roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot reported that during the takeoff roll about 60 knots with a "slight" crosswind, he "felt an abrupt" turn to the right, heard a "huge steady scrape" sound, and noted a vibration. Airborne at 65 knots, he reported a strong gust of wind from the left which felt like a quartering tail wind. He reported that he did not believe he had touched back down on the runway after becoming airborne. The pilot then flew the airplane over the airport where a local pilot on the ground reported to him that the nose landing gear was bent.During the subsequent landing, he reported that he made a soft field type of landing with the main landing gear touching down first. He held the nose landing gear off the ground as long as possible but when the nose landing gear touched down, he had no directional control and he heard a scraping noise. The airplane departed the runway to the right into a ditch and nosed over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, left wing, and vertical stabilizer. The pilot reported that he took off on runway 17 about 1410. The weather observation facility at the accident airport reported that from 1355 to 1415, the wind velocity varied from 13 knots to 15 knots with occasional gusts to 19 knots, and the wind direction varied from 190 to 240 degrees.According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Type Certificate Data Sheet, the maximum demonstrated crosswind component for the airplane is 15 miles per hour (13.03 knots). The FAA has published the Airplane Flying Handbook FAA-H-8083-3A (2004). This handbook discusses operations in crosswind conditions and states in part:Takeoffs and landings in certain crosswind conditions are inadvisable or even dangerous. If the crosswind is great enough to warrant an extreme drift correction, a hazardous landing condition may result. Therefore, the takeoff and landing capabilities with respect to the reported surface wind conditions and the available landing directions must be considered.Page 2 of 6 GAA16CA149It is imperative that pilots determine the maximum crosswind component of each airplane they fly, and avoid operations in wind conditions that exceed the capability of the airplane.
The pilot reported that during the landing roll in gusty wind conditions with aileron corrections applied, the airplane began to weather vane to the left. He further reported that as the airplane slowed down the landing gear tires "suddenly regained traction". Subsequently, the airplane veered to the right, departed the runway, and the right main landing gear impacted an airport sign and collapsed. The right wing sustained substantial damage.  According to the pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot was in cruise flight in the experimental, amateur-built airplane. The pilot transmitted a mayday call via radio, stating that he had "lost an engine." Witnesses saw the airplane before impact and stated that the airplane was not making any sound. One witness saw the airplane enter a sharp turn before entering a nose-low descent. The airplane then impacted an open field; the sharp turn followed by the nose-low descent is consistent with an aerodynamic stall.Examination of the experimental, kit-built engine revealed that the crankshaft had fractured forward of the No. 2 connecting rod journal. Further testing of the crankshaft revealed that the fracture was the result of fatigue cracking. There were no chemical variations or foreign material present in the metallurgical testing. The crankshaft only had 20 hours total time in service, suggesting that initiation of the cracking and the subsequent failure of the crankshaft was almost immediate. As there were no apparent metallurgical mechanical deficiencies with the crankshaft, the fatigue failure was likely the result of unusual stresses; however, there was insufficient information about the engine operation in the final 17 minutes of flight to determine the reason for the failure.Although the pilot's toxicology results tested positive for Zolpidem, a prescription medication for the treatment of insomnia, the values were below the normal therapeutic range and there was no evidence that impairment contributed to the accident.
The commercial pilot was conducting an agricultural application flight. The pilot reported that, while maneuvering the airplane about 300 ft above ground level, the engine experienced a partial loss of power. Unable to maintain altitude, the pilot conducted an emergency landing to a field, during which the airplane landed hard and nosed over, coming to rest inverted. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the No. 2 cylinder head exhibited a circumferential crack of its barrel between the cooling fins.The Federal Aviation Administration had previously issued an airworthiness directive (AD) to address cylinder head cracking on the accident model engine. The AD required periodic visual inspections for cracks in the cylinder heads at specified intervals of time in service (every 100 hours for the accident airplane). According to the engine maintenance logbooks, the AD was last complied with about 35 hours before the accident. The previous inspections to this were sporadic, indicating that neither maintenance personnel nor the owner(s) were regularly complying with the AD.
The airline transport pilot was departing in the experimental, amateur-built airplane. During the initial climb, the engine experienced a partial loss of power. The pilot performed a precautionary landing on a taxiway, during which the airplane departed the paved surface and the nose landing gear collapsed.Postaccident examination of the engine turbocharger revealed reddish-white discoloration of the turbine wheel, which suggested excessive engine exhaust gas temperature. Likewise, discoloration observed on the turbine end shaft journal was consistent with high temperature. The combination of high exhaust temperature and the rotational speed of the turbine wheel likely caused the blade material to creep and the wheel diameter to increase until the blade tips rubbed against the turbine housing. This eventually caused blade tip failures, which resulted in a rotating imbalance. It is likely that the combination of wheel rubbing and imbalance and caused the turbocharger to slow or stop, which in turn resulted in the loss of engine power. The reason for the excessive engine temperature could not be determined during the investigation based on the available information.
According to the pilot, during final approach, his airspeed was too fast. He reported that he decided to extend the landing flare in ground effect in order to bleed off the excess airspeed. As the airplane's main landing gear touched down on the runway, the airplane bounced. The pilot reported that when the airplane settled back on the runway, the nose gear collapsed and the airplane exited the runway to the left. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the firewall and the composite fuselage floorboard. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical failures or anomalies with the airplane prior to or during the flight that would have prevented normal flight operation.
The non-certificated pilot/owner of the single engine airplane was conducting a local test flight with a prospective buyer, who held a private pilot certificate. After exiting the airport traffic area and climbing to an altitude of 1,800 feet, the pilot permitted the prospective buyer to manipulate the flight controls. The pilot then reassumed control of the airplane for the return flight to the departure airport. According to the prospective buyer, while on final approach to land on runway 5, he noticed that the airplane was yawed to the left and applied right rudder, but the pilot told him to stay off the controls, which he did for the remainder of the flight. After landing, the airplane veered to the left and departed the left side of the runway; where it struck an embankment, and flipped over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wing struts, rudder, aft lower fuselage, firewall, and nose gear assembly. Both occupants stated there were no pre-impact anomalies with the airplane.
The solo student pilot reported that the airplane bounced after touched down, then veered off the runway to the left and came to a stop in gravel.   A postaccident exam revealed substantial damage to the firewall. According to the student pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of a tailwheel equipped airplane reported that he encountered a gust of wind during the landing flare and bounced on the touchdown. During the landing roll, the airplane began moving to the left and the pilot applied power to go-around. Subsequently, the airplane continued to the left during the aborted landing, departed the runway, and impacted trees that were located about 115 feet to the left of the runway.A postaccident examination revealed substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight. The pilot reported that, during cruise flight, the engine "sputtered" twice and then lost total power. He switched the fuel selector from the left tank to the right tank, but the engine would not restart, so he chose to activate the airframe parachute system. The parachute deployed normally, and the airplane touched down in a lawn adjacent to an industrial complex.An examination of the engine revealed that the camshaft gear had numerous missing or smeared teeth, and metal particles were found inside the oil filter element and oil sump. Additional metallurgical examination revealed that the first fractured tooth, located about 180° from the timing mark, failed due to fatigue. Most of the remaining broken or missing teeth exhibited overload signatures. Camshaft gear hardness was measured, and it met the manufacturer's specifications.In August 2005, the engine manufacturer issued a service bulletin (SB), which called for the replacement of the camshaft gear with an improved, wider gear design "at next engine overhaul or at camshaft gear replacement." The recommended overhaul time for this engine was 2,000 hours or 12 years, whichever occurred first. At the time of the accident, the engine was 15 years old, had accumulated 1,544 hours in service, and had never been overhauled. At the time of the accident, the SB had not been complied with and the improved camshaft gear had not been installed in the engine.
The noncertificated pilot reported that, after takeoff in the light sport trike, about 200 ft above ground level, he heard a popping sound and the aircraft yawed to the right. He heard the sound a second time, and the aircraft turned hard to the right. The pilot applied full engine power in an attempt to recover and gain lift in order to deploy the ballistic parachute; however, the aircraft did not recover and subsequently collided with the ground in a nose-down attitude. Postaccident examination of the aircraft revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation, and the investigation was unable to determine the cause of the yaw and subsequent loss of control. The pilot was not appropriately certificated, nor did he have any experience flying the accident aircraft make and model.
The pilot was conducting a cross-county flight in the single-engine airplane when the engine began to run rough. Shortly thereafter, the engine experienced a partial loss of power and the pilot subsequently performed a forced landing to a golf course. During the landing, the airplane impacted trees and sustained substantial damage to the left wing.Examination of the engine revealed that two nuts were missing from the No. 3 cylinder head studs, three nuts were loose, and a third stud was fractured. The mostly-flat fracture surface of the stud exhibited features and striations consistent with fatigue, with a shear lip on one side that displayed features consistent with overstress. The fatigue fracture of the No. 3 cylinder head stud led to the loss of engine power and the loosening of several of the other nuts that secured the No. 3 cylinder head to its base.
During cruise flight in the experimental, amateur-built airplane, the private pilot attempted to move the fuel selector from the left to the right fuel tank. During that process, the engine lost power, and the airplane sustained substantial damage during the subsequent forced landing. The pilot reported that he had recently modified the fuel system, and, while attempting to select the right fuel tank, he inadvertently starved the engine of fuel. The pilot reported no problems with the engine before the loss of engine power and stated that the engine lost power because he used improper procedures while attempting to change the fuel selector.
The pilot of the tailwheel equipped airplane reported that during the landing roll in gusty wind conditions, the airplane veered off the runway to the left, despite him "standing" on the right brake with full right rudder applied.  The pilot further reported that he did not apply enough back pressure to enable the tailwheel steering to lock. The airplane ground looped, and slid into a fence. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. According to the pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
During the cross-country flight, the engine experienced a total loss of power and the student pilot performed a forced landing to a field. The airplane nosed over during the landing and came to rest inverted. An examination of the engine revealed that the incorrect bearing and thrust washer had been used during the engine reassembly about 90 flight hours before the accident, resulting in the seizure and failure of the #1 and #2&nbsp;connecting rods&nbsp;and the subsequent loss of engine power. The mechanic who performed the overhaul and reassembly used an outdated parts manual and installed the improper bearing and thrust washer assembly.
The airline transport pilot reported that, shortly after takeoff on the local sightseeing flight, the engine experienced a partial loss of power about 400 ft above ground level. The pilot initiated a turn back to the airport and subsequently landed hard on the runway, substantially damaging the airplane. During the postaccident engine examination, an obstruction was found in one end of the fuel hose between the gascolator to the carburetor. The firesleeve on the hose was removed, which revealed that the hose entered the fitting at a slight angle that was not visible with the firesleeve in place. To facilitate further examination, the hose was cut close to the obstruction. The inner surface of the hose appeared cut and curled into the hose near the fitting, consistent with the improper assembly of the hose and fitting. It is likely that the curled piece of hose acted as a flapper valve that either restricted or cut off fuel flow to the carburetor. The high demand for fuel during takeoff depleted the supply of fuel in the carburetor and resulted in the loss of power. Although maintenance log entries indicated that the last replacement of the fuel hoses occurred 49 years before the accident, given the condition of the hoses, it is likely that a subsequent replacement was performed but not documented.
The helicopter pilot reported that while flying about 300 feet above a ridge with an elevation of 4,900 feet at 10 miles per hour (8.68 knots), he could not hear very well in his headset and needed to adjust the volume. He reported that he removed his left hand from the collective and used it to hold the cyclic so he could use his right hand to adjust the volume on his headset. During this process, he reported that he forgot to increase the friction on the collective prior to removing his left hand. He further reported that the collective "dropped which decreased main rotor pitch causing the engine to overspeed." The pilot reported that the helicopter started to spin to the right; he grabbed the collective, reduced throttle, and then increased the collective pitch. He reported that the helicopter "experienced settling with power," and spun around 8 to 10 times. He further reported that the helicopter landed hard at the top of a ridge and rolled onto its right side. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, main rotor system, tailboom, and tail rotor system. The pilot verified that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.As a safety recommendation, the pilot stated he "should have increased the collective friction prior to removing his left hand from the collective stick." He also stated that "the problem was made worse because the helicopter was only 300 feet above ground level at 10 miles per hour [8.68 knots]." The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published FAA-H-8083-21 Helicopter Flying Handbook (2012). This handbook discusses the function of the collective and states in part:"An adjustable friction control helps prevent inadvertent collective pitch movement." This handbook also discusses recovery from a settling with power condition and states in part: Page 2 of 6 GAA16CA143"When recovering from a settling with power condition, the pilot tends first to try to stop the descent by increasing collective pitch. However, this only results in increasing the stalled area of the rotor, thereby increasing the rate of descent. Since inboard portions of the blades are stalled, cyclic control may be limited. Recovery is accomplished by increasing airspeed, and/or partially lowering collective pitch. In many helicopters, lateral cyclic combined with lateral tail rotor thrust will produce the quickest exit from the hazard assuming that there are no barriers in that direction. In a fully developed vortex ring state, the only recovery may be to enter autorotation to break the vortex ring state."The pilot reported that he utilized a 4-point restraint system installed in the helicopter and sustained minor injuries. He also reported that "I credit the shoulder harness restraint with keeping my injuries from being far worse."
The commercial pilot was conducting a nonscheduled cargo flight. The pilot reported that, as the airplane was descending on an instrument approach, it encountered continuous light-to-moderate turbulence. As the airplane descended through about 2,000 ft mean sea level at an airspeed of 130 knots, it encountered severe turbulence, and the pilot subsequently executed a missed approach and chose to divert to an alternate airport. The airplane continued to encounter light-to-moderate turbulence en route to the alternate airport, and the pilot landed the airplane uneventfully. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the airframe had sustained substantial damage during the flight. Although there were multiple AIRMETs for widespread moderate turbulence and low-level windshear, there were no pilot reports of, nor SIGMETs forecasting, severe turbulence at the time the pilot received her preflight weather briefing.
The student pilot and his flight instructor conducted 6 takeoffs and landings in the tailwheel-equipped airplane. The student pilot then took off solo, flew in the traffic pattern, and during the landing he reported that as soon as my wheels hit the pavement it jerked hard to the right. The student pilot attempted to "straighten it out" but he reported that the airplane was going too fast so he applied power and attempted to take off. He then stated that the airplane "jumped me to the right of the runway," the airplane departed the runway to the right, the propeller impacted terrain, and the main landing gear collapsed under the fuselage. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the two right wing lift struts. The student pilot verified that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.As a safety recommendation, the student pilot stated "more practice" and "land on gravel."
The private pilot was conducting a personal flight in his multiengine airplane and was preparing to perform a touch-and-go landing with a headwind at 11 knots, gusting to 17 knots. After touchdown and a brief landing roll, the pilot applied power and took off. The pilot stated that shortly after takeoff, he received an aural and visual traffic alert; the pilot reduced power on both engines and attempted to land straight ahead. The pilot reported that the airplane then encountered a wind gust and rolled to the right; it struck the ground to the left of the runway, which resulted in substantial damage to the wings, empennage, and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that the airplane had 7 gallons of fuel and that he had planned a short flight to a nearby airport to purchase more fuel. During initial climb, about 750 ft above ground level, the engine experienced a partial loss of power. The pilot applied carburetor heat, but the engine rpm remained at about 1,700, and he was unable to maintain the airplane's altitude. He then turned the airplane back toward the airport and realized that it was not going to reach the runway. The pilot subsequently attempted to land in a field ahead of the runway, but the airplane impacted and came to rest in trees just ahead of the field. The airplane's left wing fuel tank cap was found on the runway; it likely became separated during the takeoff roll. About 2 gallons of fuel was drained from each wing fuel tank after the accident, and more fuel may have leaked out after the accident due to the airplane's position; therefore, it is unlikely that fuel leaked out during the brief flight. The engine was subsequently successfully test-run on the airframe. Review of a carburetor icing chart revealed that the atmospheric conditions at the time of the accident were outside of the icing envelope. Thus, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.
The engine's valves were adjusted the week before the flight to remedy engine performance issues that would typically begin between 10 and 45 minutes in flight. The private pilot performed a full preflight check with no anomalies noted. He then departed, orbited the airport for about 45 minutes, and continued flying over the airport. No engine issues were noted until about 1 hour 5 minutes after takeoff, when the engine began to run roughly. The pilot entered the traffic pattern, but, while operating with the mixture control full rich and the engine at 2,250 rpm with normal oil temperature and pressure, the engine went to idle and did not respond to throttle input. Unable to reach the intended runway, the pilot initiated a descent for a forced landing to a road but, while descending, collided with a utility pole and then impacted the ground hard. Examination of the engine revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Although a blockage of the left fuel vent line was noted several months after the accident, the airplane was equipped with vented fuel caps, which would have mitigated the issue had it existed at the time of the accident. In addition, although the magnetos were improperly timed, this would have been detectable by the pilot before takeoff and likely did not contribute to the reported loss of engine power. Further, although the weather conditions were favorable for the formation of serious carburetor icing at glide power, the pilot was not operating in that regime when the loss of engine power occurred. Therefore, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined based on the available evidence.