roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot of the helicopter was conducting an agricultural application flight in dark night conditions. He stated that, after completing the chemical application, he landed on the load truck and the hopper was filled with 50 gallons of water to rinse out the applicator system. The pilot departed from the load truck toward an open field about 200 yards away. The pilot stated that, while maneuvering about 40 ft above ground level when the spray tank was almost empty, the helicopter began to “bounce and tilt in all directions,” then “fish-tailed” before the engine lost total power. The pilot stated that he was unable to judge the helicopter’s height above the ground, and the helicopter subsequently landed hard, during which the main rotor blades severed the tail rotor drive shaft. Postaccident examination of the helicopter and engine revealed no anomalies or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. About 5 gallons of fuel was found in the fuel tank, 1.4 gallons of which was unusable. No engine abnormalities were found during an engine run on a test stand. Based on the available information, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.
The student pilot reported that during the fifth solo landing of the day the airplane began to yaw to the left of centerline after touching down.  He applied right rudder but was unable to correct the yaw and the right main landing gear collapsed, which resulted in substantial damage to the main wing spar and fuselage. The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor and the pilot receiving instruction were practicing short field landings. After an initial unsuccessful approach, the pilot conducted a go-around and set up for another landing approach. The flight instructor described that after passing over obstacles while on short final approach to the runway, the flight instructor told the pilot to reduce engine power to idle so that they would not overshoot the touchdown point again. The pilot complied, and as they descend the pilot continued to increase the airplane’s pitch attitude as if engine power had not been reduced. The flight instructor noted this, directed the pilot to decrease the airplane’s pitch, and then “nudged” the control stick forward to reduce the airplane’s angle of attack. As the flight instructor released his forward pressure on the control stick, the airplane’s pitch again increased along with its descent rate, as the pilot continued to pull back on the control stick. The airplane subsequently touched down “hard” on the runway, resulting in substantial damage to the right wing. The operator reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation, nor did the pilot or flight instructor report any.
The pilot taxied to the ramp after an uneventful flight. After moving the throttles toward the ground idle position while in front of the marshaller, the airplane turned left, and the pilot observed that the right brake was inoperative. He attempted to stop the airplane by placing both propeller levers to the feather position and subsequently moved both throttles toward the reverse (beta) position. The airplane continued forward and struck a hangar, which resulted in substantial damaged to the left wing.Postaccident examination of the braking system revealed the brake master cylinders were nearly empty of brake fluid, with no leaks observed. The pilot, who was also a mechanic, recorded completion of a phase inspection about nine months before the accident. The inspection included servicing the brake master cylinders, but the pilot reported he did not check the fluid levels of the master cylinders.
After having a condition inspection of the experimental amateur-built airplane completed, the pilot reported performing a thorough preflight inspection, checking both fuel tanks for contamination with none noted. The left wing fuel tank contained about 7 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel and the right wing fuel tank was almost full. The preflight inspection, engine start, and run-up were normal. During initial climb, the engine sustained a total loss of power. The pilot pushed the nose over and attempted a left turn to return to the airport. The engine regained power shortly before the airplane impacted the ground and a fuel truck, resulting in substantial damage.  Postaccident examination of the engine found no evidence of a preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the wing fuel tanks revealed that the fuel pickups in both wing fuel tanks were installed incorrectly as compared to the kit manufacturer’s plans; both lines were facing forward instead of aft. The incorrect positioning of the pickup lines made it likely that the amount of unusable fuel was greatly increased, especially at nose high pitch attitudes, such as during takeoff and initial climb, due to the fuel’s movement toward the aft portion of the tank. The pilot reported that he was not provided documentation when he bought the airplane as to the quantity of unusable fuel, nor had the unusable fuel amounts been calculated since he purchased the airplane.  A review of maintenance records showed that the kit manufacturer’s service bulletin and a service notification letter relating to fuel pickups had not been complied with. While compliance was not mandatory, if the service bulletin and service letter had been complied with, it is possible that the incorrect fuel pickup orientation would have been identified. Page 2 of 8 ERA23LA124Although the amount of unusable fuel in the selected tank selected could not be determined (given the damage sustained to the tank during the accident), it is likely that during initial climb the engine was starved for fuel due to the incorrect installation of the pickup lines, resulting in a loss of engine power.
The pilot reported that during initial climb through about 5,000 ft mean sea level, the engine lost power. He attempted to restart the engine, but the attempt was unsuccessful. Unable to return to the departure airport, the pilot conducted a forced landing to a field. During the forced landing, the airplane sustained substantial damage to the forward fuselage. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed the left fuel tank contained no usable fuel, and the right fuel tank was full of fuel. After the airplane was recovered, a functional engine test run, with the right fuel tank selected, was completed with no anomalies noted. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. After the accident, the pilot stated that he should have a better understanding of engine restart procedures. The loss of engine power was attributed to fuel starvation.
The pilot reported that, while flying low along the river, the helicopter collided with an unseen wire. The pilot subsequently accomplished a landing in the shallow water of the river without further incident. A main rotor blade was substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
On the return leg of a cross-country flight, while on final approach at the planned destination, the pilot stated that he experienced moderate turbulence while attempting to land. The airplane floated about halfway down the runway, so he executed a go-around. The pilot reported that the engine abruptly lost power during the go-around and the airplane only climbed about 100 ft above ground level. He maneuvered to avoid obstacles at the end of the runway and then the engine lost total power. He initiated a forced landing, during which the airplane’s right wing struck a tree. The airplane then impacted a pond and came to rest submerged in the water, with only the empennage and top of the fuselage visible above the waterline. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Thus, the reason for the total loss of engine power could not be determined.
The pilot attempted to start the engine six times before the battery died. He recharged the battery and attempted six more engine starts before ceasing further attempts. He said that during each engine start attempt, he applied the engine primer three times and pumped the throttle control two times. The throttle control was positioned about ¼ inch forward during each start attempt. At times during the start attempts, he placed the mixture control into idle cutoff and ran the engine starter. The pilot and one passenger exited the airplane while one passenger remained inside. The passenger who exited the airplane noticed a small flame inside the engine cowling. The pilot told the passenger inside the airplane to move the mixture control to idle cutoff. The passenger then exited the airplane. The fuel selector was not turned to the off position. A large fire the erupted from the engine compartment, which destroyed the airplane. Fire damage precluded determination of the fuel and ignition sources of the fire.
The student pilot was performing landings during her second solo flight. On her third touch-and-go landing, while looking down to ensure that the flaps were retracted and carburetor heat was off, she advanced the throttle to full, and the airplane began to veer to the left. The student pilot attempted to correct but was unable to regain control of the airplane before it departed the runway. The airplane entered muddy terrain, nosed over, and came to rest inverted. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the vertical stabilizer and wings. The student pilot reported there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that before departure he checked the fuel level in the wing fuel tanks with a dip stick and the level correlated to about 24 gallons of fuel. After departure, he flew for about 3 hours. While approaching the destination airport, the engine started to run rough and then lost all power. The pilot executed a forced landing to a snow-covered field about 3 miles from the airport. The left wing collided with a tree during the forced landing and sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and wings during the impact.A postaccident examination found that the left-wing fuel cap was missing and the fuel tank was void of fuel; however, there was no evidence of fuel leaking from the left fuel tank nor was there fuel evidence on the ground or in the snow. The fuel tank was not compromised. The fuel cap was not located during a search of the accident site or of the fueling location; however, it is most likely that the fuel cap separated during the impact with the tree. During recovery of the airplane, when the right wing was cut at the root, a fire ignited and consumed a portion of the right wing and investigators were unable to determine the amount of fuel in the right wing.A detailed engine and airframe examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The accident flight departed with ample fuel for the flight. Given the empty left fuel tank and the lack of evidence to support a fuel leak, it is most likely that the engine lost power due to fuel starvation. During the accident sequence the seatbelt failed with a separation of the threading at the “Y” junction. The date of manufacturing stamp on the shoulder harness restraint was December 15, 2017. The shoulder harness label stated that the restraint system was an FAA-PMA part with a rated strength assembly of 1,500 pounds.Page 2 of 6 CEN23LA101
The pilot reported that, the intention of the flight was to sight see and look at some local airstrips to determine their conditions. He noticed fresh tracks in the snow at an airstrip he was familiar with and decided to do a low pass to inspect further. On the third low approach he misjudged the tailwheel airplane’s height above the snow and the main wheels contacted and dug in. The pilot attempted a go-around however the airplane nosed over and came to rest inverted. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wing struts, vertical stabilizer, and rudder. The pilot reported there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot stated he touched down with a small bounce, drifted to the right edge of the runway, and caught the right main tire in the deep snow. The airplane nosed over and came to rest inverted which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing and vertical stabilizer. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The Cessna 150 had been converted to a tailwheel configuration.
The pilot, seated in the left seat, reported that the operator’s chief pilot/check airman, seated in the right seat, was conducting an operating experience (OE) flight during a CFR Part 135 cargo flight to a remote Alaskan village. The pilot said that her approach to Runway 33, a 35-foot wide, 2,200 ft long, ice-covered runway, required a correction for a strong right crosswind. She added that the airport windsock was frozen in place, making it difficult to discern the wind velocity and direction. She reported that during the landing roll, the airplane began to veer to the left of the runway center. She said that the chief pilot/check airman then took control of the airplane to correct the veer, but the strong crosswind continued to push the airplane to the left on the ice-covered runway. The airplane subsequently collided with a snow berm on the left side of the runway, resulting in substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.During a follow up conversation with the operator’s director of operations, he said that the chief pilot/check airman was on board the accident flight to provide additional OE to a recently hired pilot due to icy runway conditions and a strong crosswind at the destination airport. This was the pilot’s first flight to the remote village.
The pilot reported, and airport security video confirmed, that during a takeoff attempt, the right wing contacted the runway and the pilot pulled back excessively on the yoke. The airplane pitched up, stalled, and descended back on to the runway. It subsequently travelled off the end of the runway and impacted trees, before coming to rest on its side. The pilot added that in retrospect, he should have rejected the takeoff when the right wing contacted the runway. Examination of the wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions, nor did the pilot report any. The inspector noted that both wings separated, and the fuselage was substantially damaged.
The student pilot reported that he was performing touch-and-go landings. When he added power to take off, he lost control of the airplane as it veered left.  He was unable to regain control before the airplane impacted a snowbank.  The airplane flipped over and came to rest inverted on the side of the runway, which resulted in substantial damage to the wings, fuselage, and vertical stabilizer. The pilot reported there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operations. At the time of the accident, the pilot was landing on Runway 34 with wind from 350°at 4 knots.
The private pilot stated that during takeoff from runway 23 when the flight was 20 ft above the runway, the tip-up canopy became unlatched and “flipped up” which eliminated his forward vision and made the airplane difficult to control. He returned for landing and reported the, “landing was hard.” During the landing roll the nose landing gear dug in and the airplane nosed over resulting in structural damage to the vertical stabilizer and damage to the rudder.According to a Service Letter from the airplane designer, in the event that a tip-up canopy opened in-flight, field reports indicate that the airplane will “most likely pitch nose down abruptly. The severity of the pitching moment can depend on speed, attitude, and weight and balance.”According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, postaccident examination of the tip-up canopy revealed the canopy frame was distorted and the left side of the canopy frame was damaged which prevented the left aft side from latching closed. The right aft side of the canopy could be latched closed and was unable to be manually raised once closed. The airplane was equipped with a secondary canopy latch at the top rear of the canopy frame. No discrepancies of it were reported. Further, no discrepancies were reported or observed on either “catch tooth” of the latch handle or canopy latch. The airplane was not equipped with a tip-up canopy latch warning system.While the FAA inspector reported no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the canopy latch system (primary or secondary), the damage to the canopy frame likely occurred during the accident sequence. It is likely that the canopy was not closed and latched on either aft side and the canopy latch handle was not fully engaged with the canopy latch during takeoff. Had the airplane been equipped with Page 2 of 6 ERA23LA153a tip-up canopy latch warning system, it is likely that the improperly closed canopy would have been detected by the pilot.
The pilot receiving instruction and flight instructor reported that, during the landing roll, while slowing the airplane in preparation to exit the runway, the airplane abruptly turned to the right. Despite the application of left rudder and left brake, the airplane continued to the right and ground looped. The pilot taxied the airplane back to his hangar and noticed that the rudder inputs needed were not typical. Upon examination at his hangar, he discovered substantial damage to the left wing, left horizontal stabilizer and elevator. He also noted that the right main landing gear leg was misaligned, and the right main landing gearbox assembly was fractured.Postaccident examination of the right main landing gearbox revealed evidence of fatigue cracking within the hollow slot of the assembly and subsequent overstress fractures outside of the fatigue zone.
The instrument-rated pilot was positioning the airplane in preparation for an annual inspection. The flight was conducted under night visual flight rules (VFR); however, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed along the route of flight. The pilot reported that the cloud ceiling at the departure airport was about 700 ft above ground level (agl). The pilot inadvertently flew into clouds while en route and remained in instrument conditions for about 10 minutes. During the final approach the airplane descended below the clouds, but the pilot was unable to locate the airport and “saw only pitch black” with no visual references. The airplane subsequently struck trees shortly before the pilot intended to initiate a go-around. It subsequently came to rest nose down in a wooded area. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. A Notice to Air Mission (NOTAM) pertaining to the destination airport indicated that the runway lights were unserviceable during the time of the accident flight.
The pilot reported that during a landing attempt, after touchdown, he raised the flaps and the right wing lifted. He added right aileron input, but the airplane then turned about 60° to the left. The pilot was unable to correct the turn with rudder and initiated a go around, at which time the airplane collided with a snow berm, and the pilot continued. On the second landing, the airplane touched down normally, but the landing gear collapsed. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage.The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor of an amphibious float-equipped airplane reported that, he was demonstrating to the student pilot a water landing and step taxi from the back seat. While in the step taxi and preparing to takeoff, the student alerted the flight instructor to a channel hazard marker directly in front of the airplane. The flight instructor was unable to respond before the left wing and left side float collided with the marker about a second later. The left wing and left side float separated from the fuselage resulting in substantial damage. The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot was taking the airplane on a flight to another airport for maintenance. During the preflight inspection, the pilot turned on the electrical power and noticed that the fuel gauge was indicating 80 gallons of fuel. The pilot reported the airplane holds a maximum of 156 gallons of fuel and he calculated that he needed 113 gallons of fuel to legally complete the flight. He informed the fixed base operator (FBO) that he wanted the fuel tanks topped off, but was informed by the ramp technician that the fuel tanks were full and he did not need fuel. The pilot went back to the airplane and removed the fuel cap. He noticed fuel in the filler neck and assumed the fuel tanks were full. He did not push open the anti-siphon fuel valve to see if the tanks were full or if residual fuel was pooled on top of the anti-siphon fuel valve. When the pilot started the engines, he noticed the fuel gauge was flickering and thought it was malfunctioning. He proceeded to depart for the maintenance base. After about 2 hours of flight time both engines lost power. Unable to reach the closest airport, the pilot executed an off-field landing in a cotton field. After landing, the airplane rolled into the trees and the left wing separated from the fuselage. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left and right wings. According to the fueler at the FBO, she drove out to the airplane to fuel it on the morning of the accident and, after removing the single fuel cap, saw fuel on top of the anti-siphon valve. She used her finger to push down the valve and felt fuel, so she believed the airplane was full of fuel and it did not need additional fuel. Both wing fuel bladders were breached during the accident and a minor amount of fuel was leaked onto the ground. Personnel from the company who recovered the wreckage stated that there was no fuel in the fuel tanks when the airplane was recovered. The fuel quantity Page 2 of 7 ERA23LA122transmitter was sent to the manufacturer for examination. Testing of the transmitter revealed no anomalies with the unit. Based on this information, it is likely that the pilot erred in his assessment of the airplane’s fuel quantity prior to departing on the accident flight and that the available quantity of fuel was exhausted, which resulted in the total loss of engine power and the subsequent forced landing.