CASE OF RUIZ-MATEOS v. SPAIN

1. The case was referred to the Court first by the Government of the Kingdom of Spain ("the Government") and then by the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 20 and 21 February 1992, within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention"). It originated in an application (no. 12952/87) against Spain lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by six Spanish nationals, Mr José María, Mr Zoilo, Mr Rafael, Mr Isidoro, Mr Alfonso and Mrs María Dolores Ruiz-Mateos, on 5 May 1987.
The Government ’ s application referred to Article 48 (art. 48); the Commission ’ s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Spain recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The object of the application and the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicants stated that they wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyers who would represent them (Rule 30). The President of the Court gave the lawyers leave to use the Spanish language (Rule 27 para. 3).
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr J. M. Morenilla, the elected judge of Spanish nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 27 February 1992, in the presence of the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr C. Russo, Mr N. Valticos, Mrs E. Palm, Mr R. Pekkanen, Mr F. Bigi and Mr L. Wildhaber (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43).
By a letter of 26 February to the President, Mr Morenilla had stated that he wished to withdraw pursuant to Rule 24 para. 2, because he had represented the Government before the Commission as Agent. On 6 April the Government notified the Registrar of the appointment of Mr Rafael de Mendizábal Allende, judge at the Supreme Court, as ad hoc judge (Article 43 of the Convention and Rule 23) (art. 43).
On 20 October the Registrar received a letter from the latter stating that he wished to withdraw "for [a] special reason" (Rule 24 para. 3), following his appointment to the Constitutional Court. On 20 November the Government appointed a new ad hoc judge, Mr Dámaso Ruiz- Jarabo Colomer, a judge who is on secondment as head of the private office of the President of the General Council of the Judiciary.
4. Mr Ryssdal had assumed the office of President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5) and had, in the meantime, through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Government, the Delegate of the Commission and the applicants on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant to the President ’ s orders and directives, the Registrar received the Government ’ s memorial on 6 July 1992 and the applicants ’ memorial on 7 July. On 8 September the Secretary to the Commission informed him that the Delegate would submit oral observations.
5. On 10 April and 30 June 1992 respectively the President had authorised, under Rule 37 para. 2, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Portuguese Republic to submit written observations on the applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention to constitutional courts. These observations reached the registry on 10 June and 27 August.
6. On 23 November 1992, the date initially fixed for the hearing - which had had to be postponed because of Mr de Mendizábal Allende ’ s withdrawal -, the Chamber decided under Rule 51 to relinquish jurisdiction forthwith in favour of the plenary Court.
7. On 27 November 1992 the President directed that the oral proceedings should open on 27 January 1993. The hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on the appointed day. Mr R. Bernhardt, the Vice-President of the Court, had replaced Mr Ryssdal as President, the latter being unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rule 9). The Court had held a preparatory meeting before the hearing.
There appeared before the Court:
- for the Government (whose Agent had been authorised by the President to use the Spanish language - Rule 27 para. 2)
of the Legal Department for Human Rights, Ministry of Justice,
Mr J.L. Fuertes Suárez, Ministry of Justice, Counsel;
Mr F. Ruhlmann, avocat, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Borrego Borrego for the Government, by Mr Pellonpää for the Commission and by Mr García Montes, Mr Sánchez Pardo and Mr Ruhlmann for the applicants, as well as their replies to its questions. The lawyers for the applicants and the Government ’ s representatives produced various documents.
8. Mr José María Ruiz-Mateos, a businessman, Mr Zoilo Ruiz-Mateos, Mr Rafael Ruiz-Mateos, Mr Isidoro Ruiz-Mateos, Mr Alfonso Ruiz-Mateos and Mrs María Dolores Ruiz-Mateos are brothers and sister. They are all of Spanish nationality. In 1983 they held 100% of the shares in RUMASA S.A., the parent company of the RUMASA group, which comprised several hundred undertakings. RUMASA S.A. ’ s holding in these undertakings varied from one to the other.
I. THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. The expropriation of the RUMASA group
9. By a legislative decree of 23 February 1983 the Government ordered the expropriation in the public interest of all the shares in the companies comprising the RUMASA group, including those of the parent company (Article 1). The State, which was the beneficiary of this measure, was to take immediate possession of the expropriated property through the intermediary of the Directorate General for National Assets (Article 2).
The legislative decree was confirmed on 2 March 1983 by the Chamber of Deputies. It gave rise to an appeal to the Constitutional Court ( recurso de inconstitucionalidad, Article 161 para. 1 (a) of the Constitution, see paragraph 26 below), as a group of deputies contested its constitutional validity. The Constitutional Court dismissed the deputies ’ appeal by a judgment of 2 December 1983, adopted with the President ’ s casting vote; in a dissenting opinion, six members of the court expressed the view that the expropriation procedure followed was contrary to the Constitution.
10. In the meantime Law no. 7/1983 of 29 June 1983, published a day later in the Official State Gazette ( Boletín Oficial del Estado ), had replaced the legislative decree. Articles 1 and 2 thereof ordered the immediate expropriation and transfer of possession of the companies concerned in similar terms to those of the legislative decree (see paragraph 9 above). The aim of these measures was to protect the public interest because, in order to finance the group ’ s companies, its banks had taken risks considered to be disproportionate in relation to their solvency, thereby jeopardising "the stability of the banking system and the interests of the depositors, employees and third parties".
B. The action for the restitution of the expropriated property
1. The proceedings at first instance
11. Between the publication of the legislative decree and that of Law no. 7/1983, Mr José María Ruiz-Mateos had, on 8 April 1983, both on his own behalf and on that of the other applicants and RUMASA S.A., instituted summary proceedings for the restitution of the expropriated property ( interdicto de recobrar ). On 11 April the Madrid First-Instance Court ( juzgado de primera instancia ) no. 18 - composed of a single judge - declared the application inadmissible on procedural grounds. The first applicant had failed to adduce evidence establishing that he had been divested of the assets as alleged and showing that prior to the impugned measure the assets in question had been in his possession.
12. On 9 May 1983 Mr José María Ruiz-Mateos lodged a further application concerning 50% of the RUMASA S.A. shares. The other five applicants followed suit on 27 May with regard to the remaining shares, each claiming 10%. The two cases were allotted respectively to Madrid First-Instance Courts nos. 18, which reopened the file, and 21.
13. The Counsel for the State ( Abogado del Estado ), representing the Government, obtained, on 4 and 5 July respectively, a stay of three months in each of the two sets of proceedings to enable him to consult his superiors. The applicants ’ appeals against those decisions were dismissed on 16 and 18 July.
On 21 September the Counsel for the State applied for the joinder of the two sets of proceedings. Court no. 18 acceded to this request on 22 November, having received the consent of Mr José María Ruiz-Mateos on 18 November. On 27 March 1984 Court no. 21 ordered that the file of the proceedings before it be transmitted to Court no. 18, the other five applicants having given their agreement on 23 March. Court no. 18 received the file on 9 May.
14. On 21 March 1984 the first applicant had requested Court no. 18 to refer to the Constitutional Court a question on the conformity of Articles 1 and 2 of Law no. 7/1983 (see paragraph 10 above) with Articles 14, 24 and 33 of the Constitution ( cuestión de inconstitucionalidad, see paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 below). The court held hearings on 18 June and 17 September 1984. On 19 September the judge invited the parties to submit observations on this matter within ten days (Article 35 of Institutional Law no. 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court, "Institutional Law no. 2/1979", see paragraph 27 below). On 29 September the Counsel for the State replied that the question was not material to summary proceedings for the examination of an action to recover possession. On 1 October the Attorney General ’ s department also expressed its opposition to the motion. On the same date in support of their claims the applicants submitted two memorials, respectively eighty-five and thirty-seven pages long.
15. By a decision (auto) of 5 October 1984 Court no. 18 referred to the Constitutional Court the question of the conformity of the above-mentioned articles of Law no. 7/1983 with Article 24 para. 1 of the Constitution inasmuch as it had not been open to the applicants either to invoke in the courts their right of property in respect of the assets expropriated by legislative action or to challenge the necessity of seizing them. In the opinion of the first-instance court, the decision on the merits of the dispute depended on the validity of the provisions in issue.
16. The Constitutional Court found the question admissible on 17 October 1984; it then gave notice of the question to the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, the Government and the Attorney General (Fiscal General del Estado ), who were each entitled to file observations within the same fifteen-day period (Article 37 para. 2 of Institutional Law no. 2/1979, see paragraph 27 below).
The Constitutional Court received the observations of the Attorney General ’ s department and of the Counsel for the State on 5 and 6 November respectively; on 12 November the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies indicated that the Chamber did not intend to submit observations.
17. On 27 January 1986 Mr José María Ruiz-Mateos complained of the delay in the proceedings; he relied in this connection on Article 24 para. 2 of the Constitution (see paragraph 25 below) and Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1). The Constitutional Court joined the application ( recurso de queja ) to the file on 30 January, but did not pursue the matter because the applicant lacked locus standi.
On 7 February he again applied to the Constitutional Court, alleging that the decision of 30 January infringed Article 24 of the Constitution. He also maintained that he had locus standi in respect of the constitutional proceedings by virtue of his status as a party in the main proceedings. On 21 February the Constitutional Court confirmed its earlier decision.
18. Following the election to the Constitutional Court of six new members, on 26 March 1986 Mr José María Ruiz-Mateos challenged two of these judges for lack of impartiality. He claimed that one of them was well-known to be a friend of the Prime Minister and the other had already been involved in the case as adviser to the Minister of Justice and had, among other things, participated in preparing the speech to Parliament on the expropriation of RUMASA.
On 10 April the Constitutional Court dismissed the challenge on the ground that the applicant lacked locus standi.
19. By a judgment of 19 December 1986, it held that Articles 1 and 2 of Law no. 7/1983 were compatible with Article 24 of the Constitution. It found that legislative expropriation - even by means of a special statute concerning a specific case - was not contrary to the Constitution. Although this admittedly meant that the persons concerned suffered restrictions on the judicial protection of their rights, as they could not challenge in the courts the necessity of the seizure of their assets, it was always open to them to contest the measure in the administrative courts and to ask those courts to refer a question to the Constitutional Court on the constitutional conformity of such action. In addition an appeal (amparo), founded on the right to equality before the law, lay against the final decision of the administrative courts. Finally, the law in issue had in no way deprived the persons concerned of their right to appropriate compensation, a right which they could assert before the Provincial Expropriation Board ( jurado provincial d ’ expropiación ) - the competent administrative body -, and then in the administrative courts.
Two judges expressed the view, in a dissenting opinion, that the expropriation procedure used had deprived the applicants of their right of access to the courts.
20. This judgment was communicated to Court no. 18 on 22 December 1986. The following day that court dismissed the action for restitution.
21. On 27 December 1986 the applicants appealed to the Audiencia provincial of Madrid, which declared the appeal admissible on 5 February 1987.
The examination of the appeal began on 26 June 1988. The court communicated the file to each of the parties in turn, each party having ten days to study it. The hearing was initially set down for 21 October, but was adjourned at the request of the applicants ’ lawyer, who was unable to attend. As soon as the hearing opened on 28 November, the applicants sought a stay of the proceedings until the European Commission and Court of Human Rights had had an opportunity to rule on their application to Strasbourg. In the alternative, they requested the Audiencia provincial to refer to the Constitutional Court a new question concerning the compatibility of Articles 1 and 2 of Law no. 7/1983 with Articles 14 and 33 para. 3 of the Constitution (see paragraph 25 below).
The court ordered an adjournment so as to allow the applicants to submit documents in support of their first request. On 19 December 1988 they supplied a translation of the correspondence from the Secretariat of the Commission. After a further hearing on 13 February 1989, the court refused to stay the proceedings. On 7 July 1989 it overruled the applicants ’ objection to this decision.
22. On 14 February 1989 it had invited the parties and the Attorney General ’ s department to give their views on whether the above-mentioned question as to constitutional conformity should be submitted to the Constitutional Court (Article 35 para. 2 of Institutional Law no. 2/1979, see paragraphs 21 above and 27 below). After having received their comments, the Audiencia provincial referred the question to the Constitutional Court on 9 July 1989.
The latter court declared it admissible on 31 October 1989, then communicated it to the institutions of the State listed in Article 37 para. 2 of Institutional Law no. 2/1979 (see paragraph 27 below). The Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies replied on 17 November that the Chamber did not intend to submit observations; on the same day and the following day respectively, Counsel for the State and the Attorney General ’ s department filed their submissions.
23. By a judgment of 15 January 1991 the Constitutional Court found the contested articles of Law no. 7/1983 to be compatible with Articles 14 and 33 para. 3 of the Constitution. Two judges expressed a dissenting opinion.
24. The Audiencia provincial was notified of this on 25 January 1991 and set down a hearing for 22 February. On that occasion the applicants made a further application for the proceedings to be stayed. The court dismissed their appeal by a judgment of 25 February.
On 6 March the applicants lodged an application for the interpretation of that judgment; their application was dismissed on 11 March 1991.
II. THE APPLICABLE DOMESTIC LAW
25. The relevant Articles of the 1978 Constitution are worded as follows:
"Spaniards shall be equal before the law and may not be discriminated against in any way on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or any other condition or personal or social circumstance."
"1. Every person has the right to obtain the effective protection of the judges and the courts in the exercise of his legitimate rights and interests, and in no case may he be denied that protection.
2. Likewise, all persons have the right of access to the ordinary courts as predetermined by law; to the defence and assistance of a lawyer; to be informed of the charges brought against them; to a public trial without undue delays and with full guarantees; to the use of evidence pertinent to their defence; not to make self-incriminating statements; not to declare themselves guilty; and to the presumption of innocence.
"1. Private property rights ... are recognised.
3. No-one may be deprived of his property and rights, except on justified grounds of public interest against proper compensation and in accordance with the provisions of the law."
26. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is defined as follows:
"The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over the whole of Spanish territory and is competent to hear:
(a) appeals against alleged unconstitutionality of laws and regulations having the force of law ...;
(b) individual appeals for protection ( recurso de amparo) against violation of the rights and liberties referred to in Article 53 para. 2 of the Constitution, in the circumstances and manner laid down by law;
(c) conflicts of jurisdiction between the State and the Autonomous Communities or between the Autonomous Communities themselves.
Only the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 to 29 of the Constitution may be the subject of an amparo appeal, which is not therefore available in respect of the right to property secured under Article 33.
"If a judicial body considers, in the course of proceedings, that a regulation with the status of law which is applicable in those proceedings and upon the validity of which the judgment depends may be contrary to the Constitution, it may bring the matter before the Constitutional Court in the circumstances, manner and subject to the consequences to be laid down by law; such consequences shall in no case be suspensive ."
"1. The judgments of the Constitutional Court shall be published in the Official State Gazette, together with any dissenting opinions. They have the force of res judicata with effect from the day following their publication, and no appeal may be brought against them. Those which declare the unconstitutionality of a law or of a rule with the force of law, and all those which do not merely recognise an individual right, shall be fully binding on all persons.
2. Unless the judgment rules otherwise, that part of the law not affected by unconstitutionality shall remain in force."
2. Institutional Law no. 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court
27. Chapter III of the Institutional Law on the Constitutional Court is entitled "On questions of constitutionality submitted by judges and courts" and is worded as follows:
"1. When a judge or court, ex proprio motu or at the request of a party, decides that a provision having the status of law which applies in the case in issue and on the validity of which his or its decision depends might be contrary to the Constitution, he or it shall refer the matter to the Constitutional Court, in accordance with the provisions of the present law.
2. Judges or courts shall not refer such a question until the case is ready to be tried and they must do so within the time-limits laid down for ruling on the case. They must specify which law or provision having the status of law is alleged to be unconstitutional and which article of the Constitution is considered to have been breached. They must also state the precise reasons why the outcome of the proceedings depends on the validity of the contested provision. Before taking a final decision on whether to refer the question to the Constitutional Court, the judge or court must first hear the views of the parties to the proceedings and the Attorney General ’ s department in order to give them the opportunity, within a single and non-extendable ten-day time-limit, to submit any observations they may wish to make concerning the pertinence of the question. The judge shall then announce his decision, without taking any further steps, within three days. No appeal shall lie against this decision. However, the question as to constitutionality may be raised again in subsequent proceedings until the judgment has become final."
"A question as to constitutionality referred to the Constitutional Court by a judge or court must be accompanied by a certified copy of the main file and, in so far as there are any, the observations provided for in the preceding article."
"1. On receipt of the file the Constitutional Court shall follow the procedure laid down in paragraph 2 of the present article. However, the Court may declare the question inadmissible, in a decision stating its reasons, after hearing only the Attorney General, when the procedural requirements are not satisfied or when the question is manifestly ill-founded.
2. The Constitutional Court shall give notice of the question to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate via their respective Speakers, to the Attorney General and via the Ministry of Justice to the Government. If the question raises an issue concerning a law or another provision having the status of law adopted by an Autonomous Community, notice thereof shall also be given to its legislative and executive authorities. All these authorities may appear before the court and submit observations on the question referred within a single and non-extendable fifteen-day time-limit. When this time-limit has expired, the court shall give judgment within fifteen days, except when it considers a longer period, which may not exceed thirty days, to be necessary, in which case it must state the reasons for its decision."
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
28. The applicants lodged their application with the Commission on 5 May 1987. They alleged in the first place that their case had not been given a fair hearing conducted within a reasonable time by an impartial tribunal (Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention) (art. 6-1). They claimed in addition that they had been deprived of their right of access to the courts to challenge the public interest justification for the expropriation and the necessity of the immediate transfer of their property (Articles 6 para. 1 and 13 of the Convention) (art. 6-1, art. 13). Finally, they complained of discrimination in relation to other Spanish citizens in that the latter were subject to the ordinary law on expropriations and could therefore institute proceedings in the administrative courts (Article 14 read in conjunction with Articles 6 para. 1 and 13) (art. 14+6-1, art. 14+13).
29. On 6 November 1990 the Commission declared the first complaint admissible and the remainder of the application (no. 12952/87) inadmissible. In its report of 14 January 1992 (made under Article 31) (art. 31), the Commission expressed the opinion that there had been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) inasmuch as (a) the applicants had not been given a fair hearing (thirteen votes to two) and (b) the relevant proceedings had not been conducted within a reasonable time (eleven votes to four). The full text of the Commission ’ s opinion and of the three separate opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment [*].
I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 PARA 1 (art. 6-1) OF THE CONVENTION
30. In the applicants ’ submission, their actions for the restitution of their assets were not heard within a reasonable time as required under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention. In addition, the proceedings conducted in the Constitutional Court failed to comply with the principle of equality of arms, inherent in the right to a fair trial as guaranteed under the same provision, according to which:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ..."
The Government contested this view, whereas the Commission subscribed to it.
31. The Government contended that the applicants ’ complaint was directed solely at the first set of proceedings in the Constitutional Court, to which Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) did not apply; in particular, as regards compliance with the "reasonable time" requirement their initial application had cited only those proceedings.
It should, however, be noted that, when they lodged their application with the Commission on 5 May 1987, the Audiencia provincial of Madrid had only recently, three months earlier, declared admissible their appeal from the judgment of 23 December 1986 (see paragraph 21 above); they could not therefore at that stage complain of the ensuing delays, but they have done so since. In accordance with its established case-law (see, among many other authorities, the Ringeisen v. Austria judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A no. 13, p. 38, para. 93, and pp. 40-41, para. 98, and the Capuano v. Italy judgment of 27 July 1987, Series A no. 119, p. 11, para. 22), the Court will therefore examine all the proceedings in issue.
32. The applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) to the applicants ’ civil actions for the restitution of their assets is not open to dispute. The Government maintained, however, that the proceedings in the Constitutional Court should not be taken into account in ruling on the question of "reasonable time". They also claimed that the complaint as to the fairness of the latter proceedings fell outside the scope of the aforementioned provision.
The issue of the applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) does not arise in precisely the same terms on both points.
B. Compliance with the "reasonable time" requirement
1. Period to be taken into consideration
33. The period to be taken into consideration began on 27 May 1983, when Zoilo, Rafael, Isidoro, Alfonso and María Dolores Ruiz-Mateos brought their action in respect of half the capital of RUMASA, thereby supplementing the action brought by José María Ruiz-Mateos on 9 May 1983 in respect of the other half (see paragraph 12 above). It ended on 25 February 1991, the date of the judgment of the Audiencia provincial (see paragraph 24 above). Notwithstanding the applicants ’ arguments to the contrary, the Court does not regard their application of 6 March 1991 for the interpretation of the judgment as relevant, because it had no bearing on the outcome of the dispute.
34. In the Government ’ s view, two lapses of time should be deducted from the above period, one of more than twenty-six months at first instance (5 October 1984 - 19 December 1986) and another of eighteen months on appeal (9 July 1989 - 15 January 1991), when the civil courts had to wait for the Constitutional Court ’ s decision on the questions which they had referred to it. The Government contended that the proceedings in the Constitutional Court could not be regarded as a stage in the civil proceedings. The task of the Constitutional Court was not to rule on a specific case, but to "refine", from an objective point of view, domestic law by annulling rules that were contrary to the Constitution.
35. According to the Court ’ s well-established case-law, proceedings in a Constitutional Court are to be taken into account for calculating the relevant period where the result of such proceedings is capable of affecting the outcome of the dispute before the ordinary courts (see, inter alia, the Deumeland v. Germany judgment of 29 May 1986, Series A no. 100, p. 26, para. 77, the Poiss v. Austria judgment of 23 April 1987, Series A no. 117, p. 103, para. 52, and the Bock v. Germany judgment of 29 March 1989, Series A no. 150, p. 18, para. 37). The Court sees no grounds for departing from this line of authority so as to revert to the approach adopted in the Buchholz v. Germany judgment of 6 May 1981 (Series A no. 42, p. 15, para. 48), as it was urged to do by the respondent Government and by the German and Portuguese Governments (see paragraph 5 above).
36. It is true that the constitutional proceedings in this case took place in mid-course of the main action and not, as in the above-mentioned cases, after its conclusion. However, in the Court ’ s view this circumstance, on which the Government laid particular stress, on the contrary provides an additional reason for taking them into account in the calculation of the period to be considered, especially where they concern a preliminary issue (see the Giancarlo Lombardo v. Italy judgment of 26 November 1992, Series A no. 249-C, p. 43, para. 18).
The Government also invoked the "political nature" of the Constitutional Court, which was not part of the judiciary. The argument is not convincing: the Court has on more than one occasion had regard to interlocutory proceedings conducted before political institutions or administrative bodies or agencies (see, inter alia, the Foti and Others v. Italy judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no. 56, p. 21, para. 63, and the Martins Moreira v. Portugal judgment of 26 October 1988, Series A no. 143, pp. 19-21, paras. 55-60). What is in issue in every case is the responsibility of the State (see the Foti and Others judgment, cited above, ibid.)
37. In the present case the competent civil courts had considered it necessary to refer to the Constitutional Court, at the plaintiffs ’ request, the question of the conformity of Articles 1 and 2 of Law no. 7/1983 with the Constitution (see paragraphs 15 and 22 above). In order to do so, they had not only to establish the applicability of the contested provisions, but also to show that their decision to refer the matter was relevant, in other words to specify to what extent the outcome of the proceedings before them depended on the validity of the rules in issue (Article 35 para. 2 of Institutional Law no. 2/1979 - see paragraph 27 above).
For its part, the Constitutional Court found the two questions admissible, being satisfied that they fulfilled the formal conditions laid down by the relevant law (see paragraphs 16 and 22 above).
As the questions referred concerned a preliminary issue, the civil courts, in order to be able to give judgment, had to await the decisions of the Constitutional Court, which were decisive for the ruling in the main action.
The period to be taken into consideration therefore includes the two sets of constitutional proceedings; this being so, it lasted nearly seven years and nine months.
2. Reasonableness of the relevant period
38. The reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be determined with reference to the criteria laid down in the Court ’ s case-law and in the light of the circumstances of the case.
39. According to the applicants, the procedure for the examination of questions of constitutionality is extremely simple because it does not involve a hearing or the taking of evidence.
40. The Government replied that simplicity of procedure should not be confused with the simplicity of the case. In fact this case was an extremely complex one, not only because of the volume of the file - approximately three thousand pages -, but also because of the serious nature of the legal issues involved.
41. The Court considers that although the main civil action was not complex at the outset, it subsequently gave rise to constitutional questions which were undeniably difficult.
As the Commission correctly pointed out, however, the procedure for resolving such questions did not involve steps liable to lead to prolongations. The Constitutional Court had only to seek the observations of the institutions of the State listed in Article 37 para. 2 of Institutional Law no. 2/1979, observations which were subject to a single and non-extendable fifteen-day time-limit (see paragraph 27 above). In this instance the Constitutional Court received the memorials of the Attorney General ’ s department and the Counsel for the State on 5 and 6 November 1984 for the first question, and on 17 and 18 November 1989 for the second question (see paragraphs 16 and 22 above).
42. According to the Government, the length of the civil proceedings is explained to a large extent by the conduct of the applicants themselves. To bring an action for restitution, which was normally available to recover goods unlawfully obtained, in respect of an expropriation effected by legislative action was an abuse of process. The applicants had in reality only sought to precipitate an early referral of the matter to the Constitutional Court by the competent civil courts. By requesting the latter to submit questions of constitutionality, they had considerably slowed down the proceedings because the question of whether such a step was appropriate in the context of summary proceedings was problematical and required careful examination.
43. The Court is not persuaded by this argument. According to the applicants, the expropriation in issue was equivalent to unlawfully depriving them of their property because Articles 1 and 2 of Law no. 7/1983 were contrary to the Constitution. If the Constitutional Court had reached a similar conclusion, it would have declared the provisions in question void, which would have deprived the impugned measure of any legal basis. This was moreover also how the civil courts and the Constitutional Court perceived the situation, as is shown by the fact that they accepted the questions as admissible. In addition, the applicants could not themselves file an amparo appeal based on an interference with a right of property (see paragraph 26 above); it cannot be held against them that they had recourse to the only means available to them under Spanish law of defending their interests.
Furthermore, Mr José María Ruiz-Mateos protested at the protracted nature of the proceedings in the Constitutional Court, but to no avail because, in that court ’ s opinion, he lacked locus standi (see paragraph 17 above).
44. It is nevertheless true that the appeal hearing set down for 21 October 1988 was adjourned to 28 November at the applicants ’ request; on that date they asked the Madrid Audiencia provincial to stay the proceedings pending the decision of the European Commission of Human Rights, with which they had recently lodged an application. This interlocutory phase of the proceedings was not concluded until 7 July 1989, when their appeal against the refusal to stay the proceedings was dismissed (see paragraph 21 above). It delayed the decision in the appeal proceedings by a total of over eight months.
(c) Conduct of the competent authorities
45. The applicants held the competent authorities responsible for the time taken to hear their action. Their complaint was in particular directed against the Constitutional Court. In their view, that court was aware of the urgency of the case and was already familiar with the issues to which it gave rise, as it had dealt with them in examining the appeal lodged by a number of members of Parliament against the legislative decree of 23 February 1983 (see paragraph 9 above).
46. In the Government ’ s submission, on the other hand, the civil courts displayed the maximum dispatch possible. The Government considered further that the constitutional proceedings had not been of unreasonable length; these proceedings had given rise to issues that were both complex and new, because in its judgment of 2 December 1983 the Constitutional Court had ruled only on the method of expropriation chosen - the legislative decree - and not on the merits of the measure (see paragraph 9 above).
47. The Court notes at the outset that at first instance there were no notable interruptions, except to resolve the preliminary issue.
On appeal there were, however, two periods of inactivity. The Audiencia provincial declared the appeal admissible on 5 February 1987, but did not begin consideration of it until 26 June 1988 (see paragraph 21 above), in other words sixteen months and three weeks later. No step was taken in the proceedings during that period.
48. The Government stressed that the workload of the Madrid Audiencia provincial had increased after 1985 as a result of the restructuring of the Spanish judicial system by the Institutional Law on the Judiciary. On 10 June 1988 the public authorities had, however, taken remedial action by creating additional posts.
This argument is not convincing in that the measures introduced were too late to have any effect in the present case (see, inter alia, the Unión Alimentaria Sanders S.A. v. Spain judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 157, pp. 15-16, para. 41).
49. The delay in question results essentially from the time taken to examine the two questions of constitutionality. After the Attorney General ’ s department and the Counsel for the State had filed their observations, the case remained dormant for more than twenty-five months as regards the first question and for nearly fourteen months as regards the second ( 6 November 1984 - 19 December 1986 and 18 November 1989 - 15 January 1991, see paragraphs 16, 19, 22 and 23 above).
Yet, pursuant to Article 37 para. 2 of Institutional Law no. 2/1979, the Constitutional Court ought to have given its decision within fifteen days of receiving the memorials, with the possibility of extending that period to thirty days (see paragraph 27 above). The shortness of these time-limits shows the importance attached by the Spanish legislature to the speedy hearing of a preliminary question of this nature.
50. The Government emphasised the specific character of the structure and operation of the Constitutional Court. It comprises only twelve members; it is independent of the three State powers and competent to review their decisions. Under Articles 161 and 163 of the Constitution, it enjoys very wide jurisdiction (see paragraph 26 above). The institutions of the State, the organs of the Autonomous Communities, the ordinary courts and individuals may all apply to it. Since its creation, it has, according to the Government, had a backlog of business, a problem which is difficult to overcome in view of the limited number of its members.
51. While attaching weight to the special features of constitutional proceedings, the Court cannot help but consider that in this instance those proceedings were too long. There was a connection between the two questions, notwithstanding the difference in content; in particular the Constitutional Court had already settled the issue of relevance during its examination of the first question, so that it did not need to do so in studying the second.
52. Nor should it be forgotten that what was at stake in this case, not only for the applicants but also for Spanish society in general, was considerable, in view of its vast social and economic implications. The large number of persons concerned - employees, shareholders and third parties - and the amount of capital involved militated in favour of a prompt resolution of the dispute.
53. In the light of all of the circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the proceedings exceeded a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1), which has therefore been violated on this point.
54. The applicants ’ complaint under the fair trial principle is directed solely at the proceedings in the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 30 above), but given that those proceedings were preliminary in nature, it is necessary to take account of the context in which they arose, namely an action for the restitution of expropriated assets.
1. Applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
55. The Government denied that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) was applicable, pleading that the right in issue was not a "civil right". In support of this contention, they cited the specific nature of the Constitutional Court ’ s task and the features peculiar to questions of constitutionality. The Constitutional Court ’ s role was to ensure that the legislature, the executive and the judiciary respected the Constitution and not to rule on the rights and interests of individuals. This specificity of its functions appeared even more clearly in relation to proceedings of the type under review. Such proceedings were instituted by the ordinary courts and were intended to eliminate from the domestic legal system provisions contrary to the Constitution. In this instance, there were no "parties" because Institutional Law no. 2/1979 provided that only the representatives of the State authorities and the Attorney General need be heard (see paragraph 27 above). In addition, the judgment was notified solely to the court which referred the question.
56. In their observations of 10 June and 27 August 1992 (see paragraph 5 above), the German and Portuguese Governments drew attention to the fact that the decision in the Ruiz-Mateos case would be of great significance to those other member States of the Council of Europe which have a constitutional court. The German Government, citing the above-mentioned Buchholz judgment, maintained that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) did not apply to proceedings conducted before such courts. That had been the Federal Republic ’ s understanding when it had ratified the Convention. They supported the respondent Government ’ s argument, giving a broad outline of the rules in force in Germany, which are moreover similar to the Spanish provisions. The Portuguese Government took the view that, by reason of their nature, structure and jurisdiction, constitutional courts fell outside the ambit of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
57. The Court is not called upon to give an abstract ruling on the applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) to constitutional courts in general or to the constitutional courts of Germany and Portugal or even of Spain. It must, however, determine whether any rights guaranteed to the applicants under that provision were affected in the present case.
58. The applicants conceded that constitutional proceedings did not in general deal with disputes over civil rights and obligations. However, they stressed the special features of Law no. 7/1983 on the expropriation of RUMASA S.A., of which they were the shareholders. Despite its status as a formal law, it was a concrete and specific measure aimed at a group of companies listed in its annex (see paragraph 10 above). The applicants emphasised that they could not contest the expropriation in the civil courts unless the law was declared invalid; yet such a ruling could only be made by the Constitutional Court, following referral of the matter to it by Madrid Court no. 18 or the Audiencia provincial.
59. The Court observes that there was indeed a close link between the subject-matter of the two types of proceedings. The annulment, by the Constitutional Court, of the contested provisions would have led the civil courts to allow the claims of the Ruiz-Mateos family (see paragraphs 15-16, 20, 22-24, 27 and 37 above). In the present case, the civil and the constitutional proceedings even appeared so interrelated that to deal with them separately would be artificial and would considerably weaken the protection afforded in respect of the applicants ’ rights. The Court notes that by raising questions of constitutionality, the applicants were using the sole - and indirect - means available to them of complaining of an interference with their right of property: an amparo appeal does not lie in connection with Article 33 of the Spanish Constitution (see paragraph 26 above).
60. Accordingly, Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) applied to the contested proceedings.
2. Compliance with Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
61. The Ruiz-Mateos family alleged a violation of the principle of equality of arms. The Counsel for the State, their opponent in the civil proceedings, was able to submit to the Constitutional Court written observations on the lawfulness of Law no. 7/1983, whereas they were not allowed to do so because they were held to lack locus standi; they were even refused the possibility of challenging two judges, whose impartiality appeared to them to be open to doubt (paragraph 18 above).
The Commission agreed in substance with this view.
62. In the opinion of the Government, however, the Counsel for the State at the Constitutional Court could not be regarded as the applicants ’ opponent because it was necessary to distinguish between the executive as a branch of State authority and the administrative arm of government. It was the latter, and more specifically the Directorate General for National Assets, in whose possession the RUMASA S.A. shares had been since the expropriation, which was the plaintiffs ’ opponent in the restitution action (see paragraphs 9 and 13 above). On the other hand, neither it nor the Ruiz-Mateos family were parties to the preliminary proceedings in question. The applicants moreover knew this full well and would never have raised the issue in a Spanish court. It was true that the executive and the administrative authorities were represented by officials from the same civil service corps, but the officials in question were acting on behalf of different branches of government.
63. The Court will examine the complaint in the light of the whole of paragraph 1 of Article 6 (art. 6-1) because the principle of equality of arms is only one feature of the wider concept of a fair trial, which also includes the fundamental right that proceedings should be adversarial (see, among other authorities, mutatis mutandis, the Brandstetter v. Austria judgment of 28 August 1991, Series A no. 211, p. 27, para. 66).
The right to an adversarial trial means the opportunity for the parties to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed or evidence adduced by the other party (see, mutatis mutandis, the same judgment, p. 27, para. 67). Admittedly proceedings before a constitutional court have their own characteristics which take account of the specific nature of the legal rules to be applied and the implications of the constitutional decision for the legal system in force. They are also intended to enable a single body to adjudicate on a large number of cases relating to very different subjects. Nevertheless, it may happen that, as here, they deal with a law which directly concerns a restricted circle of persons. If in such a case the question whether that law is compatible with the Constitution is referred to the Constitutional Court within the context of proceedings on a civil right to which persons belonging to that circle are a party, those persons must as a rule be guaranteed free access to the observations of the other participants in these proceedings and a genuine opportunity to comment on those observations.
64. The Court sees no reason to depart from this rule in the present case. It cannot accept the distinction drawn by the Government. In view of the closeness of the link noted above (see paragraph 59 above), it would be artificial to dissociate the role of the executive - on whose authority the decision to expropriate was taken - from that of the Directorate General for National Assets - the beneficiary of the measure -, and even more so to purport to identify a real difference between their respective interests.
65. In November 1984 and November 1989 the Counsel for the State filed with the Constitutional Court, by virtue of Article 37 para. 2 of Institutional Law no. 2/1979 (see paragraph 27 above), observations affirming the constitutional validity of Law no. 7/1983 (see paragraphs 16 and 22 above). The applicants were not given an opportunity to reply thereto, although it would clearly have been in their interests to be able to do so before the final decision.
66. According to the Government, the Constitutional Court was able to examine the applicants ’ arguments by referring to the very voluminous memorials which the latter had submitted in the civil courts pursuant to Article 35 para. 2 of Institutional Law no. 2/1979 (see paragraphs 14 and 22 above) inasmuch as the full files of the proceedings in those courts had been transmitted to it.
67. The Court does not find this argument convincing.
In the first place, Article 35 para. 2 fixes for the parties - in this instance the applicants and the Counsel for the State - and for the Attorney General ’ s department a single time-limit for putting forward their views on the appropriateness of submitting a preliminary question. Whereas the applicants ’ written submissions also raised substantive issues, those of the Counsel for the State, which were very short, dealt only with procedural questions. In any event, even if the latter had also given his opinion on the merits, the applicants would not have been able to challenge it in the civil courts or in the Constitutional Court. On the other hand, the Counsel for the State had advance knowledge of their arguments and was able to comment on them in the last instance before the Constitutional Court.
68. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 (art. 50) OF THE CONVENTION
69. Under Article 50 (art. 50),
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."
The Ruiz-Mateos family sought two thousand billion (2,000,000,000,000) pesetas for the damage allegedly deriving from the violation of their right to a fair trial, three hundred billion of which were claimed in respect of deterioration of their commercial reputation and loss of customers; they did not seek the reimbursement of costs.
70. The violations found in this case relate to the failure to conduct proceedings within a "reasonable time" and the non-adversarial nature of the proceedings in the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 53 and 68 above). There is nothing to suggest that, in the absence of these violations, the Constitutional Court would have declared the impugned law void and the European Court cannot speculate as to the conclusion which the national court would have reached (see, as the most recent authority, the de Geouffre de la Pradelle v. France judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 253-B, p. 44, para. 39). Consequently, as was argued by the Government and the Commission, no causal connection between the alleged damage and the violations found has been established.
1. Holds by twenty-two votes to two that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) as regards the length of the proceedings;