Judgment Case ID: 2629

Judgment:
Appeal No. 882 of 1968. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 1	 1966 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Reference No. 20 of 1963. 445 D. N. Mukherjee and Sunil Kumar Ghosh	 for the appellant. A. K. Sen	 Sukumar Ghose and Krishna Sen	 for respondent No. 1. B. Sen	 Sukumar Basu and P. K. Chakravarti	 for respondent No. 2. Niren De	 Attorney General	 V. A. Seyid Muhammad	 R. H. Dhebar and section P. Nayar	 for the Union of India. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava	 J. Rama Sundari Debi	 the first respondent in this appeal by special leave	 instituted a suit for the ejectment of Indu Bhusan Bose appellant who was a tenant in premises No. 18	 Riverside Road	 owned by respondent No. 1	 situated within the cantonment area of Barrackpore. The agreed rent was Rs. 250/per mensem but there was a dispute as to whether the owner or the tenant was liable to pay rates and taxes. On an application presented by the appellant	 the Rent Controller fixed fair rent under section 10 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act No. XII of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") at Rs. 170/per month inclusive of all cantonment taxes	 and	 in appeal	 the amount was enhanced to Rs. 188/ per month inclusive of all cantonment taxes. Respondent No. 1	 in December	 1960	 served a notice on the appellant to quit and	 on failing to get vacant possession	 filed a suit in the Court of the Munsif. In the plaint	 respondent No. 1 claimed that	 regulation of house accommodation including control of rents being a subject in entry No. 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution	 the State Legislature could not competently enact a law on the same subject for cantonment are as	 so that the appellant was pot entitled to protection under the Act which had been extended to that area by the State Government. It was urged that the extension of that State Act to the cantonment area was ultra vires and void. The Munsif	 thereupon	 made a reference under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court of Calcutta for decision of this constitutional question raised in the suit before him. The High Court decided the reference by making a declaration that the notification	 whereby the State Government had extended the provisions of the Act to the Barrackpore cantonment area	 was ultra vires and void. This is the decision of the High Court that has been challenged in this appeal. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the High Court is not correct in holding that the field of legislation covered by the Act	 which is primarily concerned with control of rents and eviction of tenants	 is included within the expression 446 "regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas" used in entry No. 3 of List I. That entry is as follows : "3. Delimitation of cantonment areas	 local self government in such areas	 the constitution and powers within such areas of cantonment authorities and the regulation of house accommodation (including the control of rents) in such areas. " The submission made is that regulation of house accommodation will not include within it laws or rules on the subject of relationship of landlord and tenant of buildings situated in the cantonment areas. On the other hand	 according to the appellant	 legislation on this subject can be made either under entry No. 18 of List II	 or entries Nos. 6	 7 and 13 of List 111	 so that a State 	Legislature is competent to legislate and regulate relationship between landlord and tenant even in cantonment areas. These relevant entries are reproduced below "List II 18. Land	 that is to say	 rights in or over land	 land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant	 and the collection of rents; transfer and allenation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonisation." "List III 6. Transfer of property other than agricultural land; registration of deeds and documents. Contracts	 including partnership	 agency	 contracts of carriage	 and other special forms of contracts	 but not including contracts relating to agricultural land. Civil procedure	 including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of this Constitution	 limitation and arbitration. " On the scope of entry 3 of List 1	 the argument advanced is that Parliament is empowered to legislate in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas only to the extent that that house accommodation is needed for military purposes and laws are required for requisitioning or otherwise obtaining possession of that accommodation for such purposes. In the alternative. the submission made is that regulation of house accommodation by parliamentary law should be confined to houses acquired	. requisitioned or allotted for military purposes. This entry 3	 according to the appellant	 should not be read as giving Parliament the power to legislate	 on the relationship of landlord 447 and tenant in respect of houses situated in cantonment areas if such houses are let out privately by a private owner to his tenant and have nothing at all to do with the requirements of the military. We are unable to accept this submission. The language of the entry itself does not justify any such interpretation. In the entry	 when power is granted to Parliament to make laws for the regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas	 there are no qualifying words to indicate that the house accommodation	 which is to be subject to such legislation	 must be accom modation required for military purposes	 or must be accommodation that has already been acquired	 requisitioned or allotted to the military. In fact	 if a legislation in respect of any cantonment was to be undertaken by Parliament for the first time under this entry	 there would be	 at the time of that legislation	 no house in the cantonment already acquired	 requisitioned or allotted for military purposes; and	 if the interpretation sought to be put on behalf of the appellant were accepted	 the power of Parliament to pass laws cannot be exercised by Parliament at all. It is also significant that	 in the entry	 various items	 which can be the subject matter of legislation by Parliament	 are mentioned separately	 and these are : (i) Delimitation of cantonment areas; (ii) local self government in such areas; (iii) the constitution and powers within such areas of cantonment authorities; and (iv) the regulation of house accommodation (including the control of rents) in such areas. In none of these clauses there is any specification that the legislation is to be confined to areas or accommodation required for military purposes. When legislating in respect of local self government in cantonment areas	 it is obvious that Parliament will have to legislate for the entire cantonment area including portions of it which may be in possession of civilians and not military authorities or military officers. Similarly	 the powers of the cantonment authorities	 which could be granted by legislation by Parliament; cannot be confined to those areas or buildings which are in actual possession of military authorities or officers and must be in respect of the entire cantonment area including those buildings and lands which may be in actual ownership as well as occupation of civilians. In these circumstances	 there is no reason to narrow down the scope of legislation on regulation of house accommodation and confine it to houses which are required or are actually in possession of military authorities or military officers. The power to regulate house accommodation by law must extend to all house accommodation in the cantonment area 448 irrespective of its being owned by	 or in the possession of	 civilians. In fact	 if a law were to be made for the first time under ' this entry	 all the houses would be either vacant or occupied by owners or occupied by tenants of owners under private agreements and the law	 when first made	 will have to govern such houses. The scope of the expression "regulation of house accommodation" in this entry cannot	 therefore	 be confined as urged on behalf of the appellant. It is	 in the alternative	 contended that	 even if the expression "regulation of house accommodation" in this entry includes regulation of houses in private occupation	 it should not be interpreted as giving Parliament the power even to legislate for eviction of tenants who may have occupied the houses under private arrangement with the owners. It should be confined to legislation for the purpose of obtaining possession and allotment of such accommodation to military authorities or military officers. We cannot accept that the	 word "regulation" can be so narrowly interpreted as to be confined to allotment only and not to other incidents	 such as termination of existing tenancies and eviction of persons in possession of the house accommodation. The dictionary meaning of the word "regulation" in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary is "the act of regulating" and the word "regulate. is Given the meaning "to control	 govern or direct by rule or regulation". This entry	 thus	 gives the power to Parliament to pass legislation for the purpose of directing or controlling all house accommodation in cantonment areas. Clearly	 this power to direct or control will include within it all aspects as to who is to make the constructions under what conditions the constructions can be altered	 who is to occupy the accommodation and for how long	 on what terms it is to be occupied	 when and under what circumstances the occupant is to cease to occupy it	 and the manner in which the accommodation is to be utilised. All these are ingre dients of regulation of house accommodation and we see no reason to hold that this word "regulation" has not been used in this wide sense in this entry. It appears that	 in the Government of India Act	 1935	 the corresponding entry No. 2 in List I of the Seventh Scheiule to that Act was similar to this entry No. 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the	 Constitution	 but the expression "including centrol of rents" which is now in entry No. 3 of List I within brackets did not exist. An argument was sought to be built on it that regulation of house accommodation was not intended to cover control of rents when that expression was used in the corresponding entry in the Government of India Act	 and that this expression used in the Constitution should also be interpreted to cover the same field	 so that	 but for the addition made within brackets	 Parliament 449 could not have legislated for control of rents of house accommodation within cantonment areas. It is further urged that	 if the expression "regulation of house accommodation" is interpreted as not including within it regulation or control or rents	 it should also be held that it will not include regulation of eviction of private tenants. This argument is based on the premise that the words "including control of rents" was introduced in entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution for the purpose of en larging the scope	 of the legislative authority of Parliament and making it wider than that of the Federal Legislature under the Government of India Act. Such an assumption is not necessarily justified. It may be that the words "including the control of rents" were introduced by way of abundant caution or to clarify that the regulation of house accommodation is wide enough to include control of rents. The addition may have been made so as to concentrate attention on the fact that legislation was needed for control of rents in the situation that existed at the time when the Constitution was passed by the Constituent Assembly. It has to be remembered that cantonments are intended to be and are	 in fact	 military enclaves and regulation of occupation of house accommodation in the cantonment areas by parliamentary law is necessary from the point of view of security of military installations in cantoriments and requirements of military authorities and personnel for accommodation in such areas. Such a purpose ' could only be served by ensuring that Parliament could legislate in respect of house accommodation in cantonment areas in all its aspects	 including regulation of grant of leases	 ejectment of lessees	 and ensuring that the accommodation is available on proper terms as to rents. On an interpretation of the contents of the entry itself	 therefore	 we are led to the conclusion that Parliament was given the exclusive power to legislate in respect of house accommodation in cantonment areas for regulating the accommodation in all its aspects. In this connection	 we may refer to three decisions which explain the object of legislation on the subject of rent control. In Prout vs Hunter(1)	 Scrutton	 L.J.	 dealing with the legislation during the war in England	 held: "Great public feeling was aroused by the exorbitant demands for rent that were made and the ejectments for nonpayment of it	 with the result that Parliament passed the Rent Restriction Acts with the two fold object	 (1) of preventing the rent from being raised above the prewar standard	 and (2) of preventing tenants from being turned out of their houses even if the term for which they had originally taken them had expired. " (1) 450 In Property Holding Company Limited vs Clark(1)	 it was held : "There are certain fundamental features of all the Rent Restriction legislation	 or at any rate of the legislation from 1920 to 1939. The two most important objects of policy expressed in it are (1) to protect the tenant from eviction from the house where he is living	 except for defined reasons and on defined conditions; (2) to protect him from having to pay more than a fair rent. The latter object is achieved by the provisions for standard rent with (a) only permitted in creases	 (b) the provisions about furniture and attendant liabilities from the landlord to the tenant which would undermine or nullify the standard rent provisions. The result has been held to be that the Acts operate in rem upon the house and confer on the house itself the quality of ensuring to the tenant a status of irremovability. In this description of the distinguishing characteristics conferred by statute upon the clouse	 the most salient is the tenant 's security of tenure his protection against eviction; although the scope of the statutory policy about a fair rent must also be borne in mind especially in connexion with the provisions relating to furniture	 attendance	 services and board. " In Curl vs Angelo and Another(2)	 Lord Greene	 M.R.	 dealing with Rent Restrictions Act	 held : "The courts have had to consider what the over riding purpose and intention of the Acts are	 and I cannot put it in a more clear or authoritative way than by using the words of Scrutton	 L.J.	 in Skinner vs Geary 	560)	 that the object was to protect the person residing in a dwelling house from being turned out of his home." All these three cases clearly show that whenever any legislation is passed relating to control of rents	 that legislation can be effective and can serve its purpose only if it also regulates eviction of tenants. Consequently	 when in entry 3 of List I the power is granted to Parliament specifically to legislate on control of rents	 that power cannot be effectively exercised unless it is held that Parliament also has the power to regulate eviction of tenants whose rents are to be controlled. Such power must	 therefore	 be necessarily read in the expression "regulation of house accommodation". Of course	 it has to be remembered that this power (1) (2) 451 reserved for Parliament is to be exercised in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas only and not other areas the legislative power in respect of which is governed by entries either in List II or in List III. This view that we are taking is also borne out by the historical background provided by the legislation relating to cantonments and house accommodation in cantonments in India. Carnduff in his book on "Military and Cantonment Law in India" has indicated how the need for legislating with the object of overcoming difficulties experienced by military officers in obtaining suitable accommodation in cantonments came under consideration	 and has stated : "In the early days of the British dominion in India	 the camps	 stations	 and posts of the field army gradually developed into cantonments	 where troops were regularly garrisoned. The areas so occupied were at first set apart exclusively for the military and intended for occupation by them only; but	 by degrees	 non military persons were admitted land was taken possession of by them	 and houses were built under conditions laid down by the Government from time to time. These conditions were undoubtedly framed with the main object of rendering accommodation always primarily available for the military officers whose duties necessitated their residence within cantonment limits." (p. clxii). He goes on to relate that a Bill which ultimately became the Contonments Act	 1889	 originally contained a set of provisions on the subject	 insisting on the prior claim of military officers to occupy houses in cantonments and proposing that disputes as to the rent to be paid and the repairs to be executed should be referred to	 and settled by	 committees of arbitration. That part of the Bill was	 however	 omitted as it evoked considerable opposition and a separate measure was	 consequently	 taken up	 but not till after many years of discussion. The new Bill was introduced in the Governor General 's Council in 1898	 and was passed into law as the Cantonments (House Accommodation) Act II of 1902. The main provision in this Act was that	 on the Act being applied to any cantonment	 every house situated therein became liable to appropriation at any time for occupation by a military officer. It recognised the paramount claim of the military authorities to insist upon houses in cantonments being	 where necessary	 made primarily available for occupation by the military officers stationed therein. In addition	 a provision was made in section 10 that no house in any cantonment or part of a cantonment was to be occupied for the purposes of a hospital	 bank	 hotel	 shop or school	 or by a railway administration	 without the previous sanc 452 tion of the General Officer of the Command	 given with the concurrence of the Local Government. This provision	 thus	 clearly regulated the letting out of houses in a cantonment even for some of the civilian purposes	 such as hospital	 bank	 etc. The reason obviously was that it was considered inappropriate that a house occupied for such a purpose should be required to be vacated in order to make the house available for military officers. Keeping the primary object of facilitating availability of house accommodation for military officers in view	 even private letting out was	 thus	 regulated at that earliest stage. Subsequently came the Cantonments (House Accommodation) Act VI of 1923 which was in force when the Government of India Act was enacted	 as well as at the time when the Constitution came in to force. This Act also contained similar provisions which permitted military authorities to direct an owner to lease out a house to the Central Government	 to require the existing occupier to vacate the house and to refrain from letting out any house for purposes of a hospital	 school	 school hostel	 bank	 hotel	 or shop	 or by a railway administration. a company or firm engaged in trade or business or a club	 without the previous sanction of the Officer Commanding the District given with the concurrence of the Commissioner or	 in a Province where there are no Commissioners	 of the Collector. This Act also	 thus	 interfered with and regulated letting out of house accommodation by owners for civilian purposes even though	 at the time of letting	 the house was not required for any military purpose. It was in the background of this legislative history that provision was made in the Government of India Act in entry 2 of List I of the Seventh Schedule reserving for the Federal Legislature the power to legislate so as to regulate house accommodation in cantonment areas. and the same power with further clarification was reserved for Parliament in entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Obviously	 it could not be intended that Parliament should not be able to pass a law containing provisions similar to the provisions in these earlier Acts which did interfere with private letting out of house accommodation in cantonment areas by owners for certain purposes. Another aspect that strengthens our view is that if we were to accept the interpretation sought to be put on behalf of the appellant that the power of Parliament is confined to legislation for the purpose of obtaining house accommodation in cantonment areas for military purposes and excludes legislation in respect of house accommodation not immediately required for military purposes	 all that Parliament will be able to do will be to make provision for acquisition or requisition of house accommodation. On the house accommodation being acquired or requisitioned	 it will be available for use by military authorities. Such power	 obviously	 could riot be intended to be conferred by entry 3 in List I when 453 the same power is specifically granted concurrently to both Parliament and the State Legislatures under entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. On behalf of the appellant	 reliance was placed on some decisions of some of the High Courts in support of the proposition that the power of Parliament under entry 3 of List I does not extend to regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant which power vests in the State Legislature under entry 18 of List II. The first of these cases is A. C. Patel vs Vishwanath Chada(1) where the Bombay High Court was dealing with entry 2 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act	 1935 and entry 21 of List 11 of that Act. The Court was concerned with the applicability of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act No. 57 of 1947 to cantonment areas. Opinion was first expressed that the Rent Restriction Act had been passed by the Provincial Legislature under Entry 21 of List II and reliance was placed on the English interpretation Act to hold that land in that entry would include buildings so as to confer jurisdiction on the Provincial Legislature to legislate in respect of house accommodation. Then	 in considering the effect of Act 57 of 1947	 the Court said : "As the preamble of the Act sets out	 the Act was passed with a view to the control of rents and repairs of certain premises	 of rates of hotels and lodging houses	 and (A evictions. Therefore	 the pith and substance of Act LVII of 1947 is to regulate the relation between landlord and tenant by controlling rents which the tenant has got to pay to the landlord and by controlling the right of the landlord to evict his tenant. Can it be said that when the Provincial Legislature was dealing with these relations between landlord and tenant	 it was regulating house accommodation in cantonment areas ? In our opinion	 the regulation contemplated by Entry 2 in List I is regulation by the State or by the Government. Requisitioning of property	 acquiring of property	 allocation of property	 all that would be regulation of house accommodation	 but when the Legislature merely deals with relations of landlord and tenant	 it is not in any way legislating with regard to house accommodation. The house accommodation remains the same	 but the tenant is protected quae his landlord. " We have felt considerable doubt whether the power of legislating on relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of house accommodation or buildings would appropriately fall in Entry 21 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India (1) I.L.R. 3SupCI69 15 	 or in the corresponding Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. These Entries permit legislation in respect of land and explain the scope by equating it with rights in or over land	 land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant	 and the collection of rents. It is to be noted that the relation of landlord and tenant is mentioned as being included in land tenures and the expression "land tenures" would not	 in our opinion	 appropriately cover tenancy of buildings or of house accommodation. That expression is only used with reference to relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of vacant lands. In fact	 leases in respect of non agricultural property are dealt with in the Transfer of Property Act and would much more appropriately fall within the scope of Entry 8 of List III in the seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act read with Entry 10 in the same List	 or within the scope of Entry 6 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution read with Entry 7 in the same List. Leases and all rights governed by leases	 including the termination of leases and eviction from pro perty leased	 would be covered by the field of transfer of property and contracts relating thereto. However	 it is not necessary for us to express any definite opinion in this case on this point because of our view that the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas is clearly covered by the Entries in List I. In the Constitution	 the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to the matters contained in that Entry	 notwithstanding the fact that a similar power may also be found in any Entry in List 11 or List III. Article 246 of the Constitution confers exclusive power on Parliament to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 1	 notwithstanding the concurrent power of Parliament and the State Legislature	 or the exclusive power of the State Legislature in Lists III and 11 respectively. The general power of legislating in respect of relationship between landlord and tenant exercisable by a State Legislature either under Entry 18 of List II or Entries 6 and 7 of List III is subject to the overriding power of Parliament in respect of matters in List 1	 so that the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that	 on the subject of relationship between landlord and tenant insofar as it arises in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas	 Parliament alone can legislate and not the State Legislatures. The submission made that this interpretation will lead to a conflict between the powers conferred on the various Legislatures in Lists I	 II and III has also no force	 because the reservation of power for Parliament for the limited purpose of legislating in 'respect of cantonment area only amounts to exclusion of this part of the legislative power from the general powers conferred on State Legislatures in the other two Lists. This kind of exclusion is not confined only to legislation in respect of house accommodation in 455 cantonment areas. The same Entry gives Parliament jurisdiction to make provision by legislation for local self government in cantonment areas which is clearly a curtailment of the general power of the State Legislatures to make provision for local self government in all areas of the State under Entry 5 of List R. That Entry 5 does not specifically exclude cantonment areas and	 but for Entry 3 of List I	 the State Legislature would be competent to make provision for local government even in cantonment areas. Similarly	 power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of : (i) education	 including universities	 under Entry 1 1 of List 11 is made subject to the provisions of Entries 63	 64	 65 and 66 of List I and Entry 25 of List III; (ii) regulation of mines and mineral development in Entry 23 of List II is made subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union; (iii) industries in Entry 24 of List 11 is made subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List 1; (iv) trade and commerce within the State in Entry 26 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III; (v) production	 supply and distribution of goods under Entry 27 of List 11 is made subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III; and (vi) theatres and dramatic performances; cinemas in Entry 33 of List 11 is made subject to the provisions of Entry 60 of List I. Thus	 the Constitution itself has specifically put down entries in List II in which the power is expressed in general terms but is made subject to the provisions of entries in either List I or List III. In these circumstances	 no anomaly arises in holding that the exclusive power of Parliament for regulation of house accommodation including control of rents in cantonment areas has the effect of making the legislative powers conferred by Lists 11 and III subject to this power of Parliament. In this view	 we are unable to affirm the decision of the Bombay High Court in A. C. Patel 's case(1) which is based on the interpretation that Entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act only permitted laws to be made for requisitioning of property	 acquiring of property and allocation of property only. The same High Court	 in a subsequent case in F. E. Darukhanawalla vs Khemchand Lalchand(2)	 placed the same interpretation on Entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. That decision was also based on the same interpretation of the scope of regulation of house accommodation as was accepted by that Court in the earlier case. The Nagpur High Court in Kewalchand vs Dashrathlal(3) pro ceeded on the assumption that the decision in the case of A. C. Patel vs Vishwanath Chada(1) correctly defined the scope of Entry (1) I.L.R. (2) I.L.R. (3) I.L.R. 3 Sup. CI 69 16. 456 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act	 and considered the narrow question whether the relationship of landlord and tenant specifically mentioned in Entry 21 in List It of that Act covered the requirement of permission to serve a notice for eviction in regulating the relation of landlord and tenant and fell within the scope of Entry 21 in List II or in Entry 2 in List I of that Act. The Court held that it substantially fell in Entry 21 in List II and not in Entry 2 in List I. That Court did not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the question whether the expression "regulating of house accommodation" included something besides what Chagla	 C.J.	 had said was its ambit in the case of A. C. Patel vs Vishwanath Chada(1)	 but expressed the opinion that the expression could not be stretched to include the aspect of the relation of landlord and tenant involved in that particular case. It is clear that	 in	 that case also	 a narrow interpretation of the expression "regulation of house accommodation" was accepted	 because it appears that there was no detailed discussion of the full scope of that expression. Similar is the decision of the Patna High Court in Babu Jagtanand vs Sri Satyanarayanji and Lakshmiji Through the Shebait and Manager Jamuna Das (2) . In fact	 this last case merely followed the decision a the Bombay High Court in the case of F. E. Darukhanawalla vs Khemchand Lalchand(3). On the other hand	 the Rajasthan High Court in Nawal Mal vs Nathu Lal(4) held that the power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of landlord and tenant of buildings is to be found in Entries 6	 7 and 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and not in Entry 18 of List 11	 and that that power was circumscribed by the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate on the same_subject under Entry 3 of List I. That is also the view which the Calcutta High Court has taken in the judgment in appeal before us. We think that the decision given by the Calcutta High Court is correct and must be upheld. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs payable to plaintiff respondent only. R.K.P.S. (1) I.L. R. (2) I.L.R. 40 Patna 625. (3) I.L.R. (4) I.L.R. R.K.P.S Appeal dismissed.

Summary:
The first respondent	 who was the owner of certain premises situated within the cantonment area of Barrackpore filed a suit for the appellant 's eviction from the premises. In the plaint it was claimed that the appellant was not entitled to the protection of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 12 of 1956	 the regulation of house accommodation including control of rents being a subject in Entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution	 the State Legislature could not competently enact a law on the same subject for Cantonment areas and the extension of the Act to the cantonment area was ultra vires and void. Upon the Trial Court making a reference under section 113 C.P.C. to the High Court for a decision of the constitutional question	 that court upheld the first respondents contention. In appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court was in error in holding that the field of legislation covered by the Act	 which is primarily concerned with control of rents and eviction of tenants	 is included in the expression "regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas" used in Entry 3 List I	 regulation of house accommodation will not include within it laws or rules on the subject of relationship of landlord and tenant of buildings situated in the cantonment areas. On the other hand according to the appellant	 legislation on this subject can be made either under entry 18 of List 11	 or entries 6	 7 and 13 of List III	 so that a State Legislature is competent to legislate and regulate relationship between landlord and tenant in the cantonment areas; that under Entry 3 List I Parliament is empowered to legislate in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas only to the extent that house accommodation is needed for military purposes and laws are required for requisitioning or otherwise obtaining possession of that accommodation for such purposes. The alternative submission made was that regulation of house accommodation by parliamentary law should be confined to houses acquired	 requisitioned or allotted for military purposes. Entry 3	 List I	 according to the appellant	 should not be read as giving Parliament the power to legislate on the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of houses situated in cantonment areas if such houses are let out privately by a private owner to his tenant and have nothing at all to do with the requirements of the military. HELD : Dismissing the appeal	 When power is granted to Parliament under Entry 3 List I to make laws for the regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas	 there are no qualifying words to indicate that the house accommodation	 which is to be subject to such legislation	 must be accommodation 444 required for military purposes	 or must be accommodation that has already been acquired	 requisitioned or allotted to the military. [447B] When legislating in respect of local self government in cantonment areas	 it is obvious that Parliament will have to legislate for the entire cantonment area including portions of it which may be in possession of civilians and not military authorities or military officers. Similarly	 the powers of the cantonment authorities	 which could be granted by legislation by Parliament	 cannot be confined to those areas or buildings which are in actual possession of military authorities or officers and must be in respect of the entire cantonment area including those buildings and lands which may be in actual ownership as well as occupation of civilians. In these circumstances	 there is no reason to narrow down the scope of legislation on regulation of house accommodation and confine it to houses which are required or are actually in possession of military authorities or military officers. [447F H] The word "regulation" cannot be so narrowly interpreted as to be confined to allotment only and not to other incidents	 such as termination of existing tenancies and eviction of persons in Possession of the house accommodation. Entry 3 List I gives power to Parliament to pass legislation for the purpose of directing or controlling all house accommodation in cantonment areas. [448 D] Prout vs Hunter	 	 Property Holding Co. Ltd. vs Clark	 and Curl vs Angelo & Anr. 	 referred to. In the Constitution	 the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to the matters contained in that Entry	 notwithstanding the fact that a similar power may also be found in any Entry in List 11 or List 111. Article 246 of the Constitution confers exclusive power on Parliament to make laws with respect to and of the matters enumerated in List 1	 notwithstanding the concurrent power of Parliament and the State Legislature	 or the exclusive power of the State Legislature in Lists III and 11 respectively. The general power of legislating in respect of relationship between landlord and tenant exercisable by a State Legislature either under Entry 18 of List 11 or Entries 6 and 7 of List 111 is subject to the overriding power of Parliament in respect of matters in List 1	 so that the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that	 on the subject of relationship between landlord and tenant insofar as it arises in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas	 Parliament alone can legislate and not the State Legislatures. [454E G] A.C. Patel vs Vishwanath Chada	 I.L.R. 	 F.E. Darukhanawalla vs Khemchand Lalchand	 I.L.R. [1954] Bom. 544	 Kewalchand vs Dashrathlal	 I.L.R. and Babu Jagtanand vs Sri Satyanarayanji and Lakshmiji through the Sheba it and Manager Jamuna Das	 I.L.R. 40 Pit. 625	 disapproved. Nawal Mal vs Nathu Lal	 I.L.R. 	 approved.