roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The helicopter pilot reported that he was transporting a passenger to a remote drilling site where a tracked drilling unit was stationed. He reported that he landed into the wind, which necessitated descending over bordering trees into the drilling site. The helicopter touched down on the dirt, and upon lowering the collective, he reported that he heard a "bang," and the helicopter slowly started to "pick up a ground wobble." The pilot shut down the helicopter, and both occupants exited without further incident. A postaccident inspection revealed that the blue and red main rotor blades sustained substantial damage from impacting a black 1.5-inch steel frame attached to the tracked drilling unit, which is used to mount a canvas weather shelter for the drilling crews. The pilot reported that the steel frame was not visible to him from above as he was descending into the drilling site. The pilot further reported that he had made multiple landings at the drilling site in the past 3 months and that, with the previous landings, he had landed farther past the tracked drilling unit, and the steel frame was always behind the helicopter.The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. The Federal Aviation Administration Helicopter Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-21A, 2012) discusses high and low reconnaissance procedures and states, in part:The purpose of conducting a high reconnaissance is to determine direction and speed of the wind, a touchdown point, suitability of the landing area, approach and departure axes, and obstacles for both the approach and departure.A low reconnaissance is accomplished during the approach to the landing area. When flying the approach, verify what was observed in the high reconnaissance, and check for anything new that may Page 2 of 6 ANC17CA041have been missed at a higher altitude, such as wires and their supporting structures (poles, towers, etc.), slopes, and small crevices.
The noncertificated pilot, who was the owner of the experimental weight shift control aircraft, stated that he was practicing a series of takeoff and landings called "crow hops" when the left main landing gear tire separated from the wheel rim. The aircraft then veered off the runway and rolled onto its side. The pilot stated that the previous airplane owner had put liquid fix-a-flat in the left tire, which is a product not to be used in aircraft tires. The pilot said that liquid fix a flat will corrode the aluminum of the landing gear wheels and allowed the tire to spin on the wheel during braking. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed the presence of liquid flat repair called "slime," and that the diameter of the main landing gear wheel was relatively small compared to the tire, which likely resulted in slippage of the tire from the wheel.
The airline transport pilot was landing in the tailwheel-equipped airplane in right quartering tailwind conditions. After touchdown, with the tailwheel on the runway, the airplane drifted to the right and the pilot applied left brake. The right landing gear collapsed, and the airplane ground looped and came to rest upright near the right edge of the runway. The pilot stated there were no mechanical malfunctions with the airplane, and that, "it got away from me, I guess."
The pilot was conducting a commercial charter flight for the passenger to place mineral claim markers. He stated that, while flying over a lagoon at an altitude lower than he "should have been," while making inputs to the GPS unit, he likely inadvertently applied forward cyclic and allowed the helicopter to descend into the water below. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation. Although helicopters operated under 14 CFR Part 135 are required to be equipped with radar altimeters, the accident helicopter was not, as the operator had been authorized by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to operate the helicopter without one. It is likely that if a radar altimeter was installed in the helicopter at the time of the accident, was functioning properly, and was set to provide an aural warning at a predetermined altitude, the pilot may have had adequate time to recognize and stop the inadvertent descent before impact with water.
The sport pilot of the gyroplane stated that, upon touchdown, he should have raised the aircraft's nose to reduce airspeed; however, he allowed the nosewheel to contact the runway. He subsequently applied right rudder to maintain runway alignment. Since the nosewheel and rudder were interconnected (the nosewheel did not pivot on a caster), the application of rudder resulted in the gyroplane tipping over on its side, and both the rotor and propeller blades struck the ground. The pilot stated that there were no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the gyroplane.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during the landing roll in crosswind conditions, the airplane began an uncommanded slow right turn. He added that he applied left brake and left rudder, but the airplane continued to turn right. Subsequently, the airplane ground looped to the right, the left main landing gear collapsed, and the left wing impacted the ground. The left wing sustained substantial damage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The automated weather observation system on the airport reported that, about 10 minutes after the accident, the wind was from 90° at 9 knots. The pilot landed on runway 36.
The pilot reported that, just after touchdown, he lost directional control of the airplane. The airplane exited the right side of the runway and collided with a taxiway sign.The airplane's lower right fuselage sustained substantial damage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The airline transport pilot of the experimental, fly-by-wire-equipped helicopter was taxiing to the runway for a test flight. During the taxi, he had commanded a high collective pitch and a slight forward cyclic pitch stick, and the helicopter was light on its wheels; as a result, the flight control computer transitioned from ground mode to flight mode. The slight forward pitch stick in combination with flight control mode resulted in a nose down pitch rate. The pilot took corrective action, inputting aft cyclic stick. The initial pitch axis correction led to a small initial left roll. The pilot countered the small left roll rate with an appropriate magnitude right stick input. In conjunction with the right stick input, the pilot raised the collective to increase the helicopter's altitude. The helicopter's right roll response to the right stick input was larger than expected, and the pilot countered with a large left stick input. The helicopter's left roll response was also larger than expected. The helicopter bank angles quickly increased, and the pilot rapidly lowered the collective to land the helicopter. The rapid left and right rolls resulted in upper and lower rotor contact, which damaged all rotor blades. The investigation determined that the larger-than-expected roll response to the pilot's cyclic stick input was the unintended result of a flight control system design change that resulted in an increase in cyclic stick sensitivity in the roll axis during the transition from ground control mode to flight mode.
According to the pilot, he made two passes over a dry creek bed to assess a potential landing site. The second pass was accomplished up-creek into rising terrain. The airplane was configured with full power and with flaps at 20°, and it was about 50 ft above ground level at 80 mph. The pilot reported that the airplane encountered a downdraft as it transitioned from overflying the trees to overflying the creek bed, which he attempted to correct, but the airplane aerodynamically stalled.Following the stall, the pilot attempted to land on a dry creek bed. The airplane touched down on the creek bed, then bounced and descended into a "dry cut channel." The airplane came to rest nose down in a near vertical position. The airplane was destroyed by a postcrash fire.According to the National Transportation Safety Board's Pilot Aircraft Accident Report, the pilot reported that the event could have been avoided by making the low pass along descending terrain at a higher airspeed. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
Following a full-stop landing and a back taxi to the runway, the flight instructor and a student pilot planned to conduct a soft-field takeoff to prepare the student for his private pilot test flight. Although there were no witnesses to the takeoff, an automobile dash camera video showed the airplane flying just above tree tops and then entering a right turn. During the turn, the left wing and the nose of the airplane dropped, which was consistent with a stall and an initial spin. The airplane then descended and impacted the ground. The available evidence did not indicate which pilot was flying the airplane at the time of the accident, but it is likely that the student pilot was flying at the time.Postaccident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The carburetor heat control was found in the off position, which was the correct position for takeoff. The temperature and dew point at the time of the accident were in a range of susceptibility for moderate icing at cruise power settings and serious icing at descent power settings. Although the airplane was at takeoff power when the accident occurred, a partial loss of engine power likely occurred due to carburetor icing, which might have accumulated while the airplane was operating at a lower power setting on the ground before the accident takeoff. The partial loss of engine power resulted in reduced airplane performance and the pilot's inability to maintain adequate airspeed, which then resulted in an exceedance of the airplane's critical angle-of-attack and a subsequent aerodynamic stall.
The private pilot had been receiving multiengine instruction from the flight instructor in order to obtain a multiengine rating. The accident flight was a practice checkride for the pilot's practical test that was scheduled for the following day. A witness stated that, during the accident takeoff from runway 18, the airplane passed the airport terminal building at a "very low" altitude and stated that it was not climbing very fast. The airplane then turned left and appeared to enter a normal traffic pattern. The witness did not see the accident occur. The airplane came to rest on airport property west of the threshold of runway 18. Data from an onboard engine monitor indicated that right engine power was reduced about 7 minutes before the end of the data, consistent with simulated single-engine operation. The left engine power was then reduced about 2.5 minutes before the data ended, consistent with simulated dual-engine loss of power; however, data was consistent with power being restored and both engines operating normally for about the final minute of the flight. The damage to the airplane was consistent with a low-speed impact in a left-wing-low and shallow pitch attitude. The left and right propellers displayed S-shaped bending and leading edge polishing consistent with operation. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal airplane operation.Autopsy of the pilot receiving instruction revealed evidence of severe coronary artery disease, which could cause sudden impairment or incapacitation; however, if that occurred, the flight instructor should have been able to successfully complete the flight. Therefore, it is unlikely the pilot's heart disease contributed to the accident. Toxicology of the pilot revealed the presence of an antidepressant, indicating some degree of underlying depression; however, the flight instructor should have been able to compensate if the pilot had slowed responses to checkride scenarios.   Page 2 of 10 CEN17FA297
The pilot had flown the airplane uneventfully on the outbound leg of a cross-country flight. On the return leg, the pilot noticed that he was unable to achieve full manifold pressure and that the engine was "running roughly." He stopped at an interim airport, where an aircraft mechanic examined the airplane but was unable to find any problems with the airplane or engine. The pilot subsequently departed to continue the trip home. While in cruise flight, he noticed that the oil pressure had dropped to 0 psi. The pilot retarded the throttle, declared an emergency with air traffic control, and diverted toward a nearby airport. The engine then lost total power. The airplane was unable to reach the diversion airport and sustained substantial damage to the fuselage during the forced landing.Preliminary examination of the wreckage revealed that the engine was devoid of oil; no obvious leaks or other failures were apparent. Further examination of the engine revealed that the No. 1 connecting rod bearing and cap assembly had failed catastrophically due to oil starvation and that the liberated or partially liberated components caused significant internal damage to the engine. In addition, many internal engine components exhibited thermal distress signatures due to oil starvation. Detailed examination of the turbocharger revealed significant damage to the compressor and turbine blades, grossly excessive axial and radial freeplay of the compressor and turbine rotors, and fracture separation of the two rotors from one another. In addition, the turbocharger bearing housing, turbine outlet case, and turbine blades displayed coked oily/dirty residue. This evidence indicated that the engine oil was depleted by leaking and/or burning via the turbocharger.The turbocharger manufacturer guidance specified certain inspections and that the turbocharger overhaul interval should coincide with, but not exceed, the time between overhaul (TBO) (hours in service) published by the engine manufacturer. The engine manufacturer's published TBO was 1,400 hours. However, the engine manufacturer guidance explicitly excluded engines with parts not supplied by the engine manufacturer, which was the case for this engine. The airplane maintenance records showed that the turbocharger was overhauled 13 years before the accident and had accumulated about 1,974 hours since that overhaul. The records did not document any relevant maintenance actions or inspections of the Page 2 of 12 WPR17LA172turbocharger since its overhaul. Given this information, it is likely that the turbocharger failure was the result of improper and/or incomplete maintenance and inspection. The turbocharger failure completely depleted the engine oil during the accident flight, and the oil depletion resulted in a catastrophic internal failure of the engine and a complete loss of engine power. There was insufficient evidence to determine when the oil depletion began or how long that process took.
During the flight the pilot reported a loss of oil pressure followed by a decrease in manifold pressure.  The pilot declared an emergency and requested landing clearance, however, the engine lost total power and he initiated a forced landing to a field where the airplane sustained minor damage. Postincident examination of the airplane revealed that the lower side of the fuselage was covered in oil and a hole was discovered in the engine’s crankcase. The examination of the engine revealed damage to the starter adapter assembly, which included the starter pulley, bearing, seal, and shaft, that was consistent with the over-tensioning of the accessory belt, which resulted in an excessive side-load. The damaged starter adapter assembly components ultimately resulted in the loss of engine oil and subsequent failure of several connecting rods due to oil starvation. A manufacturer Critical Service Bulletin provided instructions for an inspection of the starter adapter for indications of oil leakage at the shaft oil seal, however, review of the airplane maintenance records show that the service bulletin was not complied with.
During an instructional flight, the engine started running rough and, shortly after the oil pressure light illuminated, subsequently quit. The pilot elected to ditch the airplane in the water close to the shoreline. An onsite examination of the engine revealed that the top bolt of the right magneto was loose and had backed off, which allowed the magneto to become partially separated, leaving a 3/8-inch gap at the top of the magneto where it mounted to the case, which allowed oil to exit the engine. Metal shavings were observed throughout the engine. A review of the maintenance records indicated that the magnetos were removed and overhauled about 9 months before the accident during a 500-hour inspection, which was 420.5 hours of flight time before the accident. The airplane had accumulated about 22 hours of flight time since its last annual inspection, and the loose magneto bolt should have been able to be identified at that time.
The private pilot reported that the airplane veered right while landing earlier in the day. During the accident landing, the airplane again veered right when the nosewheel touched down on the runway and then exited the runway into grass. While the pilot was attempting to steer the airplane back onto the runway, it hit a runway sign, which separated the right main landing gear from the airplane. The right wing contacted the ground, and the airplane veered right again and then came to rest in the grass alongside the runway. Postaccident examination of the airplane did not reveal evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have resulted in the pilot's inability to maintain directional control.
According to the helicopter pilot, after an agricultural flight, he landed on the platform located on top of the truck to refuel the helicopter. The ground crew connected the fuel and chemical hoses to the helicopter. The pilot was taking notes and his focus was inside the helicopter during the connection of the hoses. The pilot reported that he did not expect the chemical hose to be connected to the helicopter. Once the helicopter had the required amount of fuel, the pilot motioned to the ground crew using hand and arm signals that more fuel would be required after the next flight. The driver removed the fuel hose from the helicopter and then stepped back and made eye contact with the pilot. The pilot reported that the ground crew then gave him a "thumbs up" signal. The pilot understood the signal to mean that the helicopter "was clear and safe for departure."The pilot returned the "thumbs up" signal and advanced the throttle. The helicopter ascended, and the pilot noticed the ground crew motioning that the helicopter remained connected to the chemical hose. The pilot observed that the chemical hose was still connected to the helicopter, and he applied aft cyclic. The tail rotor and then the main rotor struck the truck.Per the National Transportation Safety Board Pilot Aircraft Accident Report, the pilot noted that the accident could have been prevented if he had visually confirmed, "with his own eyes, that all possible connecting hoses were in fact, not connected and the departure could be safely executed." The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot, who had not flown this experimental, amateur-built airplane before the accident flight, had just departed for a local flight. Witnesses reported that the airplane made a right turn, the wing and nose then dropped, and the airplane disappeared out of view before impacting terrain. One of the witnesses stated that the airplane was having "difficulties" after it took off.Another witness, who identified himself as part owner of the airplane, stated that before departure, he noted that the pilot's leg interfered with the control yoke due to the pilot's size and the small cockpit. He also stated that the airplane tended to "drop a wing" in turns, which required a quick recovery, and that the airplane was a little "squirrelly" because it reacted quickly to control inputs.Several modifications from the original configuration had been made to the airplane, which included changing the landing gear from a conventional to tricycle gear; installing different brakes; installing a differently shaped fuel tank; changing and raising the seats; modifying the steering assembly; and, most recently, changing the flaperons to a flap and aileron design. The part owner stated that they did not conduct any flight tests or aerodynamic performance calculations after the modifications. It could not be determined what effect, if any, the modifications had on this accident. It is possible that the pilot lost control of the airplane during the departure turn due to the airplane's unique handling characteristics as the part owner described, the pilot's unfamiliarity with the modified airplane, or the pilot's leg interfering with the movement of the control yoke. The exact reason for the loss of control could not be determined.Page 2 of 6 CEN17LA293
The private pilot reported that he was in cruise flight when the engine experienced a total loss of power. Oil covered the windshield and smoke filled the cockpit, making it difficult for him to see out of the airplane. He attempted to land at an airport but conducted a forced landing to a field about 300 ft short of the runway. The right wing separated from the fuselage when it hit a hay bale. The examination of the engine revealed a large hole in the engine case near the No. 2 cylinder. The engine maintenance records indicated that when the engine had a major overhaul about 8 years before the accident, the engine crankcase was repaired at a facility specializing in crankcase repairs. The facility typically used glass bead media to clean engine crankcases instead of "mildly abrasive organic substances" as required by the engine manufacturer. About 1 year before the accident, about 825 hours since the major overhaul, all 6 cylinders were replaced. The engine failure occurred about 198 hours after the cylinders were replaced.The metallurgical examination of the eight through bolts revealed that two of the through bolts and the No. 2 cylinder studs had fracture surfaces that were consistent with fatigue. The fatigue in the studs and through bolts likely resulted from insufficient clamping force due to insufficient torque applied to the attachment nuts during installation or could have developed in service as asperities on the clamping surfaces worked down over time, leading to a reduction in clamping force.
The airline transport pilot flew his experimental, amateur-built biplane on a cross-country flight with multiple legs and refueling stops. About 1 hour, 15 minutes into the flight and 15 miles from his destination, the pilot initiated a descent from 3,500 ft to 2,500 ft. When the pilot added power to level off, the engine began to run rough and experienced a partial loss of power. The pilot said that he immediately applied carburetor heat but observed no improvement in engine operation. The engine continued to lose power and "sputter." During the subsequent forced landing, the airplane touched down on unsuitable terrain at the edge of a soybean field, decelerated rapidly, and nosed over. A postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the engine. Nearby weather was conducive to serious icing at descent power about the time of the engine power loss. Although the pilot reported that he applied carburetor heat, it is likely that, at the time of application, the ice had already accumulated in the carburetor to the extent that the carburetor heat was insufficient to melt the ice and restore full engine power.