romikgosai/squad_modified huggingface dataset:
A further line in the directive stressed the need to inflict the heaviest losses possible, but also to intensify the air war in order to create the impression an amphibious assault on Britain was planned for 1941. However, meteorological conditions over Britain were not favourable for flying and prevented an escalation in air operations. Airfields became water-logged and the 18 Kampfgruppen (bomber groups) of the Luftwaffe's Kampfgeschwadern (bomber wings) were relocated to Germany for rest and re-equipment.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was inflicting heavy losses and increasing the air war designed to do?
A: create the impression an amphibious assault on Britain was planned for 1941', '
Q: What was preventing escalation of air operations?
A: meteorological conditions over Britain', '
Q: What happened to airfields?
A: Airfields became water-logged', '
Q: How many bomber groups were relocated to Germany?
A: 18']
From the German point of view, March 1941 saw an improvement. The Luftwaffe flew 4,000 sorties that month, including 12 major and three heavy attacks. The electronic war intensified but the Luftwaffe flew major inland missions only on moonlit nights. Ports were easier to find and made better targets. To confuse the British, radio silence was observed until the bombs fell. X- and Y-Gerät beams were placed over false targets and switched only at the last minute. Rapid frequency changes were introduced for X-Gerät, whose wider band of frequencies and greater tactical flexibility ensured it remained effective at a time when British selective jamming was degrading the effectiveness of Y-Gerät.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: How many sorties were flown in March 1941?
A: 4,000', '
Q: When did the Luftwaffe fly inland missions?
A: only on moonlit nights', '
Q: Why were ports better targets?
A: Ports were easier to find', '
Q: How did the Germans confuse the British?
A: radio silence was observed until the bombs fell', '
Q: Why was the X-Gerat frequencies used more?
A: British selective jamming was degrading the effectiveness of Y-Gerät']
The attacks were focused against western ports in March. These attacks produced some breaks in morale, with civil leaders fleeing the cities before the offensive reached its height. But the Luftwaffe's effort eased in the last 10 attacks as seven Kampfgruppen moved to Austria in preparation for the Balkans Campaign in Yugoslavia and Greece. The shortage of bombers caused the OKL to improvise. Some 50 Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers and Jabos (fighter-bombers) were used, officially classed as Leichte Kampfflugzeuge ("light bombers") and sometimes called Leichte Kesselringe ("Light Kesselrings"). The defences failed to prevent widespread damage but on some occasions did prevent German bombers concentrating on their targets. On occasion, only one-third of German bombs hit their targets.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was focused in March?
A: western ports', '
Q: What did these attacks accomplish?
A: breaks in morale', '
Q: Why was the OKL forced to improvise?
A: shortage of bombers', '
Q: How many Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers and Jabos were used?
A: 50', '
Q: How many German bombs hit their target?
A: only one-third']
The diversion of heavier bombers to the Balkans meant that the crews and units left behind were asked to fly two or three sorties per night. Bombers were noisy, cold, and vibrated badly. Added to the tension of the mission which exhausted and drained crews, tiredness caught up with and killed many. In one incident on 28/29 April, Peter Stahl of KG 30 was flying on his 50th mission. He fell asleep at the controls of his Ju 88 and woke up to discover the entire crew asleep. He roused them, ensured they took oxygen and Dextro-Energen tablets, then completed the mission.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: How many sorties a night were crews asked to fly?
A: two or three sorties', '
Q: What contributed to the exhaustion of crews flying extra sorties?
A: Bombers were noisy, cold, and vibrated badly', '
Q: What happened to Peter Stahl when he fell asleep flying?
A: woke up to discover the entire crew asleep.', "
Q: What did Peter's crew take to complete their mission?
A: oxygen and Dextro-Energen tablets"]
Regardless, the Luftwaffe could still inflict huge damage. With the German occupation of Western Europe, the intensification of submarine and air attack on Britain's sea communications was feared by the British. Such an event would have serious consequences on the future course of the war, should the Germans succeed. Liverpool and its port became an important destination for convoys heading through the Western Approaches from North America, bringing supplies and materials. The considerable rail network distributed to the rest of the country. Operations against Liverpool in the Liverpool Blitz were successful. Air attacks sank 39,126 long tons (39,754 t) of shipping, with another 111,601 long tons (113,392 t) damaged. Minister of Home Security Herbert Morrison was also worried morale was breaking, noting the defeatism expressed by civilians. Other sources point to half of the port's 144 berths rendered unusable, while cargo unloading capability was reduced by 75%. Roads and railways were blocked and ships could not leave harbour. On 8 May 1941, 57 ships were destroyed, sunk or damaged amounting to 80,000 long tons (81,000 t). Around 66,000 houses were destroyed, 77,000 people made homeless, and 1,900 people killed and 1,450 seriously hurt on one night. Operations against London up until May 1941 could also have a severe impact on morale. The populace of the port of Hull became 'trekkers', people who underwent a mass exodus from cities before, during, and after attacks. However, the attacks failed to knock out or damage railways, or port facilities for long, even in the Port of London, a target of many attacks. The Port of London in particular was an important target, bringing in one-third of overseas trade.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What did the British fear most?
A: intensification of submarine and air attack', '
Q: What was an important destination for supply convoys from North America?
A: Liverpool', '
Q: The Liverpool Blitz sank how much shipping?
A: 39,126 long tons (39,754 t) of shipping', '
Q: How many ships were destroyed on May 8, 1941?
A: 57 ships', '
Q: How much of the overseas trade did the Port of London take on?
A: one-third of overseas trade']
On 13 March, the upper Clyde port of Clydebank near Glasgow was bombed. All but seven of its 12,000 houses were damaged. Many more ports were attacked. Plymouth was attacked five times before the end of the month while Belfast, Hull, and Cardiff were hit. Cardiff was bombed on three nights, Portsmouth centre was devastated by five raids. The rate of civilian housing lost was averaging 40,000 people per week dehoused in September 1940. In March 1941, two raids on Plymouth and London dehoused 148,000 people. Still, while heavily damaged, British ports continued to support war industry and supplies from North America continued to pass through them while the Royal Navy continued to operate in Plymouth, Southampton, and Portsmouth. Plymouth in particular, because of its vulnerable position on the south coast and close proximity to German air bases, was subjected to the heaviest attacks. On 10/11 March, 240 bombers dropped 193 tons of high explosives and 46,000 incendiaries. Many houses and commercial centres were heavily damaged, the electrical supply was knocked out, and five oil tanks and two magazines exploded. Nine days later, two waves of 125 and 170 bombers dropped heavy bombs, including 160 tons of high explosive and 32,000 incendiaries. Much of the city centre was destroyed. Damage was inflicted on the port installations, but many bombs fell on the city itself. On 17 April 346 tons of explosives and 46,000 incendiaries were dropped from 250 bombers led by KG 26. The damage was considerable, and the Germans also used aerial mines. Over 2,000 AAA shells were fired, destroying two Ju 88s. By the end of the air campaign over Britain, only eight percent of the German effort against British ports was made using mines.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: How many houses were spared damage in Glasgow?
A: seven', '
Q: How many people per week were losing housing?
A: 40,000 people', '
Q: Why was Plymouth targeted the most?
A: because of its vulnerable position on the south coast', '
Q: What did the Germans use along with incendiaries and bombs?
A: aerial mines', '
Q: How many AAA shells were fired?
A: Over 2,000']
In the north, substantial efforts were made against Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Sunderland, which were large ports on the English east coast. On 9 April 1941 Luftflotte 2 dropped 150 tons of high explosives and 50,000 incendiaries from 120 bombers in a five-hour attack. Sewer, rail, docklands, and electric installations were damaged. In Sunderland on 25 April, Luftflotte 2 sent 60 bombers which dropped 80 tons of high explosive and 9,000 incendiaries. Much damage was done. A further attack on the Clyde, this time at Greenock, took place on 6 and 7 May. However, as with the attacks in the south, the Germans failed to prevent maritime movements or cripple industry in the regions.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What were two large ports on the English east coast in the North?
A: Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Sunderland', '
Q: Sunderland saw how many incendiaries used against it on 25 April?
A: 9,000 incendiaries', '
Q: How many bombers were used in a five-hour attack?
A: 120', '
Q: What was the result of the German attacks?
A: the Germans failed to prevent maritime movements or cripple industry in the regions']
The last major attack on London was on 10/11 May 1941, on which the Luftwaffe flew 571 sorties and dropped 800 tonnes of bombs. This caused more than 2,000 fires. 1,436 people were killed and 1,792 seriously injured, which affected morale badly. Another raid was carried out on 11/12 May 1941. Westminster Abbey and the Law Courts were damaged, while the Chamber of the House of Commons was destroyed. One-third of London's streets were impassable. All but one railway station line was blocked for several weeks. This raid was significant, as 63 German fighters were sent with the bombers, indicating the growing effectiveness of RAF night fighter defences.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: When was the last major attack London saw?
A: 10/11 May 1941', '
Q: How many tonnes of bombs did the Luftwaffe use on London?
A: 800 tonnes', '
Q: How many casualties were inflicted?
A: 1,436 people were killed and 1,792 seriously injured', "
Q: What was the damage done to London's streets?
A: One-third of London's streets were impassable", '
Q: What showed RAF night fighter effectiveness was increasing?
A: 63 German fighters were sent with the bombers']
German air supremacy at night was also now under threat. British night-fighter operations out over the Channel were proving highly successful. This was not immediately apparent. The Bristol Blenheim F.1 was undergunned, with just four .303 in (7.7 mm) machine guns which struggled to down the Do 17, Ju 88, or Heinkel He 111. Moreover, the Blenheim struggled to reach the speed of the German bombers. Added to the fact an interception relied on visual sighting, a kill was most elusive even in the conditions of a moonlit sky.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: How was the British night fighter operations faring?
A: were proving highly successful.', '
Q: How did the Bristol Blenheim F.1 perform against German aircraft?
A: was undergunned, with just four .303 in (7.7 mm) machine guns', '
Q: What did interception rely upon?
A: visual sighting', '
Q: How did the Bristol Blenheim F.1 compare to German aircraft speed?
A: struggled to reach the speed of the German bombers']
The Boulton Paul Defiant, despite its poor performance during daylight engagements, was a much better night fighter. It was faster, able to catch the bombers and its configuration of four machine guns in a turret could (much like German night fighters in 1943–1945 with Schräge Musik) engage the unsuspecting German bomber from beneath. Attacks from below offered a larger target, compared to attacking tail-on, as well as a better chance of not being seen by the bomber (so less chance of evasion), as well as greater likelihood of detonating its bombload. In subsequent months a steady number of German bombers would fall to night fighters.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What performed better during night fighting?
A: The Boulton Paul Defiant', '
Q: How could aircraft engage bombers when fitted with a turret?
A: engage the unsuspecting German bomber from beneath', '
Q: What benefits did attacking from below offer?
A: larger target, compared to attacking tail-on, as well as a better chance of not being seen by the bomber']
Improved aircraft designs were in the offing with the Bristol Beaufighter, then under development. It would prove formidable, but its development was slow. The Beaufighter had a maximum speed of 320 mph (510 km/h), an operational ceiling of 26,000 ft (7,900 m) and a climb rate of 2,500 ft (760 m) per minute. Its armament of four 20 mm (0.79 in) Hispano cannon and six .303 in Browning machine guns offered a serious threat to German bombers. On 19 November, John Cunningham of No. 604 Squadron RAF shot down a bomber flying an AI-equipped Beaufighter. It was the first air victory for the airborne radar.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was the max speed of a Beaufighter?
A: 320 mph (510 km/h)', '
Q: What is the operational ceiling of the Beaufighter?
A: 26,000 ft (7,900 m)', '
Q: how many machine guns did the Beaufighter include?
A: six .303 in Browning machine guns', '
Q: What day was the first victory the RAF had with airborne radar?
A: 19 November']
By April and May 1941, the Luftwaffe was still getting through to their targets, taking no more than one- to two-percent losses on any given mission. On 19/20 April 1941, in honour of Hitler's 52nd birthday, 712 bombers hit Plymouth with a record 1,000 tons of bombs. Losses were minimal. In the following month, 22 German bombers were lost with 13 confirmed to have been shot down by night fighters. On 3/4 May, nine were shot down in one night. On 10/11 May, London suffered severe damage, but 10 German bombers were downed. In May 1941, RAF night fighters shot down 38 German bombers.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was the most losses the Luftwaffe suffered on any mission?
A: one- to two-percent losses', "
Q: How many bombers hit Plymouth on Hitler's birthday?
A: 712", "
Q: How many bombs hit Plymouth on Hitler's birthday?
A: 1,000 tons of bombs", '
Q: On May 3/4 how many German bombers were lost?
A: nine', '
Q: How many German bombers were shot down by the RAF in May?
A: 38 German bombers']
The military effectiveness of bombing varied. The Luftwaffe dropped around 45,000 short tons (41,000 t) of bombs during the Blitz disrupting production and transport, reducing food supplies and shaking the British morale. It also helped to support the U-Boat blockade by sinking some 58,000 long tons (59,000 t) of shipping destroyed and 450,000 long tons (460,000 t) damaged. Yet, overall the British production rose steadily throughout this period although there were significant falls during April 1941, probably influenced by the departure of workers of Easter Holidays according to the British official history. The British official history on war production noted the great impact was upon the supply of components rather than complete equipment. In aircraft production, the British were denied the opportunity to reach the planned target of 2,500 aircraft in a month, arguably the greatest achievement of the bombing, as it forced the dispersal of industry. In April 1941, when the targets were British ports, rifle production fell by 25%, filled-shell production by 4.6%, and in smallarms production 4.5% overall. The strategic impact on industrial cities was varied; most took from 10–15 days to recover from heavy raids, although Belfast and Liverpool took longer. The attacks against Birmingham took war industries some three months to recover fully from. The exhausted population took three weeks to overcome the effects of an attack.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: The Luftwaffe used how many short tons of bombs during the Blitz?
A: 45,000 short tons', '
Q: The Luftwaffe helped the U-boats by sinking how much shipping?
A: 58,000 long tons', '
Q: How did the British production fare as a result of all the bombing?
A: overall the British production rose steadily throughout this period', '
Q: What was the greatest achievement of the bombings?
A: British were denied the opportunity to reach the planned target of 2,500 aircraft in a month', '
Q: How long was the recovery of industrial cities from raids?
A: most took from 10–15 days']
The air offensive against the RAF and British industry failed to have the desired effect. More might have been achieved had the OKL exploited their enemy's weak spot, the vulnerability of British sea communications. The Allies did so later when Bomber Command attacked rail communications and the United States Army Air Forces targeted oil, but that would have required an economic-industrial analysis of which the Luftwaffe was incapable. The OKL instead sought clusters of targets that suited the latest policy (which changed frequently), and disputes within the leadership were about tactics rather than strategy. Though militarily ineffective, the Blitz caused enormous damage to Britain's infrastructure and housing stock. It cost around 41,000 lives, and may have injured another 139,000.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: How could have more been achieved in the air offensive?
A: had the OKL exploited their enemy's weak spot", '
Q: What did the disputes in the OKL tend to be about?
A: about tactics rather than strategy', '
Q: What was the Luftwaffe incapable of doing?
A: an economic-industrial analysis', '
Q: How many casualties did the Blitz ultimately cause?
A: cost around 41,000 lives, and may have injured another 139,000']
The relieved British began to assess the impact of the Blitz in August 1941, and the RAF Air Staff used the German experience to improve Bomber Command's offensives. They concluded bombers should strike a single target each night and use more incendiaries because they had a greater impact on production than high explosives. They also noted regional production was severely disrupted when city centres were devastated through the loss of administrative offices, utilities and transport. They believed the Luftwaffe had failed in precision attack, and concluded the German example of area attack using incendiaries was the way forward for operations over Germany.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: What helped increase the Bomber Command's offensives?
A: the German experience", '
Q: What did the RAF conclude?
A: bombers should strike a single target each night and use more incendiaries because they had a greater impact on production than high explosives', '
Q: What caused the most production disruption?
A: when city centres were devastated through the loss of administrative offices, utilities and transport.', '
Q: What did the Luftwaffe fail?
A: failed in precision attack', "
Q: What did the experience of German's using incendiaries mean?
A: using incendiaries was the way forward for operations over Germany."]
Some writers claim the Air Staff ignored a critical lesson, however: British morale did not break. Targeting German morale, as Bomber Command would do, was no more successful. Aviation strategists dispute that morale was ever a major consideration for Bomber Command. Throughout 1933–39 none of the 16 Western Air Plans drafted mentioned morale as a target. The first three directives in 1940 did not mention civilian populations or morale in any way. Morale was not mentioned until the ninth wartime directive on 21 September 1940. The 10th directive in October 1940 mentioned morale by name. However, industrial cities were only to be targeted if weather denied strikes on Bomber Command's main concern, oil.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was the critical lesson Air Staff ignored?
A: Targeting German morale, as Bomber Command would do, was no more successful.', '
Q: Aviation strategists disputed over what? 
A: that morale was ever a major consideration for Bomber Command.', '
Q: What did 16 of the Western Air Plans not mention?
A: morale as a target.', '
Q: When was morale finally mentioned?
A: ninth wartime directive on 21 September 1940', "
Q: When were industrial cities to be targeted?
A: if weather denied strikes on Bomber Command's main concern, oil."]
AOC Bomber Command Arthur Harris did see German morale as a major objective. However, he did not believe that the morale-collapse could occur without the destruction of the German economy. The primary goal of Bomber Command's offensives was to destroy the German industrial base (economic warfare), and in doing so reduce morale. In late 1943, just before the Battle of Berlin, he declared the power of Bomber Command would enable it to achieve "a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable." A summary of Harris' strategic intentions was clear:

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Without what could morale collapse occur according to Arthur Harris?
A: without the destruction of the German economy.', '
Q: What was the primary strategy for Bomber Command offensives?
A: to destroy the German industrial base (economic warfare), and in doing so reduce morale', '
Q: Arthur Harris announced that Bomber Command would enable economic warfare to achieve what?
A: "a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable."']
A converse popular image arose of British people in the Second World War: a collection of people locked in national solidarity. This image entered the historiography of the Second World War in the 1980s and 1990s, especially after the publication of Angus Calder's book The Myth of the Blitz (1991). It was evoked by both the right and left political factions in Britain during the Falklands War when it was embedded in a nostalgic narrative in which the Second World War represented aggressive British patriotism successfully defending democracy. This imagery of people in the Blitz was and is powerfully portrayed in film, radio, newspapers and magazines. At the time it was a useful propaganda tool for home and foreign consumption. Historians' critical response to this construction focused on what were seen as over-emphasised claims of righteous nationalism and national unity. In the Myth of the Blitz, Calder exposed some of the counter-evidence of anti-social and divisive behaviours. What he saw as the myth—serene national unity—became "historical truth". In particular, class division was most evident.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What view became popular of the British people in WWII?
A: people locked in national solidarity.', "
Q: When did this popular view come to be?
A: in the 1980s and 1990s, especially after the publication of Angus Calder's book The Myth of the Blitz (1991).", '
Q: Political factions in Britain supported what view of Britains in WWII?
A: aggressive British patriotism successfully defending democracy.', "
Q: What was the Historians' critical response to this view?
A: over-emphasised claims of righteous nationalism and national unity.", '
Q: What did Calder try to expose in his book?
A: some of the counter-evidence of anti-social and divisive behaviours']