roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot of the personal flight stated that while the airplane was in cruise flight, he felt a pop or shudder. The airplane began to shake, and oil began to cover the windshield. The airplane lost engine power and the pilot then performed a forced landing to a field, during which it struck a fence. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the engine’s No. 2 cylinder head was cracked. There were no other mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal airplane operation.
The student pilot reported that he was performing a touch and go landing during a solo traffic pattern flight and had added full engine power for takeoff when he noticed the airplane had drifted right of the runway centerline and made a correction back by applying left rudder. The airplane then began oscillating and increased with each control input. Realizing that the airplane was not going to be able to takeoff safely, the student pilot aborted the takeoff. He continued to apply corrective directional control inputs, but the airplane departed the runway surface and impacted terrain in a field adjacent to the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing. The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor and student were conducting a local area discovery flight in the weight-shift-control light sport aircraft. An onboard video of the accident flight and ADS-B data revealed that about 28 minutes into the flight the aircraft entered a right turn as the flight instructor stated another way for them to lose altitude was to “do spirals.” The aircraft then continued a tight descending right turn, and the descent rate and airspeed rapidly increased to near the aircraft’s maneuvering limitations for both bank angle and airspeed. As the aircraft rolled out of the right turn and near a wings-level attitude, three of the battens connecting the left-wing fabric to the wing structure released at the trailing edge. The left wing subsequently began to flutter, and the aircraft rapidly rolled left and entered a spiral dive, from which the pilot was unable to recover before impact with terrain.A Service Instruction issued by the aircraft manufacturer listed three different factors that can cause the hinged batten to unload: 1) damage to the latch from incorrect loading of the fitting, 2) overtension of the batten within the pocket, and 3) operation outside the placarded limitation of the aircraft. While the investigation was not able to determine the state of battens before the accident, a performance study determined that the aircraft banked near its maximum recommended bank angle of 60° and near its maximum maneuvering speed of 73 kts in a right turn during the descent.The battens that separated during the flight were not recovered and therefore could not be examined. Postaccident examinations of the airframe and engine revealed no additional evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The parachute pin was removed and the parachute was partially deployed. It is likely Page 2 of 10 ANC23FA003that the parachute was deployed without enough altitude remaining to fully open and arrest the descent.Ethanol was detected at low levels in the flight instructor’s liver and muscle tissue specimens collected during a postmortem examination. Some or all of the small amounts of detected ethanol may have been from postmortem production, and it is unlikely that ethanol effects contributed to the crash.
An annual inspection had just been completed on the airplane, and the following day the pilot conducted a test flight directly over the airport. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot climbed to 6,500 ft mean sea level (msl) while conducting rectangular patterns directly over the airport for several minutes and then initiated a descent to 4,500 ft msl. During the descent, without any warning, the airplane sustained a loss of engine power. The pilot was unsuccessful in his attempts to restart the engine, resulting in the need to conduct a forced landing. As he entered the airport traffic pattern, the airplane was too high to land on the runway, so he conducted a side slip to lose altitude, but over-corrected and was too low to reach the desired runway. Unable to glide to the runway, the pilot landed short of the runway on rough, hilly terrain, which resulted in substantial damage to the airframe. Postaccident examination of the engine, fuel system, and induction system revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The weather conditions reported at the time of the accident were conducive to serious carburetor icing. Examination revealed that the carburetor heat was not in use when the airplane impacted the ground based on damage signatures to the bottom side of the heat box; the carb heat butterfly valve was in the “cold air” position and could not be activated due to the deformation of the box. The pilot also did not report that he used the carburetor heat. Based on the temperature and dew point at the altitude about where the loss of engine power occurred, the conditions were favorable for serious carburetor icing at the glide power setting and very close to the cruise power setting; therefore, it is likely that carburetor ice accumulated while descending and resulted in a loss of engine power. Page 2 of 6 ERA23LA059
The pilot reported that during the climb, about 4,500 ft mean sea level, the engine began to run rough, and shortly thereafter lost all power. The pilot immediately turned back toward the departure airport, which was about 5 miles from his position. He began troubleshooting the loss of power, but power was not restored. The pilot was able to glide to the airport; however, in a right turn to align with the runway, the pilot felt the onset of an aerodynamic stall. He leveled the wings, the airplane overshot the runway, descended abruptly, and impacted a grass area hard next to the runway. The left wing and fuselage sustained substantial damage.A postaccident test run of the engine revealed it produced normal power with the electric fuel pump on, but would not operate with only the engine-driven fuel pump. Further examination and disassembly of the engine-driven fuel pump revealed no anomalies that would have explained its inability to pump fuel. The pilot reported that in the climb he turned off the electric fuel pump and, after the loss of power, he did not turn the pump back on, despite the owner’s manual instructing pilots to use the electric fuel pump following a loss of engine power. Had the pilot turned the electric fuel pump on, power likely would have been restored.
The pilot was at 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl), in cruise flight, when he noticed electrical problems with the airplane. Night, visual meteorological conditions prevailed. He recalled that some of the displays on his navigation system were not functioning, he was hearing air traffic control (ATC) only intermittently, and his transponder was not operating normally. He contacted ATC and was given directions to a nearby airport. As he set up for an approach, he perceived that his engines were losing power and he needed full throttle to maintain safe airspeed. He could not read the engine instruments since it was dark and assumed a loss of engine power based on his tablet computer’s display. He attempted to lower the landing gear with the manual extension handcrank; however, he had difficulty accessing the handcrank and moving it. After landing, the airplane skidded to a stop on the runway with the landing gear retracted, resulting in substantial damage to the lower fuselage. The manual extension handcrank was used to lower the landing gear after the accident and it operated in a normal manner. After charging the aircraft battery, the engines were started and ran up to 2,100 rpm each. Troubleshooting of the alternators revealed that the 2-amp fuse for the left alternator was blown, preventing that alternator from functioning. Also, the field wire for the right alternator was found disconnected, preventing that alternator from functioning. Once investigators replaced the blown fuse and reattached the field wire, both alternators functioned normally. The postaccident engine test runs did not reveal evidence of a mechanical malfunction or anomaly that would have precluded normal operation.When interviewed after the accident, the pilot reported that the airplane had been flown for the last 10 days with both alternator warning lights continuously illuminated in the cockpit and with unreliable load meters. When the pilot brought the electrical issues up with his supervisor and with maintenance personnel, he was told to keep flying the airplane because it was being used to transport cargo and there was fear that the operator would lose the contract. He Page 2 of 7 ERA23LA064stated that management pressured him to fly the airplane, telling him that there was nothing wrong with it.
According to the flight crew, the airplane was descending to land with the autopilot configured to intercept a managed flight path profile. The airplane was descending in "Vertical Speed” mode at 500 feet per minute, with the airspeed set for 300 knots. As the airplane approached the profile, the crew selected “Managed Descent” mode and the airplane nosed over rapidly to intercept the descending flight path. The first officer checked the altimeter setting and then noticed that the airspeed indicator was approaching the maximum allowable airspeed; he then deployed the speed brakes to about 50%. Simultaneously, the captain took control of the airplane, disengaged the autopilot, and pitched up to avoid an overspeed condition. The crew then reset the automation and commenced a deliberate slow down. Shortly thereafter, the cabin crew called and advised that one of the flight attendants was injured during the maneuver. A flight attendant who was securing carts in the aft galley was hoisted into the air and landed on her left foot, fracturing her ankle. The remainder of the flight continued without incident.
The pilot of the aerial application helicopter completed operations for the day and stopped to refuel on the way back to the operator’s facility. After refueling and during the initial climb, the pilot reported that he was unable to maintain main rotor rpm. The pilot initiated a 180° autorotation and landed hard on a grass area near a hangar. During the landing, the right-side skid collapsed, the tail boom separated, and the helicopter came to rest upright. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, the tail boom, and the tail rotor system.Examination of the engine revealed that the fuel nozzle inlet screen was contaminated and partially blocked with a buildup of debris. The fuel nozzle assembly had been inspected, as part of the required 150-hour inspection interval, 25.9 hours before the accident.The director of maintenance (DOM) for the operator was interviewed for additional details on how the inspection had been performed. The DOM reported that he had cleaned the fuel nozzle, but not the fuel nozzle inlet screen. When asked specifically about the fuel nozzle inlet screen cleaning, the DOM reported that he, “has not had a chance to get to that yet.” A review of the engine maintenance records showed that the DOM had signed his initials indicating that the fuel nozzle assembly was inspected and cleaned at the required 150-hour inspection interval.The partially blocked fuel nozzle inlet screen with debris likely restricted fuel flow to the engine. The DOM’s failure to clean the entire fuel nozzle assembly, including the fuel nozzle inlet screen, likely resulted in a partial loss of engine power, an autorotation, and a hard landing. Based on the available evidence, it is likely the DOM did not clean the fuel nozzle inlet screen for undetermined reasons.Page 2 of 7 CEN23LA025
The private pilot just purchased the amateur-built airplane which was reportedly equipped with two fuel tanks in each wing totaling 22 gallons, or a total capacity of 44 gallons. According to the previous owner who was an airframe and powerplant mechanic, since filling the right fuel tank more than 1 month earlier, he flew the airplane on two separate flights totaling 1.3 hours. No additional flights were made by him after fueling. During an engine run before departure of the accident flight, the left and right fuel gauges indicated about one needle width from empty and 1/2 capacity, respectively. The new owner believed the depicted fuel amount was adequate for the intended short-duration flight to a nearby airport for fuel. He departed with the fuel selector on both, then shortly after takeoff moved it to the left fuel tank. About 13 minutes later the engine quit. He declared a mayday, moved the fuel selector to both and then right tank positions but that did not restore power. He flew towards a nearby airport but realized he was unable to land there. He maneuvered for a field, but about 26 minutes since departure the airplane collided with a tree adjacent to a residence, stalled, and impacted a portion of the house, the ground, and a car before coming to rest upright. Examination of the wreckage at the accident site by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed no fuel remaining in either wing fuel tanks, in the airframe fuel strainer, fuel lines, or on the ground around the wreckage. Although the carburetor was impacted damaged, there were no fuel stains on or around it. Postaccident testing of the fuel quantity indicating system was not performed.The engine Operator’s Manual specified that the fuel consumption was about 9.0 gallons-per-hour at 65% power, or at economy cruise. Thus, for the approximate 30 minutes-long flight about 4.5 gallons of fuel were required. That value could have been reflected in any combination between the left and right fuel tanks, but it an extreme unbalance with no fuel in the left fuel tanks and all fuel in the right tanks would have reflected just under 1/4 capacity on the right fuel gauge. At no configuration based on the amount that was actually on-board should the right fuel gauge have indicated 1/2 capacity. Therefore, Page 2 of 6 ERA23LA053the right fuel quantity gauge likely indicated that the tanks contained more fuel than the amount that was actually on board, which resulted in inadequate fuel for the intended flight and a subsequent total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.As part of the airplane’s last condition inspection performed more than 12 months earlier by the previous owner, the accuracy of the fuel gauges at empty was not performed.
The pilot reported that during the cross-country flight he noticed his fuel consumption was higher than he had expected. After entering the traffic pattern at the destination airport, and while turning from base to final, the engine “sputtered.” He switched from the right to the left fuel tank and attempted to restart the engine, however, engine power was not restored. The pilot conducted a forced landing in a field and touched down hard short of the runway threshold, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector who examined the airplane after the accident was unable to verify the presence of fuel in either the right or left fuel tanks.  The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation and that he needed to, “Establish a not to exceed minimum fuel level for continued flight.”
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during touchdown, the “nose pitched up” and caused the right wing to stall. The airplane fell and impacted the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. At the time of the accident, the pilot was landing on runway 18 with winds directly down the runway at 14 knots, gusting to 25 knots.
The pilot departed for the visual flight rules cross-country flight with about 12 gallons of fuel in each fuel tank for the planned 1 hour and 40-minute flight.  She reported that while enroute the fuel gauges were reading “low” and were fluctuating. Closer to the destination, the fuel gauges indicated that more fuel was present in the right fuel tank, so the pilot moved the fuel selector from the “both” position to the “right” position. About 1.5 hours into the flight, while flying at an altitude of about 2,000 feet above ground level and while being provided with radar vectors to the airport traffic pattern at the destination airport, the engine “started sputtering and got quiet.” The pilot attempted to restart the engine, but was unsuccessful, and she subsequently performed a forced landing in a field. The impact with the ground resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. Post-accident examination of the airplane found that the intact right-wing fuel tank was empty, that the intact left-wing fuel tank had about 6 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel remaining, and that the fuel selector was in the right tank position. During a postaccident interview the pilot stated that when the engine lost power she did not use a checklist in her attempt to restart the engine.  Review of the power loss in flight checklist found aboard the airplane revealed that the sixth item stated “fuel selector – check/switch/both.” Based on all available information, it is likely that after the pilot selected the right fuel tank earlier in the flight, its fuel supply was eventually exhausted and the engine lost power. It is also likely that, had the pilot used the checklist and selected the “both” position on the fuel selector, the fuel remaining in the left fuel tank could have restored engine power before the forced landing. Page 2 of 6 ERA23LA049
The pilot reported that while landing on a friend’s private airstrip the airplane struck wires that crossed the approach end of the runway. He continued the landing on the airstrip and the airplane departed the left side of the runway. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical problems with the airplane and that he just did not see the wires in time to avoid them. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the rudder.The owner of the airstrip had previously purchased orange markers to attach to the wires to aid visibility, but the electric power company had not yet attached the markers to the wires when the accident happened. After the accident the markers were placed on the wires.
The 76-year-old pilot was attempting an instrument approach in instrument meteorological conditions. He was cleared for the approach and air traffic control (ATC) instructed the pilot to maintain an altitude of 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) until established on the approach. The pilot did not read back the altitude assignment in the clearance and a controller had to re-state the clearance. The pilot acknowledged with the airplane’s call sign only. The airplane was then observed to climb and descend above and below the assigned altitude, which triggered a Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) alert to ATC. A controller immediately informed the pilot, who responded that he was climbing and “going around.” The controller instructed the pilot to climb to the assigned altitude of 3,000 ft msl, to turn to a specific heading, and to keep his wings level. The pilot repeated the instructions. The airplane then entered a climbing right turn to 3,200 ft msl, before it made a descending left turn. The controller continued to receive low altitude alerts and made numerous attempts to contact the pilot, but there was no response. The airplane continued to descend until it was no longer observed on radar. A witness heard the airplane’s engines operating at a high rpm as it descended wings-level from the cloud cover. He thought that the pilot would have had time to realize his proximity to the ground, but saw that the pilot never reacted and the airplane flew into the ground.Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed it sustained extensive impact damage consistent with impacting the ground at a high rate of speed. No evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures were identified, to the extent possible, that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot’s medical history, including chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL), prostate cancer, aortic valvular stenosis, hypertension, and mini stroke, conveyed increased risk of medical impairment. The pilot’s family also stated that he was not feeling well in the months leading up Page 2 of 9 ERA23FA047to the accident. However, the extent of the pilot’s injuries prevented any forensic determination regarding possible medical impairment during the flight. Additionally, ethanol was detected at a low level in the only available postmortem specimen. Some or all of the small amount of detected ethanol may have been from postmortem production. It is unlikely that ethanol effects contributed to the accident.
The pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight. He performed a preflight inspection, and the takeoff and climb were normal. After flying for about 1 hour 10 minutes, the pilot felt the engine shake and noticed some abnormal indications on the engine monitor. He made some adjustments to the engine controls, and the engine smoothed out and ran normally. A few minutes later, the engine surged momentarily to full power and then returned to its previous power setting. The pilot diverted to a local airport, and the engine operated normallyas the airplane descended. During the approach, which was conducted in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), the engine lost total power when the airplane was about 8 miles from the airport. The pilot attempted to restart the engine but was unsuccessful. The airplane exited the IMC and subsequently landed hard on a golf course, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage, both wings, and horizontal stabilizer.Postaccident examination of the airplane and extracted engine data revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane or engine. Given the available evidence for this accident investigation, the reason for the total loss of engine power could not be determined.
The pilot reported that he was preparing for a display flight in a local airshow which included a preflight procedure to rotate the engine prior to start for lubrication purposes. During the procedure, the electric starter motor struggled to rotate the engine due to viscous oil because of cooler overnight temperatures, and the main circuit breaker had tripped. The pilot turned off all cockpit switches, but forgot to turn off the magneto switch, and exited the airplane. The pilot then utilized a hand crank to rotate the engine, and the engine unexpectedly started. The wheel chocks had been previously removed in preparation for the planned flight, and the airplane began to move. Several ground personnel attempted to stop the airplane but were unsuccessful before the airplane impacted two parked airplanes.The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings and the elevator. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, he was on final approach and remained higher than normal and intended to land long to provide more separation from the wake turbulence from another airplane that had just landed. During the landing, the pilot “flared the airplane a little high, and the airplane fell from a few feet above the runway.” The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.