roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot reported that during the takeoff, flight, and landing for a local routine helicopter patrol flight, he did not experience any turbulence nor did any of the flight controls reveal an indication that something was wrong. The pilot reported that during the postflight inspection, the vertical stabilizer was found bent downward away from the tail rotor. A postaccident examination of the vertical stabilizer revealed a fatigue crack that initiated at the aft end of the inboard skin at about the middle of the span. A stop-drill hole was present above the upper aft attachment hole, indicating that the vertical stabilizer was allowed to continue in service after a crack had been detected that extended about 1 1/4 inches from the aft edge of the inboard edge. The crack intersected the lower side of the stop-drill hole, and a fatigue crack reinitiated from the forward side of the stop-drill and continued to propagate towards the leading edge. The operator acquired the helicopter as US Army surplus. Since 2003, the US Army’s daily inspection checklist included inspection for cracks originating from the four attachment inserts on the inboard of the vertical stabilizer. The operator’s maintenance vendor was not aware of the US Army aviation safety action message for the daily inspection for cracks inboard of the vertical stabilizer. Had those daily inspections of the vertical fin attachment area been accomplished, these cracks would likely have been identified.
The sport pilot reported that, before departing on a cross-country flight, he contacted the flight service station for a weather briefing for his flight route. He then conducted a preflight inspection of the airplane, started it to allow it to warm up, and ran the carburetor heat before departing. The climb to cruise at 2,000 ft was normal. The pilot reported that, about 10 miles from the departure airport, the engine started to run "rough" and that he applied carburetor heat. When this did not have any effect on engine performance, he decided to return to the departure airport. He added that, during the return, the engine "power was very poor" and that the airplane was losing altitude rapidly. The pilot spotted a clear field nearby and performed a soft-field landing approach. Upon landing, the gear dug into the soft plowed field. The airplane continued forward on its belly, which resulted in substantial damage. The weather conditions were conducive to the accumulation of serious icing at any power setting. Although the pilot reported that he used carburetor heat, it is likely that the ice had already accumulated to the degree that the carburetor heat was insufficient to melt the ice and restore full engine power. An examination of the airplane and engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies.
The pilot reported that, while on a cross-country flight, he diverted from his destination to a nearby airport due to low fuel. He added that the right fuel tank "went dry" and that the engine lost power on downwind, so he switched to the left fuel tank, and the engine momentarily restarted before it experienced a total power loss of power on base. Subsequently, the airplane impacted the instrument landing system lights, which resulted in substantial damage to both wings.The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. He reported that he miscalculated the fuel and "ran out of gas." A postaccident examination found about 1 cup of fuel in one of the tanks.
The pilot receiving instruction reported that, during an annual insurance flight review, he was told to perform a short-field landing for the final landing. The flight instructor told him to be "50 ft. over the numbers at 75 KIAS [knots indicated airspeed], then go to flight idle, push the nose down, and land short." On short final, the pilot obtained the target altitude and airspeed, then reduced the power to flight idle, and the airplane dropped rapidly. He advanced the power lever, but the turbine-powered engine was slow to respond due to the spool-up lag, and the airplane landed hard and bounced. The pilot reported they taxied back to the hangar with no further incident.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage.The substantial damage was discovered later during a Federal Aviation Administration evaluation for repairs for a ferry permit. The ferry permit was submitted after receiving an engineering evaluation on the structure of the fuselage to allow the company to fly the airplane to a more appropriate repair station.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.The flight manual for the PA-46-350P states: "for a short field technique, flaps are to be full down, airspeed 78 KIAS, throttle as required. Once over the obstacle on final, throttle reduced to idle. After touchdown, brakes maximum."
The solo student pilot reported that, while on a cross-country flight, the weather deteriorated at the destination airport. He decided to complete a touch-and-go landing at an airport along the route and then return to the departure airport. The student pilot further reported that, when he began the flight back to his original point of departure, the airplane had about 3/4 tank of fuel remaining, and a headwind was present. About 10 to 15 nautical miles from the original departure airport, the fuel supply was exhausted, and the student pilot made a forced landing in a field. During the forced landing, the right wing struck a tree and was substantially damaged.The student pilot did not report any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The 64-year-old pilot, who was the airplane owner, departed on a local personal flight in the airplane about 45 minutes before the accident. Witnesses saw the airplane at 400-500 ft above ground level when it entered a descent, pitched up, rolled right, and then pitched nose down impacting the ground. Ground scarring surrounding the airplane was consistent with a near-vertical nose-down impact attitude, which resulted in the engine separating and coming to rest about 20 ft from the airframe. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. According to his pilot logbook, the pilot had not completed a flight review since 2012, and the pilot's last Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman medical certificate was issued in 2012. At the time of the accident, he was operating an airplane that required a medical certificate, but his certification was no longer valid. The pilot's personal medical records showed a history of a chronic progressive neurodegenerative disease beginning in 2011 with intermittent worsening of symptoms. The disease and its symptoms likely impaired his ability to safely operate the airplane. Toxicology testing of samples from the pilot detected ethanol at 0.070 gm/dl in vitreous and 0.038 g/dl in blood. Although blood levels of ethanol can change after death, the vitreous from an intact eye is not subject to significant postmortem changes. Therefore, it is likely the ethanol detected in blood and vitreous was from ingestion. The vitreous blood level was well above the FAA prohibited level of 0.04 gm/dl, and mild impairment has been shown at blood levels as low as 0.020 gm/dl. It is likely that the pilot was experiencing some level of impairment from alcohol ingestion and that the combination of the pilot's progressive degenerative neurologic condition and his use of alcohol impaired his ability to safely operate the airplane and contributed to the accident.  Page 2 of 8 CEN17FA046
The commercial pilot of the helicopter stated that the purpose of the flight was to transport a telecommunications technician to a cattle ranch on an island. After departing from the airport, while flying overwater, the pilot observed a snow squall with near-zero visibility and decided to return to the airport. On the return trip, while flying in a mountainous valley, another snow squall moved into the area. He stated that due to the deteriorating flight conditions, he conducted a precautionary landing to remote, snow-covered terrain to wait for improved flight conditions. Once the squall passed, he continued to the airport. Several minutes later, another snow squall arrived, and the pilot decided to conduct another precautionary landing. During the landing sequence, the main rotor system downwash resulted in whiteout conditions, and the pilot was unable to recognize any topographical features. The main rotor blades impacted terrain and the helicopter rolled onto its left side. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The airplane was equipped with an air sampling system used to collect air samples at various altitudes. The accident occurred when the pilot was returning to the airport after taking air samples at various altitudes over oil fields. As he was being vectored for an instrument approach, the airplane overshot the runway's extended centerline. The pilot then reported that he had a fire on board. The airplane lost altitude rapidly, and radar contact was lost. Examination of the accident site indicated that the airplane struck the ground at high velocity and a low impact angle.One piece of the airplane's shattered Plexiglas windshield exhibited soot streaking on its exterior surface. This soot streaking did not extend onto the piece's fracture surface, indicative of the smoke source being upstream of the windshield and the smoke exposure occurring before windshield breakup at impact.Both nose baggage compartment doors were found about 2 miles south of the main wreckage, which indicative that they came off at nearly the same time and most likely before the pilot's distress call. Although there was no soot deposits, thermal damage, or deformation to the doors consistent with a "high energy explosion," the separation of the luggage compartment doors could have occurred due to an overpressure caused by the ignition of a fuel air mixture within the nose portion of the airplane. The ignition of fuel air mixtures can create overpressure events when they occur in confinement. An overpressure in the nose baggage compartment may have stretched the airframe enough to allow the doors to push open without deforming the latches. If it was a lean fuel air mixture, it would likely leave no soot residue.Post-accident examination revealed no evidence that the air sampling system, which was strapped to the seat tracks behind the copilot's seat, was the cause of the fire. The combustion heater, which was mounted in the right front section of the nose baggage compartment, bore no evidence of fuel leakage, but a fuel fitting was found loose.Page 2 of 9 CEN17FA045
The pilot reported that, during the landing roll, he commanded reverse thrust and lightly applied brake pressure. While he was reaching for the condition levers to bring the propellers back to low rpm, the airplane suddenly veered to the right. The pilot applied left braking action and adjusted the engines to low rpm, but the airplane continued to veer toward the right side of the runway and a runway sign. The pilot reported that he could have either gotten more aggressive with the corrective actions and hope to avoid striking the sign, or allow the airplane to exit the runway onto what he thought was a hard, smooth surface. The pilot chose to exit the runway surface, and the airplane entered the runway safety area, which had a rock layer that consisted of river rock. The landing gear sunk deep into the rocks, which quickly slowed the airplane to a stop. Several rocks penetrated the fuselage, which resulted in substantial damage. A postaccident examination of the steering and brake system revealed no evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation.
The No. 1 engine experienced a catastrophic failure due to a separated high pressure turbine (HPT) 2nd stage blade. The separated blade subsequently damaged the HPT 2nd stage nozzle vanes, remaining HPT 2nd stage rotor blades, and all four stages of the low pressure turbine (LPT).Metallurgical analysis of the HPT 2nd stage blades that separated below the platform concluded that the first blade to separate failed due to a high cycle fatigue crack that originated from an area of corrosion on the convex side. Six additional blades separated below the blade platform at high cycle fatigue cracks that had transitioned to overload due to impact damage from the initial blade release. The remaining blades in the HPT 2nd stage separated above the blade platform due to overload consistent with secondary impact damage. Multiple blades that separated above the blade platform also had fatigue cracks present below the blade platform that originated from areas of corrosion. The corroded areas contained elements including: sulfur, sodium, potassium, and phosphorus, which are common corrosive elements. The source of the corrosive elements could not be identified.The engine water wash schedule was reviewed and according to GoJet Airlines, water washes are performed on their CF34-8C engines every 1,200 flight hours, or when engine trend data shows performance degradation. GE currently recommends water washing the engine at every -2A check, or about 1,600 flight hours. A GE service bulletin applicable to CF-348C engines is scheduled to be released in the first quarter of 2018 that increases the water wash interval to 2,000 flight hours or when engine trend data shows performance degradation.
The airline transport pilot was taxiing the airplane to the parking area and was concerned about an airplane parked on the left side of the taxilane. He maneuvered his airplane right of the taxiway centerline and struck a helicopter parked on the right side of the taxiway. Postincident investigation revealed that the taxilane object free area (TOFA) was 47.5 ft on either side of the taxilane centerline; Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airport design standards indicate that the TOFA should have been 57.5 ft on either side of the centerline. Although the parked airplane was within the TOFA, sufficient distance between the airplane and the helicopter remained such that the incident airplane could have taxied safely between them.
The solo student pilot reported that, during landing, "the airplane bounced a couple times," and the propeller struck the runway. He then taxied to the ramp without further incident. During a postaccident examination, substantial damage was found to the engine mounts and fuselage.The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot was giving a ride to the passenger and was relocating the airplane to a nearby private airstrip for overnight parking. Witnesses located near the airstrip observed the airplane touch down about midfield on the southwest runway while traveling at a high rate of speed. According to the witnesses, the wind was from the east-northeast at 15 to 20 miles per hour, which was a downwind condition for the landing. The pilot performed a go-around, and the airplane pitched upward and banked steeply to the right. The pilot executed a 180° turn to parallel the runway and leveled off at an altitude of about 100 to 150 ft above ground level. Shortly thereafter, the airplane entered a steep right turn toward the runway, and the witnesses lost sight of it.Examination of the accident site indicated that the airplane impacted terrain in a near vertical attitude about 600 ft short of the approach end of the dirt runway. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. The witness observations of the pilot's steep turns and the airplane's near-vertical impact with terrain are consistent with the pilot failing to maintain adequate airspeed while maneuvering aggressively in the traffic pattern, resulting in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall.The pilot's autopsy results revealed that he had coronary artery disease without evidence of an old or new heart attack. Although this condition placed the pilot at increased risk for a cardiovascular event, there was no evidence that the pilot's coronary artery disease impaired the pilot or contributed to the accident as he was actively maneuvering the airplane up until the stall. Toxicology tests revealed that the pilot had therapeutic levels of the antidepressant sertraline in has blood at the time of the accident. However, sertraline is not known to cause impairment, and it is unlikely that the effects of sertraline impaired the pilot. In addition, the tests revealed that the pilot had a blood level of the antidepressant trazodone well below therapeutic levels, making it unlikely that the effects of trazadone impaired the pilot.Review of the pilot's personal medical records revealed that he had major depression that was not Page 2 of 9 WPR17FA029adequately controlled. This condition is associated with significant cognitive degradation, particularly in executive functioning. Cognitive degradation may not improve even with treatment and remission of the depressed episode, and patients with severe disease are more significantly affected than those with fewer symptoms or episodes.Although the pilot likely had the skill and experience necessary to safely conduct the flight, he demonstrated poor decision-making and executive function when he decided to attempt a landing with a significant tailwind and elected to maneuver aggressively in the traffic pattern while attempting to perform a go-around and a subsequent landing attempt. It is likely that the pilot's inadequately controlled depression impaired his decision-making and contributed to the accident.
The commercial pilot reported that, during cruise flight, he noticed the oil pressure begin to fluctuate and he decided to return to the departure airport. As the airplane neared the airport, the engine experienced a total loss of power, and the pilot initiated an off-airport forced landing. During the landing roll, the airplane struck two dirt berms and the nose landing gear collapsed. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the connecting rods, pistons, piston pins, bearings, and bushings in cylinder Nos. 5 and 6 exhibited numerous fractures and severe deformation. Due to the widespread postfracture damage to many of the fracture surfaces, it was not possible to determine which component fractured first. The No. 5 cylinder connecting rod and cap were severely deformed and battered. The piston pin had fractured in multiple places, and the underside of the piston exhibited gouging consistent with impact from adjacent components. In addition, the skirt and pin boss of the piston had fractured in multiple locations. The features on these fracture surfaces were generally consistent with having fractured in and around the pin boss; therefore, the likely initial point of failure in cylinder No. 5 was either the piston pin boss, the piston pin, or the pin side of the connecting rod. Based on the degree of damage observed, the components in the No. 5 cylinder likely began to fracture first, followed by fractures in the No. 6 cylinder.
The commercial pilot was conducting an on-demand passenger flight at night in instrument meteorological conditions that were at/near straight-in approach minimums for the runway. The pilot flew the approach as a nonprecision LNAV approach, and he reported that the approach was stabilized and that he did not notice anything unusual. A few seconds after leveling the airplane at the missed approach altitude, he saw the runway end lights, the strobe lights, and the precision approach path indicator. He then disconnected the autopilot and took his hand off the throttles to turn on the landing lights. However, before he could turn on the landing lights, the runway became obscured by clouds. The pilot immediately decided to conduct a missed approach and applied engine power, but the airplane subsequently impacted terrain short of the runway in a nose-up level attitude. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical anomalies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely the pilot lost sight of the runway due to the visibility being at/near the straight-in approach minimums and that the airplane got too low for a missed approach, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.A passenger stated that he and the pilot were not wearing available shoulder harnesses. The passenger said that he was not informed that the airplane was equipped with shoulder harnesses or told how to adjust the seats. The pilot sustained injuries to his face in the accident.
The student pilot reported that he inadvertently pressed down on the right brake during the landing roll. The airplane veered off the runway to the right into soft grass and nosed over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing lift strut and empennage. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that the takeoff was "normal" until about 200 ft above ground level, when the engine "suddenly stopped completely." Her efforts to restore engine power were not successful, and she executed a forced landing straight ahead. The airplane touched down "hard" in a pasture off the end of the runway and impacted a row of trees before coming to a stop. A witness that responded to the accident site stated that the fuel selector was in the off position. A responding law enforcement officer stated that both the pilot and passenger independently informed him that they believed the fuel selector was in the "wrong" position during takeoff. A postrecovery examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction; therefore, it is likely that the engine experienced a total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation.
The pilot of the tailwheel equipped airplane reported that during the 3-point landing, the airplane drifted to the left and he applied right correction. He further reported that he "obviously over corrected" because the airplane went to the right and he was unable to correct with left rudder and brake. The airplane exited the runway and impacted trees. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot reported as a safety recommendation that he should have conducted a wheel landing to provide more directional control during the landing roll.
The airline transport pilot stated that he performed a routine preflight inspection of the airplane, which included checking the landing gear tire pressure, and he observed no anomalies. He then departed on a local flight before returning to land. The pilot stated that, during the landing roll, the airplane began to veer to the left. He tried using the right rudder and brake to correct, but the airplane traveled off the runway surface and nosed over, resulting in substantial damage to both wings, the firewall, and the horizontal stabilizer. After exiting the airplane, he noticed that the left main landing gear tire was flat. A mechanic removed the tire's tube and it was lacerated in 3 places.