roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot reported that shortly after takeoff, he noticed flames coming from under the engine cowling. He maneuvered the airplane into the downwind pattern for the runway as the fire continued to develop in the airplane. Unable to make the runway, the pilot landed the airplane off field. The airplane was destroyed by the fire. After the airplane was recovered, extensive fire damage was observed with the engine. The mechanical fuel pump was completely consumed during the fire. Due to fire damage the fuel pump could not be tested or examined and the reason for the inflight fire was not determined.
The pilot reported that, as he taxied down the runway, he observed a deer on the right side of the airplane. The deer made a quick left turn in front of the airplane and the pilot aggressively applied the brakes. The airplane subsequently nosed over and came to rest inverted. The left wing, wing strut and vertical stabilizer were substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor and student had just completed a series of uneventful practice maneuvers and decided to perform off-airport landings at a location that the instructor had used before. After a series of reconnaissance orbits, low passes, and power checks over the landing area and, with the helicopter operating normally, the instructor decided to proceed with a landing.The student was maneuvering at low altitude while attempting to land when they felt a jolt, and the helicopter yawed to the left. The instructor took over the controls, and attempted to maneuver away from trees but the helicopter began to vibrate and yawed aggressively to the left with an accompanying reduction in engine speed. The helicopter began to descend with the low rotor rpm horn sounding, and the instructor performed an autorotation, during which the main rotor blade cut through the tail.Postaccident examination revealed a damaged engine intake valve that would have resulted in a partial loss of engine power. The helicopter’s response during the event was consistent with a loss of engine power, although due to the altitude and environmental conditions, the helicopter was being operated at the upper limits of its performance envelope.
The pilot in the glider reported that, during the return flight to the airport, he encountered a higher sink rate than expected and did not have sufficient altitude to reach the airport. During an emergency landing in a fruit orchard, the glider landing gear contacted utility pole wires, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the glider that would have precluded normal operation.
Southwest Airlines flight 48 encountered turbulence during cruise. One flight attendant sustained serious injuries. The airplane was not damaged. The regularly scheduled passenger flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from the Kansas City International Airport (MCI), Kansas City, Missouri, to the Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, Colorado. According to the flight attendant, as she was pouring coffee into cups while in the front galley, the airplane encountered very light turbulence which she described as a ‘very light bump’. During the event, the coffee pot flipped over and spilled coffee onto the back of her hand, resulting in 2nd degree burns. After the event, the captain called back to the cabin to apologize for the turbulence and advised that it was unexpected. The flight attendant continued duties after the event, and there was no further turbulence. Prior to the flight, the captain discussed the possibility of turbulence during the preflight briefing, however the turbulence associated with the event was unannounced and unexpected.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, he was performing practice landings on a dry lakebed. After the second landing, he felt the right rear of the tail lift and move left. The airplane continued to decelerate, and the pilot attempted corrective control inputs, but the left wing stuck the ground and the airplane nosed over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the vertical stabilizer and both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The student pilot reported that while hovering, the helicopter encountered a gust of wind and began to yaw to the right.  The student pilot was unable to correct for the unanticipated right yaw, resulting in the forward portion of the helicopter’s right skid impacting the ground, and a subsequent dynamic rollover. The rollover resulted in substantial damage to the main rotor blades, tail boom, tail rotor, and vertical stabilizer. The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that during the landing flare at night, the airplane’s left wing stuck a deer that was on the runway, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
While performing a landing to the runway, the student pilot lost control of the airplane, departed the runway, and collided with a glider and a hangar. The airplane sustained substantial damage to fuselage, empennage, and both wings. The student pilot reported that he did not initiate the go around in time. The student pilot did not return the National Transportation Safety Board Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report Form 6120.1.
According to the flight instructor, the student pilot was high on the approach but he allowed her to continue as he determined the landing was achievable based on visual references and cues. The student performed the landing flare, the airplane “hit hard and bounced quite high,” and the airplane pitched nose up to about a 45-degree angle. The flight instructor assumed control of the airplane, pushed the nose downward and applied full engine power to recover from the “imminent stall.” The flight instructor explained that the airplane lacked the power, airspeed, and altitude to outclimb the trees to its front and continued to fly the airplane “right at stall speed” until it settled into an area of small trees and heavy brush beyond the departure end of the landing runway, which resulted in substantial damage to the airplane’s fuselage and wings, and minor injuries to the occupants.
The pilot reported that the brakes were not effective during landing rollout.  He allowed the airplane to depart the paved runway into the adjacent grass area to slow down.  The airplane encountered a shallow ditch which damaged the fuselage immediately aft of the firewall, resulting in substantial damage to the airplane.  The firewall and nose landing gear were also damaged.A mechanic completed a postaccident examination and was unable to identify any anomalies with respect to the brake system.  The mechanic commented that the brake system can be affected if the parking brake is partially engaged at takeoff; however, the pilot reported that the parking brake was not used during the flight. The mechanic noted the airplane departed the pavement about 800 ft from the end of the 4,400 ft runway and encountered a drainage ditch.  The airplane traveled about 600 ft past the ditch before it stopped.  Based upon this distance, the pilot likely landed long and with excessive airspeed which resulted in an inability to slow the airplane sufficiently before encountering the end of the runway.
The flight instructor reported that the airplane was not performing as expected during the takeoff and initial climb. He took control of the airplane from his student and was able to clear trees off the departure end of the runway, but the airplane would not continue climbing and the engine was “noticeably weak.” He maneuvered the airplane, maintaining the best angle of climb airspeed (VX), and was unable to find a suitable landing area. The airplane impacted trees and the ground and a postimpact fire ensued. Postaccident examination of the airplane and its engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies; however, the extensive fire damage precluded functional testing and examination of several airframe and engine components. Recorded flight data indicated that the airplane was below the published Vx airspeed, but above stall speed. The airspeed derived from the data used surface winds reported at the departure airport and the actual winds encountered by the airplane could not be determined. This discrepancy could account for the difference in the derived speed and the speed the pilot reported. Operation of the airplane below VX could have reduced the airplane’s climb rate but any deficit to climb performance could not be quantified.The recorded temperature and dewpoint at the time of the accident was conducive to the development of serious icing at glide power and was between the range for icing at glide and cruise power and serious icing at cruise power.
The pilot departed to a nearby airport, where he completed three takeoffs and landings before returning to his home airport. Flight track data indicated that the airplane slowed to about 60 knots (kts) on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, much slower than its speed on the downwind leg during the previous two traffic patterns. Just before turning to the base leg, the airplane diverged away from the runway, then began a 180°, accelerating, descending turn. The airplane overshot the runway centerline but corrected before crossing the approach end of the runway. The airplane then continued past the runway, where it impacted a fence and terrain about 557 ft from the departure end of the runway. The pilot was fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed by a postimpact fire. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed that the aileron carry-through cable had fractured due to between-strand wear and overstress of the remaining wires. The loss of the carry-through cable degraded the aileron control system by only commanding movement of one aileron or the other, depending on which direction the pilot was turning. It is possible that the cable separated on the downwind leg of the last traffic pattern, as this was the first indication of a deviation of normal traffic pattern flight.A review of maintenance records revealed the last annual inspection, occurred on October 1, 2021, and called for inspection of control cables, specifically at the pulleys.
The captain reported that the airplane was on a stabilized approach when, just before the airplane touched down, he heard a horn activate. He did not realize that the landing gear was not fully down until the nose landing gear touched down and he heard metal grinding. The airplane veered off the right side of the runway and came to rest about 20 ft from the edge. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the bottom of the fuselage. The captain’s recollection of the landing gear selection was “fuzzy” following the accident.A postaccident functional test of the landing gear system showed normal extension and retraction. No other preaccident failures or malfunctions were noted with the airplane or systems that would have precluded normal operations. The lack of anomalies indicated that the flight crew failed to ensure the landing gear was down before landing.
According to the pilot, when the airplane reached 15-20 knots (kts) during the initial takeoff roll, the left main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane ground looped to the left. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left elevator and left wing.Examination of the left main landing gear (MLG) leg determined it fractured due to preexisting cracks that initiated at the inboard side of the leg at the forward and aft sides of the forward hole for attaching the leg to the fuselage at the outboard attachment bracket. Examination of the crack revealed it existed before the accident flight; however, spacing between crack arrest features suggest the number of load cycles from initiation to failure was relatively low. A review of available flight data did not reveal a specific hard landing event that could have resulted in the initiation of the crack. The airplane’s main landing gear is made from a woven E-glass with epoxy resin and prepreg laminate that is pressed and then oven cured. The raw material is not aviation specific. Destructive testing of the failed landing gear and material samples from other gear manufactured from the same lot of material found the material did not meet minimum specified strength requirements. The material batch in question was traceable to 16 airplanes (30 gear legs), including 1 other airplane that had a similar failure following a hard landing. The owners of the affected airplanes were notified and the landing gear for some of the affected airplanes were replaced. Following this accident, the airplane manufacturer initiated a redesign of the landing gear and beganperforming destructive batch sample tests of the composite material used for every batch of gear legs to ensure each new gear leg meets minimum required strength requirements. Page 2 of 8 WPR22LA357The accident is consistent with the landing gear being manufactured using material that did not meet the necessary strength requirements and subsequently failing after a crack developed in the landing gear. The event that initiated the crack was not identified based on available evidence.
The pilot built the experimental gyroplane and was in the process of achieving the required 40 flight test hours. The maintenance records showed that the gyroplane had accumulated 37.8 flight hours before the accident. The gyroplane departed from the airport and two witnesses observed black smoke emitting from the gyroplane while it was flying. Neither witness observed fire emitting from the gyroplane while in-flight. The gyroplane impacted a grass field. The wreckage, which was destroyed, sustained extensive thermal damage.Examination of the wreckage revealed that an in-flight fire had occurred. Several sections of the fuselage, empennage, and the main rotor mast were found a significant distance from the impact point. The sections exhibited signs of thermal damage that did not appear to be related to a postimpact fire. In addition to the thermal damage, there was also evidence of fluid consistent with oil on both the interior and exterior of several fuselage and empennage pieces. The fluid on the exterior surfaces appeared in airflow-driven patterns, indicating that the fluid leak occurred in flight.Evidence showed that the in-flight fire had originated from the compartment where the experimental engine was housed. Two aluminum valve covers (cylinders Nos.2 and 4) collocated on the engine were melted along the bottom edge of the covers with evidence of dripping and material flow. The flow direction of the melted areas indicated that the material was in an upright (in-flight position) at the time the material started to flow and is inconsistent with postimpact fire damage.The fire fuel source appeared to be leaking oil from the governor pad. The engine had oil coating over a large area of the exposed surfaces. Oil was found on several sections of the fuselage and the empennage, including sections located away from the area of impact and Page 2 of 10 CEN22FA433postimpact fire. A governor had not been installed on the governor pad and the governor flange cover was still in place. The still-installed governor pad was heavily coated in oil, with an area of coagulated oil directly beneath the pad.With the governor flange cover installed, oil leaked from the governor pad and likely ignited at the turbocharger exhaust duct. An in-flight fire occurred that produced the black smoke that the two witnesses observed. It is likely that the pilot lost control in flight with the engine fire, and subsequently impacted terrain..Contributing to the accident was the improper build process by the pilot. The engine installation manual states that the governor flange cover is for engine transportation only and not for flight operations. Additionally, the governor flange cover must be replaced with a functional governor, or the engine is to be converted to a different version per a service document from the engine manufacturer. It is likely that the pilot did not fully reference and understand the engine installation manual and the service document during the build process, and thus flew the gyroplane with the governor flange cover installed, which eventually leaked oil and resulted in an in-flight fire.
The pilot of the tailwheel equipped airplane reported that, during the landing roll, as the tailwheel touched down, the airplane veered right and subsequently ground looped. The left wing and the left horizontal stabilizer and elevator were substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the flight instructor, at the conclusion of the checkout flight he and the pilot were returning to the airport for landing. The instructor described that the pilot’s approach was stable until he began the landing flare too high, at an estimated altitude of about 20 feet. The flight instructor told the pilot to execute a go-around and then attempted to take over the flight controls. He was unable to recover before the airplane landed hard, resulting in substantial damage to both wings. The flight instructor stated that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, during the landing the airplane touched down about halfway down the runway.  He applied heavy braking when he noticed the runway end was approaching. The airplane subsequently overran the runway end and collided with a fence. The right wing was substantially damaged.The pilot initially reported that the brake system did not function as expected; however, a brake system examination did not reveal any preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.  The pilot later stated that the airspeed was likely too fast when he touched down, which resulted in a runway overrun.
The pilot reported that while the airplane was settling to the runway and he was making rudder corrections, a gust of wind lifted the left wing and the left main landing gear from the runway. The pilot was able to get the left main landing gear back on the runway, while still applying right rudder input. The airplane then ground looped, and the left wing and the left rudder impacted the runway. The airplane came to rest upright on the runway and the pilot was then able to taxi to the ramp. The airplane’s left wing and the left elevator sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. At the time of the accident, the airplane was landing on runway 32 with winds light and variable with gusts to 7 knots.
The pilot reported that after an uneventful cross-country flight, while on short final approach to the runway, he received an unsafe nose landing gear (NLG) indication and performed a go-around. The pilot reported that the main landing gear indicator lights showed that the landing gear were down and locked; however, the NLG indicator light was flickering on and off. The pilot cycled the landing gear with the landing gear switch while in the traffic pattern and received confirmation from the tower controller that the landing gear appeared down. Subsequently, the pilot continued the traffic pattern to landing and, upon touchdown, the NLG collapsed and the airplane skidded to a stop on the runway. The fuselage sustained substantial damage.Examination of the landing gear system found no anomalies that would have prevented normal operation of the nose landing gear. Damage sustained to the airframe prevented the landing gear system from being tested. The manual landing gear extension crank was found in an intermediate position, which likely would have prevented the nose landing gear from fully extending and locking into place. The investigation was not able to determine whether the crank was improperly stowed, or not fully engaged, during flight, or whether the crank was moved after the accident during recovery operations.
While conducting an instructional flight, the flight instructor reported that, he assumed control of the helicopter to demonstrate a left 180° autorotation, and the maneuver began normally. Part way through the maneuver, the pilot noticed that the helicopter was lower in altitude than he expected. He reported that he applied right cyclic and aft cyclic, attempting to slow the rate of descent. The helicopter landed hard and skidded to a stop. When stopped, the flight instructor and the student pilot exited the helicopter, and a postimpact fire ensued. The tail boom and fuselage sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the multiengine airplane reported that he had completed six touch-and-go landings uneventfully.  During approach for the seventh landing, he was distracted by a low fuel caution light illuminating in the cockpit, and other traffic in the area. The pilot forgot to extend the landing gear and the airplane landed on the runway with the landing gear retracted. The airplane came to rest upright on the runway and postaccident examination of it revealed substantial damage to the fuselage stringers. The pilot further reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions with the airplane.
The pilot of the airplane reported that, while en route he mistakenly turned into the wrong valley with rising terrain. The pilot stated that he waited too long before he made a turn to exit the valley. During the turn, the airplane struck trees, which resulted in substantial damage to both wings and empennage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the pilot, the wind at the airport was from “082° at 7 knots” based on the automated observation.  He entered a right traffic pattern and saw “no change” on the windsock before landing.  After landing, the passenger commented that the windsock had changed.  About that time, “the right wing came back up” and the airplane “swerved” to the right.  The pilot initially added full engine power to go-around; however, he was unable to regain directional control and reduced engine power to idle.  The airplane departed the runway and subsequently nosed over.  The pilot reported that there were no anomalies which would have precluded normal operation.  The vertical stabilizer and rudder sustained substantial damage during the accident.
The pilot was departing on a cross-country flight in a float-equipped airplane when the accident occurred. She had contacted a family member and stated she was departing; however, she did not arrive at the destination when expected. A search was initiated, and the airplane was located partially submerged in the departure lake. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed that both floats were heavily corroded and separated from the fuselage.  There was no evidence that either float had contacted a foreign object in the water. A portion of the hull on the right float tore open and bent back. It is likely that tear in the float resulted in the airplane impacting the water during the takeoff. Maintenance records were not available for review during the investigation. Though toxicology testing of the pilot’s tissue detected diazepam and venlafaxine and their metabolites in the pilot’s system, it is unlikely that the effects of these medications contributed to this accident.