CASE OF SZANYI v. HUNGARY

1. The case originated in an application (no. 35493/13) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr Tibor Jenő Szanyi (“the applicant”), on 27 May 2013.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr D. Karsai, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Justice.
3. The applicant, a Member of Parliament at the material time, alleged in particular that the decisions to fine him and to ban his interpellations had violated his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.
4. On 7 November 2013 the application was communicated to the Government.
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Budapest. At the material time, he was a Member of Parliament and a member of the largest opposition party, the Hungarian Socialist Party.
A. The fine imposed on the applicant
6. At the plenary parliamentary session on 18 March 2013 the applicant made an interpellation. After the respondent Government member ’ s reply, the applicant had the floor to give a counter-reply. According to the applicant and not contested by the Government, during his speech numerous remarks were made. Once the applicant finished talking, he sat down and showed his left middle finger in the direction of the Jobbik MPs.
7. On 25 March 2013 the Speaker initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. He submitted a proposal to the plenary to fine him – under section 48(3) of Act no. XXXVI of 2012 on Parliament – 131,410 Hungarian forints (approximately 450 euros ) for using a blatantly offensive expression.
The Speaker ’ s proposal reads as follows:
Decision in disciplinary matter
According to the minutes of Parliament ’ s session of 18 March 2013, Tibor Szanyi MP used a blatantly offensive expression during the counter-reply ( viszonválasza során, sic ) of his interpellation.
For this reason, I propose, under section 48(3) of Act no. XXXVI of 2012 on Parliament and in application of my prerogatives under subparagraph 6 of the same, that Parliament
whose amount should be one-third of the MP ’ s honorarium, that is, HUF 131,410.
An affirmative decision was adopted by the plenary on 28 March 2013, without any remedy available.
B. The banning of the applicant ’ s interpellations
8. On 30 April 2013 the applicant submitted – under section 90 of Parliamentary Resolution no. 46/1994. (IX.30.) OGY (“the Rules of Parliament”) – an interpellation to the Speaker. It was addressed to the Minister of National Development and concerned the publication of the list of successful bidders in the national tender for tobacco retail licences.
“ The nation has acquired 1,500 tobacco retailers. They have most of the dough [2]; more precisely FIDESZ ’ s [3] pals and cronies have it. The mafia-government cannot be bothered that several thousands of petrol station keepers, grocers, newsagents or real tobacco retailers have lost their living.
Tobacco retailers have not had a significant margin, exactly 4 .5 per cent. This was generally just enough to cover perhaps the overheads, although the costs of lease of the shop and the employees ’ wages had to be generated beyond this profit. It has been the State in any case that got the real profit through the excise tax and the VAT.
What is happening now? Every twenty tobacco retailers will go bankrupt and be replaced by one, that is, instead of every twenty retailers, one will have the concentrated profit.
However, the newly introduced 10 per cent profit, now due to the cronies ( csókosoknak járó ), will result in a situation in which the [new] “national” retailers will have forty times higher profit than was usual. Forty-fold profit for the pals and the cronies! This is big-time bloody swinishness ( vérbő disznóság )!
Tobacco licences are, in Europe, normally the privilege of those with impaired working abilities. Why? Because this work requires the least mobility, it is locally done and not too complicated. The government have finished off this tradition by forcing into unemployment tens of thousands of employees of small Hungarian enterprises; instead, they give all the opportunities to their obese pals, who can now freely select their underpaid dummy employees among the freshly expropriated losers.
The government ’ s trust of lies is disseminating their false sermon. But there is no point in lying; the tens of thousands who have been sacked and their families will not be deceived. But I am going even further. There is not one living soul in this country who would believe your deceitful talk.
Not even yourselves, since you are perfectly aware that you are legislating in order to rob. You have sacrificed tens of thousands of real Hungarian employments in order to be able to freely abuse the State monopoly.
I am asking therefore the Honourable Minister: is your face not burning with shame?
And if it is, are you then planning to surrender the power and duly hide your head? Or else are you planning to continue looting the country, now completely without a face, that is, barefacedly ( pofátlanul ) ?”
10. The interpellation was refused by the Speaker on 6 May 2013 – under section 97(4) of the Rules of Parliament – with the reasoning that it contained statements that were injurious to the prestige of Parliament and inadmissible in a democratically functioning system.
No remedy lay against the decision.
11. The applicant submitted a further interpellation on the same topic on 21 May 2013. This interpellation reads as follows [4] :
“The recent weeks were mostly about you distributing tobacco licences. To benefit from that, one basically needed to be right-wing, extreme right-wing. But to get the golden prize of the juicy retail spots possibly generating millions per day, one needed to belong to, one way or another, the jamboree of buddies of the local FIDESZ-chieftains.
To win, you did not even need to have business premises. Originally, it was sufficient to undertake to sell tobacco and to adore FIDESZ. In exchange and ex post facto, you have increased the statutory profit rate and, at the same time, prohibited tobacco selling anywhere else, destroying tens of thousands of shops and their employees, under the slogan “let the strong live and the weak perish”.
You, a mercenary of FIDESZ, are apparently eager to keep serving the other projects of FIDESZ as well, that is, what you can buy in these [new] shops will include, in addition to tobacco, alcohol, gambling tickets, newspapers and even things to lick. The category of “things to lick” seems still to be open, but one can fear that whatever you can buy in these “ Spahi -shops”, such as tax-free spirits, will be prohibited elsewhere. Amongst these, I am sure, you will consider sex toys, common horse-riding equipment, and, to please your [extreme right-wing] friends, maybe penis pumps as well or those dance bars around which naked strippers jerk.
I am asking you: have you calculated the damage you are causing to provincial Hungary through this operation? Will the licences issued be sufficient for the mayors and MPs of FIDESZ, reduced to a dummy existence after the falling down? Do you believe that the democratic forces winning the 2014 elections will allow your failed teams to continue operating on these looting fields?
My previous, prohibited question also targeted this issue: is your face not burning with shame? Since then, the answer has become clear: no, it is not, because you have already been, without a face, or to use your favourite expression, barefacedly playing games with the livelihood of the Hungarian people. You have pushed anyone into misery; you have taken away even the allowances of the most miserable, those disabled – just to be able to stuff your mafia feeding on public procurement.
I am asking therefore another question: are you willing to rush voluntarily onto History ’ s garbage dump, or do you want first to try your luck with the bold game called “power or prison”?
The interpellation was refused by the Speaker on 27 May 2013, with reasoning similar to the one above (see paragraph 10 above). No remedy lay against the decision.
12. The relevant domestic, comparative and international law is outlined in paragraphs 24 to 61 in the case of Karácsony and Others v. Hungary ([GC], no. 42461/13, 17 May 2016 ).
13. Section 48(3) of Act no. XXXVI of 2012 on Parliament provides as follows:
“ ... The remuneration ... of an MP whose intervention includes an expression susceptible to excessively injuring ... Parliament ’ s reputation ... may be reduced.”
14. Parliamentary Resolution no. 46/1994. (IX.30.) OGY ( “ the Rules of Parliament ” ), as in force at the relevant time, provided as follows:
“ (1) In order to ask for explanations, Members may address interpellations to those specified in the Fundamental Law on all matters within the function of the latter.
(2) The subject matter of the interpellation shall be indicated in the form of a title.
(3) The addressee shall be indicated in the interpellation, as well as the reason why he/she is competent to answer.
(4) The Speaker shall reject an interpellation which has not been submitted in accordance with paragraphs (1) to (3). The Parliament shall be informed thereof at on next sitting day. ”
“(4) A motion introduced not in conformity with the rules may be refused by the Speaker of Parliament.”
“ (2) Interpellations shall be submitted to the Speaker. An interpellation must contain the facts and circumstances related thereto.
(3) At the time as indicated in the orders of the day of Parliament ’ s sitting, at least ninety minutes shall be provided for debating each interpellation and question. Interpellations may be presented and questions may be asked in the first round by opposition parliamentary groups ... ”
“ (1) Parliament can only debate interpellations submitted ... at least four days before the sitting day.
(3) The interpellation can be presented in three minutes. There shall be four minutes for the answer, and another minute to make a declaration related to the answer. When these time limits are exceeded, the chair of the sitting shall withdraw the right to speak, giving the reason of the withdrawal.
(4) The interpellation presented shall not contain any new facts that have not been mentioned in the written text of the same. ... ”
“ (1) In case of a written response to the interpellation, the question and response shall be recorded in the minutes of the Parliament. The Speaker shall provide for sending the written answer to the Members. ... ”
15. According to Resolution 36/1998-2002 ÜB of 24 February 2000:
“If an interpellation ... submitted does not comply with Article 7 (1) and (2) of the Fundamental Law [5] and/or section 90(1) to (3) of [the Rules of Parliament], the Speaker shall reject the interpellation ... exercising his/her right specified in section 90(4) [6] and extended by section 91(2) of [the Rules of Parliament]. The Speaker is entitled to reject the interpellation ... both ex officio and at the request of the interpellated ... Member of Parliament. ... ”
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
16. The applicant complained that the measures of fining him and banning his interpellations infringed his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, since they did not serve a legitimate aim and were disproportionate. He claimed that declaring interpellations inadmissible for the protection of Parliament ’ s prestige constituted censorship and deprived the Members of Parliament of the possibility to express their opinion on issues of public interest.
Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
17. The Government submitted that the applicant could have challenged the impugned legislation as such before the Constitutional Court in the form of a constitutional complaint, which constituted an existing remedy available in respect of parliamentary disciplinary law. In their view, he had not, therefore, exhausted the domestic remedies available.
18. Referring to its relevant findings in Karácsony and Others v. Hungary ([GC], no. 42461/13, § 83, 17 May 2016 ), the Court is satisfied that this complaint cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
19. It is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, either. The Court further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
20. The applicant submitted that the impugned measures did not serve a legitimate aim, were disproportionate, had a chilling effect on Members of Parliament expressing their political opinion on issues of public interest, and were meant to discourage open debate on the side of members of the opposition party. In short, they amounted to censorship.
21. Any limitations on free expression should be applied narrowly, given the utmost importance of this right, even more so in the course of a public debate. In his expression and in his intended interpellations he had not endangered the functioning of Parliament or prevented other MPs from performing their duties. He had had no intention of breaking the Rules of Parliament or obstructing the activities of Parliament. His conduct had not been disruptive, unlike that of other MPs in previous terms. During the previous term of Parliament between 2006 and 2010, the then opposition (at the time of the events complained of forming a two-thirds majority) had chosen to leave the plenary session every time the Prime Minister held a speech, in order to protest, an event that had lasted several minutes during which time the official work of Parliament had practically been at a standstill. On those occasions no one had been fined, as the right of the opposition to express its political views on the leader of the government had outweighed the obstruction it had caused.
22. The Government submitted that although there had been an interference with the applicant ’ s right to freedom of expression, the scope of application and the reasons for the imposition of the impugned measures had been sufficiently clear and precisely formulated, and the sanctions had been foreseeable under the regulation and the established practice of Parliament. The interference was necessary in a democratic society in order to achieve the legitimate aims of ensuring the proper functioning and the authority and dignity of Parliament, and was lawful under the Act on Parliament.
23. Under the Court ’ s case-law concerning the duties and responsibilities mentioned in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, such duties and responsibilities were to be understood as flowing from the specific situation of the person actually exercising the right to freedom of expression. In assessing those duties and responsibilities, the situation and legal status of the given person must be taken into account. Thus, the duties and responsibilities need to be assessed in the light of the societal and professional characteristics of the activities carried out by the person in question. Hence, MPs also had to exercise their rights by paying due regard to their special situation.
24. In addition to the separation of powers and Parliament ’ s autonomy, the political nature of these disciplinary decisions also excluded legal control over them. The regulation secured an on-the-merits discretionary right to Parliament as it ensured for it the right to regulate its members. A chair ’ s actions inevitably flowed from political discretion. It should not be overlooked that in Parliament political dialogue was being conducted, that is, the speeches and conduct in the debate and violating the Rules of Parliament, the assessment of the injury caused, and the imposition of a sanction proportionate to the injury were issues requiring mostly political deliberation, the review of which from a purely legal aspect would be difficult.
25. Furthermore, the sanctions imposed on the applicant were not disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued since the applicant had had the opportunity to express his opinion in a manner compatible with the Rules of Parliament. In any case, the fine imposed for the gesture demonstrated on 18 March 2013 had not prevented the applicant from expressing his views and could not therefore be seen as censorship ( see Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103).
The Government also submitted that the Hungarian system of maintaining order in Parliament was in compliance with the principle of progressivity meaning that normally a harsher sanction was preceded by a mere call to order or a warning – although it is true that sometimes the sudden occurrence of serious disturbance might call for the immediate application of one of the more severe measures.
Lastly, the Government added that an English translation of the interpellations did not fully reflect their original vulgar tone.
( a ) Whether there was an interference
26. The Court observes that the applicant was subjected to a fine as a sanction for the non-verbal expression which he had made.
Moreover, he was prevented from making the interpellations he intended. The Court notes that interpellation in Hungarian law is a right for MPs to bring controversial issues to the attention of the governing majority and to require explanations, and that the interpellation has to be made in a limited time-frame of three minutes plus one. For an MP to be able to make one, he or she is required to submit its text, containing the related facts and circumstances, beforehand to the Speaker (see paragraph 14 above). For the Court, interpellation thus constitutes political speech, undoubtedly protected by Article 10 of the Convention, which was in essence admitted by the Government.
It follows that there has been an interference with the applicant ’ s right to freedom of expression.
27. The Court observes that the impugned measure (the fine) was based on section 48(3) of Act no. XXXVI of 2012 on Parliament and section 97(4) of the Rules of Parliament and was therefore prescribed by law.
However, in so far as the interpellations are concerned, the Court observes that the grounds for rejection of an interpellation are purely formal (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above) and that it has not been argued that the formal conditions were not met in the applicant ’ s case. The Court will take into account this circumstance when examining the necessity of banning the interpellations.
28. Referring to its conclusions on this point in Karácsony and Others (cited above, §§ 128-29), the Court accepts that the interference pursued the legitimate aims of protection of the rights of others and the prevention of disorder, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
( d ) Necessary in a democratic society
29. The principles governing the issue at hand, as present in the Court ’ s case-law, are outlined paragraphs 132 to 147 of Karácsony and Others (cited above) as well as in Handyside v. the United Kingdom (7 December 1976, § 49, Series A no. 24) and Jerusalem v. Austria ( no. 26958/95, §§ 36 and 40, ECHR 2001-II).
30. In addition the Court would add that Article 10 does not prohibit prior restraints on publication as such. This is borne out not only by the words “conditions”, “restrictions”, “preventing” and “prevention” which appear in that provision, but also by the Court ’ s considerations in the cases of The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) (26 April 1979, Series A no. 30) and markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany (20 November 1989, Series A no. 165). On the other hand, the dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court. This is especially so where the press is concerned, because news, dealing with a topical issue, may be regarded as “perishable commodity” and to delay the publication thereof, even for a short period, may well deprive news of all the value and interest. The Court considers that, in certain circumstances, the timeliness of a parliamentary interpellation is of comparable importance. Moreover, interpellation in the Hungarian system is a right of each Member of Parliament. It constitutes an important minority right that needs special protection in the parliamentary activity of a democracy (see Karácsony and Others, cited above, §§ 147 and 157).
( ii ) Application of those principles to the present case
( α ) The fine imposed on the applicant
31. With regard to the fine imposed on the applicant for his conduct at the session of 18 March 2013, the Court considers that the interference consisted in the application of a sanction in a process where the procedural guarantees and those of the appearance of non-partisanship were insufficient, even if the applicant ’ s non-verbal expression was grossly inappropriate and vulgar.
In this connection, it is of concern that the Speaker ’ s proposal forming the basis for the sanction sustained by the applicant does not offer a transparent description of the impugned conduct, nor a consideration of the circumstances or detailed reasons for the decision.
32. For essentially the same reasons as the ones set out in paragraphs 148 to 162, in particular paragraphs 151, 154, 156 and 158 in Karácsony and Others (cited above) – notably the absence of effective and adequate safeguards against the abuse of disciplinary powers, the lack of adequate reasoning in the decisions and the non-availability of a parliamentary procedure in which the applicant could have been heard – this interference cannot be considered “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
( β ) The banning of the applicant ’ s interpellations
33. The States – or indeed Parliaments themselves – are competent to regulate independently the time, place and manner of speech in Parliament; and correspondingly the Court ’ s scrutiny in this respect should be limited. The disciplinary supervision by the Speaker of Parliament is – in principle – an important counterweight to the Member of Parliament ’ s privileges. By contrast, States have very limited latitude in regulating the content of parliamentary speech. However, some regulation may be considered necessary in order to prevent forms of expression such as direct or indirect calls for violence. In verifying that the freedom of expression remains secured, the Court ’ s scrutiny in this context should be stricter. In any case, through the generally recognised rule of parliamentary immunity the States provide an increased level of protection to speech in Parliament, with the consequence that the need for the Court ’ s intervention could nonetheless be expected to be rare. The Court attaches importance to protection of the parliamentary minority from abuse by the majority. It will therefore examine with particular care any measure which appears to operate solely, or principally, to the disadvantage of the opposition. In the present case, the interference concerned exclusively the content of parliamentary speech, entailing a narrow margin of appreciation of the State ’ s side – all the more so since the proposed interpellations were devoid of any appearance of a call for violence ( see Karácsony and Others, cited above, §§ 140, 146 and 148).
34. In assessing the proportionality of this interference, the Court will consider the nature of the intended expression in the context of the legitimate aim sought to be protected, the impact on order in Parliament and the authority of Parliament, the process applied and the sanctions imposed.
35. Contrary to the argument of the Government, according to which speech in Parliament does not fall under the ordinary standards of speech as it entails special responsibilities of members, the Court reiterates that freedom of expression is especially important for elected representatives of the people, interference with which can only be justified by very weighty reasons (see Karácsony and Others, cited above, § 137).
36. The Court notes that the applicant, a member of the parliamentary opposition, intended to express his views on the Government ’ s project to re-regulate tobacco retail. The interpellations, introduced under the relevant rule of the Rules of Parliament, concerned a public matter of the highest political importance that is directly related to the functioning of a democracy. The Court observes at this juncture that to submit an interpellation is a statutory right of MPs, not subject to the Speaker ’ s discretionary power (see paragraph 1 4 above).
37. It is true that the applicant was not prevented from expressing his views on the bill in the eventual voting process. However, the interpellations concerned the Government ’ s responsibility for the consequences of the bill; and the views contained in them cannot be equated with the political act of agreement or disagreement expressed by the vote. The ban on the two intended interpellations resulted in a situation where the applicant was effectively hindered in participating in the debate – a situation having substantial impact on the functions of parliamentarians related to the representation of their constituents. In view of the importance of such political expressions, only very weighty reasons justify an interference with parliamentary interpellations, especially when such interference occurs by way of a prior prohibition applied to a certain interpellation intended by an MP in an ongoing debate.
38. Considering the language used by the applicant in the draft interpellations, the Court is satisfied that, although written in a controversial, sometimes rude, and in any case quite polemic style, those texts cannot be reasonably seen as giving rise to very weighty reasons for the restrictions complained of, especially since they did not contain any gratuitous personal denigrations. That said, the obscene references in the second interpellation remain highly problematic, even in the face of the fact that it was written in response to the ban on the first one. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, freedom of expression is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population (see Handyside, loc. cit.). In the consideration of the nature of the expression, the Court finds that the protection of minority members and parties within Parliament is also of concern, and special weight must be paid to ensuring their ongoing right to express opinions, and the public ’ s right to hear those viewpoints. Given the importance of public exposure to minority views as an integral function of democracy, minority members should have leeway to express their views, even if in harsh language, within a reasonable framework (see Karácsony and Others, cited above, § 141 ).
39. The Court observes nevertheless that although the reasons for banning the interpellations did not specifically mention this element, the second text contained some phrases with sexual connotation which may raise some concerns from the perspective of parliamentary decorum.
Impact on order in, and authority of, Parliament
40. The Court notes the importance of orderly conduct in Parliament and recognises the importance of respect for constitutional institutions in a democratic society. The Court has to satisfy itself that the domestic authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and relied on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.
41. In terms of their actual impact and the infringement of the rights of others, the Court cannot see how the applicant ’ s expressions could have disturbed the actual functioning of Parliament. The Government have not adduced cogent reasons justifying the measure applied by the Speaker so as to protect Parliament ’ s authority, allegedly challenged by the offensive accusations directed against the Government policy. Moreover, the Speaker ’ s decision did not provide any relevant explanation on that.
42. Moreover, it cannot be argued that the Government as a collective political entity has a right not to be criticised in harsh terms as long as it is not demonstrated that such criticism affects the rights of the individual members of the Government in a manner contrary to Article 10. However, such a personal attack has not been argued in the present case.
The process leading to the interference
43. The Court observes that the ban was imposed without any debate, which did not offer any protection to a member of the opposition at the material time. Moreover, the impugned decisions of the Speaker did not specify, even less give reasons, why the proposed interpellations were “ injurious to the prestige of Parliament and inadmissible in a democratically functioning system” (see paragraph 10 above), necessitating a sanction effectively preventing the applicant from making those interventions (see, in the context of ex post facto sanctions, Karácsony and Others, cited above, §§ 156-58) – and this without any procedural safeguards available.
44. The Court observes that a prior call to order or warning, at least once, is European standard in the framework of parliamentary discipline (see Karácsony and Others, cited above, §§ 51 and 57 ). However, in the present case, censorship was directly exercised, without considering any less intrusive measures. At this juncture, the Court notes that the principle of progressivity of sanctions referred to by the Government (see paragraph 25 above) does not seem to have come into play in the instant case.
45. Noting that the interpellations were banned for their style and contents rather than not meeting the formal requirements – which appears to have been the sole valid ground for rejection (see paragraph 27 above) – the Court concludes that these interferences were devoid of a compelling reason, since the interests of the authority of, and order in, Parliament were not demonstrated to be seriously affected, nor was it shown that these interests were on balance weightier than the right to freedom of expression of the opposition. Moreover, the procedural guarantees and those of the appearance of non-partisanship (see Karácsony and Others, cited above, § 157 ) were insufficient. Therefore, the interferences cannot be considered “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
46. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
47. The applicant complained of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 10, as under domestic law no remedy lay against the decisions complained of.
Article 13 of the Convention reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
48. The Government contested that argument.
49. The Court considers that, while this complaint is also admissible, it is not necessary to examine it separately (see Karácsony and Others, cited above, § 174), having regard to its conclusion under Article 10 of the Convention ( see paragraph 46 above).
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
50. The applicant further complained that the measures showed that he was discriminated against on account of his political opinion, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention, which provides as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. ”
51. The applicant submitted that only opposition members of Parliament were subjected to disciplinary sanctions by the Speaker. He also maintained that the Speaker had expressed on several occasions his disapproval of the communication methods used by opposition parties in Parliament.
52. The Government observed that the applicant ’ s arguments in this connection relied only on the general statement that opposition members were more frequently found to have violated the Rules of Parliament. However, for the Government, such an overall consideration could not justify a conclusion that the applicant was discriminated against, since such figures simply flow from the fact that opposition party MPs more frequently express their opinion by means violating the Rules of Parliament.
53. The Court ’ s case-law establishes that where a general policy or measure has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group, it is not excluded that this may be considered as discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed or directed at that group (see Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, § 154, ECHR 2001 III (extracts)).
54. Even assuming that the majority of MPs sanctioned for their alleged disturbing behaviour in Parliament were members of the opposition, in the absence of a showing that behaviour similar to that of the applicant has been tolerated in the case of majority members, the Court does not consider that this in itself discloses a practice which could be classified as discriminatory within the meaning of Article 14. Having regard to all the materials in the case file, there is no substantiation of the applicant ’ s allegation that he was discriminated against in the enjoyment of any of his Convention rights.
55. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
56. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
57. The applicant claimed 450 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, that is, the amount of the fine. In respect of non-pecuniary damage, he claimed EUR 60,000.
58. The Government contested this claim.
59. The Court considers that in the event that the applicant has paid the fine imposed on him (see paragraph 7 above), the Government should cover the pecuniary loss incurred on that account by reimbursing the amount of the fine to him.
60. Moreover, it considers that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage the applicant sustained.
61. The applicant also claimed EUR 2 ,65 0, plus 27% VAT, for the legal fees incurred before the Court. This sum corresponds to 13 hours of legal work billable by his lawyer.
62. The Government contested this claim.
63. According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the full sum claimed.
64. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
1. Declares, by six votes to one, the complaints under Article 10 and Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 10 admissible;