roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The flight instructor reported that the purpose of the flight was to familiarize the pilot with the airplane. As they prepared for takeoff, the flight instructor mentioned that the larger engine on this airplane tends to pull the airplane “gently left at full power.” The pilot started the takeoff roll with no problem. As the tailwheel lifted off the ground, the airplane veered sharply right and was nose high. The airplane subsequently impacted trees and terrain. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage. The flight instructor further reported there were no mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operations.
The flight instructor and student pilot were completing stop-and-go landings at night at an uncontrolled airport. During the second landing, a deer collided with the left rear fuselage and the empennage, then the airplane yawed left. The flight instructor took control of the airplane and taxied off the runway without further incident. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left horizontal stabilizer.
The flight instructor reported that, during the takeoff portion of a touch-an-go landing, the student applied an “extreme amount” of left rudder and the airplane began to veer left and impacted a light with the wingtip, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing. The instructor stated that he was not guarding the rudder pedals and attempted to assume control of the airplane, but the event happened very quickly and there was not enough time to correct and center the airplane over the runway. The instructor stated that during debriefing later, the student indicated that he lost control of the rudder.Post-accident inspection of the rudder flight control system by the Federal Aviation Administration revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction.
The accident pilot was the lead pilot of a flight of two returning to their home base after a local flight. The pilot reported a loss of engine rpm and the pilot of the second airplane reported the accident airplane was trailing smoke. An emergency was declared, and the airplane was cleared to land. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data showed the airplane crossed the airport boundary at an altitude of 200 ft with a groundspeed of 165 knots. The recommended speed for a precautionary landing with engine power is 90 knots. The pilot overflew the runway, and the airplane came to rest inverted in a marsh, about 1,500 ft past the end of the runway. The airplane was not visible from shore. First responders used multiple boats and a drone to search for the airplane; however, shallow water and the terrain slowed responders’ progress. A good Samaritan, who first located the airplane, provided assistance to the pilot and guided emergency responders to the airplane. During the time responders searched for and extricated the pilot the tide continued to rise and submerged the pilot before extrication. Downloaded engine data indicated an increase in cylinder head temperature (CHT) in the No. 4 cylinder followed by loss of oil pressure, a drop in exhaust gas temperature (EGT), and a decrease in engine power to 50%. The No. 4 cylinder exhibited low compression and suction during the postaccident examination, which was most likely due to environmental debris from the accident sequence that was found on the valve seat. No other anomalies were found during the examination that would have resulted in the loss of engine power.Review of postaccident medical records, including the autopsy data and toxicology reports, revealed no medical issues that would have contributed to the accident. Although the Page 2 of 8 ERA22FA141toxicology detected therapeutic levels of the unapproved antidepressant vilazodone, which is associated with side effects such as dizziness, it is unknown how long the pilot was taking this medication or the severity of her depression. Given the pilot’s actions during the flight, it is unlikely that effects from this medication or the pilot’s depression were factors in this accident. The metabolite of naltrexone, 6-beta-natrexol, was detected but not quantified, suggesting that any effects from the use of naltrexone were likely minimal and not a factor in this accident. ADS-B data revealed the airplane crossed over the runway threshold at a significantly higher airspeed than recommended in the pilot’s operating handbook. It’s likely the pilot’s perceived emergency and urgency to land led to the excessive airspeed on final approach and inability to touchdown on the runway.
The pilot reported that, during takeoff with a density altitude of 6,750 ft and the airplane’s weight near gross weight, the airplane’s acceleration seemed sluggish. The airplane lifted off about 1/3 of the way down the runway after achieving 55 knot rotation speed, but the climb was also “sluggish”. The airplane cleared the airport perimeter fence and began to settle. The airplane subsequently touched down on soft dirt and nosed over. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation and he believed that the cause of the accident was a combination of high-density altitude and the airplane’s weight close to the maximum allowable gross weight.
The pilot of the powered parachute reported that, about two weeks before the accident flight, he changed the throttle linkage connection to the throttle quadrant from the original connection to pull back for full throttle to push forward for full throttle. During the accident flight he was maneuvering the powered parachute to avoid powerlines, and mistakenly pulled the throttle back to gain altitude and subsequently cut engine power. Unable to clear the powerlines he immediately made a hard left turn and impacted the rising terrain. The powered parachute was destroyed during the post accident fire. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the powered parachute that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that after takeoff, while operating in the vicinity of the Salton Sea, he leveled off about 600 ft above ground level. The wind was out of the southeast and coming off the large body of water. After flying straight and level for about 4 miles, he moved the fuel selector from the “both” position to the “right” tank position. About 4 miles later a partial loss of engine power occurred. The engine continued to operate but was unable to produce adequate power to sustain flight. The pilot made a right turn and attempted to troubleshoot the loss of power to no avail, and the engine subsequently lost total power. The pilot landed on a soft dirt field and the airplane nosed over. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. An engine test run was completed with no anomalies or malfunctions identified. A review of the Federal Aviation Administration Carburetor Icing Probability Chart revealed that a serious probability of carburetor icing existed while operating within the atmospheric conditions, which included a relative humidity of greater than 50 percent that was present at the time of the accident. The pilot reported applying carburetor heat after the partial loss of power, per the emergency checklist, followed by the subsequent total loss of engine power. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation; therefore, the loss of engine power during low altitude flight near a large body of water without the application of carburetor heat, was likely the result of carburetor icing.Page 2 of 7 WPR22LA115
The pilot stated he was flying about 700 ft above ground level (AGL), then noticed that the airplane had descended “well below 500 ft.” He could see a pump station ahead with powerlines crossing the waterway and stated, “I’m too low.” He was traveling about 170 kts when he pulled back to climb and heard a “thud.” The airplane continued flying, but the pilot had limited rudder control. He returned to the departure airport and landed uneventfully; however, he noticed that the rudder was missing from the airplane. He stated that he looked up the pump station address and drove over to find the rudder laying in the grass near the powerlines. The rudder had impacted the powerline and separated from the airplane, resulting in substantial damage. The pilot reported that the airplane had no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor and his student were performing maneuvers as part of a flight lesson.  About 40 minutes into the flight, while attempting a left pedal turn, the helicopter descended just enough to touch the left rear skid, which surprised the student, who then added right lateral cyclic control. The helicopter’s right skid dug in the ground, and the helicopter rolled over on to its right side, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and main rotor blades.The helicopter manufacturer’s flight maneuvers guide advised that a 5-foot hover should be used for all taxi and hover operations, and a minimum 5-foot hover was the policy of the flight school.After the accident, the flight school had discussions with all their helicopter instructors to emphasize the need to maintain proper height above the ground, the need to closely guard the controls while instructing, and the need for improved awareness of the capabilities and experience of the students.
During descent, after a short local flight, the engine lost partial power. The pilot advanced the throttle and turned on the carburetor heat; however, power was not restored to the engine. He performed a forced landing to a wet, grassy field. The main landing gear wheels locked up and the airplane contacted a tree stump during the landing roll.Although a review of the maintenance records revealed the airplane’s engine had not been overhauled in 24 years, exceeding the recommended engine overhaul time of 12 years, a postaccident examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The reason for the partial loss of engine power could not be determined.
The pilot reported that after about 3 hours of total flight time, he proceeded to a nearby airport for fuel. During the descent, the “left fuel low” light illuminated and, shortly thereafter, the “reservoir fuel low” light illuminated. The pilot ensured the fuel tanks, fuel pump, and igniters were on, and he diverted to a nearby private strip. Soon after, the airplane’s engine began to lose power. The pilot increased the throttle, but the engine lost total power. The airplane descended rapidly and struck several trees before touching down on an upsloping field short of the runway. The pilot reported after the accident that he last refueled the airplane the day before the accident at Ozona Municipal Airport (OZA). He then flew the airplane a little over 1 hour to the departure airport to prepare for the accident flight. When asked if the airplane ran out of fuel, the pilot replied “no, I should have had more fuel.” During an on-scene examination, the airplane’s electrical system was turned on and the “LT fuel low,” “RT fuel low,” and “reservoir fuel low” lights were all illuminated. In addition, the left and right fuel gauges indicated “empty.” Both the left and right fuel tanks were sumped, and no fuel was noted. About 2 cups of fuel were drained from the reservoir fuel tank, and a couple ounces of fuel were drained from the fuel strainer. Fuel was later added to the fuel tanks and the engine started and operated normally. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the pilot’s inadequate fuel planning, which resulted in fuel exhaustion and a total loss of engine power.
Prior to landing during the commercial multi-engine checkride flight, the pilot performed the flight school’s landing checklist as he flew s-turns on the final approach leg to slow for traffic ahead. The pilot reported that “during the unstable approach my attention was divided between obliging the DPE’s (designated pilot examiner) advisements, slower traffic ahead of us, traffic behind, and listening (for a) possibl(e)…go-around (instruction) due to poor spacing.” He stated that he did not see the amber gear-up light illuminate and did not hear the landing gear warning horn. The pilot further reported that during the approach, the DPE advised him to not “reduce the power that much, we’re going to get behind the power curve and sink”, which he heeded. The airplane landed with the landing gear retracted, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. A post-accident examination of the airplane revealed that the landing gear motor circuit breaker was open. During recovery of the airplane from the runway, a mechanic reset the circuit breaker, after which the landing gear operated normally. Subsequent testing of the landing gear revealed that the landing gear warning horn and the green landing gear down and locked indicator light functioned normally. According to the airplane owner’s handbook, the amber light should flash when power is reduced on one engine with the landing gear up. The landing gear warning horn should sound when power is reduced on both engines below about 12 inches of manifold pressure if the landing gear is not down and locked. Given the pilot’s report of landing with some engine power applied, the power setting may have been above the threshold to activate the landing gear warning horn. Another pilot reported that a similar event occurred about two months prior to the accident. During an approach, when he moved the landing gear selector to the down position, there was no noise, and the landing gear down and locked indicator light did not illuminate. He performed a go around, and then discovered that the landing gear motor circuit breaker was open. He reset the circuit breaker and lowered the landing gear, which operated normally thereafter.
The student pilot reported that, he was performing a solo night flight. The student made a normal touchdown on the runway and retarded the throttle to idle. The airplane encountered a wind gust and the right wing lifted upward. Despite his aileron and rudder inputs, he was unable to regain control of the airplane. He added full power and the airplane momentarily became airborne before settling back down. The airplane abruptly veered to the right, resulting in him breaking the window and hindering his ability to control the throttle. The airplane departed the runway surface and the left wing was substantially damaged when it contacted the ground. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that after landing the tailwheel equipped airplane on the turf airstrip, local residents advised him of soft spots in the runway surface due to recently melted snow. The pilot said that he walked the areas and taxied on the taxiway and turf runway without any issues. He taxied to the end of the runway and prepared for takeoff, which included choosing a takeoff path that appeared dryer. About 450 ft into the takeoff roll, the airplane encountered a soft spot on the runway which slowed the airplane, raised the tail, and the airplane “jerked” to one side. The left wing struck the ground and the airplane then nosed over. When asked if any mechanical problems with the airplane existed prior to the accident the pilot replied that there were none and that the airplane just sunk into the soft turf during the takeoff.The airplane incurred substantial damage to the engine mount, right wing, and right wing strut.
The pilot departed from a river sand bar, and shortly after takeoff the airplane encountered an unexpected left quartering tailwind. The pilot reported that the airplane’s left wing stalled, which induced a spin at a low altitude. The airplane’s left wing and forward left fuselage impacted the shallow river water and sustained substantial damage. Since the accident, the airplane washed away in the river current and has not been located.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The noncertificated pilot stated that, shortly after takeoff, the engine began to lose power, run roughly, and shake violently. He applied carburetor heat and selected the left fuel tank, then the right fuel tank before selecting both fuel tanks with no change noted. He reduced engine power to control the airplane shaking and conducted an emergency landing. During the emergency landing, the airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. A postaccident examination revealed that the fuel selector was improperly labeled. However, the examination of the engine, accessories, and the other fuel system components revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. As a result, the reason for the partial loss of engine power and the engine’s rough operation could not be determined.
The sport pilot did not obtain a weather briefing before departing on a day visual flight rules cross-country flight over open water to an island airport along with a friend, who was flying a second airplane. The pilot of the second airplane reported that he had to descend from 6,500 ft mean sea level (msl) to 1,500 ft msl to remain below a broken cloud layer, diverted, and encouraged the accident pilot via radio several times to do the same. However, the accident pilot stated that he was descending from 6,500 ft msl to 4,500 ft msl and continuing to the original planned destination. No further communications were received from the accident pilot. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data revealed that the airplane was in the vicinity of moderate precipitation, which had been forecast, when it entered a descending right spiral before the flight track ended. Only the airplane’s vertical stabilizer and the right portion of the horizontal stabilizer were recovered after the accident. The pilot received his sport pilot certificate about one month before the accident. At that time, he reported a total flight experience of 88 hours; of which, 24 hours were as pilot-in-command and 0 hours were instrument experience. Given the pilot’s limited overall experience and lack of instrument flight experience, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation and lost control of the airplane after encountering limited visibility conditions in the moderate precipitation while flying over open water.
The pilot of the tailwheel equipped airplane reported that, prior to takeoff, he had the airplane positioned perpendicular to the direction of takeoff. During takeoff, when he added power and attempted to turn and align the airplane with the runway, he lost directional control. Subsequently, the airplane ground looped and struck a tree with the right wing, which resulted in substantial damage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The student pilot was conducting a solo flight and was on the base leg of the traffic pattern at the conclusion of the flight when the engine lost total power. The pilot determined that he could not reach the runway and chose a river for the forced landing, during which the airplane sustained substantial damage. Examination of fueling and dispatch records revealed that at the time of the accident, the airplane had logged 4.1 hours of flight since it was most recently fueled to capacity, which would have provided about 5.3 hours of endurance in a nominal cruise flight configuration of 75% power with a fuel consumption rate of about 9 gallons per hour (gph). Interviews with the student pilot and his flight instructor, as well as a review of surveillance video of the preflight inspection, revealed that the student pilot did not visually inspect the fuel quantity. Although the instructor performed a visual inspection, the fuel quantity measuring device for the airplane “was broken” and was not used. Recovery and examination of the airplane revealed that the fuel tanks were intact. The right fuel tank contained about 1 gallon of fuel, and the left fuel tank contained about 2 to 3 gallons of fuel. There was no evidence of fuel spillage in the water at the accident site. The fuel selector was found in the right tank position. There was no evidence found of mechanical deficiencies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.Examination of data downloaded from the airplane’s engine data monitor revealed fuel flow rates at or above 10 gph for about 21 minutes of the 1.1-hour flight. Given the position of the fuel selector, the small amount of fuel found in the right tank, and the lack of mechanical anomalies, it is likely that the loss of engine power was the result of fuel starvation when the fuel supply in the right tank was exhausted. Page 2 of 7 ERA22LA144
The solo student pilot of the airplane reported that, during the landing flare the airplane porpoised and veered left. He applied full engine power and attempted to go-around however, the airplane continued to veer left. Concerned the airplane would not become airborne, he aborted the go-around and applied brakes. The airplane exited the runway and impacted a parked vehicle and hanger. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings and fuselage. The student pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor and the pilot receiving instruction were conducting a flight in an airplane that the pilot receiving instruction owned, and the purpose of the accident flight was to prepare him for the commercial pilot practical examination. About 30 minutes after takeoff, the airplane was maneuvering at an altitude of about 1,600 ft above ground level. The airplane then entered a left spin and descended toward the ground, impacting a residential street. A witness stated that he heard a single-engine airplane overhead and thought the airplane’s loud engine sound did not match its slow airspeed, which meant to him that the airplane was most likely in a steep climb to practice a stall. The witness looked up again and saw the airplane diving almost straight down and twisting toward the ground. Examination of the wreckage revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions. Review of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data revealed that the airplane’s maneuvers during the final portion of flight were conducted below its flaps-up, idle power stall speed and were twice briefly below the flaps-down stall speed. During the final 30 seconds of flight, the airplane rolled rapidly to the left when engine noise was reduced. The airplane’s rapid left roll and loss of altitude were consistent with an aerodynamic stall. Thus, the pilot who was flying (which could not be determined based on the available evidence) allowed the airplane’s critical angle of attack to be exceeded, resulting in a loss of airplane control. Toxicological testing detected ethanol and metoprolol in the flight instructor’s specimens. The most likely source of the ethanol was postmortem production; therefore, the identified ethanol did not contribute to the circumstances of the accident. Although direct effects from the flight instructor’s use of metoprolol likely did not contribute to the events, the available evidence precluded a determination of whether effects from the flight instructor’s recent heart attack and underlying heart disease contributed to the circumstances of the accident. In addition, if Page 2 of 8 ERA22FA137the flight instructor had experienced a medical event during the flight, should have been reasonable able to control the airplane.