romikgosai/squad_modified huggingface dataset:
The Luftwaffe's poor intelligence meant that their aircraft were not always able to locate their targets, and thus attacks on factories and airfields failed to achieve the desired results. British fighter aircraft production continued at a rate surpassing Germany's by 2 to 1. The British produced 10,000 aircraft in 1940, in comparison to Germany's 8,000. The replacement of pilots and aircrew was more difficult. Both the RAF and Luftwaffe struggled to replace manpower losses, though the Germans had larger reserves of trained aircrew. The circumstances affected the Germans more than the British. Operating over home territory, British flyers could fly again if they survived being shot down. German crews, even if they survived, faced capture. Moreover, bombers had four to five crewmen on board, representing a greater loss of manpower. On 7 September, the Germans shifted away from the destruction of the RAF's supporting structures. German intelligence suggested Fighter Command was weakening, and an attack on London would force it into a final battle of annihilation while compelling the British Government to surrender.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Why did the Luftwaffe fail to locate their targets?
A: poor intelligence', '
Q: What did German crew members face if they were shot down over Britain?
A: capture', "
Q: Britain's  fabrication  of fighter planes out paced Germany by what margin?
A: 2 to 1", '
Q: How big was the crew of a bomber?
A: four to five crewmen', '
Q: How many aircraft did Britain produce in 1940?
A: 10,000']
The decision to change strategy is sometimes claimed as a major mistake by the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL). It is argued that persisting with attacks on RAF airfields might have won air superiority for the Luftwaffe. Others argue that the Luftwaffe made little impression on Fighter Command in the last week of August and first week of September and that the shift in strategy was not decisive. It has also been argued that it was doubtful the Luftwaffe could have won air superiority before the "weather window" began to deteriorate in October. It was also possible, if RAF losses became severe, that they could pull out to the north, wait for the German invasion, then redeploy southward again. Other historians argue that the outcome of the air battle was irrelevant; the massive numerical superiority of British naval forces and the inherent weakness of the Kriegsmarine would have made the projected German invasion, Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion), a disaster with or without German air superiority.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What does OKL stand for?
A: Oberkommando der Luftwaffe', '
Q: What month would the weather window begin to decline?
A: October', '
Q: If serious loss had happened to the RAF where might they have pulled out of?
A: the north', '
Q: What is the German name of Operation Sea Lion?
A: Unternehmen Seelöwe', '
Q: Who had exponential larger naval forces?
A: British naval forces']
Regardless of the ability of the Luftwaffe to win air superiority, Adolf Hitler was frustrated that it was not happening quickly enough. With no sign of the RAF weakening, and Luftwaffe air fleets (Luftflotten) taking punishing losses, the OKL was keen for a change in strategy. To reduce losses further, a change in strategy was also favoured to take place at night, to give the bombers greater protection under cover of darkness.[b] On 4 September 1940, in a long address at the Sportspalast, Hitler declared: "And should the Royal Air Force drop two thousand, or three thousand [kilograms ...] then we will now drop [...] 300,000, 400,000, yes one million kilograms in a single night. And should they declare they will greatly increase their attacks on our cities, then we will erase their cities."

Questions and answers:
['
Q: The Luftwaffe air fleets were taking what kind of losses?
A: punishing', '
Q: What did the punishing losses to the air fleet cause the Luftwaffe to do?
A: change in strategy', '
Q: What kind of strategy did the Luftwaffe use to give their bombers better protection?
A: cover of darkness', '
Q: What city did Hitler give a speech where he said he would erase British cities?
A: Sportspalast', '
Q: In what year did Hitler give the speech at Sportspalast? 
A: 1940']
It was decided to focus on bombing Britain's industrial cities in daylight to begin with. The main focus of the bombing operations was against the city of London. The first major raid in this regard took place on 7 September. On 15 September, on a date known as the Battle of Britain Day, a large-scale raid was launched in daylight, but suffered significant loss for no lasting gain. Although there were a few large air battles fought in daylight later in the month and into October, the Luftwaffe switched its main effort to night attacks in order to reduce losses. This became official policy on 7 October. The air campaign soon got underway against London and other British cities. However, the Luftwaffe faced limitations. Its aircraft—Dornier Do 17, Junkers Ju 88, and Heinkel He 111s—were capable of carrying out strategic missions, but were incapable of doing greater damage because of bomb-load limitations. The Luftwaffe's decision in the interwar period to concentrate on medium bombers can be attributed to several reasons: Hitler did not intend or foresee a war with Britain in 1939; the OKL believed a medium bomber could carry out strategic missions just as well as a heavy bomber force; and Germany did not possess the resources or technical ability to produce four-engined bombers before the war.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Which British city did the Luftwaffe focus its bombing on?
A: London', '
Q: What was the name of the large air raid that took place in daylight hours in Britain?
A: Battle of Britain Day', '
Q: What was the main reason the Luftwaffe was not able to cause extensive damage with their missions?
A: bomb-load limitations', '
Q: What kind of bombers was Germany not able to build?
A: four-engined bombers']
Although it had equipment capable of doing serious damage, the problem for the Luftwaffe was its unclear strategy and poor intelligence. OKL had not been informed that Britain was to be considered a potential opponent until early 1938. It had no time to gather reliable intelligence on Britain's industries. Moreover, OKL could not settle on an appropriate strategy. German planners had to decide whether the Luftwaffe should deliver the weight of its attacks against a specific segment of British industry such as aircraft factories, or against a system of interrelated industries such as Britain's import and distribution network, or even in a blow aimed at breaking the morale of the British population. The Luftwaffe's strategy became increasingly aimless over the winter of 1940–1941. Disputes among the OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy. This method condemned the offensive over Britain to failure before it began.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What year did the OKL become aware that Britain would be a possible target?
A: early 1938', '
Q: What disagreements did the  Luftwaffe staff center around?
A: tactics', '
Q: Poor intelligence and what other problem made it difficult for the Luftwaffe to do extreme damage?
A: unclear strategy', '
Q: What did the disputes between the staff cause to happen to the strategy against Britain?
A: failure before it began']
In an operational capacity, limitations in weapons technology and quick British reactions were making it more difficult to achieve strategic effect. Attacking ports, shipping and imports as well as disrupting rail traffic in the surrounding areas, especially the distribution of coal, an important fuel in all industrial economies of the Second World War, would net a positive result. However, the use of delayed-action bombs, while initially very effective, gradually had less impact, partly because they failed to detonate.[c] Moreover, the British had anticipated the change in strategy and dispersed its production facilities making them less vulnerable to a concentrated attack. Regional commissioners were given plenipotentiary powers to restore communications and organise the distribution of supplies to keep the war economy moving.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Coupled with British quick reactions what cause operational capacity hard to achieve?
A: limitations in weapons technology', '
Q: What was an important fuel in the Second World War?
A: coal', '
Q: Who was given permission to restore power and move supplies to keep the war moving?
A: Regional commissioners', '
Q: What kind of bombs were effective in the beginning but became less so with time?
A: delayed-action bombs', '
Q: What did Britain do that helped make the new strategy less effective? 
A: dispersed its production facilities']
Based on experience with German strategic bombing during World War I against the United Kingdom, the British government estimated after the war that 50 casualties— with about one third killed— would result for every tonne of bombs dropped on London. The estimate of tonnes of bombs an enemy could drop per day grew as aircraft technology advanced, from 75 in 1922, to 150 in 1934, to 644 in 1937. That year the Committee on Imperial Defence estimated that an attack of 60 days would result in 600,000 dead and 1,200,000 wounded. News reports of the Spanish Civil War, such as the bombing of Barcelona, supported the 50-casualties-per-tonne estimate. By 1938 experts generally expected that Germany would attempt to drop as much as 3,500 tonnes in the first 24 hours of war and average 700 tonnes a day for several weeks. In addition to high explosive and incendiary bombs the enemy would possibly use poison gas and even bacteriological warfare, all with a high degree of accuracy. In 1939 military theorist Basil Liddell-Hart predicted that 250,000 deaths and injuries in Britain could occur in the first week of war.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: How many casualties did the British government estimate for every ton of bombs dropped?
A: 50', '
Q: As technology increased what was the amount of bombs that could be dropped in 1937 per day? 
A: 644', '
Q: How many tons did experts expect Germany to drop in the first 24 hours of the war?
A: 3,500', '
Q: What committee estimated that 60 days of attacks would result in 600,000 deaths?
A: Imperial Defence', '
Q: Who was the military theorist in 1939 who said 250,000 deaths and injury could occur in the first week of war in Britian?
A: Basil Liddell-Hart']
In addition to the dead and wounded, government leaders feared mass psychological trauma from aerial attack and a resulting collapse of civil society. A committee of psychiatrists reported to the government in 1938 that there would be three times as many mental as physical casualties from aerial bombing, implying three to four million psychiatric patients. Winston Churchill told Parliament in 1934, "We must expect that, under the pressure of continuous attack upon London, at least three or four million people would be driven out into the open country around the metropolis." Panicked reactions during the Munich crisis, such as the migration by 150,000 to Wales, contributed to fear of societal chaos.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was the biggest fear aerial attacks would cause besides death and wounded?
A: psychological trauma', '
Q: Psychiatrists believe in 1938  that mental trauma could reach how many millions?
A: three to four', '
Q: Where did 150,000 migrate during the Munich crisis?
A: Wales', '
Q: Who told Parliament that after long periods of attacks people would leave the cities for the country? 
A: Winston Churchill']
The government planned to voluntarily evacuate four million people—mostly women and children—from urban areas, including 1.4 million from London. It expected about 90% of evacuees to stay in private homes, and conducted an extensive survey to determine available space. Detailed preparations for transporting them were developed. A trial blackout was held on 10 August 1939, and when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September a blackout began at sunset. Lights would not be allowed after dark for almost six years, and the blackout became by far the most unpopular aspect of the war for civilians, more than rationing.:51,106 The relocation of the government and the civil service was also planned, but would only have occurred if necessary so as not to damage civilian morale.:33

Questions and answers:
['
Q: The government planned to evacuate 1.4 million from which city?
A: London', '
Q: What trial took place on August 10 1939?
A: a blackout', '
Q: What was most unpopular affect of the war with civilians ?
A: the blackout', '
Q: How long were lights not allowed on after dark?
A: almost six years', '
Q: Why did the government  and civil service not want to relocate during the war?
A: damage civilian morale']
Much civil-defence preparation in the form of shelters was left in the hands of local authorities, and many areas such as Birmingham, Coventry, Belfast and the East End of London did not have enough shelters. The Phoney War, however, and the unexpected delay of civilian bombing permitted the shelter programme to finish in June 1940.:35 The programme favoured backyard Anderson shelters and small brick surface shelters; many of the latter were soon abandoned in 1940 as unsafe. In addition, authorities expected that the raids would be brief and during the day. Few predicted that attacks by night would force Londoners to sleep in shelters.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What civil-defense efforts were left to local authorities to handle?
A: shelters', '
Q: What year did the shelter program finish?
A: 1940', '
Q: Why were the shelters soon abandoned in 1940? 
A: unsafe', '
Q: Why were Londoners forced to sleep in shelters?
A: attacks by night']
Very deeply buried shelters provided the most protection against a direct hit. The government did not build them for large populations before the war because of cost, time to build, and fears that their very safety would cause occupants to refuse to leave to return to work, or that anti-war sentiment would develop in large groups. The government saw the Communist Party's leading role in advocating for building deep shelters as an attempt to damage civilian morale, especially after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939.:34

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What kind of sentiment did the government fear would developed in large group shelters? 
A: anti-war', "
Q: Who did the government see as a leading advocate for building deep shelters?
A: the Communist Party's", '
Q: What was the name of the Pact of August 1939?
A: Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact']
The most important existing communal shelters were the London Underground stations. Although many civilians had used them as such during the First World War, the government in 1939 refused to allow the stations to be used as shelters so as not to interfere with commuter and troop travel, and the fears that occupants might refuse to leave. Underground officials were ordered to lock station entrances during raids; but by the second week of heavy bombing the government relented and ordered the stations to be opened. Each day orderly lines of people queued until 4 pm, when they were allowed to enter the stations. In mid-September 1940 about 150,000 a night slept in the Underground, although by the winter and spring months the numbers had declined to 100,000 or less. Noises of battle were muffled and sleep was easier in the deepest stations, but many were killed from direct hits on several stations.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Why did the government refuse to allow the London Underground stations to be used as shelters?
A: interfere with commuter and troop travel', '
Q: Underground officials were ordered to lock the stations during raids but opened how long after the orders?
A: by the second week', '
Q: In 1940 how many people were sleeping in the Underground stations?
A: 150,000 a night', '
Q: Muffling the sound of batter made what easier in the Underground Stations?
A: sleep', '
Q: Why were many killed in Underground Stations?
A: direct hits']
Communal shelters never housed more than one seventh of Greater London residents, however. Peak use of the Underground as shelter was 177,000 on 27 September 1940, and a November 1940 census of London found that about 4% of residents used the Tube and other large shelters; 9% in public surface shelters; and 27% in private home shelters, implying that the remaining 60% of the city likely stayed at home. The government distributed Anderson shelters until 1941 and that year began distributing the Morrison shelter, which could be used inside homes.:190

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was the largest number to use Underground shelters in September  27, 1940?
A: 177,000', '
Q: In 1940 what percentage used the Tube for a sleeping shelter?
A: 4%', '
Q: Where did 60% of populations stay?
A: at home', '
Q: What year did the government start giving out Morrison shelters?
A: 1941', '
Q: Where could the Morrison shelters be used?
A: inside homes']
Public demand caused the government in October 1940 to build new deep shelters:189–190 within the Underground to hold 80,000 people but were not completed until the period of heaviest bombing had passed. By the end of 1940 significant improvements had been made in the Underground and in many other large shelters. Authorities provided stoves and bathrooms and canteen trains provided food. Tickets were issued for bunks in large shelters to reduce the amount of time spent queuing. Committees quickly formed within shelters as informal governments, and organisations such as the British Red Cross and the Salvation Army worked to improve conditions. Entertainment included concerts, films, plays and books from local libraries.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What year did the government start to build new deep shelters?
A: 1940', '
Q: How many people were the new shelters going to hold?
A: 80,000', '
Q: What helped cut down time standing in the queue for shelters?
A: Tickets', '
Q: Which two groups help improve life in the shelters?
A: British Red Cross and the Salvation Army', '
Q: What kind of trains provided food in the shelters?
A: canteen']
Although the intensity of the bombing was not as great as prewar expectations so an equal comparison is impossible, no psychiatric crisis occurred because of the Blitz even during the period of greatest bombing of September 1940. An American witness wrote "By every test and measure I am able to apply, these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit ... the British are stronger and in a better position than they were at its beginning". People referred to raids as if they were weather, stating that a day was "very blitzy".:75,261 However, another American who visited Britain, the publisher Ralph Ingersoll, wrote soon after the Blitz eased on 15 September that:

Questions and answers:
["
Q: What witness wrote that these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit?
A: American", '
Q: With the intense bomb what did not happen as great as prewar predictions expected?
A: psychiatric crisis', '
Q: People called the raids very blitzy like they were talking about what?
A: weather']
Ingersoll added that, according to Anna Freud and Edward Glover, London civilians surprisingly did not suffer from widespread shell shock, unlike the soldiers in the Dunkirk evacuation.:114,117–118 The psychoanalysts were correct, and the special network of psychiatric clinics opened to receive mental casualties of the attacks closed due to lack of need. Although the stress of the war resulted in many anxiety attacks, eating disorders, fatigue, weeping, miscarriages, and other physical and mental ailments, society did not collapse. The number of suicides and drunkenness declined, and London recorded only about two cases of "bomb neuroses" per week in the first three months of bombing. Many civilians found that the best way to retain mental stability was to be with family, and after the first few weeks of bombing avoidance of the evacuation programs grew.:80–81 Glover speculated that the knowledge that the entire country was being attacked, that there was no way to escape the bombs, forced people to accept and deal with the situation.:118

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Anne Freud and Edward Glover said London civilians did not suffer from what?
A: widespread shell shock', '
Q: Why did the psychiatric clinics close?
A: lack of need', '
Q: What two things declined during the attacks in Britain?
A: suicides and drunkenness', '
Q: The entire country was being attack and Glover believe it help people to do what?
A: accept and deal']
The cheerful crowds visiting bomb sites were so large they interfered with rescue work, pub visits increased in number (beer was never rationed), and 13,000 attended cricket at Lord's. People left shelters when told instead of refusing to leave, although many housewives reportedly enjoyed the break from housework. Some people even told government surveyors that they enjoyed air raids if they occurred occasionally, perhaps once a week. Despite the attacks, defeat in Norway and France, and the threat of invasion, overall morale remained high; a Gallup poll found only 3% of Britons expected to lose the war in May 1940, another found an 88% approval rating for Churchill in July, and a third found 89% support for his leadership in October. Support for peace negotiations declined from 29% in February. Each setback caused more civilians to volunteer to become unpaid Local Defence Volunteers, workers worked longer shifts and over weekends, contributions rose to the £5,000 "Spitfire Funds" to build fighters, and the number of work days lost to strikes in 1940 was the lowest in history.:60–63,67–68,75,78–79,215–216

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What drink was never rationed?
A: beer', "
Q: How many people attended cricket at Lord's?
A: 13,000", "
Q: What percent of Briton's expected to lose the war?
A: 3%", "
Q: What was Churchill's highest rating? 
A: 89%", '
Q: What were Spitfire Funds used for?
A: to build fighters']
The civilians of London had an enormous role to play in the protection of their city. Many civilians who were unwilling or unable to join the military became members of the Home Guard, the Air Raid Precautions service (ARP), the Auxiliary Fire Service, and many other organisations. The AFS had 138,000 personnel by July 1939. Only one year earlier, there had only been 6,600 full-time and 13,800 part-time firemen in the entire country. During the Blitz, The Scout Association guided fire engines to where they were most needed, and became known as the "Blitz Scouts". Many unemployed were drafted into the Royal Army Pay Corps. These personnel, along with others from the Pioneer Corps, were charged with the task of salvage and clean-up.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What is ARP?
A: Air Raid Precautions', '
Q: The Auxiliary Fire Service had how many members in July of 1939?
A: 138,000', '
Q: Who was given the name Blitz Scouts?
A: Scout Association', '
Q: The Royal Army Pay Corps and what other group were in charge of salvage and clean-up?
A: Pioneer Corps']
The WVS (Women's Voluntary Services for Civil Defence) was set up under the direction of Samuel Hoare, Home Secretary in 1938 specifically in the event of air raids. Hoare considered it the female branch of the ARP. They organised the evacuation of children, established centres for those displaced by bombing, and operated canteens, salvage and recycling schemes. By the end of 1941, the WVS had one million members. Prior to the outbreak of war, civilians were issued with 50 million respirators (gas masks). These were issued in the event of bombing taking place with gas before evacuation.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: What group did Samuel Hoare set up in 1938?
A: Women's Voluntary Services for Civil Defence", '
Q: Who was Home Secretary in 1938?
A: Samuel Hoare', '
Q: How many members did the WVS have at the end of 1941?
A: one million', '
Q: How many gas mask were issued before the war?
A: 50 million']