roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The noncertificated pilot was flying the helicopter on a local, personal flight. He reported that, during takeoff and while flying between 25 and 30 mph, the helicopter began an uncommanded climb that he could not control with forward cyclic control input. He added that the helicopter then "came to a complete stop." The helicopter yawed right, its nose dropped, and then the tailboom swung left and descended into trees. The airplane came to rest on its side at the base of a tree. The pilot reported no issues with the cyclic or collective flight controls from the cockpit to the main rotor. Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed extensive fire damage; however, there was no evidence of any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The failure of a flight control system spring or cable could cause unexpected movement of the collective, but the helicopter's collective system was equipped with two springs and two cables for redundancy. None of these components had failed. Although the springs exhibited evidence of relaxing, it was likely due to the postcrash fire.
The commercial pilot reported that, after an uneventful touchdown on the dry, gravel-surface runway, he felt a medium vibration as he applied the brakes. As the airplane continued the landing roll, both main landing gear (MLG) legs sheared off. The propeller impacted the runway, and the airplane came to rest on the bottom of the fuselage, which sustained substantial damage. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that both MLG legs failed due to fatigue cracking. The fatigue cracks were extended by intermittent overstress until the legs separated. The overstress extensions likely occurred during the accident landing or immediately before it because there was no corrosion of the crack surfaces.
The pilot reported that during the landing roll he realized the airplane was not going stop within the remaining runway distance. He further reported that he aborted the landing and became airborne, but during the initial climb the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall and impacted terrain about 300 feet beyond the runway threshold.The fuselage and both wings sustained substantial damage.  The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the tundra tire-equipped, tailwheel airplane reported that he made an off-airport precautionary landing due to icing conditions; the airplane encountered soft terrain during the landing roll and nosed over.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing and empennage. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.A review of recorded data from the intended destination's automated weather observation station about 19 miles to the south west, revealed that, about 37 minutes before the accident the wind was 120 degrees true at 14 knots, visibility 1 statue mile, light snow, mist, temperature 34 degrees Fahrenheit, dewpoint 30 degrees Fahrenheit. And, about 23 minutes after the accident the wind was 110 degrees true at 13 knots, overcast 1,700 feet, visibility 1 ¼ statue mile, light snow, mist, temperature 34 degrees Fahrenheit, dewpoint 32 degrees Fahrenheit.
The airline transport pilot was departing from an 800-ft-long remote, unimproved airstrip that had accumulated between 1 and 2 inches of wet snow. He stated that the airplane seemed to accelerate normally but that it failed to become airborne at his established go/no-go decision point (about 400 ft down the airstrip). With about one-third of the airstrip remaining, he realized that, if he rejected the takeoff, he would be unable to stop the airplane on the remaining airstrip due to the wet snow. So, the pilot chose to continue the takeoff through the low brush at the end of the airstrip. The airplane became airborne, settled back to the ground, and then became airborne again. The main landing gear impacted brush on a small embankment, and the airplane then began to settle. The pilot saw a clear area ahead of the airstrip that led into a creek bed; he reduced the power to idle and held full-aft pressure on the control yoke. The airplane settled to the surface in a three-point attitude and came to rest in the creek bed, which resulted in substantial damage to the vertical stabilizer. The pilot stated there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The solo student pilot reported that on final, following a cross-country flight, "It was really bumpy", the airplane was at a "pretty steep angle", and the stall warning horn was "really going crazy". He further reported that he tried to avoid a stall, and lowered the nose of the airplane, and the airplane touched down to the left of the runway unexpectedly. The airplane continued to the left of the runway and impacted a ditch.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The student pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The accident airplanes were the first two of a flight of six that were travelling to another airport for the pilots and passengers to have breakfast together. The first airplane departed first as it was a slower airplane and required more time to fly to the destination airport. The second airplane departed about 1 minute 18 seconds later. Radar data indicated that that the second airplane was behind and to the left of the first airplane, until they collided at 3,500 ft mean sea level. It could not be determined why the pilot of the second airplane did not see and avoid the first airplane prior to the collision. Both airplanes then entered a near-vertical, nose-down descent. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the second airplane's propeller sliced through the first airplane's empennage, and the first airplane subsequently contacted the second airplane's left wing with its tire, severing an outboard section. No preimpact mechanical malfunctions were identified with the wreckages of both airplanes that would have precluded normal flight.
On September 24 2016, at about 1015 PM EDT, Commutair flight 4919, a De Havilland Dash 8-200, N366PH, performed a nose gear up landing on runway 1R after the nose gear would not fully extend during approach to Washington Dulles International Airport (KIAD), Dulles, Virginia.  The passengers were evacuated via exit doors on the runway.  There were no injuries to the 21 passengers and 3 crew members and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Albany International Airport (KALB), Albany, New York to KIAD.According to the operator, the airplane was scheduled for maintenance during an overnight period on the evening before the accident flight at the Albany Maintenance Hangar Facility at KALB.  As part of the scheduled maintenance, a frangible towing fuse in the nose landing gear mechanism was removed and replaced.  The aircraft was released from maintenance and signed off for revenue service on the morning of the accident flight.According to the flight crew, the flight was uneventful until the final approach phase when they were configuring the airplane for landing at KIAD.  After selecting the gear down, both main landing gear indicated down and locked but the nose gear indicated that the gear doors remained open and that the gear was unsafe. The flight crew then retracted the main landing gear and climbed to 3000 feet. While at altitude, the flight crew attempted to lower the gear a second time but the same result was indicated.  The flight crew then performed the manual gear extension, but the nose gear still failed to extend. The flight conducted a low pass of the airport and ground personnel confirmed that the main landing gear were down, but the nose gear was retracted with the doors open. The flight crew climbed back to 3,000 feet, declared an emergency and requested airport emergency vehicles standby.Page 2 of 6 DCA16CA226During the landing roll, the nose of the airplane contacted the runway surface and the captain shut down the engines after the airplane came to a stop and called for an evacuation.  None of the passengers or crew were injured.  Examination of the airplane found substantial damage to the airplane skin and forward pressure vessel as a result of the contact with the runway.  Inspection of the nose gear system found that the frangible towing fuse, which was replaced before the flight, was incorrectly installed.
The pilot of the powered parachute reported that the flight got started later in the day than he had planned and that the temperature and relative humidity had risen. He further reported that during the initial climb the powered parachute was unable to gain sufficient lift to maintain a climb rate required to clear nearby power lines. Subsequently, the powered parachute struck the power lines.The powered parachute sustained substantial damage to its tubular frame.The pilot reported that the air temperature at the time of the accident was 94 degrees Fahrenheit, with a density altitude of 1,800 feet.The pilot reported that there were no pre impact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot was conducting a local flight in the vintage military trainer airplane when the engine began to sputter and then experienced a total loss of power. He made an emergency landing in a farm field with the landing gear retracted and the airplane collided with a shallow drainage ditch. The engine separated from the firewall and came to rest under the right side of the fuselage. An undetermined amount of fuel was found in both wing fuel tanks. On-site examination of the engine revealed no mechanical failures; however, the engine was heavily impact damaged. No additional examination of the engine was performed and the reason for the power loss was not determined.
According to the private pilot of the jet trainer airplane, the airplane was on final approach for landing about 100 ft above ground level and 60 ft from the runway threshold, when there was an "uncommanded" retraction of the flaps. He adjusted the airplane's pitch and advanced the throttle in order to compensate for the flap retraction, increasing the airspeed from 90 knots to 130 knots. The airplane touched down on the runway and the pilot applied the brake pedals, followed by the emergency brake. As the airplane began to veer toward the side of the runway, the pilot released the emergency brake and continued to apply brakes using the brake pedals. The airplane continued off the departure end of the runway, struck trees, and came to rest about 1,050 ft from the end of the 5,350ft-long runway. While impact-related damage prevented a functional test of the airplane's normal and emergency flap extension systems, an examination of the flap system components revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely that the airplane's increased speed at the time of touchdown resulted in the runway excursion.
The airline transport pilot reported that rain was intensifying as the airplane approached the runway and that the runway appeared to be wet. After landing smoothly and while decelerating through 80-90 knots, the airplane hydroplaned and departed the left side of the runway. An 8-knot crosswind from the left prevailed. The left main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane came to rest in the grass about 180° from the runway heading, which resulted in structural damage to the left main gear well. Postaccident examination of the main landing gear tires revealed that three tires had no measurable tread, and the fourth tire had only 1.17 mm of tread. The tire manufacturer stated that tires should be removed if tread wear reached the base of any groove. White skid marks were found on the runway, indicative of a hydroplaning condition. Witnesses reported heavy rain and standing water on the runway at the time of the accident.
The flight instructor stated that the helicopter was in cruise flight at 75 mph and 800 ft mean sea level when he announced "simulated engine failure" and reduced the throttle and collective. The student pilot responded to the simulated emergency by establishing an autorotation and cross-checking the instruments, which were all "normal" or "in the green." During recovery of the maneuver at 100 ft above ground level, the instructor noted the engine rpm was "zero," announced an actual engine failure, joined the student pilot on the flight controls, and completed the autorotation to the ground. At touchdown, the helicopter bounced on the right front skid and rolled onto its right side. The helicopter was recovered to the operator's facility, where an engine start was attempted on the airframe using the helicopter's battery and starter. The engine started immediately and ran smoothly without interruption until manually shut down.
The private pilot reported that the engine "sputtered and went to idle" during cruise flight while returning to the departure airport after a local flight. His attempts to restore engine power were not successful. The pilot subsequently conducted a forced landing, during which the airplane impacted a fence and sustained substantial damage.During postaccident examination, the fuel totalizer indicated that 7.3 gallons of fuel remained; however, only about 1.5 gallons of fuel was recovered from the airplane. After fuel was added to each tank, an engine run was conducted, and the engine ran smoothly at idle and about 1,000 rpm, and no anomalies were noted. The pilot reported that the airplane fuel gauges were unreliable, so he used the fuel totalizer for fuel quantity information. However, the totalizer's operating instructions stated that the instrument does not provide a measurement of the fuel in the tanks and that it "should never be used as the primary indicator of the fuel quantity." The pilot should not have used the totalizer to determine the amount of fuel onboard the airplane and his reliance on the instrument without ensuring that sufficient fuel was on board for the flight led to fuel exhaustion and a total loss of engine power.
The pilot reported that after four stop and go landings under night visual meteorological conditions, he planned to terminate the flight with a soft field landing. He further reported that as the airplane touched down, he heard scraping and the airplane subsequently slid to a stop on the runway. The pilot reported that he forgot to extend the landing gear for landing and did not hear the landing gear warning horn through his conventional (non-noise canceling) headset. The fuselage sustained substantial damage.   The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. During a postaccident interview with the chief flight instructor of the operator, he reported that the gear warning horn in the accident airplane was normally audible in the cockpit, but does not sound directly through the headset. He further reported that they are in the process of installing a "supplemental voice" gear warning horn that will sound through the airplane's audio panel.
The airline transport pilot reported that, before the flight preceding the accident flight, he added 19 gallons of fuel to the auxiliary and main fuel tanks. He added that he did not add fuel to the tip tanks and that he had used all the fuel in those tanks during the flight before the accident flight. The pilot then departed for the accident flight. He stated that, during the flight, he only used the auxiliary and main fuel tanks and that, while on final approach for landing, he switched from the auxiliary to the main fuel tanks for landing. Shortly thereafter, the right engine lost power and then the left engine lost power. The pilot subsequently conducted a forced landing to a road and a field, during which the fuselage and wings were crushed, the empennage was partially separated from the fuselage, and the pilot and one passenger sustained serious injuries.The examination of both engines, fuel tanks, and related fuel systems revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. One gallon of fuel was recovered from the right main tank fuel lines, and 3 gallons of fuel were recovered from the left auxiliary tank. Although no fuel was recovered from the tip fuel tanks, damage signatures on both tip fuel tanks were consistent with both tanks being full of fuel at the time of the accident. Given this evidence, it is likely that pilot did not use the tip fuel tanks during the previous flight despite believing that he had done so and instead used the main and auxiliary fuel tanks. The pilot's fuel mismanagement resulted in fuel starvation to both engines and their subsequent loss of engine power while on final approach to the airport.
According to the pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane, he and his passenger waited most of the day for the 30-knot wind to subside before departing the 1,200-ft-long dirt and grass airstrip. He reported that the wind velocity had decreased to 10 knots and that he had calculated that, with the 10-knot headwind, the airplane would rotate about 700 ft down the runway. The pilot monitored the wind via ribbons placed at various locations around the airstrip. During takeoff, the airplane rotated about 700 ft down the runway and climbed to about 8 ft above the ground. The pilot stated that it "then it felt like we lost our lift." The pilot recalled that there wasn't enough runway remaining to land and that there was a brush-covered bank at the departure end of the runway. The airplane started to settle to the ground, and although operating at full power and on the cusp of a stall, they cleared the bank. Beyond the bank, the pilot landed the airplane on a short sand bar, but the airplane overran the sand bar and impacted several large rocks. After exiting the airplane, the pilot noticed that he had departed with an 8- to 10-knot tailwind. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left-wing strut, the aileron, the horizontal stabilizer and the elevator. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies with the airframe or engine that would have prevented normal operation.
After a preflight inspection and engine run up that revealed no anomalies, the private pilot and two passengers were departing on a cross-country flight. The pilot&nbsp;stated that the airplane became airborne approximately 5,000 ft down the 7,172-ft-long&nbsp;runway at 80 knots. Approximately 100 feet above ground level, he heard a "gurgle" and the engine experienced a loss of power. The pilot verified that the fuel pump was on and the throttle was in its full-forward position. The pilot then located a forced landing site and during the landing, the airplane impacted a tree. The occupants egressed, and the airplane was subsequently consumed by postcrash fire. The accident airport was located at an elevation about 6,500 ft mean sea level (msl). Given the atmospheric conditions at the time of the accident, the density altitude exceeded 9,000 ft msl, which would have significantly increased the airplane's takeoff distance and reduced its climb capability. The pilot's experience operating in high density altitude environments could not be determined. Review of photos from the accident site revealed that the fuel selector handle appeared to be located between the left fuel tank and off positions; however, the fuel selector was not examined and its position could not be verified, therefore,&nbsp;the reason for the reported loss of engine power could not be determined.
The examination of the No. 2 Engine Fan Cowl Components showed no evidence of preexisting damage on the latches/cowls prior to the event. Further, there was no evidence of latch design failures due to the previous nights routine maintenance work. Manufactures and Regulatory Agencies have released Service Bulletins/Regulatory Actions to prevent further loss of Fan Cowl Doors. At the time of the incident, Aruba Airlines had not incorporated (due to time in service) any of the modifications proposed by the Manufacturer/Regulatory Agencies.
The private pilot was flying a passenger, who was a student pilot, home after her completion of a lesson with a flight instructor. During the night arrival to a nontowered airport, the pilot descended to about 150 ft above the ground on an extended right base to the runway. He subsequently flew across the runway's final approach course and began a left turn away from the runway, which continued for about 300° until impact with 50-ft-tall trees.     Although adequate visibility and moon illumination existed for a night visual approach, the runway's final approach was over an unpopulated state park surrounded by water on three sides with little cultural lighting. The lack of visual cues over this dark area likely contributed to the pilot perceiving his altitude to be higher than it was. Additionally, when the pilot turned left toward the dark area, he turned the airplane away from the runway's visual glideslope indicator, which could have provided the pilot with information about his height above the terrain. Further, the low altitude at which the pilot approached the airport and subsequently initiated his maneuvering to align with the runway did not allow for any imprecision in altitude control. It is unlikely that the pilot's diabetes, high blood pressure, or medications used to treat these conditions impaired the pilot or contributed to the accident. Additionally, there is no evidence the pilot's coronary artery disease or bilateral cataracts impaired the pilot or contributed to the accident.
The commercial pilot was performing a night visual approach for landing. A witness on the ground, who was a flight instructor, stated that the airplane's approach was "very unstable" and "erratic," and that the airplane's nose pitched up and down as the pilot made "large power adjustments." He stated that the airplane then began a go-around, which he also described as "unstable." The airplane subsequently descended and impacted terrain. Examination of the airplane revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
The day before the accident, the pilot was performing aerial application work when he noticed a significant loss of engine power and made an emergency landing in a corn field. Maintenance personnel inspected the engine and replaced the No. 2 cylinder, test ran the engine, and returned the airplane to service. The following day, the pilot ran the engine for several minutes before flight to ensure that it was operating normally. Experiencing no anomalous behavior, the pilot conducted a short-field takeoff, but immediately after rotation and during initial climb, the engine lost partial power. The pilot was unable to climb or maintain altitude and the airplane settled back onto the ground before colliding with farm equipment.Postaccident examination revealed that the No. 3 cylinder failed catastrophically. The failed accident cylinder was not examined in detail, and the manner in which the failure occurred was not determined.
The pilot reported that during the landing touchdown, the airplane bounced hard, pitched up, and became airborne again. He further reported that he pushed the flight controls forward to lower the pitch attitude, and the airplane touched down again "abruptly" on the main landing gear, which was "almost immediately followed by the nose gear." During the landing roll, the airplane rolled to the left and the pilot "realized the nose gear had collapsed," because he could not steer the airplane. The airplane stopped off to the left edge of the runway.The firewall sustained substantial damage.  The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.