roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot reported that during the last landing he felt that the left wing was too high, even with the right crosswind. He overcorrected, the airplane floated, and then the left wing was too low. The pilot added power to go around, but the airplane veered to the left and went off of the runway and into a corn field. The landing gear collapsed, and the airplane came to rest on its belly which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage, the left wing, and the right horizontal stabilizer. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
During a descent to perform contour flying for a practical test, the pilot applicant vented the balloon. When it began to level off too high, he vented it again and the balloon began a descent he described as “faster than (he) expected.” The designated pilot examiner (DPE) called for a burn and the pilot applicant “gave a short burn” with one burner. The DPE, recognizing that the burn was insufficient to arrest the balloon’s descent, called for another burn while simultaneously grabbing the other burner. The balloon started to ascend and when the DPE realized that the basket was going to strike a light pole, he removed his hand from the burner and called for the pilot applicant to do the same; however, the pilot applicant did not remove his hand from the burner. When the basket impacted the pole, the load tapes sustained burn and heat damage. The DPE assumed control and flew them to an uneventful landing. The pilot reported that there were no pre-accident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
Flight track data from the helicopter air ambulance flight indicated that, while in cruise flight at an altitude of about 1,500 ft mean sea level (msl), the helicopter departed normal cruise flight with an abrupt increase in altitude, followed by a dive. The recovered data from various sources onboard the helicopter did not contain information as to whether the helicopter rolled inverted during this altitude excursion, as recalled by the crewmembers. Surveillance video showed the helicopter in a near-vertical, nose-down, spiraling descent. The pilot arrested the rotation and recovered the helicopter from the dive but was unable to climb or hover due to insufficient engine power, thereby resulting in a hard landing to a city street and substantial damage to the helicopter. Examination of the helicopter revealed no evidence of malfunction that would result in an abrupt departure from cruise flight.Because of the limited control authority of the Stability Augmentation System (SAS) actuators, it is unlikely that a malfunction of a SAS actuator would have resulted in an inflight upset before the pilot could react to the malfunction. Additionally, a malfunction of a trim actuator would not result in an inflight upset as the pilot would notice an attitude deviation before the trim actuator, whose rate of movement is limited by design, would be able to move the helicopter into an unusual attitude.Data indicated that a main rotor system overspeed, which likely occurred during the dive maneuver, resulted in the overspeed of both engine power turbines due to the sudden reduction in load from the main rotor. As a result of the power turbine overspeed, both engine control systems, independent of each other, functioned as designed and reverted to manual mode while at a minimum fuel flow rate. Both engines continued to run at low power without Page 2 of 10 ERA22FA105automatic governing, resulting in insufficient power to continue normal flight as the engine twist grips remained in the normal fly position for the duration of the flight.
Shortly after takeoff the engine started to “sputter,” then stopped producing power; oil then blew out of the engine cowling onto the windshield. The pilot made a forced landing in a field and the airplane contacted a wire fence, resulting in substantial damage to the airframe. A postaccident inspection of the engine revealed that the engine crankcase was ruptured in two places near the Nos. 5 and 6 cylinders. Subsequent detailed examinations showed the Nos. 5 and 6 connecting rods were fractured and that a counterweight retaining ring (circlip) was missing its eyelets and had separated from the counterweight assembly. Additional metallurgical examination revealed that the counterweight retaining ring failed due to fatigue.  The failure allowed the counterweight roller to eject from the counterweight. Additionally, the No. 6 connecting rod exhibited evidence of a fatigue failure in multiple locations and the Nos. 5 and 6 pistons showed evidence of detonation. It is likely that the fatigue failure of the retaining ring or the fatigue failure of the No. 6 connecting rod occurred and propagated throughout the engine until a catastrophic failure resulted. The failure sequence could not be determined, but it is likely that the piston detonation exacerbated the process.
The student pilot in the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that during the full stop landing roll, he applied too much pressure to the left brake pedal and the airplane veered left. The airplane exited the left side of the runway, entered the soft grass surface, and subsequently nosed over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right-wing lift strut. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that the airplane was stored outdoors for several weeks before the accident flight. The pilot observed water in the left fuel tank during the preflight inspection and he extracted about 1 ounce of water before he derived that there wasn’t much water in the fuel system. He started the engine, taxied onto the runway, and took off to the southeast. During the initial climb, the engine lost power about 200 ft above ground level. The pilot declared an emergency to the tower controller and initiated a descending right turn. The airplane impacted the ground and came to rest on an active railroad crossing. The pilot was extracted from the accident airplane moments before it was struck by a passenger train.During the weeks prior to the accident, it had rained for 18 days. Postaccident examination of the airframe revealed that the right and left wing tank fuel cap gaskets were deteriorated and were not intact. Excessive quantities of corrosion and rust were observed throughout the gascolator and the carburetor. Postaccident examination of the airplane’s engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have prevented normal operation. It is likely that the deteriorated fuel caps allowed water to enter the fuel tanks when rain was present and that water remained in the airplane's fuel system after the pilot’s preflight inspection and engine runup. A total loss of power during the initial climbout likely occurred when the contaminated fuel reached the engine.
The commercial pilots departed during night, instrument conditions on a positioning flight. After leveling off at 8,000 ft mean sea level with moderate turbulence conditions likely, the airplane slowly turned left from a west to southeast heading. The airplane continued turning left and entered a rapid descent until terrain impact. The airplane was destroyed when it impacted terrain. Examination revealed no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.Although the pilot and copilot were both instrument current, their flying experience predominantly involved visual flight rules operations. The pilot in command (PIC) did not have the required experience to operate as PIC on Part 135 flights and was the PIC of this Part 91 positioning flight to gain experience. Immediately before the accident flight, the pilot communicated to her boyfriend that she had concerns about the flight due to the weather, along with her and the copilot’s instrument flying skills. The pilot likely became spatially disoriented during night instrument conditions that included moderate turbulence. Because of the airplane’s single set of flight instruments and “throwover yoke” control column, which required pulling a T-handle latch on the back of the control arm to change the yoke from one side of the cockpit to the other, the copilot likely wasn’t able to assume control of the airplane. As a result, the copilot wasn’t able to recover control of the airplane from its unusual attitude before impact with terrain.Page 2 of 11 CEN22FA096
Two airplanes were taxiing when a ground collision occurred. According to the pilot of the Cessna 172, he was taxiing towards the run-up area, when he saw the engine start of a Cessna 150. He said it was stationary in a parking spot facing the taxiway as he proceeded forward. As he continued to taxi, he saw the right wing of the Cessna 150 pass under his wing toward his airplane. As he tried to avoid a collision, the right wing tip collided with the windscreen. During the collision the right aileron of the Cessna 150 sustained substantial damage. According to the pilot of the Cessna 150, he was preparing to exit the ramp area and taxi to runway 08. After making a radio call, he checked the taxiway for other aircraft, and said his sight was limited due to an airplane that was parked next to him. He said that he checked to see if any airplanes were on the taxiway and did not see any. He pulled out onto the taxiway and felt a slight bump when the Cessna 172 struck his airplane from behind. Both pilots reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplanes that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported he departed with 7 gallons of automotive fuel in the right fuel tank and 5.8 gallons of automotive fuel gallons in the left fuel tank and that he checked the fuel levels with a sight gauge. The right fuel gauge indicated “one quarter of a tank” and the left fuel gauge indicated “slightly less than half a tank.” After the completion of the local flight, the pilot entered the downwind leg of the traffic pattern. At the midfield point, the pilot added 10° flaps and applied full carburetor heat. The engine then “stumbled and quit.” The pilot attempted to restart the engine to no avail. The pilot had the fuel tank selector in the BOTH position.The pilot increased the flaps to 40° and executed a teardrop-style left turn to the runway. The airplane “floated long” and landed on airport property beyond the runway into trees, at stall speed. The airplane came to rest with the left wing pointing down toward the ground and the right wing toward the sky. The three occupants were able to egress from the airplane without further incident. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage.Postaccident examination of the airplane found both fuel tanks intact, with no signs of a fuel leak on the airframe. About a quarter of a gallon of fuel was drained from the right fuel tank and about four gallons of fuel was drained from the left fuel tank. The fuel tank selector was found in the BOTH position. Airframe to engine control continuity was confirmed. An examination of the engine revealed no mechanical anomalies.The reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined based on the available evidence.A review of the meteorological conditions near the time of the accident, showed that the formation of carburetor icing was not likely for the usage of aviation gasoline. However, the airplane was modified to use automotive gasoline, which the pilot used to fill the airplane with Page 2 of 7 CEN22LA098prior to the flight. References have stated that carburetor icing will occur in less time and at higher ambient temperatures with automotive gasoline than with aviation gasoline. Based on the available evidence, it could not be determined what, if any role, carburetor icing may have played in the accident.
The pilot reported that after an uneventful landing, a strong gust of wind pushed the airplane off the runway surface. The airplane went across the grass and struck a precision approach path indicator light (PAPI). The left wing sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operations. At the time of the accident, the pilot was landing the airplane on runway 18 with wind 250o at 14 knots with gusts to 20 knots.
The flight instructor reported to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector that he was planning to demonstrate to the student how to land on the numbers for the runway and set up his approach accordingly. He believed that while crossing the road adjacent to the airport, the sun visor slipped down and after seeing a fence, pulled aft on the control yoke but was too late. The student pilot stated that he saw the flight was, “coming down really fast” and he was about to say something to the flight instructor and pull the control yoke but the airplane impacted the fence with the landing gear. The pilot reported that there were no pre-accident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.A post-accident examination revealed substantial damage to the engine mount and wrinkles to the lower and upper skins of the left wing.
The pilot reported that he was performing a precautionary landing on a beach when the airplane veered left and impacted a sand dune, resulting in substantial damage. Following the accident, he reported to his insurance company that there were no mechanical malfunctions with the airplane and that he chose to land on the beach to take a photo. The airplane was not examined following the accident; however, the circumstances are consistent with the pilot’s loss of directional control during an off-airport landing.
The pilot of the tail wheeled-equipped airplane reported that, he was on an approach to land at an uncontrolled airport behind two helicopters. An airport surveillance video showed the accident airplane flying over the runway about 20 seconds after a helicopter was in a slow hover taxi adjacent to the runway.  The pilot reported that he saw the helicopter and decided to land long to maintain separation. He added that while on short final, he saw a helicopter “cross” the runway, so he increased engine power to full and attempted a go-around. About one-third of the way down the length of the runway, the airplane encountered the helicopter’s downwash, and the airplane entered an uncommanded steep right bank. The pilot applied opposite aileron, but he was not able to maintain control of the airplane. Subsequently, the airplane impacted right of the runway and sustained substantial damage to the right wing and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident  mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.According to Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular No. 90-23G, Aircraft Wake Turbulence, “pilots should avoid taxiing or flying within a distance of three rotor diameters of a helicopter hovering or in a slow hover taxi, as the downwash can contain high wind speeds.Page 2 of 5 WPR22LA072Figure 1. Except of Helicopter Vortices Figure from AC 90-23G
The pilot reported that while landing following a night instrument flight, on a known contaminated runway and employing aerodynamic braking, the airplane contacted a snow and ice patch and veered to the left. The airplane continued left until it contacted an unplowed snowbank on the left side of the runway and nosed over coming to rest inverted. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, both ailerons, the vertical stabilizer, and rudder. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that prior to the flight he had filed and instrument flight plan and was aware of a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that at most 10% of the runway had compacted snow. An area 60-ft wide was plowed and swept.
The pilot reported that the landing gear did not extend properly as he approached the intended destination airport. His attempts to extend the landing gear manually were not successful, and he decided to divert to a tower-controlled airport. The tower controller subsequently confirmed that the landing gear appeared to be “a few inches down from the retracted position” but was not fully extended. He ultimately executed an emergency gear-up landing.A postaccident examination of the landing gear system was performed after the airplane was repositioned to a hangar at the airport. The landing gear motor jack screw corresponded to the retracted position at the time of the exam. Electrical power did not appear to be reaching the gear extension motor. When the nose landing gear doors were released (opened), the landing gear was able to be extended manually. Although, the examination confirmed an anomaly with both the primary and secondary extension/retraction systems, it did not  determine the exact problem.
The pilot stated that, about 30 minutes after departure and while in cruise flight at an altitude of about 10,500 ft mean sea level, he observed the fuel pressure decrease from 44 to 39 pounds per square inch (psi), increase to 40 psi, and decreased to 0 psi as the engine speed decreased to 0 rpm. For about the next 3 to 5 minutes, the fuel pressure and RPMs fluctuated between normal and zero. He activated the backup fuel pump with no effect noted. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings during the forced landing. A postaccident examination revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Engine runs were performed with no anomalies noted that were consistent with the pilot’s statements and onboard recorded data. The onboard recorded data showed fluctuations in fuel pressure and intermittent operation of the engine consistent with the pilot’s statement. As a result, the reason for the partial loss of engine power could not be determined based on the available evidence for this investigation.
The pilot reported that he was returning to land after dropping a load of skydivers at 10,000 ft above mean sea level, and that he did not apply carburetor heat during the descent. He reduced the throttle to idle when he entered an extended based leg of the traffic pattern. The approach path was low, so the pilot increased the throttle, but the engine did not respond. He completed steps to troubleshoot the loss of power, but he did not apply the carburetor heat. The pilot made a forced landing to a marshy area; the airplane impacted uneven terrain and sustained substantial damage to the left wing. Examination of the fuel system did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The atmospheric conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to the development of serious carburetor icing at glide power. Given the evidence, it is likely that carburetor ice accumulated, which resulted in the inability to increase engine power during the final approach. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, the airplane’s engine is highly susceptible to ice formation during a descent and the use of carburetor heat is recommended.
The pilot reported that he was making a personal flight and that he would buy fuel after arriving at the destination airport. While on final approach to land, the engine suddenly stopped producing power. The pilot stated that the fuel gauge showed about 4 gallons of fuel in the right tank (the fuel selector was set to the right-wing tank) and that the fuel boost pump was turned on. The pilot stated that the airplane was unable to maintain altitude and that he performed a forced landing to a field, during which the right wing and fuselage were substantially damaged.Postaccident engine test runs found that the engine performed normally through all power settings. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Although the weather conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to the accumulation of carburetor icing at glide power, the pilot reported that the carburetor heat temperature gauge indicated 60°F.The pilot reported that he had flown about 4 hours since last refueling the airplane and that the airplane had 19 gallons of fuel for the flight. According to these numbers, the airplane would have burned about 8.0 to 8.5 gallons of fuel per hour. As such, the airplane would have had enough fuel to complete the 76.5-nautical mile flight. Because the airplane had sufficient fuel to complete the flight and no mechanical issues were identified that would have precluded normal operation, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined based on the available evidence for this accident.Page 2 of 7 ERA22LA099
The pilot of the tailwheel equipped airplane reported that during the takeoff roll on snow-covered desert terrain, the airplane broke through the snow, and nosed over. The vertical stabilizer and rudder were substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The airplane was at a maintenance facility for an annual inspection, which had not been completed, and the airplane had not been returned to an airworthy condition. Despite this, the private pilot picked up his airplane from the maintenance facility to fly it to his base airport. While in the traffic pattern, the pilot lowered the main landing gear (MLG) but noted that the left MLG was not fully extended. The pilot attempted to manually extend the MLG to no avail and subsequently landed the airplane with the left MLG retracted.Postaccident examination of the left MLG revealed that the saddle assembly had fractured. The assembly was removed for metallurgical examination, which revealed that the saddle fracture surfaces exhibited features consistent with fatigue. An airworthiness directive (AD) required that the MLG saddles be inspected for cracks using the dye-penetrant procedure as part of the annual inspection. The mechanic who was conducting the annual inspection reported that he had not inspected the landing gear before the pilot took the airplane and that he had informed the pilot that the annual inspection was not complete and that he was not signing the airplane off as airworthy. It is likely that, if the AD had been complied with and the pilot had not taken the airplane before the annual inspection was complete, the preexisting crack would likely have been identified during the inspection of the MLG saddles.
The commercial pilot and private pilot-rated passenger departed on a local flight in day visual meteorological conditions and climbed to a peak altitude about 2,370 ft above ground level. The airplane then entered a gradual, wings-level descent during which it began to fly over a large lake. The airplane impacted the water and subsequently sank. The airplane was mostly intact and exhibited no evidence of mechanical failures or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Given the condition of the airplane, flight track, altitude data, and the proximity to land, it is likely that the pilot intentionally descended the airplane to low altitude over the lake. It is also likely that the lake exhibited a glassy surface due to low wind conditions about the time of the accident, which would have reduced depth perception and made it difficult for the pilot to judge the airplane's height above the water. Additionally, toxicology of the pilot revealed the presence of three different impairing medications. It is likely that he was experiencing combined adverse effects of these three central nervous system depressants, which contributed to his failure to maintain clearance from the water while performing low-altitude flight.