roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
During a training flight in the multi-engine airplane, at an altitude of about 5,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the flight instructor and pilot receiving instruction simulated a loss of right engine power by shutting down the right engine. After feathering and securing the engine, they subsequently attempted to restart it, but reported that the engine would not produce power. The airplane continued to descend and the pilots ultimately chose to perform a forced landing to a field, during which the airplane slid into a ditch, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot-rated passenger, who was observing the flight from the back seat, reported that “there seemed to be confusion on roles and responsibilities” between the instructor and the pilot receiving instruction, and he did not recall any checklist items being called out between the two pilots. The passenger reported that the right engine appeared to be running, but at a lower rpm than the left engine, and that the right propeller continued to turn throughout the descent and forced landing. The fuel and oil pressure gauges for the right engine were indicating “in the green range.” At an altitude around 1,500 ft msl, the flight instructor took control of the airplane for the forced landing.Postaccident examination of the airplane did not reveal evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have prevented normal operation. At the accident site, both engines’ mixture control levers were found in the full rich position, the propeller control levers were found in the fine pitch/high rpm position, the electric fuel pumps were in the “on” position, and the fuel selectors were in the “on” position. Both propellers were found in the fine pitch/high rpm position. Test runs of both engines revealed no anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. Page 2 of 9 ERA22LA237Review of the airplane flight manual indicated that, given the atmospheric conditions at the time of the accident, with one engine properly secured (propeller feathered) and the other engine operating at maximum continuous power, the airplane would have been able to maintain a positive rate of climb.The airplane flight manual stated that, if it was not possible to restart an engine in flight, the engine securing procedure should be accomplished. The positions of the engine controls and propellers after the accident, along with the passenger’s observations of the right propeller turning and the right engine fuel and oil pressure gauges, and his observation of a lack of checklist usage, indicate that the attempted engine restart was likely not done in accordance with the manufacture’s prescribed procedures and was consistent with a failure to properly secure the right engine after the pilots’ determination that it was not producing power. It is likely that the windmilling condition of the right propeller, which would have produced significant drag, was the reason that the airplane was unable to maintain altitude. Had the instructor followed the published procedure after the right engine could not be restarted, it is likely that the flight could have returned to an airport and landed without incident.
The pilot reported that following a normal approach to landing, about 20 ft above the runway he encountered a “slight tail wind.” He reported that at this point, “I should have gone around” but he believed the landing was salvageable. Subsequently, the airplane touched down hard, and he maneuvered the airplane off the runway into grass where the airplane nosed over. The empennage and fuselage sustained substantial damage.The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
Shortly after takeoff while on a local flight, the pilot, who was also the owner of the airplane, heard and felt an unusual vibration emanating from the engine. The pilot elected to return to the private airfield as the experimental automobile engine was still running. He declared an emergency as the engine was losing coolant, and the coolant and oil temperature steadily rose to very high levels. Fearing a complete engine failure, he elected to fly straight in and land on an un-mowed portion of the airport. As the airplane touched down the nose gear collapsed, causing the airplane to impact the terrain and come to a sudden stop that resulted in substantial damage to the airframe. The pilot, who was also an aircraft mechanic, examined the engine and discovered that the engine gearbox drive flange, also known as a “spider,” had failed. The three-eared flange had fractured outside of the splined driveshaft hole. The resulting failure threw parts into the radiator, puncturing it. The punctured radiator lost coolant, causing a subsequent engine over-temperature that likely would have led to a complete loss of engine power. Fearing an imminent loss of engine power, the pilot made a precautionary landing on an unimproved part of the airport.
The pilot reported that, before the flight, the airplane was fueled with 140 gallons of Jet A fuel. Shortly after takeoff, both engines lost total power.  Because the airplane had insufficient altitude to return to the airport, the pilot executed a forced landing to a field and the left wing sustained substantial damage. A postcrash fire ensued. The investigation determined that the airplane was inadvertently fueled with Jet A fuel rather than AVGAS, which was required for the airplane’s reciprocating engines. The line service worker who fueled the airplane reported that there were no decals at the airplane fuel ports; however, postaccident examination of the airplane found that a decal specifying AVGAS was present at the right-wing fuel port. The investigation could not determine whether the same or a similar decal was present at the left-wing fuel port because the left wing was partially consumed during the postimpact fire.)
The non-instrument-rated private pilot and passenger departed their home airport with the intention of flying to an airport on the coast. About 20 minutes before the accident, the pilot contacted air traffic control and requested to perform sightseeing in the San Francisco Bay area before proceeding southwest toward the destination airport. The pilot was instructed to remain clear of the Class B airspace that overlaid the area at an altitude of 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl). About six minutes before the accident, the pilot requested to transition toward his destination. The controller acknowledged and instructed the pilot to remain outside of Class B airspace. About one minute later, the pilot again stated his intent to proceed to the destination, and the controller again acknowledged and instructed the pilot to remain clear of the Class B. The airplane then made a series of turns, climbs, and descents from an altitude of 2,100 ft msl and below over a period of several minutes before it impacted the ground in a nose-down attitude.Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. There was no record of the pilot obtaining a weather briefing before departing on the flight. According to witnesses, surveillance video, and weather reports, the airplane flew from an area of visual meteorological conditions into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) as it neared the accident location. These conditions were forecast and would have been apparent to the pilot as he proceeded toward the area of the accident site. Modeling of the conditions in the area of the accident site indicated that the low-lying clouds and fog began about 200 ft above ground level and likely extended up to an altitude about 2,800 ft above ground level.Page 2 of 12 WPR22FA172The pilot had received instrument flight training, but did not hold an instrument rating at the time of the accident. Logbook entries suggested that the pilot had previously operated under instrument flight rules in IMC without an instructor onboard the airplane.Autopsy of the pilot revealed a dilated, enlarged heart; however, it is unlikely that the pilot’s heart disease contributed to the accident. Although toxicology testing indicated that the pilot had used the cannabis products delta-9 THC and cannabidiol, no detectable psychoactive cannabinoids remained in the pilot’s postmortem blood, and it is therefore unlikely that effects of his cannabis use contributed to the accident.The reduced visibility conditions present at the time of the accident in the accident area and the pilot’s lack of instrument flight experience presented circumstances conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The flight track data, which depicted the airplane’s erratic flight path before collision with terrain, was consistent with the effects of spatial disorientation. Based on the available information, it is likely that the pilot’s decision to proceed into an area of instrument meteorological conditions resulted in his spatial disorientation and a subsequent loss of airplane control.
The pilot was issued instrument approach instructions from air traffic control (ATC) and instructed to report over a waypoint. The pilot did not report over the waypoint and did not respond to any subsequent ATC communications. At the request of ATC, pilots of another airplane tried to get the accident pilot’s attention but were unsuccessful.  They continued alongside and watched as the airplane descended into the ocean.  The pilot had a history of heart palpitations and had a loop recorder heart monitor implanted in his left upper chest. The download of the device revealed a period of tachycardia during the time the pilot was not responding to ATC. It is likely that this cardiac event caused the pilot to be incapacitated. Examination revealed there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The captain reported slower than normal acceleration during the takeoff roll. At 60 to 80 knots, the captain “pushed in the parking brake” handle and continued the takeoff. The crew reported no anomalies on the departure or while en route. While landing at the destination, the airplane swerved right and the captain lost directional control, which resulted in a runway excursion and substantial damage to the right wing. Postaccident examination revealed that the right main landing gear brakes were seized and the right main landing gear tires had flat spots down to the wheel rims, consistent with no tire rotation during landing. No preaccident anomalies were observed with the braking system that would have precluded normal operation. According to the flight manual, proper release of the parking brake required the brake pedals to be depressed while the parking brake handle was pushed fully forward. The parking brake was likely not correctly released before takeoff, which allowed the right brakes to retain pressure and led to the loss of directional control during landing.
The pilot reported that during the takeoff roll for the aerial application flight, the airplane used more runway than normal, and that after takeoff it “didn’t seem to produce power as usual.” He began a right turn and noticed “the power and airspeed [were] slowing.” He checked the gauges and noticed that that the fuel pressure was fluctuating, and then turned on the emergency fuel pump. He then jettisoned the chemical load, and the airplane continued to descend until it impacted trees. A postaccident examination of the airplane found that the electric main fuel pump did not operate. Disassembly of the pump’s electric motor revealed that the carbon brushes had completely worn away, with no brush material remaining in either of the two brush holders. Examination of the engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Given that the pilot reported a longer than usual takeoff roll and a reduction in engine power throughout the flight, the pump may not have been operating properly or at all before takeoff. The reduction in power may have been due to the engine operating on only its internal fuel pump. The pilot did not report that the condition improved after he activated the emergency fuel pump. Whether or not the emergency pump had no effect or there was insufficient time to recover before the airplane struck trees could not be determined.
The pilot reported that he completed two landings uneventfully. During the third approach, the airplane was high, and the pilot attempted to recover the approach while maintaining an airspeed of 60 mph. The airplane developed a high sink rate and landed hard, which resulted in substantial damage to the lower fuselage. During the landing, the nose gear collapsed and the airplane skidded about 50 ft before coming to rest upright on the runway. The pilot added that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions with the airplane.
The pilot reported that while landing the airplane slowed and, as the nosewheel touched down, the airplane abruptly lurched to the side. The airplane exited the runway surface, struck a berm, became airborne, and came to rest nose down near the airport perimeter fence. The firewall, left wing, and rudder sustained substantial damage.A postaccident examination of the flight controls and landing gear revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operations; the damage was consistent with impact and overload from the accident sequence. Based upon the ground scars and condition of the nose landing gear it is likely that the pilot landed the airplane with excessive speed and lost directional control.
The pilot was conducting a personal flight with three passengers aboard. Witnesses and airport surveillance video revealed that the airplane took off to the north and immediately entered a nose-high attitude at slow speed while not climbing. The pilot then began a left 270° turn and crossed the departure end of the runway on an easterly heading. The airplane impacted terrain east of the runway and a postimpact fire ensued. The wreckage displayed signatures consistent with the airplane having been in an aerodynamic stall at the time of impact. Witnesses described that the engine was running during the accident flight. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of a pre-existing mechanical failure or malfunction. Postaccident weight and balance calculations revealed that the airplane’s weight at takeoff was about 224 pounds, or nearly 10% more than the maximum allowable gross weight. One of the surviving passengers reported that the pilot did not ask for his weight and that he did not observe the pilot performing any preflight weight and balance calculation. Based on this information, it is likely that the pilot’s failure to perform weight and balance calculations resulted in the airplane taking off while overweight, which resulted in its inability to climb. Ultimately the airplane to exceed its critical angle of attack and entered an aerodynamic stall from which the pilot could not recover.
According to the operator, the flight crew was conducting one engine inoperative (OEI) training as part of a check ride. While conducting an OEI instrument landing system approach, the flight crew became task-saturated and “failed to complete the approach and final checklists.” The flight crew completed the landing to the runway with the landing gear fully retracted and the airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The flight crew reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot stated that this was his first flight in the airplane and during landing, the airplane bounced and rolled to the left. He attempted to correct for the roll, but the left wingtip impacted the runway, the airplane bounced again, rolled right, and then impacted the ground with the right main landing gear, followed by the nose, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot reported that the airplane had no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot had picked up the airplane from a maintenance provider after an annual inspection was completed the previous day. Prior to takeoff, the pilot performed an engine run-up with no anomalies noted, and the engine ran smoothly. Shortly after takeoff, at an altitude of about 250 ft above ground level, the engine lost power and the airplane descended under control into trees. The engine did not “sputter” and the mixture control was set to full rich. The airplane impacted a wooded residential area about ¼ mile from the departure end of the runway and sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and wings.The pilot recalled that the fuel selector was in the LEFT position for the flight. He stated that on previous flights he sometimes had to “fiddle” with the fuel selector when moving it to the LEFT position to ensure that it was in the detent. During the first postaccident examination of the fuel selector, the detent could not be felt and the associated “click” sound could not be heard when moving the selector from the OFF position to the LEFT position. It could be heard and felt when moving from the RIGHT to LEFT position. A lack of feel or click sound of the detent does not necessarily indicate that the fuel valve is not in the proper position, but it is the only means for the pilot to confirm the proper position.A subsequent examination by a mechanic was arranged by the pilot/owner. The mechanic reported that the detent click sound could be heard as the fuel selector was moved to all positions, and fuel flowed through the valve when it was in the detents for the LEFT and RIGHT positions. The exact position of the selector at the time of the accident could not be confirmed, as it was moved to the OFF position after the accident. However, given the pilot’s familiarity with the operation of the fuel selector, it is likely that the fuel selector was correctly positioned in the LEFT detent. Page 2 of 7 ERA22LA216The mechanic reported that the engine air filter element was found out of place, wedged between the carburetor heat valve/door and the top of the carburetor heat box. In that position, it prevented the carburetor heat control from moving to the ON position, and likely restricted or obstructed the air path to the carburetor. Given that the engine performed normally during the before takeoff run-up, takeoff roll, and initial climb, it was likely not in that position at those times. Additionally, it is unlikely to have been in that position during the engine-run up, as it would have prevented the application of carburetor heat, which should have been performed as part of the run-up procedure. Thus, it is likely that the air filter element was dislodged from its proper position sometime after takeoff.
The pilot, who was also a mechanic, had been troubleshooting an autopilot issue before the accident flight. He had removed and reinstalled the autopilot mode control unit in the cockpit panel and planned to complete a local maintenance test flight. The pilot initiated the flight, completed a normal run-up, and reported that nothing was abnormal with the flight controls. During takeoff and after reaching the airplane’s rotation speed, the pilot was unable to move the control wheel aft so that the elevator would move toward the airplane-nose-up direction. The pilot subsequently aborted the takeoff, but insufficient runway remained, and the airplane overran the runway and collided with trees. The fuselage and wings sustained substantial damage.Postaccident examination of airplane’s left-side cockpit avionics stack, which contained a GPS and radio unit, found that the avionics trays had sagged downward, resulting in the elevator bellcrank to become lodged within the lowest avionics tray. Further, the avionics trays were missing metal straps designed to secure the rear weight of the GPS and radio units to the structure of the airframe.The avionics tray and elevator bellcrank exhibited significant scraping and metal polishing, which indicated that rubbing contact between the sagging avionics tray and the elevator bellcrank had likely been occurring for some time before the accident flight. Neither the pilot nor the passenger (who was also a mechanic) reported observing any anomalies with the flight controls during the preflight run-up but did report that the airplane hit a dip in the runway as the airplane approached its the rotation speed. Thus, this movement likely moved the tray further downward and into the movement area of the elevator bellcrank.  Page 2 of 9 ERA22LA215The Federal Aviation Administration had published advisory circular guidance advising mechanics to ensure that avionics units (including GPS and radio units) were properly secured with rear or side metal straps connected to a structural element on the aircraft. Review of maintenance records found no recent references to work involving the affected avionics or the securing of their avionics trays. The pilot had maintained the airplane for several years and signed off multiple annual inspections. During a postaccident interview, the pilot explained that he was not aware of the need to secure metal side or rear straps on avionics trays. Thus, because the pilot did not realize the need to properly secure the avionics trays to structural airplane elements, the trays eventually contacted the elevator bellcrank and precluded normal operation of the airplane’s pitch controls.
The private pilot of the personal flight reported that while landing the tailwheel equipped airplane, a gust of wind was encountered at touchdown resulting in the right wing contacting the ground. He applied engine power to regain control of the airplane but applied too much power, and the airplane swerved to the left. During the swerve, the right main landing gear strut broke, the propeller struck the ground, and the airplane partially exited the side of the runway. The right wing impacted the ground. The pilot reported that there was no mechanical malfunction or failure of the airplane. The airplane received substantial damage to the right wing.
The pilot of the tailwheel equipped airplane reported that, during an instructional flight practicing landings to a full stop, the airplane veered left, directional control was lost and the left wing and left elevator were substantially damaged when they contacted the runway surface during a ground loop. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor reported that, during an instructional flight, he told the student to set up for landing on runway 6. When they were at an altitude of about 400 ft above ground level, the flight instructor told him to apply full power since for a go-around. When the student applied full power, the engine did not respond. The flight instructor took control of the airplane and tried to land on runway 24. The flight instructor knew they would not make the runway, so he tried to land in the grass and the left wing contacted a fence and flipped the airplane over, which resulted in substantial damage to both wings, the vertical stabilizer and horizontal stabilizer. The flight instructor stated that he thought the throttle cable had become disconnected. A postaccident examination revealed that the throttle cable was not connected to the carburetor. An AN drilled bolt was found at the bottom of the cowling; however, the castellated nut was not located. Review of the maintenance logbooks revealed that the engine had been recently overhauled and installed in the airplane.Further conversations with the flight instructor, who was also the mechanic, stated that it is possible he forgot to install the cotter pin into the castellated nut and the bolt fell out.