roccoangelella/AeroGraph huggingface dataset:
The flight instructor was conducting a local instructional flight with a new student pilot. Following the preflight inspection and engine start, the flight instructor noted that the fuel selector looked to be positioned “in the right place,” and that neither he nor the student touched the fuel selector for the entirety of the accident flight. They subsequently conducted about 15 to 20 minutes of the instructional lesson on the ground, while the engine was running. During engine run-up, the flight instructor noted that “the fuel pressure indicator went to zero” so he turned on the airplane’s electric fuel pump and the fuel pressure recovered. After 1 to 2 minutes, the flight instructor turned off the electric fuel pump and the fuel pressure returned to the normal range and remained there. After takeoff, and during the initial climb, the engine started to “lose and gain power,” so the flight instructor attempted a turn back to the departure runway. Halfway through the turn, the airplane lost all engine power, and the flight instructor landed the airplane in a grassy area, but encountered uneven terrain. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing during the landing. Initial postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the fuel selector was of a configuration that the handle of the rotary valve faced away from the fuel tank being selected, while the opposite side of the handle indicated the selected tank or shutoff position. The operator had painted a gray/white stripe on the handle and fuel selector valve placard that showed the selected tank to aid pilots in correctly selecting the desired position. Following the accident, the flight instructor stated that he was confused by the white paint stripe on the fuel selector. He also stated that the airplane’s owner advised him after the accident that the fuel selector had been found in the “off” position after the accident.The wreckage was subsequently disposed of by the owner, and no additional detailed examination was conducted to determine if the fuel selector valve handle, the valve mechanism itself, or fuel selector valve placard were correctly oriented and that the internal Page 2 of 6 ERA23LA061valve mechanism was intact, nor were the engine or fuel system otherwise examined or tested. Based on this information, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.
The aerial observation pilot was mapping costal erosion; about 2 hours and 20 minutes into the flight, the engine “sputtered” three times over the course of 30 to 60 seconds before completely losing power. The pilot then began troubleshooting the loss of engine power while searching for a forced landing location. The pilot landed the airplane on a relatively sparsely populated area of the beach below. During the landing, the main landing gear dug into the sand and the airplane nosed over, resulting in substantial damage to the engine mounts, vertical stabilizer, and rudder. Postaccident examination of the airplane’s engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. The temperature and dewpoint conditions about the time of the accident were conducive to the formation of “serious icing at glide [idle] power.” Given the lack of any mechanical anomalies observed during the postaccident examination of the engine, it is likely that the loss of engine power was due to carburetor icing. Additionally, the pilot reported that he did not begin troubleshooting the engine anomalies until after the total power loss had occurred. Had the pilot used carburetor heat to prevent the formation of carburetor ice, or applied it immediately after the engine roughness began, the loss of engine power may have been avoided.
The pilot reported that he flew an instrument approach to a 4,999-ft-long, 100-ft-wide, asphalt runway. He flared at 78 kts and the airplane touched down on centerline. After touchdown, he applied brakes and the airplane veered left. He pressed harder on the right brake pedal, but the plane did not react, so he applied full right pedal but he did not observe any response. The airplane skidded off the left side of the runway and continued skidding through grass. It subsequently struck a small embankment at the edge of a cotton field, where it came to rest upright. The pilot added that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions with the airplane.Examination of the wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed substantial damage to the right wing, nose landing gear, and firewall. His examination, which also included observing the airplane’s left main wheel was free to rotate and that the tire did not show any abnormal wear, did otherwise note evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The wind recorded at the airport, about the time of the accident, indicated a left crosswind to tailwind at 9 knots.
According to the pilot, he just purchased the airplane that day and was going to take it for a test flight before heading back to this home airport. He stated the flight, and the landing were normal, however; during the landing rollout, he applied the brakes to slow the airplane and make the next taxiway turnoff. The nose wheel started to shimmy during the turn and applied side loads to the nose landing gear linkage and structure. The pilot continued and taxied that airplane to the hangar, where he noticed the damage to the structure. He stated there were no mechanical deficiencies with the airplane and that he should have slowed the airplane down to a taxi speed before making a turn. Th pilot reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Post-accident examination of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the airplane’s fuselage structure in the vicinity of the nose landing gear.
The student pilot reported that, he was performing a solo flight with the intention of staying in the traffic pattern, when after takeoff he was distracted by noise in his headset. On the downwind leg, he unintentionally climbed above traffic pattern altitude while trying to resolve the issue. He then overshot the runway centerline on the final leg while still too high. He brought the power to idle and tried to lose altitude by performing a forward slip. The pilot stated he leveled off over the threshold and the airplane bounced twice after touching the runway. After attempting to regain pitch control, the airplane’s nose dropped, and the propeller and left wing impacted the runway. The left wing was substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the flight instructor, the airplane was in cruise flight when the engine rpm dropped from about 2,400 to about 1,300. He took the flight controls from the student pilot, turned on carburetor heat, and used the checklist in an attempt to restore power. According to the flight instructor, while trying different throttle and mixture settings, the rpm increased to about 1,500 for about 10 seconds before reducing back to 1,300. According to the student pilot, after the engine rpm reduced to 1,300, the flight instructor applied carburetor heat, and the engine rpm reduced and then increased briefly.The instructor notified air traffic control of the power loss and diverted to the nearest airport. When he realized they would not be able to reach the airport, he selected a field for a forced landing. During the landing, the nosewheel dug into the soft soil, and the airplane flipped over, which resulted in substantial damage to the vertical stabilizer and rudder.A postaccident examination of the engine and airframe revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.Based on the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) carburetor icing probability chart, the atmospheric conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to the development of serious carburetor icing at glide and cruise power. Therefore, it is likely that the loss of engine power was due to the formation of carburetor ice. Although the engine power increased briefly when the flight instructor applied carburetor heat, it is likely the amount of ice was too much for the carburetor heat to overcome.
The flight instructor and his student were conducting an instructional flight in night visual meteorological conditions and in the airport traffic pattern when the airplane collided with multiple geese during initial climb. The flight instructor made an uneventful landing following the bird strike. The airplane’s right-wing leading edge and main spar were substantially damaged during the bird strike.
On November 12, 2022, about 1322 central standard time, a Boeing B-17G airplane, N7227C, and a Bell P-63F airplane, N6763, collided in flight during a performance at the Commemorative Air Force’s (CAF) Wings Over Dallas air show at Dallas Executive Airport (KRBD) in Dallas, Texas.  The pilot, copilot, flight engineer, and two scanners on board the Boeing B 17G and the pilot of the Bell P-63F were fatally injured, and both airplanes were destroyed. No injuries to persons on the ground were reported. Both accident airplanes (and six other historic, former military airplanes that were airborne as part of the same performance) were operated by the CAF under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 and a certificate of waiver for the air show. The Boeing B 17G and the Bell P-63F departed from KRBD about 1310 and 1315, respectively, for the local flights.
The pilot of the tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that, he was attempting to takeoff from an approximate 800 ft long unimproved dirt, curved and slightly upslope backcountry airstrip that had about 200 ft that was unusable. The pilot configured the airplane for a short field takeoff toward the downhill. The pilot reported that when the airplane reached the end of the airstrip, the airplane did not have sufficient speed to fly and lifted off the ground slightly, then settled back to the ground. The airplane traveled off the end of the airstrip and collided with vegetation. The right wing and fuselage were substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot was enroute during a cross-country flight when the engine began running rough. He attempted to land in a clearing, but the airplane collided with trees and came to rest inverted before reaching the desired landing area.Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the No. 1 cylinder exhaust valve had separated and was imbedded in the face of the No. 1 piston, cracking the piston. A portion of the intake valve was missing, and a portion of a valve was recovered inside the heat exchanger. Either a failed intake or exhaust valve would have resulted in a partial loss of engine power, but damage to the No. 1 piston and its intake and exhaust valves prevented determination of the initiating failure within the cylinder.
The flight instructor reported that, while conducting hover autorotation training from about one foot above the ground, the pilot receiving instruction quickly closed the throttle. The helicopter subsequently descended rapidly, caught the left skid on the pavement and rolled over to the left. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the tail boom and main rotor blades. The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot of the amphibious airplane reported that while on final approach to runway 26 he had trouble viewing the runway due to glare from the setting sun. He recalled making “…continuous efforts to block the sun glare.” He planned to make a gradual descent on the final approach to get the best forward view and peripheral views of the area. While descending, he further described that “the brightness inside the cockpit was difficult to observe instruments. I descended towards what I was convinced was the runway. I remember nothing else from that time forward.” The airplane subsequently struck the roof of a business, and the wreckage came to rest next to the building in the parking lot. The airplane’s fuselage, both wings, empennage, and floats were substantially damaged. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Based on this information, the airplane likely struck the building after the pilot allowed the airplane to descend too low on the approach to the runway.
The student pilot was flying low over a river when the airplane impacted an unmarked cable suspended about 30 ft above the water. The wings were separated from the airframe and a portion of the cable remained wrapped around the right wing. The engine remained attached to the airframe. The propeller blades remained attached to the engine crankshaft flanges, and gouges consistent with cable impact were present along the leading edge of one of the blades.Although the pilot had mild-to-moderate coronary artery disease, given the circumstances of the accident, it is unlikely that the pilot’s coronary artery disease contributed to the crash.Toxicology testing of the pilot’s tissue indicated the presence of a cannabis product. One accredited laboratory detected the psychoactive cannabinoid delta-9-THC in blood, while the other did not. No active metabolite of delta-9-THC was detected, and the nonpsychoactive metabolite carboxy-delta-9-THC was detected at low levels only. Based on these results and the accident circumstances, it is unlikely that cannabis significantly affected the pilot’s decision to fly at low altitude or his failure to avoid the unmarked cable.
American Airlines flight 2548 encountered turbulence while descending through 18,000 ft to land at the Miami International Airport (MIA), Miami, FL, and a flight attendant (FA) fractured her spine. The flight crew reported that during descent, with the seatbelt sign illuminated and after notifying the FAs to prepare for landing, air traffic control (ATC) issued a vector for the approach at MIA with a flight path that intersected a thin cloud layer. After the airplane passed through this cloud layer about 18,000 ft, the pilot’s noticed a towering cumulus cloud directly ahead that had not been displayed on the airplane’s weather radar display. Unable to maneuver around the cloud build up, the airplane passed through the tops of the cumulus clouds, and the flight encountered moderate turbulence for about 3 seconds. The flight crew then received a call from the cabin advising them that a FA had been injured. At the time of the turbulence event, the number 4 FA was in the aft galley and was thrown to the floor. She came to rest with her back against the aft jumpseat. The injured FA was provided oxygen, helped to her jumpseat, and secured with her safety belt. Upon being notified of the injury, the flight crew requested to have paramedics meet the airplane at the gate. The injured FA was transported to the hospital where she was diagnosed with a fractured spine. Eddy dissipation rate (EDR) is a universal measure of turbulence rate. Recorded data from the airplane revealed that about 1900 to 1901 EST the EDR indicated 0.156 to 0.175 which equates to light turbulence. About 5 minutes later the EDR indicated 0.367 which equates to moderate turbulence. At the time of the flight’s arrival into MIA there were no active significant meteorological information (SIGMETs) for the area where the turbulence occurred.  Page 2 of 6 DCA23LA050
The pilot reported that after a “normal” approach and landing, a “strong” wind gust “picked up the right wing.”  The airplane entered a left skidding turn and departed the runway pavement.  The right main landing gear collapsed in the grass area adjacent to the runway, and the airplane pitched up onto its nose before settling back onto the tail.  The right-wing spar and fuselage sustained damage.  The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.  At the time of the accident, the pilot was landing on runway 18 with wind from 190o at 7 knots, gusts to 15 knots.
After engine start, the student pilot and the flight instructor realized that the airplane’s nosewheel chock was still in place. The flight instructor decided to deplane to remove the chock without shutting down the engine. After removing the chock, the flight instructor moved to signal the student pilot that the chock was removed. In the process, the flight instructor made physical contact with the spinning propellor, resulting in serious injury. The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot reported that, during the initial climb following a takeoff from takeoff from runway 10, the airplane encountered a wind shift that forced the airplane back to the ground and it departed the side of the runway. During the runway excursion, the airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported no pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.Before the pilot’s departure another airplane reported windshear, a 15-20 knot gain on final for runway 35R. Low-level windshear advisories were in effect at the time of departure, and when cleared for takeoff, the controller reported the wind from 340° at 9 knots.
The two pilots were conducting multiple cross-country flights the day of the accident with the purpose of building flight time as part of an air carrier pilot development program. The pilots departed for the fourth leg of the day and the left seat pilot was primarily flying for this leg. Both pilots reported that while enroute they noticed the fuel level was low. Subsequently, about 15 nautical miles from the destination, the engine lost all power.  The left seat pilot reported that the right seat pilot took control of the airplane after the loss of power.  About 600 feet above ground level (agl) the right seat pilot deployed the ballistic parachute recovery system when it became clear that they would not be able to glide to an airport.  The impact with the ground resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. Post-accident inspection of the fuel system showed no fuel visible in either wing tank and no fuel visible in the inline fuel filters. The left seat pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The pilot flew a visual approach to his home airport but did a go-around due to ground fog. After receiving an instrument flight rules clearance, he flew an RNAV/GPS approach that he also discontinued due to ground fog. After executing a missed approach, the pilot flew another RNAV/GPS approach. The pilot reported that during this last approach he lost visual references and initiated a go-around, during which the airplane impacted trees about 800 ft to the right of the runway. The main wreckage came to rest upright and was consumed by a post-impact fire. The postaccident examination revealed no preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that he observed the right engine was slower to accelerate than the left engine during the attempted go-around, and that he was distracted looking at the engine indications. He reported that he did not notice if the airplane yaw to the right and, before he could correct for the altitude loss, the airplane descended into and struck the trees.
The pilot reported that after the airplane lifted off the ground, the wind blew the airplane harder than expected and he decided to set it back down on the runway, however, the airplane touched down half on and half off the runway. The pilot was unable to maintain control of the airplane due to the wind and it went down an embankment. The airplane nosed into the ground and sustained substantial damage to the wings, fuselage, and empennage. The pilot report that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. At the time of the accident, the pilot was departing from runway 32 with winds from 290° at 27 gusting 37 knots.
The pilot reported that he was under the impression that his airplane’s inboard fuel tanks had been topped and he had 202 gallons on board prior to departure. He had a “standing order” with the airport’s fixed base operator to top the tanks; however, the fueling was not accomplished and he did not visually check the fuel level prior to departure. He entered 202 gallons in cockpit fuel computer and unknowingly commenced the flight with 61 gallons on board. Prior to reaching his destination, his fuel supply was exhausted, both engines lost all power, and he performed a forced landing in a cemetery about one mile from the airport. The pilot and his passenger had minor injuries. Inspectors with the Federal Aviation Administration examined the wreckage and determined that damage to the wings and fuselage was substantial. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The solo student pilot was conducting pattern work at the accident airport. Video footage from around the airport as well as witness statements showed the accident airplane overfly the runway at a low altitude and high rate of speed. While over the runway the airplane made several pitch up and down oscillations and, when it neared the departure end of the runway, the airplane pitched up and entered into a steep right roll, followed by the nose dropping and the airplane impacting the ground.Review of recorded communication at the accident airport revealed that when the accident airplane was on final approach to land, the controller instructed the accident pilot to sidestep to the left and go around. There was no response from the accident pilot, and the controller repeated the instruction to go around, without a response. During this timeframe, a radio transmission about a trim problem, thought to be from the accident pilot, was heard on frequency. It is likely that while on final approach to land, with the airplane’s flaps at 50%, and the airplane’s indicated air speed reaching 140 knots, the increased camber from flap deflection increased lift, primarily on the rear portion of the wing and produced a nose-down pitching moment which may have caused the airplane to pitch down. However, with no change in the airplane’s trim position, it mistakenly led the pilot to believe there was a malfunction with the trim, which resulted in the pitch oscillations observed in the witness-provided video and the recoverable data module (RDM).Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation.A review of the RDM data showed that while on final approach to land, the indicated flap position changed from 100% to the 50% position and the airplane’s airspeed continued to increase gradually, reaching a maximum of 140 knots indicated. The recorded data showed Page 2 of 10 WPR23FA027that, when the airplane was near the departure end of the runway, with an indicated air speed of 125 knots, the airplane pitched up 20° and banked 13°. The airplane then entered a steep right roll, the electronic stability and protection (ESP) system activated in roll mode as the airplane exceeded a 20° pitch down attitude and 70° bank, the stall warning sounded, and the recording ended. The student pilot likely exceeded the airplane’s critical angle of attack during a turn, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and an impact with terrain.