roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot reported that, during the initial climbout, the engine did not respond to his throttle movements. The pilot turned the airplane back toward the airport and entered the downwind leg. While on the base leg, the pilot turned off the engine ignition switch and performed a forced landing. Due to a higher-than-anticipated headwind, the pilot misjudged the flight profile, and the airplane touched down short of the runway and impacted instrument landing system structures, which damaged both wings, the fuselage, and the empennage. Postaccident examination revealed the throttle cable was disconnected from the throttle lever arm at the fuel injector/control. A loose washer was found at the bottom of the engine cowling, and the castellated nut and cotter pin required for proper installation of the throttle linkage were not located. During the last annual inspection, the throttle cable had been disconnected to perform maintenance actions. The linkage hardware was likely not secured properly after that maintenance was performed, which resulted in the separation and subsequently the engine did not to respond to the pilot’s inputs during initial climb.
The commercial helicopter pilot was attempting to land on a mobile landing platform in gusty conditions. As the helicopter settled down onto the helipad, the skids contacted the pad unevenly, which caused it to tilt to the right. The pilot attempted to correct and lowered the collective, but the helicopter rapidly entered a dynamic rollover and struck the ground, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage, mast, and main rotor blades. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot departed the operator’s ramp for five nighttime aerial application operations. He was supported by three ground crewmembers, who described normal interactions with the pilot during the landings to the truck. About 2.5 hours later, while at the third job site, the pilot indicated that the wind had increased and that he was having difficulty lining up the helicopter with the support truck (for landing). The pilot also reported that the helicopter’s heater was not working and that he was cold, even though he was dressed for the outside conditions. The pilot also exhibited confusion and difficulty with communicating with the ground crew. The pilot subsequently canceled the third and fourth jobs, directed the ground crew to the fifth job site, and then departed the fourth jobsite with chemicals still in the helicopter’s tanks and without stating his intentions—two actions that were reportedly not typical for the pilot. The helicopter was last seen heading south above a large set of power lines that were about 100 ft high and close to the fourth job site. The last location of the helicopter was also near an airstrip that the pilot commonly used when taking breaks. The helicopter impacted terrain in a nose-low left bank. Postaccident examination of the recovered airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.Before the accident, the pilot had told two family members that he had tested positive for COVID-19. Hydroxychloroquine and ibuprofen were found in the debris field, and acetaminophen was found in one of the pilot’s specimens. His postmortem COVID-19 test was negative. A low level of ethanol was detected in a single specimen from the pilot but not in two others, which indicated that the source was not from ingestion and thus was not a factor in the accident.Page 2 of 10 WPR22FA098Given the evidence of the pilot’s conversations about COVID-19, the medicines found at the accident site, and the reported change in the pilot’s normal behavior pattern as the night progressed suggested that the pilot might have reported to work ill and was experiencing worsening symptoms or fatigue. The location of the accident is consistent with the pilot deciding to fly to the airstrip with the intentions of taking a break. The full moon and clear night would have provided ample illumination for a transition to the airstrip, which was parallel with the power distribution lines in the area. Even though the pilot was likely operating the helicopter at 500 ft above ground level, the altitude that the pilot used for ferry flights, the pilot likely lost situational awareness and descended the helicopter into the terrain while enroute to the airstrip.
The pilot reported that he was interested in purchasing the airplane and the accident flight was a demonstration flight. The owner of the airplane provided a flight instructor as the pilot had not flown the make and model airplane in many years. Prior to the flight, 10 gallons of fuel were added to each wing fuel tank, to bring the total useable fuel to 38 gallons. The pilot further stated that he and the flight instructor then performed a thorough preflight inspection, which included sumping the fuel tanks. The pilot planned to perform touch-and-go landings and the first one was uneventful. While on a downwind leg to the runway for a second landing, the pilot verified that the electric fuel pump was on and switched the fuel selector from the right fuel tank to the left fuel tank. The engine subsequently lost all power and the propeller continued to windmill. The pilot attempted to glide to the airport while the flight instructor attempted to restart the engine, which included switching back to the right fuel tank. The engine did not regain power and the pilot subsequently performed a forced landing in a field. During the forced landing, the airplane struck a ditch, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. During a post-accident examination, about 3 quarts of water were drained from the left fuel tank, about 1 pint of water was drained from the fuel system and no water was found in the right fuel tank. The airplane had not flown for about 11 months prior to the accident flight. During that time, it sat outside for several months. The left-wing fuel cap appeared to have a good seal and the investigation could not determine how water entered the left fuel tank.
The pilot receiving tail wheel instruction (student pilot) stated that during takeoff, he raised the tail wheel too high, and the propeller contacted the ground. The airplane nosed over and came to rest inverted. The student pilot added that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions and the flight instructor confirmed the student pilot’s statement. Examination of the wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration inspection revealed substantial damage to the wings and vertical stabilizer.
The pilot was receiving flight training as a new hire, and the accident occurred during his first flight in the airplane and the first landing. The pilot stated the approach was flown at the upper end of the allowable approach speed, and about 100 ft above the normal glidepath. During the landing, all three of the airplane’s landing gear touched down at the same time, the airplane immediately veered right, and continued off the right side of the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right-wing structure.The flight instructor chose an airport with a challenging approach that required a special training program prior to the first landing. The approach procedure requires a left 40° turn then rolling wings level just before touchdown. It is likely that the airplane’s descent rate during landing exceeded the airplane’s capability, which resulted in a hard landing and failure of the right-wing structure.
The pilot reported the takeoff and initial climb into the traffic pattern were uneventful. However, the engine began to run rough while on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern. The pilot immediately changed the fuel selector from the right tank to the left tank, verified that the carburetor heat was on, and turned the airplane toward the runway. The pilot’s efforts to restore engine power were not successful. The airplane was not able to glide to the runway, and the pilot executed a forced landing into a wooded area.Postaccident examination revealed that the left fuel tank was intact and the right fuel tank appeared to be compromised. A distinct fuel odor was present at the accident site and fuel was observed leaking from the left tank. The engine carburetor bowl contained minimal fuel, and the carburetor accelerator pump did not contain any fuel. No other anomalies with respect to the engine were observed. The pilot recalled that the left and right fuel tanks contained about 4 gallons and 7 gallons, respectively, before takeoff.While it is possible that the pilot’s decision to change to the tank containing less fuel resulted in unporting of the fuel tank inlet and the subsequent loss of engine power, the investigation was unable to determine the reason for the loss of power or the initial engine roughness.
The airplane had recently undergone an annual inspection, and the pilot planned to fly the airplane back to his home base. After receiving clearance from air traffic control, the pilot proceeded to take off. The airplane accelerated and reached a peak groundspeed of 81 kts about 2,075 ft down the 4,097-ft runway. Once airborne, the airplane drifted slightly to the right and the pilot radioed an urgent need to return to the airport. The controller cleared the airplane to land and no further transmissions were received from the accident airplane. The airplane’s flight path showed that it slowed before turning back toward the left and the airplane’s speed continued to decrease throughout the remainder of the data. The final data point recorded the airplane at a groundspeed of 45 kts. The groundspeed would equate to 60 kts airspeed when considering the 15-kt headwind. The stall speed chart for the airplane listed the minimum stall speed for any configuration as 64 kts.Postaccident examinations of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. External and internal engine damage indicated that the engine was producing power at the time of impact, but the amount of power output could not be determined.Based on the available information, the pilot perceived an urgent need to return the airplane to the airport; however, due to the amount of damage from the impact and postimpact fire, the reason that the pilot was returning to the airport could not be determined. Stall speed information for the airplane, the recorded winds, and flight track data, indicated that the airplane encountered an aerodynamic stall before impacting the ground near the departure end of the runway. Since the airplane stalled and impacted the ground before reaching the perimeter of the airport, the pilot may not have had sufficient altitude to execute a forced landing to the empty field off the departure end of the runway.Page 2 of 9 CEN22FA119
The pilot was practicing takeoffs and landings during a solo instructional flight at the time of the accident.  She completed 7 landings without incident, and the accident approach was to be the final landing.  The pilot reported that the runway was in sight, but she did not see the power lines.  The airplane hit the lines and subsequently impacted the ground below the lines.  The airframe sustained damage to the fuselage and left wing.  According to the pilot, there were no failures or malfunctions associated with the airplane before the accident.  The accident occurred about 24 minutes after sunset and about 3 minutes before the end of civil twilight.  The runway was equipped with Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) system.  An inspection of the system after the accident revealed that it was operating normally at that time.
The pilot reported that the helicopter was about to take off with a flight nurse, paramedic, and a patient onboard when she noticed a flash and flame reflection on the front left windscreen immediately followed by screams and the cabin filling with smoke. The pilot immediately reduced the throttle, pulled the fuel shutoff valve, and applied full rotor brake. The paramedic on board’s flight suit was on fire. The flight nurse on board managed to open the helicopter’s right-side door, unbuckle the paramedic, and pull her from the helicopter. The flight nurse extinguished the flames, called for additional help, and began cutting away the burned flight jacket and flight suit from the paramedic. In the paramedic’s left chest flight suit pocket were keys and a burnt lithium battery. The nurse reported that when she went to remove the battery to prevent further injury to the paramedic, the battery was extremely hot and smoking, and burned her hand. She threw the battery to the ground and continued to render care to the paramedic. Later two burnt lithium batteries lying on the ground next to the helicopter’s left skid were recovered. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation. The operator’s parent company issued a safety alert to all of its air and ground ambulance companies warning of the dangers of improperly carrying or storing loose lithium and lithium-ion batteries used in personal electronic devices.
The airplane was approaching the destination airport in dark night conditions when it collided with trees, impacted terrain, and came to rest about 500 ft before the runway threshold. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing and empennage. Neither occupant could remember the events of the accident flight. A postaccident examination of the engine and airframe revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, data recovered from multiple devices that contained non-volatile memory revealed no anomalies with recorded engine parameters and that all flight parameters were consistent with controlled flight.
The helicopter pilot reported that, while hovering in front of a hangar he erroneously increased collective pitch, panicked, and lost control of the helicopter.  The helicopter subsequently impacted the top of a hanger and rolled over. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the main rotor and tail boom. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot of the tailwheel-equipped biplane was in the runup pad adjacent to the taxiway, had just completed his pre takeoff checks, and was attempted to taxi into position to hold for takeoff. The private pilot of a low-wing airplane was already stopped at the hold short line of the departure runway. As the biplane pilot taxied out of the runup pad he performed several s-turn maneuvers and looked out the side of the cockpit to increase his limited forward visibility, but did not see the low-wing airplane. The biplane impacted the low-wing airplane, striking the right wing and aileron with the operating propeller, which resulted in substantial damage to the low-wing airplane.
The pilot reported that during his landing roll, he attempted to slow the airplane as he exited the runway for the taxiway. As he applied brakes, the left brake loss pressure and the right brake maintained its pressure and operated normally. This anomaly caused the airplane to ground loop, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing. Examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed the left brake master cylinder was void of fluid. Fluid was filled into the master cylinder and when pressure was applied to simulate braking, fluid began to seep from the master cylinder. The master cylinder was disassembled revealing a damaged O-ring seal. The O-ring was pinched and cut; therefore, unable to maintain hydraulic fluid within the master cylinder and resulted in the loss of braking.  A review of maintenance records reveal that the braking system was serviced about a month prior, but no anomalies were noted during the service.
The pilot reported that the engine start, taxi, and run-up were normal. The night flight proceeded uneventfully until about 60 nm from the destination airport when the engine briefly stuttered and started to run rough. The pilot stated that he told air traffic control that the engine was running rough and requested to divert to an airport located about 39 nautical miles (nm) east of the destination airport. About 40 nm from the destination airport, the pilot told air traffic that the engine smoothed out and he wanted to continue the flight to the destination airport. About 6 nm from the destination airport, the pilot told air traffic that he would be unable to make it to the runway due to engine power loss and was going to look for a field where he could land. He located a field and deployed the airframe parachute. The airplane landed, under parachute, in the field and sustained substantial damage to the fuselage.Recorded avionics data for the flight showed that the abnormal engine indications began about 100 nm from the destination airport and continued to the end of the flight. The pilot continued the flight and passed two airports where a safe precautionary landing could have been performed while operating in night light conditions, which increased the risk of finding a safe area to perform an off-airport landing.Postaccident examination of the engine revealed a catastrophic engine failure. The No. 4 and 5 cylinders were not connected to their respective crankpins. The No. 5 cylinder crankpin surface lacked the deformation and scoring found on the No. 4 cylinder crankpin, suggesting that the No. 5 piston connecting rod separated from its crankpin and that material from the No. 5 cylinder induced foreign object damage and subsequent failure to the remaining portions of the engine.Page 2 of 7 CEN22LA117
The pilot reported that, during the landing roll, while attempting to arrest a developing ground loop, the airplane departed the runway onto grass. The airplane collided with a deep rut and spun around.  The left wing dropped and contacted the ground, substantially damaging the left wing and left aileron. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot stated he crossed over the destination airport, entered a left downwind for landing on runway 36, and extended the landing gear and “approach flaps.” He said he extended his flaps “further” on the base leg and flew a “stabilized” approach at 80 knots in “swirling…strong and gusty” winds. The pilot estimated touchdown was about 1,000 ft beyond the threshold of the 3,000-ft runway, and that braking action would not stop the airplane. The airplane continued off the departure end and down an embankment which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing. He added that perhaps the wind may have “shifted to a tailwind” which pushed the airplane. A review of commercially available track data and video surveillance revealed that the airplane crossed the landing threshold at 108 knots groundspeed and floated approximately 2/3rds the length of the landing runway before it touched down at 71 knots groundspeed with about 1,000 ft. of paved surface remaining.The pilot reported the airplane had no pre-impact mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal operation.
A turbo-jet airplane was being operated as a public-use aircraft in support of the United States Air Force’s simulated combat flight training at the time of the accident. The airplane took off and proceeded to the Military Operating Area (MOA) and, near the completion of the flight the pilot reported a discrepancy between the two fuel quantity indications in the cockpit. Shortly thereafter, the pilot headed back to the airport once the airplane reached its briefed minimum fuel status. While en route to the airport, the pilot reported a loss of fuel pressure and shortly afterward the engine flamed out. The pilot attempted to restart the engine but was unsuccessful. When the pilot determined that he could not make the runway at his destination, he turned toward an uninhabited area and successfully ejected from the airplane. Subsequently, the airplane impacted terrain.Postaccident interviews revealed that the airplane was not fueled with the correct amount of fuel for the flight by maintenance personnel before the flight. Although the refueling forms accurately reflected the shorted amount of fuel, the error was not detected by maintenance personnel or the pilot before the airplane took off. During the flight, the pilot failed to notice that his fuel load was incorrect. The pilot relied on a fuel remaining totalizer that had been manually set to the expected full fuel load, not to the actual fuel load, and did not appropriately reference the individual fuel quantity tapes. Postaccident examination of the airplane wreckage revealed that the airplane’s fuel tanks had loose sealant globules inside the main feeder fuel tanks and an additional piece of Foreign Object Debris (FOD) present. Additionally, the operator discovered that several of their F-1 airplanes were found with varies type of FOD in the fuel tanks, including loose pieces of fuel tank sealant, which led to fuel anomalies including issues that caused false full tank fuel Page 2 of 12 WPR22FA094indications during refueling. Once the FOD was removed, the airplanes’ fuel system anomalies that were experienced were virtually eliminated. It is possible that the FOD caused anomalies during refueling of the accident airplane and presented a false full tank indication, which contributed to the airplane not being serviced to the correct fuel load.
The Cirrus pilot reported making a radio call on what he thought was the published common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) when the flight was 10 miles away, then continued to the airport for a straight-in approach to runway 23 making radio calls. During the same time frame, a flightcrew member of an Army helicopter announced on the CTAF when their flight was on 10, 5, and 2 nautical mile final for runway 5. The Cirrus pilot indicated that he did not hear any communication on the CTAF and he was unable to activate the runway lights using the CTAF. When the Cirrus flight was between 2 and 3 miles from the airport, he saw a helicopter at the opposite end of the runway moving to the east, adding that the sun was in his eyes which was “definitely a factor.” He did not hear the helicopter on the selected CTAF frequency and made a radio call on the CTAF that he was on short final approach. A flightcrew member of the military helicopter reported they did not hear any advisory call from the airplane and after they spotted it, the IP took the controls and turned to the right (east) to avoid a collision. The Cirrus pilot indicated that after flying over the airport property fence, he looked to his left and noted a military helicopter several hundred feet above his altitude. He continued his descent to runway 23 and when the flight was about 15 to 20 ft AGL the flight encountered, “very strong turbulence” which caused the left wing to drop. He recovered from that and then when the flight was between 5 and 10 ft AGL encountered another round of “very strong turbulence” which made the right wing contact the runway resulting in substantial damage to the wing. The airplane went to the right and skidded into the grass. The military helicopter continued to the east and reported that since they could not affect the situation continued with the training.A short audio recording of the CTAF recorded a flightcrew member of the military helicopter announcing they were on a 2 mile final for runway 5, followed by an announcement that they were departing to the east off of runway centerline.Postaccident examination of the radios of the Cirrus airplane revealed the pilot had selected the #2 radio to transmit, which was set to 122.700 MHz. That frequency was the departure airport CTAF. The accident airport published CTAF was 123.05MHz.Page 2 of 6 ERA22LA125