roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The flight instructor in the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that he was demonstrating flight maneuvers to the passenger when the oil filler cowl door unlatched in flight. The flight instructor reported that he feared for their safety, decided to land as soon as possible, and overflew a nearby island airstrip to verify wind direction and identify potential obstacles. During the precautionary landing on the 2,000 foot long by 15 foot wide airstrip, the flight instructor reported that as the airplane slowed and the tailwheel was lowered to the ground, the airplane encountered a wind gust from the left, and the airplane drifted to the right side of the narrow runway. The flight instructor reported that, "it became clear that I could not keep the aircraft on the runway surface, I initiated a go-around." During the aborted landing, the right main landing gear impacted an unknown object, which slowed the airplane's momentum, and the airplane settled to the ground and slid to a stop on the fuselage. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the horizontal stabilizer cables and the right aileron.Inspection of the oil filler cowl latch was conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety Inspector assigned to this accident and he found no failure or degradation of the locking mechanism or the latch assembly. Meteorological conditions reported for the airstrip where the accident occurred, reported that about the time of the accident the wind was out of the north-northeast at 7 knots gusting to 9 knots. The flight instructor was landing to the southeast.
The private pilot was about 6 miles from the destination airport when he informed the controller that the airplane had lost all engine power and would not be able to make it to the airport. The airplane struck the roof of a 40-ft-tall warehouse. No fuel was found in either fuel tank, and there was no evidence of a fuel spill. The pilot stated after the accident that the engine had lost power due to fuel exhaustion. No information was obtained during the investigation that detailed where the pilot had departed from or how much fuel was on board the airplane at the start of the accident flight. It is likely that the pilot departed with insufficient fuel on board for the planned flight or that he did not monitor his fuel usage during the flight; either of these scenarios would have resulted in the loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
The airline transport pilot reported that, about 30 minutes into the local flight, the engine experienced a total loss of power, and he conducted a forced landing to a powerline cut. He stated that the airplane was at low altitude at the time of the loss of engine power because he had been taking photos of a friend's farm.Two witnesses observed the airplane conducting aerobatic maneuvers during the flight. One of the witnesses stated that the airplane was flying so low that it startled her horses as it passed overhead. She then observed the airplane roll inverted; shortly thereafter, the engine became silent. The airplane lost altitude while still inverted and impacted trees. Examination of the wreckage revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane's operating instructions stated that, "Inverted flying must be limited to 10 seconds because of engine difficulties resulting from prolonged inverted flight." Because no anomalies were found during the examination, it is likely that the loss of engine power was a result of fuel disruption to the engine during the extended inverted flight.
The commercial pilot was conducting a local flight when he noted a lower-than-normal oil pressure indication and engine roughness. The engine subsequently experienced a partial loss of power and the airplane could not maintain altitude. The pilot deployed the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) at an estimated 472 ft above ground level, and the airplane impacted rough terrain under canopy in a nose-low, upright attitude. A test run of the engine and review of recorded data did not reveal the reason for the partial loss of engine power. Examination of the airframe parachute system revealed that, during deployment of the CAPS, the rocket separated from its lanyard in overstress. Fracture testing of the lanyard revealed that it did not exceed the minimum value in several tests, and the examined lanyard sections did not fully conform to specification; however, it is unlikely that these anomalies resulted in the overstress fracture.Features observed on the CAPS retaining harness suggested that some resistance was encountered when pulling the incremental bridle from the sleeve during the deployment. The cover flap from the retaining harness had discoloration and heat damage consistent with abnormal exposure to the rocket exhaust, and pulled stitches were noted in the vicinity of the sleeve where the incremental bridle was stowed. It is likely that the incremental bridle was not released immediately from the sleeve, which kept the rocket closer to the retaining harness and placed abnormal loads on the lanyards. At some point, the incremental bridle was released from the sleeve and loaded to separate the stitches in the incremental bridle as designed.During a nominal CAPS deployment, the airplane enters a nose-low attitude before leveling off, a stage of deployment referred to as "tail drop." For tail drop to occur, the deployment must be initiated to allow adequate time and/or altitude. During the accident, the parachute inflated fully; however, the abnormal CAPS deployment, as well as low deployment altitude resulted in the airplane touching down in a nose-low attitude before tail drop occurred.Page 2 of 14 CEN16LA223Based on static pull tests in the lab, the orientation of the incremental bridle within the sleeve can significantly affect the force required to release the incremental bridle from its stowed position. A review of parachute packing procedures revealed that the orientation of the incremental bridle as it was inserted in its sleeve was not specified. In the absence of any specific procedure for orienting the incremental bridle in the sleeve, it would be possible for the incremental bridle to be inserted in either orientation. The investigation could not determine whether the incremental bridle had been inserted in an unfavorable orientation or if such an orientation would have resulted in the lanyard fracture. Based on review of the parachute deployment and subsequent testing, an exact cause for the abnormal CAPS deployment could not be determined.
According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aviation Safety Inspector, the pilot of the Experimental Amateur Built airplane departed from a private airstrip. During the takeoff initial climb, the airplane lost engine power and force landed in a field. The FAA Inspector reported that the airplane was equipped with an older cog engine drive belt that failed during takeoff. The airplane impacted the ground and sustained substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage.The National Transportation Safety Board Air Safety Investigator-in charge attempted on multiple occasions to contact the pilot and the pilot's son, to whom the airplane was registered. The FAA Inspector was unable to contact the pilot, but he was able to speak with the pilot's son who was informed by the inspector to call the NTSB Investigator-in-charge; to no avail.
The pilot/owner and the pilot-rated passenger were making a multiple-leg cross-country trip. The day before the accident on two legs of the trip, the airplane's engine had run rough and experienced a partial power loss; both instances occurred after reaching cruise flight altitude and leaning the engine's fuel/air mixture. Due to the engine anomaly, the pilots elected to divert the night before the accident rather than continuing to the final destination in night conditions. The pilot/owner then consulted her mechanic, who attributed the power loss to vapor lock as a result of the weather conditions and instructed her to lean the mixture during the next pre-takeoff engine run-up.The next morning, the pilots performed a preflight inspection. The airplane was not fueled before departure, and both pilots stated that the fuel onboard was adequate for the flight; however, neither provided the specific fuel quantity contained in each tank. The pilots departed with the left fuel tank selected and established a cruise altitude of 10,500 ft; the pilot/owner stated that she "did not lean the mixture at all" during the flight. About 50 minutes from the destination, the pilots switched the fuel selector from the left fuel tank to the right tank. Nearing their destination airport, they initiated a cruise descent and retarded the throttle to 1,800 rpm; the engine subsequently experienced a total loss of power. They attempted to restore engine power by cycling the throttle and mixture control but were unable to restart the engine. They did not switch fuel tanks. After determining that the airplane would not reach the runway, the pilots performed a forced landing to desert terrain. The airplane subsequently impacted the ground hard and bounced before it came to rest in an area of sparse desert vegetation about 1/2 mile from the airport. A postaccident examination revealed that the fuel system was intact and not damaged during the accident; the right tank was found void of fuel, and the left tank contained about 10 gallons. Examination of the fuel sensor system showed that both the left and right fuel gauges erroneously indicated fuel was available when the fuel transmitters were placed in the empty position. An engine test run revealed no anomalies.Page 2 of 8 WPR16LA128Based on the information provided by the pilots, the airplane likely departed on the accident flight with about 30 total gallons of fuel. Although fuel computations using the pilots' flight plan indicated that the right fuel tank, which was selected at the time of the engine power loss, should have had about 8 gallons of usable fuel remaining, the tank was void of fuel at the accident site.The fuel consumption figures provided in the pilot's operating handbook indicated that the airplane's fuel consumption during the flight would have ranged from about 8.7 gallons per hour (gph) to 10.2 gph depending on the engine power setting and with the fuel-air mixture leaned to maximum power then slightly enrichened. Given that the fuel system was intact and that the right tank was completely void of fuel, the loss of power was likely the result of fuel starvation due to inflight fuel mismanagement.
The pilot reported that during a soaring competition, he found himself in an area of sink and proceeded to an open field that he had pre-selected, in the event that an off-field landing was warranted. He reported that he had a choice of two open fields, selected the field with the northeast to southwest orientation, overflew the field and noted that trees marked the northeast and southwest boundaries. He reported that he made his approach from the northeast, overshot the intended landing zone and impacted the trees that marked the southwest boundary. The glider sustained substantial damage to both wings and the empennage.The landing zone was about 800 feet long, from the northeast to the southwest boundary, and the trees were about 50 feet high.The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies with the glider prior to impact that would have prevented normal flight operations.
The helicopter pilot reported that during the engine run-up sequence while on a movable helicopter pad attached to a tug, he noticed that the right rear door was not secure. The pilot unhooked his shoulder harness to reach back to secure the door. While attempting to reach the door, the pilot reported that he inadvertently applied right tail rotor pedal, which caused the helicopter to spin to the right multiple times. During the rotation the helicopter departed the movable pad, impacted the tug, and came to rest in an upright position on the ground. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the vertical stabilizer. The pilot reported there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped turbine powered airplane reported that while landing, he reduced the power and there was an increased descent rate. The pilot added power but reported that the engine rpm did not have time to accelerate. The airplane touched down about 10 feet short of the runway in tall grass, the right main landing gear sheared off during the impact, the nose of the airplane dropped and the propeller impacted the ground.  The airplane rotated to the left and came to a stop in a ditch, sustaining substantial damage to both the wings and their lift struts.The pilot reported there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.The pilot reported as a safety recommendation, to allow plenty of runway space in case of a sudden increase in descent rate while landing.
The pilot of a tailwheel equipped airplane reported that during a gusty crosswind takeoff from a dry lake bed the left wing lifted and unbeknownst to the pilot, the right wing contacted the ground. The pilot further reported that during the initial climb, the airplane turned right despite full left rudder and aileron inputs. The airplane turned downwind about 4-6 feet off the ground, encountered a tailwind which "pushed the airplane down", descended onto a puddle, hydroplaned, and nosed over.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing and aileron.The pilot reported there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot reported that, during an aerial observation flight near known thunderstorms, the right center windscreen shattered. The pilot sustained multiple facial lacerations, but he was able to land the helicopter near a highway without further incident. The pilot reported that he did not see anything strike the windscreen and found no evidence of a bird strike.Examination of the helicopter revealed that debris from the windscreen substantially damaged two of the main rotor blades and the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer. Examination of the windscreen and its frame revealed evidence of cracking that originated in the center of the windscreen and propagated outward, consistent with impact forces from outside the helicopter.DNA from samples taken from portions of the windscreen matched DNA from a Western Kingbird; however, given the extent of the damage to the windscreen, the small size of the Western Kingbird, and the pilot's statement, it is likely that this DNA was due to a previous bird strike and did not result in the failure of the windscreen. Therefore, the reason for the windscreen failure could not be determined.
During cruise flight through an area of mountainous terrain, the commercial pilot became geographically disoriented and selected the incorrect route through the mountains. Upon realizing it was the incorrect route, he initiated a steep climb while executing a 180° turn. During the steep climbing turn, the airplane inadvertently entered instrument meteorological conditions, and the airplane subsequently impacted an area of rocky, rising terrain. The pilot reported there were no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.
In a telephone interview with the NTSB Investigator-in-charge (IIC), the pilot stated that the airplane touched down midfield, and he knew he was going to overrun the runway. He attempted to abort the landing, however the airplane over ran the runway and impacted the airport perimeter fence.A postaccident examination revealed substantial damage to the fuselage. According to the pilot there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. After multiple requests, the pilot did not return the National Transportation Safety Board Form 6120.1 Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report as requested.
The student pilot reported that during his fifth solo touch and go landing, the airplane landed short of the runway and impacted the runway asphalt edge with the nose landing gear. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the firewall. The student pilot reported that there were no pre impact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The student pilot reported that while on a solo cross country flight, after he landed at his destination, the weather degraded. He reported that he called his flight instructor and the flight instructor told him to wait out the weather. About three hours later, his flight instructor called him to check on the weather conditions. The student pilot reported that he checked the local weather reporting station, "but everything [was] missing" (referring to the weather information). His flight instructor told him to "get back and check the weather and I'll call you back". The student pilot interpreted that as "[it's] ok to takeoff". During the takeoff roll the airplane veered off the runway to the left and impacted a ditch.The flight school President reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.A review of recorded data from a weather observation station located about 1.6 miles to the northeast, revealed that, about the time of the accident the wind was 360 degrees true at 3 knots. The airplane departed on runway 36.
The private pilot had departed the airport in visual meteorological conditions, when, about ½ mile from the departure end of the runway, the airplane collided with a power transmission line support structure that was about 80 ft tall. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postimpact fire. There were no known witnesses to the accident, but a witness who saw the airplane take off stated that its altitude was low during the initial climb. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. In the months before the accident, the pilot flew with a flight instructor on two separate occasions for a flight review. The instructor stated that the pilot's skills were "very rusty" and that the pilot had difficulty controlling the airplane's airspeed, pitch, and landing flare. The instructor did not endorse the pilot for a flight review and recommended that he receive additional dual instruction; however, it is unknown if the pilot followed this recommendation because his personal logbook was not located after the accident. Given the lack of preimpact mechanical anomalies, it is likely that the pilot did not maintain an appropriate climb rate after takeoff, which resulted in collision with the power line structure.
The pilot reported that the airplane’s preflight inspection, runup, and takeoff roll were normal. He stated that, after becoming airborne, the airplane settled back to the runway, and he attempted to climb the airplane again but was unsuccessful. On the third attempt, the airplane lifted off but never achieved more than 20 ft of altitude. It then impacted trees about 90 ft beyond the departure end of the runway. The wooden propeller exhibited signs of rotational damage, indicating it was likely under some power; there was leading edge damage, and the outboard section of the propeller blades were splintered. The airplane was under gross weight at departure. Although a postaccident examination of the engine revealed that one of the cylinders indicated low compression, the examination was not accomplished with oversight of a Federal Aviation Administration inspector; a follow-up examination was not possible. Weather at the time of the accident was not conducive to the formation of carburetor ice.It is likely that the engine experienced a partial loss of power during the takeoff roll and subsequent attempted climb; however, the reason for the reduction of engine power and subsequent airplane performance could not be determined. In addition, instead of making repeated attempts to climb, the pilot should have aborted the takeoff at the first sign that the airplane would not climb.
The commercial pilot was completing an instrument flight rules air taxi flight on a route that he had flown numerous times for the customer on board. Radar and voice communication data revealed that the airplane was vectored to the final approach course for the precision approach and was given a radio frequency change to the destination airport control tower frequency. The tower controller issued a landing clearance, which the pilot acknowledged; there were no further communications with the pilot. Weather conditions at the airport at the time of the accident included an overcast ceiling at 300 ft with 1 mile visibility in mist.The wreckage was located in densely-wooded terrain. Postaccident examination revealed no evidence of any mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The wreckage path and evidence of engine power displayed by numerous cut tree branches was consistent with a controlled, wings-level descent with power.A radar performance study revealed that, as the airplane crossed the precision final approach fix 6.7 nautical miles (nm) from the runway threshold, the airplane was 800 ft above the glideslope. At the outer marker, 5.5 nm from the runway threshold, the airplane was 500 ft above the glideslope. When radar contact was lost 3.2 nm from the threshold, the airplane was about 250 ft above the glideslope. Although the airplane remained within the lateral limits of the approach localizer, its last two recorded radar returns would have correlated with a full-downward deflection of the glideslope indicator in the cockpit, and therefore, an unstabilized approach.Further interpolation of radar data revealed that, during the last 2 minutes of the accident flight, the airplane's rate of descent increased from 400 ft per minute (fpm) to greater than 1,700 fpm, likely as a result of pilot inputs. During the final minute of the flight, the rate decreased briefly to 1,000 fpm before radar contact was lost. The company's standard operating procedures stated that, if a rate of descent greater than 1,000 fpm was encountered during an instrument approach, a missed approach should be performed.Page 2 of 9 ERA16FA215The airplane's relative position to the glideslope and its rapid changes in descent rate after crossing the outer marker suggest that the airplane never met the operator's stabilized approach criteria. Rather than executing a missed approach procedure as outlined in the company's operating procedures, the pilot chose to continue the unstabilized approach, which resulted in a descent into trees and terrain.It is unlikely that the pilot's well-controlled diabetes and effectively treated sleep apnea contributed to the circumstances of this accident. However, whether or not the pilot's multiple sclerosis contributed to this accident could not be determined.