roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The glider pilot reported that, during an aerotow takeoff and after becoming distracted by something in the cockpit, he looked back outside and noticed that he was about 100 ft higher than the tow airplane. He added that he attempted to correct, "but the tow hook released on its own." The pilot turned the glider to the left, the left wing impacted the ground, and the glider came to rest in some brush.The glider sustained substantial damage to the fuselage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the glider that would have precluded normal operation.The Federal Aviation Administration's Glider Flying Handbook, FAA-H-8083-13A, "Normal Assisted Takeoff" section, stated, in part:One of the most dangerous occurrences during aerotow is allowing the glider to fly high above and losing sight of the towplane. The tension on the towline caused by the glider pulls the towplane tail up, lowering its nose. If the glider continues to rise, pulling the towplane tail higher, the tow pilot may not be able to raise the nose. Ultimately, the tow pilot may run out of up elevator authority.
The pilot reported that he was attempting to perform a crosswind, soft-field takeoff from a dry, turf airstrip. He set the flaps to 10°, and the airplane was in a nose-high attitude until the stall warning horn sounded. He then relaxed pressure on the yoke until the stall warning horn stopped. Shortly after liftoff, the airplane entered a power-on stall, and the pilot lost airplane control, and the airplane then began to descend to the runway. The airplane subsequently departed the runway and impacted a barbed wire fence.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing strut.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The solo student pilot reported that, as the airplane entered ground effect, while landing in crosswind conditions, a wind gust lifted the airplane and pushed it to the left. He added that he initiated a go-around and "[pushed] the nose down slightly to gain lift." He further added that, during the go-around, he "must have relaxed the aileron countering the wind," and a wind gust pushed the airplane to the left. Subsequently, the airplane impacted the ground and spun around. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the engine mount. The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The automated weather observation system located on the airport reported that, about 23 minutes before the accident, the wind was from 180° at 15 knots, gusting to 21 knots. The student pilot landed on runway 16.
The commercial pilot had filed an instrument flight rules flight plan and was departing in dark night visual meteorological conditions on a cross-country personal flight. A witness at the departure airport stated that during takeoff, the airplane sounded and looked normal. The witness said that the airplane lifted off about halfway down runway 24, and there was "plenty" of runway remaining for the airplane to land. The witness lost sight of the airplane and did not see the accident because the airport hangars blocked her view. The wreckage was located about 2,400 ft southeast of the departure end of runway 24. Examination of the accident site indicated that the airplane impacted in a nose-down attitude with a left bank of about 20°. A left turn during departure was consistent with the airport's published instrument departure procedures for obstacle avoidance, which required an immediate climbing left turn while proceeding to a navigational beacon located about 7 miles east-northeast of the airport.Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot had reportedly been awake for about 15 hours and was conducting the departure about the time he normally went to sleep and, therefore, may have been fatigued about the time of the event; however, given the available evidence, it was impossible to determine the role of fatigue in this event.Although the circumstances of the accident are consistent with spatial disorientation, there was insufficient evidence to determine whether it may have played a role in the sequence of events.
The commercial pilot was on the second leg of a postmaintenance flight. The first flight leg, which was about 1-hour long, was uneventful, and the pilot reported that the fuel selector was positioned to the right tank during this flight leg. He landed the airplane but did not purchase fuel before departing for the return leg. The pilot reported that, during the return leg, the fuel selector was positioned to the left tank. While on final approach to the airport, the pilot added power to go around. He turned onto the crosswind and then downwind legs of the airport traffic pattern, and while on the downwind leg, the engine lost all power. The pilot switched the fuel selector to the right tank, but engine power was not restored. Realizing that the airplane would be unable to reach the runway, the pilot conducted a forced landing in trees, and the airplane came to rest inverted.During postaccident examination, more than the unusable amount of fuel was drained from the left fuel tank, which was breached in two locations; only about 6 ounces of fuel were drained from the unbreached right fuel tank. No fuel was found in the engine-driven fuel pump or the flow divider, which is indicative of fuel starvation. Examination of the fuel supply system revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The engine was started and operated briefly using the fuel that had been drained from the airplane with no discrepancies noted.Although the pilot stated that he conducted the entire second flight leg with the fuel selector positioned to the left tank and then switched to the right tank after the engine lost power, the fuel selector was found positioned to the left tank, which had more than the unusable amount of fuel. Therefore, it is likely that the pilot was approaching the airport with the fuel selector positioned to the right tank, which ran out of fuel, and that he then switched to the left tank too late to restore engine power. Given this and the lack of fuel in the engine-driven fuel pump and flow divider, it is likely that the pilot mismanaged the fuel, which resulted in the loss of all engine power.Page 2 of 7 ERA17LA205
The student pilot reported that, during the landing roll of a solo flight, the airplane landed to the left of the runway centerline. He added that he applied right rudder but overcorrected and that the airplane veered to the right. The student pilot reported that he "panicked" and his leg "got stuck on the right rudder." The airplane veered off the runway to the right and impacted a ditch.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the firewall.The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during the landing and as the left main landing gear (MLG) touched down, the airplane encountered a wind gust and then veered "abruptly" left. He added that, as the right MLG touched down, the airplane "began skidding to the left," and the right MLG collapsed. Subsequently, the airplane came to rest on the left side of the runway and nosed down.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The automated weather observation system at the airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 260° at 10 knots, gusting to 15 knots. The pilot landed the airplane on runway 32.
The No. 1 engine failure was caused by combustion outer liner buckling due to low cycle (thermal) fatigue.  An axial crack that was about 2.5 inches long in the outer panel connected with a circumferential crack that was about 12 inches long between the 10 o'clock and 12:30 positions. At the junction of the two cracks, the outer liner was displaced (buckled) about 1.5 inches inward toward the engine centerline. The liner deformation caused an airflow disruption that prevented complete combustion of fuel in the combustion chamber and decreased engine performance margin. In response to the decrease in performance, the engine control system increased fuel flow in an attempt to compensate. The combination of increased fuel flow and incomplete combustion of the fuel injected into the combustion chamber led to delayed ignition of unconsumed fuel downstream of the combustion chamber (flame holder). The delayed ignition resulted in thermal damage to the high pressure turbine (HPT) hardware. The first stage HPT blades and vanes receive a high volume of cooling airflow and remained intact, but the HPT 2nd stage nozzle was thermally damaged and a nozzle vane segment at the 10 o'clock position eventually separated. After separation of the HPT 2nd stage nozzle vane segment, all four stages of the LPT experienced severe impact damage as separated fragments moved through the gaspath. The HPT 2nd stage nozzle separation also resulted in LPT case burn through at the 10 o'clock position that allowed hot gases to escape and contact the engine fire detection loop, which triggered a fire warning. There was no evidence that high energy fragments exited the LPT case.     Combustion liner cracks are a normal occurrence on high time parts. The engine line maintenance manual (LMM) includes inspection criteria with limits based on crack length and location.     SkyWest received a total of four GE customer notification reports (CNRs) for the incident engine related to reduced hot day performance margin. SkyWest complied with the CNR recommendation to perform a core engine water wash after receipt of each CNR. Although the first water wash was effective, the third (April 1, 2017) and fourth (May 6, 2017) attempts did not improve engine performance margin. The CNRs all also included a recommendation to perform a borescope inspection (BSI) of the HPC and HPT (recommendations 3 and 4). SkyWest performed a HPC BSI on June 6, 2017 Page 2 of 8 ENG17IA028and no anomalies were reported. They then elected to cease further maintenance on the engine and instead scheduled it for removal and replacement. The HPT 2nd stage nozzle thermal damage would likely have been visible if an HPT BSI had been performed.      Reduced engine margin and the two ITT exceedances were both strong indicators of a potential core engine issue, but SkyWest did comply with all AMM inspection requirements leading up to the engine failure. GE CNRs are non-mandatory diagnostic tools, so both the completion of the recommended maintenance actions and the order the maintenance actions are completed are at the discretion of the operator.
The noninstrument-rated private pilot reported that, while en route, he encountered clouds about 2,200 ft above ground level (agl). He descended the airplane to 2,100 ft agl to try to get out of the clouds, but he still could not see outside. The pilot reported that he decided not to climb nor contact air traffic control; the airplane impacted a tree-covered mountain ridge and came to rest upright with its left wing bent aft. The pilot reported no anomalies with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot reported that the helicopter's engine start and run-up were normal. At full power for takeoff, the helicopter began to vibrate. The pilot "rolled the throttle off" and lowered the collective; however, the vibrations became worse and the helicopter "began to destroy itself." He reported that he had not re-centered before the cyclic trim before takeoff as noted on the checklist, and it remained at a nearly full-forward position from the previous flight. He noted that if the cyclic had been centered, the vibrations would have stopped. However, with the trim full forward, the rotor blades began hitting the stops, causing the vibrations. The pilot added that there were no malfunctions or failures with the helicopter before the accident.
The pilot reported that, during the landing, the airplane bounced. She added that she attempted to correct, but the propeller struck the runway. The pilot taxied the airplane to the ramp without further incident.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the firewall.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor reported that, during a simulated engine failure in the traffic pattern, with gusting wind conditions, the student pilot entered a forward slip on final approach. He added that 10 to 20 ft above the runway surface, "the wind gust we were riding suddenly halted wherein the aircraft began a rapid downward descent." The flight instructor reported that he "went for the flight controls to take command," but the student pilot at that same time applied back pressure on the flight controls. Subsequently, the airplane touched down hard, bounced, and the flight instructor performed a go-around. The flight instructor completed the subsequent traffic pattern and landing without further incident.The engine mounts and firewall sustained substantial damage. The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.An automated weather observation station at the airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 170° at 16 knots, gusting to 24 knots. The flight instructor reported that the landing was on runway 15.
The airplane was in cruise flight when the engine's forward main seal (crankshaft seal) began to leak engine oil. Shortly thereafter, the engine lost power, and the pilot subsequently performed a forced landing to a field about 5 miles west of the departure airport. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the bottom half of the crankshaft seal had slipped forward from its placement, which allowed engine oil to leak from the engine. The seal had an approximate time in service of 21 hours since its replacement. It is likely that maintenance personne installed an improperly sized crankshaft seal, which led to it slipping, allowing the engine oil to leak.
The instrument-rated commercial pilot departed on a 46-nautical-mile visual flight rules (VFR) flight in the multiengine airplane. Radar data indicated that, as the airplane approached the destination airport at an altitude about 500 ft above ground level, it turned northwest and climbed and appeared to be heading toward a nearby airport. The airplane then entered a right turning descent. The final radar target associated with the airplane was at 3,649 ft mean sea level (about 700 ft agl) about 1 nautical mile north of the accident site. The pilot received two weather briefings before departing on the accident flight, the second about 45 minutes before departure. During the second briefing, the pilot was provided AIRMETs Tango and Sierra for moderate turbulence and mountain obscuration due to clouds and mist, valid for the route of flight and the area of the destination airport.  The pilot was also advised during this briefing that VFR flight was not recommended. Review of weather information revealed the presence of multiple cloud layers in the area of the accident site around the time of the accident, including scattered clouds at 1,600 ft above ground level (agl), a broken ceiling at 2,900 ft, and an overcast ceiling at 6,500 ft.Despite the forecasts indicating marginal VFR conditions for the destination airport, the pilot chose to depart and continue into an area of low cloud ceilings and rising terrain. It is likely that, while maneuvering at low altitude, the terrain was obscured or the pilot's in-flight visibility was limited by the cloud conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.Witness marks in the trees and damage to the airplane were consistent with a controlled flight into terrain event. The airframe and engine examination revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.Page 2 of 10 WPR17FA125The toxicology report yielded positive findings for ethanol and for citalopram, a prescription antidepressant. It is likely that some of the ethanol was the result of postmortem production; however, due to limited tissue specimens, whether some of the ethanol was from ingestion or if it impaired the pilot could not be determined. It is unlikely that the pilot's use of citalopram resulted in impairment, but whether the pilot was impaired by the effects of depression could not be determined. Additionally, due to the extent of injury, autopsy was unable to determine if the pilot had any potentially impairing natural disease.Through a review of the pilot's FAA certified medical information, it was determined that the pilot was instrument rated. However, the pilot's logbook was not available, and investigators were not able to determine the pilots instrument currency.
The pilot of the airplane reported that, during landing, she added full flaps, and the wind shifted. She applied full power, but the airplane settled, and the left main landing gear touched down on the left edge of the runway. Subsequently, the airplane impacted trees on the left side of the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot reported that the wind was light and variable and that she landed on runway 19. The automated weather observation system about 9 nautical miles from the accident site reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 220° at 7 knots. Additional weather observations from the same site showed that, from 1 hour before the accident until 1 hour after the accident, the wind direction varied from south-southwest to west-northwest, and the speed varied from 6 to 8 knots.
The private pilot reported that, during the accident flight, he planned to take off and circle the experimental, amateur-built airplane above the runway to check engine operation. Just after takeoff, the engine began sputtering. He made a left 180° turn to return to the runway and during the turn, the engine experienced a total loss of power. He stated that the airplane stalled when he was in the turn and he did not have enough time to recover before impacting the ground. The airplane had accumulated about 47 hours of run time and was in the initial flight test stage when the accident occurred.The pilot reported that he had been having trouble with increased cylinder head temperatures on the converted automotive engine. The engine had experienced a total loss of power during a previous flight, but the pilot was able to land the airplane without incident. Following that event, he replaced some ignition system components and adjusted the valves. He was then able to start the engine and reported that it "ran fine" during subsequent test runs.Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the fuel mixture was not adjustable in the cockpit. Examination of the engine revealed that there was melted plastic material inside the distributor rotor and the distributor drive shaft. The condition of the spark plugs was consistent with an overly lean fuel mixture and/or high temperature operation. It is likely that the melted distributor rotor was the result of the engine's high operating temperatures; the degradation of the distributor and its drive shaft would have resulted in a shift in ignition timing and a subsequent loss of engine power.
According to the flight instructor, after an uneventful training flight, the airplane was returning to home base. After touchdown and during the landing roll, the airplane veered to the right of the centerline and stopped. The instructor exited the airplane and discovered that the right main landing gear had collapsed. Postaccident examination of the landing gear revealed that the right aft main landing gear trunnion bracket had failed and that the wing spar web was damaged. A visual examination of the fracture surfaces revealed that the landing gear trunnion bracket failed during an overstress event. A review of the logbooks did not reveal any recent maintenance to the gear assembly. The investigation could not determine when the overstress event occurred that resulted in the failure of right main landing gear trunnion bracket.
The commercial pilot reported that, while inflating the balloon with hot air in light wind, he heard people yelling and stopped burning; he turned and saw another balloon that was airborne and swinging around. The accident balloon then became airborne and started swinging around very rapidly. He looked down and realized that spectators on the ground were directly below his balloon, and he immediately started burning to add heat so that the balloon would rise and not descend on spectators. Due to concern for spectator safety, the pilot felt his only recourse was to attempt to climb the balloon to avoid injuring the spectators on the ground. However, the accident balloon did not rise and instead struck the ground twice, and the pilot was ejected from the basket. Due to the decreased weight after the pilot was ejected, the balloon rose and flew off with two passengers still in the basket and subsequently landed about 2 blocks away. The passengers jumped out, causing the balloon to rise again. The balloon descended a final time about 1/4 mile away in a field. A review of weather reports from a nearby airport revealed that the wind was 5 knots. A spectator on the ground provided videos of the balloons before and during the accident sequence. The spectator reported and the videos showed that the wind was calm, followed by gusts. Based on the available evidence, it is likely the accident resulted from unexpected wind gusts that led the balloon to prematurely become airborne.