roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot reported that he conducted an off-airport takeoff from a surface covered with standing water. The water created excess drag on the main landing gear, the tail lifted, and the airplane then nosed over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing lift strut. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot added as a safety recommendation to add more weight in the tail, avoid taking off in water, and to abort the takeoff when first signs of trouble arise.
The pilot reported that, during takeoff, he added power, and the biplane veered left, which he was unable to "check." The biplane veered off the runway to the left and impacted precision approach path indicator lights, spun 180°, and came to rest in grass adjacent to the runway. The biplane sustained substantial damage to the lower right wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the biplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot performed a takeoff in his float-equipped airplane from a small lake with one passenger. The pilot estimated the lake to be 750 ft long, the weight of the airplane at 1,716 lbs, and the wind to be light and variable between 3 and 8 knots. He applied full power with one notch of extended flaps. At 40 mph, he extended the flaps another notch and the airplane lifted off the water, but it was unable to climb. The pilot and passenger stated that they did not observe or hear any abnormal engine indications. According to the pilot, the airplane descended to the ground beyond the lake, and the right float and wing impacted the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. The night of the accident, the pilot stated that he overloaded the airplane with moose meat and was forced to land after takeoff; he later stated that he did not know what caused the lack of climb performance, but “maybe it was a lack of engine power.” Additionally, he reported that he estimated the meat’s weight without weighing it, but he was confident that, including the load, the airplane’s takeoff weight was within the maximum gross weight limit, which was 1,760 lbs. The investigation was unable to determine the actual takeoff weight of the airplane due to the remote location of the accident and inaccessibility of the evidence.Postaccident engine examination and an engine test run revealed no anomalies that would have prevented normal operation.Given the pilot’s initial statement that the airplane was overloaded, his failure to weigh the load, and no evidence of engine anomalies, it is likely that the moose meat weighed more than the pilot estimated and that the airplane was overweight during the takeoff from the small lake. Page 2 of 7 ANC19LA054
The pilot in the float-equipped airplane reported that he did not extend the flaps before he accelerated for takeoff from a lake. He added that, shortly after coming on step, he rolled the ailerons left and applied back pressure to the elevator to "become airborne." However, the airplane did not become airborne, and the floats subsequently impacted the shoreline. The airplane then bounced, skidded to a stop, impacted rising terrain, and came to rest upright.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left elevator.The pilot reported that he had not maintained a sterile cockpit during takeoff and that he failed to complete the Before Takeoff checklist. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot and pilot-rated passenger had just departed and planned to depart the airport area. During the initial takeoff climb, the pilot-rated passenger reported to air traffic control that she had a “fuel issue/problem” and was going to return to the airport. A witness stated that the engine made a loud "pop pop" sound followed by a decrease in engine power. A few seconds later, the witness heard the engine power increase again. According to the air traffic controller, the airplane’s left bank continued to increase, and he cleared the airplane to land on any runway. The airplane subsequently impacted terrain in a nose-low attitude. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the left wing contained about one gallon of fuel and about 6 oz of water. The source of the water could not be determined. No other anomalies were noted with the airframe. Examination and a functional test of the engine did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely that the engine lost power shortly after takeoff due to the water contamination found in the fuel tank. It is also likely that during the steep bank turn towards the airport, the pilot allowed the airplane to exceed the critical angle of attack which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and subsequent impact with the ground.Based on the toxicology results, it is likely that the pilot had taken the sedating prescription medication clonazepam. Clonazepam is used to treat seizure disorder and panic disorder. The inactive metabolite was detected in blood and urine suggesting the use of the medication occurred several days before the accident. Given the lack of the active compound it is unlikely the pilot’s use of clonazepam contribute to this accident. Ethanol was detected in the pilot’s blood, but not in his urine. It is likely that the identified ethanol was from sources other than ingestion and did not contribute to this accident.Page 2 of 6 CEN19FA325
Just after takeoff following a touch-and-go landing, the engine backfired and lost partial power. The pilot decided that he could not land on the remaining runway, so he continued to climb the airplane, raised the flaps, and increased airspeed. The manifold pressure continued to decrease despite the pilot’s application of full throttle, and the pilot attempted to return to the airport, but had insufficient altitude, and conducted a forced landing to a field. The nose landing gear sheared off, and the main landing gear collapsed. Both wings sustained substantial damage. Examination of the engine and accessories revealed that the left magneto fired on only 3 of its 6 terminals. The airplane was equipped an electronic ignition system that was coupled to the magnetos. The system created multiple sparks over a longer duration and synchronized timing between the two magnetos. This synchronization was accomplished by using the left magneto as a trigger for the complete system. When the electronic ignition was operating, it relied solely on the left magneto points to fire both magnetos with an enhanced multi-spark. If the left magneto failed or deteriorated, then the complete ignition cycle would be compromised. The degraded functionality of the left magneto was likely the cause of the partial engine power loss.
The pilot reported that, during takeoff from a lake and after the floats came up on the step, the right float struck a submerged bog, which resulted in a brief deceleration of airspeed. After the float cleared the submerged bog, the airplane accelerated again, but the airspeed was not sufficient for liftoff, so the pilot aborted the takeoff. As the airplane approached rocks at the edge of the lake, he steered the airplane right onto a mud embankment, and the airplane slid to a stop short of an adjacent taxiway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, while on approach to land, he felt that the airplane was a little slow and below the glidepath. He corrected by adding power and reestablishing on the visual approach slope indicator glidepath and continued the landing. However, when the airplane reached the approach end of the runway, it aerodynamically stalled. He lowered the nose, and the airplane landed about 15 ft short of the runway threshold runway. The airplane bounced onto the runway, veered right, and exited the runway onto the adjacent field, and the landing gear collapsed. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot, 10 skydivers, and 1 passenger departed on a skydiving flight. After the skydivers jumped, the pilot and passenger returned to the airport to land. The pilot stated that, during the landing, he encountered a sudden downdraft and the airplane dropped out of the air from about 10 to 15 ft above the runway. The airplane landed hard and the nose landing gear collapsed; the airplane slid to the right side of the runway, crossed the parallel runway, and impacted a tree. Examination of the airplane revealed that the left wing was bent up about 3 ft from the wing tip and the nose landing gear was fracture-separated. The pilot stated that there were no mechanical anomalies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Thus, it is likely that the pilot failed to maintain airplane control during the landing, which resulted in a hard landing.
The flight instructor and his passenger departed for a work flight that tested radar in an airplane that was near its maximum weight limit. Videos of the accident flight showed that the airplane took off from the runway, climbed out, appeared to level off for a few seconds, then entered a right bank turn. After about 90° of turn, the airplane banked sharply to the right and entered a steep nose-down descent. The airplane impacted a building about 3/4 mile east of the airport.Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. A video of the accident flight and impact markings at the accident site were consistent with the airplane entering an aerodynamic stall then steeply descending to the ground. It is likely that the pilot failed to maintain airspeed during the turn, which resulted in an exceedance of the aircraft's critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall.Toxicology testing of the pilot’s specimens detected low concentrations of ethanol and diphenhydramine that generally would not be considered impairing.
The noninstrument-rated private pilot departed on a cross-country flight over mountainous terrain. The airplane was in level cruise flight between 10,000 and 10,500 ft mean sea level (msl) when it entered a descending right turn and impacted steep terrain at an elevation just below an 8,000 ft ridgeline. The nearest surface weather observations to the accident site indicated several layers of scattered, broken, and overcast clouds, with remarks advising of mountain obscuration in the area of the accident site. Weather satellite imagery depicted cloudy conditions over the area of the accident site with cloud tops over 20,000 ft msl. A model sounding for the accident site indicated near-saturated conditions below about 9,000 ft msl. Although there were no active advisories for instrument flight rules or mountain obscuration conditions, there was an active AIRMET for mountain obscuration conditions close to the accident site. It is likely that the airplane inadvertently entered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and the pilot initiated a course reversal. During the turn, the pilot may have experienced spatial disorientation as the airplane did not maintain level flight and descended toward the steep terrain. The wreckage was significantly fragmented, consistent with a high-energy impact. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. According to the pilot's logbook, he had about 3 hours of simulated instrument flight experience.
The pilot was performing an engine run-up before takeoff in his experimental airplane when the engine lost all power. He exited the airplane to examine the engine and noticed a fire, which quickly spread and consumed most of the airplane. Due to extensive fire damage, the origin of and reason for the fire could not be determined.
The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight. The airplane was at 4,500 ft mean sea level and descending when the low fuel pressure light illuminated; the engine immediately lost all power. The pilot maneuvered the airplane for a forced landing to a road, during which the airplane hit tree branches and veered off the road, resulting in substantial damage.A postaccident examination revealed only a small amount of fuel in the fuel tanks; neither tank was breached. There was no evidence of mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation. The circumstances are consistent with a loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
The student pilot reported that, during landing, he flared the airplane too high. The airplane then sank, landed hard, and bounced multiple times, and the nose landing gear collapsed. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the engine mount. The safety manager for the flight school reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor and student pilot were on the downwind leg of the airport traffic pattern when the engine began to lose power. The flight instructor took control and maneuvered the airplane toward the runway, and the airplane descended into trees, resulting in substantial damage to both wings.Examination of the engine did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. An examination of the airframe components revealed that the carburetor air intake scat tubing was crushed on the airframe side of the hose. The airframe scat tubing fiberglass connection side was also found crushed. Examination of the tubing found that the interior of the scat tubing had collapsed. It is likely that the collapsed scat tubing restricted the air entering the carburetor, resulting in the partial loss of engine power. No debris was found within the carburetor.
The flight instructor reported that, during a touch-and-go takeoff from a grass strip with the pilot receiving instruction on the controls, the airplane veered left, and the tail lifted. The instructor applied right rudder, but the airplane nosed over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the rudder. The instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The helicopter was about 100 ft above ground level during an aerial application fight when the engine experienced a partial loss of power. The pilot performed an autorotation and the helicopter impacted trees and terrain. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the crankshaft idler gear flange, which should have been secured to the left half of the crankcase by a bolt and stud, had separated from its mounting location. Worn fragments of the bolt and stud were recovered from the oil sump. Metallurgical examination of the fasteners revealed that they failed due to rotating bending fatigue, which allowed the crankshaft idler gear to disengage and resulted in a loss of engine power. A review of maintenance records revealed that the engine had been in service for about 20 years and 1,900 operating hours since its last major overhaul, which is 8 years and 400 hours beyond the manufacturer recommended time between overhauls.
The pilot and pilot-rated passenger were conducting a demonstration flight for the passenger, who was interested in purchasing a share of the airplane. Multiple witnesses heard the airplane's engine shortly after takeoff. Two of the witnesses thought that the airplane was performing aerobatics due to variations in engine power sounds. Another witness stated that the airplane’s engine was running smoothly right before he heard it impact terrain. Air traffic control radar information indicated that the airplane was flying about 1,600 ft above ground level shortly before the accident. The last air traffic control radar return, about 11 seconds before the data ended, indicated that the airplane was traveling at a groundspeed of 191 knots. The airplane impacted a wetlands area and was found embedded in 6 ft of mud. The wreckage was heavily fragmented, consistent with a high-speed impact. Examination of the wreckage revealed no anomalies with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation, and damage signatures and witness accounts indicated that the engine was producing power at the time of the accident.The tandem-configuration airplane was equipped with a control stick in the front and back seats; however, the back seat, where the pilot-rated passenger was seated, was not equipped with a throttle control or rudder pedals. According to the builder/co-owner of the airplane, the pilot was known do some low-g aerobatics such as aileron rolls, although he was unsure if the pilot planned to do aerobatics during the accident flight. Toxicology testing of the pilot's kidney and muscle tissue was positive for ethanol. While some or all of the identified ethanol could be from postmortem production, there was not enough information to conclude that with any certainty. However, the levels were well below the regulatory cut off and it was unlikely that effects from ethanol contributed to the events in this accident. Page 2 of 9 ERA19FA275The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the pilot’s loss of control and subsequent impact with terrain; however, the reason for the loss of control could not be determined based on the available information.
The student pilot reported that, while on approach to land, the airplane suddenly sank. She added power, but the airplane bounced. She added more power, but the airplane bounced again, and the nose landing gear collapsed. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing. The flight school's chief executive officer reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, while landing on an off-airport gravel bar in a river, the airplane veered right, hit a rut, and then bounced. The pilot applied the brakes, and the airplane subsequently nosed over and then came to rest inverted. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right-wing lift struts and empennage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The No. 1 engine low pressure compressor (LPC) stage 1 integrally bladed rotor (IBR) failure was caused by a stage 1 IBR high cycle fatigue crack that originated at the runout of an airfoil leading edge root radius. Multiple analytical methods, including two-dimensional (2D) computational fluid dynamics (CFD), acoustic testing, and instrumented flight testing identified a coupled LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR instability caused by an acoustic coincidence with the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity. At high engine N1 speeds, the stage 3 IBR blade tips generate vortices/turbulent airflow and given the right conditions, the turbulent airflow can create an acoustic tone as it passes over the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity, located immediately aft of the LPC stage 3 IBR (Figure 1). The acoustic tone drove a LPC stage 3 IBR blade 1st bending mode excitation that was then mechanically transferred through the LPC module and excited a LPC stage 1 IBR stiffwise bending mode that was present at the same approximate frequency.  The resultant stresses on the LPC stage 1 IBR blades exceeded material limits and subsequently led to crack formation and eventual progression to overload failure. Page 2 of 9 ENG19IA034Figure 1- Engine LPC Diagram Identifying the IBR 3 / 2.5 Bleed Valve Acoustic InteractionFactors that contributed to the LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR acoustic coincidence and blade excitation within the engine operating range were: installation of electronic engine control (EEC) Software V2.11.7.2 and the low time rub in period on the LPC IBR blade tip clearances. EEC Software V2.11.7.2 changed the LPC inlet guide vane schedule to rotate the IGV’s in the closed direction at specific high power engine conditions to improve engine stall/surge margin. The revised vane schedule inadvertently created conditions that were favorable for generation of the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity acoustic tone and IBR mode excitation. New engines have tighter clearances between the LPC IBR blade tips and the outer air seals. The reduced clearance created unsteady loading at the blade tip region and resulted in stronger acoustic coupling/flutter response. After a rub in period, the clearance increases, and the occurrence of flutter onset is reduced.  This incident was the second of four Airbus A220-300 PW1500G LPC stage 1 IBR separations that occurred between July 25, 2019 and February 12, 2020. The findings from the first LPC stage 1 IBR failure investigation are available in the NTSB investigation number ENG19IA029 docket.Page 3 of 9 ENG19IA034
The pilot reported that, during initial approach, the airplane was too high. The pilot attempted three separate landings, and during the fourth approach, the airplane was again too fast and too high above the runway. The airplane landed long, and he applied the brakes, but the airplane overran end of the runway, crossed a public road, and impacted a drainage culvert. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the tailwheel equipped airplane reported that prior to departure, while he refueled the airplane and taxied to the runway, the wind was "picking up and gusting" but "were comfortably within [his] personal and aircraft limits."  During takeoff, as he "rolled on the power," the right wing started to lift so he corrected with full control input left but the airplane rolled to the right and impacted terrain.  The pilot added that he did not get a wind checkThe airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings and fuselage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The airport's automated weather observation station reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was 220° at 24 knots, gusting to 38 knots. The airplane was departing from runway 26.According to the manufacturer's Pilot's Operating Handbook for an unmodified airplane, the maximum demonstrated crosswind is 11.7 knots. The steady state crosswind component for the accident flight was 15 knots, with gusting winds, the crosswind component for the accident flight was 24 knots.
The pilot said that, shortly after takeoff, he heard a noise from under the engine cowling followed by a partial loss of engine power. The pilot was unable to maintain altitude and made a forced landing to a field, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. Data downloaded from the airplane's electronic engine control unit was consistent with an uncommanded decrease in induction air boost pressure on takeoff. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the flexible induction coupling between the intercooler and the engine induction inlet had backed off. The two clamps that secured the flexible coupling to the induction inlet were intact and safety wired. However, the two clamps were loose, and the induction tube could be inserted into the coupling without loosening the clamps. A review of maintenance records revealed that the flexible induction coupling and clamps had been removed and replaced at the last 100-hour inspection about 15 flight hours before the accident. Because the two clamps that secured the coupling from the intercooler to the induction inlet were recently replaced, it is likely that the mechanic who installed the clamps did not properly tighten them, and they loosened in flight, leading to the induction inlet backing off and resulting in a loss of engine power.