CASE OF KOTILAINEN AND OTHERS v. FINLAND

1. The case originated in an application (no. 62439/12) against the Republic of Finland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by nineteen Finnish nationals (“the applicants”), on 28 September 2012. A list of the applicants, by household, is set out in the appendix.
2. The applicants were represented by Mr Esa Puranen, a lawyer practising in Jyväskylä. The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mr Arto Kosonen and Ms Krista Oinonen, both of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that the police had omitted to protect the lives of their deceased relatives under Article 2 of the Convention.
4. On 8 December 2015 the application was communicated to the Government.
5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as established in the domestic proceedings, may be summarised as follows.
6. The applicants are relatives of individuals who were killed in a school shooting in Kauhajoki on 23 September 2008. The tragedy took place at a vocational institute attended by young adults. The perpetrator, a 22-year-old student of the institute, killed ten people, of whom nine were students and one was a teacher, and then killed himself. The attack attracted wide publicity both in Finland and internationally.
7. Following the fatal attack, the factual background to the shooting was clarified after the fatal attack in the pre-trial investigation and established in the subsequent criminal proceedings against the Detective Chief Inspector involved in the licensing of the perpetrator’s weapon (see paragraphs 19-35 below) as well as in the proceedings conducted by an investigation commission set up by the Government (see paragraph 38 below). The facts, as established by the investigations and proceedings, are as follows.
8. On 25 June 2008 the perpetrator applied at the local police station for a licence to acquire and carry a weapon. In his application he indicated that he needed a weapon for practising precision shooting at the local shooting range and that he had already practised shooting at his summer house with his father’s weapon. In reality his father – or rather his stepfather – had never shot with him, nor did they have a weapon or a firearms licence at that time. This fact was not known to the police at the relevant time. The perpetrator attached to his application for a firearms licence a receipt showing that he had paid a “membership fee” of 10 euros (EUR) to the local shooting club which entitled him to practise at the local shooting range. The regular membership fee was EUR 26 and this would also have entitled him to participate in competitions, but the perpetrator did not choose that option. He was thus not a member of the local shooting club.
9. On 21 July 2008 the perpetrator visited a psychologist at the local health centre for panic attacks and fits of aggression. From 11 August 2008 he saw a nurse specialising in depression about once a week, five times in total, the last session being on 9 September 2008. On 13 August 2008 he was prescribed medication to help treat his severe depression and panic attacks. The police did not have that piece of information on file before the shooting.
10. On 7 August 2008, after interviewing the perpetrator, the Detective Chief Inspector granted him permission to acquire a weapon. On 12 August 2008 the perpetrator purchased a weapon in another part of the country. On 2 September 2008 a police officer approved the perpetrator’s weapon at the local police station.
11. During the night of 17-18 September 2008, an attempt was made to explode the letter box of a local teacher. No evidence has ever been found to link the perpetrator to that event.
12. In the early morning of Friday, 19 September 2008 a cleaning lady at a local high school, situated approximately one kilometre away from the vocational institute attended by the perpetrator, saw a grave candle that had been lit in the proximity of the high school. She told two individuals about the candle, one of whom discovered a few hours later three video clips posted on the Internet in which the perpetrator was seen firing a weapon at a shooting range. It later transpired that he had been filmed by a friend of his who also practised shooting. In addition, the material posted on the Internet contained pictures in which the perpetrator was holding a handgun as well as texts in English about war and dying. This information was submitted to the police the same day. Also on the same day, another concerned citizen informed the local police in the neighbouring town about the same postings on the Internet by the perpetrator, but this information never reached the police officers involved in the present case.
13. After receiving the above-mentioned information, several police officers viewed the video clips. They found out that the videos had been posted under a pseudonym which the perpetrator used. These postings contained only small amounts of text and no references to a school shooting. The same pseudonym had also been used on a social media website (IRC-Galleria) as a member of a community called “Zero Hour: Massacre at Columbine High”. The perpetrator had also commented on a television documentary of the same name as “entertainment at its best” on 18 August 2008. On the basis of these materials, several police officers had started to suspect that the perpetrator might commit a school killing since, given the way he was dressed and his gestures, he seemed to be imitating the perpetrator of a previous school killing which had taken place in Finland less than a year earlier. Since the Detective Chief Inspector was off duty that day, the police officers contacted his replacement and requested permission to temporarily seize the perpetrator’s weapon. That request was granted at 3.40 p.m. When the police officers went to execute this assignment about ten minutes later, they could no longer find the perpetrator at home or at school since he had left to visit his home town for the weekend.
14. On Saturday, 20 September 2008 the Detective Chief Inspector learnt about the events of the previous day during a social event attended by him and some of the police officers.
15. On Monday, 22 September 2008 the Detective Chief Inspector was told in more detail about the observations made, and he himself viewed the videos and read the texts in English. It appears that he was also aware of the reference to the massacre at Columbine High School in the United States in 1999. The Detective Chief Inspector called in the perpetrator for an interview the same afternoon, which lasted approximately a quarter of an hour. The perpetrator explained to the Detective Chief Inspector, inter alia, that the English texts were the lyrics of a song by a certain band. He was given a verbal warning. Following the interview, the Detective Chief Inspector concluded that “no such circumstances [had] appeared in this matter on the basis of which [the perpetrator’s] weapon and his firearms licence should be withdrawn at this stage”. After this decision was taken, the police officers sent him three more pages from the IRC-Galleria website at 3.20 p.m.
16. That same evening and on the following morning the perpetrator purchased some tools which were used in the killing. A few hours before the act, he also made video clips in which he indicated his intention to carry out killings. He filmed these video clips himself. According to the investigation commission, that material was subsequently discovered in deleted camera files, and it had probably not been posted or shown anywhere.
17. On Tuesday, 23 September 2008 the school killings took place at 10.42 a.m.
18. During the investigations it transpired that the perpetrator had been discharged from his military service in August 2006 owing to mental health problems. It was also established that the perpetrator had as early as 2002 planned a school shooting, which had come to the knowledge of a local police department in another part of the country. It appears from the pre-trial investigation material that that piece of information came to the knowledge of the police officers involved in the present case only on 23 September 2008, several hours after the school killing had taken place. The perpetrator also wrote in his farewell letter that he had been planning such a killing since 2002.
Criminal proceedings against the Detective Chief Inspector, encompassing compensation claims against the State
19. Criminal proceedings were instituted against the Detective Chief Inspector who had been responsible for the decisions concerning the licensing of the weapon used by the perpetrator. The case was investigated by the National Bureau of Investigation ( Keskusrikospoliisi, Centralkriminalpolisen ). The pre-trial investigation against the Detective Chief Inspector was concluded on 8 December 2008.
20. The public prosecutor pressed charges against the Detective Chief Inspector on 16 February 2009. He was charged with negligent breach of an official duty ( tuottamuksellinen virkavelvollisuuden rikkominen, brott mot tjänsteplikt av oaktsamhet ) by the public prosecutor for having decided not to seize the firearm from the perpetrator on 22 September 2008, the date on which he was called in for questioning by the police. He was also charged by the applicants with breach of an official duty ( virkavelvollisuuden rikkominen, brott mot tjänsteplikt ) covering the period of 22 June 2008 to 23 September 2008, and on ten counts of grossly negligent homicide ( törkeä kuolemantuottamus, grovt dödsvållande ) covering the period from 25 June to 23 September 2008. The applicants also joined the charges brought by the public prosecutor and presented their compensation claims against the Finnish State.
21. On 29 January 2010 the Kauhajoki District Court ( käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten ) dismissed in part the charges brought by the public prosecutor and the applicants and dismissed in part, without examining the merits, the charges brought by the applicants in so far as they concerned a time that was too distant from the shooting. The applicants’ compensation claims were also rejected.
22. The court found that the firearms licence had been issued to the perpetrator in accordance with the law at the time as he had fulfilled the legal requirements for such a licence. The first suspicions of a possible risk of a shooting had arisen only a few days before it took place. It was shown that the day before the school shooting the Detective Chief Inspector had been aware of the material that the perpetrator had posted on the Internet but had not found it threatening. However, he had called the perpetrator in for questioning on the same day. As the interview with the perpetrator had not revealed any clear reason to withdraw his firearms licence, the Detective Chief Inspector had only given him a verbal warning. The court found that the Detective Chief Inspector had had all relevant material in his possession and he had discussed the situation with his colleagues. He had questioned the perpetrator in person, and found nothing unusual in his behaviour. The decision had been within his discretion and there was no evidence of any negligence. He had thus not breached his official duties.
23. By a letter dated 30 April 2010 the applicants appealed against the District Court’s judgment to the Vaasa Court of Appeal ( hovioikeus, hovrätten ), requesting that it be overturned and that the Detective Chief Inspector be convicted. The public prosecutor also lodged an appeal.
24. On 19 January 2011 the Vaasa Court of Appeal made a procedural decision concerning the locus standi of the applicants as far as the charges of negligent breach of official duty and breach of official duty were concerned. It found that the applicants could not be considered directly concerned by these counts and that they did not therefore have any locus standi in this respect.
25. On 15 April 2011 the Vaasa Court of Appeal convicted the Detective Chief Inspector of negligent breach of official duty for having failed to confiscate the perpetrator’s gun temporarily the day before the shooting.
26. The court found that the firearms licence had been issued in accordance with the law as the perpetrator had fulfilled the legal requirements applicable at the time for such a licence and he had been personally interviewed by the Detective Chief Inspector before obtaining it. The Detective Chief Inspector had acted in accordance with the practice at the time. Having examined all the circumstances and the evidence relating to the granting of the licence, the Court of Appeal concluded that there had been no negligence in this context.
27. Concerning the question of whether the Detective Chief Inspector had had reasoned grounds to consider that the perpetrator had been misusing his gun, the court found that such misuse had already taken place a few days before the school shooting and that the Detective Chief Inspector should have temporarily seized the perpetrator’s gun. In this connection, the court noted that such a seizure was a precautionary measure with a low threshold and that such a measure was not conditional upon any unlawful conduct having occurred, nor on any suspicion that unlawful conduct might follow; it was sufficient that the weapon had been involved when its holder had behaved disturbingly.
28. The court noted that the material posted on the Internet showed the perpetrator posing with a gun and shooting at a shooting range. This in itself could not be regarded as misuse of firearms. A separate posting cited the lyrics of a song dealing with war, dying children and crying mothers. In addition, the perpetrator’s profile on IRC-Galleria contained some pictures and comments which led the court to consider that the perpetrator’s Internet postings, taken as a whole, had constituted disturbing behaviour of a kind that warranted temporary seizure of his gun. The court therefore considered that, under the circumstances, the Detective Chief Inspector’s decision to refrain from seizing the gun had not been within his discretion and that he was guilty of negligent breach of official duty.
29. As to the charges of grossly negligent homicide, the court found that the Detective Chief Inspector had not had any concrete grounds to suspect that the perpetrator would commit a murderous attack. The court noted that the subordinate police officers, based on the evidence collected prior to the interview conducted by their superior, had expressed mutually differing views concerning the risk posed by the perpetrator. The court found it likely that their perceptions, as reflected in their testimonies, might in part have been affected by the shock of the subsequent events, reinforcing a sense of risk. On the evidence the court found that neither the circumstances relating to the perpetrator’s prior behaviour, nor his behaviour in the context of the interview, had been of a kind to give the Detective Chief Inspector reasonable grounds for suspecting that the perpetrator might commit a school shooting. In fact, it was possible that it had been only after the interview and the verbal warning that the perpetrator had decided to commit such an act. This hypothesis was supported by the fact that nothing in the extensive evidence adduced in the case suggested that the perpetrator had had an intention to commit such an attack, and that it had been only following his encounter with the Detective Chief Inspector and shortly before the attack that he had uploaded material to the Internet indicating his intention to carry out the attack.
30. Therefore, the court concluded that, when taking the decision not to seize the weapon, the Detective Chief Inspector had not had any probable cause to suspect that the perpetrator would commit a school shooting. The risk he had taken and the negligence he had committed in deciding not to seize the gun had not been causally relevant to the criminal acts subsequently committed by the perpetrator. The Detective Chief Inspector was thus not, through his negligence, responsible for the homicides.
31. When assessing the punishment, the court took into account the harm caused to the Detective Chief Inspector by the extremely wide media publicity of the incident, mainly caused by the acts of the perpetrator, and found that this publicity had been disproportionate vis-à-vis the Detective Chief Inspector’s negligence. He was therefore given a warning.
32. The Court of Appeal also examined the applicants’ compensation claims against the State. Taking into account the conclusions it had reached concerning the criminal charges against the Detective Chief Inspector, the court concluded that, as the negligence attributable to him was not causally related to the criminal acts committed by the perpetrator, that negligence did not engage the liability of the State vis-à-vis the applicants. The court further examined whether the liability of the State was engaged on the grounds of cumulative negligence on the part of the authorities. In this context, the court considered, inter alia, the significance of the applicants’ allegations according to which the perpetrator had already in 2002, together with another pupil, planned to carry out a school shooting in his previous school in another part of the country. The court stated that no evidence had been adduced regarding the timing, circumstances, content or seriousness of the alleged threat, or regarding the authorities’ reaction in respect of the perpetrator. The court concluded that the liability of the State was not engaged on the grounds of negligence on the part of the authorities.
33. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal examined whether the liability of the State was engaged on the grounds of a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. Having analysed the Court’s case-law in Osman v. the United Kingdom (28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ VIII) and subsequently in cases such as Mastromatteo v. Italy ([GC], no. 37703/97, ECHR 2002 ‑ VIII), Kontrová v. Slovakia (no. 7510/04, 31 May 2007) and Güngör v. Turkey (no. 28290/95, 22 March 2005), the court found that the circumstances of the case did not give rise to any liability on the part of the State on this basis.
34. By a letter dated 13 June 2011, the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court ( korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen ), reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before the Court of Appeal.
35. On 30 March 2012 the Supreme Court refused the applicants leave to appeal.
36. By a letter dated 1 June 2012 the applicants lodged an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court, alleging that one of the Supreme Court justices had been biased as he had been working at the Office of the Prosecutor General ( valtakunnansyyttäjänvirasto, riksåklagarämbetet ) at the time when the charges had been brought.
37. On 25 April 2014 the Supreme Court rejected the applicants’ application. It found that it could not be shown that the judge in question had been involved in the matter when charges had been brought. He had not even had any competence to influence the prosecutor’s decision. The sole fact that he had worked at the Office of the Prosecutor General at the time when charges had been brought did not give any reason to doubt his impartiality or independence as a judge. Nor was there any other reason to doubt his impartiality.
38. In November 2008 the Government appointed an investigation commission to inquire into the Kauhajoki school killing ( Kauhajoen koulusurmien tutkintalautakunta, Kommissionen för undersökning av skolmorden i Kauhajoki ). On 17 February 2010 the commission issued nine recommendations concerning, inter alia, the availability of firearms, mental-health services for young people, comprehensive security planning in educational institutions, cooperation between authorities in preventing similar incidents, and coordination of psychosocial support. According to the commission, attempts to identify potential criminal intentions in an interview conducted by the police or a doctor had proved unreliable as evidenced by the fact that in school killings the perpetrators had been able to behave inconspicuously when the need arose. A person could not be deemed suitable or unsuitable to possess a firearm on the basis of mental health diagnoses either.
RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAWFirearms Act
39. Section 18 of the Firearms Act ( ampuma-aselaki, skjutvapenlagen, Act no. 1/1998) provides:
“[u]nless otherwise provided in this Act, the following activities are subject to authorisation:
(1) transfer and import to Finland, transfer and export from Finland, transit for commercial purposes as well as trade, acquisition, possession and manufacture of firearms, firearm components, cartridges and especially dangerous projectiles;
(2) repair and conversion of firearms and firearm components;
A licence or permit for the activities referred to in subsection 1 may be granted if there is an acceptable reason for granting the licence or permit, and if there is no reason to suspect misuse of the licence or permit or the objects acquired or possessed under it.”
40. Section 45 of the same Act provided, at the relevant time, the following:
“A firearms acquisition permit may be granted to a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who, on the basis of his or her state of health and behaviour, is deemed suitable for possessing firearms and firearm components. With the consent of his or her parents or guardians, the permit may, however, also be granted, for the shooting of animals permitted by hunting legislation or for target shooting or practice, to a person who is fifteen but not yet eighteen years old and who otherwise fulfils the requirements for a firearms acquisition permit applicant.
(1) for the shooting of animals permitted by hunting legislation or for target shooting or practice, an applicant shall produce a reliable account of his or her hobby;
41. Pursuant to section 92(1) of the same Act, if there are reasonable grounds to suspect misuse of a firearm, firearm component, cartridges or especially dangerous projectiles, or if a procedure to revoke a related permit has been initiated, the police must, without delay, make a decision on seizing the objects temporarily.
42. Section 35(2) of the Police Act ( poliisilaki, polislagen, Act no. 493/1995), as in force at the relevant time, provided as follows:
“When assessing whether a driving licence, firearm permit or other such licence is still valid, the police have the right, on making a substantiated request, to obtain information on the licence holder’s state of health, use of intoxicants or violent behaviour, notwithstanding the duty of confidentiality, if there are reasons to suspect that the licence holder no longer meets the conditions for obtaining a licence.”
A similar provision is contained in Chapter 4, section 2(2), of the current Police Act ( poliisilaki, polislagen, Act no. 872/2011), which entered into force on 1 January 2014.
43. Chapter 40, Article 10 of the Penal Code ( rikoslaki, strafflagen, Act no. 39/1889, as amended by Act no. 604/2002) provides:
“[I]f a public official, when acting in his or her office, through carelessness in a manner other than that referred to in Article 5 § 2 violates his or her official duty based on the provisions or regulations to be followed in official functions, and the act, when assessed as a whole, taking into consideration its detrimental and harmful effects and the other circumstances connected with the act, is not petty, he or she shall be sentenced for negligent violation of official duty to a warning or to a fine.”
Legislative amendments enacted after the incident
44. Section 45 of the Firearms Act, as amended by Act no. 124/2011, which entered into force on 13 June 2011, reads as follows:
“A firearms acquisition permit may be granted to a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who, on the basis of his or her state of health and behaviour, is deemed suitable for possessing firearms and firearm components. The licensing authorities have the right to obtain a medical evaluation of the applicant if, on the basis of information received or an interview, they have reason to suspect that the applicant is not, for personal reasons, suited to possessing a firearm. The licensing authorities have the right, notwithstanding the duty of confidentiality, to obtain such health records concerning the applicant as are necessary for the authorities to assess the applicant’s suitability to carry a firearm. A conscript shall attest to any completed military or unarmed service. If service has not yet been completed, the conscript shall present an induction order or a decision on exemption from service, postponement of service or a reasoned decision for discharge from service. An acquisition permit for a pistol, small-bore pistol, revolver or small-bore revolver or their components may only be granted to a person over twenty years old. An acquisition permit for firearms used in shooting sports or in shooting as a hobby and listed in section 6(2)(4 ‑ 7) may be granted to a natural person on condition that he or she provides a certificate as regards this hobby, issued by a licensed shooting instructor of an association referred to in section 4 of the Associations Act (Act no. 503/1989), and the hobby has been actively pursued for at least two years. This period of two years may include a period corresponding to half of the conscript’s completed military service or half of the completed women’s voluntary military service. An acquisition permit for firearms used in shooting as a sport or as a hobby and listed in section 6(2)(4 ‑ 7) may also be granted if the applicant provides reliable details as to his or her hobby as well as a certificate issued by the State authorities, as an employer, attesting that the applicant carries, in the context of his or her official duties, a firearm listed in section 6(2)(4 ‑ 7).
(2) for shooting as a sport or as a hobby, the applicant shall provide reliable details about his or her hobby;
45. Under section 97a of the Conscription Act ( asevelvollisuuslaki, värnpliktslagen, Act no. 1438/2007, as amended by Act no. 127/2011), the necessary information on military service or fitness for such service may be made available, notwithstanding the duty of confidentiality, from the database on conscripts in respect of individuals applying for or holding a firearms licence under the Firearms Act (Act no. 1/1998), in order to assess their personal suitability for the possession of such a licence. This provision entered into force on 13 June 2011.
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
46. The applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention of the lack of any measures on the part of the police to prevent the school shooting.
47. Article 2 of the Convention reads as follows:
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”
48. The Government contested that argument.
49. The Government argued that the applicants could not be considered direct victims of any violation of the Convention. The public prosecutor had charged the Detective Chief Inspector with negligent breach of an official duty for not having taken the firearm from the perpetrator on 22 September 2008. The applicants had pursued their own charges of breach of an official duty covering the period of 22 June to 23 September 2008 and, in the alternative, joined the public prosecutor’s charges. They had also pursued charges against the Detective Chief Inspector on ten counts of grossly negligent homicide covering the period of 25 June to 23 September 2008. In its final judgment, the Court of Appeal considered that the applicants had lacked locus standi as far as the charges of negligent breach of an official duty and breach of an official duty were concerned. The applicants could not therefore be considered in this respect as victims in the present case and their application should be rejected as incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
50. The applicants considered that the Government’s arguments alleging the inadmissibility of their application were completely ill-founded. In such circumstances as in the present case, the applicants should have the right to complain of the State’s failure to carry out measures to protect the right to life which resulted in the death of their close relatives. As the Court had stated in its earlier case-law, the next of kin should be able to complain in Article 2 cases in their own right because of the nature of the violation. All the applicants were either parents, spouses or children of the persons killed in the shooting. Although the Court of Appeal had denied the applicants locus standi, it was incorrect to claim that this decision had relevance in respect of their victim status before the Court. Victim status should be established solely on the basis of the Convention and the Court’s case-law. In the present case, the State of Finland had in no way recognised any violation, nor awarded any compensation to the applicants. The applicants had to therefore be considered as victims within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.
51. According to the Court’s established case-law, the concept of “victim” must be interpreted autonomously and irrespective of domestic concepts such as those concerning an interest or capacity to act (see Gorraiz Lizarraga and Others v. Spain, no. 62543/00, § 35, ECHR 2004 ‑ III). In the Court’s settled case-law, it is also accepted that, in Article 2 cases, close family members of the deceased can legitimately claim to be victims of an alleged violation of that Article. Moreover, a domestic decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him or her of victim status unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, a breach of the Convention and subsequently afforded appropriate and sufficient redress for it (see, for the main principles, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178-213, ECHR 2006-V, and Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria, no. 7888/03, § 49, 20 December 2007, as well as the cases cited therein). The Court has generally considered this to be dependent on all the circumstances of the case, with particular regard to the nature of the right alleged to have been breached (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 116, ECHR 2010), the reasons given for the decision (see M.A. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 35242/04, ECHR 2005, and contrast Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), no. 48470/99, ECHR 2001-X) and the persistence of the unfavourable consequences for the person concerned after that decision (see Freimanis and Līdums v. Latvia, nos. 73443/01 and 74860/01, § 68, 9 February 2006). Only when those conditions are satisfied does the subsidiary nature of the protective mechanism of the Convention preclude examination of an application (see Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, § 71, ECHR 2006-V, and Cataldo v. Italy (dec.), no. 45656/99, 3 June 2004). It is therefore for the Court to verify, ex post facto, whether the redress afforded domestically by the domestic courts was appropriate and sufficient, having regard to the just satisfaction as provided for under Article 41 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Normann v. Denmark (dec.), no. 44704/98, 14 June 2001; Jensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark (dec.), no. 52620/99, 20 March 2003; and Nardone v. Italy (dec.), no. 34368/02, 25 November 2004).
52. In the present case, the Court notes that all the applicants are close family members of the deceased in the school shooting. They must therefore be considered indirect victims of the attack. Moreover, the domestic judgments were not favourable to them, nor did the national authorities acknowledge, either expressly or in substance, any breach of the Convention, nor was any redress afforded. In these circumstances the applicants have not lost their victim status. Therefore, this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. The Court further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
53. The applicants considered that before the shooting took place on 23 September 2008, the Finnish authorities had had knowledge of several circumstances that together had constituted an acute and concrete threat of serious acts of violence. The most central risk elements that the authorities had known or should have known before the school shooting were the following: a concerned citizen had informed the police on 18 September 2008 of material which the perpetrator had posted on the Internet, pointing out its similarities to earlier postings by the perpetrator of another school shooting. The material had clearly shown that the perpetrator had admired mass killings and that he had found school massacres “entertainment at its best”. The police had known already in 2002 that the perpetrator had planned to carry out a similar school shooting at his previous school. The police had also known, or ought to have known, that the perpetrator had lied to them when applying for a firearms acquisition permit about having had shooting as a hobby, whereas totally different information had been published on one of his social-network profiles. The type of firearms acquired had not even been suitable for the purposes the perpetrator had submitted to the police. The police should have learned, at the latest a few days before the incident when they had examined the perpetrator’s online profile, that the perpetrator had not acquired the firearm for recreational purposes as he had claimed. This should have constituted strong grounds for the authorities to suspect that there had been a risk of misuse of the firearm.
54. The applicants asserted that the police had also been aware of the videos and pictures posted online before the attack in which the perpetrator could be seen posing with a gun and shooting. The videos clearly showed reckless handling of firearms and random and threatening shooting with a pistol. The police had also been aware, or ought to have been aware, of the strong copycat culture among those who had admired school shootings and that such persons had aimed to copy the actions of their idols as closely as possible. There had been remarkable similarities to a school shooting which had taken place less than a year earlier, which several individual police officers had noticed. They had characterised the accused as a potential perpetrator of a school shooting. The authorities thus had had sufficient information to recognise the potential threat of a school shooting but any attempts by these police officers to have the perpetrator’s gun confiscated had been thwarted when their superior had made a conscious decision to allow the perpetrator to keep his firearm.
55. The applicants further stated that State authorities had also had knowledge of the clear risk factor related to the perpetrator’s mental health which had made him unsuitable to possess firearms. The perpetrator had visited a psychologist in July 2008 for treatment in respect of aggressive behaviour and had visited a nurse specialised in depression about once a week since August 2008. He had also been prescribed medicine to counteract severe depression and panic disorders. The perpetrator had also self-harmed several years earlier and the authorities had been aware of this. The police would have been able to obtain all the information concerning the perpetrator’s mental health had they decided to take further investigative action in the case prior to the school shooting. The police had been aware of, or at least would have been able to find out, the fact that the perpetrator had been discharged from his military service for mental health reasons and that he had been found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol in the summer of 2007.
56. On the basis of the above circumstances, the applicants claimed that it was evident that the police had been, or at least ought to have been, aware of the real and immediate threat that the perpetrator had presented to the school in question. He had planned to carry out a school shooting in his own school and therefore these students should have been considered as “identifiable individuals” who risked being potential targets of a lethal act. A positive obligation had therefore arisen for the authorities to take sufficient and efficient operational measures to protect these citizens and society at large. Several police officers had recognised the acute risk of a potential school shooting and had attempted to confiscate the perpetrator’s weapon before the start of a new school week. However, their superior had consciously decided to allow the perpetrator to keep his firearm. This was the so-called decisive moment when the authorities had failed to take measures to avert the risk. There had been many concrete measures which could have been taken, the most efficient being the confiscation of his weapon. The actual interview had lasted for about ten minutes, which had clearly not been sufficient to thoroughly investigate the matter. It might have also made the perpetrator act more rapidly than planned as he had then become aware of the police’s plan to confiscate his gun.
57. In conclusion, the applicants alleged that the respondent State had thus clearly failed to fulfil its positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention.
58. The Government argued that, contrary to the case of Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 5878/08, 30 March 2016), in the present case the applicants appeared to be dissatisfied with the conviction and sentence of the Detective Chief Inspector and with the fact that their claim for compensation was not successful. However, the matter had been resolved domestically and, taking into account the margin of appreciation left to the States in this respect, the applicants’ application should not be considered by the Court due to its fourth-instance nature.
59. The Government stated that it was obvious that Article 2 of the Convention required the Contracting Parties to have in place effective mechanisms governed by administrative and criminal law to prevent misuse related to firearms and to make intervention in such misuse possible. Not only were there several proscriptions in the Penal Code, but there was also the possibility to seize firearms and to revoke acquisition and possession permits, which together constituted such an effective mechanism. Accordingly, the domestic firearms legislation was, as a mechanism, in compliance with Article 2.
60. The Firearms Act as in force at the material time had explicitly prohibited the granting of a permit without acceptable grounds or if a reason had existed for suspecting misuse of the permit or objects acquired or possessed under it. When assessing the criminal charges against the Detective Chief Inspector concerning the granting of an acquisition permit in August 2008, the Court of Appeal had found no evidence that the Detective Chief Inspector had failed to comply with the relevant legislation or that there had been any other negligence on his part. Accordingly, the decision to grant the perpetrator the firearms acquisition permit had not been in breach of Article 2.
61. The Court of Appeal had found in its judgment that the material posted by the perpetrator on the Internet, when viewed as a whole, constituted conduct that was in breach of the statutory requirement that firearms be used in an appropriate manner. Such conduct had given the Detective Chief Inspector grounds for further enquiries as to whether the perpetrator’s conduct had warranted a revocation of his licence to possess firearms. The court had, however, also held that the Detective Chief Inspector had had no concrete grounds for suspecting that the perpetrator’s conduct had amounted to anything more than arousing fear and concern. According to the court, the Detective Chief Inspector had not considered it possible that the perpetrator would commit a school shooting. The Government stressed that the perpetrator had not shown any particular interest in the victims before the shooting had taken place. Even though the Detective Chief Inspector had acted in breach of his duties by failing to seize the perpetrator’s firearm, the situation was not comparable to that in Osman v. the United Kingdom (28 October 1998, § 116, Reports 1998 ‑ VIII). Accordingly, the Detective Chief Inspector’s decision not to confiscate the firearm had not been in violation of Article 2.
62. The Government averred that in November 2008 it had appointed an investigation commission to inquire into the school shooting. On 17 February 2010 the commission had found that attempts to identify potential criminal intentions in an interview conducted by the police or a doctor had proved unreliable as evidenced by the fact that in school killings the perpetrators had been able to behave matter-of-factly when the need had arisen. Nor could a person have been deemed suitable or unsuitable to possess a firearm on the basis of mental health diagnoses.
63. Furthermore, the national authority supervising healthcare had prepared its own report on the appropriateness of the healthcare service provided to the perpetrator in the present case. According to the report, the staff treating the perpetrator could not possibly have foreseen the school shooting and had had no grounds for considering that the perpetrator had been an immediate danger to himself or others. The medication prescribed for him had been appropriate but it was possible that he had not been taking it during the last days of his life. The perpetrator had also failed to inform the health-centre staff of his interest in firearms. The national supervisory authorities had held that the healthcare authorities in question had taken all customary measures within their competence. In the Government’s view the activities of the healthcare authorities had also been in compliance with Article 2.
64. In conclusion, the Government argued that there had been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention.
(a) Substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention
65. The Court observes that Article 2 of the Convention, which safeguards the right to life, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention. Together with Article 3, it enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. The object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings also requires that Article 2 be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective (see, among many other authorities, Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, § 109, ECHR 2002 ‑ IV).
66. The Court reiterates that the first sentence of Article 2 § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, § 36, Reports 1998 ‑ III; Osman, cited above, § 115; and Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, § 71, ECHR 2002 ‑ II). Such a positive obligation has been found to arise in a range of different contexts. Thus, for example, the Court has held that the State’s positive obligation under Article 2 is engaged in respect of the management of various dangerous activities (see Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 71, ECHR 2004 ‑ XII) and in the context of road safety (see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], no. 41720/13, § 135, 25 June 2019). These duties of the domestic authorities entail above all the primary obligation to have in place an appropriate set of preventive measures geared to ensuring public safety. This entails above all a primary duty on the part of the State to adopt and implement a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life (see Öneryıldız, cited above, §§ 89-90, and Masneva v. Ukraine, no. 5952/07, § 64, 20 December 2011). In this regard, the Court has emphasised that the States’ obligation to regulate must be understood in a broader sense, which includes the duty to ensure the effective functioning of that regulatory framework. The regulatory duties thus encompass necessary measures to ensure implementation, including supervision and enforcement (see Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], no. 56080/13, § 189, 19 December 2017). Thus, the States’ positive obligation under the substantive limb of Article 2 extends to a duty to ensure the effective functioning of the regulatory framework adopted for the protection of life (see Cavit Tınarlıoğlu v. Turkey, no. 3648/04, § 86, 2 February 2016).
67. The Court has held that the above-mentioned positive obligation under Article 2 must be construed as applying in the context of any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may be at stake ( see Öneryıldız, cited above, § 89, and Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase, cited above, § 135, with further references). Thus, in the context of activities which may pose a risk to human life due to their inherently hazardous nature, States are required to take reasonable measures to ensure the safety of individuals as necessary (see Cevrioğlu v. Turkey, no. 69546/12, § 57, 4 October 2016, with further references). In this regard, special emphasis must be placed on regulations geared to the special features of the activity in question, particularly with regard to the level of the potential risk to human lives (see Masneva, cited above, § 64). The regulatory measures in question must govern the licensing, setting-up, operation, security and supervision of the activity and must make it compulsory for all those concerned to take practical measures to ensure the effective protection of citizens whose lives might be endangered by the inherent risks (see Cevrioğlu, cited above, § 51, and Zinatullin v. Russia, no. 10551/10, §§ 25-27, 28 January 2020). The Court has, however, also emphasised that the positive obligation is to be interpreted in such a way as not to impose an excessive burden on the authorities, bearing in mind, in particular, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources (see Öneryıldız, cited above, § 107, and Ciechońska v. Poland, no. 19776/04, §§ 63 and 64, 14 June 2011). Accordingly, not every potential risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take preventive measures to deter that risk from materialising. The extent of the positive obligations in a given context depends on the kind of risks concerned and the possibilities of mitigating them (see Cavit Tınarlıoğlu, cited above, § 90).
68. In this context, the Court has held that where a Contracting State has adopted an overall legal framework and legislation tailored to the protective requirements in the specific context, matters such as an error of judgment on the part of an individual player, or negligent coordination among professionals, whether public or private, could not be sufficient of themselves to make a Contracting State accountable from the standpoint of its positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to protect life (see Lopes de Sousa Fernandes, cited above, § 165; Fernandes de Oliveira v. Portugal [GC], no. 78103/14, § 106, 31 January 2019; and Marius Alexandru and Marinela Ștefan v. Romania, no. 78643/11, § 100, 24 March 2020).
69. In addition, there is a further substantive positive obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect an identified individual from another individual (see Osman, § 115, and Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase, § 136, both cited above) or, in particular circumstances, from himself or herself (see Fernandes de Oliveira, cited above, §§ 103 and 108-15). In order to engage this positive obligation, it must be established that the authorities knew, or ought to have known at the time, of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see Osman, cited above, §§ 115-16; Öneryıldız, cited above, §§ 74 and 101; Bône v. France (dec.), no. 69869/01, 1 March 2005; Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 26562/07 and 6 others, § 483, 13 April 2017; Cavit Tınarlıoğlu, cited above, §§ 91-92; and Fernandes de Oliveira, cited above, § 109).
70. The above-mentioned obligation of the State authorities to take preventive operational measures has been established for situations where the real and immediate risk from criminal acts of a third party concerns the life of one or more identified or identifiable individuals. In certain circumstances, however, the Court has held that a similar obligation to afford protection against a real and imminent risk of criminal acts emanating from a given individual may arise towards members of the public who are not identifiable in advance, notably in the context of the granting of prison leave or conditional release to dangerous prisoners (see Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], no. 37703/97, § 69, ECHR 2002 ‑ VIII; Maiorano and Others v. Italy, no. 28634/06, § 107, 15 December 2009; and Choreftakis and Choreftaki v. Greece, no. 46846/08, §§ 48-49, 17 January 2012).
71. Thus, the Court has drawn a distinction between cases concerning the requirement of personal protection of one or more individuals identifiable in advance as the potential target of a lethal act, and those in which the obligation to afford general protection to society was in issue (see Maiorano and Others, cited above, § 107, and Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, § 247, ECHR 2011). In the latter context, the Court has stressed the duty of diligence incumbent on the State authorities, in dealing with the danger emanating from the potential acts of certain individuals in their charge, to afford general protection of the right to life (see Mastromatteo, § 74, and Maiorano and Others, § 121, both cited above). Similarly, in a case concerning a police officer who deliberately shot two persons with his police gun while off duty, the Court found a violation of Article 2 on the grounds that the officer had been issued with the gun in breach of the existing domestic legislation governing police weapons and that there had been a failure to properly assess his personality in the light of his known history of previous disciplinary offences (see Gorovenky and Bugara v. Ukraine, nos. 36146/05 and 42418/05, § 39, 12 January 2012).
72. The Court has also found that the obligation to afford general protection against potentially lethal acts was engaged in respect of the danger emanating from a person with a history of violence, unlawful possession of firearms and alcohol abuse, who was apparently mentally disturbed and had been under the control of the police on the day of the killing committed by him (see Bljakaj and Others v. Croatia, no. 74448/12, § 121, 18 September 2014). In the circumstances of that case, which arose in the context of domestic violence and concerned the killing of the lawyer of the perpetrator’s wife in the wake of an attack on the latter, the risk to life emanating from the perpetrator was found to have been real and imminent, even though the lawyer had not been identifiable in advance as a potential victim. Moreover, the supervisory duties of diligence in a school setting were engaged in Kayak v. Turkey (no. 60444/08, §§ 59 and 66, 10 July 2012).
73. For a positive obligation to arise, it must in any event be established that the authorities failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see, among other authorities, Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, § 90, ECHR 2001 ‑ III).
(ii) Application in the present case
74. The Court notes that the applicants’ main grievance concerns the fact that the perpetrator of the fatal attack was permitted to possess a firearm and that, in particular, his licensed weapon was not seized before the attack.
75. For the Court, there can be no doubt that the use of firearms entails a high level of inherent risks to the right to life since any kind of misconduct, not only intentional but also negligent, involving the use of firearms may have fatal consequences for victims, and the risk of such weapons being used to commit deliberate criminal acts is even more serious. Accordingly, the use of firearms is a form of dangerous activity which must engage the States’ positive obligation to adopt and implement measures designed to ensure public safety (see paragraphs 66-68 above). This primary obligation consists in the duty to adopt regulations for the protection of life and to ensure the effective implementation and functioning of that regulatory framework.
76. In the light of the applicants’ complaints, the regulatory framework applicable in the respondent State at the relevant time as such is not in issue in the present case. The Court does not discern any deficiencies in this respect that could entail a violation of the State’s positive obligations under Article 2. In this context, the Court is not prepared to hold that the absence of nationwide sharing of information between the various local police authorities regarding past records of various threats which have not given rise to criminal proceedings could in itself be considered a relevant deficiency in the regulatory framework (see paragraph 18 above).
77. As to the licensing of the perpetrator’s firearm, the domestic courts examined the allegations put forward by the applicants, and established that the licence granted to the perpetrator was issued in compliance with the relevant legislation. The perpetrator had fulfilled the statutory requirements and had, as a prerequisite for the licence, undergone a personal interview. According to the domestic courts, there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the Detective Chief Inspector in charge of the licensing. The Court sees no reason to call into question these findings of the domestic courts.
78. Turning to the question whether the domestic authorities, in particular the local police, complied with the preventive operational duties arising under Article 2 (see paragraph 69 above), the Court notes that the domestic courts, having taken and carefully considered the available evidence, concluded that the information available to the local police authority at the time preceding the perpetrator’s criminal act had not given rise to any reason to suspect an actual risk of an attack in the form of a school shooting.
79. The Court reiterates that its task is not to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them (see, inter alia, Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/1 2, § 150, 20 March 2018). Although the Court is not bound by the findings of the domestic courts, in normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those courts (see Gäfgen, cited above, § 93). In the present case, the Court does not discern any grounds for departing from the assessment of the Court of Appeal. The approach followed by that court is not inconsistent with the test of actual or imputed knowledge of a real and imminent risk to life as laid down in the Court’s case-law.
80. In essence, the assessment made by the domestic court leads to the conclusion that although, prior to the murderous attack committed by the perpetrator, there were certain factual elements suggesting that the perpetrator might potentially pose a risk of life-threatening acts, the school killing actually committed by him was not reasonably foreseeable. The findings of the investigation commission similarly stated that the material posted by the perpetrator on the Internet had not contained any references to a school killing. The Court finds it important to emphasise that there remains a substantial difference between conduct involving video clips and cryptic postings on the Internet without any specific or even non-specific threats, and the indiscriminate killing of people present at a specific location (see, mutatis mutandis, Van Colle v. the United Kingdom, no. 7678/09, § 99, 13 November 2012). The Court also notes that the Court of Appeal found it possible that it was only after the police interview and the verbal warning that the perpetrator had actually decided to commit the school shooting (see paragraph 29 above).
81. Under these circumstances, the Court is unable to conclude that there was a real and immediate risk to life directed at identifiable individuals of which the authorities knew or ought to have known at the relevant time. In other words, it cannot be held that the circumstances in the present case gave rise to a duty of personal protection towards the victims of the subsequent killing, or towards the other students or staff of the school concerned. The question whether there had been any decisive stage in the sequence of events leading up to the fatal shooting when it could have been said that the authorities had known or ought to have known of a real and immediate risk to the lives of the applicants’ next of kin must therefore be answered in the negative (see Van Colle, cited above, § 95). Consequently, the domestic authorities cannot be faulted for having failed to comply with their preventive operational obligation to protect the victims, as set out in the Court’s case-law (see paragraph 69 above).
82. The present case must also be distinguished from Bljakaj and Others (see paragraph 72 above). In that case, the perpetrator was found to present a real and immediate risk to life of which the relevant authorities were aware, whereas the victim was not identifiable in advance. The case concerned a mentally disturbed and dangerous person in respect of whom the need for further medical supervision had been identified and who, owing to the acute state he had been in and the threats made by him, had been under immediate police control earlier in the day on which he severely wounded his wife and killed her lawyer. In the present case, the domestic courts, having examined the facts and the evidence, did not conclude that it could have been foreseen that the perpetrator posed a real and immediate risk to the life of others. The circumstances of the present case are indeed distinctly different. On account of the material the perpetrator had posted on the Internet, he was interviewed by the Detective Chief Inspector in order to determine whether there were any indications that he posed a danger to public safety; however, this was not considered to be the case. In the light of the assessments made by the domestic authorities and courts, the Court is not in a position to conclude that there was a real and immediate risk to life emanating from the perpetrator of which the police knew or ought to have known in advance of the attack.
83. This conclusion is not affected by the argument advanced by the applicants according to which the police authority ought to have obtained the perpetrator’s medical and military records to verify data regarding his mental health. The Court observes that the confidentiality of health data is a vital principle in the legal systems of all the Contracting Parties, and is also protected under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court has acknowledged that respect for such confidentiality is crucial not only for the sake of the patients’ sense of privacy but to preserve their confidence in the health service and to ensure that people are not discouraged from seeking diagnosis or treatment, which would undermine the preventive efforts in healthcare (see Z v. Finland, 25 February 1997, § 95, Reports 1997 ‑ I; P. and S. v. Poland, no. 57375/08, § 128, 30 October 2012; and L.H. v. Latvia, no. 52019/07, § 56, 29 April 2014). The domestic law must therefore afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such communication or disclosure of personal health data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees in Article 8 of the Convention (see Z v. Finland, cited above, § 95). While there are undoubtedly many circumstances in which it is necessary and justified for the police authorities to be able to obtain certain medical data in order to carry out their functions in law enforcement and crime prevention, access by the police to an individual’s medical data cannot be a matter of routine. Such access must remain subject to specific requirements of necessity and justification based on the concrete circumstances. The presence of such necessity or justification cannot be established with the benefit of hindsight. Moreover, even if the data regarding the perpetrator’s medical history (see paragraph 9 above) had been available, it cannot be determined whether or to what extent the assessment of whether the perpetrator posed a real and imminent risk at the relevant time might have depended on such information.
84. In the light of the State’s positive obligations relating to the control of dangerous activities (see paragraphs 66-68 above), it remains to be examined, however, whether the authorities of the respondent State have complied with their duty of diligence in the protection of public safety, taking into account the context of the case, namely the use of firearms, where a particularly high level of risk to life is inherent. The Court reiterates that, in the light of the importance of the protection afforded by Article 2, it must subject complaints about loss of life to the most careful scrutiny, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances (see, among many other authorities, Banel v. Lithuania, no. 14326/11, § 67, 18 June 2013).
85. As stated above, the Court has held that the duty to provide general protection to society against potential criminal acts of one or several individuals may be engaged in respect of individuals, notably dangerous prisoners, who are in the charge of State authorities, or in circumstances where the imminent danger emanating from them has become apparent in connection with an intervention by the police (see paragraph 71 above). The Court considers that a similar obligation of special diligence is engaged in the circumstances of the present case. Although the perpetrator was not in the charge of State authorities, those authorities are responsible for determining and upholding the requirements for the lawful possession of firearms. The particularly high level of risk to life which is inherent in their use must entail a duty for the authorities to intervene when alerted to facts that give rise to concrete suspicions regarding compliance with such requirements.
86. In the present case, the local police had become aware of the perpetrator’s postings on the Internet which, although they did not contain any threats, were of such a nature as to cast doubt on whether it was safe for him to remain in possession of a firearm. Indeed, the police did not remain passive but conducted an interview with the perpetrator. No action was taken, however, to seize the weapon he was known and licensed to possess. While an individual error of judgment cannot suffice to conclude a violation of the State’s positive obligations (see paragraph 68 above), especially not when identified with the benefit of hindsight, what is in issue in the present case can be seen to go beyond such an error of judgment. The Court notes, however, that it cannot accept the applicants’ argument suggesting that the perpetrator was actually provoked by the police interview to proceed with the attack the following morning. Such a conclusion is entirely based on the benefit of hindsight. The Court can see no reason why, in the light of the facts known at the time, it would not have been an appropriate step to organise a meeting in person with the perpetrator following the discovery of his postings on the Internet.
87. The crucial question is whether there were measures which the domestic authorities might reasonably have been expected to take to avoid the risk to life arising from the potential danger of which the perpetrator’s known behaviour, as demonstrated by the Internet postings, gave indications. What is important is whether reasonable measures which the domestic authorities failed to take could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm (see Bljakaj and Others, cited above, § 124).
88. Given the particularly high level of risk to life involved in any misuse of firearms, the Court considers that it is essential for the State to put in place and rigorously apply a system of adequate and effective safeguards designed to counteract and prevent any improper and dangerous use of such weapons. In the context of the present case, the Court notes that the precautionary measure of seizing the gun was available to the police authority and was even considered, although not implemented. The Court also observes that such a measure would not have entailed any significant interference with any competing rights under the Convention, and thus it would not have involved any particularly difficult or delicate balancing exercise. Nor would such a measure have required any high threshold of application, rather the contrary. Indeed, the domestic Court of Appeal held that, given the information that had come to the attention of the police authority, the gun could and should have been seized in accordance with domestic law, this being envisaged as a precautionary measure with a low threshold (see paragraph 27 above).
89. The Court reiterates, in line with the Court of Appeal, that this finding is a matter separate from the conclusion according to which it could not be held that the decision not to seize the gun was causally relevant to the subsequent killings, or that it entailed a failure to comply with the State’s obligation to provide personal protection to the victims (see paragraph 81 above). For the Court, the seizure of the perpetrator’s weapon was a reasonable measure of precaution to take under circumstances where doubts had arisen, on the basis of information that had come to the attention of the competent authority, as to whether the perpetrator was fit to possess a dangerous firearm. The Court therefore considers that the domestic authorities have not observed the special duty of diligence incumbent on them because of the particularly high level of risk to life inherent in any misconduct involving the use of firearms.
90. For these reasons, the Court finds that there has been a violation by the respondent State of the substantive positive obligations arising under Article 2 of the Convention.
(b) Procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention