roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The flight instructor on the controls of the high skid-equipped-landing-gear helicopter reported that he was the pilot-in-command (PIC). The PIC reported that he and another flight instructor were performing simulated emergency procedures during the flight. He reported that he attempted to demonstrate a simulated fixed-pitch (right stuck antitorque pedal) emergency procedure. He reported that, during the maneuver, the nose of the helicopter was about 40° nose right of centerline. He reduced the throttle, and the nose corrected to about 20° nose right of centerline. The helicopter touched down on taxiway delta with minimal forward airspeed, and it then bounced about 5 ft above the ground and yawed right about 1 3/4 turns. The helicopter touched down a second time about 65 ft south of the taxiway centerline and rolled onto its left side. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the firewall, main rotor drive system, and tail rotor drive system. A METAR at the time of the accident reported that the wind was from 110° at 08 kts. The flight instructor seated in the right seat reported that the wind at the time of the accident was from 090° at 08 kts. When the PIC was asked by the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge if he placed the collective in the full-down position after touchdown or if he increased the collective after the initial touchdown, he responded that he could not remember. When asked if he applied full left pedal to combat the right yaw, he said that he did not because the event happened quickly.According to the Federal Aviation Administration Helicopter Flying Handbook (FAA-8083-21A), the Helicopter Instructor's Flying Handbook (FAA-8083-4), and Advisory Circular (AC) 90-95 "Unanticipated Rapid Right Yaw in Helicopters," the loss of tail rotor effectiveness is a critical, low-speed aerodynamic flight characteristic that can result in an uncommanded rapid yaw rate that does not subside of its own accord and, if not corrected, can result in the loss of aircraft control.Page 2 of 6 GAA17CA132AC 90-95, Section 7.d.3. (page 7), defines flight characteristics and wind azimuths and states that the tail rotor vortex ring state occurs when the wind is from 210° to 330°.1. Winds within this region will result in the development of the vortex ring state of the tail rotor.AC 90-95, Section 10, "Recommended Recovery Techniques," (page 8), states: a. If a sudden unanticipated right yaw occurs, the pilot should perform the following:(1) Apply full left pedal. Simultaneously, move cyclic forward to increase speed. If altitude permits, reduce power.(2) As recovery is effected, adjust controls for normal forward flight.b. Collective pitch reduction will aid in arresting the yaw rate but may cause an increase in the rate of descent. Any large, rapid increase in collective to prevent ground or obstacle contact may further increase the yaw rate and decrease rotor rpm.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The airline transport pilot and private pilot were conducting a personal, local flight in a single-engine, amateur-built airplane. During takeoff, the private pilot applied full power and began to climb the airplane. During climbout, about 400 ft above ground level, the pilots noticed a total and abrupt loss of engine power. Following unsuccessful attempts to regain power, the airline transport pilot executed a forced landing to an uneven field, during which the right wing and fuselage sustained substantial damage. Examination and testing of the engine and fuel system components revealed no evidence of any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.
The pilot reported that he heard a loud crunch when he raised the landing gear shortly after takeoff. The pilot climbed the airplane to about 3,000 ft and attempted to lower the landing gear using both the normal and emergency gear extension procedures but was unable to do so and subsequently landed with the gear retracted, resulting in substantial damage to the lower fuselage. Examination revealed that the landing would not extend normally. The landing gear motor was found shorted out internally and the gearbox sector gear contacted the internal stop when retracted; therefore, the emergency gear handle was not in contact with the pinion and rotated freely. The crank assembly exhibited signs of excessive wear and excessive pinion shaft end play. The American Bonanza Society Air Safety Foundation’s Landing Gear Inspection Checklist and Repair Guide stated that, “if the sector gear [end] hits the stop in either the extended or retracted position, the gearbox and motor should be removed and overhauled. The most common cause of this condition is a gear motor that is due for overhaul.”The excessive wear within the gearbox caused the sector gear to lose contact with the pinion which caused the gear motor and emergency gear handle to rotate freely with no corresponding motion from the landing gear itself.
The commercial pilot reported that, following an uneventful flight to break in the recently installed rebuilt left engine, he entered the airport traffic pattern. As the airplane crossed over the runway threshold, he reduced power, and the airplane began to settle into ground effect. Subsequently, the pilot initiated a go-around. When he applied power, the right engine responded; however, the left engine did not respond, and the airplane immediately began rolling and yawing left. The pilot reduced power and applied control inputs, but the airplane continued to yaw left and then impacted terrain. Photographs obtained from airport management showed that, immediately following the accident, the left auxiliary fuel pump switch was in the "low" position. Both engines were test run in an engine test cell, and they started and operated normally at various power settings. The left auxiliary fuel pump was operationally tested and compared to the limits noted on the manufacturer's data plate. During functional tests in the low-boost setting, the fuel flow rate was almost double the minimum specification for the low-boost setting and higher than the minimum high-boost fuel flow rate. Leaking fluid was observed around the outlet fitting, so the outlet fitting was removed; an O-ring was found damaged, which likely resulted in fuel leaking around the outlet fitting. The investigation could not determine how or when the O-ring was damaged. A new O-ring was installed, and functional tests were conducted again. In the low-boost setting, the fuel flow rate was again more than double the minimum specification for the low-boost setting and higher than the minimum high-boost fuel flow rate. During a review of airframe and engine maintenance records, no entries were found pertaining to the left auxiliary fuel pump. The Pilot's Operating Handbook specified that, before takeoff or landing, the auxiliary fuel pumps should be off unless the ambient temperature is 90°F or above, in which case they should be set at "low." The ambient temperature at the time of the accident was 64°F. Therefore, it is likely that, during the attempted go-around, the left auxiliary fuel pump was positioned to "low" and that this, in combination with the excessive fuel flow rate while positioned to the low-boost setting, resulted in the loss of engine power. Page 2 of 7 WPR17LA059
The commercial pilot was conducting an aerial observation flight of pipelines in visual meteorological conditions. According to the operator, the pilot was transitioning the airplane to the east between two pipelines, which were about 112 miles apart. During the flight the airplane's left wing contacted the top guy-wire of a 449-ft tall communications tower. The airplane impacted terrain and a post-impact fire consumed the airplane. Although the wreckage was significantly fragmented and damaged by fire, examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operations. Separated sections of the left wing were found between the communications tower and main wreckage. Portions of the wing exhibited wire strike markings consistent with the diameter of the tower guy-wire, and white paint marks consistent with the left wing's paint color were found on the top guy-wire about 430 ft above ground level (agl). GPS data indicated that, for the last 10 minutes of flight, the airplane's altitude varied between 219 and 552 ft agl. The last data point showed the airplane at 403 ft. GPS data and wreckage and impact information are consistent with the pilot failing to maintain clearance from the communications tower guy-wire while flying a long-distance transition flight at low altitude.
The helicopter pilot reported that, during takeoff from a trailer, the tie-down remained attached to the left skid and that the helicopter experienced a dynamic roll-over. The helicopter rolled off the trailer to the left and impacted the ground.The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, tailboom, and firewall.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The student pilot and flight instructor were conducting a personal flight. The flight instructor reported that the pretakeoff checks were "normal" but that, during the takeoff, the engine felt "weak" and that the engine lost power during the initial climb. The flight instructor conducted a forced landing to a field, during which the airplane impacted the top of a tree and then the ground. Examination of the airplane revealed that the exhaust valve for the No. 4 cylinder was stuck in the "open" position possibly due to excessive deposits from the combustion process. It is likely that the stuck exhaust valve resulted in the partial loss of engine power reported by the flight instructor.
The private pilot reported that he did not perform a preflight inspection, including sumping the fuel tanks, before departing for a cross-country flight with full fuel tanks. When the airplane reached 12,500 ft mean sea level and the pilot reduced engine rpm for cruise flight, the engine suddenly, and without warning, stopped producing power. The pilot tried several times to restart the engine to no avail and subsequently conducted a forced landing, during which the airplane collided with trees. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, both wings, and the tail section. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that both wing fuel tanks were breached and that the fuel strainer drains for each wing were corroded due to exposure to moisture. Similar corrosion was also observed in the engine's fuel pump and fuel metering unit. The airplane had been sitting outside exposed to snow before and after it was recovered from the accident site. Given that the fuel system had been breached, it could not be determined when the corrosion occurred or whether the pilot's failure to sump the fuel tanks contributed to the loss of power. Examinations of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation, and the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.
The private pilot had recently completed building the airplane and had flown it about 10 hours. He reported that, during that time, the airplane had experienced fuel flow issues; specifically, fuel was not flowing evenly from the wing tanks. Fuel was supplied to the engine from both tanks via gravity; the tanks were not individually selectable. To remedy the uneven fuel flows, the airplane kit manufacturer suggested that the pilot add snorkels to each vented fuel tank cap. The pilot did so; however, this did not correct the uneven fuel flow. The pilot tried several combinations before closing the vented caps completely and using only snorkels, which was the configuration of the fuel system on the day of the accident.The pilot departed on the accident flight with 7 gallons of fuel in one tank and 8 gallons in the other. He flew for about one hour, and, while returning to the airport, he noted that the left fuel tank gauge was reading low and that the right fuel tank gauge was reading high. The engine subsequently experienced a total loss of power and the pilot performed an emergency landing in a field short of the runway. Although the loss of engine power is consistent with fuel starvation, it could not be determined why the fuel in the right tank failed to supply the engine; nor could the underlying reason for the uneven fuel flow be determined based on the information available.
The pilot of the tundra tire- and tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, while on the flight back to his home airport, he decided to land on a snow-covered airstrip. He flew over the landing area three times before deciding on the fourth pass to attempt a full-stop landing. During the touchdown of the three-point landing, he realized the snow was deeper than he had expected, and the airplane decelerated rapidly. The pilot increased power, but the airplane continued to sink in the snow. Subsequently, the airplane nosed over and slid to a stop inverted. The airplane sustained substantial damage to its empennage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, during the landing roll in gusting wind conditions, the airplane veered to the left. He applied right rudder and brake, but the airplane struck a runway sign on the left side of the runway and exited the runway.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.A review of recorded data from the automated weather observation station located on the airport revealed that, about 8 minutes after the accident, the wind was 320 ° true at 19 knots, gusting to 25 knots, and peak wind was 300 ° true at 27 knots. The airplane landed on runway 30.
The pilot reported that, during the landing flare in gusting wind conditions, as he "expected" to touch down, he reduced engine power. The airplane ballooned, followed by a hard landing and a bounce. During a subsequent second bounce, the nose gear collapsed. The airplane then veered left, exited the runway, and came to a stop nose down.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the firewall.The pilot reported there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot landed on runway 23, and the reported the wind was 260° at 11 knots, gusting to 17 knots.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped biplane reported that she extended the downwind leg due to other aircraft in the traffic pattern and that, while on the extended final, she put the biplane in a "slip." During the slip, the windsock was out of view. She further reported that, during the landing flare, she noticed that the "ground-speed" was higher than normal and that "about 800 ft" after touchdown, the biplane "violently swerved to the right." She attempted to recover with rudder inputs; however, the biplane veered off the runway and came to rest inverted.The biplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the private pilot, shortly after takeoff, as the airplane reached 1,400 ft, he noticed "thick" smoke coming from behind the instrument panel and then the glareshield, followed by flames near his feet and legs. The pilot was able to return to the departure airport and land successfully. During the subsequent landing roll, the pilot reduced the throttle and mixture to shut down the engine and pulled the brake handle; however, the airplane did not slow, and he egressed the airplane while it was in motion. The airplane came to rest in a grass area right of the runway and was mostly consumed by fire. The pilot's description of the onset and growth of the fire was consistent with a fast-growing fire such as a fire fed by liquid fuel. Examination of the wreckage revealed that several sections of the fuel system were consumed or damaged by fire. The main fuel line from the fuel strainer to the carburetor was found loose on the carburetor side. The lower left portion of the engine cowling exhibited more thermal damage than the right side, which is consistent with the location of the loose fuel line supplying the carburetor; however, due to the extent of the thermal damage, the origination point of the in-flight fire could not be determined.
The pilot was on a cross-country flight when the airplane's engine lost power during cruise flight about 1 hour 13 minutes after takeoff. The pilot stated that the wing fuel tank gauge indicated above 3/4 full and that the header tank sight gauge appeared "unchanged" from where it had been at departure. The pilot's corrective actions were unsuccessful in restoring engine power, and he conducted a forced landing to a dirt road. The airplane's left wing struck a small tree during the landing roll, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing and twin vertical stabilizers. The pilot reported that the header fuel tank was empty after the accident, and each wing fuel tank contained about 7-8 gallons of fuel.During normal operation, the engine-driven fuel pump transfers fuel from the wing tanks to the header tank, where it is gravity fed to the engine. A postaccident functional test of the header tank float-equipped sight gauge, which indicates the amount of fuel in the header tank, revealed the float would stick in the full up position and would remain stuck in that position despite vigorous shaking of the assembly by hand. There were no anomalies observed during multiple engine test runs, during which the engine-driven fuel pump functioned normally. Examination of the wing fuel tanks revealed significant pitting of the aluminum skins and peeling tank sealant. However, there was no evidence of an obstruction of the fuel lines when compressed air was blown through the fuel lines. The wing tank fuel shutoff valve was found in the on position and was secured by a rubber hose. The airplane was not equipped with an electric fuel pump. In the event of an engine-driven fuel pump failure or an obstructed fuel transfer line, the only fuel accessible to the engine was from the header tank. The reason why the engine-driven fuel pump did not continue to transfer fuel from the wing tanks to the header tank during the flight could not be determined with the available information.Because the header tank sight gauge float was stuck in the full up position, the pilot did not have the normal visual indication that the header tank was being depleted of fuel during the flight. However, the pilot could have identified that fuel was not being transferred from the wing tanks to the header tank had he adequately monitored the wing fuel tank quantity gauge for a continual decrease throughout the Page 2 of 7 CEN17LA089flight. Had the pilot identified the fuel transfer issue before the header tank was depleted of fuel, he could have potentially landed before the engine was starved of fuel.
The airline transport pilot reported that, before landing following an uneventful flight, he extended the wing flaps to the approach position and extended the landing gear; the gear indicator lights showed "3 green." After touchdown, he heard noises, and the airplane started to sink. After the airplane came to a stop on the right side of the runway, he noticed that the landing gear handle was up. The pilot stated to the copilot, "How did the gear handle get up?" then placed the handle to the down position and the flight crew exited the airplane. The copilot reported that he was acting as an observer during the flight and that he also saw three green landing gear down-and-locked indicator lights before landing. The airframe sustained substantial damage from contact with the runway. All three landing gear were found in a partially-extended position. Skid marks from all three tires were observed on the runway leading up to the main wreckage. Both propeller assemblies were damaged due to contact with the runway. The pressure vessel was compromised from contact with a propeller blade. The nose landing gear actuator was forced up, into the nose gear well and penetrated the upper nose skin. Examination of the landing gear components did not reveal evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or malfunction.The skid marks leading to the wreckage and the partially-extended gear were inconsistent with the pilot's account that the gear handle was up after the airplane came to rest and was then lowered. The gear handle consisted of an electrical switch that required it to be pulled out of a detent before placing it up or down. There was no mechanical linkage between the gear handle and the landing gear, as the gear were driven by an electric motor. It is likely that the pilot realized that the gear were not extended just before touchdown and then tried to lower the gear, resulting in a touchdown with the gear only partially extended.The pilot reported that he had experienced several interruptions to his sleep the night before the accident. He also reported that he flew 7 legs on the day of the accident for a total of 5.2 hours, only Page 2 of 7 ERA17LA096eating a banana for breakfast during this time period. It is likely that the pilot's fatigue contributed to his failure to ensure that the landing gear were down and locked before landing.
The private pilot reported that, about 10 minutes after departing for a personal, local flight and when the airplane was about 1,000 ft above ground level, the engine began running roughly, and the rpm surged several times despite the engine monitoring gauges all indicating normal operation. The pilot chose to make a precautionary landing on a snow-covered dirt airstrip. The pilot reported that, after reducing power to land, he did not recall the engine experiencing further roughness or surging. During the landing roll, the airplane nosed over in the deep snow and then came to rest inverted.During postaccident test runs, the engine ran normally through various power settings with no anomalies noted that would have precluded normal operation. The reason for the engine momentarily running roughly and surging could not be determined.
The solo student pilot reported that, after completing maneuvers in the local area, he returned to his home airport and was cleared for a straight-in approach. During touchdown, the nosewheel and propeller struck the runway hard, and the airplane bounced. During the second bounce, he increased power to abort the landing but was unsuccessful due to the damaged nosewheel and propeller. Subsequently, the student pilot stopped the airplane on the runway.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the firewall and fuselage.The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.