roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The commercial pilot of the balloon was performing a local sightseeing flight. The balloon took off from a field, climbed, and drifted southeast. As the balloon approached an interstate, the pilot began a descent to land on a field near a university campus.About 100 to 140 ft above ground level (agl), the balloon entered a rapid descent. The pilot applied maximum fuel to the burner system to arrest the descent; however, the descent continued. The pilot stopped the descent about 50 ft agl and the balloon began to climb again; upon reaching 75 ft agl, the balloon gondola contacted power lines. The contact caused electricity to arc through the gondola, severing two of the four suspension cables. The pilot "hand-removed" the power line from the gondola, applied heat to the burner system, and climbed away from the power lines. The pilot subsequently made an uneventful landing on a soccer field at the university about a mile away from the power lines.The National Weather Service (NWS) surface analysis chart depicted a cold front, which was located immediately south of the area at the time of the accident and moving across the state. The front resulted in a shift of the prevailing wind to the north-northwest with an increasing pressure gradient behind the front. Some lifting would be associated ahead of the front and then would subside but wouldn't be classified as strong downdrafts near the accident site. Though not conclusive, it is possible that the shifting wind and changing weather conditions could have affected the performance of the balloon, causing an increase in its descent rate during the pilot's landing approach.
The private pilot departed the grass airstrip on a personal local flight in the single-seat experimental, amateur-built airplane. Two witnesses saw the airplane flying low about treetop height and then saw its nose pitch up followed by the airplane descending to ground impact. Another witness heard a loud engine, looked up, and saw the airplane in a nose dive; he heard the engine until just before the airplane impacted the ground. The witness observations were consistent with the pilot failing to maintain control of the airplane, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall. Because the airplane was flying low, there was not enough altitude for the pilot to recover the airplane from the stall.Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The propeller blades showed no rotational damage, consistent with the engine not producing power at impact. However, a witness reported hearing the engine during descent until just prior to impact. The investigation could not determine if the engine lost power during descent or if the pilot reduced power prior to impact.The shoulder harness assembly was found behind the forward bulkhead, unable to be accessed by the pilot. Additionally, the shoulder harness was found wrapped around the rudder cable. However, the wear on the shoulder harness was consistent with having been wrapped around the rudder cables for a while indicating it did not likely affect the operation of the rudder.
The pilot reported that, after clearing some electrical wires on final approach, he reduced the throttle to idle. He further reported that the airspeed became low, the airplane landed hard and bounced twice, and the nose landing gear collapsed. The airplane nosed over and came to rest inverted.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage, fuselage, and both wings.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot recently purchased the airplane and was returning it to his home airport. Before the flight, he added 1/2 quart of oil to the engine, bringing the oil level to between 3 1/2 and 4 quarts. About 30 minutes after departure, the pilot noticed that the oil pressure was dropping. He reduced engine power and turned the airplane toward the closest airport. The oil pressure continued to decrease, even though the engine continued to produce power, and the pilot chose to perform a precautionary landing on a road. Upon touchdown, the airplane skidded across the road until it impacted a tree and came to rest in a ditch. Examination of the engine revealed a hole in the oil sump consistent with impact damage, and oil was noted coming from the crankcase breather tube. In addition, oil was noted on the bottom of the airplane from the nose to the empennage. Even after the oil leaked from the broken oil sump and from the breather tube, the postaccident engine oil level was 3 1/2 quarts.A subsequent engine run demonstrated that the engine would experience a momentary drop in oil pressure indication if the oil sump was overfilled. The engine and the oil pressure gauge otherwise operated normally. Since the pilot lacked operational experience with the airplane, it is likely that he unintentionally overfilled the oil sump, which resulted in an interaction between the oil in the sump and the rotating crankshaft. The interaction likely resulted in air bubbles becoming entrained in the oil and a subsequent oil pressure fluctuation. Additionally, since he checked the oil level following a previous flight, it was likely that the oil had not fully drained back into the sump when the reading was taken. Considering that the oil pressure gauge operated normally after the accident, it is unlikely that the gauge was producing a faulty reading in flight.
The private pilot reported that the personal local flight was uneventful until the engine made an odd noise, which was followed by a partial loss of engine power. The pilot attempted to troubleshoot the problem, but the engine power was not fully restored, and the airplane was unable to maintain altitude, so the pilot made a forced landing to a road. The airplane struck power lines and vehicles before coming to rest on a sidewalk.Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the No. 3 cylinder's intake valve had separated. The valve stem was found in the oil pan, and the remainder of the valve was found in its intake manifold. Metallurgical examination of the No. 3 cylinder assembly, including the fractured intake valve, revealed that the valve was fractured in the stem in two places and through the head in one place. The interior of the cylinder exhibited damage consistent with impacts from the fractured valve. The connecting rod was intact, but the bearings were worn through both the babbit and copper layers. Examination of the fracture surfaces revealed fatigue cracks initiating from the fillet radius between the valve stem tip and the key area of the stem shaft. The other fractures were consistent with overstress.Further examination of the engine case revealed that all eight hydraulic valve tappet plungers were installed 180° opposite of the proper installation contained in the manufacturer's overhaul manual. The reversed installation of the plunger would have adversely affected the operation of the No. 3 cylinder's intake valve and placed an abnormal load on the valve's tip. A review of the engine's maintenance logbook revealed that the engine had been repaired about 35.7 hours before the accident. At that time, all four cylinders were removed and replaced, including the hydraulic valve tappet plunger assemblies. Given that the cylinders had been recently removed and reinstalled on the engine, including the hydraulic valve tappet plungers, it is likely that the engine experienced a partial loss of engine power due to maintenance personnel's improper installation of the No. 3 cylinder's hydraulic valve tappet plunger.Page 2 of 7 ERA17LA110
The pilot reported that, during the first landing of a currency flight, he "never realized he was low on the approach" and that the airplane impacted a snow-covered area short of the asphalt runway and nosed over. He added that the flight was conducted in "reduced light conditions" and that he "did not recognize the conditions as being flat light."The vertical stabilizer sustained substantial damage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The National Weather Service reported that the sun set about 25 minutes after the accident.The Federal Aviation Administration Chart Supplement stated, in part, that the landing runway was equipped with a precision approach path indicator.
The flight instructor reported that, after takeoff on the instructional flight, the engine was running smoothly before it "missed" or "hesitated." The flight instructor initiated a return to the airport; shortly thereafter, the engine began to make loud noises and vibrate, ultimately experiencing a total loss of power. The flight instructor performed a forced landing to a field, resulting in substantial damage. Examination of the engine revealed that the No. 2 connecting rod had failed. Remnants of the connecting rod bearing found within the oil pan exhibited evidence of bearing failure and extrusion. Due to the extensive secondary engine damage, the reason for the failure of the No. 2 bearing could not be determined. The engine was overhauled 11 years 6 months before the accident, and had accumulated about 16 hours of flight time in the preceding 3 years. Guidance published by the engine manufacturer stated that abnormal wear could occur during engine start due to a loss of protective oil film after an extended period of inactivity and recommended that all engines not in continuous service be overhauled every 12 years.
A flight instructor and a private pilot receiving instruction were departing for an instructional flight from runway 17L. The pilot receiving instruction reported that after liftoff, the engine rpm was high but that the airplane was not gaining altitude. The instructor reported that shortly after takeoff, he felt as if something was pushing the airplane downward. He stated that the engine had full rpm and that the throttle and mixture controls were full forward. He recalled seeing that the airspeed was about 65 knots and hearing the stall warning horn. The pilot receiving instruction reported that the airspeed was at 55 knots before he braced for impact. The airplane contacted the ground about 1 mile from the end of the runway. Landing gear track marks showed all three landing gear on the ground with a straight track until the airplane impacted a tree, after which it crossed a parking lot driveway, skidded about 100 ft, and came to rest inverted. About 2 minutes before the airplane departed, a small jet airplane had taken off from the same runway. In addition, the winds at the time of the accident were from 170° at 15 knots, gusting to 23 knots. After the accident, the private pilot reported that he was concerned about wake turbulence from the small jet, and the flight instructor reported that he thought that the airplane was affected by wind shear. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Based on the available information, the reason for the loss of control could not be determined.
The student pilot was on the second leg of a solo cross-county training flight. During the landing flare at the destination airport, he landed the airplane "hard," and it bounced twice before he was able to regain control. He taxied back to the beginning of the runway and conducted a run-up. Noting no anomalies, he taxied onto the runway and started the takeoff roll. During the takeoff, he pulled back on the yoke "too far," and the airplane climbed between 30 and 40 ft before entering an aerodynamic stall and colliding with the ground. The nose landing gear collapsed, and the propeller struck the ground, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical anomalies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. It could not be determined whether the airplane incurred damage during the hard landing that would have impacted the pilot's ability to maintain pitch control during the subsequent takeoff; therefore, the reason for the loss of control could not be determined.
The private pilot was conducting a personal local flight in the helicopter. The pilot stated that he was flying at a low altitude over a cow pasture and descended to look at the cows. The helicopter was operating at 10 knots with a 7-knot headwind when the pilot initiated a 180° turn, which resulted in a tailwind condition and a subsequent uncommanded descent. The pilot took remedial actions, but the helicopter landed hard, and the main rotor blades severed the tailboom. The pilot stated that there were no mechanical anomalies with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely that the helicopter lost effective translational lift during the turn from a headwind to a tailwind condition and that the pilot failed to compensate for the loss of translational lift, which resulted in the uncontrolled descent.
The pilot reported that, during the takeoff as the tailwheel lifted, the biplane veered "hard right" and exited the runway. He added that he "felt" he had enough speed to fly and attempted to lift off. Subsequently, the biplane struck a tree.The biplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the biplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot was flying a local, personal flight from his personal airstrip after sundown. A witness who heard the airplane before the crash reported that the engine made a "sputtering" sound. The airplane collided with two tall trees and came to rest inverted on the approach end of the runway. The propeller did not exhibit indications of rotational damage. Although the right fuel tank was breached from impact and no fuel was found inside, the left tank contained 11 gallons of fuel.An annual inspection was completed on the airframe and engine about 2.2 hours before the accident. An examination of the engine fuel lines found the throttle and metering unit outlet AN "B" nut was less than finger-tight. When the fuel manifold valve cap was opened, fuel leaked from the loose throttle and metering unit outlet AN "B" nut. Compressed air was passed through the throttle and metering unit inlet fuel line; bubbles and fuel could be seen coming out of the fuel outlet AN fitting. The condition of the fuel lines was an inspection item specifically noted as completed during the annual inspection. The throttle and metering unit outlet "B" nut most likely was not adequately secured during the inspection and backed off during the 2.2-hour previous flight and the 12-minute accident flight, which subsequently resulted in a total loss of engine power. The pilot was likely attempting to return to the runway, as the landing gear were extended and the flaps were up at the time of the accident. However, since the accident occurred concurrently with the end of civil twilight, it is possible that he did not see the trees on final approach due to the darkening conditions.
The student pilot, who had recently purchased the airplane, and a flight instructor were conducting a local instructional flight. Another pilot reported that, while approaching the airport for landing, he heard an airplane (likely the accident airplane) announce over the common traffic advisory frequency that they would be departing runway 31; however, he did not see the airplane depart. A witness, who was driving on a highway near airport, observed the accident airplane fly in front of her heading south/southeast. She stated that the airplane seemed to be flying low and fast as it went over the highway. It then began to nose down, then level out, and "tilt to the right." The witness then lost sight of the airplane behind trees.The airplane impacted trees and terrain on a southeasterly heading about 500 ft west of the departure end of runway 31 (the runway 13 threshold). Given the location and orientation of the wreckage, it is possible that the flight instructor and student departed runway 31 and were attempting to return to the airport to land on the opposite runway (13) when they experienced a loss of control. As the airplane turned back toward runway 13, the pilots would have encountered an 8-knot gusting to 14-knot tailwind, which would have increased the airplane's ground speed and closure rate with terrain and obstacles surrounding the airport and the runway.Weight and balance calculations revealed that, although the airplane was operating below its maximum gross weight at the time of the accident, its center of gravity (CG) was forward of the limit established by the manufacturer. Since airplane stability and control are affected by improper balance, exceedance of the forward limit would likely have resulted in a nose-heavy condition and difficulty in controlling and raising the nose, especially during takeoff and landing.Although the reason for the decision to land on the opposite runway could not be determined, it is likely that the airplane's forward CG affected its control characteristics and that the trim required to help relieve the control forces imposed by the forward CG may have resulted in reduced pitch control travel at the lower airspeeds required for approach and landing. Examination of the airplane and engine did not reveal evidence of any preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. There was evidence of fuel onboard, and the lack of airframe, flight control, and engine anomalies were Page 2 of 12 ERA17FA106also consistent with a loss of control event.Toxicology testing revealed that the flight instructor had used amphetamine at some time before the flight, but whether the drug was being used to treat an underlying condition such as attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) or narcolepsy, or whether he had used the amphetamine illicitly to get high and was in/or entering the withdrawal phase of use, also could not be determined. Overall, whether the flight instructor's use of amphetamine or effects from an underlying medical condition contributed to the accident circumstances could not be determined.
The Boulder sector approach controller was the first controller the pilot of CPZ6081 contacted when entering NCT airspace. The controller informed the pilot that the ATIS was "tango" and to expect a visual approach to runway 28L. Aircraft arriving from the south of SFO were routinely assigned runway 28L on initial contact; however, when noise abatement procedures were in effect, runway 28R was the preferential runway. When the Boulder controller realized that CPZ6081 would arrive at SFO during noise abatement hours, he informed the Woodside controller that he would change CPZ6081 to runway 28R. The Boulder controller subsequently changed CPZ6081's data tag on the radar display from runway 28L to runway 28R and electronically handed the airplane off to the Woodside controller. The Boulder controller did not inform the pilot of CPZ6081 about the runway change to 28R and did not inform the Woodside controller that he had not passed that runway change information to the pilot.  CPZ6081's data tag indicated runway 28R when the Woodside controller accepted the airplane.  When the Woodside controller cleared CPZ6081 for the visual approach to runway 28R, that was the first mention of runway 28R to the pilot. The pilot read back "runway 28R," however, continued to prepare for the runway 28L approach. The flight crew had briefed for a visual approach to runway 28L with a backup ILS to runway 28L and thought they had been cleared for the runway 28L approach. The Woodside controller electronically handed off CPZ6081 to SFO ATCT, and the SFO local controller accepted the handoff; the data tag on the tower radar display indicated runway 28R. Page 2 of 10 OPS17IA014The pilot of CPZ6081 contacted SFO tower and reported they were on a visual approach to runway 28L. The local controller issued the wind and cleared CPZ6081 to land "runway 28L," which the pilot read back correctly. When the local controller instructed VRD920 to LUAW on runway 28L, she visually scanned the approach corridor and saw CPZ6081 on final approach, and then scanned the tower radar display and saw that CPZ6081's data tag indicated runway 28R. She stated that although it was difficult to visually discern which runway (28L/28R) an aircraft was lined up for, especially at night, she expected CPZ6081to land on runway 28R, and thought she had cleared the flight to land on runway 28R. The local control audio revealed that the local controller had been consistent in providing traffic information to a pilot when she put an airplane into LUAW when another airplane was on the approach for that runway; however, in this case she had not provided traffic information to VRD920 or  CPZ6081. The airport surface surveillance capability (ASSC) system functioned as designed and produced the appropriate alert when CPZ6081 was approximately .85 nautical mile final runway 28L. The local controller took timely and appropriate action when the ASSC alerted and issued go-around instruction to CPZ6081; the pilot adhered to the go-around instruction.
The pilot was on a cross-country flight with no discrepancies noted during the flight. When the flight arrived near the destination airport, the engine quit. The pilot attempted to troubleshoot the engine, but it did not restart. He diverted to an alternate nearby airport but had to perform an emergency off-airport landing. The pilot set up for landing, but because of the darkness he was not able to see exactly where to land. During the landing, the airplane struck a fence and seating area. The pilot reported approximately 40-45 gallons of fuel onboard at the time of the accident. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and tail section of the airplane.An engine examination and engine ground run were performed, with no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation or production of horsepower.
The pilot of the tailwheel, ski-equipped airplane reported that, while landing off airport in flat light conditions, he was unable to maintain a good visual reference of the hard-packed snow-covered landing area. After touchdown, the airplane drifted off the hard-packed snow, and the left ski sunk in softer snow. He increased power and attempted to recover with "hard right control" to no avail. The airplane's left ski struck a snow-covered tank.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left-wing lift strut.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
On February 15, 2017, at about 1142 eastern standard time, a PSA Airlines flight 5320, a Bombardier CRJ700, N709PS, struck a deer during takeoff from runway 36C at Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT), Charlotte, North Carolina. The airplane sustained substantial damage. There were no injuries to the 48 passengers and crew onboard.   The flight was operating under 14 CFR Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight from CLT to Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport (GPT), Gulfport, Mississippi.According to the operator, the airplane struck a deer with its right wing during the takeoff roll.  The crew continued the takeoff and declared an emergency.  Before returning to land, the flight crew conducted a low pass down runway 36R, for the airport rescue and firefighting (ARFF) to inspect the damage. ARFF observed damage to the right wing and reported vapor coming from it. After landing on runway 36R, the flight crew elected to stop on the taxiway due to the fuel leak, where passengers were evacuated and bused them to the terminal. Post flight examination of the wing found damage substantial damage to the leading edge slats, slat tracks, flaps, and front spar of the right wing.