roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot reported that the right landing gear contacted an unseen object while landing on an unimproved surface, which resulted in the tundra tire losing air pressure. After aborting the landing, he flew to an airport where he declared an emergency and advised air traffic control that he intended to land in the grass adjacent to the runway. The pilot made two low passes over a grassy area and, during climb-out from the second low pass, the engine lost all power. The pilot performed a forced landing to uneven terrain outside the airport fence, during which the airplane sustained substantial damage.A postaccident examination and engine test run did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were conducive for serious icing at glide power. The pilot did not report using carburetor heat. It is likely that during multiple low passes prior to landing that carburetor ice accumulated, which resulted in a loss of engine power.
After an uneventful flight, the powered glider approached the grass airstrip to land. The passenger stated that the altitude seemed to be low during the approach. He stated that as the pilot started to turn the glider, the passenger felt that they were not going to land safely, and yelled to the pilot, “we are not going to make this.” The powered glider dropped down and seemed to stall. The passenger heard the engine rev up, and the powered glider collided with the ground. Examination of the accident site showed evidence of a low-energy impact, consistent with a low-altitude stall. Examination of the airframe and flight controls did not reveal any mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operations. Physical examination of the engine and downloaded engine data were consistent with normal engine operation. Cannabis was detected in the toxicology testing of the pilot; however, since no THC or active THC metabolite was detected, it is unlikely that the pilot’s use of cannabis was recent enough to have contributed to the accident. The autopsy on the pilot revealed moderate to severe atherosclerosis of the pilot’s cerebral arteries, coronary arteries, and aorta, as well as chronic kidney and lung conditions. It could not be determined whether these conditions contributed to the accident. The passenger did not report any indications that the pilot was impaired or incapacitated. Based on all available evidence, it is likely that the pilot attempted to extend the glide to the runway during the base turn to final, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall.
The pilot stated that the tailwheel spring cross tube broke when the tailwheel landing gear touched down. After landing, the airplane made an immediate turn and spun around. The left main landing gear collapsed, and the left wing struck the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wing. Postaccident examination of the tailwheel spring cross tube revealed that the outside diameter of the tube was about 0.002 inch smaller than the specified nominal outside diameter of 0.875 inch, and the wall thickness was 0.0009 inch thinner than the specified nominal wall thickness of 0.049 inch for the original tube design.Examination of the tube showed signatures consistent with overstress deformation. The part dimensions indicated the part could have been from original manufacture and likely had not been replaced since at least 1985, when the drawing for replacement parts was changed to have a thicker wall, 0.120 inch. An uncoated steel part of that age used in an airplane used in aerial application service would be expected to have a more corroded surface than what was observed on the accident part. The surface condition suggests it may have been recently sanded, possibly removing about 0.001 inch of material around the outside diameter. The recent change in outside diameter likely did not significantly affect the strength of the tube. The bending strength of the tube was reduced by about 2 percent relative to the nominal tube based on a comparison of the bending moments required to reach given stress at the exterior surface. Similarly, the cross-sectional area was also reduced by just 2 percent. While some increase in impact loading on the tube could be expected due to the additional clearance between the tube and the fitting, the failure is more likely attributed to loads that exceeded the Page 2 of 6 CEN22LA427maximum design load for the tailwheel. An additional margin of safety could have been achieved if the tube had been replaced with the thicker-walled replacement part rather than apparently having been cleaned up and reused.The metallurgical examination of the tailwheel spring cross tube revealed that it failed in overload, which indicates that it was not the initiating event for the loss of control. It is likely that the pilot failed to maintain airplane control during the landing sequence, which resulted in a ground loop and the substantial damage to the left wing and the fractured tailwheel spring cross tube.
A pilot and flight instructor were conducting a personal flight over a reservoir when they descended and flew at a low altitude over two boats on the water. After passing the second boat, they turned west into a cove and impacted rising terrain about 1 mile west of the shoreline, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. Following the accident, the flight instructor made differing and conflicting statements to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The first statement was that there was an engine malfunction and to avoid landing on the water or impacting boats on the surface, he elected to make a climbing right turn to the west, away from the lake, and the airplane subsequently impacted rising terrain. In a written statement provided by the flight instructor, he stated that the power had been reduced to “see more of the scenery.” Shortly thereafter, the pilot flying told him that he could not climb due to a jammed elevator. The flight instructor stated that he could only control the airplane through the use of trim and power manipulation. To avoid congested areas, they maneuvered to the reservoir and attempted to free the jammed elevator by “wiggling the flight control in and out,” which resulted in the airplane pitching down. He stated that after adding power and retrimming the airplane, he elected to fly west into the valley to look for a landing area.A review of flight track data revealed that the airplane did not descend as described in the written statement, but instead flew east to west over the reservoir and descended during a 270° turn over the reservoir that was initiated about mid-channel. The airplane traversed about 1.6 miles south along the reservoir before it turned west and climbed. The last recorded altitude was about 6,075 ft msl near the accident location.Page 2 of 12 CEN22LA414Photographs provided by a witness show the airplane low over the water as it approached one of only three visible boats. At first, the airplane appeared headed toward the shore, but made a left turn toward the first boat. After making a very low pass over the boat, the airplane made a steep climb, followed by a steep right turn, and then flew at a low altitude over the second boat. After passing the second boat, the airplane appeared to depart toward a valley. Postaccident examinations by the Federal Aviation Administration and the NTSB revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the engine or flight controls.
After landing on runway 27R at Chicago O’Hare International Airport, Southwest Airlines B737 flight 2659 (SWA2659) was cleared by ground control to taxi to gate M-14 via taxiways Z, D, TT, A, A-19. As they proceeded down taxiway A, both pilots observed an American Airlines B737 (AA1121) holding short of taxiway A-19. The pilots of SWA2659 asked ground control for permission to utilize taxiway A-20 instead and were granted permission. The captain said that as he tried to pass AA1121, he stayed left of centerline to ensure wingtip clearance. The first officer was looking out the window and informed the captain that their airplane’s wingtip was clear. However, their right winglet impacted the left elevator of AA1121. AA1121 was stationary on taxiway A and holding short of taxiway A-19 with the parking brake set, awaiting entry to gate K-20, when it was impacted by SWA2659.Page 2 of 9 DCA22LA201Figure 1. Depiction of SWA2659 taxi route and area of occurrence (Adapted from Google Earth)Post-event examination of both airplanes revealed that the right winglet of SWA2659 was damaged and sheared off by the impact and the left elevator of AA1121 was substantially damaged.
According to the pilot, he finished training and received a logbook endorsement to fly the gyroplane five days before the accident. The purpose of the accident flight was to practice touch-and-go landings. The first two were uneventful, but during the third touch-and-go, he applied power to take off again and the gyroplane rolled to the left. The pilot overcorrected and rolled the gyroplane right, resulting in the main rotor blades contacting the ground. The gyroplane slid on the runway to a stop on its right side resulting in substantial damage to main rotor blades and tail section. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the gyroplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot and two passengers were returning to the base airport following an aerial firefighting mission. During the approach to the airport, the helicopter began an uncontrolled right rotation that could not be arrested despite full use of the left pedal. The pilot attempted to land in the back yard of a private residence; however, the helicopter landed hard and rolled onto its left side. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the main rotor system, fuselage, and tailboom. An on-scene examination revealed the tail rotor drive shaft had separated at a flex coupling and components critical to the assembly were missing. Postaccident metallurgical examination of tail rotor drive shaft assembly, the pulley, and the recovered hardware revealed that tail rotor drive shaft flange was likely directly attached to the air conditioning pulley flange without a drive ring. The bolt length and recovered hardware would have been adequate to secure the drive shaft flange and the pulley flange together to a drive ring; however, the drive ring, two bolts, six washers and one nut were not found amongst the wreckage after a thorough search. The examination also revealed that the two bolts that were recovered failed from fatigue, likely from the cyclic stress due to the absence of a drive ring. According to the helicopter maintenance records, there had been no recent work on the tail rotor drive shaft or air conditioning unit that would have required disassembly and reassembly of the failed flex coupling.
The pilot reported that the airplane’s engine lost power at an altitude of about 400 ft agl after takeoff. He attempted to glide to an open field but landed in a wooded area after he realized the airplane would not reach the field. The pilot’s attempts to troubleshoot the power loss were unsuccessful. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, both wings, and the empennage.Postaccident examination revealed carbon tracking inside the ignition switch that interfered with the proper operation of the ignition switch as evidenced by testing using a multimeter. Once the carbon tracking was cleaned, the ignition switch operated normally.It is likely that the carbon tracking present in the ignition switch resulted in a short, that caused both magnetos to stop functioning and ultimately the engine ceased producing power. Based on the available evidence, it could not be determined how long the carbon tracking had been present inside the ignition switch.
The pilot elected to fly an RNAV approach in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) at the destination airport. The pilot executed a missed approach, after which he requested another RNAV approach. Air traffic control (ATC) issued instructions to join the approach course; however, the pilot began to descend and maneuver, and was unable to join the final approach course. The controller asked if he needed assistance to which the pilot responded negative and that he needed to “get reset.” The pilot was issued an altitude and heading, but he turned to a heading 180° from the heading issued. When queried, the pilot responded that he was having trouble with his gyros. The controller offered the ILS approach and the pilot accepted. The controller issued vectors for the approach and the pilot complied. The pilot was cleared for the approach but did not intercept the localizer. The controller instructed the pilot to stop his turn and maintain altitude. No further communications were received from the pilot. According to ADS-B flight track data, the airplane entered a right turn after being cleared for the ILS. The airplane completed two right turns and descended before climbing and entering a left turn. The last track data was observed as the airplane was in a descent. The wreckage descended to impact with a lake south of the airport.Examination of the engine-driven vacuum pumps, which operate the primary flight instruments consisting of the attitude indicator and directional gyro, revealed they were intact and no preimpact anomalies were noted; however, no evidence of scoring on the interior surface of the housings was noted.The attitude indicator, directional gyro, and the horizontal situation indicator (HSI) were impact damaged, which precluded functional testing; however, no pre-impact defects or rotational scoring were noted.Page 2 of 10 ERA22FA405The pilot’s logbook was not located; therefore, the pilot’s experience operating in IMC conditions could not be documented.Because the investigation was unable to establish the operational status of the directional gyroscope and HSI, it could not be determined what issue the pilot was dealing with when he replied that he needed to “get reset.” The pilot was able to follow the controller’s instruction following the missed approach, but was unable to initiate a second approach.It is likely that the pilot was task saturated with a perceived instrumentation issue. Based on his communications with air traffic control and the airplane’s flight track, the pilot’s ability to control the airplane continually degraded. The airplane’s erratic maneuvers are consistent with the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation resulting in a loss of control in flight and inability to recover the airplane.
The pilot in the tailwheel equipped airplane reported that, during the landing roll, the airplane began to veer right, and he attempted to correct with left rudder control. The airplane subsequently departed the runway surface, traveled through a ditch, and came to rest on the right side of the runway. The right main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage lugs. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The student pilot performed an engine run-up before departure that included a check of the magnetos and carburetor heat, noting normal rpm decreases for each. He initiated the takeoff, noting full rpm during the takeoff roll and normal takeoff distance. On the upwind leg of the airport traffic pattern, when the airplane was about 300 ft above ground level, the engine began to lose power. The pilot lowered the airplane’s nose to maintain airspeed then made a left turn to return to the airport. When the airplane was close to the airport the engine sustained a total loss of power and he realized that the airplane was too high to land on the runway. He flew over and then north of the airport, where he intended to land on an east/west oriented road. The airplane subsequently impacted a powerline pole and came to rest on the road, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage and aft empennage.Postaccident examination of the engine revealed the loss of engine power was a result of the No. 2 cylinder exhaust valve being stuck in the open position. About 32 years before the accident, a reconditioned cylinder was installed at the No. 2 position, there were multiple maintenance record entries associated with the No. 2 cylinder citing either a stuck exhaust valve or work to the cylinder consistent valve problems, the most recent being nearly 3 years and about 63 engine hours earlier.Guidance from the engine manufacturer related to a stuck exhaust valve cited a need to clean the cylinder components and perform dimensional checks of specified components. It did not cite what to do for a repetitive problem.
The pilot reported that, during a landing attempt with a crosswind, she encountered a gust of wind that lifted and pushed the airplane to the left. She applied full throttle and right rudder to arrest the airplane’s descent back to the runway, but the airplane porpoised and departed the left side of the runway. While the airplane porpoised the nose landing gear impacted gravel, separated and the airplane skid to a stop. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the floor panel structure. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that during cruise flight the engine began to shudder and lose power. The engine continued to run until there was a loud clunk and the propeller stopped. Unable to maintain altitude or restore power, the pilot performed a forced landing and the airplane came to rest inverted. Postaccident examination of the engine components revealed obsolete rocker arms that were incompatible with the installed single-piece bushings, which were improperly positioned in the rocker arms. Five exhaust rocker arms and four intake rocker arms had a smooth rocker bore consistent with rocker arms designed for use with dual bushings that are no longer available for installation on the accident engine. As indicated in warnings in the engine manufacturer’s maintenance manual, use of single-piece bushings in arms designed for dual bushings may restrict or block oil flow to the rocker shaft and valve guides, resulting in possible engine failure. The examination also revealed the oil holes in the bushings were positioned incorrectly at the outboard side of the housing, and in some cases the holes were offset to the wrong side of the arm’s longitudinal centerline. The incorrect positioning of oil holes in the bushings (as observed in this engine) will result in a loss of rocker arm shaft lubrication, severe wear of the rocker arm bushing, shaft, and valve guide and possible engine failure. The overhauled engine had been installed in the airplane about 6 months, and just over 500 hours, before the accident. The use of obsolete rocker arms and the incorrect positioning of the bushing holes likely led to insufficient oil spray to the valve tips and rocker pads. The insufficient oil spray from both intake and exhaust rocker arms likely led to inadequate cooling as evidenced by heat tinting on the exhaust valve tips, exhaust valve springs, and exhaust Page 2 of 8 ERA22LA410rocker arms and the eventual overstress fracture of the No. 1 exhaust valve from impact with the piston while stuck open. The engine likely failed due to the improper installation of 5 obsolete exhaust rocker arms and 4 obsolete intake rocker arms when the engine was last overhauled. The obsolete rocker arms are incompatible with the current bushings that were installed in all of the rocker arms, which led to inadequate lubrication to the corresponding intake and exhaust valve tips and the subsequent fracture of the No. 1 exhaust valve.
The pilot obtained multiple preflight weather briefings that resulted in him delaying the flight’s departure until the afternoon. After departure, while near his intended destination, the pilot was twice advised by air traffic controllers of adverse weather, including heavy to extreme precipitation along the intended final approach. While in visual meteorological conditions the pilot requested an RNAV approach to his destination airport. While flying towards the final approach fix at a low thrust setting the autopilot attempted to maintain 2,000 ft while pitching up and slowing to about 100 knots, causing an airspeed aural warning. The pilot applied partial thrust and while in instrument meteorological conditions the flight encountered extreme precipitation and turbulence associated with the previously reported thunderstorm. The pilot turned off the autopilot; the airplane then climbed at a rate that was well beyond the performance capability of the airplane, likely caused by updrafts from the mature thunderstorm and application of takeoff thrust. The High Electronic Stability & Protection (ESP) engaged, pitching the airplane nose-down coupled with the pilot pushing the control stick forward. The airplane then began descending followed by pitching up and climbing again. The pilot pulled the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) and descended under canopy into a marsh but the airplane was dragged a short distance from wind that inflated the CAPS canopy.Postaccident examination of the recovered airplane revealed substantial damage to the front pressure bulkhead and to both sides of the fuselage immediately behind the front pressure bulkhead. There was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the flight controls for roll, pitch, or yaw.Page 2 of 9 ERA22LA404Data downloaded from the Recoverable Data Module (RDM) revealed no faults with the autopilot or stability protection systems until the CAPS system was activated, when those recorded faults would have been expected. Further, there were no discrepancies with the engine. Although the pilot perceived a malfunction of the autopilot at several times during the final portion of the flight, the perceived autopilot discrepancies were likely normal system responses based on the autopilot mode changes.
The pilot planned to depart from a 2,250 ft turf/gravel runway with expected wind conditions of 5 to 10 knots. After he arrived to the airplane, the pilot observed high wind conditions, with gusts to 40 knots. The pilot elected to depart and as the airplane passed over trees during the initial climb, he noticed high, gusty wind conditions, which he made full control inputs to counter. The airplane entered into sink and it subsequently impacted terrain, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing and right horizontal stabilizer. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation, and that he should have delayed the departure based on the high wind conditions.