roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The solo student pilot reported that, during approach, he felt a "slight sink." He added that the main landing gears touched down, and the airplane began to porpoise. The student pilot added power to initiate a go-around, but the airplane veered left. The porpoising continued, so the pilot reduced the power to idle and attempted to use brakes to steer. The airplane exited the runway to the left and impacted a taxiway sign.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing.The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported in a written statement that, after a "successful pre-check," he initiated power for takeoff, and once airborne, "the plane was losing power enough that [the] plane would not clear [the] tree line at the end of the runway." He added that, about 10 ft above the runway, he aborted the takeoff by "throttling back" and made a hard landing on the grass runway. The pilot reported that during the landing, the main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane slid for about 50 ft on the runway before stopping. The left wing, fuselage, and engine mounts sustained substantial damage.The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aviation safety inspector reported that, about 3 weeks after the accident, the pilot called him to add to his original statement. According to the inspector, the pilot reported that the engine was not losing power, he overreacted to the situation, and put the airplane back on the ground too quickly. The pilot further reported that the airplane did not gain altitude because he did not apply elevator input quickly enough to execute a proper takeoff. The pilot added that he rotated at the speed he normally does when he flies single pilot, but during this flight, he had one passenger on board. The pilot did not submit the NTSB Form 6120.1 Pilot/ Operator Aircraft Accident/ Incident Report and did not return phone calls from the NTSB investigator-in-charge.
The pilot reported that, while en route to his destination, he heard a “loud bang,” followed by a complete loss of engine power. After determining that the airplane was not within gliding distance of the nearest airport, the pilot performed an off-airport landing, during which the airplane impacted a small drainage ditch, nosed over, and came to rest inverted, resulting in substantial damage. Disassembly of the engine revealed mechanical damage in multiple locations inside the crankcase. The No. 1 main bearings had shifted slightly out of the support and displayed deformation. The No. 2 main bearings displayed bearing shift signatures. One was missing, and the other had extruded out of the bearing support. Multiple pieces of the missing bearing were found in the oil sump. The No. 3 main bearings were intact and had moved in a clockwise direction when viewed from the back of the engine, had shifted slightly out of the support, and the oil passage holes were partially blocked. The crankshaft was fractured at the crankshaft cheek between the No. 2 main journal and the No. 2 connecting rod journal. The No. 2 connecting rod journal and connecting rod bearings displayed incipient signatures of lubrication distress.Review of the engine maintenance records revealed that, about 500 flight hours before the accident, all the cylinders had been replaced with overhauled cylinders and new pistons had been installed along with reconditioned lifters and seals. If a bearing shifts for any reason after removal of one or more cylinders, or during replacement of one or more cylinders, the oil holes in the bearing can become misaligned with the oil passages in the crankcase, partially cutting off the oil supply to the bearing. If the engine is then put back into service, the reduced oil supply to the bearing can cause increased heat and friction that can result in the bearing shifting more, further reducing its oil supply. Eventually, the bearing can shift enough to cause the oil supply to be cut off completely, resulting in a catastrophic failure. This is usually referred to as a "spun bearing."Page 2 of 8 ERA17LA307To prevent a spun bearing, the manufacturer specified a multiple-step torquing process for proper cylinder installation. The process required that the through bolt nuts be torqued on both sides of the engine, even if only one cylinder was being installed. The manufacturer warned that "failure to torque through bolt nuts on both sides of the engine can result in a loss of main bearing crush with main bearing shift and subsequent engine failure." Given the observed damage, it is likely that maintenance personnel did not apply sufficient torque to the cylinder flange nuts and through bolts during installation of the cylinders, which resulted in shifting of the Nos. 1, 2, and 3 main bearings, a loss of lubrication, and failure of the crankshaft.
The private pilot reported that, upon touchdown in the retractable gear, multi-engine airplane, he experienced a "mushy feeling" and aborted the landing even though the gear down indicator light was illuminated. He made another landing attempt with the same results, but after the second attempt, he noted that neither the red gear-up light nor the green gear-down light were illuminated. Ultimately, the pilot diverted to a nearby tower-controlled airport. The tower personnel confirmed that the right main landing gear was not fully extended. Attempts to lower the landing gear using emergency procedures were unsuccessful, and the pilot landed the airplane, during which the right landing gear collapsed.Subsequent examination revealed that a pushrod from the gear motor was bent, which likely resulted in the inability of the right landing gear to fully extend. The reason for the bent pushrod could not be determined.
During the approach to line up with a helipad, the commercial pilot noted that the helipad was not set up for landing into the wind, so he discontinued the approach and decided to land on a nearby wash rack, into the wind. As he turned right, the helicopter encountered a wind gust, or the wind was blocked by a nearby outbuilding, which can cause a turbulent effect. The helicopter suddenly and violently yawed right and pitched up. He attempted to correct the condition with pedal and cyclic inputs; however, a right spin ensued, and the helicopter spun to the ground and then came to rest on its right side. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely that the pilot did not adequately compensate for wind conditions, and when he added power to compensate, the helicopter yawed right and pitched up. The pilot was unable to stop the yaw and lost helicopter control due to a loss of tail rotor effectiveness.
The private pilot of the experimental, amateur-built airplane stated that he began the approach high and made a steeper and faster approach to land than normal to clear cranes located near the end of the runway. He landed the airplane long and, instead of going around, continued with the landing. The airplane went off the runway and into the water, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical problems with the airplane and that the accident was caused by his poor judgment to continue with the landing.
A private pilot departed on a local flight in his experimental, amateur-built airplane equipped with a tip-up (forward-opening) canopy. A witness saw the airplane during its initial climb after takeoff and stated that it descended "straight down and burst into a ball of flames" upon impact. Examination of the accident site revealed that items from the cabin were found on the ground near the runway threshold and before the impact site. There were no preimpact anomalies of the airframe or engine and kit manufacturer fuel tank Service Bulletins were compiled with.The airplane's before takeoff checklist stated, "Canopy – CHECK Latched." However, the metal canopy latching mechanisms on the roll bar frame exhibited soot-colored discoloration and its polyethylene latch block was not present, and the latch handle on the canopy was intact, not deformed, and not discolored, consistent with the latch being unsecured at the time of impact. Additionally, the presence of items from the cockpit before the impact site is consistent with the canopy opening in flight.About 9 months before the accident, the kit manufacturer published a service letter regarding the in-flight opening of tip-up canopies. The letter stated that, based on previous events, the aircraft will most likely pitch nose down abruptly if the canopy opens in flight. The severity of the pitching moment can depend on speed, attitude, and weight and balance. The letter further stated that most instances of in-flight canopy openings were the result of the pilot forgetting to latch the canopy properly before takeoff, and cautioned pilots to ensure that the latching mechanism fully engaged as designed. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the accident pilot failed to properly latch the canopy before takeoff, did not maintain airplane control following the canopy opening, and the airplane subsequently impacted terrain to the extent that the incorporated service bulletins remedies did not keep the fuel tank from breaching, causing the ground fire.
The solo student pilot reported that, on a cross-country flight, she diverted to a closer airport because the airplane was low on fuel. She added that she executed a go-around after a high approach, but when she advanced the throttle forward, the engine experienced a total loss of engine power. She then landed the airplane straight ahead in brush.The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. Postaccident examination revealed that the airplane had less than the 3.5 unusable gallons of fuel. The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the pilot of the tailwheel-equipped, experimental amateur-built airplane, during the takeoff roll on runway 3, there was a slight crosswind and he was unable to maintain directional control of the airplane, possibly due to wind shear. The airplane exited the left side of the runway and impacted the visual approach slope indicator lights. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the aft fuselage bulkhead and the vertical stabilizer.According to the METAR at the accident airport, about the time of the accident, the wind was variable at 3kts, the visibility was greater than 10 statute miles, and there were few clouds at 3,800ft. The temperature was 72°F and the dew point was 57°F. Wind shear was not reported.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor reported that he was demonstrating a "full [aerodynamic] stall" landing for the student pilot in "stiff" gusting crosswind conditions. He added that the airplane crossed the runway threshold at 2 ft, the stall warning sounded, and then a "strong [wind] gust lifted the aircraft to…[approximately] 6 feet with the stall warning still sounding." He further added that he immediately applied power to go around, but the "gust died out." Subsequently, the left wing dropped and impacted terrain, and the airplane nosed over. The fuselage, right wing, and vertical stabilizer sustained substantial damage.The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.An automated weather observation station 17 nautical miles southwest from the accident site reported, about the time of the accident, wind from 110° at 12 knots. The landing was on runway 36.The flight instructor failed to submit the National Transportation Safety Board Form 6120.1 Pilot/ Operator Aircraft Accident/ Incident Report.
The private pilot stated that, about 20 to 25 minutes after departure for the cross-country flight, the engine's oil temperature gauge was indicating that the oil temperature was hotter than normal. He added that, to avoid having the engine seize while in flight, he chose to perform a precautionary landing on a dirt road that had an uphill gradient. After touchdown, the airplane bounced, the right main landing gear sheared off, and the airplane turned 180° and came to rest with the right wingtip on the ground. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The engine was successfully started and run for over 5 minutes at various power settings. The tailwheel could not be manually rotated counterclockwise to the stop because the right control cable was catching and rubbing on a displaced fairing behind the pedals. It could not be determined if this had occurred before the accident and the pilot was unable to maintain directional control or was a result of the accident sequence.
The pilot reported that, during the initial climb, about 150 ft above the ground, while the landing gear were being retracted, the airplane impacted a flock of medium-sized birds. He noted that the landing gear unlock indicator remained illuminated and that the landing gear handle would not return to the up neutral position. No degradation of performance was noted, so the pilot chose to continue to his destination. About 20 miles from the airport, the pilot attempted to lower the landing gear but was unsuccessful. He contacted maintenance personnel on the ground and advised them of the landing gear issue. The ground maintenance personnel visually verified that the nose and right main landing gear (MLG) were down. The pilot performed the emergency gear extension checklist and noted little to no resistance on the hand pump. The pilot made multiple attempts to lower the landing gear without success. During the landing, the right MLG collapsed, and the left wing impacted the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. Postaccident examination revealed snarge on both horizonal stabilizers, the left wing, and the fuselage and that the right inboard MLG door actuator hose had failed.
The private pilot and the passenger were making a local personal flight in the airplane. According to witnesses, the airplane was flying "low" in the vicinity of the runway when it collided with trees and impacted terrain in a nose-down attitude. Examination of the airplane revealed that the fuel selector was in the left tank position; there was no fuel in the left tank or in the fuel lines, and there was less than 1 teaspoon of fuel in the electric boost pump. Therefore, it is likely that the engine lost power because of fuel exhaustion. At an unknown time, the airplane's original 108-horsepower engine had been replaced with a 150-horsepower engine. An updated pilot operating handbook or operating handbook supplement that would have provided fuel consumption figures for the higher horsepower engine was not located. When the accident occurred, the airplane had been flown about 2.23 hours since it had been fully fueled. Based on the estimated fuel burn rate of between 8.8 and 10 gallons per hour provided by the engine manufacturer for the 150-horsepower engine, the airplane likely would have consumed its entire usable fuel capacity of 22 gallons about the time of the accident.
The helicopter flight instructor reported that the student was practicing quick-stops on the taxiway. The student was hovering with a tailwind and began to accelerate when the helicopter started a "fast yaw to the right." He added that they stopped the acceleration, checked the engine gauges, and then accelerated again. As the helicopter was going through effective translational lift, it spun to the right. The flight instructor took the flight controls, noticed the rpm was high, and reduced the throttle. The helicopter impacted the ground backward and slid before coming to rest.The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the vertical stabilizer.The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.A review of recorded data from the automated weather observation station located on the airport reported that, about 37 minutes before the accident, the wind was from 190° at 7 knots. The helicopter was taxiing to the north.
The pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight. The fuel selector was set to the left main fuel tank for takeoff and climbout. After reaching cruise altitude, he switched to the auxiliary tanks and later to the right main fuel tank. While in cruise flight, he also activated the two fuel pumps to transfer fuel from the tip tanks to the main tanks. When the airplane was about 4 miles from and 2,000 ft above the intended destination airport, the pilot switched to the left main fuel tank; the fuel-injected engine lost power, but the propeller continued to windmill. The pilot selected the landing gear down and attempted to restart the engine to no avail. The pilot determined that he would not make the runway and selected an open area as his landing target. He switched to the right main fuel tank, but the propeller continued only to windmill. The pilot then switched back to the left main tank and again could not start the engine. The airplane landed hard on flat desert terrain, which resulted in the nose landing gear collapsing and the fuselage buckling. The airplane slid upright to a stop.On-site examination of the fuel tanks revealed that they were not breached; the left main fuel tank contained about 23 gallons of fuel, the right main tank contained about 20 gallons, and the auxiliary tanks and the tip tanks did not contain any fuel. Examination of the fuel system did not reveal any obvious reason for the engine power loss. Although the left main tank fuel pickup screen was found separated from its line, the line appeared clear and functional. The ports and chambers of the fuel selector valve were clear, and the valve was functional. The fuel selector valve handle position detents were worn so that proper selection of a fuel tank by tactile method alone was difficult or impossible, and the placard was worn to the point where the position marker for the left tank was absent. The engine was removed for examination and a test run, and there was no evidence of a mechanical anomaly that would have precluded normal operation.Based on the pilot's reported sequence of events, the airplane examination, and the engine test run, it is likely that the pilot did not correctly position the fuel selector valve handle when he switched to the left tank for landing, which resulted in fuel flow interruption and power loss due to fuel starvation. The worn condition of the fuel selector valve made it susceptible to being mis-set, which would impede or Page 2 of 12 WPR17LA190terminate fuel flow to the engine. In addition, a fuel-injected engine can be more difficult and/or take longer to start after it is deprived of fuel. Due to the airplane's proximity to the ground, the pilot had limited time to troubleshoot or restart the engine.
The pilot and copilot reported that, during the landing roll, the airplane bounced and then veered right and that the pilot then corrected back to the runway centerline. The copilot added that the airplane’s right side seemed to “dip” as it continued to pull right, and the pilot added that the airplane’s right side was lower than its left side, so they assumed that the right main landing gear (MLG) had a flat tire. Subsequently, the pilot was able to taxi the airplane off the runway and park it on a taxiway, and the passengers disembarked without incident. Examination of the airplane revealed that the aft portion of the right MLG trunnion was protruding through the top of the right wing and that the MLG strut and wheel were positioned out and aft in about a 45° angle from their original position. The right MLG trunnion aft pivot pin was not in the trunnion but remained in the trunnion mount in the aft wing spar; it was easily removed from the mount by hand. The retaining bolt used to keep the pivot pin in the trunnion was in place and secured with a nut and cotter pin.Review of the airplane’s maintenance records revealed that the left and right MLG trunnions had been replaced with new trunnions and trunnion pivot pins 8 days before the incident. The mechanic who performed the work stated that, after installing the right MLG aft trunnion pivot pin, it must have shifted aft when he went to install the bolt through the pin. He stated that an “air-pocket” must have developed and pushed the pin back out. He added that the pin looked fully engaged and that he noted no faults during postmaintenance operational checks. Therefore, based on the evidence, it is likely that, after the mechanic installed the right MLG aft trunnion pivot pin, it backed out, which led to the retaining bolt not being installed in the hole in the pivot pin and resulted in the pin separating from the trunnion, the trunnion puncturing the right wing, and the right MLG collapsing.Following the incident, the airplane manufacturer revised the trunnion pivot pin installation procedures in the Airplane Maintenance Manual. The revision included, in part, a step for maintenance personnel to visually check and ensure that the bolt is visible when looking through the pivot pin from the aft side Page 2 of 7 WPR17IA189and that, if it is not visible, to remove it, ensure that the pivot pin is fully installed in the trunnion assembly, and reinstall the bolt.
The private pilot was flying the airplane at a low altitude when the engine lost total power. The pilot reported that the engine did not sputter, bang, or run roughly before the loss of engine power; however, several witnesses heard the airplane's engine running roughly immediately before the crash. One witness reported that the airplane's engine fluctuated between "sputtering" and "revving" before it lost total power. The airplane collided with trees and terrain during the subsequent forced landing and came to rest inverted.Postaccident examination of the airplane and engine did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, the airplane had ample fuel available that did not contain any water or debris. The engine also demonstrated the ability to produce rated horsepower during a postaccident operational test run. The carburetor heat control was in the "OFF" position.The weather conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to moderate carburetor icing at cruise power and serious carburetor icing at descent power. The pilot reported that he did not use carburetor heat during the flight because he was operating the engine at a cruise power setting. The airplane flight manual states that carburetor heat should be used upon a loss of engine power or an unexplained decrease of manifold pressure, a roughly running engine, or before the throttle is moved to idle for landing. Additionally, the use of carburetor heat might be required to avoid carburetor ice accumulation during a descent at a reduced engine power setting. According to a Federal Aviation Administration Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin, pilots should use carburetor heat while in weather conditions where carburetor icing is probable. Based on the available information, the total loss of engine power was likely due to carburetor ice accumulation. Additionally, the low altitude at which the loss of engine power occurred precluded the pilot from reestablishing normal engine operation before the airplane descended into trees.