kilograms ...] then we will now drop [...] 300,000, 400,000, yes one million kilograms in a single night. And should they declare they will greatly increase their attacks on our cities, then we will erase their cities."

Q1: The Luftwaffe air fleets were taking what kind of losses?
A1: punishing
Q2: What did the punishing losses to the air fleet cause the Luftwaffe to do?
A2: change in strategy
Q3: What kind of strategy did the Luftwaffe use to give their bombers better protection?
A3: cover of darkness
Q4: What city did Hitler give a speech where he said he would erase British cities?
A4: Sportspalast
Q5: In what year did Hitler give the speech at Sportspalast?
A5: 1940
It was decided to focus on bombing Britain's industrial cities in daylight to begin with. The main focus of the bombing operations was against the city of London. The first major raid in this regard took place on 7 September. On 15 September, on a date known as the Battle of Britain Day, a large-scale raid was launched in daylight, but suffered significant loss for no lasting gain. Although there were a few large air battles fought in daylight later in the month and into October, the Luftwaffe switched its main effort to night attacks in order to reduce losses. This became official policy on 7 October. The air campaign soon got underway against London and other British cities. However, the Luftwaffe faced limitations. Its aircraft—Dornier Do 17, Junkers Ju 88, and Heinkel He 111s—were capable of carrying out strategic missions, but were incapable of doing greater damage because of bomb-load limitations. The Luftwaffe's decision in the interwar period to concentrate on medium bombers can be attributed to several reasons: Hitler did not intend or foresee a war with Britain in 1939; the OKL believed a medium bomber could carry out strategic missions just as well as a heavy bomber force; and Germany did not possess the resources or technical ability to produce four-engined bombers before the war.

Q1: Which British city did the Luftwaffe focus its bombing on?
A1: London
Q2: What was the name of the large air raid that took place in daylight hours in Britain?
A2: Battle of Britain Day
Q3: What was the main reason the Luftwaffe was not able to cause extensive damage with their missions?
A3: bomb-load limitations
Q4: What kind of bombers was Germany not able to build?
A4: four-engined bombers
Although it had equipment capable of doing serious damage, the problem for the Luftwaffe was its unclear strategy and poor intelligence. OKL had not been informed that Britain was to be considered a potential opponent until early 1938. It had no time to gather reliable intelligence on Britain's industries. Moreover, OKL could not settle on an appropriate strategy. German planners had to decide whether the Luftwaffe should deliver the weight of its attacks against a specific segment of British industry such as aircraft factories, or against a system of interrelated industries such as Britain's import and distribution network, or even in a blow aimed at breaking the morale of the British population. The Luftwaffe's strategy became increasingly aimless over the winter of 1940–1941. Disputes among the OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy. This method condemned the offensive over Britain to failure before it began.

Q1: What year did the OKL become aware that Britain would be a possible target?
A1: early 1938
Q2: What disagreements did the  Luftwaffe staff center around?
A2: tactics
Q3: Poor intelligence and what other problem made it difficult for the Luftwaffe to do extreme damage?
A3: unclear strategy
Q4: What did the disputes between the staff cause to happen to the strategy against Britain?
A4: failure before it began
In an operational capacity, limitations in weapons technology and quick British reactions were making it more difficult to achieve strategic effect. Attacking ports, shipping and imports as well as disrupting rail traffic in the surrounding areas, especially the distribution of coal, an important fuel in all industrial economies of the Second World War, would net a positive result. However, the use of delayed-action bombs, while initially very effective, gradually had less impact, partly because they failed to detonate.[c] Moreover, the British had anticipated the change in strategy and dispersed its production facilities making them less vulnerable to a concentrated attack. Regional commissioners were given plenipotentiary powers to restore communications and organise the distribution of supplies to keep the war economy moving.

Q1: Coupled with British quick reactions what cause operational capacity hard to achieve?
A1: limitations in weapons technology
Q2: What was an important fuel in the Second World War?
A2: coal
Q3: Who was given permission to restore power and move supplies to keep the war moving?
A3: Regional commissioners
Q4: What kind of bombs were effective in the beginning but became less so with time?
A4: delayed-action bombs
Q5: What did Britain do that helped make the new strategy less effective?
A5: dispersed its production facilities
Based on experience with German strategic bombing during World War I against the United Kingdom, the British government estimated after the war that 50 casualties— with about one third killed— would result for every tonne of bombs dropped on London. The estimate of tonnes of bombs an enemy could drop per day grew as aircraft technology advanced, from 75 in 1922, to 150 in 1934, to 644 in 1937. That year the Committee on Imperial Defence estimated that an attack of 60 days would result in 600,000 dead and 1,200,000 wounded. News reports of the Spanish Civil War, such as the bombing of Barcelona, supported the 50-casualties-per-tonne estimate. By 1938 experts generally expected that Germany would attempt to drop as much as 3,500 tonnes in the first 24 hours of war and average 700 tonnes a day for several weeks. In addition to high explosive and incendiary bombs the enemy would possibly use poison gas and even bacteriological warfare, all with a high degree of accuracy. In 1939 military theorist Basil Liddell-Hart predicted that 250,000 deaths and injuries in Britain could occur in the first week of war.

Q1: How many casualties did the British government estimate for every ton of bombs dropped?
A1: 50
Q2: As technology increased what was the amount of bombs that could be dropped in 1937 per day?
A2: 644
Q3: How many tons did experts expect Germany to drop in the first 24 hours of the war?
A3: 3,500
Q4: What committee estimated that 60 days of attacks would result in 600,000 deaths?
A4: Imperial Defence
Q5: Who was the military theorist in 1939 who said 250,000 deaths and injury could occur in the first week of war in Britian?
A5: Basil Liddell-Hart
In addition to the dead and wounded, government leaders feared mass psychological trauma from aerial attack and a resulting collapse of civil society. A committee of psychiatrists reported to the government in 1938 that there would be three times as many mental as physical casualties from aerial bombing, implying three to four million psychiatric patients. Winston Churchill told Parliament in 1934, "We must expect that, under the pressure of continuous attack upon London, at least three or four million people would be driven out into the open country around the metropolis." Panicked reactions during the Munich crisis, such as the migration by 150,000 to Wales, contributed to fear of societal chaos.

Q1: What was the biggest fear aerial attacks would cause besides death and wounded?
A1: psychological trauma
Q2: Psychiatrists believe in 1938  that mental trauma could reach how many millions?
A2: three to four
Q3: Where did 150,000 migrate during the Munich crisis?
A3: Wales
Q4: Who told Parliament that after long periods of attacks people would leave the cities for the country?
A4: Winston Churchill
The government planned to voluntarily evacuate four million people—mostly women and children—from urban areas, including 1.4 million from London. It expected about 90% of evacuees to stay in private homes, and conducted an extensive survey to determine available space. Detailed preparations for transporting them were developed. A trial blackout was held on 10 August 1939, and when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September a blackout began at sunset. Lights would not be allowed after dark for almost six years, and the blackout became by far the most unpopular aspect of the war for civilians, more than rationing.:51,106 The relocation of the government and the civil service was also planned, but would only have occurred if necessary so as not to damage civilian morale.:33

Q1: The government planned to evacuate 1.4 million from which city?
A1: London
Q2: What trial took place on August 10 1939?
A2: a blackout
Q3: What was most unpopular affect of the war with civilians ?
A3: the blackout
Q4: How long were lights not allowed on after dark?
A4: almost six years
Q5: Why did the government  and civil service not want to relocate during the war?
A5: damage civilian morale