roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot of a tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that during the landing roll in gusty crosswind conditions, the airplane started to veer to the right. The pilot further reported that he applied left rudder and brake, but the airplane ground looped to the right and the left wing struck the runway. The left wing and left elevator were substantially damaged. The pilot did not report any mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. An automated weather observing system at the airport, about the time of the accident, reported the wind at 080 degrees true at 7 knots, for the landing on runway 26.
The commercial pilot and one passenger were departing on runway 36 when the airplane experienced a total loss of engine power about 200 ft above the runway. The pilot announced over the control tower frequency that the engine had lost power and that he intended to land the airplane on runway 26, which was located at the end of and perpendicular to the takeoff runway. According to the passenger and witnesses, the airplane completed a left turn to align with runway 26 before the wings rocked, and it rolled into a 90° left bank and collided with terrain. The passenger and witness observations were consistent with the pilot failing to maintain sufficient airspeed, which resulted in the airplane's wing exceeding its critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall.Data downloaded from a panel-mounted engine monitoring system revealed parameters consistent with engine idle, run-up, taxi, and full takeoff power application. A sudden decrease in engine rpm and manifold pressure from takeoff power was preceded by a rapid decrease in fuel flow. Examination of the wreckage revealed that both the left and right wing fuel tanks contained fuel and that the fuel selector handle was between the "Left Tank" and "Off" placard positions. The engine was placed in a test cell where it started immediately, accelerated smoothly, and ran continuously without interruption.Computerized axial tomography imagery revealed that the fuel selector valve was positioned between the "Left Tank" and "Right Tank" detent positions and that all three valve ports were open to each other. The difference between the handle's position according to the placard and its actual position indicated that the placard had been displaced relative to the handle, which likely occurred during the impact. Bench flow testing of the fuel selector valve and dynamic engine run testing revealed that the valve would supply adequate fuel for normal engine in the as-found intermediate position.The computerized axial tomography imagery, engine data, and testing of the engine and the fuel selector valve revealed no evidence of preimpact anomalies and demonstrated that the system components still functioned as designed after the accident. The fuel flow interruption and the loss of engine power shortly after takeoff were likely due to the pilot inadvertently placing the fuel selector in the "Off" position, which likely occurred when he completed the step in the Before Takeoff checklist that called for the fuel Page 2 of 9 ERA16FA150selector to be placed on the fullest tank. It is possible that the pilot inadvertently moved the fuel selector from the "Left Tank" position to the "Off" position instead of moving it from the "Right Tank" position to the "Left Tank" position. After the power loss, the pilot likely moved the fuel selector from "Off" to its intermediate as-found position in an attempt to restore engine power.
The pilot reported that he encountered gusty wind conditions and a "sudden low level wind shear" during the landing flare and touched down hard. During the landing roll, the pilot noticed that he could not steer the airplane to the left, but he was able to stop the airplane on the runway. During a postaccident inspection, evidence of a propeller strike was also observed. The firewall was substantially damaged. An automated weather observing system, about the time of the accident, at the accident airport reported the wind 330 degrees true at 16 knots gusting to 28 knots. The pilot reported that he landed on runway 34.The pilot did not report any mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot had recently purchased the accident airplane and was planning a cross-country flight to an airport several hours away. Before departing, the pilot flew around the airport traffic pattern with the airplane's previous owner and received a briefing from the previous owner about its operation, fuel consumption, and endurance. Specifically, the previous owner advised him that he typically used 2 hours as a maximum flight leg time; the airplane had a 16-gallon fuel capacity and consumed about 6 gallons of fuel per hour, so a 2-hour flight leg would leave about 4 gallons of fuel remaining for about a 30-minute reserve. The previous owner advised the pilot that they had already used some fuel and that he likely would not have enough fuel to reach his intended destination airport, which was about 2 flight hours away, with an adequate fuel reserve. The pilot stated that he would look for a fuel stop before his intended destination and departed. The airplane subsequently impacted terrain while maneuvering in the vicinity of a runway at an airport just off the direct course between the departure airport and the intended destination airport. The airplane had been airborne for about 2 hours 26 minutes. Examination of the airplane at the accident site revealed that the fuel system was intact and absent of fuel. Further examination of the airplane's engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Given this information, it is likely that the pilot had exhausted the airplane's fuel supply, which resulted in a total loss of engine power and subsequent forced landing while attempting to reach the runway at the intermediate airport.
The commercial pilot was conducting a commercial on-demand flight between two villages over open water in an amphibious float-equipped airplane before navigating through mountainous terrain. As the airplane approached the usual route company pilots took through the mountains, the accident pilot relayed to the operator's director of operations via airborne communications that he was unable to make it through the pass due to low clouds and reduced visibility and that he was going to try an alternate route over lower terrain. After the director of operations determined that the airplane did not arrive at its destination, search and rescue efforts ensued. The airplane was subsequently found in an area of rising steep mountainous, snow-covered terrain at an elevation of about 2,240 ft mean sea level in a near-vertical attitude.A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. GPS data for the accident flight showed the airplane making a total of five 360° turns in various locations in cloud-obscured, mountainous terrain while attempting to make it to the destination; the last turn was made shortly before impact. Based on the conversation the pilot had with the director of operations and the location of the wreckage, it is likely that the pilot thought he had taken a path over lower terrain but that he actually flew into a different valley which had higher-than-anticipated terrain, and then executed a 360° turn to gain altitude before continuing the flight. However, the airplane did not gain sufficient altitude to clear terrain, and it is likely that the pilot attempted another climb, which reduced the airspeed and led to the exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack. The disposition of the airplane at the accident site was consistent with an aerodynamic stall and a right spin.
During a business flight over the Gulf of Mexico, the crew felt a slight vibration of the tail rotor with no other anomalies noted and landed the helicopter uneventfully at their planned destination. A postflight inspection revealed that one of the tail rotor blade erosion shield extensions, also known as a lightning strip (LS), was missing and that only its side tabs remained attached to the blade. One of the main rotor blade tips sustained substantial damage when the LS separated from the tail rotor blade and impacted the bottom of the main rotor blade. Metallurgical analysis of the fractured LS revealed microcavities in the metal, which resulted in a fatigue fracture. The helicopter manufacturer concluded that the microcavities were a direct result of the electroplating manufacturing process. Finite element modeling (FEM) of an exemplar LS revealed that the maximum stress values expected during flight were considerably lower than the fatigue limit specified for the electroplated nickel material. The microcavity observed on the accident LS could not be replicated by the FEM model, but the presence of a microcavity could adversely influence the in-flight stresses and reduce the overall strength of the LS. Additional flight testing with strain gauges did not reveal any load condition that would lead to similar LS failures that were experienced during the accident flight. It is likely the LS separated in flight due to a fatigue fracture that was the result of increased stress in the presence of a material flaw that had existed since its manufacture.The helicopter manufacturer, in response to multiple reports of similar LS failures, changed the material specification from electroplated nickel to a higher strength steel. The steel LS will be installed on all newly built helicopters, and an optional service bulletin will be issued to operators to provide the steel LS upon request.
The pilot reported that he was performing external load long line hauling operations with a helicopter and was on a return leg with two empty nets. During the approach to a hilltop helipad, the pilot reported that he performed a normal approach, rather than a long line approach. Subsequently, the 100 foot long line snagged on a ridgeline and the helicopter jerked in an uncontrollable turn to the right, touched down right skid first, and rolled over. The pilot reported that he forgot that the long line was still attached.The tail boom was substantially damaged. The pilot did not report any mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation. The operator submitted two operator/ owner safety recommendations to the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge. First, the operator revised the normal operation checklist. The revised checklist included a new "CARGO HOOK – CHECK" in both the BEFORE TAKEOFF and DESCENT AND LANDING checklist. Second, the chief pilot provided a copy of a memorandum to all employees that directs the use of an observer, when available, to observe the takeoff and landings and communicate any unsafe condition to the pilot via radio communication or hand signals.
According to the student pilot, during landing on his solo flight the airplane porpoised. He reported that after landing he repositioned the airplane, but prior to takeoff, a fellow pilot, who witnessed the porpoise, contacted him on the VHF radio, and informed him that he should have the airplane checked out before attempting to takeoff. The student pilot taxied to the parking area and the airport manager and airframe and powerplant mechanic inspected the airplane. The student pilot called his flight instructor and conveyed the situation and the level of damage. However, according to the flight instructor, the student pilot only conveyed the damage to the tail skid. The flight instructor reported that he told the student to confer with the mechanic and determine if the airplane was airworthy. The student pilot departed and proceeded to the airport where his flight school was based. Shortly after the departure, the airport manager that looked the airplane over for the student pilot, called the flight school and conveyed the gravity of the situation and informed the school that the airplane actually sustained damage to the firewall, tail skid and rudder fairing. The flight instructor did not confer with anyone other than the student pilot to ensure the airplane was airworthy. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fire wall. The student pilot reported that there were no mechanical failures or anomalies with the airplane prior to or during the flight that would have prevented normal flight operation.
The pilot reported that about 5 hours into a night cross country flight the engine started running rough. He switched between the left and right fuel tanks several times, adjusted the mixture, but was unsuccessful in correcting the issue. The pilot further reported that he knew that he would not make it to the nearest airport, so he turned on his landing light and looked for a place to land. The pilot landed the airplane in a pond, and came to rest on the shore. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage.A postaccident examination revealed that the right and left fuel tanks were empty.According to the pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that during taxi through a high traffic density ramp area, the left wing impacted a light pole, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing.  According to the pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the pilot of the tailwheel-equipped biplane, during approach, the tower cleared him to land on the short runway which he refused because he felt rushed by inbound traffic. He reported that the tower acknowledged his refusal, and cleared him to land on the long runway which was runway 17R. The pilot reported that he landed on runway 17R with a quartering tail wind. However, during the pilot's approach, the wind that was reported by ATC to the pilot was 230 degrees true at 6 knots. He recalled that the airplane exited the right side of the runway, then ground looped to the right, and came to a stop nose down in a ditch and resting on the bottom left wing. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the lower left wing spar. The meteorological aerodrome report (METAR) reported the wind as calm, 5 minutes before the accident. One hour before the accident, the METAR reported the wind as variable at 3 knots. One hour after the accident the METAR reported the wind as variable at 4 knots.The pilot reported that there were no mechanical failures or anomalies with the airplane prior to or during the flight that would have prevented normal flight operation.
The loss of separation occurred after the air traffic controller issued N57GX a climb from 5,000 feet to 9,000 feet while N758PK was on an opposite direction heading, level at 8,000 feet. The air traffic controller became aware of the incident after the pilot of N57GX reported that he had received a conflict alert and had taken evasive action to avoid a collision with N785PK. After N57GX had departed OCF, the air traffic controller instructed the pilot to climb to 5,000 feet, and subsequently issued the pilot a climb to 9,000 feet, which was the pilot's requested altitude. The air traffic controller did not consider the performance of the aircraft, or the proximity of N785PK when he issued the climb instructions to N57GX.  The decision by the air traffic controller to climb N57GX without ensuring minimum radar or vertical separation would exist, and be maintained, resulted in the aircraft coming into close proximity to one another. Additionally, the controller did not issue a safety alert when the air traffic control conflict alert activated, requiring the pilot of N57GX to take evasive action to avoid a collision with N758PK. The closest proximity was estimated to be 0.85 nautical miles lateral and 200 feet vertical separation.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that as the tail came down during the landing roll in gusty wind conditions, a wind gust lifted the airplane about 10 feet into the air, with the left wing high. The pilot further reported that the airplane drifted off the runway to the right and impacted the ground right wing first.  The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, both wings, and the empennage.According to the pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. A review of recorded data from the automated weather observation station located about 5 miles to the southeast, revealed that, about 7 minutes before the accident occurred, conditions were wind 300 degrees true at 13 knots, wind gust 18 knots.
About 15 minutes after departing on the cross-country flight, the experimental, amateur-built airplane experienced a loss of engine power, and the private pilot considered landing on a 550-ft-long airstrip for remote-controlled aircraft. After observing numerous people on and near the runway, he subsequently decided to land on an interstate highway. Upon touching down with the landing gear retracted, the airplane slid into a car parked on the paved shoulder of the highway, fatally injuring one of the car's occupants. Video footage captured by a cell phone inside the airplane showed normal engine indications before the accident. A video taken shortly thereafter did not capture the instrument panel or engine indications; however, the engine could be heard surging. The airplane was equipped with fuel tanks in the left and right wings, as well as a fuselage tank. The right and left wing tanks each had a capacity of 52 gallons, and the capacity of the fuselage tank was 33 gallons. The fuel system was configured so that the left wing tank connected to the fuselage tank, and the engine would draw from the fuselage tank. The fuselage tank did not have a dedicated fuel quantity gauge; the pilot stated that he knew it was full when the wing tank gauge began to indicate above zero. The pilot stated that before departing on the accident flight, the left fuel tank quantity gauge indicated 1 gallon, which corresponded to 34 gallons available. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A test run of the engine at low, intermediate, and high power settings was successful.The fuselage tank was breached during the accident, and an undetermined quantity of fuel leaked out. The gascolator did not contain any fuel, and the line from the gascolator to the engine-driven fuel pump, as well as the fuel inlet line to the fuel manifold, contained no fuel. The lack of fuel in these areas, coupled with the engine surging heard on video, may be an indication of fuel starvation; however, since the investigation was unable to determine the total quantity of fuel on board the airplane, the reason for the loss of power and engine surging could not be determined.  Page 2 of 10 WPR16FA091
The pilot reported that he landed the airplane on the runway with visible ice and snow, and noted no issues with the braking and steering capabilities of the airplane. He reported that during the subsequent takeoff roll with full power applied, the airplane started sliding to the left. He attempted to control the sliding with right rudder. During the acceleration, he reported the left main landing gear got trapped in area with ice and the airplane departed the runway to the left and impacted a snowbank. The airplane sustained substantial damage to an engine mount and to the fuselage.  The pilot verified that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.The Federal Aviation Administration has published the Aeronautical Information Manual (2014). This manual provides the definition of a contaminated runway and states in part:A runway is considered contaminated whenever standing water, ice, snow, slush, frost in any form, heavy rubber, or other substances are present.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped bi-plane reported that during the landing roll, the bi-plane started turning to the right, the left main landing gear collapsed, and the nose of the bi-plane impacted the ground.  The bi-plane sustained substantial damage to the left lower wing. According to the pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that during takeoff the airplane began to drift to the left immediately after rotation. The pilot further reported that he applied right aileron, but the drift continued and the airplane's left main landing gear struck a tree within a tree line about 100 feet to the left of the runway. After the impact, the airplane sank further into the trees and came to rest slightly nose high and left wing down.The fuselage, both wings, and horizontal stabilizer were substantially damaged. The pilot did not report any mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The instrument-rated private pilot departed in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with the intention of flying visual flight rules (VFR) to his destination. About 90 minutes into the flight, the pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that he was having problems with the right engine. The pilot switched fuel tanks, turned on the fuel pumps, and restored power to the right engine. A few minutes later, the pilot stated that he was in IMC and requested assistance. While diverting to another airport, the pilot reported to ATC that he had lost power in both engines. The pilot performed a forced landing on a highway, during which the airplane impacted a tree and came to rest inverted next to the road. No fuel was observed in any of the airplane's fuel tanks during the on-scene examination, nor did the accident site display any signs of fuel spillage or blight. Other that the absence of fuel, no evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies were noted with the engines that would have precluded normal operation, and it is likely that the loss of power to both engines was the result of fuel exhaustion.
The pilot was flying the helicopter from his home base to an airport that he was familiar with; he had flown the route multiple times in the past 2 years in the accident helicopter and in his airplane. Although he had an airplane instrument rating, he did not have a helicopter instrument rating, and the helicopter was not certificated for instrument flight. Before the flight, the pilot reviewed the weather conditions and forecast with his son, who was also a pilot; however, he did not receive an official weather briefing from a flight service station. Although instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the area at the time the pilots reviewed the weather, the forecast was for conditions to improve by the time the pilot intended to arrive.The flight departed in visual meteorological conditions and proceeded to the north. About 40 minutes into the flight, 10 miles south of the destination airport, the helicopter climbed sharply as it approached a ridgeline and entered the clouds. It then completed a 330° left turn, slowed, and climbed again, before reversing course and entering an uncontrolled descent into terrain. Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed extensive impact damage, although there was no evidence of a preimpact failure or malfunction with the flight controls, drive line, structure, or the engine. The pilot was not instrument rated in helicopters, the helicopter was not equipped for flight in instrument meteorological conditions and the flight had inadvertently entered the clouds, all of which are conditions conducive to spatial disorientation. The vertical and horizontal maneuvering in the clouds was inconsistent with the intended rout of flight, and likely due to spatial disorientation.