romikgosai/squad_modified_2 huggingface dataset:
In general, German bombers were likely to get through to their targets without too much difficulty. It was to be some months before an effective night fighter force would be ready, and anti-aircraft defences only became adequate after the Blitz was over, so ruses were created to lure German bombers away from their targets. Throughout 1940, dummy airfields were prepared, good enough to stand up to skilled observation. A number[clarification needed] of bombs fell on these diversionary ("Starfish") targets.

Q1: Anti-aircraft defenses became better after what?
A1: Blitz was over
Q2: What did they use to lure German bombers away from their targets?
A2: ruses
Q3: What kind of airfields were prepared to stand up to skilled observers?
A3: dummy
Q4: What was the name given to these dummy airfields?
A4: Starfish
The use of diversionary techniques such as fires had to be made carefully. The fake fires could only begin when the bombing started over an adjacent target and its effects were brought under control. Too early and the chances of success receded; too late and the real conflagration at the target would exceed the diversionary fires. Another innovation was the boiler fire. These units were fed from two adjacent tanks containing oil and water. The oil-fed fires were then injected with water from time to time; the flashes produced were similar to those of the German C-250 and C-500 Flammbomben. The hope was that, if it could deceive German bombardiers, it would draw more bombers away from the real target.

Q1: Fake fires were used as what kind of technique?
A1: diversionary
Q2: What was injected into the fires from time to time to produce a flash?
A2: water
Q3: Two tanks one of oil, one of water fed what kind of fire?
A3: boiler
Q4: What did these flashes simulate?
A4: German C-250 and C-500 Flammbomben
Q5: What was the purpose of these fires?
A5: deceive German bombardiers
Initially the change in strategy caught the RAF off-guard, and caused extensive damage and civilian casualties. Some 107,400 long tons (109,100 t) of shipping was damaged in the Thames Estuary and 1,600 civilians were casualties. Of this total around 400 were killed. The fighting in the air was more intense in daylight. Overall Loge had cost the Luftwaffe 41 aircraft; 14 bombers, 16 Messerschmitt Bf 109s, seven Messerschmitt Bf 110s and four reconnaissance aircraft. Fighter Command lost 23 fighters, with six pilots killed and another seven wounded. Another 247 bombers from Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3) attacked that night. On 8 September, the Luftwaffe returned. This time 412 people were killed and 747 severely wounded.

Q1: The bombing of the Thames Estuary cause how many civilian casualties?
A1: 1,600
Q2: How many were killed in the bombing of the Thames Estuary?
A2: around 400
Q3: How many aircraft did the Luftwaffe lose?
A3: 41
Q4: How many German pilots were killed?
A4: six
Q5: How many Air Fleet 3 attacked that night?
A5: 247
On 9 September the OKL appeared to be backing two strategies. Its round-the-clock bombing of London was an immediate attempt to force the British government to capitulate, but it was also striking at Britain's vital sea communications to achieve a victory through siege. Although the weather was poor, heavy raids took place that afternoon on the London suburbs and the airfield at Farnborough. The day's fighting cost Kesselring and Luftflotte 2 (Air Fleet 2) 24 aircraft, including 13 Bf 109s. Fighter Command lost 17 fighters and six pilots. Over the next few days weather was poor and the next main effort would not be made until 15 September 1940.

Q1: What was the name of the airfield where heavy raids took place?
A1: Farnborough
Q2: How many Bf 109s were lost?
A2: 13
Q3: FighterCommand lost how many fighters?
A3: 17
Q4: How many pilots did Fighter Command lose?
A4: six
Q5: What caused the delay in the effort?
A5: weather was poor
On 15 September the Luftwaffe made two large daylight attacks on London along the Thames Estuary, targeting the docks and rail communications in the city. Its hope was to destroy its targets and draw the RAF into defending them, allowing the Luftwaffe to destroy their fighters in large numbers, thereby achieving an air superiority. Large air battles broke out, lasting for most of the day. The first attack merely damaged the rail network for three days, and the second attack failed altogether. The air battle was later commemorated by Battle of Britain Day. The Luftwaffe lost 18 percent of the bombers sent on the operations that day, and failed to gain air superiority.

Q1: On September 15 the Luftwaffe made daylight raids on what target in London?
A1: Thames Estuary
Q2: What two targets were the Luftwaffe trying to destroy?
A2: docks and rail communications
Q3: What was the reason to try and draw the RAF into a battle?
A3: destroy their fighters in large numbers
Q4: What was this air battle called?
A4: Battle of Britain Day
Q5: The Luftwaffe lost what percentage of its bombers sent that day?
A5: 18
While Göring was optimistic the Luftwaffe could prevail, Hitler was not. On 17 September he postponed Operation Sea Lion (as it turned out, indefinitely) rather than gamble Germany's newly gained military prestige on a risky cross-Channel operation, particularly in the face of a sceptical Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union. In the last days of the battle, the bombers became lures in an attempt to draw the RAF into combat with German fighters. But their operations were to no avail; the worsening weather and unsustainable attrition in daylight gave the OKL an excuse to switch to night attacks on 7 October.

Q1: Who thought the Luftwaffe could win?
A1: Göring
Q2: What day did Hitler postponed Operation Sea Lion?
A2: 17 September
Q3: What was the name of the man from the Soviet Union who was doubtful of Operation Sea Lion?
A3: Joseph Stalin
Q4: Who did the Luftwaffe try to lure into battle using its bombers?
A4: RAF
Q5: When did the OKL switch to night raids?
A5: 7 October
On 14 October, the heaviest night attack to date saw 380 German bombers from Luftflotte 3 hit London. Around 200 people were killed and another 2,000 injured. British anti-aircraft defences (General Frederick Alfred Pile) fired 8,326 rounds and shot down only two bombers. On 15 October, the bombers returned and about 900 fires were started by the mix of 415 short tons (376 t) of high explosive and 11 short tons (10.0 t) of incendiaries dropped. Five main rail lines were cut in London and rolling stock damaged.

Q1: On October 14 how many German bombers attacked?
A1: 380
Q2: How many people were killed?
A2: Around 200
Q3: Who fired anti-defense rounds?
A3: General Frederick Alfred Pile
Q4: How many rounds of anti-defense were fired?
A4: 8,326 rounds
Q5: How many German bombers were shot down?
A5: two
Loge continued during October. According to German sources, 9,000 short tons (8,200 t) of bombs were dropped in that month, of which about 10 percent of which was dropped in daylight. Over 6,000 short tons (5,400 t) was aimed at London during the night. Attacks on Birmingham and Coventry were subject to 500 short tons (450 t) of bombs between them in the last 10 days of October. Liverpool suffered 200 short tons (180 t) of bombs dropped. Hull and Glasgow were attacked, but 800 short tons (730 t) of bombs were spread out all over Britain. The Metropolitan-Vickers works in Manchester was targeted and 12 short tons (11 t) of bombs dropped against it. Little tonnage was dropped on Fighter Command airfields; Bomber Command airfields were hit instead.

Q1: How much of the short tons of bombs were dropped during the day?
A1: 10 percent
Q2: What two cities had 500 short tons of bombs dropped on them during the end of October?
A2: Birmingham and Coventry
Q3: What was targeted with 12 short tons of bombs?
A3: The Metropolitan-Vickers works in Manchester
Q4: Which was targeted more heavily, bomber or fighter command airfields?
A4: Bomber Command airfields
Q5: Liverpool had how many short tons dropped on it?
A5: 200
Luftwaffe policy at this point was primarily to continue progressive attacks on London, chiefly by night attack; second, to interfere with production in the vast industrial arms factories of the West Midlands, again chiefly by night attack; and third to disrupt plants and factories during the day by means of fighter-bombers. Kesselring, commanding Luftflotte 2, was ordered to send 50 sorties per night against London and attack eastern harbours in daylight. Sperrle, commanding Luftflotte 3, was ordered to dispatch 250 sorties per night including 100 against the West Midlands. Seeschlange would be carried out by Fliegerkorps X (10th Air Corps) which concentrated on mining operations against shipping. It also took part in the bombing over Britain. By 19/20 April 1941, it had dropped 3,984 mines, ⅓ of the total dropped. The mines' ability to destroy entire streets earned them respect in Britain, but several fell unexploded into British hands allowing counter-measures to be developed which damaged the German anti-shipping campaign.

Q1: What was the Luftwaffe's second primary policy?
A1: to interfere with production in the vast industrial arms factories of the West Midlands
Q2: Who was in command of the Luftflotte 2?
A2: Kesselring
Q3: How many sorties a night was Luftflotte 3 doing?
A3: 250
Q4: What did the Fliegerkorps X concentrate on?
A4: mining operations against shipping
Q5: By April of 1941 about how many mines had been dropped?
A5: 3,984 mines
By mid-November 1940, when the Germans adopted a changed plan, more than 13,000 short tons (12,000 t) of high explosive and nearly 1,000,000 incendiaries had fallen on London. Outside the capital, there had been widespread harassing activity by single aircraft, as well as fairly strong diversionary attacks on Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool, but no major raids. The London docks and railways communications had taken a heavy pounding, and much damage had been done to the railway system outside. In September, there had been no less than 667 hits on railways in Great Britain, and at one period, between 5,000 and 6,000 wagons were standing idle from the effect of delayed action bombs. But the great bulk of the traffic went on; and Londoners—though they glanced apprehensively each morning at the list of closed stretches of line displayed at their local station, or made strange detours round back streets in the buses—still got to work. For all the destruction of life and property, the observers sent out by the Ministry of Home Security failed to discover the slightest sign of a break in morale. More than 13,000 civilians had been killed, and almost 20,000 injured, in September and October alone, but the death toll was much less than expected. In late 1940, Churchill credited the shelters:

Q1: In September how many railway hits were there in Great Britain?
A1: no less than 667
Q2: By mid November of 1940 how many incendiaries were dropped on London?
A2: 1,000,000
Q3: What did the Ministry of Home Security fail to discover?
A3: the slightest sign of a break in morale
Q4: What locations suffered strong diversionary tactics?
A4: Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool
Q5: About how many civilians were injured in September and October?
A5: 20,000
The American observer Ingersoll reported at this time that "as to the accuracy of the bombing of military objectives, here I make no qualifications. The aim is surprisingly, astonishingly, amazingly inaccurate ... The physical damage to civilian London, to sum up, was more general and more extensive than I had imagined. The damage to military targets much less", and stated that he had seen numerous examples of untouched targets surrounded by buildings destroyed by errant bombs. For example, in two months of bombing, Battersea Power Station, perhaps the largest single target in London, had only received one minor hit ("a nick"). No bridge over the Thames had been hit, and the docks were still functioning despite great damage. An airfield was hit 56 times but the runways were never damaged and the field was never out of operation, despite German pilots' familiarity with it from prewar commercial flights. Ingersoll wrote that the difference between the failure of the German campaign against military targets versus its success in continental Europe was the RAF retaining control of the air.:79–80,174

Q1: What was the name of the American observer?
A1: Ingersoll
Q2: The American observer said what about the damage to London?
A2: to sum up, was more general and more extensive than I had imagined.
Q3: How many bridges over the Thames were struck?
A3: No bridge over the Thames had been hit
Q4: The Battersea Power Station took how many hits in two months?
A4: one minor hit ("a nick")
Q5: What did German pilots use to gain knowledge of an airfield?
A5: prewar commercial flights.
British night air defences were in a poor state. Few anti-aircraft guns had fire-control systems, and the underpowered searchlights were usually ineffective against aircraft at altitudes above 12,000 ft (3,700 m). In July 1940, only 1,200 heavy and 549 light guns were deployed in the whole of Britain. Of the "heavies", some 200 were of the obsolescent 3 in (76 mm) type; the remainder were the effective 4.5 in (110 mm) and 3.7 in (94 mm) guns, with a theoretical "ceiling"' of over 30,000 ft (9,100 m) but a practical limit of 25,000 ft (7,600 m) because the predictor in use could not accept greater heights. The light guns, about half of which were of the excellent Bofors 40 mm, dealt with aircraft only up to 6,000 ft (1,800 m). Although the use of the guns improved civilian morale, with the knowledge the German bomber crews were facing the barrage, it is now believed that the anti-aircraft guns achieved little and in fact the falling shell fragments caused more British casualties on the ground.

Q1: British night air defenses were effective to what height?
A1: 12,000 ft (3,700 m)
Q2: By July of 1940 how many guns were deployed in Britain?
A2: only 1,200 heavy and 549 light guns
Q3: What was the practical ceiling of the effective heavy guns?
A3: 25,000 ft (7,600 m)
Q4: What type of light gun dealt with aircraft up to 6000 ft.?
A4: Bofors 40 mm
Q5: What is believed to have caused many civilian casualties from anti-aircraft guns?
A5: falling shell fragments
London's defences were rapidly reorganised by General Pile, the Commander-in-Chief of Anti-Aircraft Command. The difference this made to the effectiveness of air defences is questionable. The British were still one-third below the establishment of heavy anti-aircraft artillery AAA (or ack-ack) in May 1941, with only 2,631 weapons available. Dowding had to rely on night fighters. From 1940 to 1941, the most successful night-fighter was the Boulton Paul Defiant; its four squadrons shot down more enemy aircraft than any other type. AA defences improved by better use of radar and searchlights. Over several months, the 20,000 shells spent per raider shot down in September 1940, was reduced to 4,087 in January 1941 and to 2,963 shells in February 1941.

Q1: Who reorganised London's defences?
A1: General Pile
Q2: The British were how far below the establishment of heavy anti-aircraft artillery?
A2: one-third
Q3: Who relied on night fighters?
A3: Dowding
Q4: Who's four squadrons shot down more enemy aircraft than any other type?
A4: Boulton Paul Defiant
Q5: How were AA defenses improved?
A5: by better use of radar and searchlights
Airborne Interception radar (AI) was unreliable. The heavy fighting in the Battle of Britain had eaten up most of Fighter Command's resources, so there was little investment in night fighting. Bombers were flown with airborne search lights out of desperation[citation needed], but to little avail. Of greater potential was the GL (Gunlaying) radar and searchlights with fighter direction from RAF fighter control rooms to begin a GCI system (Ground Control-led Interception) under Group-level control (No. 10 Group RAF, No. 11 Group RAF and No. 12 Group RAF).

Q1: The bombers used what out of desperation?
A1: airborne search lights
Q2: What was considered unreliable?
A2: Airborne Interception radar
Q3: Gunlaying radar and RAF controls combined to create what system?
A3: Ground Control-led Interception
Q4: What used most of Fighter Command's resources?
A4: the Battle of Britain
Whitehall's disquiet at the failures of the RAF led to the replacement of Dowding (who was already due for retirement) with Sholto Douglas on 25 November. Douglas set about introducing more squadrons and dispersing the few GL sets to create a carpet effect in the southern counties. Still, in February 1941, there remained only seven squadrons with 87 pilots, under half the required strength. The GL carpet was supported by six GCI sets controlling radar-equipped night-fighters. By the height of the Blitz, they were becoming more successful. The number of contacts and combats rose in 1941, from 44 and two in 48 sorties in January 1941, to 204 and 74 in May (643 sorties). But even in May, 67% of the sorties were visual cat's-eye missions. Curiously, while 43% of the contacts in May 1941 were by visual sightings, they accounted for 61% of the combats. Yet when compared with Luftwaffe daylight operations, there was a sharp decline in German losses to 1%. If a vigilant bomber crew could spot the fighter first, they had a decent chance at evading it.

Q1: Who replaced Dowding on November 25?
A1: Sholto Douglas
Q2: What supported the GL carpet?
A2: six GCI sets controlling radar-equipped night-fighters
Q3: How many pilots remained in February 1941?
A3: 87 pilots
Q4: How many number of contacts and combats were there in May?
A4: 204 and 74
Q5: What did a bomber crew need to do for a good chance at evasion?
A5: spot the fighter first
Nevertheless, it was radar that proved to be critical weapon in the night battles over Britain from this point onward. Dowding had introduced the concept of airborne radar and encouraged its usage. Eventually it would become a success. On the night of 22/23 July 1940, Flying Officer Cyril Ashfield (pilot), Pilot Officer Geoffrey Morris (Observer) and Flight Sergeant Reginald Leyland (Air Intercept radar operator) of the Fighter Interception Unit became the first pilot and crew to intercept and destroy an enemy aircraft using onboard radar to guide them to a visual interception, when their AI night fighter brought down a Do 17 off Sussex. On 19 November 1940 the famous RAF night fighter ace John Cunningham shot down a Ju 88 bomber using airborne radar, just as Dowding had predicted.

Q1: What was critical in the night battles over Britain?
A1: radar
Q2: What concept eventually became successful?
A2: airborne radar
Q3: On what day did airborne radar help intercept and destroy enemy aircraft for the first time?
A3: the night of 22/23 July 1940
Q4: Who was the RAF night fighter ace that used airborne radar to destroy a Ju 88 bomber?
A4: John Cunningham
From November 1940 – February 1941, the Luftwaffe shifted its strategy and attacked other industrial cities. In particular, the West Midlands were targeted. On the night of 13/14 November, 77 He 111s of Kampfgeschwader 26 (26th Bomber Wing, or KG 26) bombed London while 63 from KG 55 hit Birmingham. The next night, a large force hit Coventry. "Pathfinders" from 12 Kampfgruppe 100 (Bomb Group 100 or KGr 100) led 437 bombers from KG 1, KG 3, KG 26, KG 27, KG 55 and Lehrgeschwader 1 (1st Training Wing, or LG 1) which dropped 394 short tons (357 t) of high explosive, 56 short tons (51 t) of incendiaries, and 127 parachute mines. Other sources say 449 bombers and a total of 530 short tons (480 t) of bombs were dropped. The raid against Coventry was particularly devastating, and led to widespread use of the phrase "to conventrate". Over 10,000 incendiaries were dropped. Around 21 factories were seriously damaged in Coventry, and loss of public utilities stopped work at nine others, disrupting industrial output for several months. Only one bomber was lost, to anti-aircraft fire, despite the RAF flying 125 night sorties. No follow up raids were made, as OKL underestimated the British power of recovery (as Bomber Command would do over Germany from 1943–1945). The Germans were surprised by the success of the attack. The concentration had been achieved by accident. The strategic effect of the raid was a brief 20 percent dip in aircraft production.

Q1: The Luftwaffe's change in strategy targeted what primarily?
A1: the West Midlands
Q2: How many parachute mines were dropped?
A2: 127
Q3: The Coventry raid led to what phrase being in widespread use?
A3: "to conventrate"
Q4: What stopped work in 9 factories in Coventry?
A4: loss of public utilities
Q5: What effect did the raid have strategically?
A5: a brief 20 percent dip in aircraft production
Five nights later, Birmingham was hit by 369 bombers from KG 54, KG 26, and KG 55. By the end of November, 1,100 bombers were available for night raids. An average of 200 were able to strike per night. This weight of attack went on for two months, with the Luftwaffe dropping 13,900 short tons (12,600 t) of bombs. In November 1940, 6,000 sorties and 23 major attacks (more than 100 tons of bombs dropped) were flown. Two heavy (50 short tons (45 t) of bombs) attacks were also flown. In December, only 11 major and five heavy attacks were made.

Q1: How many bombers hit Birmingham?
A1: 369
Q2: For how many months did the night raids continue for?
A2: two months
Q3: How many tons of bombs had to be dropped to be considered a major attack?
A3: more than 100 tons of bombs dropped
Q4: December saw how many attacks?
A4: only 11 major and five heavy attacks
Probably the most devastating strike occurred on the evening of 29 December, when German aircraft attacked the City of London itself with incendiary and high explosive bombs, causing a firestorm that has been called the Second Great Fire of London. The first group to use these incendiaries was Kampfgruppe 100 which despatched 10 "pathfinder" He 111s. At 18:17, it released the first of 10,000 fire bombs, eventually amounting to 300 dropped per minute. Altogether, 130 German bombers destroyed the historical centre of London. Civilian casualties on London throughout the Blitz amounted to 28,556 killed, and 25,578 wounded. The Luftwaffe had dropped 18,291 short tons (16,593 t) of bombs.

Q1: On what day was London itself attacked?
A1: the evening of 29 December
Q2: What group was the first to use incendiaries?
A2: Kampfgruppe 100
Q3: How many fire bombs were dropped per minute?
A3: 300
Q4: How many civilians were killed in the bombing?
A4: 28,556 killed
Q5: The Luftwaffe dropped how many short tons of bombs?
A5: 18,291 short tons
Not all of the Luftwaffe's effort was made against inland cities. Port cities were also attacked to try to disrupt trade and sea communications. In January Swansea was bombed four times, very heavily. On 17 January around 100 bombers dropped a high concentration of incendiaries, some 32,000 in all. The main damage was inflicted on the commercial and domestic areas. Four days later 230 tons was dropped including 60,000 incendiaries. In Portsmouth Southsea and Gosport waves of 150 bombers destroyed vast swaths of the city with 40,000 incendiaries. Warehouses, rail lines and houses were destroyed and damaged, but the docks were largely untouched.

Q1: Why were port cities targeted by the Luftwaffe?
A1: to try to disrupt trade and sea communications
Q2: How many times was Swansea bombed heavily?
A2: four times
Q3: What was primarily damaged in the attacks?
A3: commercial and domestic areas
Q4: What cities had large sections of them destroyed?
A4: Portsmouth Southsea and Gosport
Q5: What was left mostly unharmed?
A5: the docks