roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The flight instructor reported that, during the takeoff roll, shortly after the student pilot rotated and lifted off the runway, there was a loud and noticeable impact to the right side of the airplane. The airplane pulled to the right and they elected to land straight ahead. As soon as the airplane touched back down the right wing struck the runway and the airplane skidded to a stop. Neither the flight instructor nor his student observed the deer that the airplane had collided with before the impact. Following the accident, the flight instructor noted that the right main landing gear had separated from the airplane and the deer that the airplane had impacted was near the runway centerline. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector confirmed that the airplane’s elevator was substantially damaged during the accident.
The pilot stated that during a landing attempt on a 2,400-ft-long runway, the airplane was not slowing enough, and he decided to perform a go around maneuver.  During the go-around attempt, the airplane did not gain sufficient altitude to clear a fence at the end of the runway.  Subsequently, the airplane impacted the fence and came to rest beyond the runway.  The fuselage and wings were substantially damaged.  The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor and airline transport pilot receiving instruction were performing takeoffs and landings in the tailwheel-equipped airplane. The first two landings were uneventful, and they had planned for the third to be a full stop with the airplane configured for a three-point landing. During the landing roll, the airplane began to veer left. The pilot applied full right rudder and brakes, but the airplane continued the left turn and exited the runway surface. The airplane ground looped, coming to rest facing approximately 90o from the runway centerline. The right wing was substantially damaged. The pilots both reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The airplane departed on an air tour scenic flight and after about 30 minutes, the engine lost power. Unable to restart the engine, the pilot ditched the airplane into a lake. Two of the five passengers onboard were unable to exit the airplane and the airplane sank to the bottom of the lake. The pilot had no recollection of the circumstances of the flight or his actions to restart the engine following the loss of power.Postaccident examination of the airplane did not identify any mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have resulted in the loss of engine power. The airplane was underwater for weeks before it was recovered, therefore the amount of fuel present in each fuel tank could not be determined.A photo taken just before the flight showed the left fuel tank quantity indicator was on full and the right tank indicator showed the tank contained less than 10 gallons of fuel. The company refueling procedure at that time was to refuel the left tank to 25 gallons and the right tank to 10 gallons. This procedure allows the pilots to use the left fuel tank only for the shorter scenic routes with quicker refueling after the flight.The Engine Failure – Restart Checklist called for the pilot to turn the auxiliary fuel pump ON and change the fuel selector to the other tank if fuel is available. The fuel pump was found in the ON position and the fuel selector was positioned to the left tank when the airplane was recovered. Since the fuel pump was ON, it appears that the pilot initiated the engine restart procedures. It is unknown if the pilot switched fuel tanks during the restart procedure. Had the pilot flown the entire flight on the right fuel tank the fuel supply in that tank would have been exhausted about the time of the power loss. Page 2 of 12 WPR22FA303 Because of the pilot’s lack of recall of the accident circumstances and his actions during the flight, the investigation was unable to determine the position of the fuel selector when the loss of power occurred. Additionally, the submersion of the wreckage in water compromised the amount of fuel in the tanks, precluding the investigation from assessing the airplane’s fuel state and potentially other evidence of the engine failure. The flaps were determined to have been in the retracted position. With limited time available because of the low altitude, the pilot likely continued to attempt an engine restart and did not run the ditching checklist, which stated to lower the flaps to 30° for a water landing.The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Airplane Flying Handbook states “that an airplane that is ditched at minimum speed and in normal landing attitude does not immediately sink upon touchdown.” With the flaps set to the retracted position, the airspeed would not have been as slow as possible when the airplane contacted the water, potentially lessening the impact forces and injuries to the occupants.
According to the pilot, this was the first time that the experimental, amateur-built airplane had been flown in 5 years. An aviation mechanic recently flushed the fuel tanks several times to ensure that they were clean and signed-off a condition inspection. After performing several engine run-ups, the pilot taxied to the active runway and took off. As the airplane climbed between 300 and 500 ft above the ground, the engine sustained a “very brief” stutter, then experienced a complete loss of power. The pilot attempted to return to the airport but was unsuccessful. The airplane descended and impacted on rough terrain near the departure end of the runway. Postaccident examination of the engine did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the gyroplane reported that, while in the traffic pattern and shortly after a turn onto the final approach leg, he heard and felt a “bang” and the engine lost power. The pilot attempted to maintain airspeed; however, the gyroplane entered a descending, slow spin. The pilot was able to flare just before landing hard in a flat attitude. The gyroplane contacted the dirt and flipped onto its side before the rotor blades came to a stop. Postaccident examination of the engine mount revealed fatigue cracks exhibiting ratchet marks with multiple origin points emanating from the toe weld that secured two washers onto the steel tube. When the engine mount failed, it dropped several inches and allowed the propeller to strike the keel tube, severing the right rudder cable and causing a loss of directional control while maneuvering.
The pilot had flown about 4.8 hours and was about 10 miles from the destination airport when he reported to air traffic control that the engine lost all power and that he was not going to be able to reach the destination airport. A review of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data showed the airplane aligned with a road with the last data point about 675 ft above mean sea level (msl). Surveillance video footage captured the airplane near the last ADS-B data point. In the video, the landing gear was extended, and the propeller appeared to be windmilling. As the airplane descended, it struck powerlines. A second video taken from inside a vehicle showed the airplane immediately after the powerline contact. The airplane continued the descent and touched down on the roadway. After touchdown, the left wing impacted a bridge railing, a road sign, and a power pole, which separated the left wing. The remainder of the airplane impacted a building, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage.A postaccident examination revealed that the left-wing fuel tank was breached during the impact and absent of fuel. The right-wing fuel tank remained intact, and only a small amount of fuel was present inside the tank. The fuel selector was positioned on the “RIGHT TANK.” The fuel strainer contained about 3 oz of fuel and the fuel line into the fuel flow divider was absent of fuel. No mechanical malfunctions or failures were discovered with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane was equipped with a fuel-injected engine and, as such, was not susceptible to carburetor icing. Although the pilot added 54 gallons of fuel the day before the accident, the exact amount of fuel onboard at the time of departure could not be determined. A review of airplane performance charts and wind aloft observations revealed that if the flight had departed with Page 2 of 8 CEN22FA383just the 54 gallons, the endurance would have been between 3.7 and 4.7 hours. Had the airplane departed with full fuel tanks (75.6 usable gallons), the endurance would have been between 5.4 and 6.8 hours. These calculations do not include additional fuel required to climb to altitude.Based upon the lack of fuel in the fuel lines, flow divider, and right wing fuel tank, it is likely the engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion.Toxicology testing revealed that the pilot had used cannabis as low concentrations of its inactive metabolite THC-COOH were detected in his heart blood and urine. The active, short-lived metabolite of THC, 11-OH-THC was detected in his urine, but not in his blood. While the pilot’s pattern of cannabis use is unknown, given the lack of psychoactive THC in his blood and low concentration of 11-OH-THC and THC-COOH in his urine, it is unlikely that the pilot was under the influence of THC. Thus, while the pilot was found to have cannabis in his body,the effects of the pilot’s use of cannabis did not contribute to this accident.
The pilot of the glider reported that, on a visual approach and landing he flared the nose too high. The tailwheel touched down first and the nose impacted hard, resulting in several firm oscillations. The glider sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the glider that would have precluded normal operation.
The student pilot reported that the flight instructor was attempting to demonstrate a soft-field takeoff with 10° of flaps after having completed a short field landing. The flight instructor had the student pilot “follow along on the controls” during the demonstration. After takeoff and while in ground effect, the stall warning horn sounded, and the airplane drifted to the right. Unable to gain airspeed by pitching the nose down due to their low altitude, the flight instructor instructed the student pilot to retract the flaps to 0°. The student pilot reported that immediately following the flap retraction, the airplane stalled to the left and impacted terrain. The airplane sustained substantial damage to left elevator. The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that while on a short cross-country flight and near his destination airport, the airplane’s engine lost power. The pilot subsequently performed a wheels-up landing on a gravel road. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right side of the fuselage. A postaccident inspection of the airplane at the accident site revealed that both wing fuel tanks were empty. No other preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions were found with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The loss of engine power was due to fuel exhaustion.
About two hours into the flight, while at cruise altitude over mountainous terrain, the airplane’s engine sustained a loss of power. The pilot was unable to restore engine power and performed a forced landing to a canyon, resulting in substantial damage when the airplane impacted trees. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the fuel lines and carburetor contained about 2 oz of fuel. The fuel strainer remained undamaged and did not contain any fuel and the fuel tanks contained minimal fuel. The examination did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot stated that he departed on the flight with about 3 hours of fuel. He also stated to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspectors that the airplane was “low” on fuel when the loss of engine power occurred. There were signs of fuel stains on the airplane at the accident site; therefore, it is possible that fuel leaked the from tanks while the airplane sat at the accident site. However, since there was no fuel found in the undamaged fuel strainer, it is likely that the pilot did not have as much fuel onboard as he thought, and that the loss of engine power was due to fuel exhaustion.
During a night cross-country instructional flight, the pilot receiving instruction performed a touch-and-go maneuver. Shortly afterward, during the climb to cruise flight on the return leg, the engine began to lose power. The flight instructor briefly attempted to troubleshoot the engine (including applying carburetor heat); however, he was unable to restore engine power, which remained at idle with the propeller windmilling. Because the airplane would be unable to reach an airport, the flight instructor established the airplane’s best glide speed. The airplane subsequently impacted trees. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the single-drive dual magneto, which remained attached to the engine, would not produce a spark when the engine’s crankshaft was rotated. Internal examination revealed that, when the magneto’s input drive was rotated, neither set of contact points opened. The magneto manufacturer’s service support manual stated that the magneto should be inspected every 500 hours with particular attention focused on rotating parts, bearings, and electrical components. The maintenance logbooks showed no record of 500-hour magneto inspections having been completed during the almost 2,000 hours that the airplane was operated since the operator had purchased it. The weather conditions about the time of the accident were conducive to carburetor icing at cruise and glide engine power settings, and while the instructor applied carburetor heat with no engine power improvement after the engine had begun to faulter, it is possible that the engine might not have been developing sufficient heat by that point to deice an accumulation of ice in the carburetor. Thus, it could not be determined whether the anomalous operation of the magneto’s points that was observed during the postaccident examination, the possible Page 2 of 8 ERA22LA369formation of carburetor ice, or a combination of both these factors ultimately resulted in the partial loss of engine power during the accident flight.
The non-instrument-rated pilot was in cruise flight when he advised the air traffic controller that he was looking at his cockpit weather radar display and requested a deviation between what he described as a gap between radar echoes. The airplane subsequently transitioned through echoes consistent with areas of light, moderate, heavy, and then extreme precipitation before track data depicted a steep, descending right turn that continued until contact with the airplane was lost in the vicinity of the accident site.The damage to the airplane and the distribution of the wreckage, which was spread over a distance of 0.8 miles, were consistent with an in-flight break-up. Examination of the wreckage revealed fracture surfaces consistent with overstress failure, and no evidence of preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal operation of the airplane.The extent of the pilot’s preflight weather planning activities could not be determined, as there was no record of him obtaining weather information from an access-controlled source. Based on his communications with air traffic control, the pilot was aware of the convective activity along his route of flight and was likely using his cockpit Next Generation Radar (NEXRAD) weather display for tactical weather avoidance decisions, and not accounting for the latencies inherent to the processes used to create and deliver this imagery to an inflight display.
The pilot reported that she purchased the airplane in July 2021 and had not flown it recently. The purpose of the flight was to reposition the airplane for an annual inspection. She reported that the night before the accident she spent two hours “chair flying” in preparation for the flight. The next day she departed from the local airport and completed one stop-and-go landing, which was completed without incident. She then departed and flew to the destination airport and intended to land on the gravel strip. During the landing flare, the airplane “ballooned slightly” and the airplane landed beyond the intended landing point. Upon touchdown, she pushed the yoke forward and applied brakes, then the airplane nosed over and came to rest inverted. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing and vertical stabilizer. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, although the airplane’s climb started out fine, shortly after takeoff its performance dropped off. The pilot attempted to return to the airport to land, but was unable to maintain sufficient altitude to reach the runway. He conducted an off-airport forced landing in a field, where the airplane sustained substantial damage.  The airplane’s performance chart indicated that an adequate rate of climb was available given the airplane’s gross takeoff weight and the density altitude that day. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation and, therefore, the reason for the loss of performance could not be determined.
The pilot was returning from a solo hunting trip when the accident occurred. There were no reported distress calls or radio communications from the pilot. The next day a pilot who was overflying the area spotted the airplane wreckage about 2 nautical miles (nm) west of a gravel airstrip. A review of the data from the accident pilot’s GPS revealed that the airplane departed the gravel strip to the south and then made a right turn into a mountain valley. The flight track continued west up the valley about 300 to 400 ft above ground level (agl) for about 2 nm, then made a sharp left turn and descended to the ground.The airplane impacted the ground in a nose-low attitude and came to rest upright. The forward fuselage and cockpit area were crushed upward and aft. Flight control continuity was confirmed from all flight control surfaces, through a few impact separations, to the cockpit controls. The flaps were partially extended. The pitch trim jackscrew was found in a full nose-up position. The propeller damage signatures were indicative of the engine operating at the time of impact. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The engine data monitor data indicated the engine was operating normally with no anomalies noted. A postaccident weight calculation, including fuel, revealed the airplane was about 61 lbs over its maximum gross weight. The airplane's center of gravity could not be calculated since the exact location/station of the cargo could not be determined.The pilot who discovered the wreckage stated that, on the afternoon of the accident, there was significant wind shear in the area with sustained wind at least 20 kts and gusting to at least 30 kts. He stated that the wind gusts were violent, which made him park his airplane on an airstrip about 15 miles east of the gravel airstrip and wait for the wind to subside. He added that Page 2 of 9 ANC22FA066another pilot who flew northbound over the gravel strip a few hours after the accident time reported that the wind conditions were very turbulent. The circumstances of the accident were consistent with the pilot’s loss of control shortly after taking off into reported high gusting wind.
According to the pilot, he stated he was landing in the evening and the sun was low on the horizon. While he was on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, he heard another pilot state that they were departing from the runway. As the pilot turned onto the final leg of the traffic pattern, the sun was in his eyes, and he could not see very well. After the airplane touched down on the runway, he noticed the departing airplane right in front of him and he veered hard to the right to avoid a collision. The airplane departed the right side of the runway and contacted runway lights resulting in substantial damage to the leading edge of the right wing. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have resulted normal operation.
The pilot reported that, he performed an orbit of his intended off-field landing site prior to starting the approach. As he made his final approach to the site, he realized the helicopter was fast and determined that he needed to abort the landing and perform a go-around. However, the helicopter settled, and the low rotor rpm light illuminated, which was accompanied by the low rotor rpm horn. The pilot attempted to add power but could not lower the collective due to his shallow approach and low altitude. As the helicopter touched down on a slope the pilot applied right cyclic, and the helicopter impacted the ground and came to rest on its right side. The fuselage was substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the airplane reported that, while on final approach to land, he failed to maintain sufficient power which, resulted in a high sink rate, hard landing, and subsequent left landing gear collapse. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the forward fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that during landing, the left wing stalled and the airplane impacted the ground, which resulted in damage to the landing gear and propeller. He attempted to takeoff, but the airplane veered off the side of the runway into small trees, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing strut and left elevator. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that after liftoff, the airplane did not seem to be accelerating. She pushed the nose down to accelerate in ground effect; however, the airplane was approaching the end of the runway and, in her judgement, may not have had sufficient altitude to clear a line of trees. The pilot decided to reject the takeoff. After touching down, she “immediately” applied full brakes but was unable to stop before the airplane departed the end of the runway. It continued into the grass and impacted the airport perimeter fence.   A postaccident engine examination did not reveal any anomalies consistent with an inability to produce rated power. The airplane was loaded within the specified gross weight and center-of-gravity limits and the runway length was sufficient based on published performance data. The pilot noted that factors adversely affecting airplane takeoff performance were the elevated density altitude, the near-maximum airplane gross weight, the upsloping runway, and the additional altitude required to clear the tree line. She added that a short field takeoff procedure may have provided additional climb performance and clearance from the tree line.Although the published airplane performance indicated the takeoff could have been completed safely, the pilot prudently decided to reject the takeoff when the obstacle clearance was in doubt. The decision was made without sufficient runway available to land and resulted in the runway excursion and impact with the airport perimeter fence.