roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
***This report was modified on June 13,2018. Please see the docket for this accident to view the original report.***The helicopter pilot reported that he was performing an agricultural application flight and was in a hurry to spray the field because of a previous 3-hour delay caused by a broken fuel truck. The pilot reported that the weight of the helicopter was 40 lbs below the helicopter's maximum gross weight and that he "approached the field with the understanding that I was heavier, and it was hotter and more windy than I originally planned for." The pilot reported that the helicopter was headed south and that the wind was from the southwest about 15 knots. He made a low-altitude, low-airspeed, left turn to the north, and the helicopter entered a nose-low attitude and sank more rapidly than he anticipated. The pilot aborted the turn and chose to maintain a southeast heading to use the crosswind to avoid power lines. He attempted to arrest the sink rate by increasing the collective, but the low rotor rpm horn sounded. The helicopter impacted the ground, bounced, and then rolled onto its left side. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the tailboom and the main rotor system.The nearest METAR was about 32 miles northwest of the accident site, and it reported, at the time of the accident, wind from 230° at 9 knots, gusting to 16 knots. The temperature was 88°F and the dew point was 20°F. The field elevation was 696 ft, and the density altitude was 2,786 ft.According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Helicopter Flying Handbook, FAA-8083-21A (pg. 2-4, para. 5), "turns in a helicopter increase the load factor exponentially, ultimately increasing the power requirement that is necessary to maintain the helicopter's altitude. Left pedal turns increase the quantity of anti-torque produced by the tail rotor, by demanding additional power from the 245-brake horsepower engine. Pilot flight control inputs demanding more power than the engine is capable of Page 2 of 6 GAA17CA401producing, with respect to the atmospheric conditions, adversely affects the helicopter's ability to sustain its altitude. Available engine power is directly correlated to main and tail rotor RPM. When the engine fails to produce the required power to sustain airspeed and altitude at high DA [descent altitude], the main rotor blades will exceed their critical angle of attack, consequently decreasing main rotor blade RPM." The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the retractable-landing-gear airplane forgot to extend the landing gear before touchdown. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.After multiple requests, the pilot did not submit the National Transportation Safety Board Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report Form 6120.1.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during the landing roll, the tailwheel shimmied, so he held full aft elevator input until the airplane slowed. He then "slightly" released the back pressure when the airplane suddenly swerved to the right. The pilot was unable to correct the turn, and the airplane ground looped. The left main landing gear collapsed, and the left wing impacted the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of a tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during landing, the airplane bounced and, upon the second touchdown, veered to the right and ground looped. The airplane exited the runway and impacted a drainage ditch.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot indicated that he performed a preflight inspection of the airplane before the local flight and noticed a small amount of water drain from the fuel tanks while sampling fuel from them. After an engine run up, he did not notice any anomalies and departed. While in cruise flight at an altitude of 1,200 ft above ground level, the engine lost power, and the pilot changed his course to return to the departure airport. During the return to the airport, the engine lost total power. The pilot began an emergency descent and conducted a forced landing, during which the airplane struck power lines, collided with the ground, and nosed over, which resulted in substantial damage to the airplane.Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed a mixture of water and fuel draining from the right fuel tank. Examination of the carburetor revealed a significant amount of corrosion within the carburetor; several large flakes of corroded material were at the bottom of the fuel bowl, and one flake was within the mixture control housing, indicating that water had likely been present in the fuel system for an extended period of time. Given this information, it is likely that water contamination of the fuel ultimately resulted in the loss of engine power.
The flight instructor and private pilot, who did not have a multiengine rating, were conducting a familiarization flight in the centerline thrust, multiengine airplane. Following the preflight inspection, the instructor and the pilot believed that both fuel tanks were about 1/2 to 3/4 full. After practicing maneuvers uneventfully for about 30 minutes, the front engine lost all power. The instructor told the pilot to return to the departure airport; the rear engine was operating at this time. However, before reaching the airport, the rear engine lost all power. With insufficient altitude remaining to reach a runway, the pilot transferred control to the instructor, who then conducted a forced landing into trees.Postaccident examination of the accident site revealed no smell of fuel, and only about 6 gallons of fuel (of a possible 131 gallons with all fuel tanks filled to capacity, 3 gallons of which were unusable) were recovered from both wing fuel tanks. Examination of both engines revealed no evidence of any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The four fuel quantity sender units (two for each main fuel tank) were removed and tested with an ohm meter. In the empty position, the left outboard fuel sender unit displayed a resistance value equal to an approximate 1/2-tank reading. The left and right inboard fuel sender units displayed a resistance value equal to an approximate full-tank reading. The right outboard fuel sender unit displayed inconsistent resistance readings throughout its range of travel.The airplane manufacturer published a mandatory service bulletin (SB) about 18 years before the accident, which required inspection of the fuel quantity indicating system to verify that each fuel gauge indicated the accurate fuel amount. The SB also required that an initial inspection of the system be completed within 100 hours of operation and subsequent recurring inspections every 12 months. Examination of the airplane's maintenance logbooks revealed no evidence of compliance with the SB.Given the lack of fuel found at the accident site and that postaccident examination of the engines revealed no mechanical issues, it is likely that the pilots did not adequately verify the quantity of fuel during the preflight inspection, in part due to erroneous fuel quantity indications provided by the fuel quantity indicating system, which resulted in fuel exhaustion and a subsequent loss of all engine power Page 2 of 7 ERA17LA235to both engines. The airplane operator's failure to comply with the SB precluded the pilots from being able to identify the fuel quantity in flight.
The pilot of the helicopter reported that, during a hover taxi while using night vision goggles, he "pedal turned facing the west to line up with [the] landing lines painted on the ramp." He added that he looked under his goggles and observed the right painted mark under the right skid and noted that he estimated that the helicopter was about 6 ft above the ground. He then looked back through his goggles to land the helicopter. The tactical field officer that was on board the helicopter advised the pilot that they needed to move forward. The pilot further reported that he "tried to move forward but nothing happened at which time [he] felt a sudden jolt and then [heard] the noise of the tail rotor strike." The helicopter struck a building and then impacted the ground. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the fuselage.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot in the retractable-landing-gear airplane reported that he made a normal approach, but he failed to extend the landing gear. The airplane touched down on the runway and skidded to a stop on the lower fuselage. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the lower fuselage.Per the National Transportation Safety Board Pilot Aircraft Accident Report, the pilot noted that the accident could have been prevented if he had performed a "double and triple check of my GUMPS checklist."The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The private pilot departed on a local, private flight in the helicopter with a family member onboard for a scenic tour of the area. The pilot reported that, about 45 minutes into the flight, he slowed the helicopter to 35 knots, descended it to about 300 ft above ground level (agl), and then entered a left orbiting turn to follow an animal. The helicopter then experienced an uncommanded yaw, which the pilot perceived as a loss of tail rotor authority, and it then began to spin clockwise and descend. The pilot immediately attempted to counteract the spin by lowering the collective control, reducing power, and applying left antitorque pedal, which he maintained for the rest of the descent. When the helicopter was about 5 ft agl, the pilot pulled the collective control, but he was unable to arrest the descent, likely because the descent rate was too high, and the helicopter subsequently impacted the ground hard, which resulted in substantial damage to the tail cone and tail rotor. Postaccident helicopter examination revealed no evidence of any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Further, the pilot reported that there were no problems with the engine and that it continued to run normally after the helicopter came to rest. It is likely that the pilot allowed the airspeed to drop below translational lift, which resulted in a loss of tail rotor effectiveness and a subsequent spin. Despite remedial actions to compensate for the spin, the descent rate was likely too high to arrest it, which resulted in the hard landing.
The private pilot was taking off in day, visual meteorological conditions. According to a witness who was both a pilot and a mechanic, the airplane took off and sounded "normal" and returned for landing. After touchdown, the airplane continued for a touch-and-go landing but the engine, "fumbled… faltered drastically for 3 or 4 seconds" before the pilot aborted the takeoff, taxied back to the beginning of the runway, and took off again. During that takeoff, the witness heard the engine "miss" and heard further power interruptions before his attention was diverted from the airplane. The witness did not see the accident. Airport surveillance video depicted the airplane on its takeoff roll, followed by an initial climb and a left turn in the vicinity of the crosswind leg of the airport traffic pattern. The airplane then entered a shallow descent and a shallow bank angle as it descended from view behind trees.Examination of the airplane at the accident site revealed no fuel odor and no evidence of fuel spillage at the scene. Three ounces of fuel were recovered from the airplane. Detailed examination of the airframe and engine revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation; however, locking pliers were substituted for the trim actuator handle, and a bird's nest was found in the engine. In addition, the lap belt and shoulder harnesses were not buckled, and the shoulder harnesses were stowed behind the seat, the lap belts were stowed to either side of the seat pan, and the mold growth, dirt, and corrosion visible on the belts, buckle, and male tabs suggested they had not been used for an extended period of time. Examination of airplane records revealed that the airplane's most recent annual inspection was 5 years before the accident.Whether the pilot confirmed the amount of fuel onboard before departure could not be determined, but his failure to appropriately address the "faltering" engine before attempting another takeoff reflects poor hazard recognition and impaired decision making. Given the lack of fuel found onboard after the accident, the loss of engine power was likely the result of fuel exhaustion.Additionally, toxicology testing of the pilot identified the use of butalbital (a barbiturate) and marijuana, both of which can affect decision-making. Thus, it is likely that the effects from the pilot's use of two psychoactive substances contributed to his decision to conduct the takeoff after observing an engine Page 2 of 8 ERA17FA232anomaly. Because the pilot was over 40 years old, his medical certificate expired 2 years after issuance; thus it was not valid at the time of the accident.
The helicopter pilot reported that he was maneuvering at low altitude during an agricultural application flight. While in a left turn, he did not see the power lines until they were very close. He increased the collective to climb, and he banked right to avoid impact. However, the tail rotor struck the power lines, and the helicopter lost tail rotor effectiveness. The pilot conducted an autorotation and landed the helicopter, but the tailboom impacted trees. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the tail rotor gear box, the tail rotor blades, and the vertical stabilizer.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The airline transport pilot was preparing to depart in the helicopter on his fifth aerial application flight of the day. While on the ground, he increased engine rpm from idle to 3,100 rpm. Before making a collective input, the pilot felt a "sudden pull" and heard a "very loud snap." The pilot then saw that a company truck, which was parked nearby, had just sustained damaged and that the helicopter's two main rotor blades were missing. He shut down the engine; exited the helicopter; and found the main rotor blades, which were constructed of wood, splintered and scattered on the ground from about the helicopter's 2 o'clock position counterclockwise to its 8 o'clock position. The helicopter's transmission case was fractured, and the rotor mast had separated from the transmission and came to rest about 120 ft behind the helicopter's 7 to 9 o'clock positions. The damage to the company truck was consistent with impact from one or both main rotor blades. The main rotor blades were installed on the helicopter about 6 years before the accident. Examination of the recovered sections of the wood from the main rotor blades found that the blades were constructed according to blade design specifications and that there was no evidence of fungal decay in the wood.One main rotor blade had a metal core assembly separation near its root. Examination of two adjoining sections of the assembly revealed a fracture through the bar at the outboard edge of a lug. Visual examinations of the fracture faces revealed a corroded region at the trailing edge of the bar with fracture marks and arrest lines that were consistent with fatigue progression from the trailing edge. Ratchet marks indicated multiple fatigue origins in the area. The fatigue origin area had propagated about 0.25 inch toward the leading edge of the blade. Given this information, the main rotor blades most likely separated from the helicopter due to the failure of the blade's metal core assembly as a result of undetected corrosion and fatigue.The metal core assembly's fatigue origin area within the wooden blade would not have been visible to a pilot or mechanic, but x-ray nondestructive techniques could likely have detected the fatigue crack Page 2 of 9 CEN17LA264within the wooden blade. However, the Bell 47D1 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-approved maintenance manual and related FAA service bulletins did not include procedures to inspect the condition of the main rotor blade metal core assembly. The wooden main rotor blades are no longer manufactured, and an estimated 200 sets of these blades were still in operation at the time of this investigation.
The flight instructor reported that, during an instructional flight, when the tailwheel-equipped airplane was at rotation for takeoff, it sharply veered to the left. When safe flight was not assured, the flight instructor took over control from the student pilot, and subsequently the airplane exited the runway into the adjacent grassy area. Postaccident examination revealed substantial damage to the fuselage. The flight instructor reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The accident occurred during the third flight since the airplane had been filled with fuel. The student pilot and flight instructor stated that the engine lost power during the base leg to final approach to turn. The flight instructor took control of the airplane but had insufficient altitude to reach the runway, so he landed the airplane in a field just short of the runway where it contacted a ditch.The airplane had been flown about 3 hours 45 minutes since it was last filled with fuel. The expected fuel consumption for the engine was 11.7 gallons per hour (gph) at 75% power and 10.14 gph at 65% power, which resulted in an endurance of about 3 hours 30 minutes or 4 hours 10 minutes, respectively. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed 12 ounces of fuel remained in the fuel system, and there was no evidence of fuel leakage around the airplane. Given the fuel burn calculations and the evidence, it is likely that the flight instructor did not ensure that sufficient fuel was on board for the flight, which led to fuel exhaustion and the subsequent total loss of engine power.
The private pilot was conducting a cross-country flight and was performing a stop-and-go landing at an interim airport. After landing, he fully retracted the flaps. During the subsequent takeoff roll, the pilot had the pilot-rated passenger extend the flaps to 10°, and the airplane began to porpoise and then impacted terrain. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. During the examination, the nose pitch trim was found in the full nose-down position. Full nose-down pitch trim would have increased the pitch control forces needed to counteract the nose-down pitching tendencies of the airplane when the flaps were initially extended. (Initial flap deflections of up to 15° while moving can cause the airplane to balloon and create nose-down pitching tendencies.) Thus, the combination of the full nose-down pitch trim and the extension of the flaps during the takeoff roll would have required increased pitch control inputs to maintain airplane control. It is likely the pilot did not make such inputs and that this resulted in his loss of pitch control during the attempted takeoff.
The airline transport pilot and two passengers were on a cross-country flight. While the airplane was descending, the pilot attempted to level off, but the engine did not respond to his throttle input. The pilot decided to divert and began troubleshooting the engine. The pilot could decrease engine power with throttle movement but could not restore engine power with throttle movement. Subsequently, the throttle would not advance past three-fourths of the distance to full throttle application, and the airplane was unable to maintain its altitude. Because the airplane would be unable to reach a nearby airfield, the pilot performed a forced landing to a field, during which the airplane's firewall was substantially damaged. Postaccident examination of the airplane found that the throttle control arm was improperly fastened, resulting in throttle arm slippage, which precluded proper control of the engine. It could not be determined if the throttle arm was improperly fastened during the airplane's last annual inspection, which occurred about 3.5 months before the accident. The airplane had accumulated 12 hours of flight time since the inspection.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, during the landing roll, the airplane veered to the left off the runway. He added that he applied full power and "managed to maneuver the plane out of the ground loop but started taking out runway lights" as he maneuvered the airplane back toward the runway. The airplane impacted a runway light and two taxiway signs, damaging the main landing gear. The airplane then "flew over the runway," landed, and the main landing gear collapsed.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and left wing lift struts.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The glider pilot reported that, while maneuvering about 10,000 ft mean sea level he "lost control," and the glider went into a spin, followed by a spiral. He added that he egressed from the glider, deployed his parachute, and was later rescued. The glider impacted terrain and was destroyed.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the glider that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot in the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that he made a three-point landing on runway 4, but the airspeed was high, and the airplane bounced. The airplane then descended and landed on the main landing gear. As the airspeed decreased and the tailwheel settled to the runway, the pilot felt that he did not have rudder authority, and he mistakenly attempted to apply the heel brakes. The accident airplane was equipped with toe brakes. The pilot's other airplane had heel brakes, and he recalled that the heel brake application was instinctive. The pilot reported that there was a crosswind, that the airplane began pulling to the right, and that he eventually applied the toe brakes, but the airplane ground looped to the right.The airplane sustained substantial damage to the horizontal stabilizer.The METAR reported that the wind was from 130° at 7 knots and that the sky was clear with 10 statute miles of visibility.The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The commercial pilot and two passengers had completed a local flight. After a routine touchdown and landing roll, the pilot applied the brakes to initiate a right turn onto a taxiway. The pilot reported that the right brake "grabbed immediately," causing the airplane to ground loop. A postaccident examination and disassembly of the brake system revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The reason for the reported brake malfunction could not be determined.