Judgment Case ID: 626

Judgment:
iminal Appeal No. 79 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 7	 1955	 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 370 of 1954	 arising out of the judgment and order dated July 26	 1954	 of the Court of the Special Judge at Bhagalpur in Special Case No. 14 of 1954. B. R. L. Iyengar	 for appellant No. 1. section P. Sinha and P. C. Agarwala	 for appellant No. 2. R. C. Prasad	 for the respondent. August 18. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the concurrent judgments and orders of the courts below	 convicting the two appellants under section 120B read with section 165A	 Indian Penal Code	 and sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months	 and to pay a fine of Rs. 200 each	 and in default of payment of fine	 to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 6 months. A separate conviction under section 165A has been recorded in respect of the first appellant	 Badri. Under this head	 he has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months	 the sentence to run concurrently with the sentence under the common charge. The facts as found by the courts below	 which could not be successfully challenged before us	 areas follows: The second appellant	 Ramji Sonar	 is a goldsmith by profession and runs a shop on the main road in the village Naogachia. In that village there is a police station and the shop in question is situated in between the police station building and the residential quarters of the Inspector of police	 who was the First Informant in the case	 resulting in the conviction and 1143 sentences of the appellants as stated above. The first appellant	 Badri	 runs a school for small boys in the same village about 50 yards away from the shop a foresaid of the second appellant. On August 22	1953	 the First Informant	 who	 holding the position of an Inspector of police	 was in charge of the police station	 made a seizure of certain ornaments and molten silver from a vacant building in front of the house of the second appellant	 Ramji. Those ornaments were being melted by six strangers coining from distant places	 with implements for melting	 said to have been supplied by Ramji. The seizure was made on the suspicion that the ornaments and the molten silver were stolen property	 which were to be sold to Ramji in a shape which could not be identified with any stolen property. After making the seizure list of ' the properties	 thus seized	 the police officer arrested Ramji	 as also the other six strangers. Ramji was .released on bail that very day. Police investigations into the case	 thus started	 followed. During that period	 on August 24	 1953	 at about 7 30 p.m.	 the Inspector was on his way from his residential quarters to the police station	 when both the appellants accosted him on the road	 and Ramji asked him to hush up the case for a valuable consideration. The Inspector told them that he could not talk to them on the road	 and that they should come to the police station. Thereafter	 the Inspector reported the matter to his superior officer	 the D.S.P. (P.W. 8)	 and to the sub inspector	 P.W. 9	 attached to the same police station. On August 31	 the same year	 the first appellant	 Badri	 came to the police station	. saw the Inspector in the central room of the thana	 and offered to him a packet wrapped in a piece of old newspaper	 containing Rs. 500 in currency notes. He told the Inspector	 (P. W. 1)	 that the second appellant	 Ramji	 had sent the money through him in pursuance of the talk that they had with him in the evening of August 24	 as a consideration for hushing up the case that was pending against Ramji. At the time the offer was made	 a number of police officers besides a local merchant	 (P.W. 7)	 were present there. The Inspector at once 1144 drew up the first information report of the offer of the bribe on his own statement and prepared a seizure list of the money	 thus offered	 and at once arrested Badri and put him in the thana lock up. After the usual investigation the appellants were placed on their trial	 with the result indicated above. Both the courts below have found that the prosecution case	 a summary of which has been given above	 has been proved by good and reliable evidence	 and that the defence case that the prosecution was started by the inspector out of spite and in order to defend himself against the consequences of wrongfully arresting Ramji	 was unfounded. We are not impressed with the halting criticism of the evidence adduced in this case on behalf of the prosecution and accepted by the courts below. Ordinarily	 this Court does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact. The only serious question raised in this appeal is the point raised on behalf of the second appellant	 Ramji	 as to whether the statement made by the first appellant	 Badri	 on August 31	 1953	 that he had been sent by the second appellant with the money to be offered by way of bribe to the police officer	 was admissible against him. The learned counsel for the appellant was not able clearly to formulate his grounds of objection to the admissibility of that piece of evidence	 which is the basis of the charge against both the accused persons. Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act	 is a complete answer to this contention. The section is in these terms: " 10. Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong	 anything said	 done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention	 after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them	 is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring	 as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it. " The incident of August 24	 when both the appellants 1145 approached the inspector with the proposal that he should hush up the case against the second appellant	 for which he would be amply rewarded	 is clear evidence of the two persons having conspired to commit the offence of bribing a public servant in connection with the discharge of his public duties. There cannot	 therefore	 be the least doubt that the court had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellants had entered into a conspiracy to commit the offence. Therefore	 the charge under section 120B had been properly framed against both of them. That being so	 anything said or done by any one of the two appellants	 with reference to the common intention	 namely	 the conspiracy to offer bribe	 was equally admissible against both of them. The statement made by the first appellant on August 31	 that he had been sent by the second appellant to make the offer of the bribe in order to hush up the case which was then under investigation	 is admissible not only against the maker of the statement the first appellant but also against the second appellant	 whose agent the former was	 in pursuance of the object of the conspiracy. That statement is admissible not only to prove that the second appellant had constituted the first appellant his agent in the perpetration of the crime	 as also to prove the existence of the conspiracy itself. The incident of August 24	 is evidence that the intention to commit the crime had been entertained by both of them on or before that date. Anything said or done or written by any one of the two conspirators on and after that date until the object of the conspiracy had been accomplished	 is evidence against both of them. It was faintly suggested on behalf of the second appellant	 that the charge under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code	 had been deliberately added by the prosecution in order to make the first appellant 's statement of August 31	 admissible against the second appellant	 as otherwise it could not have been used as evidence against him. As already indicated	 the incident of August 24	 is a clear indication of the existence of the conspiracy	 and the court was perfectly justified in drawing up the charge under section 120B also. It is no 1146 answer in law to say that unless the charge under that section had been framed	 the act or statement of one could not be admissible against the other. Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act	 has been deliberately enacted in order to make such acts and statements of a co conspirator admissible against the whole body of conspirators	 because of the nature of the crime. A conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and executed in darkness. Naturally	 therefore	 it is not feasible for the prosecution to connect each isolated act or statement of one accused with the acts or statements of the others	 unless there is a common bond linking all of them together. Ordinarily	 specially in a criminal case	 one person cannot be made responsible for the acts or statements of another. It is only when there is evidence of a concerted action in :furtherance of a common intention to commit a crime	 that the law has introduced this rule of common responsibility	 on the principle that every one concerned in a conspiracy is acting as the agent of the rest of them. As soon as the court has reasonable grounds to believe that there is identity of interest or community of purpose between a number of persons	 any act done	 or any statement or declaration made	 by any one of the co conspirators is	 naturally	 held to be the act or statement of the other conspirators	 if the act or the declaration has any relation to the object of the conspiracy. Otherwise	 stray acts done in darkness in prosecution of an object hatched in secrecy	 may not become intelligible without reference to the common purpose running through the chain of acts or illegal omissions attributable to individual members of the conspiracy. It was also suggested that the statement made by the first appellant on August 31	 about the purpose of the payment	 having been made after the payment	 was not admissible in evidence because the object of the conspiracy had been accomplished before the statement in question was made. Reliance was placed in this connection upon the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Mirza Akbar vs The King Emperor.(1). But that decision is itself an answer to the (1) (1940) L.R. 67 I.A. 336. 1147 contention raised. The payment was made	 and the statement that it was being made with a view to hushing up the case against the second appellant is a part of the same transaction	 that is to say	 the statement accompanied the act of payment of the bribe. Hence	 it cannot be said that the statement was made after the object of the conspiracy had already been accomplished. The object of the conspiracy was the hushing up of the criminal case against the second appellant by bribing the public servant who was in charge of the investigation of the case. The object of the conspiracy was yet far from being accomplished when the statement in question was made. The leading case on the subject is that of R. vs Blake (1). That decision is an authority both for the positive and the negative aspects of the question. It lays down what is admissible and what is not admissible. It held that the documents actually used in effectuating the objects of the conspiracy	 were admissible	 and that those documents which had been created by one of the conspirators after the object of the conspiracy had been achieved	 were not admissible. section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act is on the same lines. It is manifest that the statement in question in the present case was made by the first appellant in the course of the conspiracy	 and accompanied the act of the payment of the money	 and is clearly covered by the provisions of section 10	 quoted above. It must	 therefore	 be held that there is no substance in the only question of law raised in this appeal. It is	 accordingly	 dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

Summary:
The appellants were prosecuted on charges under section 120B read with section 165A of the Indian Penal Code	 for having conspired to commit the offence of bribing a public servant in connection with the discharge of his public duties. The case against them was that on August 24	 1953	 when the Inspector of Police who was in charge of the investigation of a case in which the second appellant was involved	 was on his way to the police station	 the appellants accosted him on the road and the second appellant asked him to hush up the case for valuable consideration. Some days later	 on August 31 the first appellant offered to the Inspector at the police station a packet containing Rs. 500 in currency notes and told him that the second appellant had sent the money through him in pursuance of the talk that they had with him on August 24	 as a consideration for hushing up the case. The courts below accepted the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution and convicted the appellants. On appeal by special leave it was contended that the court had no reasonable grounds to believe that the appellants had entered into a conspiracy to commit the offence and that the statement of August 3 I was not admissible against the second appellant because (1) the charge under section 120B had been deliberately added in order that the act or statement of the one would be admissible against the other	 and (2) the object of the conspiracy	 namely the payment of the hush money	 had been accomplished before the statement in question was made: Held	 (1) that the incident of August 24 was evidence that the intention to commit the offence had been entertained by both the appellants on or before that date showing a clear indication of the existence of the conspiracy	 and that the statement made by the first appellant on August 31 was admissible not only to prove that the second appellant had constituted the first appellant his agent in the perpetration of the crime but also to prove the existence of the conspiracy ; the court was therefore justified in drawing up the charge under section 120B along with that under section 165A of the Indian Penal Code. (2)that the payment of the bribe and the statement of August 31 accompanying it	 were part of the same transaction	 having been made in the course of the conspiracy	 and the 1142 statement in question was therefore admissible under section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act. Mirza Akbar vs The King Emperor	 (1940) L. R. 67 I. A. 336 and R. vs Blake	 ; 	 relied on.