rlacombe/ClimateX huggingface dataset:
This compares to overall cumulative net CO 2 emissions until reaching net zero CO 2 of 510 (330–710) GtCO 2 in pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, and 890 (640–1160) GtCO 2 in pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
While most future CO 2 emissions from existing and currently planned fossil fuel infrastructure are situated in the power sector, most remaining fossil fuel CO 2 emissions in pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) and below are from non-electric energy – most importantly from the industry and transportation sectors (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Decommissioning and reduced utilisation of existing fossil fuel installations in the power sector as well as cancellation of new installations are required to align future CO 2 emissions from the power sector with projections in these pathways (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
While there is considerable literature on country-level mitigation pathways, including but not limited to NDCs, the country distribution of this literature is very unequal (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
NDCs with unconditional and conditional elements14 lead to 53 (50–57) and 50 (47–55) GtCO 2-eq, respectively (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
This closes the emission gaps by about one third to 2°C and about 20% to 1.5°C compared to the original NDCs submitted in 2015/16 (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
An implementation gap also exists between the projected emissions with ‘current policies’ and the projected emissions resulting from the implementation of the unconditional and conditional elements of NDCs; this is estimated to be around 4 and 7 GtCO 2-eq in 2030, respectively (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
The literature does not adequately include demand-side options and systems analysis, and captures the impact from non-CO 2 GHGs (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
The way countries develop determines their capacity to accelerate mitigation and achieve other sustainable development objectives simultaneously (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Policies can shift development pathways. There are examples of policies implemented in the pursuit of overall societal development objectives, such as job creation, macroeconomic stability, economic growth, and public health and welfare. In some countries, such policies are framed as part of a Just Transition, however, they can have major influence on mitigative capacity, and hence can be seen as tools to broaden mitigation options (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Detailed design of mitigation policies is critical for distributional impacts and avoiding lock-in (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
To this aim, mobilising a range of policies is preferable to single policy instruments (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Accelerated mitigation and shifting development pathways necessitates both redirecting existing financial flows from high- to low-emissions technologies and systems, and providing additional resources to overcome current financial barriers (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
At the national level, public finance for actions promoting sustainable development helps broaden the scope of mitigation (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Changes in behaviour and lifestyles are important to move beyond mitigation as incremental change, and when supporting shifts to more sustainable development pathways will broaden the scope of mitigation (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Equity can be an important enabler, increasing the level of ambition for accelerated mitigation (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Transition pathways have distributional consequences such as large changes in employment and economic structure (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Differences between pathways typically represent choices that can steer the system in alternative directions through the selection of different combinations of response options (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
The likelihood of limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot has dropped in AR6 WGIII compared to AR6 SR1.5 because global GHG emissions have risen since 2017, leading to higher near-term emissions (2030) and higher cumulative CO 2 emissions until the time of net zero (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Pathways limiting warming to 2°C (>67%) reach 50% reductions in the 2040s and net zero CO 2 by the 2070s (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Final energy demand in the absence of any new climate policies is projected to grow to around 480 to 750 EJ yr –1 in 2050 (compared to around 390 EJ yr –1 in 2015) (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
The highest emissions scenarios in the literature result in global warming of >5°C by 2100, based on assumptions of rapid economic growth and pervasive climate policy failures (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Only 30% of the pathways limiting warming to 2°C (>67%) or below reach net zero GHG emissions in the 21st century (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
In those pathways reaching net zero GHGs, net zero GHGs is achieved around 10–20 years later than net zero CO 2 is achieved (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Reaching and sustaining global net zero GHG emissions – when emissions are measured and reported in terms of GWP100 – results in a gradual decline in temperature (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot entail CO 2 emissions reductions between 2019 and 2050 of around 77% (31–96%) for energy demand, around 115% (90–167%) for energy supply, and around 148% (94–387%) for AFOLU.16 In pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%), projected CO 2 emissions are reduced between 2019 and 2050 by around 49% for energy demand, 97% for energy supply, and 136% for AFOLU (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
In cost-effective mitigation pathways, the energy supply sector typically reaches net zero CO 2 before the economy as a whole, while the demand sectors reach net zero CO 2 later, if ever (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
The use of bioenergy can lead to either increased or reduced emissions, depending on the scale of deployment, conversion technology, fuel displaced, and how, and where, the biomass is produced (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
CDR deployment in pathways serves multiple purposes: accelerating the pace of emissions reductions, offsetting residual emissions, and creating the option for net negative CO 2 emissions in case temperature reductions need to be achieved in the long term (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
CDR through some measures in AFOLU can be maintained for decades but not over the very long term because these sinks will ultimately saturate (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
These estimates do not account for the economic benefits of avoided climate change impacts (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
This holds true even without accounting for benefits in other sustainable development dimensions or non-market damages from climate change (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
When aggregate economic benefits from avoided climate change impacts are accounted for, mitigation is a welfare-enhancing strategy (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Delayed global cooperation increases policy costs across regions, especially in those that are relatively carbon intensive at present (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Pathways with uniform carbon values show higher mitigation costs in more carbon-intensive regions, in fossil fuel-exporting regions, and in poorer regions (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Mitigation at the speed and scale required to limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or below implies deep economic and structural changes, thereby raising multiple types of distributional concerns across regions, income classes, and sectors (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Furthermore, avoided impacts for poorer households and poorer countries represent a smaller share in aggregate quantifications expressed in GDP terms or monetary terms, compared to their influence on well-being and welfare (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
However, emerging evidence suggests that, even without accounting for co-benefits of mitigation on other sustainable development dimensions, the global benefits of pathways limiting warming to 2°C (>67%) outweigh global mitigation costs over the 21st century (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
TS.5.1 Energy A broad-based approach to deploying energy-sector mitigation options can reduce emissions over the next ten years and set the stage for still deeper reductions beyond 2030 (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
In scenarios limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (likely below 2°C), net electricity sector CO 2 emissions reach zero globally between 2045 and 2055 (2050 and 2080) (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
This includes reduced fossil fuel consumption, increased production from low- and zero-carbon energy sources, and increased use of electricity and alternative energy carriers (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
The impacts, however, are uncertain, particularly at the regional scale (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Multiple energy supply options are available to reduce emissions over the next decade (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
It will not be possible to widely deploy all of these and other options without efforts to address the geophysical, environmental-ecological, economic, technological, socio-cultural, and institutional factors that can facilitate or hinder their implementation (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Energy systems can be integrated across district, regional, national, and international scales (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Energy-sector mitigation and efforts to achieve SDGs generally support one another, though there are important region- specific exceptions (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Advances in low-carbon energy resources and carriers such as next-generation biofuels, hydrogen produced from electrolysis, synthetic fuels, and carbon-neutral ammonia would substantially improve the economics of net zero energy systems (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
For most regions, per-capita urban emissions are lower than per-capita national emissions (excluding aviation, shipping and biogenic sources) (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: very high)
However, urbanisation can result in increased global GHG emissions through emissions outside the city’s boundaries (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: very high)
In 2015, urban emissions were estimated to be 25GtCO 2-eq (about 62% of the global share) and in 2020 were 29 GtCO 2-eq (67–72% of the global share).21 Around 100 of the highest-emitting urban areas account for approximately 18% of the global carbon footprint (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
For 2000 to 2015, the urban emissions share increased from 28% to 38% in Africa, from 46% to 54% in Asia and Pacific, from 62% to 72% in Developed Countries, from 57% to 62% in Eastern Europe and West Central Asia, from 55% to 66% in Latin America and Caribbean, and from 68% to 69% in the Middle East (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Under a scenario with aggressive but not immediate urban mitigation policies to limit global warming to 2°C (>67%) (low emissions, SSP1-2.6), urban emissions could reach 17 GtCO 2-eq in 2050.23 (Figure TS.13) {8.3.4} Urban land areas could triple between 2015 and 2050, with significant implications for future carbon lock-in (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Three broad mitigation strategies have been found to be effective in reducing emissions when implemented concurrently: (i) reducing or changing urban energy and material use towards more sustainable production and consumption across all sectors, including through compact and efficient urban forms and supporting infrastructure; (ii) electrification and switching to low-carbon energy sources; and (iii) enhancing carbon uptake and storage in the urban environment (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
New and emerging cities will have significant infrastructure development needs to achieve high quality of life, which can be met through energy-efficient infrastructures and services, and people-centred urban design (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Transport-related emissions in developing regions of the world have increased more rapidly than in Europe or North America, a trend that is expected to continue in coming decades (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
These same technologies and expanded use of available electric rail systems can support rail decarbonisation (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Increased capacity for low-carbon hydrogen production would also be essential for hydrogen-based fuels to serve as an emissions reduction strategy (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Increased efficiency has been insufficient to limit the emissions from shipping and aviation, and natural gas-based fuels are expected to be inadequate to meet stringent decarbonisation goals for these segments (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Advanced biofuels could provide low-carbon jet fuel (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
The production of synthetic fuels using low-carbon hydrogen with CO2 captured through DACCS/BECCS could provide jet and marine fuels but these options still require demonstration at scale (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: low)
Ammonia produced with low-carbon hydrogen could also serve as a marine fuel (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
The scenarios literature projects continued growth in demand for freight and passenger services, particularly in developing countries in Africa and Asia (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
While many global scenarios place greater reliance on emissions reduction in sectors other than transport, a quarter of the 1.5°C scenarios describe transport-related CO 2 emissions reductions in excess of 68% (relative to modelled 2020 levels) (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Given the high degree of potential recyclability of lithium-ion batteries, a nearly closed-loop system in the future could mitigate concerns about critical mineral issues (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Of this, 57% (6.8 GtCO 2-eq) were indirect emissions from off-site generation of electricity and heat, 24% (2.9 GtCO 2-eq) were direct emissions produced on-site and 18% (2.2 GtCO 2-eq) were embodied emissions from the production of cement and steel used in buildings (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Sufficiency measures tackle the causes of GHG emissions by limiting the demand for energy and materials over the lifecycle of buildings and appliances (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Density, compacity, bioclimatic design to optimise the use of nature-based solutions, multi-functionality of space through shared space and to allow for adjusting the size of buildings to the evolving needs of households, circular use of materials and repurposing unused existing buildings to avoid using virgin materials, optimisation of the use of buildings through lifestyle changes, use of the thermal mass of buildings to reduce thermal needs, and moving from ownership to usership of appliances, are among the sufficiency interventions implemented in leading municipalities (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
At a global level, up to 17% of the mitigation potential in the buildings sector could be captured by 2050 through sufficiency interventions (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
The construction of high-performance buildings is expected to become a business-as- usual technology by 2050 with costs below USD20 tCO 2–1 in developed countries and below USD100 tCO 2–1 in developing countries (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
However, for the whole building stock they tend to be in cost intervals of USD–200 tCO 2–1 and >USD200 tCO 2–1 (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Literature emphasises the critical role of the 2020–2030 decade in accelerating the learning of know-how and skills to reduce the costs and remove feasibility constraints for achieving high-efficiency buildings at scale and set the sector on the pathway to realise its full potential (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
The complementarity and interdependency of measures leads to cost reductions, while optimising the mitigation potential achieved and avoiding the lock-in-effect (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
The lack of institutional capacity, especially in developing countries, and appropriate governance structures slow down the decarbonisation of the global building stock (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
However, this is not enough by far to close the investment gap (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Building energy codes represent the main regulatory instrument to reduce emissions from both new and existing buildings (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Building energy codes have proven to be effective if compulsory and combined with other regulatory instruments such as minimum energy performance standard for appliances and equipment, if the performance level is set at the level of the best available technologies in the market (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Market-based instruments such as carbon taxes with recycling of the revenues and personal or building carbon allowances could also contribute to fostering the decarbonisation of the building sector (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Expected heatwaves will inevitably increase cooling needs to limit the health impacts of climate change (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Mitigation actions in the building sector bring health gains through improved indoor air quality and thermal comfort, and have positive significant macro- and micro-economic effects, such as increased productivity of labour, job creation, reduced poverty, especially energy poverty, and improved energy security (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
The Paris Agreement, the SDGs and the COVID-19 pandemic provide a new context for the evolution of industry and mitigation of industry greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Producer, user, and regulator education, as well as innovation and commercialisation policy are needed (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Pulp mills have access to biomass residues and by-products and in paper mills the use of process heat at low to medium temperatures allows for electrification (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
In the energy sector, CO 2 emissions from biomass combustion for energy are recorded as an information item that is not included in the sectoral total emissions for the that sector.At the same time the capacity of the land to support these functions may be threatened by climate change (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
At the same time managed and natural terrestrial ecosystems were a carbon sink, absorbing around one third of anthropogenic CO 2 emissions (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
If the responses of all managed and natural land to both anthropogenic environmental change and natural climate variability, estimated to be a gross sink of –12.5 ± 3.2 GtCO 2 yr –1 for the period 2010–2019, are added to land-use emissions, then land overall constituted a net sink of –6.6 ± 5.2 GtCO 2 yr –1 in terms of CO 2 emissions (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
The rate of deforestation, which accounts for 45% of total AFOLU emissions, has generally declined, while global tree cover and global forest-growing stock levels are likely increasing (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Similarly, AFOLU N 2O emissions are increasing, dominated by agriculture, notably from manure application, nitrogen deposition, and nitrogen fertiliser use (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Climate change itself could reduce the mitigation potential from the AFOLU sector, although an increase in the capacity of natural sinks could occur despite changes in climate (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
The continued loss of biodiversity makes ecosystems less resilient to climate change extremes and this may further jeopardise the achievement of the AFOLU mitigation potentials indicated in this chapter (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
While not as closely connected to the AFOLU sector as bioenergy, other renewable energy options can influence AFOLU activities in both synergistic and detrimental ways (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Deployment can be partly decoupled from additional land use, for example, use of organic waste and residues and integration of solar PV into buildings and other infrastructure (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Wind and solar power can coexist with agriculture in beneficial ways (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
The agriculture and forestry sectors can devise management approaches that enable biomass production and use for energy in conjunction with the production of food and timber, thereby reducing the conversion pressure on natural ecosystems (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Integrated responses that contribute to mitigation, adaptation, and other land challenges will have greater likelihood of being successful (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
This is well short of the more than USD400 billion yr –1 that is estimated to be necessary to deliver the up to 30% of global mitigation effort envisaged in deep mitigation scenarios (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Some also include direct air CO 2 capture and storage (DACCS) (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Rapid and deep changes in demand make it easier for every sector to reduce GHG emissions in the near and mid-term (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Behavioural nudges promote easy behaviour change, for example, ‘Improve’ actions such as making investments in energy efficiency, but fail to motivate harder lifestyle changes (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
TS.6.1 Policy and Institutions Long-term deep emission reductions, including the reduction of emissions to net zero, is best achieved through institutions and governance that nurture new mitigation policies, while at the same time reconsidering existing policies that support the continued emission of GHGs (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
The awareness of co-benefits for the public increases support of climate policies (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
They are able to experiment with climate solutions and can forge partnerships with the private sector and internationally to leverage enhanced climate action (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
Subsidy removal may have adverse distributional impacts especially on the most economically vulnerable groups which, in some cases can be mitigated by measures such as redistributing revenue saved, all of which depend on national circumstances (high confidence); fossil fuel subsidy removal is projected by various studies (using alternative methodologies) to reduce global CO 2 emissions by 1–4%, and GHG emissions by up to 10% by 2030, varying across regions (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
There is no consistent evidence of significant emissions leakage or competitiveness effects between countries, including for emissions- intensive trade-exposed industries covered by emission-trading systems (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
AFOLU {Chapter 7}Regulation of land-use rights and practices have led to falling aggregate AFOLU-sector emissions.Regulation of land-use rights and practices, payments for ecosystem service, and offsets, have led to decreasing rates of deforestation (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Other international agreements and institutions have led to avoided CO 2 emissions from land-use practices, as well as avoided emissions of some non-CO 2 greenhouse gases (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
Both new and pre-existing forms of cooperation are vital for achieving climate mitigation goals in the context of sustainable development (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: high)
While previous IPCC assessments have noted important synergies between the outcomes of climate mitigation and achieving sustainable development objectives, there now appear to be synergies between the two processes themselves (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)
International cooperation helps countries achieve long-term mitigation targets when it supports development and diffusion of low-carbon technologies, often at the level of individual sectors, which can simultaneously lead to significant benefits in the areas of sustainable development and equity (IPCC AR6_WGIII, confidence: medium)