CASE OF REGNER v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

1. The case originated in an application (no. 35289/11) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Czech national, Mr Václav Regner (“the applicant”), on 25 May 2011.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr L. Trojan, a lawyer practising in Prague. The Czech Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Vít A. Schorm, of the Ministry of Justice.
3. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained of the unfairness of administrative proceedings in which he had been unable to have sight of decisive evidence regarded as classified information and made available to the courts by the defendant.
4. On 6 January 2014 the President of the former Fifth Section, to which the application had been allocated (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court) decided to communicate it to the Government. On 26 November 2015 a Chamber of that Section composed of Angelika Nuβberger, President, Boštjan Zupančič, Ganna Yudkivska, Vincent De Gaetano, André Potocki, Helena Jäderblom and Aleš Pejchal, judges, and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar, delivered its judgment in which it unanimously declared the application admissible and concluded, by a majority, that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The partly dissenting opinion of Judge Jäderblom and the concurring opinion of Judge Pejchal were annexed to the judgment.
5. On 11 February 2016 the applicant requested, in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention, the referral of the case to the Grand Chamber. On 2 May 2016 the panel of the Grand Chamber granted that request.
6. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24.
7. The applicant and the Government each filed supplementary written observations (Rule 59 § 1) on the merits of the case. Observations were also received from the Government of the Slovak Republic, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3).
8. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 19 October 2016 (Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the GovernmentMr V.A. Schorm, Agent, Mr V. Pysk, Office of the Government Agent, Ministry of Justice, Mrs L. Zahradnická, Office of the Government Agent, Ministry of Justice, Mrs H. Bončková, Advisers;
(b) for the applicantMr M. Bilej, Counsel, Mrs D. Káňová, Mrs A. Kukrálová, Advisers.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Bilej and Mr Schorm and replies to the questions from the Court.
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
9. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Prague.
10. On the basis of a contract signed on 2 November 2004 and governed by the provisions of the Labour Code, the applicant became an employee of the Ministry of Defence.
11. On 27 December 2004, the Ministry ’ s authorised representative requested the National Security Authority ( Národní bezpečnostní úřad – “the Authority”) to issue the applicant with security clearance ( osvědčení ) giving him access to State classified information in the “secret” category ( tajné ) in accordance with the duties to be carried out by him.
12. On 1 January 2005 the applicant took up his duties as director of the Department of administration of the Ministry ’ s property ( Sekce správy majetku Ministerstva obrany ).
13. On 19 July 2005 the Authority issued the applicant with security clearance, valid until 18 July 2010, confirming that he had access to State classified information in the “secret” category.
14. During the year 2006 the applicant was appointed deputy to the first Vice-Minister of Defence ( zástupce Prvního náměstka ministra obrany ), while continuing to carry out his duties as director of the Department of administration of the Ministry ’ s property.
15. On 7 October 2005 the Authority received confidential information from the intelligence service, classified “restricted” ( vyhrazené ) and dated 5 October 2005. It started an investigation in order to verify the information received. In the course of that investigation the intelligence service provided the Authority with other information, dated 21 March 2006, classified “restricted” and annexed to the security file ( bezpečnostní spis ) under number 77. On the basis of that information the Authority revoked the security clearance on 5 September 2006. There were two unrelated reasons for that decision: firstly, the applicant had failed to indicate, as he should have done when applying for security clearance, that he held directorships in a number of companies and accounts in foreign banks; and secondly, the applicant was considered to pose a national security risk, within the meaning of section 14(3)(d) of Law no. 412/2005. With regard to that risk, the decision did not however indicate which confidential information it was based on, as this was classified “restricted” and could not therefore legally be disclosed to the applicant. The decision indicated that the facts established in respect of his conduct, as documented in the information received by the Authority on 7 October 2005, cast doubt on his suitability for security clearance and his ability not to be influenced and to keep sensitive information secret, and thus indicated that he was no longer trustworthy.
16. On an administrative appeal ( rozklad ) by the applicant, the director of the Authority, after obtaining an opinion from the appeals board, confirmed on 18 December 2006 the Authority ’ s decision of 5 September 2006, but on partly different grounds. He dismissed as unfounded the complaint that the applicant had failed to disclose certain information prior to being issued with security clearance. However, he agreed with the Authority ’ s conclusions regarding the existence of a security risk, which had transpired from the investigation carried out by the Authority and from the classified documents.
17. In the meantime, on 4 October 2006, the applicant had asked to be discharged, for health reasons, from his duties as deputy to the first Vice-Minister of Defence, and from those of director of the Department of administration of the Ministry ’ s property. He was removed from office on the same day under Article 65 § 2 of the Labour Code (see paragraph 26 below). On 20 October 2006 he signed an agreement, under Article 43 of the Labour Code, terminating his contract by mutual consent with effect from 31 January 2007.
18. On 19 January 2007 the applicant lodged an application with the Prague Municipal Court ( městský soud ) for judicial review of the decision revoking his security clearance. He and his lawyer were permitted to consult the file, but the parts classified as confidential were excluded. However, the documents containing information about the existence of a risk, including the confidential documents, had been sent by the Authority to the court, which had access to them. At the public hearing the applicant was given the opportunity to make his submissions and to state what he thought were the reasons for revoking his security clearance. He stated that he believed the information in question had been provided by a military intelligence service which had sought to take revenge on him for his refusal to accept a proposal to co-operate in a manner exceeding his statutory obligations.
19. In a judgment of 1 September 2009 the court dismissed the application for judicial review. It observed that in a procedure revoking security clearance the relevant authority could only disclose reasons for revoking clearance that were based on non-classified documents and that as regards grounds based on classified documents it had to confine itself to referring to the relevant documents and their level of confidentiality. It found that the approach taken by the Authority, which had not disclosed to the applicant the contents of the information on the basis of which the security clearance had been revoked, had not been illegal as disclosure of such information was prohibited by law. It added that the applicant ’ s rights had been sufficiently respected because the court had power to obtain knowledge of the classified information and assess whether it justified the decision taken by the Authority.
20. In a judgment of 15 July 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court ( Nejvyšší správní soud ) dismissed an appeal on points of law ( kasační stížnost ) lodged by the applicant as unfounded. It considered that the classified documents in question had shown beyond any doubt that the applicant did not satisfy the statutory conditions to be entrusted with secret information. It observed that the risk in his regard concerned his conduct, which affected his credibility and his ability to keep information secret. The Supreme Administrative Court added that disclosure of the classified information could have entailed the disclosure of the intelligence service ’ s working methods, the revelation of its information sources or the risk of influencing possible witnesses. It explained that there was a statutory prohibition on indicating where exactly the security risk lay and on specifying the considerations underlying the conclusion that such a risk existed, the reasons and considerations underlying the Authority ’ s decision being based exclusively on classified information. Accordingly, the reasons for the decision had to be limited to a reference to the documents on which it was based and the level of confidentiality of the information used. It went on to observe that, owing to the special nature of proceedings where classified information was concerned, not all the applicant ’ s procedural rights could be guaranteed but that the non-disclosure of the exact reasons underlying the decision to revoke security clearance was counterbalanced by the guarantee that the administrative courts had unlimited access to the classified documents. The Supreme Administrative Court pointed out that the report on the result of the investigations carried out by the intelligence service, included in the file under no. 77, contained specific, comprehensive and detailed information concerning the conduct and lifestyle of the applicant on the basis of which the court was satisfied in the present case as to its relevance for determining whether the applicant posed a national security risk. It observed, further, that the information did not in any way concern the applicant ’ s refusal to co-operate with the military intelligence service.
21. On 25 October 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court ( Ústavní soud ), complaining of the unfairness of the proceedings. In a judgment of 18 November 2010 the court dismissed his complaint as manifestly ill-founded. Referring to its earlier case-law on the subject, it observed that given the special nature and the importance of decisions adopted in respect of classified information where national security interests were manifest, it was not always possible to apply all the guarantees relating to fairness of proceedings. It considered that in the present case the courts ’ conduct had been duly justified and the reasoning in their decisions comprehensible and in conformity with the Constitution; that they had not departed from procedural standards and constitutional rules to an inordinate degree; and that the Constitutional Court was not therefore required to intervene in their decision-making procedure.
22. On 16 March 2011 the prosecution service lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant and 51 other persons on charges of influencing the award of public contracts at the Ministry of Defence from 2005 to 2007. The applicant was indicted for participation in organised crime ( účast na zločinném spolčení ); aiding and abetting abuse of public power ( pomoc k trestnému činu zneužívání pravomoci veřejného činitele ); complicity in illegally influencing public tendering and public procurement procedures ( pomoc k trestnému činu pletich při veřejné soutěži a veřejné dražbě ); and aiding and abetting breaches of binding rules governing economic relations ( pomoc k trestnému činu porušování závazných pravidel hospodářského styku ).
In a judgment of 25 March 2014 the České Budějovice Regional Court ( krajský soud ) found the applicant guilty and sentenced him, inter alia, to three years ’ imprisonment. In a judgment of 27 May 2016 the Prague High Court ( Vrchní soud ) upheld the first-instance judgment convicting the applicant, but suspended execution of his prison sentence for a two-year probationary period. That judgment became final.
A. The Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms (Law no. 2/1993)
23. By virtue of Article 26 § 2 of the Charter ( Listina základních práv a svobod ), which has the rank of constitutional law, the right to exercise certain professions or activities may be subject to certain conditions or restrictions.
B. Legislation governing the status of public servants and labour law
24. The Czech State Civil Service was codified for the first time by the Civil Service Act ( zákon o státní službě ) (Law no. 234/2014), which came into force on 1 January 2015. Although, in 2002, Parliament had passed Law no. 218/2002 on State employees in administration offices and their remuneration and that of other employees in the administration (Service Act ), that Act had never come into force and was replaced by the aforementioned Act (Law no. 234/2014).
25. Accordingly, State employees recruited prior to the entry into force of the Civil Service Act were in a private-law relationship with their employer, governed by the Labour Code (Law no. 65/1965, in force until 31 December 2006), with no special status.
26. Article 65 § 2 of the Labour Code provides that employees appointed or elected to a post may be removed from office or relinquish their duties. Under Article 65 § 3, removal from office or relinquishment of duties does not have the effect of terminating employment and the employer will reach an agreement with the employee regarding a future appointment corresponding to his or her qualifications.
27. The exhaustive list of grounds on which an employee may be dismissed with notice or with immediate effect can be found in Articles 46 and 53 of the Labour Code respectively.
28. Article 64 of the Labour Code provides that an employee may bring legal proceedings challenging the lawfulness of his or her dismissal within two months of that dismissal.
C. Protection of Classified Information Act (Law no. 148/1998)
29. Security clearance was issued to the applicant under the Protection of Classified Information Act (Law no. 148/1998 – “the 1998 Act”) ( zákon o ochraně utajovaných skutečností ).
30. Section 17 of that Act, which was repealed by Law no. 413/2005 on the amendment of laws in the framework of the enactment of the law on the protection of State classified information and access thereto ( zákon o změně zákonů v souvislosti s přijetím zákona o ochraně utajovaných informací a o bezpečnostní způsobilosti ), provided, in particular, that an individual could only have sight of classified information where he or she needed that information in order to carry out his or her activities and was in possession of security clearance, possession of which constituted a prerequisite for exercising a profession that required knowledge of classified information.
31. Section 7(1) of the 1998 Act set up the National Security Authority.
32. By virtue of section 41, an employee ’ s immediate superior could request the Authority to issue security clearance to his or her employee.
33. Section 5 classified the data as “restricted” ( vyhrazené), “confidential” ( tajné ), “secret” ( důvěrné ) or “top secret” ( přísně tajné ) information.
34. Anyone seeking to obtain security clearance for one of those categories of information had to be a Czech citizen, of full legal capacity, an adult, of irreproachable character, and trustworthy both in terms of personality and from the point of view of national security. A person who had been convicted of a criminal offence related to the protection of State, economic or professional secrets was regarded as untrustworthy. Furthermore, the law regarded as untrustworthy anyone who, following psychological vetting, had character traits, attitudes or personal relations capable of casting doubt on his or her ability to keep secrets.
35. At the relevant time the 1998 Act did not provide for any judicial review of decisions refusing to grant security clearance.
D. Law no. 412/2005 on the protection of State classified information and access thereto (version in force until 23 May 2007)
36. Law no. 412/2005 on the protection of classified information and suitability for security clearance ( zákon o ochraně utajovaných informacích a o bezpečnostní způsobilosti ) and Law no. 413/2005, amending Law no. 148/1998, came into force on 1 January 2006. The conditions for issuing security clearance were identical to those contained in the earlier Act, but with a slight difference in definition.
37. Under section 4, State classified information was divided into the following categories: a) “top secret”, where disclosure to an unauthorised person or unlawful use could very seriously harm the interests of the Czech Republic; b) “secret”, where disclosure to an unauthorised person or unlawful use could seriously harm the interests of the Czech Republic; c) “confidential”, where disclosure to an unauthorised person or unlawful use could harm the interests of the Czech Republic; and d) “restricted”, where disclosure to an unauthorised person or unlawful use could be disadvantageous for the interests of the Czech Republic. In respect of the latter category, section 3(5) provided that the disclosure of classified information to an unauthorised person or unlawful use thereof could be disadvantageous for the Czech Republic if it was liable to
a) disrupt the activities of the armed forces of the Czech Republic, NATO or one of its Member States or a Member State of the EU;
b) thwart, complicate or endanger an investigation into criminal offences other than particularly serious offences, or facilitate the perpetration thereof;
c) adversely affect major economic interests of the Czech Republic or the EU or one of its Member States;
d) disrupt major commercial or political negotiations between the Czech Republic and a foreign power; or
e) disrupt security or intelligence operations.
38. Sections 6 to 10 of the Law defined the conditions of access of individuals to classified information in the “restricted” category. Under section 6(1), an individual could be granted access to such classified information where absolutely necessary in order to carry out his or her function, professional or other activities, provided that he or she obtained a document ( oznámení ) certifying that he or she satisfied the conditions for access to classified information in the “restricted” category. That document was issued either by the individual ’ s hierarchical superior or the National Security Authority according to the case in question.
39. Sections 11-14 of the Law defined the conditions of access of individuals to classified information in the “top secret”, “secret” and “confidential” categories (which were stricter than for access to information in the “restricted” category).
40. Under section 11(1), an individual could be granted access to such classified information where absolutely necessary in order to carry out his or her function, or professional or other activities, provided that he or she had obtained valid security clearance for the necessary category of information and had received appropriate instructions.
41. Section 12(1) defined the conditions for granting security clearance to an individual as follows:
“The Authority shall issue security clearance to individuals who
a) are nationals of the Czech Republic, of a Member State of the EU or of NATO;
b) satisfy the conditions laid down in section 6(2) [full legal capacity, aged 18 or over, no criminal record];
c) are of trustworthy character;
d) are trustworthy from the point of view of national security.”
42. Pursuant to section 12(2), the individual in question had to satisfy the conditions laid down in 12(1) throughout the entire period of validity of the security clearance.
43. Section 13(1) provided that an individual could be deemed to be of trustworthy character if he or she did not suffer from a disorder liable to adversely affect his or her trustworthiness or ability to keep information secret. In accordance with section 13(2), this was to be certified by a statement that the individual concerned was of trustworthy character and, where required by law, also by an expert report.
44. Section 14(1) provided that anyone who did not pose a security risk was deemed trustworthy from the point of view of national security.
Under section 14(2), the following were deemed to pose a national security risk:
a) any serious or recurrent activity contrary to the interests of the Czech Republic, or
b) any activity consisting in suppressing fundamental rights and freedoms, or supporting any such activity.
45. Section 14(3) listed the factors which could be deemed to pose a national security risk. Under letter (d), this could be conduct which affected a person ’ s trustworthiness and ability not to be influenced and to keep information secret.
46. Under section 58(1)(e), taken in conjunction with sub-section 2, from the date of their appointment and throughout the exercise of their functions, and in so far as necessary for the exercise thereof, all judges had access to all categories of classified information, even where they did not have security clearance for individuals.
47. Law no. 412/2005 introduced a new section IV, entitled “Security vetting procedure” ( bezpečnostní řízení ), which applies to the procedure for both issuing and revoking security clearance, and is divided into two phases: the administrative stage and the judicial stage. The fourth chapter is devoted more particularly to the judicial stage.
48. Under section 89(7), a party to the vetting procedure for issuing or revoking security clearance and his or her representative are entitled, prior to adoption of the decision, to consult the file and make notes, except for the documents containing classified information.
49. Pursuant to section 101(1), the Authority must bring proceedings to revoke security clearance in respect of anyone who can reasonably be suspected of no longer satisfying the conditions for issuing the relevant public certificate. In accordance with section 101(2), the Authority will revoke security clearance in respect of anyone who no longer satisfies those conditions.
50. Section 107(4) provides that the intelligence services shall, at the Authority ’ s request, submit a report on the results of the investigation carried out by them.
51. Section 122(3) provides that the reasons given in a decision taken under the Act must state the grounds for adopting the decision, the evidence on which the decision is based and the reasoning adopted by the Authority when assessing that evidence and applying the regulations. Where some of the reasons constitute classified information, the decision must contain only a reference to the evidence on which it is based and the degree of confidentiality. The reasoning adopted by the Authority in support of its assessment and the reasons for adopting the decision must only be referred to in so far as they do not constitute classified information.
52. Under section 133(1), judicial review may be sought of the director of the Authority ’ s decision. Section 133(2) provides that on a judicial review the court will take the evidence in such a way as to comply with the duty to protect the confidentiality of the information yielded as a result of the investigation or contained in the records of the intelligence services or the police. The information in question cannot be examined at a hearing unless the person bound by the duty of confidentiality is exempted from that duty. An exemption cannot be granted where this may endanger or seriously compromise the activity of the intelligence services or the police. This also applies to evidence taken other than at a hearing.
53. In accordance with section 133(3), the Authority specifies the information referred to in sub-section 2 which, in its view, cannot be the subject of an exemption from the duty of confidentiality. Where there is a risk of endangering or seriously compromising the activity of the intelligence services or the police, the president of the chamber dealing with the case will decide that the parts of the file having a connection with that information shall be excluded; those parts of the file cannot be consulted by the person seeking judicial review or his or her representative.
E. The Code of Administrative Justice (Law no. 150/2002)
54. In accordance with Article 45 § 3 of the Code of Administrative Justice, whenever a document is filed the administrative authority always indicates the parts of the document that contain classified information. The president of the chamber excludes these parts from consultation. This provision applies, mutatis mutandis, to court files. Under Article 45 § 4, however, consultation of the parts of the file to be used as evidence in court cannot be prohibited. Nor is it possible to prohibit consultation of the parts of the file which a party to the dispute had been authorised to consult before the administrative authority.
55. Pursuant to Article 45 § 6, prior to consultation of the file the president of the chamber must inform anyone needing to consult a file containing classified information, as provided for by a special law, of the criminal consequences of breaching the confidentiality of that information. By signing a document certifying that he or she has been informed accordingly, the person thus warned becomes a “designated person”, having a need to know the classified information in question.
56. Under Article 77 § 2, subject to a contrary provision in a special law on the scope and method of taking evidence, the courts may re-examine the evidence or, in this context, request evidence in addition to that previously produced by the administrative authority.
III. RELEVANT DOMESTIC PRACTICE
57. Law no. 148/1998 and Law no. 412/2005 have given rise to major developments in the case-law.
58. On 12 July 2001 the Constitutional Court, sitting in plenary, adopted judgment no. Pl. ÚS 11/2000 on Law no. 148/1998 which in principle prohibited the Authority from communicating to the person concerned the reasons for not issuing security clearance. While acknowledging the legitimate interests of the State in keeping certain information and investigation methods secret, the Constitutional Court nevertheless held that even in those specific cases it was not possible to waive the protection of the individual ’ s fundamental rights. It concluded that it was incumbent on the legislature to enact new legislation providing an appropriate means of reflecting and reconciling private interests and the general interest.
59. The Supreme Administrative Court, in judgment no. 6 As 14/2006 of 31 January 2007, and subsequently the Constitutional Court, in judgment no. II. ÚS 377/04 of 6 September 2007, while observing that the granting of security clearance was an “extraordinary privilege”, considered that the decisions taken by the authorities in this area were amenable to judicial review. They did, however, find that it was “ certainly not possible to oblige the Authority, on the pretext of fully respecting the procedural rights of a party to the proceedings, to refer in its decisions to facts which could endanger the State ’ s interests, the effectiveness of the work of the intelligence services or the police, or the security of their staff or third parties” and held as follows: “extra special care should be taken to ensure that these aims are not pursued to the detriment of the principles of the rule of law or of the individual ’ s fundamental rights. According to the Constitutional Court ’ s case-law ... on a review of a decision having the direct consequence of limiting the possibility of holding a particular post, the public interest in confidentiality cannot justify excluding that decision from the scope of ... Article 6 § 1 of the Convention guaranteeing the right to judicial protection”.
60. In judgment no. I. ÚS 828/09 of 22 September 2009 the Constitutional Court observed, in particular, that the right to freely choose one ’ s profession did not include the right to obtain security clearance or the right to practise a specific profession, the exercise of which was moreover strictly limited in the interests of the State. It rejected the complainant ’ s argument that a decision revoking security clearance for the “secret” category had infringed his fundamental right to freely choose his profession, within the meaning of Article 26 of the Charter. It observed that that right could be construed not as enshrining everyone ’ s right to a specific profession but only the right to choose the profession one wished to practise. It added that in order to enter into a particular employment relationship or to carry on a specific independent activity, the person concerned had to satisfy the detailed statutory conditions for exercising that profession or activity, in accordance with Article 26 § 2 of the Charter.
61. In judgment no. 5 As 44/2006 of 30 January 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court held that, in interpreting the expression “risk for national security”, the evidence gathered had to be examined in the light of a possible security risk. Thus, a mere suspicion of a national security risk sufficed to conclude that the person concerned was not trustworthy from a national security point of view.
62. The Supreme Administrative Court also referred to the connection between holding a particular post and issuing security clearance. Referring to the drafting history of the Law, it observed that access to classified information must only be granted to persons necessarily requiring access for the purposes of exercising their profession or function. That was also the position taken by the Constitutional Court, which, in judgment no. I. ÚS 828/09 of 22 September 2009, held that it was not possible to infer from the right to freely choose one ’ s profession the right to obtain security clearance, which was neither guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms nor by the instruments of infra-constitutional rank.
63. A judgment delivered by the seventh chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court on 9 April 2009 (no. 7 As 5/2008) stated, among other things, that in the particular area in question, where the authorities decided not to disclose to the interested party the specific factual reasons for which he or she was considered untrustworthy from a security point of view, they were nonetheless obliged, in order for their decision to stand up to a judicial review, to make it entirely possible for those reasons to be verified – particularly as to the facts – by a court. In its view, this meant that the information underlying the relevant decision had to be included in the National Security Authority ’ s file and that the court had to re-examine of its own motion the relevance thereof. The judgment added that accordingly the National Security Authority could only base its conclusions on the information included in the file.
By using the term “information”, the judgment in question indicated fairly clearly that the file submitted by the National Security Authority necessarily had to include all the information that had served as a basis for an administrative decision, and thus even their sources, but remained silent as to verification of the authenticity and veracity of those sources.
64. In a subsequent judgment, of 25 November 2011 (no. 7 As 31/2011), the seventh chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court examined the question of the veracity of the information and its sources. It referred expressis verbis to the judgment delivered in respect of the applicant, stating that in that case the court had not mentioned the specific information on which it had based its decision on grounds of an interest in concealing that information, which meant that the party concerned, not having been advised of its contents, could not make informed submissions on the relevance of the circumstances observed. It concluded that in such a situation the court had to step into the applicant ’ s shoes and review the relevance of the classified information from every standpoint that appeared to be a priori important for deciding the dispute.
The judgment acknowledged that the administrative courts could not examine the authenticity and veracity of the documents and information provided by the intelligence service and that this was an exception to the ordinary powers of the administrative courts in assessing the evidence produced before them. It added that, with regard to information received from the intelligence service, absolute certainty and truth were not required and it was sufficient that the conclusions drawn from the facts set out in the information thus provided constituted the most plausible explanation. It added that this did not mean that the court was thus deprived of the possibility of examining the credibility and force of the information provided by the intelligence service, pointing out that the reports drawn up by the intelligence service should not be limited to reflecting the opinion of their authors without it being possible for the courts to verify the relevant facts set out in the file.
65. In a judgment of 30 September 2015 (no. 1 As 146/2015), the Supreme Administrative Court observed, inter alia, that, according to the provisions of section 133 of Law no. 412/2005, the court (the president of the chamber) had the task of deciding whether to remove a document from the file, on condition that it had concluded that the statutory conditions allowing the exclusion of certain information and restriction of access thereto were satisfied. It stated that, in providing thus, Law no. 412/2005 did not associate the application of the procedure provided for in section 133(3) only with information classified at a particular level, but that the procedure was generally applicable to any information classified as confidential (from restricted to top secret) yielded by an investigation or contained in the records held by the intelligence services or the police, where its disclosure was liable to endanger or disrupt the activities of the intelligence services or of the police, while being identified by the authorities as requiring that confidentiality be maintained (see judgment no. 9 As 9/2010 of 15 July 2010 of the Supreme Administrative Court).
66. Sitting in its extended composition, the Supreme Administrative Court held, on 1 March 2016 (no. 4As 1/2015-40), that information did not automatically have to remain inaccessible throughout the judicial proceedings and nor did it have to be automatically excluded from the process of examining evidence. It stated that this was only the case if the judge concluded that the exclusion of such information was legal. It found, on the question of the assessment of the quality of information underlying a decision to revoke clearance and of its sources, that neither the National Security Authority nor the administrative courts verified the truth of information emanating from those services in the same way as in ordinary administrative proceedings. However, it added that information from the intelligence services could not take the form of a mere opinion of the author, without being supported by sufficient evidence included in the file and capable of being verified by the court. In the court ’ s view, the National Security Authority and the administrative courts should have the possibility of assessing the truthfulness and persuasiveness of intelligence information and its relevance for the security vetting procedure.
IV. COMPARATIVE LAW AND JUDICIAL PRACTICE
67. In the light of the comparative information available to the Court concerning thirty member States, protection of national security is a matter of concern in every State whose legislation was examined. Whilst the concept of “national safety” or “national security” is not uniformly defined, the legislation in each member State allows the executive, in particular the authorities responsible for national security, to restrict access to classified information, including in judicial, criminal and administrative proceedings, where this is deemed necessary to protect the State ’ s interests. The authorities enjoy a wide discretion in this regard.
68. A large majority of States, however, entrust the courts with a power of scrutiny concerning justification for the classification of documents. Most of the States entrust the courts with the power to examine not only the formal lawfulness of a decision classifying documents, but also the specific justification for classifying as confidential information gathered by the intelligence services. Certain States invest all judges with this power, while others provide for a vetting procedure for judges required to examine such information and documents. In some member States the judicial examination is conducted in the absence not only of the public and the press, but also the parties to the proceedings and their lawyers.
69. The scope of that judicial review is not uniformly regulated. The only consensus is in considering that the non-disclosure of classified information during the judicial proceedings does not in itself constitute a violation of the fundamental rights of the person. Whilst non-disclosed documents cannot be used in a criminal trial, the use of classified information and non-disclosed documents is allowed in administrative proceedings in certain States.
70. With regard more specifically to the refusal or the withdrawal of security clearance granting courts access to confidential documents, certain States exclude any judicial review while others provide for a judicial review conferring variable powers on judges, ranging from merely reviewing the formal lawfulness of the relevant decision to examining the justification on the merits with an analysis of the documents underlying the decision.
V. CASE-LAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
71. On 4 June 2013 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) gave a preliminary ruling in the case ZZ v. the United Kingdom (case C-300/11). The request for the ruling concerned the interpretation of Article 30(2) of the amending Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004, on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, read in particular in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The context was a dispute between a person with dual French and Algerian nationality and the United Kingdom immigration authorities regarding the latter ’ s decision refusing him admission, on public security grounds, to the United Kingdom. The CJEU replied, in substance, that where, in exceptional cases, a national authority refused, on grounds of State security, to provide precise and full disclosure to the person concerned of the grounds which constituted the basis of a decision refusing entry, it was necessary for a court to be entrusted with verifying whether those reasons stood in the way of precise and full disclosure of the grounds on which the decision in question was based and of the related evidence. With regard to proof that State security would in fact be compromised by disclosure to the person concerned of those grounds, it observed that there was no presumption that the reasons invoked by a national authority existed and were valid (§ 61 of the judgment). It observed, further, that if the court in question concluded that State security did not preclude disclosure to the person concerned of the precise and full grounds on which a decision refusing entry was based, it gave the competent national authority the opportunity to disclose the missing grounds and evidence to the person concerned. If that authority did not authorise their disclosure, the court proceeded to examine the legality of such a decision on the basis of solely the grounds and evidence which had been disclosed (§ 63) and if it turned out that State security did stand in the way of disclosure of the grounds to the person concerned, judicial review of the legality of a decision taken must be carried out in a procedure which struck an appropriate balance between the requirements flowing from State security and the requirements of the right to effective judicial protection whilst limiting any interference with the exercise of that right to that which was strictly necessary. It held in particular :
“65. In this connection, first, in the light of the need to comply with Article 47 of the Charter, that procedure must ensure, to the greatest possible extent, that the adversarial principle is complied with, in order to enable the person concerned to contest the grounds on which the decision in question is based and to make submissions on the evidence relating to the decision and, therefore, to put forward an effective defence. In particular, the person concerned must be informed, in any event, of the essence of the grounds on which a decision refusing entry ... is based, as the necessary protection of State security cannot have the effect of denying the person concerned his right to be heard and, therefore, of rendering his right of redress ineffective ....
66. Second, the weighing up of the right to effective judicial protection against the necessity to protect the security of the Member State concerned – upon which the conclusion set out in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment is founded – is not applicable in the same way to the evidence underlying the grounds that is adduced before the national court with jurisdiction. In certain cases, disclosure of that evidence is liable to compromise State security in a direct and specific manner, in that it may, in particular, endanger the life, health or freedom of persons or reveal the methods of investigation specifically used by the national security authorities and thus seriously impede, or even prevent, future performance of the tasks of those authorities.
67. In that context, the national court with jurisdiction has the task of assessing whether and to what extent the restrictions on the rights of the defence arising in particular from a failure to disclose the evidence and the precise and full grounds on which the decision ... is based are such as to affect the evidential value of the confidential evidence.
68. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the national court with jurisdiction, first, to ensure that the person concerned is informed of the essence of the grounds which constitute the basis of the decision in question in a manner which takes due account of the necessary confidentiality of the evidence and, second, to draw, pursuant to national law, the appropriate conclusions from any failure to comply with that obligation to inform him.”
72. In the case of Commission and Others v. Kadi (No. C-584/10 P, 18 July 2013), the CJEU carried out a similar balancing exercise between the requirements relating to the right to effective judicial protection, in particular respect for the principle of an adversarial process, and those flowing from the security of the European Union or its Member States (see, in particular, paragraphs 111 and 125-129).
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
73. The applicant complained of the unfairness of the proceedings he had brought to challenge the decision revoking his security clearance. In his submission, the administrative courts had refused him access to decisive evidence, classified as confidential, which had been made available to them by the defendant. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
74. The Chamber first examined the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Government and based on the inapplicability of Article 6 of the Convention. It noted in that regard that Czech law recognised that anyone to whom security clearance had been granted had a special right entitling him or her to obtain a review of any subsequent decision revoking that clearance with a view to ensuring that the decision was justified according to the statutory criteria for issuing clearance (see paragraph 53 of the judgment).
75. With regard to the civil nature of the right, the Chamber applied the Vilho Eskelinen test (see Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, § 62, ECHR 2007 ‑ II ) and considered that the applicant was a public servant. However, it distinguished the present case from Vilho Eskelinen on the grounds that the labour dispute had not been directly decisive for the applicant, as he had not been removed from office as a result of the revocation of his security clearance and the proceedings in issue had not concerned his dismissal. In the Chamber ’ s view, even though the revocation of security clearance had not resulted in the automatic termination of the applicant ’ s employment contract with the Ministry of Defence, it had been decisive for the choice of posts available to him (see paragraph 55 of the judgment). Accordingly, the decision revoking the applicant ’ s security clearance and the subsequent proceedings had affected his civil rights and, consequently, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was applicable (see paragraphs 57-58 of the judgment).
76. On the merits, the Chamber found that the reasons for the decision not to disclose the document in question to the applicant had been based on national security interests because, according to the authorities, disclosure could have had the effect of revealing the working methods of an intelligence service and its information sources or have led to attempts by the applicant to influence possible witnesses. According to the Chamber, the decision-making procedure had “as far as possible” complied with the requirements of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to protect the applicant ’ s interests, with the result that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 72, 75-76 and 79 of the judgment).
B. Preliminary objections raised by the Government
( i ) Victim status of the applicant
77. In reply to a question put to them by the Grand Chamber regarding the victim status of the applicant, the Government submitted that the outcome of the domestic proceedings had not been directly decisive for the applicant ’ s right to continue carrying out his duties. They pointed out that it was the applicant himself who had asked to be removed from office and that he had not said that his request was motivated by the revocation of his security clearance or otherwise connected with that revocation. Moreover, removal from office had not terminated his employment relationship as such. In other words, there was nothing to suggest that the measure in question, namely, the revocation of the applicant ’ s security clearance, had had any bearing on his employment relationship with the Ministry of Defence. Accordingly, the applicant could not be regarded as a victim, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a fair trial.
( ii ) Applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
78. The Government did not contest the fact that the present case concerned a “dispute” between the applicant as a former holder of security clearance and the National Security Authority, a central authority responsible for decisions regarding security clearance. They agreed with the Chamber that the main subject of the dispute had been the reliability of the applicant from a security point of view (see paragraph 50 in fine of the Chamber judgment).
79. However, unlike the Chamber, which had considered that the subject of the dispute had been the applicant ’ s right to obtain a review of the decision revoking his security clearance (see paragraph 53 of the Chamber judgment), the Government submitted that the present dispute concerned the question whether the applicant should continue to be regarded as reliable from a security point of view, that is, whether he had a substantive right, or rather a privilege, allowing him to keep the security clearance that gave him access to classified information.
80. The Government added that in the present case the dispute did not concern the right not to be unfairly dismissed, as the applicant had himself asked to be removed from office and had agreed to the termination of his employment relationship.
81. With regard to the question whether the dispute concerned a right recognised under domestic law, the Government noted first of all that no right of access by individuals to classified information could be inferred from the relevant provisions of domestic law. They pointed out that, according to the case-law of the higher domestic courts, Czech law did not provide for a “right” to be issued with security clearance. They referred in that connection to domestic case-law according to which issuing security clearance to a particular individual was an extraordinary privilege granted by the Authority and the decision whether or not to grant that privilege to the person concerned was left to the full discretion of that authority.
82. According to the Government, the above-mentioned considerations applied, mutatis mutandis, to revocation of a person ’ s security clearance.
83. They observed that the Authority enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in determining the conduct or activities that could raise suspicion regarding a security risk and thus cast doubt on a person ’ s reliability from a security point of view. Relying on the general principles established by the Court, the Government submitted that where the subject of the domestic proceedings was a decision as to whether the applicant should continue to enjoy a certain privilege, an unfettered discretion or even a wide margin of appreciation on the part of the Authority was a factor indicating that no “right” to such a privilege was recognised under the domestic law (they referred to Mendel v. Sweden, no. 28426/06, § 44, 7 April 2009).
84. They added that once a doubt regarding a person ’ s reliability from a national security point of view had been established, the Authority had no further discretion, the law then imposing immediate measures requiring the revocation of that person ’ s security clearance. The Government stressed in that regard that as a reasonable doubt or a mere suspicion constituted reasonable grounds for revoking security clearance, the Authority had hardly any leeway in its decision-making (they referred to Wolff Metternich v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 45908/99, 18 May 1999).
85. With regard to the civil nature of the right in question within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Government maintained that the question whether or not a State should regard as reliable from a national security point of view a person working within its central administration concerned the core of public authority prerogatives and State sovereignty.
86. The Government also pointed out that a tenuous connection between the dispute and the civil rights in issue or remote consequences for those rights did not suffice for Article 6 § 1 to be applicable. A civil right or obligation had to be the subject of the “dispute” and, at the same time, the outcome of the proceedings had to be directly decisive for that right (they cited the case of Smagilov v. Russia (dec.), no. 24324/05, § 54, 13 November 2014).
87. In the present case the Government stressed that, apart from stating that he was no longer allowed to continue in his post, the applicant had never claimed that the Authority ’ s decision or the subsequent proceedings had had an impact on any of his civil rights; nor had he in any way demonstrated the slightest adverse effect on his civil rights. The Government also pointed out that the applicant ’ s monthly income during the period prior to the revocation of his security clearance had in fact been almost identical to the income received subsequently.
88. The Government observed that no “civil right” of a public servant to be authorised to hold a certain public office in the State administration could be inferred from the Convention (they cited the case of Houbal v. the Czech Republic, no. 75375/01, § 70, 14 June 2005 ). Likewise, at the relevant time it had not been possible to infer the existence of a subjective right to the undisturbed performance of public office where a person had already been appointed to the post in question because, by law, a public servant could be removed from office at will by the person empowered to appoint him or her, which did not mean, however, that the employment relationship with the employer was thus terminated, as only the job position changed.
89. Those considerations were of even greater application, in the Government ’ s submission, if, under Article 26 § 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, for the performance of a specific public office, the law stipulated special requirements that the official concerned had ceased to satisfy. The Government therefore shared the view of the Supreme Administrative Court that there was no right to hold such public office because the person concerned could not have any legitimate expectation of not being removed from office if he or she no longer satisfied the requirements for the proper performance of that office ( see paragraph 59 above).
90. The Government concluded that the present dispute mainly concerned the question whether the applicant had remained reliable from a security point of view and could accordingly keep the security clearance which gave him access to State secrets. That prerogative could hardly be considered as a “right”, still less a civil right. Accordingly, in their submission, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention did not apply in the present case.
( i ) Victim status of the applicant
91. The applicant submitted that his removal from office and the subsequent termination of his employment relationship had been the consequences of prior unlawful measures and erroneous decisions taken by the National Security Authority which he had challenged in administrative and judicial proceedings and before the Constitutional Court.
92. Considering the psychological pressure that had been exerted on him, he had had no choice but to leave his post and then his employment as well.
(ii) Applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
93. The applicant submitted that a decision granting or revoking the security clearance giving access to classified information had not then and did not now depend on an assessment by the Authority but had to be granted where the statutory conditions were met and that, accordingly, Czech law provided for a right of access to classified information where the statutory conditions were satisfied.
94. He stated that his application did not only concern the revocation of his security clearance as such, but also the procedural measures taken by the administrative authorities and the courts which had led to his clearance being revoked.
95. The applicant also indicated that the revocation of his security clearance had had the effect of making it impossible for him to continue carrying out his duties. As deputy to a vice-minister of Defence and director of the Department of administration of the Ministry ’ s property, the applicant had regularly dealt with classified information, which had become impossible without security clearance. Therefore, he had had to stop working at the Ministry of Defence. He added that he had been unable to carry out other duties requiring security clearance. He concluded that the case had concerned his civil rights and that, consequently, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applied in the present case.
( a) Whether the applicant was a victim
96. The Court observes at the outset that the Government are not estopped from disputing the applicant ’ s victim status for the first time before the Grand Chamber, especially as the latter put a question to the parties of its own motion on the subject (see Blečić v. Croatia [GC], no. 59532/00, §§ 63-67, ECHR 2006-III).
97. The Grand Chamber notes that it can, like the Chamber, under Article 35 § 4 in fine of the Convention, “reject any application which it considers inadmissible ... at any stage of the proceedings”. Thus, even at the merits stage and subject to Rule 55 of the Rules of Court, the Grand Chamber may reconsider a decision to declare an application admissible where it concludes that it should have been declared inadmissible for one of the reasons given in the first three paragraphs of Article 35 of the Convention (see Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and others, § 56 and further references cited in the judgment, 25 March 2014 ).
98. In the light of the particular circumstances of the instant case, the applicant ’ s victim status is closely linked to the substance of his complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court therefore considers it justified to join this question to the examination of the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
( b) Applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
99. The Court reiterates that for Article 6 § 1 to be applicable under its “civil” limb, there must be a “dispute” regarding a “right” which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, irrespective of whether it is protected under the Convention. The dispute must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise; and, finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question, mere tenuous connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to bring Article 6 § 1 into play.
100. With regard firstly to the existence of a right, the Court reiterates that the starting-point must be the provisions of the relevant domestic law and their interpretation by the domestic courts (see Masson and Van Zon v. the Netherlands, 28 September 1995, § 49, Series A no. 327 ‑ A; Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 32555/96, § 120, ECHR 2005 ‑ X; Boulois v. Luxembourg [GC], no. 37575/04, § 91, ECHR 2012; Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland [GC], no. 5809/08, § 97, ECHR 2016, and further references cited in the judgment; Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 101, ECHR 2016; and Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 7694 3 /11, § 7 1, ECHR 2016 (extracts), and further references cited in the judgment ). Article 6 § 1 does not guarantee any particular content for “rights and obligations” in the substantive law of the Contracting States: the Court may not create by way of interpretation of Article 6 § 1 a substantive right which has no legal basis in the State concerned (see, for example, Fayed v. the United Kingdom, 21 September 1994, § 65, Series A no. 294 ‑ B; Roche, cited above, § 119; and Boulois, cited above, § 91).
101. In that connection the Court observes that the rights thus conferred by the domestic legislation can be substantive, or procedural, or, alternatively, a combination of both.
102. There can be no doubt about the fact that there is a right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 where a substantive right recognised in domestic law is accompanied by a procedural right to have that right enforced through the courts. The mere fact that the wording of a legal provision affords an element of discretion does not in itself rule out the existence of a right (see Camps v. France (dec.), no. 42401/98, 24 October 2000, and Ellès and Others v. Switzerland, no. 12573/06, § 16, 16 December 2010; and, conversely, Boulois, cited above, § 99, and Miessen v. Belgium, no. 31517/12, § 48, 18 October 2016 ). Indeed, Article 6 applies where the judicial proceedings concern a discretionary decision resulting in interference in an applicant ’ s rights (see Pudas v. Sweden, 27 October 1987, § 34, Series A no. 125 ‑ A; Obermeier v. Austria, 28 June 1990, § 69, Series A no. 179; and Mats Jacobsson v. Sweden, 28 June 1990, § 32, Series A no. 180 ‑ A ).
103. However, Article 6 is not applicable where the domestic legislation, without conferring a right, grants a certain advantage which it is not possible to have recognised in the courts (see Boulois, cited above, § 90, which concerned a prison board ’ s refusal to grant a prisoner prison leave, with no possibility of appeal to an administrative court). The same situation arises where a person ’ s rights under the domestic legislation are limited to a mere hope of being granted a right, with the actual grant of that right depending on an entirely discretionary and unreasoned decision of the authorities (see Masson and Van Zon, cited above, §§ 49-51; Roche, cited above, §§ 122-25; and Ankarcrona v. Sweden (dec.), no. 35178/97, ECHR 2000 ‑ VI.
104. There are also cases where the domestic legislation recognises that a person has a substantive right without at the same time, for one reason or another, there being a legal means of asserting or enforcing the right through the courts. This is the case, for example, of jurisdictional immunities provided for in the domestic law. Immunity is to be seen here not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts ’ power to determine the right (see Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, § 48, ECHR 2001 ‑ XI, and Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], no. 15869/02, § 57, ECHR 2010- III ).
105. In some cases, lastly, national law, while not necessarily recognising that an individual has a subjective right, does confer the right to a lawful procedure for examination of his or her claim, involving matters such as ruling whether a decision was arbitrary or ultra vires or whether there were procedural irregularities (see Van Marle and Others v. the Netherlands, 2 6 June 1986, § 35, Series A no. 101, and, mutatis mutandis, Kök v. Turkey, no. 1855/02, § 36, 19 October 2006). This is the case regarding certain decisions where the authorities have a purely discretionary power to grant or refuse an advantage or privilege, with the law conferring on the person concerned the right to apply to the courts, which, where they find that the decision was unlawful, may set it aside. In such a case Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is applicable, on condition that the advantage or privilege, once granted, gives rise to a civil right.
106. With regard to the civil nature of the right in question, the Court observes first of all that an employment relationship under the ordinary law, based on an employment contract concluded between an employee and an employer, gives rise to civil obligations for both parties, which are, respectively, to carry out the tasks provided for in the contract and to pay the stipulated salary.
An employment relationship between a public-law entity, including the State, and an employee may be based, according to the domestic provisions in force, on the labour-law provisions governing relations between private individuals or on a body of specific rules governing the civil service. There are also mixed systems, combining the rules of labour law applicable in the private sector with certain specific rules applicable to the civil service.
107. With regard to public servants employed in the civil service, according to the criteria established in Vilho Eskelinen and Others, cited above, the respondent State cannot rely before the Court on the applicant ’ s status as a civil servant to exclude the protection embodied in Article 6 unless two conditions are fulfilled. First, the State in its national law must have expressly excluded access to a court for the post or category of staff in question. Secondly, the exclusion must be justified on objective grounds in the State ’ s interest. In order for the exclusion to be justified, it is not enough for the State to establish that the civil servant in question participates in the exercise of public power or that there exists a special bond of trust and loyalty between the civil servant and the State, as employer. It is also for the State to show that the subject matter of the dispute in issue is related to the exercise of State power or that it has called into question the special bond. Thus, there can in principle be no justification for the exclusion from the guarantees of Article 6 of ordinary labour disputes, such as those relating to salaries, allowances or similar entitlements, on the basis of the special nature of the relationship between the particular civil servant and the State in question. There will, in effect, be a presumption that Article 6 applies. It will be for the respondent State to demonstrate, first, that a civil-servant applicant does not have a right of access to a court under national law and, secondly, that the exclusion of the rights under Article 6 for the civil servant is justified (ibid., § 62, and Baka, cited above, § 103 ).
108. The Court reiterates further that the criteria set out in the Vilho Eskelinen and Others judgment have been applied to many types of dispute concerning civil servants, including those relating to recruitment or appointment (see Juričić v. Croatia, no. 58222/09, §§ 54-58, 26 July 2011 ), career or promotion (see Dzhidzheva-Trendafilova (dec.), no. 12628/09, § 50, 9 October 2012), transfer (see Ohneberg v. Austria, no. 10781/08, § 24, 18 September 2012 ) and termination of service (see Olujić v. Croatia, no. 22330/05, §§ 33-34, 5 February 2009, and Nazsiz v. Turkey (dec.) no. 22412/05, 26 May 2009). More explicitly, the Court held in Bayer v. Germany (no. 8453/04, § 38, 16 July 2009 ), which concerned the removal from office of a State-employed bailiff following disciplinary proceedings, that disputes about “salaries, allowances or similar entitlements” were only non-exhaustive examples of “ordinary labour disputes” to which Article 6 should in principle apply under the Eskelinen test. In the Olujić judgment (cited above, § 34) it held that the presumption of applicability of Article 6 in the Eskelinen judgment also applied to cases of dismissal (see Baka, cited above, § 105).
109. Specifically, the Court applied Article 6 § 1 in a case concerning refusal to issue security clearance to the applicant, who was thus dismissed from his post as border guard (see Ternovskis v. Latvia, no. 33637/02, §§ 9 and 10, 29 April 2014 ). It noted that although a right of access to State secrets was not guaranteed by the Convention, the refusal to issue security clearance had led to the applicant ’ s dismissal, resulting in clear pecuniary repercussions for him. Indeed, the link between the decision not to grant the applicant security clearance and his loss of income was “certainly more than tenuous or remote” (ibid., § 44). The Court concluded that Article 6 was applicable, adding that domestic law had not excluded access by the claimant to a court (ibid., §§ 46-50).
110. Article 6 of the Convention was also held to be applicable in two cases concerning revocation of a licence to carry firearms, the applicants having been listed in a database containing information on persons deemed to be a potential danger to society (see Pocius v. Lithuania, no. 35601/04, § 40, 6 July 2010, and Užukauskas v. Lithuania, no. 16965/04, § 34, 6 July 2010 ). The applicants had brought legal proceedings challenging the listing of their names by the police and had sought to have their names removed from the database. The courts had rejected their request, basing their decision on evidence produced by the police and classified secret that it was thus impossible to disclose to them. The Court concluded that Article 6 was applicable, on the grounds that the inclusion of the applicants ’ names in the database had affected their reputation, their private life and their job prospects (see Pocius, §§ 38-46, and Užukauskas, §§ 34-39, both cited above ).
111. The Court also concluded that Article 6 was applicable in a case concerning judicial review of the appointment of a court president ( see Tsanova-Gecheva v. Bulgaria, no. 43800/12, §§ 84-85, 15 September 2015 ). Whilst recognising that Article 6 did not guarantee the right to be promoted or to occupy a post in the civil service, the Court observed, however, that the right to a legal and fair recruitment or promotion procedure or to equal access to employment and to the civil service could arguably be regarded as rights recognised under domestic law, in so far as the domestic courts had recognised their existence and had examined the grounds submitted by the persons concerned in this regard.
112. Lastly, Article 6 of the Convention was applied recently in a case in which the applicant complained of having been unable to challenge before the courts her dismissal from the National Security Service (see Miryana Petrova v. Bulgaria, no. 57148/08, §§ 30-35, 21 July 2016 ). In that case the Court found that what was at stake was not access to State secrets, which was not guaranteed by the Convention, but rather the applicant ’ s rights which had been affected as a consequence of the refusal to issue her security clearance. In the Court ’ s view, that refusal had had a decisive impact on the applicant ’ s personal situation as in the absence of the required clearance, she had been unable to continue to work in the position in which she had served for years, and this had had clear pecuniary repercussions for her. The link between the decision not to grant the applicant security clearance and her loss of income had therefore been “more than tenuous or remote” (ibid., § 31).
( ii ) Application of the above-cited principles to the present case
113. In order to determine whether the applicant had a right in the present case the Court must first analyse the actual nature of his complaint.
114. The applicant complained of the unfairness of the proceedings before the administrative courts which he had brought following the revocation, by the National Security Authority, of the security clearance issued to him to enable him to carry out his duties at the Ministry of Defence (see paragraphs 11 - 14 above). In his submission, he had lost his function and subsequently his employment as a result of the decision revoking his security clearance (see paragraphs 93 - 95 above).
115. It is clear from the provisions of domestic law and their interpretation by the domestic courts that the possession of security clearance is a necessary prerequisite for exercising professional activities requiring the persons concerned to have knowledge of or to handle State classified information (see paragraphs 30 and 40 above). Security clearance is not an autonomous right but a condition sine qua non for the exercise of duties of the type carried out by the applicant. Accordingly, the loss of the applicant ’ s security clearance had a decisive effect on his personal and professional situation preventing him from continuing to carry out certain duties at the Ministry of Defence (see, mutatis mutandis, Helmut Blum v. Austria, no. 33060/10, § 65, 5 April 2016 ).
116. The Court must therefore first examine whether the applicant could rely on a right or whether he was in a situation in which he aspired to obtain a mere advantage or privilege which the competent authority had a discretion to grant or refuse him without having to give reasons for its decision.
117. Access to employment and, still further, to the functions performed by the applicant in the present case, constitutes in principle a privilege that can be granted at the relevant authority ’ s discretion and cannot be legally enforced.
This is not the case regarding the continuation of such an employment relationship or the conditions in which it is exercised. In the private sector labour law generally confers on employees the right to bring legal proceedings challenging their dismissal where they consider that they have been unlawfully dismissed, or unilateral substantial changes have been made to their employment contract. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to public-sector employees, save in cases where the exception provided for in the above-mentioned judgment Vilho Eskelinen and Others applies.
118. In the present case the applicant ’ s ability to carry out his duties was conditional on authorisation to access classified information. The revocation of his security clearance therefore made it impossible for him to perform his duties in full and adversely affected his ability to obtain a new post in the civil service.
119. In these circumstances the Court considers that the link between the decision to revoke the applicant ’ s security clearance and the loss of his duties and his employment was more than tenuous or remote (see, mutatis mutandis, Ternovskis, cited above, § 44, and Miryana Petrova, cited above, § 31). He could therefore rely on a right to challenge the lawfulness of that revocation before the courts.
( β ) Civil nature of the right
120. With regard to the civil nature of the right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, whilst it is true that the present case does not concern a dispute between the applicant and his employer concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the former ’ s dismissal, but the revocation of his security clearance, regard must be had to the fact that the revocation prevented him from continuing in his function with the Vice-Minister of Defence. What was therefore at stake for the applicant was not the right to have access to classified information, but rather his duties and his employment affected by the revocation of his security clearance. In the absence of the requisite security clearance, he was no longer able to work in his former position. The Court will now examine whether the right in question is a civil right.
121. As has already been mentioned above, the employment relationship between the applicant and the Ministry of Defence was based on the provisions of the Labour Code, which did not contain any specific provisions applicable to functions performed within the State administration, so that at the material time there was no civil service, in the traditional sense of the term, conferring on public servants obligations and privileges outside the scope of the ordinary law. Specific legal provisions governing the status of civil servants have only existed since the Civil Service Act (Law no. 234/2014) came into force on 1 January 2015.
Employment disputes, especially those concerning measures terminating employment in the private sector, concern civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
122. On the basis of the above-mentioned considerations it can be concluded that the decision revoking the applicant ’ s security clearance and the subsequent proceedings affected his civil rights.
123. That being so, even assuming that the applicant were to be regarded as having been a civil servant whose status was governed by legal provisions outside the scope of the ordinary law, the Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, disputes between the State and its civil servants fall in principle within the scope of Article 6 except where both the cumulative conditions referred to in paragraph 107 above are satisfied.
124. In the instant case it cannot but be observed that the first of these conditions was not satisfied. Czech law made provision for persons with an interest in bringing proceedings to apply for judicial review of the National Security Authority ’ s decisions (see paragraphs 52 - 56 above). That possibility was available to the applicant, and he did indeed make such an application. It follows that Article 6 applies to the present case under its civil limb.
125. That provision therefore required that the applicant had access to a judicial body competent to determine his civil rights and obligations in accordance with the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 (see Veeber v. Estonia (no. 1), no. 37571/97, § 70, 7 November 2002).
126. Moreover, having regard to the conclusion that the applicant could rely on a civil right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Court considers that he can claim to have victim status for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention.
127. Accordingly, the preliminary objections raised by the Government must be rejected.
128. The applicant argued that it was not possible for the courts to properly examine the justification or non-justification of the Authority ’ s decision to refuse to grant or to revoke security clearance on the basis of indirect and inauthentic evidence, namely, a report submitted by an intelligence service. He observed that the report on which the courts had based their decision in the present case had amounted only to indirect and incomplete information emanating from a third party which they had been unable to verify or compare with his own statements, given that the report had not been disclosed to him at any stage in the proceedings. In his submission, the only means of verifying that information was to assess the facts referred to in it, and a court was unable to do this if a party targeted in the report was absent. Domestic case-law authority according to which a judicial review must also, in order to comply with the provisions of section 133 of Law no. 412/2005, be carried out beyond the grounds relied on by one of the parties to the proceedings, did not alter anything in this respect as the courts could not verify the truth and accuracy of the contents of the evidence. He referred in this context to judgment no. 4 As 1/2015 of 1 March 2016 of the Supreme Administrative Court, sitting as an extended chamber.
129. The applicant submitted that the principle of equality of arms was infringed where one of the parties to administrative proceedings had not had an opportunity to fully acquaint him or herself with all the evidence that had served as the main basis for an unfavourable decision. He conceded that in some circumstances State security interests defined by law took precedence over the interests of a person seeking protection from the courts in proper adversarial proceedings. He observed that in the present case, however, his right to a fair trial or to a position of equality before the law should not have been restricted because the statutory conditions under Czech law for such a procedure to be followed had not been met. The author of document no. 77, which the applicant had not been allowed to consult, had classified the report and the information contained in it in the lowest category of secrecy, namely, “restricted”. In the light of section 3(5)(e) of Law no. 412/2005, the author of the report had considered that information thus classified compromised certain intelligence operations in progress. However, under section 133(3) of that Law, in order for the courts to be able to exclude part of a document from examination by a party, there had to be a risk of interference in the activities of the intelligence services and that interference had to pose a major risk, as evidenced by the terms “endanger or seriously compromise”, which, by virtue of the law, required it to be classified at least in the “secret” category. According to the applicant, the legislature had sought to limit the application of the special procedure strictly to situations in which facts were referred to that had to be kept secret. In his view, the statutory conditions for limiting his procedural rights indicated in section 133(3) of Law no. 412/2005 had not been met because the information appearing in the report could not be such as to justify recourse to the special procedure.
130. He observed in this context that the courts had not had the documents in the intelligence service ’ s file or even part of those documents in their possession as these had not even been disclosed to the Authority or the administrative courts. He concluded that the only basis for the courts ’ decisions had therefore been the report in which the contents of the file had been summarised. According to him, the courts and their decisions could not be deemed to be independent and impartial where they were not in a position to verify the authenticity and accuracy of evidence produced by the parties. Even if the courts reviewed the facts of the case exercising their “full jurisdiction”, that did not in itself guarantee a fair hearing because even the most unbiased judge could be manipulated in a situation where he could not objectively assess the relevant evidence. Consequently, in his view, the balance between his right to a fair trial and the State ’ s interest in keeping certain information confidential had not been maintained, contrary to section 133(3) of Law no. 412/2005, in so far as the report that had served as the basis of the unfavourable decision had been classified in the lowest category of confidentiality.
131. The Government submitted that the overwhelming majority of domestic laws allowed the parties access to classified documents, irrespective of their security level and without the need to declassify them, where they were to be used as evidence. A different approach had been adopted for certain very specific proceedings whose salient feature was a close link to the vital interests of national security. That approach applied to judicial review proceedings in such fields as cross-border trade with military equipment, entrance to aerodrome premises subject to increased protection and to proceedings issuing and revoking security clearance. For those proceedings the principles concerning a party ’ s access to confidential documents applied mutatis mutandis. Only exceptionally, as a last resort, where intelligence services ’ or the police ’ s activities could otherwise be jeopardised or seriously disrupted, did the law permit the application of more restrictive rules providing that, in extreme cases, a party could be completely denied access to such evidence. Moreover, in those exceptional cases the judicial authorities were required to be particularly vigilant and compensate effectively any disadvantage caused to the opposing party by their own course of action so as to forestall any arbitrariness or abuse of process in the authorities ’ decision-making.
132. The Government submitted that the States enjoyed greater latitude regarding restrictions on parties ’ procedural rights in respect of proceedings concerning civil rights and obligations than those concerning criminal proceedings (they referred to the case of Gillissen v. the Netherlands, no. 39966/09, § 50(d), 15 March 2016 ). Whilst it was clear that the present case needed to be judged according to different standards of protection from those applicable in criminal cases, the proceedings in question could not be treated as conventional administrative proceedings either. Rather, they were sui generis proceedings whose legal framework, characteristics, object and purpose were necessarily factors preventing any such comparison.
133. The fact that there were legal grounds in the present case justifying the Authority ’ s decision not to disclose the contents of the intelligence service ’ s report to the applicant had been confirmed by all the domestic courts dealing with the case. Accordingly, the Government were fully satisfied that the non-disclosure of evidence, in the special circumstances of the present case, had not been an arbitrary decision.
134. The Government were also convinced that the judicial proceedings had provided as many safeguards as practicable to protect the applicant ’ s interests. Firstly, the applicant ’ s security file, including the classified documents, had been submitted to the administrative courts at two levels of jurisdiction and to the Constitutional Court. Given that the judges had ex lege access to classified information, regardless of the security level, the nine judges who had been called upon at the different stages of the proceedings to protect the applicant ’ s interests had been duly apprised of the contents of the intelligence service ’ s report. The Government added that the applicant had not called into question the independence and impartiality of the judges.
135. The Government also noted that limiting the courts ’ powers to addressing only the points raised by the complainant did not apply in such cases because the party to the proceedings could not effectively claim that the findings were unlawful when he or she did not even know their contents. Since in such a situation the position of the party to the proceedings and his or her ability to argue against the decision effectively was necessarily weakened, the courts were obliged proprio motu to “stand in” for the party ’ s procedural activity and duly examine the procedure followed and the grounds for the decision being challenged in their entirety, that is, over and above the points raised by the complainant.
136. In performing their supervisory function in relation to the Authority ’ s decisions, the administrative courts were called upon to assess whether the legal grounds relied on for implementing an exceptional procedure allowing access to confidential documents to be refused to the defendant party were justified. The Government submitted that in the present case the two administrative courts, which had had full jurisdiction, had proceeded as outlined above when they had concluded that the disclosure of the confidential part of the applicant ’ s security file would endanger or seriously compromise the activity of the intelligence services or of the police and, accordingly, they had considered that the decision to exclude that part from the consultation was justified.
137. The Government added that the file kept by the intelligence service or documents from it were not directly sent to the Authority and subsequently to the courts, but rather the relevant contents of the file were summarised in the report. However, the domestic courts ’ settled case-law set out numerous requirements that had to be met by the classified documents underlying the Authority ’ s decisions, in particular the reports on the outcome of the investigations carried out by the intelligence services, in order to be used in the subsequent judicial review. They had to contain very specific information, or a summary thereof, enabling the court to verify effectively the relevance and information value of the intelligence services ’ conclusions, and in particular that the information established by them was credible, balanced and related to issues that were decisive for the security vetting procedure. Moreover, the intelligence service had to indicate, in abstract terms, from which source the information had been obtained, including a description of the circumstances and the reasons why the intelligence services regarded the information as credible. The courts ’ function in the security proceedings was not to re-examine the authenticity and veracity of the reference documents kept by the intelligence services, but to verify whether there existed a well-founded suspicion of a possible security risk. To that end, the assessment of the credibility, plausibility and relevance of the information gathered was, in the Government ’ s submission, an appropriate criterion.
138. With regard to the applicant ’ s submission regarding whether the conditions of application of section 133(3) of Law no. 412/2005 had been satisfied, the Government considered that that provision did not make the possibility of denying access to classified evidence conditional on a high security level. Nor did the law confine that procedure to situations where there was a greater risk of jeopardising or disrupting the activities of the intelligence services or the police.
139. The Government submitted that in the present case there was no reason to doubt that if the courts had considered the information in the report on the outcome of the investigation to be incomplete, irrelevant, insufficiently detailed or not credible, they would have set aside the decision in question and ordered the Authority to supplement its factual findings by further evidence.
140. In the light of the Court ’ s case-law, the Government argued that there had been a significant subsidiary guarantee of protection of the applicant ’ s interests, namely, that he had been given the opportunity to provide the court with a detailed description of the events preceding the report on the outcome of the intelligence service ’ s investigation, its presumed contents as well as the possible motivation of its author to seek revocation of the applicant ’ s security clearance. They submitted that the applicant had thus had an opportunity to challenge the credibility of the report in the eyes of the judges who had protected his interests in the proceedings. That had also ensured that the judges made their decision in full knowledge of the matter, taking into account the applicant ’ s concerns and objections. The Government added that the fact that the Constitutional Court had also examined the applicant ’ s case constituted an additional guarantee that his interests were protected.
141. The Government were convinced that in the present case the right to a fair hearing and, in particular, the principle of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms, for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, had not been infringed since there had been no arbitrariness or abuse of process in the limitation of the applicant ’ s procedural rights and that limitation had been sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by independent and impartial judicial authorities which had played an active role in the proceedings and thus provided not only adequate safeguards to protect the applicant ’ s interests but also struck a fair balance between the State ’ s interests and those of the applicant.
( c) Submissions by the third-party intervener
142. The Slovak Government argued that where secrecy on grounds of national security was concerned the State enjoyed a broad margin of appreciation in determining which information was so sensitive that its disclosure would threaten the fundamental rights of persons or the protection of an important public interest. The disclosure of classified information concerning the internal workings and methods of the security services or law-enforcement bodies could seriously disrupt the activities of those services. The authorities therefore had a legitimate interest in keeping that information secret.
143. The Slovak Government observed that the right to disclosure of all relevant evidence was not absolute and could be subject to restrictions designed to protect the rights of third parties or an important public interest such as national security. They noted that the Slovakian legal regulations were, in substance, similar to the Czech legal regulations: security clearance issued by the National Security Authority or by another security department – the Slovak intelligence service or military intelligence service – was a prerequisite to gaining access to classified information. Classified information was also excluded from court files and neither the parties to the proceedings nor their legal representatives could claim access to it unless they had the appropriate authorisation.
144. The National Security Authority or any other security department had the power to revoke the security clearance of a person failing to meet the relevant statutory conditions. Such a decision was amenable to appeal before a committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, established by a special law. Subsequently, an appeal lay against the final decision of that appeal body to the administrative courts. In the judicial proceedings the Authority was required to provide the court with all the administrative files concerning the case in question, including all classified information. The judges thus had unlimited access to the classified information contained in those files.
145. Both the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic had made provision for the decision in question to be examined by courts having full jurisdiction. The courts were therefore required to examine of their own motion not only the lawfulness of the decision and of the conduct of the security department, but also the factual and legal assessment of the matter by the security department, over and above the objections raised during the proceedings. The Slovak Government submitted that those legal regulations were justified and adequately satisfied the requirements of adversarial proceedings and the equality of arms.
( a) The principles established in the Court ’ s case-law
146. The Court reiterates that the adversarial principle and the principle of equality of arms, which are closely linked, are fundamental components of the concept of a “fair hearing” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. They require a “fair balance” between the parties: each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent or opponents (see Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], no. 17502/07, § 119 and other references, ECHR 2016 ).
147. However, the rights deriving from these principles are not absolute. The Court has already ruled, in a number of judgments, on the particular case in which precedence is given to superior national interests when denying a party fully adversarial proceedings ( Miryana Petrova, cited above, §§ 39-40, and Ternovskis, cited above, §§ 65-68) The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in this area. However, it is for the Court to determine in the last instance whether the requirements of the Convention have been complied with ( see, for example, Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and Others and McElduff and Others v. the United Kingdom, 10 July 1998, § 72, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ IV; Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], no. 42527/98, § 44, ECHR 2001 ‑ VIII; and Devenney v. the United Kingdom, no. 24265/94, § 23, 19 March 2002).
148. The Court reiterates, moreover, that the entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is not an absolute right either. In criminal cases it has found that there may be competing interests, such as national security or the need to protect witnesses at risk of reprisals or keep secret police methods of investigation of crime, which must be weighed against the rights of the party to the proceedings. However, only measures restricting the rights of a party to the proceedings which do not affect the very essence of those rights are permissible under Article 6 § 1. For that to be the case, any difficulties caused to the applicant party by a limitation of his or her rights must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities (see, mutatis mutandis, Fitt v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29777/96, § 45 with other references, ECHR 2000 ‑ II, and Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC], no. 9154/10, § 107, ECHR 2015 ).
149. In cases where evidence has been withheld from the applicant party on public interest grounds, the Court must scrutinise the decision-making procedure to ensure that, as far as possible, it complied with the requirements to provide adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to protect the interests of the person concerned (see Fitt, cited above, § 46).
( b) Application of the above-mentioned principles to the instant case
150. In the instant case the Court observes that, in accordance with the requirements of Czech law in the event of legal proceedings challenging a decision refusing to issue or revoking security clearance, the proceedings brought by the applicant were restricted in two ways with regard to the rules of ordinary law guaranteeing a fair trial: first, the classified documents and information were not available either to him or to his lawyer, and second, in so far as the decision revoking security clearance was based on those documents, the grounds for the decision were not disclosed to him. The Court accordingly has the task of examining whether those restrictions infringed the very essence of the applicant ’ s right to a fair trial.
151. In carrying out that examination the Court will have regard to the proceedings considered as a whole and will determine whether the restrictions on the adversarial and equality-of-arms principles, as applicable in the civil proceedings, were sufficiently counterbalanced by other procedural safeguards.
152. In that connection the Court notes the powers conferred on the domestic courts, which have the necessary independence and impartiality; this is not disputed as such by the applicant who rather limits himself to calling into question the capacity of the judges to adequately assess the facts of the case, given that they did not have full access to the relevant documents (see paragraph 130 above).
First, the courts have unlimited access to all the classified documents on which the Authority has based itself in order to justify its decision. They then have power to carry out a detailed examination of the reasons relied on by the Authority for not disclosing the classified documents. They can assess the reasons given for not disclosing classified documents and order disclosure of those that they consider do not warrant that classification. Moreover, they are empowered to assess the merits of the Authority ’ s decision revoking security clearance and to quash, where applicable, an arbitrary decision of the Authority.
153. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the courts examining the dispute encompasses all the facts of the case and is not limited to an examination of the grounds relied on by the applicant, who has been heard by the judges and has also been able to make submissions in writing. It is true that, on this point, Czech law could have made provision, to the extent compatible with maintaining the confidentiality and proper conduct of investigations regarding an individual, for him to be informed, at the very least summarily, in the proceedings, of the substance of the accusations against him. In the present case the applicant would thus have been able to mount a clear-sighted and focused defence and the courts dealing with the case would not have had to compensate for the lacunas of the defence.
154. However, the Court observes that the courts duly exercised the powers of scrutiny available to them in this type of proceedings, both regarding the need to preserve the confidentiality of the classified documents and regarding the justification for the decision revoking the applicant ’ s security clearance, giving reasons for their decisions with regard to the specific circumstances of the present case.
155. Accordingly, the Supreme Administrative Court considered, having regard to the need to preserve the confidentiality of the classified documents, that their disclosure could have had the effect of disclosing the intelligence service ’ s working methods, revealing its sources of information or leading to attempts to influence possible witnesses. It explained that it was not legally possible to indicate where exactly the security risk lay or to indicate precisely which considerations underlay the conclusion that there was a security risk, the reasons and considerations underlying the Authority ’ s decision originating exclusively in the classified information. Accordingly, there is nothing to suggest that the classification of the documents in question was carried out arbitrarily or for a purpose other than the legitimate interest indicated as being pursued.
156. Regarding the justification of the decision revoking the applicant ’ s security clearance, the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was unequivocally clear from the classified documents that the applicant no longer satisfied the statutory conditions for being entrusted with secrets. It observed that the risk in his regard concerned his conduct, which affected his credibility and his ability to keep information secret. It noted further that the confidential document emanating from the intelligence service contained specific, comprehensive and detailed information concerning the conduct and lifestyle of the applicant on the basis of which the court was satisfied in the present case as to its relevance for determining whether the applicant posed a national security risk (see paragraph 20 above).
157. In this connection the Court notes that in March 2011 the applicant was prosecuted for participation in organised crime; aiding and abetting abuse of public power; complicity in illegally influencing public tendering and public procurement procedures; and aiding and abetting breaches of binding rules governing economic relations (see paragraph 22 above). It finds it understandable that where such suspicions exist the authorities consider it necessary to take rapid action without waiting for the outcome of the criminal investigation, while preventing the disclosure, at an early stage, of suspicions affecting the persons in question, which would run the risk of hindering the criminal investigation.
158. It would appear, moreover, in the light of the information in the Court ’ s possession, that the domestic courts did not make use of their power to declassify certain documents. Whilst they did examine the classified documents, they expressly stated that these could not be disclosed to the applicant. It is therefore not possible for the Court to rule on the thoroughness of the review carried out by the domestic courts. They did not make a distinction in that respect regarding the level of classification – confidential, secret, top secret – of the documents produced, as the Supreme Administrative Court expressly found (thus rejecting a ground raised by the applicant) that the degree of classification was irrelevant as concerned the scope and thoroughness of the review to be carried out by the court. That being said, having regard to the confidentiality of the documents, recognised as such by the various judicial bodies examining the case, the latter could hardly, in their respective decisions, have explained in detail the extent of the review they had carried out without compromising the secrecy of the information in their possession.
159. The Court acknowledges that the intelligence service ’ s report, which served as a basis for the decision revoking the applicant ’ s security clearance, had been classified in the lowest category of confidentiality, namely, the “restricted” category (see paragraphs 15 and 38 above). However, it considers that that fact did not deprive the Czech authorities of the right not to disclose the contents to the applicant. It can be seen from the Supreme Administrative Court ’ s case-law, although it postdates the judgment in the present case (see paragraph 65 above), that, contrary to the applicant ’ s submission, Law no. 412/2005, and particularly section 133(3) of that Law, is applicable to any information classified as confidential and not limited to data of a higher degree of confidentiality. Accordingly, the application of section 133(3) of Law no. 412/2005 by the domestic courts does not appear to be arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.
160. Nonetheless, it would have been desirable – to the extent compatible with the preservation of confidentiality and proper conduct of the investigations concerning the applicant – for the national authorities, or at least the Supreme Administrative Court, to have explained, if only summarily, the extent of the review they had carried out and the accusations against the applicant. In that connection the Court notes with satisfaction the positive new developments in the Supreme Administrative Court ’ s case-law (see paragraphs 63 - 64 above).
161. Having regard to the proceedings as a whole, to the nature of the dispute and to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities, the Court considers that the restrictions curtailing the applicant ’ s enjoyment of the rights afforded to him in accordance with the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms were offset in such a manner that the fair balance between the parties was not affected to such an extent as to impair the very essence of the applicant ’ s right to a fair trial.
162. Consequently, there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
1. Rejects, by fifteen votes to two, the preliminary objections raised by the Government;