roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot reported that upon landing approach at a private grass and dirt airstrip, he decided to execute a go around.  He applied full engine power but did not “achieve good speed and lift” and then decided that “landing was best.”  Upon landing, the airplane encountered a rough area of the field; the nose landing gear dug in and subsequently collapsed and the airplane nosed over.  The airframe sustained substantial damage to the vertical stabilizer, rudder, and engine mount.  The pilot reported that there were no mechanical anomalies that precluded normal operation of the airplane.
The flight instructor was giving the student pilot his first flight lesson in an airplane. According to the pilot-rated passenger, who was observing the flight in the back seat, the student pilot assisted with the takeoff. The instructor told the student that she would tell him when to start pulling back during the takeoff roll. The instructor then initiated the takeoff roll and when the airplane reached rotation speed, she told the student pilot to start pulling back. The student pilot pulled back on the control wheel and the airplane began to climb. However, he continued to pull back and the airplane stalled less than 200 ft above the ground. The left wing dropped, and the airplane descended toward the ground. The flight instructor tried to get control of the airplane, but it was too late, and the airplane impacted a ditch adjacent to the runway. A postaccident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.Though part of the flight lesson syllabus included instruction on the positive exchange of flight controls, the student pilot could not recall what instruction the flight instructor gave him regarding the takeoff. His only memory of the flight was when the airplane was airborne and stalling. He did not remember if his hands were on the controls. The pilot-rated passenger did not recall the flight instructor discussing positive transfer of the flight controls before taking off.Though the flight instructor provided the student pilot instruction on how to perform the takeoff, she most likely did not anticipate that he would continue to pull back on the controls after the airplane became airborne. The airplane then exceeded its critical angle of attack and stalled. The instructor attempted to regain control, but the airplane did not have sufficient altitude to recover and it impacted the ground. Page 2 of 10 ERA23FA008
The pilot reported that he was conducting his first flight in the airplane and practiced some basic stall maneuvers at altitude before attempting to land. During the first attempted landing, the airplane landed hard from about 2 ft above ground level (agl), and the pilot performed a go-around. During the second landing, about 8 ft agl, he reduced engine power and [the airplane] “bottomed out.” He stated the airplane bounced uncontrollably, nosed over, bounced again, spun to the right and flipped over, coming to rest inverted. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operations. The pilot’s statement included a recommendation to acquire transition training in a “new to you” airplane.
The pilot of the float-equipped airplane was departing from a pond. He aborted the first attempt and was taxiing back to attempt a second takeoff. Witnesses saw the floats almost fully submerged under the water as the airplane taxied and stated that the pitch attitude of the airplane was unusually nose-low. The pilot reduced engine power and the airplane nosed over. The airplane was not damaged; however, several hundred pounds of unsecured cargo inside the airplane shifted during the nose-over and likely resulted in the pilot’s inability to egress and his subsequent drowning. During a postaccident examination, two unsealed holes were found under the float bumpers that would have allowed water to enter the front compartment of each float. It is likely that the front compartments in both floats filled with water and resulted in the nose-over during taxi.
The flight instructor was demonstrating a three-point landing during an instructional flight when the airplane bounced on the runway and ground looped. The instructor recovered the airplane from the ground loop as it departed the runway surface and then added engine power to try to avoid impact with a wall that was part of the runway’s bridge over a creek. The airplane impacted the wall and fell into the creek. The airplane sustained substantial damage that included damage to the airplane fuselage and engine mount. The flight instructor stated that there was no mechanical malfunction/failure of the airplane that would have precluded normal operations.
The pilot reported that, while in the pattern practicing touch and go landings, he became distracted, failed to use the pre-landing checklist, and forgot to extend the airplane’s landing gear. He landed the airplane with the landing gear retracted and skidded to a stop on the runway, resulting in substantial damage to the lower fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that her approach was at a “higher-than-normal speed which led to a ground loop.”  The airplane veered off the east side of the runway and came to rest on an embankment. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the front of the fuselage and left wing. The pilot stated that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operations.
According to the pilot, he purchased the multiengine airplane about 3 months prior to the accident, then flew it uneventfully to another airport for an annual inspection and to have other maintenance issues addressed. After the annual inspection was completed, several engine-runs and taxi checks were performed with no anomalies noted. On the day of the accident, the pilot completed a preflight inspection and intended to fly to his home airport. The mechanic that completed the annual inspection told him that he had drained black sooty water from the fuel tanks. The pilot went out to the airplane and drained water out of the tanks until the fuel was clean and clear. About 5 to 6 minutes into the flight, the left engine began to run rough and lost partial power. When the pilot increased the power on the right engine, the right engine immediately lost all power. He set up for an off-airport landing and noticed a highway, so he lined up with the centerline of the highway and landed. During the landing rollout, the right-wing tip collided with a highway sign. The airplane subsequently rolled off the highway and came to rest upright in a field. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the right-wing spar. Two days after the accident, more water was sumped from both fuel tanks. After the water was removed, both engines ran normally. The pilot added that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions with the airplane. Based on this information, it is most likely that the loss of engine power the pilot experienced during the accident flight was due to fuel contamination.
According to recorded ADS-B data, the pilot departed from a local airport and maneuvered to the east over mountainous terrain. A witness reported that she saw the airplane fly towards Lyons Peak and heard the engine “sputtering.” Shortly thereafter, the airplane disappeared from her field of view and she heard a loud “bang.” An unsuccessful attempt was made to retrieve the wreckage, which was inaccessible because of the steep, mountainous terrain. Consequently, it was not possible to examine the airframe and engine. The pilot’s toxicological testing detected ethanol. The extent of trauma, delayed recovery of the pilot’s remains, and the presence of n-propanol and n-butanol make it plausible that some or all of the detected ethanol may have been from postmortem production. However, the positive ethanol result in a single specimen is insufficient to exclude the possibility of alcohol consumption or related impairment. Therefore, the investigation was unable to determine whether ethanol effects contributed to the crash. Additionally, the zolpidem, commonly used to treat short-term insomnia, and cyclobenzaprine, commonly used to treat muscle spasms, detected in the pilot’s muscle tissue indicated that he had used these medications. However, the limited extent of the autopsy and lack of specific information about the accident sequence prevented the investigation from determining whether the effects of the pilot’s zolpidem and cyclobenzaprine use contributed to the crash. As reported by friends and family, the pilot was ill during the weeks before the accident. The unknown illness caused him to miss family events and seek medical care. The pilot had a history with chronic lymphocytic leukemia. Whether he was acutely ill at the time of the Page 2 of 9 WPR23FA007accident is uncertain, and his autopsy was too limited by injury to be useful for assessing possible underlying conditions (including leukemia). Given the pilot’s unknown medical condition at the time of the accident and the inaccessible wreckage, which prevented a postaccident examination, the cause of the accident could not be determined.
According to the pilot, while landing at an unfamiliar airport, he landed with excessive airspeed and touched down too far down the runway to safely stop. The airplane subsequently departed the grass runway and impacted a fence. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, the airplane touched down in a three-point attitude and slightly ballooned. After the airplane touched down again, the airplane swerved to the left, started to rotate, and subsequently ground looped. The right wing and aileron were substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot under instruction was flying a practice power-off 180° maneuver from the downwind leg at the accident airport. The flight instructor stated that on final approach the airplane’s airspeed was slow and the flight path was low. He stated that since the purpose of the flight was to evaluate student’s piloting skills, he allowed the approach to proceed and did not tell the student to add power or go around. The airplane landed firmly at the runway threshold and the horizontal stabilizer impacted a runway threshold light. Postaccident examination revealed that the horizontal stabilizer sustained substantial damage. The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation and that a go-around maneuver should have been initiated when the approach became unstable.
The two pilots departed on a business flight with two passengers and observed that the airplane did not pressurize during the initial climb out. As the climb continued, the crew observed a door open warning on the crew alerting system (CAS). The pilot in command (PIC), seated in the right seat, got out of his seat to check the door and attempted to push the handle down toward the locked position, but stated that “it kept coming up.” About 14 seconds after the PIC got out of his seat, the main cabin door opened inflight, which resulted in substantial damage to the door and fuselage.The PIC returned to his seat and commented several times that the second in command (SIC) had not secured the door. The flight returned to land without further incident.Postaccident examination revealed no anomalies that would have prevented the door from a normal sequence of closing, latching, and locking. A corroded/jammed locked sensor assembly was observed that erroneously indicated a locked door to the CAS when the door was actually only latched but not locked. However, the two visual locked indications on the door functioned properly, which was consistent with the crew not fully closing the door or observing the unsafe (red) visual locked indicators. During climb out, the aerodynamic forces on the door and/or airplane vibration likely caused the target for closed door sensor to move away from the sensor, which triggered the CAS door open warning. The aerodynamic forces on the door, airplane vibration, and/or the PIC’s handle movement likely allowed the door to open inflight.
The pilot of the tail wheel-equipped airplane reported that, during a touch and go, at full power, the airplane began to roll to the right and the pilot was unable to arrest the roll. The airplane entered a corn field north of the runway, and impacted the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot and pilot-rated passenger departed Grand Canyon National Park Airport after a fuel stop in Las Vegas, Nevada. About 30 minutes into the flight the pilot noticed a low oil pressure indication and declared an emergency. Moments later the engine sustained a total power loss and the engine seized. When it became evident the airplane could not make it to the airport, the pilot made the decision to ditch the airplane into a nearby lake. The airplane was substantially damaged during the water landing.Postaccident examination of the engine revealed discoloration of the cylinder and bearing surfaces consistent with high heat signatures due to oil starvation. The engine examination revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies except for the oil filter adapter housing, which was loose, and the gasket was torn and deformed. As the oil level was likely normal at the pilot’s previous stop and the pilot did not notice any unusual reductions in oil quantity during the service life of the engine, it is likely that the oil started to leak during the accident flight. The failure of the gasket likely allowed engine oil to exit the crankcase rapidly, resulting in oil starvation and the subsequent catastrophic failure. A review of the engine maintenance records revealed no entries that the oil filter gasket had been inspected in accordance with the mandatory service bulletin, nor was it required. Page 2 of 9 WPR23LA003
The pilot reported that while enroute on a cross-country flight and about 10 miles from her destination airport, she elected to execute a precautionary landing to a field due to low fuel. During the approach to land, the pilot noticed obstacles and attempted to maneuver the airplane away from the obstacles. The airplane touched down smoothly, however, during the rollout, the airplane struck a ditch. The airplane’s left wing contacted the ground and the airplane ground looped. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the outboard section of the left wing. Examination of the airplane at the accident site revealed that both fuel tanks were nearly empty. The pilot reported that she should have stopped earlier to refuel.
As the pilot approached the destination airport, the wind was reported as light and variable. He stated that as he flew the visual approach to runway 4 and prepared to land, he encountered a major gust of wind and elected to perform a go-around. The pilot reported that he applied full engine power, retracted the landing gear and flaps, and initiated a climb when the “stall shaker started shaking”. The pilot lowered the nose to prevent the airplane from stalling and initiated a gear-up landing to an open field adjacent to the runway. The pilot reported encountering a gust of wind; however, the wind reported at the airport 4 minutes before the accident was from 180 ° at 11 knots. The wind reported about an hour after the accident was from 160° at 10 knots. Neither weather report indicated wind gusts or significant changes in wind direction. The calculated crosswind component at the time of the accident was about 7 knots, with a tailwind of about 8 knots.  Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.Given the pilot’s description of the go-around and the absence of a mechanical failure or malfunction, he likely retracted the flaps before establishing the required climb airspeed and positive rate of climb. The quartering tailwind would have contributed to the loss of expected airplane performance, resulting in an incipient stall and the subsequent gear-up landing.
The pilot reported that a gust of wind caused the tailwheel-equipped airplane to swerve left during landing roll. He was unable to regain directional control of the airplane before it departed off the left runway edge, striking a concrete pad and runway edge light which caused the airplane to nose over. The airplane’s fuselage, vertical stabilizer, and rudder were substantially damaged during the accident. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot reported that the surface wind was calm when he listened to the airport’s automated weather broadcast about 11 minutes before landing. A weather report issued about 5 minutes after the accident included a 4-knot surface wind from the northeast. Based on available weather information, a variable wind direction likely prevailed at the time of the accident that resulted in an unexpected left quartering tailwind during the landing.
The airplane had been in maintenance for repair work on the airplane’s tail section. On the first flight after the completed work, following a preflight inspection and engine run-up, the pilot taxied the airplane to the runway for departure. During the takeoff roll, when the pilot applied forward stick controls to raise the tail, the tail did not rise, and the airplane instead “shot straight up, stalled, then descended nose-first onto the runway.” Examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed substantial damage to the fuselage. The inspector also noted that the elevator control cables were installed incorrectly such that the elevator moved in the direction opposite to that commanded.
The accident airplane was the lead airplane in a flight of two and while flying about 50 ft over a river, the airplane struck a power line. The airplane abruptly pitched up, descended to the right, and impacted the water, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and wings. According to a witness, the pilot had prior experience flying at low level over the river close to the accident site. The trailing pilot reported that the accident pilot did not report any mechanical failures or anomalies before the impact with a powerline. The trailing pilot was not aware of the powerline placement, and it is likely that the pilot also did not see the powerline’s placement across the river as it was unmarked.
The pilot in the tailwheel equipped airplane reported that, while landing with a quartering tailwind, a strong gust of wind was encountered that “weathervaned” the airplane. The airplane veered to the right and the right wing subsequently collided with a post on the edge of the runway. The right wing and fuselage were substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. At the time of the accident, the pilot was landing the airplane on runway 9 with wind from 230° at 8 knots gusting to 15 knots.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, after performing a 3-point landing, the left wing lifted. He applied corrective aileron and rudder control inputs, but the airplane ground looped to the right, sustaining substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
During a post-maintenance operational check flight, the pilot and mechanic heard a loud crack/pop sound, followed by the helicopter spinning to the right. The pilot initiated an autorotation, and the helicopter subsequently impacted a tree and landed hard, which resulted in a rollover and substantial damage to the helicopter  Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed that the No. 4 segmented tail rotor drive shaft failed due to disbonding of the splined adapter from the tail rotor drive shaft tube, which resulted in a loss of tail rotor drive to the tail rotor gearbox and subsequent loss of directional control of the helicopter. Once the disbond occurred, the splined adapter continued to turn under power while the drive shaft tube slowed down, further damaging the disbonded surfaces, which prevented identification of a reason for the disbond.  The operator accomplished the recurrent proof-load test on their bonded segmented drive shafts, as outlined by Bell Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. 206-20-139, a total of 4 times since release of the ASB, with no anomalous findings. The ASB specified that within the next 75 flight hours or 3 months after release of the bulletin, and every 300 flight hours or 12 months thereafter, operators should conduct a visual inspection of the bond line of the bonded adapters, apply an index mark on each bonded adapter, and conduct a proof-load test using a bonded shaft tool. The operator had last performed the proof-load test about 77.7 hours before the accident. Accordingly, the frequency of the proof-load test in the ASB, which was subsequently required by Transport Canada Airworthiness Directive (AD) No. 2022-33 and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) AD No. 2023-06-05, may not be adequate in discovering an impending failure of a bonded adapter. Testing by Bell on exemplar bonded segmented drive shafts, in support of the development of the proof-load testing (preceding issuance of the ASB), showed that a drive shaft [with a serviceable bond] would yield in excess of 200% applied torque, and that yielding of the shaft tube occurs first. Based on a review of the Page 2 of 8 WPR23LA004operator’s proof-load testing tools, the operator was using the correct tooling. Additionally, there was no evidence the operator applied excessive torque on the bonded segmented drive shafts during the recurrent proof-load tests. Therefore, the operator’s continuing maintenance and performance of the proof-load tests on the bonded segmented drive shafts were likely not a factor in this accident.Metallurgical examination of the bonded tail rotor drive shaft found that the splined adapter tapered thin wall did not meet its thickness requirements; however, it’s likely this was not the sole factor in the disbond. The segmented drive shafts are not life limited and therefore are not required to be tracked after manufacture; accordingly, the age and time in service of the accident drive shaft could not be determined.
The pilot reported that, while in cruise flight about 2,300 ft mean sea level, the helicopter’s engine lost power and he initiated an autorotation and landed on a residential street. During the landing sequence, the pilot increased the collective to reduce the descent rate to clear obstacles, which resulted in a loss of rotor rpm and a hard landing that damaged the tail boom.Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed a low amount of fuel in each tank. The pilot stated that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot did not report how much fuel was onboard the helicopter at the time of departure, and the extent of his preflight fuel planning could not be determined. Based on the available information, it is likely that the engine lost total power as a result of fuel exhaustion.