romikgosai/squad_modified_2 huggingface dataset:
Popper died of "complications of cancer, pneumonia and kidney failure" in Kenley at the age of 92 on 17 September 1994. He had been working continuously on his philosophy until two weeks before, when he suddenly fell terminally ill. After cremation, his ashes were taken to Vienna and buried at Lainzer cemetery adjacent to the ORF Centre, where his wife Josefine Anna Popper (called ‘Hennie’) had already been buried. Popper's estate is managed by his secretary and personal assistant Melitta Mew and her husband Raymond. Popper's manuscripts went to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, partly during his lifetime and partly as supplementary material after his death. Klagenfurt University possesses Popper's library, including his precious bibliophilia, as well as hard copies of the original Hoover material and microfilms of the supplementary material. The remaining parts of the estate were mostly transferred to The Karl Popper Charitable Trust. In October 2008 Klagenfurt University acquired the copyrights from the estate.

Q1: How old was Popper when he died?
A1: 92
Q2: Which cemetery in Vienna received Popper's ashes?
A2: Lainzer
Q3: Where are Popper's manuscripts kept now?
A3: Hoover Institution at Stanford University
Q4: Which university has the contents of Popper's library?
A4: Klagenfurt University
Q5: What was Popper's wife's name?
A5: Josefine Anna Popper
Popper won many awards and honours in his field, including the Lippincott Award of the American Political Science Association, the Sonning Prize, the Otto Hahn Peace Medal of the United Nations Association of Germany in Berlin and fellowships in the Royal Society, British Academy, London School of Economics, King's College London, Darwin College, Cambridge, and Charles University, Prague. Austria awarded him the Grand Decoration of Honour in Gold for Services to the Republic of Austria in 1986, and the Federal Republic of Germany its Grand Cross with Star and Sash of the Order of Merit, and the peace class of the Order Pour le Mérite. He received the Humanist Laureate Award from the International Academy of Humanism. He was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1965, and was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1976. He was invested with the Insignia of a Companion of Honour in 1982.

Q1: Which award did Popper receive from the American Political Science Association?
A1: Lippincott Award
Q2: What recognition did Austria bestow on Popper in 1986?
A2: Grand Decoration of Honour in Gold for Services to the Republic of Austria
Q3: Who gave Popper its Humanist Laureate Award?
A3: International Academy of Humanism
Q4: Which English monarch knighted Popper?
A4: Queen Elizabeth II
Q5: Which central European university made Popper a fellow?
A5: Charles University, Prague
Other awards and recognition for Popper included the City of Vienna Prize for the Humanities (1965), Karl Renner Prize (1978), Austrian Decoration for Science and Art (1980), Dr. Leopold Lucas Prize (1981), Ring of Honour of the City of Vienna (1983) and the Premio Internazionale of the Italian Federico Nietzsche Society (1988). In 1992, he was awarded the Kyoto Prize in Arts and Philosophy for "symbolising the open spirit of the 20th century" and for his "enormous influence on the formation of the modern intellectual climate".

Q1: In which year did Popper win the Karl Renner Prize?
A1: 1978
Q2: Which city made Popper part of its Ring of Honour in 1983?
A2: Vienna
Q3: What award given by a Japanese foundation did Popper win in 1992?
A3: Kyoto Prize in Arts and Philosophy
Q4: Popper won the Dr. Leopold Lucas Prize in which year?
A4: 1981
Karl Popper's rejection of Marxism during his teenage years left a profound mark on his thought. He had at one point joined a socialist association, and for a few months in 1919 considered himself a communist. During this time he became familiar with the Marxist view of economics, class-war, and history. Although he quickly became disillusioned with the views expounded by Marxism, his flirtation with the ideology led him to distance himself from those who believed that spilling blood for the sake of a revolution was necessary. He came to realise that when it came to sacrificing human lives, one was to think and act with extreme prudence.

Q1: What political philosophy that attracted Popper as a teenager had a profound influence on his thinking going forward?
A1: Marxism
Q2: For a time during which year did Popper consider himself a communist?
A2: 1919
Q3: At which stage of life was Popper most strongly influenced by Marxist thinking?
A3: teenage years
Q4: How did Popper feel about Marxism after only a short time associating with other Marxists?
A4: disillusioned
The failure of democratic parties to prevent fascism from taking over Austrian politics in the 1920s and 1930s traumatised Popper. He suffered from the direct consequences of this failure, since events after the Anschluss, the annexation of Austria by the German Reich in 1938, forced him into permanent exile. His most important works in the field of social science—The Poverty of Historicism (1944) and The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945)—were inspired by his reflection on the events of his time and represented, in a sense, a reaction to the prevalent totalitarian ideologies that then dominated Central European politics. His books defended democratic liberalism as a social and political philosophy. They also represented extensive critiques of the philosophical presuppositions underpinning all forms of totalitarianism.

Q1: What political ideology dominated Austrian politics in the decades before the second world war?
A1: fascism
Q2: What key event in 1938 pushed Popper into exile from Austria?
A2: the Anschluss
Q3: What political ideology do Popper's major works defend?
A3: democratic liberalism
Q4: What form of political organization do Popper's works mainly critique?
A4: totalitarianism
Q5: What was the Anschluss?
A5: the annexation of Austria by the German Reich
Popper puzzled over the stark contrast between the non-scientific character of Freud and Adler's theories in the field of psychology and the revolution set off by Einstein's theory of relativity in physics in the early 20th century. Popper thought that Einstein's theory, as a theory properly grounded in scientific thought and method, was highly "risky", in the sense that it was possible to deduce consequences from it which were, in the light of the then-dominant Newtonian physics, highly improbable (e.g., that light is deflected towards solid bodies—confirmed by Eddington's experiments in 1919), and which would, if they turned out to be false, falsify the whole theory. In contrast, nothing could, even in principle, falsify psychoanalytic theories. He thus came to the conclusion that psychoanalytic theories had more in common with primitive myths than with genuine science.

Q1: Which two important psychologists did Popper view as advancing non-scientific theories?
A1: Freud and Adler
Q2: Whose recent breakthrough in physics did Popper view as paradigmatic science?
A2: Einstein
Q3: What quality of the theory of relativity did Popper believe made it proper science?
A3: risky
Q4: What did Popper think psychoanalytic theory shared more feature with than real science ?
A4: primitive myths
Q5: What could you not do to psychoanalytic theory that Popper believed crucial in genuine science?
A5: falsify
This led Popper to conclude that what were regarded[by whom?] as the remarkable strengths of psychoanalytical theories were actually their weaknesses. Psychoanalytical theories were crafted in a way that made them able to refute any criticism and to give an explanation for every possible form of human behaviour. The nature of such theories made it impossible for any criticism or experiment - even in principle - to show them to be false. This realisation had an important consequence when Popper later tackled the problem of demarcation in the philosophy of science, as it led him to posit that the strength of a scientific theory lies in its both being susceptible to falsification, and not actually being falsified by criticism made of it. He considered that if a theory cannot, in principle, be falsified by criticism, it is not a scientific theory.

Q1: According to Popper, a theory is scientific only is it is susceptible to what?
A1: falsification
Q2: What key components of science are ineffective when brought to bear on non-scientific theories?
A2: criticism or experiment
Q3: How did Popper characterize the wide applicability and immunity to criticism of psychoanalytic theory?
A3: weaknesses
Popper coined the term "critical rationalism" to describe his philosophy. Concerning the method of science, the term indicates his rejection of classical empiricism, and the classical observationalist-inductivist account of science that had grown out of it. Popper argued strongly against the latter, holding that scientific theories are abstract in nature, and can be tested only indirectly, by reference to their implications. He also held that scientific theory, and human knowledge generally, is irreducibly conjectural or hypothetical, and is generated by the creative imagination to solve problems that have arisen in specific historico-cultural settings.

Q1: What term did Popper use for his philosophy?
A1: critical rationalism
Q2: Which account of scientific method did Popper's repudiate?
A2: the classical observationalist-inductivist account
Q3: What was Popper's position on classical empiricism?
A3: rejection
Q4: According to Popper, what is the only way one can test scientific theories because they are necessarily abstract?
A4: indirectly
Logically, no number of positive outcomes at the level of experimental testing can confirm a scientific theory, but a single counterexample is logically decisive: it shows the theory, from which the implication is derived, to be false. To say that a given statement (e.g., the statement of a law of some scientific theory) -- [call it "T"] -- is "falsifiable" does not mean that "T" is false. Rather, it means that, if "T" is false, then (in principle), "T" could be shown to be false, by observation or by experiment. Popper's account of the logical asymmetry between verification and falsifiability lies at the heart of his philosophy of science. It also inspired him to take falsifiability as his criterion of demarcation between what is, and is not, genuinely scientific: a theory should be considered scientific if, and only if, it is falsifiable. This led him to attack the claims of both psychoanalysis and contemporary Marxism to scientific status, on the basis that their theories are not falsifiable.

Q1: Popper pointed out an important logical asymmetry between what two concepts?
A1: verification and falsifiability
Q2: What does Popper say demarcates scientific theory from non-science?
A2: falsifiability
Q3: What political theory did Popper say did not meet his falsifiability criterion?
A3: Marxism
Q4: What branch of psychology was Popper critical of for not producing falsifiable theory?
A4: psychoanalysis
In All Life is Problem Solving, Popper sought to explain the apparent progress of scientific knowledge – that is, how it is that our understanding of the universe seems to improve over time. This problem arises from his position that the truth content of our theories, even the best of them, cannot be verified by scientific testing, but can only be falsified. Again, in this context the word "falsified" does not refer to something being "fake"; rather, that something can be (i.e., is capable of being) shown to be false by observation or experiment. Some things simply do not lend themselves to being shown to be false, and therefore, are not falsifiable. If so, then how is it that the growth of science appears to result in a growth in knowledge? In Popper's view, the advance of scientific knowledge is an evolutionary process characterised by his formula:

Q1: Which of Popper's works addresses the improvement of scientific understanding of the world over time?
A1: All Life is Problem Solving
Q2: Popper described the growth of scientific understanding as what kind of process?
A2: evolutionary
Q3: What aspect of a scientific theory can never be fully verified, according to Popper?
A3: truth content
In response to a given problem situation (), a number of competing conjectures, or tentative theories (), are systematically subjected to the most rigorous attempts at falsification possible. This process, error elimination (), performs a similar function for science that natural selection performs for biological evolution. Theories that better survive the process of refutation are not more true, but rather, more "fit"—in other words, more applicable to the problem situation at hand (). Consequently, just as a species' biological fitness does not ensure continued survival, neither does rigorous testing protect a scientific theory from refutation in the future. Yet, as it appears that the engine of biological evolution has, over many generations, produced adaptive traits equipped to deal with more and more complex problems of survival, likewise, the evolution of theories through the scientific method may, in Popper's view, reflect a certain type of progress: toward more and more interesting problems (). For Popper, it is in the interplay between the tentative theories (conjectures) and error elimination (refutation) that scientific knowledge advances toward greater and greater problems; in a process very much akin to the interplay between genetic variation and natural selection.

Q1: What process in science is like the process of natural selection in nature?
A1: error elimination
Q2: What is a better description for theories that survive scientific scrutiny than "more true?"
A2: more "fit"
Q3: What is another term for the tentative theories enter the process of error elimination in science?
A3: conjectures
Q4: Toward what does Popper believe scientific understandings progress?
A4: more and more interesting problems
Among his contributions to philosophy is his claim to have solved the philosophical problem of induction. He states that while there is no way to prove that the sun will rise, it is possible to formulate the theory that every day the sun will rise; if it does not rise on some particular day, the theory will be falsified and will have to be replaced by a different one. Until that day, there is no need to reject the assumption that the theory is true. Nor is it rational according to Popper to make instead the more complex assumption that the sun will rise until a given day, but will stop doing so the day after, or similar statements with additional conditions.

Q1: Popper's thoughts on falsification present a solution to the philosophical problem concerning what type of scientific reasoning?
A1: induction
Q2: What parts of a theory are unnecessary before the simple theory is falsified?
A2: additional conditions
Q3: Who presented a solution to the philosophical problem of induction centered around falsifiability?
A3: Popper
Popper held that rationality is not restricted to the realm of empirical or scientific theories, but that it is merely a special case of the general method of criticism, the method of finding and eliminating contradictions in knowledge without ad-hoc-measures. According to this view, rational discussion about metaphysical ideas, about moral values and even about purposes is possible. Popper's student W.W. Bartley III tried to radicalise this idea and made the controversial claim that not only can criticism go beyond empirical knowledge, but that everything can be rationally criticised.

Q1: Popper's rational approach opposes what technique sometimes used to remove contradictions in knowledge?
A1: ad-hoc-measures
Q2: Which of Popper's students argued that rational criticism should be most widely applied?
A2: W.W. Bartley III
Q3: What type of knowledge is not the only sphere of rational criticism, according to Popper's student W.W. Bartley III?
A3: empirical
To Popper, who was an anti-justificationist, traditional philosophy is misled by the false principle of sufficient reason. He thinks that no assumption can ever be or needs ever to be justified, so a lack of justification is not a justification for doubt. Instead, theories should be tested and scrutinised. It is not the goal to bless theories with claims of certainty or justification, but to eliminate errors in them. He writes, "there are no such things as good positive reasons; nor do we need such things [...] But [philosophers] obviously cannot quite bring [themselves] to believe that this is my opinion, let alone that it is right" (The Philosophy of Karl Popper, p. 1043)

Q1: According to Popper, what is not grounds for doubt?
A1: lack of justification
Q2: What principle of traditional philosophy did Popper take an anti-justificationist stance against?
A2: principle of sufficient reason
Q3: What does Popper believe is essential to do to theories instead of justification?
A3: eliminate errors
Q4: What don't we need to look for about theories in Popper's view?
A4: good positive reasons
In The Open Society and Its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism, Popper developed a critique of historicism and a defence of the "Open Society". Popper considered historicism to be the theory that history develops inexorably and necessarily according to knowable general laws towards a determinate end. He argued that this view is the principal theoretical presupposition underpinning most forms of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. He argued that historicism is founded upon mistaken assumptions regarding the nature of scientific law and prediction. Since the growth of human knowledge is a causal factor in the evolution of human history, and since "no society can predict, scientifically, its own future states of knowledge", it follows, he argued, that there can be no predictive science of human history. For Popper, metaphysical and historical indeterminism go hand in hand.

Q1: What is the term for the view that there are discoverable general laws constraining history's development?
A1: historicism
Q2: What political forms did Popper believe historicism supported?
A2: authoritarianism and totalitarianism
Q3: What unpredictable feature of the world did Popper say refuted historicism?
A3: the growth of human knowledge
Q4: Which of Popper's works criticized the idea that history has an inexorable developmental path?
A4: The Poverty of Historicism
As early as 1934, Popper wrote of the search for truth as "one of the strongest motives for scientific discovery." Still, he describes in Objective Knowledge (1972) early concerns about the much-criticised notion of truth as correspondence. Then came the semantic theory of truth formulated by the logician Alfred Tarski and published in 1933. Popper writes of learning in 1935 of the consequences of Tarski's theory, to his intense joy. The theory met critical objections to truth as correspondence and thereby rehabilitated it. The theory also seemed, in Popper's eyes, to support metaphysical realism and the regulative idea of a search for truth.

Q1: Whose theory of truth did Popper read with intense interest in 1935?
A1: Alfred Tarski
Q2: What theory of interest to Popper did Alfred Tarski publish in 1933?
A2: semantic theory of truth
Q3: Tarski's theory overcame certain objections to what conception of truth?
A3: truth as correspondence
Q4: What kind of realism did Popper believe Tarski's theory supported?
A4: metaphysical
According to this theory, the conditions for the truth of a sentence as well as the sentences themselves are part of a metalanguage. So, for example, the sentence "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. Although many philosophers have interpreted, and continue to interpret, Tarski's theory as a deflationary theory, Popper refers to it as a theory in which "is true" is replaced with "corresponds to the facts". He bases this interpretation on the fact that examples such as the one described above refer to two things: assertions and the facts to which they refer. He identifies Tarski's formulation of the truth conditions of sentences as the introduction of a "metalinguistic predicate" and distinguishes the following cases:

Q1: What term do philosophers give to the kind of theory Tarski proposed about truth?
A1: deflationary
Q2: With what does Popper say Tarski's theory replaces the predicate "is true?"
A2: "corresponds to the facts"
Q3: What concept did Tarski introduce to discuss the conditions for the truth of statements?
A3: metalanguage
Q4: What two things does Popper argue Tarski's theory involves in an evaluation of truth?
A4: assertions and the facts to which they refer
Upon this basis, along with that of the logical content of assertions (where logical content is inversely proportional to probability), Popper went on to develop his important notion of verisimilitude or "truthlikeness". The intuitive idea behind verisimilitude is that the assertions or hypotheses of scientific theories can be objectively measured with respect to the amount of truth and falsity that they imply. And, in this way, one theory can be evaluated as more or less true than another on a quantitative basis which, Popper emphasises forcefully, has nothing to do with "subjective probabilities" or other merely "epistemic" considerations.

Q1: What term does Popper use that roughly means verisimilitude?
A1: truthlikeness
Q2: Poppers notion of verisimilitude leaves no place for which kind of probabilities in the evaluation of scientific hypotheses?
A2: subjective
Q3: What class of considerations did Popper believe were not important in scientific measurement?
A3: epistemic
Q4: What is the logical content of hypotheses inversely proportional to in Popper's reasoning?
A4: probability
Knowledge, for Popper, was objective, both in the sense that it is objectively true (or truthlike), and also in the sense that knowledge has an ontological status (i.e., knowledge as object) independent of the knowing subject (Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, 1972). He proposed three worlds: World One, being the physical world, or physical states; World Two, being the world of mind, or mental states, ideas, and perceptions; and World Three, being the body of human knowledge expressed in its manifold forms, or the products of the second world made manifest in the materials of the first world (i.e., books, papers, paintings, symphonies, and all the products of the human mind). World Three, he argued, was the product of individual human beings in exactly the same sense that an animal path is the product of individual animals, and that, as such, has an existence and evolution independent of any individual knowing subjects. The influence of World Three, in his view, on the individual human mind (World Two) is at least as strong as the influence of World One. In other words, the knowledge held by a given individual mind owes at least as much to the total accumulated wealth of human knowledge, made manifest, as to the world of direct experience. As such, the growth of human knowledge could be said to be a function of the independent evolution of World Three. Many contemporary philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, have not embraced Popper's Three World conjecture, due mostly, it seems, to its resemblance to mind-body dualism.

Q1: What did Popper argue was objective and independent of its subject?
A1: knowledge
Q2: How many different worlds or realities did Popper differentiate in Objective Knowledge?
A2: three
Q3: What constituted World One in Popper's theory?
A3: the physical world
Q4: Who produced the contents of World Three?
A4: individual human beings
Q5: Which world's evolution corresponds to the growth of human knowledge?
A5: World Three