CASE OF MUHAMMAD AND MUHAMMAD v. ROMANIA

1. The case originated in an application (no. 80982/12) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Pakistani nationals, Mr Adeel Muhammad and Mr Ramzan Muhammad (“the applicants”), on 19 December 2012.
2. The applicants, who had been granted legal aid, were represented by Ms E. Crângariu and Ms F. Dumitru, lawyers practising in Bucharest. The Romanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms S.-M. Teodoroiu, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. The applicants complained that they had been deported from Romania to Pakistan, allegedly in breach of their rights under Article 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.
4. The application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 10 July 2015 the Government were given notice of the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 and the applicants’ complaints under Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention were declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3. The application was subsequently allocated to the Court’s Fourth Section. On 26 February 2019 a Chamber of that Section composed of Ganna Yudkivska, President, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, Faris Vehabović, Iulia Antoanella Motoc, Carlo Ranzoni, Marko Bošnjak and Péter Paczolay, judges, together with Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected thereto (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72).
5. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24.
6. The applicants and the Government each filed written observations on the admissibility and the merits of the case. The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights based in Poland and the Association for Legal Intervention, together with Amnesty International and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, which had been given leave to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3), also submitted observations.
7. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 25 September 2019 (Rules 71 and 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the GovernmentMs S.-M. Teodoroiu, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agent, Ms O. Ezer, diplomatic adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ms S.D. Popa, deputy to the Permanent Representative of Romania to the Council of Europe, Ms D.A. Stănișor, judge at the High Court of Cassation and Justice, Ms I. Măiereanu, judge at the High Court of Cassation and Justice, Mr O. Spînu, judge at the Bucharest Court of Appeal, Advisers;
(b) for the applicantsMs E. Crângariu, lawyer, Ms F. Dumitru, lawyer, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Ms Teodoroiu, Ms Crângariu and Ms Dumitru, followed by their answers to questions from judges.
As authorised by the President of the Grand Chamber, the Government submitted in writing additional answers to some of the questions put by judges during the hearing. Those answers were notified to the applicants, who submitted observations in that connection.
8. Adeel Muhammad was born in 1993 and lives in Tehsil Karor (Pakistan). Ramzan Muhammad was born in 1982 and lives in Dubai (United Arab Emirates).
9. Adeel Muhammad (“the first applicant”) entered Romania in September 2012, on a student visa he had obtained on 7 September 2012 and which was valid until 2015. He received an “Erasmus Mundus” scholarship and studied in the economic sciences faculty of Lucian Blaga University in Sibiu.
10. Ramzan Muhammad (“the second applicant”) entered Romania on 17 February 2009 on a long-stay student visa. He completed his first year of preparatory studies in Piteşti before being transferred to Lucian Blaga University in Sibiu on being granted an “Erasmus Mundus” scholarship. His wife arrived in Romania on 14 April 2012, having obtained a long-stay visa for family reunification purposes.
THE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE FOR THE APPLICANTS TO BE DECLARED UNDESIRABLE PERSONS
11. In a note of 4 December 2012 the Romanian Intelligence Service ( Serviciul român de informaţii – “the SRI”) asked the public prosecutor’s office at the Bucharest Court of Appeal (the “public prosecutor’s office”) to apply to the appropriate court to assess whether the applicants should be declared “undesirable persons” in Romania for a fifteen-year period. In support of its request, the SRI provided classified documents at the “secret” ( strict secret ) level (see paragraph 51 below).
12. On 4 December 2012 the public prosecutor’s office submitted an application ( rezoluție ) to the Administrative Division of that court (the “Court of Appeal”) asking it to declare the two applicants undesirable in Romania. The application stated that, according to the “secret” classified intelligence transmitted to the public prosecutor by the SRI, there were serious indications that the applicants intended to engage in activities capable of endangering national security within the meaning of Article 85 § 1 of Emergency Ordinance ( ordonanţei de urgenţă a Guvernului – “OUG”) no. 194/2002 on the status of aliens in Romania (“OUG no. 194/2002”) in conjunction with section 3 points (i) and (l) of Law no. 51/1991 on national security (“Law no. 51/1991”) and section 44 of Law no. 535/2004 on the prevention and countering of terrorism (“Law no. 535/2004”). The public prosecutor’s office also stated that the safeguards provided for under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention would not be breached by the measure, given that an alien could be expelled before exercising the rights enumerated in paragraph 1 (a)-(c) of that Article where such expulsion was necessary in the interests of public order or for national security reasons. The public prosecutor’s office based its application on Article 85 § 2 and Article 97 § 3 of OUG no. 194/2002.
13. In support of its application, the public prosecutor’s office submitted to the Court of Appeal the “secret” classified documents it had received from the SRI, indicating that those documents could be used in compliance with the provisions of Government Order no. 585/2002 on the approval of national standards for the protection of classified information in Romania (“Government Order no. 585/2002”). The president of the Administrative Division of the Court of Appeal was informed that the public prosecutor’s office had filed a “document” classified as “secret” with the classified information department at the Court of Appeal so that it could be studied by the judge who would be examining the applicants’ case.
14. According to the Government’s observations, the classified document transmitted by the SRI to the public prosecutor’s office gave details and examples of the activities of the two applicants in support of a fundamentalist Islamist group linked ideologically to al-Qaeda, showing their connections with various terrorist entities and their training. It also contained specific data and information concerning the two applicants’ involvement in activities which endangered national security, as collected by the SRI using its technical intelligence gathering resources.
15. Also on 4 December 2012, after 5.20 p.m., the Sibiu police summoned the applicants to appear the next day, at 9 a.m., in the Court of Appeal, in connection with proceedings for the purpose of examining the application of the public prosecutor’s office. The summonses were not accompanied by any documents.
16. On 5 December 2012, after travelling overnight by bus the applicants reached Bucharest at 5 a.m. They arrived at the Court of Appeal at the time indicated.
THE FIRST-INSTANCE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEAL
17. In an interlocutory judgment of 5 December 2012, the bench to which the case had first been allocated relinquished it, on the grounds that the judge did not have the authorisation required by Law no. 182/2002 on the protection of secret information (“Law no. 182/2002”) to have access to the classified document adduced by the public prosecutor’s office. The Inspectorate General for Immigration (the “IGI”) was joined as a party to the proceedings, being the competent authority for the execution of the Court of Appeal’s decision.
18. The case was allocated to a different bench, which had been issued by the Office of the national register for State secret information (the “ORNISS”) with authorisation to access documents corresponding to the level of classification of the information in question.
19. A hearing took place on 5 December 2012 during which the applicants were present, assisted by an Urdu interpreter.
20. The Court of Appeal allowed the applicants the time necessary to apprise themselves, through the interpreter, of the application by which the case had been referred to the court. It was noted in that document that there were strong indications that the applicants had planned to carry out activities capable of endangering national security and falling within the scope of Article 85 § 1 of OUG no. 194/2002, in conjunction with section 3 points (i) and (l) of Law no. 51/1991 and section 44 of Law no. 535/2004. It was also mentioned that the data and intelligence underlying the initiating application had been forwarded to the Court of Appeal.
21. The applicants indicated orally to the Court of Appeal that they did not understand the reasons why they had been summoned, bearing in mind that the initiating application merely contained references to legal provisions. The Court of Appeal replied that the documents in the file were classified and that only the judge was authorised to consult them.
22. As the applicants stated that they had no preliminary requests, the Court of Appeal called on the parties to submit evidence. The public prosecutor’s office requested the admission in evidence of the classified documents that it had filed with the classified information department of the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 13 above). The applicants indicated that they had no evidence to adduce and they asked the Court of Appeal to scrutinise the case documents strictly, given that, in their submission, they had done nothing to endanger national security. The IGI representative asked that the classified documents submitted to the Court of Appeal be admitted in evidence.
23. Referring to Article 167 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeal decided that the classified documents should be admitted in evidence, indicating that such evidence was conclusive, pertinent and useful for the resolution of the case. It then opened the proceedings on the merits of the case.
24. The public prosecutor’s office asked the court to declare the applicants undesirable persons and order their expulsion from Romania, submitting that it was apparent from the classified documents that they had engaged in activities capable of endangering national security.
25. The applicants replied that they had done nothing illegal, that they were merely students and that the first applicant had arrived in Romania only two months earlier. They complained that they had been wrongly suspected and asked to be assisted by officially assigned defence counsel.
26. After submitting the applicants’ request for legal assistance to adversarial debate, the Court of Appeal rejected it as out of time, on the ground that such a request should have been submitted before the opening of the proceedings on the merits of the case (see paragraph 23 above).
27. In a judgment of the same date, delivered in private, the Court of Appeal declared the applicants undesirable for a fifteen-year period and ordered that they be placed in administrative custody ( luare în custodie publică ) pending their deportation.
28. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning was as follows:
“... Ramzan Muhammad and Adeel Muhammad, Pakistani nationals, are in Romania on student visas, both having ‘Erasmus Mundus’ scholarships to study in the economic sciences faculty of Lucian Blaga University in Sibiu.
After examining the information transmitted by the SRI, classified for State secrecy purposes at the ‘secret’ level, the Court [of Appeal] regards it as proof that the aliens [in question] are engaging in activities capable of endangering national security.
Account should be taken of the provisions of section 3 points (i) and (l) of Law no. 51/1991 [on national security] under which the following acts represent threats for the national security of Romania: (i) terrorist acts, and any planning or suspicion [ sic ] related thereto, by any means whatsoever; ... (l) the creation or constitution of an organisation or group, or the fact of belonging to one or supporting one by any means, in pursuit of any of the activities listed in points (a) to (k) ..., and the covert pursuit of such activities by lawfully established organisations or groups.
The Court [of Appeal] also takes into consideration section 44 of Law no. 535/2004 [on the prevention and countering of terrorism], which provides that foreign nationals or stateless persons concerning whom there are data or serious indications that they intend to engage in terrorist activities or to promote terrorism are to be declared undesirable in Romania and that their leave to remain may be curtailed, if they have not been prohibited from leaving the country, in accordance with the law on immigration status in Romania.
The Court [of Appeal] also has regard to the fact that Romania, as a member of the United Nations, has undertaken to deny leave to remain to anyone who finances, prepare or commits terrorist acts, or who supports such acts.
The measure ordered [in the present case] does not breach Article 8 of the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] given that, even if this measure constitutes an interference with [the right to] private and family life [of those concerned] it is in accordance with the law, pursues a legitimate aim and is necessary in a democratic society.
The measure is indeed provided for by Article 85 of OUG no. 194/2002, which authorises the ordering of an alien’s removal or exclusion from the country, [namely by a] normative instrument published in the Official Gazette, which thus satisfies the condition of accessibility of the law.
Similarly, procedural safeguards are upheld for an alien who is declared undesirable, as the measure is ordered by a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR, ensuring due respect for the adversarial principle and for defence rights.
A measure declaring aliens undesirable pursues a legitimate aim, namely the prevention of serious acts that are capable of endangering the national security of the Romanian State.
As to the need to adopt such a measure in respect of aliens, it is justified by the nature and seriousness of the activities carried out [by them], in respect of which it should be verified that the measure is proportionate to the aim pursued.
Having regard to these considerations and in the light of the provisions of Article 85 § 5 of OUG no. 194/2002 to the effect that, where an alien is declared undesirable for national security reasons, the judgment does not mention the data or intelligence underlying its decision, the Court [of Appeal] grants the application and declares [the applicants] undesirable in Romania, on national security grounds, for a fifteen-year period.
In the meantime, the placement of the aliens in administrative detention is hereby ordered, in accordance with Article 97 § 3 of OUG no. 194/2002, pending their deportation, [without this detention exceeding] eighteen months.”
29. Also on 5 December 2012 the applicants were informed, by a letter from the IGI of Bucharest in Romanian and English, that they had been declared undesirable persons and that they would be removed from Romania under escort. They were placed in the Otopeni immigration holding facility pending their deportation.
30. On 6 December 2012 the SRI published a press release, which read as follows:
“In the context of the measures taken by the Romanian authorities responsible for the prevention and countering of terrorism, which formed the basis of decision no. 6906 of Bucharest Court of Appeal of 5 December 2012, in which the foreign nationals R.M. and A.M. [the applicants, whose names were not disclosed] were declared undesirable for a period of fifteen years, the SRI is authorised to communicate as follows:
On the basis of the intelligence gathered through the National System for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism (the ‘SNPCT’), the SRI, in cooperation with the other institutions [operating within the framework of that] System, undertook complex investigations to obtain information on activities conducted in preparation for a terrorist attack on Romanian soil, during the period of the end-of-year festivities, by an extremist entity ideologically affiliated to al-Qaeda.
For that purpose, the competent bodies monitored the activities of the entity’s members in our country, [these individuals] being regarded as ‘support points’, who were acting by way of conspiracy under external coordination. It was established that they were supposed to provide support for the whole operation to be carried out. It should be noted that one of those individuals [who were] implicated had the necessary knowledge to make improvised explosive devices.
Similarly, according to the information obtained [by the competent bodies], in order to implement the action thus planned, there was an attempt [by the extremist entity] to co-opt certain individuals who were known to support Jihadi groups and who were supposed to act in collaboration with the ‘support points’ in Romania.
The relevant data and information obtained in this case were transmitted, in accordance with the law, to the public prosecutor’s office at the Bucharest Court of Appeal, which supported, in the proceedings before that court, the SRI’s proposal to declare undesirable the foreign nationals R.M. and A.M., on the grounds of their involvement in activities capable of seriously endangering national security in the counterterrorism field.
Following the decision of the Bucharest Court of Appeal, the two foreign nationals were arrested and placed in administrative detention pending their deportation.
In its capacity as national authority for counterterrorism, the SRI, together with the other institutions of the SNPCT, prioritises the prevention of any terrorist risk and threat.”
31. Two articles were published in the newspaper Adevărul reporting the information in the SRI’s press release, but without citing it as the source of that information, while indicating the applicants’ names and the details of their university studies in Romania. At an unknown date the applicants became aware of the content of the press release.
APPEAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE HIGH COURT OF CASSATION AND JUSTICE
32. The applicants, who in the meantime had retained two lawyers to represent them in the proceedings, appealed to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (the “High Court”) against the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 5 December 2012 (see paragraphs 27-28 above). Those lawyers did not hold an ORNISS certificate and thus did not have access to the classified documents in the file (see paragraph 54 below).
33. In their grounds of appeal the applicants complained that they had not been informed by the Court of Appeal of the procedure to be followed and more specifically of the conditions in which they could have sought legal assistance. They further submitted that, in breach of Article 85 § 4 of OUG no. 194/2002, the Court of Appeal had not informed them of the facts “underlying the proposal” to have them declared undesirable, merely referring to the “secret” level of classification of the documents in the file. They submitted that there was no mention in the file of classified documents at any level of classification and in their view, even assuming that it did contain classified documents, the Court of Appeal had a legal obligation to inform them of the case against them. That failure to inform them of the precise accusations against them had deprived them of the possibility of defending themselves and had thus breached their right to a fair hearing and to an effective remedy.
34. The applicants further complained that, even though they themselves had been denied access to the case against them on the ground that the documents in the file were classified as “secret”, the day after the judgment of the Court of Appeal the SRI had published a press release, relayed by the media, in which the accusations against them were set out.
35. They alleged that the Court of Appeal could have informed them of the specific acts they were said to have committed without disclosing secret intelligence, concerning for example the SRI’s investigative methods, the names of the SRI’s officers who had monitored them or the evidence gathered. The Court of Appeal had explained its decision by the “activities” in which they had allegedly “engaged” and the nature of those activities, thus implying in their view that they were accused of performing specific acts and not merely an intention to perform activities undermining national security. In the absence of such disclosure, it had been impossible for them to submit evidence in their defence.
36. They added, lastly, that the second applicant had previously been persecuted by agents of the SRI and that, for this reason, on 19 November 2012, they had already submitted a request to the University to have their situation clarified and if possible to be transferred to another country participating in the “Erasmus Mundus” scholarship scheme.
37. A hearing took place on 20 December 2012 before the High Court. The applicants, who were present at the hearing, assisted by their two lawyers and an interpreter, sought permission to produce documents attesting to their conduct at the university and their integration into university life.
38. The applicants also asked the High Court to contact bank T. to obtain a bank statement showing their financial situation and to admit it in evidence. They adduced a note issued by bank T. dated 18 December 2012, which stated that, pursuant to Articles 111-113 of Government Ordinance no. 99/2006 on credit institutions and the sufficiency of equity capital, which guaranteed the secrecy of data, the bank could not disclose their account statements to a third party but could make them available to the High Court, if need be. They argued that, given that neither they nor their lawyers, who did not have the requisite authorisation, had access to the classified evidence in the file, the bank statement would enable them to counter the accusations made against them in the SRI press release and to show that they had not financed terrorist activities (see paragraph 30 above).
39. The public prosecutor’s office and the Romanian Immigration Office (the “ORI”), which had been joined as parties to the proceedings, opposed that request, submitting that the bank statement could not provide any relevant or useful evidence in the case. The ORI explained that only the classified documents were pertinent to the case, as the proceedings concerned the information contained therein, and not any information subsequently published in the press. The public prosecutor responsible for the case expressed the view that the requested evidence would not be relevant or useful for the examination of the case.
40. Referring to Article 305 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court admitted evidence of the applicants’ conduct at university and rejected the applicants’ request to obtain the bank documents. It then put the case to adversarial debate.
41. On the merits of the case, the applicants submitted that they were mere students and had not committed terrorist acts. They reiterated that the Court of Appeal had not communicated the facts underlying the public prosecutor’s application, in breach of the relevant provisions of OUG no. 194/2002. In spite of the “secret” classification of the evidence in the file, the day after the first-instance judgment had been delivered the accusations against them had been published in the SRI press release (see paragraph 30 above). They had not been informed of their right to be assisted by a lawyer or of the accusations against them. They had not been afforded the procedural safeguards of a fair trial as the proceedings had been a mere formality.
42. In a final judgment of 20 December 2012 the High Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal. After summing up the decision of the Court of Appeal, the High Court found that it could be seen from the classified documents available to it that the court below had rightly taken account of the existence of indications that the applicants had intended to engage in activities capable of endangering national security. It further observed that, pursuant to Article 85 § 5 of OUG no. 194/2002, where a decision to declare an alien undesirable was based on reasons of national security, the data and information, together with the factual grounds ( motivele de fapt ) underlying the judges’ opinion, could not be mentioned in the judgment. It added as follows:
“The applicants’ arguments about their good conduct at university cannot prosper and fail to rebut the conviction of the court, based as it is on the classified documents containing information which is necessary and sufficient to prove the existence of strong indications that they intended to engage in activities that were capable of endangering national security.”
43. The High Court then analysed the applicants’ ground of appeal based on the alleged breach of their fundamental rights and procedural safeguards during the first-instance proceedings. It found as follows:
“The measures of expulsion, administrative detention and removal under escort of aliens who have been declared undesirable in Romania are legitimate, being governed in domestic law by the provisions of Chapter V (‘Rules governing the removal of aliens from Romania’) of OUG no. 194/2002; [they] are necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued in so far as the court [ instanța de judecată ] has found that the evidence gathered proves that there are strong indications [ indicii temeinice ] that the persons concerned intend to engage in activities that are capable of endangering national security.”
44. The High Court further noted that the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention were applicable to the case. The applicants were legally in Romania when the expulsion procedure was initiated but that the provisions of paragraph 2 of that Article were not applicable to them, given that they had not been expelled before the exercise of their rights. After referring to the Court’s findings in Ahmed v. Romania (no. 34621/03, 13 July 2010), Kaya v. Romania (no. 33970/05, 12 October 2006), and Lupsa v. Romania (no. 10337/04, ECHR 2006 ‑ VII), where a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention had been found because the competent authorities had not notified the aliens concerned of the document initiating the proceedings or of the slightest information as to the accusations against them, the High Court found that the circumstances of the present case were different.
45. The High Court noted that, in the present case, the applicants had been notified of the public prosecutor’s initiating application and had been allotted the necessary time, with the assistance of an interpreter, to study its content and the supporting documents in the file. They had thus been in a position to know the reason why they had been summoned to court in the exclusion and expulsion proceedings. It gave the following reasoning:
“It is true that the documents classified as ‘secret’ in the file, [which] were available to the court [which examined the case], were not disclosed to the appellants.
The lack of direct and specific disclosure of the information contained in the documents classified as a State secret [ secret de Stat ] at the level ‘secret’ [ strict secret ] submitted by the SRI is consistent with the statutory obligation, binding on the court, under the provisions of Article 85 § 5 of Ordinance no. 194/2002 ... and especially the provisions of Law no. 182/2002 on the protection of classified information [citation of sections 2(2), 15 (f) and 39(1) and (2) of the Law].
Under those provisions, the court, having taken note of the information contained in the classified documents in the case file, is bound by a duty not to disclose that information.
Compliance with the safeguard imposed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, [namely that of] ensuring the protection of the person (being deported) against any arbitrary interference by the authorities with his or her Convention rights (see ECtHR, Ahmed case, cited above, § 52), is secured in the present case by the fact that both the first-instance court and the appellate court had the possibility of examining the validity of the existence of the indications [that those concerned] ‘intended to engage in activities capable of endangering national security’ (within the meaning of Article 85 § 1 of OUG no. 194/2002); the case has thus been examined at two levels of jurisdiction before an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
If it were considered that the need to inform the deportee of the grounds for his deportation entailed, unequivocally, the direct, effective, concrete and timely presentation of the indications ... this would be tantamount – in the High Court’s opinion and in relation to its obligation not to disclose or encourage the disclosure of information which could cause serious harm to national security – to calling into question the very notion of national security together with all the measures aimed at protecting information falling within this concept.
The [High Court] notes that [in the present case] the rights secured by Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention were upheld in the judicial proceedings: [the appellants] had the genuine possibility of being present both before the first-instance court and the appeal court, assisted by lawyers of their choosing; [they were able to submit] reasons against their expulsion; their case was examined directly and effectively by an independent and impartial tribunal; [and] they were represented by lawyers of their choosing.
Having regard to the arguments set out above, the High Court takes the view that there has not been – contrary to the grounds of appeal – any breach of the right to an effective remedy or the right of access to a court, as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, nor has there been any disregard of the non-discrimination principle guaranteed by Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12, as prohibited by Article 18 § 1 of the Constitution.
The fact that, after the delivery of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the press and broadcasting media revealed information on which the expulsion decision was based does not lead to the conclusion that the right of access to a court or the right to a fair hearing have been breached. For the same reasons as those given above, the [appellants’] argument that their right of access to a court was only nominally respected cannot prosper.
The [appellants’] argument as to the protection of individuals under Article 3 of the Convention is also ill-founded since the risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in the country of destination has not been proved by documents emanating from State authorities [ statale ]; [the appellants] merely adduced a report by the Romanian National Council for Refugees drawn up on the basis of certain ‘public information, selected and translated following an on-line search’.
Also ill-founded is the argument raised by [the appellant] Muhammad Ramzan under Article 8 of the Convention on the basis of the presence in Romania of his wife, who is nine months’ pregnant and is dependent on his doctoral grant. Even though his deportation constitutes an interference with the exercise of his right to respect for his family life, the [High Court] takes the view that, for the reasons given above, this interference meets the requirements of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, being in accordance with the law and necessary in the interest of national security.
As to the upholding of the [appellants’] defence rights before the Court of Appeal, the High Court notes that [they] had the possibility of submitting arguments against their expulsion and were able to express themselves in their mother tongue, through an interpreter. Moreover, it should be noted that, pursuant to the law [ în mod legal ] the Court of Appeal had declared out of time their request for assistance by officially assigned counsel, on the ground that this request had been submitted once the merits of the case had been put to adversarial debate, not at the earlier stage of the proceedings. In addition, before the appellate court, they have been assisted by lawyers of their choosing and have been able to submit all their arguments in their defence. Consequently, it cannot be admitted that there has been a breach of the right to a fair trial, as protected by Article 21 § 3 of the Constitution and by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The [appellants’] arguments to the effect that the Court of Appeal had written [that they had] ‘engaged in activities’ [ desfășurarea de activități ], whereas the public prosecutor’s application had referred to an ‘intention to engage in certain activities’, and had erroneously cited the text of section 3 point (i) of Law no. 51/1991, are not capable of negating the lawfulness and validity of the decision delivered.
Having regard to the foregoing, ... the High Court dismisses the appeal as unfounded ...”
46. The applicants left Romania on 27 December 2012.
Relevant legal framework and practice
DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICEDomestic lawThe Constitution
47. The relevant provisions of the Constitution read as follows:
Article 18 Foreign nationals and stateless persons
“(1) Foreign nationals and stateless persons who live in Romania enjoy the general protection of individuals and property, as secured by the Constitution and other laws.”
Article 21 Free access to the courts
“(3) Parties have the right to a fair hearing and to the settlement of their disputes within a reasonable time ...”
“(1) Defence rights are guaranteed.
(2) Throughout the proceedings, the parties have the right to be assisted by counsel, whether of their own choosing or officially assigned.”
Article 31 The right to information
“(3) The right to information shall not compromise measures for protection ... of national security.”
48. The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, as in force at the material time, read as follows:
“(2) The court informs the parties of their rights and obligations depending on their capacity in the proceedings ...”
“(1) Evidence can only be admitted if the court [ instanța ] is of the view that it is capable of contributing to the manifestation of the truth [ că ele pot să aducă dezlegarea pricinii ] ...
(2) It will be added to the file before the opening of the proceedings on the merits.
(3) Evidence for and against will be gathered, as far as possible, at the same time.
“No new evidence may be presented for the purposes of an appeal [ recurs ], except for the written documents which may be adduced until the close of the proceedings.”
Law no. 51/1991 on national security
49. The relevant provisions of Law no. 51/1991 on national security read as follows:
“The following shall constitute threats to the national security of Romania:
(a) plans and activities seeking to abolish or undermine the sovereignty, unity, independence or indivisibility of the Romanian State;
(b) activities whose direct or indirect aim is to trigger a war against the State or a civil war, to facilitate foreign military occupation or servitude towards a foreign power or to help a foreign power or organisation achieve such aims;
(c) treason committed by aiding enemies;
(d) armed or violent acts which seek to weaken the power of the State;
(e) espionage, the transmission of State secrets to a foreign power or organisation or to their agents, the illegal possession of State secrets with a view to their transmission to a foreign power or organisation or to the agents thereof ...;
(f) the acts of undermining, sabotaging or any other act which seeks to destroy by force the democratic institutions of the State or which seriously breaches the fundamental rights and freedoms of Romanian citizens or which may interfere with the defence capacity or other similar interests of the State, and any destruction or damage ... of the infrastructures necessary for the proper functioning of social and economic life or for national defence purposes;
(g) acts through which harm is caused to life, to physical integrity or to the health of individuals who perform significant State duties ...;
(h) the conception, organisation or commission of radical or extremist acts, of a communist, fascist ... racist, anti-Semitic, negationist or separatist nature, which may endanger, in any manner, the territorial unity and integrity of Romania, or incitement to commit acts which may undermine the rule of law;
(i) terrorist acts, and any planning or support related thereto, by any means whatsoever;
(j) attacks against an authority perpetrated by any means whatsoever;
(k) the theft of weapons, munitions, explosives, or radioactive, toxic or biological substances from the units authorised to hold them, the smuggling of such material, or the fabrication, possession, disposal, transport or use thereof in conditions other than those prescribed by law, and the unlawful possession of weapons or munitions endangering national security;
(l) the creation or constitution of an organisation or group, or the fact of belonging to one or supporting one by any means, in pursuit of any of the activities listed in points (a) to (k) above, and the covert pursuit of such activities by lawfully established organisations or groups.”
“Intelligence activities, aimed at the preservation of national security, shall be carried out by the Romanian intelligence service, ...”
“Intelligence activities for the protection of national security shall be classified as a State secret [ secret de stat ].”
“Information relating to national security may be transmitted:
(d) to the organs of public prosecution, where the information concerns the commission of an offence.
The disclosure of [such] information must be approved by the heads of the bodies responsible for national security.”
Law no. 535/2004 on the prevention and combating of terrorism
50. The relevant part of section 44 of Law no. 535/2004 on the prevention and combating of terrorism, as in force at the material time, was drafted as follows:
“1. In the case of foreign nationals or stateless persons concerning whom there is data or strong indications [ indicii temeinice ] [showing] that they intend to carry out terrorist acts or to aid and abet terrorism, they shall be declared as undesirable persons in Romania and may have their leave to remain withdrawn, unless they have been prohibited from leaving the country ...”
Law no. 182/2002 on the protection of secret information
51. The relevant provisions of Law no. 182/2002 on the protection of secret information read as follows:
“The following terms shall be defined as follows, within the meaning hereof:
(b) classified information: any information, data, documents having a national security interest, which, in view of their level of importance and any consequences they may have on account of their unauthorised disclosure and dissemination, must be protected;
(c) the categories of classified documents are: State secrets [ secret de stat ] and service secrets;
(d) information [constituting] State secrets: information related to national security, the disclosure of which may harm national security and the defence of the nation;
(f) the following levels of classification [ de secretizare ] are attributed to classified information within the category of State secret:
– top secret [ strict secret de importanță deosebită ]: information of which unauthorised disclosure is capable of causing harm of exceptional seriousness to national security;
– secret [ strict secrete ]: information of which unauthorised disclosure is capable of causing serious harm to national security;
– confidential [ secrete ]: information of which unauthorised disclosure is capable of causing harm to national security; ...”
“(1) Information classified as a State secret [ secret de stat ] shall include information concerning:
(f) the intelligence gathering activity of the public authorities established by law for the defence of the nation and national security;
(g) any resources, methods, techniques or working equipment, or specific sources of information used by public authorities engaging in intelligence activities;
“(1) The Office of the national register of State secret information shall be a subordinate body [ în subordinea ] directly reporting to the Government.
(2) The Office of the national register of State secret information shall keep a record of the lists and information belonging to this category, of the time-frame within which a certain level of classification is maintained, of the staff vetted and approved to work with State secret information, and of the authorisation registers ...”
“(4) Classified information under section 15 (f) hereof may be declassified by order of the Government upon a reasoned request of the competent [body].
(10) Declassification or relegation to a lower level of classification shall be carried out by individuals or public authorities with power to approve the classification and level of classification of the information at issue.”
“(1) Access to State secret classified information shall be possible only by written authorisation of the director of the legal entity which holds the information, after giving prior notice to the Office of the national register of State secret information.
(2) Authorisation shall be given depending on the levels of classification provided for in section 15 (f), after vetting of the person concerned, with his or prior written consent. Legal persons, ... shall inform the Office of the national register of State secret information of the issuance of access authorisation.
(4) The validity of the authorisation shall last for four years; during that period, vetting may be resumed at any time.
“(1) Persons to whom classified information is entrusted shall ensure its protection in accordance with the law and shall comply with the provisions of schemes for the prevention of leaks of classified information.
“(1) Public authorities, together with other legal entities which are holders of information with the State secret or service secret classification or to which such information has been entrusted, shall provide the funds necessary to fulfil their obligations and shall take the necessary measures to protect the said information.
(2) Responsibility for the protection of classified information lies with the head of the authority or public institution or of the legal entity which holds the information, as the case may be.”
“(1) Any breach of the rules concerning the protection of classified information shall engage disciplinary, administrative, civil or criminal liability, as the case may be.
(2) Any individuals working in the sector of intelligence, in the security services or in the army, or for the department of foreign relations, or those persons who have been specially entrusted with the protection of State secret information, who are found guilty of wilful disclosure or acts of negligence giving rise to the disclosure or leaking of classified information, shall irrevocably be dismissed from their posts [ calitatea ].”
Government Ordinance no. 194/2002 on immigration status in Romania
52. The provisions relevant to the present case in OUG no. 194/2002 on immigration status in Romania, as in force at the material time, read as follows:
Article 85 Declaration of an alien as an undesirable person
“(1) The declaration [that an individual is] an undesirable person is a measure taken against an alien who has carried out or who carries out activities that are capable of endangering national security or public order, or [about whom] there are strong indications [ indicii temeinice ] [that he or she] intends to carry out such activities.
(2) The measure provided for in the previous paragraph shall be taken by the Bucharest Court of Appeal, on the proposal of the public prosecutor, .... who submits his application to that court, on the proposal of the competent institutions in the field of public order and national security which are in possession of such indications ...
(3) Any data or intelligence which form the basis of the proposal to declare an alien undesirable for national security reasons must be made available to the [Court of Appeal] under conditions that have been laid down by the normative instruments governing activities related to national security and the protection of classified information.
(4) The application provided for in the second paragraph shall be examined at a private hearing to which the parties are summoned. The Court of Appeal shall notify the alien of the facts underlying the application, in accordance with the provisions of the normative instruments governing activities related to national security and the protection of classified information.
(5) The Court of Appeal shall deliver a judgment containing reasons, within a period of ten days from the submission of the application formulated in accordance with paragraph 2 hereof. The court’s decision shall be final. Where an alien is declared undesirable on national security grounds, the data and intelligence on which the decision is based shall not be mentioned in the text of that decision.
(9) An alien may be declared undesirable for a period of between five and fifteen years ...”
Article 86 Appeals against judgments delivered under Article 85 § 5
“The judgment provided for in Article 85 § 5 hereof may be challenged by an appeal before the High Court of Cassation and Justice within ten days from the date of its notification [to the person concerned]. The High Court shall give its decision within five days from the date on which the appeal is deposited.”
53. The relevant provisions of the national standards of protection of classified information in Romania, as approved by Government Order no. 585/2002, read as follows:
“Information [classified] as a State secret may be declassified by order of the Government, upon the reasoned request of the issuing [body].”
“(1) [Classified] information shall be declassified where:
(a) the classification time-limit has expired;
(b) the disclosure of the information can no longer cause harm to national security ...;
(c) [the classification] had been carried out by a person without legal authorisation [ neîmputernicită ].
(2) Declassification or relegation to a lower level of classification of State secret [classified] information shall be decided by authorised persons or senior civil servants entitled by law to attribute different levels of classification, subject to the prior opinion of the institutions which coordinate activities concerning the protection of classified information and the supervision of related measures ...”
“Classified information may be transmitted to individuals who hold security clearance certificates or access permits corresponding to the level of classification [of the information in question].”
“The following situations attributable to an applicant [seeking access to classified information] ... shall represent situations of incompatibility with access to State secret [classified] information:
(a) if he or she has committed or intended to commit, acts of espionage, terrorism, treason or other offences against State security;
The procedure for obtaining an ORNISS certificate
54. The situation since 2010 is that lawyers may ask to be granted a security clearance certificate or access permit delivered by the ORNISS (“the ORNISS certificate”), in order to gain access to classified documents. For that purpose the lawyer must submit his application to the Chair of the Bar of which he is a member, who forwards it to the National Union of Romanian Bars (“the UNBR”). The lawyer must attach to his application, among other documents, a copy of the authority form given to him by the client in order to represent him in a case and a note from the body that is dealing with his client’s case which attests that classified material has been submitted in evidence and that, in order to have access to that material and prepare his client’s defence, the lawyer needs that certificate. The UNBR then initiates the procedure, which involves the competent authority carrying out preliminary checks on the lawyer’s situation. The duration of the vetting procedure for persons who have requested access to “secret” classified information is 60 working days (Article 148 of Government Order No. 585/2002). Following the checks, the competent vetting authority forwards its conclusions to the ORNISS, which will issue its opinion to be forwarded to the UNBR. The latter will then have five days within which to issue the decision on access to classified documents.
55. Upon receipt of the ORNISS certificate, the lawyer to whom it is issued must sign a confidentiality agreement for the protection of any classified information brought to his knowledge. Once issued, the ORNISS certificate is valid for four years. During the period of validity, vetting of the lawyer may be resumed at any time.
56. On 10 October 2013 the Chair of the UNBR asked the ORNISS for its opinion on the possibility of publishing, on the websites of the various Bar Associations, the names of lawyers issued with documents giving them access to classified information. On 6 November 2013 the ORNISS stated its position that such publication would lead to the introduction of different categories of lawyers within the same system, and therefore to a situation of discrimination against lawyers who did not hold such documents. Under section 2 of Law No. 182/2002, access to classified information was not a right guaranteed by law to all citizens and was only allowed in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law. Therefore it could not be said that all lawyers registered with the Bar could obtain such access. It concluded that the idea of publishing the names of lawyers authorised to have access to classified information on the websites of the various Bar Associations or on that of the UNBR was not justified.
57. In the opinion of the UNBR, as indicated in a letter it sent to the Government in January 2018, the publication of a list of lawyers holding ORNISS certificates might breach Article 24 of the Constitution (right to be represented by a lawyer of one’s choosing). In a letter of 19 April 2019, in reply to a request from the applicants, the UNBR indicated that any lawyer who was chosen or appointed to represent a person concerned by classified material or to provide that person with legal assistance was entitled to apply for an ORNISS certificate, and therefore there was no “list of lawyers holding an ORNISS certificate”; moreover, the compilation and use of such a list would be at odds with Article 24 of the Constitution.
58. The Government indicated, based on information provided to them by the national authorities, that in December 2012 eight lawyers held an ORNISS certificate, and that from 2011 until the date on which they submitted their observations to the Grand Chamber, thirty-three lawyers had been granted access to classified information.
59. The parties submitted examples of domestic case-law concerning proceedings brought by aliens against decisions declaring them undesirable or challenged refusals by the Romanian Immigration Office (ORI) to grant them permanent leave to remain in Romania.
60. In a series of decisions (28 January 2011, 18 October 2011, 14 March 2012, 9 July 2012, 26 October 2012, 9 November 2012, 20 December 2012, 22 August 2013, 7 November 2013 and 2 April 2015) the Court of Appeal found that the aliens concerned had received sufficient information to enable them to prepare their defence, based on the submissions initiating the proceedings, which had mentioned that they stood accused of activities related to terrorism as defined by section 3 points (i) and (l) of Law no. 51/1991.
61. In other cases, in addition to the reference to section 3 points (i) and (l) of Law No. 51/1991, the Court of Appeal indicated more specific factual details, for example: that the alien was suspected of intent to engage in “subversive activities” in favour of a terrorist organisation (judgments of 24 August 2012, 10 June 2015 and 30 August 2016) or of supporting these organisations financially or through propaganda (judgments of 6 February 2013, 19 July 2017, 2 August 2017, 13 December 2017, 7 March 2019, 26 March 2019 and 3 April 2019); that the alien was accused of spying for foreign organisations, had made contact with terrorist organisations via the Internet, or had shown a willingness to commit acts of violence in the name of a terrorist ideology (for example, judgments of 17 May 2012, 23 April 2013, 31 March 2015, 29 December 2015, 14 June 2016, 1 September 2016, 1 March 2017, 14 November 2017, 4 April 2018 and 20 June 2018).
62. It appears from the examples of case-law adduced by the Government that in two cases, having considered all of the evidence before it and its credibility, the Court of Appeal had only partly accepted the prosecutor’s request to declare the aliens undesirable (judgments of 31 March 2015 and 19 July 2017).
63. In some cases the aliens had challenged refusals by the ORI to grant them permanent leave to remain in Romania, on the ground that it was clear from the classified evidence that the alien was engaging in activities likely to undermine public order or national security. In a number of those cases the competent domestic courts (Court of Appeal and High Court) upheld their appeals on the ground that the ORI’s refusal was not justified by any objective elements or the classified documents in the file (see the final judgments of the High Court of 28 September 2010, 22 February 2011, 24 March 2011, 16 September 2011, 8 March 2012, 29 May 2014 and 25 September 2018). On other occasions, the High Court dismissed the aliens’ appeals, finding that the ORI’s denial of leave to remain was well founded (see the final judgments of the High Court of 16 June 2011, 19 June 2012 and 28 February 2014).
64. According to some examples of case-law adduced by the Government, national courts did not inform those concerned of the possibility of being assisted by a lawyer (Court of Appeal judgments of 24 August 2012, 26 October 2012 and 7 March 2019). In other cases, the Court of Appeal notified the aliens that only persons with special authorisation could have access to the classified documents in the file, without however identifying the lawyers who held such a certificate (judgments of 7 November 2013, 2 April 2015 and 1 September 2016).
65. A number of decisions show that, where the aliens requested the adjournment of the case in order to find a lawyer, the Court of Appeal did not grant their requests, on the grounds that such proceedings were required by law to be expedited and the alien would still be able to appeal (judgments of 9 July 2012, 7 November 2013, 10 June 2015, 14 June 2016 and 30 August 2016; see also the High Court judgment of 8 January 2016 finding that the statutory time-limit for a decision on such an appeal was strict).
66. In other cases the domestic courts granted the alien’s request to adjourn the proceedings in order to find a lawyer, while indicating that the chosen lawyer already had to hold an ORNISS certificate (Court of Appeal case no. 2138/2/2018 and the High Court’s interlocutory judgment of 11 July 2016) as it was impossible for a lawyer to obtain the certificate during the proceedings on account of the statutory time-limit. However, in two immigration cases (one from 2017 the other from 2019) the domestic courts adjourned the proceedings several times, even beyond the statutory time-limit, so that the alien’s lawyer could take the necessary steps to obtain an ORNISS certificate.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE DOCUMENTSProtocol No. 7 to the Convention, Explanatory Report
Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, Explanatory Report
Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, Explanatory Report
67. The Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 7 was drafted by the Steering Committee on Human Rights and submitted to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers. It explains at the outset that the text of the report itself “does not constitute an instrument providing an authoritative interpretation of the text of the Protocol, although it might be of such a nature as to facilitate the understanding of the provisions contained therein”.
68. The relevant parts of the Explanatory Report read as follows:
6. In line with the general remark made in the introduction (see above, paragraph 4), it is stressed that an alien lawfully in the territory of a member State of the Council of Europe already benefits from certain guarantees when a measure of expulsion is taken against him, notably those which are afforded by Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) and 8 (right to respect for private and family life), in connection with Article 13 (right to an effective remedy before a national authority) of the European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and – in those States which are parties – by the European Convention on Establishment of 1955 (Article 3), the European Social Charter of 1961 (Article 19, paragraph 8), the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community of 1957 (Article 48), the Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees of 1951 (Articles 32 and 33) and the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (Article 13).
7. Account being taken of the rights which are thus recognised in favour of aliens, the present article has been added to the European Convention on Human Rights in order to afford minimum guarantees to such persons in the event of expulsion from the territory of a Contracting Party. The addition of this article enables protection to be granted in those cases which are not covered by other international instruments and allows such protection to be brought within the purview of the system of control provided for in the European Convention on Human Rights.
11. Paragraph 1 of this article provides first that the person concerned may be expelled only ‘in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law’. No exceptions may be made to this rule. However, again, ‘law’ refers to the domestic law of the State concerned. The decision must therefore be taken by the competent authority in accordance with the provisions of substantive law and with the relevant procedural rules.
12. Sub-paragraphs a, b and c of this same paragraph go on to set out three guarantees. Unlike the wording of Article 13 of the United Nations Covenant, the three guarantees have been clearly distinguished in three separate sub-paragraphs.
13.1. The first guarantee is the right of the person concerned to submit reasons against his expulsion. The conditions governing the exercise of this right are a matter for domestic legislation. By including this guarantee in a separate sub-paragraph, the intention is to indicate clearly that an alien can exercise it even before being able to have his case reviewed.
13.2. The second guarantee is the right of the person concerned to have his case reviewed. This does not necessarily require a two-stage procedure before different authorities, but only that the competent authority should review the case in the light of the reasons against expulsion submitted by the person concerned. Subject to this and to sub-paragraph c, the form which the review should take is left to domestic law. In some States, an alien has the possibility of introducing an appeal against the decision taken following the review of his case. The present article does not relate to that stage of proceedings and does not therefore require that the person concerned should be permitted to remain in the territory of the State pending the outcome of the appeal introduced against the decision taken following the review of his case.
13.3. Sub-paragraph c requires that the person concerned shall have the right to have his case presented on his behalf to the competent authority or a person or persons designated by that authority. The ‘competent authority’ may be administrative or judicial. Moreover, the ‘competent authority’ for the purpose of reviewing the case need not be the authority with whom the final decision on the question of expulsion rests. Thus, a procedure under which a court, which had reviewed the case in accordance with sub-paragraph b, made a recommendation of expulsion to an administrative authority with whom the final decision lay would satisfy the article. Nor would it be inconsistent with the requirements of this article or of Article 14 of the Convention for the domestic law to establish different procedures and designate different authorities for certain categories of cases, provided that the guarantees contained in the article are otherwise respected.
16. The European Commission of Human Rights has held in the case of Application No. 7729/76 that a decision to deport a person does ‘not involve a determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him’ within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. The present article does not affect this interpretation of Article 6. ...”
European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers
69. Article 9 § 5 of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers signed in Strasbourg on 24 November 1977 reads as follows:
“The residence permit, issued in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 3 of this article, may be withdrawn:
a) for reasons of national security, public policy or morals;
b) if the holder refuses, after having been duly informed of the consequences of such refusal, to comply with the measures prescribed for him by an official medical authority with a view to the protection of public health;
c) if a condition essential to its issue or validity is not fulfilled.
Each Contracting Party nevertheless undertakes to grant to migrant workers whose residence permits have been withdrawn, an effective right to appeal, in accordance with the procedure for which provision is made in its legislation, to a judicial or administrative authority.”
European Convention on Establishment
70. Article 3 § 2 of the European Convention on Establishment signed in Paris on 13 December 1955 reads as follows:
“ Except where imperative considerations of national security otherwise require, a national of any Contracting Party who has been so lawfully residing for more than two years in the territory of any other Party shall not be expelled without first being allowed to submit reasons against his expulsion and to appeal to, and be represented for the purpose before, a competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.”
EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND CASE-LAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
71. Article 12 (1) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, reads as follows:
“Return decisions and, if issued, entry-ban decisions and decisions on removal shall be issued in writing and give reasons in fact and in law as well as information about available legal remedies.
The information on reasons in fact may be limited where national law allows for the right to information to be restricted, in particular in order to safeguard national security, defence, public security and for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences.”
72. The relevant Articles of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, read as follows:
Article 28 Protection against expulsion
“1. Before taking an expulsion decision on grounds of public policy or public security, the host Member State shall take account of considerations such as how long the individual concerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, state of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration into the host Member State and the extent of his/her links with the country of origin.
2. The host Member State may not take an expulsion decision against Union citizens or their family members, irrespective of nationality, who have the right of permanent residence on its territory, except on serious grounds of public policy or public security.
3. An expulsion decision may not be taken against Union citizens, except if the decision is based on imperative grounds of public security, as defined by Member States, if they:
(a) have resided in the host Member State for the previous ten years; or
(b) are a minor, except if the expulsion is necessary for the best interests of the child, as provided for in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.”
Article 31 Procedural safeguards
“1. The persons concerned shall have access to judicial and, where appropriate, administrative redress procedures in the host Member State to appeal against or seek review of any decision taken against them on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health.
2. Where the application for appeal against or judicial review of the expulsion decision is accompanied by an application for an interim order to suspend enforcement of that decision, actual removal from the territory may not take place until such time as the decision on the interim order has been taken, except:
- where the expulsion decision is based on a previous judicial decision; or
- where the persons concerned have had previous access to judicial review; or
- where the expulsion decision is based on imperative grounds of public security under Article 28(3).
3. The redress procedures shall allow for an examination of the legality of the decision, as well as of the facts and circumstances on which the proposed measure is based. They shall ensure that the decision is not disproportionate, particularly in view of the requirements laid down in Article 28.
4. Member States may exclude the individual concerned from their territory pending the redress procedure, but they may not prevent the individual from submitting his/her defence in person, except when his/her appearance may cause serious troubles to public policy or public security or when the appeal or judicial review concerns a denial of entry to the territory.”
73. In the decision denying a citizen of the European Union admission to an European Union member State on public security grounds, and thus involving the citizenship and free movement rights of persons under European Union law, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has found in the preliminary ruling in ZZ v. the United Kingdom (case C ‑ 300/11, 4 June 2013) as follows:
“65. In this connection, first, in the light of the need to comply with Article 47 of the Charter, that procedure must ensure, to the greatest possible extent, that the adversarial principle is complied with, in order to enable the person concerned to contest the grounds on which the decision in question is based and to make submissions on the evidence relating to the decision and, therefore, to put forward an effective defence. In particular, the person concerned must be informed, in any event, of the essence of the grounds on which a decision refusing entry ... is based, as the necessary protection of State security cannot have the effect of denying the person concerned his right to be heard and, therefore, of rendering his right of redress ... ineffective.
66. Second, the weighing up of the right to effective judicial protection against the necessity to protect the security of the Member State concerned – upon which the conclusion set out in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment is founded – is not applicable in the same way to the evidence underlying the grounds that is adduced before the national court with jurisdiction. In certain cases, disclosure of that evidence is liable to compromise State security in a direct and specific manner, in that it may, in particular, endanger the life, health or freedom of persons or reveal the methods of investigation specifically used by the national security authorities and thus seriously impede, or even prevent, future performance of the tasks of those authorities.
67. In that context, the national court with jurisdiction has the task of assessing whether and to what extent the restrictions on the rights of the defence arising in particular from a failure to disclose the evidence and the precise and full grounds on which the decision ... is based are such as to affect the evidential value of the confidential evidence.
68. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the national court with jurisdiction, first, to ensure that the person concerned is informed of the essence of the grounds which constitute the basis of the decision in question in a manner which takes due account of the necessary confidentiality of the evidence and, second, to draw, pursuant to national law, the appropriate conclusions from any failure to comply with that obligation to inform him.”
OTHER INTERNATIONAL MATERIALSInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
74. Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the Covenant”), to which Romania has been a party since its entry into force on 23 March 1976, reads as follows:
“An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority.”
Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live
75. Article 7 of the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live, annexed to General Assembly resolution 40/144 of 13 December 1985, provides that:
“An alien lawfully in the territory of a State may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons why he or she should not be expelled and to have the case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority. Individual or collective expulsion of such aliens on grounds of race, colour, religion, culture, descent or national or ethnic origin is prohibited.”
The General Recommendation No. 30 (2004) of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
76. In its General Recommendation No. 30 (2004) on discrimination against non-citizens, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recommended that States parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination should:
“25. Ensure that ... non-citizens have equal access to effective remedies, including the right to challenge expulsion orders, and are allowed effectively to pursue such remedies.”
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens
77. At its sixty-sixth session, in 2014, the International Law Commission adopted a set of Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens. The text, of which the United Nations General Assembly took note (Resolution A/RES/69/119 of 10 December 2014), includes the following provisions:
Article 26 Procedural rights of aliens subject to expulsion
“1. An alien subject to expulsion enjoys the following procedural rights:
(a) the right to receive notice of the expulsion decision;
(b) the right to challenge the expulsion decision, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require;
(c) the right to be heard by a competent authority;
(d) the right of access to effective remedies to challenge the expulsion decision;
(e) the right to be represented before the competent authority; and
(f) the right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand or speak the language used by the competent authority.”
“(1) Draft article 26, paragraph 1, sets out a list of procedural rights from which any alien subject to expulsion must benefit, irrespective of whether that person is lawfully or unlawfully present in the territory of the expelling State. The sole exception — to which reference is made in paragraph 4 of the draft article — is that of aliens who have been unlawfully present in the territory of that State for a brief duration.
(2) Paragraph 1 (a) sets forth the right to receive notice of the expulsion decision. The expelling State’s respect for this essential guarantee is a conditio sine qua non for the exercise by an alien subject to expulsion of all of his or her procedural rights. This condition was explicitly embodied in article 22, paragraph 3, of the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which stipulates that the expulsion decision ‘shall be communicated to them in a language they understand’. In 1892 the Institute of International Law already expressed the view that ‘l’acte ordonnant l’expulsion est notifié à l’expulsé’ [the expulsion order shall be notified to the expellee] and also that ‘si l’expulsé a la faculté de recourir à une haute cour judiciaire ou administrative, il doit être informé, par l’acte même, et de cette circonstance et du délai à observer’ [if the expellee is entitled to appeal to a high judicial or administrative court, the expulsion order must indicate this and state the deadline for filing the appeal]. The legislation of several States contains a requirement that an expulsion decision must be notified to the alien concerned.
(3) Paragraph 1 (b) sets out the right to challenge the expulsion decision, a right well established in international law. At the universal level, article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides the individual facing expulsion with the right to submit the reasons against his or her expulsion, except where ‘compelling reasons of national security otherwise require’ ... The same right is to be found in article 7 of the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live, annexed to General Assembly resolution 40/144 of 13 December 1985, which provides that ‘[a]n alien lawfully in the territory of a State ... shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons why he or she should not be expelled’. At the regional level, article 1, paragraph 1 (a) of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides that an alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State and subject to an expulsion order shall be allowed ‘to submit reasons against his expulsion’. Article 3, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Establishment offers the same safeguard by providing that ‘[e]xcept where imperative considerations of national security otherwise require, a national of any Contracting Party who has been so lawfully residing for more than two years in the territory of any other Party shall not be expelled without first being allowed to submit reasons against his expulsion’. Lastly, the right of an alien to contest his or her expulsion is also embodied in internal law.
(4) The right to be heard by a competent authority, set out in paragraph 1 (c), is essential for the exercise of the right to challenge an expulsion decision, which forms the subject of paragraph 1 (b). Although article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly grant the alien the right to be heard, the Human Rights Committee has taken the view that an expulsion decision adopted without the alien having been given an opportunity to be heard may raise questions under article 13 of the Covenant:
Article 83 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; article 32, paragraph 2, of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; article 31, paragraph 2, of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons; article 9, paragraph 5, of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers; and article 26, paragraph 2, of the Arab Charter on Human Rights also require that there be a possibility of appealing against an expulsion decision. This right to a review procedure has also been recognized, in terms which are identical to those of article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, by the General Assembly in article 7 of the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live, annexed to General Assembly resolution 40/144.
(5) Paragraph 1 (d) sets out the right of access to effective remedies to challenge the expulsion decision. While article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entitles an alien lawfully present in the expelling State to a review of the expulsion decision, it does not specify the type of authority which should undertake the review...
The Human Rights Committee has drawn attention to the fact that the right to a review, as well as the other guarantees provided in article 13, may be departed from only if “compelling reasons of national security” so require. The Committee has also stressed that the remedy at the disposal of the alien expelled must be an effective one:
(6) Paragraph 1 (e), the content of which is based on article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, gives an alien subject to expulsion the right to be represented before the competent authority. From the standpoint of international law, this right does not necessarily encompass the right to be represented by a lawyer during expulsion proceedings. In any case, it does not encompass an obligation on the expelling State to pay the cost of representation.
(7) The right of an alien to the free assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand or speak the language used by the competent authority, which is set out in paragraph 1 (f) and recognized in the legislation of a number of States, is an essential element of the right to be heard, which is set out in paragraph 1 (c). It is also of some relevance to the right to be notified of the expulsion decision and theright to challenge that decision, to which paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) of this draft article refer... .”
Judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 30 November 2010 in the case of Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
78. On 30 November 2010 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a judgment in the case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (( Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo ), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, p.639). The ICJ considered Guinea’s claim that Mr. Diallo’s expulsion had been in breach of Article 13 of the Covenant and Article 12 § 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “African Charter”). The Court observed that, in order to comply with these provisions, the expulsion of an alien lawfully in the territory of a State which was a party to these instruments could be decided in accordance with the domestic law applicable in that respect — which itself had to be compatible with the other requirements of the Covenant and the African Charter — and must not be arbitrary in nature. The ICJ took the view that the expulsion decree had not complied with the provisions of Congolese law for two reasons: it had not been preceded by consultation of the national competent authority and it was not “reasoned”, as required by the national law. It followed that in these two respects the expulsion had not been decided “in accordance with law” and was in violation of Article 13 of the Covenant and Article 12 § 4 of the African Charter. The ICJ further considered that Guinea was justified in contending that the right afforded by Article 13 of the Covenant to an alien who was subject to an expulsion measure to “submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by the competent authority” had not been respected in the case of Mr. Diallo. The ICJ also noted that the Democratic Republic of the Congo had failed to demonstrate the “compelling reasons of national security” which supposedly justified Mr. Diallo being denied the right to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by the competent authority. The ICJ concluded that, on these grounds too, Article 13 of the Covenant had been violated in respect of the circumstances of Mr. Diallo’s expulsion.
79. In the light of the comparative law material available to the Court concerning forty Council of Europe member States, the legislation in the vast majority of those States permits limitations on the right of access to classified documents and confidential information that have been submitted in support of an expulsion on national security grounds, including in the course of the judicial proceedings.
80. As to the extent of the factual information notified to the aliens in the context of expulsion proceedings on national security grounds, in six of the member States studied the aliens are in general fully informed of the case against them, although access to classified information may be restricted. In thirteen member States the aliens are informed in general terms of the facts on which the expulsion decision is based, but the national security issues underlying the decision are not fully disclosed. In seventeen member States, aliens are informed of the case against them in general terms but no information is given about classified evidence.
81. In Armenia there are no limitations on access to classified documents in the context of expulsion proceedings on national security grounds. In eleven of the member States the courts decide whether and to what extent the alien should have access to classified evidence. In twelve other States the alien in principle has no access to classified evidence. In some of those twelve States a court or another competent authority can nevertheless grant the alien access to classified information in specific circumstances. In seven of the member States studied, access to classified documents can be limited by the national authorities. In two States neither the alien nor his/her representative have access to this type of document.
82. In twenty-four member States, when access to classified documents is denied and the alien is not informed of the accusations against him, the courts must weigh up the various interests at stake. In the United Kingdom the special advocate analyses these interests when examining the relevance of the case submitted by the Secretary of State for the non-disclosure of classified documents. In four other member States, the courts may weigh up the interests at stake. In a fifth State there have been some cases where the courts did weigh up the interests and other cases where they did not.
83. In thirteen member States the courts can verify whether the classification of documents is properly justified by reasons of national security, while in sixteen other States they do not have the power to do so.
84. In Finland the courts can themselves declassify documents should they deem it necessary. In seven other member States the courts can request declassification of confidential information or documents, but they cannot declassify such information themselves. In fifteen member States the courts have no power to request declassification or to declassify documents themselves.
85. In twenty-two member States, domestic courts can verify the accuracy and relevance of the information in classified documents submitted to them. In eight other States, the domestic courts have no such power.
86. In seventeen member States, lawyers representing the alien can have access to classified material. In fifteen others the lawyers have no such access. In some of those fifteen, a lawyer may be able to gain access to classified documents after obtaining the necessary security clearance. The institution of a “special advocate” exists in Norway and the United Kingdom.
87. In Iceland there is no legal basis for the removal of lawfully resident aliens on national security grounds and in Liechtenstein such removal relates only to criminal cases.
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 7 TO THE CONVENTION
88. Relying on Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 and Article 13 of the Convention, the applicants complained that they had not been afforded sufficient procedural safeguards and therefore had not been able to defend themselves effectively in the proceedings initiated by the application to have them declared undesirable persons in Romania on national security grounds. More specifically they alleged that they had not been notified of the actual accusations against them, even though they did not have access to the documents in the file.
89. The Government contested the applicants’ arguments.
90. The Court, being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 113-15 and 126, 20 March 2018), finds it appropriate to examine the applicants’ allegations solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, of which the relevant part reads as follows:
“1. An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not be expelled therefrom except in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall be allowed:
(a) to submit reasons against his expulsion,
(b) to have his case reviewed, and
(c) to be represented for these purposes before the competent authority or a person or persons designated by that authority.”
91. The Court reiterates that the safeguards provided for by Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 apply only to aliens who are “lawfully resident” in the territory of a State which has ratified this Protocol (see Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], no. 13255/07, § 228, ECHR 2014, and Sejdovic and Sulejmanovic v. Italy (dec.), no. 57575/00, 14 March 2002). In the present case the applicants arrived in Romania to continue their university studies and had obtained long-stay visas for that purpose (see paragraphs 9-10 above). They were thus “lawfully resident” in Romania when the expulsion proceedings were initiated against them. Consequently, given that they were facing expulsion at a time when they were aliens lawfully residing in Romania, Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 is applicable ratione materiae in the present case.
92. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
MeritsThe parties’ submissions and observations of the third-party interveners
The parties’ submissions and observations of the third-party interveners
The parties’ submissions and observations of the third-party interveners
93. The applicants complained that the principle of the equality of arms had been breached, on the grounds that neither they nor their lawyers had been able to take cognisance of the actual accusations against them, as the proceedings had been based on documents classified as “secret”.
94. They alleged that neither the administrative nor the judicial authorities had informed them of the acts of which they had stood accused. In their submission, the fact of being informed before the Court of Appeal, by an interpreter, about the proposed measure against them and the corresponding provisions of Romanian law did not amount to the “communication” of the application initiating the proceedings. They added that, in any event, the application itself did not contain any indication of the content of the accusations against them.
95. The conditions imposed by the various applicable legal provisions in order to ensure the protection of classified information (see paragraphs 43 and 51 above) had prevented the national courts from informing them of any specific accusations.
96. The applicants further pointed out that the SRI press release of 6 December 2012 (see paragraph 30 above) had made public some more detailed information on the activities of which they had been accused. Such a difference in approach between the Court of Appeal and the SRI as to the extent of the information that could be disclosed to the public called into question, in the applicants’ view, the need for that information to be classified.
97. The applicants added that there was nothing in the case file to suggest that the documents, which had been presented as falling under the “secret” category, had had to be classified. The domestic courts were not required by law to verify whether the classification of the information by the SRI was justified or to analyse the reasons given by the latter for its refusal to transmit the classified documents to those concerned. Similarly, the law did not allow the domestic courts themselves to declassify any classified documents or information (see paragraph 51 above).
98. They further stated that Romanian law did not impose, in this type of case, any obligation on the judicial authorities to ensure that those concerned were assisted by a lawyer or to inform them of such a possibility, or to point out that some lawyers held an ORNISS certificate. They admitted that in accordance with the statutory provisions governing civil procedure they could theoretically have been assisted before the Court of Appeal by a lawyer of their choosing. However, given the speed with which the proceedings had been held and the distance they had had to travel for the hearing before the Court of Appeal, they had not had enough time to find a lawyer.
99. As to the possibility for the lawyers who had represented them in the High Court to obtain an ORNISS certificate, they alleged that the length of the procedure for that purpose was much longer than the procedure under Romanian law for the purposes of declaring a person undesirable (see paragraphs 35 and 54 above). As regards the possibility of being represented from the start of the proceedings by a lawyer who held an ORNISS certificate, the applicants stated that, according to their research, the website of the Bucharest Bar contained no information to enable them to identify an authorised lawyer. They referred to a letter of the National Union of Romanian Bars, which explained that there was no list of the lawyers who held an ORNISS certificate (see paragraph 58 above). They argued that, in any event, having regard to the applicable domestic rules (see paragraphs 43 and 51 above), even a lawyer holding an ORNISS certificate would not have been able to disclose the classified information to them.
100. They explained that, even though it was not prohibited under the statutory provisions applicable to this type of procedure for the court to verify the information submitted to it by the SRI and the public prosecutor, including by the taking of evidence of its own motion, they had doubts about the extent of the review by the national courts as to the well ‑ foundedness of the measure against them. In this context they pointed to the refusal by the High Court, without giving any reasoning, to grant their request to obtain, by official means, certain bank information concerning them. They took the view that the proceedings had been a mere formality and that the court had simply assumed that the SRI’s request and the public prosecutor’s application initiating the proceedings had been well founded.
101. Lastly, the applicants alleged that they had sustained damage as a result of their expulsion, entailing their inability to pursue their university studies and their social isolation, including from their families, and that their reputations had been tarnished on account of the serious accusations against them. They alleged that after returning to Pakistan they had been subjected to an investigation in order to verify the accusations of terrorist acts but it had not yielded any results.
102. The Government stated that preventing and combating threats to national security were priority tasks for the national security authorities. The SRI was the legally established national authority responsible for preventing and combating terrorism, and as such it was competent to request the limitation of certain rights of aliens in Romania. Similarly, in order to prevent terrorist acts, in cooperation with other authorities acting in the field of national security, the SRI was competent to collect, verify and use, through special techniques, the information necessary for the prevention of terrorism. In accordance with the relevant legal provisions (see paragraph 51 above), the information thus obtained by the SRI, together with the means and equipment used to obtain it, was classified as “State secret” information.
103. The Government explained that the exclusion and expulsion of an alien were administrative measures to prevent or combat terrorism. As to the conduct of this procedure, they stated first of all that it was the SRI which transmitted to the public prosecutor’s office at the Bucharest Court of Appeal the intelligence that it regarded as justifying an application to have an alien declared undesirable in Romania. If, after an assessment of that intelligence, the public prosecutor considered the SRI’s request to be well founded, he or she would refer the matter to the Bucharest Court of Appeal. The application initiating the court proceedings, which contained the legal characterisation of the accusations against the alien and sometimes certain specific factual material, was notified to the person concerned.
104. The Government explained that, under domestic law, the national courts competent to deal with such cases, and of which they emphasised the independence and impartiality, had access to all classified documents on which the prosecution’s application was based. Even if those courts were not themselves competent to declassify the classified data and information made available to them, they could ask the competent authority to analyse the desirability of declassifying or reclassifying the documents for the purpose of placing them on file for consultation by the interested party. Moreover, there was no statutory provision allowing national courts to examine of their own motion whether the classification of the information in question was justified. However, where the legality of the classification of documents was challenged in the context of the appeal, the competent court might review the matter within the confines of the law.
105. Referring to the examples of case-law they had submitted (see paragraphs 60-61 above), the Government further indicated that, as a general rule, after having first examined the classified documents forwarded by the public prosecutor’s office, the Court of Appeal would notify the person concerned of the information it considered sufficient to enable him or her, with the help of an interpreter, to understand the essence of the facts underlying the proceedings. However, they pointed out that the court would not disclose data which, in its opinion, might have a bearing on national security. They argued that, in order to fulfil their obligation to inform aliens of the accusations against them, Romanian courts were required to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake: on the one hand, to provide aliens with sufficient information to enable them to defend themselves and, on the other, to comply with the legal provisions governing the confidentiality of classified information.
106. The Government submitted that the practice of Romanian courts to inform aliens of the essence of the accusations against them was in line with both the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (judgment of the CJEU of 10 September 2014 in Ben Alaya v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-491/13, EU:C:2014:2187, paragraph 33, and judgment of the CJEU of 4 June 2013 in ZZ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-300/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:363) and of the Court ( Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 35289/11, 19 September 2017). They noted that, while the practice of domestic courts fluctuated until 2015 or 2016 as to the extent of the factual information to be disclosed to aliens in this type of proceedings, after that period the case-law had become consolidated in the sense of providing specific information to those concerned. In the present case they argued that, even assuming, as the applicants claimed, that the Court of Appeal had not provided them with sufficient factual information about the suspicions against them, they had at least taken cognisance of those suspicions as a result of the SRI press release of 6 December 2012. They explained in this regard that the SRI might inform the public, through press releases, about information of public interest, but it never disclosed classified information.
107. The Government emphasised, referring to the examples of case-law they had provided to the Court (see paragraphs 62-63 above) that, when national courts made their examination of the need to declare an alien undesirable, they would take into account not only classified documents but also any other evidence or information brought to their attention by the person concerned, also having regard to the potential consequences for national security of the activities of which the aliens were suspected if they were not removed from the country. Where the decision to declare a person undesirable was based on classified data or information related to national security, the law expressly prohibited any mention of such classified material in the text of the decision.
108. Lastly, the Government stated that, under domestic law, an alien who was the subject of proceedings to have him or her declared undesirable was not allowed to consult classified documents. However, he or she could be represented by a lawyer holding an ORNISS certificate and the lawyer would have such access. If the lawyer chosen by the alien concerned did not hold such a certificate, that lawyer could request the adjournment of the proceedings in order to take the necessary steps to obtain one or to contact a lawyer already holding such a certificate. In the Government’s view, even though the lawyer holding an ORNISS certificate had to comply with the legal provisions concerning the protection of the classified documents consulted, he or she would nevertheless be able to prepare the alien’s defence accordingly and seek evidence to counter the information contained in the classified documents. The Government added that in the present case the lawyers chosen by the applicants had not held an ORNISS certificate and that they had not made a request for adjournment of the proceedings for the purpose of taking steps to obtain such a certificate or of seeking to be replaced by other lawyers so authorised.
109. The Government concluded that, in the present case, the applicants had enjoyed sufficient safeguards to meet the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 and the Court’s case-law in such matters. Even though the applicants’ right of access to classified data and information had been limited, they had received sufficient information to prepare their defence. The decision against them had been rendered in compliance with the applicable legal provisions. Their case had been examined effectively by two independent and impartial courts which had had access to all the documents and had established the need to protect national security by removing them from Romania. They had appeared in person and had been represented by lawyers at the hearings of those courts.
(i) Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and the Association for Legal Intervention
110. The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and the Association for Legal Intervention ( Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej ) took the view that, irrespective of whether or not the court taking the decision had access to the classified documents, the minimum procedural safeguards imposed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 could not be guaranteed unless the aliens being deported were informed of the main grounds on which the decision against them was based. The aliens, or if appropriate their representative, had to be made aware of the factual reasons underlying the expulsion, in order for the proceedings to be consistent with the relevant case-law of the CJEU, with EU legislation and with United Nations standards in matters of expulsion of aliens.
111. Amnesty International was of the view that the safeguards inherent in the right to a fair trial could be transposed to the subject-matter of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7. Thus the principle of adversarial proceedings and the equality of arms, the obligation of the courts to provide reasons for their decisions and the protection against arbitrariness should preclude the use in judicial proceedings of classified documents to which the individual or his legal representative had no access and in the absence of which the individual could not usefully prepare his or her defence. The use of such documents would be all the more problematic where the person concerned alleged that, in the event of expulsion, he or she would be exposed to treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention.
(iii) The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
112. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism stated that the use of classified evidence, whether the proceedings were criminal, civil or migration-related, must remain exceptional because it ran counter to the principle of free access to a court, the adversarial principle and the equality of arms. The Special Rapporteur took the view that the concept of “national security” must be defined precisely in order to avoid its improper use and that the authorities had a duty to prove that a case fell within national security. The use of classified evidence, which was often not properly regulated by domestic law, had to remain exceptional and be subjected to a very stringent admissibility test. She drew attention to the fact that deportation proceedings might have a significant impact on an individual, where the classified information indicated that he or she could be involved in terrorist activity or linked to a terrorist group, on account of the practical consequences that such a characterisation might have for the person concerned.
113. The Court notes that the applicants relied on the right to be informed, during the proceedings initiated by the application to have them declared undesirable, of the specific factual reasons underlying that application. They also submitted that the refusal to allow them to consult the classified documents submitted by the public prosecutor’s office to the Court of Appeal in support of the application for their expulsion had breached their right of access to the case file.
114. The Court reiterates that, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations, the States have the right to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. The Convention does not guarantee the right of an alien to enter or to reside in a particular country (see, among many other authorities, De Souza Ribeiro v. France [GC], no. 22689/07, § 77, ECHR 2012, and Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, § 125, 21 November 2019).
115. Administrative proceedings concerning the expulsion of an alien do not pertain to the determination of a civil right or obligation, or of a criminal charge, for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 (see Maaouia v. France [GC], no. 39652/98, § 38, ECHR 2000 ‑ X). The States, being aware that Article 6 of the Convention did not apply to procedures for the expulsion of aliens, wished to take special measures in that sphere and thus adopted Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, which defines the procedural safeguards applicable to this type of procedure (ibid., § 36; see also points 6, 7 and 16 of the Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 7 cited in paragraph 68 above).
116. Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 refers expressly to aliens “lawfully resident in the territory of a State” (see Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above, § 228) and who, in the event of expulsion, enjoy the specific safeguards provided for by this provision (see C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 1365/07, § 70, 24 April 2008, and Ljatifi v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 19017/16, § 32, 17 May 2018). Article 1 § 2 of Protocol No. 7 provides for an exception, enabling States to expel an alien who is lawfully resident on its territory even before he or she has exercised the rights afforded under Article 1 § 1, in cases where such expulsion is necessary in the interests of public order or for reasons of national security.
117. According to the Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 7, in adopting Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 the States agreed to “minimum” procedural safeguards in the event of expulsion (see point 7 of the Explanatory Report quoted in paragraph 68 above).
118. Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 establishes as the first basic safeguard that the person concerned may be expelled only “in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law”. This phrase has a similar meaning throughout the Convention and its Protocols (see C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 73). It concerns not only the existence of a legal basis in domestic law, but also the quality of the law in question: it must be accessible and foreseeable and must also afford a measure of protection against arbitrary interference by the public authorities with the Convention rights (see Lupsa v. Romania, no. 10337/04, § 55, ECHR 2006 ‑ VII, and Baltaji v. Bulgaria, no. 12919/04, § 55, 12 July 2011). This applies equally to Convention provisions which lay down procedural rights, as does Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, for it is well-established case-law that the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the Preamble to the Convention, is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention (see Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 117, 23 June 2016). Arbitrariness entails a negation of the rule of law (see Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland [GC], no. 5809/08, § 145, 21 June 2016) and could not be more tolerated in respect of procedural rights than it is in respect of substantive rights.
119. In addition to the general condition of legality, Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 provides for three specific procedural safeguards: aliens must be able to submit reasons against their expulsion, to have their case reviewed and, lastly, to be represented for these purposes before the competent authority (see point 12 of the Explanatory Report cited in paragraph 68 above).
120. In certain cases, the Court has had occasion to examine, besides the quality of the domestic law, the safeguards enumerated in Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7. In order to ascertain whether these safeguards were afforded in the relevant cases, it took account of the following circumstances: the order initiating the proceedings had not been notified to the alien (see Lupsa, cited above, § 59); the courts had refused to examine on the merits an appeal against the expulsion decision and no independent or impartial authority had examined that decision (see Baltaji, cited above, § 57); the applicant had not been able, at any stage in the proceedings, to ascertain even the slightest factual reasons for his expulsion, so that he was unable to submit reasons against that decision (see Lupsa, cited above, § 59; Ahmed v. Romania, no. 34621/03, § 53, 13 July 2010; Geleri v. Romania, no. 33118/05, § 46, 15 February 2011; and Baltaji, cited above, § 58); the competent court had rejected any request for adjournment, thus preventing the applicant’s lawyer from studying the order against him (see Lupsa, cited above, § 59); and the review by the domestic courts had been a mere formality (see C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, §§ 73-74; Kaushal and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 1537/08, § 49, 2 September 2010; Geleri, cited above, § 48; and Takush v. Greece, no. 2853/09, §§ 60-63, 17 January 2012).
121. More recently, in the case of Ljatifi (cited above), in examining the compatibility with Article 1 § 1 (a) and (b) of Protocol No. 7 of an expulsion decision on national security grounds, the Court summed up the applicable principles as follows:
“35. In so far as the impugned order was based on national security considerations, the Court has held that the requirement of foreseeability does not go so far as to compel States to enact legal provisions listing in detail all conduct that may prompt a decision to expel an individual on national security grounds. However, even where national security is at stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic society require that deportation measures affecting fundamental human rights be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent authority or a court competent to effectively scrutinise the reasons for them and review the relevant evidence, if need be with appropriate procedural limitations on the use of classified information. The individual must be able to challenge the executive’s assertion that national security is at stake. While the executive’s assessment of what poses a threat to national security will naturally be of significant weight, the independent authority or court must be able to react in cases where the invocation of this concept has no reasonable basis in the facts or reveals an interpretation of ‘national security’ that is unlawful or contrary to common sense and arbitrary (see C.G. and Others [ v. Bulgaria ], cited above, § 40).”
122. In the context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 the Court has taken into account the fact that the object and purpose of the Convention, as an instrument of human rights protection, call for an understanding and application of its provisions such as to render its safeguards practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory (see Geleri, cited above, § 48, and Takush, cited above, § 63). This is a general principle of interpretation of all the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto (see, for example, Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37; Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 87, Series A no. 161; and Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], no. 18030/11, § 121, 8 November 2016).
123. It follows from the foregoing that in cases concerning Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 the Court has always sought to ensure that the expulsion decision was not arbitrary (see paragraphs 116 and 121 above) and that the alien was able to exercise effectively the rights enumerated in that first paragraph (see paragraphs 119 and 121 above).
124. The Court will examine successively, in the light of the above case ‑ law, whether, and if so to what extent, the rights asserted by the applicants are protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 (ii), the possibility of restricting them (iii), and the criteria to be taken into account in determining the compatibility of a limitation of those rights with Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 (iv).
(ii) Whether, and if so to what extent, the rights asserted by the applicants are protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 7
125. The Court observes that the rights asserted by the applicants, namely the right to be informed of the reasons for their expulsion and the right to have access to the documents in the case file, are not expressly mentioned in the text of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7. It is thus for the Court to determine, bearing in mind that the Convention secures rights which are “practical and effective”, whether and, if so to what extent, those rights may be regarded as required by the first paragraph of that Article.
126. The Court reiterates that the condition laid down in Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7, namely that an alien cannot be expelled except in pursuance of a decision reached “in accordance with law” implies, as mentioned above, that the law in question satisfies the quality criteria required by the Court’s case-law in such matters, including the quality of ensuring protection against arbitrariness on the part of the authorities (see paragraph 118 above). In addition, Article 1 § 1 (a) of Protocol No. 7 expressly guarantees the right for the alien to submit reasons against his expulsion. In the Court’s opinion, an alien cannot meaningfully challenge the authorities’ allegations to the effect that national security is at stake, or reasonably submit reasons against his expulsion without being aware of the relevant factual elements which have led the domestic authorities to believe that the alien represents a threat to national security. Such information is essential in order to ensure the effective exercise by the alien of the right enshrined in Article 1 § 1 (a) of Protocol No. 7.
127. In the cases previously examined by the Court under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, the applicants had not been informed of the specific accusations against them, or even of the general context on which the expulsion was based, as the submissions initiating the proceedings had merely referred to intelligence to the effect that they had engaged in activities capable of endangering national security (see, for example, Lupsa, cited above, § 10; Kaushal and Others, cited above, § 6; Baltaji, cited above, § 9; and Ljatifi, cited above, § 7). In those cases the Court required that at least an “independent body or tribunal” should be informed of the “grounds for the decision and the relevant evidence”, but without addressing the question whether it was also necessary for those grounds to be disclosed to the person concerned. However, the Court has found that Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 enshrines a right for the alien to be notified of the accusations against him (see Lupsa, cited above, § 59) and it has always found fault with a failure to provide any information to those concerned about the reasons underlying an expulsion decision (see Lupsa, cited above, §§ 40 and 56; Ahmed, cited above, § 53; Kaushal and Others, cited above, §§ 30 and 48; Baltaji, cited above, § 58; and Ljatifi, cited above, §§ 36-39).
128. As to the right of access to the documents in the file, this has not so far been enshrined as such in the Court’s case-law under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7. The Court has nevertheless had occasion to state, even where national security was at stake, that deportation measures must be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings, if need be with appropriate procedural limitations as to the use of classified information (see Ljatifi, cited above, § 35). In the Court’s opinion, this implies that, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, a right is secured to the alien to be informed, preferably in writing and in any event in a way allowing an effective defence, of the content of the documents and the information relied upon by the competent national authority which is deciding on the alien’s expulsion, without prejudice to the possibility of imposing duly justified limitations on such information if necessary.
129. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 requires in principle that the aliens concerned be informed of the relevant factual elements which have led the competent domestic authorities to consider that they represent a threat to national security and that they be given access to the content of the documents and the information in the case file on which those authorities relied when deciding on their expulsion.
(iii) Permissible limitations of both the right to be informed of relevant factual elements underlying the expulsion decision and the right of access to the content of the documents and the information relied upon by the competent national authority
130. Nevertheless, these rights are not absolute. As in certain criminal proceedings, administrative expulsion proceedings may also be characterised by the presence of competing interests – such as national security, the need to protect witnesses at risk of reprisals or the requisite secrecy of police investigation methods – which must be weighed in the balance against the rights of the alien (see, among many other authorities, Jasper v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27052/95, § 52, 16 February 2000, for an example of criminal proceedings, and Regner, cited above, § 148, for administrative proceedings). The Court has also found that Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in such matters (see Regner, cited above, § 147).
131. The Court has also accepted limitations of an applicant’s rights to access the file and to be informed of the accusations in cases concerning expulsion proceedings where national security was invoked (see, among other authorities, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, § 137, 20 June 2002, concerning Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention, and Ljatifi, cited above, § 35, concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 7). Moreover, the Court finds that, as regards the possibility of limiting the procedural rights of aliens facing expulsion, the vast majority of member States expressly provide in their domestic legislation for the possibility of such limitations where national security is at stake (see paragraph 79 above).
132. The Court reiterates that it is acutely conscious of the extent of the danger represented by terrorism and the threat it poses to society, and consequently of the importance of counterterrorism considerations. It is also aware of the considerable difficulties currently faced by States in protecting their populations against terrorist violence (see, among other authorities, Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 179, ECHR 2005 ‑ IV; A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 126, ECHR 2009; and A. v. the Netherlands, no. 4900/06, § 143, 20 July 2010). Accordingly, Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 should not be applied in such a manner as to put disproportionate difficulties in the way of the competent authorities in taking effective measures to counter terrorism and other serious crimes, in the discharge of their duty under Article 2, Article 3 and Article 5 § 1 of the Convention to protect the right to life and the right to bodily security of members of the public (see, mutatis mutandis, Sher and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 5201/11, § 149, ECHR 2015 (extracts), and Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541/08 and 3 others, § 252, 13 September 2016).
133. Nevertheless, any limitations of the rights in question must not negate the procedural protection guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 by impairing the very essence of the safeguards enshrined in this provision (see, mutatis mutandis, Regner, cited above, § 148). Even in the event of limitations, the alien must be offered an effective opportunity to submit reasons against his expulsion and be protected against any arbitrariness. The Court will therefore first ascertain whether the limitations of the alien’s procedural rights have been found to be duly justified by the competent independent authority in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. The Court will then examine whether the difficulties resulting from these limitations for the alien concerned were sufficiently compensated for by counterbalancing factors. Thus, only limitations which, in the circumstances of each case, are duly justified and sufficiently counterbalanced will be permissible in the context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7.
(iv) Criteria used to determine whether limitations imposed on the right to be informed of the relevant factual elements underlying the expulsion decision and the right of access to the content of the documents and the information relied upon by the competent national authority are compatible with Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7
134. The Court observes that it has previously found, under Article 6 of the Convention, that even where national security or public order interests were involved, only those limitations of procedural rights which did not impair the very essence of those rights would be legitimate (see, for example, Regner, cited above, § 148; see also, mutatis mutandis, Fayed v. the United Kingdom, 21 September 1994, § 54, Series A no. 294 ‑ B, and Omar v. France, 29 July 1998, § 34, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ V). When confronted with limitations on certain procedural rights, it has frequently taken the view that the effects of such limitations on the situation of those concerned must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the national authorities (see, for example, Jasper, cited above, § 52; Fitt v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29777/96, § 45, ECHR 2000-II, with further references; Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC], no. 9154/10, § 107, ECHR 2015, concerning Article 6 of the Convention; and A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 218, concerning Article 5 § 4 of the Convention).
135. While it cannot be inferred from the above references to the case-law under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention that the extent of the procedural safeguards should necessarily be the same under Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7, this case-law nevertheless provides useful indications as to the methodology to be followed in assessing limitations of the rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 7.
136. Thus, the Court will now determine under what circumstances limitations of the right to be informed of the factual elements underlying the expulsion decision and/or limitations of the right of access to the content of the documents and the information relied on by the national authority competent to decide on the expulsion are compatible with Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7. For the sake of convenience, those rights will be referred to below as the alien’s “procedural rights”.
137. For this purpose, the Court considers that it must first ascertain whether the restrictions in question were duly justified in the circumstances of the case and subsequently assess whether those limitations were sufficiently counterbalanced, in particular by procedural safeguards, such as to preserve the very essence of the relevant rights (see paragraph 133 above).
138. The Court will carry out its examination having regard to the circumstances of a given case, taking into account the proceedings as a whole. This approach is consistent with the role of the Court, whose task is not to review the relevant law and practice in abstracto, but to determine whether the manner in which they affected the applicant gave rise to a violation of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, N.C. v. Italy [GC], no. 24952/94, § 56, ECHR 2002 ‑ X).
(α) Whether the limitation on the aliens’ “procedural rights” was duly justified
139. The Court accepts that there may be duly justified reasons, such as the need to protect national security, for limitations to be imposed on the alien’s procedural rights. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it falls primarily to the national authorities to assess whether limitations on an alien’s procedural rights are needed in a given case and are duly justified (see, mutatis mutandis, Schatschaschwili, cited above, § 119). The Court will therefore examine the decision-making procedure in which the limitation of the alien’s procedural rights was imposed. In this connection, the Court reiterates that, in a democratic society governed by the rule of law, this assessment of the necessity of the limitation of an alien’s procedural rights should be surrounded by safeguards against arbitrariness (see paragraph 118 above). Requirements to that end include the need for the decision imposing such restrictions to be duly reasoned and, particularly in the event that those reasons are not disclosed to the person concerned, a procedure allowing for these reasons to be properly scrutinised.
140. In order for such scrutiny to be in accordance with the rule of law, which opposes legal discretion being granted to the executive in terms of an unfettered power (see, mutatis mutandis, Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 56, ECHR 2000 ‑ II), it should be entrusted to an authority, judicial or not, which is independent from the executive body seeking to impose the limitation (see, mutatis mutandis, Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, §§ 55-56, Series A no. 28, and Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no. 47143/06, § 233, ECHR 2015). In this connection, it is to be noted that in the context of examining the compatibility with Article 1 § 1 (a) and (b) of Protocol No. 7 of an expulsion decision taken on national security grounds, the Court has stressed the need for independent scrutiny in respect of an assessment of those grounds (see Ljatifi, cited above, § 35).
141. The question whether an independent national authority has examined the need for limitations on the alien’s procedural rights is thus the first criterion to be applied in the Court’s examination under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7. In that context, the Court will attach weight to the scope of the remit of that national authority, and in particular consider whether it is entitled to review the need to maintain the confidentiality of the classified information (see, mutatis mutandis, Regner, cited above, § 152).
142. The Court will then also have to examine the powers vested in the independent authority, depending on its findings in a given case as to the need to limit an alien’s procedural rights. More specifically, it should ascertain, in cases where the independent authority has found that national security did not justify the refusal to disclose to the alien concerned the content of the documents and of the information relied upon by the authority having decided on the expulsion, whether that independent authority was entitled to ask the competent body in matters of national security to review the classification of the documents or whether it was itself able to declassify them (ibid.), so that they could be transmitted to the alien, or at least so that the latter could be notified of their content.
143. By contrast, where it was found by the independent authority that the protection of national security did preclude the disclosure to the alien of the content of the classified documents, the Court must determine whether, in reaching that conclusion, the authority duly identified the interests at stake and weighed up the national security interests against the alien’s interests.
144. However, should the national authorities have failed to examine – or have insufficiently examined and justified – the need for limitations on the alien’s procedural rights, this will not suffice in itself to entail a violation of Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7. In any event, the Court will also ascertain whether any counterbalancing measures have been applied in the case at hand and, if so, whether they were sufficient to mitigate the limitations of the alien’s procedural rights, such as to preserve the very essence of those rights.
145. As regards the examination by the national authorities of the need to place limitations on the alien’s procedural rights, the less stringent the examination, the stricter the Court’s scrutiny of the counterbalancing factors will have to be (see, for the methodology, mutatis mutandis, Ibrahim and Others, cited above, § 265; see also paragraph 133 above). To be precise, an excessively cursory examination at national level of the need to limit the rights in question will call for the implementation of enhanced counterbalancing factors in order to ensure the preservation, depending on the circumstances of the case, of the very essence of the rights secured by Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 (see paragraph 133 above).
146. In its assessment, the Court will be guided by two basic principles: first, the more the information available to the alien is limited, the more the safeguards will be important, in order to counterbalance the limitation of his or her procedural rights; second, where the circumstances of a case reveal particularly significant repercussions for the alien’s situation, the counterbalancing safeguards must be strengthened accordingly.
(β) Whether the limitations on the alien’s “procedural rights” were sufficiently compensated for by counterbalancing factors
147. In the second stage of its examination (see paragraph 136 above), the Court will ascertain whether the limitations on the alien’s procedural rights have been counterbalanced by appropriate and adequate safeguards.
148. In this connection the Court notes that it cannot be seen from the information at its disposal that there is a European consensus as to the types of factors that would be capable of counterbalancing the limitations of aliens’ procedural rights or as to the scope of such factors. Limitations on the right of access to classified documents and on the disclosure of the reasons underlying the expulsion decision may be mitigated through mechanisms which vary according to the specificities of the legislation or procedure put in place in a given country (see paragraphs 82-86 above).
149. The Court infers from the above that under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7, the States should be afforded a certain margin of appreciation in the choice of factors to be put in place in order to counterbalance any limitation of procedural rights. This margin of appreciation nevertheless goes hand in hand with European supervision and in such cases the Court’s task is to ensure that the procedural protection guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 is not negated (see paragraph 133 above).
150. Where expulsion proceedings are examined as a whole, such as to assess the consequences of certain limitations on the effective exercise by aliens of their procedural rights, the following factors, enumerated non-exhaustively and based on the Court’s case-law and on the comparative analysis (see paragraphs 80-86 above), should be taken into account (see also, mutatis mutandis, Ibrahim and Others, cited above, § 274, and Beuze v. Belgium [GC], no. 71409/10, § 150, 9 November 2018).
‒ The relevance of the information disclosed to the alien as to the grounds for his or her expulsion and the access provided to the content of the documents relied upon
151. The Court’s case-law does not set in abstracto the volume of information to be provided to aliens, as this will vary depending on the circumstances of each case. The Court will therefore, in each case, take account of the relevance of the information actually disclosed to the alien with regard both to the factual elements underlying the expulsion decision and the access to the content of the documents and information relied upon by the authority making that decision. It will ascertain whether the national authorities have, to the extent compatible with maintaining the confidentiality and proper conduct of investigations, informed the alien concerned, in the proceedings, of the substance of the accusations against him or her (see, in the same vein, Lupsa, cited above, § 59; Ljatifi, cited above, § 39; and, mutatis mutandis, Regner, cited above, § 153).
152. A further question of importance is whether it falls upon a judicial or other independent authority to determine, in a given case, after examining all the classified evidence, which factual information may be disclosed to the alien concerned without endangering national security, provided it is disclosed at a stage of the proceedings when the alien is still able meaningfully to challenge that information.
‒ Disclosure to the alien of information as to the conduct of the proceedings and the domestic mechanisms in place to counterbalance the limitation of his or her rights
153. The Court further takes the view that the provision to those concerned of minimum but adequate information as to their rights under domestic law constitutes an inherent prerequisite to ensure the effective exercise of those rights (see, mutatis mutandis, Ibrahim and Others, cited above, § 272, and Beuze, cited above, § 129). In this type of case, the Court will ascertain whether the domestic authorities have provided the requisite information to the alien, at least at key stages in the proceedings. Such information will be particularly useful where aliens are not represented by a lawyer and where a lack of relevant information may result in their failure to exercise rights available to them in domestic law. Lastly, this obligation to provide information will be all the more important in cases where the rules of domestic procedure impose a certain expedition in the examination of the case.
‒ Whether the alien was represented
154. As indicated by Article 1 § 1 (c) of Protocol No. 7, aliens must be able to obtain representation before the competent authority for the purposes of the decision on their expulsion. This implies, firstly, that provisions of domestic law afford an effective possibility of representation in such cases. The possibility for an alien to be represented by a lawyer, or even by a specialised lawyer who holds the relevant authorisations to access classified documents in the case file which are not accessible to the alien, therefore constitutes a significant counterbalancing factor. The Court will further consider whether it was possible in practice for the alien to have effective access to such representation in the course of the proceedings in question.
155. The Court will regard the rights enjoyed by the alien’s representative in a given case as a further significant safeguard. On that basis it will examine, for example, the extent to which access to the documents in the case file, including classified documents not accessible to the alien, was provided to the alien’s representative. It will further consider whether or not the representative’s communication with his or her client was restricted once the access to the classified material had been obtained (see, mutatis mutandis, A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 220).
‒ Whether an independent authority was involved in the proceedings
156. Article 1 § 1 (a) and (b) of Protocol No. 7 provides that the alien concerned has the right to “submit reasons against his expulsion” and to “have his case reviewed”. In the Court’s opinion, the following aspects could be taken into account when assessing compliance with those provisions:
(i) Whether one or more independent authorities, either administrative or judicial, were involved in the proceedings, either to adopt the expulsion measure directly or to review its legality, or even its merits (see, among many other authorities, Al-Nashif, cited above, § 137; Lupsa, cited above, § 56; and Ljatifi, cited above, § 32), and where that authority is a court, the question of its level in the hierarchy of the national legal system. In this connection, judicial scrutiny of the expulsion measure will in principle have a greater counterbalancing effect than an administrative form of scrutiny.
(ii) Whether the applicant was able to challenge, in an effective manner and before an independent authority, the allegations against him according to which he or she represented a danger for national security (see Ljatifi, cited above, § 35).
(iii) Whether the independent authority had the power to effectively examine the grounds underlying the expulsion application or decision, as the case may be, and the supporting evidence adduced and, if so, whether it duly exercised that power in the case at hand (see C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, §§ 73-74; Geleri, cited above, § 48; and Ljatifi, cited above, § 35). On this point, the Court will take account of whether, to perform its task in that regard, that authority had access to the totality of the file constituted by the relevant national security body in order to make its case against the alien, including to the classified documents (see Ljatifi, cited above, § 32). Another major factor will be the power of that authority to verify the authenticity of the documents in the file, together with the credibility and veracity of the classified information adduced in support of the expulsion application or decision, as the case may be (see C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, §§ 73-74; Kaushal and Others, cited above, § 49; and, mutatis mutandis, Regner, § 152). In this connection, there is no presumption that the State security grounds invoked by the competent national security body exist and are valid: the independent authority should be able to verify the facts in the light of the evidence submitted (see Kaushal and Others, cited above, §§ 31-32 and 49).
(iv) Whether the independent authority called upon to review an expulsion decision had the power to annul or amend that decision if it found, in the light of the information in the file, that the invoking of national security was devoid of any reasonable and adequate factual basis.
(v) Whether the necessity of the expulsion was sufficiently plausible in the light of the circumstances of the case and the reasoning provided by the independent authority to justify its decision. In this context the Court will ascertain whether the nature and the degree of the scrutiny applied by the national authority in respect of the case against the alien concerned transpire, at least summarily, from the reasoning of its decision.
157. In respect of that list of questions, the Court wishes to point out that compliance with Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 does not necessarily require that they should all be answered cumulatively in the affirmative. The above list only contains examples of factors that would be capable of appropriately counterbalancing any limitation of the rights enjoyed by aliens under Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7, and it should be borne in mind that the assessment of the nature and extent of the counterbalancing factors to be implemented may vary depending on the circumstances of a given case (see, mutatis mutandis, Ibrahim and Others, cited above, § 274, and Beuze, cited above, § 150). In each case the Court will be required, in the light of the proceedings as a whole, to determine whether the very essence of the rights secured to the alien by Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 has been preserved (see paragraph 133 above).
(b) Application of those principles to the present case
(i) The limitation on the applicants’ procedural rights
158. With regard to the applicants’ right to be informed of the factual elements underlying the expulsion decision, it should be noted that, under Article 85 §§ 3 and 4 of OUG no. 194/2002, as then in force, the Court of Appeal was required to inform aliens of the facts on which the application to declare them undesirable was based, “in accordance with the provisions of the normative instruments governing activities related to national security and the protection of classified information”. Under Article 85 § 5 of OUG no. 194/2002, where the decision to declare an alien undesirable was based on national security grounds, the data and information together with the factual reasons ( motivele de fapt ) having formed the opinion of the judges could not be mentioned in the ensuing judgment. In addition, the relevant provisions of Law no. 182/2002 (see paragraphs 51 and 53 above) precluded the disclosure of classified information to persons who did not hold a certificate authorising them to access this type of document. On the basis of a combined application of these legal provisions, the national courts found in the present case that they were required by law to refrain from providing the applicants with specific information as to the facts and grounds underlying the expulsion application.
159. As regards the applicants’ right to be informed of the content of the documents and the information in the case file on which the case against them was based, the Court notes that, from the outset of the proceedings, in applying the relevant legal provisions, the domestic courts found that the applicants were not entitled to access the documents in the file as they were classified (see paragraph 21 above).
160. This entailed a significant limitation of the applicants’ right to be informed of the factual elements and the content of the documents underlying both the application for their expulsion submitted by the public prosecutor’s office and the domestic courts’ decision to order their removal from Romania.
161. The Court will now examine whether the limitations of the applicants’ procedural rights were necessary (see paragraphs 139-43 above) and whether counterbalancing measures were put in place by the national authorities to mitigate those limitations (see paragraphs 144-56 above), before assessing the concrete impact of the limitations on the applicants’ situation in the light of the proceedings as a whole (see paragraphs 136 and 144 above). In this connection, the Court notes that the applicants’ expulsion had the main effect of making it impossible for them to continue their university studies and of severing any social ties that they had established in Romania. In addition, the accusations against them were very serious, as they were suspected of intending to commit acts of terrorism in Romania, and thus tarnished their reputation (see paragraph 101 above).
(ii) Whether the limitations of the applicants’ procedural rights were duly justified
162. In the present case, the Court notes that the national courts, applying the relevant legal provisions (see paragraphs 51 and 53 above), ruled from the outset that the applicants could not have access to the file on the grounds that the documents were classified (see paragraph 158 above). Domestic law, moreover, did not allow the courts to examine of their own motion whether the preservation of national security required, in a given case, the non-disclosure of evidence in the file (see paragraphs 51 and 53 above; contrast Regner, cited above, § 152).
163. Nor can it be seen from the judgments of the national courts in the present case that they carried out any examination of the need to limit the applicants’ procedural rights and to refrain from disclosing confidential information to them. The actual national security reasons which, in the authorities’ opinion, precluded the disclosure of the classified evidence and intelligence concerning the applicants, were not clarified by the national courts. Moreover, when the applicants argued before the High Court that they had doubts as to the level of classification applied in the present case, no clarification was provided on this point by the High Court (see paragraph 33 above).
164. Lastly, in the Court’s view, the fact that the press release published by the SRI on the day after the Court of Appeal’s judgment contained more detailed factual information than that provided to the applicants in the application initiating the proceedings or in the first-instance proceedings contradicts the need to deprive the applicants of specific information as to the factual reasons submitted in support of their expulsion.
165. Consequently, in the absence of any examination by the courts hearing the case of the need to limit the applicants’ procedural rights, the Court must exercise strict scrutiny in order to establish whether the counterbalancing factors put in place were capable of effectively mitigating the limitations of the applicants’ procedural rights in the present case. In this context, the Court will take account of its finding that the limitations at stake were significant (see paragraph 161 above).
(iii) The existence of counterbalancing factors in the present case
166. The Court notes that, according to the Government, a number of factors must be taken into consideration by the Court when it examines whether the applicants’ rights were upheld in the present case. They pointed out in particular that in the proceedings and in the SRI press release (see paragraph 106 above) the applicants had nevertheless been informed of certain factual accusations against them, that they were entitled to be represented by a lawyer holding an ORNISS certificate (see paragraph 108 above) and, above all, that high-level impartial and independent courts had conducted the proceedings and decided on the necessity of the expulsion, in the light of the classified documents (see paragraphs 104 and 107 above).
167. The Court will now examine the concrete impact of each of the factors submitted by the Government in the present case. If appropriate, it will also take account of factors other than those mentioned by the Government, as identified above (see paragraphs 151-56 above).
(α) The extent of the information provided to the applicants as to the factual elements underlying their expulsion
168. As regards the extent of the information provided to the applicants concerning the factual elements underlying their expulsion, the Court notes that, at the hearing before the Court of Appeal on 5 December 2012, the applicants were notified, through an interpreter, of the application initiating the proceedings (see paragraph 20 above). Only the numbers of the legal provisions which, according to the public prosecutor’s office, governed the alleged conduct were referred to in that document, without any mention of the conduct itself. No specific accusations against the applicants were stated. It is true that an interpreter assisted the applicants in translating the public prosecutor’s application. However, in the Court’s opinion, a mere enumeration of the numbers of legal provisions cannot suffice, not even as a basic minimum, to constitute adequate information about the accusations (see, for example, mutatis mutandis, Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30 August 1990, § 41, Series A no. 182, and Kerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 40451/98, 7 December 1999). The Court would conclude that in the course of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, no information as to the factual reasons for the expulsion was provided to the applicants.
169. It should now be ascertained whether more information was received by the applicants during the High Court proceedings.
170. In this connection, and with regard first to the information that the applicants might have gleaned from the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the Court observes that it merely reproduced the parts of section 3 of Law no. 51/1991 which it considered relevant, thus circumscribing the legal framework of the accusations against the applicants, namely an intention to commit acts of terrorism, or the aiding and abetting of such acts by any means. While the reference to section 3, points (i) and (l), of Law no. 51/1991 provided the applicants with general information about the acts constituting the relevant offences and their legal characterisation, no specific fact was mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s judgment either.
171. The Court further notes that on the day after the delivery of the Court of Appeal’s judgment and while the further proceedings were still pending before the High Court, the SRI issued a press release setting out some of the accusations against the applicants (see paragraph 30 above). However, it is not necessary to look further into the question whether the extent of the information given in the press release might have enabled the applicants to challenge their expulsion or whether that information could have been sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7. Even assuming that the information contained in the press release was sufficient to enable the applicants to prepare their defence, the Court takes the view that in the present case the press release cannot be regarded as a valid source of information, for the following reasons.
172. Firstly, it does not appear that the SRI press release was added to the case file before the High Court. Nor has it been established that the public prosecutor’s office considered the facts stated in that press release to form the basis of its application, or that the High Court confirmed to the applicants that those were the facts which had given rise to the accusations against them.
173. Secondly, after taking cognisance of the acts of which they stood accused according to the press release, in their grounds of appeal before the High Court the applicants pleaded accordingly (see paragraph 38 above). However, it cannot be seen from the file or from the wording of the High Court’s final judgment that the court had relied on the press release or its content in its reasoning.
174. Thirdly, and most importantly, a press release, even one disseminated through official channels, cannot be an appropriate means of providing parties to judicial proceedings with the information that they need to make their case before the competent authority. By its very nature, a press release, even when it concerns judicial proceedings, presents content which is tailored to its aim of informing public opinion more generally. By contrast, the parties to a case who can be readily contacted by the authorities are entitled to receive official information with a level of specificity and precision that is adapted to the particular features of the dispute and to the scope of their procedural rights. In this connection the Court also notes that the SRI was not a party to the proceedings.
175. Consequently, in the High Court proceedings also, the applicants were not informed of the allegations against them such as to be able to effectively exercise their procedural rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7.
176. The Court takes note of the case-law examples submitted by the Government showing the developments in domestic case-law as to the extent of the information disclosed to those concerned in this type of procedure (see paragraph 61 above). However, the factual information disclosed must be examined on a case-by-case basis and in the context of the proceedings in question, such that these examples, however commendable, have no impact on the applicants’ concrete situation. In addition, while these examples demonstrate that the national courts have the power to inform the aliens concerned of certain facts, they fail to explain why those courts chose not to use that power in the present case.
177. The Court thus finds that, as no specific information was provided to the applicants in the context of the proceedings by an independent authority, this is not a factor which is capable of counterbalancing the limitation of the applicants’ procedural rights. The Court must therefore pursue its examination to ascertain whether any other safeguards were put in place for the benefit of the applicants. Moreover, the extensive restriction of specific information entails the need for strong counterbalancing safeguards (see paragraph 146 above).
(β) Whether the applicants were informed about the conduct of the domestic proceedings and about their procedural rights
178. The Court notes that, on the evening of 4 December 2012, the applicants were summoned to appear the following day, at 9 a.m., before the Bucharest Court of Appeal in proceedings instituted at the request of the public prosecutor’s office, which sought to have them declared undesirable persons (see paragraph 15 above). No documents or information concerning the conduct or purpose of the proceedings were attached to the summons.
179. Subsequently, at the hearing of 5 December 2012, the Court of Appeal ensured that the applicants were provided with the assistance of an interpreter for the translation of the application initiating the proceedings (see paragraphs 19-20 above). It also informed the applicants that the documents in the file were confidential and that only the court had access to them by virtue of the authorisation given to it (see paragraph 21 above). The Court of Appeal thus informed the applicants of the limitation of their right of access to the documents in the file and of the safeguard provided for under domestic law to counterbalance this lack of access, namely the court’s access to those documents.
180. However, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to make sure that the applicants – aliens, the first of whom had recently arrived in Romania and did not speak Romanian – were well informed about the conduct of the proceedings before it or about the existence in domestic law of other safeguards that could counterbalance the effects of the limitation on their procedural rights.
181. The Court of Appeal did not therefore verify whether the applicants knew that under Romanian law they had the possibility, if they so wished, of being represented by a lawyer or at what point in the proceedings an application for representation should be made. Similarly, while the Court of Appeal informed the applicants of the limitation of their right of access to the file, it provided no information to them about the existence of lawyers holding an ORNISS certificate who would be authorised to access the classified documents.
182. In the Court’s view, this failure to provide the applicants with information about the conduct of the domestic proceedings in the Court of Appeal and the rights that they should have enjoyed, combined with the rapidity of the procedure, had the effect of negating the procedural safeguards to which the applicants were entitled before that court.
183. The Court further notes that in the High Court proceedings the applicants were assisted by two lawyers of their choosing. The Court leaves open the question whether the authorities were released from their obligation to inform the applicants of their rights and of the safeguards they could have enjoyed under domestic law by the fact that they were represented by two lawyers of their choosing before the High Court. In any event, it can be seen from the file that the High Court did not, of its own motion, inform them of the procedural safeguards under domestic law, with the result that this counterbalancing factor had no impact in the present case in mitigating the limitation of the applicants’ procedural rights.
(γ) The applicants’ representation in the proceedings
184. The Court first notes that under domestic law the national authorities had no obligation to ensure that the applicants were assisted by a representative in the proceedings. It was nevertheless open to the applicants, if they so wished, to be represented by a lawyer.
185. The Court further observes that the domestic authorities, both judicial and administrative, were not required under domestic law to inform the applicants that they were entitled to be represented by a lawyer holding an ORNISS certificate. It also notes that very few lawyers held such a certificate (see paragraph 58 above) and that the names of those lawyers were not published by the Bar (see paragraph 57 above).
186. The Court takes note of the Government’s argument that the applicants’ lawyers should have assisted them in finding a lawyer holding an ORNISS certificate (see paragraph 108 above). Even assuming that a lawyer of the alien’s own choosing could be expected to assist him or her in finding another lawyer who holds an ORNISS certificate, the Court notes that the Government did not demonstrate the manner in which, at the material time, the lawyers would have had effective and timely access to the list of names of the lawyers already holding that certificate (paragraphs 57 ‑ 58 above).
187. The Court takes the view that, in the above-mentioned context (see paragraphs 184-85 above) and having regard to the expeditious nature of the first-instance proceedings, the applicants were not afforded an effective possibility of obtaining representation by a lawyer, still less a lawyer holding an ORNISS certificate, before the Court of Appeal.
188. The Court further observes that before the High Court the applicants were represented by two lawyers whom they themselves had chosen and who did not hold an ORNISS certificate. It remains to be ascertained whether the assistance provided by those lawyers on the basis of the authority conferred on them under domestic law was sufficient to ensure the applicants’ effective defence.
189. In this connection, the Court takes account of the fact that, as they did not hold an ORNISS certificate, the lawyers chosen by the applicants did not have access to the classified documents in the file. As regards the possibility for those lawyers to request the adjournment of the High Court proceedings in order to obtain such a certificate, the Court notes that the time-limit imposed by domestic law for that purpose (see paragraph 52 above) exceeded the normal length of the proceedings to establish whether the alien should be declared undesirable (see paragraph 54 above). A request for adjournment would therefore, in principle, not have enabled the applicants’ lawyers to obtain such a certificate for use in the appeal proceedings. The examples of case-law adduced by the parties confirm this finding (see paragraphs 65-66 above), as there is no example of practice dating back to the relevant time to show that the proceedings could have been extended beyond the time-limit imposed under domestic law.
190. Moreover, according to the information provided by the parties, a lawyer who initiates the procedure to obtain that certificate has to present a copy of the authority form given by his client in order to represent him in the proceedings (see paragraphs 54 and 57 above). As a result, it is not certain that the applicants’ lawyers could have sought such a certificate before being chosen by the applicants to represent them in the proceedings.
191. The Court thus takes the view that, in the present case, the presence of the applicants’ lawyers before the High Court, without any possibility of ascertaining the accusations against their clients, was not capable of ensuring their effective defence.
192. In the light of the foregoing, the applicants’ representation was not sufficiently effective to be able to counterbalance, in a significant manner, the limitations affecting the applicants in the exercise of their procedural rights.
(δ) Whether the expulsion decision was subjected to independent scrutiny
193. The Court observes at the outset that the proceedings under Romanian law with a view to declaring a person undesirable were of a judicial nature. The competent courts in such matters, namely the Court of Appeal and the High Court, enjoyed the requisite independence within the meaning of the Court’s case-law, and this has not been questioned by the applicants (see S.C. v. Romania, no. 9356/11, § 73, 10 February 2015; see also, among many other authorities, for the definition of an independent tribunal, Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, § 93, ECHR 2009). The Court also attaches particular weight to the fact that the proceedings took place before the superior courts in the hierarchy of the Romanian legal system; the High Court is in fact the highest judicial authority. In the Court’s view, these are significant safeguards to be taken into account in the assessment of the factors capable of mitigating the effects of the limitations imposed on the applicants’ enjoyment of their procedural rights.
194. Before those courts, in view of the very limited and general information available to them, the applicants could only base their defence on suppositions and on general aspects of their student life or financial situation (see paragraphs 37-38 above), without being able specifically to challenge an accusation of conduct that allegedly endangered national security. In the Court’s view, faced with a situation such as this, the extent of the scrutiny applied by the national courts as to the well-foundedness of the requested expulsion should be all the more comprehensive.
195. Under Romanian law, specifically Article 85 §§ 2 and 3 of OUG no. 194/2002, it was the Court of Appeal which decided whether the measure requested by the public prosecutor’s office was necessary and justified. In the light of these legal provisions, the Court of Appeal and the High Court – the latter by way of judicial review – should in principle have had access to all the classified documents on which the public prosecutor’s application was based (contrast Abou Amer v. Romania, no. 14521/03, § 58, 24 May 2011, and Ljatifi, cited above, § 40). The judges were thus, in principle, supposed to be duly informed of the case against the applicants as contained in the classified information. It was for the domestic courts to verify on that basis whether the applicants genuinely represented a danger for national security.
196. Moreover, in ordering the expulsion, the Court of Appeal could confine itself, under Article 85 §§ 1 and 2 of OUG no. 194/2002, merely to verifying that there was “sufficient information” or “indications” that the alien in question intended to engage in activities which endangered national security. The Court would observe, however, that according to its case-law (see C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 74, and Kaushal and Others, cited above, § 49), the national court which is competent to decide on an expulsion should verify whether the expulsion application under examination is substantiated by the supporting evidence submitted.
197. In the present case, the public prosecutor’s office submitted in evidence before the Court of Appeal a “document” which, in the Government’s submission, provided details of the applicants’ alleged activities and referred to the specific data and intelligence obtained by the SRI concerning the involvement of the two applicants in activities which threatened national security (see paragraph 14 above). It is not clear whether the domestic courts actually had access to all the classified information underlying the expulsion application or only to that one “document”. Even though they were invited to do so, the Government failed to clarify this point.
198. Moreover, when the applicants expressed their doubts before the High Court about the presence of classified documents in the file, that court did not provide any clarification on this point (see paragraph 33 above). In addition, the High Court refused to order the inclusion in the file of the only item of evidence that was requested by the applicants with the aim of rebutting the allegations that they had financed terrorist activities (see paragraphs 38 and 40 above). In other words, there is nothing in the file to suggest that any verification was actually carried out by the national courts as to the credibility and veracity of the facts submitted to them by the public prosecutor’s office (see, mutatis mutandis, Raza v. Bulgaria, no. 31465/08, § 54, 11 February 2010).
199. Furthermore, the domestic courts gave very general responses in dismissing the applicants’ pleas that they had not acted to the detriment of national security. They merely indicated that it could be seen from the evidence in the file that there were strong indications showing that the applicants intended to engage in activities capable of endangering national security, without any verification of the credibility of the document submitted to them by the public prosecutor’s office.
200. The Court notes the efforts of the domestic courts to refer to its relevant case-law in such matters. In particular, it acknowledges the fact that the High Court referred in its judgment to case-law which indicated to the domestic authorities that they needed to provide for scrutiny by an independent authority as a safeguard against arbitrariness on the part of the executive (see paragraphs 44-45 above).
201. The Court thus accepts that the examination of the case by an independent judicial authority is a very weighty safeguard in terms of counterbalancing any limitation of an applicant’s procedural rights. However, as in the present case, such a safeguard does not suffice in itself to compensate for the limitation of procedural rights if the nature and the degree of scrutiny applied by the independent authorities do not transpire, at least summarily, from the reasoning of their decisions (see paragraph 156 in fine above).
202. The Court further notes that some of the examples of case-law provided by the Government show that the Court of Appeal may, in the light of the classified documents at its disposal, verify the veracity and credibility of the information submitted to it (see paragraphs 62-63 above). However, there are few such examples dating back to the relevant time. In any event, the documents in the file do not show that in the present case the domestic courts effectively and adequately exercised the powers vested in them for such purpose.
(iv) Conclusion as to compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 in the present case
203. The Court reiterates that in the present case the applicants were subjected to significant limitations in the exercise of their right to be informed of the factual elements underlying the decision to deport them and their right to have access to the content of the documents and the information relied upon by the competent authority which made that decision (see paragraph 160 above). It does not appear from the file that the need for such limitations was examined and identified as duly justified by an independent authority at domestic level. The Court is therefore required to exercise strict scrutiny of the measures put in place in the proceedings against the applicants in order to counterbalance the effects of those limitations, for the purposes of preserving the very essence of their rights under Article 1 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 (see paragraphs 133 and 144-45 above).
204. The Court would observe in that connection that the applicants received only very general information about the legal characterisation of the accusations against them, while none of their specific acts which allegedly endangered national security could be seen from the file. Nor were they provided with any information about the key stages in the proceedings or about the possibility of accessing classified documents in the file through a lawyer holding an ORNISS certificate.
205. As to the extent of the scrutiny exercised by an independent authority, the Court takes the view that the mere fact that the expulsion decision was taken by independent judicial authorities at a high level, without it being possible to establish that they actually used the powers vested in them under Romanian law, does not suffice to counterbalance the limitations that the applicants sustained in the exercise of their procedural rights.
206. In conclusion, having regard to the proceedings as a whole and taking account of the margin of appreciation afforded to the States in such matters, the Court finds that the limitations imposed on the applicants’ enjoyment of their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 were not counterbalanced in the domestic proceedings such as to preserve the very essence of those rights.
207. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
208. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
209. The applicants each claimed 104,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the pecuniary damage that they had allegedly sustained. They stated that this sum corresponded to the loss of any effective possibility for them to find employment for over two years, since their removal from Romania. They included in that sum the loss of opportunities in relation to the completion of their doctoral studies and their pursuit of an academic career. They also sought EUR 10,000 each in respect of alleged non-pecuniary damage.
210. As regards the sum requested by way of pecuniary damage, the Government indicated that there was no real link between the decision to remove the applicants from Romania and the alleged damage, and that the applicants had failed to show how they had calculated the amount claimed. As to the non-pecuniary damage, they asked the Court to indicate that a finding of a violation would constitute in itself sufficient redress, and in the alternative, to take account of its case-law in dealing with the applicants’ claim.
211. The Court observes that the only basis on which just satisfaction can be awarded, in the present case, lies in the fact that the applicants did not enjoy sufficient procedural safeguards in the proceedings leading to their removal from Romania. The Court cannot speculate as to any other outcome of the proceedings. In any event, it is of the view that the alleged pecuniary damage is not substantiated by the documents in the file. Consequently, the claim pertaining to pecuniary damage must be rejected.
212. The Court finds, however, that the applicants definitely sustained non-pecuniary damage and the finding of a violation cannot by itself constitute redress. In view of the nature of the violation, the Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards each of the applicants EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
213. The applicants, who submitted their claim while the case was still pending before the Chamber, sought EUR 3,000 for costs and expenses in respect of their lawyer’s fees incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court. The Government argued that the amount claimed for costs and expenses before the Chamber was not substantiated by sufficient and legible documents.
214. The applicants made a request for legal aid before the Grand Chamber and requested the reimbursement of the expenses incurred by their lawyers to assist them before the Grand Chamber and to attend the hearing, for which they submitted supporting documents. At the Grand Chamber hearing they requested the full reimbursement of the expenses they had incurred for their lawyers’ participation in the hearing.
215. The Court notes that only the applicants’ claim concerning the reimbursement of the costs relating to the attendance of their lawyers at the hearing is substantiated by relevant and legible documents. In view of the Court’s case-law in such matters (see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, § 54, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI) and the fact that the applicants received only a partial reimbursement of the travel expenses for the hearing, in the form of legal aid, the Court awards EUR 1,365 jointly to both applicants under that head.
216. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
Declares, unanimously, the application admissible;