roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
As the student pilot was approaching the runway for a practice soft-field, full-stop landing, the airplane descended faster than expected and the nose pitched up. The airplane's airspeed was slow, and the flight instructor called for a go-around. During the go-around, the flight instructor told the student pilot to apply power faster. Subsequently, the airplane exceeded its critical angle of attack and aerodynamically stalled, settled toward the ground, struck the ground hard short of the runway, and then bounced onto the runway, sustaining substantial damage to the fuselage and wings. The accident might have been avoided if the flight instructor had intervened or taken control of the airplane earlier in the sequence.
The pilot reported that his intent was to practice touch-and-go takeoffs and landings. The first takeoff and landing to a full stop was normal. The pilot reported he taxied back and initiated a full throttle takeoff.  He reported that after lifting off at 70 knots, the engine continued to run but was no longer producing power, and the airplane began to descend. The pilot reduced the throttle and initiated a forced landing to a grass field. The airplane traveled through the airport perimeter fence and continued to a road where it contacted a dirt berm.The foreign manufactured engine was an unusual design. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to contact and work with the manufacturer to determine the cause of the partial loss of engine power.
The commercial pilot and passenger departed on a local flight in the twin-engine airplane. According to a witness, the pilot took off from the private grass runway and departed the area for about 10 minutes. The airplane then returned to the airport, where the pilot performed a low pass over the runway and entered a steep climb followed by a roll. The airplane entered a nose-low descent, then briefly leveled off in an upright attitude before disappearing behind trees and subsequently impacting terrain.The pilot's toxicology testing was positive for ethanol with 0.185 gm/dl and 0.210 gm/dl in urine and cavity blood samples, respectively. The effects of ethanol are generally well understood; it significantly impairs pilot performance, even at very low levels. Federal Aviation Administration regulations prohibit any person from acting or attempting to act as a crewmember of a civil aircraft while having 0.040 gm/dl or more ethanol in the blood. While the identified ethanol may have come from sources other than ingestion, such as postmortem production, the possibility that the source of some of the ethanol was from ingestion and that pilot was impaired by the effects of ethanol during the accident flight could not be ruled out.Toxicology also identified a significant amount of diphenhydramine in cavity blood (0.122 µg/ml, which is within or above the therapeutic range of 0.0250 to 0.1120 µg/ml; diphenhydramine undergoes postmortem redistribution, and central postmortem levels may be about two to three times higher than peripheral or antemortem levels.). Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine that causes more sedation than other antihistamines; this is the rationale for its use as a sleep aid. In a driving simulator study, a single dose of diphenhydramine impaired driving ability more than a blood alcohol concentration of 0.100%.The pilot had been diagnosed with memory loss about 8 months before the accident. It appears that he had some degree of mild cognitive impairment, but whether his cognitive impairment was severe enough to have contributed to the accident could not be determined from the available evidence. However, it is likely that the pilot's mild cognitive impairment combined with the psychoactive effects of diphenhydramine and possibly ethanol would have further decreased his cognitive functioning and Page 2 of 9 ERA18FA004contributed to his decision to attempt an aerobatic maneuver at low altitude in a non-aerobatic airplane.
The private pilot built the airplane over a 24-year period; the accident occurred on the airplane's first flight after the pilot completed building it. The pilot aborted the first takeoff attempt for unknown reasons. During the second takeoff, the airplane was struggling to gain altitude, pitching up and down, and banking. Several witnesses reported hearing "good" engine sounds. Just before the impact, the airplane was in a steep nose-down, left descending spiral before it descended below the trees, followed by a plume of black smoke.The airplane's wooden structure was mostly destroyed by impact forces and postimpact fire. Portions of the flight control systems were found in the wreckage; however, it could not be determined if they were installed and rigged properly due to the amount of damage. Witnesses reported hearing the engine operating, and postaccident engine examination did not reveal evidence of any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Therefore, it is unlikely that the airplane experienced a loss of engine power.The pilot did not have any flight experience in the accident make and model airplane. Further, he had only flown for 4.8 hours in the 12 months before the accident flight. Although it is likely that the pilot's lack of recent flight experience and time in the airplane's make and model played a role in the accident, investigators were unable to determine the cause of the accident due to thermal damage to the airplanes flight controls.
The flight instructor reported that he and the pilot receiving instruction were conducting an instructional, cross-country flight. About 1.3 hours into the flight, the oil pressure started to decrease, and the pilots decided to divert to a nearby airport. The oil pressure continued to decrease, and the engine subsequently lost all power. The airplane was unable to reach the runway, so the pilots chose to activate the parachute system. Upon ground impact, the parachute dragged the airplane for about 20 ft. The pilots then egressed the airplane, and the parachute then dragged it another 200 ft. The nose landing gear and left main landing gear collapsed, and the fuselage and engine firewall sustained substantial damage. During postaccident examination of the airframe, an oil streak was observed covering the airplane’s belly. During engine examination, a b-nut fitting that attached the oil supply line to the turbocharger inlet check valve was found loose. A significant amount of fresh oil was observed in the area around the b-nut fitting and on the engine’s right side near the turbocharger next to the b-nut. The cowling bottom’s right side exhibited significantly more oil staining than the bottom’s left side. The b-nut and its threads were not damaged. A small hole was found on the top of the engine crankcase, consistent with an internal engine failure.A review of the airplane’s maintenance records revealed that an annual inspection was completed earlier on the day of the accident flight and that actions were taken to comply with a turbocharger manufacturer's safety bulletin that recommended that the turbocharger oil supply inlet screen be inspected and cleaned on a regular basis. To inspect and clean the inlet screen, the oil line to the turbocharger bearing housing inlet and cap has to be removed, followed by the removal of the valve assembly from the turbocharger oil inlet fitting. The valve assembly must then be reassembled, during which the check valve should be torqued to 85-inch lbs. The valve assembly should then be reinstalled on the turbo oil adapter and torqued to 85-inch lbs. It is likely that, during the maintenance, maintenance personnel failed to properly torque the b-nut fitting that attached to the turbocharger inlet check valve oil line supply line to the turbocharger inlet check valve, which resulted in oil starvation and a subsequent engine failure.Page 2 of 8 WPR18LA018
The flight instructor of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that the purpose of the flight was to demonstrate a short-field takeoff to an observing student. During the takeoff roll, about rotation speed, the left wing unexpectedly dropped and impacted the ground. Subsequently, the airplane ground looped and sustained substantial damage to both wings and the empennage. The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot was performing the first flight after assembly of the experimental airplane. The day before, the pilot started and taxied the airplane with no anomalies observed, and the preflight taxi and engine run-up on the morning of the accident flight also revealed no anomalies. The pilot advanced engine power slowly for takeoff and the engine ran "perfectly" as the airplane quickly accelerated and became airborne. When the airplane was about 200 to 300 feet above ground level and more than 3/4 of the way down the runway, he sensed that the engine was losing power. By the end of the runway, it became apparent that it was losing power. The pilot then started a gradual left turn and attempted to troubleshoot the loss of power but realized that the airplane was not going to make it back to the airport. The pilot performed a forced landing to a recently harvested cornfield, during which the airplane sustained substantial damage. Examination of the airplane’s vintage engine did not reveal evidence of any preimpact malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation. The engine was not equipped with carburetor heat and review of a carburetor icing probability chart revealed that the atmospheric conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to the formation of carburetor ice. It is possible that while operating the airplane on the ground before takeoff (a period during which the engine would typically be operating at low power), carburetor ice started forming and continued until the engine began losing engine power during the initial climb. The fuel system was also of a vintage design and used an air pump to apply pressure to the fuel tank, enabling fuel to flow to the carburetor. According to the builder, a partial loss of power could have occurred if the fuel system was not properly vented, and the engine could have incurred fuel starvation as a result.Either carburetor icing or inadequate fuel venting could have resulted in a partial loss of power; however, it could not be determined which scenario occurred and resulted in the accident. Given the potential for either scenario, and that no evidence that a mechanical failure contributed to the loss of Page 2 of 7 ERA18LA003engine power, it is likely that an interruption of the normal fuel/air mixture to the engine resulted in the loss of engine power.
The student pilot was conducting a personal flight in the gyrocopter and planned on landing near his residence. The pilot reported that he made a normal approach near the powerlines; however, a gust of wind pushed the gyrocopter downward and the left landing gear caught a powerline. The pilot lost control of the gyrocopter and it impacted a road and came to rest on its right side. The accident is consistent with the pilot's failure to maintain adequate clearance from a powerline during the landing approach.
The private pilot departed for a long cross-country flight with the mixture leaned to the high field elevation. He then further leaned the mixture for lean-of-peak exhaust gas temperature as he climbed the airplane to 10,500 ft mean sea level (msl) for improved fuel efficiency. Thirty minutes into the flight, he descended the airplane to about 8,000 ft msl. The pilot did not enrich the mixture during the approximate 2,500-ft descent. Shortly after, the engine sputtered, followed by a loss of about 700 rpm. He verified the position of the throttle and enriched the fuel/air mixture with one full rotation of the control knob, but he never advanced the knob to the "full rich" position. The pilot then decided to perform a precautionary landing because he was concerned the airplane would not have the power to cross an approaching mountain range. He chose a dry river bed despite the availability of two nearby airports with dirt runways. During the landing, the airplane nosed over and came to rest inverted, which resulted in substantial damage to the rudder. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation, and the engine achieved full and continuous power during a test run. The Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) required a mixture adjustment during the descent for smooth operation, which the pilot did not do during the 2,500-ft descent. An engine manufacturer representative reported that the engine may suffer leaning misfires if the fuel/air mixture is not enriched during a descent. Therefore, it is likely that the engine sputtered and lost partial power due to the pilot's failure to properly enrich the fuel/air mixture during the descent in accordance with the POH. The pilot could have remediated this condition if he had advanced the mixture to the "full rich" position in accordance with the POH emergency procedures; however, instead the pilot made a minor mixture adjustment, which did not restore engine power. Page 2 of 9 WPR18LA002
The private pilot and pilot-rated passenger were approaching the airport for landing during a personal flight; the tower controller cleared the airplane to land behind a flight of two Blackhawk helicopters. The passenger reported that he and the pilot visually acquired the helicopters and were instructed by the controller to perform s-turns for spacing during final approach. As the airplane crossed the runway threshold, the passenger noted that the helicopters were clearing the runway. The airplane then encountered a "heavy downdraft" followed by a "burst" that pitched the airplane to the left. The pilot subsequently initiated a go-around, during which the airplane encountered another "burst," pitched up, rolled inverted, and collided with the ground between the runway and taxiway. The passenger reported that there were no mechanical anomalies with the airplane and that the engine was performing normally. The pilot died in the hospital the day after the accident.Although the controller cleared the airplane for landing following the helicopters, Federal Aviation Administration guidance on wake turbulence avoidance states that, if a pilot accepts a clearance to visually follow a preceding aircraft, the pilot accepts responsibility for both separation and wake turbulence avoidance. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the airplane encountering wake turbulence from the landing helicopters, and it is likely that, had the pilot maintained greater separation from the helicopters or conducted a go-around earlier, the airplane would not have encountered the wake vortices that resulted in the loss of control.
On October 2, 2017, at about 0840 CDT, Southwest Airlines flight 681, Boeing B737-700, N930WN, was struck by an unmanned tug while boarding was ongoing at Chicago Midway Airport (KMDW), Chicago, Illinois.  There were no injuries to the 84 passengers and crew onboard.  The airplane received substantial damage to the lower fuselage skin, frames and stringers over an area about 3 feet by 3 feet. The flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulation Part 121 as a scheduled passenger flight from KMDW to Omaha Airport (KOMA), Omaha, Nebraska. A ramp agent was driving a covered baggage tug with two baggage carts in tow between Gates B22 and B24 when the tug made contact with two staged baggage carts. The ramp agent jumped off the tug as the tug continued to accelerate forward. The now unmanned baggage tug struck additional ground support equipment before striking the fuselage of the accident airplane at Gate B22.  The ramp agent stated afterwards that he could not get the tug to stop and thought running the tug into the staged baggage carts would stop or at least slow the tug down. Examination of the baggage tug after the event revealed there was a mechanical failure of the fuel governor which resulted in the runaway.  The runaway could have been stopped by either turning the ignition key off or using the manual shut down lever on the front cover.  There was no guidance in the Ground Operations Training Manual related to how ramp personnel should handle mechanical failures of ground support equipment.
The private pilot was conducting a local flight in the helicopter with a passenger. After departing from an open field, the pilot flew along the perimeter of the field, and the passenger recalled that about halfway around the perimeter of the field, the helicopter began descending, slowly at first and then more rapidly. According to the passenger, the rotor speed increased, but the helicopter continued to descend. Ground-based video footage revealed that before it began descending, the helicopter was moving forward slowly when it yawed about 270° to the right. As it neared the ground, the helicopter again yawed to the right, completing nearly a 360° turn either immediately before or just after it contacted the ground. The helicopter came to rest on its left side. The engine continued to run after the helicopter came to rest, and the passenger shut it off.Airframe and engine examinations did not reveal evidence of any anomalies consistent with a pre-impact failure or malfunction. Surface wind conditions recorded at nearby airports were light and variable.Federal Aviation Administration publications regarding a loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) state that in the event of a sudden, unanticipated right yaw, a pilot should apply full left pedal, simultaneously move the cyclic control forward to increase airspeed, and if altitude permits, reduce engine power. Factors that contribute to LTE are a high-power setting, which induces considerable main rotor downwash and more turbulence relative to a low power setting, and a slow forward speed, which may create variations in airflow around the tail rotor. The video footage showing a right yaw followed by a descent suggests that the pilot encountered LTE, which resulted in the 270° right yaw before the pilot was able to regain control. The additional power required by the tail rotor during the recovery reduced the power available to the main rotor and resulted in a descent that could not be arrested with the engine power available. It appeared that the pilot did not attempt to increase airspeed during the recovery, which reduced his ability to avoid impacting the ground.Page 2 of 8 CEN18FA001
The pilot reported that, during landing, the airplane touched down about "150 ft. beyond [the runway] numbers" and he immediately "removed flaps and applied brakes." He added that he was "unable to stop the forward momentum of the plane," and he believed he was going to overrun the runway, so he applied full power to go-around. Subsequently, the airplane overran the runway before a climb rate could be established, and during the runway excursion, the airplane struck a chain link fence. During the impact, the right wing separated from the fuselage, and the airplane rolled inverted down a ravine before coming to a stop on the main landing gear. The pilot further reported that, after the accident, he believed he came in "too fast" for landing. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, empennage, and both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The noninstrument-rated private pilot, departed on a cross-country flight over mountainous terrain into an area of instrument meteorological conditions (IMC); IMC conditions had been forecasted earlier that morning. An acquaintance of the pilot, who was also a pilot, stated that he spoke with the accident pilot before the flight about the clouds along his intended route. The accident pilot stated that, if he needed to, he would climb above the clouds and look for a hole through which he could descend to the destination. If he could not find a hole in the clouds, then he would return to the departure airport. About 12 minutes into the flight, and after having reached its maximum altitude of 8,700 ft msl and on a heading of 254°, radar track data revealed that the airplane had started a descending left turn.  Over the next 24 seconds the airplane descends from 8,700 ft msl to 8,100 ft msl at a rate of descent of 1,500 ft per minute (fpm). About 12 seconds later the airplane climbed from 8,100 ft to 9,000 ft at an average rate of 4,500 fpm, followed next by a period of about 12 seconds when the airplane descended from 9,000 ft to 7,100 ft at an average rate of descent of 9,500 fpm and an average ground speed of 40 knots. The last radar return, which was 12 minutes 40 seconds into the flight, showed the airplane at an altitude of 7,100 ft (1,700 ft above ground level), and about 638 ft west of the accident site.An on-duty state trooper in the area heard an airplane flying at treetop level and in the clouds just prior to the accident. The trooper then heard the airplane pass over his position with "the engine screaming," after which it entered a left turn and subsequently impacted terrain. A survey of the accident site revealed a linear debris path and damage to the airplane that was consistent with controlled flight into terrain. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal evidence of any mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.An AIRMET, which was valid for an area near the accident site was issued about 2 hours before the accident, advising of ceilings below 1,000 ft, visibility below 3 statute miles, precipitation, and mist. Additionally, an Area Forecast issued earlier that morning revealed widespread instrument meteorological conditions near the area of the accident site, with terrain and mountains obscured Page 2 of 9 WPR18FA001through late morning. It is most likely that the pilot encountered IMC en route and was maneuvering to return to visual conditions when the airplane turned left and collided with terrain.
The glider pilot reported that, while in the base leg in the traffic pattern, the glider was "fast and too high." He added that, during the landing, he landed long, the glider ran off the end of the runway, and the left wing struck a storage trailer parked on the left.The glider sustained substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the glider that would have precluded normal operation.
On September 30, 2017, about 1050 eastern daylight time, American Airlines flight 1533, a Boeing 737-800, N841NN, collided with American Airlines flight 419, an Airbus A321, N982VJ, on a taxiway at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (KDCA), Arlington, Virginia. There were no injuries to the occupants of either airplane.  Both flights were scheduled domestic passenger flights, operating under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 121. N841NN originated at Miami International Airport (KMIA), Miami, Florida, and had 108 passengers and crew onboard. N982VJ originated at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, (KDFW) Dallas, Texas, and had 191 passengers and crew on board. According to flight crew statements N982VJ was stopped on taxiway K waiting for their assigned arrival gate to be vacated. As N841NN attempted to pass N982VJ, the left wingtip of N841NN impacted the left horizontal stabilizer of N982VJ, causing substantial damage to the horizontal stabilizer.