roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The commercial pilot reported that, while taxiing the airplane to the runway for departure, the airplane suddenly veered right. The pilot attempted to correct the right turn by applying the left brake; however, the attempt was unsuccessful, and the airplane subsequently exited the taxiway, entered a drainage ditch, and then came to rest upright; the left horizontal stabilizer was bent. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the landing gear brake and nosewheel steering system that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the helicopter reported that he had landed and was going to reposition to another company landing zone after dropping off his crew chief. The pilot opened the engine cowling to allow the engine to cool before restart. However, the pilot did not perform a thru-flight walkaround inspection and climbed into the cockpit and took off. About 60 seconds after departure, he felt a large thump throughout the airframe and then landed as soon as practicable. Upon shutdown and inspection, he noticed that the engine cowling had departed the helicopter and struck the right two main rotor blades and the vertical stabilizer, which resulted in substantial damage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation. In the recommendations section of the National Transportation Safety Board Pilot Aircraft Accident Report, the pilot specified that the company has issued a policy that prohibits opening the engine cowling for the sole purpose of allowing the engine to cool. Additionally, the policy directed a pretakeoff helicopter inspection to be completed by a qualified technician.
The pilot reported that, during the landing roll with a "light quartering tailwind," the airplane veered off the runway to the left into soft mud and nosed over.The vertical stabilizer and rudder sustained substantial damage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The nearest automated weather observation station, located 7 nautical miles from the accident airport, about the time of the accident, recorded variable wind at 5 knots. The pilot reported that he landed on runway 2.
The pilot, who was also the owner of the of amateur-built gyroplane, stated that he adjusted the prerotator motor pressure plate before the flight by moving it closer to the clutch to improve rpm. During takeoff, the gyroplane rolled right, and he was unable to maintain control. The gyroplane subsequently impacted the ground and cartwheeled, which resulted in substantial damage to the rotor, mast, and cabin. The pilot further stated that, due to his adjustment, it was likely that the prerotator did not disengage, which resulted in increased right torque and the inability to control the gyroplane during takeoff.
The private pilot stated that he rented the airplane 2 days before the accident flight to fly across the state for several days. On the day of the accident, the pilot performed a preflight inspection of the airplane with no anomalies noted. After takeoff and during the initial climb, the pilot noticed a loss of engine power, and the rpm started to drop. He attempted to return to the departure airport and land on an intersecting runway, but during the turn, he realized he would not make it back to the airport; he ditched the airplane into the surrounding water. The airplane was substantially damaged during the ditching.Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the induction duct from the air filter to the carburetor had collapsed, which likely restricted air flow to the engine and ultimately resulted in the loss of engine power. Further examination revealed that the induction duct on the accident airplane was not approved for installation on the engine. About 3 years before the accident, the Federal Aviation Administration had issued a special airworthiness information bulletin recommending operators inspect airplanes of this model to ensure that the correct induction duct was installed; that there was no loose or displaced supporting wire or signs of wear, perforation, or deterioration; and that the part had not collapsed. However, the operator was unaware of the bulletin and had not performed the inspection. After the accident, the operator inspected the fleet and installed the approved part on all affected airplanes.
The pilot reported that, while on short final following a jet airplane, the airplane "encountered turbulence that induced significant rolling." He added that the airplane "was not able to completely re-establish a stabilized approach prior to touching down." Subsequently, the airplane touched down "more firm than usual." The pilot taxied the airplane to the ramp without further incident.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor reported that he and two student pilots were on a night, visual flight rules, instructional flight. The instructor tried to activate the pilot-controlled lighting at the destination airport, but he believed that it was inoperative. He reported that he could see the wind sock on the airfield but that he did not see the "X" near the runway numbers and performed a touch and go. During rotation the instructor reported that, "I heard a red cone make impact with the nose gear section." He had to apply continuous forward pressure to the yoke because the nose continued to pitch up with the trim set to the full-down position. He asserted that the flight characteristics were "acceptable" and continued the flight about 47 nautical miles to their home airport. Upon arrival, the instructor alerted the tower that he had a stabilator malfunction and landed the airplane with zero flaps. The instructor reported that he did not check the notices to airmen (NOTAM). The airplane sustained substantial damage to the stabilator.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. According to Federal Aviation Administration NOTAM 03/058, the airport runways were closed at the time of the accident.
The airline transport pilot reported that, nearing the airport at the conclusion of a personal cross-country flight, he performed the before landing checklist. When he extended the landing gear, he noted that only the nose and right main landing gear (MLG) lights were illuminated, which indicated that the left MLG was not locked in the extended position. He then climbed and performed the emergency gear extension checklist, but the left MLG still did not extend. The pilot chose to continue flying to exhaust the fuel in the left tank before attempting to land. During landing, the airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing and impacted two taxiway signs before coming to rest. A witness reported that it appeared that the left-side tire was sitting against the inside gear door and not fully extended. The pilot reported that the accident flight was the first flight after a recent owner-assisted annual inspection, during which the left landing gear control valve was resealed with new "O" rings. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the right MLG side brace was broken, which would prevent gear retraction. During a partial gear-swing test, the MLG gear started to retract; however, immediately thereafter, the left side push-pull rod assembly that connected the gear door actuator to the MLG and door control valve failed and broke in half, likely due to impact damage. The push-pull rod and control valve were subsequently examined, and there was no evidence of any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The reason for the failure of the left MLG to fully extend could not be determined.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during touchdown, the airplane "weathervaned to the left and full right rudder could not keep it on the runway." Subsequently, the main landing gear dug into the soft mud, and the airplane nosed over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The automated weather observation system located on the accident airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was variable at 6 knots. The pilot landed on runway 34.
The glider pilot reported that, while returning to his home airport, he was unable to find enough lift and did not have enough altitude to cross a section of land called "The Gap." After he altered course to land at an alternate airport, he attempted to ridge soar but again did not encounter enough lift. He "hugged the ridge top" for as long as he could and then proceeded down a valley in anticipation of landing in a field. Subsequently, the glider collided with trees preceding the field and came to rest suspended in the trees.The glider sustained substantial damage to both wings and empennage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the glider that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot landed the airplane left of the approach end of the runway on the runway safety area (RSA). Examination of tire tacks indicated that the airplane then veered left, travelled about 70 ft, and subsequently impacted the pilot's truck, which was in front of his hangar. A postimpact fire ensued.Postaccident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Although one of the witnesses stated that the engine did not sound normal, given that the other witness stated that the engine sounded normal during the flight and no anomalies were found with the engine, it was likely producing power during the accident sequence. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the pilot failed to attain a proper touchdown point, which resulted in the airplane landing on the RSA. The pilot then failed to maintain directional control for reasons that could not be determined based on the available evidence.
**This report was modified on September 17, 2020. Please see the public docket for thisaccident to view the original report.**The pilot of the commuter airplane reported that she was going to establish an approach and landing on runway 05 at an airport with a single runway and no taxiways. While on a 7-mile final, she communicated with the pilot of an airplane that was on short final for the same airport. The pilot that was on short final reported that he would report when he was clear of the runway, and he did. The commuter pilot acknowledged the other pilot's clear-of-runway transmission and initiated the approach. As the pilot began the transition to land, she noticed that the airplane that she had communicated with was not clear of the runway. The airplane on the ground was near the runway 23 numbers with the propeller turning facing toward her landing airplane. She aborted the landing, but the airplane did not climb. The airplane impacted the runway hard and bounced. She reported that, when the airplane touched down after the bounce, she "applied left rudder pedal to steer the aircraft off the runway and out of the way of the other aircraft's possible flight path." The airplane exited the left side of the runway and ground-looped to the left. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right side of the fuselage and the right wing. Markings on the runway show the propeller struck the runway multiple times in a low pitch configuration before it became feathered. After the groundloop, the pilot of the airplane near the runway 23 numbers attempted to take off. He was contacted via radio transmission by the airport manager and told that the runway was closed until further notice. According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) safety inspector, the FAA’s postaccident examination of the accident airplane determined that there were no preimpact mechanical anomalies with the airplane that would have prevented normal operation.Page 2 of 6 GAA17CA191
The pilot reported that he entered the traffic pattern for runway 4 about 800 ft above the ground. He added that, after touchdown, he did not see the fence that ran across the runway until the airplane was about 300 ft from it. Subsequently, the airplane impacted the fence. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. A review of the airport's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) chart supplement (02 MAR 2017 to 27 APR 2017) revealed that the runway the pilot landed on was depicted in the airport sketch with two "X" marks, which indicated that the runway was closed. A review of the visual flight rules sectional chart in publication at the time of the accident revealed that the surface the pilot landed was depicted along with the other runway surface at the airport. The FAA Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge stated, in part: Marking and Lighting of Permanently Closed Runways and Taxiways For runways and taxiways that are permanently closed, the lighting circuits are disconnected. The runway threshold, runway designation, and touchdown markings are obliterated and yellow "Xs" are placed at each end of the runway and at 1,000-foot intervals.A review of photographs of the "X" markings on the surface the pilot landed on showed that only fragments of faded yellow paint were visible and that what was visible did not resemble an "X."Code of Federal Regulations Section 91.103, "Preflight Action," stated, in part:Each pilot in command shall, before beginning a flight, become familiar with all available information concerning that flight. This information must include— (a) For a flight under IFR [instrument flight Page 2 of 5 GAA17CA185rules] or a flight not in the vicinity of an airport, weather reports and forecasts, fuel requirements, alternatives available if the planned flight cannot be completed, and any known traffic delays of which the pilot in command has been advised by ATC [air traffic control]; (b) For any flight, runway lengths at airports of intended use, and the…takeoff and landing distance information.The pilot did not report that he consulted the FAA chart supplement before landing, which depicted the runway closed.
The student pilot reported that, during a stop-and-go landing in crosswind conditions, the gyroplane bounced about 4 ft. He added that the wind lifted the gyroplane and that he did not have "the speed or rudder control to counteract" the drift. The gyroplane impacted the ground on its right side.The gyroplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage.The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.A review of recorded data from the automated weather observation station located on the airport revealed that, about 39 minutes before the accident, the wind was from 300° at 8 knots. The gyroplane landed on runway 30.
On March 9, 2017 at 1915 central standard time, American Airlines flight 2588, a Boeing MD-83, N9615W, from Toronto, Ontario, Canada to Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), encountered turbulence at flight level 280 (FL280) during cruise flight from Toronto, Ontario, Canada to Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), Dallas, Texas, resulting in a serious injury to one of the flight attendants (FA).  None of the other passengers and crew members were injured and the airplane received minor damage.  According to the operator, while enroute to DFW at FL 280, in intermittent IMC conditions at 0.74 Mach, the flight crew was deviating left of assigned course to avoid weather and was northeast of Memphis .  The seat belt sign was on and the on-board radar was not depicting any precipitation.   The aircraft experienced unexpected turbulence.  The #2 and the #4 FAs were seated in their jumpseats in the rear of the aircraft, however, their seatbelts were not fastened.  Both the #2 and the #4 FAs struck the overhead ceiling panel and fell to the floor.  No passengers reported injuries and the FAs were able to complete their duties.  Emergency Medical Service personnel met the FAs at the gate and transported to the hospital.  Both FAs were treated and released from the hospital that evening, however, the #2 FA was later diagnosed with fractures to her vertebrae.
The pilot reported that he attempted to land on his private airstrip but that he "landed long" due to "gusty crosswind conditions." Upon touchdown, a wind gust lifted the right wing, which resulted in the right wheel lifting off the ground. He added that he then performed a go-around, and that, due to the "high angle of attack" while attempting to clear trees and power lines, he did not have visibility out of his front windscreen. Subsequently, the airplane struck a tree and two power lines. The airplane descended, impacted the ground, and was consumed by a fire started by the severed power lines. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, fuselage, and empennage.The pilot stated that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The automated weather observation system located about 7 nautical miles from the accident site, about the time of the accident, reported wind from 190° at 14 knots, gusting to 19 knots. The pilot landed to the southwest.
The pilot of a tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during the landing roll, the airplane veered off the runway to the left. He added that he applied rudder inputs and full power to arrest the veer but was unsuccessful. The airplane continued to veer off the runway and impacted a tree. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. An automated weather observation located about 10 miles northwest of the airport reported that, about 7 minutes before the accident, the wind was from 280° at 14 knots, gusting to 21 knots. The airplane was landing on runway 29.
The pilot was returning to the airport from a local personal flight in the airplane. The airplane approached runway 9 at an angle before rolling inverted, descending, and impacting terrain, consistent with an aerodynamic stall.  A review of weather conditions revealed that, on final approach, the airplane likely experienced a tailwind of about 9 knots with wind gusts as high as 20 knots. Pilots familiar with the airport reported that, due to the slope of the runway, pilots preferred to land on runway 9 unless there was a tailwind of more than 10 knots. Postaccident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operations. It is likely that, while maneuvering on final approach to the runway with a gusting tailwind, the pilot failed to maintain control of the airplane, which resulted in the exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall.
The pilot, who was the owner of the powered glider, reported that, during the preflight, he "did not note any anomalies or irregular motion of the control surfaces." He added that, during a turn in cruise flight, the rudder pedals "abruptly became unusual." He looked to the rear of the powered glider and saw that the rudder had detached from the top of the vertical stabilizer. He added that the adverse yaw was "mild," so he continued to land. During the landing roll, the rudder separated from the empennage.Photographs provided by the Federal Aviation Administration showed extensive corrosion on the rudder hinges. The upper hinge showed a clean fracture surface on both the rudder and vertical stabilizer sides of the hinge. The pilot reported that he has an outdoor tie-down space on the airport where he parks the powered glider. The airport is located in a marine environment, less than 1/2 mile from the Pacific Ocean. The flight manual section titled, "Daily Inspections," stated, in part, Prior to flight operations the following visual exterior checks have to be performed…        5. Tail unit•         Proper installation•         Securely locked•         Control connections locked•         Freedom of movement•         DamagePage 2 of 5 GAA17CA179•         Pitot pressure tube (vertical fin) checked, cover removeA review of maintenance records revealed that the most recent annual inspection was completed about 14 months before the accident. The most recent inspection performed on the powered glider was a 6,000-hour "Extension of Life Time" inspection, which was performed about 9 months before the accident. In the 6,000-hour inspection checklist, all line items were initialed "satisfactory" except for the "visual check for any decay" line items for the aileron, controls in the fuselage, elevator/trim tab, and rudder, which were left uninitialed. The mechanic who performed the most recent annual inspection and the 6,000-hour "Extension of Life Time" inspection reported that he did not notice anything abnormal during either inspection and that, during the 6,000-hour inspection, he did not carry his initials down to the "visual check for any decay" line items but that they were performed and that the condition looked "satisfactory." He added that he believed the corrosion was responsible for the upper rudder hinge failure and that it is not uncommon for that amount of corrosion to form between the time of the most recent inspection and the accident flight. He recommended that the glider should have been inspected more often and rinsed with water daily to remove any salt residue from ocean spray.In followup e-mail correspondence, the pilot reported that he believed that, during the "Extension of Life Time" inspection, all inspections had been renewed. He added that he learned after the accident that the annual inspection had not been performed.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, after completing 12 to 13 touch-and-go landings on a grass runway in crosswind conditions, he planned to complete a full-stop landing. He added that, during the landing roll, the airplane "departed the runway to the right" into marshy terrain and nosed over.The vertical stabilizer and rudder sustained substantial damage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.According to a Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety Inspector, a few hours after the accident, he examined the grass runway and found no abnormalities with the surface.The nearest automated weather observation station, located 12 nautical miles from the accident airport, about the time of the accident, recorded wind from 190° at 7 knots. The pilot reported that he landed on runway 26 left.