roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot reported that during landing on a coastal beach, the airplane's left wing struck a driftwood tree branch that protruded from a higher berm. The airplane subsequently spun to the left, which resulted in substantial damage to the elevator and both ailerons. The pilot further reported that he had seen the tree but not the branch on his initial flight over the landing area while looking for debris.The pilot reported that there were no pre impact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that while en-route to his destination airport, he saw a "small area of rain" ahead. He further reported that he "circled around for a while" awaiting for the weather to clear, but during the circling he "ran out of fuel" and the engine lost power. Subsequently, the pilot landed in a corn field and the airplane nosed over.The firewall sustained substantial damage. The pilot did not report any mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot and flight instructor were performing a recurrent training flight in the tailwheel-equipped airplane. Both pilots reported that the takeoff roll and acceleration on the 1,900-ft grass runway seemed normal. As the airplane approached the predetermined decision point, they decided to continue the takeoff. The airplane became airborne near the end of the runway, and the wheels contacted vegetation past the departure end. The airplane slowed, settled into a marshy area, and came to rest inverted. Postaccident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Review of the airplane's performance data indicated that, under the conditions present at the time of the accident, the airplane's ground run would be about 546 ft, and the distance to clear a 50-ft obstacle would be about 1,192 ft. However, review of carburetor icing probability charts indicated the potential for moderate icing at cruise power, and serious icing at descent power. The flight instructor reported that, during the takeoff roll, the carburetor heat was off. Thus, it is likely that carburetor ice accumulated during taxi and run-up before the takeoff, which resulted in a loss of engine power and reduced takeoff performance.
According to the glider pilot, while being towed during the takeoff roll, the glider encountered a bump and he heard a loud bang. He reported that he was contacted by radio and informed that the aft canopy had separated from the glider. The pilot recalled that although the glider controllability was normal he communicated with the tow airplane pilot, executed one pattern and landed the glider. The pilot reported that during the preflight inspection he failed to properly close and lock the two canopy latches for the aft canopy. The glider sustained substantial damage to the aft canopy and the vertical stabilizer.The pilot reported that were no mechanical failures or anomalies with any portion of the glider that would have prevented normal flight operations.
The pilot reported that during the initial touchdown he "got a bad bounce." On the third bounce the nose wheel "gave way and the propeller impacted the ground." The airplane sustained substantial damage to the firewall. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The Federal Aviation Administration has published the Airplane Flying Handbook FAA-H-8083-3B (2016). This handbook discusses porpoising and states in part:In a bounced landing that is improperly recovered, the airplane comes in nose first initiating a series of motions that imitate the jumps and dives of a porpoise. The problem is improper airplane attitude at touchdown, sometimes caused by inattention, not knowing where the ground is, miss-trimming or forcing the airplane onto the runway.Ground effect decreases elevator control effectiveness and increases the effort required to raise the nose. Not enough elevator or stabilator trim can result in a nose low contact with the runway and a porpoise develops.Porpoising can also be caused by improper airspeed control. Usually, if an approach is too fast, the airplane floats and the pilot tries to force it on the runway when the airplane still wants to fly. A gust of wind, a bump in the runway, or even a slight tug on the control wheel will send the air plane aloft again.
The pilot of the tailwheel equipped airplane reported that during the landing roll he lost directional control, which resulted in a ground loop to the left, a runway excursion, both main landing gear collapse, and substantial damage to the airplane's left aileron and elevator.The pilot reported that there were no pre impact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
According to multiple witnesses at the airport, they observed the airplane perform several touch-and-go landings throughout the late morning and early afternoon on the day of the accident. They added that the pilot then landed and taxied to a local fuel vendor's facility and refueled. The pilot then departed. Two witnesses who were near the departure runway reported that, after the airplane departed, they heard the engine making a "pop pop" sound and that it then appeared to lose power. Another witness near the runway reported hearing the engine "sputtering" and added that the airplane appeared to stall. All the witnesses reported that they observed the airplane turn right steeply, that its right wing and nose dropped abruptly, and that it then descended in a steep, nose-down attitude, consistent with an aerodynamic stall. A postimpact fire immediately ensued, which destroyed the airplane.A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The witnesses reported hearing noises consistent with an engine misfiring and it was likely losing power; however, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined based on the postaccident examination. After the loss of engine power, the pilot attempted a steep turn at low altitude, during which he failed to maintain proper airspeed and exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and a loss of control at too low of an altitude to recover.
The private pilot was on a local personal flight and, after flying about 1.5 hours, the engine experienced a total loss of engine power that he could not restore. He maneuvered the airplane for a forced landing in a field, but the airplane impacted the ground in a nose- and left-wing-low attitude, which resulted in substantial damage to the airframe. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no fuel remaining in the intact fuel tank and only residual fuel remaining in the fuel strainer and carburetor. The glass face of the fuel tank quantity indicator gauge was scratched and cloudy. The examination revealed no evidence of preimpact failures or malfunctions of the engine or engine accessories that would have precluded normal operation. Thus, it is likely that the pilot did not adequately manage the fuel supply during flight, and the scratched and cloudy glass face of the fuel quantity indicator gauge may have led the pilot to misinterpret how much fuel was remaining.
The pilot and three passengers departed on a personal cross-country flight when the pilot heard and felt a sudden reduction in engine power during initial climb. He told the tower controller that he had engine trouble and requested an immediate landing. The pilot was unable to maintain altitude and, as a result, deployed the airplane's emergency parachute system. After a successful parachute deployment, the airplane contacted power lines shortly before it impacted the ground in a nose-level attitude. After the airplane landed, the occupants egressed, and a fire erupted that destroyed the airframe. A postaccident engine examination revealed that the induction tube coupler closest to the No. 1 cylinder was partially disconnected from its associated induction tube. Although both coupler clamps were tight, the clamp closest to the No. 1 cylinder did not overlap its associated induction tube. Additionally, the cylinder No. 3 induction tube was fractured at the cylinder mounting flange. A laboratory examination of the cylinder No. 3 induction tube revealed multiple areas of fatigue; however, the cause of the fatigue could not be conclusively determined due to postfracture damage. The material properties of the induction tube were consistent with the manufacturer's specification for an annealed aluminum alloy. A review of the engine logbook was inconclusive as to whether the induction system tubes had been removed for maintenance in the 7.4 years since the engine had been rebuilt. The two separations in the induction system likely caused an imbalance of the intake pressures and the partial loss of engine power during initial climb.
The airline transport pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight in the experimental amateur-built, tailwheel-equipped airplane. The pilot reported that, while landing on a turf and gravel airstrip, the airplane veered sharply left as the tailwheel touched down. Despite applying full right rudder and brake controls, the pilot was unable to correct the airplane's track, and the right wing and horizontal stabilizer impacted the ground. The pilot stated that, after the airplane stopped, he was unable to straighten the tailwheel with the rudder control inputs because the tailwheel was bent. Postaccident metallurgical examination of the tailwheel suspension system revealed fractures within the welds of the assembly and a fatigue fracture at the bolt hole for mounting the tailwheel. The crack fracture surfaces exhibited orange and dark red corrosion, suggesting that the cracks were preexisting, and the fracture surfaces were consistent with overstress. The assembly also exhibited general twisting deformation, primarily as the result of deformation in the pivot bracket.
The student pilot reported that during a short field landing, she flared a "little bit too high". She pushed the yoke forward, and the nose wheel impacted the ground first, subsequently the airplane porpoised and impacted a taxiway edge identifier light on the edge of the runway. The student pilot further reported that after she applied "heavy" brakes she taxied the airplane to the ramp area without further incident. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the engine mount. According to the student pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.The Federal Aviation Administration has published the Airplane Flying Handbook FAA-H-8083-3A (2004). This handbook discusses porpoising and states in part:In a bounced landing that is improperly recovered, the airplane comes in nose first setting off a series of motions that imitate the jumps and dives of a porpoise—hence the name. The problem is improper airplane attitude at touchdown, sometimes caused by inattention, not knowing where the ground is, mistrimming or forcing the airplane onto the runway.Ground effect decreases elevator control effectiveness and increases the effort required to raise the nose. Not enough elevator or stabilator trim can result in a nose low contact with the runway and a porpoise develops.Porpoising can also be caused by improper airspeed control. Usually, if an approach is too fast, the airplane floats and the pilot tries to force it on the runway when the airplane still wants to fly. A gust of wind, a bump in the runway, or even a slight tug on the control wheel will send the air plane aloft again. The corrective action for a porpoise is the same as for a bounce and similarly depends on its severity. When it is very slight and there is no extreme change in the airplane's pitch attitude, a follow-up landing Page 2 of 5 GAA16CA431may be executed by applying sufficient power to cushion the subsequent touchdown, and smoothly adjusting the pitch to the proper touchdown attitude.
The private pilot was conducting a local personal flight in an experimental, amateur-built airplane. The pilot reported that, during cruise flight, the voltmeter's indications became erratic and that, shortly after, the airplane experienced a total loss of electrical power. The engine subsequently lost power, and the pilot conducted an emergency landing, during which the bottom of the fuselage contacted surrounding vegetation. The right wing then dipped, and the airplane impacted terrain. The pilot reported that, following the accident, he checked the battery's charge, and it was 11 volts; however, the electrical system on the airplane required 12 to 13 volts for operation.The pilot partially disassembled the airplane following the accident, and the engine, most of the flight instruments, the tachometer, and the interior components were not available for examination. Therefore, a thorough evaluation of the airplane's electrical system was not possible. However, the battery examination revealed that it had a 10-volt charge, indicating that either a battery or charging system failure occurred. The fuel delivery system included two electronic fuel pumps connected in series with no mechanical or auxiliary pumps installed. Therefore, the loss of electrical power would have disabled both fuel pumps and resulted in fuel starvation and a loss of engine power. There was no other method to deliver fuel to the engine if the battery power was insufficient to power the fuel pumps.
The scheduled passenger flight was enroute at a cruise altitude of flight level 320 (FL320), when the airplane encountered severe turbulence. Of the 2 pilots, 3 flight attendants, and 146 passengers onboard, all three flight attendants and 28 passengers sustained minor injuries. The pilots subsequently diverted to a nearby airport and landed without further incident. The pilots reported that the onboard weather radar depicted some precipitation along the route, and the captain informed the flight attendants to remain seated and turned the seatbelt sign on. After the flight exited some of the light precipitation, the crew observed cumulonimbus clouds ahead and subsequently requested and were granted a deviation around the clouds; however, the airplane encountered turbulence as it flew through the edge of the clouds. The first officer stated that it "felt like they went up and then dropped," and the captain described the encounter as "very violent and very quick."The flight attendants reported that the flight had been experiencing light turbulence when the captain called to state that it would continue for the next 30 to 45 minutes. One of the flight attendants made a public address announcement to the passengers to remain seated with their seatbelts on; at this time, all three of the flight attendants were seated in their jumpseats. The turbulence continued for about 10 minutes before it smoothed out, and all three flight attendants got up from their seats to conduct various tasks throughout the cabin. The airplane subsequently encountered what they described as "extreme," "violent" turbulence, and all three sustained injuries.A review of the flight plan showed convective SIGMETs and thunderstorms that were forecasted and valid on or near the route of flight. The pilots reported that they only saw areas of green returns on their onboard radar and did not see any indication of severe weather. Additionally, there were no pilot reports (PIREPs) to indicate that other aircraft were encountering severe turbulence, nor did air traffic control provide any information to indicate that they might encounter such turbulence.  Page 2 of 6 DCA16IA215
The pilot reported that during touchdown the airplane bounced and then landed in a flat attitude. The pilot further reported that the nose landing gear collapsed and the airplane skidded down the runway and then nosed over, which resulted in substantial damage to both wing struts and empennage.The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that about 7 nautical miles from the airport he mistook a road for the runway, which resulted in the airplane being above the normal approach path for landing. The pilot further reported that he reduced power to idle, applied full flaps, and entered a side slip, but the airplane did not touchdown until about ½ to ¾ down the runway. Subsequently, the airplane overran the runway, the landing gear collapsed, and the right wing impacted a guard rail on a road about 550 feet beyond the runway threshold. The right wing sustained substantial damage. The pilot did not report any mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
After completing one full-stop landing on the grass runway in calm wind conditions, the private pilot decided to complete another landing in the opposite direction. During the landing, the tailwheel-equipped airplane bounced multiple times and became airborne again. The airplane then veered to the right and impacted a ditch next to the runway. The pilot stated that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely that the pilot failed to control the airplane's descent rate and landing flare, which led to the bounced landing. He was then unable to recover and exited the side of the runway.
On August 9, 2016 at 2100 eastern daylight time, Delta Airlines as flight 442, a Boeing 737, N3762Y, was struck by a catering truck while parked at the gate during passenger boarding at John F Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Queens, New York.  The impact resulted in substantial damage to the lower left fuselage of the airplane.  The were no injuries to the six crewmembers, 160 passengers, or two ground service personnel.  Weather was reported as night visual conditions.  The ground crew reported that the truck had problems with the handbrake and jumped the chock, impacting the airplane. The flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight from JFK to Salt Lake City International Airport (SLC), Salt Lake City, Utah.
The private rated pilot reported that he flew a normal traffic pattern to the grass strip airport. During the final landing approach, he was lined up with the runway but a little bit low for the approach. He stated that he knew he was low and for an unknown reason he did not advance the throttle to arrest the airplane's descent. This resulted in the airplane's landing gear contacting the bean field. When the gear contacted the beans, the airplane nosed down into the ground and was damaged. The airplane came to rest on the end of the grass runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the firewall and fuselage. The pilot was not injured. When asked if he experienced any mechanical difficulties with the airplane, he responded that there were none and that the airplane was operating perfectly. Based on this information the pilot failed to maintain a proper glide path during the landing approach and then failed to use available engine power to arrest the descent, resulting in an undershoot and collision with terrain.
The pilot of a tailwheel equipped airplane reported that during landing after the left main landing gear touched down, a gust of wind caused the airplane to veer to the left. The pilot further reported that he applied right rudder and full power to abort the landing, but the right main landing gear impacted an airport taxiway marker. The airplane spun to the right and nosed over, which resulted in substantial damage to the forward left lift strut. According to the pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. A review of recorded data from the automated weather observation station located on the airport, revealed that about 12 minutes before the accident the wind was 240 degrees true at 9 knots. A further review of the recorded data revealed that about 6 minutes after the accident the wind was 240 degrees true at 7 knots. The airplane landed on runway 28L.
The commercial pilot was landing the airplane during a cross-country flight. The pilot reported that, during the landing roll, the airplane veered left. The pilot straightened the airplane and added power to go around, but the airplane again veered left, traveled off the side of the runway, and impacted two airplanes parked on the ramp. A postaccident examination of the airplane confirmed the pilot's report that there were no mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
During a full-stop landing to the 100 foot wide paved runway the airplane hit "very hard and bounced to a very high level". The student pilot did not execute a go-around and reported that on the second touchdown "he tried to hold it off again", but the operating propeller struck the runway surface and the airplane bounced a second time. On the third touchdown the nose gear collapsed, directional control was lost, and the airplane exited the left side of the runway. After digging into the grass the nose gear completely separated resulting in substantial damage to the firewall and the forward fuselage. The student pilot and the operator reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures.
The airline transport pilot of the float-equipped airplane was attempting a takeoff with the load of passengers that he had flown to the lake earlier in the day. The pilot's calculated takeoff distances for the water run and over a 50-ft obstacle were 1,050 ft and 2,210 ft, respectively. The pilot did not add a safety margin to his takeoff distance calculations. The approximate shore-to-shore distance of the takeoff path was 1,800 ft. During taxi, the pilot retracted the wing flaps, where they remained for the takeoff. GPS data showed that the airplane attained a speed of about 49 knots before impacting terrain just beyond the shoreline. The airplane's stall speed with flaps retracted was about 52 knots.Postaccident examination revealed that the left wing flap was in the fully retracted position; the right wing flap assembly was damaged. The airplane flight manual takeoff checklist stated that flaps were to be selected to the "TAKE-OFF" position before takeoff. Additionally, the takeoff performance data contained in the flight manual was dependent upon the use of "TAKE-OFF" flaps and did not account for no-flaps takeoffs. Even if the pilot had used the correct flap setting for takeoff, the calculated takeoff distances were near the available takeoff distance, and it is likely that the airplane would still not have been able to avoid a collision with terrain. The pilot stated that there was no mechanical malfunction/failure with the airplane, and he should have "done the right thing," which was to conduct two flights, each with a half load of passengers.