Judgment Case ID: 1079

Judgment:
minal Appeal No. 119 of 1958. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 29	 1957	 of the Rajasthan High Court	 Jodhpur	 in Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 1954. 16 122 B. L. Kohli and C. L. Sareen	 for the appellants. section K. Kapur and D. Gupta	 for the respondent. December 9. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO	 J. This is an appeal by special leave against the conviction and sentence by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur of the 9 appellants under section 304	 read with section 149	 and section 148 of the Indian Penal Code. The 9 appellants	 along with 34 other persons	 were accused before the Sessions Judge	 Merta. Briefly stated the case of the prosecution was as follows: There were two factions in village Harnawa one consisting of Rajputs and other of the cultivators of the village. Admittedly there were disputes between these two factions in respect of certain fields. At about 3 30 p.m. on October 31	 1951	 the day after Diwali	 popularly known as Ram Ram day	 both the groups went to a temple called Baiji kathan. The cultivators went first to the temple and sat in the place which was usually occupied by the Rajputs. Subsequently when the Rajputs went there	 they found their usual sitting place occupied by the cultivators and took that as an insult to them. Though they were invited by the pujari to sit in some other place	 they refused to do so and went to a banyan tree which was at a short distance from the temple. There they held a brief conference and then returned to the temple armed with guns	 swords and lathies. The Rajputs fired a few shots at the cultivators and also beat them with swords and lathies. As a result	 16 of the cultivators received injuries and of these 6 received gun shot injuries	 of which two persons	 namely	 Deena and Deva	 succumbed to the injuries. Out of the remaining 14 injured persons	 3 received grievous injuries and the rest simple ones. Forty three persons	 alleged to have taken part in the rioting	 were put up for trial before the Sessions Judge		 Merta	 for having committed offences under section 302	 read with section 149	 and section 148 of the Indian Penal Code. Five of the accused admitted their presence at the scene of 123 occurrence but pleaded that after they had made their customary offerings at the temple and when they were returning they were attacked by the cultivators. Others pleaded alibi. The learned Sessions Judge held that it had not been established that the accused had a common object to kill the cultivators and that it had also not been proved beyond any reasonable doubt that any of the accused was guilty of a particular offence. On these findings	 he acquitted all the accused. On appeal the learned Judges of the High Court found that the accused were members of an unlawful assembly	 that they were animated by a common object of beating the cultivators and that further out of the 43 accused it had been clearly established that the appellants	 who are 9 in number	 took part in the activities of the unlawful assembly. On that finding they held that the accused were guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304	 read with section 149	 Indian Penal Code; they also held that appellants 1	 2	 3 and 4 were also guilty under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code	 as they were armed with deadly weapons	 and the rest under section 147	 Indian Penal Code. For the offence under section 304	 read with section 149	 the appellants were sentenced to ten years ' rigorous imprisonment	 and for the offence under section 148	 appellants 1 to 4 were further sentenced to one year 's rigorous imprisonment and the rest under section 147	 to six months ' rigorous imprisonment. Having examined the entire evidence	 they agreed with the learned Sessions Judge that no case had been made out against the other accused beyond any reasonable doubt. The appeal was	 therefore	 allowed in respect of the nine appellants and dismissed in respect of the others Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the Sessions Judge came to a reasonable conclusion on the evidence and that the. High Court had no substantial and compelling reasons to take a different view. In recent years the words "compelling reasons" have become words of magic incantation in every 124 appeal against acquittal. The words are so elastic that they are not capable of easy definition; with the result	 their interpretation varied between two extreme views one holding that if a trial court acquitted an accused	 an appellate court shall not take a different view unless the finding is such that no reasonable person will come to that conclusion	 and the other accepting only the conscience of the appellate court as the yardstick to ascertain whether there are reasons to compel its interference. In the circumstances we think it necessary to clarify the point. The scope of the powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal has been elucidated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup vs King Emperor There Lord Russell observed at p. 404 thus: ". . the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses	 (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused	 a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquit ted at his trial	 (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt	 and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses Adverting to the facts of the case	 the Privy Council proceeded to state	 ". . They have no reason to think that the High Court failed to take all proper matters into consideration in arriving at their conclusions of fact. " These two passages indicate the principles to be followed by an appellate court in disposing of an appeal against acquittal and also the proper care it should take in re evaluating the evidence. The Privy Council explained its earlier observations in Nur Mohammad vs Emperor (2) thus at p. 152: "Their Lordships do not think it necessary to read it all again	 but would like to observe that there really is only one principle	 in the strict use of the word	 laid down there; that is that the High (1) (1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 398. (2) A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 151. 125 Court has full power to review at large all the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded	 and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. " These two decisions establish that the power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal is not different from that it has in an appeal against conviction; the difference lies more in the manner of approach and perspective rather than in the content of the power. These decisions defining the scope of the power of an appellate court had been followed by all the courts in India till the year 1951 when	 it is said	 this Court in Surajpal Singh vs The State (1) laid down a different principle. But a perusal of that judgment does not bear out the construction which is very often placed thereon. The passage relied upon is found at p. 201 and it reads thus: "It is well established that in an appeal under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code	 the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded	 but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court	 and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons. " On the facts of that case this Court held	 "we are inclined to hold that the Sessions Judge had taken a reasonable view of the facts of the case	 and in our opinion there were no good reasons for reversing that view". We think that these observations are nothing more than a restatement of the law laid down by the Privy Council and the application of the same to the facts of the case before the Court. Though in one paragraph the learned Judges used the words "substantial and compelling reasons" and in the next paragraph the words "good reasons"	 these observations were not intended to record any disagreement (1)[1952] S.C.R. 193. 126 with the observations of Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup 's case (1) as to matters a High Court would keep in view when exercising its power under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. If it had been so intended	 this Court would have at least referred to Sheo Swarup 's case (1)	 which it did not. The same words were again repeated by this Court in Ajmer Singh vs The State of Punjab (2). In that case the appellate court set aside an order of acquittal on the ground that the accused had failed to explain the circumstances appearing against him. This court held that as the presumption of innocence of an accused is reinforced by the order of acquittal	 the appellate court could have interfered only for substantial and compelling reasons. The observations made in respect of the earlier decisions applied to this case also. Mahajan	 J.	 as he then was	 delivering the judgment of the court in Puran vs State of Punjab (3) again used the words "very substantial and compelling reasons"	 but immediately thereafter the learned Judge referred to the decision of Sheo Swarup 's case(1) and narrated the circumstances which an appellate court should bear in mind in interfering with an order of acquittal. This juxtaposition of the so called formula and the circumstances narrated in Sheo Swarup 's case (1) indicate that the learned Judge used those words only to comprehend the statement of law made by the Privy Council. Mukherjea	 J.	 as he then was	 in C. M. Narayan vs State of Travancore Cochin (4) again referred to thePrivy Council decision and affirmed the wide powerof an appellate court and also the proper approach in an appeal against acquittal. The learned Judge did not introduce any further limitation on the power of the appellate court. But it was observed that the High Court had not clearly kept before it the well settled principles and reversed the decision of the trial court 'without noticing or giving due weight and consideration to important matters relied upon by that court '. In Tulsiram Kanu vs The State (5) this (1) (1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 398. (2) ; (3) A I.R. (4) (5) A.I.R. 1954 8.C. I. 127 Court used a different phraseology to describe the approach of an appellate court against an order of acquittal. There the Sessions Court expressed that there was clearly reasonable doubt in respect of the guilt of the accused on the evidence put before it. Kania	 C. J.	 observed that it required good and sufficiently cogent reasons to overcome such reasonable doubt before the appellate court came to a different conclusion. This observation was made in connection with a High Court 's judgment which had not taken into consideration the different detailed reasons given by the Sessions Judge. In Madan Mohan Singh 's case (1)	 on appeal by special leave	 this Court said that the High Court 'had not kept the rules and principles of administration of criminal justice clearly before it and that therefore the judgment was vitiated by non advertence to and misapprehension of various material facts transpiring in evidence and the consequent failure to give true weight and consideration to the findings upon which the trial court based its decision '. In Zwinglee Ariel vs State of M. P. (2) this Court again cited the passage from the decision of the Privy Council extracted above and applied it to the facts of that case. In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs State of Vindhya Pradesh(1)	 Bhagwati	 J.	 speaking for the Court	 after referring to an earlier decision of this Court	 accepted the principle laid down by the Privy Council and	 indeed	 restated the observations of the Privy Council in four propositions. It may be noticed that the learned Judge did not use the words cc substantial and compelling reasons". In section A. A. Biyabani vs The State of Madras (4)	 Jagannadhadas	 J.	 after referring to the earlier decisions	 observed at p. 647 thus: "While no doubt on such an appeal the High Court was entitled to go into the facts and arrive at its own estimate of the evidence	 it is also settled law that	 where the case turns on oral evidence of witnesses	 the estimate of such evidence by the trial court is not to be lightly set aside. " (1) A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 637. (2) A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 15. (3) A I.R. (4) A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 645. 128 The learned Judge did not repeat the so called formula but in effect accepted the approach of the Privy Council. The question was again raised prominently in the Supreme Court in Aher Raja Khima 	v. The State of Saurashtra(1). Bose, J., expressing the majority view, stated at p. 1287 thus: It is	 in our opinion	 well settled that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong: Ajmer Singh vs State of Punjab (2); and if the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case	 interference under section 417 is not justifiable unless there are really strong reasons for reversing that view. " It may be noticed that the learned Judge equated "substantial and compelling reasons" with "strong reasons". Kapur	 J.	 in bhagwan Das V. State of Rajasthan(1) referred to the earlier decisions and observed that the High Court should not set aside an acquittal unless there are " substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. In Balbir Singh vs State of Punjab (4)	 this Court observed much to the same effect thus at p. 222: "It is now well settled that though the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded	 it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused person is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial Court and the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses must be given proper weight and consideration; and the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses must also be kept in mind and there must be substantial and compelling reasons for the appellate Court to come to a conclusion different from that of the trial Judge. " These observations only restate the principles laid down by this Court in earlier decisions. There are (1) ; (2) [1953] S.C.P. 418	 423. (3) A.I. R. (4) A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 216. 129 other decisions of this Court where	 without discussion	 this Court affirmed the judgments of the High Courts where they interfered with an order of acquittal without violating the principles laid down by the Privy Council. There is no difficulty in applying the principles laid down by the Privy Council	 and accepted by this Court	 to the facts of each case. But appellate courts are finding considerable difficulty in understanding the scope of the words "substantial and compelling reasons" used by this Court in the decisions cited above. This Court obviously did not and could not add a condition to section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The words were intended to convey the idea that an appellate court not only shall bear in mind the principles laid down by the Privy Council but also must give its clear reasons for coming to the conclusion that the order of acquittal was wrong. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup 's case(1) afford a correct guide for the appellate court 's approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court	 such as	 (i) "substantial and compelling reasons"	 (ii) "good and sufficiently cogent reasons"	 and (iii) "strong reasons" are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts	 but should also express those reasons in its judgment	 which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified. With this background we shall now look at the judgment of the Sessions Judge and that of the High (1) (1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 398. 17 130 Court to ascertain whether the High Court anywhere departed from the principles laid down by the Privy Council. The framework of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge may be shortly stated thus: The first question was whether the case of the prosecution that the Rajputs met. under a banyan tree	 conspired to beat the Jats and came back to the temple armed with weapons was true. This fact was spoken to by several eve witnesses	 including Goga (P.W. 1)	 Chandra (P.W. 2) and Doongar Singh (P.W. 21). This fact was also mentioned in the First Information Report lodged by Doongar Singh (P.W. 21). There were 20 eyewitnesses who spoke about the conspiracy; and	 out of them	 P.Ws. 5	 8	 9	 11	 12	 15	 16	 17	 18. 24 and 25 received injuries during the riot. The learned Sessions Judge considered the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and rejected it on unsubstantial grounds and on the basis of insignificant discrepancies. Therefter	 he noticed that all the other eye witnesses	 with slight and inconsequential variations	 spoke to the fact of their returning from the banyan tree with lathies	 swords and guns ' but he did not give a definite finding whether he accepted that evidence or not	 though at the fag end of the judgment he found that he could not hold that the assembly of Rajputs had any common object of killing anybody. Then the learned Sessions Judge proceeded to consider whether any of the Rajputs were recognized by any of the witnesses. He divided the accused into three groups	 namely	 (i) those accused who were amongst the Rajputs when they had come for darshan of Baiji	 (ii) those accused who were amongst the Rajputs when they returned from the banyan tree but for whom the evidence of taking part in the actual rioting is divided	 and (iii) those accused for whom most of the eye witnesses have stated that they had committed rioting and inflicted injuries on the assembly of cultivators. Taking the first group	 the learned Sessions Judge	 for the reasons given by him earlier	 rejected the evidence of Goga and Chandra	 pointed out that 28 accused had not been named unanimously by all the eye witnesses	 131 noticed that there was long standing enmity between the Rajputs and the cultivators	 and laid down a criterion that	 for determining the presence of any particular accused	 there should be an allegation against him about doing any overt act in the unlawful	 assembly. By applying the said yardstick he held that none of the accused falling in the first group	 which included appellants 7	 8 and 9	 was guilty of the offences with which they were charged. Coming to the second category	 with which we are not concerned in this appeal	 the learned Sessions Judge again applied the test that an overt act should be proved against each of the accused and held that no case had been made out against them. Adverting to the third group	 after noticing that 12 of the eye witnesses were those who received injuries	 the learned Sessions Judge applied another test for accepting their evidence. In effect and substance the test adopted by him was that an accused identified only by one witness and not proved to have done any overt act should be acquitted by giving him the benefit of doubt. Applying this test to the said witnesses he held that the said accused were not guilty. After considering the evidence in the aforesaid manner	 he came to the following final conclusion: "I cannot hold that the assembly of Rajputs had any common object of killing anybody. All happened at the spur of the moment. Those Rajputs who took part in the rioting have not been truthfully named. Innocent persons have been implicated and the cases of those persons who are alleged to have committed any overt acts are also full of doubts. " On appeal the learned Judges of the High Court	 as already stated	 allowed the appeal in respect of the 9 appellants and dismissed it in regard to the others. The learned Judges of the High Court observed that it had not the slightest hesitation in holding that the case put forward by the prosecution	 by and large	 represented the substantial truth and that the incidents at the banyan tree were true. They pointed out that the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for not believing the evidence of the main witnesses	 Goga 132 and Chandra	 who spoke as to what happened at the banyan tree	 could not be sustained and that the alleged discrepancies and contradictions in their evidence were not such as to detract from truthfulness. We have also gone through the evidence of Goga and Chandra and we entirely agree with the observations of the learned Judges of the High Court that their evidence was natural and consistent and that the alleged discrepancies pointed out by the Ses sions Judge were not either contradictions at all or	 even if they were so	 they were so trivial as to affect in any way their veracity. The learned Judges further pointed out that the evidence of Goga and Chandra was supported by the evidence of Doongar Singh (P. W. 21)	 a police constable	 who gave the First Information Report at the earliest point of time. The recitals in the First Information Report corroborate his evidence. The learned Judges then indicated that this version was practically supported by other eve witnesses and that they did not see any reason why it should have been invented	 if it was not true. Having regard to the said evidence	 they found themselves entirely unable to accept the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that this was a case where a stray beating was given by some individuals on the side of the Rajputs to some individuals on the Bide of the Jats. They found that the Rajputs were members of an unlawful assembly and that they were all animated by a common object of beating the cultivators. Having held that the learned Sessions Judge was clearly wrong on the question of unlawful assembly	 the learned Judges proceeded to consider the case of each accused. They adopted the following principle	 based upon the decision of this Court in Abdul Gani vs State of M. P. (1): "We quite recognise that in a case of rioting where two inimical factions are involved	 exaggerations are bound to be made	 and some innocent persons are likely to be falsely implicated; but all the same	 it is the duty of the courts not to throw out the whole case by following the easy method of (1) A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 31. 133 relying on discrepancies	 and	 where the case for the prosecution is substantially true	 to find out if any of the accused participated	 in the offence	 and if their presence is established beyond all reasonable doubt	 punish them for the offences committed by them. " They found	 on the evidence	 that appellant 1	 Sanwat Singh	 who was present on the spot was a member of the unlawful assembly and had actually struck Sheonath with his sword as a result of which his three fingers were cut; that appellant 2	 Dhan Singh	 was one of the persons who took a leading part in the beating; that appellant 3	 Mangej Singh	 was undoubtedly one of the participants in the unlawful assembly; that appellant 4	 Kalu Singh	 was armed with a sword and attacked the Jats and that his version that he had been first attacked by the Jats was not true; that appellant 5	 Narain Singh	 was one of the members of the unlawful assembly and that he had given beatings to P.W. 25; that appellant 6	 Gulab Singh	 struck Sheokaran Jat with lathies; and that appellant 7	 Sabal Singh	 appellant 8	 Baney Singh	 and appellant 9	 Inder Singh	 who admitted their presence at the spot but stated that they were attacked by the Jats	 were clearly participators in the beating. As regards the other accused	 the learned Judges	 having examined the entire evidence	 agreed with the Sessions Judge in holding that no case had been made out against those accused beyond all reasonable doubt. So far as these accused are concerned there is no evidence to show that any of them had a weapon or that they had taken any active part in assaulting one or other of the Jats. In the result	 the learned Judges of the High Court found that the appellants formed an unlawful assembly to beat the Jats and that they must have known that murders were likely to be committed in prosecution of that common object. On that finding	 they convicted and senten ced the appellants as stated earlier in the judgment. Now	 can it be said that	 as learned counsel for the appellants argues	 the Judges of the High Court had ignored any of the principles laid down by the Privy 134 Council and subsequently accepted by this Court? We think not. The foregoing analysis of the findings of the two courts discloses the following facts: The Sessions judge	 on the general case of the prosecution that the Rajputs	 chagrined by the attitude of the Jats in occupying their usual place in the temple	 went to the banyan tree	 conferred for a short time and came back to the temple to attack the Jats	 rejected the evidence of the main witnesses for the prosecution	 namely	 Goga	 Chandra and Doongar Singh	 on grounds which do not stand a moment 's scrutiny and ignored the voluminous evidence	 which corroborated the evidence of the said three witnesses	 without giving valid or acceptable reasons for the same. The learned Sessions Judge did not even give a definite finding on this version of the prosecution case	 though impliedly he must be deemed to have rejected it. In regard to the individual cases he divided the witnesses into three categories	 and	 applying mechanical tests	 refused to act upon their evidence. The High Court rightly pointed out that there was no reason why the voluminous evidence in support of the general case and why the evidence of the three witnesses	 Goga	 Chandra and Doongar Singh	 should be rejected. The learned Judges of the High Court accepted their evidence	 which conclusively established that the general case was true and that the appellants actually took active part in attacking the Jats with swords and lathies. In doing so	 the learned Judges did not depart from any of the principles laid down by the Privy Council. Indeed	 they interfered with the judgment of the Sessions Judge	 as they came to the conclusion that	 the said judgment	 in so far as the appellants were concerned	 was clearly wrong and contrary to the overwhelming and reliable evidence adduced in the case. The learned Judges of the High Court	 in our opinion	 approached the case from a correct perspective and gave definite findings on a consideration of the entire evidence. The question now is	 whether the appellants have made out any case for interference with the judgment of the High Court under article 136 of the Constitution. 135 Article 136 of the Constitution confers a wide discretionary power on this Court to entertain appeals in suitable cases not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. It is implicit in the reserve power that it cannot be exhaustively defined	 but decided cases 	 do not permit interference unless "by disregard to the forms of legal process or some violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise	 substantial and grave injustice has been done". Though article 136 is couched in widest terms	 the practice of this Court is not to interfere on questions of fact except in excep tional cases when the finding is such that it shocks the conscience of the court. In the present case	 the High Court has not contravened any of the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup 's case (1) and has also given reasons which led it to hold that the acquittal was not justified. In the circumstances	 no case has been made out for our not accepting the said findings. In the result	 the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

Summary:
There were two rival factions in a certain village one con sisting of Rajputs and the other of cultivators. On a particular festival day both the groups went to a temple for worship and cultivators who reached the temple first occupied a place therein which was usually occupied by Rajputs. Subsequently Rajputs arrived and resented the occupation of the sitting place by the cultivators. They shifted to a short distance and after holding a brief conference came back to the temple and attacked the cultivators with guns	 swords and lathis as a result of which several persons were injured and two were killed. 43 persons alleged to have taken part in the rioting were put up for trial before the Sessions judge for having committed offences under section 302 read with section 149 and section 148 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions judge held that a common object on the part of the accused to kill the cultivators had not been established and that it had also not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused were guilty of a particular offence. On these findings the Sessions judge acquitted all the accused. On appeal the High Court after examining the entire evidence found some of the accused guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304 read with section 149 and section 148 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. The appeal in respect of some other accused was dismissed as no case had been made out against them beyond any reasonable doubt On appeal by special leave against the conviction and sentence by the High Court	 Held	 that the words "substantial and compelling reasons" for setting aside an order of acquittal used by this Court in its decisions were intended to convey the idea that an appellate court shall not only bear in mind the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup 's case but must also give its clear reasons for coming to the conclusion that the order of acquittal was wrong. The following results emanate from a discussion of the case law on appeals against acquittal: (1)an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles 121 laid down in Sheo Swarup 's case afford a correct guide for the appellate court 's approach to a case disposing of such an appeal; (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court	 such as (1) "substantial and compelling reasons"	 (II) "good and sufficiently cogent reasons"	 and (III) "strong reasons"	 are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion	 but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the Court below in support of its order of acquittal in arriving at a conclusion on those facts	 but should express the reasons in its judgment	 which led it to hold that the acquittal was not justified. Sheo Swarup vs King Emperor	 (1934) L. R. 61 I. A. 398	 con sidered and followed. Nur Mohammad vs Emperoy	 A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 151	 Surajpal Singh vs The State	 ; 	 Ajmer Singh vs The State of Punjab	 ; 	 Puran vs State of Punjab	 A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 459	 C. M. narayan vs State of Travancore Cochin	 	 Tulsiram Kanu vs The State	 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 1	 Madan Mohan Singh 's case	 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 637	 Zwinglee Ariel vs State of U. P.	 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 15	 Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs State of Vixdhya Pradesh	 ; 	 section A. A. Biyabani vs The State of Madras	 A.I. R. 	 Aher Raja Khima vs The State of Saurashtra	 ; 	 Bhagwan Das vs The State of Rajasthan	 ; and Balbir Singh vs State of Punjab	 A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 216	 discussed. The High Court approached the instant case from a correct perspective and gave definite findings on a consideration of the entire evidence	 and in so doing it did not depart from any of the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup 's case and also gave reasons for holding that the acquittal was not justified. Abdul Gani vs State of M. P.	 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 31	 referred to. Although the powers of this Court under article 136 of the Constitution are very wide	 interference is not permitted unless "by disregard to the forms of legal process or some violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise	 substantial and grave injustice has been done	 on questions of fact the practice of this Court is not to interfere except in exceptional cases when the finding is such that it shocks the conscience of this Court, 
6716	The respondent field a suit against the appellant for recovery of possession of a building on the ground of wilful deflault in payment of rent which was Rs. 900 per ;month. The appellant denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, claiming himself as one of the associates" or "co sharers" or "co owners" of the building. The Munsif decreed the suit; and the decree was affirmed in appeal by the first appellate court as also by the High Court. Hence the present appeal. During the pendency of the present appeal	 cl. (ii) of section 30 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act	 1960	 which exempted from application of the Act premises the monthly rent in respect of which exceeded Rs. 400	 and on the basis of which the suit giving rise to the present appeal emanated	 was struck down in a judgment by this Court. ** The appellant contended that as a result of the declaration by this Court of the constitutional invalidity of clause (ii) of section 30	 of the Act	 311 which excluded from the purview of the Act any building or part thereof let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 400	 the decree of the civil court became null and void and of no effect. On behalf of the respondent it was submitted that the decree passed by the civil court was not a nullity for the Act did ;not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court but only prohibited execution of a decree of eviction otherwise than in accordance with the relevant statutory provision; and that such a decree was not void	 but was merely under an eclipse	 and would become executable as and when the bar is removed. Allowing the appeal	 this Court	 HELD; 1.1 Section 10 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act	 1960 prohibits jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of eviction of a tenant whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of that section and sections 14 to 16. The sole circumstance and the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by a civil court as stated in second proviso to section 10(1) is that the tenant should have denied the title of the landlord or claimed right of permanent tenancy and the Controller	 on such denial or claim by the tenant	 reaches a decision and duly records a finding that such denial or claim was bona fide and only when these conditions are satisfied jurisdiction of the civil court can be invoked to pass a decree for eviciton on any of the grounds mentioned in section 10 or sections 14 to 16. Except to this limited extend the jurisdiction of the civil court is completely barred and the same is vested in the tribunals set up under the Act. Any suit instituted by a landlord for eviction of a tenant from a building falling within the ambit of the Act	otherwise than as stipulated by the section is	 therefor	 incompetent for lack of jurisdiction of the court and any decree of the court in such a suit is null and void and of no effect. [317D E	 G H; 318 D	G H] Sushil Kumar Mehta vs Gobind Ram Bohra	 [1990] 1 SCC page 193	 referred to. 1.2 The decision of the Controller is concerned solely with the bona fides	 and not the correctness or validity	 of the denial or claim	 for these difficult questions of title are by the statute reserved for decision by the appropriate civil court which is the more competent forum in such matters. [318D E] Magiti Sasamal vs Pandab Bissoi	[1962] 3 SCR 673	 referred to. 1.3 If the decision of the Controller is that tenant 's denial or 312 claim is not bona fide	 the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be invoked by the landlord and the Controller will then be the competent authority to order eviction	 after affording the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard	 on any one of the grounds specified under the statute	 including the ground that the tenant has	 without bona fide denied landlord 's title or claimed right of permanent tenancy.[318E F] 1.4 Although the Act contains no express bar of jurisdiction of the civil court	 its provisions explicitly show that	 subject to the extraordinary powers of the High Court	 and this Court	 such jurisdiction is statute for eviction of tenants "in execution or otherwise". The provision of the Act are clear and complete in regard to the finality of the orders passed by the special tribunals set up under it	 and their competence to administer the same remedy as the civil courts render in civil suits. Such tribunals having been so constituted as to act in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure	 the clear and explicit intendment of the legislature is that all questions relating to the special rights and liabilities created by the statute should be decided by the tribunals constituted under it. [317A C] Dhulabhai &Ors. vs The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. 	 ; ; Secretary of State vs Mask & Co.	 [1939 40] IA 222 (PC	 Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. vs Governor General in Council	 [1946] 47 IA 50 (PC and Barraclough vs Brown & Ors.	 	 referred to. In the instant case	 the procedure stipulated in the second proviso to section 10 had not been complied with. At the time of institution of the suite	 the building in question did not come within the ambit of the Act	 owing to the exclusionary provision contained in cl. (ii) of section 30	 but after leave to appeal was granted	 the applicability of the Act was extended to the building by reason of the decision of this Court	 declaring the invalidity of cl. (ii) of section 30 on account of its inconsistency with Article 14 of the Constitution. Whatever be the consequences of that declaration whether it has rendered the statutory provision null and void and of no effect	 or	 merely inoperative	 unenforceable and dormant to be revitalised on subsequent removal of the constitutional ban in either event	 the civil court acting without the aid of the exclusionary provision in cl. (ii) of section 30	 during the period of invalidity	had become coram non judice and its proceedings resulting in the decree a nullity. [319A D] 313 Ratan Arya & Ors. vs State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. 	 ; 	 referred to. Kiran Singh & Ors. vs Chaman Paswan & Ors.	 ; relied on. V.B. Patankar & Ors.v. C.G. Sastry	 ; 	 held inapplicable. Behram Khurshed Pesikaka vs State of Bombay	 ; Saghir Ahmad vs State of U.P. and Ors. ; ; Bhikaji Narain Dhakras & Ors. vs The State of M.P. The State of A.P. & Anr.	 ; 	 referred to.