roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot stated that he listened to the airport’s automated weather station broadcast before taxi and, at that time, the surface wind was from 080° at 8 knots. However, while he taxied to runway 13 the airport’s windsock direction was consistent with a surface wind from the north-to-northeast. Before takeoff, he relistened to the airport’s automated weather station broadcast, which still reported the surface wind was from 080° at 8 knots. Believing the automated weather station report was accurate, the pilot continued with a takeoff on runway 13.The pilot stated the takeoff was conducted with 10° of flaps extended but recalled that the takeoff roll was longer than normal. He kept the control stick full aft and to the left (into the wind) during the initial takeoff roll. After the airplane accelerated to 60 mph, he pushed the control stick forward to raise the tail, but the airplane suddenly veered left and off the left side of the runway into a drainage ditch. The pilot was unable to regain directional control with a full right rudder input. During the runway excursion, the right main landing gear separated which resulted in substantial damage to both wings when they impacted the ground. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical failures or anomalies with the airplane that would have prevented normal operation.The pilot believes a left quartering tailwind may have contributed to his loss of directional control during takeoff. He also opined that the surface wind direction reported by the airport’s automated weather station was incorrect, which led him to believe using runway 13 was appropriate for the reported wind direction. A review of the airport’s automated weather station data revealed the reported surface wind direction was 080°-090° in the minutes before and after the accident. A postaccident weather model for the airport included an east-northeast surface wind (061°) at 4.5 knots. Based on the pilot’s windsock observation, the unintentional Page 2 of 6 CEN22LA389left veer during the takeoff roll was likely due to the pilot not maintaining directional control with a left quartering tailwind.
The pilot was participating in firefighting operations and reported seven water tank re-fills (scoops) from the lake from the accident location before he stopped to refuel. Upon returning for the eighth scoop, the wind had increased, and the lake surface conditions were rougher than before. The pilot found it difficult to fill the water tank in the rough surface conditions and decided to abort his scoop run early. He closed the water filling scoops while trying to keep the nose of the airplane straight. He added power and rudder and had not transitioned to flight when the nose veered uncontrollably, and the airplane rotated almost 180°. The floats separated from the airplane and the right wing struck the water and sustained substantial damaged. Examination of the airplane revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Damage signatures did not indicate the airplane hit an object in the water. Recorded data showed the propeller rpm decreased to zero over three seconds, followed by the airplane rotating 153° to the right. A weather report from a nearby airport showed gusty wind conditions and the terminal aerodrome forecast (TAF) predicted thunderstorms in the vicinity around the time of the accident.
A witness reported that he saw the accident airplane climbing after takeoff. He stated that the airplane was “going really slow” and that the engine was “sputtering.” The airplane appeared to be “floating in the air” before it “dipped” and came back up. The left wing dropped and the airplane rolled to the right and descended into the ground. The airplane sustained damage consistent with a nose-low impact with terrain. Examination of the airplane and engine did not reveal any mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The amount of fuel on board at the time of the accident could not be determined.  Recorded engine data showed a reduction in fuel flow prior to a reduction in engine speed toward the end of the recording. Changes in fuel flow during this period correlated to engine speed. Postaccident examination of the airplane fuel system revealed little residual fuel aboard and in enclosed components. The reduction of fuel flow prior to a decrease in engine speed and the lack of residual fuel in the airplane fuel system were consistent with fuel exhaustion but contradicted the recorded fuel available for undetermined reasons.The pilot had cardiovascular disease including severe coronary artery disease. This conveyed increased risk of a sudden impairing or incapacitating cardiac event such as abnormal heartbeat or heart attack. Such an event can cause chest pain, shortness of breath, palpitations, nausea, sweating, unconsciousness, and death. There is no autopsy evidence that such an event occurred, although such an event does not reliably leave autopsy evidence if it occurs just before death. Despite the risk it conveys, even severe coronary artery disease is often asymptomatic. This is partly because, as coronary artery narrowing by plaque progresses over time, diminishing blood flow to downstream heart muscle may be supplemented by increasing blood flow through collateral vessels. It is unlikely that the pilot’s cardiovascular disease contributed to the accident.Page 2 of 8 CEN22FA376
The pilot reported that the engine lost partial power when he adjusted the engine power while entering the downwind leg of the traffic pattern. The engine did not respond, so he cycled the throttle several times with no change. Unable to maintain altitude, he initiated a forced landing onto a freeway, during which the airplane impacted a freeway barrier and a postaccident fire ensued that resulted in substantial damage. The pilot further reported that he did not believe he turned on the auxiliary fuel pump switch before the accident.Examination of the airframe and engine revealed that the fuel supply line from the engine driven fuel pump to the fuel servo had a torsional twist near the engine driven fuel pump outlet port. The engine-driven fuel pump was removed and exhibited signatures consistent with a preexisting fuel leak at the case split, along with corrosion to the input drive seal area. The pump was tested utilizing a test bench, the fuel pump output pressure was found to be within manufacturer limits despite the preexisting leak and likely did not contribute to a loss of engine power. It could not be determined how much the kinked fuel line restricted the fuel flow to the fuel servo. Downloaded engine monitoring data showed that fuel flow was within the manufacturers specified limits, thus it’s likely that the twisted fuel line did not contribute to the loss of engine power. The loss of engine power could not be determined due to the available evidence.
The pilot reported that, while turning the airplane into the wind for an engine run-up, a gust of wind lifted the right wing, which caused the left wing to impact the pavement and the airplane to nose over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left outboard wing. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operations.
The pilot departed in the experimental airplane for a personal flight. A review of the onboard recorded data showed that shortly before the data terminated, the airplane went from a straight and level attitude to a nose-down attitude. A review of the recorded engine parameters did not show any signatures consistent with a loss of engine power. The airplane came to rest nose down, in a flat dirt field. The wreckage, which was destroyed, sustained fire damage. Postaccident examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe and the engine. No fire damage specifically related to an in-flight fire was found in the wreckage.The pilot purchased the airplane with a partner about 1 year before the accident. According to his logbook, he had flown the airplane 26.2 hours, of which 20.0 hours were with a flight instructor. Toxicological tests revealed ethanol was detected in lung, liver, kidney, and heart tissue samples along with N-propanol detected in lung tissue, kidney tissue, and heart tissue. Based on the pattern of toxicology results, some or all the ethanol detected in the pilot’s postmortem specimens likely was from sources other than ethanol consumption. Given the unclear accident circumstances, there was insufficient evidence to determine whether low-level ethanol effects may have contributed to the accident. The pilot’s autopsy was severely limited by the extent of the injuries sustained and therefore reduced the potential for determining if the pilot suffered from impairment or incapacitation due to medical reasons during the flight.Based on the available evidence, it is likely the airplane departed from controlled flight for unknown reasons, entered a nose-down attitude that was not recovered from, and the airplane impacted terrain. The reason for the loss of control in flight was undetermined.Page 2 of 9 CEN22FA375
The pilot reported that the landing gear retracted normally on takeoff; however, when he attempted to extend the landing gear in preparation for landing, the nosewheel extended and locked into place but the main landing gear did not fully extend. The pilot completed the checklist items for “landing gear emergency operation,” but the landing gear still did not fully extend and lock into place. Unable to extend the main landing gear, the pilot elected to accomplish the landing with the nosewheel extended and the main gear out of the wheel well, but not in the down-and-locked position. The pilot shut down the engine when the landing was assured to protect the engine. After the touchdown and during deceleration, the airplane rolled slightly to the left and the left elevator and horizontal stabilizer contacted the runway, which resulted in substantial damage.Postaccident examination of the hydraulic actuator revealed a fatigue crack that initiated along the retaining ring groove of the actuator. The crack propagated in a circumferential direction outward and once the fatigue crack grew to its terminal size, the remainder of the cross-section fractured from mixed overstress and fatigue. This led to part of the housing barrel fracturing in overstress, allowing the release of the internal pressurized hydraulic fluid.
The pilot reported that the off-field takeoff from sloping tundra, on top of a mesa, was uneventful. The left wing stalled in turbulent air, as the airplane was building airspeed to climb, and then the left wing struck the ground. The airplane cartwheeled onto the nose and came to rest about 200 yards downslope from the top of the mesa. The left wing, empennage, and fuselage sustained substantial damage. The pilot stated that there were no mechanical anomalies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operations.
The pilot decided to land during the personal sightseeing flight so the two passengers could switch seats. The pilot stated they were going to quickly change seats due to rain in the area, and his desire to keep the rain out of the cockpit. He stated he also briefed the passengers that, after exiting the airplane, they should walk aft and meet at the tail before coming back around and to watch out for the propeller. After parking, the pilot opened the canopy while the engine was still operating, and he proceeded to start the engine shutdown procedures per the checklist. During this time the front seat passenger exited the cockpit onto the right wing and proceeded to step off the front of the wing towards the propeller. While the pilot was completing the engine shutdown checklist, the passenger walked into the rotating propeller, resulting in a fatal injury. According to the rear seat passenger, the sequence of events transpired very quickly, and the pilot did not provide any briefing information regarding exiting the airplane after they landed.The airplane flight manual’s engine shutdown/starting procedures stated that the canopy must be closed and latched (or in an intermittent position to allow for cooling) during engine operation and that no persons should enter or exit the airplane while the engine was running. Given the pilot’s desire to keep the cockpit from getting wet due to the rain, the front seat passenger may have had the impression that she needed to quickly exit. It is likely that had the pilot provided more assertive commands to remain seated until advised to exit the airplane until after the engine had been shut down, consistent with the guidance in the airplane’s flight manual, the accident would have been avoided.Page 2 of 7 ERA22LA362
The glider was being air towed by an airplane. The glider pilot reported that, the takeoff roll and liftoff were normal, but halfway down the runway, he heard an “unfamiliar wind noise in the cockpit.” He lost sight of the tow airplane and pulled his tow release handle. The pilot attempted to land straight ahead but was unsuccessful in deploying the airbrakes. Subsequently, he turned right to land between a hanger and trees. During the forced landing in a grass field, the empennage section sustained substantial damage.The glider pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the glider that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot-rated passenger, who was accompanied by a commercial pilot, was performing the takeoff at near-maximum gross weight after purchasing the airplane. The pilot-rated passenger took off with 10° of flaps for “extra lift to get us away from the ground.” Both pilots reported that there was high terrain near the airport. The airplane lifted off with about 1,000 ft of runway remaining, climbed to about 100 ft above the runway, and then would no longer climb. The commercial pilot took control of the airplane and looked for a place to land. The stall warning horn sounded, so he lowered the nose to maintain flying airspeed. He maneuvered around some power lines, raised the flaps, and the airplane crashed onto a roadway. It came to rest on an embankment adjacent to the road and was substantially damaged. Postaccident examination of the wreckage, including a test run of the engine, revealed no evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or anomaly. The owner’s manual for the airplane stated that normal and obstacle clearance takeoffs should be performed with flaps up. Use of 10° flaps will shorten the takeoff roll; however, that advantage is lost in the climb to a 50-ft obstacle. The manual further notes that use of 10° flaps should only be used for takeoffs with minimum ground runs or soft/rough fields with no obstacles ahead.
The pilot reported that, following an aerial application on field, he was returning to a private [air]strip, when the engine began to run rough and lost power at an altitude of about 100 ft above ground level. The pilot initiated a forced landing to a wheat field, however, the airplane impacted terrain about 75 ft short of the field, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage.  The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.  The pilot added that carburetor ice “was not even considered at the time of power loss” and that the conditions favorable to carburetor ice were not taken into account. Carburetor heat was not used. Weather conditions reported at the time of the accident were conducive for serious carburetor icing at cruise power.
Delta Air Lines flight 1696 sustained a tailstrike while landing at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL), Atlanta, GA. The flight was a regularly scheduled domestic passenger flight from Fort Lauderdale, FL (FLL) to ATL. The airplane sustained substantial damage, and there were no injuries to the 203 passengers and crew onboard.  According to the flight crew, the captain was the pilot monitoring, and the first officer (FO) was the pilot flying. The captain reported that he was providing operational experience to the FO and that it was the FO’s first time landing the Boeing 757-200 model airplane. The airplane was in the landing configuration with flaps at 25 and on a stabilized approach at 1000 ft above ground level (AGL) on final approach to Runway 10 in night visual condition. After touchdown, the speed brakes deployed, and the FO reported that he applied too much aft pressure on the yoke causing the plane to lift back off the ground and the captain executed a “go-around” procedure. At this time the captain assumed the pilot flying role, and the airplane landed uneventfully. Both the captain and FO reported they had no indications of a tailstrike on the flight deck, they did not receive any passenger or flight attendant reports of any abnormalities and were unaware a tailstrike had occurred until the plane was inspected by maintenance later.
The private pilot of a predominately black and orange colored, tailwheel-equipped airplane (black airplane) reported that he was taxiing in the grass next to the turf runway 25 for departure. The taxi route required him to cross another converging turf runway 23. During the taxi, he did not make any radio calls on the airport common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) announcing that he was taxiing or crossing runway 23. The commercial pilot of a predominately red and white colored, tailwheel-equipped airplane (red airplane) that was based at the airport stated that he was departing runway 23, which was primarily used for glider operations but also was routinely used by powered airplanes when available based on runway conditions. He scanned ahead on runway 23 and after observing there was no conflicting traffic and not hearing any announcements from other aircraft, he broadcast his intent to depart from runway 23 on the CTAF. That transmission was heard by the pilot of the black airplane but at the time it did not register to him that the red airplane was departing from a converging runway, adding that he looked along runway 25 and expected to see the red airplane departing but he did not. The pilot of the red airplane reported that just after lifting off, the right wing of his airplane and the right wing of the black airplane collided; he never saw the other airplane. Following the collision, the red airplane impacted the ground and rolled onto its right side. The pilot of the black airplane, who was taxiing slowly, reported he heard a loud engine followed immediately by the sight of something hitting his right wings. Both airplanes sustained substantial damage to their wings during the collision. The pilots of both airplanes reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with their airplanes that would have precluded normal operation. Page 2 of 7 ERA22LA364According to the airport manager, the runway utilized by the pilot of the red airplane was specified in the airport facility directory to be for gliders only, though that was not strictly enforced.
The pilot reported that, during the return flight to the airport, the glider encountered a higher descent rate than he had expected and that the glider did not have sufficient altitude to reach the airport. During the forced landing into a corn field, the fuselage sustained substantial damage.
The pilot was on the return leg of a cross-country flight when the airplane’s engine lost power. He reported that he performed emergency procedures that included applying carburetor heat, switching the selected fuel tank from the left fuel tank to the right fuel tank, activating the electric fuel pump, and attempting to restart the engine. He noted that he made about 3 such attempts without success in restarting the engine. He landed on a road and the airplane’s right wing was substantially damaged when it impacted a road sign during rollout.Flight track data indicated that the airplane had been airborne on the round-trip flight for about 3 hours and 35 minutes. Postaccident examination revealed that the airplane’s left fuel tank was nearly empty, and the right tank contained about 10 gallons of fuel and 1-1/2 ounces of water. Examination of the engine revealed that the flexible tube from the heat shroud to the carburetor heat box was partially collapsed. The damage to the tube did not appear to be impact related and investigators were not able to establish when the collapse occurred. During the engine run the collapsed induction tube was reinstalled as-found following the accident. The engine started normally and ran smoothly; however, when the carburetor heat check was performed, the engine rpm reduced by 700 rpm, but returned to full rpm when the carburetor heat was turned off. No other anomalies were detected during the engine test run that would have precluded normal operations. During the second engine run the collapsed flexible tube was removed and the carburetor heat system performed as expected during the carburetor heat check. Based on the available information, the loss of engine power was likely due to fuel starvation. The collapsed induction hose only affected engine operation when carburetor heat was Page 2 of 7 CEN22LA377applied, so it would not have resulted in the initial power loss. However, the collapsed induction tube could have hampered the pilot’s attempts to restart the engine following the loss of power.