CASE OF DE TOMMASO v. ITALY

1. The case originated in an application (no. 43395/09) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Italian national, Mr Angelo de Tommaso (“the applicant”), on 28 July 2009.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr D. Conticchio, a lawyer practising in Casamassima. The Italian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their co-Agents, Ms P. Accardo and Mr G. Mauro Pellegrini.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that the preventive measures to which he had been subjected for a period of two years were in breach of Articles 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
4. The application was allocated to the Second Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court).
5. On 18 October 2011 the Government were given notice of the application.
6. On 25 November 2014 a Chamber of the Second Section, composed of Işıl Karakaş, Président, Guido Raimondi, András Sajó, Nebojša Vučinić, Helen Keller, Egidijus Kūris, Robert Spano, judges, and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72).
7. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24.
8. The applicant and the Government each filed written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.
9. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 20 May 2015 (Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the GovernmentMs P. Accardo, Mr G. Mauro Pellegrini, co-Agents;
(b) for the applicantMr D. Conticchio, Counsel, Ms L. Fanizzi, Ms M. Casulli, Advisers.
The Court heard addresses by Ms Accardo and Mr Conticchio, and also their replies to questions from judges.
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
10. The applicant, Mr Angelo de Tommaso, is an Italian national who was born in 1963 and lives in Casamassima.
11. On 22 May 2007 the Bari public prosecutor recommended that the Bari District Court place the applicant under special police supervision ( sorveglianza speciale di pubblica sicurezza ) for two years, on the basis of Act no. 1423/1956, and impose a compulsory residence order on him during that time. The public prosecutor submitted that the applicant ’ s previous convictions for drug trafficking, absconding and unlawful possession of weapons showed that he associated with criminals and was a dangerous individual. He also noted that the applicant had been given a “warning” by the police but had persisted in his criminal conduct.
12. In submissions of 6 March 2008 the applicant challenged the prosecutor ’ s recommendation. He argued that there had been a case of mistaken identity and that the alleged breaches of the terms of his special supervision concerned a person who shared his first name and surname but had been born in 1973. He further submitted that no criminal charges had been brought against him since a conviction dating back to 2002. Although he had been convicted of absconding in 2004, that was not a decisive factor for the imposition of the measure in question. He argued that there was no need to place him under special supervision.
13. In a decision of 11 April 2008, served on 4 July 2008, the Bari District Court placed the applicant under special supervision for two years. It rejected his arguments, finding that the statutory requirements for the imposition of the measure were indeed satisfied, there being no doubt that he was dangerous.
14. The District Court found that the applicant had “active” criminal tendencies and that the evidence before it showed that he had derived most of his means of subsistence from criminal activity.
15. The court observed, in particular:
“ The subject was issued with a ‘ verbal warning for public safety ’ on 18 September 2006, but this did nothing to improve his conduct; he continued to associate regularly with key figures in the local underworld ( malavita locale ) and carried on committing offences (see statement of charges pending: breach of supervision order on 25 April 2007; breach of supervision order on 29 April 2007). ”
16. The District Court further held :
“The findings of the investigation (see documents and certificates in the case file) show that Mr Angelo de Tommaso remains personally involved in various criminal activities, among which the greatest threat to public order and safety is posed by offences against property and weapon- and drug-related offences.
This negative picture is compounded by the contents of the recent report issued by the Gioia del Colle carabinieri on 26 January 2008, from which it appears that far from having receded, the subject ’ s criminal tendencies are still thought to be active and operational. The evidence in the file indicates that he has no fixed and lawful occupation (having declared himself available for employment from February 2008) and that the serious offences under consideration are such as to warrant the conclusion that he has, up until now, derived a significant part of his means of subsistence from criminal activity, by repeatedly resorting to crime either alone or in association with habitual offenders (whether in his municipality of residence or elsewhere). To ensure more thorough monitoring, it is therefore necessary to order not only special police supervision for a period of two years (a measure deemed reasonable on account of the subject ’ s character as clearly emerges from the acts attributed to him), but also compulsory residence for the same duration.”
17. The preventive measure imposed the following obligations on the applicant:
– to report once a week to the police authority responsible for his supervision;
– to start looking for work within a month;
– to live in Casamassima and not to change his place of residence;
– to lead an honest and law-abiding life and not give cause for suspicion;
– not to associate with persons who had a criminal record and who were subject to preventive or security measures;
– not to return home later than 10 p.m. or to leave home before 6 a.m., except in case of necessity and only after giving notice to the authorities in good time;
– not to keep or carry weapons;
– not to go to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels and not to attend public meetings;
– not to use mobile phones or radio communication devices; and
– to have with him at all times the document setting out his obligations ( carta precettiva ), and to present it to the police authority on request.
18. On 14 July 2008 the applicant appealed to the Bari Court of Appeal.
19. On 31 July 2008 the Bari prefecture ordered the withdrawal of the applicant ’ s driving licence.
20. In a decision of 28 January 2009, served on the applicant on 4 February 2009, the Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and quashed the preventive measure ex tunc.
21. The Court of Appeal observed, firstly, that for a preventive measure to be imposed it was necessary to establish that the individual posed a “current danger”, which was not necessarily linked to the commission of a specific offence, but rather to the existence of a complex situation of a certain duration indicating that the individual had a particular lifestyle that prompted alarm for public safety.
22. In the Court of Appeal ’ s view, the requirement of a “current” danger to society implied that the relevant decision should relate to the time of the assessment and should remain valid throughout its implementation; any previous circumstances could be taken into account only in relation to their impact on the “current” element.
23. The court found that at the time the measure had been imposed, the applicant ’ s dangerousness could not have been inferred from any criminal activity.
24. It then observed that in several final judgments delivered between September 1995 and August 1999 the applicant had been convicted of tobacco smuggling. He had subsequently changed his sphere of activity and until 18 July 2002 had been involved in drug trafficking and handling illegal weapons, offences for which he had been sentenced to four years ’ imprisonment in a judgment of 15 March 2003, which had become final on 10 March 2004; he had served his sentence from 18 July 2002 to 4 December 2005.
25. The Court of Appeal accordingly noted that the applicant ’ s most recent illegal activities relating to drugs dated back to more than five years before the preventive measure had been imposed. All that the court could hold against him was an offence of absconding, committed on 14 December 2004 (while he had been subject to a compulsory residence order).
26. The court also pointed out that the breaches of the terms of special supervision committed on 25 and 29 April 2007 concerned a different person, who had the same first name and surname as the applicant but had been born in 1973.
27. The Court of Appeal held that the District Court had omitted to assess the impact of the rehabilitation purpose of the sentence on the applicant ’ s personality.
“While it is true that the application of special supervision is compatible with the status of detention, which relates solely to the time of the execution of the sentence, the assessment of dangerousness is inevitably even more significant in the case of an individual who has fully served his sentence and has committed no further offences after his release, as is the case for Mr de Tommaso.
The note of 26 January 2008 in which the carabinieri mentioned that Mr de Tommaso associated with convicted offenders (to whom he had been caught speaking) does not appear sufficient to establish his dangerousness, bearing in mind that Mr de Tommaso has not been the subject of any further judicial proceedings since the decision to impose the preventive measure.
Lastly, the Court of Appeal notes that the material produced by the defence before the District Court and at the hearing before this division indicates that, notwithstanding the typically casual nature of work as a farm labourer, the subject has, at least since his release from prison in 2005 up to the present day, consistently been in lawful employment providing him with a respectable source of income.
In conclusion, in March 2008 there were no specific facts from which to infer persistent dangerousness on the part of the subject, who, after serving his lengthy sentence of imprisonment, has not displayed any conduct justifying the assessment made in the judgment appealed against, which is therefore to be quashed.”
II. THE GOVERNMENT ’ S PARTIAL UNILATERAL DECLARATION
28. On 7 April 2015 the Government submitted a letter containing a friendly-settlement proposal in respect of the part of the application concerning the complaint of a lack of a public hearing in the Bari District Court and Court of Appeal (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention), as well as a unilateral declaration under Rule 62A of the Rules of Court in relation to that complaint.
29. In their declaration the Government, referring to the Court ’ s well ‑ established case-law ( Bocellari and Rizza v. Italy, no. 399/02, 13 November 2007; Perre and Others v. Italy, no. 1905/05, 8 July 2008; and Bongiorno and Others v. Italy, no. 4514/07, 5 January 2010), acknowledged that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of a public hearing, offered to pay a specified sum in respect of the costs relating to this part of the application and requested that this part of the application be struck out.
III. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
30. Praeter delictum preventive measures against individuals date back to the nineteenth century in Italy. They were already in existence prior to the unification of Italy in 1861, and were subsequently reincorporated in the legislation of the Kingdom of Italy by the Pica Act (no. 1409/1863), and later by the 1865 Consolidated Public Safety Act ( Testo Unico di Pubblica Sicurezza ).
31. In 1948 the Italian Constitution came into force, placing emphasis on protection of fundamental freedoms, in particular personal liberty (Article 13) and freedom of movement (Article 16), as well as the principle of legality in relation to criminal offences and security measures (Article 25, paragraphs 2 and 3).
32. Nevertheless, preventive measures against individuals were not abolished altogether; following the introduction of the new Act no. 1423/1956, they were adapted to comply with the fundamental criteria referred to in judgments of the Constitutional Court, requiring judicial intervention and observance of the principle of legality in their application.
33. Act no. 1423 of 27 December 1956, as in force at the material time, provides for the imposition of preventive measures against “persons presenting a danger for security and public morality”.
34. Section 1 of the Act provides that preventive measures apply to:
“(1) individuals who, on the basis of factual evidence, may be regarded as habitual offenders;
(2) individuals who, on account of their behaviour and lifestyle and on the basis of factual evidence, may be regarded as habitually living, even in part, on the proceeds of crime; and
(3) individuals who, on the basis of factual evidence, may be regarded as having committed offences endangering the physical or mental integrity of minors or posing a threat to health, security or public order.”
35. Under section 3, a measure entailing special police supervision, combined if need be with a prohibition on residence in a named district or province or an order for compulsory residence in a specified district ( obbligo del soggiorno in un determinato comune ), may be imposed on individuals referred to in section 1 who have not complied with an official police warning under section 4 and pose a threat to public safety.
36. Before the measure of police supervision is imposed, the police issue an official warning urging the individual concerned to behave lawfully. If, despite the warning, the individual does not change his or her behaviour and poses a threat to public safety, the police may recommend that the judicial authorities impose the measure in question.
37. Section 4 of the Act provides that the district court, sitting in camera, must give a reasoned decision within thirty days, after hearing submissions from the public prosecutor and the individual concerned, who has the right to file written pleadings and to be assisted by counsel. The preventive measures fall within the exclusive competence of the district court sitting in the provincial capital.
38. The public prosecutor and the individual concerned may appeal within ten days; the appeal does not have suspensive effect. The Court of Appeal, sitting in camera, has to give a reasoned decision within thirty days (section 4(5) and (6)). Subject to the same conditions, an appeal on points of law may then be lodged with the Court of Cassation, which, sitting in camera, must give its ruling within thirty days (section 4(7)).
39. When adopting one of the measures provided for in section 3, the district court must specify how long it is to remain in force – between one and five years (section 4(4)) – and must lay down the rules to be observed by the individual concerned (section 5(1)).
40. Section 5 provides that when imposing the measure of special supervision, the district court orders the person suspected of living on the proceeds of crime to look for work and housing within a short space of time and inform the authorities accordingly. The individual will not be allowed to travel away from the designated address without permission. The court also orders the individual: to lead an honest and law-abiding life and not give cause for suspicion; not to associate with individuals who have a criminal record and are subject to preventive or security measures; not to return home later than a specified time in the evening or to leave home before a specified time in the morning, except in case of necessity and only after giving notice to the authorities in good time; not to keep or carry weapons; not to go to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels; and not to attend public meetings. In addition, the district court may impose any other measures it deems necessary in view of the requirements of protecting society, in particular a ban on residing in certain areas.
41. Section 6 provides that where special supervision is combined with a compulsory residence order or an exclusion order, the president of the district court may in the course of the proceedings make an order ( decreto ) for the temporary withdrawal of the individual ’ s passport and the suspension of the validity of any equivalent document entitling the holder to leave the country. Where there are particularly serious grounds, the president may also direct that the compulsory residence or exclusion order should be enforced provisionally in respect of the individual concerned until the preventive measure has become final.
42. In accordance with section 9, a breach of the above rules is punishable by a custodial sentence.
B. Case-law of the Constitutional Court
43. Act no. 1423/1956 initially provided for the possibility of imposing preventive measures against individuals in certain cases of “ordinary dangerousness” only – in other words, when it was established that the individual posed a danger to public safety.
Its scope was later extended to cover other situations of “special dangerousness”, a notion applicable to individuals suspected of belonging to Mafia-type organisations (Act no. 575/19 6 5) or involved in subversive activities (Act no. 152/1975, introduced in response to the emergence of extreme left-wing and right-wing political terrorism during the “years of lead” (“ anni di piombo ”). Finally, the categories of “ordinary dangerousness” were amended and reduced to three by Act no. 327/1988.
44. The Constitutional Court has found on several occasions that the preventive measures provided for in Act no. 1423/1956 were compatible with fundamental freedoms.
45. In judgment no. 2 of 1956 it held:
“Article 16 of the Constitution remains to be examined: ‘ Every citizen has the right to reside and travel freely in any part of the national territory, subject to the general restrictions that may be laid down by law for health or security reasons. No restrictions may be imposed for political reasons. ’
It is a more delicate matter to determine whether the grounds of ‘ public order and safety and public morality ’ referred to in section 157 of the Public Safety Act constitute ‘ health or security reasons ’ within the meaning of Article 16.
An interpretation of ‘ security ’ as concerning solely physical integrity must be rejected, as this would be too restrictive; it thus appears rational and in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution to interpret the term ‘ security ’ as meaning a situation in which the peaceful exercise of the rights and freedoms so forcefully safeguarded by the Constitution is secured to citizens to the greatest extent possible. Security therefore exists when citizens can carry on their lawful activities without facing threats to their physical and mental integrity. ‘ Living together in harmony ’ is undeniably the aim pursued by a free, democratic State based on the rule of law.
That being so, there is no doubt that ‘ persons presenting a danger to public order and safety or public morality ’ (section 157 of the Public Safety Act) constitute a threat to ‘ security ’ as defined above and as contemplated by Article 16 of the Constitution.
With regard to morality, it is true that this does not entail having regard to individuals ’ personal convictions, which in themselves are uncontrollable, or moral theories, the manifestation of which, like any other manifestation of thought, takes place freely or is governed by other legal rules. Nevertheless, citizens have the right not to be disturbed and offended by immoral conduct where this also endangers health – as referred to in Article 16 of the Constitution – or creates an environment conducive to common crime.
With regard to public order, without entering into a theoretical debate on the definition of this concept, it is sufficient to point out that, for the purposes of Article 16 of the Constitution and section 157 of the Public Safety Act, danger to public order cannot result merely from conduct of a social or political nature – which is governed by other legal rules – but must result from outward signs of intolerance or rebellion vis-à-vis legislative rules and legitimate orders issued by the public authorities, since such conduct could easily give rise to situations of alarm and to violence indisputably posing a threat to the ‘ security ’ of all citizens, whose freedom of movement would become limited as a result.
To sum up, the expression ‘ health or security reasons ’ in the text of Article 16 of the Constitution must be interpreted as referring to facts posing a danger to citizens ’ security as defined above.
This conclusion is also accepted in the virtually uniform case-law of the Court of Cassation and by many legal authors. It has been observed that the generic wording of Article 16 applies to an infinite number of cases which are difficult to foresee and which can be encompassed by the summary expression ‘ health or security reasons ’, and that the purpose of this provision of the Constitution is to reconcile the need not to allow unrestricted freedom of movement for individuals posing a danger to society with the need to avoid sweeping, uncontrolled policing power.”
46. In judgment no. 27 of 1959 the Constitutional Court held that despite the restrictions on fundamental freedoms which they entailed, preventive measures satisfied the legitimate requirement laid down in the Constitution of guaranteeing “the orderly and peaceful course of social relations, not only through punitive criminal legislation, but also through a system of preventive measures intended to prevent the commission of future offences”. It added that such measures were necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued, because the categories of individuals concerned were sufficiently restricted and specific. Accordingly, it concluded that the measures were compatible with the principle of legality set forth in Articles 13 and 16 of the Constitution in the case of restrictions on rights relating to personal liberty.
47. In judgment no. 45 of 1960 the Constitutional Court held that the Constitution permitted administrative authorities to take measures restricting freedom of movement, such as an “order to leave a district”, as provided for in Act no. 1423/1956. It also specified that measures restricting personal liberty were to be taken by the judiciary alone.
48. In judgment no. 126 of 1962, reiterating its previous definition of “public morality”, the Constitutional Court noted that this concept was an aspect of public safety, a ground on which citizens ’ freedom of movement could be restricted in accordance with Article 16 of the Constitution.
49. In judgment no. 23 of 1964 the Constitutional Court held that preventive measures did not breach either the principle of legality or the presumption of innocence. In particular, it observed that the principle of legality, enshrined in the Constitution in relation both to restrictions on personal liberty (Article 13) and to criminal offences and security measures (Article 25), was applicable to preventive measures. However, observance of that principle had to be reviewed in accordance with special criteria taking into account the nature and purposes of the measures concerned. Their preventive aims meant that they were not imposed on the basis of a specific finding that a particular act had been committed, but rather on a pattern of behaviour indicating a danger to society.
50. The Constitutional Court held that as a result, when determining the different categories of individuals concerned, the legislature had to use different criteria from those employed to define the constituent elements of a criminal offence (and could also have recourse to elements of presumption); the criteria applied had to correspond to objectively identifiable types of behaviour. The approach to be adopted in defining preventive measures was different from, but no less strict than, the approach to defining criminal offences and penalties. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court concluded that the Act contained a sufficiently precise description of which types of conduct were held to represent a “danger to society” in the case of “idlers, those who are unfit for work and vagrants” and other categories of individuals.
51. Next, concerning the principle of presumption of innocence, the Constitutional Court held, firstly, that this principle did not apply, since preventive measures were not based on guilt and had no bearing on an individual ’ s criminal responsibility. Nor did the measures amount to a departure from this principle, given that an acquittal on grounds of insufficient evidence could never in itself justify a finding that a person posed a danger to society, since other factual indications of dangerousness had to be present.
52. In judgment no. 32 of 1969 the Constitutional Court pointed out that simply belonging to one of the categories of individuals designated by the Act was not a sufficient ground for imposing a preventive measure. On the contrary, it was necessary to establish the existence of specific conduct indicating that the individual concerned posed a real and not merely theoretical danger.
53. The Constitutional Court has found a violation of the Constitution on only three occasions on account of certain procedural or substantive aspects of the system for the application of preventive measures.
54. In judgment no. 76 of 1970 it declared section 4 of Act no. 1423/1956 unconstitutional in that it did not provide for the compulsory presence of counsel during proceedings for the application of preventive measures.
55. In judgment no. 177 of 1980 the Constitutional Court found that one of the categories of individuals laid down in section 1 of the 1956 Act as in force at the time, namely those “whose outward conduct gives good reason to believe that they have criminal tendencies”, was not defined in sufficient detail by the law and did not make it possible to foresee who might be targeted by the preventive measures or in what circumstances, since too much discretion was left to the authorities. The Constitutional Court also concluded that there had been a breach of the principle of legality, which was applicable in relation to preventive measures by virtue of Article 13 (personal liberty) and Article 25 (security measures).
Summarising its entire body of case-law in this area, the Constitutional Court held:
“(3) The question of preventive measures and associated issues have been brought before this court ever since its inception.
As early as judgment no. 2 of 1956, the court set forth certain important principles, such as the requirement of judicial intervention for all measures restricting personal liberty and the outright rejection of suspicion as a condition for the imposition of such measures, which must be based on specific facts in order to be lawful.
In judgment no. 11 of the same year (1956) the court held that ‘ the great difficulty in ensuring a balance between the two fundamental requirements – not hindering the activity of crime prevention, and guaranteeing respect for the inviolable rights of the human being – appears to have been resolved through recognition of the traditional rights of habeas corpus in the sphere of the principle of strict legality ’. In the same judgment the court further noted: ‘ Consequently, the person concerned cannot in any circumstances be subjected to a deprivation or restriction of his or her (personal) liberty unless the deprivation or restriction is provided for in abstract terms by the law, proceedings have been lawfully instituted to that end and there has been a reasoned decision by a judicial body. ’
The constitutionality of a ‘ system of measures for the prevention of unlawful acts ’ designed to guarantee ‘ orderly and peaceful relations between citizens ’ has been confirmed by subsequent judgments of this court (judgments no. 27 of 1959; no. 45 of 1960; no. 126 of 1962; nos. 23 and 68 of 1964; no. 32 of 1969; and no. 76 of 1970) concerning Articles 13, 16 and 17 and Article 25 § 3 of the Constitution. Sometimes the court has emphasised the parallel with security measures (as provided for in Article 25 § 3 of the Constitution), while at other times it has played it down; sometimes it has confirmed that these two types of measures, both relating to the danger posed to society by the individual, pursue the same aim – crime prevention – while at other times it has on the contrary highlighted the differences between them.
Reference should be made here not only to the observation in judgment no. 27 of 1959 as to the ‘ restricted and qualified ’ nature of the ‘ categories of individuals who may be placed under special supervision (section 1 of the Act) ’ (no. 1423/1956), but also and above all to this court ’ s judgment no. 23 of 1964, in which it declared ill ‑ founded ‘ the question of the constitutionality of section 1 of Act no. 1423 of 27 December 1956, having regard to Articles 13, 25 and 27 of the Constitution ’. The reasoning of that judgment states that ‘ in determining the circumstances (requiring a preventive measure), the legislature should normally use different criteria from those employed to define the constituent elements of a criminal offence; it may also have recourse to elements of presumption, although these must always correspond to objectively identifiable types of behaviour. This does not mean less rigour, but a different type of rigour in defining and adopting preventive measures in comparison with the definition of criminal offences and the imposition of sentences. ’ With regard specifically to subsections 2, 3 and 4 of section 1 of Act no. 1423/1956, the court ruled out the possibility that ‘ preventive measures could be adopted on the basis of mere suspicion ’, instead requiring ‘ an objective assessment of the facts revealing the individual ’ s habitual behaviour and standard of living, or specific outward signs of his or her criminal tendencies, which must have been established in such a way as to preclude purely subjective and unverifiable assessments by the authority ordering or applying the preventive measures ’.
(4) In accordance with previous decisions of this court, it should be noted that the constitutionality of preventive measures – in so far as they restrict personal liberty to varying degrees – is necessarily subject to observance of the principle of legality and the existence of judicial safeguards (judgment no. 11 of 1956). These two conditions are equally essential and closely linked, since the absence of one deprives the other of all effect by rendering it purely illusory.
The principle of legality in the context of prevention – that is, the reference to the ‘ cases provided for by law ’ – as deriving from Article 13 or Article 25 § 3 of the Constitution means that although in the majority of cases the application of the measure is linked to a prospective assessment, it must be based on ‘ cases of dangerousness ’ provided for – described – by law, forming both the framework of the judicial examination and the basis of a finding of prospective danger, which can only be lawfully founded on that basis.
Indeed, while jurisdiction in criminal matters means applying the law through an examination of the factual requirements in proceedings affording the necessary safeguards, among them the reliability of evidence, it is undeniable that even in proceedings relating to preventive measures the prospective assessment of dangerousness (which is entrusted to a judge and undoubtedly involves elements of discretion) is necessarily based on factual requirements that are ‘ provided for by law ’ and hence open to judicial scrutiny.
Judicial intervention (and likewise the presence of defence counsel, the need for which has been unequivocally affirmed) in proceedings for the application of preventive measures would have little meaning (or indeed would dangerously distort the judicial function in the sphere of personal liberty) if it did not serve to guarantee the examination, in adversarial proceedings, of the cases provided for by law.
Lastly, it should be noted that the imposition of preventive measures against individuals, which are likewise designed to prevent the commission of (other) offences (and do not always presuppose the commission of a – previous – offence; Article 49 §§ 2 and 4 and Article 115 §§ 2 and 4 of the Criminal Code), to the extent that they can be considered two species of the same genus, is linked to an examination of the cases provided for by law, and the assessment of dangerousness is based on this examination, whether such dangerousness is presumed or must be established in the precise circumstances.
(5) Thus, for preventive measures too the emphasis is on whether or not the factual requirements are defined sufficiently precisely by the law to allow a prospective assessment of the danger to society posed by the individual.
The questions put to this court require it to examine whether the ‘ indicators of danger to society ’ – to use the term commonly employed by legal authors – defined in the impugned legislative provisions are sufficient for the purposes outlined above.
To that end, it should be noted that in terms of precision, the fact that the definition in the legislation refers to a single type of behaviour or a pattern of behaviour is not decisive, since the only thing that can be assessed is an individual ’ s behaviour or conduct in relation to the outside world, as reflected in his or her acts and omissions.
Similarly, for preventive measures it is also crucial that the legislative definition –the cases provided for by law – should make it possible to identify the type(s) of behaviour whose presence in the specific circumstances of the case may form a basis for a prospective, that is to say forward-looking, assessment.
It should also be observed that the types of behaviour required for the imposition of preventive measures – since their aim is to prevent criminal offences – cannot be defined without an explicit or implicit reference to the offence, offences or categories of offences sought to be prevented, so that the description of the type(s) of behaviour concerned becomes all the more crucial in that it can be inferred from their presence in the specific circumstances that there is a reasonable prospect (of the risk) that such offences will be committed by the individuals in question.
(6) In the light of the foregoing considerations, the question of the constitutionality of the final point of section 1(3) of Act no. 1423/1956 must be declared well-founded.
The provision in question (unlike, for example, the first subsection of the same section 1) does not describe one or more types of behaviour, or any ‘ outward conduct ’, that could automatically prompt a judicial examination. The question as to what forms of ‘ outward conduct ’ are relevant is referred to the judge (and prior to that, to the appropriate prosecution and police authorities) when the factual circumstances are being established, even before the examination on the merits. The conditions for the assessment of ‘ criminal tendencies ’ have no conceptual autonomy vis-à-vis the assessment itself. The legal formulation does not therefore have the function of properly defining the circumstances, that is, identifying the particular ‘ cases ’ concerned (as required both by Article 13 and by Article 25 § 3 of the Constitution), but it leaves an uncontrollable margin of discretion to those involved.
... The expression ‘ criminal tendencies ’ used in the 1956 legislation may appear to evoke the concept of ‘ propensity for crime ’ in Article 108 of the Criminal Code, but the comparison does not hold true in substantive terms, since the wording of the latter provision requires the following to be established: an intentional offence against life or limb, motives indicating a particular propensity for crime, and the especially bad character of the guilty party. In the instant case, however, the expression ‘ criminal tendencies ’ is to be understood as a synonym of danger to society, with the result that the entire legislative provision, which allows for the adoption of measures restricting personal liberty without identifying either the requirements or the specific aims justifying them, must be declared unconstitutional.”
56. In judgment no. 93 of 2010, relying on Article 6 of the Convention and on the Bocellari and Rizza v. Italy judgment (no. 399/02, 13 November 2007), in which the European Court had found a violation of Article 6 in relation to proceedings for the application of measures involving property under the 1956 Act, the Constitutional Court declared section 4 of Act no. 1423/1956 unconstitutional in that it did not afford the person concerned the opportunity to request a public hearing during the proceedings for the application of preventive measures, whether at first instance or on appeal. However, in judgment no. 80 of 2011 the Constitutional Court clarified that it was unnecessary to provide for the possibility of requesting a public hearing in the Court of Cassation.
57. In judgment no. 282 of 2010 the Constitutional Court was called upon to determine whether or not section 9(2) of Act no. 1423 of 27 December 1956 was compatible with Article 25, paragraph 2, of the Constitution in so far as it provided for criminal penalties in the event of failure to observe the requirement laid down in section 5(3), first part, of the same Act no. 1423/1956, namely “to lead an honest and law-abiding life and not give cause for suspicion”, and whether or not it infringed the principle that the situations in which criminal-law provisions are applicable must be exhaustively defined by law ( principio di tassatività ).
58. In the submission of the court that had referred the question to the Constitutional Court, the obligation to lead an honest and law-abiding life and not give cause for suspicion, although included within the conditions imposed on the person subject to special supervision, constituted an obligation of a general nature applicable to the entire community, and not specifically to the individual concerned. Accordingly, the referring court contended that precisely because of its general scope, the obligation in question could not constitute a requirement, with prescriptive, typical and specific content, of the measure of special supervision, in that it was not possible to determine with any precision what conduct was capable of giving rise to the offence of breaching the terms of special supervision, given the vague and indeterminate nature of the elements used to characterise that offence.
59. In the Constitutional Court ’ s view, the inclusion in the description of the offence in question of summary expressions, words with multiple meanings, general clauses or elastic concepts did not entail a breach of Article 25, paragraph 2, of the Constitution in so far as the overall description of the act alleged to have been committed nevertheless enabled the trial court – having regard to the aim pursued by the relevant criminal provision and to the wider legislative context in which it was to be viewed – to establish the meaning of that element by means of an interpretative process not extending beyond its ordinary task : in other words, in so far as that description enabled it to express a judgment as to the correspondence between the concrete circumstances and the abstract definition of the offence, underpinned by a verifiable hermeneutic basis, and, correspondingly, enabled the person to whom the provision applied to have a sufficiently clear and immediate perception of its relative prescriptive value. In that context, the requirement to “lead an honest life”, assessed in isolation, in itself appeared generic and capable of taking on multiple meanings. However, if it was viewed in the context of all the other requirements laid down in section 5 of Act no. 1423/1956, its content became clearer, entailing a duty for the person concerned to adapt his or her own conduct to a way of life complying with all of the above-mentioned requirements, with the result that the wording “lead an honest life” became more concrete and geared to the individual.
60. The Constitutional Court also found that the requirement to be “law ‑ abiding” referred to the duty for the person concerned to comply with all the prescriptive rules requiring him or her to behave, or not to behave, in a particular way; not only the criminal laws, therefore, but any provision whose non-observance would be a further indication of the person ’ s danger to society as already established.
61. Lastly, regarding the requirement to “not give cause for suspicion”, the Constitutional Court noted that this too should not be seen in isolation but in the context of the other requirements set out in section 5 of Act no. 1423/1956, such as the obligation for the person under special supervision not to frequent certain places or associate with certain people.
C. Case-law of the Court of Cassation
62. In judgment no. 10281 of 25 October 2007 the plenary Court of Cassation noted that the prerequisite for imposing a preventive measure in respect of a specified individual was a finding that the individual posed a “current danger”, which was not necessarily linked to the commission of an offence, although this might be a relevant factor. What was important, in the Court of Cassation ’ s view, was the existence of a complex situation of a certain duration indicating that the individual ’ s lifestyle raised an issue in terms of public safety. The assessment of this “current danger” was therefore “an assessment on several levels, taking into account various types of behaviour noted in the individual, which do not necessarily constitute grounds for a prosecution but nevertheless provide an indication of his or her danger to society”.
63. In judgment no. 23641 of 2014 the Court of Cassation held that the assessment of dangerousness for the purposes of applying a preventive measure did not involve a mere assessment of subjective danger but corresponded to the assessment of “facts” which could be examined from a historical perspective and were themselves “indicators” of whether the individual concerned could be included in one of the criminological categories defined by law.
Accordingly, in the Court of Cassation ’ s view, an individual “being examined in proceedings for the application of a preventive measure” was not found “guilty” or “not guilty” of a specific offence, but was deemed “dangerous” or “not dangerous” in the light of his or her previous conduct (as established on the basis of various sources of information), which was regarded as an “indicator” of the possibility of future conduct likely to disrupt social or economic order; this assessment was to be made on the basis of precise legislative provisions “categorising” the various forms of dangerousness.
64. The Court of Cassation held that falling into one of the categories thus established was a precondition, but was not sufficient in itself, for the imposition of a preventive measure on an individual, since the categories in question represented indicators of the danger to society posed by the individual, as emerged clearly from section 1(3) of Enabling Act no. 136 of 13 August 2010, on the basis of which Legislative Decree no. 159/2011 was introduced.
D. Legislative Decree no. 159 of 6 September 2011
65. The new “Anti-Mafia Code”, consolidating the legislation on anti ‑ Mafia action and preventive measures concerning individuals and property, came into force in September 2011. It repealed Act no. 1423/1956 but did not alter the categories of individuals concerned. Among the applicable measures, the only one abolished by the new legislation is the requirement not to go to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels.
As regards the procedure for the imposition of preventive measures, section 7 of the Legislative Decree provides that, at the request of the individual concerned, a public hearing may be held.
66. Lastly, in February 2015 the Italian Government adopted Legislative Decree no. 7, which subsequently became Act no. 43 of 17 April 2015, containing urgent measures to combat international terrorism. As a result, new terrorist offences have been included in the Criminal Code, notably one relating to travel by foreign fighters for terrorist purposes. In addition, the scope of preventive measures concerning individuals (and property) has been extended. A new measure involving confiscation of passports and identity cards has been introduced.
E. Act no. 117 of 13 April 1988 on compensation for damage caused in the exercise of judicial functions and the civil liability of judges
67. Section 1(1) of Act no. 117/1988 provides that the Act is applicable “to all members of the ordinary, administrative, financial, military and special judiciary exercising a judicial function of any type, and to any other persons involved in the exercise of a judicial function”.
“(1) Any person who has sustained unjustifiable damage as a result of judicial conduct, acts or measures on the part of a judge who is guilty of intentional fault or serious misconduct in the exercise of his or her functions, or as a result of a denial of justice, may bring proceedings against the State for compensation for any pecuniary damage sustained or for non-pecuniary damage resulting from deprivation of personal liberty.
(2) In the exercise of judicial functions the interpretation of provisions of law or the assessment of facts and evidence shall not give rise to liability.
(3) The following shall constitute serious misconduct:
(a) a serious breach of the law resulting from inexcusable negligence;
(b) the assertion, due to inexcusable negligence, of a fact whose existence is indisputably refuted by documents in the case file;
(c) the denial, due to inexcusable negligence, of a fact whose existence is indisputably established by documents in the case file; or
(d) the adoption of a measure concerning personal liberty in a case other than those provided for by law or without due reason.”
The first sentence of section 3(1) of Act no. 117/1988 states that a denial of justice may also occur in the event of “a refusal, omission or delay by a judge with regard to the taking of measures within his or her competence where, after expiry of the statutory time-limit for taking the measure in question, the party concerned has applied to have the measure taken and, without valid reason, no action has been taken within thirty days following the date on which the application was lodged with the registry”.
68. The subsequent provisions of Act no. 117/1988 lay down the conditions and procedure for bringing a claim for compensation under sections 2 or 3 of the Act, and also specify the actions which may be brought retrospectively against a judge guilty of intentional fault or serious misconduct in the exercise of his or her functions, or of a denial of justice.
69. According to the information available to the Court on the legislation of thirty-four member States, the vast majority of the countries surveyed (twenty-nine countries [1] out of thirty-four) do not have any measures comparable to those applied in Italy in the present case. Measures of this kind can be found in only five countries (Austria, France, Russia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom).
70. Austria, France and Switzerland have adopted measures of this kind to deal with hooliganism: preventive measures are used against potentially violent individuals at sports events. France also makes provision for other types of measure (such as banning meetings, events or shows, or making a compulsory treatment order) falling within the responsibility of the administrative authorities. In the United Kingdom similar measures were introduced in 2011 in the context of terrorism prevention.
71. In Russia various laws provide for preventive measures in respect of former prisoners convicted of a serious crime, a repeat offence or other specified types of offence, abandoned minors, juvenile offenders, drug addicts and alcoholics who represent a danger to others, persons implicated in household crimes, persons breaching public order during public events, persons taking part in unofficial youth organisations pursuing illegal activities and persons involved in drug dealing or illegal drug-taking.
72. As far as European legislation is concerned, Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States provides for the possibility for States to restrict this freedom of movement and residence on grounds of public policy, public security or public health (Article 27). However, expulsion on grounds of public policy or public security must comply with the principle of proportionality and be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned, which must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. As regards the duration of such a measure, the Directive states that after a reasonable period – and, in any event, after a three-year period from enforcement of the exclusion order – the person concerned must be able to submit an application for lifting of the order.
73. At Council of Europe level, the Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS no. 217) was adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 May 2015 and was opened for signature in Riga on 22 October 2015. The Protocol lays down an obligation for States to make it a criminal offence to travel, or attempt to travel, to a State other than the State of residence or nationality for the purpose of perpetrating, planning, preparing or participating in terrorist acts, or providing or receiving terrorist training, and to adopt such measures as may be necessary to cooperate in efforts to prevent anyone from travelling abroad to join terrorists.
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL No. 4
74. The applicant complained that the preventive measure imposed on him had been arbitrary and excessive in its duration. He relied on Article 5 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
The relevant part of Article 5 provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. ”
Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 provides:
“1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the maintenance of ordre public, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
4. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject, in particular areas, to restrictions imposed in accordance with law and justified by the public interest in a democratic society.”
75. The Government contested that argument.
76. The Government submitted that Article 5 of the Convention was not applicable in the present case. They pointed out that, in accordance with the Court ’ s settled case-law (referring to Raimondo v. Italy, 22 February 1994, § 39, Series A no. 281 ‑ A; Villa v. Italy, no. 19675/06, §§ 41-43, 20 April 2010; and S.M. v. Italy (dec.), no. 18675/09, §§ 21-23, 8 October 2013 ), obligations resulting from preventive measures did not amount to deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention, but merely to restrictions on liberty of movement. They submitted that the complaint was thus incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention.
77. The applicant submitted that special police supervision fell within the ambit of Article 5 of the Convention and pointed out that failure to observe the rules of conduct attaching to that measure was punishable by a custodial sentence (section 9 of the 1956 Act). The restrictions imposed on him during the period from 4 July 2008 to 4 February 2009 had deprived him of his personal liberty. In his submission, the present case was comparable to Guzzardi v. Italy (6 November 1980, Series A no. 39), in which the Court had found that in view of the particular circumstances of the case, the applicant – who had been subjected to similar measures to those imposed on the applicant in the present case – had been deprived of his liberty, and that there had been a violation of Article 5.
78. The applicant submitted that the fact that he had been unable to leave home between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. amounted to a deprivation of liberty resembling house arrest.
79. The Court must first determine whether Article 5 of the Convention is applicable in the present case.
80. It reiterates at the outset that in proclaiming the “right to liberty”, paragraph 1 of Article 5 contemplates the physical liberty of the person. Accordingly, it is not concerned with mere restrictions on liberty of movement, which are governed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. In order to determine whether someone has been “deprived of his liberty” within the meaning of Article 5, the starting-point must be his or her specific situation and account must be taken of a whole range of factors such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question. The difference between deprivation and restriction of liberty is one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance (see Guzzardi, cited above, §§ 92-93; Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10593/08, § 225, ECHR 2012; Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09, § 57, ECHR 2012; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06, § 115, ECHR 2012; and Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, § 73, ECHR 2010). Furthermore, an assessment of the nature of the preventive measures provided for by the 1956 Act must consider them “cumulatively and in combination” (see Guzzardi, cited above, § 95).
81. As the Court has also held, the requirement to take account of the “type” and “manner of implementation” of the measure in question (ibid., § 92) enables it to have regard to the specific context and circumstances surrounding types of restriction other than the paradigm of confinement in a cell. Indeed, the context in which the measure is taken is an important factor, since situations commonly occur in modern society where the public may be called on to endure restrictions on freedom of movement or liberty in the interests of the common good (see, mutatis mutandis, Austin and Others, cited above, § 59).
82. The Convention institutions ’ body of case-law concerning preventive measures imposed against individuals dates back to the Commission ’ s decision of 5 October 1977 in Guzzardi v. Italy (no. 7960/77, unreported). The applicant in that case alleged that an order for his compulsory residence in the district of Force amounted to a deprivation of liberty. In dismissing his complaint, the Commission concluded that the conditions for the implementation of the compulsory residence order imposed on him, together with the associated obligations, did not entail any deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention but solely restrictions on his liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
83. Subsequently, in a separate case brought by the same applicant, the Court referred to the above-mentioned Commission decision in noting that special supervision accompanied by an order for compulsory residence in a specified district did not of itself come within the scope of Article 5 (see Guzzardi, judgment cited above, § 94). However, it concluded that in view of the particular circumstances of the case, the applicant had been “deprived of his liberty” within the meaning of Article 5 and could therefore rely on the guarantees under that provision. The applicant, who was suspected of belonging to a “band of mafiosi”, had been forced to live on an island within an (unfenced) area of 2.5 sq. km, mainly together with other residents in a similar situation and supervisory staff. The requirement to live on the island was accompanied by other restrictions similar to the measures imposed on Mr de Tommaso. The Court attached particular significance to the extremely small size of the area where the applicant had been confined, the almost permanent supervision to which he had been subjected and the fact that it had been almost completely impossible for him to make social contacts ( ibid., § 95).
84. The Court notes that since the Guzzardi case, it has dealt with a number of cases ( Raimondo, cited above, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 193, ECHR 2000 ‑ IV; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, no. 36681/97, § 37, ECHR 2004 ‑ VI; see also, mutatis mutandis, Villa, cited above, §§ 43-44, and S.M. v. Italy, cited above, §§ 22-23) concerning special supervision together with a compulsory residence order and other associated restrictions (not leaving home at night, not travelling away from the place of residence, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with individuals who had a criminal record and who were subject to preventive measures). As none of those cases involved special circumstances comparable to those in Guzzardi, the Court examined the preventive measures in question under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
85. The Court observes that in the present case the applicant was subjected to similar measures to those which it examined in the cases cited above and that, unlike the applicant in the Guzzardi case, he was not forced to live within a restricted area and was not unable to make social contacts.
86. Nor can the Court accept the applicant ’ s argument that the fact of being unable to leave home, except in case of necessity, between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. amounts to house arrest and hence deprivation of liberty.
87. It reiterates that house arrest is considered, in view of its degree and intensity ( see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755/07, § 104, ECHR 2016 ), to amount to deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention (see N.C. v. Italy, no. 24952/94, § 33, 11 January 2001; Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 40896/98, §§ 60 and 74, 30 September 2004; Danov v. Bulgaria, no. 56796/00, §§ 61 and 80, 26 October 2006; and Ninescu v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 47306/07, § 53, 15 July 2014 ). It further notes that under Italian law, a person under house arrest is deemed to be in pre-trial detention (see Ciobanu v. Romania and Italy, no. 4509/08, § 22, 9 July 2013, and Mancini v. Italy, no. 44955/98, § 17, ECHR 2001 ‑ IX).
88. The Court observes, however, that in all the cases it has examined that are similar to the present case, the applicants were under an obligation not to leave home at night (see paragraph 84 above), and this was found to constitute interference with liberty of movement. It cannot find any sufficiently relevant grounds for changing this approach, especially as it appears that in the present case, having regard to the effects of the applicant ’ s special supervision and the manner of its implementation, there were no restrictions on his freedom to leave home during the day and he was able to have a social life and maintain relations with the outside world. The Court further notes that there is no indication in the material before it that the applicant ever applied to the authorities for permission to travel away from his place of residence.
89. The Court considers that the obligations imposed on the applicant did not amount to deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, but merely to restrictions on liberty of movement.
90. It follows that the complaint under Article 5 of the Convention is incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4.
91. Since Article 5 is not applicable, the applicant ’ s complaint falls to be examined under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, the applicability of which in the present case has not been disputed by the parties.
92. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It therefore declares it admissible.
93. The applicant submitted that the special supervision and compulsory residence order constituted a restriction of his right under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. He noted firstly that from 1956, by passing the Act in question, Parliament had conferred on the judiciary the power to determine what factual elements were symptomatic of an individual ’ s dangerousness. He accepted that the Constitutional Court ’ s judgments had laid down strict criteria for imposing such measures and finding that individuals were dangerous, but contended that the judiciary had an “unquestionable discretion” in reaching that finding, on the basis of factual elements that were not defined by law and hence were not foreseeable by citizens.
94. The applicant also emphasised the vague nature of the measures imposed on him, for example the obligation to lead an honest life and not give cause for suspicion as regards his behaviour. He added that a custodial sentence could be imposed on anyone breaching or disregarding those requirements.
95. He submitted that the measure in issue had been imposed on him because of a case of mistaken identity, as the Court of Appeal had acknowledged in its judgment. The Court of Appeal had declared the preventive measure unlawful ab origine in finding that it had been unnecessary in the absence of any danger to society.
96. The applicant further submitted that despite the favourable outcome of the proceedings, he had been placed under special supervision for 221 days. This was a lengthy period and resulted from the Bari Court of Appeal ’ s failure to comply with the thirty-day time-limit for giving its decision. In conclusion, he contended that this was not a problem linked to length of proceedings.
97. The Government stated that preventive measures were subject to two guarantees: they had to be foreseeable and be imposed as a result of a judicial procedure. The procedure drew on objective factors demonstrating that the individual posed a danger to society and justifying the need to apply such measures to prevent and avoid the commission of criminal offences.
98. As to the lawfulness of the measure, the Government referred in particular to the reasons given by the Court of Cassation in its judgment no. 23641 of 2014 (see paragraph 63 above).
99. They pointed out that preventive measures had been reviewed by the Constitutional Court, which on several occasions had emphasised the need for a statutory provision based on objective circumstances, the exclusion of mere suspicion as a basis for such measures, and the balance to be struck between respect for individual rights and the requirements of protecting society.
100. They informed the Court that the new “Anti-Mafia Code”, consolidating the legislation on anti-Mafia action and preventive measures concerning individuals and property, had come into force in 2011, repealing Act no. 1423/1956. The register containing information about preventive measures was confidential and was kept by the courts.
101. The Government also pointed out that the domestic courts had held that only a substantive breach of a preventive measure could lead to the application of section 9 of the Act in issue, and thus to a custodial sentence.
102. The Government added that the interference with the right to liberty of movement had been in accordance with law, had pursued a legitimate aim – namely preservation of the public interests referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 – and had been proportionate. According to the domestic case-law, failure by the Court of Appeal to comply with the statutory time-limit (of thirty days) did not automatically upset the requisite fair balance (they referred to S.M. v. Italy, cited above, § 27). Moreover, under section 3 of Act no. 117/1988 (see paragraph 67 above), once the statutory time-limit for taking the measure in question had expired, the applicant could have asked the Court of Appeal to rule on his application and could subsequently have brought a claim for compensation.
103. The Government submitted that the applicant had been able to submit evidence and also to attend the hearings and file observations, which had then been included in the case file. The Bari Court of Appeal had not acknowledged that there had been a case of mistaken identity, but had simply reassessed all the evidence on which the District Court ’ s decision had been based, concluding that the applicant did not pose a danger to society. The Government contended that the applicant had had access to a remedy and had been successful in using it. Accordingly, the requisite fair balance had not been upset.
(a) Whether there was an interference
104. The Court reiterates that Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 guarantees to any person a right to liberty of movement within a given territory and the right to leave that territory, which implies the right to travel to a country of the person ’ s choice to which he or she may be admitted (see Khlyustov v. Russia, no. 28975/05, § 64, 11 July 2013, and Baumann v. France, no. 33592/96, § 61, ECHR 2001-V). According to the Court ’ s case-law, any measure restricting the right to liberty of movement must be in accordance with law, pursue one of the legitimate aims referred to in the third paragraph of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 and strike a fair balance between the public interest and the individual ’ s rights (see Battista v. Italy, no. 43978/09, § 37, ECHR 2014; Khlyustov, cited above, § 64; Raimondo, cited above, § 39; and Labita, cited above, §§ 194-195).
105. In the present case the Court has found that the restrictions imposed on the applicant fall within the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (see paragraph 91 above). It must therefore determine whether the interference was in accordance with law, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in the third paragraph of that Article and was necessary in a democratic society.
(b) Whether the interference was “in accordance with law”
106. The Court reiterates its settled case-law, according to which the expression “in accordance with law” not only requires that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the persons concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see Khlyustov, cited above, § 68; X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, § 58, ECHR 2013; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 140, ECHR 2012; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 52, ECHR 2000-V; and Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 30, ECHR 2004-I).
107. One of the requirements flowing from the expression “in accordance with law” is foreseeability. Thus, a norm cannot be regarded as a “law” unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate their conduct; they must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Such consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (see Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 49, Series A no. 30; Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, § 40, Series A no. 260-A; Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-III; and Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, cited above, § 141).
108. The level of precision required of domestic legislation – which cannot in any case provide for every eventuality – depends to a considerable degree on the content of the law in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (see RTBF v. Belgium, no. 50084/06, § 104, ECHR 2011; Rekvényi, cited above, § 34; Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, § 48, Series A no. 323; and Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, cited above, § 142). It is, moreover, primarily for the national authorities to interpret and apply domestic law (see Khlyustov, cited above, §§ 68-69).
109. The Court reiterates that a rule is “foreseeable” when it affords a measure of protection against arbitrary interferences by the public authorities (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, cited above, § 143, and Khlyustov, cited above, § 70). A law which confers a discretion must indicate the scope of that discretion, although the detailed procedures and conditions to be observed do not necessarily have to be incorporated in rules of substantive law (see Khlyustov, cited above, § 70, and Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1983, § 88, Series A no. 61).
(ii) Application of these principles in the present case
110. The Court observes in the present case that Act no. 1423/1956, as interpreted in the light of the Constitutional Court ’ s judgments, formed the legal basis for the individual preventive measures imposed on the applicant. It therefore concludes that the preventive measures in issue had a legal basis in domestic law.
111. The Court must therefore ascertain whether the Act was accessible and foreseeable as to its effects. This factor is especially important in a case such as the present one, where the legislation in question had a very significant impact on the applicant and his right to liberty of movement.
112. The Court considers, firstly, that Act no. 1423/1956 satisfied the requirement of accessibility; indeed, this was not disputed by the applicant.
113. The Court must next determine whether the Act was foreseeable as to its effects. To that end, it will first examine the category of individuals to whom the preventive measures were applicable, and then their content.
114. The Court notes that to date, it has yet to conduct a detailed examination of the foreseeability of Act no. 1423/1956. It observes, however, that in Labita (cited above, § 194) it found that the preventive measures were based on Acts nos. 14 23/1956, 575/1965, 327/1988 and 55/1990 and were therefore “in accordance with law” within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. In S.M. v. Italy (cited above, § 26) the Act in issue was examined in the light of the Court of Appeal ’ s decision acknowledging that there had been a procedural defect in the proceedings at first instance. In the Court ’ s view, the mere fact that the District Court ’ s decision had subsequently been quashed had not as such affected the lawfulness of the interference during the prior period. By contrast, in Raimondo and Vito Sante Santoro (both cited above), the Court found that the interference with the applicants ’ liberty of movement had been neither “in accordance with law” nor “necessary” on account of the delay in serving the decision revoking the special supervision (see Raimondo, cited above, § 40) and on account of the unlawful prolongation of the special supervision for a period of two months and twenty-two days without any compensation for the damage sustained (see Vito Sante Santoro, cited above, § 45).
115. In the present case the applicant complained specifically of the lack of precision and foreseeability of Act no. 1423/1956. Accordingly, the Court is called upon to examine whether the Act was foreseeable as regards the individuals to whom the preventive measures were applicable (section 1 of the 1956 Act), in the light of the Constitutional Court ’ s case-law.
116. In this connection, the Court notes that the Italian Constitutional Court set aside the law in respect of one category of individuals which it found not to be defined in sufficient detail, namely those “whose outward conduct gives good reason to believe that they have criminal tendencies” (see judgment no. 177 of 1980, paragraph 55 above). The relevant provision was no longer in force at the time when the impugned measures were applied to the applicant. In respect of all other categories of individuals to whom the preventive measures are applicable, the Constitutional Court has come to the conclusion that Act no. 1423/1956 contained a sufficiently detailed description of the types of conduct that were held to represent a danger to society. It has found that simply belonging to one of the categories of individuals referred to in section 1 of the Act was not a sufficient ground for imposing a preventive measure; on the contrary, it was necessary to establish the existence of specific conduct indicating that the individual concerned posed a real and not merely theoretical danger. Preventive measures could therefore not be adopted on the basis of mere suspicion, but had to be based on an objective assessment of the “factual evidence” revealing the individual ’ s habitual behaviour and standard of living, or specific outward signs of his or her criminal tendencies (see the Constitutional Court ’ s case-law set out in paragraphs 45-55 above).
117. The Court observes that, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitutional Court has intervened on several occasions to clarify the criteria to be used for assessing whether preventive measures are necessary, the imposition of such measures remains linked to a prospective analysis by the domestic courts, seeing that neither the Act nor the Constitutional Court have clearly identified the “factual evidence” or the specific types of behaviour which must be taken into consideration in order to assess the danger to society posed by the individual and which may give rise to preventive measures. The Court therefore considers that the Act in question did not contain sufficiently detailed provisions as to what types of behaviour were to be regarded as posing a danger to society.
118. The Court notes that in the present case the court responsible for imposing the preventive measure on the applicant based its decision on the existence of “active” criminal tendencies on his part, albeit without attributing any specific behaviour or criminal activity to him. Furthermore, the court mentioned as grounds for the preventive measure the fact that the applicant had no “ fixed and lawful occupation” and that his life was characterised by regular association with prominent local criminals (“ malavita ”) and the commission of offences (see paragraphs 15-16 above).
In other words, the court based its reasoning on the assumption of “criminal tendencies”, a criterion that the Constitutional Court had already considered insufficient – in its judgment no. 177 of 1980 – to define a category of individuals to whom preventive measures could be applied (see paragraph 55 above).
Thus, the Court considers that the law in force at the relevant time (section 1 of the 1956 Act) did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope or manner of exercise of the very wide discretion conferred on the domestic courts, and was therefore not formulated with sufficient precision to provide protection against arbitrary interferences and to enable the applicant to regulate his conduct and foresee to a sufficiently certain degree the imposition of preventive measures.
119. As regards the measures provided for in sections 3 and 5 of Act no. 1423/1956 that were applied to the applicant, the Court observes that some of them are worded in very general terms and their content is extremely vague and indeterminate; this applies in particular to the provisions concerning the obligations to “lead an honest and law-abiding life” and to “not give cause for suspicion”.
In this connection, the Court notes that the Constitutional Court has come to the conclusion that the obligations to “lead an honest life” and to “not give cause for suspicion” did not breach the principle of legality (see paragraph 59 above).
120. The Court observes that the interpretation performed by the Constitutional Court in its judgment no. 282 of 2010 was subsequent to the facts of the present case and that it was therefore impossible for the applicant to ascertain, on the basis of the Constitutional Court ’ s position in that judgment, the precise content of some of the requirements to which he had been subjected while under special supervision. Such requirements, indeed, can give rise to several different interpretations, as the Constitutional Court itself admitted. The Court notes, moreover, that they are couched in broad terms.
121. Furthermore, the interpretation by the Constitutional Court in 2010 did not solve the problem of the lack of foreseeability of the applicable preventive measures since under section 5(1) of the Act in issue, the district court could also impose any measures it deemed necessary – without specifying their content – in view of the requirements of protecting society.
122. Lastly, the Court is not convinced that the obligations to “lead an honest and law-abiding life” and to “not give cause for suspicion” were sufficiently delimited by the Constitutional Court ’ s interpretation, for the following reasons. Firstly, the “duty for the person concerned to adapt his or her own conduct to a way of life complying with all of the above-mentioned requirements” is just as indeterminate as the “obligation to lead an honest and law-abiding life”, since the Constitutional Court simply refers back to section 5 itself. In the Court ’ s view, this interpretation does not provide sufficient guidance for the persons concerned. Secondly, the “duty of the person concerned to comply with all the prescriptive rules requiring him or her to behave, or not to behave, in a particular way; not only the criminal laws, therefore, but any provision whose non-observance would be a further indication of the danger to society that has already been established” is an open-ended reference to the entire Italian legal system, and does not give any further clarification as to the specific norms whose non-observance would be a further indication of the person ’ s danger to society.
The Court therefore considers that this part of the Act has not been formulated in sufficient detail and does not define with sufficient clarity the content of the preventive measures which could be imposed on an individual, even in the light of the Constitutional Court ’ s case - law.
123. The Court is also concerned that the measures provided for by law and imposed on the applicant include an absolute prohibition on attending public meetings. The law does not specify any temporal or spatial limits to this fundamental freedom, the restriction of which is left entirely to the discretion of the judge.
124. The Court considers that the law left the courts a wide discretion without indicating with sufficient clarity the scope of such discretion and the manner of its exercise. It follows that the imposition of preventive measures on the applicant was not sufficiently foreseeable and not accompanied by adequate safeguards against the various possible abuses.
125. The Court therefore concludes that Act no. 1423/1956 was couched in vague and excessively broad terms. Neither the individuals to whom preventive measures were applicable (section 1 of the 1956 Act) nor the content of certain of these measures (sections 3 and 5 of the 1956 Act) were defined by law with sufficient precision and clarity. It follows that the Act did not satisfy the foreseeability requirements established in the Court ’ s case-law.
126. Accordingly, the interference with the applicant ’ s liberty of movement cannot be said to have been based on legal provisions complying with the Convention requirements of lawfulness. There has therefore been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 on account of the lack of foreseeability of the Act in question.
127. Having regard to the foregoing conclusion, the Court is not required to deal with any other submissions made by the applicant or to examine the question whether the measures imposed on him pursued one or more legitimate aims and were necessary in a democratic society.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
128. The applicant alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of a public hearing in the District Court and the Court of Appeal, and also complained that the proceedings had been unfair. The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 reads as follows:
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
129. The Government acknowledged that the applicant had been the victim of a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the lack of a public hearing in the domestic courts, and disputed his other allegations.
A. The Government ’ s partial unilateral declaration
130. On 7 April 2015 the Government sent the Court a letter containing a proposal for a friendly settlement in respect of the part of the application concerning the complaint of a lack of a public hearing in the Bari District Court and Court of Appeal (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention), as well as a unilateral declaration within the meaning of Rule 62A of the Rules of Court in relation to that complaint. The Government also asked the Court to strike the complaint out in part should the friendly settlement not be accepted (see paragraph 29 above).
131. On 22 April 2015 the applicant stated that he was not satisfied with the terms of the proposed friendly settlement. He did not comment on the unilateral declaration.
132. The relevant parts of Article 37 § 1 of the Convention read:
“1. The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that
(c) for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application.
However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires.”
133. The Court notes at the outset that this is the first case before the Grand Chamber in which a request has been made to strike out part of an application. However, there have been cases where Sections have agreed to strike out parts of an application following a unilateral declaration and to examine the remaining complaints (see Bystrowski v. Poland, no. 15476/02, § 36, 13 September 2011; Tayfur Tunç and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 22373/07, §§ 20-21, 24 March 2015; Pubblicità Grafiche Perri S.R.L v. Italy (dec.), no. 30746/03, 14 October 2014; Frascati v. Italy (dec.), no. 5382/08, §§ 21-22, 13 May 2014; Ramazan Taş v. Turkey (dec.), no. 5382/10, 14 October 2014; Pasquale Miele v. Italy (dec.), no. 37262/03, 16 September 2014; Aleksandr Nikolayevich Dikiy v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 2399/12, 16 December 2014; and Ielcean v. Romania (dec.), no. 76048/11, §§ 18-19, 7 October 2014 ).
134. The Court reiterates that in certain circumstances it may be appropriate to strike out an application under Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention on the basis of a unilateral declaration by the respondent Government even where the applicant wishes the examination of the case to be continued. It has pointed out in this connection that such a procedure is not in itself designed to circumvent the applicant ’ s opposition to a friendly settlement. It must be ascertained from the particular circumstances of the case whether the unilateral declaration offers a sufficient basis for finding that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention does not require the Court to continue its examination of the case (see Baudoin v. France, no. 35935/03, § 78, 18 November 2010).
135. Relevant factors in this regard include the nature of the complaints made, whether the issues raised are comparable to issues already determined by the Court in previous cases, the nature and scope of any measures taken by the respondent Government in executing judgments delivered by the Court in such cases, and the impact of these measures on the case under consideration (see Tahsin Acar v. Turkey (preliminary objections) [GC], no. 26307/95, § 76, ECHR 2003-VI).
136. Other factors are also of importance. In particular, the Government ’ s unilateral declaration must, on the basis of the complaints raised, contain an acknowledgment of responsibility in relation to the alleged violations of the Convention, or at the very least some kind of admission in this regard. In the latter case, it is necessary to determine the scope of such admissions and the manner in which the Government intend to provide redress to the applicant (see, among other authorities, Tahsin Acar, cited above, §§ 76-82, and Prencipe v. Monaco, no. 43376/06, §§ 57 ‑ 62, 16 July 2009).
137. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the Government have acknowledged in their unilateral declaration that the applicant has suffered a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of a public hearing, and that they have undertaken to pay him a sum of money in respect of procedural costs. As to the manner of providing redress, it notes that the Government have not proposed any award in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
138. The Court reiterates that, as it has consistently held, the exclusion of the public from proceedings for the application of preventive measures concerning property amounts to a violation of Article 6 § 1 (see Bocellari and Rizza, cited above, §§ 34-41; Perre and Others, cited above, §§ 23-26; Bongiorno and Others, cited above, §§ 27 ‑ 30; Leone v. Italy, no. 30506/07, §§ 26-29, 2 February 2010; and Capitani and Campanella v. Italy, no. 24920/07, §§ 26-29, 17 May 2011 ). However, it notes that there are no previous decisions relating to the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to proceedings for the application of preventive measures concerning individuals, and thus to the question of public hearings in such proceedings, which, moreover, are conducted in the same way as those for the application of preventive measures in respect of property.
139. Having regard to the foregoing and to all the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the conditions for striking out part of the application are not satisfied.
140. It therefore rejects the Government ’ s request for part of the application to be struck out under Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention.
141. The applicant submitted that the criminal limb of Article 6 § 1 was applicable to proceedings for the application of preventive measures in respect of individuals in that they related to the citizen ’ s personal liberty and were governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He added that Article 6 § 1 was applicable since the Court had already held that the civil limb of Article 6 applied to proceedings for the application of preventive measures in respect of property.
142. The Government made no submissions on this point.
143. The Court observes at the outset that the criminal aspect of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is not applicable, since special supervision is not comparable to a criminal sanction, given that the proceedings concerning the applicant did not involve the determination of a “criminal charge” within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention (see Guzzardi, cited above, § 108, and Raimondo, cited above, § 43). It remains to be determined whether Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is applicable in its civil aspect.
144. The Court reiterates that for Article 6 § 1 in its “civil” limb to be applicable, there must be a dispute (“ contestation ” in the French text) over a “right” which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, irrespective of whether that right is protected under the Convention. The dispute must be genuine and serious; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise; and finally, the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question, mere tenuous connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to bring Article 6 § 1 into play (see, among many other authorities, Mennitto v. Italy [GC], no. 33804/96, § 23, ECHR 2000 ‑ X; Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, § 74, ECHR 2009; and Boulois v. Luxembourg [GC], no. 37575/04, § 90, ECHR 2012).
145. In this regard, the character of the legislation which governs how the matter is to be determined (civil, commercial, administrative law, and so on) and that of the authority which is invested with jurisdiction in the matter (ordinary court, administrative body, and so forth) are not of decisive consequence (see Micallef, cited above, § 74).
146. The Court notes that unlike the Guzzardi case, the present case is characterised by the fact that the preventive measures imposed on the applicant did not amount to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention but to restrictions on his liberty of movement. Accordingly, the question whether the right to liberty is “civil” in nature does not arise in the present case (see Guzzardi, cited above, § 108, and also Aerts v. Belgium, 30 July 1998, § 59, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V, and Laidin v. France (no. 2), no. 39282/98, § 76, 7 January 2003).
147. However, the question of the applicability of the civil limb of Article 6 arises in another respect. The Court has held – in the context of imprisonment – that some restrictions on detainees ’ rights, and the possible repercussions of such restrictions, fall within the sphere of “civil rights”. By way of example, the Court observes that it has found Article 6 to be applicable to certain types of disciplinary proceedings relating to the execution of prison sentences (see Gülmez v. Turkey, no. 16330/02, §§ 27 ‑ 31, 20 May 2008, in which the applicant was prohibited from receiving visits for one year).
148. In the cases of Ganci v. Italy (no. 41576/98, §§ 20-26, ECHR 2003 ‑ XI), Musumeci v. Italy (no. 33695/96, § 36, 11 January 2005) and Enea v. Italy ([GC], no. 74912/01, § 107, ECHR 2009) the Court found that Article 6 § 1 was applicable to the high-security regime under which some prisoners could be placed in Italy. In these cases the restrictions imposed on the applicants mainly entailed a prohibition on receiving more than a certain number of visits from family members each month, the ongoing monitoring of correspondence and telephone calls and limits on outdoor exercise time. For example, in Enea (cited above, § 107) the Court held that the complaint concerning the restrictions to which the applicant had allegedly been subjected as a result of being placed in a high-security unit was compatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention since it related to Article 6 under its civil head. It found that some of the restrictions alleged by the applicant – such as those restricting his contact with his family – clearly fell within the sphere of personal rights and were therefore civil in nature (ibid., § 103).
149. The Court also concluded that any restriction affecting individual civil rights had to be open to challenge in judicial proceedings, on account of the nature of the restrictions (for instance, a prohibition on receiving more than a certain number of visits from family members each month, or the ongoing monitoring of correspondence and telephone calls) and of their possible repercussions (for instance, difficulty in maintaining family ties or relationships with non-family members, or exclusion from outdoor exercise) (ibid., § 106).
150. In Stegarescu and Bahrin v. Portugal (no. 46194/06, §§ 37-38, 6 April 2010) the Court applied Article 6 § 1 to disputes concerning the restrictions (visits limited to one hour per week and only behind a glass partition, outdoor exercise limited to one hour per day, and the first applicant ’ s inability to pursue studies and sit examinations) to which detainees in high-security cells were subjected.
151. The Court therefore observes that there has been a shift in its own case-law towards applying the civil limb of Article 6 to cases which might not initially appear to concern a civil right but which may have direct and significant repercussions on a private right belonging to an individual (see Alexandre v. Portugal, no. 33197/09, § 51, 20 November 2012, and Pocius v. Lithuania, no. 35601/04, § 43, 6 July 2010).
152. In the Court ’ s view, the present case has similarities with the cases cited above: although the restrictions imposed in a prison context in those cases concerned contact with family members, relations with others or difficulties in maintaining family ties, they resemble those to which the applicant was subjected. The Court refers in particular to the requirement not to leave the district of residence, not to leave home between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., not to attend public meetings and not to use mobile phones or radio communication devices.
153. The Court notes that in the present case, a “genuine and serious dispute” arose when the District Court placed the applicant under special supervision, dismissing his arguments. The dispute was then conclusively settled by the judgment of the Bari Court of Appeal, which acknowledged that the preventive measure imposed on the applicant was unlawful.
154. The Court further observes that some of the restrictions complained of by the applicant – such as the prohibition on going out at night, leaving the district where he lived, attending public meetings or using mobile phones or radio communication devices – clearly fall within the sphere of personal rights and are therefore civil in nature (see, mutatis mutandis, Enea, cited above, § 103, and Ganci, cited above, § 25).
155. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the applicant ’ s complaint concerning the restrictions to which he was allegedly subjected as a result of being placed under special supervision is compatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, since it relates to Article 6 in its civil aspect. As this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds, the Court declares it admissible.
156. The applicant complained of a violation of his right to a fair hearing. He submitted firstly that he had been unable to have a public hearing as this had not been permitted under the law at the time and the Constitutional Court ’ s subsequent intervention had not made it possible to remedy that violation.
157. The applicant further alleged that the Bari District Court had found that he was dangerous because he had committed offences against individuals and property, whereas it was clear from his criminal record certificate – which had been included in the case file – that the judgments in which he had been convicted with final effect between September 1995 and August 1999 concerned tobacco smuggling. He had later been convicted of drug trafficking in 2003 and absconding in 2004.
158. In addition, the criminal record certificate included in the case file showed that the alleged breaches of the terms of his special supervision in fact concerned an individual who shared his first name and surname but had been born in 1973.
159. In support of his allegation of a violation of the right to a fair hearing, the applicant further contended that the District Court had not taken into account the evidence in the case file showing that he was engaged in honest employment and did not have a notable standard of living. The District Court had not even considered the documents certifying that he had worked as a farm labourer. Although it was true that the Court of Appeal had subsequently quashed the measure in issue, it had taken seven months to give its decision, whereas the law prescribed a time-limit of thirty days ( see paragraph 96 above).
160. The Government pointed out that in judgment no. 93 of 12 March 2010 the Constitutional Court, applying the principles set forth in the European Court ’ s case-law, had declared section 4 of Act no. 1423/1956 and section 2 ter of Act no. 575/1965 unconstitutional in that they did not afford individuals the opportunity to request a public hearing in proceedings for the application of preventive measures.
161. The Government acknowledged that the applicant was the victim of a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the lack of a public hearing in the domestic courts.
162. As regards the complaint that the proceedings had been unfair, the Government pointed out that the applicant had been able to produce evidence and also to attend the hearings and file submissions, which had then been included in the case file. They contended that the Bari Court of Appeal had not acknowledged that there had been a case of mistaken identity, but had simply reassessed all the evidence on which the District Court ’ s decision had been based, concluding that the applicant did not pose a danger to society. In the Government ’ s submission, the applicant had had access to a remedy and had been successful in using it. Accordingly, they argued that there had been no violation of Article 6 in that respect.
(a) Lack of a public hearing in the District Court and Court of Appeal
163. The Court reiterates that while a public hearing constitutes a fundamental principle enshrined in Article 6 § 1, the obligation to hold such a hearing is not absolute since the circumstances that may justify dispensing with a hearing will essentially depend on the nature of the issues to be determined by the domestic courts (see Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053/01, §§ 41-42, ECHR 2006 ‑ XIV ).
164. The Court notes firstly that in the present case the Government have acknowledged that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 in that the hearings in the Bari District Court and Court of Appeal were not public.
165. It further observes that the Constitutional Court has declared section 4 of Act no. 1423/1956 and section 2 ter of Act no. 575/1965 unconstitutional in that they did not afford individuals the opportunity to request a public hearing in proceedings for the application of preventive measures (see paragraph 56 above).
166. The Court also refers to its relevant case-law regarding the lack of a public hearing in proceedings concerning preventive measures in respect of property (see Bocellari and Rizza, cited above, §§ 34-41; Perre and Others, cited above, §§ 23-26; Bongiorno and Others, cited above, §§ 27 ‑ 30; Leone, cited above, §§ 26-29; and Capitani and Campanella, cited above, §§ 26 ‑ 29).
167. Furthermore, in the Court ’ s view, the circumstances of the case dictated that a public hearing should be held, bearing in mind that the domestic courts had to assess aspects such as the applicant ’ s character, behaviour and dangerousness, all of which were decisive for the imposition of the preventive measures (see, mutatis mutandis, Jussila, cited above, § 41).
168. Accordingly, having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in this respect.
(b) Complaint concerning the alleged unfairness of the proceedings
169. With regard to the complaints specifically concerning the proceedings in the Bari District Court, the Court reiterates that its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention.
170. In particular, it reiterates that it is not its function to deal with alleged errors of law or fact committed by the national courts unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see, for example, García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I, and Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 82, ECHR 2004-I), for instance where they can be said to amount to “unfairness” in breach of Article 6 of the Convention. While Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way in which evidence should be assessed, these being primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts. In principle, issues such as the weight attached by the national courts to particular items of evidence or to findings or assessments submitted to them for consideration are not for the Court to review. The Court should not act as a fourth-instance body and will therefore not question under Article 6 § 1 the national courts ’ assessment, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see, for example, Dulaurans v. France, no. 34553/97, §§ 33-34 and 38, 21 March 2000; Khamidov v. Russia, no. 72118/01, § 170, 15 November 2007; Anđelković v. Serbia, no. 1401/08, § 24, 9 April 2013; and Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, §§ 64-65, ECHR 2015).
171. The Court ’ s sole task in connection with Article 6 of the Convention is to examine applications alleging that the domestic courts have failed to observe specific procedural safeguards laid down in that Article or that the conduct of the proceedings as a whole did not guarantee the applicant a fair hearing (see, among many other authorities, Donadze v. Georgia, no. 74644/01, §§ 30-31, 7 March 2006).
172. In the instant case, the proceedings as a whole were conducted in accordance with the requirements of a fair hearing. The applicant ’ s main complaint was that the Bari District Court ’ s assessment of the evidence had been arbitrary, but the Court points out that the Court of Appeal found in his favour (see paragraphs 26 -27 above) and consequently quashed the preventive measure.
173. There has therefore been no violation of Article 6 in this respect.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
174. The applicant also complained that he had no effective remedy by which to seek redress in the domestic courts and alleged a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
175. The Government contested that argument.
176. The Court observes that this complaint, to the extent that it concerns the existence of a domestic remedy whereby the applicant could have raised his grievance under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds and must therefore be declared admissible.
177. The Government submitted that the applicant ’ s complaint was not an arguable one (relying on S.M. v. Italy, cited above, § 30). They further pointed out that the applicant had won his case in the Court of Appeal.
178. The applicant alleged that he had not had an effective remedy by which to seek redress for the violation of Article 5 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
179. The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy by which to complain of a breach of the Convention rights and freedoms. Therefore, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their obligations under this provision, there must be a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief. The scope of the obligation under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant ’ s complaint under the Convention, but the remedy must in any event be “effective” in practice as well as in law, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the State (see Nada, cited above, §§ 208-209; see also Büyükdağ v. Turkey, no. 28340/95, § 64, 21 December 2000, and the references cited therein, in particular Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, § 95, Reports 1996-VI). In certain circumstances, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may satisfy the requirements of Article 13 (see, among other authorities, Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, § 77, Series A no. 116).
180. However, Article 13 requires that a remedy be available in domestic law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as “arguable” in terms of the Convention (see, for example, Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, 27 April 1988, § 54, Series A no. 131). It does not compel States to allow individuals to challenge domestic laws before a national authority on the ground of being contrary to the Convention (see Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, § 40, Series A no. 247-C), but seeks only to ensure that anyone who makes an arguable complaint of a violation of a Convention right will have an effective remedy in the domestic legal order (ibid., § 39).
(b) Application of those principles in the present case
181. The Court observes that, in view of its above finding of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (see paragraph 126 above), this complaint is arguable. It therefore remains to be ascertained whether the applicant had an effective remedy under Italian law by which to complain of the breaches of his Convention rights.
182. The Court reiterates that where there is an arguable claim that a measure taken by the authorities might infringe an applicant ’ s freedom of movement, Article 13 of the Convention requires the national legal system to afford the individual concerned the opportunity to challenge the measure in adversarial proceedings before the courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Riener, cited above, § 138).
183. However, a domestic appeal procedure cannot be considered effective within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention unless it affords the possibility of dealing with the substance of an “arguable complaint” for Convention purposes and granting appropriate relief. In this way, by giving direct expression to the States ’ obligation to protect human rights first and foremost within their own legal system, Article 13 establishes an additional guarantee for individuals in order to ensure that they effectively enjoy those rights (ibid., § 142; see also Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 152, ECHR 2000-XI, and T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28945/95, § 107, ECHR 2001-V).
184. The Court observes that the applicant was able to appeal to the Bari Court of Appeal, arguing that the special supervision and compulsory residence order had been imposed unlawfully. After reviewing the terms and proportionality of the special supervision order, the Court of Appeal quashed it.
185. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant therefore had an effective remedy under Italian law affording him the opportunity to raise his complaints of Convention violations. There has therefore been no violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
186. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
187. The applicant sought an award in respect of pecuniary damage, leaving it to the Court to determine the amount.
188. With regard to non-pecuniary damage, he claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) for the period which he had spent under special supervision.
189. The Government did not submit any observations under Article 41.
190. The Court notes that the claim in respect of pecuniary damage has not been quantified; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it considers it appropriate to award the applicant EUR 5,000 in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage.
191. The applicant also claimed EUR 6, 000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 5,525 for those incurred before the Court.
192. The Government did not comment on this claim.
193. According to the Court ’ s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, having regard to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the full amount claimed by the applicant covering costs under all heads.
194. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
1. Rejects, unanimously, the Government ’ s request to strike the application out in part on the basis of their unilateral declaration regarding the complaint about the lack of a public hearing in the Bari District Court and Court of Appeal;