romikgosai/squad_modified huggingface dataset:
Aristotle's explanation of how this was possible was not strictly empiricist in a modern sense, but rather based on his theory of potentiality and actuality, and experience of sense perceptions still requires the help of the active nous. These notions contrasted with Platonic notions of the human mind as an entity that pre-existed somewhere in the heavens, before being sent down to join a body on Earth (see Plato's Phaedo and Apology, as well as others). Aristotle was considered to give a more important position to sense perception than Plato, and commentators in the Middle Ages summarized one of his positions as "nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu" (Latin for "nothing in the intellect without first being in the senses").

Questions and answers:
["
Q: What theory was Aristotle's explanation based on?
A: his theory of potentiality and actuality", "
Q: How did Plato's Phaedo and Apology think of the mind?
A: an entity that pre-existed somewhere in the heavens, before being sent down to join a body on Earth", '
Q: Who thought the senses were more important, Aristotle or Plato?
A: Aristotle', '
Q: Who thought the senses were less important, Aristotle or Plato?
A: Plato', '
Q: What does "nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu" mean?
A: Latin for "nothing in the intellect without first being in the senses"']
This idea was later developed in ancient philosophy by the Stoic school. Stoic epistemology generally emphasized that the mind starts blank, but acquires knowledge as the outside world is impressed upon it. The doxographer Aetius summarizes this view as "When a man is born, the Stoics say, he has the commanding part of his soul like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon." Later stoics, such as Sextus of Chaeronea, would continue this idea of empiricism in later Stoic writings as well. As Sextus contends "For every thought comes from sense-perception or not without sense-perception and either from direct experience or not without direct experience" (Against the Professors, 8.56-8).

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What is the Stoic view?
A: the mind starts blank, but acquires knowledge as the outside world is impressed upon it', "
Q: What was Aetius's career?
A: doxographer", '
Q: Where was Sextus from?
A: Chaeronea', "
Q: Who wrote 'Against the Professors'?
A: Sextus", '
Q: Whose ideas did Sextus build on?
A: Aetius']
During the Middle Ages Aristotle's theory of tabula rasa was developed by Islamic philosophers starting with Al Farabi, developing into an elaborate theory by Avicenna and demonstrated as a thought experiment by Ibn Tufail. For Avicenna (Ibn Sina), for example, the tabula rasa is a pure potentiality that is actualized through education, and knowledge is attained through "empirical familiarity with objects in this world from which one abstracts universal concepts" developed through a "syllogistic method of reasoning in which observations lead to propositional statements which when compounded lead to further abstract concepts". The intellect itself develops from a material intellect (al-'aql al-hayulani), which is a potentiality "that can acquire knowledge to the active intellect (al-'aql al-fa'il), the state of the human intellect in conjunction with the perfect source of knowledge". So the immaterial "active intellect", separate from any individual person, is still essential for understanding to occur.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: Whose idea was 'tabula rasa'?
A: Aristotle", '
Q: What religion was Al Farabi?
A: Islamic', "
Q: What does al-'aql al-hayulani mean?
A: material intellect", "
Q: What does al-'aql al-fa'il mean?
A: active intellect", '
Q: What is crucial for understanding?
A: the immaterial "active intellect"']
In the 12th century CE the Andalusian Muslim philosopher and novelist Abu Bakr Ibn Tufail (known as "Abubacer" or "Ebn Tophail" in the West) included the theory of tabula rasa as a thought experiment in his Arabic philosophical novel, Hayy ibn Yaqdhan in which he depicted the development of the mind of a feral child "from a tabula rasa to that of an adult, in complete isolation from society" on a desert island, through experience alone. The Latin translation of his philosophical novel, entitled Philosophus Autodidactus, published by Edward Pococke the Younger in 1671, had an influence on John Locke's formulation of tabula rasa in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: What was 'Abubacer' normally called?
A: Abu Bakr Ibn Tufail", "
Q: What was 'Ebn Topnail' normally called?
A: Abu Bakr Ibn Tufail", "
Q: What was Ibn Tufail's religion?
A: Muslim", "
Q: What was Ibn Tufail's ethnicity?
A: Andalusian", '
Q: When did Ibn Tufail live?
A: 12th century CE']
In the late renaissance various writers began to question the medieval and classical understanding of knowledge acquisition in a more fundamental way. In political and historical writing Niccolò Machiavelli and his friend Francesco Guicciardini initiated a new realistic style of writing. Machiavelli in particular was scornful of writers on politics who judged everything in comparison to mental ideals and demanded that people should study the "effectual truth" instead. Their contemporary, Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) said, "If you find from your own experience that something is a fact and it contradicts what some authority has written down, then you must abandon the authority and base your reasoning on your own findings."

Questions and answers:
['
Q: When was da Vinci born?
A: 1452', '
Q: When did da Vinci die?
A: 1519', '
Q: What did renaissance writers question?
A: the medieval and classical understanding of knowledge acquisition', '
Q: Who did Machiavelli disdain?
A: writers on politics who judged everything in comparison to mental ideals', '
Q: What did da Vinci advise when your experience contradicted authority?
A: abandon the authority and base your reasoning on your own findings']
The decidedly anti-Aristotelian and anti-clerical music theorist Vincenzo Galilei (ca. 1520–1591), father of Galileo and the inventor of monody, made use of the method in successfully solving musical problems, firstly, of tuning such as the relationship of pitch to string tension and mass in stringed instruments, and to volume of air in wind instruments; and secondly to composition, by his various suggestions to composers in his Dialogo della musica antica e moderna (Florence, 1581). The Italian word he used for "experiment" was esperienza. It is known that he was the essential pedagogical influence upon the young Galileo, his eldest son (cf. Coelho, ed. Music and Science in the Age of Galileo Galilei), arguably one of the most influential empiricists in history. Vincenzo, through his tuning research, found the underlying truth at the heart of the misunderstood myth of 'Pythagoras' hammers' (the square of the numbers concerned yielded those musical intervals, not the actual numbers, as believed), and through this and other discoveries that demonstrated the fallibility of traditional authorities, a radically empirical attitude developed, passed on to Galileo, which regarded "experience and demonstration" as the sine qua non of valid rational enquiry.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: When was Vincenzo Galilei born?
A: ca. 1520', '
Q: When did Vincenzo Galilei die?
A: 1591', "
Q: Who was Vincenzo Galilei's oldest son?
A: Galileo", "
Q: What does 'esperienza' mean?
A: experiment"]
British empiricism, though it was not a term used at the time, derives from the 17th century period of early modern philosophy and modern science. The term became useful in order to describe differences perceived between two of its founders Francis Bacon, described as empiricist, and René Descartes, who is described as a rationalist. Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza, in the next generation, are often also described as an empiricist and a rationalist respectively. John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume were the primary exponents of empiricism in the 18th century Enlightenment, with Locke being the person who is normally known as the founder of empiricism as such.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: When was the British empiricism period?
A: 17th century', '
Q: What type of philosopher was Francis Bacon?
A: empiricist', '
Q: What type of philosopher was Descartes?
A: rationalist', '
Q: What type of philosopher was Hobbes?
A: empiricist', '
Q: What type of philosopher was Spinoza?
A: rationalist']
In response to the early-to-mid-17th century "continental rationalism" John Locke (1632–1704) proposed in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) a very influential view wherein the only knowledge humans can have is a posteriori, i.e., based upon experience. Locke is famously attributed with holding the proposition that the human mind is a tabula rasa, a "blank tablet", in Locke's words "white paper", on which the experiences derived from sense impressions as a person's life proceeds are written. There are two sources of our ideas: sensation and reflection. In both cases, a distinction is made between simple and complex ideas. The former are unanalysable, and are broken down into primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are essential for the object in question to be what it is. Without specific primary qualities, an object would not be what it is. For example, an apple is an apple because of the arrangement of its atomic structure. If an apple was structured differently, it would cease to be an apple. Secondary qualities are the sensory information we can perceive from its primary qualities. For example, an apple can be perceived in various colours, sizes, and textures but it is still identified as an apple. Therefore, its primary qualities dictate what the object essentially is, while its secondary qualities define its attributes. Complex ideas combine simple ones, and divide into substances, modes, and relations. According to Locke, our knowledge of things is a perception of ideas that are in accordance or discordance with each other, which is very different from the quest for certainty of Descartes.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: When was 'An Essay Concerning Human Understanding' published?
A: 1689", "
Q: Who wrote 'An Essay Concerning Human Understanding'?
A: John Locke", "
Q: What does 'tabula rasa' mean?
A: blank tablet", "
Q: What did Locke say 'tabula rasa' meant?
A: white paper", "
Q: What did Locke's 'tabula rasa' concept say happens to the mind?
A: on which the experiences derived from sense impressions as a person's life proceeds are written"]
A generation later, the Irish Anglican bishop, George Berkeley (1685–1753), determined that Locke's view immediately opened a door that would lead to eventual atheism. In response to Locke, he put forth in his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) an important challenge to empiricism in which things only exist either as a result of their being perceived, or by virtue of the fact that they are an entity doing the perceiving. (For Berkeley, God fills in for humans by doing the perceiving whenever humans are not around to do it.) In his text Alciphron, Berkeley maintained that any order humans may see in nature is the language or handwriting of God. Berkeley's approach to empiricism would later come to be called subjective idealism.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: Who wrote 'Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge'?
A: George Berkeley", "
Q: Who wrote 'Alciphron'?
A: George Berkeley", "
Q: When was 'Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge' published?
A: 1710", '
Q: What religion was George Berkeley?
A: Anglican', '
Q: What nationality was George Berkeley?
A: Irish']
The Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) responded to Berkeley's criticisms of Locke, as well as other differences between early modern philosophers, and moved empiricism to a new level of skepticism. Hume argued in keeping with the empiricist view that all knowledge derives from sense experience, but he accepted that this has implications not normally acceptable to philosophers. He wrote for example, "Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. On this view, we must say that it is only probable that all men must die or that the sun will rise to-morrow, because neither of these can be demonstrated. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities—by ‘proofs’ meaning arguments from experience that leave no room for doubt or opposition." And,

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What did Hume bring to empiricism?
A: a new level of skepticism', "
Q: What was Hume's nationality?
A: Scottish", '
Q: What two types of arguments did Locke say there are?
A: demonstrative and probable', '
Q: When did Hume die?
A: 1776', '
Q: When was Hume born?
A: 1711']
Hume divided all of human knowledge into two categories: relations of ideas and matters of fact (see also Kant's analytic-synthetic distinction). Mathematical and logical propositions (e.g. "that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides") are examples of the first, while propositions involving some contingent observation of the world (e.g. "the sun rises in the East") are examples of the second. All of people's "ideas", in turn, are derived from their "impressions". For Hume, an "impression" corresponds roughly with what we call a sensation. To remember or to imagine such impressions is to have an "idea". Ideas are therefore the faint copies of sensations.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What types of human knowledge did Hume say there are?
A: relations of ideas and matters of fact', '
Q: What type of human knowledge is math?
A: relations of ideas', '
Q: What type of human knowledge is observing the world?
A: matters of fact', '
Q: What type of human knowledge is "the sun rises in the East"?
A: matters of fact', '
Q: Where did Hume say people\'s ideas come from?
A: their "impressions"']
Hume maintained that all knowledge, even the most basic beliefs about the natural world, cannot be conclusively established by reason. Rather, he maintained, our beliefs are more a result of accumulated habits, developed in response to accumulated sense experiences. Among his many arguments Hume also added another important slant to the debate about scientific method — that of the problem of induction. Hume argued that it requires inductive reasoning to arrive at the premises for the principle of inductive reasoning, and therefore the justification for inductive reasoning is a circular argument. Among Hume's conclusions regarding the problem of induction is that there is no certainty that the future will resemble the past. Thus, as a simple instance posed by Hume, we cannot know with certainty by inductive reasoning that the sun will continue to rise in the East, but instead come to expect it to do so because it has repeatedly done so in the past.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What did Hume think our beliefs are?
A: a result of accumulated habits, developed in response to accumulated sense experiences', "
Q: What did Hume think our beliefs can't be established solely by?
A: reason", '
Q: What did Hume think is a circular argument?
A: the justification for inductive reasoning', "
Q: What did Hume say we can't know by inductive reasoning?
A: that the sun will continue to rise in the East", '
Q: Why did Hume say we expect the sun to rise?
A: because it has repeatedly done so in the past']
Most of Hume's followers have disagreed with his conclusion that belief in an external world is rationally unjustifiable, contending that Hume's own principles implicitly contained the rational justification for such a belief, that is, beyond being content to let the issue rest on human instinct, custom and habit. According to an extreme empiricist theory known as phenomenalism, anticipated by the arguments of both Hume and George Berkeley, a physical object is a kind of construction out of our experiences. Phenomenalism is the view that physical objects, properties, events (whatever is physical) are reducible to mental objects, properties, events. Ultimately, only mental objects, properties, events, exist — hence the closely related term subjective idealism. By the phenomenalistic line of thinking, to have a visual experience of a real physical thing is to have an experience of a certain kind of group of experiences. This type of set of experiences possesses a constancy and coherence that is lacking in the set of experiences of which hallucinations, for example, are a part. As John Stuart Mill put it in the mid-19th century, matter is the "permanent possibility of sensation". Mill's empiricism went a significant step beyond Hume in still another respect: in maintaining that induction is necessary for all meaningful knowledge including mathematics. As summarized by D.W. Hamlin:

Questions and answers:
["
Q: What conclusion do most of Hume's followers disagree with?
A: that belief in an external world is rationally unjustifiable", "
Q: What did Hume say can't be rationally justified?
A: belief in an external world", '
Q: What is phenomenalism?
A: physical objects, properties, events (whatever is physical) are reducible to mental objects, properties, events', '
Q: What is subjective idealism closely related to?
A: Phenomenalism', '
Q: What did John Stuart Mill say matter is?
A: the "permanent possibility of sensation"']
Mill's empiricism thus held that knowledge of any kind is not from direct experience but an inductive inference from direct experience. The problems other philosophers have had with Mill's position center around the following issues: Firstly, Mill's formulation encounters difficulty when it describes what direct experience is by differentiating only between actual and possible sensations. This misses some key discussion concerning conditions under which such "groups of permanent possibilities of sensation" might exist in the first place. Berkeley put God in that gap; the phenomenalists, including Mill, essentially left the question unanswered. In the end, lacking an acknowledgement of an aspect of "reality" that goes beyond mere "possibilities of sensation", such a position leads to a version of subjective idealism. Questions of how floor beams continue to support a floor while unobserved, how trees continue to grow while unobserved and untouched by human hands, etc., remain unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable in these terms. Secondly, Mill's formulation leaves open the unsettling possibility that the "gap-filling entities are purely possibilities and not actualities at all". Thirdly, Mill's position, by calling mathematics merely another species of inductive inference, misapprehends mathematics. It fails to fully consider the structure and method of mathematical science, the products of which are arrived at through an internally consistent deductive set of procedures which do not, either today or at the time Mill wrote, fall under the agreed meaning of induction.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What did Mill say knowledge comes from?
A: an inductive inference from direct experience', '
Q: What sensations did Mill differentiate?
A: actual and possible sensations', '
Q: When Mill left a question of sensations unanswered, how did Berkeley answer it?
A: God', '
Q: What did Mill say might not actually exist?
A: gap-filling entities', '
Q: What did Mill misrepresent about math?
A: the structure and method of mathematical science, the products of which are arrived at through an internally consistent deductive set of procedures']
The phenomenalist phase of post-Humean empiricism ended by the 1940s, for by that time it had become obvious that statements about physical things could not be translated into statements about actual and possible sense data. If a physical object statement is to be translatable into a sense-data statement, the former must be at least deducible from the latter. But it came to be realized that there is no finite set of statements about actual and possible sense-data from which we can deduce even a single physical-object statement. Remember that the translating or paraphrasing statement must be couched in terms of normal observers in normal conditions of observation. There is, however, no finite set of statements that are couched in purely sensory terms and can express the satisfaction of the condition of the presence of a normal observer. According to phenomenalism, to say that a normal observer is present is to make the hypothetical statement that were a doctor to inspect the observer, the observer would appear to the doctor to be normal. But, of course, the doctor himself must be a normal observer. If we are to specify this doctor's normality in sensory terms, we must make reference to a second doctor who, when inspecting the sense organs of the first doctor, would himself have to have the sense data a normal observer has when inspecting the sense organs of a subject who is a normal observer. And if we are to specify in sensory terms that the second doctor is a normal observer, we must refer to a third doctor, and so on (also see the third man).

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What phase of empiricism ended in the 1940s?
A: phenomenalist', "
Q: How can't a finite set of statements be described?
A: in purely sensory terms", "
Q: What is necessary to explain a doctor's normality in sensory terms?
A: a second doctor"]
Logical empiricism (also logical positivism or neopositivism) was an early 20th-century attempt to synthesize the essential ideas of British empiricism (e.g. a strong emphasis on sensory experience as the basis for knowledge) with certain insights from mathematical logic that had been developed by Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Some of the key figures in this movement were Otto Neurath, Moritz Schlick and the rest of the Vienna Circle, along with A.J. Ayer, Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What are other terms for logical empiricism?
A: logical positivism or neopositivism', '
Q: When was logical empricism formulated?
A: early 20th-century', '
Q: What did logical empiricism try to combine with mathematical logic?
A: British empiricism', '
Q: What was Otto Neurath an important member of?
A: Logical empiricism', '
Q: What was AJ Ayer an important member of?
A: Logical empiricism']
The neopositivists subscribed to a notion of philosophy as the conceptual clarification of the methods, insights and discoveries of the sciences. They saw in the logical symbolism elaborated by Frege (1848–1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) a powerful instrument that could rationally reconstruct all scientific discourse into an ideal, logically perfect, language that would be free of the ambiguities and deformations of natural language. This gave rise to what they saw as metaphysical pseudoproblems and other conceptual confusions. By combining Frege's thesis that all mathematical truths are logical with the early Wittgenstein's idea that all logical truths are mere linguistic tautologies, they arrived at a twofold classification of all propositions: the analytic (a priori) and the synthetic (a posteriori). On this basis, they formulated a strong principle of demarcation between sentences that have sense and those that do not: the so-called verification principle. Any sentence that is not purely logical, or is unverifiable is devoid of meaning. As a result, most metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic and other traditional philosophical problems came to be considered pseudoproblems.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: When was Bertrand Russell born?
A: 1872', '
Q: When did Bertrand Russell die?
A: 1970', '
Q: What did Frege say about math?
A: all mathematical truths are logical', '
Q: What did Wittgenstein say about logic?
A: all logical truths are mere linguistic tautologies', '
Q: What are pseudoproblems?
A: most metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic and other traditional philosophical problems']