roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
On December 13, 2016, at 1847 mountain standard time, United Airlines flight 1545, a Boeing 737-800, N24202, experienced turbulence during descent that resulted in one flight attendant sustaining a serious injury.  There were no injuries to the other passengers and crew onboard and the airplane was not damaged.  The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight from San Francisco International Airport (SFO), California to Denver International Airport (DEN), Colorado.  The flight landed at DEN with no further incident.According to the operator, weather forecasts indicated that mountain wave turbulence was expected over the Sierra Nevada mountains and moderate turbulence was forecast for the descent in to DEN below 17,000 feet.  As the airplane descended through approximately FL270 the captain advised the flight attendants "it's going to get bumpy" and to be seated.The flight crew reported that passing through approximately FL220 the airplane experienced increasing turbulence and then at about FL200 experienced a "big jolt."  The flight attendant in position 2L was securing the galley at the time of the turbulence and was thrown to the ceiling and then struck her face on the galley counter while falling to the floor.  She suffered multiple injuries including a large gash to her cheek and a fractured facial bone.
The pilot reported that, after landing and during the turn onto a taxiway, the left wing impacted a taxiway sign. He added that he was not able to see the sign because of sun glare.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
Passengers reported that, during a winter flight, cold air was entering the airplane from the left side of the passenger cabin. Afterward, the pilot examined the area and discovered that there was a small gap under the emergency exit window that was allowing air to enter the cabin from outside the airplane. He opened the window and examined the rubber seal, which was intact. However, he could not tell if it was compressed or thinner than normal. He then closed and latched the window and inspected the latch with a flashlight to make sure it was latched. Because he was going to fly back to his home airport in similar winter conditions on the next flight, he took several rolled-up paper towels and placed them between the trim and the window to try and keep the cold air out and placed a strip of blue painter's tape on the outside of the lower portion of the window to further reduce the entry of cold air. He decided to fly the airplane once around the traffic pattern before fueling up for his return flight. After takeoff and while on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern at 800 ft, he suddenly heard a "whoosh" behind his seat. Instead of landing and checking to see what happened, he checked for other traffic, turned on the autopilot, in heading and altitude mode, then reached around behind him to shut and latch the window, which had opened 2 to 3 inches. Seconds later, after turning back around to his normal seated position, he heard a loud "pop" and turned around and saw that the window had opened completely. Given that he was afraid it would come off the airplane and strike the tail, he reached back again and pulled the window down. The pilot reported that he must have "bumped" the autopilot off while he was doing this, because when he looked forward to check for traffic, he noticed that the airplane was approaching the ground. He then banked left and right to determine his location and spot any obstacles, raised the nose, and added power to climb. He then noticed that there were power lines slightly higher than his altitude directly in front of him, and rather than risk a possible stall close to the ground by pulling back suddenly, he lowered the nose and "put" the airplane on the ground. The airplane then struck trees, and a fire ensued, which resulted in substantial damage to the airframe. Examination of the emergency exit window by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed that the paper towels the pilot inserted in the gap between the window and the airframe were interfering with the window's latching mechanism.Page 2 of 6 ERA17CA068
The commercial pilot was departing on a routine positioning flight in dark night visual meteorological conditions. Footage from a security camera at the airport showed the airplane take off normally and initiate a right turn, which was the established direction of traffic for the takeoff runway. The airplane continued the right turn, then entered an increasingly rapid descent and subsequently impacted terrain about 1 mile southwest from the airport.  The wreckage distribution was consistent with a high-energy impact. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Autopsy and toxicology testing of the pilot did not reveal any evidence of impairment or incapacitation. Visual conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident; however, the setting Moon was obscured by cloud cover, and the airport was located in an area of remote, sparsely-populated high desert terrain. This would have resulted in few visual references to which the pilot could have oriented the airplane. Although the pilot had experience operating in this environment in night conditions and held an instrument rating, the circumstances of the accident are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. The investigation could not determine the initiating event which led to the pilot's mismatch between the airplane's perceived and actual attitude; however, he likely experienced a sensory illusion as a result of spatial disorientation, which led to a loss of control.
According to the pilot, he had the fuel tanks filled before departing for the cross-country flight, and he confirmed that they were full during the preflight inspection. During the flight, the fuel meter indicated a flow rate of between 12 and 15 gallons per hour. When the pilot was descending the airplane for the approach to his destination, he noted that both fuel tank gauges were reading just below 1/4 tank and that the fuel totalizer was showing about 22 gallons were remaining. He then switched from the right to the left tank. Subsequently, the engine lost all power. The pilot was unable to restart the engine, so he chose to conduct a gear-up landing in hilly terrain about 10 miles east of the airport, which resulted in substantial damage to the forward fuselage.  The flight time from the time of departure to the loss of engine power was about 5 hours.During examination of the airplane 1 month after the accident, no evidence of any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures were found that would have precluded the normal operation. An unspecified amount of fuel was found in the wing tanks; however, the fuel line between the right header tank and selector valve was breached. Therefore, it is likely that any fuel remaining at the time of the accident drained out of the breached fuel line at the accident site. According to the engine manufacturer, assuming the fuel tanks were full at takeoff and using the time elapsed from takeoff to the loss of engine power and the fuel burn rate during before the flight, it was estimated that the airplane likely had about 10 to 15 gallons of fuel in the tanks when the engine lost power. Given the evidence, it is likely that the engine lost power due to fuel starvation.
While the private pilot was conducting a cross-country flight, the airplane's engine started running roughly when the airplane was about 5,500 ft. The pilot pushed the mixture, propeller, and throttle controls to the full forward position, but the engine continued to run roughly. The pilot then decided to return to the departure airport. During the turn back to the airport, oil covered the windscreen. The pilot declared an emergency and asked air traffic control for radar vectors to a closer airport. The pilot was having trouble controlling the airplane, so he asked for vectors to another airport. Seconds later, he saw parts, which he thought were from the propeller, separate from the airplane. The engine then lost total power, and the pilot ditched the airplane into the water below. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the crankshaft was fatigue fractured at the No. 4 main bearing journal. The origin surface area of the fatigue crack was obliterated due to relative movement between the mating fracture faces; thus, the investigation could not determine the cause of the fatigue crack.
During the landing roll, the airplane began to swerve to the left and continued off the runway, after which the left main landing gear assembly separated from the airplane. Examination revealed substantial damage to the left wing and horizontal stabilizer.The pilot did not provide a written statement, nor did he complete the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report Form 6120.1; therefore, the pilot's flight experience and the airplane's maintenance history could not be determined. The accident is consistent with the pilot's failure to maintain directional control during the landing roll.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during taxi, he turned right to position the airplane to perform pretakeoff procedures, and the right wing passed over the running engine of a stationary airplane and struck the turning propeller. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing, and the stationary airplane sustained minor damage. Both pilots reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with their airplanes that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot was conducting a local personal flight with a pilot-rated passenger in the experimental, amateur-built airplane. During the initial climb, when the airplane was at 100 ft above ground level (agl), the pilot felt a vibration that soon stopped. She continued the takeoff and noted that all exhaust gas temperature (EGT) readings were higher than normal, with the No. 2 cylinder EGT over the maximum red line limit; the engine then lost partial power. She kept full throttle applied, informed her passenger of the discrepancy, and remained in the traffic pattern to return to the airport. While flying about 200 ft agl and turning onto the base leg of the airport traffic pattern, she reduced the throttle to slow the airplane from 80 to 75 mph; at that moment, the left wing dropped immediately, which she later indicated was consistent with an aerodynamic stall although she did not feel any airframe buffet. The airplane impacted and remained suspended in trees a few feet off the ground. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed damage to the No. 2 cylinder piston consistent with pre-ignition. This damage was likely the source of the partial loss of engine power. While the pilot was using an oil additive, the investigation could not determine whether the additive contributed to pre-ignition.The airplane was not equipped with stall warning protection. Although the pilot/builder had accrued about 290 flight hours in the accident airplane and should have been familiar with its aerodynamic stall characteristics, stall warning protection could have alerted the pilot to an impending stall so that she could take action to avoid the stall.
The student pilot departed on his second solo flight in the helicopter. Before the accident, he completed two takeoffs and landings without incident. During a subsequent practice autorotation, the tail rotor struck the ground, the helicopter entered a spin, and it then came to rest near the place of initial impact. The student pilot reported that there were no mechanical or system malfunctions with the helicopter before the accident. The flight instructor who witnessed the accident stated that the deceleration/flare was executed too low.
The light sport pilot decided to conduct a night cross-country flight in his light sport airplane even though he was not current to act as pilot-in-command at night. Radar data depicted the airplane departing after sunset and proceeding along the intended route of flight. The last radar contact was at 3,500 ft above mean sea level (msl), about 2,600 ft above ground level, about 0.5 mile from the accident site. There were no witnesses to the accident, and the wreckage was located the following morning in a plowed field along the intended route of flight about 12.6 nautical miles from the departure airport.The impact damage to the airframe was consistent with the airplane impacting the terrain while inverted. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction.The pilot's sport pilot certificate did not authorize him to fly at night. In conjunction with his private pilot training, he had an expired 90-day endorsement for night flight that was dated about 14 months before the accident. It is possible that the pilot became spatially disoriented and lost control of the airplane; however, given that the pilot had been flying at night and that there were no mechanical anomalies identified during the investigation, the reason for the loss of control could not be determined.
The pilot of a tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during a wheel landing, the airplane "yawed to the left," and he corrected with right rudder. He further reported that the airplane veered to the right and that he applied the brakes and left rudder, but the main landing gear collapsed during the swerve, and the airplane skidded to a stop on the runway.The left wing sustained substantial damage.The pilot reported that the left tailwheel connector cable was disconnected after the accident but that the cable was connected during his preflight inspection.
According to the flight instructor in the multiengine airplane, he occupied the right seat during the instructional flight. The flight instructor reported that, during the landing roll, the brakes on his side were inoperative, but the brakes used by the pilot under instruction appeared to function normally. The flight instructor allowed the pilot under instruction to taxi to parking. During the right turn in the parking area, the pilot under instruction was told to apply both brakes, and the airplane started to "pull left." The flight instructor attempted to use differential thrust to arrest the left pull by increasing the right engine speed, but the attempt had no effect. The flight instructor shut down both engines; however, the left wing struck a parked airplane and came to a stop. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing.The flight instructor reported that the accident could have been prevented if he had stopped on the taxiway and not entered the parking ramp.A postaccident examination of the brake assembly revealed that the right brake actuator piston "o" ring had failed, which decreased hydraulic brake pressure and prevented proper brake function of the airplane.
The non-instrument-rated private pilot and three passengers departed from an airport along a lakefront in an airplane not equipped or certified for flight into known icing conditions. A couple of minutes after the airplane departed, a pilot who was descending to land at the departure airport spoke with the accident pilot. The pilot of the descending airplane told the accident pilot that the tops of the clouds were about 2,000 ft. The accident pilot replied, "looking good under here, I'm gonna keep going." No further radio transmissions were received from the accident pilot. When the airplane failed to arrive at its intended destination, a search was launched. The day following the accident, airplane debris and personal items that were positively identified as belonging to the occupants of the airplane were found floating on the surface of the lake. The debris indicated that the airplane impacted the surface of the lake. Despite an extensive search, neither the occupants nor the airplane have been recovered, and, due to the depth of the lake, a recovery mission is unlikely. Weather camera images, surface weather observations, and upper air observations indicated that the weather conditions at the time of the accident likely included freezing fog and mist, low visibilities and ceilings, and moderate or greater icing conditions in the clouds covering the accident area. Therefore, the accident flight likely encountered instrument meteorological conditions shortly after departure and rapidly began accumulating structural and/or induction icing. However, because the airplane was not available for examination by investigators, the possibility of mechanical failure or malfunction could not be ruled out.
The pilot of the weight-shift control aircraft uneventfully departed runway 15 and made a right turn to the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern. He then requested and was cleared for the downwind leg for the intersecting runway. While making the turn to the downwind leg, the aircraft entered a rapid descent and impacted the ground near an apartment complex. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The crankshaft exhibited torsional twisting, consistent with the engine producing power at the time of impact. The pilot purchased the aircraft new and took delivery 4 days before the accident. Review of his logbook revealed 65 total hours of flight experience, with 12 hours in the accident aircraft make and model; however, his flight experience in the accident aircraft could not be determined. Toxicology testing on the pilot was positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, the primary psychoactive component of marijuana) and tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid (THC-COOH, an inactive metabolite); however, there is no established direct relationship between blood levels and impairment. Therefore, it could not be determined whether psychoactive effects from the pilot's use of marijuana contributed to the accident. Although the circumstances of the accident are consistent with a loss of control in the airport traffic pattern, the investigation was unable to determine the reason for the loss of control.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during the landing roll, the airplane veered left of centerline and that he attempted to correct with right brake input but was unsuccessful. The airplane continued to veer off the runway to the left, ground looped, and the right wing impacted the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing. A review of recorded data from the automated weather observation station located on the airport revealed that, about 10 minutes before the accident, the wind was from 120° at 4 knots. The airplane landed on runway 30.The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The turbofan-powered airplane struck birds after takeoff, resulting in a total loss of power on the right engine. The commercial pilot diverted to another airport, where he landed the airplane uneventfully. Examination of the airplane revealed several locations with bird remains, including within the right engine's fan duct. Examination of the right engine showed that the fan and booster stages were missing from the engine; they were found as a unit near the departure airport. Examination of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing from the fan and booster stages.DNA analysis of the bird remains indicated that they were from redhead ducks, which can weigh between 1.38 and 3.31 lbs each. Damage on two fan blades that were approximately opposite each other indicated that at least two birds struck the fan. Examination of the engine components revealed that all damage was consistent with overload failures resulting from the bird strikes. The engine was certified to withstand the impact of a single 4-lb bird; thus, the ingestion of multiple ducks likely exceeded the engine certification requirements. However, the subsequent engine failure was contained because the fan case and inlet were not penetrated, as designed.
The commercial pilot of the jet reported that he initially requested that 100 lbs of fuel be added to both fuel tanks. During the subsequent preflight inspection, the pilot decided that more fuel was needed, so he requested that the airplane's fuel tanks be topped off with fuel. However, he did not confirm the fuel levels or check the fuel gauges before takeoff. He departed on the flight and did not check the fuel gauges until about 1 hour after takeoff. He stated that, at that time, the fuel gauges were showing about 900-1,000 lbs of fuel per side, and he realized that the fuel tanks had not been topped off as requested. He reduced engine power to conserve fuel and to increase the airplane's flight endurance while he continued to his destination. When the fuel gauges showed about 400-500 lbs of fuel per side, the low fuel lights for both wing fuel tanks illuminated. The pilot reported to air traffic control that the airplane was low on fuel and diverted the flight to the nearest airport. The pilot reported that the airplane was high and fast on the visual approach for landing. He misjudged the height above the ground and later stated that the airplane "landed very hard." The airplane's left main landing gear and nose gear collapsed and the airplane veered off the runway, resulting in substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot reported that he was on final approach for landing when he observed another airplane landing on the same runway. To maintain separation between the two airplanes, the pilot performed s-turns and retracted the landing gear to improve the glide distance. When he extended the landing gear for the second time in preparation for landing, the landing gear position indicator light did not illuminate. The pilot pushed the gear reset button and subsequently pulled back on the control stick to abort the landing, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and stalling 10 to 20 ft above the runway. A witness observed the accident airplane on final approach with the landing gear retracted and at a low airspeed. The airplane touched down, bounced back into the air, settled onto the runway, and slid about 100 ft before coming to rest. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the landing gear handle was in the UP position. A mechanic who recovered the airplane reported that he overheard the pilot say he was distracted on final approach.
Based on the material laboratory examinations, the area around the failure point contained higher than allowable levels of retained austenite. The presence of too much retained austenite subsequently resulted in the formation of intergranular cracking. The intergranular cracking resulted in the formation of progressive cracking, which caused the separation and subsequent failure of the downlock spring. After the failure, the spring became lodged in the nose landing gear yoke, which prevented the nose gear from achieving a down and locked position. Without the NLG being fully down and locked, as the weight of the aircraft during landing was transferred to the nose and main landing gear, the NLG subsequently retracted back into the nose gear wheel.
The pilot reported that, during the approach to land, the biplane was low and to the right of the runway centerline. He further reported that to recover from the low altitude he added power, but the biplane struck a tree, which impaired its controllability. Subsequently, the biplane glided into small tree(s) and brush and came to rest nose down. The biplane sustained substantial damage to all four wings and struts.The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.