roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot reported that, during landing, the airplane approached with "extra speed" and ballooned in the landing flare. He added that, "instantly my training took over" and he applied power to go-around, but then also remembered he could not go around when landing in this direction, at this airport, due to terrain and obstacles. He further added that he then reduced power to idle and "stalled the airplane to the ground" and impacted the remining runway hard. Subsequently, he taxied the airplane to the ramp without further incident. The ailerons, wings, and firewall sustained substantial damage. During a telephone conversation with the NTSB investigator-in-charge, the pilot reported that he had flown into this airport numerous times prior to the accident and knew that, "once you get to the powerlines you are committed to landing." The power lines were located about ¼ nautical miles from the runway threshold.The pilot did not report that there were any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The Federal Aviation Administration Chart Supplement for the airport stated in part: "Land Rwy [runway] 28 (west) tkf [takeoff] Rwy [runway] 10 (east)." The pilot reported that the landing was on runway 28.
The private pilot stated that the flight originated with full fuel tanks. About 8 minutes after takeoff, he noticed fuel leaking from the left fuel tank cap for a short period. The pilot continued the flight, switching fuel tanks every 25 minutes. The flight continued uneventfully until the engine lost total power while the airplane was entering the downwind leg to land. The pilot switched fuel tanks and attempted to restart the engine to no avail. The pilot performed a forced landing in a field; the airplane touched down hard and contacted a hay bale, which resulted in substantial damage to the wings and compromised the fuel system. Postaccident examination of the main fuel tank caps revealed the O-rings were cracked. Maintenance records showed that the O-rings were replaced about 17 months before the accident. Although it is unknown how much fuel leaked from the fuel cap during the flight, the pilot reported that, about 50 minutes before the accident, both fuel tanks were indicating about 3/4 full; thus, it is doubtful that enough fuel would have leaked to result in fuel exhaustion. A postaccident engine test run was conducted with the fuselage strapped down on a trailer; an alternate fuel system was rigged to both the left and right fuel inlet lines at the fuselage. The engine started without hesitation and ran smoothly up to 1,500 rpm using the left fuel tank inlet. The test was repeated using the right fuel tank inlet, and the engine performed in the same manner. The rpm was not increased any higher due to the security of the fuselage during the test. Postaccident examination of the engine did not reveal evidence of preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation; thus, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.
The private pilot of the amphibious airplane reported that he performed a fly-by of the lake he intended to land on to ensure that there were no boats or obstacles in the water. Seeing none and observing calm conditions, he conducted the landing, during which the airplane impacted a submerged object. The impact compromised the hull allowing water to enter, and the airplane subsequently sank. Pine and bark debris was found in the damaged area of the hull. The pilot reported there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot was conducting a cross-country, personal flight. He reported that, while approaching the destination airport at a cruise altitude of 2,500 ft mean sea level, he noticed smoke coming from the engine cowling. Concerned that there was a fire, he decided to immediately land the airplane in an open field. During touchdown, the airplane impacted 5-ft-tall grass and immediately cartwheeled. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed that there was a loose oil line fitting at the oil cooler and that oil was dripping on the exhaust system, which likely resulted in the smoke the pilot saw before initiating the precautionary landing.
The pilot reported that, during the landing, the airplane bounced and soon after he felt a "jerk and thump," and the propeller contacted the runway as the airplane slid across the runway with the nose down. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer. Examination of the runway surface revealed markings consistent with a hard landing on the nose landing gear. The pilot reported there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely that the pilot failed to maintain a proper landing flare, which resulted in a hard landing on the nose gear and its subsequent separation.
The pilot of the aerial application flight indicated that the airplane was in cruise flight on its way to an application site when he heard a "pop," and the engine lost total power. The pilot maneuvered the airplane for a forced landing on a roadway but changed his forced landing site to a corn field due to vehicle traffic. After touchdown, the main landing gear separated, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage.Examination of the engine revealed catastrophic internal damage; all compressor turbine blades were fractured. Metallurgical examination revealed fracture features consistent with high-velocity impact and high-temperature deformation such as "creep." The primary fracture could not be identified; therefore, the sequence in which the fractures occurred could not be determined.The engine was an assembled compilation of manufacturer and aftermarket parts manufacturer approval (PMA) parts. Some PMA parts installed were not authorized for the application, and the serial numbers reflected in the maintenance records did not match the components installed. For example, the factory original compressor turbine disk was installed, but the logbook indicated another disk was installed. The compressor turbine disk was a time-limited item, and the total hours on the installed disk could not be verified.
The private pilot descended the airplane to the destination airport but did not apply carburetor heat. While in the traffic pattern, as the airplane was turning onto a left base leg for the runway, the engine began to run roughly. The pilot then applied carburetor heat, but the engine lost total power. After realizing that the airplane was not going to glide to the runway threshold, the pilot performed a forced landing in a grassy area just short of the runway. During the landing, the nose gear collapsed and the airplane spun 180° before it came to rest, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing.Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures of the ignition system, fuel system, or engine that would have precluded normal operation. The weather conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to the formation of serious carburetor icing at glide power. Although the Descent checklist in the pilot operating handbook for the airplane make and model instructed the pilot to use carburetor heat as required, the pilot did not apply carburetor heat before initiating the descent; rather, he waited until the engine began to run roughly. It is likely that the engine initially lost partial power after developing carburetor ice and that the pilot's delayed application of carburetor heat was ineffective at melting any accumulated ice.
The pilot in the multi-engine airplane reported that the airplane touched down on the runway and she felt the application of aft yoke pressure. She looked over and saw that her right front seat passenger was "clenching the yoke with both fists." She reported that the airplane bounced once, and she aborted the landing. She flew one pattern and landed the airplane, and then she taxied to parking. According to the single-engine, pilot-rated passenger in the right front seat, during the initial touchdown, both engines remained at high rpm, and the airplane was drifting to the right side of the runway. The airplane bounced, and the pilot took the engines to idle. The airplane bounced again "very hard" on the nose landing gear. The airplane bounced a third time and landed "violently" on the nose landing gear. He reported that he felt the need to prevent a fourth runway impact, and he grabbed the yoke and applied aft pressure to minimize the rate of descent. The pilot in the left seat subsequently applied full power and aborted the landing. She flew one pattern and landed the airplane, then she taxied to parking.According to the passenger seated in the right rear seat, the approach was normal, but the initial touchdown was "forceful" and the airplane bounced. The airplane felt like it landed on the nose landing gear followed by the main landing gear and bounced a second time "much harder." A third bounce ensued, and it was the hardest. He heard the engines spool up and observed the pilot abort the landing. She flew one pattern and landed the airplane, and then she taxied to parking. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, just below the windscreen.The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, while performing a wheel landing on an unimproved gravel airstrip, a wind gust lifted the "weight off of [the] tires and initiated a skid." He added that, as the airplane settled back on the airstrip, the tail rose rapidly due to the brakes being applied, and the airplane nosed over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing lift strut and empennage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot reported that, while in cruise flight, a total loss of engine power occurred. After unsuccessful attempts to restart the engine, he landed the airplane gear up in a cornfield, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the engine mixture control cable had fractured about 9 inches from its attachment point at the engine. A metallurgical examination of the mixture control cable with a scanning electron microscope revealed fracture surface features that were consistent with a fatigue failure. It is likely that the engine mixture control cable fractured in flight, which led to a total loss of engine power.
On September 13, 2017, at 3:45 pm eastern daylight time, PSA Airlines flight 5233, a Bombardier CRJ-200, N261PS, collided with a TLD Jet-16 baggage tug operated by Piedmont Airlines while taxiing at Charlotte-Douglas International Airport (KCLT), Charlotte, North Carolina.  The airplane received substantial damage to the left wing and the tug canopy section was damaged.  The tug driver was seriously injured and there were no injuries to the 34 passengers and crew onboard the CRJ-200.  Weather was daytime visual meteorological conditions.After landing on runway 18R, the airplane was instructed to taxi to Gate E4.  While taxiing in a narrow alleyway near the north end of concourse E, between the concourse and the baggage transfer point, the ground tug impacted the left wingtip.The tug was driving on non-movement area of the terminal ramp. The baggage tug was slightly in front of the aircraft at about a 10 o'clock position to the captain of the aircraft. A terminal road crosses the taxi alleyway from near Gate E38 to the beginning of area designated as the baggage transfer point. The transfer point is located outside the alleyway and is lined with concrete barriers. Airplane taxi within the alleyway and ground equipment travel perpendicular to aircraft movement when accessing the transfer point. As the tug turned onto the service road and began to cross the roadway he noticed the airplane taxing in the alley. The driver indicated that, in order to avoid a collision, he tightened his right turn in the opposite direction the airplane was traveling before colliding with the left hand wing. The canopy of the baggage tug was sheared off and the leading edge and winglet of the airplane was substantially damaged. The final resting place of the tug was just behind the trailing edge of the wing. There were skid marks from the airplane tires consistent with maximum braking starting when the airplane made contact with the baggage tug. According to airline ground movement procedures, an airplane on the non-movement area always has the right of way.Page 2 of 6 DCA17CA197
The private pilot reported that he was conducting a personal, cross-country flight and that, when he was about 5 miles from his destination airport, he checked the AWOS, which reported wind from 280° at 24 knots, gusting to 32 knots. He checked the AWOS again while entering the base leg for runway 27, and the reported wind had not changed. Upon turning to final, the pilot felt strong wind and added power to stay higher than a normal approach. With flaps set to 40°, the pilot decreased power and started to flare the airplane. The wheels hit the runway hard, the airplane bounced, and a wind gust pushed the airplane left off the runway. After the airplane bounced again, the pilot added power and attempted a go-around. Subsequently, the airplane again exited the left side of the runway and struck a cistern and a fence and then came to rest inverted. Based on the evidence, it is likely that the pilot improperly flared the airplane in strong gusting wind conditions, which resulted in the airplane bouncing and the subsequent loss of directional control.
The airplane, which was operating as a nonscheduled domestic passenger flight, was standing on a ramp during dark night conditions waiting for the flight's passengers to arrive by bus; the flight crew was onboard the airplane. The only airport employee on duty opened the gate, told the bus driver to drop the passengers next to the airplane, and then returned to previous duties. The bus driver reported that there was no lighting on the ramp when he drove the bus onto it. He added that he made a right turn around the back of the airplane and "didn't see the wing." At that point, he was unable to stop the bus before it hit the wing. Although the bus driver reported that there was no light on the back of the wing, a video of the ramp area showed that the vertical portion of the T-tail was illuminated and that the airplane position lights were illuminated. The bus driver possessed current commercial passenger-carrying vehicle operational and medical certifications. The driver did not have vision problems. The driver stated that he was not using his cell phone at the time of the crash. A review of the driver's 72-hour activity history did not reveal any irregularities. The driver's postaccident toxicological testing results were negative for the tests performed. Given these facts, it is likely that the unescorted driver failed to maintain clearance from the airplane during the planeside delivery of passengers in dark night conditions. The lack of an airport employee to escort the bus to the side of the airplane likely contributed to the accident. After the accident, the operator stated that it would make a policy that drivers be guided to airplanes by a ground guide. If a ground guide was not available, the drivers would not be permitted to drop passengers planeside.  Page 2 of 9 CEN17LA350
The commercial pilot reported that, about halfway through the planned pipeline surveillance flight, the engine experienced a total loss of power and he performed a forced landing to a dirt road. A postaccident examination revealed that both fuel tanks appeared to be empty; the left wing fuel tank cap seal appeared to be worn, and the left wing exhibited fuel staining aft of the fuel cap, consistent with fuel siphoning from the tank in flight.The airplane was fueled the preceding night, and the pilot had assumed the fuel tanks were full upon departing on the first flight of the day. The airplane was flown 2.7 hours on the morning of the accident before it was refueled. The pilot did not recall visually confirming the fuel level following that refueling. An additional 4.1 hours of flight time elapsed from the time the airplane was refueled until the accident. According to the pilot, the airplane's fuel gauges were unreliable. To compensate, he had adopted the practice of completely filling the fuel tanks during each refueling, tracking the intervening flight time, and calculating fuel burn based on the airplane's average fuel consumption rate. Two days before the accident, an individual refueling the airplane informed him that the left fuel cap seal was torn. A new fuel cap seal had not yet been installed.Although the amount of fuel lost through the cap could not be quantified, the unreliable fuel gauges did not allow the pilot to monitor either the normal fuel consumption nor alert him to the potentially abnormal rate of consumption due to the siphoning fuel. In addition, the pilot failed to verify the amount of fuel onboard before departure, which further rendered his method of tracking fuel consumption inaccurate.
The airline transport pilot reported that general maintenance had recently been completed on the airplane, and this was the pilot's first flight in the airplane and the first flight since the maintenance. The pilot completed two engine run-ups before taking off to practice touch-and-go landings. During the takeoff sequence, all instruments indicated normal. The airplane climbed to about 200 ft but then stopped climbing. The pilot reported that the engine did not sound obviously rough; however, the altitude was not increasing, and airspeed was decreasing. He enriched the mixture with no improvement. He turned on the fuel boost pump and received a little extra power for about half a second. He then tested the magnetos, which both indicated normal. He attempted to maintain altitude; however, his airspeed was steadily decreasing, so he chose to land on a nearby road, during which the airplane impacted a car and then the ground before it was consumed by fire. The weather observation just before the accident indicated the wind was variable at 3 knots, with the visibility at or greater than 10 miles and clear skies. The weather observation just after the accident indicated the wind was at 14 knots gusting to 19 knots, with visibility at or greater than 10 miles and clear skies. A gust front was moving northeastward toward the accident site about the time of the accident. The leading edge of the outflow or gust front moved past the accident site right around the time of the accident. Witnesses reported that shortly after takeoff, the engine sounded "weird" and was "sputtering" or "puttering." The postaccident airframe and engine examination revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Thus, it is likely that the erratic and strong wind conditions reduced the airplane's ability to maintain the initial takeoff climb.
The commercial pilot reported that the airplane was nearing the destination at the conclusion of a long cross-country flight when the engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot declared an emergency and conducted a forced landing to a highway. During the forced landing, the airplane struck an elevated island and a car and was substantially damaged. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed blue-colored fuel stains streaking from the right wing fuel filler aft to the trailing edge of the right wing flap. The right fuel tank contained 1 cup of fuel and the left fuel tank had about 10 gallons of fuel. The fuel cap and seat were unremarkable. An examination of the engine and remaining systems revealed no anomalies. It is likely that the right fuel cap was not seated properly before takeoff, which resulted in the siphoning of the fuel during the flight, and a subsequent total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation.
On September 12, 2017, at 1310 pacific daylight time, United Airlines flight 447, a Boeing 737, N69813, collided with Air Canada flight 785, a Boeing 767, C-GHOZ, while taxiing on taxiway C near gate 69B at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), Los Angeles, California.  Both aircraft were regularly scheduled passenger flights and there were no injuries aboard either airplane.  The right winglet of the B737 had minor damage and the right horizontal stabilizer of the B767 was substantially damaged.The B767 was being marshaled onto gate 69B and was instructed to stop approximately 15 feet short of the stop line because it is normally a tow-in gate.  The flight crew shut down the engines and awaited the ground crew to hook up the tow bar.  There are white lines painted around each gate area to aid ground vehicles driving on the ramp.  The B767 tail protruded beyond the white lines perpendicular to, and adjacent to, taxiway C.  The B737 was taxiing out for departure via taxiway C in accordance with ATC instructions.  The captain reported that he saw the B767 and maneuvered left of centerline for more clearance.  He asked the first officer (FO), who was heads down making FMS entries, to look and verify if they had enough clearance.  The FO reported he saw that the B767 was hooked up to the tug but wasn't sure if it was being towed.  He judged that there was about 5 feet of clearance.  He said he saw no action by the marshallers indicating they thought the airplanes were too close.As the airplane continued taxiing, the right winglet of the B737 contacted the horizontal stabilizer of the B767. The flight crew reported that they did not feel an impact but were told by ATC that the collision had occurred.  The B737 returned to the gate and deplaned passengers normally.  The B767 was towed into the gate and deplaned passengers normally.Surveillance video from Gate 69B was obtained and captured the event.  The B737 nosewheel was tracking along the yellow centerline of taxiway C.Page 2 of 12 DCA17CA195
During a telephone interview with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge, the pilot reported that he "landed around 80 knots" and "didn't get the flaps down" before landing. He further reported that the airplane "didn't want to stop" and that it then "ran off the runway." During the runway excursion, the nosewheel collapsed, and the airplane nosed over.The fuselage, wings, and vertical stabilizer sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.An automated weather observation station located 28 nautical miles west from the accident site reported, about the time of the accident, wind from 170° at 7 knots. The landing was on runway 36.The pilot did not submit the NTSB Form 6120.1 Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report.A witness reported that he was at the airport in a hangar and noticed that the accident airplane was "high, fast, and downwind." He added that he observed the airplane overrun the runway and nose over into the grass.