roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The pilot reported a gradual loss of engine power during cruise flight. He applied carburetor heat when the engine began running rough, which seemed to make the situation worse. Eventually, the available engine power was insufficient to maintain altitude and it became clear the airplane would not be able to reach the destination airport. The pilot executed a forced landing to a field; however, he flared too high and landed hard. The airframe sustained substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage.A postaccident engine examination revealed minor anomalies with respect to the carburetor heat system, and those anomalies may have slightly reduced the effectiveness of the carburetor heat when applied. The remaining anomalies identified during the engine examination were not consistent with a gradual loss of engine power and did not contribute to the accident.Meteorological conditions were conducive to the formation of carburetor icing during cruise flight. Based on the available information, it is likely that the formation of carburetor icing, which the carburetor heat system was unable to adequately remove, resulted in the loss of engine power. In addition, the hard landing that occurred during the forced landing may have increased the extent of damage to the airframe.
The pilot and passenger were conducting a local flight to practice maneuvers and landings. About 3 to 4 minutes after takeoff, and 2,000 ft above ground level, the pilot noticed a master warning light on instrument panel but did not notice any anomalies or problems. The pilot elected to return to the airport, and about 1 minute later the engine sustained a series of power loss fluctuations. The pilot attempted to troubleshoot the problem but was unsuccessful and the engine lost total power. Unable to reach the airport or a field due to a high descent rate, the pilot performed a forced landing to a nearby roadway. During the landing, the airplane impacted a powerline and terrain before coming to rest inverted. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings, fuselage, and empennage.Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed non-ferrous metallic debris throughout the entire fuel system; the source of the debris was unable to be determined. Due to a leak noted during a functional test, the engine-driven fuel pump was disassembled. Scratches and scoring marks were noted on the pressure relief valve seat, which allowed fuel into the air side cavity of the fuel pump. It is likely the fuel pump air cavity filled with fuel, which equalized the pump pressure and restricted fuel flow to the engine. The restricted fuel flow resulted in a total loss of engine power.
The airplane was on a visual approach for landing during an instructional flight when the stall warning sounded as it approached the runway threshold. The flight instructor told the student pilot to add engine power to avoid a hard landing. She added engine power, the airplane veered left, and then bounced on the runway while the stall warning continued to sound. The flight instructor then told her to add full engine power. She added full engine power and the airplane continued to veer left and did not climb. The airplane settled into a field adjacent to the runway and sustained substantial damage to the left horizontal stabilizer. The application of engine power at a low airspeed would have necessitated greater control input to counter torque effects from the added power. The stall warning annunciation during the approach to landing was consistent with an unstabilized approach, during which an immediate go-around should have been instructed to the student pilot or performed by the flight instructor. The flight instructor stated that the airplane should have attained a climb rate and attributed the lack of climb rate to an engine problem. The student pilot, however, attributed the lack of airplane climb rate to its low airspeed and high angle of attack during the go-around. A postaccident engine examination and engine run revealed no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the engine that would have precluded normal operation.
On January 13, 2023, about 2044 eastern standard time, the flight crew of American Airlines (AAL) flight 106, a Boeing 777-200, N754AN, crossed runway 4L on taxiway J without air traffic control (ATC) clearance at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Queens, New York, causing the flight crew of Delta Air Lines (DAL) flight 1943, a Boeing 737-900, N914DU, to abort their takeoff roll on runway 4L. None of the 6 crew and 153 passengers on DAL1943, nor the 12 crew and 137 passengers on AAL106, were injured, and there was no damage to either airplane. AAL106 operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 scheduled international passenger flight from JFK to London Heathrow International Airport (LHR), London, United Kingdom. DAL1943 was a CFR Part 121 scheduled international passenger flight from JFK to Santo Domingo (SDQ), Dominican Republic. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the airport at the time of the incident.
Before the day of the accident, the nose fuel tank cap had been dislodged during a snowstorm, which allowed snow to enter the fuel tank. During preflight inspection, the pilot drained fuel from the fuel tank and discovered water in the fuel. He continued to drain the fuel until no water was visible.  The pilot took off and during cruise flight the engine began to run rough so he performed a precautionary landing on a road. He drained fuel from the fuel tank again and once again found water in the fuel. He continued to drain fuel until there was no more sign of water. The pilot’s mechanic responded to the site to assist the pilot. The mechanic drained all of the fuel from the carburetor to ensure there was no water. They started the engine, and it ran normally again so the pilot decided to take off. Shortly after departure from the road, the engine began to run rough again. The pilot landed back on the road. During the landing roll, the right wing impacted a street sign, and the airplane came to rest in a ditch. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed water in fuel samples drained from the gascolator and carburetor.  Other than the presence of water, no anomalies were noted with the engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, before landing his wheel/ski-equipped airplane at a snow-covered airstrip, he elected to “drag” the site, which involved doing a series of touch-and-go landings to determine the snow conditions before doing a full stop landing.  He said that after completing two successful drags on the untouched snow, during the third, he inadvertently allowed the airspeed to decay, and he was unable to get airborne again. The airplane subsequently passed the end of the airstrip and impacted a snow-covered gravel berm. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage.  The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, during the approach for landing to a wet runway, he experienced a tailwind that pushed the airplane further down the runway than intended as he crossed the threshold. During the landing roll, the pilot applied the brakes but discovered that there was more standing water on the runway than expected, resulting in the airplane hydroplaning. The airplane subsequently overran the end of the runway onto soft ground and through trees resulting in substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that he announced his position on the common traffic advisory frequency while inbound to land on his destination runway. Just prior to touchdown, the pilot observed an airplane landing directly in his path from the opposite end of the runway. To avoid a collision, the pilot added power and attempted to climb to the left, but impacted a berm, nosed over and came to rest inverted, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
The flight instructor and student pilot flew a visual arrival to a non-towered airport in dark night visual meteorological conditions. Flight track information revealed that the airplane approached the airport and its last recorded position was consistent with a left downwind entry to the traffic pattern. The wreckage was located about 1.2 miles south of the runway, where the airplane impacted a farm field in a near wings-level and moderate nose-down attitude. Examination of the airplane and engine revealed no evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. The carburetor heat control was in the full forward (off) position at the accident site and the wing flaps were retracted. The weather conditions around the time of the accident were conducive to the development of serious carburetor icing at cruise power settings. The propeller spinner and both propeller blades exhibited minimal rotational damage, and the airplane’s impact attitude was consistent with a loss of control.The cockpit was equipped with flood ‘strip’ lights, which the flight instructor had previously reported could make viewing the in-set instruments in the cockpit more difficult at night.It is likely that the pilots were maneuvering to land before the accident occurred and would have been operating the airplane at a reduced engine power setting. The reduced power, lack of carburetor heat, and the atmospheric conditions present at the time would have significantly increased the engine’s susceptibility to the development of carburetor icing, and resulted in a loss of engine power. Given the lack of flight track information, and witnesses, whether the accident occurred during the approach for the first landing or during a subsequent traffic pattern/landing could not be determined. The extent to which the dark night conditions, Page 2 of 9 CEN23FA077airplane interior lighting, and lack of cultural lighting in the vicinity of the airport may have contributed to the outcome also could not be determined.
During an instructional flight, while flying on the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern at an altitude of about 1,000 ft above the ground, the flight instructor and the student pilot heard a momentary grinding noise of what sounded like "metal on metal." The flight instructor described that the noise lasted no more than 2 to 3 seconds and immediately abated.  The flight instructor and student did not see anything approaching the airplane or its flight path before the noise occurred, nor did they report any sensation similar to an impact. The flight instructor and student pilot subsequently landed the airplane without issue and during a postflight inspection with the airplane’s owner, the flight instructor noted damage to the right side of the engine cowling and substantial damage to the inboard aft face of one of the propellor blades. There were no visible blood or bird remains present on the propeller or cowling. The flight instructor and airplane owner postulated that the airplane may have impacted an unmanned aerial system (UAS), and the airplane owner subsequently coordinated a ground search for debris in the days following the accident; however, no UAS components was located. Review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records revealed that no Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability authorizations were requested for the area at the time of the accident, nor had any UAS operational waivers had been filed with the FAA for operation in the area at the time of the accident. Given all available information, the reason that the airplane’s engine cowling and propeller were damaged during the flight could not be definitively determined.
The pilot reported the engine lost total power while he was on approach to his destination airport. According to the pilot, he attempted to restart the engine by switching fuel tanks, but he may have forgotten to engage the boost pump, and the restart was unsuccessful. The pilot then conducted a forced landing on a freeway, during which the right and left wings sustained substantial damage. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the left fuel tank contained no usable fuel, the right fuel tank had visible but unknown quantity of fuel. After the airplane was recovered from the freeway, a functional engine test run, with the right fuel tank selected, was completed with no anomalies noted. After the accident, the pilot stated that he should have incorporated better fuel management techniques. The loss of engine power was attributed to fuel starvation.
The pilot reported that the flight’s purpose was to guide cattle while at low altitude. During a turn with trees in the vicinity, the pilot heard a noise and felt a bump in the flight controls. The helicopter began to spin uncontrollably and impacted terrain, which resulted in substantial damage to the main rotor system, tail rotor system, fuselage, and tail boom. Examination revealed that the tail rotor gear box and tail rotor (TR) blades were separated from the helicopter. The gear box housing fracture surfaces were consistent with overload. The size/shape of the dents and tree debris lodged in the leading edge of the TR blades was consistent with the size/shape of the tree branches that were broken. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane, he planned to perform a touch-and-go landing, and proceeded with a “wheel landing.” During rollout, with both main wheels on the runway, “an unpredictable and unknown force” caused the airplane to depart the right side of the runway. The airplane continued toward runway signage, and the pilot applied engine power to avoid it, which resulted in the airplane’s “ground loop to the right.” The airplane’s right wing and propeller struck the ground which resulted in substantial damage to the wing and fuselage. Weather reported 14 miles south of the accident site at the time of the accident included clear skies and calm winds. The pilot reported there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The accident occurred about 5 miles from the destination airport near the conclusion of a short cross-country flight. Automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that about 2 miles from the accident location the airplane’s descent rate rapidly increased to 500 ft/min with the airspeed staying just above 90 knots. The descent rate slowed to 200 ft/min before it rapidly increased to more than 1,500 ft/min during the final minute of flight. A performance study showed that a steep banked turn would have been required to orient the flight path with the wreckage direction and that the airplane’s final known speed was close to its stall speed in the turn. A witness reported seeing the airplane in a nosedive with two spiral trails of black smoke about 5 to 10 ft behind the airplane; however, she did not observe any fire from the airplane.Six days before the accident, the pilot brought his airplane to a mechanic, as it had an excessive engine rpm drop during a run-up magneto check. The mechanic changed some spark plugs but did not have a chance to run the engine. Three days before the accident, the pilot arrived at the mechanic’s hangar and performed a ground run of the engine on the ramp area near the mechanic’s hangar so the mechanic could listen to the engine. As soon as the pilot ran the engine, the mechanic knew that the new spark plugs did not correct the problem as the engine was “skipping.” The pilot shut down the engine and the mechanic informed the pilot that the airplane was not to be flown until he could investigate further, and he would most likely be able to do it the following week. The mechanic later moved the pilot’s airplane from the ramp in front of his hangar, into the pilot’s hangar, as bad weather was forecast. The mechanic added that he had not completed the maintenance on the airplane and that the pilot did not contact him before departing on the accident flight to see if the maintenance had been completed. Page 2 of 8 ERA23FA103Postaccident Examination of the wreckage revealed that the hold-down nuts on both magnetos were only finger tight. Some rotational damage was noted on both propeller blades. No other preimpact mechanical malfunctions were identified. Due to the combination of black smoke that the witness observed trailing the airplane, the limited rotational damage signatures that were observed on the propeller blades, and the only finger tight magneto hold-down nuts that were found during the postaccident engine examination, it is likely that the loose magnetos detrimentally affected ignition, which resulted in a partial loss of engine power. Given that there was a known, unresolved maintenance issue that existed prior to the flight, had the pilot positively affirmed the airplane’s airworthy condition with the mechanic prior to the flight, it is likely the accident would not have occurred. Additionally, the witness description of the airplane’s final descent, the airplane’s calculated speed during it’s final maneuvering, and the lack of a horizontal debris field observed at the accident site suggested that the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall before it impacted the ground.
The pilot departed on the first leg of the trip with the airplane fully fueled and two passengers onboard. After about an hour flight, the pilot landed at the destination airport and dropped off both passengers. The airplane was not fueled at that time. The pilot departed as the sole occupant to return to the initial airport. About 18 miles from the destination airport, the airplane entered a gradual descent as it remained on course. About 6 minutes later, the airplane entered a descending left turn that continued until the available position data ended. The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 3 miles from the airport. The accident site was in a wooded area adjoining an open field.A witness heard the airplane as it approached and recalled that the engine sounded as if it was going to lose power but then “revved up really high.” This cycle occurred 3 or 4 times over a span of 10 – 15 seconds. The engine then seemed to stop; however, he was unsure if the airplane had descended behind a ridgeline. He did not hear the impact nor was he able to see the airplane.Postaccident airframe and engine examinations did not reveal any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.The airplane was equipped with 2 25-gallon main fuel tanks and 2 10-gallon auxiliary fuel tanks. The fuel selector valve had settings for the left main tank, the right main tank, and the auxiliary tanks. The main fuel tanks were selected individually. Both auxiliary tanks fed simultaneously when selected. Excess (unburned) fuel from the engine was returned to the selected main fuel tank or, if the auxiliary tanks were selected, to the left main fuel tank.Page 2 of 8 CEN23FA074The fuel tank caps were securely installed, and each tank appeared to be intact.  About 15 gallons and 10 gallons of fuel were recovered from the left and right main fuel tanks, respectively. Both the left and right auxiliary fuel tanks contained minimal fuel.  Data recovered from an onboard electronic engine display unit revealed that the pilot departed on the initial leg of the trip with the left fuel main fuel tank selected. About midflight, the pilot changed to the auxiliary fuel tanks. Upon departure on the accident flight, the pilot had the right main fuel tank selected. About 14 minutes before the accident, the pilot selected the auxiliary fuel tanks to supply the engine. About 2 minutes before the accident, the useable fuel contained in the auxiliary tanks was exhausted, and the engine lost power due to fuel starvation. The pilot most likely selected the left main fuel tank in an effort to restore engine power. Useable fuel was available in both the left and right main fuel tanks when the engine lost power.The pilot was likely maneuvering toward an open field for a forced landing under a clear night sky and rising full moon. However, the airplane did not have sufficient altitude to reach the field. It could not be determined whether the night lighting conditions hindered the pilot’s attempted forced landing.
The pilot and two passengers were departing from a 2,800-ft-long turf runway and reported that prior to initiating the takeoff the wind was light and variable. During the initial climb after takeoff, and once the airplane had cleared a ridge and trees that ran parallel to the runway, the pilot reported that there was a “sudden windshear that caused a reduction in lift.” The pilot reduced the airplane’s pitch attitude in an attempt to regain lift, but the airplane continued to descend. The pilot was unable to arrest the descent and the airplane subsequently impacted the ground. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The automated weather observation at an airport 9 miles away noted wind at 10 knots, with no gusts or other convective activity described.
The pilot was performing touch-and-go landings, and during the landing roll, he removed his hand from the twin-engine airplane’s throttles to turn off the electrically-powered fuel pumps. As the pilot moved his hand, his sweater sleeve caught on the right throttle handle, the right engine power increased, and the airplane veered off the runway to the left. During the runway excursion, the airplane collided with a runway marker sign and visual approach lighting equipment, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and empennage. The pilot attempted to reduce the right throttle setting, but his sweater was jammed between the throttles, and he ultimately stopped the airplane by shutting down the airplane’s engines. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that the airplane’s engine did not respond to a commanded power increase while maneuvering for spacing due to aircraft traffic. He subsequently made a forced landing to a field. The airplane sustained substantial damaged to the forward fuselage when it struck a terrace in the field. A postaccident engine run was conducted and although the test was limited due to the bent propeller, the engine exhibited no anomalies during the engine run. The possibility of carburetor icing existed based on the atmospheric conditions present at the time of the accident, but the pilot stated that he had carburetor heat applied during the event. The carburetor heat system worked normally during the engine run.Based on the available information, the reason for the partial loss of engine power could not be determined.
The pilot reported that while practicing stop-and-go landings on runway 35L in a tailwheel-equipped airplane, the airplane touched down, rolled a few feet, and then veered to the left. The pilot “immediately put in right rudder” to bring the airplane back to runway centerline. The airplane nosed over and came to rest inverted in the grass. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the vertical stabilizer, and right wing. After the accident, the pilot said that he “hit the brakes too hard” when the airplane departed the side of the runway.  In a separate written statement, the pilot stated that perhaps a gust of wind struck the tail during the landing roll out. Reported wind at the time of the accident was from 300° at 7 knots. The pilot reported there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operations.