roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The noninstrument-rated private pilot departed on a night flight for which he had not received proper authorization from the flight school that owned the airplane. For most of the approximate 30-minute flight, including taxi and takeoff, the pilot was conducting a video call with his girlfriend, but ended the call about 6 minutes before the accident occurred. During the flight, the pilot completed one practice hold pattern, maintaining nearly constant altitude about 1,400 ft mean sea level, then turned right toward an area with no ground reference lights, likely to perform another hold pattern, during which the airplane's altitude began to vary. The airplane then entered a right descending turn, during which it exceeded the standard turn rate, reached a rate of descent about 6,000 ft per minute, and subsequently impacted the ground. The airplane was destroyed by high-energy impact forces.Personnel from the flight school assumed that the airplane had become stuck at a coastal airport due to weather but did not attempt to locate the pilot and did not report the airplane missing until 4 days later. An undetermined malfunction of the airplane's emergency locator transmitter (ELT) likely also contributed to the delay in identifying the crash and locating the wreckage. The wreckage was subsequently located, recovered, and examined; there were no discrepancies with the airframe, flight controls, engine, or recovered engine accessories.The flight instructor who flew in the airplane earlier the day of the accident with the accident pilot later reported that the attitude indicator displayed a "3° or less" right bank during that flight; he did not write up the discrepancy. However, the airplane's directional gyro and attitude indicator displayed a heading and bank angle consistent with the radar data and the disposition of the wreckage path, which suggests an operative vacuum system and functional vacuum-operated flight instruments at the time of the accident. Although debris was found in the vacuum regulating valve, the debris was consistent with material produced by an insect, which likely entered the valve after the accident occurred.Postaccident toxicology testing of specimens from the pilot identified ethanol and n-propanol. It is likely that the n-propanol and some of the ethanol was from postmortem production; however, the investigation was unable to eliminate the possibility that some of the ethanol could have been from Page 2 of 12 ERA17FA231ingestion and could not determine whether or to what extent it may have contributed to the accident.Conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation were present at the time of the accident, including the night conditions, operating over an area with no ground lighting, scattered clouds (which would have reduced available moon illumination). Additionally, the airplane's spiraling descent and the fragmentation of the wreckage due to high-energy impact are consistent with the known effects of a loss of control due to spatial disorientation.
The noninstrument-rated private pilot and three passengers departed on a visual flight rules cross-country flight in the multi-engine airplane. The pilot was not in contact with air traffic control at any time during the flight and there was no evidence that the pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing from an official, access-controlled source. Witnesses near the accident site reported that a thunderstorm was advancing toward the area and that the sky was becoming very dark; although it was not yet raining, they heard thunder in the distance, and it was windy. They heard an airplane flying above, then saw pieces of the airplane falling from the sky. The wreckage was scattered over a large area consistent with an in-flight breakup. Examination of the airframe and both engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.Review of air traffic control and weather radar data revealed that the accident airplane flew at altitudes between 3,500 and 5,000 ft mean sea level north toward its destination and a large area of convective activity. As the airplane neared the southern edge of the convective system, it turned east, then back to the north before turning east again. Radar contact was lost shortly thereafter. Given the proximity of the airplane to the convective activity, it is likely that it was operating in highly turbulent conditions amidst the updraft/downdraft boundary along the leading edge of the advancing convection, and possibly in an area of reduced visibility. Review of weather information indicated that the airplane would have been operating in visual meteorological conditions for most, if not all, of its approach toward this large convective system, and the presence of convective activity ahead of the airplane should have been apparent to the pilot.An Area Forecast issued about an hour before the flight departed and valid for the accident time advised of scattered clouds at 3,500 ft and 5,500 ft, rain showers and thunderstorms with moderate rain, and possible severe thunderstorms with cumulonimbus clouds with tops to 45,000 ft. A convective SIGMET was issued about 45 minutes before the airplane reached the area of the accident site. At that time, the accident site was located very close to the boundary of the SIGMET advisory area.The pilot's lack of an instrument rating, turbulence, maneuvering flight, and the possible restricted Page 2 of 10 ERA17FA222visibility conditions are all factors known to be conducive to the development of spatial disorientation, and the in-flight breakup is consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. It is likely that, upon encountering the conditions associated with the leading edge of a large area of convective activity, the pilot became spatially disoriented, which resulted in a loss of control, subsequent exceedance of the airplane's design stress limitations, and an in-flight breakup.
The commercial pilot was conducting a personal flight in the two-seat, light sport airplane with his dog in the right passenger seat. A witness, who was piloting another airplane in the traffic pattern, reported that, while he was on the downwind leg, he saw the accident airplane on final approach to the runway. The witness subsequently lost visual contact with the accident airplane as he turned his airplane onto the base leg. The witness did not see the accident airplane on the runway or taxiway after he turned onto final approach. The witness conducted a go-around and then saw the accident airplane in a cornfield adjacent to the runway. After the accident, the witness saw the pilot's dog running out of the cornfield where the airplane had crashed.Based on available ground track and engine data, the airplane crossed the runway 27 threshold at a calculated airspeed of 48 knots. About 3 seconds later, the airplane turned right away from the runway heading, and the engine speed increased to takeoff power. The airplane subsequently descended right wing down into the cornfield about 250 ft north of the runway centerline. The final calculated airspeed was about 44 knots. Although the airplane's wings-level aerodynamic stall speed with the wing flaps fully extended was 39 knots, the stall speed would have increased exponentially with the bank angle as the airplane turned right.According to the pilot's son, the pilot routinely flew with his dog, who weighed between 70 and 75 lbs. He added that the pilot had installed a homemade, removable, plywood device to prevent the right-seat passenger (or his dog) from inadvertently contacting the rudder pedals during flight. Although the device was not approved to be installed in the airplane, there was no evidence that it interfered with the full movement of either control stick or the pilot-side rudder pedals. Postaccident examination of the airplane and engine did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Given the ground track and engine data, it is likely that the dog contacted the aileron and/or stabilator controls during landing, which resulted in the pilot's loss of airplane control and a subsequent aerodynamic stall at a low altitude when the airplane exceeded its critical angle of attack.Page 2 of 9 CEN17FA249
The pilot reported that, during the landing roll on the grass runway, the airplane began to veer to the right before the tailwheel was down. He added that he applied left rudder; however, the airplane pitched forward, and the propeller struck the ground. Subsequently, the airplane came to rest inverted off the right side of the grass runway.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage and right wing lift strut.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The automated weather observation system about 3 nautical miles from the accident site reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 220° at 10 knots. The pilot landed on runway 18.
During the landing roll, the tailwheel-equipped airplane veered off the runway to the left, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the right wing impacted the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot did not submit the National Transportation Safety Board Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report Form 6120.1.
The flight instructor and the student pilot were conducting a local flight in the weight-shift-control aircraft. An onboard camera captured the accident flight and showed that, at the time of the accident, the instructor was demonstrating a spiral dive maneuver. The video showed that the maneuver was initiated at an altitude that appears to be below 1,000 ft AGL which is a minimum required recovery altitude. During the maneuver, the aircraft's bank angle continued to increase until the aircraft entered a nearly-vertical descent and impacted terrain. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot of the multi-engine airplane was conducting an instrument flight rules cross-country flight at night. The pilot checked in with air traffic control at a cruise altitude about 10,000 ft mean sea level (msl). About 31 minutes later, the pilot reported that he saw lightning off the airplane's left wing. The controller advised the pilot that the weather appeared to be about 35 to 40 miles away and that the airplane should be well clear of it. The pilot responded to the controller that he had onboard weather radar and agreed that they would fly clear of the weather. There were no further communications from the pilot. About 4 minutes later, radar information showed the airplane at 10,400 ft msl. About 1 minute later, radar showed the airplane in a descending right turn at 9,400 ft. Radar contact was lost shortly thereafter. The distribution of the wreckage, which was scattered in an area with about a 1/4-mile radius, was consistent with an in-flight breakup. The left horizontal stabilizer and significant portions of both left and right elevators and their respective trim tabs were not found. Of the available components for examination, no pre-impact airframe structural anomalies were found. Examination of the engines and turbochargers did not reveal any pre-impact anomalies. Examination of the propellers showed evidence of rotation at impact and no pre-impact anomalies.Review of weather information indicated that no convection or thunderstorms were coincident with or near the airplane's route of flight, and the nearest convective activity was located about 25 miles west of the accident site. Autopsy and toxicology testing revealed no evidence of pilot impairment or incapacitation. Given the lack of radar information after the airplane passed through 9,400 ft, it is likely that it entered a rapid descent during which it exceeded its design stress limitations, which resulted in the in-flight breakup; however, based on the available information, the event that precipitated the descent and loss of control could not be determined.
On June 30, 2017 at 2130 central daylight time, the wingtip ("sharklet") of an Airbus A321, N991AU, operated by American Airlines flight 1162, contacted the horizontal stabilizer of a Bombardier CRJ200, N862AS, operated by SkyWest Airlines d.b.a. Eagle Flight 3047, during taxi at the Chicago O'Hare International Airport.  The A321 received minor damage and the CRJ200 was substantially damaged.  There were no injuries aboard either aircraft.  The CRJ200 had landed and taxied to the terminal and had been instructed by air traffic control to follow another aircraft on taxiway A7.  Another aircraft ahead stopped unexpectedly and the line of traffic ending with the CRJ200, had to stop.  The A321 was taxiing along taxiway A, perpendicular to A7, and maneuvered to go around the protruding tail of the CRJ200.  However, the left sharklet wingtip of the A321 contacted the horizontal stabilizer of the CRJ200.
The pilot of the helicopter reported that, while maneuvering low around power lines during an agricultural spray, he "pulled up," and the right spray boom contacted a power line. He added that the "fuselage pitched forward and the main rotor blade cut the tail boom off just aft of the horizontal stabilizer." Subsequently, the helicopter began to rapidly spin, and after one or two rotations, the pilot "closed the throttle which stopped the rotation" and "cushioned the impact." The fuselage and tailboom sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor reported that he was providing instruction to a student pilot in the helicopter during a cross-country flight. During the flight, the instructor asked the student to perform a "land as soon as possible" emergency procedure. The student pilot approached the hillside landing site from the south. The wind was out of the west about 8 to 10 knots, which resulted in a left crosswind for the landing. The student pilot reported that, during the approach, the instructor told him he "needed more left pedal." The helicopter descended and decelerated below effective translational lift (ETL). According to the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) 8083-21A, the Helicopter Flying Handbook, pg. 2-20, para. 2, ETL occurs between 16 and 24 knots. The student pilot reported that, "We descended below ETL, maybe 10 feet off the ground and still descending. By this point we were what I perceived to be straight, and the instructor took the controls. From what I could tell, he used forward cyclic and left pedal immediately. It was too late." The flight instructor reported that, "As we came closer to our landing spot and began to slow down, I felt that the nose of the helicopter was not pointed far enough into the wind (we were out of trim). I took the flight controls right as we slowed below ETL. The helicopter started to develop a hard right yaw and I immediately gave full forward cyclic." The helicopter developed an uncontrollable rapid right yaw and spun about two revolutions. The helicopter touched down on the skids and rolled onto its left side. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the tail rotor drive shaft and the main and tail rotor blades.The student pilot and flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation. Page 2 of 6 GAA17CA376According to the FAA's Helicopter Flying Handbook (FAA-8083-21A), the Helicopter Instructor's Flying Handbook (FAA-8083-4), and Advisory Circular (AC) 90-95, "Unanticipated Rapid Right Yaw in Helicopters," the loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) is a "critical, low-speed aerodynamic flight characteristic which can result in an uncommanded rapid yaw rate which does not subside of its own accord and, if not corrected, can result in the loss of aircraft control."AC 90-95 defined flight characteristics and wind azimuths associated with LTE and stated that the tail rotor vortex ring state occurs during left crosswinds when the relative wind azimuth is from 210° to 330°" and that "winds within this region will result in the development of the vortex ring state of the tail rotor." AC 90-95 also stated that, for all wind azimuths, the loss of ETL is associated with LTE as it "results in increased power demands and additional anti-torque requirements."
The private pilot reported that he conducted a preflight inspection to prepare for the local personal flight and that a minimum of 20 gallons of fuel was on board. He started the engine and taxied the airplane to an open area for a run-up. Shortly after takeoff, about 300 ft above ground level, the engine lost power. He initiated an emergency landing to a riverbed. The airplane subsequently came to rest under a highway overpass and caught fire. Postaccident visual and engine examinations revealed no evidence of a mechanical malfunction. Further, impact and fire damage precluded a determination of the cause of the loss of engine power.
The commercial pilot was preparing to fly the experimental amateur-built airplane on a local, Phase 1 test flight. The pilot reported that ground operations were normal, including the engine run-up. Shortly after takeoff, about halfway down the runway, the engine sputtered, hesitated, and then lost partial power. The pilot had passed the point at which he could land the airplane straight ahead on the runway, so he looked for a place to conduct a forced landing. During the forced landing, he turned the airplane to avoid nearby houses and then steepened the turn due to wind that was pushing the airplane left. The airplane subsequently collided with the ground and fragmented into multiple sections. The pilot did not recall the impact sequence due to injuries he sustained during the accident. The fragmentation of the airframe was consistent with an in-flight loss of airplane control before ground impact. Examination of the engine, including a full disassembly, did not reveal evidence of any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The reason for the partial loss of engine power could not be determined.
The pilot reported that, after he leveled off for the personal cross-country flight, he leaned the engine for cruise flight. The pilot noticed that the manifold pressure was lower than usual although the engine instruments indicated “in the green.” About 30 minutes later, the oil pressure reading rapidly dropped; the engine subsequently lost all power and made a loud bang, then oil sprayed on the wind screen, which impeded the pilot’s visibility. The pilot deployed the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System and the airplane descended into a vineyard. A main landing gear went through and substantially damaged the wing.Visual examination of the engine revealed a hole in the top of the engine case. A piece of connecting rod and connecting rod bolt was found on top of the left side baffling.Disassembly of the engine revealed that the numbers 3 and 4 connecting rods were fractured and separated from their connecting rod journals. Thermal discoloration to the connecting rod journals was consistent with oil starvation. The crankcase had fractured.Postaccident examination of the turbochargers revealed that the left turbocharger was functional. The right turbine was damaged, and its wheel head had separated from the turbine shaft and was not located. The right turbine shaft fractured circumferentially at a piston ring groove, but the type of fracture could not be determined due to the extensive damage. Postaccident examination did not show any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction or abnormalities that would have precluded normal operation. However, the extent of internal damage to the engine components during impact/the accident sequence and the missing right turbine wheel head precluded a detailed examination of the engine.
The student pilot performed three landings earlier that day with his flight instructor and then was signed off for his first solo flight. The student departed and remained in the traffic pattern, and the airplane bounced during the first landing. After bouncing three times, the nose landing gear fork and wheel assembly separated, and the propeller impacted the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the engine mount and firewall. The operator reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions of the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
According to a local news report, after the accident, the noncertificated pilot stated, "The wind got the better of me and the near-death experience is pretty interesting." He further stated, "I tried to level out before the crash into the house and aimed for the tree. I thought we were dead and I pulled the yoke as far as I could to get the elevation leveled out, which saved our life. I hit the tree with the wing and we spun and landed." Subsequently, the airplane came to rest in the residential neighborhood. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings.After multiple requests, the noncertificated pilot failed to submit the National Transportation Safety Board Form 6120.1 Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report. The automated weather observation system at the accident airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 320° at 17 knots, gusting to 25 knots. The pilot departed on runway 29.
The pilot reported that, during the landing flare, a wind gust "picked up" the right wing and "spun" the airplane to the left. The airplane veered off the left side of the runway and came to rest in a ditch. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the forward portion of the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions of the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. An automated weather observation system located about 13 nautical miles from the accident site reported that, about the time of the accident, a right 70°, 8-knot crosswind wind prevailed.
An employee of the operator reported that the planned aerial application flight was delayed about 2 hours while the pilot waited for the weather conditions to improve. The pilot had spoken with individuals by phone before the flight in an attempt to assess the local conditions. The visibility at the airport was about 1-1/2 miles when the pilot departed.A witness reported that she was sitting on her patio when she heard the airplane. The sound of the engine was normal, "not anything unusual at all." She observed the airplane emerge from the fog and "within seconds" impact the ground. The airplane was level or descending slightly and did not appear to change its flight path before impacting gradually rising terrain. She noted that the airplane did not appear to be out of control, nor did it seem that anything was wrong mechanically. She recalled that it was "very, very foggy" at the time, with about 200 yards visibility. There was no precipitation and little or no wind at the time.A postaccident examination did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction.It is likely that the pilot encountered instrument meteorological conditions while operating at a low level and inadvertently impacted the terrain.