roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
According to the operator, the airplane was supposed to spray a cornfield located about 5 miles southeast of the airstrip. The operator added that the clouds were low at the time of departure but that the forward visibility was good. Review of data from a GPS recovered from the wreckage revealed that for the approximate 2-minute accident flight, the airplane flew southeast at GPS altitudes between 250 to 350 ft. The last recorded data point was just before a tree line, indicating a GPS altitude of 315 ft and a groundspeed of 123 knots. The airplane subsequently struck the trees and an approximate 50-foot debris path at a descending angle was oriented about a magnetic course of 130°. The recorded weather at an airport located about 18 miles southeast of the accident site, about 30 minutes after the accident, included an overcast ceiling at 400 ft. There was no record of the pilot receiving a weather briefing from flight service. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. It is likely that the pilot attempted to maintain visual flight and stay below the clouds, which left him little room to maneuver and resulted in impact with trees and terrain.Review of medical information did not identify any significant medical conditions for the 28-year-old pilot. The toxicology identified that the pilot had used a sedating antihistamine, diphenhydramine, at some point before the accident but the blood level was too low to quantify; it is unlikely that effects from the pilot's use of this drug contributed to his decision to attempt flight in instrument conditions. While the autopsy report is unavailable, there is nothing to suggest it would identify further relevant conditions. Overall, the limited available medical evidence does not indicate a medical condition or use of medication contributed to this accident.
On August 15, 2017, at approximately 6:15 PM EDT, American Airlines flight 290, a Boeing B757, N175AN,  was stationary awaiting takeoff clearance when it was struck by Delta Air Lines flight 2503, a Boeing B737-800, N377DA, as it was taxiing at John F. Kennedy International Airport (KJFK), Queens, New York.  There were no injuries to the 129 passengers and crew onboard the B757, nor to the 166 passengers and crew onboard the B737. The American Airlines B757 sustained substantial damage and the Delta Air Lines B737 sustained minor damage.  Both airplanes were operating under 14 CFR Part 121 as regularly scheduled passenger flights.According to flight crew statements, the American Airlines B757 taxied down taxiway C and turned onto taxiway FB where it stopped short of runway 22R and was awaiting takeoff clearance. The Delta B737 followed the American B757 down taxiway C and was then instructed to taxi behind the American B757 and to continue to taxiway E.  The Delta captain stated he steered slightly to the right of the taxiway centerline to keep clear of the stopped American B757. He then steered back towards the centerline once he thought his left winglet had cleared the American B757s tail when he felt a bump.  After stopping, emergency personnel inspected both airplanes and indicated that Delta's left winglet had contacted the American B757 right horizontal stabilizer, resulting in substantial damage to the elevator.   Both aircraft taxied back to their respective gates under their own power and passengers deplaned normally.
The student pilot, who was the builder of the experimental, amateur-built airplane, reported that the engine had recently been rebuilt and installed on the airplane. The engine had a "couple" of hours of ground run-up time, and the accident occurred on the first flight. The pilot was "crow-hopping" the airplane on the runway when he decided to take off. Upon reaching about 500 ft above the ground, the engine stopped responding to throttle control movements and the propeller continued to rotate. The pilot was unable to maintain altitude, and he landed the airplane in a factory parking lot, where it hit a steel handrail. A postaccident examination of the airplane and engine did not reveal any reason for the loss of engine response. A review of the weather conditions revealed that carburetor ice was unlikely at takeoff engine power settings.
The helicopter pilot reported that, during an agricultural application flight, he performed a "high…[reconnaissance]" pass over the field and observed houses, tree lines, and power lines surrounding the field. He added that he descended for the first pass, about 70 mph and 100 to 150 ft above ground level, and as he approached the end of the field, he "suddenly became aware of two [additional] large power lines stretched out in front of [him] at eye level and closing fast." He further added that he "instinctively pulled up on the collective and back on the cyclic," and the fuselage cleared the wire, but suddenly there was a "violent lurch" when the tail rotor contacted the wire. Subsequently, the helicopter started to "spin out of control," the pilot braced for impact, and the helicopter impacted the terrain. The fuselage, tailboom, and main rotor sustained substantial damage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot reported that, about 2 hours into the pipeline surveillance flight, the engine began running roughly. He initially established a course to a nearby airport; however, the engine was not producing enough power to maintain altitude. He subsequently executed a forced landing to a pasture, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing.A postaccident engine examination revealed that the No. 3 cylinder exhaust valve fractured at the stem seat. Metallurgical examination revealed that the fracture features were consistent with torsional loading at fracture. The stem was tapered adjacent to the fracture, and interconnected voids and surface oxidation were observed at the fracture surface. The presence of voids, tapering of the stem, and oxidation are consistent with high-temperature deformation under stress. Further examination revealed grain structure and subsurface oxidation consistent with exposure to elevated temperatures over an extended period of time, consistent with a stuck valve condition.Factors leading to stuck exhaust valves include excessive engine temperature, dirty or contaminated engine oil, high lead content fuels, hot engine shut-downs, and poor engine baffling. Running engines past the recommended overhaul interval or at elevated temperatures risks creating an exhaust valve fatigue event. The investigation was unable to determine the exact combination of elements that led to the stuck valve. However, based on the available maintenance records, the most recent engine overhaul was completed in 1968, and it is likely that the extended 49-year interval contributed to the stuck valve. While this exceeded the engine manufacturer's 12-year or 1,500-hour time between overhaul interval, the operator was not required to comply under current regulations due to the type of operation.Page 2 of 6 CEN17LA317
The solo student pilot reported that, after completing three takeoffs and landings unassisted with his flight instructor, he took off for his first solo. He added that, during the first solo landing, the airplane "floated" in ground effect for about 4 to 5 seconds, and he added rudder to align the airplane with the runway centerline. He further added that the airplane's nosewheel was "not straight when it touched [down]" on the runway. Subsequently, the student pilot applied brake to maintain directional control and then applied power to abort the landing, but the airplane veered off the runway to the right. He then reduced power to idle and stopped the airplane in the grass next to the runway and awaited instructions from air traffic control. The left wing sustained substantial damage.The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot was conducting a scheduled commuter flight with four passengers onboard. During a visual approach about 3 miles from the destination airport, the engine lost total power while over water. The pilot selected the other fuel tank and turned the auxiliary fuel pump on; however, engine power was not restored. He ditched the airplane near a rugged island beach, and he and the four passengers egressed and swam ashore. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and left wing. The pilot reported that he departed with about 1.5 hours of fuel available in the right wing fuel tank and additional fuel in the left tank. The airplane flew two short segments, a total of about 0.9 hours, with the right fuel tank selected before the loss of engine power. When the wreckage was recovered, 2 gallons of fuel were drained from the right tank, which was less than the unusable amount  of 3.5 gallons, and less than the expected 10 gallons remaining based on average fuel consumption and flight time. If or how much fuel may have escaped through vents while the airplane was submerged could not be determined.A postaccident airframe and engine examination revealed moderate wrinkling throughout the fuel tank bladders, likely the result of sea water submersion. The vented fuel caps, fuel senders, filter screens, and the auxiliary fuel pump were intact. The fuel selector valve operated normally. The fuel tank air vents were in place and clear of blockages. A successful engine test run was performed at multiple power settings with the fuel drained from the airplane. There was no evidence of fuel system leaks or anomalies that would have resulted in a loss of engine power.The airplane had a history of power loss events that were attributed by company management to poor checklist use, inadequate fuel management, and vapor lock; however, company pilots reported that the right fuel tank often contained less fuel than expected after a flight. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the total loss of engine power was the result of fuel starvation; however, why the quantity in the selected tank was less than planned given the engine fuel flow and time en route could not be Page 2 of 9 ANC17LA043determined based on the available information. It is possible that engine power was not restored after selecting the fuller fuel tank due to air in the fuel lines and subsequent vapor lock.
During cruise flight, the airplane experienced a total loss of engine power, and the flight instructor performed a forced landing into trees. The engine crankshaft was replaced about 4 years and about 317 hours of operation before the accident. Teardown examination of the engine revealed that the crankshaft gear screws were fractured, and the crankshaft gear was separated from the crankshaft. Fretting was observed near two of the four crankshaft screw holes and corresponded to two elongated screw holes on the crankshaft gear. The crankshaft and crankshaft gear did not contain a dowel pin as specified in the most current versions of the manufacturer's illustrated parts catalog and overhaul manual, which were published more than 2 years before the crankshaft replacement. Additionally, the crankshaft gear did not contain a dowel pin hole, which was consistent with a crankshaft gear for an older, different model engine. Both publications contained numerous instructions and references to use a crankshaft gear with a dowel pin hole and to align the gear to the crankshaft with a dowel pin, which would pilot the crankshaft gear on the crankshaft. Thus, it is likely that when the crankshaft was replaced, maintenance personnel did not use the most recent manuals and installed a crankshaft gear for a different engine, which led to the crankshaft gear's failure and the subsequent loss of all engine power.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during landing in crosswind conditions, he initiated the flare high. Subsequently, the airplane bounced and veered to the left. He added that, as the airplane was slowing down, it ground looped to the left, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the right wing struck the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.The automated weather observation station located at the airport reported that, about 10 minutes before the accident, the wind was from 340° at 7 knots. The same weather observation station reported that, about 10 minutes after the accident, the wind was from 320° at 6 knots. The airplane was landing on runway 2. After multiple requests, the pilot did not submit the National Transportation Safety Board Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report Form 6120.1.
The solo student pilot in the high-performance airplane reported that, before takeoff, he observed a "dead still" flag and windsock, indicating "no wind." He added that, during the takeoff roll, a wind gust pushed the airplane off the runway to the left. He added that he attempted to recover by reducing power, but the airplane impacted a ditch, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the airplane nosed over. He further added that the wind gust occurred after the airplane had "cleared" a large hill to the west of the runway.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings, fuselage, and empennage.The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.A weather reporting station about 18 miles north of the airport reported that, between 1100 and 1320, the wind increased from calm to 8 knots, and no gusts were reported. The wind came predominately from the southwest. The airplane departed from runway 16, and the airport is located in an area of low rolling hills. The Federal Aviation Administration's Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, FAA-H-8083-25B, contained a section titled, "Effect of Obstructions on Wind," which stated, in part:"Obstructions on the ground affect the flow of wind and can be an unseen danger. Ground topography and large buildings can break up the flow of the wind and create wind gusts that change rapidly in direction and speed. These obstructions range from man-made structures, like hangars, to large natural obstructions, such as mountains, bluffs, or canyons. It is especially important to be vigilant when flying in or out of airports that have large buildings or natural obstructions located near the runway.Page 2 of 6 GAA17CA492The intensity of the turbulence associated with ground obstructions depends on the size of the obstacle and the primary velocity of the wind. This can affect the takeoff and landing performance of any aircraft and can present a very serious hazard."
The private pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane stated that, during a "wheel landing," the airplane bounced twice upon touchdown then veered off the runway into a grass area. The pilot was unable to return the airplane to the runway surface because the airplane was "slipping on the grass" while the pilot applied left rudder and left wheel brake. The airplane nosed over when it came to a stop in the grass area and came to rest inverted. The pilot stated that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane. According to the Airplane Flying Handbook, corrective action from a bounced landing is dependent upon its severity, and such action can range from an application of power to cushion a subsequent landing to performance of a go-around.
The pilot of the experimental, amateur-built biplane reported that, following a normal initial climb, about 100 ft above the ground, the biplane started an uncommanded left turn, followed by a descent. He added that it became apparent that the flightpath was into the tree line, and he "attempted to climb to possibly maintain at least an altitude to clear the trees, but to no avail, nearly stalling." Subsequently, the biplane impacted the trees.The biplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the biplane that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot added that the biplane is "not very stable once in a flying configuration, any air mass (gusts) change can disturb the balance and result in self-induced turns, climbs and descents. These movements have to be countered immediately because of the relative size (small) of control surfaces (rudder, ailerons). And corrections are slow, possibly resulting in loss of altitude. Pilots expect these upsets and become alert for them."The automated weather observation system on the accident airport reported, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 360° at 5 knots. The pilot was departing from runway 03. The calculated density altitude was 1,897 ft.
The pilot reported that the airplane landed hard and bounced. He added that he performed a go-around, landed, and taxied to the ramp uneventfully. During a walkaround before another flight that day, he noticed that the airplane had sustained substantial damage to the fuselage during his previous flight.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that in preparation for the cross-country flight, he performed a weight and balance calculation and determined that the weight was just below maximum gross weight. The weather advisory from 25 minutes before the accident, the density altitude was 7,400 ft. Before takeoff, he performed run-up checks and leaned the mixture. The pilot stated that after the airplane lifted off, the airplane climbed about 80 mph to about 350 ft to 400 ft above ground level then stopped climbing; the airspeed would not increase above 80 mph and the stall indication light was on. The pilot lowered the nose of the airplane a little to gain additional airspeed, but the airspeed did not increase above 80 mph. The pilot attempted to return to the airport, but about 30° into a right downwind turn, the airplane began to lose altitude, and to the airplane would not reach the runway. The pilot flew under power lines and subsequently landed the airplane in an uneven open field, which resulted in substantial damage to the airplane's left wing. An examination and successful engine run revealed no evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely that with the airplane at or near gross weight and was taking off at a high density altitude, which would degrade engine performance; thus, the airplane was not able to attain an airspeed sufficient to maintain a positive climb rate.
***This report was modified on January 3, 2018. Please see the docket for this accident to view the original report.*** The pilot reported that, during a go-around after a low approach, the left cabin door opened. He added that he reached back to close the door and that the airplane then aerodynamically stalled. The pilot was unable to recover, and the airplane impacted the ground and struck multiple fences.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor and private pilot had completed training maneuvers and were returning to the airport when the engine experienced a partial loss of power about 1,000 to 1,500 ft above ground level. They were unable to glide the airplane to an open field and descended into a wooded area. The airplane impacted trees and became wedged between trees, suspended above the ground. The engine and empennage separated from the rest of the airplane and came to rest on the ground nearby. The fuel tanks were damaged and most of the remaining fuel spilled onto the ground. A postaccident examination of the engine revealed no pre-impact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation or production of rated horsepower; however, an examination of the gascolator showed that it had been leaking fuel from three locations and contained a significant amount of debris. In a postaccident examination, the gascolator was subjected to the relevant service bulletin testing and did not pass the test due to the leaking seals and drain valve. Since the gascolator was unable to seal properly, it would have allowed air into the fuel system, which would have resulted in a loss of engine power. A review of the airplane maintenance records revealed no record of compliance with the service bulletin, nor was compliance mandatory.
The student pilot, who had 15 hours of flight experience, was performing an instructional flight with her flight instructor and a passenger. According to GPS data, the airplane landed on and then took off from a grass airstrip, climbed about 150 ft, then collided with terrain about 1,000 ft past the end of the runway. There were no known eyewitnesses, and the student pilot and passenger did not recall the accident due to their injuries. The flight instructor was fatally injured.An examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of a preaccident mechanical malfunction or anomaly. An examination of the flight controls revealed that the wing flaps were in the fully extended (40º) position at impact. The airplane's operating checklist stated that normal and obstacle clearance takeoffs are performed with wing flaps up, and flap settings greater than 10º are not recommended at any time for takeoff. Upon landing on the grass runway, the flaps should have been retracted as part of the after-landing checklist, then confirmed up as part of the before takeoff and takeoff checklists. It is likely that the flap setting at the time of takeoff resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control during the initial climb.It could not be determined who was at the controls at the time of the takeoff and loss of airplane control; however, the flight instructor, as pilot-in-command, was responsible for the operation and safety of the flight and should have ensured that the flaps were retracted before takeoff. He also should have anticipated and corrected any significant errors made by the student.
According to airline transport pilot, during the takeoff roll, the airplane veered left. The pilot tried to correct the turn without success, and the airplane subsequently departed the left side of the runway, struck a taxiway light, and then came to rest in grass adjacent to the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. The pilot reported that he had owned the airplane for about 1 month, during which time he observed that he had to continuously apply right rudder for the airplane to taxi straight ahead, which he thought was normal for that airplane. Examination of the tailwheel assembly revealed that, when the rudder pedals were centered, the rudder was also centered. However, the tailwheel remained in a left-turn position and required about 75% right rudder input to center the tailwheel, and with full-right rudder deflection, the tailwheel turned very little to the right. A review of the maintenance records revealed that maintenance, including the installation of a new upper mount assembly and a new tailwheel strut, was performed on the tailwheel assembly about 3 years before the accident. Given the pilot's report that he had always needed to apply right rudder for the airplane to taxi straight ahead, it is likely that the tailwheel assembly was improperly rigged following the previous maintenance.