roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot departed on the non-scheduled passenger flight with one passenger onboard; the flight was the 3rd leg of a 4-leg trip. About 13 minutes after departure, he advised air traffic control that the airplane was “fuel critical” and requested vectors to the nearest airport, which was about 7 miles away. Both engines subsequently lost total power and the pilot performed a forced landing on a street about 2 miles from the airport, during which the airplane collided with two vehicles. Examination of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the fuel tanks, with evidence of a small fire near the left wingtip fuel tank.Fuel consumption calculations revealed that the airplane would have used about 100 gallons of fuel since its most recent refueling, which was the capacity of the main (wingtip) tanks. Both fuel selectors were found in their respective main tank positions. Given the available information, it is likely that the pilot exhausted all the fuel in the main fuel tanks and starved the engines of fuel. Although the total amount of fuel on board at the start of the flight could not be determined, had all tanks been full, the airplane would have had about 63 gallons remaining in the two auxiliary tanks at the time of the accident. The auxiliary fuel tanks were breached during the accident and quantity of fuel they contained was not determined. Examination of the engines revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot stated that, when he initiated the takeoff for a flight review on the damp, soft runway, the airplane accelerated slowly. The flight instructor reported that he felt the airplane's nose "dive" twice, so he instructed the pilot to increase back pressure and get the airplane in ground effect because of the soft runway. The instructor then took control of the airplane, and it lifted off the runway and subsequently became airborne about 2,000 ft down the 3,000-ft-long runway. The instructor lowered the nose in ground effect to gain airspeed, but the airplane did not accelerate, and it was nearing an aerodynamic stall. The instructor then chose to land on a nearby field. He turned the airplane toward the field but had to level it off because he was concerned it was going to stall. During the landing, he flared the airplane too high, and the airplane impacted the field hard on the main landing gear. The nose landing gear dug into the soft terrain and collapsed, and the airplane then nosed over.During a postaccident test-run, the engine started without hesitation. The engine ran smoothly at various power settings, including full throttle. Given that the engine operated normally during the postaccident test-run, it is likely that the airplane did not accelerate properly due to the pilot's improper soft-field takeoff, which resulted in his failure to attain adequate airspeed. The instructor's subsequent improper landing flare led to a hard, forced landing.
Shortly after takeoff on the instructional flight, the pilot receiving instruction heard a "pop" sound; the flight instructor  saw smoke coming from the right lower portion of the instrument panel and felt a melted wire contact her leg. The pilot receiving instruction continued to fly the airplane briefly, then the flight instructor took the controls. With inadequate runway remaining ahead on which to land, the instructor initiated a turn to return to the runway. The airplane impacted the ground and slid about 500 ft, coming to rest upright and resulting in substantial damage to the airframe.Postaccident examination of the cockpit revealed that electrical wires of a recently-installed avionics switch had arced against the top aft edge of the adjacent autopilot control unit and also at the edge of a vertical support member. The wires did not have circuit protection, nor was there any mechanical protection or supports present along the length of the wires to prevent chafing, contrary to FAA guidance. The pilots' failure to secure the electrical system from memory in response to the cockpit smoke would not have mitigated the hard landing, but may have decreased the smoke in the cockpit and lessened the urgency to land.
The student pilot reported that, during the landing roll, the airplane "slid" to the left off the runway. He added that he attempted to correct, but the airplane impacted trees.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing.The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot was maneuvering to land at the destination airport after a cross-country flight in dark night, visual meteorological conditions. The pilot reported that he became disoriented as he orbited the airport waiting for the airport manager to turn on the runway lights, which resulted in him believing that he was on final approach to runway 1 instead of runway 19. The pilot stated that, during final approach, he incorrectly identified a crossing road that he believed was about 3/4 mile south of the runway 1 approach threshold; however, the road he observed was about 1 mile north of the airport. The pilot stated that he and his passenger suddenly saw tree branches appear as the airplane descended on final approach. The pilot immediately increased engine power and airplane pitch in an attempt to avoid the trees, but the right wing impacted a tree, and the airplane subsequently impacted terrain about 1/2 mile north of runway 19. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot had previously flown 7 hours during nighttime conditions; however, he had not flown at night within the 238 days preceding the accident. According to federal regulations, pilots are prohibited from acting as pilot-in-command with passengers at night unless they have completed three night takeoffs and three night landings within the previous 90 days. An ancillary benefit of pilots maintaining their regulatory night flight currency is that it demonstrates their having an adequate level of proficiency of night flight operations on a recurring basis. The pilot's lack of recent night flight experience likely contributed to his becoming disorientated while maneuvering in the airport traffic pattern, the airplane descending below a normal approach path, and the collision with trees.
During a night instructional flight in the helicopter, the commercial pilot receiving instruction and the flight instructor departed and flew uneventfully to an adjacent island, where they conducted a practice instrument approach to an airport before they initiated the published missed approach procedure. As the flight reestablished radio communication with air traffic control, the pilots obtained an instrument flight rules clearance for their return to the departure airport. Radar and radio contact with the helicopter were lost shortly thereafter. Air units from the United States Coast Guard and a local fire department located some floating debris in the ocean the night of the accident and the day following the accident, respectively. The wreckage was located about 12 months following the accident submerged in the Pacific Ocean at a reported depth of 298 ft. A portion of the located wreckage was recovered about 3 months later. A postaccident examination of the recovered wreckage revealed no evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation of the airframe or engine.Weather radar depicted an area of moderate-to-heavy rain showers along the helicopter's flight path about the time radar and radio contact were lost. Although the pilots had access to sufficient weather information to properly plan their flight around the weather and could have asked for further assistance in avoiding the weather from air traffic control, they elected to fly into an environment favorable to unexpected changes in wind direction and speed due to heavy rain showers, which could result in localized instrument meteorological conditions; however, because only a portion of the wreckage was recovered, the reason for the helicopter's sudden descent and impact with open ocean waters could not be determined.
The non-instrument-rated private pilot was conducting a VFR cross-country flight in an area of low clouds and fog layers. According to a pilot who departed about 10 minutes ahead of the accident pilot on the same flight route, widespread areas of low-level fog existed along the flight route. The interviewed pilot estimated that fog existed between 400 and 600 ft above ground level (agl). The interviewed pilot also stated that he flew his airplane at 1,500 ft agl, above the fog and with good visibility, but he did not know the altitude at which the accident pilot would be flying his airplane. Examination of the airplane did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Meteorological information indicated that the accident pilot would have encountered instrument meteorological conditions during the flight. Specifically, the area forecast that was valid at the time of the accident included an AIRMET for instrument conditions, a broken to overcast ceiling at 300 ft with cloud tops at 10,000 ft, and visibilities below 1 mile in mist. Also, images from the FAA's aviation weather camera facing the direction of the accident location indicated a low bank of clouds toward the accident site and along the intended flight route.The pilot's relatively low flight experience, lack of an instrument rating and the lack of visual references due to fog and cloud layers created a situation conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The airplane wreckage and impact information indicated that a loss of control occurred, which is consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation.
The flight instructor reported that the purpose of the flight was to conduct commercial maneuvers in the local area. After completing maneuvers in the practice area, the pilot flew the airplane to the airport to conduct takeoffs and landings. The student pilot reported that he did his landing checklist about midfield on the downwind. After he put the landing gear handle down, he noted that he heard the landing gear hydraulic motor actuating. He added that he glanced at the gear down indictor light and believed that it was green. During the touchdown, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane came to a stop on the runway. After exiting the airplane, the flight instructor and student pilot noticed that the landing gear handle was down, the green gear down light was not illuminated, and the circuit breaker for the gear pump was open. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage.During a postaccident examination, the airplane was lifted by jacks, and the landing gear were swung five times. The malfunction could not be reproduced, and no anomalies were noted.
The private pilot reported that shortly after takeoff, during the initial climb, he sensed the airplane slow down and the climb rate diminish. A witness reported seeing grey smoke being emitted from the airplane's exhaust. Realizing that the engine had lost partial power, the pilot chose a sod field as an off-airport landing site. During the forced landing, the airplane's landing gear collapsed, and the airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage.A postaccident examination, which included an engine run, revealed that when the throttle was advanced through a manifold pressure of about 36 inches of mercury (inHg), the fuel flow exceeded the engine manufacturer's full throttle high-side limit. Continued movement of the throttle resulted in a manifold pressure of about 39 inHg before the engine began experiencing fuel flows that were too excessive to support combustion. The slope controller was adjusted to reduce manifold pressure to that specified by Cirrus, and the engine test run continued with high fuel flows. After the manifold pressure adjustment, the engine throttle was rapidly advanced multiple times from idle to full throttle without any hesitation, stumbling, or interruption in power.Thus, it is likely that the improperly adjusted slope controller and fuel pump resulted in an excessively high fuel flow, an extremely rich mixture, a rough-running engine, and a partial loss of engine power.
On October 15, 2017, at about 1022 universal coordinated time , Omni Air International, LLC, Boeing B-767-300ER, N342AX, was enroute to Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (DFS), Honolulu, Hawaii, when the flight encountered turbulence that caused serious injuries to one "deadheading" cabin crew member. None of the other 11 crew members were injured and the airplane was not damaged. The flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 between Osan Air Base (OSN), Pyeongtaek, Republic of Korea, to DFS. As the flight was descending through about flight level 315 over the Pacific Ocean, approximately 117 miles from DFS, the airplane entered a thunderstorm cell and encountered severe turbulence that lasted about 30 seconds. When the turbulence was encountered, an off duty "deadheading" cabin crew member was in the aisle near the aft lavatory and was thrown to the floor injuring her right ankle. After being notified of the injury, the flight crew contacted telemedical advisory services via voice satellite communications and was provided medical direction to stabilize the injured crew member. Emergency medical personnel met the airplane on arrival and the injured crew member was transported to a local hospital where she was diagnosed with fractures in the right lateral and medial malleolus.Analysis of digital flight data retrieved from the Aeromechanical Systems Airborne Flight Information Reporting System (AFIRS) indicated that the airplane experienced vertical accelerations up to 1.78 g's and as low as 0.46 g's, with a change in rate of descent ranging from +240 feet per minute to -4,080 feet per minute.  The flight crew reported no indication of precipitation or wind shear on the installed radar. The operator indicated that review of recorded telemetry reported by four other aircraft in the area equipped with The Weather Company Turbulence Auto-PIREP System (TAPS) showed no evidence of turbulence at the time of the accident.
The private pilot reported that he had just completed a low altitude pass and that when he applied power to initiate a climb, the engine "stumbled slightly and seemed to hesitate." The pilot applied carburetor heat due to concerns about carburetor ice and then applied full power. The engine again seemed to hesitate, and the pilot initiated a precautionary landing to an open salt flat. Shortly after touchdown, the airplane nosed over. The pilot reported that after he exited the airplane, he noted that both main wheel brakes were engaged, however neither he nor his passenger actuated the brake pedals during the landing sequence. A postaccident examination of the wheel brakes revealed no evidence of a preexisting malfunction or failure with the brakes.Examination of the engine revealed that one of the two carburetor temperature probe wires were separated from an electrical connector, consistent with a bad crimp. The disconnected wire would have prevented the carburetor air temperature from being displayed on the airplane's avionics panel. The examination revealed no additional findings or evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. The atmospheric conditions in the area at the time of the accident were conducive to the formation of carburetor ice at glide and cruise power. It is likely that the hesitation in the engine performance reported by the pilot was the initial stages of the accumulation of ice in the carburetor, which precipitated the off-airport precautionary landing.
According to the pilot in the experimental, amateur-built, tailwheel-equipped airplane, during the takeoff roll on runway 25, the airplane weathervaned into the 11-knot crosswind from the south. The airplane exited the left side of the runway and struck a precision approach path indicator (PAPI) light, but the pilot continued the takeoff. During the initial climb, the passenger reported smelling fuel, but the airplane remained airborne until the fuel in the right tank was exhausted. The pilot further reported that he was unsure if the landing gear were damaged, and he was unable to contact anyone at the airport to verify the landing gear's condition. He flew to a nearby airport, where the tower controller confirmed that the landing gear appeared undamaged. The pilot landed the airplane without further incident. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right-wing spar and the elevator.The nearest METAR to the accident airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 200° at 10 knots.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
After takeoff, the pilot proceeded south until reaching the Mississippi River when he proceeded to fly along the river at a low altitude. As the airplane approached a bend in the river, the pilot entered a shallow left turn to follow the river. The airplane subsequently struck power lines spanning the river that were located about 200 yards beyond the bend. Ground-based video footage and witness statements indicated that the airplane was at or below the height of the trees lining both sides of the river shortly before encountering the power lines. One witness initially thought that the pilot intended to fly under the power lines due to the low altitude of the airplane. Several witnesses also noted that the sound of the engine seemed normal and steady before the accident. A post-recovery examination of the airplane did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction.The power lines were below the level the trees on either side of the river. Red aerial marker balls were installed on the power lines at the time of the accident. Weather conditions were good at the time of the accident; however, the sun was about 9° above the horizon and aligned with the river. It is likely that the position of the sun in relation to the power lines hindered the pilot's ability to identify the hazard as he navigated the bend in the river at low altitude. In addition, the location of the power lines relative to the river bend minimized the reaction time to avoid the lines.FAA regulations prohibit operation of an aircraft less than 500 feet above the surface in uncongested areas unless approaching to land or taking off, and at least 1,000 feet from obstacles in congested areas. They also prohibit operations in a reckless manner that endanger the life or property of another. Based on the available information, the airplane was less than 100 feet above the river and within 400 feet of the residences located along the river during the final portion of the flight.The pilot's flight instructor described the pilot as "reckless" because of his habit of low-level flying.While the location of the bend in the river and the position of the sun relative to the power lines may have hindered the pilot's ability to see and avoid the lines, it was the pilot's decision to operate the airplane along the river at a low altitude contrary to applicable regulations and safety of flight Page 2 of 7 CEN18FA011considerations that caused the accident.
The pilot and mechanic reported that, before the accident, the mechanic had adjusted the helicopter’s main rotor track and balance. After the mechanic made the final adjustments, the pilot hovered the helicopter to a wash rack for cleaning. Subsequently, while the pilot was repositioning the helicopter to a nearby landing cart and just as the front portions of the skids were over the cart, the collective began to oscillate, followed by the skids striking the cart. The pilot attempted to land the helicopter as it continued to oscillate, but the right skid slid off the cart. The helicopter then rolled onto its right side and impacted the ground. The mechanic reported that all components prior to the accident were in good working order and that the track and balance adjustments had resulted in satisfactory monitoring equipment readings prior to the accident.Examination of the helicopter did not reveal evidence of any preaccident malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The reason for the oscillations could not be determined based on the available information.
A student pilot was conducting a solo flight when the right main landing gear struck a coyote during the landing flare. The pilot contacted flight school management to inform them of the event. A  visual examination that the pilot conducted did not reveal any damage, and she was instructed to fly the airplane back to the home airport. Upon landing, a flight school mechanic examined the airplane and reported seeing hair on the landing gear; the airplane remained in service. The next morning, the airplane was dispatched for a local employment evaluation flight. The flight instructor and pilot receiving instruction completed a preflight inspection, and no anomalies were observed. The employment evaluation flight departed and consisted of instrument approaches and touch-and-go landings. After the final landing, the pilots heard an abnormal noise coming from the right main landing gear area. Postaccident examination revealed that the internal composite wing structure where the landing gear attaches was fractured.Based on the available information, the damage to the wing structure was likely a result of the wildlife strike, which damaged the landing gear mount, and the subsequent operation of the airplane, which likely aggravated the damage.Page 2 of 7 GAA18LA062
The helicopter flight instructor reported that he was training a new company pilot at night, and they were using night vision goggles. He added that, while in a hover, he attempted to demonstrate the use of the controllable search light to the pilot in the right seat. The flight instructor added that, "to adjust the light, I took the [left] cyclic in my left hand which would normally be holding the left collective and attempted to reach the control switch for the light and grabbed the throttles of the right collective with my right hand. My right hand would normally be on the left cyclic." He further added that he then inadvertently pushed down on the collective, and the helicopter began to settle on the runway. He reported that in response "[his] reflex was to pull up with [his] left hand (which would normally be on the collective)," and when he did so the helicopter moved rearward. Subsequently, he "pushed the cyclic forward to correct" the rearward movement, but in doing so, the helicopter touched down hard, and the main rotor impacted the upper wire strike protection unit. The main rotor sustained substantial damage. The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.