roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot reported that, while conducting an agricultural application flight, he made a minimum bank angle turn to the south. He then maneuvered the airplane to avoid wires, but the vertical stabilizer struck the bottom set of wires, which resulted in the separation of the top section of the vertical stabilizer and rudder. The airplane subsequently impacted the ground, and a postaccident fire ensued. The airplane was consumed by postaccident fire.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported he was returning to the airfield as part of an 11-ship formation. The wind at the airfield was from between 220° and 230° and 7 to 8 knots. He landed the tailwheel-equipped airplane on the left side of the runway and kept the tail up during landing rollout to allow for spacing with the other aircraft in the formation. When he began to lower the tail to the runway, the wind hit the airplane' left side and lifted the left wing. Despite the pilot's control inputs, the airplane crossed to the right side of the runway, continued into grass, and came to a stop facing south. The left wingtip, aileron, and outboard aileron hinge struck the ground during the excursion, substantially damaging the airplane. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, during an agricultural application low pass, he descended below the height of wires adjacent to the field. Shortly after, he saw a telephone pole and maneuvered the airplane to avoid the pole, but the airplane's left wing struck the top of the pole. The airplane rolled left and impacted the ground inverted. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot (who was the owner of the airplane) and pilot-rated passenger departed the airport for a cross-country flight in dark night instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), destined for an airshow for the final weekend of the event. Radar data showed the airplane's radar track after takeoff in a 180° left arc. The airplane climbed to about 1,300 ft mean sea level (msl), or about 850 ft above ground level, and then descended to 1,100 ft msl before radar contact was lost about 1 minute after takeoff.The pilot-rated passenger had access to the flight controls and held pilot certificates, ratings, and flight experience that would have allowed him to act as a pilot for the flight It could not be determined what his role was for the flight, be that solely a passenger, assisting the pilot/owner, or manipulating the airplane’s controls during all or a portion of the accident flight. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane. Weather information and a witness statement were consistent with weather conditions likely to have produced restricted visibility in addition to the darkness that prevailed at the time of the accident. The wreckage distribution, which was consistent with a relatively high-speed impact, the airplane's turning ground track and descent about 1 minute after takeoff, and the low visibility at the time of the accident, were indicative of a loss of airplane control after the onset of spatial disorientation. Further, the pilot/owner did not obtain an official weather briefing, did not file an instrument flight rules flight plan for a flight that departed into IMC, and was flying the airplane after the annual inspection was due; thus, it is likely that he had developed an anti-authority attitude, as evidenced by the disregard for several rules and regulations. While it could not be determined what role the pilot-rated passenger played in the decision making that took place before and during the flight, the pilot-rated passenger should have had the training and experience necessary to recognize these hazards. In addition, they may have experienced "get-there-itis" because they were flying to the airshow for its final few days and, thus, Page 2 of 10 ERA19FA234wanted to arrive as quickly as possible, which resulted in the decision to depart the airport in dark IMC under visual flight rules.Although toxicology testing detected ethanol in tissue samples from the pilot and passenger, medical evidence was insufficient to determine if the pilot or passenger were impaired.
On July 23, 2019, about 0048, pacific daylight time, United Airlines flight 1161, N57852, a Boeing 757-324, received substantial damage during pushback. There were no injuries to the passengers or crew onboard.  The regularly scheduled domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from San Francisco International Airport (SFO), to Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois.According to the flight crew the airplane was at gate 62 at SFO and after the door was closed and Pre-flight and Before-pushback checklists were completed, the flight crew then received clearance to push back. According to the ground crew, the pushback operation was conducted with a tug driver and a wing walker at each wing. After pushback was initiated, another airplane was towed behind the accident airplane.  The tug driver stated he saw the other airplane and stopped but lost sight of the wing walker. After he thought the other airplane was clear, he started to move the airplane again, but then was signaled by the other airplanes ground crew to stop and that he had hit their airplane.Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the right-hand elevator outboard section had broken at the second attach fitting. Also, the right-hand horizontal stabilizer had a puncture, end cap damage and other damage to the lower skin extending about 24 to 30 inches from the outboard end.
The pilot reported that, during landing, shortly after the main landing gear touched down, the airplane veered left, exited the runway, and impacted the visual approach slope indicator. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor and her student departed on a local instructional flight. After completing a touch-and-go maneuver at a nearby airport, the student configured the airplane for a normal landing. The instructor’s attention was focused outside the cockpit as she watched for an incoming airplane while her student flew the airplane. While setting up for the approach, the student configured the airplane by applying carburetor heat and retarding the throttle. After the student turned on to final approach, she noticed the engine speed reduce to 1,000 rpm without any intervention. She slowly advanced the throttle but was unable to maintain altitude. The flight instructor then took control of the airplane and determined that they had lost partial engine power. The airplane subsequently impacted the ground hard and came to rest. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed a small obstruction in the left-wing vent line, which is not likely to have obstructed fuel flow as the obstruction was not in the fuel lines and fuel was being fed to the engine from both tanks at the time of the accident. The engine was nearly 1,400 hours beyond the manufacturer’s recommended time before overhaul but did not show any preimpact anomalies during testing. Weather data indicated that the airplane was operating in conditions conducive to carburetor icing at the time of the accident and may have been more susceptible to icing because the engine was being fueled by automotive gasoline. However, the cause of the loss of engine power could not be determined as the student pilot applied carburetor heat before the power loss and postaccident testing did not reveal any anomalies with the airplane or engine.
The noncertificated pilot and two passengers were departing the airport for a local flight. On departure, the pilot noted that the airplane's engine did not produce full power and that the airplane would not climb as expected. The airplane collided with a sign and a vehicle before coming to rest on a golf course. Examination of the engine found that the No. 1 cylinder exhaust valve was stuck in the open position; no other anomalies were detected with the airframe and engine. It is likely that the reduced engine power was a result of the stuck exhaust valve, which would have severely limited the airplane's climb performance.
The pilot reported that, during the landing approach, he selected the landing gear selector switch to the down position, which was followed by "three greens," indicating that the landing gear was down, locked, and safe for landing. He noted that all three occupants verified and verbally confirmed that the landing gear was "down and locked." The airplane landed uneventfully, but as the pilot started a left turn onto the taxiway, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the right wing struck the ground, sustaining substantial damage.A postaccident examination of the landing gear system revealed that the right main landing gear assembly bell crank pivot bolt had sheared and displayed features consistent with a ductile overstress fracture from shear loading.
During the approach for landing, the engine lost power, and the pilot completed a forced landing short of the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane wreckage was sold before an examination could take place, so whether a mechanical anomaly or malfunction contributed to the accident could not be determined.
While in cruise flight at 3,500 ft, the pilot and flight instructor-rated passenger heard the engine begin to run rough. They completed the emergency checklist for a loss of engine power and chose to return to the departure airport; however, the engine continued to lose power and the pilots performed a forced landing to a field, during which the airplane impacted a barbed wire fence. The atmospheric conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to the development of serious carburetor icing at descent power; however, the engine was operating at cruise power at the time of the accident. The airplane's engine was test run at the accident site; the engine started and ran with no anomalies noted. The reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined based on the available information.
The private pilot was practicing full-stop takeoffs and landings in the airport traffic pattern. During the fourth takeoff,  about 500 to 600 ft above the ground, the airplane's engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot performed a forced landing and the airplane impacted trees and terrain, resulting in substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage. Postaccident examination, which included three engine test runs, failed to duplicate the power loss. Examination of the carburetor revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Atmospheric conditions about the time of the accident were conducive to the development of serious carburetor icing at glide power. Given the absence of mechanical anomalies, it is likely that the loss of engine power was the result of carburetor ice accumulation while the engine was being operated at reduced power settings during the previous landings and ground operations.
The commercial pilot of the helicopter was performing an aerial application flight when he noted the engine rpm below "half" and dropping along with the main rotor rpm. The pilot reduced the collective and attempted a high hovering autorotation. Due to the lack of airspeed and altitude, the helicopter impacted a bean field "very hard." The pilot reported that the engine was not operating when the helicopter came to rest on its left side. The pilot reported that he was paying close attention to the carburetor heat temperature during the flight, as he had the carburetor heat lever pulled out "a little over half" and he kept the needle out of the yellow arc depicted on the carburetor temperature gauge. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine found no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation, and the helicopter had adequate fuel onboard at the time of the accident. The temperature and dew point at the time of the accident were conducive to the formation of serious carburetor icing at glide power settings.  However, given that the pilot was monitoring the carburetor temperature gauge, it is unlikely that the loss of engine power was due to carburetor ice.  The reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined based on the available information.
During a cross-country flight in night visual meteorological conditions, the airplane began to lose electrical power, and the pilot diverted to the nearest airport. During the landing approach, the pilot extended the landing gear and flaps, and, although the gear position indicator lights did not illuminate, he felt that the airplane was in its normal landing configuration and continued the approach. The right horizontal stabilizer and elevator contacted the runway upon landing, resulting in substantial damage. Examination revealed that the nose landing gear was extended and locked, but the main landing gear did not extend and lock. A functional test of the landing gear and the emergency gear extension system revealed no anomalies. It is likely that electrical power remaining was inadequate to fully extend and lock the landing gear. The alternator was bench-tested and revealed no anomalies. Based on the available information, the reason for the loss of electrical power could not be determined.
The noncertificated pilot was performing a high-speed taxi on a grass runway when the airplane became airborne, then impacted terrain in a nose-down attitude. The airplane’s left wing and forward fuselage sustained substantial damage. Examination of the airplane revealed no preaccident malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The accident was consistent with the pilot’s exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack when the airplane became airborne during a high-speed taxi test, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain. Whether a medical factor contributed to the accident could not be determined from available evidence.
The pilot reported that, while conducting the preflight inspection, he mistook the voltmeter for the fuel gauge. The first leg of his flight was uneventful; however, on the return flight, the engine started to sputter and then lost all power. He navigated toward a nearby airport, but when he realized that the airplane would not reach the airport, he chose to land on a field near the south end of the airport. During the landing, the left wing impacted a tree. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and horizontal stabilizer.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, during a touch-and-go landing and shortly after touchdown, the airplane veered left. He added power, and the airplane pitched up, so he "cut the power" and corrected with right aileron, but the airplane landed hard on a grass field next to the runway, struck runway lights, and nosed over. The pilot added that the airplane was trimmed for landing. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right-wing lift strut and empennage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that the wind was from 030° at 10 to 15 knots, gusting to 20 knots.
The pilot reported that, after the airplane touched down on the grass airstrip and rolled about 130 ft, the nose landing gear impacted a depression and then bent aft. The nosewheel dragged through the grass about 30 ft, and the airplane then nosed over and came to rest inverted. The pilot added that this was the first time he had landed at this airstrip and that he was not aware of the hazards on the rough surface. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the rudder and wing struts. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot was in cruise flight at an altitude of 19,000 feet mean sea level (msl) for about 1 hour and 10 minutes on an easterly heading when he requested a diversion from his filed destination to an airport along his route of flight to utilize a restroom. Two miles west of his amended destination at 12,000 ft msl, the pilot advised the controller that he had a “fuel emergency light" and wanted to expedite the approach. The controller acknowledged the low fuel warning and cleared the airplane to descend from its assigned altitude. Instead of conducting the descent over the airport, the airplane continued its easterly heading past the airport for nearly 8 miles before reversing course. After reversing course, instead of assuming a direct heading back to the airport, the pilot assumed a parallel reciprocal track and didn’t turn for the airport until the airplane intercepted the extended centerline of the landing runway. The pilot informed the controller that he was unable to make it to the airport and performed a forced landing less than 1 mile from the landing runway. Both fuel tanks were breached during the accident sequence, and detailed postaccident inspections of the airplane’s fuel system revealed no leaks in either the supply or return sides of the system. A computer tomography scan and flow-testing of the engine-driven fuel pump revealed no leaks or evidence of fuel leakage. The engine ran successfully in a test cell. Data recovered from an engine and fuel monitoring system revealed that, during the two flights before the accident flight, the reduction in fuel quantity was consistent with the fuel consumption rates depicted at the respective power settings (climb, cruise, etc). During the accident flight, the reduction in fuel quantity was consistent with the indicated fuel flow throughout the climb; however, the fuel quantity continued to reduce at a rate consistent with a climb power setting even after engine power was reduced, and the fuel flow indicated a rate consistent with a cruise engine power setting. The data also showed that the indicated fuel quantity in the left and right tanks reached 0 gallons within about 10 minutes of each other, and shortly before the accident. Given this information, it is likely that the engine lost power Page 2 of 9 ERA19LA231due to an exhaustion of the available fuel supply; however, based on available data and findings of the fuel system and component examinations, the disparate rates of indicated fuel flow and fuel quantity reduction could not be explained.
The pilot reported that, during takeoff from a 2,000-ft-long grass runway, "the airspeed indication was not showing a comfortable amount of increase." He aborted the takeoff and applied brakes, but the airplane overran the runway. The left wing impacted a pole, and the airplane came to rest in brush near the runway.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, while on the downwind leg, "the tower told us that there was a crosswind." During the landing roll, the airplane veered left and exited the runway, and the right wing struck the ground. When the airplane came to rest, the pilot exited the airplane and determined that there was no wind. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot stated that, during takeoff in the float-equipped airplane, he saw the left float begin to move into his peripheral vision from the left cockpit window and the airplane began to yaw to the left. The left wing subsequently impacted the water and the airplane nosed over, separating the right wing from the fuselage. The passengers consistently reported choppy water conditions at the time of the accident; one passenger reported that white caps were visible on the ocean waves in the distance. The passengers said that, during the takeoff, the airplane impacted a swell or wave and nosed over abruptly, and the cabin rapidly filled with water. Examination of the float assembly revealed fractures in the left front flying wire attachment fitting and the right rear flying wire attachment strap and hole elongation in the left rear flying wire attachment fitting.  Additionally, the bolts attaching the two left flying wire attachment fittings to the left float were bent, and the two flying wires that had been attached to the fractured attachment fitting and attachment strap were buckled.  While some areas of corrosion were observed on the fractured left forward fitting, the total area of corrosion was a small percentage of the total cross-section, and the remainder of the fracture and associated deformation of the lug was consistent with ductile overstress fracture.  Similar areas of corrosion were also observed on each of the intact flying wire attachment fittings.Post-accident testing completed by the float manufacturer revealed that buckling of flying wires similar to that observed on the accident airplane was only reproduced at strap and fitting failure loads above 9,000 pounds force; the design specification load was 3,453 pounds of force. This indicates that the small amount of corrosion present on the fractured flying wire attachment fitting did not reduce its load-carrying capability below the design specification load of 3,453 pounds of force, and that both the flying wire attachment fitting and flying wire attachment strap fractured due to overload. Therefore, it is likely that the accident airplane floats were subject to forces that exceeded their design limitations, resulting in overload of the flying wires attached to the left float. It is also likely that, given the lack of damage on either float, the force was due to impact with an ocean wave or swell and not by striking an object.Page 2 of 8 ANC19FA035
The pilot reported that during cruise flight, about 800 to 1,000 ft above ground level, he advanced the throttle and the engine immediately lost power. The pilot’s attempt to restart the engine was unsuccessful and he initiated a forced landing to a nearby tree-lined residential road. During the landing sequence, the airplane struck trees and came to rest upright against a fire hydrant.Postaccident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. The engine was successfully run on the airframe at various power settings with no anomalies noted. The reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined based on available evidence.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, while landing on a grass runway and about 10 ft above ground level, the airplane "dropped" quickly. The airplane touched down hard on the runway and then skidded to a stop. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and rudder. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.