roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The student pilot reported that during the preflight inspection of his airplane, he discovered substantial damage to the left wing. A follow-on inspection later the same day revealed additional damage to the left main landing gear tire rim. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector examined the airplane and found additional damage to the left aileron and left elevator. Abrasion and asphalt marks on the underside of the wing tip and elevator appeared consistent with both having struck the ground. The inspector examined the ramp and runway for debris but found none. The top skin of the left wing near the tip was buckled upward. No other damage with the airplane was found.The student pilot reported that he had last flown the airplane 17 days prior to his intended flight and that when he checked the tie-down chains two days before his intended flight because of an impending storm, everything with the airplane looked okay. He surmised to the FAA inspector that maybe a fuel truck impacted the parked airplane.The damage observed was consistent with the airplane having been operated; however, based on the available information, the damage could not be conclusively associated with a specific ground operation or flight.
The pilot/builder in the right seat was on the fifth test flight in his amateur-built airplane with another pilot on board who was assisting. While turning from left base to the final leg of the traffic pattern for landing, with the left-seat pilot at the controls, the Y-stick that controlled both pitch and roll jammed. Both pilots attempted to free the Y-stick with force, but it remained jammed with no control of the flaperons and elevator. The airplane remained in a left, descending turn until it collided with trees and terrain about one mile short of the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage; the right-seat pilot was seriously injured and the left-seat pilot had minor injuries. An examination of the wreckage, including the flight control system, was conducted after the accident. Flight control continuity was confirmed from the flaperons, elevator, and rudder to the cockpit controls, except for the impact-related overload fractures. No areas of flight control binding or improper installation were found that would have prevented normal operation. An examination of the Y-stick revealed that the lower portion of the stick had minimal clearance with the cockpit floor and surrounding structure by design. The stick-to-floor clearance was smallest when the stick was near neutral (straight up). The clearance increased as bank was increased left or right. According to the kit manufacturer, the smallest Y-stick-to-structure clearance was 4.83mm (roll input neutral with full forward stick). The actual Y-stick pre-accident clearance dimensions of the accident airplane could not be determined because of cockpit floor deformation from impact damage. There was no device installed on the floor that would have prevented a foreign object, such as a note pad, mobile phone, logbook, etc., from rolling or sliding under the Y-stick. Both pilots believed that a note pad used by the right-seat pilot to record flight test data fell to the floor during flight and jammed the control. Examination of photos of the 8.5 inch by 11-inch note pad revealed damage consistent with lower Y-stick impingement. It is likely that the note pad fell to the floor Page 2 of 8 ERA23LA132during flight and slid under the Y-stick during to the turn to final; when the stick was moved toward neutral, the jam occurred.The kit manufacturer offered, as an option, a soft boot to cover the lower portion of the Y-stick; however, it is not known if this boot would have prevented the accident scenario.
During a checkout flight with a flight instructor to meet flying club currency rules, the pilot flew to a nearby airport. Upon arrival at the airport they practiced landings. Immediately after the fifth landing, during the roll out, the airplane turned abruptly to the right, exited the runway onto the grass area between the runway and taxiway, and impacted a drainage ditch. The airplane’s fuselage and right wing were substantially damaged. Postaccident examination of the airplane’s wheels and braking system revealed that the right main wheel would not rotate on its axle. When pressure was applied to the top of the pilot’s side right rudder pedal, the actuator rod for the master cylinder would stick in the retracted position and would not automatically extend when the rudder pedal was released. Additionally, a gurgling sound (which indicated that air was in the system) could be heard during actuation. Further examination of the brake system revealed that the right brake assembly was not functional, displayed evidence of overheating, and was leaking fluid from around the upper piston, which was stuck in the extended position. The lower piston was also partially extended and was covered with brake fluid. The pressure plate would not move, and the anchor bolts that the pressure plate slid on displayed evidence of corrosion. Additionally, both piston O-rings appeared flat and did not stand proud from the sides of the pistons, the brake linings displayed higher than normal wear, and the brake disc displayed grooving. Based on this information, it is likely that the airplane’s right brake malfunctioned during the landing, which resulted in the loss of directional control during landing.
JetBlue’s flight 206 (JBU206) flight crew initiated a go-around while over runway 04R due to Hop-a-Jet flight 280 (HPJ280) taking off without a takeoff clearance from runway 09 at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS).  Runways 04R and 09 at BOS are intersecting runways. The BOS tower controller had instructed the pilot of HPJ280 to line up and wait (LUAW) on runway 09 while JBU206 had been cleared to land on runway 04R. HPJ280’s flight crew read back the controller’s instructions to LUAW, however they began the takeoff-roll instead. The airport surface detection equipment, model X (ASDE-X) alerted, and the controller issued go-around instructions to JBU206.  JBU206’s flight crew initiated a go-around while over runway 04R, prior to reaching the intersection with runway 09. The closest proximity between both airplanes occurred when JBU206 was about 30ft AGL during the landing flare, close to the point where both runways intersected, see figure 1.  A video file taken by the occupant of the flight deck observer seat was provided to the NTSB and a screen capture from the video is shown in figure 2.  Page 2 of 9 DCA23LA192Figure 1. Flight tracks of both JetBlue (JBU206) and Hop-a-Jet (HPJ280) with yellow circle indicating incursion area. Figure 2:Screen capture from jump-seat occupant’s video recording showing Lear 60 crossing runway centerline.Page 3 of 9 DCA23LA192The captain of HPJ280 said that they had received clearance to cross runway 4L on taxiway E, and then take taxiway Mike, to Runway 9. On taxiway M he said, “they had heard a clearance that seems to be Line Up and Wait." He further stated that “he probably responded to the clearance, but in his mind, they were cleared for takeoff.” He said they performed the takeoff at 18:55 local time, and during cruise they received a message from ATC providing them with a phone number to call upon landing. After landing at FXE, BOS tower told them that they had taken off without authorization and caused an airplane that had been cleared to land on runway 04 to execute a go-around, passing about 400' above them.The first officer of JBU206 was the pilot flying, and they were on the ILS runway 04R approach. The captain of JBU206 said they had been cleared to land and had completed the landing checklist. On the tower frequency, they heard that an aircraft had been given LUAW instructions. As they entered the flare after crossing the threshold of runway 04R, about 30 feet above the ground, he saw an airplane cross 04R on runway 09 from his left and going to the right but could not estimate how far away the airplane was.
The instrument-rated pilot was conducting a personal, cross-country, visual flight rules flight and did not receive a formal weather briefing before departing. Flight track data showed that, after departure, the airplane proceeded direct to the destination airport for about 40 minutes. Then, after entering mountainous terrain, the airplane completed a descending 540° left turn and reversed course while continuing to descend at a rate of 250 ft per minute. The airplane impacted trees and terrain and came to rest in a wooded area. The reported weather conditions in the area around the time of the accident included less than 2 miles visibility and clouds about 255 ft above ground level (agl).Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Based on the cut branches located in the vicinity of the accident site, and the damage signatures observed on the propeller, the engine was likely producing power at the time of impact. While en route, the pilot likely encountered deteriorating weather conditions that obscured the mountainous terrain and as the pilot attempted to turn around and exit the deteriorating weather conditions the airplane gradually descended and struck trees and the terrain.
The pilot reported executing a wheel landing in the tailwheel-equipped airplane.  A “small bounce” after touch down caused the airplane to veer “slightly to the right.”  The pilot subsequently over corrected and lost directional control resulting in a ground loop.  The right wing was substantially damaged.  The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.  He noted being ready with “slight and occasional” rudder inputs would likely have been more effective than the “strong and consistent” rudder pressure applied.
The pilot reported that during takeoff the airplane “started to slide to the left on the ice” on the snow and ice-covered runway. The pilot chose to abort the takeoff. During the abort, the airplane kept “pulling to the left” and impacted the terrain between the runway and taxiway. Upon impact, the airplane nosed over which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage, wings, and wing struts. At the time of the accident, the pilot was taking off with a 40° right crosswind at 8 knots.
The pilot was departing from a fly-in event on a frozen lake. During the initial climb, at an altitude of about 150 feet, the engine suddenly lost power completely. The pilot attempted to turn the airplane away from trees that were ahead but hesitated to lower the airplane’s nose. The airplane subsequently encountered and aerodynamic stall and impacted the ice below, resulting in substantial damage to the right wing. A postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, the temperature and dewpoint were not favorable to the formation of carburetor icing. Based on the available information, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.
On February 24, 2023, about 20:30 eastern standard time, an Embraer E190, operated by JetBlue Airways as flight 618 from Minneapolis St. Paul International Airport (MSP), Minneapolis, Minnesota to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), had a ground service agent sustain second degree burns while connecting ground electrical power to the airplane after it blocked into Gate 5, at Terminal 5. According to the ground service agent, after connecting the ground power unit (GPU) he noted that electrical power was not being supplied to the airplane, so he went back to the connection point to confirm that power was on when suddenly the connection between the GPU and the airplane sparked and his right shirt sleeve caught fire and his wrist was burned.
The pilot reported that, he departed with 28 gallons of fuel onboard for a cross-country flight and he used 100% power during the flight. The flight was uneventful for a little over four hours, until the pilot was approaching his destination and the engine began to run rough and sputter. The pilot was unable to reach a nearby airport and force-landed the airplane in an open field where the nose landing gear collapsed, which resulted in substantial damage to the lower fuselage. The pilot and a law enforcement examined the fuel tank and discovered that the fuel tank was empty. Fuel usage computations indicated the engine likely consumed all the fuel onboard while operating at 100% power. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
During a short cross-country repositioning flight in day visual meteorological conditions, the airplane was about 4 miles from the destination airport, on an instrument approach at 1,300 ft mean sea level (msl), when the airplane pitched nose-down about 30° and remained in that attitude until ground impact. Review of onboard recorder data revealed that during the 1-minute period prior to manual autopilot disconnect and the final descent, the autopilot was in approach mode, using glidepath (GP) for vertical guidance and GPS for lateral guidance. With GP active, the vertical deviation slowly started to decrease until the final recorded vertical deviation was -952 ft. This would have resulted in the autopilot trimming nose-up to counteract the negative vertical deviation. After autopilot disconnected and during the final descent, the airplane’s electronic stability protection (ESP) pitch mode activated and stayed active for the descent. The ESP pitch protection mode would be activated when the airplane reached a pitch engagement limit of -15.5° nose-down and the system would then command the pitch servos to apply a supplemental stick force back toward the nominal pitch attitude range. The supplemental stick force would increase with increasing pitch deviation until the maximum limit of -20.5° nose-down pitch was reached. About 40 lbs of forward force would be required on the control stick to override both the ESP and the as-found full nose-up trim condition to maintain a 30° descent angle to impact. The final data point indicated that the airplane was at a pressure altitude of 370 ft, an indicated airspeed of 175 knots, and descending at a vertical speed of -6,880 ft per minute. The engine speed was 2,523 rpm with 10.9 inches of manifold pressure. Examination of the wreckage and recorded data did not reveal evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The pilot’s autopsy was limited by the severity of his injuries, and insufficient medical evidence was available to determine whether a medical condition contributed to the accident. Page 2 of 8 ERA23FA130
The solo student pilot reported that, during landing, he “rounded out a little too late” and the airplane bounced after touchdown. The airplane settled back to the runway, left of the centerline, and veered to the left. The student attempted to correct with right rudder, and full engine power to abort the landing, however, the airplane continued to the left side of the runway and collided with a snowbank. The airplane nosed over coming to rest inverted. The right wing, vertical stabilizer, and rudder sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot attempted a short field takeoff from a grass airstrip at the time of the accident. During the airplane’s takeoff roll, the passenger, who was seated in the left pilot seat, said that the windsock was “inconsistent.” At an airplane speed of 45-50 mph, the pilot applied control back pressure to ease the airplane into ground effect. The airplane became airborne but quickly settled back onto the runway and became airborne again. The airplane airspeed did not increase and remained at 40 mph. The pilot asked the passenger to continue to read the airspeed indications as the pilot realized that they were running out of remaining runway. The pilot reduced some of the control back pressure and pushed the airplane nose down out of fear of an aerodynamic stall and in hopes of increasing airspeed. The airplane descended and impacted the ground about 100 yds south of the departure runway and nosed over. The airplane sustained substantial damage that included damage to the right wing, aileron, and empennage. The pilot stated there was no mechanical malfunction or failure of the airplane that would have precluded normal operations. Recorded weather observations, north and northeast and 15-16 nm from the airport, indicated a quartering tailwind relative to the runway direction prevailed at the time of the accident.
The pilot reported the takeoff and flight were uneventful. During the landing approach, the landing gear did not extend. After performing a series of troubleshooting steps with no success, the pilot decided to return to his home airport and perform a manual gear extension. During the return flight, the manual gear system appeared to be jammed, so he continued to troubleshoot and performed a series of high-G maneuvers to help the gear extend. After multiple attempts the landing gear extended; however, the gear indication system did not show the gear was locked in the down position. The pilot continued with the landing, which was uneventful, until he retarded the throttle during the landing roll and the nose gear and main gear retracted.Postaccident examination revealed that the landing gear extension motor would intermittently seize, often without tripping its circuit breaker. Because the airplane was equipped with an emergency gear extension system, this event alone should not have been cause for concern, and the pilot followed the correct procedures to resolve the problem. However, the manual emergency gear extension system was also jammed because of significant wear to its release arm. Additionally, due to a worn and out of adjustment nose gear drag link assembly, even when the pilot was able to force the gear down with the manual system, it did not lock in place. Due to the design of the system, this out of adjustment condition was masked by the landing gear motor transmission, which under normal operation drove the drag links into the locked position.An airworthiness directive had been issued to resolve the gear collapse issue following manual extension, and this appeared to have been completed and was not due at the time of the accident. Even though it was not due, the wear observed to multiple landing gear components should have warranted further examination and repair by maintenance personnel during the annual inspection, which was completed one week before the accident.Page 2 of 8 WPR23LA116
The rear seat pilot reported that he was showing the front seat passenger the “basic operation” of a tailwheel airplane. During the three-point landing, with the passenger on the flight controls, the pilot verbally “talked him through the basic steps” of the landing. The landing was unsuccessful and a go-around was initiated. The pilot then took control, stabilized the airplane, and then decided land on the remaining runway. After touchdown, the airplane “turned sharply” to the right, the airplane departed the runway, and impacted a runway sign. The airplane remained upright, and the pilot was able to taxi the airplane back to his hangar.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing forward and aft lift struts. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot additionally reported that the accident could have been prevented by maintaining “aircraft control at all times.”
The student pilot reported that, while rolling out on landing, the airplane suddenly veered to the right causing the nose to turn to the left. The student pilot attempted to correct with opposite rudder; however, the airplane exited the left side of the runway, proceeded down a terrace, and nosed over, which resulted in substantial damage to the vertical stabilizer. The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. At the time of the accident, the student pilot was landing the airplane on runway 34 with wind from 300° at 6 knots.
The pilot reported that he forgot to put down the landing gear and that he landed with the gear retracted. The airplane slid off the runway before it came to a rest. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the lower fuselage. The pilot reported there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operations.
The pilot stated that the landing touchdown was uneventful but that during landing rollout the airplane lurched to the left, rolled inverted, and came to rest on the runway. The pilot stated that the airplane’s left wing strut failed at its midpoint. Airport surveillance video showed that during landing the airplane’s right wing moved upward and the left wing descended and contacted the runway. The airplane then nosed over onto the runway and sustained substantial damage. Postaccident examination of the left wing strut revealed that it had failed in overload from having contacted the runway. Examination of the airplane revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, he planned an off-airport landing on a dirt road. He performed a series of passes to confirm the road condition and decided to proceed with the landing. During the rollout, the dirt road elevation lowered with respect to the berms on either side, and the wings contacted vegetation, which damaged the left wing. The pilot and his passenger exited the airplane to inspect the damage and determined that the airplane was airworthy and able to fly to a nearby airport with only the pilot onboard. The pilot stated that for the accident takeoff, near rotation speed, the left main wheel dropped into a rut of soft sand, the airplane veered left, the left wing contacted a berm, and the airplane spun around and came to rest inverted. Substantial damage was sustained to the wings and fuselage. Witnesses reported that they saw the airplane climb before veering left and descending back to the ground.The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
At the conclusion of an uneventful flight, the pilot entered the airport traffic pattern for landing. The pilot reported that while on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern for landing, he failed to extend the landing gear and landed with the landing gear retracted. The airplane subsequently touched down on the runway and sustained substantial damage to the underside of the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident machinal malfunctions or failure with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The solo student pilot stated he was in the practice area and made the decision to return to the departure airport due to increasing winds. The pilot reported that on the landing rollout he felt a “large gust of wind” elevate the left wing making the airplane veer to the right. The pilot attempted to “pull back and brake.” The airplane exited the runway, and the left main wheel and strut impacted a runway sign which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. A wind limitation in the flight school pre-solo packet states surface winds must be “less than 15 knot winds” and “less than 7 knot crosswind component.” The flight instructor did not list any limitations on the student’s initial solo endorsement. Five minutes before the accident, surface winds were reported from 230° at 17 knots, gusting to 26 knots. The student pilot was landing on runway 27. Runway 23 was closed at the time of the accident.According to the owner of the flight school, the student did not check in with her before launching to discuss weather and his flight plan as he was supposed to.