roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot was relocating the recently-purchased airplane, and stated that he departed on the 3-hour flight with full fuel tanks, which provided an endurance of about 5 hours. During the descent to the destination airport, the pilot advanced the mixture control to full rich, applied carburetor heat, and began to retard the throttle; the engine then suddenly experienced a total loss of power. The pilot restarted the engine multiple times, but the engine would not sustain power. The pilot subsequently conducted a forced landing to a road, during which the airplane struck a sign, resulting in substantial damage. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the wings had been removed for transport, and an unquantified amount of fuel was drained from the fuel tanks. The gascolator contained 2 to 3 ounces of fuel. The fuel line to the carburetor was removed and no fuel residue was observed. The carburetor was disassembled and the bowl contained about one ounce of fuel. The engine was rotated by hand and displayed continuity and compression throughout. Although a compression test revealed that the Nos. 1 and 2 cylinders displayed low compression, the test was conducted on a cold engine, which was contrary to manufacturer guidance and could have provided unreliable readings. No other anomalies were observed with the engine, and a definitive reason for the loss of power could not be determined.
The private pilot did not confirm the amount of fuel onboard the airplane during the preflight inspection, but later reported that the fuel gauges indicated that the left tank was about 1/4 full and that the right tank was about 1/3 full. He then departed on the airplane's first flight in nearly one year. During the initial climb after takeoff, the airplane experienced a total loss of engine power. Only a few drops of fuel were recovered from the fuel pump and gascolator, but the fuel revealed no evidence of water or other contamination. The fuel tanks were not compromised during impact. No fuel was observed in the left tank, and 10 to 12 ounces were drained from that sump. The right tank appeared to contain several gallons of fuel; however, the amount could not be quantified. The fuel selector was positioned to the left tank. The pilot reported that he relied on bad information from the fuel gauges and overestimated the amount of fuel available in the left tank; therefore, the loss of engine power is consistent with fuel starvation due to the pilot's selection of the left fuel tank, which contained an unusable amount of fuel.
According to the operator, the commercial pilot of the helicopter was performing an aerial application flight when the helicopter struck a set of power lines that ran perpendicular to the field being sprayed. The operator stated that the lines were obscured due to trees.
According to the student pilot, during the second approach of his first solo flight he noticed that the wind direction changed from 230 degrees magnetic to 210 degrees magnetic, and the wind speed increased from 5 knots to 10 knots. He further reported that the traffic within the pattern was congested with five aircraft. He reported that during his approach, he fixated on his crosswind correction and touched down on the runway too fast, and the airplane bounced. He affirmed that his reaction to the bounce was to pitch the nose down and consequently the airplane porpoised down the runway. Substantial damage was sustained to the firewall. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical failures or anomalies with the airplane prior to or during the flight that would have prevented normal flight operation.
The airline transport pilot and commercial copilot were conducting a mosquito abatement application flight. Although flight controls were installed in both positions, the pilot typically operated the airplane. During a night, visual approach to landing at their home airfield, the airplane was on the left base leg and overshot the runway's extended centerline and collided with 80-ft-tall power transmission towers and then impacted terrain. Examination of the airplane did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.Both pilots were experienced with night operations, especially at their home airport. The pilot had conducted operations at the airport for 14 years and the copilot for 31 years, which might have led to crew complacency on the approach . Adequate visibility and moon disk illumination were available; however, the area preceding the runway is a marsh and lacks cultural lighting, which can result in black-hole conditions in which pilots may perceive the airplane to be higher than it actually is while conducting an approach visually.The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the pilot experiencing the black hole illusion which contributed to him flying an approach profile that was too low for the distance remaining to the runway. It is likely that the pilot did not maintain adequate crosscheck of his altimeter and radar altimeter during the approach and that the copilot did not monitor the airplane's progress; thus, the flight crew did not recognize that they were not maintaining a safe approach path. Further, it is likely that neither pilot used the visual glidepath indicator at the airport, which is intended to be a countermeasure against premature descent in visual conditions.
The private pilot reported that, while returning from a local flight, the airplane was in cruise flight at 2,800 ft above ground level when the engine started to "sputter" and lost power. He set the mixture to the full rich position and applied the carburetor heat in an attempt to restore power but to no avail. The pilot conducted an emergency landing at an abandoned airfield, during which the left wing impacted the ground and sustained substantial damage. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. While the weather conditions at an airport more than 40 miles away from the accident site were conducive to the formation of serious carburetor ice at cruise power settings, it could not be determined if carburetor icing played a role in the loss of engine power.
The pilot of the tailwheel equipped airplane reported that during the landing roll on a sandbar, and as the sand transitioned from dry sand to wet sand, he applied brakes and the airplane nosed over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the lift strut and the empennage. According to the pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot was taking off for a personal flight from a private turf airstrip to return to his home base airport. He initiated takeoff with a 10° flap extension and about 1,130 ft of the 1,344 ft of usable runway remaining, despite a recommendation from the airstrip owner that he begin the takeoff from a point that would have provided an additional 200 feet of runway. After beginning the takeoff, and as the airplane approached the departure end of the runway, the aft fuselage bottom contacted the runway several times due to the pilot's control input, which likely slowed the airplane. Shortly after becoming airborne while in a nose-high attitude, the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall before colliding with a tree and then the ground. After coming to rest, all occupants were conscious and alert, but the rear seat occupant required assistance exiting the airplane. The pilot attempted to assist him from the wreckage, but an explosion occurred about that time. The pilot and rear seat occupant sustained burns and died 6 days and 1 day after the accident, respectively, due to their injuries from the fire.Examination of the flight controls, engine, and engine accessories revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. Extensive heat damage to the engine and engine accessories precluded an operational test of the engine. A sound spectrum analysis of a video recording of the takeoff provided by the airstrip owner revealed that the reduced engine rpm near rotation was attributed to the slow airspeed and not a loss of engine power.The airplane was within weight and center of gravity limits. Takeoff performance data for the airplane indicated that, given the weather at the time of the accident, the distance required for the airplane to take off was about 786 ft and to clear a 50-ft obstacle was about 1,370 ft with no flaps on a hard surface runway. The chart did not contain figures for a soft, grass runway, which would increase the takeoff distance. Flaps at 10° would decrease the ground run by about 10% but would the advantage was lost to climb over a 50-ft obstacle. A speed study using the video showed that the average groundspeed between becoming airborne and the time of impact was about 47 knots, or 54 mph, which was the stall speed at gross weight and 0° bank angle. Even if the pilot had used the full usable runway distance, his decision to takeoff on this runway was poor given the performance capabilities of the airplane and the Page 2 of 13 ERA16FA161fact that the grass runway would likely have increased the takeoff and climb distance beyond that available. Further, it is likely that the pilot, when he noted that the airplane was nearing the end of the runway, increased the airplane's pitch, which resulted in the tail dragging, and lifted off the airplane with inadequate airspeed and exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall.
According to the pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane, he was practicing stop and go landings on an asphalt runway. He reported that during the third landing, he continued his landing roll to turn off the runway. He reported that he applied the brakes in order to slow down, but inadvertently applied too much pressure to both heel brakes. He recalled that due to the excessive braking the airplane veered right, and then veered left and the airplane subsequently exited the runway to the left and ground looped. Substantial damage was sustained to the right wing. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical failures or anomalies with the airplane prior to or during the flight that would have prevented normal flight operation.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that during the landing touchdown the tail immediately lifted and the airplane nosed over on the gravel runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage.According to the pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot was conducting his second spray load application of the day to a field located about 1/4 mile north of the accident site. A farmer stated that the pilot's last passes were to finish up spraying a tight area of the field that had trees at the end. A witness near the accident site saw the airplane turning at low altitude and then rapidly descending until ground impact. Postaccident examination of the wreckage and ground scars revealed that the airplane impacted terrain in a steep, nose-down attitude with low groundspeed, consistent with an aerodynamic stall. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot had hypertension and left ventricular hypertrophy (LVH). However, the investigation was unable to determine whether the pilot's underlying hypertension and LVH might have contributed to the accident.
The private pilot and non-pilot rated passenger departed for a personal flight to an island airport located on top of a plateau. While on final approach for landing, the airplane descended below the elevation of the runway threshold. The pilot attempted to conduct a go-around but was unable to prevent a collision with the rising terrain. Detailed examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal evidence of any pre-impact mechanical deficiencies or failures that would have precluded normal operation.The airport's website contained information for pilots about its unique operational hazards. The website explicitly warned that there were no visual cues for altitude reference on approach, that there was usually a strong downdraft near the approach end of the runway due to the surrounding terrain and prevailing winds, and that the upslope of the runway could cause approach and flare difficulties for inexperienced pilots. The website further stated that most flying clubs required pilots flying into the airport for the first time to be accompanied by a flight instructor or another pilot familiar with the airport. The pilot reported that the accident flight was his first experience flying to that airport, and that neither his co-owners of the airplane, nor his insurance company, required any checkout flight to that airport.  He reported that he was only vaguely aware of the visual illusions associated with the landing approach; and that he was unaware of, and never saw or used, the pulsating visual approach slope indicator (PVASI) with which the runway was equipped. Review of onboard GPS data revealed that the pilot flew a straight-in approach, instead of the normal and recommended right traffic pattern. The airplane joined the final approach course about 1.4 miles from the runway threshold and about 100 ft below the nominal approach path slope. The airplane descended farther below the nominal approach path and remained in the PVASI flashing red (well below course) indication zone for the entire approach. The pilot initiated the go-around about 8 seconds before impact, as the airplane descended below the elevation of the threshold.The pilot's incomplete preparations for the flight, particularly with regard to the airport's peculiarities Page 2 of 13 WPR16LA093and associated hazards, resulted in the pilot conducting an inordinately low final approach. Had the pilot flown the recommended traffic pattern instead of a straight-in approach, he would have provided himself with another opportunity to detect the airport's unusual characteristics and conduct his final approach accordingly. Finally, ground and wind speed data suggest that the airplane was near or at the extreme low end of its normal approach speed range just before the go-around. In combination, these factors placed the airplane in a position and energy state from which recovery was difficult or impossible once the airplane encountered the known downdraft phenomenon just short of the runway threshold.
The helicopter began the power line aerial observation flight near its maximum gross weight. As the pilot maneuvered the helicopter into an out-of-ground-effect hover with a 12-knot left crosswind, a nose-right yaw ensued that could not be corrected with a full left pedal application. Despite other remedial actions taken by the pilot, the helicopter descended to ground contact where the occupants egressed, but the helicopter was later destroyed by post-crash fire. The pilot stated there were no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. He said, "It was an aerodynamic issue, not a mechanical issue." FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 90-95, Unanticipated Right Yaw in Helicopters stated, "Any maneuver which requires the pilot to operate in a high-power, low-airspeed environment with a left crosswind or tailwind creates an environment where unanticipated right yaw may occur."
The helicopter was approaching the helipad with a direct 11-knot tailwind gusting to 16 knots. About 250 ft above ground level, the commercial pilot lost tail rotor and cyclic authority, and the helicopter pitched forward and accelerated toward the ground. The pilot recognized the onset of vortex ring state, reduced engine power, and attempted to initiate a go-around; however, insufficient altitude remained to complete the maneuver, and the helicopter landed hard, resulting in a partial separation of the tailboom. The operator reported and postaccident examination confirmed that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter before the accident.
On Thursday, April 14, 2016, at approximately 1624 PDT a Southwest Airlines' ramp agent incurred a serious injury to his right arm and hand during the baggage unloading process at San Diego International Airport (KSAN), San Diego, California. Flight 3060 from Albuquerque International Sunport (KABQ), Albuquerque, New Mexico, arrived into Gate 2 at 1617 PDT, at which time ground personnel positioned a beltloader adjacent to the forward cargo bin entry door and began offloading baggage from the aircraft. Two Agents toward the forward portion of the aircraft were discussing their plan to unload a heavy powered wheelchair out of the forward cargo bin. One agent was situated in the cargo bin, while the other was on the ground to the left side of the beltloader. Based on a review of video footage, as they were talking, the agent on the ground was observed placing and removing his hand on the top of the running belt in a recurring motion. He then placed his hand at the bottom of the belt and appeared to attempt the same behavior (riding his hand on the belt). Moments later the ramp agent's arm became lodged in the beltloader, and he immediately fell to the ground. Other ramp personnel immediately became aware of the situation and attempted to aid the ramp agent. The beltloader was turned off with the ramp agent's arm still lodged inside the belt loader. A ramp supervisor obtained a pair of scissors and cut the belt on the beltloader off. However, the ramp agent was still not able to free himself. The supervisor  quickly retrieved tools, removed the belt's access panel and roller bolts, and finally freed the ramp agent's arm from the belt. Paramedics arrived moments later. The ramp agent was examined in the ambulance and then taken to the hospital. The ramp agent sustained a burn on his forearm, a three-inch laceration on his hand, and a broken right wrist. It is unknown why the ramp agent decided to place his hand on the underside of the beltloader.  Southwest Airlines has precautions and established procedures for ramp operations that is contained in their ground operations manual.
The pilot reported during day visual meteorological conditions, he struck a goose at an altitude of about 2000 mean sea level while in cruise flight. The wind screen was shattered after the impact. The pilot further reported that he continued to the nearest airport and landed without further incident. A postaccident examination revealed substantial damage to the wind screen.According to the pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The airline transport pilot/owner was conducting a personal cross-country flight. The pilot stated that, after the main landing gear touched down, he eased the backpressure on the control stick and that the nose landing gear (NLG) then separated from the airplane. The airplane slid on the runway surface. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the NLG had fractured at a weld area. An airplane manufacturer service bulletin (SB) called for periodic inspection of the NLG for cracks in the weld area every 25 hours. The pilot reported that the NLG had accumulated a total time in service of 371 hours at the time of the accident and that it was last inspected 31 flight hours before the accident.
The sport pilot of the experimental, amateur-built motorglider reported that, after takeoff, the primary engine experienced a total loss of power about 75 ft above ground level, and the secondary engine was unable to maintain the motorglider's altitude. The pilot tried to make a 180° turn back to the airport, but the motorglider lost altitude and struck the top of pine trees. The primary engine was a 17-hp reciprocating engine designed for use in model aircraft, and the secondary engine was an electric motor. Both engines were necessary to produce enough power for takeoff. The pilot stated that, after takeoff, the motorglider encountered turbulence, which likely resulted in the separation of the primary engine's ignition plug.
The airline transport pilot was landing the airplane at the end of a cross-country flight. He stated that the airplane touched down within the first 500 ft of the 3,065-ft-long runway and that, when he applied the brakes, the right brake felt "very soft" and was "totally ineffective." The airplane departed the end of the runway, and the nose landing gear collapsed, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage.The airplane was not examined following the accident and was subsequently ferried to another airport for repair. No information was made available regarding the right brake, and the reason for the brake malfunction during landing could not be determined.
The flight instructor reported that the student pilot flared high and the airplane bounced on touchdown. Subsequently, the airplane veered to the right during the landing roll and the flight instructor took the flight controls and added power to abort the landing, but the airplane continued off the runway to the right. The right elevator struck a taxiway sign during the runway excursion, which resulted in substantial damage to the elevator. The flight instructor did not report any mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane, after performing an initial test flight, during the landing roll the airplane rapidly veered right and the left wing struck the ground. The pilot reported that he overcorrected by applying full left rudder and the airplane exited the left side of the runway and nosed over. The pilot affirmed that prior to the flight he performed maintenance on the airplane to include the tail wheel single bungee steering system. The pilot reported that he installed the bungee incorrectly. The airplane sustained substantial both wings, the windshield and the fuselage.
The pilot reported that during the takeoff roll on a grass airstrip, a "strong burst of wind" blew his airplane out of control. The airplane departed the grass airstrip to the right, nosed over, and came to rest in a canal. He reported that he had not reached rotation when the loss of control occurred. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, both wings, the vertical stabilizer, and the rudder. The pilot verified that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot reported that he took off from the grass airstrip with a heading of 020 degrees about 1530 and the wind gust just before rotation came from the west. He reported that the wind velocity at the accident site was 15 knots gusting to 20 knots, and the wind direction was 320 degrees. The closest weather reporting facility to the accident location reported that from 1510 to 1530, the wind velocity varied from 15 to 17 knots with occasional gusts from 25 knots to 33 knots, and the wind direction was 290 degrees. The Federal Aviation Administration has published the Airplane Flying Handbook FAA-H-8083-3A (2004). This handbook discusses operations in crosswind conditions and states in part:Takeoffs and landings in certain crosswind conditions are inadvisable or even dangerous. If the crosswind is great enough to warrant an extreme drift correction, a hazardous landing condition may result. Therefore, the takeoff and landing capabilities with respect to the reported surface wind conditions and the available landing directions must be considered.The headwind component and the crosswind component for a given situation can be determined by reference to a crosswind component chart. It is imperative that pilots determine the maximum crosswind component of each airplane they fly, and avoid operations in wind conditions that exceed the capability of the airplane.Page 2 of 6 GAA16CA183