roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
Review of flight track data for the personal flight showed that the airplane flew on an easterly course for about 3 hours before the airplane’s altitude, heading, and groundspeed began to deviate. The airplane overflew the intended destination airport, circled several times, and impacted terrain about 600 ft short of a private airstrip about 16 nautical miles to the northeast of the intended airport. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no preimpact anomalies or malfunctions that would have precluded normal flight. The pilot stated that he had not eaten on the day of the accident, had consumed one beer before the accident flight, and had consumed additional alcoholic beverages in the airplane during the flight. The pilot recalled nothing from the last portion of the flight; however, evidence (open alcohol containers found in the wreckage) confirmed that he had consumed alcohol during the flight.Toxicology testing detected ethanol in the pilot’s blood at 0.172 gm/dL and his urine at 0.267 gm/dL. These concentrations were four to five times higher than the Federal Aviation Administration’s regulatory limit of 0.04 gm/dL; such concentrations would be impairing, and the pilot likely experienced degraded judgment and deficient coordination, psychomotor skills, perception, and attention. The airplane’s flightpath also demonstrated pilot impairment due to alcohol consumption before and during the flight. In addition, open alcohol containers were recovered in the wreckage, and the pilot admitted to consuming alcohol before and during the flight. The pilot likely experienced alcohol-related difficulties with cognitive and motor skills and was thus unable to safely manage the flight, resulting in a subsequent loss of airplane control. Page 2 of 6 ERA22LA213
According to the flight instructor, during the approach to landing the student pilot correctly flared and maintained pitch attitude and airspeed as the airplane touched down. When the tailwheel contacted the runway, the airplane immediately yawed to the left uncontrollably. The airplane ground looped, and the main landing gear collapsed before coming to a stop. Examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. An examination of the tailwheel steering linkage assembly revealed the castellated nut fitting fractured.
The flight instructor reported that her student was performing a normal visual approach and landing. After touchdown, the student had the proper wind correction added; however, she applied excessive left brake and the airplane veered “dramatically” to the left, into the grass. The airplane collided with a runway sign, resulting in damage to the fuselage and a collapsed nose landing gear. There were no injuries. An inspector with the Federal Aviation Administration examined the wreckage and determined that the damage to the fuselage was substantial. The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot stated that he completed a preflight inspection and engine run-up with no anomalies noted. During the initial climb after takeoff, immediately after retracting the landing gear, the pilot noticed white smoke from the engine cowling. A few seconds later, the engine “coughed loudly” and lost total power. The pilot landed the airplane on the remaining runway; however, the airplane exited the runway and collided with a runway light. resulting in substantial damage to the left wing and left aileron. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspectors completed an examination of the airplane and assisted the owner’s mechanics with removing the engine for transport. They discovered that the No. 1 cylinder was cracked around its circumference. They did not observe any other anomalies during the examination.Postaccident engine examination confirmed that the No. 1 cylinder head fractured near the rear spark plug on the exhaust side. The mechanic noted it was likely that during the accident takeoff, the cylinder head separated due to pre-ignition or detonation stresses, which no longer allowed the push rods to operate the valves and resulted in a loss of engine power. A recurring FAA airworthiness directive (AD) was applicable for this airplane and related to visual inspections to prevent cylinder head cracking. The AD was completed 164.7 flight hours before the accident and was due to be completed again in 85.3 hours.
The pilot reported that he departed with “just over half a tank of fuel in each tank,” which matched the indications on the fuel gauges. He reported that he decided not to “top off” the fuel tanks for the flight of about one hour and twenty-minutes as he had about 40 gallons of fuel on board. The pilot reported that the takeoff and en route portions of the flight were normal. As the airplane descended to 6,000 ft above mean seal level, and with the destination airport in sight, the engine lost power. The pilot “immediately pulled the yoke back to best glide,” selected a grass field for the landing, and began the engine out checklist. The pilot reported that he switched fuel tanks during the engine out procedure. After he completed the checklist twice, with no success at restarting the engine, he maneuvered the airplane and performed a forced landing to a field. During the forced landing, the nose gear collapsed, and the right wing sustained substantial damage.During a postaccident examination, no fuel was found in the right fuel tank and about 5.5 gallons of fuel was found in the left fuel tank (per the airframe manufacturer, 3 gallons in each fuel tank is classified as unusable). Both fuel tanks were found intact, along with the airframe and engine fuel lines. Both fuel tank caps appeared normal and were found installed properly. There was no evidence of a fuel leak or spillage on the airframe or at the accident site. There were no odors of fuel at the accident site. The fuel tank selector was found at the right fuel tank position. The fuel line to the fuel pressure regulator and the fuel injection distribution manifold was opened and there was no visible fuel found in the line.The investigation could not determine the amount of fuel onboard before the accident flight. Based on the available evidence, it is likely the engine lost power due to the low level of fuel available in the right fuel tank due to the pilot’s improper fuel management.Page 2 of 7 CEN22LA189
The pilot reported no difficulties during the flight or landing. While taxing the airplane after landing, the green right landing gear position indicator light extinguished, and the red gear handle light illuminated. The pilot glanced over to the circuit breaker panel and noted that the landing gear control circuit breaker had tripped. After parking the airplane for refueling, he notified his company maintenance control group about the issue and was advised to not reposition the airplane after refueling. The pilot waited about 20 minutes for weather to clear before exiting the airplane. As the pilot prepared to exit, the right main landing gear collapsed and the airplane’s right wing impacted the ground, resulting in substantial damage. Metallurgical examination of the separated fracture surface on the right landing gear drag leg support fitting revealed an area of fatigue in a machined radius adjacent to the center lug of the drag leg support. The remainder of the fracture exhibited features consistent with overload failure. An additional crack was found in the machined radius on the opposite side of the center lug. This portion of the part had not completely separated. Exposure of the crack revealed the existence of a fatigue crack in about the same area as the first crack, with overload signatures outside of the fatigue area.The airplane maintenance manual indicated that the subject part was to be cleaned and visually inspected at least every 7,500 cycles or every 5 years, whichever occurred first. Maintenance records indicated that the part had accumulated 762 cycles since the most recent inspection 23 months before the accident.After the accident, the operator examined the drag leg support fittings on their fleet of 9 other airplanes of the same model. Of the 18 fittings examined, 14 were found to be cracked. Of the Page 2 of 7 CEN22LA18814 cracked fittings, 11 could only be detected using dye penetrant inspection, and could not be detected solely by visual inspection.
The pilot reported that about 10 minutes after departure the engine sustained a partial loss of power. During the forced landing to a gravel road, the airplane’s left wing contacted a tree, which resulted in substantial damage.A postaccident engine test run was performed, and the engine would not produce rated power, so the fuel servo was removed for testing. Functional testing and examination of the fuel servo revealed that it would not deliver fuel to rated specifications due to a self-locking nut being stuck inside the top section of the plug. This resulted in the head idle spring not properly allowing fuel to flow through the ball valve.The engine and fuel servo had both surpassed the manufacturers’ established time between overhauls by 572 hours.
The experimental amateur-built airplane was flying in trail behind a group of two other airplanes. The takeoff appeared to be uneventful and the weather unremarkable. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated that, after climbing to about 1,850 ft above ground level (agl), the airplane leveled off and accelerated to cruise speed. About 1 minute later, the airplane appeared to aggressively pitch down, then up, then down again before the right wing separated from the airplane and the airplane descended to impact the terrain.Damage signatures indicated that the right wing initially folded downwards almost 90° before breaking away in an upwards direction, likely as the airplane rolled to the right.The pilot built the airplane from plans, and its primary fuselage structure was made of tubular steel covered in fabric. He used an unapproved welding process to construct the airframe and used thicker walled tubing to compensate. Postaccident examination of the wreckage showed the weld quality was generally poor, and a set of structural bracing components in the main wing spar carry-through section was omitted. Even with the poor build quality, the steel airframe structure appeared to be intact before impact. The omission of the braces alone would not have resulted in the failure of the wing as observed: however, the combined effect of the omission and modifications would have affected the overall structural integrity of the airplane.ADS-B data showed the airplane was traveling below the never exceed speed (Vne), but well over maneuvering speed (Va) at the time of the breakup; therefore, an aggressive control input would likely have resulted in structural damage. A negative failure of the right wing, as observed, could have been caused by a nose-down control input, and the ADS-B data indicated that the airplane had aggressively pitched down just before the breakup. The resolution of the Page 2 of 12 WPR22FA169ADS-B data did not allow for an accurate assessment of the g-forces encountered during the final oscillations.The airplane was equipped with dual controls including a center stick. The passenger, who was seated in the rear of the airplane had not flown with the pilot in the airplane before. The passenger’s seatbelt was not buckled when examined, and although it had sustained damage it still appeared to operate. The damage observed did not explain why it was unbuckled. If the passenger was unrestrained, inadvertent flight control operation could not be ruled out. Additionally, although friends stated that it was not in the pilot’s nature to take risks, his performance of an ostentatious maneuver just before the breakup could not be ruled out.
The pilot reported that, he initiated an approach to a private grass airstrip with a 5-knot tailwind. During the landing roll the airplane had limited brake effectiveness as the grass was wet. The airplane subsequently slid off the airstrip and collided with a fence. The right-side elevator was substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that during the flare of a crosswind landing, he was late to apply right rudder and the airplane landed left of centerline and continued off the left side of the runway. During the runway excursion, the airplane nosed over, and came to rest inverted in the grass, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing and rudder. The pilot reported that there were no pre-accident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that after departing from a loading truck for the aerial application flight, he turned into the wind, then initiated a right downwind turn. The helicopter lost airspeed and rotor rpm so the pilot lowered collective and the helicopter settled to the ground resulting in a hard landing. The tailboom and main rotor were substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
During a flight of an airplane after being rebuilt, the engine began to run rough when the airplane was about 150 ft above ground level. Witnesses observed the airplane make a steep left turn in a nose high attitude back toward the direction of the runway. The left wing subsequently dropped, and the airplane entered a rapid descent until it impacted the ground in a nose-low attitude. The airplane was largely consumed by a post-crash fire.  During a postaccident examination, there were no mechanical anomalies found that would have precluded normal operation. However, the extent of the post-crash fire prevented an examination of the fuel and ignition systems.When the temperature and dewpoint were plotted on a carburetor icing probability chart, the result was that the airplane was operating in conditions that were conducive to serious carburetor icing at glide power. The investigation was unable to determine if this contributed to the engine roughness.It is likely that the pilot exceeded the critical angle of attack for the airplane as he was returning to the airport to make a precautionary landing when the engine began running rough.
The pilot reported that the baggage door opened shortly after takeoff, so he decided to return for a landing.  The landing gear circuit breaker tripped when he attempted to extend the landing gear on downwind.  After resetting the circuit breaker, the landing gear extended normally, and the gear down light illuminated. Upon landing, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing.An examination of the landing gear determined the outer bearing brace failed which allowed the landing gear strut to separate from the trunnion.  Examination of the fracture surface revealed that the bearing failed as a result of overload. The overload failure of the landing gear bearing was consistent with a hard landing.
The pilot of the helicopter was performing aerial application operations and had sprayed one load early that morning, then returned for his second load. While on the ground, operations were halted because another company helicopter had crashed into the water they were conducting operations over. Following that accident, a safety briefing was held with the pilots, and they were instructed to maintain constant communications with the loader truck. They resumed spray operations and later that afternoon the pilot noted that it was difficult to judge his height above the water and advised another company pilot via radio of that fact. He further described that the water was “like a mirror,” which hampered his depth perception. Later that evening, during a final application pass while he was looking down at the GPS, the helicopter impacted the water. The helicopter’s fuselage, main, and tail rotor blades were substantially damaged during the impact. Following the accident the pilot indicated that there were no mechanical deficiencies of the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor was providing recurrent training to the operator’s pilots. During the first training flight of the day, a pilot who received instruction from the flight instructor described that the instructor told him to perform a vortex ring state (VRS) recovery maneuver, which the pilot accomplished, but shortly afterwards, the instructor requested that the pilot perform the maneuver again. During the second entry into VRS, the helicopter developed a very high descent rate, and the pilot was surprised when the flight instructor pilot did not intervene as the helicopter got deeper into the state. The pilot, feeling uncomfortable at that point, exited the very high descent rate on his own rather than waiting for further guidance from the instructor. The remainder of the first flight was uneventful. The second training flight of the day was the accident flight. A review of the recovered parametric data for this flight showed that the helicopter had been performing training maneuvers, and that shortly before the accident the helicopter was operating within the VRS envelope with a vertical descent rate between -800 to -1,300 feet per minute (fpm). This was consistent with the instructor directing the accident pilot to enter VRS for training purposes. Shortly thereafter, multiple abrupt control inputs were recorded, which including a forward cyclic input, followed by a nearly full-aft cyclic input within 1 second, as well as a concurrent full-down collective input with an increasing left pedal input. Based on contact signatures found on the helicopter’s main rotor blades and tailboom after the accident, it is likely that these abrupt control inputs resulted in the main rotor blades contacting the tail boom and the subsequent in-flight breakup of the helicopter. The parametric data and physical evidence observed during a postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any mechanical malfunctions or failures of the helicopter that would have precluded recovery from VRS. Based on this information, the reasons why the pilot(s) might have applied these abrupt Page 2 of 12 ERA22FA207control inputs could not be determined. Given the contextual commentary from the pilot of the previous training flight, it is likely the flight instructor did not provide adequate information to the accident pilot on how he would receive training for VRS, to include how they would identify, enter, and exit VRS.
The private pilot was taxiing through a private residential flying community on a taxiway that was bordered by residential homes and hangers when he came across an airplane off his right side, and a commercial forklift that was working on a hangar door to his left. The pilot maneuvered further left to avoid the airplane but struck the forklift with his left wing. The impact spun his airplane left into the bushes and resulted in substantial damage; it sheared off about 9 inches of the outboard wing and resulted in the left wing canting aft, further damaging the airframe. The pilot stated that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the helicopter departed the landing zone to conduct an aerial application flight over a lake. He stated that he established course on his spray line but “lost sight of everything looking forward due to the glare off the water and the sun position.” He recalled having no depth perception when he looked down at the water and could not recall the helicopter impacting the water but recalled a momentary shudder followed by the helicopter coming to rest inverted. The helicopter’s fuselage, main and tail rotor blades were substantially damaged during the impact. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures of the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot said his approach to land was unstabilized. When the airplane was about halfway down the 3,000 ft-long runway and about 150 ft above the ground, the flight instructor took control of the airplane, added full power and attempted to go-around. The instructor said he retracted 10 degrees of flaps once he thought the airplane established a positive rate of climb; however, the stall warning horn sounded. He lowered the nose of the airplane to gain airspeed, but the stall warning horn continued to sound. To avoid powerlines and trees located off the end of the runway, the flight instructor turned to execute a forced landing on a road. He fully retracted the flaps, and the airplane clipped the power lines and impacted the road. The private pilot, who was an aviation maintenance technician, said the engine was operating normally and that the airplane just did not have enough airspeed and altitude to clear the power lines.
The solo student pilot of the airplane reported that, during the landing flare, he pulled back on the control yoke too fast causing the airplane to momentarily climb. While correcting, the airplane touched down and bounced several times on the runway resulting in substantial damage to the forward fuselage. The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that almost immediately upon touching down with a slight left crosswind the airplane’s left wing dipped and “the ground loop began.” He then added power in an attempt to execute a go-around maneuver but was unable to regain control of the airplane. The airplane slid off the left side of the runway into a ditch resulting in substantial damage to the right wing.  The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot was executing a 180° turn at the approach end of the runway to begin takeoff when she saw a goose crossing the runway near her position. To avoid the goose she relaxed the turn, and the right main landing gear wheel rolled off the asphalt in an area with a 4-inch lip. The airplane then rolled down an embankment resulting in substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot was attempting to land on a 2,250-ft long uphill turf runway with a 7 knot tailwind. He reported that during the landing flare, his groundspeed was higher than expected for a normal touchdown point. The pilot did not perform a go-around as he was concerned about clearing power lines at the end of the runway. The airplane subsequently touched down, overran the departure end of the runway, and collided with a fence, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot added that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions with the airplane.
The accident airplane was part of an exhibition event, the goal of which was for two pilots to fly two similarly equipped airplanes in a vertical dive, after which they would simultaneously bail out and transfer to the other airplane. The pilot of one airplane was able to successfully transfer to the other airplane and land without incident, however, the other pilot could not enter the second airplane because it entered an inverted spin shortly after egress. The pilot reported that he believed the airplane entered a spin due to the ballast that was added to offset the weight of the safety pilot. He added that the airplane was outfitted with a parachute system that was designed to trigger at an altitude of 1,000 ft, and deployed while the airplane was inverted, which resulted in it only being partially deployed when the airplane impacted the ground and was substantially damaged.