Judgment Case ID: 1530

Judgment:
Appeals Nos. 436 to 438 of 1961. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 9	 1959	 of the Punjab 886 High Court in Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 407	 408 and 409 of 1959. Achhru Ram and B. D. Jain	 for the appellants. Gian Singh Vohra	 for the respondents. October 4. The Judgement of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR	 J. What is the effect of the retrospective operation of section 31 introduced by the Punjab Pre emption (Amendment) Act	 1960 (X of 1960) in the parent Act of Pre emption (No. 1 of 1913). That is the short question which arises for our decision in these three appeals which have been ordered to be consolidated for the purpose of hearing by this Court. These appeals arise from three pre emption suits instituted by the respondents against the respective appellants. The respondents ' case was that the properties in suit had been sold by Aftab Rai on May 31	 1956	 for Rs. 10	000/ to the appellants and it is these sales which they wanted to preempt. They alleged that they are the owners of agricultural land in Patti Aulakli and Patti Rode	 in Mauza Marahar Kalan	 and as such	 they had the statutory right to claim pre emption	 under section 15(c) (ii) and (iii). The appellants resisted this claim on the ground that the respective vendees from Aftab Rai had transferred by exchanges about 2 kenals out of the lands purchased by them and as a result of the said exchanges the appellants had themselves become entitled to preempt the said sales under the same statutory provision. Since the appellants had acquired equal status with the respondents who claimed to be the preemptors	 their claim for pre emption cannot be sustained. That	 in brief	 was the nature of the contest between the parties. 887 The trial Court held that the exchanges on which the appellants relied bad not been proved and so	 it gave effect to the respondents ' right to preempt under section 15(c) (ii) & (iii). The appellants took the matter before the Addl. District Judge in appeal. The lower appellate Court was pleased to admit additional evidence under 0.41	 r. 27	 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that the exchanges in question had in fact been proved and were	 in law	 valid. It	 therefore came to the conclusion that the appellants acquired equal status with the respondents and so	 the respondents ' claim for pre emption must fail. That is why the appeals preferred by the appellants were allowed and the respondents ' suits were dismissed. The dispute was then taken up before the High Court of Panjab by the respondents by second appeals. Mahajan	 J.	 who heard these appeals held that the property acquired by exchange in lieu of the part of the property purchased by the vendees did not give the appellants a right to preempt. He referred to the fact that exchange of lands was sometimes recognised as conferring on the party the right to preempt	 but that was where the land exchanged did not form part of the land sold and preempted. In the result	 the High Court held that the plea made by the appellants was not well founded in law and so	 the respondents were entitled to pre empt. As a result of this finding	 the decrees passed by the lower appellate Court were reversed and the respondents ' suits were decreed. The appellants then moved the Division Bench by Letters Patent appeals	 but these appeals were dismissed. It is against the decrees thus passed by the Division Bench in Letters Patent appeals that the appellants have come to this Court by special leave. We have already noticed that both the appellants and the respondents are claiming a right to 888 preempt under section 15(c) (ii) and (iii) of the Parent Act of 1913. On February 4	 1960	 the amending Act No. 10 of J960 was passed. Section 4 of the amending Act has substituted anew s.15 of the old s.15 after making substantial changes in the provisionsof the earlier section. Clauses (ii) and (iii) of theoriginal s.15(c) have been deleted	 with the result that the claims for preemption made both by the appellants and the respondents have ceased to be recognised by the amended provisions. The appellants contend that since the respondents have got a decree for pre emption in their favour on the provisions of the unamended s.15	 that decree can no longer be sustained because of the provisions of s.31 of the amending Act. Section 31 provides that no Court shall pass a decree in a suit for pre emption whether instituted before or after the commencement of the Punjab Pre emption (Amendment) Act	 1959(1960) which is inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act. In support of his argument that s.31 being retrospective in operation the respondents ' title to claim pre emption can no longer be entertained. Mr. Achhru Ram for the appellants has invited our attention to a recent decision of this Court in the case of Ram Sarup vs Munshi (1) pronounced on August 30	 1962. In that case	 Ayyangar	 J.	 who spoke for the Constitution Bench considered the question about the retrospective operation of section 31 and has observed that the said provision is retrospective and that the language used in the said section is "plain the comprehensive so as to require an appellate Court to give effect to the substantive provisions of the amending Act whether the appeal before it is one against a decree granting preemption or one refusing that relief	 It was no doubt urged before the Court in that case that the words used in section 31 did (1) ; 889 not justify the application of the amended provisions to proceedings pending before the appellate Court; them said words showed that the said provisions could be invoked only in cases which were pending before the trial Court. This contention was rejected and so, it must be taken to be settled that the provisions of section 31 are retrospective and can be relied upon by the appellants in their present appeals before this Court. This position would undoubtedly have helped the appellants but for another complication which has been introduced by the relevant provisions of the amended section 15 enacted by the amending Act. We have already noticed that some persons whose right to preempt was recognised by the corresponding provisions of the parent Act, have been omitted by the amended section. The amended section has also introduced another class of persons on whom the right to claim pre emption has been conferred. These persons are the tenants who hold under tenancy of the vendors the land or property sold or a part thereof. This class of tenants has been introduced in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of amended section 15. Clause four of section 15(1) (c) provides that the right of pre emption in respect of agricultural land and village immovable property shall vest in the tenants who hold under tenancy of the vendors or any one of them the land or property sold or a part thereof. Similar provisions are made in clauses (a) & (b) of the said section. For the respondents Mr. Vohra contends that they are the tenants who hold under tenancy of the vendor the lands in question and as such, they are now clothed with the right to claim pre emption. In other words, the respondents argument is that though the right to preempt which they possessed under clauses (ii) and (iii) of the unmended section 15(c) of the parent Act have been taken ,way retrospectively by the amending Act, they have been clothed with the same right by virtue of 890 the fact that they fall under the fourth clause of the amended s, 15 (1) (c) and the conferment of this right like the destruction of their right under the deleted provisions of the unamended section must operate retrospectively. He, therefore, suggests that the respondents ought to be given an opportunity to prove their case under the fourth clause of section 15(c) as amended. In this connection, he has referred us to the fact that this plea has been specifically taken by the respondents in their statement of the case before this Court. It is on this plea that the question about the effect of the retrospective operation of section 31 arises. Mr. Achhru Ram contends that though section 31 is retrospective and in that sense the rights to preempt which vested in the respondents at the time when they instituted the present suits have been retrospectively taken away from them, it cannot be said that the right to preempt to which the respondents lay claim in the present appeals has been retrospectively created. His argument is that by the amending Act, the Legislature has no doubt provided that certain classes of persons who were entitled to preempt under the old Act should not be given that right and the extinction of the said right should operate retrospectively, but that cannot be said to be the policy of the legislature in regard to the rights which have been created for the first time by the amending Act. The argument thus presented may prima facie appear to be attractive; but a close examination of the words used in section 31 shows that it is not well founded. Section 31, in substance, requires the appellate Court to pass a decree in a preemption matter which is not inconsistent with the provisions of the amending Act. In the present appeals, if we were to uphold the respondents ' right to claim preemption on the strength of the provisions of section 15(c) 891 as they stood prior to the amendment, that would be inconsistent with the provisions of the amending Act, and so, the change made by the amending Act has to be given effect to and the right which once vested in the respondents must be deemed to have been retrospectively taken away from them. On this point there is no dispute. Would it make any difference in the legal position when we are dealing with rights which are created for the first time by the amending Act on the date when this Court will pass a decree in the present appeals? If the rights created in favour of the tenants are not recognised and a decree is passed ignoring the said rights, that decree would be inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the amending Act, and section 31 has clearly enjoined that no Court shall pass a decree which is inconsistent with the provisions of the amending Act. The position, therefore, appears to be clear that when a decree is passed in a preemption matter pending before the appellate Court, that Court must refuse to recognise the right to preempt which was recognised by the unamended Act but has been dropped by the amending Act just as much as it must recognise rights which were not recognised by the unamended Act but have been created by the amending Act. The retrospective operation of s.31 necessarily involves effect being given to the substantive provisions of section 15 retrospectively and that will apply as much to the extinction of the old rights as to the creation of new ones. The retrospective operation of section 15 which is consequential on the retrospective operation of s.31 is not affected by the fact that the right of preemption prescribed by section 15 if; referred to as a right which shall vest in the persons specified in subsections (a), (b) and (c) of section 15(1). It is, however, urged that the law of preemption requires that the preemptor must possess the right to preempt at the date of the sale, at the 892 date of the suit and at the date of the decree. This position cannot be disputed. But when it is suggested that the respondents cannot claim that they had the right when they brought the present suit or when the sales were effected, the argument ignores the true effect of the retrospective operation of section 31 and section 15. If the inevitable consequence of the retrospective operation of s.31 is to make the substantive provisions of section 15 also retrospective, it follows that by fiction introduced by the retrospective operation, the rights which the respondents claim under the amended provisions of section 15 must be deemed to have vested in them at the relevant time. If the relevant provisions are made retrospective by the legislature, the retrospective operation must be given full effect to, and that meets the argument that the right to preempt did not exist in the respondents at the time when the sale transactions in question took place. Therefore, we are satisfied that the respondents are entitled to claim that they should be given an opportunity to prove their case that as tenants of the lands in suit they have a right to claim preemption. Incidentally, when the respondents filed the present suits, they had a right to preempt under the relevant provisions of the Act as they stood at that time; by the amendment, that right has been taken away, but instead they claim another right by virtue of their status as tenants of the lands, and this right is, by the retrospective operation of section 31, available to them. We must accordingly set aside the decrees passed by the High Court and send the matters back to the trial Court with a direction that it should allow the respondents an opportunity to amend their claims by putting forth their right to ask for preemption as tenants under the amended provision of 8. 15. After the amendments are thus made, the appellants should be given an opportunity 893 to file their written statements and then appropriate issues should be framed and the suits tried and disposed of in the light of the findings on those issues in accordance with law. Under the unusual circumstances in which the litigation has thus secured a further lease of life, we direct that the costs incurred so far should be borne by the parties. 
2039	er Petition No. 7 of 1965.(Under Section 527 of Criminal Procedure Code). T. R. Bhasin, for the petitioner. G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate General for the State of Rajasthan, K. K. Jain and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, J. This is a petition under section 527 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the transfer of a criminal case (No. 2 of 1964 state vs Gurcharan Dass Chadha I.P.S.) which is pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Bharatpur, Rajasthan to another criminal court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to a High Court other than the High Court of Rajasthan. The petitioner is the accused in that case and he is being tried under sections 120B/161, Indian Penal Code and section 5(1)(a)(d) and 5`2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. prosecution has been sanctioned by the Government of India. In December, 1962, he was serving as Superintendent of Police and was selected to be Commandant of 8th Batallion of Rajasthan Armed Constabulary. He avers that he took over as Commandant on January 7, 1963 but was placed under suspension the same day and a case was registered on January 12, 1963 which has resulted in the present prosecution against him. The petitioner apprehends for reasons to be stated presently that he is not likely to get a fair, just and impartial trial in the State of Rajasthan owing to the hostility and influence of the then Law Minister who was also Minister incharge of Home Department of the State, the Additional Inspector General of Police, Anti Corruption, and the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range, Jaipur. In support of his petition he has referred to many incidents and filed many documents. He has sworn an affidavit that he entertains an apprehension that these persons would interfere with the trial of the case in the State of Rajasthan and that a transfer of the case outside the State is in the interest of justice. 680 The State Government has opposed the application strenu. ously and has questioned the jurisdiction of this Court to transfer under the powers conferred on it by section 527 Code of Criminal Procedure a case made over by the Government of the State of Rajasthan for trial to a Special Judge under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (Act 46 of 1962). In addition, the State Government joins issue on the facts alleged and the merits of the claim for the transfer of the case. While this petition was pending the State Government served the petitioner with a notice and a charge sheet to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for breach of Rule No. 8 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1954, because he had communicated directly/indirectly official documents and information to Government servants/other persons to whom he was not authorised to communicate such documents/information" as indicated and detailed in a statement of allegations accompanying the notice and the charge. The State Government has appended to this charge two appendices giving details of 31 and 16 docu ments respectively	 which were said to have been so communicated by the petitioner to his counsel Messrs. R. K. Rastogi and D. P. Gupta	 Advocates of Jodhpur and others named as "non petitioners" in a writ petition which he had filed in the High Court of Rajasthan (No. 794 of 1964) and which he subsequently withdrew on December 23	 1964 before taking action to file the present petition. The notice	 the charge and the statement of allegations accompanying them were signed by Mr. Vishnu Dutt Sharma	 Special Secretary to Government. On receiving this charge	 the petitioner moved another petition in this Court for taking action against Mr. Shrama and the Government of Rajasthan for contempt of this Court. At an earlier hearing	 where we were considering the petition for transfer	 the other petition was brought to our notice and we were about to order issuance of notices to the contemners but the Advocate General of the Government of Rajasthan took notice of the petition and offered to take action in respect thereof. As a result the State of Rajasthan through the Chief Secretary to the Government and Mr. Sharma separately filed their replies to the second petition and attempted justification. Mr. Sharma abjured knowledge of the contents of the petition for transfer and denied any malice	 ill will or grudge	 pleading good faith. The matter would have received serious attention from us but for the fact that at the next hearing the plea for justification was abandoned and an unconditional apology was entered on behalf of the State Government as well as Mr. Sharma. The latter was present in Court and expressed regret for what had. happened. 681 We accepted the appology and do not	 therefore	feel called upon to consider the plea of justification which	 in any event	 is not a plea heard in bar when contempt is clear and manifest. There could be no question in the present case that by charging the petitioner with proceedings of a different kind there was	 if not direct	 at least indirect pressure brought upon him in the prosecution of his petition for. transfer. Of this we would have taken serious note be cause it was likely to have hampered the petitioner in prosecuting his petition freely before this Court and would have resulted in obstruction of administration of justice. If the petitioner was guilty of any lapse under the Services (Conduct) Rules or even guilty of an offence the action to which he would be otherwise subject could wait till the present proceedings had terminated and there was really no reason to hurry with a charge against the petitioner which charge would have put him under duress of some kind. Such a course of action 'is to be deprecated and we are glad to note that the Government of Rajasthan and the Secretary concerned have seen the matter in this light and have made amends by proper contrition. We do not feel called upon to say more than this on the petition for contempt which shall be filed. We shall now take up the objection that this Court lacks jurisdiction to transfer the case pending before the special Judge	 Bharatpur. This objection goes to the root of the matter. Questions of inherent jurisdiction must always be decided before the merits are considered because to dismiss the petition after consideration of merits itself involves an assumption of jurisdiction. We must accordingly consider the objection even though we are satisfied that the petition must fail on merits. The power which the petitioner is invoking flows from section 527 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The first two sub sections of that section are material here and they read: "527. Power of Supreme Court to transfer cases and appeals. (1) Whenever it is made to appear to the Supreme ' Court that an order under this section is expedient for the ends of justice	 it may direct that any particular case or appeal be transferred from one High Court to another High Court or from a Criminal Court subordinate to one High Court to another Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another High Court. (2) The Supreme Court may act under this section only on the application of the Attorney General of India 682 or of a party interested	 and every such application shall be made by motion which shall	 except when the applicant is the Attorney General of India or the Advocate General	 be supported by affidavit or affirmation. It is conceded by the Advocate General that the power to transfer criminal cases as laid down in the section is ordinarily available but he contends that a case assigned by the State Government under the Criminal Law Amendment Act	 1952 to a special Judge cannot be transferred at all because under the terms of that Act	 which is a self contained special law	 such a case must be tried by the special Judge designate only. The argument is extremely plausible but does not bear close scrutiny. To understand the argument and how it is refuted certain provisions of the Act may be seen. The first section of the Act gives the short title of the Act. Sections 2 and 3 of the Act introduce changes in the Indian Penal Code by increasing the punishment in section 165 and by inserting section 165A which provides for punishment for abetment of offences defined in sections 161 and 165. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act make some amendments in section 164 of the Indian Penal Code and section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. These four sections have been repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act	 1957 as they were no longer necessary. The sections which we have to consider are sections 6	 7 and 8 of the Act. Section 6 confers power on the State Government to appoint special Judges for the trial of certain offences. The parts relevant to our purpose read "6. Power to appoint special judges. (1) The State Government may	 by notification in the official Gazette	 appoint as many special Judges as may be necessary for such area	 or areas as may be specified in the notification to try the following offences	 namely : (a) an offence punishable under section 161	 section 162	 section 163	 section 164	 section 165	 or section 165 A of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)	 or sub section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act	 1947 (11 of 1947) (b) Any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified in clause (a). 683 Section 7 next provides what cases shall be tried by special Judges. The first two sub sections read : "7. Cases triable by special Judges. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure	 1898 (Act V of 1898) or in any other law the offences specified in sub section (1) of section 6 shall be triable by special Judges only. (2) Every offence specified in sub section (1) of section 6 shall be tried by the special Judge for the area within which it was committed	 or where there are more special Judges than one for such area	 by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the State Government." The procedure which the special Judge has to follow is laid down in section 8 (1) and by sub section (2) of the same section certain powers are confered on the special Judge. Sub section (3) then provides: "8. Procedure and Powers of Special Judges. (1). . . . . . (2). . . . . . (3) Save as provided in sub section (1) or sub section (2)	 the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 1898	 shall so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act	 apply to the proceedings before a special Judge; and for the purposes of the said provisions	 the Court of the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors and the person conducting a prosecution before a special Judge shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor. . . There is no need to refer to other provisions of the Act which do	 not bear upon this matter. The Advocate General	 Rajasthan in opposing the petition relies	 principally on the provisions of section 7(1) and (2) and contends that the two sub sections create two restrictions which must be read together. The first is that offences specified in section 6(1) can be tried by special Judges only. The second is that every such offence shall be tried by the special Judge for the area within which it is committed and if there are more special Judges in that area	 by the 684 special Judge chosen by Government. These two conditions	 being Statutory	 it is submitted no order can be made under section 527 be because on transfer	 even if a special Judge is entrusted with the case	 the second condition is bound to be broken. No doubt sub section (1) of section 7 lays down that the trial of an offence specified in sub section (1) of section 6 must be by a special Judge only but that condition can be fully met by transferring the case to another special Judge. Indeed section 527 itself contemplates that the transfer should be to a court of equal or superior jurisdiction and we presume that there are special Judges in every State of India. The selection of a special Judge causes no difficulty. It is the second condition which is really pleaded in bar. The provision of sub section (2) of section 7 is that an offence shall be tried by the special Judge for the area within which it is committed. This condition	 if literaly understood would lead to the conclusion that a case once made over to a special Judge in an area where there is no other special Judge	 cannot be transferred at all. This could hardly have been intended. If this	 were so	 the power to transfer a case intrastate under section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 on a parity of reasoning	 must also be lacking. But this Court in Ramchandra Prasad vs State of Bihar(1) upheld the transfer of a case by the High Court which took it to a special Judge who had no jurisdiction in the area where the offence was committed. In holding that the transfer was valid this Court relied upon the third sub section of section 8 of the Act. That sub section preserves the application of any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure if it is not inconsistent with the Act	 save as provided in the first two sub sections of that section. The question	 therefore	 resolves itself to this : is there an inconsistency between section 527 of the Code and the second sub section of section 7 ? The answer is that there is none Apparently this Court in the earlier case found no inconsistency and the reasons appear to be these : The condition that an offence specified in section 6(2) shall be tried by a special Judge for the area within which it is committed merely specifies which of several special Judges appointed in the State by the State Government shall try it. The provision is analogous to others under which the juris diction of Magistrates and Sessions Judges is determined on a territorial basis. Enactments in the Code of Criminal Procedure intended to confer territorial jurisdiction upon courts and Presiding Officers have never been held to stand in the way of transfer of 	criminal cases outside those areas of territorial jurisdiction. The (1) ; 685 order of transfer when it is made under the powers given by the Code invests another officer with jurisdiction although ordinarily he would lack territorial jurisdiction to try the case. The order of this Court	 therefore	 which transfer a case from one special Judge subordinate to one High Court to another special Judge subordinate to another High Court creates jurisdiction in the latter in much the same way as the transfer by the High Court from one Sessions Judge in a Session Division to another Sessions Judge in another Session Division. There is no comparison between the first sub section and the second sub section of section 7. The condition in the second sub section of section 7 is not of the same character as the condition in the first sub section. The first sub section creates a condition which is a sine qua non for the trial of certain offences. That condition is that the trial must be before a special Judge and laye emphasis on the fact that trial must be before a special Judge appointed for is on a par with the distribution of work territorially between different Sessions Judges and Magistrates. An order of transfer	 by the very nature of things must	 some times	 result in taking the case out of the territory and the provisions of the Code which are preserved by the third sub section of section 8 must supervene to enable this to E be done and the second sub section of s	 7 must yield. We do not consider that this creates any inconsistency because the territorial jurisdiction created by the second sub section of section 7 operates in a different sphere and under different circumstances. Inconsistency can only be found if two provisions of law apply in identical circumstances and create contradictions. Such a situation does not arise F when either this Court or the High Court exercises its powers of transfer. We are accordingly of the opinion that the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction and power under section 527 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can transfer a case from a special Judge subordinate to one High Court to another special Judge subordinate to another High Court. This brings us to the question of the merits of the petition. The petitioner is being prosecuted for offences under section 120B/161 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(1)(a)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. His apprehension is that the case against him is H the result of the machination of two Police Officers and one Mr. Mathura Dass Mathur who was the Home Minister in 1962.He also alleges hostility on the part of the State Government. He has given instances which in his opinion prove that the above two 686 officers	 the Home Minister and the State Government are hostile to him. In relation to the State Government he has alleged that when he was appointed Commandant of the 8th Battallion of Rajasthan Armed Constabulary the State Government down graded his post	 otherwise he would have received a higher starting pay. He also alleges that his suspension and prosecution were made to coincide With his assumption of new duties so that he might not be able to join his new post. With regard to the Home Minister the petitioner has given five instances in which he apparently crossed the minister 's path and gave him room for annoyance. In regard to the two Police Officers he has averred that the Deputy Inspector General of Police	 Ajmer Range (Hanuman Prasad Sharma) and he had some differences on three occasions. He has also given similar instances of hostility towards him entertained by Sultan Singh	 Deputy Inspector General of Police. On the basis of these he says that he entertains an apprehension that he will not receive justice in the State of Rajasthan. The law with regard to transfer of cases is well settled. A case is transferred if there is a reasonable apprehension on the part of a party to a case that justice will not be done. A petitioner is not required to demonstrate that justice will inevitably fail. He is entitled to a transfer if he shows circumstances from which it can be inferred that he entertains an apprehension and that it is reasonable in the circumstances alleged. It is one of the principles of the administration of justice that justice should not only be done but it should be seen to be done. However	 a mere allegation that there is appre hension that justice will not be done in a given case does not office. The Court has further to see whether the apprehension is reasonable or not. To judge of the reasonableness of the apprehension the State of the mind of the person who entertains the apprehension is no doubt relevant but that is not all. The apprehension must not only be entertained but must appear to the Court to be a reasonable apprehension. Applying these principles it may be said that there is a possibility that the petitioner entertains an apprehension that certain persons are hostile to him but his apprehension that he will not receive justice in the State of Rajasthan is not in our opinion reasonable. All the facts which he has narrated bear upon past events in his official life. Nothing has been said which will show that there is in any manner an interference direct or indirect with the investigation of the offences alleged against him or the trial of the case before the special Judge	 Bharatpur. A general feeling that some persons are hostile to the petitioner is not sufficient. There must be material 687 from which it can be inferred that the persons who are so hostile are interfering or are likely to interfere either directly or indirectly with the course of justice. Of this there is no trace either in his petition or in the arguments which were advanced before us. Nor does the petitioner allege anything against the special Judge who is trying the case. In this view of the matter we decline to order trans fer of the case from the special Judge	 Bharatpur. The petition accordingly fails and will be dismissed. Petition dismissed.

Summary:
The properties in suit had been sold by A to the appellants on May 31; 1956	 but the respondents	 as the owners of certain agricultural land in the patti claimed that they had a right of preemption under section 15 (c) (ii) and (iii) of the Punjab Preemption Act	 1913. In the suit instituted by the respondents for this purpose the appellants resisted the claim on the ground that the vendees from A had transferred by exchanges some of the items out of the lands purchased by them and that as a result of the said exchanges the appellants themselves had become entitled to preempt the said sales under the same statutory provision. The suit was	 however	 decreed by the trial court and the decision was confirmed by the High Court of Punjab. The appellants obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and during the pendency of 885 the appeal the Act was amended by Punjab Act 10 of 1960	 by which	 inter alia	 (1) cls. (ii) and (iii) of section 15 (c) of the original Act were deleted	 (2) cl.4 of section 15 (1)(c) provided that the right of preemption in respect of agricultural land and village immoveable property shall vest in the tenants who held under tenancy of the vendors or anyone of them the land or property sold or a part thereof	 and (3) section 31 provided that no court shall pass a decree in a suit for preemption whether instituted before or after the commencement of the amending Act of 1960 which was inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act. In view of the new provisions introduced by the amending act the respondents raised a new contention that they were tenants who held under tenancy of the vendor of the lands in question and	 as such	 they were entitled to the right of preemption under cl.4 of s.15 (1)(c) of the Act	 as amended	 even if it be held that the right to claim pre emption under cls. (ii) and (iii) of s.15 (c) of the unmended Act was taken away retrospectively by the amending Act. The appellants pleaded that even assuming that cl.4 of s.15 (1)(c) was applicable	 the respondents could not get a decree on the bassis of the new right of pre emption inasmuch as they had no such right on the date on which the suit was filed or when the sales were effected. Held	 that (1 the provisions of s.31 of the Punjab Pre emption Act	 1913	 as amended by Punjab Act 10 of 1960	 are retrospective in operation and	 therefore	 the decree passed in favour of the respondents by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court under the unmended section could not be sustained. Ram Sarup V.Munshi [1963] 3 S.C.R. 858 followed. (2) The retrospective operation of s.31 necessarily involves effect being given to the substantive provisions of amended s.15 retrospectively	 and hence the rights which the respondents now claim under the amended provisions must be deemed to have vested in them at the relevant time	 with the result that they are entitled	 on remand	 to ask for a decree passed on the basis of the said rights