roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The student pilot stated that he and a flight instructor departed on a local area instructional flight with about 28 gallons of fuel, enough for 3 or more hours of flying. With the fuel selector on the left fuel tank, they performed various training maneuvers and flew to a nearby airport where they switched to the right fuel tank. They performed three full-stop landings before returning to the practice area. After about 1 hour of flight time, they entered the traffic pattern on the downwind to base leg and switched the fuel selector back to the left fuel tank before beginning their final approach. On the final leg of the traffic pattern, they elected to perform a go-around and added full power; however, the engine lost all power without warning. Too low to troubleshoot, the instructor took the flight controls and performed a forced landing in a corn field, which resulted in substantial damage to the airplane. As fuel leaked down from the right tank, the student pilot and flight instructor evacuated. The student reported that, during the egress, he turned off the electrical master switch off and switched the fuel tank into the 12 o’clock position.Postaccident examination of the engine did not reveal evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would preclude normal engine operation. The left fuel tank was compromised during impact, and about 4 gallons of fuel were drained out of the right wing tank by first responders. The student pilot’s description that he manipulated the fuel selector to the 12 o’clock position after the accident and during his egress would be consistent with him attempting to turn off fuel flow in order to mitigate the chances of a posaccident fire. However, the position of the fuel selector handle after the accident was actually the right fuel tank position. Given that the loss of engine power occurred shortly after switching fuel tanks, it is likely that the student pilot inadvertently placed the fuel selector in the OFF position during the flight, thus eventually starving the engine for fuel during the attempted go-around after the Page 2 of 7 ERA22LA425available fuel supply in the fuel system forward of the fuel selector had been exhausted. The flight instructor was likely unable to confirm the fuel selection because the selector handle was installed on the sidewall behind the student’s left leg.
The pilot reported that he and his passenger were completing a personal flight in an unregistered, experimental airplane that was not equipped with carburetor heat. They departed and flew the traffic about 800 to 1,000 ft above ground level (agl) and the engine was operating about 6,000 rpm. He turned on the left base leg and decreased throttle to about 4,000 rpm, and descended to about 600 ft, when the engine lost power. He stated that the engine acted the same as the last time he experienced carburetor icing. The airplane descended quickly, and he did not flare properly, which resulted in a stall, and subsequent impact with the runway. The pilot and passenger egressed without further incident and a post impact fire consumed a majority of the wreckage. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation and added that the loss of power was due to carburetor ice. Due to the post impact fire, an examination was not completed. The airplane was operating in an environment that was conducive to serious carburetor icing at glide power settings.
The flight instructor and student pilot took off in a Cessna airplane from their home airport and proceeded north to a practice area to perform practice maneuvers. The Sonex pilot departed from an airport east of the practice area about 5 minutes earlier and proceeded westbound toward the vicinity of the Cessna. Both airplanes climbed to 7,000 - 7,500 ft mean sea level (msl) and operated under visual flight rules (VFR). When the Cessna reached the practice area, it made a left 360° turn consistent with a clearing turn, which according to the flight school was standard procedure. On completing the turn, the Cessna proceeded eastbound. The Sonex approached the same area from the east and tracked west-northwest toward the vicinity of the Cessna. The flight track data showed the two airplanes come together at an altitude of about 6,939 ft msl and subsequently showed both airplanes rapidly descend. Fragmented sections of the outboard left wings of both airplanes were found in a field below the point where the two flight tracks merged. Both airplanes came down in fields about 2,400 ft apart and were destroyed on impact with terrain. Postaccident examination of both airplanes showed no preaccident failures or malfunctions that would have precluded their normal operations. The Cessna was equipped with automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast (ADS-B) “in/out” equipment and transmitted ADS-B data during the accident flight. The Sonex did not transmit Page 2 of 14 CEN22FA424ADS-B data during the accident flight; ATC records indicated the Sonex last transmitted ADS-B data on July 14, 2022. An examination of the GPS and transponder from the Sonex determined that the units were configured to not transmit position data via ADS-B. Investigators were unable to determine the exact configuration of the cockpit traffic displays for the Cessna.The sun was in the east (108o) about 24° above the horizon. A visibility study showed that the respective airplanes would have traversed the respective windscreens from right to left and left to right over the 60 seconds before the collision. However, the instrument panel, canopy frame, compass, and sun glare would have obscured the view of each pilot presenting challenges to detecting the respective airplanes. Toxicology specimens from the student pilot revealed Cetirizine in liver and muscle tissue. Cetirizine is an antihistamine available over the counter and is used to treat allergy symptoms. It may cause drowsiness. However, it is uncertain whether the student pilot was experiencing any sedating effects of this medication at the time of the accident. Given the circumstances of the accident, including the presence of a qualified flight instructor, it was unlikely that the student pilot’s Cetirizine use contributed to the collision.
According to the pilot, while conducting a local flight, he heard a "pop" followed by a partial loss of engine power. The airframe started shaking badly, he pulled power to idle, established best glide, and contacted Air Traffic Control (ATC). ATC provided alternate airports and current weather information. Unable to maintain altitude, he initiated a forced landing to a clearing on the beach. During the landing roll, the airplane impacted a rock retaining wall, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and left horizontal stabilizer.  Examination of the engine revealed that the No. 4 exhaust valve was fractured. Metallurgical examination of the fracture surfaces on the exhaust valve revealed that it had fractured due to fatigue. The fatigue fracture of the No. 4 exhaust valve likely led to the partial loss of engine power.
The pilot and passenger were conducting a cross-country flight. Flight track data showed their flight close to and paralleling an interstate highway one to two miles away when the airplane started a controlled descent. During the descent the airplane made a turn away from the highway, made another turn to parallel the highway, and then made a turn angling toward the highway. The flight continued to descend until it impacted terrain about one mile from the highway. The airplane impacted flat desert terrain in a nose-low attitude and a post-impact fire ensued, which consumed most of the airplane wreckage. There were no reported radio calls from the pilot or witnesses to the accident. Investigators could not determine why the pilot initially turned away from the highway, which could have provided a suitable emergency landing surface.  Examination of the engine and propeller found the propeller had broken aft and there were starter ring impact marks of an aft, non-rotational nature. Impact and fire damage prevented any examination of the fuel, air intake, electrical, and ignition systems. There were no signatures or conditions observed during the examination that would indicate there was any pre-accident catastrophic mechanical malfunction. Those findings and the controlled descent made by the airplane from cruise altitude are consistent with a loss of engine power before impact. The nose-down impact attitude is consistent with the airplane entering an aerodynamic stall at low altitude.The accident is consistent with a total loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined based on available evidence. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s decision to turn away from a suitable emergency landing surface, his failure to maintain adequate airspeed as the airplane neared the ground, and his exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. Page 2 of 9 WPR22FA348
According to the pilot, during the landing roll the airplane pitched nose forward and came to rest inverted on the runway, which resulted in substantial damage to the rudder and wings. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation and stated that the accident may have been the result of inadvertent application of the heel brakes.
The pilot reported that, about 40 minutes after departure at an altitude of about 9,500 ft mean sea level (msl), he decided to land off-airport due to severe up and down shaking of the experimental airplane’s empennage. The pilot reduced the throttle setting and initiated a glide. The pilot observed that the airplane remained stable during the glide, with no extreme vibration, and that he was able to manage the descent smoothly. Shortly after touchdown, the airplane bounced and landed hard on a field. Subsequently, the airplane nosed over and sustained substantial damage to the tail assembly. The wreckage was recovered from a field onto a flatbed truck by a local resident. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) interviewed the pilot after the accident and requested that he preserve the wreckage; however, the pilot had given the wreckage to the local resident who helped with the recovery. The pilot added that he was returning to his home country in two weeks when his visa expired.  A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector took pictures of the airplane on top of the flatbed truck but was unable to conduct an examination of the airframe or engine. The pilot further reported during a follow-up interview that he believed the engine and frame installed were too heavy for the airframe, which resulted in the extreme airframe vibration. He added that the engine was from a pre-owned car and had been installed about 7 years before the accident. The pilot indicated that the violent shaking during the accident sequence was the first occurrence in the airplane's last 204 hours of flight, which spanned the last 90 days. The local resident reported that during the recovery process, the pilot admitted to using zip ties to keep sections of the airplane intact.Page 2 of 6 WPR22LA352The pilot was not responsive after several attempts to coordinate a follow-up examination. Moreover, despite several attempts, the local resident did not respond to the investigator’s request to examine the wreckage. Since the wreckage was not made available for examination, the reason for the reported airframe vibration could not be determined.
The flight instructor performed a walkaround preflight inspection of the airplane and reported that he visually inspected each of the airplane’s 6 fuel tanks. He reported that the right main fuel tank was full. The flight instructor and pilot receiving instruction (the pilot) departed with the fuel selector on the left main fuel tank. After 40 minutes of flight time, the pilot selected the right main fuel tank and about 25 minutes later they noticed that the fuel quantity indicator still showed that the right tank was full. After a brief discussion they determined they had sufficient fuel to complete the trip and dismissed the abnormality. About 15 minutes later, while on short final approach, the pilot increased the airplane pitch attitude and added power, but did not receive a response from the engine, nor was there a response when he advanced the throttle to full power. The instructor selected the left main tank, but the engine did not respond, and the airplane continued to descend. The airplane impacted a berm during its subsequent forced landing and came to rest with the pilot at the controls. The right fuel tank was selected for 25 minutes during the flight and the postaccident examination revealed the fuel tank was empty while the left fuel tank, which was used for 40 minutes, was still ¾ full. The examination of the right fuel tank did not reveal any breaches in the fuel tank or fuel lines. The examination did reveal the right fuel tank fuel bladder had separated from the bottom of the fuel tank. The examination also discovered that the right main fuel tank gauge erroneously reported between ½ and ¾ full throughout the entire range of the float sensor position, consistent with the flight data and flight crew’s observations during the flight. While this evidence suggests a failure in the fuel quantity indication system, it didn’t likely contribute to the accident as the flight crew recognized the discrepancy during the flight and chose to rely on the instructor’s visual inspection of the fluid level during the preflight. Page 2 of 8 WPR22LA349The accident was the result of the instructor’s failure to verify the fuel quantity prior to departure and improper fuel management, which resulted in fuel starvation and a total loss of engine power.
The private pilot stated that prior to departure of the cross-country flight he performed a preflight inspection, which included using a dipstick to check the fuel quantity, though he later reported miscalculating the amount that was on-board. The flight departed with what he thought was 15 gallons of fuel for the intended 30-minute-long flight but when about 5 miles from the intended destination, the fuel pressure gauge decreased to 0 psi and the engine lost power rapidly. He realized he would be unable to land at his intended destination due to the airplane’s altitude and distance from it, so he performed an off-airport forced landing. The airplane touched down in a shallow ditch adjacent to a road and nosed over during the landing roll. He further stated that both fuel quantity gauges indicated near 0 at the moment of the loss of engine power. Examination of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the fuselage adjacent to the left main landing gear attach point. During recovery of the airplane no fuel was noted in the wing fuel tanks and postaccident examination revealed no fuel in the fuel service tank. Given this information, it is likely that the pilot exhausted the airplane’s fuel supply, which resulted in the total loss of engine power.
During a night cross-country flight over remote mountainous terrain, the pilot reported a total loss of engine power to air traffic control. He attempted to glide to a nearby airport, but the airplane impacted trees about 15 miles from the airport. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the crankshaft could not be rotated by hand and about 1 quart of oil remained in the sump. No oil was observed on the ramp at the departure airport and no oil streaks were observed on the airframe, but postimpact fire consumed a majority of the airframe. Teardown examination of the engine revealed that the Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6, connecting rods likely failed as a result of oil starvation. A crack was noted in the oil sump, but metallurgical examination revealed overstress features consistent with impact forces and thermal stress, indicating that the damage was likely sustained during impact; no fatigue was observed. Due to fire and impact damage, the investigation could not determine the reason for the oil starvation/loss that ultimately resulted in the loss of engine power.
The pilot described that during the landing approach to the turf runway, while about 50 feet above the runway threshold, he reduced engine power and the airplane began to descend rapidly. He responded by increasing engine power, but the airplane impacted the ground and nosed over. The airplane’s fuselage and vertical stabilizer were substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
Shortly after departure, on the first flight following maintenance, the pilot reported a loss of engine power. The pilot attempted a forced landing onto a gravel road, but the airplane impacted trees and powerlines on final approach. The airplane came to rest against a berm and a postcrash fire ensued. A postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the Nos. 2, 3, and 4 connecting rods were separated from the crankshaft. The left side of the engine crankcase was fractured. The Nos. 3 and 4 connecting rods were separated from their respective crankshaft rod journals. During disassembly of the engine, a vacuum pump cover was removed from the vacuum pump drive pad and no gasket, or remnants of a gasket, were found. Other engine components were removed, and all had remnants of a gasket despite the thermal damage. When the crankshaft was removed, discoloration was present, consistent with exposure to high heat. It is therefore likely that the gasket had not been installed following the completion of maintenance work. Additionally, when the bottom of the empennage was examined, a sizeable quantity of oil was present near the tail tie down ring.A review of the airplane maintenance records revealed that after a certificated airframe and powerplant mechanic had completed the work on the airplane, the Director of Maintenance, an airframe and powerplant mechanic with inspection authorization, signed off the paperwork to return the airplane back to service. The return to service entry stated that the vacuum pump had been removed but did not address the installation of the drive pad gasket or vacuum pump cover. In an interview, the mechanic who completed the removal of the vacuum pump and installation of the vacuum pump cover stated that that when he removed the vacuum pump, the gasket was still attached to it. He cleaned the mating surface of the cover and drive pad and then installed the cover. He stated that he thought he had replaced the gasket. A review of Page 2 of 10 CEN22FA419the work order showed that although the cover had been ordered, there was no record of a gasket being ordered.It is likely that, following the removal of the vacuum pump and system, no gasket was installed between the vacuum pump drive cover and the engine accessory case. Additionally, the Director of Maintenance likely did not review the work in detail before signing for the airplane to return to service. As the oil temperature increased, the viscosity lowered, and the oil became thin and thus more easily able to escape from non-sealed areas.
The pilot reported that shortly after takeoff, when the airplane was about 200 ft above ground level (AGL), the engine sustained a partial loss of power. He was not able to climb or maintain altitude and executed a forced landing. During the landing the airplane nosed over into a pond, resulting in substantial damage to both wings. Recorded flight data was consistent with the pilot’s description of events, but no recorded engine data was available. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the interior liner of the induction air hose between the air filter and the throttle body was partially collapsed inward. The exterior of the hose did not display obvious damage. No further preimpact anomalies that would explain the reported loss of engine power were found. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were conducive for carburetor icing at glide and cruise power settings, but not at the full power setting that would be used for takeoff and initial climb.Based on the available evidence, the partially collapsed induction hose likely collapsed further, blocking airflow to the carburetor and resulting in the loss of engine power.
Two pilots departed on a visual-flight-rules cross-country flight as a flight of two airplanes, with the non-instrument-rated accident pilot in the lead position. About one hour into the flight, the pilots encountered clouds at their cruise altitude of 9,500 ft and climbed above the clouds to an altitude of 11,500 ft mean sea level (msl). The pilot of the second airplane reported that he visually acquired the accident airplane after it climbed to 11,500 ft, then lost visual contact as he obtained weather information for the destination airport. ADS-B information revealed that the accident pilot began a gradual descent from about 11,500 ft to about 9,800 ft before climbing back up to about 11,000 ft before the data ended. About this time, the accident pilot transmitted to the other pilot that he was “in a cloud and doing a 180°.”  The second pilot recorded a short video of the accident airplane while the two airplanes were cruising at 11,500 ft. The footage showed the accident airplane flying over a broken to overcast cloud ceiling with cumulus and standing lenticular clouds present. A pilot report near the accident site issued about 15 minutes before the accident included clouds from 9,000 ft to 12,000 ft msl. The airplane impacted mountainous terrain about 2 nautical miles south of the last recorded ADS-B location at an elevation about 9,200 ft msl on a heading about 180° from its last recorded heading. The airplane was significantly fragmented. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. The airplane was not equipped with an attitude indicator, as the pilot had removed and replaced it with a unit capable of displaying artificial horizon data, in addition to other information, on a tablet computer. The extent of his operational experience with the unit and its display options was not determined.Page 2 of 11 WPR22FA347The reason for the pilot’s unannounced descent into the clouds could not be determined based on the available information; however, his lack of an instrument rating increased his susceptibility to spatial disorientation following the loss of visual reference to the horizon that he would have experienced upon entering clouds. The turning descent toward the accident site, as well as the fragmentation of the wreckage, which suggests a high-energy impact, are both consistent with a loss of control due to spatial disorientation.
The pilot reported that while landing on a grass runway, the airplane bounced, and the nose of the airplane pitched up. The pilot attempted to push the nose back down while the airplane was about 10-15 feet off the ground. The airplane impacted the grass runway and the nose gear collapsed. The airplane came to rest about 80 feet from the initial impact. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, the fuselage, and the engine mount. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot reported to an inspector that he hadn’t flown in many years and did not have a current flight review.
The pilot reported that, while in cruise at 2,500 ft mean sea level during a cross-country flight, the engine started to “sputter and surge” followed rapidly by a total loss of power. The pilot completed the emergency checklist by switching fuel tanks, turning on the fuel boost pump, and richening the mixture, but was unsuccessful in his multiple attempts to regain power; he performed a forced landing to a pond due to the densely populated area around him. The airplane impacted the water left-wing-low and was substantially damaged. The wreckage was discarded before it could be further examined; therefore, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.