CASE OF KÁROLY NAGY v. HUNGARY

1. The case originated in an application (no. 56665/09) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr Károly Nagy (“the applicant”), on 19 October 2009.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr A. Cech, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi.
3. The applicant alleged that there had been a violation of his right under Article 6 § 1, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, on account of the Hungarian courts ’ refusal to deal with a pecuniary claim stemming from his service as a pastor of the Reformed Church of Hungary.
4. The application was allocated to the Second Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 1 December 2015, a Chamber of that Section composed of Guido Raimondi, President, András Sajó, Nebojša Vučinić, Helen Keller, Paul Lemmens, Egidijus Kūris and Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, judges, and also of Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar, declared the application admissible regarding the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in so far as it concerned the civil proceedings leading to the decision of the Supreme Court of 28 May 2009 and the remainder of the application inadmissible, and held, by four votes to three, that there had been no violation of Article 6. The joint partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judges Raimondi, Keller and Kjølbro, as well as the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sajó, Vučinić and Kūris, were annexed to the judgment. On 9 December 2015 the applicant requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the Convention. On 2 May 2016 the panel of the Grand Chamber granted that request.
5. The composition of the Grand Chamber was decided in accordance with Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. At the final deliberations, Angelika Nußberger replaced Luis López Guerra as President of the Grand Chamber. The latter judge and Andras Sajó, whose terms of office expired in the course of the proceedings, continued to deal with the case (Article 23 § 3 of the Convention and Rule 23 § 4). André Potocki, substitute judge, replaced Marko Bošnjak, who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rule 24 § 3).
6. The applicant and the Government each filed further written observations (Rule 59 § 1). In addition, third-party comments were received from the Alliance Defending Freedom, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3).
7. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 12 October 2016 (Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the GovernmentMr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ms M. Weller, Co-Agent;
(b) for the applicantMr A. Cech, Counsel, Ms M. Nagy, Mr B. Várhalmy, Advisers.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Cech and Mr Tallódi and their replies to questions from judges.
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
8. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Gödöllő.
9. In 1991 the applicant took up the position of pastor in the Reformed Church of Hungary ( Magyar Református Egyház ). His rights and obligations, together with his remuneration, were set out in an appointment letter issued by the Presbytery of the Reformed Parish of Gödöllő on 14 December 2003 (the “Letter of Appointment”). The relevant part of the Letter of Appointment reads as follows:
“ I. Obligations of the pastor:
The tasks defined by ecclesiastical laws and legal provisions, in particular those laid down in Statute no. II of 1994 on pastors and pastoral service and the code of conduct of the Cis-Danubian Ecclesiastical Region; the pastor is expected to perform the aforementioned tasks in the spirit of his oath and to the best of his abilities.
In addition, as required by the special needs of his ecclesiastical community, the pastor ’ s responsibilities include the following: exercising the rights and obligations of management, as detailed in the Hungarian Reformed Church ’ s Statute 1995/I on Public Education ...”
10. In June 2005 disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the applicant for statements he had made in a local newspaper. At the same time the first-instance ecclesiastical court suspended the applicant ’ s service with immediate effect pending a decision on the merits in the disciplinary proceedings. He received a letter stating that, under section 82 (1) of Statute no. I of 2000 on the jurisdiction of the Reformed Church of Hungary, during his suspension he was entitled to 50% of his service allowance.
11. The applicant claimed that, following his suspension, he had sent letters to the head of the congregation and to the competent bishop claiming payment of his overdue services allowances, but to no avail.
12. On 27 September 2005 the first-instance ecclesiastical court concluded that the applicant had committed disciplinary offences and removed him from service. On appeal, on 28 March 2006, the second-instance ecclesiastical court upheld that decision.
13. On 26 June 2006 the applicant took his case to the Pest County Labour Court, seeking payment of 50% of his service allowance and other benefits to which, in his view, he should have been entitled during the period of his suspension. Arguing that his suspension had reached its statutory maximum duration on 21 October 2005, he also sought the payment of the entire service allowance from that date until the termination of his service, that is, on 30 April 2006. He argued in substance that his ecclesiastical service was analogous to employment.
14. On 22 December 2006 the Labour Court discontinued the proceedings pursuant to Article 157 (a) in conjunction with Article 130 (1) (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, holding that the applicant ’ s claim could not be enforced before domestic courts (“ a felperes kereseti kérelmében foglaltak bírói úton nem érvényesíthető igények ”). Under section 2 (3) of Statute no. I of 2000 on the jurisdiction of the Reformed Church of Hungary, a pastor ’ s service with the Church was regulated by ecclesiastical law, whereas a layman ’ s employment with the Church was governed by the State labour law. Accordingly, since the dispute before it concerned the applicant ’ s service as a pastor, the provisions of the Labour Code were not applicable in the case. This decision was upheld on appeal. The applicant did not apply for review to the Supreme Court.
15. On 10 September 2007 the applicant lodged a civil action against the Reformed Church of Hungary with the Pest Central District Court, the relevant parts of which read as follows:
“ The Plaintiff ’ s service remuneration, as described in his Letter of Appointment, was .... In addition, the Plaintiff was also eligible to an age bonus equal to .... The Plaintiff was also involved in teaching for which he received ... per month.
On 23 June 2005 the Respondent suspended the Plaintiff as a pastor and reinstated him to the service roster, which meant he was exempt from all duties until further notice. The Respondent has paid the Plaintiff ’ s pastoral allowance until 30 June 2005 and his salary as a teacher until 1 May 2006. In view of the above, the Respondent has caused damage to the Plaintiff by not paying his dues according to their standing legal agreement.
Plaintiff ’ s claims are as follows:
I. For the period between 1 July 2005 and 21 October 2005, a monthly amount of ...
II. For the period between 22 October 2005 and 30 April 2006, an amount of ....
III. For the period between 1 May 2005 and 30 April 2006 (12 months) the unpaid teaching fees ...
Furthermore I submit that the Plaintiff considered the legal basis of the above dues ... as employment and went to the Labour Court to have them reimbursed. In view of the fact that the Pest County Regional Court ’ s final decision ... upheld the ruling of the first-instance Labour Court which, for its part, stated that my involvement with the Respondent did not qualify as employment, I, the Plaintiff, hereby seek reimbursement of my loss before the Pest Central District Court.”
16. On 11 December 2007 the respondent Church filed a defence, inviting the court to dismiss the applicant ’ s claim.
17. On 15 December 2007 the applicant filed another submission with the first-instance court, further elaborating on his claim. The relevant parts of that submission read as follows:
“The Plaintiff ’ s pastoral service was constituted ... on the basis of election by the Reformed Parish of Gödöllő and confirmed by the dean of the ecclesiastical district as well as the bishop of the ecclesiastical region. Its terms were laid down in the Letter of Appointment ... which remained in force during the period indicated in the case.
The pastoral service was carried out by the Plaintiff in person. Its content and accomplishment has not been in dispute between the parties. The Plaintiff ’ s pastoral activities were manifold. In particular, he was responsible for the community services of the Parish – e.g. preaching, handling the sacraments, outreach, evangelisation, maintaining the bond between the Parish and the Church and various related tasks of pastoring, teaching and administration, which included the tutoring of his assistant and deputy pastor. The Plaintiff as pastor, together with the caretaker, represented the Parish and had numerous other administrative tasks as well. As part of his pastoral duties, the Plaintiff was also obliged to take part in management and teaching.
Neither the establishment of the pastoral service relationship nor the substance of the resulting mutual obligations was the subject of any dispute between the parties involved.
As to the legal classification of the pastoral service relationship itself ... we hold that the Plaintiff ’ s activity is best characterised as agency because its content and nature correspond to the factual elements of an obligation of means necessitating personal involvement. For the above reason, we consider that the relevant rules are those of the Civil Code on agency contracts ...
Despite the fact that the Respondent ’ s dean – the Plaintiff ’ s immediate superior –had already confirmed in writing the legal basis and the amount of the fees due for the period of suspension, in its correspondence dated 22 June 2005 ..., these were, in fact, paid only partially. Namely, the pastoral cash allowance was paid only up until 30 June 2005 and the fee due for religious teaching only up until 30 April 2005.”
18. The applicant based his claim in the first place on Articles 277 (1) and 478 (1) of the Civil Code (as in force at the material time) seeking payment of overdue fees stemming from an agency contract he believed he had with the Church. He maintained that for the period from 22 October 2005, when the suspension allegedly became unlawful, until the date of termination of his appointment, he was entitled to a fee for his services, which corresponded to the service allowance set out in his Letter of Appointment. He thus sought enforcement of the agency contract. Alternatively, he based his claim on Articles 318 (1) and 339 (1) of the Civil Code, which provided for damages for breach of the agency contract he had allegedly entered into with the respondent Church.
19. On 2 January 2008 the Pest Central District Court dismissed the applicant ’ s claim, holding as follows:
“An agency contract, according to the particulars of Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code ... is a mutual legal transaction (Article 474). Such transactions are regarded by the Civil Code as contracts of material exchange, as the Civil Code, in accordance with Article 1 (1), typically regulates pecuniary rights.
Contracts, by definition, are between parties with common material interests: they need whatever value the other has to offer. The goal of the contract is to obtain such value from each other.
Pursuant to Article 201 (1) of the Civil Code, mutual property services are contracts for valuable consideration – with the notable exception of gratuitous two-party transactions in which one party provides a material service whereas the other is not obliged to do so. The alleged agency contract between the Plaintiff and the Respondent might be gratuitous if the agent receives no payment from the principal. Except that there was no statement from the Plaintiff to that effect. Quite the contrary: he filed the lawsuit with the clear intention of obtaining material gain from the Respondent. Thus it can be said that the Plaintiff based his claim on a non-gratuitous agency contract, as provided for in Article 478 (1) of the Civil Code.
In view of the above, this required the Plaintiff to provide some sort of material service, interest or condition in return, something with clearly defined market value. The pastoral service provided by the Plaintiff (according to exhibit no. 3, it also involved preaching, handling the sacraments, outreach, evangelisation and various related tasks of pastoring, teaching etc.), however, does not qualify as material service. It is, for all intents and purposes, religious activity.
If the undertaking of mutually agreed conduct is not gratuitous, and the conduct of one of the parties has no material value, then, according to the rules of the Civil Code, there can be no civil-law contract for valuable consideration.
Agency contracts, like all contracts, are based on mutual agreement: one party makes a formal proposal containing all the key elements of the deal to another, which, in turn, issues a statement of acceptance – see Article 205 (1) and (2), and Articles 211, 213 and 214 of the Civil Code. The parties involved are free to negotiate terms on the basis of legal parity.
The documents submitted show that the Plaintiff ’ s appointment was an ecclesiastical process, the terms of his service were set out in a Letter of Appointment ... formulated by the Presbytery of his Parish. The Respondent and its officials exercised various rights vis-à-vis the Plaintiff (suspension, reprimand by the ecclesiastical court, relocation to service roster, demotion, etc.). Within the meaning of the Civil Code, the parties did not negotiate the details of the service, and the Plaintiff became a pastor by appointment, not as a result of a binding agreement. Due to the lack of legal parity between the Plaintiff and the Respondent, the Plaintiff did not enter as a civil-law party into a legal relationship with another civil-law party.
The lack of binding agreement means that the Plaintiff ’ s primary claim – with reference to Articles 277 and 478 of the Civil Code – is insufficient to support his case.
Pursuant to Article 318 of the Civil Code, the rules of tort liability are applicable to liability for breach of contract. Once again, the lack of binding agreement means there was no breach of contract nor any material damage involved. In view of this, the Plaintiff ’ s secondary claim is also unfounded.
The acknowledgment of debt, by legislative nature and in practice, is a contractual institution which allows one party to affirm its financial obligation towards another. Statements stemming from relationships beyond the control of civil legislation are, for that very reason, neither valid nor binding pursuant to Article 242 of the Civil Code. The letter submitted by the Plaintiff (illegible reference number) as acknowledgement of debt is, in this context, rather irrelevant: the sender does not legally represent the Respondent, which might not endorse, or even share, his opinion.
The documents and statements presented by the Plaintiff were sufficient for a review of the case. As the claim was unfounded, the amount at issue was not determined. The hearings of the bishop ... and dean ... were also deemed unnecessary as their opinions feature prominently in the documents and cover all necessary aspects.”
20. On 27 January 2008 the applicant filed an appeal against the first-instance judgment. On 12 October 2008 the respondent Church filed pleadings in reply, requesting the court to dismiss the applicant ’ s claim.
21. On 17 October 2008 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant ’ s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision with the following reasoning:
“ The first-instance court established the facts correctly and the second-instance court agrees with its decision, but differs in its legal reasoning:
Section 13 of Act IV of 1990 provides that the Church and – in accordance with its Constitution – its self-governing bodies are independent legal entities. Pursuant to section 14 (2) of the Respondent ’ s own Statute no. II of 1994 on the Constitution and Government of the Church, a parish is such a legal entity. Section 29 of the same Statute defines the Letter of Appointment as the service contract of Church officials.
The Plaintiff ’ s Letter of Appointment, detailing his pastoral duties and allowances, was issued on 14 December 2003 by the Reformed Parish of Gödöllő. It proves that a legal relationship was established between the Plaintiff and the Parish of Gödöllő, an independent legal entity.
In its pleadings ..., the Respondent referred to section 13 of Act IV of 1990 and Article 14 (2) of its own Statute II of 1994, thus confirming that the Parish of Gödöllő ... is an independent legal entity within the Hungarian Reformed Church.
In view of the above, the second-instance court came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff ’ s claim was unfounded vis-à-vis the Respondent, the Reformed Church of Hungary.”
22. On 2 June 2009 the applicant lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court, in which he stated as follows:
“....The Budapest Regional Court held that, based on the Letter of Appointment, the Plaintiff ’ s legal relationship was with the Reformed Parish of Gödöllő. But, as indicated by us several times, the Letter of Appointment does not mention the lectures on ecclesiastical history the Plaintiff has been giving in a Foundation School. The fees for these lectures were paid by the Respondent to the Plaintiff directly. Our motions to take evidence were dismissed because of the decision of the first-instance court, which the Budapest Regional Court overruled – but it is the lack of this very evidence that caused the second-instance court to disregard the difference between the nature and the remuneration of the above-mentioned activities.
Pursuant to Articles 200 (1), 198 (1) and 474 of the Civil Code, a legal relationship – namely agency – is established when one party (the agent) is obliged to provide quality service and the other (the principal) is obliged to pay for the said service in accordance with the agreement. As far as teaching is concerned, the Respondent was the sole principal. The Reformed Parish of Gödöllő had nothing to do with that – which is evident from the fact that the fee was determined according to State standards ...
The decisions of the courts are, first of all, only partially compliant with Article 221 of the Civil Code, which lays down the requirement of full justification, and secondly, constitute an infringement of multiple provisions of the Civil Code, namely Articles 200 (1), 198 (1), and much of the content of Article 474. Due to the dismissal of our motions to take evidence, the contradictory decisions of the courts are not based on the true nature of the material service exchanged between the parties, and regard pastoral service and teaching in a Foundation School as one and the same, despite the fact that these activities greatly differ from each other in both nature and practice of execution ... ”
23. The respondent Church replied to this petition in a submission dated 28 March 2009.
24. On 28 May 2009 the Supreme Court discontinued the proceedings, finding as follows:
“The Plaintiff commenced his action specifically in order to claim fees arising from his contractual relationship with the Gödöllő Parish, as contained in his Letter of Appointment. He did not make any reference to a contract between him and the Gödöllő Parish to provide teaching of church history, nor did he claim any fee in connection with such a contract. He submitted a claim regarding such a contract for the first time in his petition for review [to the Supreme Court]. Consequently, the fact that the lower courts did not analyse that contractual relationship between the parties and did not take evidence regarding that issue cannot be considered an omission on their part ...
In order to determine the rules applicable to the agreement in question and to the implementation of the rights and obligations arising from it, it is necessary to have regard to the very purpose of the agreement underlying the Plaintiff ’ s actual claim as well as the elements thereof defining the parties ’ rights and obligations. The first-instance court rightly stated in its assessment that the agreement serving as the basis of the applicant ’ s claim was not an agency contract under civil law or concluded by and between parties enjoying personal autonomy in the marketing of [goods and services]. The Plaintiff was appointed as a pastor in an ecclesiastical procedure, and the obligations of the Respondent were defined in an appointment letter issued by the assembly of presbyters. The parties established between themselves a pastoral service relationship, governed by ecclesiastical law.
Under section 15 (1) of Act no. IV of 1990 on Freedom of Conscience and Religion and on Churches, the Church is separate from the State. Under sub-section (2), no State coercion can be used to enforce the internal laws and regulations of Churches.
Relying on the above provisions, the applicant can make a claim under the ecclesiastical law before the relevant bodies of the Reformed Church. The fact that the agreement entered into under ecclesiastical law resembles a contractual agreement under the Civil Code does not entail State jurisdiction or the enforceability of the claim in a judicial procedure within the meaning of Article 7 of the Civil Code. (In the particular case, the basic elements of an agency contract and the execution of such a contract could not be established either.)
The Labour Court reached the same conclusion in the earlier proceedings when assessing the claim under State labour law and dismissing its enforcement in judicial proceedings.
The first-instance court was right to point out that as the impugned agreement lacked a civil-law legal basis, the court could not examine the applicant ’ s secondary claim (compensation for breach of contract). On the basis of the above reasoning, there were no grounds to adjudicate on his claim on the merits.
The Supreme Court accordingly quashes the final judgment, including the first-instance judgment, and discontinues the proceedings under Articles 130 (1) (f) and 157 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure ...”
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
25. The relevant provisions of the Constitution of Hungary (Act no. XX of 1949), as in force at the material time, read as follows:
“(1) In the Republic of Hungary everyone is equal before the law and has the right to have accusations brought against him, together with his rights and duties in legal proceedings, determined in a fair, public trial by an independent and impartial court established by law.”
“(1) In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the right to freedom of thought, freedom of conscience and freedom of religion.
(2) This right shall include the free choice or acceptance of a religion or belief, and the freedom to publicly or privately express or decline to express, exercise and teach such religions and beliefs by way of religious actions, rites or in any other manner, either individually or in a group.
(3) The Church and the State shall operate in separation in the Republic of Hungary.”
“(1) In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the right to work and to freely choose his job and profession.
(2) Everyone has the right to equal compensation for equal work, without any discrimination whatsoever.
(3) All persons who work have the right to an income that corresponds to the amount and quality of work they carry out.”
26. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code (Act no. IV of 1959), as in force at the material time, read as follows:
“Each and every government agency shall be obliged to protect the rights provided for by law. Unless otherwise stipulated by law, these rights shall be enforced in a court of law.”
“The parties to a contract are free to define the content of their contract, and they shall be entitled, upon mutual consent, to deviate from the provisions pertaining to contracts if such deviation is not prohibited by legal regulation.”
“The following claims may not be enforced in a court of law:
(a) claims originating from gambling or betting, unless the gambling or betting operation has been authorised by the State;
(b) claims originating from a loan promised or granted expressly for the purposes of gambling or betting;
(c) claims that may not be enforced through a State agency by virtue of statute.”
“(1) Contracts are entered into upon the mutual and congruent expression of the parties ’ intent.
(2) It is fundamental to the validity of a contract that an agreement is reached by the parties concerning all essential issues as well as those deemed essential by either of the parties. The parties need not agree on issues that are regulated by statutory provisions.”
“A person who causes damage to another person in violation of the law shall be liable for such damage. He shall be relieved of liability if he is able to prove that he has acted in a manner that can generally be expected in the given situation.”
“(1) Agency contracts are concluded to oblige an agent to carry out the matters entrusted to him.
(2) An agent must fulfil the principal ’ s instructions and represent his interests regarding the authority conferred upon him.”
“The principal shall pay an appropriate fee, unless the circumstances, or the relationship between the parties suggest that the agent has assumed the agency without any consideration.”
27. The relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act no. III of 1952), as in force at the material time, read as follows:
“An action shall be initiated by lodging a statement of claim; the statement of claim shall indicate:
(a) the court of competent jurisdiction;
(b) the names and addresses of the parties and their counsel, and their status in the action;
(c) the cause of action, including a description of the circumstances invoked as the basis of the claim and a description of the evidence supporting the claim;
(d) the grounds for competence and jurisdiction of the court;
(e) a plea for a court decision (pleading); ...”
“(1) The court shall reject a claim without issuing a summons [that is, without an examination on the merits] ... if it can be established that ...:
(f) the plaintiff ’ s claim is premature or cannot be enforced before the [domestic] courts... (“ a felperes követelése...bírói úton nem érvényesíthető” ) ”
“The court shall discontinue the examination of the case:
(a) should the claim already have been dismissed, without a summons being issued, pursuant to section 130 (1), points (a) to (h) ...”
4. Act no. IV of 1990 on the Freedom of Conscience and Religion and on Churches (“the 1990 Church Act”)
28. Section 15 of the above Act reads as follows:
“(1) In the Republic of Hungary the Church and the State are separate.
(2) No State coercion can be used for enforcing the internal laws and rules of the Church.”
5. Constitutional Court ’ s decision no. 32/2003. (VI. 4.) AB
29. In its decision no. 32/2003, the Constitutional Court examined the issue of access to a court of persons in the service of religious entities. The relevant parts of that decision read as follows:
“1.1. The complainant was in the service of the Reformed Church of Hungary ... as professor .... On 14 April 1995 the complainant agreed, by taking note of the students ’ motion, upon the proposal of the bishop of the Church, to retire under certain conditions. Thereafter he requested disciplinary proceedings against himself and challenged the legal statement he had made about his retirement. In its decision ... the presidency of the Synod Court of the Church reprimanded him in writing and established that no evidence capable of serving as a ground for revoking or challenging his legal statement existed. The Synod Court found his damages claim likewise ill-founded. The complainant ’ s complaint against this decision was dismissed by the presidency of the Synod Court, save for the written reprimand.
1.2. The complainant filed an action for damages with the Debrecen District Court against the ... Reformed Church District ... and the University ... The plaintiff-complainant requested the District Court to establish that the agreement he had entered into with the Church District ’ s bishop on his retirement, under the conditions specified by him, had validly come into existence but due to the respondent ’ s breach of contract had not been performed. He also requested the District Court to establish the respondent ’ s liability for damages ...
... the Hajdú-Bihar County Regional Court ...discontinued the proceedings, and referred the case to the Synod Court. In the reasoning ... the Regional Court established that under section 9 (1) of Church Act No II of 1994 on the Constitution and Government of the Church ... and section 49 of Church Statute no. VI of 1967 on church legislation ( az egyházi törvénykezésről szóló 1967. évi VI. egyházi törvénycikk ), the plaintiff ’ s claims fell within the competence of the Synod Court.
1.4. ... the Synod Court, having proceeded in the case upon referral, established its lack of competence and referred the case back to the [State court] ... the Synod Court held that section 9 (1) of the Church Constitution was not a procedural but a substantive provision which meant that in cases concerning the service relationship of certified pastors employed by the Church, the substantive “laws” to be applied by any proceeding court were the internal rules of the Church.
Under section 1 of the Statute on church legislation, the Church extends its judicial jurisdiction to disciplinary and administrative matters assigned to court competence by a law of the Church. More specific powers are contained in the Statute on church legislation : in sections 43 and 44 for disciplinary cases and in section 49 for the administrative cases enumerated therein. According to the Synod Court, the complainant ’ s action did not concern a disciplinary case but could also not be categorised under any of administrative cases listed in the practically exhaustive list (in section 49); consequently ecclesiastical courts did not only lack competence but also lacked ‘ jurisdiction ’ to proceed ....
In accordance with section 60 (3) of the Constitution, the principle of separation of Church and State prohibits State interference with religious issues and the internal affairs of churches. Compliance with church rules governing internal church relationships between churches and their members may be enforced by the churches or their authorised organs in proceedings determined by the churches.
Based on State laws and the separately operating church rules, it cannot be excluded that two distinct rule systems may regulate similar legal relationships. Between a church and its members there may exist relationships governed by internal ecclesiastical rules, in the enforcement of which no public authority may be involved. Between the same parties there may, however, also exist legal relationships defined and governed by State laws, including the relevant remedies available. Rights and obligations stemming from legal relationships based on State laws may be enforced by State coercion.
The fundamental rights and obligations guaranteed by the Constitution constitute limits to the laws of the State. In accordance with its objective institution-protection obligation, the State ‘ shapes the statutory and organisational conditions necessary for the realisation of the rights by having due regard both to its tasks related to the other fundamental rights and to its other constitutional tasks; provides for a prevalence of the various rights that is the most favourable to the whole [legal] order, and thereby promotes the harmony of the fundamental rights. ’ ... The State must respect the autonomy of churches and church organs. However, in acknowledging the autonomy of churches, regard must be had to the other fundamental rights and obligations as well. Therefore the right to church autonomy, included in the principle of separation of Church and State under section 60(3) of the Constitution, must be interpreted in the context of the other fundamental rights that are secured under the Constitution to natural persons ....
In accordance with the fundamental right of access to a court, a person in the service of a church has [just as much as any other citizen] a constitutional right to turn to a State court in order to have his legal dispute concerning his employment determined, where his employment is based on State laws.
The State organs must determine under the Constitution and the laws specified in the Act on Church Legislation whether an issue having arisen from a given legal relationship falls within the competence of a State authority or court. Hence, they must determine under State laws whether in a given case a legal relationship governed by State law exists between the parties. If the answer is in the affirmative, they must determine the appropriate procedure to be followed. Where, however, a State authority or court establishes on the basis of the State laws the lack of its competence, the State authority or court must not decide, by applying the ecclesiastical rules, which church and under what procedure should determine the given dispute; that is, a State authority or court may not interpret or apply the ecclesiastical rules. Administration of justice by the State, however, must not result in the depletion of church autonomy.
5. As to the application of section 15 (1) and (2) of Act no. IV of 1990 on the Freedom of Conscience and Religion and on Churches, in the operative part of its decision the Constitutional Court has laid down a constitutional requirement. The requirement has been set forth with a view to ensuring that in the application of the laws the principle of separation of Church and State be observed with constitutional content, without allowing for exceptions. Therefore no appeal to the State ’ s religious neutrality may result in the violation of the constitutional right of the right of access to a court. Under a joint interpretation of the principle of the separation of Church and State and of the right of access to a court, State courts are obliged to determine the merits of legal disputes relating to State law-governed rights and obligations of persons in the service of a church; in such determinations, however, church autonomy shall be respected by the judicial authorities.
6.1. In the operative part of its decision, the Constitutional Court has established constitutional requirements for the application of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 15 of Act no. IV of 1990 on the Freedom of Conscience and Religion and on Churches. The constitutional requirement was established in order to ensure that the principle of separation of Church and State be enforced by jurisprudence, without exception, with a constitutional content. Accordingly, reliance on the principle of separation of Church and State cannot result in the infringement of the constitutional right of access to a court. Reading the principle of separation of Church and State together with the right of access to a court, State courts are obliged to determine on the merits any legal dispute concerning the rights and duties, stemming from State law, of a person in ecclesiastical service, while respecting also the church ’ s autonomy ...”
6 Supreme Court ’ s guiding resolution no. BH 2004.5.180
30. In its above-mentioned guiding resolution, the Supreme Court held that proceedings involving claims for personality rights lodged with the civil courts could not be discontinued on the basis of Articles 130 (1) f and 157 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, even if the alleged damage was caused by a church official in the course of his ecclesiastical activity. In particular, it held:
“... The claim outlined in the Plaintiff ’ s brief is based on Article 75 of the Civil Code, as opposed to the internal regulations of the Church; it is not subject to Article 204 and there is no law to exclude it from enforcement by a civil court for any special reason.
Article 15 (2) of Act no. IV of 199 0 on Freedom of Conscience, Religion and Churches, as referred to by the binding decision, excludes only State coercion in the context of enforcing internal laws and procedures. The Plaintiff ’ s claim concerned his personality rights, not the enforcement of those internal laws and procedures –thus the second-instance court was wrong to discontinue the proceedings based on the lack of legal avenue [for enforcement]...”
B. Ecclesiastical law of the Reformed Church of Hungary
31. The following statutes are internal rules adopted by the Reformed Church of Hungary and as such do not form part of Hungarian State law.
1. Statute no. II of 1994 on the Constitution and Government of the Reformed Church of Hungary
32. The relevant provisions of Church Statute no. II of 1994 read as follows:
“(1) Ecclesiastical law shall apply to service relationships and liability of pastors in ecclesiastical service and of other persons in service of a pastoral nature (ecclesiastical persons), while State law shall apply to employment relationships of all other persons employed by the Church.
(2) The Church shall be liable according to the general rules of tort liability for any damage caused unlawfully to its members or office-holders.
(3) Members and office-holders of the Church shall be liable for any damage caused to the Church unlawfully in the course of exercising their rights and duties.
(4) Tort liability of the employees of the Church as well as liability for damage caused by the Church to its employees shall be governed by the current State legislation in force.”
“(1) Ministers and other pastors ... shall be granted regular allowances as recorded in a letter of appointment, endorsed by the diocese. The said letter corresponds to the service agreement of the ecclesiastical office-holders.”
2. Statute no. I of 2000 on the Jurisdiction of the Reformed Church of Hungary
33. The relevant provisions of Church Statute no. I of 2000, as in force at the material time, read as follows:
“(1) Legal disputes concerning the election and appointment of Church officers, their remuneration, retirement or transfer, the enforcement of material obligations and the management of disputes between parishes, Church organisations and their institutions, shall fall within the remit of the Church court of competent jurisdiction, with regard to the interpretation and application of legal regulations.
(2) The diocesan court having jurisdiction for the seat of the parish shall decide, in the public interest of the Church, on the termination of the service of an elected, autonomous, congregational clergyman ...”
“(1) Preparatory proceedings may be started before the Church court spontaneously or on the basis of a complaint by a complainant.
(2) Any report or complaint made to any Church organ or authority that is actionable in court shall be transferred to the presidency of the Church court of competent jurisdiction, within eight days, and the complainant shall be informed thereof.
(3) The presidency of the Church court of competent jurisdiction shall examine the complaint within eight days.”
“(1) Enforcement shall proceed on the basis of the final and binding court decision. ...”
“The presidium of the court of first instance sitting in the case shall ensure enforcement.”
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
34. The applicant complained that the domestic courts ’ refusal to decide a pecuniary claim stemming from his service as a pastor had violated his right of access to a court as provided for in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Scope of the case before the Grand Chamber
35. At the public hearing before the Grand Chamber, the applicant stated that he had entered into a separate contract with the Reformed Church of Hungary for the teaching of church history. It had been an oral agreement with the director of the Calvinist Lyceum of Gödöllő to teach church history for four hours per week, an activity which had not formed part of his pastoral relationship. In support of his statement, the applicant submitted a number of notarially certified testimonies by former members of the presbytery of his former church. Given that the school where he taught had been financed by the State, in the applicant ’ s view this second contract was undisputedly of a civil nature. Moreover, the applicant submitted that he had referred to this second contract concerning his teaching activities several times in the domestic courts: first in the labour-law proceedings, and subsequently in his civil-law claim and in the petition for review to the Supreme Court.
36. The Government disputed the applicant ’ s submissions in this respect. He had submitted claims in the first-instance civil courts for fees related to his pastoral and teaching activities only under his Letter of Appointment as a pastor. His reference to a separate contract for teaching church history had been made for the first time in his petition for review to the Supreme Court. In its decision, the Supreme Court had examined the applicant ’ s statement that he had a separate contract for teaching with the respondent Reformed Church but found that no claims under such a contract had been properly raised in the course of the proceedings before the lower courts.
37. The Government maintained that, although the applicant had raised claims for teaching fees before the first-instance court, he had not specified that the legal basis for those claims was a separate contract, distinct from his Letter of Appointment. The domestic courts could thus not have treated these claims as anything other than based on the Letter of Appointment on which the applicant relied, because he not only omitted to mention this second contract, but also stated that he had had a duty to organise and perform teaching activities in the framework of his pastoral service. Finally, the Supreme Court ’ s decision had no res judicata effect on the merits of the claims not raised properly before the first-instance court and the applicant therefore could and should have raised those claims in the domestic courts before turning to an international tribunal as required by the principle of subsidiarity underlying the Convention.
38. The Court observes that the applicant indeed mentioned his teaching activities as early as in the proceedings before the first-instance court. However, he submitted the various claims he had against the respondent Church on one sole legal basis, namely his Letter of Appointment issued by the presbyters on 14 December 2003 (see paragraph 9 above). For instance, he stated in his civil action lodged with the first-instance court that “the [applicant ’ s] pastoral activities were manifold. In particular, he was responsible for... teaching...” and “as part of his pastoral duties, the [applicant] was also obliged to take part in ... teaching” (see paragraph 17 above). The applicant did not mention any other contract, oral or written, in support of his pecuniary claims before the first-instance court.
39. It further transpires from the documents available that the applicant mentioned a separate oral agreement for the teaching of church history only in his petition for review to the Supreme Court (see paragraph 22 above). In reply to his submissions in that connection, the Supreme Court held that the applicant had failed to properly raise his claim related to a separate teaching contract before the first-instance court (see paragraph 24 above). The Government submitted that the Supreme Court ’ s conclusion did not preclude the applicant from instituting fresh civil proceedings against the respondent Church on the basis of such a second agreement, if he believed that the State courts would have been in a position to decide his claims in that respect.
40. As regards the proceedings before the Court, in his application form the applicant did not mention a separate (oral) agreement solely for the teaching of church history, nor did he adduce any evidence in this connection throughout the Chamber proceedings. Indeed, no mention of such a second agreement was made in his observations before the Chamber, in his request for referral to the Grand Chamber or in his written observations before the Grand Chamber.
41. As stated above, the applicant mentioned the existence of a separate agreement for the teaching of church history in his oral submissions before the Grand Chamber on 12 October 2016 and, following a specific question from the Court, submitted witness testimonies in support of his teaching activities in the Calvinist Lyceum of Gödöllő.
42. However, the Court reiterates its established case-law to the effect that all complaints intended to be made at the international level should have been aired before the appropriate domestic courts, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law (see, among many other authorities, Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], no. 56679/00, § 38, ECHR 2004-III). In view of the above conclusion by the Supreme Court that the applicant had not raised the issue of a second contract before the first-instance court in line with the procedural requirements of Hungarian law, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has failed to properly exhaust available domestic remedies in this connection.
43. In view of the foregoing, as well as the fact that the case before the Grand Chamber is the application as it has been declared admissible by the Chamber (see, among many other authorities, Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no. 53080/13, § 43, ECHR 2016, and Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no. 47152/06, § 91, ECHR 2016 ), the Court will proceed to examine the applicant ’ s submissions relating solely to his pastoral service under the Letter of Appointment.
44. In its judgment of 1 December 2015, the Chamber first of all examined the applicability of Article 6 to the facts of the applicant ’ s case and concluded in the affirmative.
45. The Chamber observed that civil actions to obtain enforcement of contractual obligations or to obtain redress for damage sustained on account of a breach of contract were ubiquitous in many systems of civil law and that, in the instant case, the dispute related to the applicability of the provisions relied on by the applicant to his relationship with the Reformed Church.
46. Further, the Chamber did not consider that the Constitutional Court ’ s 2003 decision (see paragraph 29 above) concerned a situation sufficiently similar to that of the applicant. In the absence of any previous court decision indicating whether or not the provisions on contractual obligations and liability were applicable to a pastor ’ s ecclesiastical service, the Chamber considered that the domestic courts were called upon to decide in the applicant ’ s case whether his service agreement with the Reformed Church fell within existing categories of contracts and whether any damage allegedly caused by the non-payment of his service allowance fell within the scope of application of the Civil Code.
47. Consequently, the Chamber considered that, at the outset of the proceedings, the applicant had, at least on arguable grounds, a claim under domestic law and that there was a genuine and serious dispute over the existence of the rights asserted by him. The subsequent Supreme Court judgment could not have retrospectively rendered the applicant ’ s claim unarguable. Finally, being purely pecuniary, the applicant ’ s claim was undisputedly civil in nature.
48. As to the merits of the applicant ’ s complaint, the Chamber found no violation of Article 6 § 1 on the grounds that the Supreme Court ’ s decision concerned the interpretation and application of domestic law, which had been neither arbitrary nor manifestly unreasonable.
C. The parties ’ submissions before the Grand Chamber as to the applicability of Article 6 § 1
49. The Government argued that the applicant ’ s claim had not been recognised under State law as an enforceable right, but remained in the sphere of natural obligations defined under Article 204 (1) of the Civil Code, inter alia, as claims that could not be enforced through a State agency by virtue of law. Indeed, pecuniary claims based on internal laws and rules of churches were not enforceable by State organs pursuant to section 15(2) of the 1990 Church Act (see paragraph 28 above).
50. The Government explained that natural obligations were unenforceable for reasons of general policy, which in the concrete case concerned the need to protect the constitutional principle of secularity of the State and the autonomy of churches. Article 6 could not be interpreted as compelling States to recognise such natural obligations as legally binding.
51. Moreover, while it was true that the applicant ’ s claim was of a purely pecuniary nature, it could not be severed from its legal basis in ecclesiastical law. Under domestic civil law, as interpreted by the domestic courts, agency contracts required from both parties the provision of a service having a certain pecuniary value. However, the activities performed by the applicant as pastor did not amount to the provision of services of pecuniary value, that is, those that could be sold on a (secular) market of goods and services, but corresponded to ecclesiastical service. Consequently, the domestic courts concluded that the relationship between the applicant and the Church could not be interpreted as being akin to an agency contract. In the absence of a civil-law contract between them, no damage from breach of contract could occur either, which is why the domestic courts had not addressed that issue.
52. Moreover, Article 7 of the Civil Code provided for the protection of statutory rights and could not be interpreted as a basis for claiming rights not guaranteed by State law. The Constitutional Court, in its 2003 decision, also concluded that the right of access to a court was only applicable to rights and obligations stemming from State law (see paragraph 29 above).
53. The applicant ’ s arguments concerning tax law were irrelevant and could not serve to establish a basis in substantive law for claims of income from ecclesiastic service. First of all, taxation was a legal relationship between the State and an individual governed by State law. Secondly, what was taxable under domestic law was not claimed income, but actually received income.
54. In the Government ’ s opinion, it was clear from the foregoing that the applicant ’ s claim had no legal basis in domestic substantive law. Moreover, the State had no obligation under international law to enforce rules of ecclesiastical law.
55. The Government raised two further inadmissibility objections, arguing that the complaint was incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and that the applicant had failed to properly exhaust available domestic remedies.
56. The applicant argued that his case concerned a dispute over a civil right which was recognised under domestic law. Firstly, the nature of the relationship on which he had based his claim – that is, a pecuniary relationship between a citizen and a religious community – was acknowledged as being a civil right under domestic law. He emphasised in this respect that ecclesiastical law recognised the applicability of State law to tort liability between the Church and its members. He also stressed that the respondent Church never relied on its exclusive competence in the matter.
57. Further, his service allowance was taxable as income deriving from employment within the meaning of the applicable legislation. The State could thus not, on the one hand, disregard the pecuniary nature of such an allowance, while at the same time imposing legal obligations (taxes) on it.
58. In the applicant ’ s view, he had two distinct legal relationships with the Reformed Church; one of ecclesiastic nature involving his pastoral service and the other primarily pecuniary, relating to his pastoral remuneration. The latter was unrelated to church autonomy and concerned a purely pecuniary claim of a private-law nature. State courts should therefore have determined his claim instead of refusing to deal with it.
59. Given the fundamental nature of Article 9 of the Convention, the centrality of “church autonomy” within the Article 9 protection and the State ’ s duty of neutrality towards religious institutions, the organisation Alliance Defending Freedom submitted that member States should defer to churches in matters of ecclesiastical disputes. While this might, on rare occasions, have an impact on other Convention rights, to conclude otherwise would most likely place other Convention rights above the right to freedom of religion, as well as position the Court as the ultimate arbiter of religious disputes.
D. The Grand Chamber ’ s assessment
60. The Court has reiterated time and again that for Article 6 § 1 in its “civil” limb to be applicable, there must be a dispute over a “right” which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, irrespective of whether that right is protected under the Convention. The dispute must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise; and, finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question, mere tenuous connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to bring Article 6 § 1 into play (see, among many other authorities, Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, § 71, 29 November 2016; Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 100, 2 3 June 2016; and Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 42, ECHR 2015).
61. Article 6 § 1 does not guarantee any particular content for civil “rights and obligations” in the substantive law of the Contracting States: the Court may not create by way of interpretation of Article 6 § 1 a substantive right which has no legal basis in the State concerned (see, for example, Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 32555/96, § 119, ECHR 2005 ‑ X, and Boulois v. Luxembourg [GC], no. 37575/04, § 91, ECHR 2012 ). Moreover, as can be seen from the Court ’ s well-established case-law, it is necessary to maintain a distinction between procedural and substantive elements: fine as that distinction may be in a particular set of national legal provisions, it remains determinative of the applicability and, as appropriate, the scope of the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention, which can, in principle, have no application to substantive limitations on a right existing under domestic law (see Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others, cited above, § 100).
62. In order to decide whether the “right” in question really has a basis in domestic law, the starting-point must be the provisions of the relevant domestic law and their interpretation by the domestic courts (see, as a recent authority, Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland [GC], no. 5809/08, § 97, 21 June 2016 ). The Court recalls that it is primarily for the national authorities, in particular the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. The Court ’ s role is limited to verifying whether the effects of such interpretation are compatible with the Convention. That being so, save in the event of evident arbitrariness, it is not for the Court to question the interpretation of the domestic law by the national courts (see Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 13279/05, § § 49-50, 20 October 2011 ). Thus, where the superior national courts have analysed in a comprehensive and convincing manner the precise nature of the impugned restriction [of access to a court], on the basis of the relevant Convention case-law and principles drawn therefrom, this Court would need strong reasons to differ from the conclusion reached by those courts by substituting its own views for those of the national courts on a question of interpretation of domestic law and by finding, contrary to their view, that there was arguably a right recognised by domestic law (see Roche, cited above, § 120).
63. Finally, it is the right as asserted by the claimant in the domestic proceedings that must be taken into account in order to assess whether Article 6 § 1 is applicable (see Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 65542/12, § 120, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). Where there is a genuine and serious dispute about the existence of the right asserted by the claimant under domestic law, the domestic courts ’ decision that there is no such right does not remove, retrospectively, the arguability of the claim (see Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, § 89, ECHR 2001 ‑ V ).
2. Application of these principles to the present case
64. The Court considers that the first question to be answered in the present case is whether the applicant had a “right” which could, at least on arguable grounds, be said to be recognised under domestic law.
65. In assessing this question, the Court must take as a starting point the provisions of the domestic law and their interpretation by the domestic courts (see Roche, cited above, § 120).
66. As regards domestic law, it is undisputed that, in accordance with section 15 (2) of the 1990 Church Act, claims involving internal laws and regulations of a church could not be enforced by State organs (see paragraph 28 above). It is further uncontested that, should domestic courts establish that an ongoing dispute concerns an ecclesiastical claim unenforceable by domestic organs, they must terminate the proceedings pursuant to Article 130 (1) f of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 27 above). The main question that arose before the domestic courts therefore revolved around the exact nature of the applicant ’ s relationship with the Reformed Church.
67. In its decision of 2003 (see paragraph 29 above), the Hungarian Constitutional Court had clarified the position of clergy in relation to their ecclesiastical service, in the sense that claims based on ecclesiastical law could not be enforced by domestic courts. In that decision, the Constitutional Court had explained that relationships between churches and their pastors might, on the one hand, be governed by ecclesiastical law, in the enforcement of which no public authority could be involved. On the other hand, where legal relationships between a church and its members are governed by State law, the Constitutional Court held that:
“Under a joint interpretation of the principle of the separation of Church and State and of the right of access to a court, State courts are obliged to determine the merits of legal disputes relating to rights and obligations of persons in the service of a church governed by State law; in such determinations, however, church autonomy shall be respected by the judicial authorities.”
68. The Court notes in this connection that the applicant ’ s ecclesiastical service was based on his Letter of Appointment, issued by the parish presbyters assigning him to the position of pastor of the Reformed Church of Hungary (see paragraph 9 above). Pursuant to the text of that letter, the applicant was to perform “tasks defined by ecclesiastical laws and legal provisions, in particular those laid down in Statute no. II of 1994 on pastors and pastoral service and the [relevant] code of conduct”. In that connection, the Court observes that section 9 of Statute no. II of 1994 on the Constitution and Government of the Reformed Church of Hungary provides that ecclesiastical law was to be applicable with regard to service relationships of pastors and other persons in service of a pastoral nature (see paragraph 32 above). Furthermore, section 34 of Statute no. I of 2000 on the jurisdiction of the Reformed Church of Hungary provides that legal disputes in the sphere of, inter alia, appointment, remuneration and retirement of pastors fall within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts (see paragraph 33 above).
69. However, instead of turning to the ecclesiastical courts with his pecuniary claims, once he was dismissed from pastoral service, the applicant first instituted labour proceedings, claiming that his relationship with the Reformed Church was akin to employment (see paragraph 13 above). The labour court discontinued the proceedings, holding that the applicant ’ s claim could not be enforced before domestic courts (see paragraph 14 above). The applicant did not apply for review to the Supreme Court, but rather turned to the civil courts and claimed that his relationship with the Reformed Church in fact constituted an agency contract within the meaning of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 15 - 18 above). It is only this last set of proceedings that has been declared admissible by the Chamber and that, therefore, falls to be examined by the Grand Chamber (see paragraph 43 above).
70. In examining the applicant ’ s case, the first-instance civil court concluded, in accordance with the provisions of the domestic law, that the applicant ’ s relationship with the respondent Church could not be equated with an agency contract as defined by the Civil Code, because it lacked important characteristics of such contracts, and in particular the applicant ’ s ecclesiastical services had no market value (see paragraph 19 above). This view was confirmed by the Supreme Court, which noted that the applicant ’ s claim had been ecclesiastical rather than civil in nature and hence not enforceable before the national courts. Therefore, in line with the provisions of the domestic law, it found no grounds to adjudicate the claim on the merits and discontinued the proceedings (see paragraphs 24 and 66 above). None of the domestic courts accepted the applicant ’ s argument that his pastoral service was to be regarded separately from his pastoral remuneration (see paragraph 58 above).
71. Before the Court, the applicant claimed that at the outset of his proceedings he had had a right under domestic law that was sufficiently recognised such as to engage Article 6 of the Convention. Such a claim involves an assessment by the Court of the content of Hungarian law and, if applicable, an assessment reaching a different conclusion from that reached by the Hungarian courts. The Court reiterates in this context that such an exercise would only be called upon should the conclusions of the domestic courts be found arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see paragraph 62 above).
72. The Court notes that in the applicant ’ s case all national courts – i.e. the labour court, the civil court and the Supreme Court – after a detailed examination of the issue of the State courts ’ jurisdiction and the right of access to a court of persons in ecclesiastical service, discontinued the proceedings holding that the applicant ’ s claim could not be enforced before national courts since his pastoral service and the Letter of Appointment which it was based on had been governed by ecclesiastical rather than the State law (see paragraphs 14 and 24 above). The Court furthermore notes that these findings are in line with the principles set by the Constitutional Court in its decision of 2003 (see paragraphs 29 and 67 above).
73. The Court is not convinced by the applicant ’ s assertion that the domestic courts ’ finding of an ecclesiastical relationship in his case had ultimately been annulled by the Supreme Court. On the contrary, the Supreme Court confirmed that the applicant ’ s relationship with the respondent Church had been of an ecclesiastical nature before terminating the proceedings before State courts (see paragraph 70 above). The applicant ’ s argument relying on taxation of his pastoral remuneration is not convincing either, since the autonomy of tax law may allow State authorities to levy tax also on income which does not stem from private-law relations governed by State law. Finally, the fact that the Reformed Church of Hungary had not relied on its exclusive competence in the matter is of no relevance since it is the task of State courts – and not of ecclesiastical authorities – to determine the scope of their jurisdiction.
74. Moreover, the Court is satisfied that section 15 (2) of the 1990 Church Act was limited to issues involving “internal laws and rules of the church” (see paragraph 28 above) and did not provide churches or their officials with unfettered immunity against any and all civil claims. To the contrary, as demonstrated by the example of the Supreme Court ’ s guiding judgment (referred to by the Government, see paragraph 30 above), other claims, such as those involving the protection of personality rights, could be lodged against church officials since they did not concern “internal laws and rules of a church” within the meaning of Article 15 (2) of the 1990 Church Act.
75. However, the applicant ’ s claim did not involve such a statutory right. Instead, it concerned an assertion that a pecuniary claim stemming from his ecclesiastical service, governed by ecclesiastical law, was actually to be regarded as falling under the civil law. Having carefully considered the nature of his claim, the domestic courts, in as far as they deal with the substance of the matter, unanimously held, in accordance with the provisions of domestic law, that this was not the case.
76. Given the overall legal and jurisprudential framework existing in Hungary at the material time when the applicant lodged his civil claim, the domestic courts ’ conclusion that the applicant ’ s pastoral service had been governed by ecclesiastical law and their decision to discontinue the proceedings cannot be deemed arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.
77. Consequently, having regard to the nature of the applicant ’ s complaint, the basis for his service as a pastor and the domestic law as interpreted by the domestic courts both prior to the applicant ’ s dispute and during the proceedings instituted by him, the Court cannot but conclude that the applicant had no “right” which could be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. To conclude otherwise would result in the creation by the Court, by way of interpretation of Article 6 § 1, of a substantive right which had no legal basis in the respondent State.
78. The Court therefore considers that Article 6 does not apply to the facts of the present case. Consequently, the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4.
Holds, by ten votes to seven, that the application is inadmissible.