CASE OF MARAVIĆ MARKEŠ v. CROATIA

1. The case originated in an application (no. 70923/11) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Croatian national, Ms Dragica Karla Maravić Markeš (“the applicant”), on 20 April 2011.
2. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs Štefica Stažnik.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that in administrative proceedings the domestic authorities had breached the principle of equality of arms.
4. On 21 February 2012 the application was communicated to the Government.
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Zagreb.
6. In 198 5 the applicant was employed as an inspector for Zagreb Municipal Council ( Grad Zagreb ). On 25 June 1991 the Executive Board ( Izvršno vijeće ) of the Municipal Council removed the applicant from her position and on 26 June 1991 she was made available for redeployment ( stavljena na raspolaganje ) and subsequently redeployed to the Municipal Council ’ s Secretariat for Planning, Public Utilities, Transport and Infrastructure ( Gradski sekretarijat za prostorno uređenje, komunalne poslove, promet i veze – “the Secretariat” ) until 30 September 1991, without being given a permanent role there.
7. On 30 September 1991 the Secretariat determined that the applicant could not be found a permanent position within the organisation and terminated her employment upon the expiry of her notice period on 31 March 1992. The applicant did not, at the time, receive any severance pay following her dismissal.
8. On 29 July 2006 the applicant requested payment of severance pay from Zagreb Municipal Council ’ s Office for Planning, Environmental Protection, Development, Construction, Public Utilities and Transport ( Gradski ured za prostorno uređenje, zaštitu okoliša, izgradnju grada, graditeljstvo, komunalne poslove i promet – “the Municipal Office”).
9. On 10 October 2006 the Municipal Office found that the request for payment should have been submitted within three years of the applicant ’ s dismissal and rejected it as lodged out of time. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:
The request of Dragica Markeš is inadmissible, as the conditions for initiating proceedings have not been met ...
By the Secretariat ’ s decision ... the applicant ’ s employment was terminated on 31 March 1992 in accordance with section 383 of the Public Administration Act.
On 29 July 2006 the applicant requested the severance pay, relying on section 383(a) of the Public Administration Act.
This Office finds that in the present case the conditions for initiating proceedings following the request of Dragica Markeš have not been met.
Section 138 of the Labour Act ... sets the statute of limitations for claims arising from employment at three years.
Section 214 subsection 1 of the Obligations Act ... provides that the right to claim fulfilment of an obligation ceases when the statutory limitation period expires ...
In the present case, the statute of limitations ran from 1 April 1992. It follows that the applicant lodged her request for severance pay out of time ... ”
10. The applicant appealed against this decision to the Chief of the Municipal Office and on 9 November 2006 he dismissed the appeal as without merit and upheld the first-instance decision. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:
After an examination of the appeal and the entire case file, it was found that the first-instance body had fully and correctly established the factual background and had rendered a correct decision. There had been no breaches of procedural rules or errors in the application of the law to the detriment of the appellant ...
As regards the appellant ’ s allegations that, instead of provisions of the Labour Act and the Obligations Act, the provisions of the State Administration Act and Administrative Proceedings Act should have been applied to her case, [this authority finds them to be ] unfounded ...
Section 371 of the Obligations Act provided that claims became time-barred after five years, if no other statutory limitation period was prescribed by law.
Section 138 of the Labour Act provides that the statute of limitations for claims arising from employment, including severance pay, is three years.
In the light of the above, it is apparent at the outset that under both the Obligations Act, relevant for determining the statute of limitations at the time the appellant ’ s employment was terminated, and under the Labour Act, relevant for determining the statute of limitations at the time of lodging the request, the appellant ’ s claim is time-barred.
The validity of the decision of the first-instance authority is therefore clear ... ”
11. On 2 3 December 2006 the applicant brought an administrative action against the appeal decision in the Administrative Court ( Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske ). Subsequently, the Administrative Court forwarded the case for comment to the Municipal Office.
12. On 15 February 2007 the Municipal Office submitted its observations to the Administrative Court. In those observations the Municipal Office raised the issue of the applicant ’ s entitlement to severance pay for the first time and reiterated that the request for payment had been lodged out of time. These observations were not forwarded to the applicant. The relevant part of the observations reads as follows:
II. It is further noted that even if the claimant had requested severance pay within the statutory time-limit, she would not have been entitled to it, as her employment was not terminated on the basis of section 383(a) of the State Administration Act, on which the claimant relied, but on the basis of section 383 of that Act ....
Section 383 of the State Administration Act, on the basis of which the claimant ’ s employment was terminated, envisages the restructuring of units or individual posts as grounds for being made available for redeployment or termination of employment, and as such does not envisage severance pay ...
On the contrary, section 383(a) envisages the needs of the civil service as grounds for being made available for redeployment or termination of employment.
It is further noted that section 383(a) of the State Administration Act, relied upon by the claimant, came into force on 8 October 1991, at the time when the decision setting the claimant ’ s notice period, on basis of section 383 of the State Administration Act, had been already rendered. Upon the expiry of that period, the claimant ’ s employment was terminated.
13. On 26 September 2007 the applicant requested that the proceedings before the Administrative Court be expedited. On 7 February 2008 the applicant again requested that the proceedings be expedited and an oral hearing held in her case. On 24 May and 9 December 2008 the applicant requested that the Administrative Court expedite the proceedings and decide her case with or without holding an oral hearing.
14. On 31 March 2009 the applicant asked the Administrative Court and the President of the Supreme Court ( Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske ) to exclude the assigned judge and the President of the Administrative Court from her case. She expressed concerns that her case had been deliberately delayed.
15. On 16 April 2009 the President of the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant ’ s request for exclusion of the President of the Administrative Court as groundless.
16. On 23 April 2009 the President of the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant ’ s request for exclusion of the assigned judge as unsubstantiated.
17. On 6 May 2009 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant ’ s action. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:
The complaint is without merit.
It transpires from the above- mentioned statutory provisions that the claimant ’ s employment was terminated on the basis of section 383, and not section 383(a) of the State Administration Act, and that the claimant ’ s claim is unfounded because her employment was terminated due to the restructuring of units or individual posts, and not due to redeployment for the needs of the civil service, as prescribed by section 383(a) of the Act. In the light of the above, the claimant has no grounds for severance pay.
However, the defendant authority did not entertain the claimant ’ s severance pay entitlement. Instead, it declared her request inadmissible as time-barred...
Given that the claimant lodged her request after the expiry of the statutory time-limit, the defendant authority correctly dismissed the claimant ’ s appeal against its decision ... ”
18. On 10 July 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court ( Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske ) complaining, inter alia, of a lack of adversarial proceedings before the Administrative Court. On 30 March 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant ’ s complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:
“The constitutional complaint is declared inadmissible.
1. The constitutional complaint was lodged against the decision of the Administrative Court ... of 6 May 2009 whereby [that court] dismissed the complainant ’ s administrative complaint and upheld the decision of the Municipal Office ... of 9 November 2006.
By that decision the complainant ’ s appeal against the first-instance decision whereby her request for severance pay had been declared inadmissible was dismissed.
2. The complainant considers that her rights guaranteed by Articles 14 § 2, 19 § 1, 29 § 1 and 48 § 1 of the Constitution were violated by the contested decisions. She also cites Articles 6, 13 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights ...
The conditions for examining the merits of the case have not been met.
3. ... Section 32 of the Constitutional Court Act provides:
“The Constitutional Court shall declare inadmissible any request or complaint in respect of which it has no jurisdiction; which is lodged out of time; and in other situations where the conditions for examining the merits of the case are not met.
By “ examining the merits of the case”, section 32 of the Constitutional Court Act refers to scrutinising the constitutional law aspects of the case.
4. In accordance with the Constitution and the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court does not form part of the regular judicial system, does not conduct court proceedings and does not decide on the merits of judicial matters. The Constitutional Court is a separate body established under the Constitution for the protection of individual human rights and fundamental freedoms (constitutional rights) in proceedings instituted by a constitutional complaint.
5. A constitutional complaint is not a regular or extraordinary remedy within the system of domestic legal remedies. It is a special, constitutional remedy for the protection of constitutional rights in individual cases. It is therefore not sufficient to base a constitutional complaint on breaches resulting from alleged unlawful acts committed by a competent body or a court. The legal protection against such unlawfulness is provided by general and specialised courts in proceedings taking place before several levels of jurisdiction. They can exceptionally be examined before the Constitutional Court, but only in so far as they can [be argued to have] violated human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the Constitution.
It is also not sufficient to repeat the submissions from the appeal or cassation proceedings or to merely enumerate constitutional rights that have allegedly been violated. The constitutional complaint must contain specific and reasoned claims of a breach of a constitutional right.
6. In the present case, the Administrative Court accepted the findings of the administrative bodies that the complainant ’ s claim had been time-barred, as her employment had been terminated on 31 March 1992 and she had submitted her request for severance pay on 29 July 2006.
The Constitutional Court finds the claims in the constitutional complaint to be a repetition of the claims in the administrative complaint.
In her constitutional complaint, the complainant was unable to show that the Administrative Court had acted contrary to the constitutional provisions concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms or had arbitrarily interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. The Constitutional Court therefore finds that the present case does not raise an issue of the complainant ’ s constitutional rights. Thus, there is no constitutional law issue in the case for the Constitutional Court to decide on.
B. Proceedings following the applicant ’ s request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time
19. Meanwhile, on 28 November 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Supreme Court ( Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske ) about the length of the administrative proceedings.
20. On 30 October 2009 her complaint was dismissed. The Supreme Court found that the proceedings had lasted for two years, eight months and fifteen days at two levels of jurisdiction, which was not deemed to be excessive.
21. The applicant appealed against this decision and on 7 February 2011 a panel of judges of the Supreme Court dismissed her appeal.
22. On 18 April 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court against the decisions of the Supreme Court.
23. On 2 June 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant ’ s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the contested decisions were not susceptible to constitutional review.
A. The Administrative Disputes Act
24. The relevant sections of the Administrative Disputes Act ( Zakon o upravnim sporovima, Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no. 4/1977, and Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nos. 53/1991, 9/1992 and 77/1992), as in force at the material time, are noted below.
25. Section 29 (1) provided that if an administrative complaint was incomplete or incomprehensible, the president of the panel should invite the claimant to correct the shortcomings identified within a certain time-limit. In doing so, the president was to instruct the claimant what had to be done and how, and warn him or her of the consequences of failing to comply with the court ’ s instructions.
26. Section 29 (2) provided that if the claimant did not correct the shortcomings in his or her action within the time-limit fixed, and they were of such a nature as to prevent the court from proceeding with the case, the court was empowered to declare the action inadmissible for failure to comply with procedural requirements.
27. Section 30 read as follows:
“ The [Administrative] Court shall declare an administrative complaint inadmissible:
( 1) if it was lodged out of time ( section 24) or is premature ( section 26);
( 3 ) if it is apparent that the impugned administrative act does not concern the claimant ’ s rights or legal interests ( section 12);
( 4) if an appeal against the impugned administrative act was possible but was not pursued [by the complainant] or was lodged out of time ( section 7 );
The [Administrative] Court may declare the complaint inadmissible on the grounds listed in subsection 1 at any stage of the proceedings. ”
28. Section 33 subsection 1 read as follows:
“If [the Administrative Court] neither declares the action inadmissible pursuant to section 29 subsection 2 or section 30 of this Act nor annuls the administrative decision pursuant to section 31 of this Act, [the Administrative] Court shall serve the action on the defendant and the interested parties, if any, for comment .”
29. Section 34 read as follows:
“The [Administrative Court] decides administrative disputes in closed session.
The [Administrative Court] may decide to hold an oral hearing on account of the complexity of the dispute or if it otherwise finds it useful for better clarification of the matter at issue.
For the same reasons a party may ask that an oral hearing be held.”
30. Section 60 provided that if the Administrative Disputes Act did not contain specific provisions on the procedure before the Administrative Court that could be applied in a case, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act should apply by analogy.
31. Section 150 paragraph 1 of the Civil Procedure Act ( Zakon o parničnom postupku, Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 4/1977, 36/1977 (corrigendum), 36/1980, 69/1982, 58/1984, 74/1987, 57/1989, 20/1990, 27/1990 and 35/1991, and Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nos. 53/1991, 91/1992, 58/1993, 112/1999, 88/2001, 117/2003, 88/2005, 2/2007, 84/2008, 123/2008, 57/2011, 148/2011 and 25/2013) as in force at the material time, provided as follows:
“Parties shall have the right to examine and copy the case file of proceedings in which they are involved .”
32. The Public Administration Act ( Zakon o upravi, Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nos. 16/1978, 50/1978, 29/1985, 41/90, 47/90 and 53A/91) regulated the employment of civil servants until October 1994 when it was repealed.
33. Section 299 provided that employment matters which were not regulated by this Act would be regulated by general employment law legislation.
34. Section 383 regulated the termination of civil servants ’ employment in situations where their post or their department had become redundant, and did not envisage the payment of severance pay.
35. Section 383 ( a ) came into force on 8 October 1991 and provided that a civil servant, at the request of his head of unit, could be made available for redeployment. Such redeployment could last from thirty days to six months, after which period the person ’ s employment would be terminated. In case of termination of employment, the civil servant had a right to severance pay.
36. Section 138 of the Labour Act ( Zakon o radu, Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 137/04, consolidated version ), as in force at the material time, provided as follows:
“If this or some other Act does not provide otherwise, the statute of limitations for claims arising from employment is three years.”
37. The relevant provisions of the Civil Obligations Act ( Zakon o obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nos. 35/2005 and 41/2008) provide as follows:
“(1) The right to claim fulfilment of an obligation shall cease when the statutory limitation period has expired.
(2) The statute of limitations [bars such a claim] when the statutory period in which a creditor could have claimed fulfilment of an obligation has expired.
“Claims become time-barred after five years, if no other statutory limitation period is prescribed by law.”
38. These provisions are essentially the same as the provisions of the Civil Obligations Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nos. 53/1991, 73/1991, 111/1993, 3/1994, 107/1995, 7/1996 and 112/1999) that was in force until 1 January 2006.
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF ARMS
39. The applicant complained that the administrative proceedings in her case had been unfair. In particular, she complained that the Administrative Court had failed to forward the observations of the Municipal Office submitted during the proceedings to her and had therefore deprived her of the possibility to comment on them. Moreover, she complained that the Administrative Court had based its decision on arguments of the Municipal Office which had been raised for the first time in its response.
40. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
41. The Government disputed the admissibility of this complaint on the grounds that the applicant had not suffered any significant disadvantage, as her request for payment of severance pay had in any event been manifestly ill-founded and submitted fourteen years after her employment had been terminated.
42. The applicant contested that argument. In her view, she had incurred substantial pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages due the fact that her case had not been duly considered by the domestic authorities.
43. The Court considers that the question of whether the applicant suffered a “significant disadvantage” within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention should be joined to the merits, since it is closely linked to the substance of the applicant ’ s complaint that the principle of equality of arms was breached in her case.
44. The Government averred that the proceedings had been fair. The Administrative Court had conducted the proceedings within a reasonable time and in accordance with the relevant procedural law. That court had rendered a reasoned judgment based on the legislation in force. In addition, the Government argued that the principle of equality of arms had also been respected in the applicant ’ s case. The applicant could at any time have sought access to the case file and had in fact subsequently submitted comments on the Municipal Office ’ s response to her claim. Moreover, the Government argued that the Municipal Office had not raised any new material facts in its response, but had simply reiterated its arguments from the impugned decision.
45. The applicant argued that she had not had a fair trial before the Administrative Court, due to the failure of the assigned judge to inform her about the defendant ’ s response to her claim. In particular, the applicant claimed that the Administrative Court had based its decision on arguments of the Municipal Office which had been raised for the first time in its response. Since that response had never been served on her, she had not had an opportunity to respond to the new arguments raised therein.
46. The Court reiterates that the principle of equality of arms, which is one of the elements of the broader concept of a fair hearing, requires each party to be given a reasonable opportunity to present its case under conditions that do not place it at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis its opponent (see, among many other authorities, Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 27 October 1993, § 33, Series A no. 274, and Ankerl v. Switzerland, 23 October 1996, § 38, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ V ). Each party must be given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed or evidence adduced by the other party (see, for example, Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, 23 June 1993, § 63, Series A no. 262, and Wynen v. Belgium, no. 32576/96, § 32, ECHR 2002 ‑ VIII).
47. Turning to the present case, the Court first notes that on 15 February 2007 the Municipal Office, being the defendant in the administrative proceedings at issue, submitted a response to the applicant ’ s action in the Administrative Court of 23 December 2006, requesting that the action be dismissed (see paragraph 11 above). It is not contested that this response was not forwarded to the applicant and that she had no opportunity to comment on it.
48. The Municipal Office ’ s response contained a reasoned opinion on the merits of the applicant ’ s action. The Court has repeatedly held that in such a situation the effect which the observations actually had on the judgment is of little consequence (see Steck-Risch and Others v. Liechtenstein, no. 63151/00, § 57, 19 May 2005 ) because it is for the parties to a dispute to state whether or not a document calls for their comment (see Ziegler v. Switzerland, no. 33499/96, § 38, 21 February 2002 ). What is particularly at stake here is the litigants ’ confidence in the workings of justice, which is based on, inter alia, the knowledge that they have had the opportunity to express their views on every document in the file (see, for example, Ziegler, cited above).
49. What is more, the Municipal Office did not confine itself in its response to restating the reasons given in the decision the applicant was contesting through her action. Rather, it advanced new arguments in support of its decision in reply to those raised by the applicant in her action. In particular, the Municipal Office argued that the applicant had never been eligible to receive severance pay, as the legal basis for the termination of her employment had been section 383 of the Public Administration Act and not section 383 (a) (see paragraphs 34 and 35 above). The Administrative Court relied on those (new) arguments raised by the Municipal Office and even incorporated them in its judgment of 6 May 200 9 dismissing the applicant ’ s action. It was therefore all the more important to give the applicant an opportunity to comment on those arguments if she had wished to do so.
50. At this juncture, the Court turns to the Government ’ s objection that the applicant did not suffer any significant disadvantage (see paragraph 41 above). They argued that it was clear that the applicant ’ s claim for severance pay had been lodged out of time. While accepting that argument, the Court, however, notes that the date of lodging the applicant ’ s claim was not the sole reason for dismissing her administrative complaint. Namely, the Administrative Court put forward additional arguments leading to the conclusion that the applicant ’ s claim before the national authorities was unfounded, thus examining the merits of it (see paragraph 17 above). Furthermore, the Court notes that it must continue the examination of the application even in the absence of any significant disadvantage suffered by the applicant, if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires or if the case has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal. Such are the requirements of the two safeguard clauses embedded into Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention.
51. As regards the first safeguard clause, the Court notes that, according to paragraph 39 of the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 ( CETS No. 194 ), the application of this admissibility requirement should ensure avoiding the rejection of cases which, notwithstanding their trivial nature, raise serious questions affecting the application or the interpretation of the Convention or important questions concerning national law.
52. It is true that the Court has already used the “no significant disadvantage” criterion to declare inadmissible similar complaints of failure to forward the observations of domestic authorities to the applicant (see Holub v. Czech Republic (dec.), no. 24880/05, 14 December 2010). However, the present case has to be distinguished from Holub, as in that case the domestic authorities did not raise new arguments in their observations. As described in paragraph 49 above, in the present case not only did the Municipal Office raise new arguments in their observations, but the Administrative Court relied on those arguments when rendering its judgment. In this connection, the Court cannot assess the validity of arguments which the applicant had no opportunity to present. It simply notes that the applicant could have reasonably argued in favour of the application of section 383(a) of the State Administration Act to her case (see Čepek v. the Czech Republic, no. 9815/10, § 58, 5 September 2013). Although these arguments would be irrelevant for the outcome of the present case, as the applicant ’ s claim was in any event time-barred, such practice on the part of the Administrative Court raises a serious issue as regards the principle of equality of arms, enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
53. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to that of the present case (see, for example, Ziegler, cited above, §§ 33-40; Steck-Risch and Others, cited above, §§ 51-59; and Schaller-Bossert v. Switzerland, no. 41718/05, § § 39-43, 28 October 2010 ). Moreover, in respect of Croatia the Court has already found a violation of Article 6 § 1 in the Hrdalo case ( Hrdalo v. Croatia, no. 23272/07, 27 September 2011). As in the present case, in Hrdalo the Administrative Court failed to serve the defendant ’ s response, containing new arguments upon which it relied in its judgment, on the claimant.
54. It follows that in the present case, respect for the right to a fair hearing, guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, required that the applicant be given an opportunity to have knowledge of and to comment on the response submitted by the defendant (see Steck-Risch and Others, cited above, § 58 ). However, the applicant was not afforded this opportunity. This deficiency was not remedied by the fact that the applicant could have and did complain to the Constitutional Court, as that court did not carry out a full review of the case (see Steck-Risch and Others, cited above, § 56, and paragraph 18 above ).
55. In the light of the foregoing, the Court first concludes that even when other criteria for rejecting the complaint under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention are met, respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires its examination on the merits (see Zborovský v. Slovakia, no. 14325/08, § 54, 23 October 2012, and, a contrario, Adrian Mihai Ionescu v. Romania (dec.), no. 36659/04, § 39, 1 June 2010).
56. The Court further considers, in the light of its findings in paragraphs 50 - 55, that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion from that of the Hrdalo case.
57. The Court accordingly rejects the Government ’ s inadmissibility objection and concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
58. The applicant also complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, about the lack of an oral hearing before the Administrative Court and about the outcome and length of the proceedings. She further complained under Article 13 of the Convention of a lack of effective remedies against the Administrative Court ’ s judgment. She additionally complained under Article 14 of the Convention that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of her Serbian origins. Finally, she complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that she had been deprived of her severance pay.
59. In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that this part of the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention. It follows that it is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a) as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
60. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
61. The applicant claimed 929,705 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 464,852 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.