roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The private pilot began flight training in 1996 and had accrued about 187 total hours of flight experience by 2012, mostly in low-performance Cessna and Piper airplanes. The pilot then ceased flying until mid-2016, when he purchased the previously-owned experimental amateur-built, high-performance accident airplane.In late 2016, when he had accrued about 31 hours of flight experience in the airplane, the pilot and a non-pilot rated passenger departed for a local personal flight. Weather conditions were benign, with light winds, clear skies, and moderate temperature. According to multiple witnesses, some of whom were pilots, the airplane entered a steep climb at some point after it lifted off.  The airplane then began a sharp right turn while continuing to climb rapidly. Shortly thereafter, the airplane entered a steep descent and impacted marshy terrain about 900 ft to the northeast of the departure end of the runway.A flight path reconstructed from data recovered from an onboard GPS device indicated a trajectory that was similar to that indicated by the witness accounts. GPS-derived comparison of the profile of the accident takeoff with those of seven of the pilot's other takeoffs in the airplane from the accident airport revealed that five of the other seven takeoff profiles were similar to one another, and that the accident takeoff profile was markedly different from those five. During the accident takeoff, the airplane remained on or near the ground about 25 seconds longer than it did during those five other takeoffs, and then climbed at a rate that was about twice the rates of those five takeoffs. The other two takeoffs exhibited ground or near-ground travel durations of about 40 seconds, with climb rates similar to those of the other five takeoffs.Postaccident examination of the engine and airframe did not reveal evidence of any pre-impact mechanical deficiencies or failures that would have precluded normal operation, and the damage was consistent with the engine developing at least moderate power at impact. The airplane was equipped with dual flight controls, but the investigation was unable to determine who was manipulating the controls for the takeoff and flight. The relative sizes of the two occupants were not consistent with the Page 2 of 11 WPR17FA041passenger being able to overpower the pilot on the flight controls. The takeoff profile was consistent with an aggressive, more exciting technique sometimes referred to as a "high-performance" or "zoom climb" takeoff. The investigation was unable to determine the reason for this takeoff profile that was uncharacteristic from previous departures. The investigation was also unable to determine the reason(s) for the right turn/roll and departure from controlled flight.
According to the flight instructor who observed the student pilot's first solo flight from the ground, the airplane landed hard and porpoised due to the student pilot's improper flare. A postaccident examination revealed the airplane had sustained substantial damage to the aileron and elevator systems and the firewall.The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot was concluding a local flight in the tailwheel-equipped airplane. After numerous uneventful touch-and-go landings, the pilot attempted a full-stop landing when the airplane suddenly swerved to the left shortly after touchdown. The pilot attempted to regain directional control by applying right rudder and increasing engine power for an aborted landing; however, the airplane swerved to the right and collided with a snowbank next to the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both main wing spars and the rudder.A postaccident examination revealed that the left wheel brake torque plate had separated from the landing gear axle endplate, which allowed the brake assembly to rotate with the brake disk that was attached to the wheel. The airplane had been modified with Cleveland wheels and brakes through a supplemental type certificate (STC). However, additional examination of the brake torque plates revealed that they had not been installed in accordance with the STC installation instructions. Specifically, the torque plates were not modified with two 0.25-inch holes that were required to ensure proper alignment with the landing gear axle endplate, and improperly sized bushings had been used during the installation. The improper torque plate installation allowed for movement of the torque plate and unintended transverse loading of the anchor bolts, which resulted in the fracture of the anchor bolts that secured the left brake torque plate to the axle endplate. The failure of the left brake likely caused the loss of directional control during landing.
The solo student pilot reported that, during the initial landing, the airplane bounced. During a subsequent touchdown, the nose gear impacted the runway with a side load, and the nose gear collapsed. The airplane slid to a stop in a nose-down attitude on the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the firewall.The student pilot reported there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot stated that he had experienced engine roughness during previous flights in the accident airplane. Maintenance personnel determined that the airplane was not receiving adequate fuel at full power, even with both electric fuel pumps operating. As a result, they installed check valves in the fuel system and replaced the fuel pressure regulator. On the day of the accident, the engine experienced a total loss of power after both fuel pumps were turned off during a pre-takeoff engine run-up. The pilot and mechanic then performed another run-up check, during which the engine operated normally. The pilot subsequently departed and entered the airport traffic pattern. While on the downwind leg, with both fuel pumps operating, the pilot reduced engine power and the engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot performed a forced landing to a field, during which the nose landing gear collapsed. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the fuel pressure and airbox pressure differential was not within the engine manufacturer's limits. The fuel pressure regulator was adjusted within those limits, and the engine was subsequently test run with no anomalies.
The noncertificated pilot reported that, while he was taxiing to test the brakes, the airplane slid to the right, impacted a snowbank, and nosed over. He added that "this was not a flight, takeoff or landing. Simply went off [the] runway during a taxi test of [the] brakes." However, in a statement provided by the Sheriff's office to the Federal Aviation Administration, the pilot stated that he was low on fuel and that, after he landed, he hit a snowdrift and nosed over. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight. The pilot reported that, after takeoff, he switched to the left fuel tank for the cruise portion of the flight. He added that, about 5 miles from the destination airport, he completed the Before Landing checklist; however, he "failed to position the fuel selector to [the] both" position at that time, which "set the stage for fuel exhaustion." The engine subsequently lost power. He checked the fuel selector, found that it was still set to the left tank, and moved it to the right tank. He subsequently executed a forced landing to an open area at the base of a hill, during which the airplane impacted a fence and sustained substantial damage to the firewall and right wing. The pilot stated that no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane preceded the accident. The pilot's failure to move the fuel selector handle to the "both" position in accordance with the Before Landing checklist resulted in the loss of engine power due to fuel starvation.
The pilot reported that, while on final approach to runway 31, the airplane flew through windy conditions and a "severe down wind shear." He said that the wind "drove" the airplane into the runway, and the airplane bounced a couple times. The left main landing gear contacted the snow and the airplane exited the runway, which resulted in substantial damage to the lower fuselage. The pilot indicated that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane. About 20 minutes before the accident, the recorded wind at the airport was 260° at 11 kts, gusting to 19 kts.
During recovery from a simulated engine failure during an instructional flight, the flight instructor and student pilot smelled and then saw smoke in the cockpit. The instructor took the flight controls, chose a forced landing site, and maneuvered the airplane for landing. Upon touchdown, the nose landing gear settled into low brush and soft terrain where the airplane stopped, nosed over, and came to rest inverted. Examination of the airplane at the accident site revealed that wires connected to the battery solenoid exhibited thermal damage. When the damaged wires were moved, the navigational gyros energized, the airplane lights illuminated, and the flaps deployed. Detailed examination revealed that the wire that connected the battery solenoid to the starter solenoid exhibited chafing and thermal damage to the insulation along a 3-inch-long section. The wire was placed in its approximate preaccident location, and the burned area corresponded to the round shape of the right rear muffler. A review of maintenance records revealed no entries related to wiring. It is likely that unknown maintenance personnel improperly routed the wires, which led to chafing and the subsequent in-flight fire.
After dropping off two passengers on an extremely cold morning, the commercial pilot departed for the return flight home. During cruise flight at 2,500 ft mean sea level, the engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot restarted the engine; shortly thereafter, the engine lost power a second time. The pilot executed a forced landing onto a road, during which the left wing was damaged. An engine teardown revealed significant heat distress to the crankshaft No. 4 connecting rod journal, as well as the Nos. 3 and 4 connecting rod bearings. The heat distress resulted in fracture of the Nos. 3 and 4 connecting rod caps and subsequent seizure of the engine. The Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 6 connecting rod bearings exhibited overlay fatigue, dirt embedment and corrosion, consistent with inadequate oil lubrication. A review of the engine maintenance logbooks revealed a history of oil changes at inconsistent intervals, which included much longer intervals than those recommended by the manufacturer; however, the effect of the inconsistent maintenance could not be determined based on the available information.
The private pilot reported that he was returning to his home airport and was practicing maneuvers at 1,200 ft. The left fuel tank ran dry, and the engine experienced a total loss of power. He stated that his normal procedure was to exhaust the fuel in one tank before switching to the other tank. He attempted to restart the engine after switching to the right tank, which, he stated, held 40 gallons of fuel. The engine would not restart, so he conducted a forced landing in a field. After touchdown, the landing gear collapsed, and the airplane nosed down into the ground.Examination of the fuel system revealed that the left wing was substantially damaged and that the left wing fuel tank was breached. The right wing had minimal damage, and the right wing fuel tank was undamaged. No fuel was found in either fuel tank, and the wing tank selector handle was found in the "off" position. Examination of the engine and airframe did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.Blood was drawn from the pilot about 1 hour after the accident, and it tested positive for 0.177 gm/dl of alcohol. At the time of the accident, the pilot's alcohol level was likely at or above 0.185 gm/dl, which is considered impairing. The pilot's impairment by alcohol before and during the flight likely led to his improper fuel mismanagement and the subsequent loss of engine power.
The pilot reported that, en route on an instrument flight rules flight plan in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), the airplane began accumulating ice, and shortly thereafter, he requested a "precautionary diversion" to the nearest airport to land. The pilot further reported that he exited IMC about 1,642 ft above ground level and circled over the diversion airport for landing. He reported that he had kept the flaps and landing gear retracted "to not adversely affect lift" and forgot to extend the landing gear before landing. However, when the airplane was over the runway threshold he reduced power, which caused the auto-extend function of the landing gear system to attempt to extend the landing gear. During the landing roll, the right main and nose landing gear collapsed. The airplane gradually slid off the runway to the right.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.In the Procedures section of the Piper Arrow II Pilot's Operating Manual, it states in part:Some aircraft are equipped with an airspeed-power sensing system (backup gear extender) which extends the landing gear under low airspeed-power conditions even though the pilot may not have selected gear down. For normal operation, the pilot should extend and retract the gear with the gear selector switch located on the instrument panel, just as he would if the backup gear extender system were not installed.The manual also states:The red gear warning light on the instrument panel and the horn operate simultaneously when: On aircraft equipped with the backup gear extender, when the system has lowered the landing gear and the gear selector switch is not in the down position and the throttle is not full open.Page 2 of 6 GAA17CA109
The private pilot reported that, shortly after takeoff from a snow-covered runway, he heard a "thump" and saw that the left main landing ski tip had rotated up, past vertical, and was in contact with the left wing strut. He was unable to reposition the left ski into a normal position. Upon landing, the ski separated from the axle, the left gear leg dug into the snow, and the airplane rapidly decelerated before it nosed over.As designed, the main landing skis are supported by two 5/32-in braided steel cables and bungee/shock cords. Both ends of the steel cables terminate with a thimble-eye and a compressed/swaged nicopress sleeve. On the accident airplane, the forward and aft support cables had pulled through their respective nicopress sleeves where the cables attached to the left ski's tip and tail. The nicopress sleeves for the left ski tip and tail attachments were not located during the investigation. However, a postaccident examination of the remaining nicopress sleeves established that they were likely improperly formed with a 3/16-in swage tool instead of a properly-sized 5/32-in tool. As a result, the steel support cables were able to pull through the inadequately-formed nicopress sleeves during the accident flight. It is likely that the aft support cable pulled through its nicopress sleeve during takeoff, which allowed the ski to rotate into a vertical position. The forward support cable likely pulled through its nicopress sleeve when the left ski separated from the axle during the subsequent landing.The pilot reported that the airplane was typically equipped with snow skis during the winter. He purchased the main landing skis in used condition, with an undocumented service history, from an individual about 8 years before the accident. The forward and aft support cables were already fabricated and installed on the skis when they were purchased. Additionally, the pilot reported that the support cables had not been repaired or replaced since he owned the skis. The pilot, who was also an aviation mechanic, installed the main landing skis for the winter snow season 2 days before the accident. The accident occurred during the first flight since the skis were installed for the season.Page 2 of 7 CEN17LA057
A near controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) incident occurred near Mt. Wilson, California, when a Boeing 777-300 departing Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) was instructed to turn left toward rising terrain after departure from runway 07R. The aircraft was operating on a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129 international flight. Air traffic control services were provided by the Federal Aviation Administration Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control (SCT TRACON). There was no damage reported to the aircraft, and no reported injuries to the passengers or crew.Due to weather in the area, LAX was operating in an east flow configuration with aircraft departing to the east. The Boeing 777-300 pilot contacted the SCT controller and was given an initial climb to 7,000 feet. A short time later, the SCT controller instructed the pilot to turn left to a heading of 180 degrees which required a left 270 degree turn. The turn resulted in the aircraft turning toward rising terrain and back toward the airport; normal procedures in an east flow would have been for a right turn to a heading of 180 degrees. While in the left turn, the pilot requested a high speed climb which resulted in the aircraft accelerating beyond the 250 knot LAX class B speed restriction and required additional airspace in order to complete an assigned turn. After recognizing the aircraft was in a left turn, the SCT controller issued the crew a right turn to a heading of 180 degrees. As the aircraft began to turn right, the air traffic controller instructed the crew to expedite the turn due to recognizing a developing proximity issue with another aircraft that had departed from LAX. The air traffic controller stopped the climb of the B777-300 and issued a left turn to a heading of 270 degrees. These turns in quick succession, combined with the speed of the aircraft, resulted in the flight tracking northbound toward rising terrain. The closest lateral and vertical proximity between the airplane and terrain/obstructions was about 0.3 miles and 0 ft, respectively, which is less than the minimum separation requirements.
The private pilot and a passenger departed on a flight to an airstrip about 40 nautical miles away. When they failed to return as scheduled, family members notified law enforcement, and the wreckage was subsequently located in an area of snow-covered, rising terrain. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Following a death investigation, the State Medical Examiner classified the manner of death as a suicide.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during takeoff from a remote airstrip, the airplane impacted a snowdrift and was "launched" into the air. Subsequently, he heard something break. He added that the airplane appeared to be fine with no indications of a problem other than the left tire "looked a little off." The pilot returned to his original departure airport without further incident. During a postaccident examination, his mechanic discovered that the tubing in the bottom of the fuselage where the oleo strut attached to the main landing gear was broken. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.As a safety recommendation, the pilot added that walking the runway before takeoff might have revealed the snowdrift.
The helicopter pilot reported that, during approach to land at a trading post, he circled the landing area multiple times to search for obstructions. He further reported that, while on final about 20 to 25 ft above the ground, he noticed multiple electrical wires in front of the helicopter. He lowered the collective to avoid the wires, and the helicopter landed hard.The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the tailboom.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The runway incursion occurred when a CRJ inadvertently turned onto a highspeed exit taxiway and entered a runway after a Boeing 737 was cleared for takeoff on the same runway. Air traffic control ground controller issued the pilots of the CRJ taxi instructions to runway 28L from their ramp exit point. The instructions included clearance to cross runway 1 left and runway 1 right. Subsequently, the ground controller issued revised taxi instructions requiring the pilots to taxi on the taxiway closest to but parallel to runway 28L, then make a slight right turn to another taxiway to taxi to the approach end of runway 28L. During the taxi, the captain made a left turn onto a runway 28L highspeed exit and began to cross the runway hold short line, instead of making the slight right turn required to follow their taxi clearance. The captain reported that "something did not feel right" and stopped the airplane as the ground controller commanded the CRJ to stop. Although the captain of the CRJ had taxied at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) "many times" and was familiar with a hotspot in the area he made the mistaken turn, he had no explanation as to why he turned left at that point in the taxi. Recorded data indicated that the B737 passed in front of the CRJ within 188 feet laterally. The pilots of the B737 did not observe the CRJ during the takeoff roll. A review of air traffic control procedures and equipment showed that appropriate procedures were followed and there were no irregularities noted with the equipment. Federal Aviation Administration guidance on taxiway design indicated that complex intersections increase the possibility of pilot error. It offered the "three-node concept" which means that a pilot is presented with no more than three choices at an intersection. The intersection where the incursion began contained five choices: a left turn, a slight left turn, straight, slight right turn, and a right turn. After this incident, SFO placed temporary barricades at this intersection preventing its use before permanently closing the taxiway. Following this event, SkyWest Airlines developed and disseminated, on January 19, 2017, a "Flight Operations Message" to all pilots titled "Surface Movement Safety – Preventing Incursions" discussing the events surrounding this event and what crews should do to be vigilant. Page 2 of 14 OPS17IA008Although the area in which this incident occurred may have contributed to the captain’s mistaken turn, it was designated as a hot spot location that required enhanced crew vigilance during wayfinding through this area. Further, there were multiple cues at the intersection before the turn was made that could be used by the pilots to support the wayfinding task. Finally, the taxiway in which the captain mistakenly turned had signs, marking, and lighting to indicate both the identification of the taxiway and the identification of and presence of a runway and the fact it was active. These cues were not heeded by either pilot before the airplane entered the runway.