Judgment Case ID: 165

Judgment:
Appeal No. 95 of 1952. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated the 27th February	 1950	 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rao and Ayyar JJ.) in Appeal No. 635 of 1946 arising	 out of judgment and decree dated the 13th August	 1946	 of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tinnevelly in Original Suit No. 50 of 1945. K. section Krishnaswamy Iyengar (section Ramachandra with him) for the appellants. K. Rajah Iyer (R. Ganapathy Iyer	 with him) for the respondent. April 14. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MAHAJAN J. One Lakshminarayana Iyer	 a Hindu Brahmin	 who owned considerable properties in the Tirunelveli district	 died on 13th December	 1924	 leaving him surviving a widow Ranganayaki	 and a married daughter Ramalakshmi. Ramalakshmi had married the plaintiff and had a number of children from him. They were all alive in December	 1924	 when Lakshminarayana died	 Before his death he 850 executed a will on 16th November	 1924	 the construction of which is in controversy in this appeal. By this will he gave the following directions "After my lifetime	 you	 the aforesaid Ranganayaki Amminal	 my wife	 shall till your lifetime	 enjoy the aforesaid entire properties	 the outstandings due to me	 the debts payable by me	 and the chit amounts payable by me. After your lifetime Ramalakshmi Ammal	 our daughter and wife of Rama Ayyar Avergal of Melagaram village	 and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alienation such as gift	 exchange	 and sale from son to grandson and so on for generations. As regards the payment of maintenance to be made to Chinnanmal alias Lakshmi Ammal	 wife of my late son Hariharamayyan	 my wife Ranganayaki Ammal shall pay the same as she pleases	 and obtain a release deed". Ranganayaki entered into possession of the properties on the death of her husband. On 21st February	 1928	 she settled the maintenance claim of Lakshmi Ammal and obtained a deed of release from her by paying her a sum of Rs. 3	350 in cash and by executing in her favour an agreement stipulating to pay her a sum of Rs. 240 per annum. Ramalakshmi died on 25th April	 1938 during the lifetime of the widow. None of her children survived her. On the 24th July	 1945	 the widow describing herself as an absolute owner of the properties of her husband sold one of the items of the property to the 2nd defendant for Rs. 500. On the 18th September	 1945	 the suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the plaintiff	 the husband and the sole heir of Ramalakshmi	 for a declaration that the said sale would not be binding on him beyond the lifetime of the widow. A prayer was made that the widow be restrained from alienating the other properties in her possession. On the 19th September	 1945	 an ad interim injunction was issued by the High Court restraining the widow from alienating the properties in her possession and forming part of her husband 's estate	 In 851 spite of this injunction	 on the 27th September	 1945	 she executed two deeds of settlement in favour of the other defendants comprising a number of properties. The plaintiff was allowed to amend his plaint and include therein a prayer for a declaration in respect of the invalidity of these alienations as well. It was averred in the plaint that Ramalakshmi obtained a vested interest in the suit properties under the will of her father and plaintiff was thus entitled to maintain the suit. The defendants pleaded that the plaintiff had no title to maintain the suit	 that the widow was entitled under the will to an absolute estate or at least to an estate analogous to and not less than a widow 's estate	 that the estate given to Ramalakshmi under the will was but a contingent one and she having predeceased the widow	 no interest in the suit properties devolved on the plaintiff. The main issue in the suit was whether the widow took under the will an absolute estate or an estate like the Hindu widow 's estate and whether the daughter 's interest therein was in the nature of a contingent remainder	 or whether she got in the properties a vested interest. The subordinate judge held that the widow took under the will a limited life	 interest	 and not an absolute estate or even a widow 's estate under Hindu law	 and that the daughter got thereunder a vested interest in the properties to which the plaintiff succeeded on her death. In view of this finding he granted the plaintiff a declaratory decree to the effect that the first defendant had only an estate for life in the suit properties and that the alienations made by her would not enure beyond her lifetime. The question as to the validity of the alienations was left undetermined. The unsuccessful defendants preferred an appeal against this decree to the High Court of Judicature at Madras. During the pendency of the appeal the widow died on 14th February	 1948. The High Court by its judgment under appeal affirmed the decision of the trial judge and maintained his view on the construction of the will. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was 852 granted and the appeal was admitted on the 27th November	 1951. The substantial question to decide in the appeal is whether the estate granted by the testator to his widow was a fall woman 's estate under Hindu law or merely a limited life estate in the English sense of that expression. It was not contested before us that a Hindu can by will create a life estate	 or successive life estates	 or any other estate for a limited term	 provided the donee or the persons taking under it are capable of taking under a deed or will. The decision of the appeal thus turns upon the question whether the testator 's intention was to give to his widow ail ordinary life	 estate or an estate analogous to that of a Hindu widow. At one time it was a moot point whether a Hindu widow 's estate could be created by will	 it being an estate created by law	 but it is now settled that a Hindu can confer by means of a will oil his widow the same estate which she would get by inheritance. The widow in such a case takes as a demisee and not as an heir. The court 's primary duty in such cases is to ascertain from the language employed by the testator "what were his intentions"	 keeping in view the surrounding circumstances	 his ordinary notions as a Hindu in respect to devolution of his property	 his family relationships etc.; in other words	 to ascertain his wishes by putting itself	 so to say	 in his armchair. Considering the will in the light of these principles	it seems to us that Lakshminarayan Iyer intended by his will to direct that his entire properties should be enjoyed by his widow during her lifetime but her interest in these properties should come to an end on her death	 that all these properties in their entirety should thereafter be enjoyed as absolute owners by his daughter and her heirs with powers of alienation	 gift	 exchange and sale from generation to generation. He wished to make his daughter a fresh stock of descent so that her issue	 male or female	 may have the benefit of his property. They were the real persons whom he earmarked with certainty as the ultimate recipients of 853 his bounty. In express terms he conferred on his daughter powers of alienation byway of gift	 exchange	 sale	 but in sharp contrast to this	 on his widow he conferred no such powers. The direction to her was that she should enjoy the entire properties including the outstandings etc. and these shall thereafter pass to her daughters. Though no restraint in express terms was put on her powers of alienation in case of necessity	 even that limited power was not given to her in express terms. If the testator had before his mind 's eye his daughter and her heirs as the ultimate beneficiaries of his bounty	 that intention could only be achieved by giving to the widow a limited estate	 because by conferring a full Hindu widow 's estate on her the daughter will	 only have a mere spes successions under the Hindu law which may or may not mature and under the will her interest would Only be a contingent one in what was left indisposed of by the widow. It is significant that the testator did not say in the will that the daughter will enjoy only the properties left indisposed of by the widow. The extent of the grant	 so far as the properties mentioned in the schedule are concerned	 to the daughter and the widow is the same. Just as the widow was directed to enjoy tile entire properties mentioned in the schedule during her lifetime in like manner the daughter and her heirs were also directed to enjoy the same properties with absolute rights from generation to generation. They could not enjoy the same properties in the manner directed if the widow had a full Hindu widow 's estate and had the power for any purpose to dispose of them and did so. If that was the intention	 the testator would clearly have said that the daughter would only take the properties remaining after the death of the widow. The widow cannot be held to have been given a full Hindu widow 's estate under the will unless it can be said that under its terms she was given the power of alienation for necessary purposes	 whether in express terms or by necessary implication. As above pointed out	 admittedly power of alienation in express terms was not conferred on her. It was argued 854 that such a power was implicit within the acts she was authorized to do	 that is to say	 when she was directed to pay the debts and settle the maintenance of Ramalakshmi it was implicit within these directions that for these purposes	 if necessity arose	 she could alienate the properties. This suggestion in the surrounding circumstances attending the execution of this will cannot be sustained. The properties disposed of by the will and mentioned in the schedule were considerable in extent and it seems that they fetched sufficient income to enable the widow to fulfil the obligations under the will. Indeed we find that within four years of the death of the testator the widow was able to pay a lump sum of Rs. 3	350 in cash to the daughter in law without alienating any part of the immovable properties and presumably by this time she had discharged all the debts. It is not shown that she alienated a single item of immovable property till the year 1945	 a period of over 21 years after the death of her husband	 excepting one	 which she alienated in the year 1937 to raise a sum of Rs. 1	000 in order to buy some land. By this transaction she substituted one property by another. For the purpose of her maintenance	 for payment of debts etc.	 and for settling the claim of the daughter in law she does not appear to have felt any necessity to make any alienation of any part of the estate mentioned in the schedule and the testator in all likelihood knew that she could fulfil these obligations without having recourse to alienations and hence he did not give her any power to do so. In this situation the inference that the testator must have of necessity intended to confer on the widow power of alienation for those limited purposes cannot be raised. In our opinion	 even if that suggestion is accepted that for the limited purposes mentioned in the will the widow could alienate	 this power would fall far short of the powers that a Hindu widow enjoys under Hindu law. Under that law she has the power to alienate the estate for the benefit of the soul of the husband	 for pilgrimage and for the benefit of the estate and for 855 other authorized purposes. It cannot be said that a Hindu widow can only alienate her husband 's estate for payment of debts	 to meet maintenance charges and for her own maintenance. She represents the estate in all respects and enjoys very wide power except that she cannot alienate except for necessity and her necessities have to be judged on a variety of considerations. We therefore hold that the estate conferred on Ranganayaki Ammal was more like the limited estate in the English sense of the term than like a full Hindu widow 's estate in spite of the directions above mentioned. She had complete control over the income of the property during her lifetime but she had no power to deal with the corpus of the estate and it had to be kept intact for the enjoyment of the daughter. Though the daughter was not entitled to immediate possession of the property it was indicated with certainty that she should get the entire estate at the proper time and she thus got an interest in it on the testator 's death. She was given a present right of future enjoyment in the property. According to Jarman (Jarman on Wills)	 the law leans in favour of vesting of estates and the property disposed of belongs to the object of the gift when the will takes effect and we think the daughter got under this will a vested interest in the testator 's properties on his death. It was strenuously argued by Mr. K. section Krishnaswami Iyengar that Lakshminarayana Iyer was a Brahmin gentleman presumably versed in the sastras	 living in a village in the southernmost part of the Madras State	 that his idea of a restricted estate was more likely to be one analogous to a Hindu woman 's estate than a life estate a	 	 understood in English law wherein the estate is measured by use and not by duration	 and that if this will was construed in the light of the notions of Lakshminarayana Iyer it should be held that the widow got under it a Hindu widow 's estate and the daughter got under it a contingent remainder in the nature of spes and on her death there was nothing which could devolve on the plaintiff and he thus had no locus standi to question the alienations made by the widow	 856 The learned counsel in support of his contention drew our attention to a number of decisions of different High Courts and contended that the words of this will should be construed in the manner as more or less similar words were construed by the courts in the wills dealt with in those decisions. This rule of construction by analogy is a dangerous one to follow in construing wills differently worded and executed in different surroundings. [Vide Sasiman vs Shib Narain (1)]. However	 out of respect for learned counsel on both sides who adopted the same method of approach we proceed to examine some of the important cases referred to by them. Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar sought to derive the greatest support for his contention from the decision in Ram Bahadur vs Jager Nath Prasad (2 ). The will there recited that if a daughter or son was born to the testator during his lifetime	 such son or daughter would be the owner of all his properties but if there was no son or daughter	 his niece section would get a bequest of a lakh of rupees	 and the rest of the movable and immovable properties would remain in possession of his wife until her death	 and after her these would remain in possession of his niece. The remainder was disposed of in the following words: "If on the death of my wife and my niece there be living a son and a daughter born of the womb of my said brother 's daughter	 then two thirds of the movable property will belong to the son and one third to the daughter. But as regards the immovable property none shall have the lest right of alienation. They will of course be entitled to enjoy the balance left after payment of rent". This will was construed as conveying an absolute estate to the son and the daughter of the niece. It was remarked that in spite of an. express restriction against alienation	 the estate taken by section (the niece) was an estate such as a woman ordinarily acquires by inheritance under the Hindu law which she holds in a completely representative character but is unable to (1) 491. A. 2 5. (2) 857 alienate except in case of legal necessity and that such a construction was in accordance with the ordinary notions that a Hindu has in regard to devolution of his property. The provisions contained in this will bear no analogy to those we have to construe. The restraint against alienation was repugnant to both a life estate and a widow '	 	 estate and was not	 therefore	 taken into account. But there were other indications in that will showing that a widow 's estate had been given. The fact that the gift over was a contin gent bequest was by itself taken as a sure indication that the preceding bequest was that of a widow 's estate. There is no such indication in the will before us. Reliance was next placed on the decision in Pavani Subbamma vs Ammala Rama Naidu (1). Under the will there dealt with	 the widow S	 was to enjoy the properties and after her lifetime the properties were to be taken in the ratio of three to five by the son 's daughter and the daughter 's son respectively. A suit was instituted by the son 's daughter for the recovery of possession of her share in one item of property forming	 part of the estate which had been sold by section The question for decision in that case was whether section was at all entitled to sell anything more than her life interest even for purposes of meeting a necessity binding upon the estate. Varadachari J. held that since in the will the gift over to the grand children was of the entire Properties	 and not a mere gift by way of defeasance	 it had to be held that it indicated that the prior gift in favour of the widow was only of a limited interest. This decision therefore goes against the contention of the learned counsel but he placed reliance on the observations made in the judgment when the learned Judge proceeded to say " In deference to the view taken in Maharaja of Kolhapur vs sundaram Iyer (2)	 it may be possible to create an interest analogous to a woman 's estate in Hindu law notwithstanding the addition of a gift over and that the estate taken by section need not necessarily be only a life estate in the English law (1) (2) Mad. 1. 111 858 sense of the term. " We do not understand how such passing observations can be helpful in deciding the present case. Assuming that it is possible to create a Hindu woman 's estate not with standing the addition of a gift over	 the question nevertheless whether that had been done in a given case must depend on the terms of the particular instrument under consideration. The following remarks in the Privy Council decision in Nathu	 Ram Mahajan vs Gangayabai(1) were next cited: As the will gave her the right to 'enjoy ' the income of the estate during her lifetime	 it was evidently contemplated that she should	 as provided by the Hindu law in the case of a widow	 be in possession of the estate. " Such casual observation made in respect of a will couched in entirely different terms cannot afford much assistance in the decision of the case. In Vasantharao Ammannamma vs Venkata Kodanda Rao Pantalu(2)	 the next case cited	 a Hindu testator who was a retired subordinate judge provided by his will as follows: "Out	 of the aforestated ancestral lands	 the oneninth share to which I am entitled shall be enjoyed after my death by my wife till her death	 and after her death it shall pass to section son of my second elder brother deceased. My self acquired properties shall on my death be enjoyed by my wife till her death and after her death they shall pass to my daughter. Thereafter they shall pass to my grandson through my daughter". The will was construed as giving the self acquired properties ultimately to the grandsons	 and the estate of the daughter was likened to an estate which she would take under the law of inheritance	 that is a limited estate analogous to a widow 's estate. At page 193 of the report it was observed as follows : "The question therefore arises	 did he intend to confer only a life estate or a daughter 's estate ? It seems (1) (2) 	 859 to us that he meant to give a daughter 's estate rather than a life estate. He omits the words 'during her life ' with reference to the disposition in favour of the daughter. The words 'pass to my daughter ' would rather indicate that in the ordinary course of devolution the estate should pass to her	 that is	 the daughter and then to the grandsons. The words used in favour of the grandsons seem to indicate that the estate conferred on the daughter was not a life estate because there is no direct gift in favour of the grandsons	 but on the other hand	 what he says is that through his daughter the estate shall pass to his grandsons. Either he must have intended that the daughter should convey the property either by will or inter vivos to the grandsons or she having taken the estate	 through her it should pass to the grandsons in the ordinary course of devolution. If it was the daughter 's estate that was intended to be conferred	 there can be no question that the estate taken by the grandsons is not a vested interest". This line of reasoning which appealed to the learned judges is not of much he] ) to us here as the language hi this will is quite different. If the same line of reasoning is adopted here	 the decision of the case would go against the client of Mr. K. section K. Iyengar because in the will in this case the widow 's estate is delimited by the words " till your lifetime. " Reliance was next placed on Maharaja of Kolhapur vs Sundaram Iyer (1). That was a case of a government grant on the special terms set out therein and the question arose as to the nature of the grant. There it was said that " the widows of Sivaji Raja got the gift of a life estate very much resembling the ordinary estate of a Hindu widow and with all the incidents of a widow 's estate except the liability to be divested	 but nevertheless a life estate rather than an estate of inheritance." These remarks do not throw much light on the point before us. The last decision referred to was the decision of the Privy Council in Mahomed Shumsool vs Shewukram(2) There a Hindu inhabitant of Bihar by a document of (1) Mad. 1. (2) (1874 75) 2 I.A. 7. 860 a testamentary character declared his daughter who had two daughters	 as his heir	 and after her two daughters together with their children were declared heirs and malik. One daughter of the daughter predeceased the testator without issue and the other daughter died after the death of the testator leaving an only son	 the respondent in that case. In a suit by the respondent against his grandmother the daughter of the 'testator for a declaratory order preserving unmolested his future right and title to the said lands	 it was held that the daughter took an estate subject to her daughters succeeding her. In this judgment the following observations were emphasized as relevant to this enquiry : " It has been contended that these latter expressions qualify the generality of the former expressions	 and that the will	 taken as a whole	 must be construed as intimating the intention of the testator that Mst. Rani Dhun Kaur should not take an absolute estate	 but that she should be succeeded in her estate by her two daughters. In other words	 that she should take an estate very much like the ordinary estate of a Hindu widow. In construing the will of a Hindu it is not improper to take into consideration what are known to be the ordinary notions and wishes of Hindus with respect to the devolution of property. It may be assumed that a Hindu generally desires that an estate	 especially an ancestral estate	 shall be retained in his family; and it may be assumed that a Hindu knows that	 as a general rule	 at all events	 women do not take absolute estates of inheritance which they are enabled to alienate. " These observations are unexceptionable but it may also be pointed out that it is open to a Hindu to confer a limited life estate on his widow or even a larger estate than a widow takes as an heir and that in every case he may not confer upon her by will a Hindu widow 's estate which she would otherwise get by inheritance. Generally speaking	 there will be no point in making a will if what is to be given to a widow is what she would get on intestacy and cases do arise 861 where a Hindu wishes to give to his widow a more restricted estate than she would get on intestacy or a much larger estate than that. The question in every case cannot be determined merely on the theory that every Hindu thinks only about a Hindu widow 's estate and no more. What is given must be gathered from the language of the will in the light of the surrounding circumstances. The learned counsel for the respondent followed the line adopted by Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar. He also on the analogy of other wills and the decisions given on their terms wanted a decision on the construction of this will in his favour. In the first instance	 he placed reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court in Ratna Chetty vs Narayana swami Chetty(1). There the testator made a will in favour of his wife providing	 inter alia	 "all my properties shall after my death be in possession of my wife herself and she herself should be heir to everything and Mutha Arunachala Chetty (nephew) and my wife	 should live together amicably as of one family. If the two could not agree and live together amicably	 my wife would pay Rs. 4	000 and separate him and then my wife would enjoy all the remaining properties with absolute rights. If both of them would live together amicably	 Muthu Arunachala Chetty himself would enjoy the properties which remain after the death of the widow. " It was held upon the construction of the will that the nephew	 who lived amicably with the widow till his death	 had a vested interest at testator 's death which could not be defeated by a testamentary disposition by the widow in favour of a stranger. This decision only decides that case and is not very relevant in this enquiry. Reference was also made to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mst. Bhagwati Devi vs Chowdry Bholonath Thakur(2). This was a case of a gift inter vivos. The gift to Mst. Chunderbutti	 his wife	 was in these terms (1) (19I4) (2) (1874 75) 2 I.A 256. 862 "the remaining 'milkiut ' and 'minhai ' 'estates	 together with the amount of ready money	 articles	 slaves	 and all household furniture I have placed in the possession of Mst. Chunderbutti Thakurain	 my wife	 to be enjoyed during her lifetime	 in order that she may hold possession of all the properties and milkiut possessed by me	 the declarant	 during her lifetime	 and by the payment of Government revenue	 appropriate the profits derived therefrom	 but that she should not by any means transfer the milkiut estates and the slaves; that after the death of my aforesaid wife the milkiut and household furniture shall devolve on Girdhari Thakur	 my karta (adopted son). " The subordinate judge held that Chunderbutti got an estate for life with the power to appropriate profits and Girdhari got a vested remainder on her death. The High Court took a different view and held that Chunderbutti took the estate in her character as a Hindu widow. The Privy Council on this will held as follows " Their Lordships do not feel justified	 upon mere conjecture of what might probably have been intended	 in so interpreting it as materially to change the nature of the estate taken by Chunderbutti. If she took the estate only of a Hindu widow	 one consequence	 no doubt	 would be that she would be unable to alienate the profits	 or that at all events	 whatever she purchased out of them would be an increment to her husband 's estate	 and the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover possession of all such property	 real and personal. But	 on the other hand	 she would have certain rights as a Hindu widow; for example	 she would have the right under certain circumstances	 if the estate were insufficient to defray the funeral expenses or her maintenance	 to alienate it altogether. She certainly would have the power of selling her own estate; and it would further follow that Girdhari would not be possessed in any sense of a vested remainder	 but merely of a contingent one. It would also follow that she would completely represent the estate	 and under certain circumstances the statute 863 of limitations might run against the heirs to the estate	 whoever they might be. Their Lordships see no sufficient reason for importing into this document words which would carry with them all these consequences	 and they agree with the subordinate judge in construing it according to its plain meaning. " These observations have to a certain extent relevance to the present case but on the facts this case is also distinguishable. This will was couched in different language than the will in the present case. There was a clear prohibition	 forbidding the widow to make any transfers of the milkiuit estates and the slaves. Reference was also made to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Lallu vs Jagmohan(1). The will there ran as follows: " When I die	 my wife named Suraj ' is owner of that property. And my wife has powers to do in the same way as I have absolute powers to do when I am present	 and in case of my wife 's death	 my daughter Mahalaxmi is owner of the said property after that. " It was held that Suraj took only a life estate under the will	 with remainder over to Mahalaxmi after her death and the bequest to Mahalaxmi was not contingent on her surviving Suraj	 but that she took a vested remainder which upon her death passed to her heirs. After considering the rival contentions of the parties	 we are of the opinion that no sufficient grounds have been made out for disturbing the unanimous opinion of the two courts below on the construction of this will. Both the learned counsel eventually conceded that the language used in the will was consistent with the testator 's intention of conferring a life estate in the English sense as well as with the intention of conferring a Hindu widow 's estate. It was	 however	 urged by Mr. Rajah Iyer that as no express or implied power of alienation for purposes of all legal necessities was conferred on the widow	 that circumstance (1) Bom. 409. 864 negatived the view that the testator intended to confer upon his widow a Hindu widow 's estate as she would get in case of intestacy. He also emphasized that the words of the gift over to the daughter as supporting his construction which was further reinforced by the words of the will limiting the widow 's estate " till your lifetime " and of the omission from therein of words such as nialik etc.	 while describing the widow 's estate. Mr. Krisbnaswami lyengar	 on the other hand	 contended that the absence of any words in the will restricting her powers of alienation and putting a restraint on them	 suggested a contrary intention and that the daughter 's estate was described as coming into being after the estate of the widow and was not conferred on her simultaneously with the widow	 and this connoted according to the notions of Hindus a full Hindu widow 's estate. In our judgment	 there is force in the contention of Mr. Rajah Iyer for reasons already stated and in the result	 therefore	 we dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the respondent Ganpat Rai.

Summary:
A Hindu Brahmin governed by the Mitakshara law made a will in which he gave the following directions: " After my life time	 you	 the aforesaid Ranganayaki Ammal	 my wife	 shall till your lifetime enjoy the aforesaid entire properties . After your lifetime	 Ramalakshmi Ammal	 our daughter and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alienation such as gift	 exchange and sale from son to grandson and so on for generations. As regards the payment of maintenance to be made to C	 wife of my late son	 H	 my wife Ranganayaki Ammal shall pay the same as she pleases and obtain a release deed." After the death of the testator his wife entered into possession of his properties but before the death of his wife	 his daughter and all her children died: Held	 (i) that on a proper construction of the will in the light of surrounding circumstances	 the testator bad conferred on his 849 wife only an ordinary life estate	 and alienations made by her would not endure beyond her lifetime ; (ii) that the testator 's daughter obtained under the will a vested interest in the properties after the lifetime of the widow	 to which her husband succeeded on her death. The rule of construction by analogy is a dangerous one to follow in construing wills differently worded	 and executed in different surroundings. Ram Bahadur vs Joger Nath Prasad 	 Pavani Subbamma vs Arumala Rama Naidu ([1937] 	 Nathu Rain Mahajan vs Ganga Bai ([1938] 	 Vasanta Rao Ammennamma vs Venkata Kodanda Rao ([1940] 	 Maharaja of Kolhapur vs Sundaram Iyer (I.L.R. 48 Mad. 1)	 Mahoned Shumsool vs Shewakram (2 I.A. 7)	 Ratna Chetty vs Narayana swami Chetty 	 Mst. Bhagwati Devi vs Choudry Bholonath Thakur (2 I.A. 256) and Lallu vs Jagmohan (I.L.R. referred to. Judgment of the Madras High Court affirmed.