roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The commercial pilot reported that, during the local sightseeing flight, he noticed fire sparks and smoke starting to fill the cabin. Shortly after, the engine lost all power, and the airplane started to shake violently. The pilot decided to return to the airport, and while en route, he attempted to restart the engine without success. When he realized there was insufficient altitude to land on the runway, he initiated a forced landing to a nearby field. The airplane impacted terrain short of the airport perimeter fence and sustained substantial damage.An engine examination revealed that the engine oil filler cap was not secured, and evidence of oil was found around the No. 4 cylinder and intake pipes. The pilot reported that he checked the oil level before the first flight of the day and then flew 10 more flights that day but did not check the oil level before those flights. The Pilot's Operating Handbook indicated that the oil quantity is to be confirmed and the oil filler cap is to be secured before each flight. It is likely that the pilot did not properly secure the oil filler cap during the preflight inspection before the first flight of the day and did not verify that it was secured before any of the following 10 flights, which resulted in a gradual leak of engine oil and subsequent engine seizure. Further, his failure to check the oil before the following 10 flights prevented him from identifying that the oil had leaked out and was at an insufficient level.
After refueling the airplane, the pilot and the pilot-rated passenger took off in the airplane to return to the pilot's home airport. During the initial climb, the airplane accelerated to about 67 knots and reached an altitude of about 170 ft above ground level before it began to slow and lose altitude, consistent with a loss of engine power. Although more than 2,300 ft of relatively level grassy terrain suitable for an emergency landing remained ahead of the airplane, the pilot made a left turn back toward the departure end of the runway. During the turn, the airplane entered a steep left spiral, impacted the ground, and caught fire.The airplane's left main fuel tank cap was found on the left side of the runway about 1,000 ft from the threshold and 4,500 ft from the main wreckage. The cap's locking lever was engaged, and it showed no fire or impact damage. The fuel selector valve was found positioned to the right main fuel tank feed position. Flight control continuity was confirmed, and no other preimpact anomalies were found. According to the pilot operating handbook for the airplane, the fuel selector should be on the left main fuel tank for takeoff. It is likely that the left main fuel tank cap was not secured after the airplane was refueled and fell off the airplane's left wing onto the runway during the takeoff. Without the cap in place, fuel escaped from the left main fuel tank and subsequently starved the engine of fuel during the climb, resulting in the power loss. The pilot likely switched the fuel selector to the right main fuel tank in an attempt to restart the engine. When the pilot tried to turn back to the airport, he failed to maintain a safe airspeed, and the airplane exceeded its critical angle of attack and entered an aerodynamic stall.
The private pilot was conducting a personal flight in the experimental, amateur-built airplane. During the initial climb, the engine lost total power when the airplane was about 200 ft above ground level. The airplane descended and impacted trees beyond the departure threshold; the airplane was destroyed. A witness reported hearing the engine "sputter," and another witness reported that the engine sounded like it did not reach full rpm during takeoff. An engine examination revealed that the gascolator and carburetor contained water-contaminated fuel. The examination did not reveal any other preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Due to his injuries, the pilot was unable to recall the events leading up to the accident. Although he indicated that he routinely completed thorough preflight inspections, he likely either did not sample the fuel or did not adequately eliminate water from the fuel before takeoff. Thus, it is likely that the loss of engine power was due to water contamination of the fuel.
The commercial pilot reported that, after he climbed the non-certificated, experimental airplane to 300 to 400 ft above ground level after takeoff, there was a partial loss of engine power. The engine continued to operate but was unable to produce adequate power to sustain flight. The pilot attempted to land in a field near a residential area and the airplane impacted a fence, which resulted in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. The fuel in the airplane had not been changed for about 12 months before the accident; however, a limited examination of the wreckage determined that the fuel onboard the airplane tested negative for water. The airplane was manufactured in 2001 and never received an airworthiness certificate. The postaccident examination was limited and the reason for the loss of power was not determined.
During initial climb in the experimental, amateur-built airplane, the engine lost total power. The private pilot switched fuel tanks, but the engine did not regain power. The pilot then intentionally slowed and stalled the airplane just above trees; it collided with the trees and ground, coming to rest inverted. The fuel tanks were constructed of fiberglass. Examination of the wreckage revealed that fuel was leaking from the right wing; however, the fuel filter was clogged with dirt and fiberglass. Although it could not be definitively determined how much fuel was on board, it is likely that the clogged fuel filter starved the engine of fuel, which resulted in the loss of engine power.
The pilot of the weight-shift-control aircraft reported that, during the base leg turn, a flock of small birds entered the flightpath, and he banked to avoid them. He added that, a moment later, a larger bird struck the support cable on the right wing. No control issues were evident; however, he decided to land in a cleared field to check the structure for damage. During the landing, the nosewheel hit the ground hard, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and wing.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the weight-shift-control aircraft that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the flight instructor in the skid-equipped helicopter, he was providing hover instruction to his airplane-rated student about 3 ft above the ground.The instructor reported that he allowed the student to make the necessary flight control inputs as he guarded the controls. The area was level with 1-ft-tall weeds. The helicopter began to drift laterally and descend. The right skid contacted the weeds, and the helicopter rolled onto its right side. The instructor reported that "I was not quick enough in lowering the collective to prevent full rollover."The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the tailboom and engine mounts. Per the National Transportation Safety Board's Pilot Aircraft Accident Report, the instructor reported that the accident could have been prevented by instructing hover practice at a "higher altitude and away from obstacles that may serve as a pivot point leading to dynamic rollover." The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
A private pilot in a fixed-wing airplane was landing at the airport following a personal flight, and a flight instructor and a pilot receiving instruction were conducting a flight review in a helicopter and practicing maneuvers in the airport traffic pattern. The instructor reported that he or the pilot receiving instruction made radio calls on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) before each turn in the pattern. When the helicopter was 1 mile from the runway, the pilot receiving instruction turned the helicopter onto final approach. After completing a steep approach, the pilot receiving instruction brought the helicopter into a hover about 15 ft above the runway threshold. The airplane pilot stated that he heard a heavy buzzing sound on the CTAF, like a helicopter rotor, and a barely distinguishable word; he scanned for traffic and declared being on downwind. The airplane pilot quickly turned to the base leg of the traffic pattern and then proceeded to land; the airplane then struck the helicopter from behind as the airplane landed on the same runway as the helicopter. The pilots of both aircraft reported scanning for traffic; however, the airplane pilot reported that he did not see the helicopter until about 2 seconds before the collision, while the flight instructor and pilot receiving instruction in the helicopter did not see the airplane before the collision, as the helicopter was oriented down the runway with its tail pointed toward the runway's approach end. Given that the airplane struck the helicopter from behind while landing, it is unlikely that the helicopter pilots were in a position to see and take action to avoid the airplane. Conversely, because of the airplane's position, the airplane pilot had the best opportunity to see and take action to avoid the helicopter.Postaccident examinations of the radio communication systems in the airplane and helicopter did not reveal any anomalies. The instructor in the helicopter indicated that radio calls were made during every turn while the helicopter was in the airport traffic pattern. The airplane pilot indicated that he was operating on the CTAF and that he was confident his calls on the radio were heard. However, the pilot of another airplane who was about 2 miles west of the airport and was monitoring the airport's CTAF recalled hearing a radio call from the helicopter announcing that it was on a 1-mile final approach to the runway at 500 ft but did not recall hearing any transmissions from the airplane. Thus, given that the Page 2 of 15 ERA17LA332airplane pilot's transmissions were not heard, it is likely that he did not adequately transmit the airplane's position while in the airport traffic pattern.
After completing an uneventful preflight inspection, the pilot was unable to start the engine due to low pressure in the pneumatic system. An individual arrived with a tank of air to pressurize the system while the pilot remained in the airplane. The pilot shut off the compressed air supply valve, as required during a pneumatic system recharge; however, the recharge could not be accomplished due to an incorrect adapter. While the individual left to find the correct adapter, another individual offered to help start the engine manually by turning the propeller. After the engine started, the pilot forgot to reopen the compressed air supply valve and, during taxi, the airplane experienced a loss of braking performance that affected its steering capabilities (the steering is accomplished through differential braking, and the brake system requires pneumatic pressure to operate). The pilot was unable to maintain directional control, and the airplane subsequently collided with a fence and sustained substantial damage to the left wing.The checklist for the make/model airplane does not require the pilot to check the air pressure or valve position during the preflight, engine start, or before takeoff phases.
The instrument-rated private pilot departed on a cross-country flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with an overcast cloud layer at 500 ft above ground level (agl) and visibility restricted to 1 ¾ miles in mist, without receiving an instrument clearance or opening his filed instrument flight rules flight plan. There was an outage of the ground communications system at the airport and there was no evidence that the pilot attempted to open his flight plan via his cellular telephone. In addition, there was a low-level outage of the radar services in the vicinity of the accident site and investigators were unable to determine the airplane's route of flight before impact. The airport manager observed the accident airplane depart from runway 35 and enter the clouds. Witnesses located to the north of the accident site did not see the airplane but reported hearing an airplane depart about the time of the accident. One witness reported hearing a low-flying airplane and commented that the engines sounded as if they were operating at full power. The witness heard a thud as he was walking into his home but attributed it to a thunderstorm in the area. The airplane impacted a field about 3.5 miles to the northeast of the departure end of the runway and off the track for the intended route of flight. The airplane was massively fragmented during the impact and debris was scattered for about 300 ft. The damage to the airplane and ground scars at the accident site were consistent with the airplane impacting in a left wing low, nose low attitude with relatively high energy.A postaccident examination of the engines and propeller assemblies did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Signatures were consistent with both engines producing power and both propellers developing thrust at the time of impact. While the massive fragmentation precluded functional testing of the equipment, there was no damage or failure that suggested preimpact anomalies with the airframe or flight controls.Several days before the accident flight, the pilot encountered a "transient flag" on the air data attitude heading reference system. The pilot reported the flag to both the co-owner of the airplane and an Page 2 of 11 CEN17FA362avionics shop; however, exact details of the flag are not known. The unit was destroyed by impact forces and could not be functionally tested. If the flag affecting the display of attitude information had occurred with the unit after takeoff, the instrument panel had adequate stand-by instrumentation from which the pilot could have continued the flight. It is not known if this unit failed during the takeoff and investigators were unable to determine what role, if any, this transient issue may have played in the accident.Based upon the reported weather conditions, the location of the wreckage, and the attitude of the airplane at the time of impact with the ground, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation shortly after takeoff which resulted in a loss of control and descent into terrain.
The noninstrument-rated private pilot and 2 passengers departed in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with an overcast cloud layer at 400 ft above ground level (agl). Data obtained from an onboard GPS unit showed the airplane depart toward the destination airport and climb and descend several times. About 2 minutes after takeoff, the airplane descended to 250 ft above ground level (agl), then turned and quickly climbed to 1,400 ft agl. The final GPS points showed the airplane in a descending right turn. A witness reported hearing the airplane overhead and stated that the engine was "screaming" before impact. The airplane impacted a field about 4 minutes after takeoff resulting in a debris path about 230 yards long, consistent with a relatively high forward airspeed at the time of impact.A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The primary vacuum pump was not found in the wreckage; however, an examination of the standby vacuum pump revealed that the rotor was fractured by impact, but the vanes were intact. The heading indicator and turn coordinator gyros exhibited rotational scoring consistent with rotation at the time of impact. The damage to the propeller blades was consistent with the engine producing power at impact. The autopsy report revealed no significant coronary artery disease; however, microscopic examination revealed focal areas of fine fibrosis suggestive of prior ischemic episodes. This finding was not significant enough to suggest an incapacitating event. No other significant natural disease was present that could pose a hazard to flight safety.Review of the pilot's logbook and his statements to individuals who spoke with him before the accident suggested that he had a history of flying in and around IMC. Given the weather conditions at the time of departure and observations of the pilot checking the weather conditions before the flight, the pilot was aware that he would be required to fly in or under IMC during the flight and chose to do so despite not holding an instrument rating. Based on the reported weather conditions and GPS data, it is likely that, Page 2 of 11 CEN17FA361while maneuvering on course after takeoff, the pilot entered IMC; he likely subsequently experienced spatial disorientation, which resulted in a loss of control and descent into terrain.
The private pilot and passenger had planned a round trip personal flight in the pilot's single-engine airplane. According to the pilot, he had wanted to service the airplane with fuel before the return leg, but he did not do so due to the passenger's desire to arrive home before a certain time. During the initial descent of the return leg, the engine lost total power. The pilot conducted a series of troubleshooting steps to no avail and then conducted a forced landing onto a residential street and struck trees. Postaccident wreckage examination revealed that both fuel tanks were empty, and although the right fuel tank sustained a small breach during impact, there was no fuel odor at the accident site. A series of brown streaks were observed trailing from an area adjacent to the right-wing fuel sump drain. The sump valve sealant was badly degraded, and it is possible that a small fuel leak had developed at an undetermined time; however, blue streaking would have been more likely if a significant and recent fuel loss had occurred. Further examination revealed no leaks in the fuel supply system or engine. The engine tachometer was tested for accuracy, and no anomalies were noted. During an engine test run, the engine started normally and operated through its full speed range with no evidence of a mechanical anomaly.The pilot had purchased the airplane 5 months before the accident and had been tracking fuel consumption since his purchase. He determined a representative fuel burn rate based on fuel purchases and engine tachometer hour-meter readings. The pilot reported that he did this because the fuel gauges were unreliable, and he did not possess a calibrated dipstick to measure the actual fuel quantities. Using his calculated fuel burn and tachometer reading method, the pilot estimated that he had enough fuel remaining to complete the flight and land with the Federal Aviation Administration-required 45-minute fuel reserve. However, he had performed multiple flights since the last fill up, which included one go-around and a full runway-length taxi earlier in the day. The total time for those flights was near the airplane's fuel endurance limit when measured by tachometer time, but the fuel consumption was likely higher due to the increased consumption demanded by the engine during the multiple takeoffs. It is likely that the pilot miscalculated the amount of fuel on board before the flight, which resulted in fuel Page 2 of 11 WPR17LA212exhaustion and a subsequent total loss of engine power.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during the second touch-and-go landing in gusting wind conditions, the "wind got under [the] left wing," and the airplane ground looped to the left. He added that, during the ground loop, he applied brakes, and the airplane nosed over on the runway. The right wing and fuselage sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.An automated weather observation station at the airport reported, about the time of the accident, wind from 360° at 10 knots, gusting 20 knots. The pilot reported that the landing was on runway 35.The pilot did not submit the National Transportation Safety Board Form 6120.1 Pilot/ Operator Aircraft Accident/ Incident Report.
The flight instructor reported that, while the student pilot was flying on downwind, he noticed a bird approaching the airplane. He added that he took the flight controls from the student and banked left, but the airplane struck the bird. The airplane landed without further incident.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing.The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The Federal Aviation Administration Airport Facility Diagram page for the airport stated, in part: "Birds and wildlife on and invof [in vicinity of] arpt."
The solo student pilot reported that the purpose of his flight was to practice hover taxi. During a right pedal turn, about 3 to 5 ft above the ground, the helicopter rolled onto its side.Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed substantial damage to the tailboom. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the pilot in the experimental, amateur-built, tailwheel-equipped airplane, he touched down on a turf surface runway, and the airplane bounced. When the airplane descended to the surface, the right main landing gear wheel and brake assembly separated from the landing gear leg. The pilot reported that the airplane "skidded down" the runway and nosed over.The pilot reported that he had recently installed tundra tires on the airplane and that the four bolts that came with the tundra tire kit were not long enough to properly secure the wheel and brake assembly to the landing gear leg. He recalled that he used four bolts that were longer; however, they were not provided by the manufacturer. He asserted that the nuts he used to retain the bolts were provided in the wheel assembly kit.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right-wing strut and the left-wing spar.
The pilot reported that, during the takeoff roll, the experimental tailwheel-equipped airplane's left wing dropped. The pilot corrected with right aileron input and back pressure on the control yoke. However, the airplane veered off the runway, bounced, and then impacted the runway in a right-wing-low attitude. Subsequently, the airplane nosed over. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the weld that connects the left main landing gear and the axle had failed. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing and empennage.
The pilot reported that, during the takeoff roll in the tailwheel-equipped airplane, with the tailwheel raised, a wind gust from the right lifted the right wing. The pilot overcorrected with right aileron control, and the right wing and horizontal stabilizer contacted the runway surface. The airplane subsequently veered off the runway to the left and came to a stop.Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the right wing and empennage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The automated weather observation system located on the airport reported that, about 13 minutes before the accident, the wind was from 220° at 10 knots, gusting to 20 knots. About 13 minutes after the accident, the wind was from 200° at 8 knots, gusting to 19 knots. The pilot landed on runway 22.