CASE OF VEJDELAND AND OTHERS v. SWEDEN

1. The case originated in an application (no. 1813/07) against the Kingdom of Sweden lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by four Swedish nationals, Mr Tor Fredrik Vejdeland, Mr Mattias Harlin, Mr Björn Täng and Mr Niklas Lundström (“the applicants”), on 4 January 2007.
2. The applicants were represented by Mr N. Uggla, a lawyer practising in Stockholm. The Swedish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs A. Erman, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
3. The applicants alleged that the Supreme Court judgment of 6 July 2006 constituted a violation of their freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. They further submitted that they were punished without law in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.
4. On 27 November 2008 the President of the Third Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government.
5. The application was later transferred to the Fifth Section of the Court, following the re-composition of the Court’s sections on 1 February 2011. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
6. In addition to written observations by the applicants and the Government, third-party comments were received jointly from the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights and the International Commission of Jurists, whom the President had authorised to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention).
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
7. The applicants were born in 1978, 1981, 1987 and 1986 respectively. The first applicant lives in Gothenburg and the other applicants live in Sundsvall.
8. In December 2004 the applicants, together with three other persons, went to an upper secondary school ( gymnasieskola ) and distributed approximately a hundred leaflets by leaving them in or on the pupils’ lockers. The episode ended when the school’s principal intervened and made them leave the premises. The originator of the leaflets was an organisation called National Youth and the leaflets contained, inter alia, the following statements:
“Homosexual Propaganda ( Homosexpropaganda )
In the course of a few decades society has swung from rejection of homosexuality and other sexual deviances ( avarter ) to embracing this deviant sexual proclivity ( böjelse ). Your anti-Swedish teachers know very well that homosexuality has a morally destructive effect on the substance of society ( folkkroppen ) and will willingly try to put it forward as something normal and good.
-- Tell them that HIV and AIDS appeared early with the homosexuals and that their promiscuous lifestyle was one of the main reasons for this modern-day plague gaining a foothold.
-- Tell them that homosexual lobby organisations are also trying to play down ( avdramatisera ) paedophilia, and ask if this sexual deviation ( sexuella avart ) should be legalised.”
9. For distributing the leaflets, the applicants were charged with agitation against a national or ethnic group ( hets mot folkgrupp ).
10. The applicants disputed that the text in the leaflets expressed contempt for homosexuals and claimed that, in any event, they had not intended to express contempt for homosexuals as a group. They stated that the purpose of their activity had been to start a debate about the lack of objectivity in the education dispensed in Swedish schools.
11. On 11 July 2005 the District Court ( tingsrätten ) of Bollnäs found that the statements in the leaflets had clearly gone beyond what could be considered an objective discussion of homosexuals as a group and that the applicants’ intention had been to express contempt for homosexuals. It therefore convicted the applicants of agitation against a national or ethnic group, and sentenced the first and second applicants to two months’ imprisonment, the third applicant to a suspended sentence ( villkorlig dom ) combined with a fine, and the fourth applicant to probation ( skyddstillsyn ) combined with 40 hours of community service.
12. The applicants as well as the prosecutor appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal ( hovrätten ) for Southern Norrland. The applicants requested the court to reject the charges, to consider the criminal act minor, or at least to reduce the punishments. The prosecutor appealed as regards the first three applicants, requesting the court to consider the criminal act to be aggravated or at least to increase the punishments.
13. On 14 December 2005 the Court of Appeal, referring to the Supreme Court’s judgment of 29 November 2005 in the case NJA 2005 p. 805 (see below under “Relevant domestic law and practice”), rejected the charges against the applicants on the ground that a conviction would amount to a violation of their right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Convention.
14. The Office of the Prosecutor-General ( Riksåklagaren ) appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court ( Högsta domstolen ) and requested it to convict the applicants of agitation against a national or ethnic group, arguing that it would not amount to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in the circumstances of the present case. The applicants disputed the appeal.
15. On 6 July 2006 the Supreme Court convicted the applicants of agitation against a national or ethnic group. The majority of judges (three out of five) first considered decisive for the outcome of the case whether the interference with the applicants’ freedom to distribute the leaflets could be considered necessary in a democratic society and whether the interference with their freedom of expression could be deemed proportionate to the aim of protecting the group of homosexuals from the violation that the content of the leaflets constituted. The majority then held:
“In the light of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding Article 10, in the interpretation of the expression “contempt” in the provision regarding incitement against a group, a comprehensive assessment of the circumstances of the case should be made, where, in particular, the following should be considered. The handing out of the leaflets took place at a school. The accused did not have free access to the premises, which can be considered a relatively sheltered environment as regards the political actions of outsiders. The placement of the leaflets in and on the pupils’ lockers meant that the young people received them without having the possibility to decide whether they wanted to accept them or not. The purpose of the handing out of the leaflets was indeed to initiate a debate between pupils and teachers on a question of public interest, namely the objectivity of the education in Swedish schools, and to supply the pupils with arguments. However, these were formulated in a way that was offensive and disparaging for homosexuals as a group and in violation of the duty under Article 10 to avoid as far as possible statements that are unwarrantably offensive to others thus constituting an assault on their rights, and without contributing to any form of public debate which could help to further mutual understanding. The purpose of the relevant sections in the leaflets could have been achieved without statements that were offensive to homosexuals as a group. Thus, the situation was in part different from that in NJA 2005 p. 805, where a pastor made his statements before his congregation in a sermon based on certain biblical quotations. The above-mentioned reasons taken together lead to the conclusion that Chapter 16, Article 8 of the Penal Code, interpreted in conformity with the Convention, permits a judgment of conviction, given the present circumstances of this case.”
16. The minority (two judges) found that convicting the applicants would not be proportionate to the aims pursued and would therefore be in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. Hence, the minority wanted to acquit the applicants but gave separate reasons for this conclusion, at least in part. One of them was of the view that the prosecution was not formulated in such a way that the Supreme Court could take into consideration that the leaflets had been distributed at a school and addressed to the pupils, while the other found it natural that the leaflets had been aimed at pupils and agreed with the majority that an overall assessment of the circumstances had to be made.
17. The first three applicants were given suspended sentences combined with fines ranging from SEK 1,800 (approximately 200 euros (EUR)) to SEK 19,000 (approximately EUR 2,000) and the fourth applicant was sentenced to probation.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
18. Chapter 16, Article 8 of the Penal Code ( Brottsbalken, SFS 1962:700) provides that a person who, in a disseminated statement or communication, threatens or expresses contempt for a national, ethnic or other such group of persons with allusion to race, colour, national or ethnic origin, religious beliefs or sexual orientation, should be convicted of agitation against a national or ethnic group. The offence carries a penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment. If the offence is considered minor the penalty is a fine, and if it is considered to be aggravated the penalty is imprisonment for no less than six months and no more than four years.
19. Agitation against homosexuals as a group was made a criminal offence by an amendment of the law that came into effect on 1 January 2003. According to the preparatory work on that amendment, as reproduced in Government Bill 2001/02:59 (pp. 32-33), homosexuals constitute an exposed group which is often subjected to criminal acts because of their sexual orientation, and national socialist and other racist groups agitate against homosexuals and homosexuality as part of their propaganda. The preparatory work also stated that there were good reasons to assume that the homophobic attitude that had caused certain offenders to attack individuals on account of their sexual orientation derived from the hate, threat and inflammatory propaganda against homosexuals as a group that was spread by the majority of Nazi and other right-wing extremist groups in the country.
20. The Supreme Court, in its judgment of 29 November 2005 (case NJA 2005 p. 805) concerning statements made by a pastor during a sermon which were deemed to have expressed contempt for homosexuals as a group within the meaning of Chapter 16, Article 8 of the Penal Code, considered that the legislation was in accordance with the Convention. However, the Supreme Court found that, the word “contempt” in the provision regarding incitement against a group had to be interpreted more restrictively than the preparatory work appeared to indicate if an application of the provisions that was in line with the Convention was to be achieved. The Supreme Court then found that an application of the provision that was in line with the Convention would not permit a judgment convicting the defendant, given the circumstances of the case, and rejected the charges.
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
21. The applicants complained that the judgment of the Supreme Court constituted a violation of their freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 of the Convention, which reads, in its relevant parts, as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, ... for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, ...”
22. The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
1. The submissions of the parties
23. The applicants maintained that their conviction constituted an unjustified interference with their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention.
24. They also argued, albeit in conjunction with their complaint under Article 7, that the law on agitation against a national or ethnic group was so unclear that it was not possible for them to ascertain whether or not their act was criminal.
25. Further, in the applicants’ view, the text in the leaflets was not disparaging or insulting to homosexuals and hence could not justify a restriction of their right to freedom of expression pursuant to Article 10 § 2.
26. The applicants contended that the wording in the leaflets was not hateful and did not encourage anyone to commit hateful acts. In their view, the leaflets rather encouraged the pupils to discuss certain matters with their teachers and provided them with arguments to use in these discussions.
27. They further submitted that freedom of speech should be limited only in its content and not as regards how and where it was exercised, pointing out that they were found guilty for agitation against a national or ethnic group and not for trespassing or littering.
28. In this connection they did not consider Swedish schools to be relatively sheltered from the political actions of outsiders. On the contrary, they alleged that Swedish schools had a tradition of letting political youth parties spread their messages, especially during election years.
29. The applicants further stated that the pupils at the school in question were between the ages of 16 and 19 and hence of an age to understand the content of the leaflets.
30. Lastly, they emphasised that their case should be compared to the Swedish case NJA 2005 p. 805, in which a pastor who had offended homosexuals in a sermon was acquitted by the Supreme Court of agitation against a national or ethnic group with reference to Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention.
31. The Government agreed that Article 10 of the Convention was applicable to the present case and that the criminal conviction of the applicants constituted an interference with their right to freedom of expression as prescribed under the second section of that Article. However, the Government submitted that the criminal conviction and the sentence imposed were proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, and thus necessary in a democratic society.
32. The Government stressed that the applicants were convicted of the crime of agitation against a national or ethnic group, in accordance with Chapter 16 Section 8 of the Penal Code, and that all five justices of the Supreme Court reached the conclusion that this penalty was prescribed by law within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
33. The Government also contended that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression served legitimate aims within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, with particular emphasis on “the protection of the reputation or rights of others”, that is, homosexuals as a group.
34. In the Government’s opinion several factors in the present case called for the conclusion that the domestic courts enjoyed a particularly wide margin of appreciation when examining the issue of whether the applicants’ conviction was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. They also argued that the same factors should be taken into account when examining whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society.
35. In this regard, the Government first pointed out that the circumstances of the present case differed from those prevailing in several of the cases where the Court had ruled on the proportionality of measures interfering with the right to freedom of expression under Article 10. Many of those cases had dealt with the conviction of journalists and editors who had written or published “defamatory” statements in newspaper articles. The Government thus submitted that the Court’s abundant case-law insisting on the essential role of a free press and of the press as a “public watchdog” was not of immediate relevance to the present case.
36. Secondly, the Government argued that it followed from the Court’s case-law that the limits of acceptable criticism were wider as regards, for example, governments, politicians or similar actors in the public domain than for private individuals. In the Government’s view, there was no reason why a group of individuals targeted by certain statements owing to a common denominator which distinguished them from other individuals – for example regarding sexual orientation or religion – should be required to display a greater degree of tolerance than a single individual in the equivalent situation.
37. Thirdly, the Government maintained that a certain distinction should be made between the present case and cases dealing with the area of political speech and statements made in the course of a political debate, where freedom of expression was of the utmost importance and there was little scope for restrictions. The reason for this was that the leaflets were distributed in a school, that is, an environment relatively sheltered from the political actions of outsiders.
38. Fourthly, the Government stressed that the Court had emphasised that balancing individual interests protected under the Convention that might well be contradictory was a difficult matter, and that Contracting States must have a broad margin of appreciation in this regard.
39. The Government also argued that the outcome of the domestic proceedings – where the applicants were convicted by the District Court, acquitted by the Court of Appeal and convicted again by three out of five justices of the Supreme Court with reference to, inter alia, Article 10 § 2 of the Convention – clearly showed that the task of balancing the different interests involved and interpreting Swedish criminal legislation in the light of the Convention and the Court’s case-law had proved particularly difficult and delicate in the present case. They contended that in these circumstances the national authorities, by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, were in a better position than international judges to give an opinion on the exact content of the concept “the protection of the reputation or rights of others” and to assess whether a particular measure would constitute an unjustified interference with the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 § 2.
40. The Government further emphasised that the domestic courts had made a careful and thorough investigation of the requirements of the Convention and the Court’s case-law and had carried out a proportionality test in full conformity with the standards set by the Convention and the principles embodied in Article 10.
41. INTERIGHTS (the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights) and the International Commission of Jurists, referring to the Court’s case-law, inter alia, submitted the following.
42. Despite the prevalence of homophobic hate speech, there has been a failure to adopt particularised standards to address the problem, at both the European and the international political level. While the Court has well ‑ developed case-law with respect to permissible restrictions on freedom of expression, it has not had the opportunity to develop a comprehensive approach to hate speech directed against a person or class of persons because of their sexual orientation. The Court has, however, repeatedly held that discrimination based on sexual orientation is as serious as discrimination based on “race, origin or colour” or sex. The Court has also found incompatible with the Convention laws concerning same-sex conduct, the age of consent, military service, adoption, child custody and inheritance that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
43. When the Court comes to the “proportionality” analysis under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, the means of communication is a relevant factor, since the impact of speech is proportional to the size of the audience it is likely to reach. It follows that when the impugned speech reaches a wider audience more caution is demanded in using that means of communication. However, as the Court has noted, where children and adolescents are concerned certain restrictive measures may be necessary to prevent pernicious effects on the morals of that group.
44. The present case provides an opportunity for the Court to consolidate an approach to hate speech directed against a person or class of persons because of their sexual orientation that is elaborated in such a way so as to ensure that they are protected from the harmful effects of such expression. A clear analogy can be drawn between racism and xenophobia – which have been the subject matter of much of the Court’s jurisprudence – and sexual orientation.
45. Sexual orientation should be treated in the same way as categories such as race, ethnicity and religion which are commonly covered by hate-speech and hate-crime laws, because sexual orientation is a characteristic that is fundamental to a person’s sense of self. It is, moreover, used as a marker of group identity.
46. When a particular group is singled out for victimisation and discrimination, hate-speech laws should protect those characteristics that are essential to a person’s identity and that are used as evidence of belonging to a particular group. Restrictions on freedom of expression must therefore be permissible in instances where the aim of the speech is to degrade, insult or incite hatred against persons or a class of person on account of their sexual orientation, so long as such restrictions are in accordance with the Court’s well-established principles.
47. The Court finds, and this is common ground between the parties, that the applicants’ conviction amounted to an interference with their freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 § 1 of the Convention.
48. Such an interference will infringe the Convention if it does not meet the requirements of Article 10 § 2. It should therefore be determined whether it was “prescribed by law”, whether it pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and whether it was “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve those aims.
(a) Lawfulness and legitimate aim
49. The Court observes that the applicants were convicted of agitation against a national or ethnic group in accordance with Chapter 16, Article 8 of the Swedish Penal Code (see paragraph 18 above), which at the time of the alleged crime included statements that threatened or expressed contempt for a group of people with reference to their sexual orientation. The Court hence considers that the impugned interference was sufficiently clear and foreseeable and thus “prescribed by law” within the meaning of the Convention. The Court further considers that the interference served a legitimate aim, namely “the protection of the reputation and rights of others”, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
(b) Necessity of the interference
50. It remains for the Court to consider whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”.
51. The test of “necessity in a democratic society” requires the Court to determine whether the interference complained of corresponded to a “pressing social need”. In this respect, the Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (see, among other authorities, Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, § 68, ECHR 2004 ‑ XI).
52. In reviewing under Article 10 the decisions taken by the national authorities pursuant to their margin of appreciation, the Court must determine, in the light of the case as a whole, including the content of the comments held against the applicants and the context in which they made them, whether the interference at issue was “proportionate” to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons adduced by them to justify the interference are “relevant and sufficient” (see, among other authorities, Pedersen and Baadsgaard, cited above, §§ 69 and 70, and Kobenter and Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria, no. 60899/00, § 29, 2 November 2006).
53. The Court further reiterates that freedom of expression is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly (see, among other authorities, Pedersen and Baadsgaard, cited above, § 71).
54. The Court notes that the applicants distributed the leaflets with the aim of starting a debate about the lack of objectivity of education in Swedish schools. The Court agrees with the Supreme Court that even if this is an acceptable purpose, regard must be paid to the wording of the leaflets. The Court observes that, according to the leaflets, homosexuality was “a deviant sexual proclivity” that had “a morally destructive effect on the substance of society”. The leaflets also alleged that homosexuality was one of the main reasons why HIV and AIDS had gained a foothold and that the “homosexual lobby” tried to play down paedophilia. In the Court’s opinion, although these statements did not directly recommend individuals to commit hateful acts, they are serious and prejudicial allegations.
55. Moreover, the Court reiterates that inciting to hatred does not necessarily entail a call for an act of violence, or other criminal acts. Attacks on persons committed by insulting, holding up to ridicule or slandering specific groups of the population can be sufficient for the authorities to favour combating racist speech in the face of freedom of expression exercised in an irresponsible manner (see Féret v. Belgium, no. 15615/07, § 73, 16 July 2009). In this regard, the Court stresses that discrimination based on sexual orientation is as serious as discrimination based on “race, origin or colour” (see, inter alia, Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, § 97, ECHR 1999 ‑ VI).
56. The Court also takes into consideration that the leaflets were left in the lockers of young people who were at an impressionable and sensitive age and who had no possibility to decline to accept them (see, mutatis mutandis, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 52, Series A no. 24). Moreover, the distribution of the leaflets took place at a school which none of the applicants attended and to which they did not have free access.
57. In considering the approach of the domestic courts when deciding whether a “pressing social need” existed, and the reasons the authorities adduced to justify the interference, the Court observes the following. The Supreme Court acknowledged the applicants’ right to express their ideas while at the same time stressing that along with freedoms and rights people also have obligations; one such obligation being, as far as possible, to avoid statements that are unwarrantably offensive to others, constituting an assault on their rights. The Supreme Court thereafter found that the statements in the leaflets had been unnecessarily offensive. It also emphasised that the applicants had left the leaflets in or on the pupils’ lockers, thereby imposing them on the pupils. Having balanced the relevant considerations, the Supreme Court found no reason not to apply the relevant Article of the Penal Code.
58. Finally, an important factor to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference with freedom of expression is the nature and severity of the penalties imposed (see Ceylan v. Turkey [GC], no. 23556/94, § 37, ECHR 1999-IV; Tammer v. Estonia, no. 41205/98, § 69, ECHR 2001-I; and Skaÿka v. Poland, no. 43425/98, §§ 41 ‑ 42, 27 May 2003). The Court notes that the applicants were not sentenced to imprisonment, although the crime of which they were convicted carries a penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment. Instead, three of them were given suspended sentences combined with fines ranging from approximately EUR 200 to EUR 2,000, and the fourth applicant was sentenced to probation. The Court does not find these penalties excessive in the circumstances.
59. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the conviction of the applicants and the sentences imposed on them were not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and that the reasons given by the Supreme Court in justification of those measures were relevant and sufficient. The interference with the applicants’ exercise of their right to freedom of expression could therefore reasonably be regarded by the national authorities as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation and rights of others.
60. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the application does not reveal a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7 OF THE CONVENTION
61. The applicants complained that they were convicted of a crime not prescribed by law. They relied on Article 7 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. ... “
62. Having regard to the finding under Article 10 that the measure complained of was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of the Convention (see paragraph 49 above), the Court finds that this part of the application should be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 a) and 4 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint under Article 10 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;