Judgment Case ID: 454

Judgment:
riminal Appeals Nos. 20 to 23 of 1955. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 7	 1954	 of the Madras High Court in Criminal Revision Cases Nos. 57 to 60 of 1954 and Case Referred Nos. 2 to 5 of 1954. N. C. Chatterji	 section Venkatakrishnan and section Subramanian	 for the appellants. V. K. T. Chari	 Advocate General	 Madras	 Ganapathy Iyer and T. M. Sen	 for the respondent. November 28. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. The point for decision in these appeals is whether sections 4(2)	 28	 29	 30	 31 and 32 of the Madras Prohibition Act No. X of 1937	 hereinafter referred to as the Act	 are unconstitutional and void. It will be convenient first to set out the impugned statutory provisions. Section 4	 omitting what is not material runs as follows; 401 4(1) " Whoever (a) imports	 exports	 transports or possesses liquor or any intoxicating drug; or (g) uses	 keeps or has in his possession any materials	 still	 utensil	 implement or apparatus whatsoever for the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor or any intoxicating drug; or (j) consumes or buys liquor or any intoxicating drug ; or (k) allows any of the acts aforesaid upon premises in his immediate possession	 shall be punished Provided that nothing contained in this sub section shall apply to any act done under	 and in accordance with	 the provisions of this Act or the terms of any rule	 notification	 order	 licence or permit issued thereunder. (2) It shall be presumed until the contrary is shown (a) that a person accused of any offence under clauses (a) to (j) of sub section (1) has committed such offence in respect of any liquor or intoxicating drug or any still	 utensil	 implement or apparatus whatsoever for the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor or any intoxicating drug	 or any such materials as are ordinarily used in the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor or any intoxicating drug	 for the possession of which he is unable to account satisfactorily ; and (b) that a person accused of any offence under clause (k) of sub section (1) has committed such offence if an offence is proved to have been committed in premises in his immediate possession in respect of any liquor or intoxicating drug or any still	 utensil	 implement or apparatus whatsoever for the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor or any intoxicating drug	 or any such materials as are ordinarily used in the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor or any intoxicating drug. 402 Section 28 provides that if any Collector	 Prohibition Officer or Magistrate has reason to believe that an offence under section 4(1) has been committed	 he may issue a warrant for search. Section 29 confers on certain officers power to search and seize articles even without a warrant	 under certain circumstances. Section 30 provides for certain classes of officers entering any place by day or night for inspection of stills	 implements	 liquor and the like. Section 31 authorises the officers empowered to make entry under sections 28	 29 or 30	 to break open any door or window and remove obstacles	 if otherwise they could not make entry. Section 32 confers authority on a Prohibition Officer or any officer of the Police or Land Revenue Departments to arrest without warrant any person found committing any offence under section 4(1). Now	 the facts are that on November 18	 1953	 the Prohibition Officer	 Madras City	 and the Deputy Commissioner of Police made a search of premises No. 28	 Thanikachala Chetty Street	 Thyagarayanagar	 Madras	 and seized several bottles of foreign liquor and glasses containing whisky and soda. The appellant	 Lakshmanan Chettiar	 was residing at the premises	 and the other three appellants	 A. section Krishna	 R. Venkataraman and V. section Krishnaswamy	 were found drinking from the glass tumblers. All the four were immediately put under arrest and in due course charge sheets were laid against them for offences under the Act. The three appellants other than Lakshmanan Chettiar were charged under sections 4 (1) (a) and 4 (1) (j) for possession and consumption of liquor	 and Lakshmanan Chettiar was charged under section 4 (1) (k) for allowing the above acts in premises in his immediate possession	 a under section 12 for abetment of the offences. He was also charged under section 4 (1) (a) on the allegation that though he was a permit holder	 he was in possession of more units than were allowed under the permit	 and that by reason of the proviso to that section	 he had committed an offence under section 4 (1) (a). Immediately after service of summons	 the appellants filed an application unders. 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code	 wherein they contended that sections 4(2) and 28 to 32 of the Act were 403 repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution	 and were therefore void	 and prayed that the above question might be referred for the decision of the High Court. The Third Presidency Magistrate	 before whom the proceedings were pending	 allowed the application	 and referred to the High Court as many as seven questions on the constitutionality of various sections of the Act. This reference was heard by Rajamannar	 C.J.	 and Umamaheswaram	 J.	 who held	 disagreeing with the appellants	 that sections 4(2) and 28 to 32 were valid		 and answered the reference against them. Against this judgment	 the appellants have preferred the present appeals under article 136 of the Constitution. Two contentions have been urged in support of the appeals: (1) Section 4(2) and sa. 28 to 32 of the Act are void under section 107 of the Government of India Act	 1935	 which was the Constitution Act in force when the Act in question was passed	 because they are repugnant to the provisions of existing Indian laws with respect to the same matter	 to wit	 I of 1872 and Criminal Procedure Code Act No. V of 1898	 and (2) the impugned sections are repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution	 and have therefore become void under article 13(1). (1) Taking the first contention	 the point for ' decision is whether the impugned provisions are hit by section 107 of the Government of India Act	 1935. Subsection (1) of section 107	 which is the relevant provision	 runs as follows: "If any provision of a Provincial law is repugnant to any provision of a Federal law which the Federal legislature is competent to enact or to any provision of an existing Indian law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List	 then	 subject to the provisions of this section	 the Federal law	 whether passed before or after the Provincial law	 or	 as the case may be	 the existing Indian law	 shall prevail and the Provincial law shall	 to the extent of the repugnancy	 be void. " For this section to apply	 two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) The provisions of the Provincial law and those of the Central legislation must both be in respect 404 of a matter which is enumerated ' in the Concurrent List	 and (2) they must be repugnant to each other. It is only when both these requirements are satisfied that the provincial law will	 to the extent of the repugnancy	 become void. The first question	 therefore	 that has to be decided is	 is the subject matter of the impugned legislation one that falls	 within the Provincial List	 in which case section 107 would be inapplicable	 or is it one which falls within the Concurrent List	 in which case the further question	 whether it is repugnant to the Central legislation will have to be decided ? The Entries in the Lists which are material for the present discussion are the following: List II Provincial Legislative List. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Federal Court	 with respect to any of the matters in this list; procedure in Rent and Revenue Courts. Intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs	 that is to say	 the production	 manufacture	 possession	 transport	 purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors	 opium and other narcotic drugs	 but subject	 as respects opium	 to the provisions of List I and	 as respects poisons and dangerous drugs	 to the provisions of List 111. Offences against laws with respect of any of the matters in this list. List III Concurrent Legislative List. Criminal Procedure	 including all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure at the date of the passing of this Act. Evidence and oaths; recognition of laws	 public acts and records and judicial proceedings. Now	 it is not contested that the Madras Prohibition Act	 as a whole	 is a law in respect of intoxicating liquors	 falling within Entry 31 of the Provincial list. The declared object of the enactment as stated in the preamble to it is "to bring about the prohibition. of the production	 manufacture	 possession	 export	 import	 transport	 purchase	 sale and assumption of 405 intoxicating liquors. . And this is carried out in section 4(1)	 which enacts prohibition in respect of the above matters	 and imposes penalties for breach of the same. The other provisions of the Act may broadly be divided into those which are intended to effectuate section 4(1) and those which regulate the grant of licences and permits. The legislation is thus on a topic which is reserved to the Provinces and would therefore fall outside a. 107(1) of the Constitution Act. The argument of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee for the appellant is that though the Act is within the competence of the Provincial Legislature in so far as it prohibits possession	 sale	 consumption	 etc.	 of liquor under 3. 4(1)	 the matters dealt with under section 4(2) and sections 28 to 32 fall not within Entry 31 of List II but within Entries 5 and 2 respectively of List III	 and to that extent	 the legislation is on matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. He contends that a. 4(2) enacting as it does a presumption to be drawn by the court on certain facts being established	 deals with what is purely a matter of evidence	 and it is therefore not a law on intoxicating liquors but evidence. Likewise	 he argues	 the provisions in sections 28 to 32 deal with matters pertaining to Criminal Procedure	 such as warrants	 seizure and arrest	 and have no connection with intoxicating liquors. It is accordingly contended that sections 4(2) and 28 to 32 are legislation under Entries 5 and 2 of List III	 and that their validity must be tested under section 107(1). The appellants are right in their contention that section 4(2) of the Act enacts a rule of evidence but does it follow from this that it is a law on evidence	 such as is contemplated by Entry 5 in the Concurrent List ? so also sections 28 to 32 undoubtedly deal with matters of Procedure in relation to crimes	 but are they for that reason to be regarded as legislation on Criminal Procedure Code within Entry 2 of List III ? The basic assumption on which the argument of the appellants rests is that the heads of legislation set out in the several Lists are so precisely drawn as to be mutually exclusive. But then	 it must be remembered that we are construing a federal Constitution	 It is of the 406 essence of such a Constitution that there should be a distribution of the legislative powers of the Federation between the Centre and the Provinces. The scheme Of distribution has varied with different Constitutions	 but even when the Constitution enumerates elaborately the topics on which the Centre and the States could legislate	 some overlapping of	 the fields of legislation is inevitable. The British North America Act	 1867	 which established a federal Constitution for Canada	 enumerated in sections 91 and 92 the topic	 		 on which the Dominion and the Provinces could respectively legislate. Notwithstanding that the lists were framed so as to be fairly full and comprehensive	 it was not long before it was found that the topics enumerated in the two sections overlapped	 and the Privy Council had time and again to pass on the constitutionality of laws made by the Dominion and Provincial legislatures. It was in this situation that the Privy Council evolved the doctrine	 that for deciding whether an impugned legislation was intra vires	 regard must be had to its pith and substance. That is to say	 if a statute is found in substance to relate to a topic with. in the competence of the legislature	 it should be held to be intra vires	 even though it might incidentally trench on topics not within its legislative competence The extent of the encroachment on matters beyond its competence may be an element in determining whether the legislation is colourable	 that is	 whether in the guise of making a law on a matter within it competence	 the legislature is	 in truth	 making a law on a subject beyond its competence. But where that is not the position	 then the fact of encroachmen does not affect the vires of the law even as regards the area of encroachment. Vide Citizens Insurance Company of Canada vs William Parson8(1)	 The Attorney General of Ontario vs The Attorney General for the Dominion of Canada(1)	 The Attorney General of Ontari	 vs The Attorney General for the Dominion(3 )	 Union Colliery Company of British Columbia vs Bryden(4) Attorney General for ' Canada vs Attorney General for (1) [1881] 7 A. C. 96. (3) (2) (4) 407 Ontario(	)	 Attorney General for Alberta vs AttorneyGeneral for Canada(2 )	 and Board of Trustees of Letherbridge Northern Irrigation District vs Independent Order of Foresters(1). The principles laid down in the above decisions have been applied in deciding questions as to the vires of statutes passed by the Indian legislatures under the Government of India Act	 1935. In Subrahmanyan Chettiar vs Muttuswami Goundan(4)	 the question was as to whether the Madras Agriculturalist ' Relief Act IV of 1938	 which was within the exclusive competence of the Provincial Legislature under Entries 20 and 21 in List 11 was ultra vires	 in so far as it related to promissory notes executed by agriculturists by reason of the fact that under Entry 28	 List I	 "cheques	 bills of exchange	 promissory notes and other like instruments " were matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre. In holding that the legislation was intra vires	 Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. stated the reason in these terms: " It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation	 though purporting to deal with a subject in one list	 touches also on a subject in another list	 and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely intertwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its ' pith and substance ' or its 'true nature and character '	 for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation in respect of matters in this list or in that. . " This point arose directly for decision before the Privy Council in Prafulla 'Kumar Mukherjee vs The Bank of Commerce	 Ltd. (5). There	 the question was whether the Bengal Money Lenders Act	 1940	 which (1) (4) (2) (5) [1946 47] 74 I.A. 23. (3) 53 408 limited the amount recoverable by a money lender for principal and interest on his loans	 was valid in so far as it related to promissory notes. Money lending is within the exclusive competence of the Provincial Legislature under Item 27 of List II	 but promissory note is a topic reserved for the Centre	 vide List 1	 Item 28. It was held by the Privy Council that the pith and substance of the impugned legislation being money lending	 it was valid notwithstanding that it incidentally encroached on a field of legislation reserved for the Centre under Entry 28. After quoting with approval the observations of Sir Maurice Gwyer C.J. in Subrahmanyan Chettiar vs Muttuswami Goundan	 (supra) above quoted	 Lord Porter observed: "Their Lordships agree that this passage correctly describes the grounds on which the rule is founded	 and that it applies to Indian as well as to Dominion legislation. "No doubt experience of past difficulties has made the provisions of the Indian Act more exact in some particulars	 and the existence of the Concurrent List has made it easier to distinguish between those matters which are essential in determining to which list particular provision should be attributed and those which are merely incidental. But the overlapping of subjectmatter is not avoided by substituting three lists for two	 or even by arranging for a hierarchy of jurisdictions. Subjects must still overlap	 and where they do	 the question must be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made	 and in what list is its true nature and character to be found. If these questions could not be asked	 much beneficent legislation would be stifled at birth	 and many of the subjects entrusted to Provincial legislation could never effectively be dealt with. " Then	 dealing with the question of the extent of the invasion by the Provincial legislation into the Federal fields	 Lord Porter observed: "No doubt it is an important matter	 not	 as their Lordships think	 because the validity of an Act can be determined by discriminating between degrees of invasion	 but for the purpose of determining what is the 409 pith and substance of the impugned Act. Its provisions may advance so far into Federal territory as to show that its true nature is not concerned with ProVincial matters	 but the question is not	 has it trespassed more or less	 but is the trespass	 whatever it be	 such as to show that the pith and substance of the impugned Act is not money lending but promissory notes or banking? Once that question is determined the Act falls on one or the other side of the line and can be seen as valid or invalid according to its true content. " Then	 there is the decision of the Federal Court in Lakhi Narayan Das vs The Province of Bihar (1). There	 the question related to the validity of Ordinance No. IV of 1949 promulgated by the Governor of Bihar. It was attacked on the ground that as a legislation in terms of the Ordinance would have been void	 under section 107(1) of the Government of India Act	 the Ordinance itself was void. The object of the Ordinance was the maintenance of public order	 and under Entry I of List II	 that is a topic within the exclusive competence of the Province. Then the Ordinance provided for preventive detention	 imposition of collective fines	 control of processions and public meetings	 and there were special provisions for arrest and trial for offences under the Act. The contention was that though the sections of the Ordinance relating to maintenance of public order might be covered by Entry I in List II	 the sections constituting the offences and providing for search and trial fell within Items I and 2 of the Concurrent List	 and they were void as being repugnant to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. In rejecting this contention	 Mukherjea J. observed: " Thus all the provisions of the Ordinance relate to or are concerned primarily with the maintenance of public order in the Province of Bihar and provide for preventive detention and similar other measures in connection with the same. It is true that violation of the provisions of the Ordinance or of orders passed under it have been made criminal offences but offences against laws with respect to matters specified in List 11 (1) 410 would come within Item 37 of List II itself	 and have been expressly excluded from Item I of the Concurrent List. The ancillary matters laying down the procedure for trial of such offences and the conferring of jurisdiction on certain courts for that purpose would be covered completely by Item 2 of List II and it is not necessary for the Provincial Legislature to invoke the powers under Item 2 of the Concurrent List." He accordingly held that the entire legislation fell within Entries I and 2 of List II	 and that no question of repugnancy under section 107(1) arose. This reasoning furnishes a complete answer to the contention of the appellants. The position	 then	 might thus be summed up When a law is impugned on the ground. that it is ultra vires the powers of the legislature which enacted it	 what has to be ascertained is the true character of the legislation. To do that	 one must have regard to the enactment as a whole	 to its objects and to the scope and effect of its provisions. If on such examination it is found that the legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature	 then it must be held to be valid in its entirety	 even though it might inci dentally trench on matters which are beyond its competence. It would be quite an erroneous approach to the question to view such a statute not as an organic whole	 but as a mere collection of sections	 then disintegrate it into parts	 examine under what heads of legislation those parts would severally fall	 and by that process determine what portions thereof are intra vires	 and what are not. Now	 the Madras Prohibition Act is	 as already stated	 both in form and in substance	 a law relating to intoxicating liquors. The presumptions in section 4(2) are not presumptions which are to be raised in the trial of all criminal cases	 as are those enacted in the Evidence Act. They are to be raised only in the trial of offences under section 4(1) of the Act. They are therefore purely ancillary to the exercise of the legis lative power in respect of Entry 31 in List 11. So also	 the provisions relating to search	 seizure and arrest in sections 28 to 32 are only with reference to offences 411 committed or suspected to have been committed under the Act. They have no Operation generally or to offences which fall outside the Act. Neither the presumptions in section 4(2) nor the provisions contained in sections 28 to 32 have any operation apart from offences created by the Act	 and must	 in our opinion	 be held to be wholly ancillary to the legislation under Entry 31 in List II. The Madras Prohibition Act is thus in its entirety a law within the exclusive competence of the Provincial Legislature	 and the question of repugnancy under section 107(1) does not arise. (2) It is next contended that the presumptions raised in section 4(2) of the Act	 are repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution	 and that the section must accordingly be declared to have become void under article 13(1). We are unable to see how section 4(2) offends the requirement as to equality before law or the equal protection of laws. The presumptions enacted therein have to be raised against all persons against whom the facts mentioned therein are established. The argument of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee is that the facts set out in section 4(2) on which the presumption of guilt is raised have no reasonable relation to the offences themselves	 that for example	 possession of liquor can be no evidence of possession of materials or apparatus for manufacture of liquor under section 4(1)(g)	 nor possession of materials	 apparatus for manufacture of liquor	 evidence of possession or consumption of liquor under section 4(1) (a) and (j)	 and that therefore the impugned provision must be struck down as denying equal protection. He relied in support of this contention on the following observations of Holmes J. in William N. McFarland vs American Sugar Refining Company (1): " As to the presumptions	 of course the legislatures may go a good way in raising one or in changing the burden of proof	 but there are limits. It is essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed	 and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. Mobile J. & K.C.R. Co. vs Turnipseed(2)." (1) ; at 86 87 ; ; 	 904. (2) ; 	 43; ; 	 80. 412 The law on this subject is thus stated by Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law	 1939 Edition	 at page 835: " The power of a legislature to prescribe rules of evidence is universally recognised	 but it is equally well established that due process limits it in this matter. It may establish rebuttable presumptions only if there is a rational connection between what is proved and what is permitted to be inferred therefrom. " The law would thus appear to be based on the due 	process clause	 and it is extremely doubtful whether it can have application under our Constitution. But a reference to American authorities clearly shows that the presumptions of the kind enacted in section 4 (2) have been upheld as reasonable and not hit by the due process or equal protection clause. In Albert J. Adams vs People of the State of New York (1)	 a law of New York had made it an (offence to be knowingly in possession of gambling instruments	 and enacted further that possession of such instruments was presumptive evidence of knowledge. It is thus in terms similar to section 4(1)(a) of the Act	 which makes it an offence to be in possession of liquor	 and to section 4(2) which raises a rebuttable presumption of guilt under section 4(1)(a). In rejecting the contention that the presumption was a violation of the due process clause	 the Court observed: " We fail to perceive any force in this argument. The policy slips are property of an unusual character	 and not likely	 particularly in large quantities	 to be found in the possession of innocent parties. Like other gambling paraphernalia	 their possession indicates their use or intended use	 and may well raise some inference against their possessor in the absence of explanation. Such is the effect of this statute. Innocent persons would have no trouble in explaining the possession of these tickets	 and in any event the possession is only prima facie evidence	 and the party is permitted to produce such testimony as will show the truth concerning the possession of the slips. Furthermore	 it is within the established power of the state to prescribe the evidence which is to be received in the courts of its own government." (1) ; ; 413 In Robert Hawes vs State of Georgia (1)	 the question arose with reference to a statute of the State of Georgia	 which had made it an offence to knowingly permit persons to locate in premises apparatus for distilling and manufacturing prohibited liquors. It also enacted a presumption that when such apparatus was found in a place	 the person in occupation thereof shall be presumed to have knowingly permitted the location of the apparatus. The question was whether this presumption was repugnant to the due process clause. In holding that it was not	 the Court observed: " Distilling spirits is not an ordinary incident of a farm	 and	 in a prohibition state	 has illicit character and purpose	 and certainly is not so silent and obscure in use that one who rented a farm upon which it was or had been conducted would probably be ignorant of it. On the contrary	 it may be presumed that one on such a farm	 or one who occupies it	 will know what there is upon it. It is not 'arbitrary for the state to act upon the presumption and erect it into evidence of knowledge;. not peremptory	 of course	 but subject to explanation	 and affording the means of explanation. " It is therefore clear that even on the application of the due process clause	 the presumptions laid down in section 4(2) cannot be struck down as unconstitutional. We should add that the construction which the appellants seek to put on section 4 (2) that a person in possession of liquor could	 under that section	 be presumed to have committed an offence under section 4(1) (g) or that a person who is in possession of materials	 implement or apparatus could be presumed to have committed offences under section 4 (1) (a) and (j) is not correct. In our opinion	 the matters mentioned in section 4 (2) should be read distributively in relation to the offences mentioned in section 4(1). Possession of liquor	 for example	 is an offence under section 4(1) (a). The presumption in section 4(2) is that if it is found in the possession of a person	 he should be presumed to have committed the offence under section 4(1)(a)	 unless he could give satisfactory explanation therefor	 as for example	 that it must have been foisted in the place without his knowledge. Likewise	 it would be an (1) ; ; 414 offence under section 4(1)(g) to be in possession of materials	 still	 implement or apparatus whatsoever for the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor. Under section 4(2)(a)	 if a person is found to be in possession of materials or other things mentioned in the sub section	 there is a presumption that he has committed an offence under section 4(1)(g)	 but it is open to him to account satisfactorily therefor. The contention	 therefore	 that there is no reasonable relation between the presumption and the offence is	 in our opinion	 based on a misreading of the section. Both the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants having failed	 these appeals are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.

Summary:
The appellants were charged before the Presidency Magistrate for offences under the Madras Prohibition Act	 1937 and when the cases were taken up for trial they raised the contentions that SS. 4(2) and 28 to 32 of the Act are void under section 107(I) of the Government of India Act	 1935	 because they are repugnant to the provisions of the 	 and the Code of Criminal Procedure	 1898	 and also because they are repugnant to article 14 Of the Constitution of India. On their application	 the Magistrate referred the questions for the opinion of the High Court under section 432 ' of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court having answered the questions against the appellants they preferred the present appeal under article 136. Held	 that the Madras Prohibition Act	 1937	 is both in form and in substance a law relating to intoxicating liquors and that the presumptions in section 4(2) and the provisions relating to search	 seizure and arrest in SS. 28 to 32 of the Act have no operation apart from offences created by the Act and are wholly ancillary to the exercise of the legislative power under Entry 31 in List II	 Sch. 7 of the Government of India Act	 1935. Accordingly the Act is in its entirety a law within the exclusive competence of the Provincial Legislature and the question of repugnancy under section 107(1) of the Government of India Act	 1935	 does not arise. When a law is impugned on the ground that it is ultra vires the powers of the legislature which enacted it	 what has to be ascertained is the true character of the legislation. To do that	 one must have regard to the enactment as a whole	 to its objects and to the scope and effect of its provisions. If on such examination it is found that the legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature	 then it must be held to be valid in its entirety	 even though it might incidentally trench on matters which are beyond its competence. It would be quite an erroneous approach to the question to view such a statute not as an organic whole	 but as a mere collection of sections	 then disintegrate it into parts	 examine under what heads of legislation those parts 52 400 would severally fall	 and by that process determine what portions thereof are intra vires	 and what are not. Subrahmanyan Chettiar vs Muthuswami Goundain	 (1940) F.C.R. 188	 Pyafulla Kumar Mukherjee vs The Bank of Commerce Ltd. (1940) L.R. 74 I.A. 23 and Lakhi Narayan Das vs The Province of Bihar 	 relied on. Held further	 that the presumptions in section 4(2) Of the Act do not off end the requirements as to equality before law or the equal protection of laws under article 14	 as they have to be raised against all persons against whom the facts mentioned therein are established. Even assuming that the law in America that a presumption of guilt would offend the requirement of the equal protection of laws unless there is a rational connection between the act proved and the ultimate fact presumed	 could have application to the Indian Constitution	 on a proper reading of the sections there is a reasonable relation between the presumption raised in section 4(2) and the offences under section 4(1). William N. McFarland vs American Sugar Refining Company	 ; 24I U.S. 79; 	 Albert 1. Adams vs People of the State of New York	 ; and Robert Hawes vs State of Georiya	 258 U.S. I ; 	 referred to.