romikgosai/squad_modified_2 huggingface dataset:
In philosophy, idealism is the group of philosophies which assert that reality, or reality as we can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. Epistemologically, idealism manifests as a skepticism about the possibility of knowing any mind-independent thing. In a sociological sense, idealism emphasizes how human ideas—especially beliefs and values—shape society. As an ontological doctrine, idealism goes further, asserting that all entities are composed of mind or spirit. Idealism thus rejects physicalist and dualist theories that fail to ascribe priority to the mind.

Q1: What do idealist philosophies say is constructed in our minds?
A1: reality
Q2: What types of things are idealist philosophies skeptical about?
A2: mind-independent
Q3: Along with physicalist theories, what theories is idealism in conflict with?
A3: dualist
Q4: In sociology, what sorts of ideas does idealism focus on?
A4: beliefs and values
The earliest extant arguments that the world of experience is grounded in the mental derive from India and Greece. The Hindu idealists in India and the Greek Neoplatonists gave panentheistic arguments for an all-pervading consciousness as the ground or true nature of reality. In contrast, the Yogācāra school, which arose within Mahayana Buddhism in India in the 4th century CE, based its "mind-only" idealism to a greater extent on phenomenological analyses of personal experience. This turn toward the subjective anticipated empiricists such as George Berkeley, who revived idealism in 18th-century Europe by employing skeptical arguments against materialism.

Q1: What Indian thinkers were early idealists?
A1: Hindu
Q2: What Greek philosophers had idealistic views?
A2: Neoplatonists
Q3: With what sect of Buddhism was the Yogācāra school affiliated?
A3: Mahayana
Q4: In what century did the Yogācāra school arise?
A4: 4th
Q5: What century did George Berkeley live in?
A5: 18th
Beginning with Immanuel Kant, German idealists such as G. W. F. Hegel, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, and Arthur Schopenhauer dominated 19th-century philosophy. This tradition, which emphasized the mental or "ideal" character of all phenomena, gave birth to idealistic and subjectivist schools ranging from British idealism to phenomenalism to existentialism. The historical influence of this branch of idealism remains central even to the schools that rejected its metaphysical assumptions, such as Marxism, pragmatism and positivism.

Q1: What was the ethnicity of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling?
A1: German
Q2: In what century did Hegel write?
A2: 19th
Q3: Along with British idealism and existentialism, what philosophy was influenced by the German idealistic tradition?
A3: phenomenalism
Q4: Along with positivism and pragmatism, what philosophy rejected idealism's metaphysical views but what nevertheless influenced by it?
A4: Marxism
Idealism is a term with several related meanings. It comes via idea from the Greek idein (ἰδεῖν), meaning "to see". The term entered the English language by 1743. In ordinary use, as when speaking of Woodrow Wilson's political idealism, it generally suggests the priority of ideals, principles, values, and goals over concrete realities. Idealists are understood to represent the world as it might or should be, unlike pragmatists, who focus on the world as it presently is. In the arts, similarly, idealism affirms imagination and attempts to realize a mental conception of beauty, a standard of perfection, juxtaposed to aesthetic naturalism and realism.

Q1: What does ἰδεῖν mean in English?
A1: to see
Q2: By what year was "idealism" a word in English?
A2: 1743
Q3: Whose worldview contrasts with that of idealists in the ordinary sense of the word?
A3: pragmatists
Q4: What language is ἰδεῖν?
A4: Greek
Any philosophy that assigns crucial importance to the ideal or spiritual realm in its account of human existence may be termed "idealist". Metaphysical idealism is an ontological doctrine that holds that reality itself is incorporeal or experiential at its core. Beyond this, idealists disagree on which aspects of the mental are more basic. Platonic idealism affirms that abstractions are more basic to reality than the things we perceive, while subjective idealists and phenomenalists tend to privilege sensory experience over abstract reasoning. Epistemological idealism is the view that reality can only be known through ideas, that only psychological experience can be apprehended by the mind.

Q1: What is the term used for philosophies that consider the spiritual to be of paramount importance?
A1: idealist
Q2: What branch of idealism believes that reality is fundamentally nonphysical?
A2: Metaphysical
Q3: What branch of idealism sees abstracts as more real than perceived objects?
A3: Platonic
Q4: Along with phenomenalists, what idealists believe the senses are more important than reason?
A4: subjective
Q5: What branch of idealism believes that we can only know the real world via ideas?
A5: Epistemological
Subjective idealists like George Berkeley are anti-realists in terms of a mind-independent world, whereas transcendental idealists like Immanuel Kant are strong skeptics of such a world, affirming epistemological and not metaphysical idealism. Thus Kant defines idealism as "the assertion that we can never be certain whether all of our putative outer experience is not mere imagining". He claimed that, according to idealism, "the reality of external objects does not admit of strict proof. On the contrary, however, the reality of the object of our internal sense (of myself and state) is clear immediately through consciousness."  However, not all idealists restrict the real or the knowable to our immediate subjective experience. Objective idealists make claims about a transempirical world, but simply deny that this world is essentially divorced from or ontologically prior to the mental. Thus Plato and Gottfried Leibniz affirm an objective and knowable reality transcending our subjective awareness—a rejection of epistemological idealism—but propose that this reality is grounded in ideal entities, a form of metaphysical idealism. Nor do all metaphysical idealists agree on the nature of the ideal; for Plato, the fundamental entities were non-mental abstract forms, while for Leibniz they were proto-mental and concrete monads.

Q1: Who is a notable subjective idealist?
A1: George Berkeley
Q2: What famous philosopher was a transcendental idealist?
A2: Immanuel Kant
Q3: Who are subjective idealists opposed to?
A3: realists
Q4: Along with Plato, what notable philosopher rejected epistemological idealism?
A4: Gottfried Leibniz
Q5: Who believed the essence of reality to be composed of monads?
A5: Leibniz
Christian theologians have held idealist views, often based on Neoplatonism, despite the influence of Aristotelian scholasticism from the 12th century onward. Later western theistic idealism such as that of Hermann Lotze offers a theory of the "world ground" in which all things find their unity: it has been widely accepted by Protestant theologians. Several modern religious movements, for example the organizations within the New Thought Movement and the Unity Church, may be said to have a particularly idealist orientation. The theology of Christian Science includes a form of idealism: it teaches that all that truly exists is God and God's ideas; that the world as it appears to the senses is a distortion of the underlying spiritual reality, a distortion that may be corrected (both conceptually and in terms of human experience) through a reorientation (spiritualization) of thought.

Q1: In what philosophy was Christian idealism often rooted?
A1: Neoplatonism
Q2: What philosophy influential in the medieval church was opposed to Christian idealism?
A2: Aristotelian scholasticism
Q3: In what century did Christian thought begin to be influenced by the scholasticism of Aristotle?
A3: 12th
Q4: Along with the Unity Church, what contemporary religious movement may be regarded as idealist?
A4: New Thought
Q5: What notable idealist was responsible for a "world ground" theory?
A5: Hermann Lotze
Plato's theory of forms or "ideas" describes ideal forms (for example the platonic solids in geometry or abstracts like Goodness and Justice), as universals existing independently of any particular instance. Arne Grøn calls this doctrine "the classic example of a metaphysical idealism as a transcendent idealism", while Simone Klein calls Plato "the earliest representative of metaphysical objective idealism". Nevertheless, Plato holds that matter is real, though transitory and imperfect, and is perceived by our body and its senses and given existence by the eternal ideas that are perceived directly by our rational soul. Plato was therefore a metaphysical and epistemological dualist, an outlook that modern idealism has striven to avoid: Plato's thought cannot therefore be counted as idealist in the modern sense, although quantum physics' assertion that man's consciousness is an immutable and primary requisite for not merely perceiving but shaping matter, and thus his reality, would give more credence to Plato's dualist position.[citation needed]

Q1: Who regarded Plato as the oldest exponent of metaphysical objective idealism?
A1: Simone Klein
Q2: What sort of dualist is Plato regarded as?
A2: metaphysical and epistemological
Q3: What was another term for forms in Plato's theory of forms?
A3: ideas
Q4: What branch of physics might support a worldview similar to Platonic dualism?
A4: quantum
With the neoplatonist Plotinus, wrote Nathaniel Alfred Boll; "there even appears, probably for the first time in Western philosophy, idealism that had long been current in the East even at that time, for it taught... that the soul has made the world by stepping from eternity into time...". Similarly, in regard to passages from the Enneads, "The only space or place of the world is the soul" and "Time must not be assumed to exist outside the soul", Ludwig Noiré wrote: "For the first time in Western philosophy we find idealism proper in Plotinus, However, Plotinus does not address whether we know external objects, unlike Schopenhauer and other modern philosophers.

Q1: What sort of philosopher was Plotinus?
A1: neoplatonist
Q2: According to Noiré, who was the first true Western idealist?
A2: Plotinus
Q3: What issue did Schopenhauer discuss that Plotinus did not?
A3: whether we know external objects
Q4: What did the Enneads believe might not have existence outside of the soul?
A4: Time
Subjective Idealism (immaterialism or phenomenalism) describes a relationship between experience and the world in which objects are no more than collections or "bundles" of sense data in the perceiver. Proponents include Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, an Anglo-Irish philosopher who advanced a theory he called immaterialism, later referred to as "subjective idealism", contending that individuals can only know sensations and ideas of objects directly, not abstractions such as "matter", and that ideas also depend upon being perceived for their very existence - esse est percipi; "to be is to be perceived".

Q1: Along with phenomenalism, what is another term for subjective idealism?
A1: immaterialism
Q2: Of what see was Berkeley bishop?
A2: Cloyne
Q3: What was Berkeley's ethnicity?
A3: Anglo-Irish
Q4: What does esse est percipi mean?
A4: to be is to be perceived
Q5: What did Berkeley consider things like matter to be?
A5: abstractions
Arthur Collier published similar assertions though there seems to have been no influence between the two contemporary writers. The only knowable reality is the represented image of an external object. Matter as a cause of that image, is unthinkable and therefore nothing to us. An external world as absolute matter unrelated to an observer does not exist as far as we are concerned. The universe cannot exist as it appears if there is no perceiving mind. Collier was influenced by An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World by "Cambridge Platonist" John Norris (1701).

Q1: Who was known as the "Cambridge Platonist"?
A1: John Norris
Q2: Who was notably influenced by John Norris?
A2: Arthur Collier
Q3: When was An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World written?
A3: 1701
Q4: What sort of reality did Collier believe was knowable?
A4: represented image of an external object
and proliferation of hyphenated entities such as "thing-in-itself" (Immanuel Kant), "things-as-interacted-by-us" (Arthur Fine), "table-of-commonsense" and "table-of-physics" (Sir Arthur Eddington) which are "warning signs" for conceptual idealism according to Musgrave because they allegedly do not exist but only highlight the numerous ways in which people come to know the world. This argument does not take into account the issues pertaining to hermeneutics, especially at the backdrop of analytic philosophy. Musgrave criticized Richard Rorty and Postmodernist philosophy in general for confusion of use and mention.

Q1: Who coined the term "thing-in-itself"?
A1: Immanuel Kant
Q2: Who invented the idea of a "table-of-commonsense"?
A2: Sir Arthur Eddington
Q3: Who came up with the idea of "things-as-interacted-by-us"?
A3: Arthur Fine
Q4: Who spoke of the "warning signs" of idealism?
A4: Musgrave
Q5: What sort of philosopher was Richard Rorty?
A5: Postmodernist
A. A. Luce and John Foster are other subjectivists. Luce, in Sense without Matter (1954), attempts to bring Berkeley up to date by modernizing his vocabulary and putting the issues he faced in modern terms, and treats the Biblical account of matter and the psychology of perception and nature. Foster's The Case for Idealism argues that the physical world is the logical creation of natural, non-logical constraints on human sense-experience. Foster's latest defense of his views is in his book A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism.

Q1: What sort of thinkers were Foster and Luce?
A1: subjectivists
Q2: What book was written by A.A. Luce?
A2: Sense without Matter
Q3: What year saw the publication of Sense without Matter?
A3: 1954
Q4: Who wrote A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism?
A4: Foster
Q5: Whose work is Sense without Matter regarded as updating?
A5: Berkeley
The 2nd edition (1787) contained a Refutation of Idealism to distinguish his transcendental idealism from Descartes's Sceptical Idealism and Berkeley's anti-realist strain of Subjective Idealism. The section Paralogisms of Pure Reason is an implicit critique of Descartes' idealism. Kant says that it is not possible to infer the 'I' as an object (Descartes' cogito ergo sum) purely from "the spontaneity of thought". Kant focused on ideas drawn from British philosophers such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume but distinguished his transcendental or critical idealism from previous varieties;

Q1: What school of thought did Berkeley belong to?
A1: Subjective Idealism
Q2: What sort of idealist was Descartes?
A2: Sceptical
Q3: In what section was Descartes criticized?
A3: Paralogisms of Pure Reason
Q4: In what edition was there a Refutation of Idealism?
A4: 2nd
Q5: When was the second edition published?
A5: 1787
In the first volume of his Parerga and Paralipomena, Schopenhauer wrote his "Sketch of a History of the Doctrine of the Ideal and the Real". He defined the ideal as being mental pictures that constitute subjective knowledge. The ideal, for him, is what can be attributed to our own minds. The images in our head are what comprise the ideal. Schopenhauer emphasized that we are restricted to our own consciousness. The world that appears is only a representation or mental picture of objects. We directly and immediately know only representations. All objects that are external to the mind are known indirectly through the mediation of our mind. He offered a history of the concept of the "ideal" as "ideational" or "existing in the mind as an image".

Q1: Who wrote Parerga and Paralipomena?
A1: Schopenhauer
Q2: What type of knowledge did Schopenhauer believe the ideal to be?
A2: subjective
Q3: According to Schopenhauer, to what can the ideal be attributed?
A3: our own minds
Q4: What did Schopenhauer believe we were restricted to?
A4: our own consciousness
Q5: What did Schopenhauer believe were the only things we could know?
A5: representations
Friedrich Nietzsche argued that Kant commits an agnostic tautology and does not offer a satisfactory answer as to the source of a philosophical right to such-or-other metaphysical claims; he ridicules his pride in tackling "the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics." The famous "thing-in-itself" was called a product of philosophical habit, which seeks to introduce a grammatical subject: because wherever there is cognition, there must be a thing that is cognized and allegedly it must be added to ontology as a being (whereas, to Nietzsche, only the world as ever changing appearances can be assumed). Yet he attacks the idealism of Schopenhauer and Descartes with an argument similar to Kant's critique of the latter (see above).

Q1: Who censured Kant for his agnostic tautology?
A1: Friedrich Nietzsche
Q2: Along with Schopenhauer, whose idealism did Nietzsche attack?
A2: Descartes
Q3: Nietzsche's attack on Schopenhauer used an argument similar to Kant's attack on who?
A3: Descartes
Absolute idealism is G. W. F. Hegel's account of how existence is comprehensible as an all-inclusive whole. Hegel called his philosophy "absolute" idealism in contrast to the "subjective idealism" of Berkeley and the "transcendental idealism" of Kant and Fichte, which were not based on a critique of the finite and a dialectical philosophy of history as Hegel's idealism was. The exercise of reason and intellect enables the philosopher to know ultimate historical reality, the phenomenological constitution of self-determination, the dialectical development of self-awareness and personality in the realm of History.

Q1: According to Hegel, what sort of idealist was Fichte?
A1: transcendental
Q2: Who did Hegel see as a subjective idealist?
A2: Berkeley
Q3: What sort of idealist did Hegel define himself as?
A3: Absolute
Q4: How did Hegel believe historical reality to be knowable to a philosopher?
A4: exercise of reason and intellect
In his Science of Logic (1812–1814) Hegel argues that finite qualities are not fully "real" because they depend on other finite qualities to determine them. Qualitative infinity, on the other hand, would be more self-determining and hence more fully real. Similarly finite natural things are less "real"—because they are less self-determining—than spiritual things like morally responsible people, ethical communities and God. So any doctrine, such as materialism, that asserts that finite qualities or natural objects are fully real is mistaken.

Q1: When was Science of Logic written?
A1: 1812–1814
Q2: Who was the author of Science of Logic?
A2: Hegel
Q3: Why did Hegel believe natural things are less real than spiritual things?
A3: less self-determining
Q4: Along with God and morally responsible people, what is an example of a spiritual thing to Hegel?
A4: ethical communities
Q5: What is an example of a school of thought Hegel believed to be wrong?
A5: materialism
Hegel certainly intends to preserve what he takes to be true of German idealism, in particular Kant's insistence that ethical reason can and does go beyond finite inclinations. For Hegel there must be some identity of thought and being for the "subject" (any human observer)) to be able to know any observed "object" (any external entity, possibly even another human) at all. Under Hegel's concept of "subject-object identity," subject and object both have Spirit (Hegel's ersatz, redefined, nonsupernatural "God") as their conceptual (not metaphysical) inner reality—and in that sense are identical. But until Spirit's "self-realization" occurs and Spirit graduates from Spirit to Absolute Spirit status, subject (a human mind) mistakenly thinks every "object" it observes is something "alien," meaning something separate or apart from "subject." In Hegel's words, "The object is revealed to it [to "subject"] by [as] something alien, and it does not recognize itself." Self-realization occurs when Hegel (part of Spirit's nonsupernatural Mind, which is the collective mind of all humans) arrives on the scene and realizes that every "object" is himself, because both subject and object are essentially Spirit. When self-realization occurs and Spirit becomes Absolute Spirit, the "finite" (man, human) becomes the "infinite" ("God," divine), replacing the imaginary or "picture-thinking" supernatural God of theism: man becomes God. Tucker puts it this way: "Hegelianism . . . is a religion of self-worship whose fundamental theme is given in Hegel's image of the man who aspires to be God himself, who demands 'something more, namely infinity.'" The picture Hegel presents is "a picture of a self-glorifying humanity striving compulsively, and at the end successfully, to rise to divinity."

Q1: In Hegel's thought, what inner reality is possessed by both subject and object?
A1: Spirit
Q2: What is another term for Hegel's "subject"?
A2: any human observer
Q3: What does Spirit turn into when a person arrives at self-realization?
A3: Absolute Spirit
Q4: What does Hegel mean by "object"?
A4: any external entity
Q5: Who did Tucker argue that Hegel's philosophy involved the worship of?
A5: self
Kierkegaard criticised Hegel's idealist philosophy in several of his works, particularly his claim to a comprehensive system that could explain the whole of reality. Where Hegel argues that an ultimate understanding of the logical structure of the world is an understanding of the logical structure of God's mind, Kierkegaard asserting that for God reality can be a system but it cannot be so for any human individual because both reality and humans are incomplete and all philosophical systems imply completeness. A logical system is possible but an existential system is not. "What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational". Hegel's absolute idealism blurs the distinction between existence and thought: our mortal nature places limits on our understanding of reality;

Q1: Who was a notable critic of Hegel?
A1: Kierkegaard
Q2: For whom did Kierkegaard argue reality cannot be a system?
A2: human
Q3: According to Kierkegaard, why can't reality be a system for human beings?
A3: humans are incomplete
Q4: Even though Kierkegaard does not believe in the possibility of an existential system of reality, what sort of system can exist?
A4: logical
A major concern of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and of the philosophy of Spirit that he lays out in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817–1830) is the interrelation between individual humans, which he conceives in terms of "mutual recognition." However, what Climacus means by the aforementioned statement, is that Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right, believed the best solution was to surrender one's individuality to the customs of the State, identifying right and wrong in view of the prevailing bourgeois morality. Individual human will ought, at the State's highest level of development, to properly coincide with the will of the State. Climacus rejects Hegel's suppression of individuality by pointing out it is impossible to create a valid set of rules or system in any society which can adequately describe existence for any one individual. Submitting one's will to the State denies personal freedom, choice, and responsibility.

Q1: Who wrote Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences?
A1: Hegel
Q2: When was Phenomenology of Spirit published?
A2: 1807
Q3: What trait did Climacus believe that Hegel suppressed?
A3: individuality
Q4: Whose will did Hegel believe should prevail over that of the individual?
A4: State
Q5: What conception of right and wrong did Climacus believe Hegel endorsed?
A5: bourgeois