romikgosai/squad_modified huggingface dataset:
In the inter-war years and after 1940, Hugh Dowding, Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command has received credit for the defence of British air space and the failure of the Luftwaffe to achieve air superiority. However, Dowding had spent so much effort preparing day fighter defences, there was little to prevent the Germans carrying out an alternative strategy by bombing at night. When the Luftwaffe struck at British cities for the first time on 7 September 1940, a number of civic and political leaders were worried by Dowding's apparent lack of reaction to the new crisis.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Who was the Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command after 1940?
A: Hugh Dowding', '
Q: What credit did Dowding receive?
A: defence of British air space', "
Q: What strategy could the German's have used instead of day raids?
A: bombing at night", '
Q: Why were civic and political leaders worried about Dowdings?
A: lack of reaction to the new crisis']
Dowding accepted that as AOC, he was responsible for the day and night defence of Britain, and the blame, should he fail, would be laid at his door. When urgent changes and improvements needed to be made, Dowding seemed reluctant to act quickly. The Air Staff felt that this was due to his stubborn nature and reluctance to cooperate. Dowding's opponents in the Air Ministry, already critical of his handling of the day battle (see Battle of Britain Day and the Big Wing controversy), were ready to use these failings as a cudgel with which to attack him and his abilities.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Who was reluctant to act quickly when urgent changes need to be made?
A: Dowding', "
Q: Who thought Dowding was stubborn and didn't like to cooperate?
A: Air Staff", '
Q: What did the Air Ministry plan to do with his failures?
A: attack him and his abilities', '
Q: The Air Ministry was critical of Dowding after which battle?
A: Battle of Britain Day']
Dowding was summoned to an Air Ministry conference on 17 October 1940 to explain the poor state of night defences and the supposed (but ultimately successful) "failure" of his daytime strategy. The criticism of his leadership extended far beyond the Air Council, and the Minister of Aircraft Production, Lord Beaverbrook, and Churchill themselves intimated their support was waning. While the failure of night defence preparation was undeniable, it was not the AOC's responsibility to accrue resources. The general neglect of the RAF until the late spurt in 1938 had left sparse resources to build defences. While it was permissible to disagree with Dowding's operational and tactical deployment of forces, the failure of the Government and Air Ministry to allot resources was ultimately the responsibility of the civil and military institutions at large. In the pre-war period, the Chamberlain Government stated that night defence from air attack should not take up much of the national effort and, along with the Air Ministry, did not make it a priority.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Who was summoned to the Air Ministry conference on October 17, 1940?
A: Dowding', "
Q: Lord Beaverbrook and Churchill's support of Dowding was what?
A: waning", '
Q: Neglect of the RAF until 1938 caused what to happen?
A: sparse resources to build defences', '
Q: The Air Ministry and which other group decided to not make night defense a top priority?
A: Chamberlain Government']
The attitude of the Air Ministry was in contrast to the experiences of the First World War when a few German bombers caused physical and psychological damage out of all proportion to their numbers. Around 280 short tons (250 t) (9,000 bombs) had been dropped, killing 1,413 people and injuring 3,500 more. Most people aged 35 or over remembered the threat and greeted the bombings with great trepidation. From 1916–1918, German raids had diminished against countermeasures which demonstrated defence against night air raids was possible.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: People over the age of 35 reacted to the bombings with what?
A: great trepidation', '
Q: Why had German raids decreased between 1916-1918?
A: countermeasures', '
Q: How many people were killed by bomb drops during the first World War?
A: 1,413', '
Q: How many bombs had been dropped?
A: 9,000']
Although night air defence was causing greater concern before the war, it was not at the forefront of RAF planning. Most of the resources went into planning for daylight fighter defences. The difficulty RAF bombers had navigating in darkness, led the British to believe German bombers would suffer the same problems and would be unable to reach and identify their targets. There was also a mentality in all air forces that, if they could carry out effective operations by day, night missions and their disadvantages could be avoided.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What did the RAF put most of their resources into?
A: daylight fighter defences', '
Q: RAF bombers had trouble flying at night, so the British believe the Germans would do what?
A: suffer the same problems', '
Q: What did the Air Force believe they could avoid if they carried out effective day missions?
A: night missions and their disadvantages', '
Q: Britain believe German bombers would be unable to reach and identify what?
A: targets']
British air doctrine, since the time of Chief of the Air Staff Hugh Trenchard in the early 1920s, had stressed offence was the best means of defence. British defensive strategy revolved around offensive action, what became known as the cult of the offensive. To prevent German formations from hitting targets in Britain, RAF's Bomber Command would destroy Luftwaffe aircraft on their own bases, aircraft in their factories and fuel reserves by attacking oil plants. This philosophy was impractical as Bomber Command lacked the technology and equipment and needed several years to develop it. This strategy retarded the development of fighter defences in the 1930s. Dowding agreed air defence would require some offensive action, and fighters could not defend Britain alone. Until September 1940, the RAF lacked specialist night-fighting aircraft and relied on anti-aircraft units which were poorly equipped and lacking in numbers.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What did the British offence become know as?
A: cult of the offensive', '
Q: Why was the tactic of bombing German aircraft bases, factories and fuel reserves impractical?
A: lacked the technology and equipment', '
Q: Until 1940 what type of aircraft did the RAF lacked?
A: specialist night-fighting', '
Q: What was wrong with the anti aircraft units?
A: poorly equipped and lacking in numbers']
Bomber crews already had some experience with these types of systems due to the deployment of the Lorenz beam, a commercial blind-landing aid which allowed aircraft to land at night or in bad weather. The Germans developed the short-range Lorenz system into the Knickebein aid, a system which used two Lorenz beams with much stronger signal transmissions. The concept was the same as the Lorenz system. Two aerials were rotated for the two converging beams which were pointed to cross directly over the target. The German bombers would attach themselves to either beam and fly along it until they started to pick up the signal from the other beam. When a continuous sound was heard from the second beam the crew knew they were above the target and began dropping their bombs.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What did the Lorenz beam allow aircraft to do?
A: land at night or in bad weather', '
Q: The Germans developed the Lorenz into what system?
A: Knickebein', '
Q: The Knickebein was the same as the Lorenz but used how many beams?
A: two Lorenz beams', '
Q: The Germans flew along one beam until they picked up the second beam the sound telling them when to start doing what?
A: dropping their bombs']
While Knickebein was used by German crews en masse, X-Gerät use was limited to specially trained pathfinder crews. Special receivers were mounted in He 111s, with a radio mast on the bomber's fuselage. The system worked on a higher frequency (66–77 MHz, compared to Knickebein's 30–33 MHz). Transmitters on the ground sent pulses at a rate of 180 per minute. X-Gerät received and analysed the pulses, giving the pilot both visual and aural "on course" signals. Three beams intersected the beam along the He 111's flight path. The first cross-beam acted as a warning for the bomb-aimer to start the bombing-clock which he would activate only when the second cross-beam was reached. When the third cross-beam was reached the bomb aimer activated a third trigger, which stopped the first hand of the equipment's clock, with the second hand continuing. When the second hand re-aligned with the first, the bombs were released. The clock's timing mechanism was co-ordinated with the distances of the intersecting beams from the target so the target was directly below when the bomb release occurred.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: While Knickebein was used my most German crews who used the X-Gerat system?
A: specially trained pathfinder crews', '
Q: What frequency did the X-Gerat system use?
A: 66–77 MHz', '
Q: What rate per minute did ground transmitters send?
A: 180', '
Q: When the bomber crossed the first beam the bomber-aimer did what?
A: start the bombing-clock', "
Q: What mechanism cause the bombs to be released?
A: clock's timing"]
Y-Gerät was the most complex system of the three. It was, in effect, an automatic beam-tracking system, operated through the bomber's autopilot. The single approach beam along which the bomber tracked was monitored by a ground controller. The signals from the station were retransmitted by the bomber's equipment. This way the distance the bomber travelled along the beam could be precisely verified. Direction-finding checks also enabled the controller to keep the crew on an exact course. The crew would be ordered to drop their bombs either by issue of a code word by the ground controller, or at the conclusion of the signal transmissions which would stop. Although its maximum usable range was similar to the previous systems, it was not unknown for specific buildings to be hit.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Which system was the most complex of the three?
A: Y-Gerät', "
Q: Who operated the automatic beam system?
A: the bomber's autopilot", '
Q: What kind of checks help to keep the plane on course?
A: Direction-finding', '
Q: The crew could be order to drop the bomb by what?
A: a code word', '
Q: Who issued the code word to the bombers?
A: ground controller']
In June 1940, a German prisoner of war was overheard boasting that the British would never find the Knickebein, even though it was under their noses. The details of the conversation were passed to an RAF Air Staff technical advisor, Dr. R. V. Jones, who started an in-depth investigation which discovered that the Luftwaffe's Lorenz receivers were more than blind-landing devices. Jones therefore began a search for the German beams. Avro Ansons of the Beam Approach Training Development Unit (BATDU) were flown up and down Britain fitted with a 30 MHz receiver to detect them. Soon a beam was traced to Derby (which had been mentioned in Luftwaffe transmissions). The first jamming operations were carried out using requisitioned hospital electrocautery machines. A subtle form of distortion was introduced. Up to nine special transmitters directed their signals at the beams in a manner that widened its path, negating its ability to accurately locate targets. Confidence in the device was diminished by the time the Luftwaffe decided to launch large-scale raids. The counter operations were carried out by British Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) units under Wing Commander Edward Addison, No. 80 Wing RAF. The production of false radio navigation signals by re-transmitting the originals was a technique known as masking beacons (meacons).

Questions and answers:
['
Q: The beam was traced to what town?
A: Derby', '
Q: The Bean Approach Training Development Unit were fitted with what kind of transmitter to search for the Knickebein? 
A: 30 MHz receiver', '
Q: In 1940 a German prisoner overheard boasting that the British would never find what system?
A: Knickebein', '
Q: Which RAF technical advisor was the conversation passed onto?
A: Dr. R. V. Jones', '
Q: The first jamming operation was carried out using what machines?
A: electrocautery machines']
German beacons operated on the medium-frequency band and the signals involved a two-letter Morse identifier followed by a lengthy time-lapse which enabled the Luftwaffe crews to determine the signal's bearing. The Meacon system involved separate locations for a receiver with a directional aerial and a transmitter. The receipt of the German signal by the receiver was duly passed to the transmitter, the signal to be repeated. The action did not guarantee automatic success. If the German bomber flew closer to its own beam than the Meacon then the former signal would come through the stronger on the direction finder. The reverse would apply only if the meacon were closer.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: The German beacons used what frequency band?
A: medium', '
Q: What two letter identifier did the signal have?
A: Morse', '
Q: What system used a separate locations for a receiver and a directional aerial?
A: Meacon', '
Q: When a German bomber flew to close to its own beam what happened to the signal?
A: stronger on the direction finder']
In general, German bombers were likely to get through to their targets without too much difficulty. It was to be some months before an effective night fighter force would be ready, and anti-aircraft defences only became adequate after the Blitz was over, so ruses were created to lure German bombers away from their targets. Throughout 1940, dummy airfields were prepared, good enough to stand up to skilled observation. A number[clarification needed] of bombs fell on these diversionary ("Starfish") targets.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Anti-aircraft defenses became better after what?
A: Blitz was over', '
Q: What did they use to lure German bombers away from their targets?
A: ruses', '
Q: What kind of airfields were prepared to stand up to skilled observers? 
A: dummy', '
Q: What was the name given to these dummy airfields?
A: Starfish']
The use of diversionary techniques such as fires had to be made carefully. The fake fires could only begin when the bombing started over an adjacent target and its effects were brought under control. Too early and the chances of success receded; too late and the real conflagration at the target would exceed the diversionary fires. Another innovation was the boiler fire. These units were fed from two adjacent tanks containing oil and water. The oil-fed fires were then injected with water from time to time; the flashes produced were similar to those of the German C-250 and C-500 Flammbomben. The hope was that, if it could deceive German bombardiers, it would draw more bombers away from the real target.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Fake fires were used as what kind of technique?
A: diversionary', '
Q: What was injected into the fires from time to time to produce a flash?
A: water', '
Q: Two tanks one of oil, one of water fed what kind of fire?
A: boiler', '
Q: What did these flashes simulate?
A: German C-250 and C-500 Flammbomben', '
Q: What was the purpose of these fires?
A: deceive German bombardiers']
Initially the change in strategy caught the RAF off-guard, and caused extensive damage and civilian casualties. Some 107,400 long tons (109,100 t) of shipping was damaged in the Thames Estuary and 1,600 civilians were casualties. Of this total around 400 were killed. The fighting in the air was more intense in daylight. Overall Loge had cost the Luftwaffe 41 aircraft; 14 bombers, 16 Messerschmitt Bf 109s, seven Messerschmitt Bf 110s and four reconnaissance aircraft. Fighter Command lost 23 fighters, with six pilots killed and another seven wounded. Another 247 bombers from Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3) attacked that night. On 8 September, the Luftwaffe returned. This time 412 people were killed and 747 severely wounded.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: The bombing of the Thames Estuary cause how many civilian casualties?
A: 1,600', '
Q: How many were killed in the bombing of the Thames Estuary?
A: around 400', '
Q: How many aircraft did the Luftwaffe lose?
A: 41', '
Q: How many German pilots were killed?
A: six', '
Q: How many Air Fleet 3 attacked that night?
A: 247']
On 9 September the OKL appeared to be backing two strategies. Its round-the-clock bombing of London was an immediate attempt to force the British government to capitulate, but it was also striking at Britain's vital sea communications to achieve a victory through siege. Although the weather was poor, heavy raids took place that afternoon on the London suburbs and the airfield at Farnborough. The day's fighting cost Kesselring and Luftflotte 2 (Air Fleet 2) 24 aircraft, including 13 Bf 109s. Fighter Command lost 17 fighters and six pilots. Over the next few days weather was poor and the next main effort would not be made until 15 September 1940.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: What was the name of the airfield where heavy raids took place?
A: Farnborough', '
Q: How many Bf 109s were lost?
A: 13', '
Q: FighterCommand lost how many fighters?
A: 17', '
Q: How many pilots did Fighter Command lose?
A: six', '
Q: What caused the delay in the effort?
A: weather was poor']
On 15 September the Luftwaffe made two large daylight attacks on London along the Thames Estuary, targeting the docks and rail communications in the city. Its hope was to destroy its targets and draw the RAF into defending them, allowing the Luftwaffe to destroy their fighters in large numbers, thereby achieving an air superiority. Large air battles broke out, lasting for most of the day. The first attack merely damaged the rail network for three days, and the second attack failed altogether. The air battle was later commemorated by Battle of Britain Day. The Luftwaffe lost 18 percent of the bombers sent on the operations that day, and failed to gain air superiority.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: On September 15 the Luftwaffe made daylight raids on what target in London?
A: Thames Estuary', '
Q: What two targets were the Luftwaffe trying to destroy?
A: docks and rail communications', '
Q: What was the reason to try and draw the RAF into a battle?
A: destroy their fighters in large numbers', '
Q: What was this air battle called?
A: Battle of Britain Day', '
Q: The Luftwaffe lost what percentage of its bombers sent that day?
A: 18']
While Göring was optimistic the Luftwaffe could prevail, Hitler was not. On 17 September he postponed Operation Sea Lion (as it turned out, indefinitely) rather than gamble Germany's newly gained military prestige on a risky cross-Channel operation, particularly in the face of a sceptical Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union. In the last days of the battle, the bombers became lures in an attempt to draw the RAF into combat with German fighters. But their operations were to no avail; the worsening weather and unsustainable attrition in daylight gave the OKL an excuse to switch to night attacks on 7 October.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: Who thought the Luftwaffe could win?
A: Göring', '
Q: What day did Hitler postponed Operation Sea Lion?
A: 17 September', '
Q: What was the name of the man from the Soviet Union who was doubtful of Operation Sea Lion?
A: Joseph Stalin', '
Q: Who did the Luftwaffe try to lure into battle using its bombers?
A: RAF', '
Q: When did the OKL switch to night raids?
A: 7 October']
On 14 October, the heaviest night attack to date saw 380 German bombers from Luftflotte 3 hit London. Around 200 people were killed and another 2,000 injured. British anti-aircraft defences (General Frederick Alfred Pile) fired 8,326 rounds and shot down only two bombers. On 15 October, the bombers returned and about 900 fires were started by the mix of 415 short tons (376 t) of high explosive and 11 short tons (10.0 t) of incendiaries dropped. Five main rail lines were cut in London and rolling stock damaged.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: On October 14 how many German bombers attacked?
A: 380', '
Q: How many people were killed?
A: Around 200', '
Q: Who fired anti-defense rounds?
A: General Frederick Alfred Pile', '
Q: How many rounds of anti-defense were fired?
A: 8,326 rounds', '
Q: How many German bombers were shot down?
A: two']
Loge continued during October. According to German sources, 9,000 short tons (8,200 t) of bombs were dropped in that month, of which about 10 percent of which was dropped in daylight. Over 6,000 short tons (5,400 t) was aimed at London during the night. Attacks on Birmingham and Coventry were subject to 500 short tons (450 t) of bombs between them in the last 10 days of October. Liverpool suffered 200 short tons (180 t) of bombs dropped. Hull and Glasgow were attacked, but 800 short tons (730 t) of bombs were spread out all over Britain. The Metropolitan-Vickers works in Manchester was targeted and 12 short tons (11 t) of bombs dropped against it. Little tonnage was dropped on Fighter Command airfields; Bomber Command airfields were hit instead.

Questions and answers:
['
Q: How much of the short tons of bombs were dropped during the day?
A: 10 percent', '
Q: What two cities had 500 short tons of bombs dropped on them during the end of October?
A: Birmingham and Coventry', '
Q: What was targeted with 12 short tons of bombs?
A: The Metropolitan-Vickers works in Manchester', '
Q: Which was targeted more heavily, bomber or fighter command airfields?
A: Bomber Command airfields', '
Q: Liverpool had how many short tons dropped on it?
A: 200']
Luftwaffe policy at this point was primarily to continue progressive attacks on London, chiefly by night attack; second, to interfere with production in the vast industrial arms factories of the West Midlands, again chiefly by night attack; and third to disrupt plants and factories during the day by means of fighter-bombers. Kesselring, commanding Luftflotte 2, was ordered to send 50 sorties per night against London and attack eastern harbours in daylight. Sperrle, commanding Luftflotte 3, was ordered to dispatch 250 sorties per night including 100 against the West Midlands. Seeschlange would be carried out by Fliegerkorps X (10th Air Corps) which concentrated on mining operations against shipping. It also took part in the bombing over Britain. By 19/20 April 1941, it had dropped 3,984 mines, ⅓ of the total dropped. The mines' ability to destroy entire streets earned them respect in Britain, but several fell unexploded into British hands allowing counter-measures to be developed which damaged the German anti-shipping campaign.

Questions and answers:
["
Q: What was the Luftwaffe's second primary policy?
A: to interfere with production in the vast industrial arms factories of the West Midlands", '
Q: Who was in command of the Luftflotte 2?
A: Kesselring', '
Q: How many sorties a night was Luftflotte 3 doing?
A: 250', '
Q: What did the Fliegerkorps X concentrate on?
A: mining operations against shipping', '
Q: By April of 1941 about how many mines had been dropped?
A: 3,984 mines']