Judgment Case ID: 1049

Judgment:
y of the view that the almost unanimous opinion of experts is that after the age of 15	 bulls. bullocks and buffaloes are no longer useful for breeding	 draught and other purposes and whatever little use they may have then is greatly offset by the economic disadvantages of feeding and maintaining unserviceable cattle disadvantages to which we had referred in much greater detail in Md. Hanif Quareshi 's case (1). Section 3 of the Bihar Act in so far as it has increased the age limit to 25 in respect of bulls	 bullocks and she buffaloes	 imposes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners	 a restriction moreover which cannot be said to be in (1) ; 623 the interests of the general public	 and to that extent it is void. We may here repeat what we said in Chintaman Rao vs The State of Madhya Pradesh (1): "The phrase 'reasonable restriction ' connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature	 beyond what is required in the interests of the public. The word 'reasonable ' implies intelligent care and deliberation	 that is	 the choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in article 19(1)(g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of article 19	 it must be held to be wanting in that quality. " As to r. 3 the grievances of the petitioners are these. Under the rule the prescribed authority for the purpose of section 3 of the Act consists of the Veterinary Officer and the Chairman or Chief Officer of a District Board	 Municipality etc. Unless both of them concur	 no certificate for slaughter can be granted. It is pointed out that the Chairman or Chief Officer would be a layman not in a position to judge the age or usefulness of cattle. The result would be that the animal in respect of which a certificate is required may have to be shown to the Veterinary Officer as also the Chairman or Chief Officer	 who may not be staying at the same place as the Veterinary Officer. If the two differ	 the matter has to be referred to the Sub divisional Animal Husbandry Officer. This procedure	 it is contended	 will involve the expenditure of so much money and time that it will not be worthwhile for the petitioners to ask for a certificate	 or having got a certificate	 to slaughter the animal. An animal which is above 15 or which has become useless generally costs much less than a young	 serviceable animal. If the petitioners have to incur all the expenditure which the procedure laid down by r. 3 must necessarily cost them	 then they must close down their trade. As to the right of appeal from an order refusing to grant a (1) ; 	763. 624 certificate	 it is contended that that right is also illusory for all practical purposes. To take the animal to the Deputy Director of Animal Husbandry or the District Animal Husbandry Officer or the Sub divi sional Animal Husbandry Officer	 as the case may be	 and to keep and feed the animal for the period of the appeal and its hearing will cost more than the price of the animal itself. We consider that these grievances of the petitioners have substance	 and judged from the practical point of view	 the provisions of r. 3 impose disproportionate restrictions on their right. It is difficult to understand why the Veterinary Officer	 who has the necessary technical knowledge	 cannot be trusted to give the certificate and why it should be necessary to resort to a complicated procedure to resolve a possible difference of opinion between two officers	 later followed by a still more expensive appeal. We	 therefore	 hold r. 3 also to be bad in so far as it imposes disproportionate restrictions indicated above	 on the right of the petitioners. (2) We now proceed to consider the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter (Amendment) Act	 1958. After the decision of this Court in Md. Hanif Quareshi vs The State of Bihar (1) an Ordinance was passed called the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter (Amendment) Ordinance	 1958. This Ordinance was later repealed and replaced by the Act. The petitioners say that in the Bill as originally drafted the age limit below which slaughter was not permissible was put at 15 years; but the Select Committee increased it to 20 years. It will probably be best	 for clearness sake	 to set forth not the whole provisions of the Act	 for that would be too lengthy	 but those which form most directly the subject matter on which the controversy turns. Section 3 of the Act reads (omitting portions not relevant for our purpose) "section 3(1) Except as hereinafter provided	 no person shall slaughter or cause to be slaughtered or offer or cause to be offered for slaughter (a). . . . . . . (1) ; 625 (b) a bull or bullock	 unless he has obtained in respect thereof a certificate in writing	 from the competent authority of the area in which the bull or bullock is to be slaughtered	 certifying that it is fit for slaughter. (2) No bull or bullock	 in respect of which a certificate has been issued under sub section (1)(b) shall be ' slaughtered at any place other than the place indicated in the certificate or within twenty days of the date of issue of the certificate. (3) A certificate under sub section (1)(b) shall be issued by the competent authority	 only after it has	 for reasons to be recorded in writing	 certified that(a) the bull or bullock is over the age of twenty years; and (b) in the case of a bull	 it has become permanently unfit and unserviceable for the purpose of breeding and	 in the case of a bullock	 it has become permanently unfit and unserviceable for the purposes of draught and any kind of agricultural operation: Provided that the permanent unfitness or unserviceability has not been caused deliberately. (4) The competent authority shall	 before issuing the certificate under sub section (3) or refusing to issue the same	 record its order in writing. Any person aggrieved by the order of the competent authority	 under this section	 may	 within twenty days of the date of the order	 appeal against it to the State Government	 which may pass such orders thereon as it may deem fit. (5) The State Government may	 at any time	 for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of the action taken under this section	 call for and examine the record of any case and may pass such orders thereon as it may deem fit. (6) Subject to the provisions herein contained any action taken under this section	 shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question. " On behalf of the petitioners it has been argued that section 3 imposes a number of unreasonable restrictions. Firstly	 it is urged that the age limit with regard to bulls or bullocks is put too high	 viz. at 20 years. This is an 626 aspect which we have already considered in relation to the Bihar Act. What we have said about the age s limit in that connexion applies equally to the Uttar Pradesh Act. The 8th Live stock Census	 1956 shows that in Uttar Pradesh bulls and bullocks over 3 years of age	 not in use for breeding or work	 numbered as many as 126	201 in 1956 as compared to 162	746 in 1951. The Municipal Manual	 Uttar Pradesh	 Vol. 1	 contains a direction that for slaughter of animals	 bullocks and male buffaloes in good state of health below ten years of age should be included. Secondly	 it is pointed out that not being content with fixing an unreasonably high age limit	 the impugned provision imposes a double restriction. It says that the animal must be over twenty years in age and must also be permanently unfit and unserviceable; and in the case of a bullock	 the unfitness must be for "any kind of agricultural operation" and not merely for draught purposes. The result of this double restriction	 it is stated	 is that even if the animal is permanently unserviceable and unfit at an earlier age	 it cannot be slaughtered unless it is over twenty years in age. Before a certificate can be given	 the animal must fulfil two conditions as to (1) age and (2) permanent unfitness. We consider this to be a demonstrably unreasonable restriction. In Md. Hanif Quareshi 's case (1) this Court had said that a total ban on the slaughter of bulls and bullocks after they had ceased to be capable of breeding or working as draught animals was not in the interests of the general public. Yet this is exactly what the impugned provision does by imposing a double restriction. It lays down that even if the animal is permanently unserviceable	 no certificate can be given unless it is more than 20 years in age. The restriction will in effect put an end to the trade of the petitioners. Thirdly	 the impugned provision provides (1) that the animal shall not be slaughtered within 20 days of the date of the issue of the certificate and (2) that any person aggrieved by the order of the competent authority may appeal to the State Government within 20 days. It is to be noted that the right of appeal is not (1) 627 confined to a refusal to grant a certificate as in the Bihar Act	 but the right is given to any person aggrieved by the order of the competent authority. In other words	 even when a certificate is given	 any person	 even a member of the public	 who feels aggrieved by it may prefer an appeal and hold up the slaughter of the animal for a long time. From the practical point of view these restrictions really put a total ban on the slaughter of bulls and bullocks even after they have ceased to be useful	 and we must hold	 following our decision in Md. Hanif Quareshi 's case (1) that section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Act in so far as it imposes unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners as to slaughter of bulls and bullocks infringes the fundamental right of the petitioners and is to that extent void. (3) Now	 we come to the Madhya Pradesh Act. Several provisions of this Act have been challenged before us as imposing unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of the petitioners. Section 4 deals with prohibition of slaughter of agricultural cattle. The expression 'agricultural cattle ' means an animal specified in the schedule: it means cows of all ages; calves of cows and of she buffaloes; bulls; bullocks; and male and female buffaloes. As we have stated earlier	 we are concerned in these cases with the validity of the restrictions placed on the slaughter of bulls	 bullocks and buffaloes. Now	 section 4 is in these terms: "section 4(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any usage or custom to the contrary	 no person shall slaughter or cause to be slaughtered or offer or cause to be offered	 for slaughter (a) cows	 calves of cows	 or calves of she buffaloes	 or (b) any other agricultural cattle unless he has obtained in respect of such cattle a certificate in writing issued by the Competent Authority for the area in which the cattle is to be slaughtered that the cattle is fit for slaughter. (1) [1959] S.C.R.29. 628 (2) No certificate under clause (b) of sub section (1) shall be issued by the Competent Authority .unless the Veterinary Officer after examining the cattle certifies that (a) the cattle is over twenty years of age and is unfit for work or breeding or has become permanently incapacitated from work or breeding due to age	 injury	 deformity or an incurable disease; and (b) the cattle is not suffering from any disease which makes its meat unwholesome for human consumption. (3) The Competent Authority shall	 before issuing or refusing to issue a certificate under this section	 record its order in writing. Any person aggrieved by the order of the Competent Authority under this section	 may	 within ten days of the date of the order	 prefer an appeal against such order to the Collector of the district or such other officer as may	 by notification	 be authorised in this behalf by the State Government	 and the Collector or such other officer may pass such orders thereon as he thinks fit. (4) Subject to the orders passed in appeal	 if any	 under sub section (3)	 the order of the Competent Authority shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court. " Section 5 places a restriction as to the place and time for slaughter and the objection taken before us relates to the time rather than to the place of slaughter. It says in effect that no cattle in respect of which a certificate has been issued under section 4 shall be slaughtered within ten days of the date of issue of the certificate and where an appeal is preferred against the grant of such certificate	 till the time such appeal is disposed of. The provision of appeal is contained in sub section (3) of section 4 of the Act which we have quoted earlier. That sub section lays down that any person aggrieved by the order of the Competent Authority	 may	 within ten days of the date of the order	 prefer an appeal against the order to the Collector of the district or such other officer as may	 by notification	 be authorised in this behalf by the State Government. 629 Section 6 imposes a restriction on the transport of agricultural cattle for slaughter and reads: "section 6. No person shall transport or offer for transport or cause to be transported any agricultural cattle from any place within the State to any place outside the State	 for the purpose of its slaughter in contravention of the provisions of this Act or with the knowledge that it will be or is likely to be	 so slaughtered. " Section 7 prohibits the sale	 purchase or disposal otherwise of certain kinds of animals. It reads . "section 7. No person shall purchase	 sell or otherwise dispose of or offer to purchase	 sell or otherwise dispose of or cause to be purchased	 sold or otherwise disposed of cows	 calves of cows or calves of shebuffaloes for slaughter or knowing or having reason to believe that such cattle shall be slaughtered. " Section 8 relates to possession of flesh of agricultural cattle and is in these terms: "section 8. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force	 no person shall have in his possession flesh of any agricultural cattle slaughtered in contravention of the provisions of this Act. " Section 10 imposes a penalty for a contravention of section 4(1)(a) and section 11 imposes penalty for a contravention of any of the other provisions of the Act. On behalf of the petitioners it has been pointed out	 and rightly in our opinion	 that cl. (a) of sub section (2) of section 4 of the Act imposes an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners. That clause in its first part lays down that the cattle (other than cows and calves) must be over 20 years of age and must also be unfit for work or breeding; and in the second part it says	 "or has become permanently incapacitated from work or breeding due to age	 injury	 deformity or an incurable disease. " It is a little difficult to understand why the two parts are juxtaposed in the section. In any view the restriction that the animal must be over 20 years of age and also unfit for work or breeding is an excessive or unreasonable restriction as we have 80 630 pointed out with regard to a similar provision in the Uttar Pradesh Act. The second part of the clause would not be open to any objection	 if it stood by itself. If	 however	 it has to be combined with the agelimit mentioned in the first part of the clause	 it will again be open to the same objection; if the animal is to be over 20 years of age and also permanently incapacitated from work or breeding etc. 	then the agelimit is really meaningless. Then	 the expression 'due to age ' in the second part of the clause also loses its meaning. It seems to us that cl. (a) of sub section (2) of section 4 of the Act as drafted is bad because it imposes a disproportionate restriction on the slaughter of bulls	 bullocks and buffaloes it is a restriction excessive in nature and not in the interests of the general public. The test laid down is not merely permanent incapacity or unfitness for work or breeding but the test is something more than that	 a combination of age and unfitness ' Learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed before us an observation contained in a reply made by the Deputy Minister in the course of the debate on the Bill in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly (see Madhya Pradesh Assembly Proceedings	 Vol. 5 Serial No. 34 dated April 14	 1959	 page 3201). He said that the age fixed was very much higher than the one to which any animal survived. This observation has been placed before us not with a view to an interpretation of the section	 but to show what opinion was held by the Deputy Minister as to the proper agelimit. On behalf of the respondent State our attention has been drawn to a book called The Miracle of Life (Home Library Club) in which there is a statement that oxen	 given good conditions	 live about 40 years. Our attention has also been drawn to certain extracts from a Hindi book called Godhan by Girish Chandra Chakravarti in which there are statements to the effect that cows and bullocks may live up to 20 or 25 years. This is an aspect of the case with which we have already dealt. The question before us is not the maximum age upto which bulls	 bullocks and buffaloes may live in rare cases. The question before us is what is their average longevity and at what age 631 they become useless. On this question we think that the opinion is almost unanimous	 and the opinion which the Deputy Minister expressed was not wrong. Section 5 in so far as it imposes a restriction as to the time for slaughter is again open to the same objection as has been discussed by us with regard to a similar provision in the Uttar Pradesh Act. A right of appeal is given to any person aggrieved by the order. In other words	 a member of the public	 if he feels aggrieved by the order granting a certificate for slaughter	 may prefer an appeal and hold up for a long time the slaughter of the animal. We have pointed out that for all practical purposes such a restriction will really put an end to the trade of the petitioners and we are unable to accept a restriction of this kind as a reasonable restriction within the meaning of cl. (6) of article 19 of the Constitution. Section 6 standing by itself	 we think	 is not open to any serious objection. It is ancillary in nature and tries to give effect to the provision of the Act prohibiting slaughter of cattle in contravention of the Act. Section 7 relates to the prohibition of sale	 purchase etc.	 of cows and calves and inasmuch as a total ban on the slaughter of cows and calves is valid	 no objection can be taken to section 7 of the Act. It merely seeks to effectuate the total ban on the slaughter of cows and calves (both of cows and she buffaloes). Section 8 is also ancillary in character and if the other provisions are valid no objection can be taken to the provisions of section 8. Sections 10 and 11 impose penalties and their validity cannot be seriously disputed. However	 we must say a few words about section 12 of the Act which has also been challenged before us. Section 12 is in these terms: "section 12. In any trial for an offence punishable under section 11 for contravention of the provision of sections 5	 6 or 7 of this Act the burden of proving that the slaughter	 transport or sale of agricultural cattle was not in contravention of the provisions of this Act shall be on the accused. " The argument is that section 12 infringes the fundamental 632 right of the petitioners inasmuch as it puts the burden of proof on an accused person not only for his own knowledge or intention but for the knowledge or intention of other persons. We do not think that this contention is correct. The accused person	 so far as sections 5 and 7 are concerned	 must be the person who has slaughtered the animal or who has purchased	 sold or otherwise disposed of the animal etc. Therefore	 the only question will be his knowledge and the legislature was competent to place the burden of proof on him. So far as section 6 is concerned	 it specifically refers to the knowledge of the person who has transported or offered for transport or caused to be transported any agricultural cattles from any place within the State to any place outside the State. Therefore	 when the section talks of knowledge	 it talks of the knowledge of that person who has transported or offered for transport etc. The knowledge of no other person comes into the purview of section 6. We are	 therefore	 ' of the view that section 12 is not invalid on the ground sug gested by the petitioners. Therefore	 the result of our examination of the various provisions of the Act is that the impugned provisions in cl. (a) of sub section (2) of section 4	 in sub section (3) of section 4 relating to the right of appeal by any person aggrieved by the order	 and in section 5 relating to the time of slaughter	 impose unreasonable and disproportionate restrictions which must be held to be unconstitutional. As to the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Rules	 r. 3 says "that an application for a certificate under section 4 shall be made to the competent authority	 and r. 4 says that on receipt of the application, the competent authority shall by an order direct the person keeping the animal to submit it for examination by the Veterinary Officer Rule 5 reproduces the provisions of cls. (a) and (b) of sub section (2) of section 4 and in so far as we have held that the provision in el. (a) of sub section (2) of section 4 is unconstitutional, the rule must also fall with it. There is one other aspect of these cases which has been emphasized before us, to which a reference must 633 now be made. It is open to the legislature to enact ancillary provisions to give effect to the main object of the Act, namely, the prevention of slaughter of animals like bulls, bullocks or buffaloes which are still useful for the purposes for which they are generally used. It is pointed out that acts innocent in themselves may be prohibited and the restrictions in that regard would be reasonable, if the same were necessary to secure efficient enforcement of valid provisions. For example, it is open to the legislature, if it feels it necessary, in order to reduce the possibilities of evasion to a minimum, to enact provisions which would give effect to the main object of the legislation. We have not ignored this aspect and have kept in mind the undisputed right of the legislature to decide what provisions are necessary to give effect to the main object of the legislation. In these cases the petitioners have complained that the main object of the impugned provisions is not the prohibition of slaughter of animals which are still useful; the impugned provisions as they are worded really put a total ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and buffaloes and for all practical purposes they put a stop to the profession and trade of the petitioners. We have held that this complaint is justified in respect of the main provisions in the three Acts. We, therefore, allow the three writ petitions and direct, as we directed in Md. Hanif Quareshi 's case (1) the respondent States not to enforce the Acts or the rules made thereunder in so far as they have been declared void by us. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs of the hearing in this Court. Petitions allowed. 
2540	minal Appeal No. 207 of 1967. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 17, 1967 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision Petition No. 735 of 1965. P. Ram Reddy and A. V.V. Nair, for the appellant. G.S. Rama Rao, for the respondents. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. K. Meerayya, K. Venkatanarayana respondents in this appeal and two others were charged before the Judicial Magistrate, IInd Class, Avanigadda, for offences under sections 323 and 324 I.P. Code for voluntarily causing injuries to Seetharamayya and Veeraraghavayya on June 22, 1964. The Trial Magistrate convicted Meerayya and Venkatanarayana the first under the offence under section 324 and the second for the offence under section 323 I.P. Code. In appeal to the Court of Session, 1006 Krishna Division, at Machilipatnam, the order was confirmed. The High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, set aside the order of conviction and sentence. The State of Andhra Pradesh has appealed to this Court, with special leave. The case raises a question of some importance in the administration of justice. The findings recorded by the Trial Magistrate and confirmed by the Sessions Judge were that the respondents had committed assault upon Seetharamayya and Veeraraghavayya and that they could in law be properly convicted. But it was urged that there was a bar against prosecution of the two accused Meerayya and Venkatanarayana because of the principle of issue estoppel". The plea is raised on the ground that the Station House Officer	 Kodur Police Station	 had instituted proceedings in the Court of the Sub Divisional Magistrate	 Bandar	 under section 107 ' Code of Criminal Procedure	 against 96 persons	 amongst whom were the two respondents	 and an order under section 112 Code of Criminal Procedure was made stating that the persons named therein were indulging in acts of violence involving breach of public peace and tranquillity in the village of Salempalam and were endangering peace in the village	 and that they had formed themselves into a party and were thereby disturbing the public peace and tranquillity by committing	 acts of violence	 and on that account they were required to show cause why each person named should not execute a bond for keeping the peace for a period of one year in the sum of Rs. 1	000 with two sureties in a like amount each. In the order requiring the parties to show cause	 four incidents were referred to the first of which is material. It was recited that on June 22	 1964	 11 persons including the two respondents had beaten Seetharamayya and Veeraraghavayya with crow bars and sticks	 and a case in Crime No. 20/64 under sections 148	 323 and 325 I.P. Code had been registered and was being investigated. The Sub Divisional Magistrate held an inquiry and was of the view that since the evidence led in support of the first incident was not supported by reliable evidence	 and there were inherent discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses and the recitals in the complaint	 the first incident was not proved against any of the eleven persons. It was urged that the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate holding that the respondents were not concerned in the incident had become final and it was not open to the Judicial Magistrate	 IInd Class	 Avanigadda	 to hold a trial against the respondents in respect of the same incident. The Trial Magistrate rejected the plea	 and the Sessions Judge agreed with him. But in the view of the High Court since in the proceeding under section 107 of the 	Code of Criminal Procedure the incident which was made the subject matter of the complaint against the respondents in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate was one of the incidents 1007 relied upon and was held not proved	 it was not open to the State to commence or continue a prosecution against the respondents in respect of the same incident. In so holding	 the High Court held that on the principle of "issue estoppel" approved by this Court in Manipur Administration vs Thokchom	 Bira Singh(1) so long as the finding	 that the respondents were not concerned in the incident	 was not set aside by appropriate proceeding	 no prosecution on any allegation legally inconsistent with that finding could be commenced against the respondents. Counsel for the State contended that the rule of issue estoppel is inconsistent with the statutory provisions contained in section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 and cannot be resorted to in criminal trials and that in any event the rule of issue estoppel had no application	 since there was no "previous trial" of the respondents for any offence alleged to arise out of the incident in respect of which they were tried. It was urged that it was not the law even recognised by the Australian Courts where the rule of issue estoppel had its origin that evidence on which a criminal proceeding was held cannot be utilised in any subsequent proceeding between the same parties. The first contention raised by counsel for the State cannot be entertained in view of a large body of authority in this Court. If the matter were res integra the argument that the Courts cannot travel outside the terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure : and extend the rule of autre fois acquit incorporated in section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may have required serious consideration. The following important rules emerge from the terms of section 403 of the Code	of Criminal Procedure: (1) An order of conviction or acquittal in respect of any offence constituted by any act against or in favour of a person does not prohibit a trial for any other offence constituted by the same act which he may have committed	 if the Court trying the first offence was incompetent to try that other offence. (2) If in the course of a transaction several offences are committed for which separate charges could have been made	 but if a person is tried in respect of some of those charges	 and not all	 and is acquitted or convicted	 he may be tried for any distinct offence for which at the former trial a separate charge may have been	 but was not	 made. (3) If a person is convicted of any offence constituted by any act	 and that act together with the consequences which re suited therefrom constitute a different offence	 he may again be tried for that different offence arising out of the consequences	 if (1) ; L 6 Sup C1169 13 1008 the consequences had not happened or were not known to the Court to have happened	 at me time when he was convicted. (4) A person who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and has been either convicted or acquitted shall not be tried for the same offence or for any other offence arising out of the same facts	 for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made or for which he might have been convicted under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts the rule of autre fois acquit and autre fois convict applicable to criminal trials. The rule is that so long as an order of acquittal or conviction at a trial held by a Court of competent jurisdiction of a person charged with committing an offence stands	 that person cannot again be tried on the same facts for the offence for which he was tried or for any other offence arising there/fore. But the rule of issue estoppel in criminal trials evolved by the High Court of Australia and approved by the Judicial Committee has been applied to criminal trials in India	 apart from the terms of section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Lord MacDermott in Sambasivam vs Public Prosecutor	 Federation of Malaya(1) observed at p. 479: "The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication. The maxim "Res judicata pro veritate accipitur" is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings. Here	 the appellant having been acquitted at the first trial on the charge of having ammunition in his possession	 the prosecution was bound to accept the correctness of that verdict and was precluded from taking any step to challenge it at the second trial. And the appellant was no less entitled to rely on his acquittal in so far as it might be relevant in his defence. That it was not conclusive of his innocence on the fire arm charge is plain	 but it undoubtedly reduced in some degree the weight of the case against him	 for at the first trial the facts proved in support of one charge were clearly relevant to the other having regard to the circumstances in which the ammunition and revolver were found and the fact that they fitted each other." 1009 In Sambasivam 's case(1) the appellant was tried for the offence of being in possession of ammunition in violation of Reg. 4(1)(b) of the Emergency (Criminal Trials) Regulations	 1948. He was acquitted of the charge. Later he was tried for the offence of carrying a fire arm contrary to Reg. 4(1)(a) of the Emergency Regulations and was convicted by the Supreme Court of the Federation of Malaya. An appeal was carried to the Judicial Committee and the legality of the conviction was challenged on the grounds	 inter alia	 that so long as the order of acquittal in respect of the carrying of ammunition stood	 the facts proved in support of that charge were in the circumstances of the case clearly relevant to the second charge	 and the appellant was entitled to rely upon the acquittal in so far as it was relevant to his defence. The plea so raised was accepted by the Judicial Committee. Pritam Singh vs The State of Punjab(a) this Court held that where a person has been tried under section 19(f) of the Arms Act and is acquitted because the prosecution has failed to establish the possession of a revolver by the accused as alleged	 in a subsequent trial of the offence of murder	 where the possession of the revolver was a fact in issue which had to be established	 the prosecution could not ignore the finding at the previous trial. In several later judgments of this Court the principle of issue estoppel has received approval: Manipur Administration vs Thokchom	 Bira Singh(a). Banwari Godara vs The State. of Rajasthan(4). Lalta & Ors. vs The State of U.P.(5) It was also accepted in The Assistant Collector of Customs and another vs L.R. Malwani and another(x). It is too late now to make a departure from the rule accepted by this Court. In the American Courts also the rule of issue estoppel has received approval: Sealfron vs United States(7). It is true that in Connelly vs Director of Public Prosecutions(8) decided by the House of Lords there was some difference of opinion amongst the Law Lords as to the applicability of the rule to criminal trials in the English Courts. Our Criminal jurisprudence is largely rounded upon the basic rules of English Law though the procedure is somewhat different. Trials by jury have been practically abolished and the cases are being tried by Judges. Several charges arising out of the same transaction can be tried under the Code of Criminal Procedure together at one trial	 and specific issues are always raised and determined (1) (2) L A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 415. (3) ; (4) Cr. A. No. 141 of 1960 decided on Feb. 7	 1961. (5) Cr. A. No. 185 of 1966 decided on Oct. 25	 1968. (6) Cr. 15 & 35 of 1967 decided on Oct. 16	 1968. (7) [1948] 332 U.S. Rep. 575. (8) L.R. 1010 by the Courts. Under the English system of administration criminal jaw	 trials for serious offences are held with the aid of the jury and it is frequently impossible to determine with certitude the specific issues on which the verdict of the jury is founded. In criminal trials under the Code of Criminal procedure	 there is no uncertainty in the determination of issues decided. Difficulties envisaged in Connelly 's case(1) in the application of the rule of issue estoppel do not therefore arise under our system. But it is necessary to notice the true basis of the rule. Dixon 1.	 in The King vs Wilkes(2) observed at pp. 518 519: " . it appears to me that there is nothing wrong in the view that there is an issue estoppel	 if it appears by record of itself or as explained by proper evidence.	 that the same point was determined in favour of a prisoner in a previous criminal trial which is brought issue on a second criminal trial of the same prisoner. There must be a prior proceeding determined against the Crown necessarily involving an issue which again arises in a subsequent proceeding by the Crown against the same prisoner. The allegation of the Crown in the subsequent proceeding must itself be inconsistent with the acquittal of the prisoner in the previous proceeding. But if such a condition affairs arises I see no reason why the ordinary rules of issue estoppel should not apply. Such rules are not to be confused with those of res judicata	 which in criminal proceedings are expressed in the pleas of autre fois acquit and autre fois convict. They are pleas which are concerned with the judicial determination of an alleged criminal liability and in the case of conviction with the substitution of a new liability. Issue estoppel is concerned with the judicial establishment of a proposition of law or fact between parties. It depends upon well known doctrines which control the relitigation of issues which are settled by prior litigation . " The rule	 does not predicate that evidence given at one trial against the accused cannot again be given in the trial of the accused for a distinct offence. As Lord Morris of Borty Y Gest observed in Connelly 's case(1) at p. 1325: " . there is no rule or principle to the effect that evidence which has first been used in support of a charge which is not proved may not be used to	 support a subsequent and different charge	 (1) (2) 77 C.L.R. 511. 1011 Can it be said in the present case that there has been a trial of the accused on an issue in a prior litigation	 and an attempt is made to relitigate the same? It may be recalled that the respondents were not tried at any criminal trial in the previous case. The earlier proceeding was for binding over the respondents and 94 others to keep the peace on the case that it was apprehended that they were likely to commit breach of peace or disturb public tranquillity. The primary issue which the Court was called upon to determine was whether there was any apprehension of the breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquillity which necessitated the passing of the order requiring the respondents and others to give security. It is true that in support of that order the Station House Officer in his report had relied upon four incidents	 one of which specifically set out the details which formed the subject matter of ' the trial from which the present appeal arises. But there was no trial of the respondents for an offence in the earlier proceeding and there was no order of conviction or acquittal. The rule of issue estoppel cannot	 in our judgment	 be extended so as to prevent evidence which was given in the previous proceeding and which was held not sufficient to sustain the other for being used in support of a charge of an offence which the State seeks to make out. The rule of issue estoppel prevents relitigation of the issue which has been determined in a criminal trial between the State and the accused. If in respect of an offence arising out of a transaction a trial has been taken place and the accused has been acquitted	 another trial in respect of the offence alleged to arise out of that transaction or of a related transaction which requires the Court to arrive at a conclusion inconsistent with the conclusion reached at the earlier trial is prohibited by the rule of issue estoppel. In the present case	 there was no trial and no acquittal. The rejection of evidence given in the earlier proceeding to sustain an order for binding over the respondents to keep the peace does not preclude the trial of the respondents in respect of the specific incident which together with the other incident was sought to be made the basis of the order of binding over the respondents. This Court in L.R. Malwani 's case(1) declined to apply the rule of issue estoppel to a case arising under the Sea Customs Act in which there was an inquiry held by the Collector of Customs and a criminal prosecution was then filed. In our judgment	 the High Court was in error in holding that the respondents could not be tried and convicted of offences under section 324 and 323 I.P. Code because in the earlier proceeding under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 evidence with regard to the incident out of which offences which are the subject matter of the present appeal was taken	 and was regarded as insufficient to sustain the order. (1) C:r	 As. 15 & 35 of 1967 decided on Oct. 16	 1968	 1012 The appeal is allowed	 and the order passed by the High Court is set aside. As	 however	 the sentences passed by the learned Trial Magistrate and confirmed by the Court of Session were of short duration and the respondents have been released on bail	 we do not think that they should be called upon to undergo the remaining sentences. We reduce the sentences of imprisonment to the period already undergone. The appeal is allowed and the order of the Session Court is restored	 subject to the modification in the sentence of imprisonment. R.K.P.S. Appeal allowed.

Summary:
In order to put the sugar industry on a stable footing	 for which it was necessary to develop the cane area	 the Ruler of the erstwhile Gwalior State by an order dated 27 7 1946 sanctioned the levy of cess of one anna per maund on all sugar cane purchased by the respondent company. When the Government of Madhya Bharat	 which was the successor state of the former Gwalior State	 made a demand for payment of the cess	 the respondent filed a petition before the High Court of Madhya 	Bharat challenging the legality of the levy on the grounds (1) that the order dated 27 7 1946 was only an executive order and not a law under article 265 of the Constitution of India and that	 therefore	 there was no authority for the imposition of the cess after January 26	 1950	 and (2) that the levy was discriminatory and violated article 14 inasmuch as while the respondent was made liable to pay the cess the other sugar factories in the State were exempt. It was found that at the time when cess was first levied there was no sugar factory in existence in the Gwalior State other than that of the respondent. Held	 that (i) the Ruler of an Indian State was an absolute monarch in which there was no constitutional limitation to act in any manner he liked	 he being the supreme legislature	 the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive. I Consequently	 the order dated 27 7 1946 issued by the Ruler of Gwalior State amounted to a law enacted by him and became an existing law under article 372 of the Constitution of India. The levy of cess was therefore by authority of law within the meaning of article 265; Madhaorao Phalke vs The State of Madhya Bharat	 ; 	 followed. (2) the levy of cess did not contravene article 14 because (a) the object was cane development in the particular area and a geographical classification based upon historical factors was a permissible mode of classification	 and (b) a tax could not be struck down as discriminatory unless it was found that it was imposed with a deliberate intention of differentiating between 620 (ii) where the order is passed by the Sub divisional Animal Husbandry Officer	 under sub rule (5)	 to the District Animal Husbandry Officer and (iii) where the order is passed by the authority prescribed under sub rule (1) to the Sub divisional Animal Husbandry Officer	 if there is one; if not	 to the District Animal Husbandry Officer; (b) The appeal shall not be decided against the appellant unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. " The argument on behalf of the petitioners is that they are "Kassais" by profession and they earn their living by slaughtering cattle only (not goats or sheep which are slaughtered by "Chiks"); that they have the fundamental right to carry on their profession and trade; and that section 3 of the Act read with r. 3 imposes unreasonable restrictions restrictions not in the interests of the general public on their fundamental right and therefore they are not saved by cl. (6) of article 19 of the Constitution. Some of these arguments were considered by this Court in Md. Hanif Quareshi vs The State of Bihar (1) and it was pointed out that the test of reasonableness should be applied to each individual statute impugned and no abstract standard	 or general pattern	 of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. It referred to the decision in State of Madras vs V. G. Row (2) and repeated what was said therein that "the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed	 the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed	 the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby	 the disproportion of the imposition	 the prevailing conditions at the time	 should all enter into the judicial verdict." 'Another consideration which has to be kept in mind is that "the legislature is the best judge of what is good for the community	. by whose suffrage it comes into existence. . . . (See The State of Bihar vs Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga (3)). But the ultimate responsibility for determining the validity of the law must rest with the (1) (2) ; (3) 621 Court and the Court must not shirk that solemn duty cast on it by the Constitution. We must	 therefore	 approach the problem before us in the light of the principles laid down by this Court. The most pertinent question is having regard to all the relevant circumstances	 is the age of 25 years laid down in section 3 a reasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners in the interests of the general public ? We are unable to say that it is. Apart from the affidavits made on behalf of the petitioners and the respondent State	 a large volume of authoritative and expert opinion has been placed before us which shows beyond any doubt that a bull	 bullock or she buffalo does not remain useful after 14 or 15 years and only a few of them live up to the age of 25. In the Report of the Cattle Preservation and Development Committee	 published by the Ministry of Agriculture	 it is recommended by the Committee that the slaughter of animals over 14 years of age and unfit for work as also animals of any age permanently unable to work owing to injury or deformity	 should be allowed. In the Report on the Marketing of Meat in India (published by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture) there is a reference to a draft Bill circulated by the Ministry of Agriculture (page 112 of the Report) which contains a clause that animals over 14 years of age and unfit for work may be slaughtered on a certificate from a Veterinary Officer. In the Report on the Marketing of Cattle in India	 again published by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture	 occurs the following passage as to the price of animals with reference to their age: "Young draught animals up to the age of 4 years being raw and untrained fetch comparatively low prices. Between 4 and 8 years of age	 the animals are in the prime of their youth and tender best service	 and fetch maximum prices. From the 8th year onwards old age sets in	 and a graded decline is observed in their capacity to work and consequently prices depreciate considerably." . In a Food and Agricultural Organisation study of cattle in India and Pakistan (Zebu Cattle of India and 79 622 Pakistan	 page 94) it is stated that the active breeding life of a bull is estimated to be about 10 years. In Black 's Veterinary Dictionary (edited by W. C. Miller and G. P. West	 fifth edition) it is stated that pedigree 	bulls may reach 12 or 14 years of age before being discarded; and cattle seldom live longer than 15 or 16 years	 and when they do	 their age is usually of no immediate importance. In another publication of the Ministry of Agriculture called 'Problems of Cattle Insurance ' under Indian conditions	 it is stated that the life of cattle is comparatively much shorter	 the maximum age being only about 15 years. There is an interesting chart relating to the determination of age in cattle in a publication called 'Cattle Development in Uttar Pradesh ' by R. L. Kaura	 Director of Animal Husbandry; that chart shows that at II years incisors appear smaller due to wearing out; at 12 years space appears between the teeth	 and after 12 teeth wear out constantly and roots remain far apart from one another. As against all this expert opinion the respondent State has relied on the chart embodying some useful data about domestic animals	 prepared by Major A. C. Aggarwala	 Director of Veterinary Services	 Punjab	 and R. R. Gulati	 Superintendent	 Veterinary Department	 Jullandur	 which shows the sterility age of a buffalo at 15 and average age at 25	 and of a cow sterility at 15 and 16 years and average life 22 years.