roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The commercial pilot was conducting a long cross-country flight. There was no record that he received a weather briefing from an official source, and he did not file a flight plan before departing. The pilot completed the first leg of the trip uneventfully and purchased fuel at an intermediate stop. During the second leg, about 30 minutes after takeoff and over a period of about 20 minutes, the airplane climbed from 3,400 ft mean sea level (msl) to 7,100 ft msl. It then made two left, 360° turns, followed by a rapid descent to 1,400 ft msl. During the next approximate hour, the target flew east at alternating altitudes below 2,500 ft msl, before turning south, flying s-turns and descending to 1,400 ft. The target proceeded south at 1,100 ft msl until about 10 minutes before the accident, when it flew near a cold front boundary. After that, the airplane completed numerous course deviations, including three complete left 360° and two right 360 turns; the last recorded radar return was about 0.4 mile east of the accident site at an altitude of 450 ft msl. The recorded weather near the accident site about the time of the accident included 10 miles visibility and an overcast ceiling at 600 ft. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.Although the pilot held an instrument rating, his most recent simulated instrument experience was about 11 months before the accident and his most recent actual instrument experience was more than 2 years before the accident. The dark night, restricted visibility conditions, and the pilot's extensive maneuvering in the last 10 minutes of flight, coinciding with the frontal boundary, provided conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The final path of the airplane in a direction opposite the last radar returns and the airplane's steep impact angle are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation and a subsequent loss of control.
The pilot was conducting a personal flight with a passenger. He indicated that after an uneventful flight, he performed a pattern approach to the runway for a touch-and-go landing. After touchdown, when the pilot lowered the left wheel to the ground, the airplane immediately and uncontrollably veered sharply to the left. The pilot applied full right rudder and immediately held the stick full right and aft to keep the airplane from ground looping or cartwheeling. The pilot was unable to regain directional control of the airplane, and it departed the runway to the left and collided with two precision approach path indicator lights before coming to a stop. Braking marks on the runway and grass correlated to the left main landing gear tire as it passed from the runway surface onto the grass. Postaccident examination did not reveal any anomalies with the left brake system. After the brake examination, the pilot stated that the passenger could have inadvertently had his foot on the brake pedal during the landing rollout. Because the examination did not reveal any anomalies with the brakes, it is likely that the passenger inadvertently activated the left brake pedal during the landing.
The student pilot reported that, during landing, the airplane bounced hard. She added power to go around, and as the airplane became airborne, it began to drift to the left. The airplane aerodynamically stalled, impacted terrain, and collided with a golf cart adjacent to the runway, which was occupied by the student pilot's flight instructor.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing.The chief pilot of the flight school reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.A review of recorded data from the automated weather observation station located on the airport revealed that, about 4 minutes before the accident, the wind was from 080° at 6 knots. The airplane landed on runway 33.
The flight instructor and private pilot were conducting an instructional flight when the private pilot made a hard landing and the airplane bounced. The flight instructor heard a "snapping" sound during the landing and subsequently took over the flight controls. He increased engine power to compensate for the bounced landing then landed the airplane on the runway. Upon touchdown, the left landing gear collapsed up and aft. The airplane continued forward on its nose and left wing, then departed the left side of the runway. The left landing gear through bolt was found fractured. A metallurgical examination of the landing gear through bolt fracture revealed two opposing regions of fatigue comprising 80-90% of the cross-sectional area of the bolt. These were separated by a narrow region of overstress, consistent with reverse bending fatigue crack propagation, which likely grew under low stress as evidenced by the length of the fatigue cracks.The airplane was subject to a manufacturer service letter for inspection of the landing gear through bolts due to previous instances of cracking and failure. The service letter recommended that the inspections be performed on or before the next 100-hour inspection and at 100-hour intervals thereafter, and at more frequent intervals if the aircraft is used in soft or rough runway operations. The owner of the airplane was unaware of the service letter and stated that the airplane had not received the recommended inspection. Although not required, it is likely that had the service letter been complied with and the through bolt been regularly inspected, the fatigued bolt would have been replaced and the accident would have been prevented.
The flight instructor stated that the student pilot was performing a takeoff while the flight instructor gently held the control wheel with both hands. The student pilot had his left hand on the control wheel and his right hand on the throttle as the airplane accelerated down the runway. When the airspeed reached 65 knots, the student pilot initiated a climb, but the airplane began to pull to the left; this airplane has an inherent tendency to turn left during takeoff. The flight instructor tried to take control of the airplane, but the student pilot continued to hold the control wheel and throttle. The flight instructor had good aileron and elevator control as he tried to maneuver away from the approaching hangars and maintain airspeed; however, he could not recall if the rudder pedals moved when he pushed them. The airplane continued left, touched down momentarily, then bounced back in the air. The flight instructor realized the airplane was not going to clear the hangars, so he shut off the engine with the mixture control. The airplane struck a hangar with the left wing, pivoted, and struck another hangar with its right wing before coming to a stop; the airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, the fuselage, and the empennage. The student pilot stated that he remembered adding full power to takeoff and then initiating a climb at 70 knots. He did not remember what happened after that except that they had “no rudder control” and could not maintain the runway centerline.Postaccident examination of the airplane’s flight controls revealed continuity for each control, including the rudder, and no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions were identified that would have precluded normal operation. Because the flight instructor did not recall if the rudder pedals moved when he tried to press on them and the student pilot never let go of the throttle or control wheel, the student pilot likely had his feet on the rudder pedals, which impeded the instructor from taking full control of the airplane and resulted in the loss of control.Page 2 of 7 ERA18LA054
According to the pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane, his intent was to perform a wheel landing, but during touchdown, the airplane bounced and a gust of wind lifted the left wing. The pilot applied left stick and right rudder to maintain directional control. The left wing settled, the nose of the airplane yawed to the right, and the tailwheel settled to the runway. The pilot applied aft stick and left rudder, but the left wing lifted again, and the nose yawed to the left. The right wing struck the ground and the airplane exited the runway to the left, where the right main landing gear collapsed. The airplane came to rest on the right wingtip and began leaking fuel.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right-wing.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
During a simulated single-engine instrument approach in a multi-engine airplane, the flight instructor, who was seated in the right seat, told the multi-engine rated pilot receiving instruction, who was seated in the left seat, to go around. The pilot applied full power to the right engine and attempted to fly the pattern with a simulated left engine failure. Shortly after, while the airplane was in a left crosswind turn, the left engine lost total power. The instructor observed that the left propeller was stationary and took control of the airplane. The instructor chose to fly at minimum controllable speed (Vmc) rather than the recommended best single-engine rate of climb speed (Vyse) and attempted to restart the failed engine rather than perform the airplane manufacturer's approved engine-out procedures. Unable to restart the left engine, he attempted to maneuver the airplane for a landing but was unable and flew toward rising terrain. Approaching a residential area, the instructor maneuvered the airplane to avoid a house, and the airplane subsequently impacted trees, fell to the ground, and came to rest on top of an automobile. The instructor stated that after the accident, he returned to the airplane to shut off the fuel and electrics when he noticed the left fuel selector was between the on and off position. A postaccident examination revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. However, a lack of fuel was observed in the left engine's fuel system forward of the fuel injection servo.Based on the observed intermediate position of the left fuel selector after the accident, the lack of fuel in the fuel system forward of the fuel injection servo, and the lack of mechanical malfunctions or failures noted during the wreckage examination, it is likely that the left engine lost total power due to fuel starvation. The manufacturer's approved procedures for an engine failure during takeoff included, among other things, maintaining a best rate of climb airspeed. A review of the manufacturer's pilot's operating manual indicated that even with a total loss of engine power on the left engine, the airplane would have been able to climb about 520 ft per minute had the required pilot inputs been made. The instructor failed Page 2 of 9 ANC18LA016to comply with the published engine-out procedures and recommended airspeeds, which led to the lack of directional control, collision with trees, and impact with the ground.
The private pilot was going to perform a local flight for the first time after an overhauled engine was installed on the airplane. During engine ground operations, no leaks were noted, and the engine operated normally. After takeoff, the pilot flew the airplane around the airport traffic pattern and accomplished a touch-and-go landing. During the climbout, at 400 to 500 ft above ground level, the engine lost total power. The pilot conducted a forced landing to a field. During the landing roll, the airplane's left wing struck a metal fence post, which resulted in substantial damage to the airplane.A postaccident examination revealed that the inlet tee fitting on the throttle body/fuel metering unit was missing a cap fitting, which was subsequently found between the Nos. 3 and 5 cylinders. After the cap fitting was reinstalled, the engine was restarted and ran normally. The mechanic who installed the overhauled engine stated that the cap fitting was in its proper place during the installation of the engine and that he had not disturbed the cap fitting during the maintenance that was performed before the maintenance check flight. The repair station's quality control manager reported that an inspector checked all of the engine fittings to verify that they were secure. During the engine test run, the tee fitting was not disturbed because it was not used to attach the gauge for the fuel system checks, and the engine met all performance objectives of the test run. The engine experienced a total loss of power due to fuel starvation when the cap fitting came off the inlet tee fitting on the throttle body/fuel metering unit. However, the available evidence was not sufficient to determine how the cap fitting became loose and displaced from its installed location.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, while landing on an unimproved snow-covered airstrip, the left main tire dug into snow, and the airplane veered left. Subsequently, the airplane sank in the softer snow off the left side of the airstrip and nosed over.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The airplane pilot reported that, while taxiing from the runway to his tie-down space, he was taxiing "into the sun." He added that, before he could react, he struck the tail of another airplane, which was stopped on the taxiway.The pilot of the stopped airplane reported to the Federal Aviation Administration inspector that he was planning to depart and had stopped on the taxiway to put on his seat belt when his airplane was struck from behind.The taxiing airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing lift strut; the stopped airplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage.Both pilots reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with their airplanes that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot said he was flying the RNAV GPS runway 36 approach in 3 miles visibility and that the wind was from 070° at 9 knots. He sighted the runway at 50 ft above the missed approach point. He said the airplane was slightly right of the runway centerline and that there was a right crosswind. When the right main landing gear (MLG) contacted the runway, it collapsed. The airplane then exited the right side of the runway onto the grass median about 1,000 ft from the end of the runway, and the airplane then came to a stop and the right main landing gear (MLG) to collapse. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane had landed hard, which resulted in the right MLG collapsing. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have resulted in the landing gear collapse.
On December 17, 2017, about 2345 central standard time, SkyWest flight 5788, an Embraer ERJ700, N128SY, experienced a sudden pitch correction during descent into St. Louis International Airport (STL), St Louis, Missouri. Of the 57 passengers and crew onboard, one flight attendant was seriously injured.  The airplane was not damaged. The flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a regularly scheduled domestic passenger flight from San Francisco International Airport (SFO) to STL.According to the flight crew, the captain was the pilot monitoring and the first officer (FO) was the pilot flying and was on his second day of initial operating experience (IOE). The air was smooth with no turbulence. Air traffic control requested the flight give its "best forward speed" and cleared it direct to the airport. The crew discussed and planned the descent and after entering the data into the flight management system (FMS), noticed they were past the top of descent point for the 3-degree descent path they had entered. As a result, the captain had the FO select flight level change and the descent rate briefly exceeded 5,000 feet/minute and the airspeed increased. To prevent an overspeed condition, the captain instructed the FO to deploy the speed brakes, but the speed continued to increase, so the captain disconnected the autopilot and pitched the nose up.At the time of the unexpected pitch input, the rear flight attendant (FA) was preparing the galley for landing and was thrown off-balance onto the floor, causing her to twist her ankle.  Medically qualified passengers assisted the FA until landing.  After landing, the FA was transported to the hospital where she was diagnosed with an ankle fracture.
The noninstrument-rated private pilot and the passenger, who held a student pilot certificate, departed on a night cross-country flight.  The pilot was not in communication with air traffic control during the accident flight; however, a review of radar information revealed a flight track that correlated with the accident flight. The airplane approached it's destination from the north/northwest, making several turns, including circles, along its route of flight, before the target disappeared from radar near the accident location. Witnesses near the accident site stated that the visibility was poor and that it was foggy at the time of the accident. A review of weather conditions revealed instrument meteorological conditions at the accident site, and at the destination airport. A further review of weather conditions for the time the flight originated from its departure airport, and an hour before departure time, revealed similar instrument weather conditions near the accident site and destination airport. There was no record that the pilot received a preflight weather briefing for the planned flight.Although examination of the airplane was limited by impact damage, no pre-impact abnormalities were noted with the airframe or engine. The accident is consistent with the noninstrument-rated pilot's flight into known instrument meteorological conditions and subsequent collision with terrain.
According to the pilot of the experimental amateur-built gyroplane, he landed on a taxiway and taxied to the runway intersection. The intersection was on the right side of runway 30R. The ramp where the pilot wanted to park, was across both runways, on the left side of runway 30L.Unfamiliar with the capabilities of the gyroplane, the tower controller asked the pilot to air taxi to the ramp. The pilot informed the tower controller that he could either ground taxi or takeoff and land on runway 30L then taxi to the ramp. The controller and the pilot agreed to the latter. The pilot further reported that, in anticipation of taxiing to parking, he had allowed the gyroplane's rotor speed to decrease; when he turned the gyroplane back onto the taxiway in the gusting wind, the main rotor struck the empennage and the pusher-propeller. The gyroplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage and rotor system.The METAR at the accident airport reported that about the time of the accident, the wind was from 330° at 14 kts and gusting to 19 kts.The pilot reported that this accident could have been prevented if he had waited for the rotor blades to stop completely before repositioning the gyroplane for taxi. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the gyroplane that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the pilot of the tailwheel-equipped, experimental airplane, the airplane bounced to the left side of the runway during the takeoff roll. He thought that the airplane would "straighten itself out"; however, the airplane's tail lifted, and the airplane continued to the left. The left main landing gear impacted a snowbank, and the airplane exited the left side of the runway. The airplane came to rest in the safety area.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage.The METAR at the accident airport reported that about the time of the accident, the wind was variable at 4kts and the sky was clear. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot was performing hover-taxi maneuvers in the experimental amateur-built helicopter when the engine lost all power, which resulted in a forced landing in a field during which the airplane landed hard. Postaccident examination revealed that the engine had seized due to oil exhaustion after the oil pressure gauge line had failed, causing most of the engine oil to be expelled overboard with an insufficient quantity of oil in the sump for engine operation.The pilot, who was also the helicopter builder, had installed the oil pressure gauge line, which was made of automotive-grade nylon tubing, about 1 year before the accident. Because the helicopter had an experimental airworthiness certificate and was considered to be an amateur-built aircraft, the pilot could use non-aviation grade components. The pilot discarded the oil line before it could be examined, so its failure mode could not be determined.
The private pilot was conducting a cross-country flight. He reported that the takeoff was normal and that, shortly after takeoff, the engine experienced a sudden loss of all power. The pilot banked the airplane to return to the airport but determined that the airplane would be unable to reach the airport. Subsequently, the pilot initiated an off-airport landing to a parking lot, where the airplane landed hard and slid into an embankment near a fence. A postimpact fire ensued.A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine found that the fuel manifold valve had thermal discoloration of its housing. The valve was disassembled, and the plunger internal parts (the collar, valve, and spring) were found separated in the plunger cavity. The plunger internal parts likely did not separate during flight; such a condition would have resulted in a rich-running engine, which would not have caused a significant loss of engine power and would have been revealed as a sooty residue on the spark plug electrode areas. The examination of the spark plugs revealed light amounts of deposits, consistent with normal fuel-air mixture and operation. Thus, the separation of the plunger internal parts was consistent with thermal exposure during the postimpact fire.The melted plastic material found in the fuel selector valve cavity during the disassembly was likely the material that made up the internal control shaft. The throttle control rod end remained secured to the throttle control arm, but the rod end could slide about ½ inch along the bolt that attached the rod end to the control arm. It is unlikely that this movement caused the loss of power during flight given that the pilot did not report an engine control problem.The examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded continued flight and caused the loss of engine power.Page 2 of 9 WPR18LA049