roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The flight crew was supporting a United States Navy (USN) training mission and ended the flight early due to icing conditions. The flight crew calculated a landing reference speed (Vref) of 140 knots (kts) indicated airspeed (KIAS) and landing distance required of 4,200 ft for a wet runway and a flap setting of 20°. Due to underwing-mounted external storage, the landing flaps were limited to a maximum extension of 20°. The flight crew configured the airplane with 20° flaps and reported that the airplane touched down at 140 kts. Although the runway was 8,001 ft long, an arresting cable was located 1,701 ft from the runway threshold, resulting in a runway distance available of about 6,300 ft. After landing, the second in command (SIC) reported that the pilot-in-command (PIC) deployed the spoilers and brakes, then announced that the airplane was not slowing down. The PIC stated that the airplane did not decelerate normally, that the brake anti-skid system was active, and that the airplane seemed to be hydroplaning. He cycled the brakes, which had no effect.The airplane subsequently overran the departure end of the runway, breached an ocean sea wall and came to rest in a nose-down attitude on a sandbar.  The airport weather observation system recorded that 0.06 inches of liquid equivalent precipitation fell between 18 and 9 minutes before the accident. In the 4 hours before the accident, the airport received 0.31 inches of liquid equivalent precipitation.A landing performance study conducted by the airplane manufacturer modeled a variety of landing scenarios considered during the investigation. The modeling used factual information provided by the investigation, including ADS-B data, as well as manufacturer-provided airplane performance data specific to the airplane. The study considered the effect on landing distance of both a wet and dry runway, a contaminated runway, both full and intermittent hydroplaning, Page 2 of 9 WPR22LA344a localized tailwind (which was not present in the weather data), and an inboard brake failure. The study showed that the most likely scenario, based on the available data, was that the airplane touched down with a ground speed well in excess of the 140 kts Vref speed reported by the crew, and that subsequent to the touchdown encountered full hydroplaning at speeds above 104 kts.       The airplane sat overnight on the sandbar and was submerged in saltwater before the airplane was recovered. As a result, the airplane’s braking system could not be functionally tested. However, the physical evidence from the brakes as found postaccident, combined with the results of the landing distance modeling, did not indicate that a brake failure occurred. Similarly, ADS-B data did not support the presence of a localized tailwind when such a landing was modeled in the study. Thus, it’s likely that the flight crew landed too fast and then encountered hydroplaning during the landing roll as a result of a recent heavy rain shower, which diminished the calculated stopping distance.
The flight instructor reported that while landing the airplane was slightly right of the runway centerline and he instructed his student to add left rudder, bring the nose up and hold it off the runway. The student added right rudder and the instructor believed also right brake. The airplane touched down on the left main tire first and when the right tire contacted the runway, the airplane veered to the right. The instructor stated that he considered a go-around but decided that it would not be safe and applied full braking. He did not attempt to steer the airplane back into runway alignment as he felt that doing to at the speed the airplane was at would also be unsafe. The airplane went into the grass alongside the runway, crossed a taxiway, impacted a taxiway sign, and then came to a stop. The student pilot being instructed had logged 8.3 hours of dual instruction when the accident occurred. The airplane incurred substantial damage to the left wing. The flight instructor indicated on his report that there were no mechanical problems with the airplane.
The 84-year-old pilot and the passenger made two attempts to take off on a cross-country flight. According to the passenger, once she and the pilot boarded the airplane, the pilot said he forgot where they were going and had to ask the name of the airport. After informing the pilot of their destination, the pilot taxied to the runway and began to accelerate for takeoff. The pilot aborted the takeoff because he thought the passenger’s door was open. The door was secured, and the pilot taxied back to the runway. Just before taking off again, the pilot asked a second time where they were going. The passenger again had to tell the pilot their destination. The pilot initiated the takeoff roll, but aborted because he felt something was wrong with the airplane. The airplane went off the end of the runway, resulting in substantial damage to the left wing. When first responders arrived on scene, they noted the pilot was confused and had memory problems. The pilot was hospitalized for neurological evaluation and consultation. Magnetic resonance imaging of the pilot’s brain performed the day after the accident demonstrated an acute-to-subacute lacunar stroke in the right medial temporal lobe. The pilot was discharged from the hospital with a diagnosis of transient global amnesia. As such, the pilot most likely experienced an acute cerebrovascular event. Impairing symptoms of this event likely diminished his situational awareness and prompted him to intentionally abort the takeoff, resulting in the runway excursion.
The pilot reported the airplane did not accelerate as usual during the takeoff roll. To avoid obstacles at the end of the runway, the pilot continued the takeoff.  The airplane cleared powerlines, trees, and a school, but was nearing a stall so the pilot decided to make a forced landing in a field. During the landing the airplane collided with a tree, resulting in substantial damage to the right wing and fuselage.Examination of the engine found excessive carbon deposits around the No. 4 cylinder exhaust valve. A large amount of carbon buildup was found on the rocker arm, rocker shaft, and valve spring. The rotator cap also had carbon deposits and exhibited a groove wear pattern consistent with a lack of cap rotation. The exhaust valve guide had excessive wobble and movement within the guide. The No. 5 exhaust valve also displayed signatures of carbon buildup but not to the same extent as the No. 4.No other anomalies were detected with the engine or airframe.The loss of engine power was likely due to at least one stuck exhaust valve.
The pilot under instruction entered the destination airport traffic pattern to practice takeoffs and landings. Shortly after turning onto final approach, the engine began to run rough, as if a cylinder was “missing.” The flight instructor took over control of the airplane, verifying that the fuel boost pump was on and the throttle was advanced. The engine then stopped completely; however, the propeller continued to windmill. Unable to make the runway, the flight instructor landed the airplane in a bean field short of the runway. An examination of the fuel-injected engine and fuel system did not reveal evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or failure. There was ample fuel on board for the flight, and the fuel system was not contaminated or obstructed. The reason for the loss of engine power was not determined.
The pilot and pilot-rated passenger departed from a 1,100-ft-long turf runway on the first flight after assembling the kit-built airplane. The pilot reported that the airplane’s ground roll was about 400 ft, and after takeoff, he turned right to avoid a rural power line near the end of the runway. The airplane subsequently impacted the power line and then terrain, which damaged both wings and fuselage. The pilot reported, and a postaccident examination corroborated, that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot remarked that the airplane’s “Y” yoke, located between the two pilots’ knees, made pitch control during the takeoff more difficult, as compared to a control wheel or stick. Takeoff performance information from the kit manufacturer indicated the airplane with a 100 horsepower (HP) engine was capable of clearing the power line by a significant margin; whereas a pilot operating handbook released in 2009 for factory-built airplanes equipped with a 100 HP engine indicated significantly less margin to clear the power line. Takeoff performance information for the accident airplane, which was equipped with a 120 HP engine, was not available to the pilots. The pilot reflected that a better risk management option for the initial takeoff would have been to depart solo and meet the pilot-rated passenger at another airport with a longer runway.
The flight instructor reported that, during an instructional flight with the student pilot at the flight controls, the airplane encountered a microburst during the takeoff climb. The airplane started to descend, he assumed control of the airplane, checked the engine RPM's and throttle. Despite his actions the airplane continued to descend. Unable to maintain altitude, he elected to land on a soccer field. During the landing roll, the right wing impacted a tree that resulted in substantial damage. Witnesses located near the accident location reported that, the accident airplane encountered a “microburst” and “big gust of wind,” and it then began/started to descend toward the ground. One witness stated that it appeared as if the airplane was “…fighting to gain altitude.”     A Federal Aviation Administration inspector reported that, the accident flight was captured on airport surveillance camera, and showed the accident airplane take off in a normal climb profile. About 50-100 ft above ground level (agl), the airplane was seen making small abrupt changes in altitude, that the FAA inspector indicated was consistent with a turbulence encounter. As the airplane continued the climb, about 200-300 ft agl, it flew into a wall of vertical dust and appeared to be in a descent. The video showed the airplane as it continued forward in the dust while still in a descent until it was no longer visible in the video frame.Prior to the accident, the airport’s automated weather observation station reported that, at 14:55 local time, the wind was from 160° at 4 knots. Shortly thereafter, the same automated station reported that, at 15:15 local time, the wind was from 110° at 5 knots, gusting to 21 knots. The airplane was taking off from runway 16.Page 2 of 6 WPR22LA342
The pilot and copilot departed on a repositioning flight in the twin-engine jet with a known hydraulic leak. The leak was identified before the flight, but the origin of the leak was unknown at the time. Shortly after departing, the landing gear would not retract. The pilots troubleshot the problem, attempted to retract the landing gear multiple times, and realized they had lost the hydraulic fluid in the system used for gear retraction. The flight diverted to an alternate airport; during the landing, the left landing gear tire blew out and the wheel and tire wore down to near the axle on one side of the wheel. The airplane came to rest near the runway and the right main landing gear collapsed. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the nose landing gear centering hydraulic flexible line was frayed and leaked near the upper fitting. This damage resulted in the complete depletion of the hydraulic System A fluid during the crew’s multiple attempts to retract the gear during flight. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was downloaded and revealed that, after the landing gear was confirmed in the down position, the pilot reported that they had all the flaps possible extended since they were limited to 15° (per the airplane flight manual [AFM] “LANDING WITH NO ‘A’ SYSTEM PRESSURE” checklist). A few minutes later the crew discussed the flaps again and referred to the flight manual before setting the flaps to the full down position, contrary to the checklist. For the airplane’s reported weight at the time of the landing, the reference landing speed (Vref) specified by the checklist was between 137 and 138 knots; however, the Vref airspeed was exceeded by 17 knots, resulting in a fast landing to a runway with a downhill gradient that constituted an unstabilized approach. The fast landing and selection of a runway with a downhill gradient, both contrary to the referenced checklist, likely contributed to the blown main tires and the loss of control during the landing roll.Page 2 of 11 WPR22LA341
During an air taxi flight, the pilot executed a glassy-water landing on a remote lake with an excessive descent rate which resulted in a hard landing and go-around. The pilot later successfully landed the airplane without further incident. The hard landing resulted in the front seat passenger sustaining a broken rib. All three persons aboard were seated and wearing lap belts without shoulder harasses. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The front-seat passenger stated the sun’s position in the sky – combined with the glassy water surface conditions - produced significant sun glare, especially on the pilot’s side of the airplane.
The pilot reported that during the landing rollout on a remote sandbar, the airplane’s main tires encountered an area of soft sand and the airplane nosed over, which resulted in substantial damage to the rudder. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The purpose of the flight was for the commercial pilot in the left seat to build flight time with an instructor so that he could be included on the owner’s insurance policy. This was the first flight to satisfy those requirements and the two accident pilots had not flown together previously. The flight instructor had 2 hours of flight experience in the Glasair; the commercial pilot-under-instruction had no flight experience in the airplane. Recorded radar and GPS data revealed that the airplane departed the home airport and airwork was performed for about 45 minutes. The flight then proceeded to another airport for traffic pattern work. The pilots entered the visual pattern and made four approaches without the airplane touching down. On the fifth approach, the airplane turned base-to-final about ½ to 1 mile sooner (tighter) than on the previous patterns. The accident approach was flown at a higher descent rate, bank angle, and pitch attitude than the previous approaches. The descent rate approached 2,500 fpm, the left bank angle approached 100°, and the pitch attitude was about 15° airplane-nose-down. During the final turn, a positive normal load factor was observed, between 1 and 2 g just before the end of the recorded data, and shortly before ground impact, indicating that the airplane did not stall before the crash. The lateral acceleration during the final turn was about 0.3 g, which was consistent with a side slip (forward slip) maneuver, commonly used when an airplane is high on approach.An examination of the airframe and powerplant revealed no evidence of a mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation.  The pilot flying at the time of the accident could not be determined; however, it is apparent that the flight instructor allowed an unstabilized approach to proceed beyond the point where a Page 2 of 10 ERA22FA399safe recovery was not possible. Had the instructor either discontinued the poor approach or directed the commercial pilot-under-instruction to do so, the accident would have been prevented.
The initial portion of the instrument flight rules cross-country flight was routine. The flight was established in cruise flight about 9,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The air traffic controller advised the pilot of an area of weather about 10 miles ahead and suggested deviating left of course. The pilot initially appeared to establish the course suggested by the controller, but shortly afterward advised the controller that he planned to proceed direct to the intended destination. The controller subsequently informed the pilot that he was entering an area of moderate to heavy precipitation that extended for about 20 miles. The controller approved deviating left or right of course. About three minutes later, the controller advised the pilot of heavy precipitation from the airplane’s current position eastbound and suggested a northbound course before proceeding eastbound to remain clear of the weather.About five minutes before the accident, the airplane entered a left turn as the flight approached the weather. The pilot completed two full 360° turns during which the airplane altitude varied from approximately 8,700 ft msl to 9,300 ft msl.  About one minute before the accident, the pilot transmitted, “I’ve got control finally we were in a bit of a whirlwind.” The controller acknowledged, noted heavy precipitation to the north of the airplane’s position, and suggested a west heading. The pilot asked the controller to confirm the suggested heading, and the controller responded, “back to the west about a two seventy.” The pilot’s reply was not discernable, and no further communications were received.About 30 seconds before the accident, the airplane entered a right turn from an approximate altitude of 9,075 ft msl. The airplane’s altitude increased to about 9,375 ft msl briefly before it entered a descent. The final data point was located about one-half mile from the accident site with a corresponding airplane altitude of 7,200 ft msl.  Page 2 of 8 CEN22FA406The airplane impacted trees and terrain. The airframe was fragmented consistent with a high-speed impact. The propeller blades were fractured and deformed consistent with engine power at impact. A postaccident examination did not identify any anomalies attributable to a preimpact failure or malfunction.Weather data revealed an area of convective activity near the final segment of the flight. The airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions at the time of the loss of control.Toxicology testing detected ethanol in one of the pilot’s muscle tissue samples but was not detected in another muscle tissue sample. Given that there was no ethanol detected in one of two muscle tissue samples, the identified ethanol was likely from sources other than ingestion. The antihistamines diphenhydramine and cetirizine and the muscle relaxant cyclobenzaprine were detected in the pilot’s muscle tissue; no blood specimens were available for toxicology testing. Without blood levels, the investigation was unable to determine whether the effects from the pilot’s use of diphenhydramine, cetirizine, and cyclobenzaprine contributed to the accident.
The pilot reported that he was performing “touch and go landings” to get current. On approach, he heard a horn but thought it was the stall warning because it went off when he increased manifold pressure. But then he heard sheet metal grinding on concrete as the airplane settled. He applied full power and the airplane lifted off the runway. He then extended the landing gear, but the airplane’s left wing dropped, and the airplane impacted the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage. The pilot reported the landing gear extended and retracted normally and the landing gear position lights and the landing gear unsafe warning horn functioned as designed. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot was returning from a cross-country flight and planned to stop for fuel along the way; however, due to deteriorating weather conditions along his route of flight, he was unable to stop. The pilot then became distracted trying to avoid weather when the airplane’s engine lost power. The pilot further described that, “We should have landed at the nearest clear airport but got fixated on dodging rain clouds causing time consuming maneuvers to go around the storms into headwinds and unaware of fuel reserves.” He subsequently performed a forced landing to a field and struck a ditch resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage. Postaccident examination of the airplane’s intact fuel tanks revealed they were empty of useable fuel. Given this information, it is likely that during the unplanned deviations around weather, the airplane’s usable fuel supply was exhausted, which resulted in the total loss of engine power and subsequent forced landing.
According to the pilot, he and a passenger were on a cross-country flight when, at approximately 7,500 feet above mean sea level (msl), the aircraft began aggressively shaking. The pilot initially flew toward a nearby airport but decided to land on a highway.  The airplane landed hard, veered off the road, and impacted terrain. Subsequently, the airplane nosed over onto a fence and sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and wings.During the postaccident examination of the engine, excessive oil and carbon were discovered on the No. 4 cylinder valve springs, guide, stem, and retainers, which is consistent with exhaust blow-by. In addition, approximately 0.8 inches of the No. 4 exhaust valve stem and valve head were not recovered from the cylinder and engine. The remaining valve stem had excessive play within the valve guide. The fracture of the stem portion of the exhaust valve was the result of a fatigue crack that emanated from severe corrosion pits at the outer surface of the stem, which resulted in a loss of engine power. The engine's logbook entries revealed that it was last overhauled 41 years before the accident, exceeding Lycoming's recommendation of 12 years. It is likely that the No. 4 exhaust valve deteriorated from age and likely fractured from a fatigue crack.
The pilot reported that, during taxi southbound for takeoff he noticed the windsock in a north-northwest wind direction. He had the flight controls in a neutral position and the engine speed was 800 rpm when he encountered a strong gust of wind from behind. The tail of the airplane lifted, and the airplane nosed over coming to rest inverted. The right-wing lift strut and vertical stabilizer were substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight crew stated that the flight was on the arrival for landing. The seatbelt sign had been on and the flight attendants were making their pre-landing cabin preparations. The flight then entered a small cloud that showed no precipitation on the radar and encountered light to moderate turbulence. When the turbulence occurred one flight attendant who was standing assisting a passenger was thrown to the floor, injuring her right foot. After landing the flight attendant was given medical care and diagnosed with a broken right foot.
The pilot of the nose landing gear-equipped airplane was conducting glider tow operations, and after landing from the second tow, he was taxing to the opposite end of the airport in the grass next to the runway.  The pilot further described that it was common practice to tow gliders for takeoff from the paved runway and to land in the opposite direction on the grass next to the runway.  The pilot decided to cross an intersecting paved taxiway at a different place than he normally would, so he could be seen by the other tow aircraft.  While attempting to cross the taxiway the nose landing gear contacted the taxiway edge, collapsed, and resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage.  The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.