romikgosai/squad_modified huggingface dataset:
Logically, no number of positive outcomes at the level of experimental testing can confirm a scientific theory, but a single counterexample is logically decisive: it shows the theory, from which the implication is derived, to be false. To say that a given statement (e.g., the statement of a law of some scientific theory) -- [call it "T"] -- is "falsifiable" does not mean that "T" is false. Rather, it means that, if "T" is false, then (in principle), "T" could be shown to be false, by observation or by experiment. Popper's account of the logical asymmetry between verification and falsifiability lies at the heart of his philosophy of science. It also inspired him to take falsifiability as his criterion of demarcation between what is, and is not, genuinely scientific: a theory should be considered scientific if, and only if, it is falsifiable. This led him to attack the claims of both psychoanalysis and contemporary Marxism to scientific status, on the basis that their theories are not falsifiable.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Popper pointed out an important logical asymmetry between what two concepts?
A: verification and falsifiability', '
Q: What does Popper say demarcates scientific theory from non-science?
A: falsifiability', '
Q: What political theory did Popper say did not meet his falsifiability criterion?
A: Marxism', '
Q: What branch of psychology was Popper critical of for not producing falsifiable theory?
A: psychoanalysis']
In All Life is Problem Solving, Popper sought to explain the apparent progress of scientific knowledge – that is, how it is that our understanding of the universe seems to improve over time. This problem arises from his position that the truth content of our theories, even the best of them, cannot be verified by scientific testing, but can only be falsified. Again, in this context the word "falsified" does not refer to something being "fake"; rather, that something can be (i.e., is capable of being) shown to be false by observation or experiment. Some things simply do not lend themselves to being shown to be false, and therefore, are not falsifiable. If so, then how is it that the growth of science appears to result in a growth in knowledge? In Popper's view, the advance of scientific knowledge is an evolutionary process characterised by his formula:

Questions and answers:
["
Q: Which of Popper's works addresses the improvement of scientific understanding of the world over time?
A: All Life is Problem Solving", '
Q: Popper described the growth of scientific understanding as what kind of process?
A: evolutionary', '
Q: What aspect of a scientific theory can never be fully verified, according to Popper?
A: truth content']
In response to a given problem situation (), a number of competing conjectures, or tentative theories (), are systematically subjected to the most rigorous attempts at falsification possible. This process, error elimination (), performs a similar function for science that natural selection performs for biological evolution. Theories that better survive the process of refutation are not more true, but rather, more "fit"—in other words, more applicable to the problem situation at hand (). Consequently, just as a species' biological fitness does not ensure continued survival, neither does rigorous testing protect a scientific theory from refutation in the future. Yet, as it appears that the engine of biological evolution has, over many generations, produced adaptive traits equipped to deal with more and more complex problems of survival, likewise, the evolution of theories through the scientific method may, in Popper's view, reflect a certain type of progress: toward more and more interesting problems (). For Popper, it is in the interplay between the tentative theories (conjectures) and error elimination (refutation) that scientific knowledge advances toward greater and greater problems; in a process very much akin to the interplay between genetic variation and natural selection.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What process in science is like the process of natural selection in nature?
A: error elimination', '
Q: What is a better description for theories that survive scientific scrutiny than "more true?"
A: more "fit"', '
Q: What is another term for the tentative theories enter the process of error elimination in science? 
A: conjectures', '
Q: Toward what does Popper believe scientific understandings progress?
A: more and more interesting problems']
Among his contributions to philosophy is his claim to have solved the philosophical problem of induction. He states that while there is no way to prove that the sun will rise, it is possible to formulate the theory that every day the sun will rise; if it does not rise on some particular day, the theory will be falsified and will have to be replaced by a different one. Until that day, there is no need to reject the assumption that the theory is true. Nor is it rational according to Popper to make instead the more complex assumption that the sun will rise until a given day, but will stop doing so the day after, or similar statements with additional conditions.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: Popper's thoughts on falsification present a solution to the philosophical problem concerning what type of scientific reasoning?
A: induction", '
Q: What parts of a theory are unnecessary before the simple theory is falsified?
A: additional conditions', '
Q: Who presented a solution to the philosophical problem of induction centered around falsifiability?
A: Popper']
Popper held that rationality is not restricted to the realm of empirical or scientific theories, but that it is merely a special case of the general method of criticism, the method of finding and eliminating contradictions in knowledge without ad-hoc-measures. According to this view, rational discussion about metaphysical ideas, about moral values and even about purposes is possible. Popper's student W.W. Bartley III tried to radicalise this idea and made the controversial claim that not only can criticism go beyond empirical knowledge, but that everything can be rationally criticised.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: Popper's rational approach opposes what technique sometimes used to remove contradictions in knowledge?
A: ad-hoc-measures", "
Q: Which of Popper's students argued that rational criticism should be most widely applied?
A: W.W. Bartley III", "
Q: What type of knowledge is not the only sphere of rational criticism, according to Popper's student W.W. Bartley III?
A: empirical"]
To Popper, who was an anti-justificationist, traditional philosophy is misled by the false principle of sufficient reason. He thinks that no assumption can ever be or needs ever to be justified, so a lack of justification is not a justification for doubt. Instead, theories should be tested and scrutinised. It is not the goal to bless theories with claims of certainty or justification, but to eliminate errors in them. He writes, "there are no such things as good positive reasons; nor do we need such things [...] But [philosophers] obviously cannot quite bring [themselves] to believe that this is my opinion, let alone that it is right" (The Philosophy of Karl Popper, p. 1043)

Questions and answers:
['
Q: According to Popper, what is not grounds for doubt?
A: lack of justification', '
Q: What principle of traditional philosophy did Popper take an anti-justificationist stance against?
A: principle of sufficient reason', '
Q: What does Popper believe is essential to do to theories instead of justification?
A: eliminate errors', "
Q: What don't we need to look for about theories in Popper's view?
A: good positive reasons"]
In The Open Society and Its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism, Popper developed a critique of historicism and a defence of the "Open Society". Popper considered historicism to be the theory that history develops inexorably and necessarily according to knowable general laws towards a determinate end. He argued that this view is the principal theoretical presupposition underpinning most forms of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. He argued that historicism is founded upon mistaken assumptions regarding the nature of scientific law and prediction. Since the growth of human knowledge is a causal factor in the evolution of human history, and since "no society can predict, scientifically, its own future states of knowledge", it follows, he argued, that there can be no predictive science of human history. For Popper, metaphysical and historical indeterminism go hand in hand.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: What is the term for the view that there are discoverable general laws constraining history's development?
A: historicism", '
Q: What political forms did Popper believe historicism supported?
A: authoritarianism and totalitarianism', '
Q: What unpredictable feature of the world did Popper say refuted historicism?
A: the growth of human knowledge', "
Q: Which of Popper's works criticized the idea that history has an inexorable developmental path?
A: The Poverty of Historicism"]
As early as 1934, Popper wrote of the search for truth as "one of the strongest motives for scientific discovery." Still, he describes in Objective Knowledge (1972) early concerns about the much-criticised notion of truth as correspondence. Then came the semantic theory of truth formulated by the logician Alfred Tarski and published in 1933. Popper writes of learning in 1935 of the consequences of Tarski's theory, to his intense joy. The theory met critical objections to truth as correspondence and thereby rehabilitated it. The theory also seemed, in Popper's eyes, to support metaphysical realism and the regulative idea of a search for truth.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Whose theory of truth did Popper read with intense interest in 1935?
A: Alfred Tarski', '
Q: What theory of interest to Popper did Alfred Tarski publish in 1933?
A: semantic theory of truth', "
Q: Tarski's theory overcame certain objections to what conception of truth?
A: truth as correspondence", "
Q: What kind of realism did Popper believe Tarski's theory supported?
A: metaphysical"]
According to this theory, the conditions for the truth of a sentence as well as the sentences themselves are part of a metalanguage. So, for example, the sentence "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. Although many philosophers have interpreted, and continue to interpret, Tarski's theory as a deflationary theory, Popper refers to it as a theory in which "is true" is replaced with "corresponds to the facts". He bases this interpretation on the fact that examples such as the one described above refer to two things: assertions and the facts to which they refer. He identifies Tarski's formulation of the truth conditions of sentences as the introduction of a "metalinguistic predicate" and distinguishes the following cases:

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What term do philosophers give to the kind of theory Tarski proposed about truth?
A: deflationary', '
Q: With what does Popper say Tarski\'s theory replaces the predicate "is true?"
A: "corresponds to the facts"', '
Q: What concept did Tarski introduce to discuss the conditions for the truth of statements?
A: metalanguage', "
Q: What two things does Popper argue Tarski's theory involves in an evaluation of truth?
A: assertions and the facts to which they refer"]
Upon this basis, along with that of the logical content of assertions (where logical content is inversely proportional to probability), Popper went on to develop his important notion of verisimilitude or "truthlikeness". The intuitive idea behind verisimilitude is that the assertions or hypotheses of scientific theories can be objectively measured with respect to the amount of truth and falsity that they imply. And, in this way, one theory can be evaluated as more or less true than another on a quantitative basis which, Popper emphasises forcefully, has nothing to do with "subjective probabilities" or other merely "epistemic" considerations.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What term does Popper use that roughly means verisimilitude?
A: truthlikeness', '
Q: Poppers notion of verisimilitude leaves no place for which kind of probabilities in the evaluation of scientific hypotheses?
A: subjective', '
Q: What class of considerations did Popper believe were not important in scientific measurement?
A: epistemic', "
Q: What is the logical content of hypotheses inversely proportional to in Popper's reasoning?
A: probability"]
Knowledge, for Popper, was objective, both in the sense that it is objectively true (or truthlike), and also in the sense that knowledge has an ontological status (i.e., knowledge as object) independent of the knowing subject (Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, 1972). He proposed three worlds: World One, being the physical world, or physical states; World Two, being the world of mind, or mental states, ideas, and perceptions; and World Three, being the body of human knowledge expressed in its manifold forms, or the products of the second world made manifest in the materials of the first world (i.e., books, papers, paintings, symphonies, and all the products of the human mind). World Three, he argued, was the product of individual human beings in exactly the same sense that an animal path is the product of individual animals, and that, as such, has an existence and evolution independent of any individual knowing subjects. The influence of World Three, in his view, on the individual human mind (World Two) is at least as strong as the influence of World One. In other words, the knowledge held by a given individual mind owes at least as much to the total accumulated wealth of human knowledge, made manifest, as to the world of direct experience. As such, the growth of human knowledge could be said to be a function of the independent evolution of World Three. Many contemporary philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, have not embraced Popper's Three World conjecture, due mostly, it seems, to its resemblance to mind-body dualism.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What did Popper argue was objective and independent of its subject?
A: knowledge', '
Q: How many different worlds or realities did Popper differentiate in Objective Knowledge?
A: three', "
Q: What constituted World One in Popper's theory?
A: the physical world", '
Q: Who produced the contents of World Three?
A: individual human beings', "
Q: Which world's evolution corresponds to the growth of human knowledge?
A: World Three"]
The creation–evolution controversy in the United States raises the issue of whether creationistic ideas may be legitimately called science and whether evolution itself may be legitimately called science. In the debate, both sides and even courts in their decisions have frequently invoked Popper's criterion of falsifiability (see Daubert standard). In this context, passages written by Popper are frequently quoted in which he speaks about such issues himself. For example, he famously stated "Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program—a possible framework for testable scientific theories." He continued:

Questions and answers:
["
Q: Which of Popper's notions is often invoked in creation-evolution debates?
A: criterion of falsifiability", '
Q: What kind of research program did Popper call Darwinism?
A: metaphysical', "
Q: What phrase did Popper use to describe Darwinism's relation to proper falsifiable theories?
A: possible framework", "
Q: Popper's philosophy is often applied in what political debate concerning biological science?
A: creation–evolution"]
Popper had his own sophisticated views on evolution that go much beyond what the frequently-quoted passages say. In effect, Popper agreed with some of the points of both creationists and naturalists, but also disagreed with both views on crucial aspects. Popper understood the universe as a creative entity that invents new things, including life, but without the necessity of something like a god, especially not one who is pulling strings from behind the curtain. He said that evolution must, as the creationists say, work in a goal-directed way but disagreed with their view that it must necessarily be the hand of god that imposes these goals onto the stage of life.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Along with some creationists, Popper believed that evolution must have what quality to its progress?
A: goal-directed', '
Q: Popper disagreed with creationists that whose hand must be directing evolution?
A: god', '
Q: What kind of an entity did Popper believe the universe to be?
A: creative']
Instead, he formulated the spearhead model of evolution, a version of genetic pluralism. According to this model, living organisms themselves have goals, and act according to these goals, each guided by a central control. In its most sophisticated form, this is the brain of humans, but controls also exist in much less sophisticated ways for species of lower complexity, such as the amoeba. This control organ plays a special role in evolution—it is the "spearhead of evolution". The goals bring the purpose into the world. Mutations in the genes that determine the structure of the control may then cause drastic changes in behaviour, preferences and goals, without having an impact on the organism's phenotype. Popper postulates that such purely behavioural changes are less likely to be lethal for the organism compared to drastic changes of the phenotype.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: What is the name of Popper's model of evolution?
A: spearhead", "
Q: Popper's model of evolution is part of what family of models?
A: genetic pluralism", "
Q: What directs the actions of organisms in Popper's biological model?
A: goals", "
Q: Organisms' goals shift along with which notable genetic process?
A: Mutations"]
Popper contrasts his views with the notion of the "hopeful monster" that has large phenotype mutations and calls it the "hopeful behavioural monster". After behaviour has changed radically, small but quick changes of the phenotype follow to make the organism fitter to its changed goals. This way it looks as if the phenotype were changing guided by some invisible hand, while it is merely natural selection working in combination with the new behaviour. For example, according to this hypothesis, the eating habits of the giraffe must have changed before its elongated neck evolved. Popper contrasted this view as "evolution from within" or "active Darwinism" (the organism actively trying to discover new ways of life and being on a quest for conquering new ecological niches), with the naturalistic "evolution from without" (which has the picture of a hostile environment only trying to kill the mostly passive organism, or perhaps segregate some of its groups).

Questions and answers:
["
Q: Which view of evolution emphasizing large changes in organisms' phenotypes does Popper oppose to his own?
A: hopeful monster", '
Q: Which aspect of organisms changes most radically in the process of evolution Popper envisions?
A: behaviour', '
Q: How does Popper describe the "monsters" that evolve in his view of evolutionary processes?
A: hopeful behavioural monster', '
Q: What kind of Darwinism does Popper subscribe to in contrast to the naturalistic kind?
A: active']
About the creation-evolution controversy, Popper wrote that he considered it "a somewhat sensational clash between a brilliant scientific hypothesis concerning the history of the various species of animals and plants on earth, and an older metaphysical theory which, incidentally, happened to be part of an established religious belief" with a footnote to the effect that "[he] agree[s] with Professor C.E. Raven when, in his Science, Religion, and the Future, 1943, he calls this conflict "a storm in a Victorian tea-cup"; though the force of this remark is perhaps a little impaired by the attention he pays to the vapours still emerging from the cup—to the Great Systems of Evolutionist Philosophy, produced by Bergson, Whitehead, Smuts, and others."

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Which professor cited by Popper described the creation-evolution debate as "a storm in a Victorian tea-cup?"
A: C.E. Raven', '
Q: What controversy involving science did Popper believe was sensationalized because of its connection with religion?
A: creation-evolution', '
Q: In which year did C.E. Raven publish the remarks on creation-evolution quoted by Popper?
A: 1943', '
Q: What term does Popper use when describing creationism as a type of theory?
A: metaphysical']
In an interview that Popper gave in 1969 with the condition that it shall be kept secret until after his death, he summarised his position on God as follows: "I don't know whether God exists or not. ... Some forms of atheism are arrogant and ignorant and should be rejected, but agnosticism—to admit that we don't know and to search—is all right. ... When I look at what I call the gift of life, I feel a gratitude which is in tune with some religious ideas of God. However, the moment I even speak of it, I am embarrassed that I may do something wrong to God in talking about God." He objected to organised religion, saying "it tends to use the name of God in vain", noting the danger of fanaticism because of religious conflicts: "The whole thing goes back to myths which, though they may have a kernel of truth, are untrue. Why then should the Jewish myth be true and the Indian and Egyptian myths not be true?" In a letter unrelated to the interview, he stressed his tolerant attitude: "Although I am not for religion, I do think that we should show respect for anybody who believes honestly."

Questions and answers:
['
Q: In which year did Popper give a secret interview concerning his views about God?
A: 1969', '
Q: Which term for his religious outlook did Popper prefer?
A: agnosticism', '
Q: What did Popper believe were at the heart of religious disagreements, and should not be the cause of as much conflict as they are?
A: myths', '
Q: Although he opposed organized religion, what attitude did Popper think should be taken toward it:
A: tolerant']
Popper played a vital role in establishing the philosophy of science as a vigorous, autonomous discipline within philosophy, through his own prolific and influential works, and also through his influence on his own contemporaries and students. Popper founded in 1946 the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics and there lectured and influenced both Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, two of the foremost philosophers of science in the next generation of philosophy of science. (Lakatos significantly modified Popper's position,:1 and Feyerabend repudiated it entirely, but the work of both is deeply influenced by Popper and engaged with many of the problems that Popper set.)

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What branch of philosophy did Popper advance the most?
A: philosophy of science', '
Q: Which department did Popper found at the London School of Economics?
A: Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method', '
Q: Which two major philosophers of science learned a great deal from Popper at the London School Economics?
A: Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend', "
Q: What did Paul Feyerabend ultimate do to Popper's philosophy of science?
A: repudiated it entirely", '
Q: Where did Popper establish a university department for the philosophy of science in 1946?
A: London School of Economics']