roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The airline transport pilot was conducting a local flight in his motor-powered glider. The pilot had the right fuel tank selected and was flying in a counterclockwise direction around a ground reference point when the engine began to lose power. The pilot switched fuel tanks with no improvement and selected a nearby road for a forced landing. During the landing roll on the ice-covered road, the glider's left wing impacted a bush, and the glider exited the road; the nosewheel broke off when it impacted a ditch.The flight manual indicated that all basic nonaerobatic maneuvers are permitted within the operational speed range, which included steep turns with a maximum bank of 60°. The recommended fuel, per the flight manual, was an unleaded super grade. A warning directed that use of fuel with alcohol content and/or other additives is not permitted. Testing of recovered fuel revealed that it contained about 5% alcohol. However, examination of the fuel system revealed no evidence of preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation, and the engine was operational during a postaccident engine run.Although the pilot reported the glider had 5 to 6 gallons of fuel in each of the two main tanks, a second engine test run was conducted where the engine was intentionally fuel starved. Data from the avionics and engine computers were then downloaded, plotted, and compared to data from the accident flight. Both the accident data and the fuel starvation test data similarly showed the engine began to run roughly as the rpm and fuel flow began to fluctuate. Additionally, avionics data showed that both the accident flight data and the fuel starvation test run data had similar indications.The glider's GPS tracked the accident flight from the point of takeoff to the point of the forced landing. This GPS data and the engine data were plotted to determine where the fluctuating engine rpm consistent with engine roughness and the loss of engine power occurred. The glider departed, climbed, and made multiple left turns with multiple altitude changes. The data showed the glider was in a left climbing turn when the engine began to lose power after fluctuations in engine rpm.Page 2 of 11 CEN18LA064Based on the available data, it is likely the fuel unported during the glider's climbing turn, which resulted in fuel starvation and the loss of engine power.
The pilot reported that following an instrument approach in light snow, he inadvertently landed in the safety area to the left of the snow-covered runway. During landing, both wings collided with runway signs. The pilot taxied the airplane to parking.The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the airplane reported that, during the approach to land, he applied full flaps, but "unfortunately, [he] added power too late and too slowly." Subsequently, "the bottom fell out," and the airplane aerodynamically stalled. The airplane landed hard, the left and right wings impacted the ground, and the airplane skidded to a stop. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, during the approach following a positioning flight, he saw that the runway had a light dusting of snow on it and that the airplane touched down on speed in the first 1,000 ft of the 4,100-ft-long runway. The copilot, who was the pilot flying, applied heavy braking, but there appeared to be no braking effectiveness, and the airplane did not slow down as expected. The pilot added that, when the airplane reached about two-thirds of the way down the runway, he knew that it was going to overrun the runway due to the loss of only half of its airspeed. He thought that if he aborted the landing, there was a small chance the airplane could become airborne within the remaining runway. The copilot added engine power to abort the landing, and the nose landing gear lifted off, but insufficient runway was remaining to take off. The copilot reduced the engine power to idle, and the airplane overran the runway and went through the airport fence and a guardrail, across a highway, and into a field.Postaccident examination revealed no flat spots or evidence of skidding on the landing gear tires. The flaps were found in the “ground flaps” position, which is not allowed for takeoff. No evidence of any pre-accident mechanical malfunctions or failures were found with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Based on an airplane weight of 11,000 lbs, the airplane’s stopping distance would have been about 4,400 ft. The flight crew’s improper decision to land on a snow-covered runway that was too short to accommodate the landing in such conditions led to a runway overrun and impact with obstacles.
The pilot reported that he was high on the approach for landing and partially focused on the tower controller's warning about heavy wake turbulence from landing jet traffic on the parallel runway. The airplane touched down about 1,800 ft or longer down the runway and subsequently ran off the end. The controller instructed him to turn around and exit the runway at taxiway Hotel; however, in confusion, the pilot turned toward the main terminal. The controller then instructed the pilot to make a 180o turn; however, he was now in the way of a taxiing incoming jet airplane. He moved the airplane to the left and subsequently struck an unmanned guard shack. Postaccident examination revealed substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
Twenty-five minutes into the cross-country flight, the airplane's engine lost total power. After an unsuccessful attempt to restart the engine, the pilot declared an emergency and selected a forced landing site. The airplane touched down on the soft terrain, nosed over, and came to rest inverted, resulting in substantial damage to the engine firewall, engine mounts, and empennage. Postaccident examination revealed that the fuel drain plug was blocked, and debris was found in the carburetor fuel bowl, both of which likely obstructed the fuel delivery system. This obstruction would have inhibited fuel flow to the engine and resulted in a loss of power.  The fuel filters at the wing roots, fuel strainer, and carburetor fuel inlet were not obstructed, but may have been cleaned during the airplane's most recent annual inspection, which took place 47 flight hours before the accident. The carburetor had not been overhauled or inspected in its history of service.
After initial contact with the flight, the air traffic controller issued the pilots a clearance to cross the initial approach fix CEGAN at or above 7,800 feet and cleared the flight for the published instrument procedure. The published altitude for the instrument procedure was at or above 10,000 feet from CEGAN until BRKET while established on the arc. The flight crew accepted the ATC clearance, and descended from 12,000 feet to 7,800 feet while established on the arc. The minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) for the airspace containing the arc was 7,800 feet, however, just prior to BRKET the floor of the MVA raised to 8,700 feet. The MVA altitudes as depicted on the radar display are for air traffic control and are not available to flight crews. Interviews with the controller indicated there was an expectation that the pilot would not descend below the 10,000 feet as published despite being assigned the "at or above 7,800 feet" crossing restriction. The controller introduced risk by assigning the lowest altitude in the MVA area containing the fix CEGAN (7,800 feet) and expecting the crew to stop their descent at the higher published altitude of 10,000 feet. There was no operational or procedural advantage gained by assigning the flight crew 7,800 feet when the controller expected the crew to stop at 10,000 feet. Had the controller issued the published altitude of 10,000 feet and issued the approach clearance, the incident likely would not have occurred because the crew could have descended to 10,000 feet and then descended according to the published procedure and not below the MVA for that segment.In the incident sequence, the controller instructed the flight crew to cross the initial approach fix (IAF) CEGAN at 7,800 feet, and, the flight did not become established on the published procedure until after CEGAN when established on the arc. The controller was required to assign an altitude to maintain until being established on the procedure, in this case at or above 10,000 feet as published.Page 2 of 18 OPS18IA003When the flight crew received the approach clearance that included a descent below the published altitude, they did not query the controller or stop the descent at the published altitude as required in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. As a result of the incident, the FAA initiated an education program with briefings and information graphics to the air traffic control workforce to emphasize MVA and MSAW conditions. The topics included the use of MVA maps, assignment of appropriate altitudes, ensuring correct altitudes are maintained, and a reminder to know approach procedures and appropriate altitudes.During the incident investigation, it was determined that an antenna adjacent to the IAF BRKET was not depicted on the Jeppesen produced approach chart for the VOR DME C current on the day the incident. Jeppesen changed the approach chart to reflect the antennae and a new obstacle height of 7,614 feet. Additionally, Jeppesen conducted a review of the terrain surrounding the MFR airport to support produced navigation products.
The private pilot was attempting to take off and noted that the airplane's landing light was not working. Although the runway lights provided him with good visibility, his depth perception was limited. As the airplane approached the intersection with the crossing runway during the takeoff roll, the pilot thought that the airplane was approaching the end of the runway. He rotated the airplane to lift off, but it had not gained enough airspeed to become airborne, so he decided to reject the takeoff. As he reduced engine power, he lost directional control, and the airplane departed the left side of the runway. The pilot stated that there were no issues with the airplane during the accident takeoff other than the inoperative landing light. He noted that a better review of the airport diagram and a working landing light might have improved his situational awareness during the takeoff.
The commercial pilot was practicing landing approaches to a private airstrip that he was constructing. According to the pilot, while flying about treetop height with full flaps deployed, he added full power to initiate a climb; the engine "sputtered" and stopped producing power. He then performed a forced landing to the unimproved airstrip. During the landing, the airplane "bounced," departed the side of the cleared area, entered the woods, and sustained substantial damage. When asked about the performance and handling of the airplane, the pilot said it was "perfect." He stated that the reason for the loss of engine power was carburetor ice and that he had not used carburetor heat for the low approach and pass over the airstrip. The weather conditions in the area at the time of the accident were conducive to serious icing at cruise power. Therefore, it is likely that the pilot's failure to use carburetor heat resulted in an accumulation of ice within the carburetor that led to a total loss of engine power.
The instrument-rated private pilot and four passengers boarded the multiengine airplane inside a hangar. The pilot then requested that the airplane be towed from the hangar to the ramp, since he did not want to hit anything on the ramp while taxiing in the dense fog. Witnesses heard the pre-takeoff engine run-up toward the end of the runway but could not see the airplane as it departed; the engines sounded normal during the run-up and takeoff. A witness video recorded the takeoff but the airplane was not visible due to the dense fog. During the takeoff roll the airplane's tires chirped, which is consistent with the wheels touching down on the runway with a side load. The video ended before the accident occurred. The witnesses stated that the takeoff continued and then they heard the airplane impact the ground and saw an explosion. The weather conditions at the time of the accident included visibility less than 1/4 mile in fog and an overcast ceiling at 300 ft above ground level. The airplane's weight at the time of the accident was about 105 lbs over the maximum takeoff weight, which exceeded the center of gravity moment envelope. The excess weight would have likely extended the takeoff roll, decreased the climb rate, and increased the amount of elevator pressure required to lift off of the runway. A majority of the airplane was consumed by postcrash fire. The ground impact marks and wreckage distribution were consistent with the airplane rolling left over the departure end of the runway and impacting the ground inverted in a nearly vertical, nose-low attitude. Examination of the engines revealed operating signatures consistent with takeoff power at the time of impact. The elevator trim tab and actuator were found beyond their full up travel limits and the trim cable exhibited tension overload separations near the actuator. It is likely that, when the cable separated in overload, the chain turned the sprocket and extended the actuator rod beyond full travel. No anomalies were observed with the airframe, engines, or cockpit instrumentation that would have precluded normal operation. The investigation was unable to determine the status of the autopilot during the accident takeoff. Based on the evidence it's likely that when the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions the pilot experienced spatial disorientation, which resulted in a loss of control and descent into terrain.Page 2 of 13 CEN18FA061
On December 23, 2017 at 1221 Alaska Standard Time (AkST) a Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas DC-9, registration N935CE, experienced a depressurization on initial climb from the Bethel, Alaska, airport (PABE.)  The flight crew returned to Bethel and landed with no further incident.  There were no injuries to the two flight crew and one cargo handler on board.  The depressurization resulted from a pallet jack in the cargo compartment impacting the rear pressure bulkhead, resulting in substantial damage to the airplane.  Inspection revealed a tie-down fastener for the pallet jack had pulled out.
The pilot of the twin-engine, experimental, amateur-built airplane was landing with a right crosswind.  The pilot turned onto final approach for the runway and the airplane banked left and began to descend. The pilot attempted to correct, but the bank and heading change persisted, the airplane's descent rate increased, and the airplane impacted trees and the ground short of the runway threshold. The airplane sustained substantial damaged to both wings. Examination of the airframe and engines did not reveal any pre-impact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the airplane encountered a crosswind during final approach, and the pilot was unable to regain control before impact with trees and terrain.
The student pilot reported that, during the first solo landing, the glider was "not straight" for the flare, and she attempted to correct with right rudder. Subsequently, she overcorrected, and the glider veered right and struck a hangar.The glider sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings.The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the glider that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot approached the destination airport at the conclusion of the visual flight rules flight while receiving traffic advisory services from an air traffic controller. The pilot could not recall at what point during the approach he extended the landing gear but postulated that he may have done so about 10 miles from the airport. As the pilot was "dodging clouds" during the approach, he heard another pilot, who was also heading to the same airport, request a "pop-up" instrument flight rules clearance from the controller due to sea fog in the area. The controller then advised the accident pilot to follow the other airplane to the airport. During the approach to the runway, the accident pilot reduced the throttle to avoid overtaking the other airplane, and the landing gear warning horn activated. He then applied a small amount of throttle, and the horn stopped. The subsequent landing was normal until the landing flare, when the pilot heard a scraping noise. The airplane slid along the runway on its belly for 400 ft before coming to a stop. Postaccident examination of the landing gear revealed that the landing gear circuit breaker was open and that the landing gear position selector was in the down position. The main landing gear had extended minimally out of their respective wells, suggesting that the landing gear extension cycle had at least started but was not successfully completed. During recovery from the runway, the airplane was placed on jacks, and the landing gear was lowered using the emergency gear extension without incident. Damage to the landing gear extension system precluded further functional testing.Based on the available information, it is possible that at some point during the flight, the pilot moved the landing gear selector handle to the down position, but the landing gear did not extend. When the pilot heard the landing gear warning horn activate as he reduced throttle, he should have realized that the landing gear was not in a safe position for landing. It is likely that his fixation on the weather conditions and the other airplane landing at the airport distracted him from completing this task. Had the pilot diverted to another nearby airport where the weather was better, he could have performed additional troubleshooting and likely could have performed a successful emergency extension of the landing gear without the distraction of the weather and other traffic.Page 2 of 6 ERA18LA058
The sport pilot was picking up his airplane following maintenance and intended to return the airplane to its base 57 nautical miles away. The owner of the maintenance facility cautioned the pilot about the weather along the route of flight and stated that the conditions at the departure airport included overcast clouds at 400 ft above ground level (agl). The pilot replied that the weather was improving and that he was familiar with the area. There was no record of the pilot having obtained a weather briefing prior to departure. The maintenance facility owner watched as the pilot subsequently took off from a taxiway and made a steep left banking turn to depart on course to his destination. About 25 minutes after departure, a witness saw the airplane flying between 150 and 200 ft agl with the engine running at a high-power setting.The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 34 nautical miles from the departure airport and oriented toward the departure airport. A nearby resident stated that the weather in the area at the time of the accident included low clouds about treetop level with very limited visibility. Review of reported weather conditions from nearby airports about the time of the accident revealed cloud ceilings ranging between 400 ft and 1,400 ft agl. Examination of the airplane and engine revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot's decision to depart and continue flight in instrument meteorological conditions resulted in controlled flight into terrain. As the airplane impacted a stand of trees in a wings-level attitude prior to impact with the ground, this supports the position of controlled flight into terrain rather than that of spatial disorientation.Autopsy of the pilot revealed evidence of severe cardiovascular disease with an implanted defibrillator; however, interrogation of the pacemaker revealed no anomalies and it is unlikely that the pilot's cardiovascular disease contributed to the accident. Toxicology testing revealed that the pilot had used a potentially impairing medication, clonazepam, at some time before the accident; however, the blood Page 2 of 10 WPR18FA053level was well below the therapeutic and impairing level and therefore did not affect the pilot's decision-making or directly contribute to the accident. The pilot's physician documented a caregiver's concerns for the pilot's impulsive behavior and difficulty remembering where he was while driving. The pilot's actions and decision to attempt to fly his airplane in poor weather conditions that exceeded his skill and ability are consistent with the reported impulsive behavior. Review of the pilot's medical history was unable to determine whether the pilot's baseline history of poor decision-making and airmanship as assessed by a previous flight instructor was solely responsible for the circumstances leading up to the accident, or the assessment of his impulsive decision-making by undiagnosed neuropsychiatric deficit, contributed to the circumstances of this accident.
The flight instructor reported that the student pilot began to flare for a touch-and-go landing when a wind gust yawed the airplane to the left. He added that the wind "dropped out," and the airplane landed hard with the nose low, which resulted in the nose landing gear collapsing.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings.The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The automated weather observation station located on the airport reported that, about 5 minutes before the accident, the wind was from 140° at 6 knots. The flight instructor reported that the wind was variable at 10 knots, gusting to 20 knots. The airplane landed on runway 21.