roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
Two pilots were conducting pattern work at the accident airport. Video footage as well as witness statements showed the accident airplane was on final approach to land at a low altitude and high rate of speed. The airplane yawed to the left while in a forward slip, rolled inverted, and descended rapidly in a nose-down attitude. The airplane impacted terrain in a field just short of the runway threshold. Postaccident examination of the airplane’s wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.Overall, the medical investigation for this accident identified that both the pilot and pilot-rated passenger had potentially impairing medical conditions and had used potentially impairing substances.Although an improperly performed slip maneuver could explain the sudden loss of control, and such an improper maneuver might plausibly represent diminished performance related to subtle impairment, the investigation was unable to determine whether a medical factor contributed to the accident based on the available evidence. It is likely that the pilot’s control inputs were too aggressive when the airplane was placed into the forward slip to land, which resulted in the loss of control. Additionally, the pilot failed to fly a stabilized approach by landing too fast.
The pilot-in-command (PIC) reported hearing a “boom” during the takeoff just before reaching V1 and a second “boom” just as he called out V1. The second-in-command (SIC), who was the pilot flying, called to abort the takeoff. Both suspected they had blown tires. They attempted to slow the airplane, but the there was no braking action. The drag chute was deployed but the airplane continued off the end of the runway, traveled through the runway end lights, and into the grass. During the accident sequence, the drag chute separated from the airplane and was located on the runway. Examination of the airplane after the accident revealed that the left main landing gear tire had ruptured and pieces of the tire and the left brake system assembly were found along the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing during the accident.According to the operator’s operations manager, the airplane’s tire pressures should have been checked at least every 7 days. When the tire pressures were checked about 2 weeks before the accident, the left inboard tire pressure was low. Air was added to the tire and the airplane was returned to service. The tire pressures were not documented since that entry. A mechanic from the operator stated the tire pressures were checked the day before the accident, and “the pressure was within limits set forth” by the manufacturer. In addition, the mechanic stated that no maintenance entry was made since no corrective action was needed. Although the mechanic stated he checked the tire pressure the day before the accident, the tire pressured was not checked on the day of the accident, as recommended by the airframe manufacturer. Given this information, it could not be determined whether or not the tires were appropriately inflated at the time of the accident.It is likely, that when the left main landing gear tire ruptured, the tire tread damaged the left main landing gear brake assembly as well as the hydraulic line in the left wing that was ruptured. Subsequently, the hydraulic fluid drained from the system, and the brake system was Page 2 of 7 ERA23LA075ineffective due to a lack of hydraulic fluid, and resulted in the flight crew’s inability to stop the airplane on the runway.
Southwest Airlines flight 136 encountered turbulence while descending through 15,600 ft into Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, Colorado, and a flight attendant fractured her ribs.  During the brief for the flight preceding the accident flight, the captain notified FA “A” that he would be requesting that the FAs take their seats about 25 minutes before their arrival at DEN. The captain stated that this was a routine part of his briefings for flights into DEN due to the unpredictable weather. FA “A” stated that she had been busy with her duties and about 4 hours had passed since the briefing. Subsequently, she had forgot to share this information with the other FAs.  About 35 minutes before landing, the captain asked the cabin crew to clean up the cabin and take their seats. All three FAs located vacant passenger seats in the cabin and were seated. When the captain “double chimed” the cabin at about 16,000 ft (indicating the cabin should be secured early), all three FAs stood up to return to their jump seats. Shortly thereafter, the airplane experienced moderate turbulence. FA “B” reported that as she was walking through the aisle, the turbulence occurred, and the airplane “dropped”. She went into the air before falling onto a row of seats. As she attempted to sit in one of the seats, the airplane dropped again, and she fell to the floor.  Following the turbulence, the first officer stated that he gave a pilot report (PIREP) to air traffic control at DEN and the flight proceeded to its destination and landed without further incident. After landing, the flight crew was informed that FA “B” required medical attention. Emergency medical services arrived and transported FA “B” to the emergency room where she was diagnosed with multiple rib fractures. Page 2 of 7 DCA23LA086A post-accident review of meteorological conditions showed no significant meteorological information (SIGMETs). Upper air model data at the time of the accident revealed limited wind shear around the accident altitude. Weather radar data from the National Weather Service station located in Watkins, Colorado (located 6 nautical miles southeast of DEN) showed no reflectivity that suggested convective activity or other precipitation.There was one applicable PIREP from about 85 minutes earlier that reported moderate turbulence between 10,000 ft and 13,500 ft (MSL) about 35 miles east-southeast of the accident location near DEN. Analysis of the aggregate weather information suggested the turbulence was likely mechanical in nature and caused by significant surface winds in the vicinity of mountainous terrain.
The two pilots were conducting a business flight with six passengers when the accident occurred. During the night arrival the captain flew a visual approach with excessive airspeed and the airplane crossed the runway threshold more than 50 knots above approach speed (Vref). The before-landing checklist was not completed, and the flaps were at an incorrect 20° position instead of 40°. The airplane touched down near the midfield point of the 6,022 ft non-grooved runway, which was wet due to earlier precipitation. The captain initially applied intermittent braking, then applied continuous braking starting about 2,069 ft from the end of the runway. The captain did not deploy the thrust reversers. The airplane exited the runway above 100 knots groundspeed, then continued into a ditch and airport perimeter fence, which resulted in substantial damage to the forward fuselage.Examination of the airplane revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The operator’s flight manual directed that all approaches were to be flown using the stabilized approach concept. For a visual approach, this included establishing and maintaining the proper approach speed and correct landing configuration at least 500 ft above the airport elevation. Neither pilot recognized the requirement to execute a go-around due to the excessive approach speed or the long landing on a wet runway, which resulted in the runway excursion.
The pilot was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan in dark night instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). As the pilot approached the destination airport, the air traffic controller attempted to vector him onto his requested GPS instrument approach procedure. The pilot was provided course corrections and heading changes from the controller, and was advised that the airplane before him had performed the missed approach procedure and diverted due to low cloud ceilings (200 ft above ground level [agl]).Flight track data revealed that the airplane was consistently below published minimum altitudes throughout the approach and was 500 ft below the minimum altitude prescribed at the final approach fix. The pilot continued the descent below the lowest minimums prescribed by the approach procedure, and about 1.25 miles from the runway and left of the runway centerline, the airplane impacted and became suspended in a power line tower at an elevation about 600 ft mean sea level (msl) and 100 ft above ground level. The airport was located at an elevation of 539 ft msl.Examination of the airplane revealed that there were no pre-impact mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. In an interview following the accident, the pilot stated that his course diversions during the flight were the result of a mis-programmed GPS. Throughout the interview, he could not articulate the features of his IFR-certified GPS, and stated that, in many situations, he used his handheld, VFR-only GPS to avoid the “complex keystrokes needed” to operate the IFR GPS.The pilot stated that he was not receiving vertical guidance on his GPS after intercepting the final approach course. He set an “alarm” to sound when the airplane had descended to 800 ft on the approach, but at 1,200 ft, he sighted the ground, and became focused on “keeping Page 2 of 15 ERA23LA071contact with the ground through the side window” and “pulling the airport out of the soup.” The pilot stated that he was familiar with the powerlines that he impacted and believed that he was beyond them. The lowest altitude allowed by the approach procedure was 789 ft msl, or 269 ft agl. However, this altitude was for an approach category that provided both lateral and vertical course guidance, and the pilot stated that he was not receiving vertical guidance. Whether the lack of vertical guidance was the result of the pilot’s mis-programming of the approach procedure or because he was referring to his VFR-only GPS for guidance was not determined. The lowest altitude allowed for an approach with only lateral guidance was 980 ft msl, or 460 ft agl.Based on the available information, the pilot became preoccupied with attempting to visually locate the runway and failed to maintain an effective scan of his instruments, which resulted in his descent below minimums, lateral deviation off the approach course, and collision with powerlines.
The noncertificated pilot described that on the day of the accident flight, he thought that the winds were gusting to about 30 knots. Shortly after takeoff from the private airstrip he reported that he lost control of the airplane after encountering a gust of wind. The airplane subsequently contacted power lines and came to rest in trees, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage and wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that after takeoff she had to recycle the landing gear because the nose gear would not retract when she retracted the landing gear. The airplane owner, who was seated in the rear seat, reported that the landing gear was functioning normally and that the nose gear did not retract due to the pilot putting the gear handle in the neutral position before the landing gear fully retracted. After the pilot recycled the landing gear it retracted without further issue and the flight proceeded to the destination.Before landing the pilot and two passengers confirmed the landing gear was extended by visual confirmation and as indicated by the cockpit landing gear indicators. The pilot reported the airplane touched down on the main landing gear, followed by the nose landing gear. When the nose landing gear touched down, the pilot felt like the nose landing gear was not locked. The airplane bounced, the propeller struck the runway, and the airplane came to rest upright. The airplane owner stated the airplane touched down on the nose wheel, porpoised multiple times, and came to rest upright.Due to the lack of reported substantial damage, the accident was initially classified as an incident.  Several months later, the airplane owner reported additional damage was observed to the forward fuselage bulkhead and other structure. The nose landing gear retract arm was pulled and separated from the bulkhead. During the time between the accident and the notification of additional damage, the airplane was sold for salvage and partially disassembled. Due to the partial disassembly, the landing gear system was compromised and could not be functionally tested. As a result, the investigation was unable to determine if the reported landing gear malfunction occurred before or during the runway contact. Page 2 of 6 CEN23LA124
The pilot reported that, he mistakenly entered the wrong valley with rising terrain, which the airplane could not out-climb. When the pilot determined that he would not out-climb the terrain or safely reverse course, he landed the airplane on the valley floor, resulting in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot was on a cross-country flight and had climbed to his en route cruising altitude. The airplane continued at that altitude for about 10 minutes and then the engine sustained a total loss of power. The pilot attempted to troubleshoot the loss of power while preparing for an off-airport landing. He estimated the airplane had about 23 gallons of fuel at this time. The pilot intentionally pulled back on the controls to deplete airspeed and avoid contacting a boulder during the forced landing. The airplane stalled, impacted the terrain, and came to rest inverted in a field. Postaccident examination revealed no evidence of leakage in the fuel system, but only trace amounts of fuel were found throughout the system and the 23 gallons could not be accounted for. It is unknown if the fuel egressed from the system after impact. The throttle cable was attached to the carburetor arm but was damaged and could only move slightly when manipulating the control knob in the cockpit (full travel was not possible). However, the pilot reported manipulating the throttle following the power loss; therefore, the throttle cable damage most likely occurred as a result of the impact.  The air intake tubing was partially crushed and evidence was found of it having been modified. It is unknown if a lack of air to the carburetor contributed to the accident.
The pilot reported that while in the landing flare, a deer ran in front of the airplane from the right side. He initiated a go-around, but the deer struck the left wing and the airplane veered off the left side of the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing. No preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane were found that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor, who was also the owner of the experimental amateur-built helicopter, said that shortly after takeoff, while about 150 ft above ground level, the helicopter’s engine lost partial power with “severe backfiring.” He declared an emergency, turned back to the airport, and landed on a grassy area. Upon touchdown, the helicopter’s front left skid dug into the grass and the helicopter rolled over. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed the No. 4 exhaust valve spring retainer was missing. The engine maintenance manual required inspection of the valve train system, including the spring retainer, every 25 hours. A review of the engine maintenance logbook revealed that the flight instructor/owner had performed the 25-hour inspection about 8.8 hours before the accident. The reason for the separation of the valve spring retainer was not determined.
The student pilot reported he was on a solo cross-country flight. The airport runway conditions were reported as good, braking deceleration and directional control was normal. As the airplane crossed over the approach end of the runway, the pilot felt he needed to lose a little more airspeed and held a flare a little longer and landed further down the runway. Upon touchdown the airplane began to slide to the left of centerline. The pilot attempted a go-around maneuver by adding power. The pilot was unable to correct back to centerline, which resulted in a runway excursion. The airplane impacted taxiway signs and lights sustaining substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot reported that there were no pre-accident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The gyroplane pilot reported that he initiated his takeoff midway down the runway with a tailwind. After takeoff, the angle of climb was shallower than expected and the pilot determined that he may not clear the trees beyond the runway’s departure end. He attempted to turn back toward the runway; however, the gyroplane had insufficient altitude and impacted the brush.  The gyroplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and tail section and the passenger was seriously injured. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the gyroplane that would have precluded normal operation and that he gave up safety margin unnecessarily. He stated that he should have performed a full-length departure into the wind.
The pilot of the weight-shift aircraft reported that, he was out for a pleasure flight and ran out of fuel and was forced to land on desert terrain. During the landing, the aircraft collided with vegetation which substantially damaged the fuselage. The pilot reported that a better preflight would have prevented this accident. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the aircraft that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot was flying the airplane in the traffic pattern when it descended into trees and terrain while on final approach to the runway. A review of aircraft track data and the wreckage debris path concluded that the airplane descended nearly wings-level into trees about 0.28 nautical miles (nm) from the runway threshold. A witness reported that he saw an airplane in a descent toward the airport and heard its engine running. There was no change in engine noise as the airplane descended below his sightline and then he heard a sound resembling a wood-chipper.Examination of the airplane, engine, and propeller revealed no evidence of a preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure that would have prevented normal operation, nor was there any evidence of a bird strike.The accident occurred about 9 minutes before sunset, with the sun positioned about 1.1° above the horizon and 27.5° left of the runway centerline. At the time of the accident, there was another pilot flying in the traffic pattern who reported being slightly disoriented by sun glare while he turned onto final approach.Aeromedical research suggests that sun glare can be visually debilitating and lead to operational errors and accidents. Specifically, sun glare during takeoff and landing phases can result in pilot perceptual issues that lead to collisions with objects or terrain when the pilot under- or over-shoots the runway and/or fails to maintain alignment with the runway.It is likely that the pilot became disoriented by sun glare after he turned the airplane onto final approach, which contributed to his failure to maintain a normal descent profile to the runway and the inflight collision with trees and terrain.Page 2 of 12 CEN23FA046
According to the pilot, he was flying with a friend in the local area and was returning to the departure airport when the accident occurred. He was operating the airplane with the fuel selector in the “BOTH” position. When the pilot made a turn with about 30° of bank, the engine began to “cut out.” The pilot stated that he leveled the wings and that the engine started to regain power just before it “sputtered and died.” The pilot immediately established the airplane’s best glide airspeed and selected a field for a forced landing. During the landing, the airplane impacted multiple trees, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage.The left and right fuel tanks had about 8 to 10 gallons of fuel per side. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed fuel in the gascolator, with no visible contamination, and no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A review of weather conditions at the time of the accident showed no probability for carburetor icing. Thus, on the basis of the available evidence for this accident investigation, the cause of the loss of engine power could not be determined.
During a checkride with an applicant pilot, the designated pilot examiner was demonstrating a 180° autorotation. The applicant pilot reported the descent was too quick, the examiner flared too low, and the helicopter experienced a hard landing. An airport surveillance video showed the helicopter descend at a rapid rate and impact the runway. The helicopter came to rest on its left side and sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, tail boom, and main rotor system. The operator reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
Multiple witnesses observed fire and a trail of smoke coming from the rear of the experimental, amateur-built airplane as it flew overhead; the airplane was equipped with a rear-mounted engine. The airplane appeared to be in a level flight attitude and the fire progressively worsened as it continued toward a nearby airport. The airplane subsequently impacted the ground about 11/2 miles northeast of the airport, where most of the airplane was consumed by a postcrash fire.    Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the inflight fire likely started near the turbocharger; however, the exact origin could not be determined due to damage from the inflight and postcrash fires. There were no other mechanical malfunctions or failures identified during the postaccident examination that would have precluded normal operation.