romikgosai/squad_modified huggingface dataset:
By mid-November 1940, when the Germans adopted a changed plan, more than 13,000 short tons (12,000 t) of high explosive and nearly 1,000,000 incendiaries had fallen on London. Outside the capital, there had been widespread harassing activity by single aircraft, as well as fairly strong diversionary attacks on Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool, but no major raids. The London docks and railways communications had taken a heavy pounding, and much damage had been done to the railway system outside. In September, there had been no less than 667 hits on railways in Great Britain, and at one period, between 5,000 and 6,000 wagons were standing idle from the effect of delayed action bombs. But the great bulk of the traffic went on; and Londoners—though they glanced apprehensively each morning at the list of closed stretches of line displayed at their local station, or made strange detours round back streets in the buses—still got to work. For all the destruction of life and property, the observers sent out by the Ministry of Home Security failed to discover the slightest sign of a break in morale. More than 13,000 civilians had been killed, and almost 20,000 injured, in September and October alone, but the death toll was much less than expected. In late 1940, Churchill credited the shelters:

Questions and answers:
['
Q: In September how many railway hits were there in Great Britain?
A: no less than 667', '
Q: By mid November of 1940 how many incendiaries were dropped on London?
A: 1,000,000', '
Q: What did the Ministry of Home Security fail to discover?
A: the slightest sign of a break in morale', '
Q: What locations suffered strong diversionary tactics?
A: Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool', '
Q: About how many civilians were injured in September and October?
A: 20,000']
The American observer Ingersoll reported at this time that "as to the accuracy of the bombing of military objectives, here I make no qualifications. The aim is surprisingly, astonishingly, amazingly inaccurate ... The physical damage to civilian London, to sum up, was more general and more extensive than I had imagined. The damage to military targets much less", and stated that he had seen numerous examples of untouched targets surrounded by buildings destroyed by errant bombs. For example, in two months of bombing, Battersea Power Station, perhaps the largest single target in London, had only received one minor hit ("a nick"). No bridge over the Thames had been hit, and the docks were still functioning despite great damage. An airfield was hit 56 times but the runways were never damaged and the field was never out of operation, despite German pilots' familiarity with it from prewar commercial flights. Ingersoll wrote that the difference between the failure of the German campaign against military targets versus its success in continental Europe was the RAF retaining control of the air.:79–80,174

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was the name of the American observer?
A: Ingersoll', '
Q: The American observer said what about the damage to London?
A: to sum up, was more general and more extensive than I had imagined.', '
Q: How many bridges over the Thames were struck?
A: No bridge over the Thames had been hit', '
Q: The Battersea Power Station took how many hits in two months?
A: one minor hit ("a nick")', '
Q: What did German pilots use to gain knowledge of an airfield?
A: prewar commercial flights.']
British night air defences were in a poor state. Few anti-aircraft guns had fire-control systems, and the underpowered searchlights were usually ineffective against aircraft at altitudes above 12,000 ft (3,700 m). In July 1940, only 1,200 heavy and 549 light guns were deployed in the whole of Britain. Of the "heavies", some 200 were of the obsolescent 3 in (76 mm) type; the remainder were the effective 4.5 in (110 mm) and 3.7 in (94 mm) guns, with a theoretical "ceiling"' of over 30,000 ft (9,100 m) but a practical limit of 25,000 ft (7,600 m) because the predictor in use could not accept greater heights. The light guns, about half of which were of the excellent Bofors 40 mm, dealt with aircraft only up to 6,000 ft (1,800 m). Although the use of the guns improved civilian morale, with the knowledge the German bomber crews were facing the barrage, it is now believed that the anti-aircraft guns achieved little and in fact the falling shell fragments caused more British casualties on the ground.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: British night air defenses were effective to what height?
A: 12,000 ft (3,700 m)', '
Q: By July of 1940 how many guns were deployed in Britain?
A: only 1,200 heavy and 549 light guns', '
Q: What was the practical ceiling of the effective heavy guns?
A: 25,000 ft (7,600 m)', '
Q: What type of light gun dealt with aircraft up to 6000 ft.?
A: Bofors 40 mm', '
Q: What is believed to have caused many civilian casualties from anti-aircraft guns?
A: falling shell fragments']
London's defences were rapidly reorganised by General Pile, the Commander-in-Chief of Anti-Aircraft Command. The difference this made to the effectiveness of air defences is questionable. The British were still one-third below the establishment of heavy anti-aircraft artillery AAA (or ack-ack) in May 1941, with only 2,631 weapons available. Dowding had to rely on night fighters. From 1940 to 1941, the most successful night-fighter was the Boulton Paul Defiant; its four squadrons shot down more enemy aircraft than any other type. AA defences improved by better use of radar and searchlights. Over several months, the 20,000 shells spent per raider shot down in September 1940, was reduced to 4,087 in January 1941 and to 2,963 shells in February 1941.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: Who reorganised London's defences?
A: General Pile", '
Q: The British were how far below the establishment of heavy anti-aircraft artillery?
A: one-third', '
Q: Who relied on night fighters?
A: Dowding', "
Q: Who's four squadrons shot down more enemy aircraft than any other type?
A: Boulton Paul Defiant", '
Q: How were AA defenses improved?
A: by better use of radar and searchlights']
Airborne Interception radar (AI) was unreliable. The heavy fighting in the Battle of Britain had eaten up most of Fighter Command's resources, so there was little investment in night fighting. Bombers were flown with airborne search lights out of desperation[citation needed], but to little avail. Of greater potential was the GL (Gunlaying) radar and searchlights with fighter direction from RAF fighter control rooms to begin a GCI system (Ground Control-led Interception) under Group-level control (No. 10 Group RAF, No. 11 Group RAF and No. 12 Group RAF).

Questions and answers:
['
Q: The bombers used what out of desperation?
A: airborne search lights', '
Q: What was considered unreliable?
A: Airborne Interception radar', '
Q: Gunlaying radar and RAF controls combined to create what system?
A: Ground Control-led Interception', "
Q: What used most of Fighter Command's resources?
A: the Battle of Britain"]
Whitehall's disquiet at the failures of the RAF led to the replacement of Dowding (who was already due for retirement) with Sholto Douglas on 25 November. Douglas set about introducing more squadrons and dispersing the few GL sets to create a carpet effect in the southern counties. Still, in February 1941, there remained only seven squadrons with 87 pilots, under half the required strength. The GL carpet was supported by six GCI sets controlling radar-equipped night-fighters. By the height of the Blitz, they were becoming more successful. The number of contacts and combats rose in 1941, from 44 and two in 48 sorties in January 1941, to 204 and 74 in May (643 sorties). But even in May, 67% of the sorties were visual cat's-eye missions. Curiously, while 43% of the contacts in May 1941 were by visual sightings, they accounted for 61% of the combats. Yet when compared with Luftwaffe daylight operations, there was a sharp decline in German losses to 1%. If a vigilant bomber crew could spot the fighter first, they had a decent chance at evading it.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Who replaced Dowding on November 25?
A: Sholto Douglas', '
Q: What supported the GL carpet?
A: six GCI sets controlling radar-equipped night-fighters', '
Q: How many pilots remained in February 1941?
A: 87 pilots', '
Q: How many number of contacts and combats were there in May?
A: 204 and 74', '
Q: What did a bomber crew need to do for a good chance at evasion?
A: spot the fighter first']
Nevertheless, it was radar that proved to be critical weapon in the night battles over Britain from this point onward. Dowding had introduced the concept of airborne radar and encouraged its usage. Eventually it would become a success. On the night of 22/23 July 1940, Flying Officer Cyril Ashfield (pilot), Pilot Officer Geoffrey Morris (Observer) and Flight Sergeant Reginald Leyland (Air Intercept radar operator) of the Fighter Interception Unit became the first pilot and crew to intercept and destroy an enemy aircraft using onboard radar to guide them to a visual interception, when their AI night fighter brought down a Do 17 off Sussex. On 19 November 1940 the famous RAF night fighter ace John Cunningham shot down a Ju 88 bomber using airborne radar, just as Dowding had predicted.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was critical in the night battles over Britain?
A: radar', '
Q: What concept eventually became successful?
A: airborne radar', '
Q: On what day did airborne radar help intercept and destroy enemy aircraft for the first time?
A: the night of 22/23 July 1940', '
Q: Who was the RAF night fighter ace that used airborne radar to destroy a Ju 88 bomber?
A: John Cunningham']
From November 1940 – February 1941, the Luftwaffe shifted its strategy and attacked other industrial cities. In particular, the West Midlands were targeted. On the night of 13/14 November, 77 He 111s of Kampfgeschwader 26 (26th Bomber Wing, or KG 26) bombed London while 63 from KG 55 hit Birmingham. The next night, a large force hit Coventry. "Pathfinders" from 12 Kampfgruppe 100 (Bomb Group 100 or KGr 100) led 437 bombers from KG 1, KG 3, KG 26, KG 27, KG 55 and Lehrgeschwader 1 (1st Training Wing, or LG 1) which dropped 394 short tons (357 t) of high explosive, 56 short tons (51 t) of incendiaries, and 127 parachute mines. Other sources say 449 bombers and a total of 530 short tons (480 t) of bombs were dropped. The raid against Coventry was particularly devastating, and led to widespread use of the phrase "to conventrate". Over 10,000 incendiaries were dropped. Around 21 factories were seriously damaged in Coventry, and loss of public utilities stopped work at nine others, disrupting industrial output for several months. Only one bomber was lost, to anti-aircraft fire, despite the RAF flying 125 night sorties. No follow up raids were made, as OKL underestimated the British power of recovery (as Bomber Command would do over Germany from 1943–1945). The Germans were surprised by the success of the attack. The concentration had been achieved by accident. The strategic effect of the raid was a brief 20 percent dip in aircraft production.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: The Luftwaffe's change in strategy targeted what primarily?
A: the West Midlands", '
Q: How many parachute mines were dropped?
A: 127', '
Q: The Coventry raid led to what phrase being in widespread use?
A: "to conventrate"', '
Q: What stopped work in 9 factories in Coventry?
A: loss of public utilities', '
Q: What effect did the raid have strategically? 
A: a brief 20 percent dip in aircraft production']
Five nights later, Birmingham was hit by 369 bombers from KG 54, KG 26, and KG 55. By the end of November, 1,100 bombers were available for night raids. An average of 200 were able to strike per night. This weight of attack went on for two months, with the Luftwaffe dropping 13,900 short tons (12,600 t) of bombs. In November 1940, 6,000 sorties and 23 major attacks (more than 100 tons of bombs dropped) were flown. Two heavy (50 short tons (45 t) of bombs) attacks were also flown. In December, only 11 major and five heavy attacks were made.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: How many bombers hit Birmingham?
A: 369', '
Q: For how many months did the night raids continue for?
A: two months', '
Q: How many tons of bombs had to be dropped to be considered a major attack?
A: more than 100 tons of bombs dropped', '
Q: December saw how many attacks?
A: only 11 major and five heavy attacks']
Probably the most devastating strike occurred on the evening of 29 December, when German aircraft attacked the City of London itself with incendiary and high explosive bombs, causing a firestorm that has been called the Second Great Fire of London. The first group to use these incendiaries was Kampfgruppe 100 which despatched 10 "pathfinder" He 111s. At 18:17, it released the first of 10,000 fire bombs, eventually amounting to 300 dropped per minute. Altogether, 130 German bombers destroyed the historical centre of London. Civilian casualties on London throughout the Blitz amounted to 28,556 killed, and 25,578 wounded. The Luftwaffe had dropped 18,291 short tons (16,593 t) of bombs.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: On what day was London itself attacked?
A: the evening of 29 December', '
Q: What group was the first to use incendiaries?
A: Kampfgruppe 100', '
Q: How many fire bombs were dropped per minute?
A: 300', '
Q: How many civilians were killed in the bombing?
A: 28,556 killed', '
Q: The Luftwaffe dropped how many short tons of bombs?
A: 18,291 short tons']
Not all of the Luftwaffe's effort was made against inland cities. Port cities were also attacked to try to disrupt trade and sea communications. In January Swansea was bombed four times, very heavily. On 17 January around 100 bombers dropped a high concentration of incendiaries, some 32,000 in all. The main damage was inflicted on the commercial and domestic areas. Four days later 230 tons was dropped including 60,000 incendiaries. In Portsmouth Southsea and Gosport waves of 150 bombers destroyed vast swaths of the city with 40,000 incendiaries. Warehouses, rail lines and houses were destroyed and damaged, but the docks were largely untouched.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Why were port cities targeted by the Luftwaffe?
A: to try to disrupt trade and sea communications', '
Q: How many times was Swansea bombed heavily?
A: four times', '
Q: What was primarily damaged in the attacks?
A: commercial and domestic areas', '
Q: What cities had large sections of them destroyed?
A: Portsmouth Southsea and Gosport', '
Q: What was left mostly unharmed?
A: the docks']
Although official German air doctrine did target civilian morale, it did not espouse the attacking of civilians directly. It hoped to destroy morale by destroying the enemy's factories and public utilities as well as its food stocks (by attacking shipping). Nevertheless, its official opposition to attacks on civilians became an increasingly moot point when large-scale raids were conducted in November and December 1940. Although not encouraged by official policy, the use of mines and incendiaries, for tactical expediency, came close to indiscriminate bombing. Locating targets in skies obscured by industrial haze meant they needed to be illuminated "without regard for the civilian population".

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was the primary goal of the German air doctrine?
A: target civilian morale', '
Q: In November and December of 1940 what changed to make attacks on civilians a moot point?
A: large-scale raids', '
Q: What had nearly been considered indiscriminate bombing?
A: use of mines and incendiaries, for tactical expediency', '
Q: Lighting targets hidden by haze had to be done without what?
A: regard for the civilian population']
Special units, such as KGr 100, became the Beleuchtergruppe (Firelighter Group), which used incendiaries and high explosive to mark the target area. The tactic was expanded into Feuerleitung (Blaze Control) with the creation of Brandbombenfelder (Incendiary Fields) to mark targets. These were marked out by parachute flares. Then bombers carrying SC 1000 (1,000 kg (2,205 lb)), SC 1400 (1,400 kg (3,086 lb)), and SC 1800 (1,800 kg (3,968 lb)) "Satan" bombs were used to level streets and residential areas. By December, the SC 2500 (2,500 kg (5,512 lb)) "Max" bomb was used.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was the group that used incendiaries and high explosives to mark targets?
A: Beleuchtergruppe', '
Q: The Feuerleitung (Blaze Control) tactic led to what creation for marking targets?
A: Brandbombenfelder (Incendiary Fields)', '
Q: What was the nickname of bombs used in streets and residential areas?
A: "Satan"', '
Q: What was the weight of the "Max" bomb?
A: 2,500 kg (5,512 lb)']
These decisions, apparently taken at the Luftflotte or Fliegerkorps level (see Organisation of the Luftwaffe (1933–1945)), meant attacks on individual targets were gradually replaced by what was, for all intents and purposes, an unrestricted area attack or Terrorangriff (Terror Attack). Part of the reason for this was inaccuracy of navigation. The effectiveness of British countermeasures against Knickebein, which was designed to avoid area attacks, forced the Luftwaffe to resort to these methods. The shift from precision bombing to area attack is indicated in the tactical methods and weapons dropped. KGr 100 increased its use of incendiaries from 13–28 percent. By December, this had increased to 92 percent. Use of incendiaries, which were inherently inaccurate, indicated much less care was taken to avoid civilian property close to industrial sites. Other units ceased using parachute flares and opted for explosive target markers. Captured German air crews also indicated the homes of industrial workers were deliberately targeted.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Decision changes at organizational levels led to what type of attacks?
A: unrestricted area attack or Terrorangriff (Terror Attack)', '
Q: What was one of the reasons for unrestricted area attacks?
A: inaccuracy of navigation', '
Q: How was it known that precision bombing was changed to area attacks?
A: tactical methods and weapons dropped', '
Q: What percentage of incendiaries were used in December?
A: 92 percent', '
Q: How was it determined that homes of industrial workers were targeted?
A: Captured German air crews']
In 1941, the Luftwaffe shifted strategy again. Erich Raeder—commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine—had long argued the Luftwaffe should support the German submarine force (U-Bootwaffe) in the Battle of the Atlantic by attacking shipping in the Atlantic Ocean and attacking British ports. Eventually, he convinced Hitler of the need to attack British port facilities. Hitler had been convinced by Raeder that this was the right course of action due to the high success rates of the U-Boat force during this period of the war. Hitler correctly noted that the greatest damage to the British war economy had been done through submarines and air attacks by small numbers of Focke-Wulf Fw 200 naval aircraft. He ordered attacks to be carried out on those targets which were also the target of the Kriegsmarine. This meant that British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Ireland were the prime targets.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What did Erich Raeder believe the Luftwaffe needed to do?
A: support the German submarine force', '
Q: Raeder convinced Hitler to do what?
A: attack British port facilities.', '
Q: What ultimately convinced Hitler that Raeder was right?
A: the high success rates of the U-Boat force', '
Q: Submarines and naval aircraft damaged what primarily?
A: British war economy', '
Q: What became the new targets for the Kriegsmarine?
A: British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Ireland']
Hitler's interest in this strategy forced Göring and Jeschonnek to review the air war against Britain in January 1941. This led to Göring and Jeschonnek agreeing to Hitler's Directive 23, Directions for operations against the British War Economy, which was published on 6 February 1941 and gave aerial interdiction of British imports by sea top priority. This strategy had been recognised before the war, but Operation Eagle Attack and the following Battle of Britain had got in the way of striking at Britain's sea communications and diverted German air strength to the campaign against the RAF and its supporting structures. The OKL had always regarded the interdiction of sea communications of less importance than bombing land-based aircraft industries.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: What was Hitler's Directive 23?
A: Directions for operations against the British War Economy", '
Q: What was a top priority of Directive 23?
A: aerial interdiction of British imports by sea', '
Q: What prevented the targeting of sea communications before?
A: Operation Eagle Attack and the following Battle of Britain', '
Q: What was considered more important than the interdiction of sea communications?
A: bombing land-based aircraft industries']
Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was the concession Goring made with the strategic bombing against Britain?
A: Directive 23', '
Q: What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support?
A: control of more Luftwaffe units', "
Q: Who was Raeder's successor? 
A: Karl Dönitz", "
Q: What was detrimental to the success of a strategic effect against Britain?
A: Göring's lack of cooperation", '
Q: How did Goring expect to regain prestige?
A: by subduing Britain by air power alone']
Even so, the decision by OKL to support the strategy in Directive 23 was instigated by two considerations, both of which had little to do with wanting to destroy Britain's sea communications in conjunction with the Kriegsmarine. First, the difficulty in estimating the impact of bombing upon war production was becoming apparent, and second, the conclusion British morale was unlikely to break led OKL to adopt the naval option. The indifference displayed by OKL to Directive 23 was perhaps best demonstrated in operational directives which diluted its effect. They emphasised the core strategic interest was attacking ports but they insisted in maintaining pressure, or diverting strength, onto industries building aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and explosives. Other targets would be considered if the primary ones could not be attacked because of weather conditions.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was the first consideration for the OKL to support Directive 23?
A: difficulty in estimating the impact of bombing upon war production', '
Q: What was the second consideration?
A: the conclusion British morale was unlikely to break', '
Q: What did the OKL insist on maintaining?
A: pressure, or diverting strength, onto industries', '
Q: When would other targets be considered available?
A: if the primary ones could not be attacked because of weather conditions']