Judgment Case ID: 1469

Judgment:
ON: Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 1957. 771 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the April 9	 1956	 of the Patna High Court in Cr. A. No. 445 of 1955. WITH Criminal Appeals Nos. 124 to 126 of 1958. Appeals from the judgment and order dated May 16	 1958	 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 76 and 108 of 1955 and Cr. M. Writ No. 2371 of 1955. Janardan Sharma for appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 1957: The appellant has been convicted under sections 124A and 505 Indian Penal Code. Both these sections are ultra vires as they contravene the provisions of article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. A speech may disturb public order or it may not	 but both are made punishable under Section 124A. The section hits speeches of both varieties permissible speeches and impermissible speeches. The explanation to section 124A do not affect the interpretation of the main section. In a democratic set up a citizen is entitled to criticise the Government with a view to change it. Two questions arises in the cases	 namely (i) does section 124A enact a law which is in the interest of public order and (ii) does this section impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order. The decision in I. L. R. (1958) 2 All. 84 which has declared s.124A to be ultra vires takes the correct law. R. C. Prasad	 for respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 1957: Referred to the decision in Ramji Lal Modi vs State of U. P. [1957] S.C.R.860. Stated that he would adopt the submissions to be made by Shri C. B. Agarwala. C. B. Agarwala for the appellant in Criminal Appeals Nos. 124 to 126 of 1958: The correct meaning of the provisions of section 124A in the context 772 of the present set up and the Constitution is that given by the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt 's case	 and not the meaning given to them by the Privy Council in Bhalerao 's case 74 I. A. 89. Intepretation by Courts of words of statutes to a particular set of facts has been changing with the change in the social and political structure of society and the opinion of its reasonable members. Section 124A is in a chapter which deals with offencss against the State. Therefore	 it is not a case of libel against any offioer but of an offence against the State. Words in the English law relating to sedition are the same as in section 124A vide Stephen 's Commentary on the law of England	 Vol. 4	 page 141	 Halsbury 's Law of England 3rd Edition	 Vol. 10	 page 169 Jowitt 's Dictionary of English law	 page 1605	 Stephen 's History of Criminal Law	 Vol. 2	 page 298 and 301 Chapter 24. Under English Law a tendency to create tumult or disorder is an essential element of sedition. Russel on Crimes	 Vol. 1	 p. 229	 R. vs Collins	 ; R. vs Sullivan	 11 Cox. Section 124A has been taken from the English Law (see Section 124A must	 therefore	 be interpreted in the same manner as sedition is interpreted in England and it must be held that a tendency to disturb public order is an essential element of the offence under section 124A. Articles 133 and 133A of the Canadian Criminal Code which deal with sedition have been given the same interpretation	 1951	 canadian section C. R. 265. The view taken in Tilak 's case 	 in Bhalerao 's case 74 I.A. 89 and in Wallice Johnsons case[1940] A. C. 231 that incitement to violence or a tendency to disturb public order was not a necessary ingredient of section 124A	 is not the correct view. takes the correct view and lays down that the tendency to disturb public order is a necessary ingredient of the offence under section 124A. Devi Saran 's case 32 Pat. 1124 also takes the same view. 773 There are two interpretations of section 124A before the Court	 one taken by the Federal Court and the other taken by the Privy Council. This Court should accept the interpretation given by the section Court	 as that interpretation would make the section Constitutional. Even if the interpretation put by the Privy Council be accepted as correct one	 section 124A will still be valid. The section certainly contemplates cases where the speech is likely to disturb public order and as such the section in the interest of public order as contemplated in article 19(2) and the mere fact that some cases in which the public order is not likely to be disturbed are also included therein	 cannot invalidate the section. This court took a similar view in Ramjilal Modi 's case ; and in Virendra 's case [1958] section C. R. 308	 the decision Lohia 's case [1960] 2 section C. R. 821 does not affect this case	 as in that case it was found that that provisions curtailing freedom of speech were not in the interest of public order as the connection between the provisions and disturbance of public order as too remove. Even if the section be held according to the Privy Council view to include which threaten public order and those which the section can be held valid with respect s where public order is threatened as the two of case are severable. 	 [1951] section C. R. 682	 [1953] 1059 and ; P. Verma for the Attorney General of Article 374(2) of the Constitution perversion of the Federal Court shall have the rect as the decision of the Supreme Court. Decision of the Federal Court in be deemed to be a decision of this Court and should be held binding. A tendency to disturb public order is inherent in section 124A itself. Gopal Behari for respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 124 of 1958: The interpretataion of section 124A by 774 the Privy Council has been accepted by the High Court. Even in English Law sedition does not necessarily include an intention to disturb public order; 	 Explanations (2) and (3) would be redundant if section 124A is interpreted to incorporate the English view of sedition. The Allahabad High Court as well as other High Courts have given the same interpretation of section 124A as the Privy Council has. See 1941 All. 156	 1930 Lah. 309	 and 10 Luck. The decision in Lohia 's case also ; governs the present case also section 124A punishes such speeches also as have no tendency to disturb public order and contravenes article 19(1)(a). It is not saved by article 19(2) as placing of restriction on such speeches is not in the interest of public order. It is not open to the Court to rewrite the section by removing from its purview such speeches as have no tendency to disturb public order and to confine it to such speeches as have a tendency to disturb public order. The whole section must fail; it cannot be dissected. C. B. Agarwala in reply: In English law is a necessary ingredient of seditious intention it must have a tendency to cause tumult or di R. vs Alred	 	 R. vs Burdott	 101	 803; R. vs O 'Brien	 The Council has only said that actual incite violence was not a necessary ingredient of It has not gone further and has not laid tendency to disturb public order was not a ingredient of section 124A. Even though public is not an ingredient of the offeence under there is a tendency to disturb public speeches or writings which bring or atte bring into hatered or contempt or excite or at to excite dissatisfaction towards the Government established by law. January 20. The Judgment of the court was delivered by 775 SINHA	 C. J. In these appeals the main question in controversy is whether sections 124A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code have become void in view of the provisions of article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The constitutionality of the provisions of section 124A	 which was mainly canvassed before us	 is common to all the appeals	 the facts of which may shortly be stated separately. In Criminal Appeal 169 of 1957	 the appellant is one Kedar nath Singh	 who was prosecuted before a Magistrate	 1st Class	 at Begusarai	 in the district of Monghyr	 in Bihar. He framed the following charges against the accused person	 which are set out in extenso in order to bring out the gravamen of the charge against him. "First. That you on 26th day of May	 1953 at village Barauni	 P. section Taghra (Monghyr) by speaking the words	 to wit	 (a) To day the dogs of the C. I. D are loitering round Barauni. Many official dogs are sitting even in this meeting. The people of India drove out the Britishers from this country and elected these Congress goondas to the gaddi and seated them on it. To day these Congress goondas are sitting on the gaddi due to mistake of the people. When we drove out the Britishers	 we shall strike and turn out these Congress goondas as well. These official dogs will also be liquidated along with these Congress goondas. These Congress goondas are banking upon the American dollars and imposing various kinds of taxes on the people to day. The blood of our brothers mazdoors and Kishanas is being sucked. The capitalists and the zamindars of this country help these Congress goondas. These zamindars and capitalists will also have to be brought before the peoples court along with these Congress goondas. 776 (b) On the strength of the organisation and unity of Kisans and mazdoors the Forward Communists Party will expose the black deeds of the Congress goondas	 who are just like the Britishers. Only the colour of the body has changed. They have to day established a rule of lathis and bullets in the country. The Britishers had to go away from this land. They had aeroplanes	 guns	 bombs and other weapons with them. (c) The Forward Communist Party does not believe in the doctrine of vote itself. The party had always been believing in revolution and does so even at present. We believe in that revolution	 which will come and in the flames of which the capitalists	 zamindars and the Congress leaders of India	 who have made it their profession to loot the country	 will be reduced to ashes and on their ashes will be established a Government of the poor and the downtrodden people of India. (d) It will be a mistake to expect anything from the Congress relers. They (Congress rulers) have set up V. Bhave in the midst of the people by causing him wear a langoti in order to divert the people 's attention from their mistakes. To day Vinova is playing a drama on the stage of Indian politics. Confusion is being created among the people. I want to tell Vinova and advice his agents	 "you should understand it the people cannot be deceived by this illusion and fraud of Vinova". I shall vinova not to become a puppet in the of the Congress men. These persons	 understand the Yojna of Vinova	 realise that Vinova is an agent to the Congress Government. (e) I tell you that this Congress Government will do no good to you. 777 (f) I want to tell the last word even to the Congress Tyrants	 "you play with the people and ruin them by entangling them in the mesh of bribery	 black marketing and corruption. To day the children of the poor are hankering for food and you Congress men are assuming the attitude of Nawabs sitting on the chairs. " Brought or attempted to bring into hatred or contempt or excited or attempted to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law in the Indian Union and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. Secondly. That you on the 26th day of May	 1953 at village Barauni	 P. section Tegra (Monghyr) made the statement	 to wit	 (a) To day the dogs of the C. I. D. are loitering round Barauni. Many official dogs are sitting even in this meeting. The people of India drove out the Britishers from this country	 And elected these Congress Goondas to the gaddi and seated them on it. To day these Congress Goondas are sitting on the gaddi due to the mistake of the people. When we have driven out the Britishers	 we shall strike and turn out these Congress Goondas. These Congress Goondas are banking upon the American dollars and imposing various kinds of taxes on the people to day. The blood of our brothers Mazdoors and Kisans is being sucked. The capitalists and the zamindars of this country help these Congress Goondas. These zamindars and capitalists will also have to be brought before the people 's Court along with these Congress Goondas. 778 (b) On the strength of organisation and unity of kisans and mazdoors the Forward Communist Party will expose the black deeds of the Congress Goondas	 who are just like the Britishers. Only the colour of the body has changed. They have	 to day	 established a rule of lathis and bullets in the country. The Britishers had to go away from this land. They had aeroplanes	 guns	 bombs	 and other reasons with them. (c) The Forward Communist party does not believe in the doctrine of votes itself. The party had always been believing in revolution and does so even at present. We believe in that revolution	 which will come and in the flames of which the capitalists	 zamindars and the Congress leaders of India	 who have made it their profession to loot the country	 will be reduced to ashes	 and on their ashes will be established a Government of the poor and the downtrodden people of India. (d) It will be a mistake to expect anything from the Congress rulers. They (Congress rulers) have set up V. Bhave in the midst of the people by causing him wear a langoti in order to divert the attention of the people from their mistakes. To day Vinoba is playing a drama on the stage of Indian politics. Confusion is being created among the people. I want to tell Vinova and advise his agents	 "You should understand it that the people cannot be deceived by this Yojna	 illusion and fraud of Vinova. I shall advice Vinova not to become a puppet in the hands of the Congress men. Those persons who understand the Yojna of Vinova	 realise that Vinova is an agent of Congress Government. 779 (e) I tell you that no good will be done to you by this Congress Government. (f) I want to tell the last word even to Congress tyrants "you play with the people and ruin them by entangling them in the mesh of bribery	 black marketing and corruption. To day the children of the poor are hankering for food and you (Congress men) are assuming the attitude of Nawabs sitting on the chairs". . With intent to cause or which was likely to cause fear or alarm to the public whereby any persons might be induce to commit an offence against the State of Bihar and against the public tranquility	 and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 505(b) of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. After recording a substantial volume of oral evidence	 the learned Trial Magistrate convicted the accused person both under sections 124A and 505(b) of the Indian Penal Code	 and sentenced him to under go rigorous imprisonment for one year. No separate sentence was passed in respect of the conviction under the latter section. The convicted persons preferred an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Patna	 which was heard by the late Mr. Justice Naqui Imam	 sitting singly. By this judgment and order dated April 9	 1956	 he upheld the convictions and the sentence and dismissed the appeal. In the course of his judgment	 the learned Judge observed that the Judge observed of the charge against the appellant was nothing but a vilification of the Government; that it was full of incitements to revolution and that the speech taken as a whole was certainly seditionus. It is not a speech critising any of is measures. He held that the offences both under sections 124A 505(b) of the Indian Penal Code had been made out. 780 The convicted person moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal. It will be noticed that the constitutionality of the provisions of the sections under which the appellant was convicted had not been convassed before the High Court. But in the petition for special leave	 to this Court	 the ground was taken that sections 124A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code "are inconsistent with article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution". The appeal was heard in this Court	 in the first instance	 by a Division Bench on May 5	 1959. The Bench	 finding that the learned counsel vco the appellant had raised the constitutional issue as to the validity of sections 124A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code	 directed that the appeal be placed for hearing by a Constitution Bench. The case was then placed before a Constitution Bench	 on November 4	 1960	 when that Bench directed notice to issue to the Attorney General of India under r. 1	 O.41 of the Supreme Court Rules. The matter was once again placed before a constitution Bench on February 9	 1961	 when it was adjourned for two months in order to enable the State Governments concerned with this appeal	 as also with the connected Criminal Appeals Nos. 124 126 of 1958 (in which the Government of Uttar Pradesh is the appellant) to make up their minds in respect of the proseocuions	 as also in view of the report that the Law Commission was considering the question of amending the law of sedition in view of the new set up. As the States concerned have instructed their counsel to press the appeals	 the matter has finally come before us. In Criminal Appeals 124 126 of 1958 the State of Uttar Pradesh is the appellant	 though the respondents are different. In Criminal appeal 124 of 1958	 the accused person is one Mohd	 Ishaq Ihahi. He was prosecuted for having delivered a speech at Aligarh as Chairman of the Reception Committee of the All India Muslim Convention on October 30	 781 1953. His speech on that occasion	 was thought to be seditious. After the necessary sanction	 the Magistrate held an enquiry	 and finding a prima facie case made out against the accused	 committed him to the Court of Session. The learned Sessions Judge	 by his Judgment dated January 8	 1955	 acquitted him of the charge under section 153A	 but convicted him of the other charge under section 124A	 of the Indian Penal Code	 and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year. The convicted person preferred an appeal to the High Court. In the High Court the constitutionality of section 124A of the Indian Penal Code was challenged. In Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 1958	 the facts are that on May 29	 1954	 a meeting of the Bolshovik Party was organised in village Hanumanganj	 in the District of Basti	 in Uttar Pradesh. On that occasion	 the respondent Rama Nand was found to have delivered an objectionable speech in so far as he advocated the use of violence for overthrowing the Government established by law. After the sanction of the Government to the prosecution had been obtained	 the learned Magistrate held an enquiry and ultimately committed him to take his trial before the Court of Sessions. In due course	 the learned Sessions Judge convicted the accused person under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for three years. He held that the accused person had committed the offence by inciting the audience to an open violent rebellion against the Government established by law	 by the use of arms. Against the aforesaid order of conviction and sentence	 the accused person preferred an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad. In Criminal Appeal 126 of 1958	 the respondent is one Parasnath Tripathi. He is alleged to have delivered a speech in village Mansapur	 P.S. Akbarpur	 in the district of Faizabad	 on September 26	 1955	 in which he is said to have 782 exhorted the audience to organise a volunteer army and resist the Government and its servants by violent means. He is also said to have excited the audience with intent to create feelings of hatred and enmity against the Government. When he was placed on trial for an offence under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code	 the accused person applied for a writ of Habeas Corpus in the High Court of Judicature at. Allahabad on the ground that his detention was illegal inasmuch as the provisions section 124A of the Indian Penal Code were void as being in contravention of his fundamental rights of free speech and expression under article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This matter	 along with the appeals which have given rise to appeals Nos. 124 and 125	 as aforesaid	 were ultimately placed before a Full Bench	 consisting of Desai	 Gurtu and Beg	 JJ. The learned judges	 in separate but concurring judgments	 took the view that section 124A of the Indian Penal Code was ultra vires article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In that view of the matter	 they acquitted the accussed persons	 convicted at aforesaid in the two appeals Nos. 124 and 125	 and granted the writ petition of the accused in criminal Appeal No. 126. In all these cases the High Court granted the necessary certificate that the case involved important questions of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution. That is how these appeals are before by on a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court. Shri C. B. Agarwala	 who appeared on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh in support of the appeals against the orders of acquittal passed by the High Court	 contended that the judgment of the High Court (bow reported in Ram Nandan vs State (1) in which it was laid down by the Full Bench that section 124A of the Indian Penal Code was ultra article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and	 783 therefore	 void for the reason that it was not in the interest of public order and that the restrictions imposed there by were not reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression	 was erroneous. He further contended that the section impugned came within the saving cl. (2) of article 19	 and that the reasons given by the High Court to the contrary were erroneous. He relied upon the observations of the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar vs The King Emperor (1). He also relied on Stephen 's Commentaries on the Laws of England	 Volume IV	 21st Edition	 page 141	 and the Statement of the Law in Halsbury 's Laws of England	 3rd Edition	 volume 10	 page 569	 and the cases referred to in those volumes. Mr. Gopal Behari	 appearing on behalf of the respondents in the Allahabad cases has entirely relied upon the full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in his favour. Shri Sharma appearing on behalf of the appellant in the appeal from the Patna High Court has similarly relied upon the decision aforesaid of the Allahabad High Court. Before dealing with the contentions raised on behalf of the parties	 it is convenient to set out the history of the law	 the amendments it has undergone and the interpretations placed upon the provisions of section 124A by the Courts in India	 and by their Lordships of the judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The section corresponding to section 124A was originally section 113 of Macaulay 's Draft Penal Code of 1837 39	 but the section was omitted from the Indian Penal Code as it was enacted in 1860. The reason for the omission from the Code is enacted is not clear	 but perhaps the legislative body did not feel sure above its authority to enact such a provision in the Code. Be that as it may	 section 124A was not placed on the Statute Book until 1870	 by Act XXVII of 1870. There 784 was a considerable amount of discussion at the time the amendment was introduced by Sir James	 Stephen	 but what he said while introducing the bill in the legislature may not be relevant for our present purposes. The section as then enacted ran as follows: "124A. Exciting Disaffection Whoever by words	 either spoken or intended to be read	 or by signs	 or by visible representation	 or otherwise	 excites	 or attempts to excite	 feelings of disaffection to the Government established by law in British India	 shall be punished with transportation for life or for any term	 to which	 fine may be added	 or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years	 to which fine may be added	 or with fine. Explanation Such a disapprobation of the measures of the Government as is compatible with a disposition to render obedience to the lawful authority of the Government and to support the lawful authority of the Government against unlawful attempts to subvert or resist that authority	 is not disaffection. Therefore	 the making of comments on the measures of the Government	 with the intention of exciting only this species of disapprobation	 is not an offence within this clause. " The first case in Indian that arose under the section is what is known as the Bangobasi case (Queen Empress vs Jagendra Chunder Bose (1)) which was tried by a Jury before Sir Comer Petheram	 C J. while charging the jury	 the learned Chief Justice explained the law to the jury in these terms: 785 "Disaffection means a feeling contrary to affection	 in other words	 dislike or hatred. Disapprobation means simply disapproval. It is quite possible to disapprove of a men 's sentiments or action and yet to like him. The meaning of the two words is so distinct that I feel it hardly necessary to tell you that the contention of Mr. Jackson cannot be sustained. If a person uses either spoken or written words calculated to create in the minds of the persons to whom they are addressed a disposition not to obey the lawful authority of the Government	 or to subvert or resist that authority	 if and when occasion should arise	 and if he does so with the intention of creating such a disposition in his bearers or readers	 he will be guilty of the offence of attempting to excite disaffection within the meaning of the section though no disturbance is brought about by his words or any feeling of disaffection	 in fact	 produced by them. It is sufficient for the purposes of the section that the words used are calculated to excite feelings of ill will against the Government and to hold it up to the hatred and contempt of the people	 and that they were used with the intention to create such feeling. " The next case is the celebrated case of Queen Empress vs Balqanqaddhar Tilak (1) which came before the Bobay High Court. The case was tried by a jury before Strachey	 J. The learned judge	 in the course of his charge to the jury	 explain the law to them in these terms: "The offence as defined by the first clause is exciting or attempting to excite feelings of disaffection to the Government. What are "feelings of disaffection" ? I agree with Sir Comer Petheram in the Bangobasi case that disaffection means simply the 786 absence of affection. It means hatred	 enmity dislike	 hostility	 contempt and every from of ill will to the Government. "Disloyalty" is perhaps the best general term	 comprehending every possible form of bad feeling to the Government. That is what the law means by the disaffection which a man must not excite or attempt to excite; he must not make or try to make others feel enmity of any kind towards the Government. You will observe that the amount or intensity of the disaffection is absolutely immaterial except perhaps in dealing with the question of punishment: if a man excites or attempts to excite feelings of disaffection	 great or small	 he is guilty under the section. In the next place	 it is absolutely immaterial whether any feelings of disaffection have been excited or not by the publication in question. It is true that there is before you a charge against each prisoner that he has actually excited feelings of disaffection to the Government. If you are satisfied that he has done so	 you will	 of course	 find him guilty. But if you should hold that charge is not made out	 and that no one is proved to have been excited to entertain feelings of disaffection to the Government by reading these articles	 still that alone would not justify you in acquitting the prisoners. For each of them is charged not only with exciting feelings of disaffection	 but also with attempting to excite such feelings. You will observe that section places on absolutely the same footing the successful exciting of feelings of disaffection and the unsuccessful attempt to excite them	 so that	 if you find that either of the prisoners has tried to excite such feeling in others	 you must convict him even if there is nothing to show that he succeeded. Again	 it is 787 important that you should fully realise another point. The offence consists in exciting or attempting to excite in others certain bad feeling towards the Government. It is not the exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion	 or any sort of actual disturbance	 great or small. Whether any disturbance or outbreak was caused by there articles	 is absolutely immaterial. If the accused intended by the articles to excite rebellion or disturbance	 his act would doubtless fall within section 124A	 and would probably fall within other sections of the Penal Code. But even if he neither excited nor intended to excite any rebellion or outbreak or forcible resistance to the authority of the Government	 still if he tried to excite feelings of enmity to the Government	 that is sufficient to make him guilty under the section. I am aware that some distinguished persons have thought that there can be no offence against the section unless the accused either counsels or suggests rebellion or forcible resistance to the Government. In my opinion	 that view is absolutely opposed to the express words of the section itself	 which as plainly as possible makes the exciting or attempting to excite certain feelings	 and not the inducing or attempting to induce to any course of action such as rebellion or forcible resistance	 the test of guilt. I can only account for such a view by attributing it to a complete misreading of the explanation attached to the section	 and to a misapplication of the explanation beyond its true scope. " The long quotation has become necessary in view of what followed later	 namely	 that this statement of the law by the learned judge came in for a great deal of comment and judicial notice. We have omitted the charge to the jury relating 788 to the explanation to section 124A because that explanation has now yielded place to three separate explanations in view of judicial opinions expressed later. The jury	 by a majority of six to three	 found Shri Balgangadhar Tilak guilty. Subsequently	 he	 on conviction	 applied under cl. 41 of the Letters Patent for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. The application was heard by a Full Bench consisting of Farran	 C. J.	 Candy and Strachey	 JJ. It was contended before the High Court at the leave stage	 inter alia	 that the sanction given by the Government was not sufficient in law in that it had not set out the particulars of the offending articles	 and	 secondly	 that the judge misdirected the jury as to the meaning of the word "disaffection" insofar as he said that it might be equivalent to "absence of affection". With regard to the second point	 which is only relevant point before us; the Full Bench expressed itself to the following effect: "The other ground upon which Mr. Russell has asked as to certify that this is a fit case to be sent to Her Majesty in Council	 is that there has been a misdirection	 and he based his argument on one major and two minor grounds. The major ground was that the section cannot be said to have been contravened unless there is a direct incitement to stir up disorder or rebellion. That appears to us to be going much beyond the words of the section	 and we need not say more upon that ground. The first of the minor points is that Mr. Justice Strachey in summing up the case to the jury stated that disaffection meant the absence of affection". But although if that phrase had stood alone it might have misled the jury	 yet taken in connection with the context we think it is impossible that the jury could have been misled by it. That expression was used in connection with the 789 law as led down by Sir Comer Petheram	 in Calcutta in the Bangobashi case. There the Chief Justice instead of using the words "absence of affection" used the words "contrary to affection". If the words "contrary to affection" had been used instead of "absence of affection" in this case there can be no doubt that the summing up would have been absolutely correct in this particular. But taken in connection with the context it is clear that by the words "absence of affection" the learned Judge did not mean the negation of affection but some active sentiment on the other side. Therefore on that point we consider that we cannot certify that this is a fit case for appeal. " In this connection it must be remembered that it is not alleged that there has been a miscarriage of Justice. " After making those observations	 the Full Bench refused the application for leave. the case was then taken to Her Majesty in council	 by way of application for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee. Before their Lordships of the Privy Council	 Asquith	 Q. C.	 assisted by counsel of great experience and eminence like Mayne	 W. C. Bonnerjee and others	 contended that there was a misdirection as to the meaning of section 124A of the Penal Code in that the offence had been defined in terms to wide to the effect that "disaffection" meant simply "absence of affection" and that it comprehended every possible form of bad feeling to the Government. In this connection reference was made to the observations of Petheram	 C.J. in Queen Empress vs Jogender Bose(1). It was also contended that the appellant 's comments 790 had not exceeded what in England would be considered within the functions of a Public journalist	 and that the misdirection complained of was of the greatest importance not merely to the affected person but to the whole of the Indian Press and also to all her Majesty 's subjects; and that it injuriously affected the liberty of the press and the right to free speech in public meetings. But in spite of the strong appeal made on behalf of the petitioner for special leave	 the Lord Chancellor	 delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee	 while dismissing the application	 observed that taking a view of the whole of the summing up they did not see any reason to dissent from it	 and that keeping in view the rules which Their Lordships observed in the matter of granting leave to appeal in criminal cases	 they did not think that the case raised questions which deserve further consideration by the Privy Council. (vide Gangadhar Tilak vs Queen Empress) (1). Before noticing the further changes in the Statute	 it is necessary to refer to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Queen Empress vs Amba Prasad (2). In that case	 Edge	 C.J.	 who delivered the judgment of the Court	 made copious quotations from the judgments of the Calcutta and the Bombay High Courts in the cases above referred to. While generally adopting the reasons for the decisions in the aforesaid two cases	 the learned Chief Justice observed that a man may be guilty of the offence defined in section 124A of attempting to excite feelings of disaffection against the Government established by law in British India	 although in a particular article or speech he may insist upon the desirability or expediency of obeying and supporting the Government. He also made reference to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the Satara (3) case. In that case a Full Bench	 consisting of Farran	 C.J.	 and Parsons and Ranade	 JJ	 791 had laid it down that the word "disaffection" in the section is used in a special sense as meaning political alienation or discontent or disloyalty to the Government or existing authority. They also held that the meaning of word "disaffection" in the main portion of the section was not varied by the explanation. Persons	 J.	 held that the word "disaffection" could not be construed as meaning 'absence of or contrary of affection or love '. Ranade J.	 interpreted the word "disaffection" not as meaning mere absence or negation of love or good will but a positive feeling of aversion	 which is akin to ill will	 a definite insubordination of authority or seeking to alienate the people and weaken the bond of allegiance	 a feeling which tends to bring the Government into hatred and discontent	 by imputing base and corrupt motives to it. The learned Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court observed that if those remarks were meant to be in any sense different from the construction placed upon the section by Strachey	 J.	 which was approved	 as aforesaid	 by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council	 the later observations of the Bombay High Court could not be treated as authoritative. As the accused in the Allahabad case had pleaded guilty and the appeal was more or less on the question of sentence	 it was not necessary for their Lordships to examine in detail the implications of the section	 though they expressed their general agreement with the view of the Calcutta and the Bombay High Courts in the first two cases	 referred to above. The section was amended by the Indian Penal Code Amendment Act (IV of 1898). As a result of the amendment	 the single explanation to the section was replaced by three separate explanations as they stand now. The section	 as it now stands in its present form	 is the result of the several A.O.S. of 1937	 1948 and 1950	 as a result of the constitutional changes	 by the Government of India Act	 1935	 by the Independence Act of 1947 and by the Indian 792 Constitution of 1950. Section 124A	 as it has emerged after successive amendments by way of adaptations as aforesaid	 reads as follows: "Whoever by words	 either spoken or written	 or by signs or by visible representation	 or otherwise	 brings or attempts to bring into hatred to contempt	 or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law in India shall be punished with transportation for life or any shorter term to which fine may be added or with imprisonment which may extend to three years	 to which fine may be added	 or with fine. Explanation 1. The expression "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. Explanation 2. Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means	 without exiting or attempting to excite hatred	 contempt or disaffection do not constitute an offence under this section. Explanation 3. Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative of other action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred	 contempt or disaffection	 do not constitute an offence under this section. " This offence	 which is generally known as the offence of Sedition	 occurs in chapter IV of the Indian Penal Code	 headed 'Of offences against the State '. This species of offence against the State was not an invention of the British. Government in India	 but has been known in England for centuries. Every State	 whatever its form of Government	 has to be armed with the power to punish those who	 by 793 their conduct	 jeopardise the safety and stability of the State	 or disseminate such feelings of disloyalty as have the tendency to lead to the disruption of the State or to public disorder. In England	 the crime has thus been described by Stephen in his Commentaries on the Laws of England	 21st Edition	 volume IV	 at pages 141 142	 in these words. "Section IX. Sedition and Inciting to Disaffection We are now concerned with conduct which	 on the one hand	 fall short of treason	 and on the other does not involve the use of force or violence. The law has here to reconcile the right of private criticism with the necessity of securing the safety and stability of the State. Sedition may be defined as conduct which has	 either as its object or as its natural consequence	 the unlawful display of dissatisfaction with the Government or with the existing order of society. The seditious conduct may be by words	 by deed	 or by writing. Five specific heads of sedition may be enumerated according to the object of the accused. This may be either 1. to excite disaffection against the King	 Government	 or Constitution	 or against Parliament or the administration of justice; 2. to promote	 by unlawful means	 any alteration in Church or State; 3. to incite a disturbance of the peace; 4. to raise discontent among the King 's subjects; 5. to excite class hatred. It must be observed that criticism on political matters is not of itself seditious. The test is the manner in which it is made. Candid and honest discussion is permitted. The law 794 only interferes when the discussion passes the bounds of fair criticism. More especially will this be the case when the natural consequence of the prisoner 's conduct is to promote public disorder. " This statement of the law is derived mainly from the address to the Jury by Fitzerald	 J.	 in the case of Reg vs Alexander Martin Sullivan (1). In the course of his address to the Jury the learned Judge observed as follows: "Sedition is a crime against society	 nearly allied to that of treason	 and it frequently precedes treason by short interval. Sedition in itself is a comprehensive term	 and it embraces all those practices	 whether by word	 deed or writing	 which are calculated to disturb the tranquility of the State	 and lead ignorant persons to endeavour to subvert the Government and the laws of the empire. The objects of sedition generally are to induce discontent and insurrection and stir up opposition to the Government	 and bring the administration of justice into contempt; and the very tendency of sedition is to incite the people to insurrection and rebellion. Sedition has been described	 as disloyalty in action and the law considers as sedition all those practices which have for their object to excite discontent or dissatisfaction	 to create public disturbance	 or to lead to civil war; to bring into hatred or contempt the Sovereign or the Government	 the laws or constitution of the realm	 and generally all endeavours to promote public disorder. " That the law has not changed during the course of the centuries is also apparent from the following statement of the law by Coleridge	 J.	 in the course of his summing up to the Jury in the case of Rex. vs Aldred (2): 795 "Nothing is clearer than the law on this head namely	 that whoever by language	 either written or spoken incites or encourages other to use physical force or violence in some public matter connected with the State	 is guilty of publishing a seditious libel. The word "sedition" in its ordinary natural signification denotes a tumult	 an insurrection	 a popular commotion	 or an uproar; it implies violence or lawlessness in some form. " In that case	 the learned Judge was charging the Jury in respect of the indictment which contained the charge of seditious libel by a publication by the defendant. While dealing with a case arising under Rule 34(6) (e) of the Defence of India Rules under the Defence of India Act (XXXV of 1939) Sir Maurice Gwyer	 C.J.	 speaking for the Federal Court	 made the following observations in the case of Niharendu Dutt Majumdar vs The King Emperor (1); and has pointed out that the language of section 124A of the Indian Penal Code	 which was in pari materia with that of the Rule in question	 had been adopted from the English Law	 and referred with approval to the observations of Fitzerald	 J.	 in the case quoted above; and made the following observations which are quite apposite: ". generally speaking	 we think that the passage accurately states the law as it is to be gathered from an examination of a great number of judicial pronouncements. The first and most fundamental duty of every Government is the preservation of order	 since order is the condition precedent to all civilisation and the advance of human happiness. This duty has no doubt been sometimes performed in such 796 a way as to make the remedy worse than the disease; but it does not cease to be a matter of obligation because some on whom the duty rests have performed it ill. It is to this aspect of the functions of government that in our opinion the offence of sedition stands related. It is the answer of the State to those who	 for the purpose of attacking or subverting it	 seek (to borrow from the passage cited above) to disturb its tranquillity	 to create public disturbance and to promote disorder	 or who incite others to do so. Words	 deeds or writings constitute sedition	 if they have this intention or this tendency; and it is easy to see why they may also constitute sedition	 if they seek	 as the phrase is	 to bring Government into contempt. This is not made an offence in order to minister to the wounded vanity of Government	 but because where Government and the law cease to be obeyed because no respect is felt any longer for them	 only anarchy can follow. Public disorder	 or the reasonable anticipation or likelihood of public disorder	 is thus the gist of the offence. The acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that is their intention or tendency. " This statement of the law was not approved by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of King Emperor vs Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao (1). The Privy Council	 after quoting the observations of the learned chief Justice in Niharendu 's case (2)	 while disapproving of the decision of the Federal Court	 observed that there was no statutory definition of "Sedition" in England	 and the meaning and content of the crime had to be gathered from any decisions. 797 But those were not relevant considerations when one had to construe the statutory definition of 'Sedition ' as in the Code. The Privy Council held that the language of section 124A	 or of the Rule aforesaid	 under the Government of India Act	 did not justify the statement of the law as made by the learned Chief Justice in Niharendu 's case(1) they also held that the expression "excite disaffection" did not include "excite disorder"	 and that	 therefore	 the decision of the Federal Court in Niharendu 's case(1) proceeded on a wrong construction of section 124A of the Penal Code	 and of sub para (e)	 sub rule (6) of Rule 34 of the Defence of India Rules; Their Lordships approved of the dicta in the case of Bal Gangadhar Tilak (2)	 and in the case of Annie Basant vs Advocate General of Madras (3)	 which was a case under section 4 of the Indian Press Act. (I of 1910)	 which was closely similar in language to section 124A of the Penal Code. The Privy Council also referred to their previous decision in Wallace Johnson vs The Kinq(4) which was a case under sub section 8 of section 326 of the Criminal Code of the Gold Coast	 which defined "seditious intention" in terms similar to the words of s.124A of the Penal Code. In that case	 their Lordships had laid down that incitement to violence was not necessary ingredient of the Crime of sedition as defined in that law. Thus	 there is a direct conflict between the decision of the Federal Court in Niharendu 's case (1) and of the Privy Counsil in a number of cases from Indian and the Gold Coast	 referred to above. It is also clear that either view can be taken and can be supported on good reasons. The Federal Court decision takes into consideration	 as indicated above	 the pre exiting Common Law of England in respect of sedition. It does not appear from the report of 798 the Federal Court decision that the rulings aforesaid of the Privy Council had been brought to the notice of their Lordships of the Federal Court. So far as this Court is concerned	 the question directly arising for determination in this batch of cases has not formed the subject matter of decision previously. But certain observations made by this Court in some cases	 to be presently noticed	 with reference to the interrelation between freedom of speech and seditious writing or speaking have been made in the very first year of the coming into force of the Constitution. Two cases involving consideration of the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression and certain laws enacted by some of the States imposing restrictions on that right came up for consideration before this Court. Those cases	 reported in Romesh Thappar vs The State of Madras(1) and Brij Bhushan vs The State of Delhi(2) were heard by Kania C.J.	 Pazl Ali	 Patanjali Shastri	 Mehr Chand Mahajan	 Mukherjea and Das	 JJ	 and judgments were delivered on the same day (May 26	 1950). In Romesh Thappar 's case (1)	 the majority of the Court declared section 9(1 A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (Mad. XXXIII of 1949)	 which had authorised imposition of restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech	 to be in excess of cl. (2) of article 19 of the Constitution authorising such restrictions	 and	 therefore	 void and unconstitutional. In Brij Bhushan 's case (2)	 the same majority struck down section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act	 1949	 as extended to the Province of Delhi	 authorising the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or 799 the maintenance of public order. The Court held those provisions to be in excess of the powers conferred on the Legislature by cl. (2) of article 19 of the Constitution. Mr. Justice Patanjali Sastri	 speaking for the majority of the Court in Romesh Thappar 's case (1) made the following observations with reference to the decisions of the Federal Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as to what the law of Sedition in India was: "It is also worthy of note that the word "sedition" which occurred in article 13(2) of the Draft Constitution prepared by the Drafting Committee was deleted before the article was finally passed as article 19(2). In this connection it may be recalled that the Federal Court had	 in defining sedition in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar vs The King Emperor (2) held that "the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency"	 but the Privy Council overruled that decision and emphatically reaffirmed the view expressed in Tilak 's case to the effect that "the offence consisted in exciting or attempting to excite in others certain bad feelings towards the Government and not in exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion	 or any sort of actual disturbance	 great or small" King Emperor vs Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao. Deletion of the word "sedition" from the draft article 13(2)	 therefore	 shows that criticism of Government exciting disaffection or bad feelings toward it is not to be regarded as a justifying ground for restricting the freedom of expression and of the press	 unless it is such as to undermine the security of or tend to overthrow the State. It is also significant that the corresponding 800 Irish formula of "undermining the public order or the authority of the State" (article 40(6)(i) of the Constitution of Fire	 1937) did not apparently find favour with the framers of the Indian Constitution. Thus	 very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgement of the right of free speech and expression	 and this was doubtless due to the realisation that freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all domocratic organisations	 for without free political discussion no public education	 so essential for the proper functioning of the processes of popular government	 is possible	 freedom of such amplitude might involve risks of abuse. But the framers of the Constitution may well have reflected	 with Madison who was "the leading spirit in the preparation of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution" that "it is better to leave a few of its naxious branches to their luxuriant growth	 than	 by prunning	 them away to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits" : (quoted in Near vs Minnesotta). Those observations were made to bring out the difference between the "security of the State" and "public order". As the latter expression did not find a place in article 19(2) of the Constitution	 as it stood originally	 the section was struck down as unconstitutional. Fazl Ali	 J.	 dissented from the views thus expressed by the majority and reiterated his observations in Brij Bhushan 's case (1) In the course of his dissenting judgment	 he observed as follows: "It appears to me that in the ultimate analysis the real question to be decided in this case is whether "disorders involving menace to the 801 peace and tranquillity of the Province" and affecting "Public safety" will be a matter which undermines the security of the State or not. I have borrowed the words quoted within inverted commas from the preamble of the Act which shows its scope and necessity and the question raised before us attacking the validity of the Act must be formulated in the manner I have suggested. If the answer to the question is in the affirmative	 as I think it must be	 then the impugned law which prohibits entry into the State of Madras of "any document or class of documents" for securing public safety and maintenance of public order should satisfy the requirements laid down in article 19(2) of the Constitution. From the trend of the arguments addressed to us	 it would appear that if a document is seditious	 its entry could be validly prohibited	 because sedition is a matter which undermines the Security of the State; but if on the other hand	 the document is calculated to disturb public tranquillity and affect public safety	 its entry cannot be prohibited	 because public disorder and disturbance of public tranquillity are not matters which undermine the security of the State. Speaking for myself	 I cannot understand this argument. In Brij Bhushan vs The State. I have quoted good authority to show that sedition owes its gravity to its tendency to create disorders and authority on Criminal Law like Sir James Stephen has classed sedition as an offence against public tranquillity. " In Brij Bhushan case (1)	 Fazl Ali	 J.	 who was again the dissenting judge	 gave his reasons to greater detail. He referred to the judgment of the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar 's case (2) 802 and to the judgment of the Privy Council to the contrary in King Emperor vs Sada Shiv Narayan (1). After having pointed out the divergency of opinion between the Federal Court of India and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council	 the learned Judge made the following observations in order to explaim why the term "sedition" was not specifically mentioned in article 19(2) of the Constitution: "The framers of the Constitution must have therefore found themselves face to face with the dilemma as to whether the word "sedition" should be used in article 19(2) and if it was to be used in what sense it was to be used. On the one hand	 they must have had before their mind the very widely accepted view supported by numerous authorities that sedition was essentially an offence against public tranquillity and was connected in some way or other with public disorder; and	 on the other hand	 there was the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee that sedition as defined in the Indian Penal Code did not necessarily imply any intention or tendency to incite disorder. In these circumstances	 it is not surprising that they decided not to use the word "sedition" in clause (2) but used the more general words which cover sedition and everything else which makes sedition such a serious offence. That sedition does undermine the security of the State is a matter which cannot admit of much doubt. That it undermines the security of the state usually through the medium of public disorder is also a matter on which eminent Judges and jurists are agreed. Therefore	 it is difficult to hold that public disorder or disturbance of public tranquillity are not matters which undermine the security of the State. " 803 As a result of their differences in the interpretation of Art.19(2) of the Constitution	 the Parliament amended cl.(2) of article 19	 in the form in which it stands at present	 by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act	 1951	 by section 3 of the Act	 which substituted the original cl. (2) by the new cl. This amendment was made with retrospective effect	 thus indicating that it accepted the statement of the law as contained in the dissenting judgment of Fazl Ali	 J.	 in so far as he had pointed out that the concept of "security of the state" was very much allied to the concept of "public order" and that restrictions on freedom of speech and expression could validly be imposed in the interest of public order. Again the question of the limits of legislative powers with reference to the provisions of articles 19 (1)(a) and 19(2) of the Constitution came up for decision by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Ramji Lal Modi vs The State of U.P. (1). In that case	 the validity of section 295A of the Indian Penal Code was challenged on the ground that it imposed restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression beyond the limits prescribed by cl.(2) of article 19 of the Constitution. In this connection	 the Court observed as follows: "the question for our consideration is whether the impugned section can be properly said to be a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental rights to freedom of speech and expression in the interests of public order. It will be noticed that language employed in the amended clause is "in the interests of" and not "for the maintenance of". As one of us pointed out in Debi Saron vs The State of Bihar	 the expression "in the interests of" makes the ambit of the protection very wide. A law may not have 804 been designed to directly maintain public order and yet it may have been enacted in the interests of public order. " Though the observations quoted above do not directly bear upon the present controversy	 they throw a good deal of light upon the ambit of the power of the legislature to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. In this case	 we are directly concerned with the question how for the offence	 as defined in section 124A of the Indian Penal Code	 is consistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution	 which is in these terms: "19. (1) All citizens shall have the right. (a) to freedom of speech and expression. " This guaranteed right is subject to the right of the legislature to impose reasonable restrictions	 the ambit of which is indicated by cl. (2)	 which	 in its amended form	 reads as follows: "(2) Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law	 in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the security of the State	 friendly relations with foreign States	 public order	 decency or morality	 or in relation to contempt of court	 defamation or incitement to an offence. " It has not been questioned before us that the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(a) of the freedom of speech and expression is not an absolute right. It is common ground that the right is subject to such reasonable restrictions as would come within the purview of cl. (2)	 which comprises (a) security of the State	 (b) friendly relations with foreign States	 (c) public order	 (d) decency or morality	 etc. With reference to the constitutionality 805 of section 124A or section 505 of the Indian Penal Code	 as to how far they are consistent with the requirements of cl. (2) of article 19 with particular reference to security of the State and public order	 the section	 it must be noted	 penalises any spoken or written words or signs or visible representations	 etc.	 which have the effect of bringing	 or which attempt to bring into hatred or contempt or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law" has to be distinguished from the person 's for the time being engaged in carrying on the administration. "Government established by law" is the visible symbol of the State. The very existence of the State will be in jeopardy if the Government established by law is subverted. Hence the continued existence of the Government established by law is an essential condition of the stability of the State. That is why 'sedition '	 as the offence in section 124A has been characterised	 comes under Chapter VI relating to offences against the State. Hence any acts within the meaning of section 124A which have the effect of subverting the Government by bringing that Government into contempt or hatred	 or creating disaffection against it	 would be within the penal statute because the feeling of disloyalty to the Government established by law or enmity to it imports the idea of tendency to public disorder by the use of actual violence or incitement to violence. In other words	 any written or spoken words	 etc.	 which have implicit in them the idea of subverting Government by violent means	 which are compendiously included in the term 'revolution '	 have been made penal by the section in question. But the section has taken care to indicate clearly that strong words used to express disapprobation of the measures of Government with a view to their improvement or alteration by lawful means would not come within the section. Similarly	 comments	 806 however strongly worded	 expressing disapprobation of actions of the Government	 without exciting those feelings which generate the inclination to cause public disorder by acts of violence	 would not be penal. In other words	 disloyalty to Government established by law is not the same thing as commenting in strong terms upon the measures or acts of Government	 or its agencies	 so as to ameliorate the condition of the people or to secure the cancellation or alteration of those acts or measures by lawful means	 that is to say	 without exciting those feelings of enmity and disloyalty which imply excitement to public disorder or the use of violence. It has not been contended before us that if a speech or a writing excites people to violence or have the tendency to create public disorder	 it would not come within the definition of 'sedition '. What has been contended is that a person who makes a very strong speech or uses very vigorous words in a writing directed to a very strong criticism of measures of Government or acts of public officials	 might also come within the ambit of the penal section. But	 in our opinion	 such words written or spoken would be outside the scope of the section. In this connection	 it is pertinent to observe that the security of the State	 which depends upon the maintenance of law and order is the very basic consideration upon which legislation	 with a view to punishing offences against the State	 is undertaken. Such a legislation has	 on the one hand	 fully to protect and guarantee the freedom of speech and expression	 which is the sine quo non of a democratic form of Government that our Constitution has established. This Court	 as the custodian and guarantor of the fundamental rights of the citizens	 has the duty cast upon it of striking down any law which unduly restricts the freedom of speech and expression with which we are concerned in this case. But the freedom has to be guarded again 807 becoming a licence for vilification and condemnation of the Government established by law	 in words which incite violence or have the tendency to create public disorder. A citizen has a right to say or write whatever he likes about the Government	 or its measures	 by way of criticism or comment	 so long as he does not incite people to violence against the Government established by law or with the intention of creating public disorder. The Court	 has	 therefore	 the duty cast upon it of drawing a clear line of demarcation between the ambit of a citizen 's fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and the power of the legislature to impose reasonable restrictions on that guaranteed right in the interest of	 inter alia	 security of the State and public order. We have	 therefore	 to determine how far the sections 124A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code could be said to be within the justifiable limits of legislation. If it is held	 in consonance with the views expressed by the Federal Court in the case of Niharendu Dutt majumdar vs The King Emperor(1) that the gist of the offence of 'sedition ' is incitement to violence or the tendency or the intention to create public disorder by words spoken or written	 which have the tendency or the effect of bringing the Government established by law into hatred or contempt or creating disaffection in the sense of disloyalty to the State in other words bringing the law into line with the law of sedition in England	 as was the intention of the legislators when they introduced section 124A into the Indian Penal Code in 1870 as aforesaid	 the law will be within the permissible limits laid down in cl. (2) of article 19 of the Constitution	 if on the other hand we give a literal meaning to the words of the section	 divorced from all the antecedent background in which the law of sedition has grown	 as laid down in the several decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council	 it will be true to 808 say that the section is not only within but also very much beyond the limits laid down in cl. (2) aforesaid. In view of the conflicting decisions of the Federal Court and of the Privy Council	 referred to above	 we have to determine whether and how far the provisions of sections 124A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code have to be struck down as unconstitutional. If we accept the interpretation of the Federal Court as to the gist of criminality in an alleged crime of sedition	 namely	 incitement to disorder or tendency or likelihood of public disorder or reasonable apprehension thereof	 the section may lie within the ambit of permissible legislative restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. There can be no doubt that apart from the provisions of (2) of article 19	 sections 124A and 505 are clearly violative of article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. But then we have to see how far the saving clause	 namely	 cl.(2) of article 19 protects the sections aforesaid. Now	 as already pointed out	 in terms of the amended cl. (2)	 quoted above	 the expression "in the interest of. public order" are words of great amplitude and are much more comprehensive than the expression "for the maintenance of"	 as observed by this Court in the case of Virendra vs The State of Punjab (1). Any law which is enacted in the interest of public order may be saved from the vice of constitutional invalidity. If	 on the other hand	 we were to hold that even without any tendency to disorder or intention to create disturbance of law and order	 by the use of words written or spoken which merely create disaffection or feelings of enmity against the Government	 the offence of sedition is complete	 then such an interpretation of the sections would make them unconstitutional in view of article 19(1)(a) read with cl. It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would make 809 them consistent with the Constitution	 and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional	 the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. The provisions of the sections read as a whole	 along with the explanations	 make it reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended	 or have a tendency	 to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence. As already pointed out	 the explanations appended to the main body of the section make it clear that criticism of public measures or comment on Government action	 however strongly worded	 would be within reasonable limits and would be consistent with the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. It is only when the words	 written or spoken	 etc. which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order. So construed	 the section	 in our opinion	 strikes the correct balance between individual fundamental rights and the interest of public order. It is also well settled that in interpreting an enactment the Court should have regard not merely to the literal meaning of the words used	 but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the legislation	 its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress (vide (1)). The Bengal Immunity Company Limited vs The State of Bihar (1) and (2) R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla vs The Union of India (2). Viewed in that light	 we have no hesitation in so construing the provisions of the sections impugned in these cases as to limit their application to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder	 or disturbance of law and order	 or incitement to violence. We may also consider the legal position	 as it should emerge	 assuming that the main section 124A is 810 capable of being construed in the literal sense in which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has construed it in the cases referred to above. On that assumption	 it is not open to this Court to construe the section is such a way as to avoid the alleged unconstitutionality by limiting the application of the section in the way in which the Federal Court intended to apply it ? In our opinion	 there are decisions of this Court which amply justify our taking that view of the legal position. This Court	 in the case of R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla vs The Union of India (1) has examined in detail the several decisions of this Court	 as also of the Courts in America and Australia. After examining those decisions	 this Court came to the conclusion that if the impugned provisions of a law come within the constitutional powers of the legislature by adopting one view of the words of the impugned section or Act	 the Court will take that view of the matter and limit its application accordingly	 in preference to the view which would make it unconstitutional on another view of the interpretation of the words in question. In that case	 the Court had to choose between a definition of the expression 'Prize Competitions" as limited to those competitions which were of a gambling character and those which were not. The Court chose the former interpretation which made the rest of the provisions of the Act	 Prize Competitions Act (XLII of 1955)	 with particular reference to sections 4 and 5 of the Act and Rules 11 and 12 framed thereunder	 valid. The Court held that the penalty attached only to those competitions which involved the element of gambling and those competitions in which success depended to a substantial degree on skill were held to be out of the purview of the Act. The ratio decidendi in that case	 in our opinion	 applied to the case in hand in so far as we propose to limit its operation only to such activities as come within the ambit of 811 the observations of the Federal Court	 that is to say	 activities involving incitement to violence or intention or tendency to create public disorder or cause disturbance of public peace. We do not think it necessary to discuss or to refer in detail to the authorities cited and discussed in the reported case R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla vs The Union of India (1) at pages 940 to 952. We may add that the provisions of the impugned sections	 impose restrictions on the fundamental freedom of speech and expression	 but those restrictions cannot but be said to be in the interest of public order and within the ambit of permissible legislative interference with that fundamental right. It is only necessary to add a few observations with respect to the constitutionality of section 505 of the Indian Penal Code. With reference to each of the three clauses of the section	 it will be found that the gravamen of the offence is making	 publishing or circulating any statement	 rumour or report (a) with intent to cause or which is likely to cause any member of the Army	 Navy or Air Force to mutiny or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty as such; or (b) to cause fear or alarm to the public or a section of the public which may induce the commission of an offence against the State or against public tranquillity; or (c) to incite or which is likely to incite one class or community of persons to commit an offence against any other class or community. It is manifest that each one of the constituent elements of the offence under section 505 has reference to	 and a direct effect on	 the security of the State or public order. Hence	 these provisions would not exceed the bounds of reasonable restrictions on the right of freedom of speech and expression. It is clear	 812 therefore	 that cl. (2) of article 19 clearly save the section from the vice of unconstitutionality. It has not been contended before us on behalf of the appellant in C.A. 169 of 1957 or on behalf of the respondents in the other appeals (No. 124 126 of 1958) that the words used by them did not come within the purview of the definition of sedition as interpreted by us. No arguments were advanced before us to show that even on the interpretation given by us their cases did not come within the mischief of the one or the other section	 as the case may be. It follows	 therefore	 that the Criminal Appeal 169 of 1957 has to be dismissed. Criminal Appeals 124 126 of 1958 will be remanded to the High Court to pass such order as it thinks fit and proper in the light of the interpretation given by us. Appeal No. 169 of 1957 dismissed. Appeals Nos. 124 to 126 of 1958 allowed.

Summary:
Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code which makes sedition an offence is constitutionally valid. Though the section imposes restrictions on the fundamental freedom of 770 speech and expression	 the restrictions are in the interest of public order and are within the ambit of permissible legislative interference with the fundamental right. There is a conflict on the question of the ambit of section 124A between decision of the federal Court and of the Privy Council. The Federal Court has held that words	 deeds or writings constituted an offence under section 124A only when they had the intention or tendency to disturb public tranquility. to create public disturbance or to promote disorder	 whilst the Privy Council has taken the view that it was not an essential ingredient of the offence of sedition under section 124A that the words etc	 should be intended to or be likely to incite public disorder. Either view can be taken and supported on good reasons. If the view taken by the Federal Court was accepted section 124A would be use constitutional but if the view of the Privy Council was accepted it would be unconstitutional. It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would make them consistent with the constitution	 and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional	 the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. Keeping in mind the reasons for the introduction of section 124A and the history of sedition the section must be so construed as to limit its application to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder	 or disturbance of law and order; or incitement to violence. Niharendu Dutt Majumdar vs King Emperor	 	 followed. King Emperor vs Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao	 (1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 89 and Wallace Johnson vs The King not followed. Romesh Thapar vs The State of Madras. (1050) S.C.R. 594. Brij Bhushan vs The State of Delhi. ; and Ramji Lal Modi vs The State U.P. ; 	 referred to. The Bengal Immunity Company Limited vs The State of Bihar	 and R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala vs The Union of India	 [1957] section C. R. 930 applied. Each one of the constituent elements of the offence of making	 publishing or circulating statements conducing to public mischief	 punishable under section 505 of the Indian Penal Code	 had reference to	 and a direct effect on	 the security of the State or public order. Hence the provisions of section 505 were clearly saved by article 19(2). ^