roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The commercial pilot was conducting a nonscheduled, cross-country passenger flight. He reported that, while en route, he detected an in-flight vibration and made a precautionary landing on an oil platform. As he was shutting down the engine, the vibration increased, and he initiated an emergency shutdown using the rotor brake.Postaccident examination revealed that a tip block and weights had separated from one of the tail rotor blades. Cracks were noted on the tail rotor gear box, which was detached from the tailboom support casting. The casting was entirely fractured and exhibited cracking consistent with overstress separations. The left-side attachment studs were fractured and exhibited reversed bending fatigue fractures. The casting also had cracks at the two forward stud hole locations, and stud hole elongation was noted at the two aft stud hole locations.The separation of the tip block from the tail rotor blade resulted from an incomplete bond area due to a waffle pattern in the adhesive and contamination of the bond line by repair debris. About 50% of the adhesive surface had smooth and glossy surfaces consistent with voids and lack of contact between the adhesive and the tip block, which was likely due to insufficient vacuum pressure being applied while curing the adhesive. The blade tip exhibited worn separation surfaces and the presence of dark material, consistent with engine exhaust, indicating that a crack had formed along the flat side bond line and then progressed until the degraded bond strength was exceeded by operational loads, and the tip block separated. This resulted in a violent rotor imbalance and induced sufficient loads to crack the gearbox attachment studs and produce rapid fatigue cracking in the left-side attachment studs and to crack and nearly fracture the gearbox support assembly. The tip block had been repaired about 65 hours before the flight. According to the helicopter manufacturer, after the repairs were made, the blade passed the postbond pull test of 1,320 lbs, which Page 2 of 7 CEN17LA174was equal to the load on the tip block at maximum tail rotor rpm, and it was returned to service. Given the postaccident condition of the adhesive, the postrepair test procedures were not adequate to detect the insufficient adhesive bonding, which resulted in the separation of the tip block from the tail rotor blade. After the accident, the helicopter manufacturer revised its approved repair and inspection procedures. The changes included, in part, a revision to the cure cycle process to use only positive pressure (not vacuum pressure) during the cure cycle that cures the adhesive that bonds the block on the blade tip and an expansion of its postrepair inspection procedures.
The student pilot reported that, during crosswind landing conditions, the airplane landed hard and subsequently bounced. He added that he initiated a go-around, and then the flight instructor took the flight controls. The flight instructor reported that, after the bounce, the airplane "began to roll to the left in a manner similar to that of an uncoordinated stall." He added that he attempted to regain control of the airplane but was unsuccessful. The airplane rolled right, and the right wing impacted the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. The flight instructor reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.The automated weather observation station located about 7 miles north of the airport reported that, about 1 minute before the accident, the wind was from 150° at 11 knots. The airplane landed on runway 24.
The pilot of the experimental amateur-built helicopter, which had a clockwise rotating main rotor blade, reported that he took off from private property with a right crosswind. He added that, when the helicopter reached 20 to 30 knots, about 50 ft above the ground, he turned southwest, which resulted in a right quartering tailwind. He further added that, as he made the turn, he applied right antitorque pedal, but "nothing was there." The pilot reported that he subsequently decided to "set it down" in a field ahead and that, about 3 to 5 ft above the ground, the "tail started to come around counter-clockwise." During the touchdown, the right skid caught on a hidden car muffler, and the helicopter rolled onto its right side and impacted terrain. During a postaccident interview, the pilot reported that he "lost tail rotor effectiveness," and he encountered "too much wind for this aircraft [helicopter]." The main rotor and tailboom sustained substantial damage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot reported that the wind was from the north and about 15 knots. The nearest automated weather observation station (AWOS), 41 nautical miles (nm) from the accident site, recorded that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 350° at 14 knots, gusting to 26 knots. About 20 minutes before the accident, the AWOS recorded a peak wind from 340° at 30 knots. The density altitude at the AWOS location was 5,332 ft. The Federal Aviation Administration Helicopter Flying Handbook stated, in part: "Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) or an unanticipated yaw is defined as an uncommanded, rapid yaw towards the advancing blade which does not subside of its own accord. It can result in the loss of the aircraft if left unchecked." The handbook further stated, in part: "At higher altitudes where the air is thinner, tail rotor Page 2 of 6 GAA17CA251thrust and efficiency are reduced. Because of the high density altitude, powerplants may be much slower to respond to power changes. When operating at high altitudes and high gross weights, especially while hovering, the tail rotor thrust may not be sufficient to maintain directional control, and LTE can occur."It is likely that the high-density altitude and the pilot's positioning of the helicopter such that it resulted in a right quartering tailwind reduced the tail rotor effectiveness of the helicopter and contributed to the pilot's inability to maintain helicopter control during the hover to landing.
The flight instructor and the commercial pilot receiving instruction were conducting an aerial application training flight. After flying over a field, the airplane descended to low altitude and flew a practice spray pass from south to north. The field was not a designated practice area for the flight school and was adjacent to a prison. At the end of the field, the airplane pitched up, collided with a power line, and impacted the ground. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the amphibious float-equipped airplane reported that, after the owner had completed multiple touch-and-go water landings, he chose to take the flight controls and perform a few water landings himself. He added that his first touch-and-go water landing "went very well." However, during the second touch-and-go water landing, the touchdown was smooth, but as he added power to "begin the climb away," the airplane veered right and nosed over into the water. He added that the right float may have struck a submerged object during the landing.The right wing lift strut sustained substantial damage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aviation Safety Inspector who inspected the accident airplane postaccident, the forward first third section of the right float was bent upward and had "scratching and scoring" marks on the bottom side of the float. He added that he did not observe any rust or corrosion on either float.A review of the FAA airman certification database revealed that neither pilot held an airplane single-engine sea rating.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that he was moving the airplane across the country for a friend and had multiple refueling stops along his route. He added that, on his first attempt to land on the asphalt runway, he conducted a go-around due to the strong crosswind, and during the subsequent approach, he landed in the grass next to the asphalt runway to touch down with a gusting headwind. Once stopped in the grass with the engine running, he radioed over the common traffic advisory frequency to ask for assistance to tie down the airplane, but after 5 to 10 minutes, no one had responded. He added, "suddenly" a wind gust lifted the left wing, and the airplane corkscrewed clockwise and nosed over. The right and left wing lift struts sustained substantial damage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot reported that the wind was from 330° at 30 knots, gusting to 40 knots at the time of the accident. An automated weather observation station (AWOS), 22 nautical miles (nm) northwest from the accident site, recorded that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 320° at 29 knots, gusting to 42 knots. Another AWOS, 32 nm southwest from the accident site, recorded that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 320° at 29 knots, gusting to 43 knots. A review of the recorded hourly weather observations from the two AWOSs revealed that, from about 30 minutes before the pilot departed to 1 hour after the accident time, the wind remained consistent from the northwest about 30 knots, gusting to 38 to 46 knots. The pilot reported that he had on-board weather capability. Page 2 of 6 GAA17CA252
While the airplane was in cruise flight, the airline transport pilot noticed a drop in manifold pressure; he advanced the throttle to regain power. After several unsuccessful attempts to regain full power, he made a forced landing and the airplane collided with a ditch, which resulted in damage to the right wing spar. Postaccident examination of the throttle body fuel injection servo revealed the throttle cable linkage was loose at the attachment point of the throttle body fuel injection servo. Further examination revealed the throttle cable linkage had slipped because the gear teeth did not make full contact locking together. Some of the gear teeth on the throttle linkage and on the throttle body servo were worn with flat spots. It is likely that this condition ultimately resulted in the pilot's inability to control the power setting of the engine.
The student pilot of the weight-shift-control aircraft reported that, while practicing touch-and-go landings on a dried lake bed, the flight instructor was controlling the throttle inputs, and she "controlled the wing." She added that, just before the accident, she observed three dust devils to the east and that, during a final pass near the north end of the lake bed, they came upon "strong localized turbulence." The aircraft impacted the ground and rolled to the left. The flight instructor reported that, during the turbulence encounter "about 4-6 ft" above the ground, the "wing stalled," which resulted in a "hard nose wheel landing."The weight-shift-control aircraft sustained substantial damage to both wings.The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the weigh-shift-control aircraft that would have precluded normal operation.The flight instructor reported that the wind was light and variable and that the temperature was 70°F at the accident location. A review of recorded data from the automated weather observation station located about 6 miles northeast of the accident site reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was calm, and the temperature was 64°F.
The pilot was landing the airplane on a gravel runway when the right main landing gear collapsed; subsequently, both wings struck the ground. A postaccident examination revealed that the outer radius of the attaching lug on the extension tube that connected the wheel axle to the left main landing gear shock unit was fractured at the shock unit attachment. Visual examination of the fractured lug fitting revealed a flat fracture surface that was perpendicular to the long axis of the fitting, which had extensive evidence of rust and pitting throughout the circumference of the fitting.
The airline transport pilot reported that, during a formation flight, the engine started to run rough. Unable to maintain level flight, the pilot detached from the formation to troubleshoot the problem. The pilot noted that there were about 29 gallons of useable fuel onboard and all other indications were normal. The engine continued to lose power, and about 500 ft above the ground, the pilot elected to land in a vineyard. During landing, the airplane touched down, came to an abrupt stop, nosed over, and came to rest inverted. Postaccident engine examination revealed small pieces of fabric in the fuel screen. In addition, some metal shavings and a small piece of metal were found in the fuel intake and carburetor inlet screen. The origins of the metal piece and shavings could not be determined. It is unlikely that the observed debris was enough to clog the fuel system; however, it is possible that there were other, non-observable pieces of debris in the fuel system that could have resulted in decreased fuel flow and the partial loss of engine power.
The pilot stated that, during the second low pass over a friend's grass airstrip, the airplane was "low and slow" and unable to maintain altitude. He applied throttle; however, he "got behind the airplane, and it got him." Subsequently, the airplane settled, touched down, and overran the north end of the runway. The airplane then hit a road, became airborne shortly, and came to rest nose down. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, fuselage, and empennage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of a glider reported that he encountered turbulence and heavy sink on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern. He added that, on final approach, the glider encountered additional "heavy sink" and a "gusting headwind." He further added that the glider was approaching soccer fields short of the runway and that he cleared an initial goal post but that the glider impacted another goal post and impacted the ground.The glider sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the glider that would have precluded normal operation.A review of recorded data from the automated weather observation station located about 12 miles east of the airport reported that, about 14 minutes after the accident, the wind was variable at 6 knots, gusting to 15 knots. The airplane was landing on runway 25.
The private pilot reported that, during the landing roll, he had traveled about halfway down the 2,355 ft-long runway when he realized that a go-around was going to be required. He could not recall the airplane's airspeed when the airplane touched down on the runway that was located steps from the ocean. However, he did recall that he initiated the go-around by applying full throttle, retracting the flaps to 0, and rotating at 62 knots. The airplane "lifted off but did not gain altitude." The pilot lowered the nose to accelerate, but the airplane stalled and impacted the water. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing spar and aileron. According to the manufacturer's Pilot's Operating Handbook, the go-around procedure is:CAUTION        To minimize control wheel forces during go-around, timely nose-down trimming is recommended to counteract nose up pitching moment as power is increased and/or flap retraction.         Power…..Full Throttle/2700 RPM        Mixture…..Full Rich        Airspeed…..65 KIAS        Wing Flaps…..Takeoff position after climb established        Trim…..Nose Down (to reduce control forces)        Airspeed…..Accelerate to 76 KIAS        Landing Gear…..-RetractPage 2 of 6 GAA17CA211        Wing Flaps…..Retract        Cowl Flaps…..Open        Airspeed…..Accelerate to 86 KIASThe pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that he chose to make an emergency landing due to his passenger not being responsive. He added that, during the landing, he "shot over and ended up in the grass at the end of the runway." The airplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.An automated weather observation station located about 16 miles northeast of the accident airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 340° at 20 knots, gusting to 32 knots. The pilot reported that the landing was on runway 20.
The pilot was returning from an application flight at the time of the accident. A witness observed the airplane approaching the airport. He noted that an unusual noise came from the airplane but was unsure of the exact nature. Shortly afterward, he heard a loud explosion. Ground-based video footage depicted the airplane entering a rapid descent while on final approach until it went behind an intervening tree line. A plume of smoke rose from that location few seconds later.A postaccident examination of the airframe, engine and propeller did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. However, an examination of some components was limited due to the extent of the impact damage.Toxicology testing revealed that the pilot had used three sedating drugs: cetirizine, oxycodone, and oxazepam. However, only oxycodone was still present at a level that could have been impairing. Because patients using opioids may develop significant tolerance to the sedating side effects, there is no accepted relationship between blood levels and impairment from these medications. Therefore, the extent of impairment, if any, could not be determined.The reason for the abrupt descent and impact with terrain while on final approach could not be determined because the postaccident examination did not reveal any preimpact anomalies.
The pilot reported that, while on his second attempt to land in gusting wind conditions, the airplane was "tossed" up and then a "downdraft" caused the airplane to "descend rapidly." He added full power; however, the airplane landed hard, the nose and right main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane nosed over.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and empennage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot reported that the weather at the accident site, about the time of the accident, was wind variable at 10 knots, gusting to 15 knots. The pilot landed on about a 310° heading.
The private pilot was part of a formation of four airplanes making a cross-country flight during day visual meteorological conditions over a broken-to-overcast cloud layer. During the flight, the accident airplane, which was positioned left of the lead airplane, began drifting to the left of and behind the formation, which resulted in the lead pilot losing sight of the airplane. The lead pilot twice asked the accident pilot if he was okay and received affirmative responses. However, the pilot in trail lost sight of the accident airplane as it dropped below and behind his airplane, and the pilot positioned to the right of the lead pilot observed the accident airplane descend in a wings level, slight nose-down attitude into clouds below and behind their position. Despite multiple attempts, no further radio communication was established with the accident pilot. A witness who was located near the accident site saw the airplane descend from the clouds in a near vertical attitude until she lost sight of it behind a nearby ridgeline.Examination of the accident site indicated that the airplane impacted terrain in a near vertical attitude. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunction that would have precluded normal operation.Toxicology testing revealed ethanol in the pilot's muscle tissue; however, no ethanol was found in brain tissue making it likely the ethanol was produced postmortem. The pilot had a history of coronary artery disease and was at an increased risk for a sudden cardiovascular event; however, there is insufficient evidence to determine if his heart disease contributed to this accident.
While conducting a postmaintenance test flight in visual flight rules conditions, the private pilot of the multi-engine airplane reported an oil leak to air traffic control. The controller provided vectors for the pilot to enter a right base leg for a landing to the south at the nearest airport, about 7 miles away. The pilot turned toward the airport but indicated that he did not have the airport in sight. Further, while maneuvering toward the airport, the pilot reported that the engine was "dead," and he still did not see the airport.  The final radar data point recorded the airplane's position about 3.5 miles west-northwest of the approach end of the runway; the wreckage site was located about 4 miles northeast of the runway, indicating that the pilot flew past the airport rather than turning onto a final approach for landing. The reason that the pilot did not see the runway during the approach to the alternate airport, given that the airplane was operating in visual conditions and the controller was issuing guidance information, could not be determined. Regardless, the pilot did not execute a precautionary landing in a timely manner and lost control of the airplane.Examination of the airplane's left engine revealed that the No. 2 connecting rod was broken. The connecting rod bearings exhibited signs of heat distress and discoloration consistent with a lack of lubrication. The engine's oil pump was intact, and the gears were wet with oil. Based on the available evidence, the engine failure was the result of oil starvation; however, examination could not identify the reason for the starvation.