roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
While conducting nighttime training at a tower-controlled airport, two helicopters were involved in a midair collision. A common practice at the airport was for the air traffic control tower (ATCT) local control controller (controller) to control helicopter operations on a non-movement portion of runway 26L called the underrun. The first helicopter to arrive was cleared for the option to land on the runway 26L underrun, at their own risk, but remained under control of the controller. The first helicopter flew one traffic pattern and then returned to the underrun and landed. The second helicopter arrived at the airport about 8 minutes later, and was cleared by the controller for the option to land on the runway 26L underrun. After the second helicopter crew reported that the first helicopter was in sight, the controller instructed them to “maintain visual separation” from the first helicopter, which the crew of the second helicopter acknowledged. While the first helicopter was on the underrun’s surface area preparing to take off, the second helicopter turned to the base leg of the traffic pattern. The controller believed that the second helicopter may have turned early and would possibly overfly the first helicopter, so he told the first helicopter that he needed him to take off; the pilot replied that they were taking off. The controller then made two radio calls to the second helicopter, one not received, and the other garbled. The controller then instructed the second helicopter to perform a go-around on the north side of runway 26L. While the pilot of the first helicopter was performing the takeoff, he saw the second helicopter overhead and attempted evasive action. While maneuvering, the main rotor blades of the first helicopter struck the second helicopter’s stabilator, which Page 2 of 12 WPR23LA045substantially damaged the main rotor blades of the first helicopter and the stabilator of the second helicopter. Both helicopters then landed on the airfield and shut down.The takeoff instructions for the first helicopter, followed by the go around instructions for the second helicopter, combined with the night conditions, likely created a scenario where the second helicopter crew lost visual contact with the first helicopter and overtook it from overhead. The controller was concerned that the second helicopter would overfly the first helicopter but did not issue a safety alert. The lack of a safety alert likely prevented the flight crews from understanding how close the helicopters were to each other, as well as their urgent need to take action to avoid a collision.
The uncertificated pilot departed from a grass field and flew the gyroplane at low altitude over a pipeline right-of-way. The gyroplane struck a power line that the pilot did not see and impacted the ground, which resulted in substantial damage to the rotor. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation, and that he should not have flown at low altitude without an observation pass of the area.
The pilot reported that he was conducting a non-commercial personal flight when during the climb and passing through 4,000 ft, the airplane experienced wind shear causing the airplane to lose 1,500 ft. of altitude. The pilot recovered the airplane from the altitude loss, continued to the destination airport, and landed without further incident. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, which were deformed upwards. The right front seat passenger reported that he was charged money for the flight, which was transportation to and from a fishing lodge. He reported that the airplane was in the clouds at the time it lost control and that as the airplane came out of the clouds, the pilot was pulling away from the ground, and was “pulling hard.” The pilot then got the airplane “upright.” The airplane was heading “almost directly” and “straight” at the ground before it was recovered.The passenger then asked the pilot what happened after the airplane was leveled off, and the pilot told him that he thought the autopilot had failed. The passenger reported the autopilot was not on, and it “seemed” that the pilot was not “paying attention to the instruments.” There were no warning tones or audible annunciations when the loss of control occurred. The passenger reported that they had just “barely taken off,” and did not feel any turbulence prior to the loss of control. He further added that “there was nothing before they got out of the clouds.”Pilot reports over the region mainly reported low overcast cloud cover, with no reports of significant turbulence or low-level wind shear.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.Page 2 of 5 CEN23LA052
The purpose of the flight was to provide video training for a local staff meteorologist over a simulated news scene. About 5 minutes into the flight, the pilot began a series of left, 360° orbits over an interstate highway. During the third orbit, helicopter control was lost and the helicopter entered a steep descent until it impacted a grassy area adjacent to the highway. The pilot made a radio call before impact stating that they were “going down.” The helicopter impacted a grassy area adjacent to an interstate highway. There was no postaccident fire. An examination of the helicopter’s flight controls after the accident revealed the forward left control rod end that should have been connected to the stationary swashplate on the main rotor was disconnected and the connecting hardware was missing. A metallurgical examination of the remaining components suggested that the connecting hardware, including a threaded bolt, nut, palnut, two washers, and two hat-shaped spacers were loose and backed out during the flight. It is unlikely that the hardware was secure before the flight and may have been loose for multiple flights before the accident. Additional examination of the remaining hardware revealed that one of the two spacers was installed backwards, most likely during the field overhaul of the helicopter about three years before the accident. The subject hardware was required to be inspected for security by the pilot during each preflight inspection and by maintenance personnel at each 100-hour/annual inspection.The pilot tested positive for quinine and the pain reliever tramadol and was under a physician’s care for arthritis and polyarthralgia that was unreported to the Federal Aviation Administration. However, based on the mechanical issues and the actions of the pilot immediately before the Page 2 of 9 ERA23FA070accident, performance impairments were not an issue. Thus, it is unlikely that the effects from the pilot’s use of quinine and tramadol were factors in this accident.
The flight instructor reported that while on a downwind leg of the airport traffic pattern, abeam the runway numbers, he simulated an engine failure for the student pilot. The student pilot performed checklist items, but the airplane was getting too low and far from the runway. The flight instructor then told him to turn directly toward the runway, which he did. The student pilot stated that he wanted to go-around, but the flight instructor said to keep going. By the time the flight instructor realized the airplane was not going to reach the runway threshold, he increased power, but the tail struck a runway light. The airplane subsequently landed uneventfully. The flight instructor stated that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Postaccident examination of the airplane confirmed that the empennage had been substantially damaged.
The student pilot and flight instructor were performing touch-and-go landings, and the airplane was on the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern when the engine lost total power. The flight instructor reported he heard a loud noise come from the engine before the power loss. The student pilot reported that he heard the engine sputter before the power loss. The flight instructor turned back to the airport, but the airplane could not glide to the runway. He landed the airplane hard in a grassy area, which resulted in substantial damage to the wings. An examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of pre-impact mechanical anomalies. Although there was a potential for carburetor icing at glide and cruise engine power settings given the reported temperature and dew point conditions, the engine was reportedly operating at full power when the power loss occurred. Thus, it is unlikely that the loss of engine power was due to carburetor icing. The investigation could not determine the reason for the loss of engine power based on the available evidence.
The pilot stated that during cruise flight the airplane engine began to run rough and shake violently. The pilot initiated a climb to a higher altitude and diverted to the nearest airport. The engine subsequently lost power and the pilot performed a forced landing on grass field, where the airplane struck a fence and sustained substantial damage. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the No. 3 cylinder exhaust valve failed. At the time of the accident, the engine exceeded the engine manufacturer’s time between overhaul period specifications as outlined in the Continental Motors Service Information Letter SIL98-9E, which is not mandatory for Part 91 operations.
The pilot recalled communicating with air traffic control (ATC) for his taxi clearance and did not recall any events after acknowledging the taxi clearance. An ATC controller issued taxi instructions and observed the airplane taxi to the run-up area. After completing the run-up, the pilot was instructed to contact the ATC tower. After no communications were received from the pilot, the controller attempted to initiate contact but there was no reply. Several attempts to contact the pilot via radio were unsuccessful, and the tower controller noticed the airplane had turned around in the run-up area. Based on the airplane’s repositioning, the controller assumed the pilot was looking for a light signal and issued a green light. When the airplane did not move, the controller made several more attempts to contact the pilot but there was no response. The controller then noticed that the airplane appeared to be taxiing back to the general aviation ramp; however, the airplane accelerated, departed the movement area into the grass, and impacted a perimeter fence. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunction or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings.Based on the witnessed circumstances of the accident, it is likely the accident was the result of the pilot’s temporary incapacitation. Postaccident medical care of the pilot revealed the pilot had an undiagnosed brain tumor. The incapacitation was possible due to a seizure trigged by the tumor, and it was also possible that the brain tumor was an incidental finding unrelated to incapacitation. The cause of the pilot’s incapacitation could not be definitively determined from available medical evidence.Page 2 of 7 CEN23LA041
While in cruise flight, the engine experienced a loss of power at 1,000 ft above ground level. The pilot performed the emergency checklist but was unable to restore engine power. He performed a forced landing to an area of ice-covered frozen tundra.Postaccident examination of the engine and fuel system revealed that the left fuel tank was full, and the right fuel tank was empty. No fuel was present in the fuel lines from the cockpit fuel selector to the engine. During the engine examination, the engine started and ran normally. Other than the absence of fuel, no anomalies were noted with the engine that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane’s fuel selector can only operate in the left or right fuel tank position. The operator’s procedure is to change the selected fuel tank at the midpoint of the flight; however, the pilot indicated after the engine examination that he likely forgot to switch fuel tanks.
Delta Air Lines flight 2295 struck several birds while descending through 13,000 feet on approach to Eppley Airfield (OMA), Omaha, Nebraska. The bird strike occurred about 34 miles southeast of the airport, near Red Oak, Iowa, at an airspeed of 290 knots. The crew continued the approach and made a normal landing. Weather at the time of the event was night visual conditions. Birds struck the airplane and punctured the fuselage skin in two locations on the left side; one above the cockpit windows and another near the pitot tube (see figure 1). Another bird punctured the skin on the right side of the fuselage below the cockpit window. Damage was evident to the stringers and frames at each location, and the size of the punctures in total exceeded the size of the outflow valve. The damage adversely affected the structural strength and pressurization performance and required a major repair. Page 2 of 7 DCA23LA067Figure 1.  Photo of two of the bird strikes on the left side of the airplane, indicated by blue circles. (Source: Delta Air Lines)The flight crew described the noise as the strike occurred as being like an “explosion.” The cabin depressurized, and the cockpit door blew open. The captain reported that the wind noise was “extreme” which made communication difficult. Soon after the strike the airplane descended though 10,000 ft and the cabin altitude matched the airplane altitude at about 9,500 ft. The crew declared an emergency, continued the approach to OMA, and landed uneventfully. The species of birds was identified as either Snow Goose or Ross’s Goose (DNA testing could not discriminate between the two) by the Smithsonian Institution Feather Identification Laboratory. According to the FAA, there were no pilot reports of bird activity in the area near the time of the accident. Page 3 of 7 DCA23LA067
The pilot reported that he was repositioning the helicopter on the helipad to refuel. During the maneuver, the helicopter drifted aft and the tailrotor struck an electrical box. The helicopter lost tail rotor authority and landed hard on the skids. The tailrotor driveshaft, gearbox, and driveshaft sustained substantial damage. The operator reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operations.
The operator reported that while enroute, the airplane encountered a flock of seagulls. The First Officer called out “birds” and the Captain attempted to take evasive action but one of the birds impacted the leading edge of the right wing, resulting in substantial damage to the right wing.   Subsequently, the crew diverted to a nearby airport and landed safely. The operator reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The student pilot in the helicopter was conducting his first solo flight in the airport traffic pattern at a towered airport. The student pilot was cleared by the local LC2 controller (controller) to depart from taxiway Papa, which parallels the north side of runway 30R, and to fly the taxiway Papa option, which was a closed traffic pattern to the taxiway. After several successful full-stop landings to taxiway Papa, the controller instructed the accident helicopter to, when able, make a right turn on taxiway Kilo, and that landing on the east ramp was at the pilot’s own risk. However, the helicopter pilot reported that he mistakenly flew an approach to runway 30R, rather than taxiway Papa; he then terminated the approach in a hover over the runway. Video surveillance footage shows that the nose of the helicopter was oriented in the landing direction; the student pilot reported being unaware that an airplane was on approach to land on the runway. The airplane then collided with the aft section of the skids and the helicopter pitched up, rotated left about 90° and landed upright on the runway.The accident airplane was on a right downwind to land on runway 30R when the controller advised the pilot of the helicopter traffic operating on taxiway Papa. The airplane pilot stated that she made visual contact with the helicopter and that it appeared to be operating on taxiway Papa. During the turn onto the base leg for runway 30R, the right wing blocked the instructor’s view of the runway and she lost sight of the helicopter. The instructor stated that as they turned onto final approach, she was assisting the student in maintaining airspeed and the glide slope while managing the flap setting. She stated that a moment later, while approaching the runway threshold, she saw the helicopter and it appeared to be hovering over runway 30R, about 100-300 ft past the runway numbers, and not on taxiway Papa. The instructor recalled that it was too late to abort the landing by the time she realized the helicopter’s position, and elected to touch down underneath the helicopter. The airplane’s left wing collided with the skids of the helicopter, the fuselage rotated left, and the wing struck the ground, sustaining substantial Page 2 of 10 WPR23LA041damage to the spar. After hearing the helicopter’s call sign to acknowledge the instruction, the controller repeated the instruction and “observed [the] helicopter hovering over Taxiway Papa very slowly drifting towards a right turn on Kilo.” After walking across the tower to view an aircraft entering the pattern, she returned to observe that the Cessna had, “cranked the wheels all the way to the left to avoid the helicopter.” At that time, the helicopter landed on the runway, right in front of the Cessna, and the airplane “tipped on the wing, and for a minute, it looked like it would go upside-down” before turning upright again.The student pilot’s mistaken approach to runway 30R, rather than the taxiway where he was cleared to land (and where he had conducted previous full-stop landings), put him directly in the path of, and facing away from, the approaching airplane.
In preparation for the instructional flight, the flight instructor primed the engine with fuel several times and attempted to start it; each time the engine would get close to starting but would not run. On the fourth start attempt, he did not prime the engine and white smoke started to emanate from the engine compartment. The flight instructor then shut off the fuel valve and electrical equipment and then exited the airplane to investigate. He discharged a fire extinguisher into the air intake without effect. The smoke increased in intensity before a fire broke out and within minutes engulfed the engine compartment and cockpit area before eventually being extinguished by airport fire rescue. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed electrical arcing damage to an alternator wire and surrounding structure. Pitting consistent with electrical arcing was discovered on the engine mounts and the alternator wire displayed features consistent with electrical arcing damage that was located near a fuel line. The clamp that affixed the wire was severely damaged and melted. Based on this information, the wire likely chafed over time until metal-to-metal contact was made as the wire was energized, which resulted in a fire that was fed by fuel from a nearby fuel line.
The pilot reported that, after receiving clearance for the night time takeoff, he set the heading bug to the flight heading while entering the runway. He mistook the left runway edge lights for the runway centerline and attempted a takeoff. During the takeoff roll, the left wing struck the runway edge lights and the pilot aborted the takeoff. The left wing sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The student pilot purchased the experimental amateur-built, tailwheel-equipped airplane on the morning of the accident. Witnesses reported seeing the accident airplane taxi up and down the runway several times, followed by a takeoff attempt at full engine power. During the takeoff roll, the airplane never became airborne and instead veered left, departed the runway, and impacted a tree. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. The seller of the airplane stated that he owned the airplane about 2 years and had accrued only 3 hours of flight time in it. He stated that the airplane’s flight controls were “very sensitive.” The seller reported that he asked the accident pilot if he had any flight hours in a tailwheel airplane, and the pilot reported that he had “a few.” The student pilot reported 70 total hours of flight experience on his most recent medical certificate application over 4 years before the accident. His pilot logbook was not located, and no determination could be made about any recent flight experience, tailwheel experience, or experience in the accident airplane make and model. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the pilot’s loss of control during takeoff. Although toxicological testing revealed an over-the-counter sedating antihistamine, it is not likely that his use of this medication contributed to the accident.
The pilot reported that, his mechanic had just completed an annual inspection on the airplane, and he was flying it home. While en route at 1,000 ft above ground level, the engine experienced a total loss of power. During the forced landing to a road, the airplane stalled about 40 ft above ground level and impacted the ground hard, which resulted in substantial damage to the upper fuselage.  After the accident, the pilot learned that the mechanic had moved the fuel selector from the BOTH position to the LEFT position. The pilot further reported that he did not check the fuel selector position before takeoff.  A postaccident examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed that the fuel selector was in the LEFT tank position. The left fuel tank was nearly empty of fuel, and the right fuel tank was full.  The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation and attributed the power loss to fuel starvation.