roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The flight instructor of the multi-engine airplane reported that during a full-feathered, single-engine practice instrument approach in visual meteorological conditions, the pilot extended the flaps and the airspeed dropped about 20-30 knots. He further reported that the pilot added power to the operating engine and the airplane "veered" to the left and "lost more altitude resulting in a stalled condition". The flight instructor took control of the airplane, reduced power to idle on the operating engine, attempted to level the wings, and the airplane impacted the airport ramp area with "excessive vertical speed".The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, both ailerons, and fuselage.The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.The Federal Aviation Administration has published the Airplane Flying Handbook FAA-H-8083-3B (2016). This handbook discusses multi-engine landings and spin awareness and states in part:LandingsThe final approach should be made with power and at a speed recommended by the manufacturer; if a recommended speed is not furnished, the speed should be no slower than the single-engine best rate-of-climb speed (VYSE) until short final with the landing assured, but in no case less than critical engine-out minimum control speed (VMC). Some multiengine pilots prefer to delay full flap extension to short final with the landing assured. This is an acceptable technique with appropriate experience and familiarity with the airplane.Spin AwarenessPage 2 of 6 GAA17CA061In order to spin any airplane, it must first be stalled. At the stall, a yawing moment must be introduced. In a multiengine airplane, the yawing moment may be generated by rudder input or asymmetrical thrust. It follows, then, that spin awareness be at its greatest during VMC demonstrations, stall practice, slow flight, or any condition of high asymmetrical thrust, particularly at low speed/high AOA (angle of attack). Single-engine stalls are not part of any multiengine training curriculum.For spin avoidance when practicing engine failures, the flight instructor should pay strict attention to the maintenance of proper airspeed and bank angle as the student executes the appropriate procedure. The instructor should also be particularly alert during stall and slow flight practice. Forward center-of-gravity positions result in favorable stall and spin avoidance characteristics, but do not eliminate the hazard.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during the landing roll, the airplane veered to the right. He added that he attempted to correct the veer but was unsuccessful. The airplane continued to the right and exited the runway. During the runway excursion, the airplane nosed over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right forward lift strut and empennage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of a balloon reported that while aloft he observed the wind increase to about 10 miles per hour, so he briefed his passengers on how to brace for a "high wind landing" and possible basket tip-over. The pilot further reported that he descended to about 3 feet above ground, and once over the target landing area he "shut off [the] fuel tanks and burners then pulled the smart vent (rapid deflation valve)." Subsequently, on touch down the basket bounced once and skidded about 15 to 20 yards before stopping with the basket tipping over on its side. The pilot reported that he secured the basket and while the passengers were exiting the basket, his ground crew informed him that a passenger had injured her ankle. According to the pilot, the injured passenger did not speak English as her first language and he was unsure if she braced appropriately for the landing or if she sustained the serious injury while exiting the basket. The pilot reported that another passenger informed him that the passenger sustained the injury while she was exiting the basket.The pilot did not report any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the balloon that would have precluded normal operation.
The student pilot reported that, shortly after departing for a local, personal flight and while the airplane was about 875 ft above ground level, the engine lost all power. The student attempted to restart the engine without success. Subsequently, he conducted a forced landing in a field, during which the left main landing gear and wing struck a dirt mound, and the airplane nosed over, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage, the right wing spar and leading edge, and the left wing attachment. Postaccident examination of the fuel system revealed that there was debris inside the fuel selector valve check ball. The debris likely restricted the fuel flow to the engine and led to the loss of all engine power due to fuel starvation.
The private pilot reported that, during the instructional flight to accumulate flight time, the airplane experienced a rough-running engine in cruise flight and that the engine subsequently experienced a total loss of power. The pilot tried to restart the engine to no avail. He then chose to conduct a forced landing to a road, during which the airplane touched down on soft, wet ground before reaching the road. It then nosed over and came to rest inverted. During recovery of the airplane, large cracks were noted in the engine crankcase near the No. 2 cylinder. Disassembly of the engine revealed that the crankshaft was fractured at the No. 3 connecting rod journal and exhibited signatures consistent with extreme heat. The No. 3 connecting rod bolts fractured at the point where the nuts contacted the connecting rod. Each connecting rod nut had a flat-face side and a raised-lip side. As found, the nuts were oriented with the raised-lip side touching the connecting rod despite the engine manufacturer's service instruction, which stated that "Nuts [were] to be assembled with flat face side touching the connecting rod." The caution associated with the orientation of the connecting rod nuts at installation stated that "the connecting rod bolt cannot be tightened correctly if the nut on the connecting rod is installed incorrectly." The operator's maintenance personnel likely installed the nuts incorrectly during an engine overhaul about 246 flight hours before the accident flight, which resulted in a loss of torque on the connecting rod's nuts and the subsequent fracture of the connecting rod's bolts and total loss of engine power.
The commercial pilot reported that, about 20 minutes into the cross-country flight, the engine suddenly experienced a partial loss of power. The pilot attempted to restore engine power but was not successful. During the subsequent forced landing to a road, the airplane struck a car, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. Examination of the airplane revealed that the hardware that attached the throttle linkage to the engine was not present. Given that the airplane had flown for only a few hours following recent maintenance, it is likely that maintenance personnel did not properly secure the throttle linkage hardware during that maintenance. No other anomalies were noted that would have precluded normal operations.
The flight instructor reported that, after demonstrating emergency descent procedures to the student pilot during an instructional flight, he applied engine power to recover from the simulation, but the engine had experienced a total loss of power. After performing troubleshooting steps, which did not restore full power, the instructor performed a forced landing. During the landing roll, the airplane struck a berm and sustained substantial damage. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed about 14 months before the accident; however, postaccident examination did not reveal any anomalies with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation, and the engine performed with no anomalies during a subsequent test run. The reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.
The commercial pilot was practicing agricultural application operations on his first flight in the accident airplane. While climbing after completing a spray pass, the airplane experienced a total loss of engine power and the pilot made a forced landing during which the airplane nosed over. Examination of the airplane revealed that the right fuel tank was intact and void of fuel, while the left tank was breached, with fuel leaking from the tank. The fuel selector was in the right tank position. No engine anomalies were observed. The pilot had been advised by the owner to switch fuel tanks after flying about 40 minutes, but failed to do so. His advice was based on the engine's typical fuel burn of about 33 gallons per hour and fuel tank capacity of 35 gallons per wing tank. The owner estimated the airplane was airborne for about one hour before the accident occurred. Given the airplane's time in flight and the lack of fuel found in the right wing tank after the accident, it is likely that the loss of engine power was the result of fuel starvation.
The airline transport pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that the previous landing, which was flown by the pilot-rated passenger, was uneventful. The pilot then conducted the second landing, during which he reported that the right brake was not operating correctly, which resulted in asymmetrical braking. The airplane ground looped and sustained substantial damage.Postaccident testing of the brake system revealed that the right brake had a small leak from both o-rings only while pressurized. Both o-rings on both calipers were replaced, the brake system was pressurized, and no further leaks were found.
The helicopter pilot reported that, during a hover taxi for takeoff, about 3 ft above the ground, he thought that he saw a person at the corner of his driveway. He added that he stopped and that the helicopter drifted to the left. Subsequently, the main rotor blade impacted a tree, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the pilot in the tailwheel-equipped airplane, he landed on the turf runway, and the airplane began to drift left. He made a right rudder pedal input that did not counter the left drift, and he adjusted his foot on the right rudder pedal so that he could apply differential braking. However, he reported that "my shoe was caught between the rudder pedal and the sheet metal fairing on the floorboard that covers the rudder pedal bell cranks," which prevented him from applying differential braking. The airplane exited the runway to the left and ground looped, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the right wing struck the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right-wing spar and right aileron.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot reported that the airplane took off, and at 800 ft, the engine oil pressure dropped to zero. The pilot stated that he immediately turned back to the departure airport and that, while he was maneuvering for landing, the engine began "popping loudly," and engine oil began emanating from the oil access panel and splattered onto the windscreen. Shortly after, the engine lost all power. The pilot subsequently conducted a forced landing on tundra about 1 mile from the airport. During the landing roll, the nose and left landing gears collapsed, and the left wing and fuselage impacted terrain. After the accident, a large puddle of oil was found on the airport ramp where the engine was started. During the recovery of the airplane, the engine oil access panel was found open with no dipstick present. The oil access panel had an impact mark on the underside that was about the same size as the dipstick top. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that there were holes and fractures on the top and bottom of the crankcase and that no oil was present in the oil tank. Several connecting rods were separated from the crankshaft and exhibited mechanical and thermal damage, consistent with oil starvation. When compressed air was applied to the right oil cooler, air was expelled from a small fracture between the brazed plates. Detailed examination of the oil cooler revealed an overstress fracture at a brazed seam; the fracture exhibited signatures of overstress with no evidence of preexisting defects. No anomalies of the oil pressure and temperature regulating systems were noted.It is likely that the oil cooler seam fractured after the engine start and that most of the engine oil was expelled before takeoff. Once the oil supply to the engine was exhausted, the internal friction of the metal components resulted in thermal damage and connecting rod fractures and the subsequent loss of all engine power. It is possible that the crankcase was pressurized during the engine failure sequence, which resulted in the oil dipstick being ejected from the engine. The reason for the engine oil overpressure in the oil cooler could not be determined. Page 2 of 7 ANC17LA006
The commercial pilot stated that the purpose of the flight was to apply chemicals to adjacent fields. After applying four loads of chemicals, the pilot flew the helicopter back to the landing pad, which was situated on top of a box-truck, to load more chemicals. While attempting to maneuver the helicopter onto the center of the truck's pad, the right skid became caught on an access hole that ground personnel use to refill the load. The pilot was unaware of the problem and attempted to reposition the helicopter by lifting the right skid. The helicopter dynamically rolled over off the back of the truck and collided with terrain. The pilot stated that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that during the second landing of a closed traffic pattern flight, the airplane "ballooned" in the landing flare and touched down "hard." The pilot further reported that she aborted the landing and landed without further incident. The firewall sustained substantial damage.The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the tailwheel equipped biplane reported that during the takeoff sequence of a touch-and-go landing he decided to try a 2-point takeoff. He further reported that he was aware of the left turning tendency when raising the tail, however the "left turning factor happened much faster than [he] anticipated"; he was unable to recover with full right rudder inputs and the biplane veered to the left off the runway. During the runway excursion, the pilot brought the throttle to idle and the biplane impacted tumbleweeds. The biplane sustained substantial damage to both right wings.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.Federal Aviation Administration's Airplane Flying Handbook, FAA-H-8083-3B (2016), contains a section titled "Normal Takeoff Roll" for tailwheel airplanes which states:It is important to note that nose-down pitch movement produces left yaw, the result of gyroscopic precession created by the propeller. The amount of force created by this precession is directly related to the rate the propeller axis is tilted when the tail is raised, so it is best to avoid an abrupt pitch change. Whether smooth or abrupt, the need to react to this yaw with rudder inputs emphasizes the increased directional demands common to tailwheel airplanes, a demand likely to be unanticipated by pilots transitioning from nosewheel models.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that during the landing roll the airplane encountered wind gusts. The pilot further reported that his "attention evidently wandered" and he did not correct for the wind gusts quick enough. Subsequently, the airplane weather vaned into the wind and ground looped. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.A review of the local weather on the airfield, about the time of the accident, recorded the wind from 030 degrees true, at 14 nautical miles per hour (knots). The pilot landed on runway 30.
The private pilot reported that the airplane was last refueled and operated about 1 month before the day of the accident. He added that, on the morning of the accident, he believed the airplane still had about 17 to 18 gallons of fuel for the flight. The pilot mentioned that the airplane's fuel float gauges were not accurate; therefore, he looked inside of the left fuel tank from the filler cap and observed fuel. He did not check the right fuel tank because the style of tank restricted his view of any fuel. He departed the airport with the left fuel tank selected. After practicing standard maneuvers, the engine hesitated for a second. The pilot switched to the right fuel tank, which resolved the issue, but he turned back toward the airport. About 1 minute later, he switched to the left fuel tank and continued to fly at full power, which led him to believe fuel was in that tank. One to 2 minutes later, the pilot switched back to the right fuel tank and climbed to 8,000 ft, circled the town once, and then proceeded back toward the airport; the engine then suddenly lost power. The pilot attempted emergency procedures and troubleshooting to no avail. The pilot located a suitable field for the emergency landing; however, during the landing roll on the soft, dry, and rocky terrain, the airplane nosed over and then came to rest inverted. Recovery personnel removed a small amount of fuel from the left auxiliary fuel tank, but the right auxiliary fuel tank and the main fuel tanks were empty. In addition, there were no observable breaches in the fuel tanks nor smell of fuel at the accident site. Given the pilot knew the airplane's fuel gauges were not accurate, he should have ensured that the airplane had sufficient fuel for the flight and his failure to do so led to the subsequent exhaustion of the fuel supply and total loss of engine power.
The private pilot and the pilot-rated passenger reported that, while in level flight at an altitude of 2,000 ft mean sea level with the autopilot disengaged, the airplane suddenly rolled to the right without any control input. The pilot stated that he tried to correct with opposite aileron, but the airplane did not respond and continued to roll inverted. The pilot-rated passenger then took control of the airplane, shut off the engine, and applied full left rudder to bring the airplane back to level flight; however, the airplane had descended to about 300 ft. The pilot-rated passenger slowed the airplane and flared it into trees. The pilot stated that he had no idea what caused the airplane to suddenly roll, that the ailerons were unresponsive, and that he assumed a flight control cable had "snapped." The pilot-rated passenger stated that they were not trying to perform aerobatics and that he thought the airplane rolled due to a broken aileron cable. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane first struck a 30- to 40-ft-tall tree with its right wing, then struck a second tree with the right wing. A 9-ft-long section of the right wing separated from the airplane and was found at the base of the second tree. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the right aileron UP flight control cable was separated at the turnbuckle, which was located inside the cabin, and the aileron balance control cable was separated in the right wing. Metallurgical examination of the cables revealed that they had both separated from overstress, indicative of the cables separating during the accident sequence. Examination of the airplane's flight controls did not otherwise reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
The student pilot and flight instructor were conducting an instructional flight in an experimental amateur-built airplane about 3/4 mile east of the departure airport in light winds with no adverse weather nearby. The investigation could not determine which of the pilots was flying the airplane at the time of the accident. One witness reported hearing the engine noise decrease before seeing the airplane descend and then abruptly pitch up and hearing the engine noise increase. He then heard a loud sound and saw a wing separate from the fuselage. Subsequently, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and impacted trees and terrain. Another witness reported seeing the airplane flying overhead and hearing the engine running. He also saw a parachute trailing behind the airplane while it was descending.Examination of the wreckage revealed that both the forward and aft right wing "Rony" attachment brackets had failed. The brackets were separated from the root tube and the root tube was fractured on all four sides at the aft wing attachment bracket mounting holes. All the attachment brackets and root tube fracture surfaces were consistent with overload failure and showed no evidence of preexisting damage, cracks, or corrosion. Examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Although the ballistic recovery airframe parachute system was found deployed, the airplane impacted tress before the parachute could inflate.The airplane had been involved in a hard landing about 1 week before the accident. Two days before the accident, the student, who had previously been an airplane mechanic in the U.S. Navy, replaced a steel cable between the two landing gear legs, which had been broken during the hard landing. However, no evidence was found indicating that the hard landing or the repairs contributed to the failure of the right wing attachment brackets and subsequent wing separation.Although the toxicology testing of specimens from the flight instructor detected hydrocodone in the liver, the investigation could not determine whether the flight instructor's use of hydrocodone before the flight contributed to the accident. Although ethanol was detected in the student's muscle, it was not detected in the liver, and no n-propanol was detected in the liver, which is consistent with postmortem Page 2 of 10 ERA17FA038production of ethanol.Given the witness's statement and the wreckage evidence, it is likely the airplane was pitched up abruptly following a descent, which resulted in the in-flight separation of the right wing and the subsequent uncontrolled descent.
The private pilot planned to fly the airplane to another airport to purchase fuel. Before departing, he used a wooden stick to estimate the airplane's fuel level. While en route, the engine abruptly lost power. The pilot was unable to restart the engine and&nbsp;executed a forced landing to a field; the airplane struck trees, which resulted in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. Postaccident examination of the accident site, the airplane's fuel tanks, and components of the airplane's fuel system revealed only trace quantities of fuel. Thus, it is likely that the pilot overestimated the airplane's fuel quantity before departing on the flight and that the engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion.
The student pilot reported that, during his third solo flight, he "had a hard landing." He added that he aborted the landing, landed again, and taxied to the ramp without further incident. After shutting the airplane down, he noticed that the propeller and nose landing gear were damaged.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the firewall.