Judgment Case ID: 4020

Judgment:
ivil Appeal Nos. 2542 to 2544 of 1972. Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 11 12 1970 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 1824 and 1825/65. V. P. Raman	 Adv. and A. V. Rangam for the Appellant. 1123 A. T. M. Sampath for Respondent in C.A. 2542/72. K. section Ramamurthi	 Mrs. Saroja Gopalkrishnan for Respondent in C.A. 2542/72. K. Jayaram and K. Ram Kumar for R. 1 in CA 2544/72. K. Rajendra Choudhry for R. 2 in C.A. 2544/72. The Judgment of. the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER J. The short point of law decided in the long judgment under appeal may justly be given short shrift. But the batch of Civil Revision Petitions allowed by the High Court involves a legal issue of deep import from the angle of agrarian reform and surplus land available for distribution under its scheme that we deem it proper to discuss the core question at some length. If the statutory construction which found favour with the High Court be correct the risk of reform legislation being condemned to functional futility is great	 and so the State has come up in appeal by Special Leave challenging the High Court 's interpretation of section 22 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on land) Act	 1961 (for short	 the Ceiling Act). Presently	 we will set out the skeletal facts relating to the civil appeals and the scheme of the Act designed for distributive justice in the field of agricultural land ownership	 sufficient to disclose the purpose of the legislation	 the mischief it intends to suppress	 the reverse effect of the construction put on the key section (section 22) in the judgment under appeal and the consequent stultification of the objective of the Ceiling Act. While dealing with welfare legislation of so fundamental a character as agrarian reform	 the court must constantly remember that the statutory pilgrimage to 'destination social justice ' should be helped	 and not hampered	 by judicial interpretation. For	 the story of agrarian re distribution in Tamil Nadu	 as elsewhere	 has been tardy and zigzag	 what with legislative delays	 judicial stays and invalidations	 followed by fresh constitutional amendments and new constitutional challenges and statutory constructions	 holding up	 for decades	 urgent measures of rural economic justice which was part of the pledges of the Freedom struggle. It is true that judges are constitutional invigilators and statutory interpreters; but they are also responsive and responsible to Part IV of the Constitution being one of the trinity of the nation 's appointed instrumentalities in the transformation of the socio economic order. The judiciary in its sphere	 shares the revolutionary purpose of the Constitutional order	 and when called upon to decode social legislation must be animated by a goal oriented approach. This is part of the dynamic of statutory intretation in the developing countries so that courts are not converted into rescue shelters for those who seek to defeat agrarian justice by cute transac 1124 tions of many manifestations now so similar in the country and illustrated by the several cases under appeal. This caveat has become necessary because the judiciary is not a mere umpire	 as some assume	 but an activist catalyst in the constitutional scheme. The Ceiling Act	 in its structure and process	 follows the common pattern. The object is equitable distribution of land to the landless by relieving those who hold more than the optimum extent fixed by the law. The success of the scheme depends on maximisation of surplus land to be taken over by the State from large landholders. The strategy of fixing a severe ceiling on land holdings was expected to be paralysed by anticipatory strategems by landholders and so the legislature sought to outwit them and clamped down pre emptive restrictions on transfer whereby the surplus takeover would be sabotaged	 Chapter II prescribes the ceiling on land holdings and Chapter III proscribes certain types of deleterious transfers and future acquisitions. One such provision is section 22 which falls for immediate dissection. The machinery for working out the scheme includes 'authorised officers ' defined in section 3(5) of the Ceiling Act. The rest of the infrastructure for implementation of the statutory scheme is not material for our case nor the other chapters relating to compensation	 exemptions and the like Chapter XI provides for appeals and revisions and the High Court	 by virtue of section 83 read with section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure	 has jurisdiction to entertain revisions against orders of Land Tribunals which enjoy appellate powers over orders of authorised officers in the manner provided. The present appeals are against a common order of the High Court allowing several revision petitions under section 115 C.P.C. Now	 the respondents before us in the several appeals are persons whose transfers have been held void by the authorised officer and the land Tribunal but upheld by the High Court on a narrow construction of section 22 of the Ceiling Act. The alienations took many forms ranging from stridhana to bona fide sale but shared one common attribute that they were executed during the suspect spell	 if one may say so	 between the date of commencement of the Act and the notified date. The legislature	 in its realistic anxiety and pragmatic wisdom	 demarcated a lethal zone viz.	 the period between the two dates stated above when all landholders with lands in excess of the ceiling would desperately salvage their surplus by resort to devices	 some bona fide	 some not	 but all having the effect of frustrating the legislative objective of freezing holdings as on the date of commencement of the Act and seizing the surplus in terms cf the Act for eventual equitable distribution	 after payment of statutory compensation. 1125 Before embarking on any further discussion of the project of interdicting transfers	 as spelt out in section 22	 we may read the provision: "Where on or after tho date of commencement of this Act	 but before the notified date	 any person has transferred any land held by him by sale	 gift (other than gift made in contemplation of death)	 exchange	 surrender	 settlement or in any other manner except by request or	 has effected a partition of his holding or part thereof	 the Authorised officer within whose jurisdiction such land	 holding of the major part thereof is situated may	 after notice to such person and other persons affected by such transfer on partition and after such enquiry as he thinks fit to make declare the transfer or partition to be void if he finds that the transfer or the partition as the case may be	 defeats any of the provisions of this Act. " Three semantic alternatives compete for judicial acceptance. The first	 which appealed to the Land Tribunal is that all alienations during the dubious period specificated in section 22	 if executed by a holder who	 but for such shedding operation or alienation	 would have had lands in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the Act	 are void because they are sure to defeat the 'surplus ' provisions of the Act. The second alternative	 which swings to the other extreme but has met with the High Court 's approval	 virtually salvages all such transfers save sham and mala fide ones	 for only if they are obnoxious in that sense can they be caught in the coils of section 22. The third possible construction	 which is in between the two extremes and has been forcefully pressed before us by Shri K. section Ramamurthy	 validates bona fide transfers even during the offending period	 the reason being that regardless of their impact on the scheme of the Act or its provisions	 the primary object is bona fide fulfilment of the alienor 's purposes such as discharge of pressing debts or borrowing to perform necessitous obligations and not to defeat or thwart the purposes or provisions of the Act. The judicial choice from among these triple possibles depends on the rules of statutory interpretation. In the present case the basic facts are beyond dispute. The legislature had a defined plan of providing for a ceiling on land holding	 taking over the balance and distributing it among the landless according to priorities. In this perspective it defined the "date of the commencement of this Act in section 3(11) as meaning the 15th day of February	 1970. It also defined in section 3(31) the notified date. As stated earlier	 the Ceiling Act had 1126 a chequered career in court and	 indeed	 at one stage the whole Act was struck down as unconstitutional. However	 now it is immune to attack having been included in the Ninth Schedule and there is no challenge to its vires before	 us. On account of extensive mischief done by alienations on a considerable scale calculated to undo the public policy behind agrarian reform the legislature felt the necessity to provide in section 22 that transfers made between 6 4 1960 and 2 10 1962 would be void if they defeated the provisions of the Act. In all the cases before us the transfers which have been ignored by the Authorised officer fall within this interregnum. That being admitted	 the only question is whether the lethal effect of section 22 operates only in the case of transfers which are sham and specifically intended to defeat the Act or does not affect transfers which are otherwise bona fide or is so pervasive that if the effect of the transfer is to defeat the provisions of the Act	 whatever the intent of the parties	 the transfer is void and can be ignored vis a vis the Ceiling Act and the Authorised officer may legitimately proceed to compute the surplus area on this basis. The learned judge adverted to an argument that the Act being a confiscatory one	 the public authority "invested with the power to enquire into and to invalidate a transfer should act reasonably	 and that such a power should be construed beneficently in favour of the subject who is affected by the statue (emphasis added). This approach	 sanctified by tradition and vintage jurisprudence	 is inept and inapplicable when we consider agrarian reform legislation whose avowed purpose is to take away as much extent of land as policy dictates so that distribution thereof among the landless may be achieved. When a whole legislation is geared to deprivation of property	 subject to payment of compensation	 rules which have frowned upon confiscatory legislation cannot apply at all. We are concerned with a Re public created by the people of India	 with a social transformation where the State is hot antagonistic to the citizen but harmonises individual interest with community good. The jurisprudential principles in such a situation cannot be the same as have been inherited from a culture which postulates the State versus the subject. We do not explore the aspect of the law further as we are satisfied that the answer to the specific question raised before us flows directly from a reading of the Section in the light of well established rules of interpretation. Section 7 is a key provision and runs as follows: "on and from the date of commencement of this Act	 no person shall	 except as otherwise provided in this Act but 1127 subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area; Provided that in calculating the total of land held by any person	 any extent in excess of the ceiling area and not exceeding half an acre in the case of wet land and one acre in the case of dry land shall	 irrespective of the assessment of such land	 be excluded. " Section 8 directs every person who holds land in excess of 30 standard acres to submit a return with specified particulars. Section 18 is the culmination and provides for the publication of a notification to the effect. that the surplus land with each landholder is required for a public purpose. Thereupon such land shall be deemed to have been acquired for a public purpose and shall vest in the Government. Chapter III is a protective armour created by the statute with prohibitions and proscriptions. In particular	 section 22	 which we have quoted earlier	 contains an interdict. If any transfer	 contrary to its tenor	 is created it can be voided by the Authorised officer. The whole purpose is to make available land with Government for its equitable dispensation according to the statutory plan. Section 94 is relevant in this context. 6 4 1960 is the date of commencement of the Act. 2 10 62 is the notified date. Transfers in between these two dates have been executed by the respondents in the various appeals before us. The concrete question is wether section 22 has the effect of rendering such transfers invalid ipso facto or whether there is need for further proof that such transfers are "sham	 nominal and bogus". The view taken by the High Court is that: " . Section 22 seems to cover only those sham	 nominal and bogus transfers which are only intended to defeat the provisions of the Act. If the Legislative intention is also to invalidate all bona fide transactions during the relevant period	 it would have made certain consequential provisions as to what are the rights of the transferor and the transferee in relation to the property conveyed	 and how the resultant equities between the transferee and the transferor have to be worked out. This view that section 22 will cover only transactions of sham	 nominal and bogus character which are intended only to defeat the provisions of the Act will not be inconsistent with the object provided in section 7." 1128 The learned judge seems to take a liberal view that transactions entered into in anticipation of the Ceiling Act will not be hit by the provisions preventing such transfers except where they are mala fide or oolourable. The reason partly turns on semantics and the court argue with logical support: "The word "defeat" normally means overcome	 thwart	 evade	 frustrate	 circumvent	 bypass	 disappoint	 prevent	 the accomplishment of the word "defeat" in Section 22 is one to be taken as having been used to import sinister	 motive. I Maxwell on the interpretation of statutes	 twelfth edition	 after stating that the Courts will not be astute to narrow the language of a statute so as to allow persons within its purview to escape its net	 that the statute has to be applied to the substance rather than the mere from of transactions thus _ defeating any shifts and contrivances which parties may have devised in the hope of falling outside the Act. " The conclusion categorically reached by the High Court virtually emasculates section 22 as we understand its object and import. The learned judge winds up with these words: "on a due consideration of the matter	 I hold that under section 22 of the Act the authorised officer is entitled to declare as void only those transfers which are sham and nominal entered into with the avowed object of defeating the provisions of the Act	 without any bona fide intention to transfer title. So in the light of the view expressed above the facts of each case have to be considered. " Section 22	 literally read leads only to one conclusion	 that any transfer	 bona fide executed or not	 is liable to be declared void by the Authorised Officer "if he finds that the transfer defeats any of the provisions of this Act. " There is not the slightest doubt that severally and cumulatively the provisions of the Act seek to make available the maximum extent of land	 in excess of the ceiling	 to be vested in Government for fulfilment of its purposes. Chapter II contains a fasciculus of provisions in this behalf and if any transfer carves out of the surplus area some land	 pro tanto	 the provisions of the Act are defeated. Indeed	 it is not seriously disputed that such will be the conclusion if we do not read into the provisions either the condition that it does not apply to bona fide transfers	 as Shri Ramamurthy would have it	 or does not apply to any transfers other than sham	 nominal or bogus transfers	 as the High Court would have it. A policy oriented interpretation tallies with the literal construction in the 1129 present case. The mischief rule in Heydon 's case and the grammatical construction which is the Golden Rule converge to the same conclusion in the present case. The policy of the law of land reform with drastic limit on holdings often drives large holders to evade by manouvres. They make r . gifts	 execute sales or settlements	 enter into other dealings to save their properties from being taken by the State. May be in a few cases	 the owner has real necessity. But why sell only on The eve of land legislation? Why execute deeds	 though for good purposes	 only where the bill fixing ceilings is round the corner? By and large	 the strategies of extrication of holdings from the arm of the law is the t reason that prompts sudden affection for making gifts	 sudden realisation of debts due and sudden awareness of family necessity. The legislature	 astute enough not to be outwitted in its objective	 puts a blanket ban on transfers which	 in effect	 defeat its provisions. This may cause hardship to some but every cause claims martyrs. Individual trauma is inevitable while ushering in a new economic order. This is the rationale of section 22 of the Ceiling Act. To alloy the sense of the text and to mi alien concepts is to debase the statutory metal. Likewise	 laws are not value free and so he reads the symbols of words best who projects in the process the values of the legislation as distinguished from his own. Reading other values into the legislators ' words may judicially demonetize the statute and break me comity between constitutional instrumentalities. The current and correct view of the interpretative process is that words must be given their 'literal ' or 'ordinary ' meaning unless there are compelling reasons	 recognised by canons of construction	 to the contrary. It must be remembered that the judicial rule of law for interpreting statutes applies the grammatical approach	 thereby to bring out the value judgment incorporated in the statute itself. Some times it is called the 'equity of the statute '. As Prof. R. B. Stevens of the Yale University has pointed out: "Whenever the judges support to depart from the literal or ordinary meaning	 and apply the mischief rule or the golden rule	 there is danger that in place of those irrelevant criteria	 the canons of construction	 they have more obviously substituted their own (perhaps more harmful) impressions	 views	 prejudices or predispositions. Such conflicts between what Parliament intended and what the judges assumed Parliament to have intended have long been appreciated. "(1) (I) Modern Law Review	 Vol. 28	1965 p 525 16 409 SCI/79 1130 Those who have reflected on the meaning of meaning have said that words. "mean" nothing by themselves. (1). They convey policy and the judge who interprets must seek the intent of the legislature by gaining an insight into this policy and making it manifest through the process of construction. Looking at the words of section 22 in the light of the scheme	 of prohibition of transfers to preserve the surplus lands for distribution	 we find no justification for importing into section 22 more than its words convey. The Section says what it means	 nothing more	 nothing else. A simple scan of the provision reveals that any transfer	 gift	 surrender	 settlement or other alienation referred to in the Section may be declared void by the Authorised officer "if he finds that the transfer or the partition. defeats any of the provisions of this Act.". The trichotomy is obvious. There must be a transfer or other alienation. It must have taken place during the period mentioned in the Section. It must have the effect of defeating any of the provisions	 of the Act. If these three elements are present	 the Authorised officer must void the transfer. There is no room for importing a fourth principal that the transfer should be 'sham	 nominal or bogus '. Nor indeed is there any additional consideration that if the transfer is bona	 fide for family necessity or other urgency then it is good	 even though it defeats the provisions of the Act. We cannot amend the Section or dilute its imperatives	 scared by the consequences or moved by extraneous sympathies. Sub conscious forces and individual prepossessions have a subtle way of entering the interpretative verdict of the judge. We have to be constantly careful to exclude such intrusions. Moreover	 when the whole purpose of the Section is	 to prevent any alienation which defeats any of the purpose if visions of the Act	 it is impermissible to introduce any requirement	 other than is mentioned in the Section	 as a condition for its operation. Obviously	 the provision seeks to provide social justice for the landless and it defeats the purpose if	 by the interpretative process	 soft Justice to large landholders is brought about. We consider the 'literal ' meaning of the Section to be that any transfer or other alienation mentioned in the Section which reduces or impairs the otherwise available extent of surplus land beyond the ceiling "defeats. the provisions of this Act. " This is the plain meaning of the Section which gives no room for doubt or justification for importation of any further condition like sham	 bogus etc. A return to the rules of strict construction	 when the purpose of (I) C. Ogden and I. Richards	 The Meaning of Meaning 9 (10th Edn. 1956) 1131 the statute needs it	 is desirable	 especially with a view to give effect A to the intention of the legislature. We are reminded of Lord Denning 's interesting remarks in his recent book "The Discipline of Law" under heading "I am a Portia Man". In justification of his view Russell LJ quoted a passage from Shakespeare. It is worth recording because there are lessons to be drawn from it as there often are from Shakes peare. 'I may perhaps be forgiven for saying that it appears to me that Lord Denning MR has acceded to the appeal of Bessanio in the Merchant of Venice. Bessanio "And	 I beseech you	 Wrest once the law to your authority: To do a great right	 do a little wrong. But Portia retorted: "It must not be; there is no power in Venice Can alter a decree established: It will be recorded for a precedent	 And many an error	 by the same example	 Will rush into the State: it cannot be." Then said Russell LJ. 'I am a Portia man '. I cannot believe that Russell LJ would be a 'Portia man ' if it meant aligning himself with Shylock in support of a strict law of penalties which could not be relieved by equity. To be truly a 'Portia marl ' The lawyer should follow the way ill which Portia avoided an unjust decree. Not to let the words of the deed be the masters: but so construe them adapt them as the occasion demands so as to do what justice and equity require. This is how she turned the tables on Shylock: It is in this denouement that I would follow the example of Portia I too am a Portia man In the interpretation of section 22 we too are Portia men. For this reason we reverse the view of the High Court that section 22 will not apply to nullify any transaction of transfer or partition unless it is further 1132 shown that it is sham	 nominal or bogus. Nor do we agree with Shri Ramamurthy that even if a Transaction defeats the ceiling provisions	 it may still be valid if the transfer is	 from an individual point of view	 bona fide. The short reply is that from the community 's angle	 especially the landless community 's angle hungering for allotment	 the alienation	 however necessary for the individual	 is not bona fide visa vis the community. Therefore	 we allow the appeal in the light of the interpretation we have adopted	 restore the tribunal 's holding and rule that if any transfer defeats the provisions of the Act by reducing the extent of surplus land in excess of the ceiling available from any person such transaction bona fide or not	 is void in the matter of computation of the permissible area and the surplus area. May be	 that the transaction may be good for other purposes or may not be. The Authorised officer is within his power if he ignores it as void for purposes of section 22	 section 7 and other ceiling related provisions. The detailed discussion of the High Court on many other aspects of the Act do not affect the core of the matter and cannot deflect us from the conclusion we have arrived at. The appeals are allowed but in the light of the earlier direction of the Court the State will pay the costs of the respondent. P.B.R. Appeal allowed.

Summary:
Section 7 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1961	 provides that on and from the date of commencement of the Act no person shall	 except as otherwise provided in the Act	 but subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII	 be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area. Section 22 provides that where on or after the date of commencement of the Act (6th April	 1960) but before the notified date (2nd October	 1962) any person has transferred any land held by him by sale	 gift etc. the Authorised officer within whose jurisdiction such land holding of the major part thereof is situated may	 after notice to such person and other persons affected by such transfer or partition and after such inquiry as he thinks fit to make	 declare tho transfer or partition to be void if he finds that the transfer or the partition	 as the case may be	 defeats any of tho provisions of the Act. Tho alienations in all the cases took many forms ranging from stridhana to bona fide sale and they were executed between the date of commencement of the Act and notified date. The Land Tribunal held that the alienations were void because but for the alienations the holders would have had the lands in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the Act. On the interpretation of section 22 of the Act	 the High Court was of the view that the section covered only those sham	 nominal and bogus transfers which are intended to defeat the provisions of the Act and which are inconsistent with the object provided in section 7. It was also held that transactions entered into in anticipation of the Ceiling Act would not be hit by the provisions preventing such transfers except where they were mala fide or colourable; and that tho the word "defeat" in section 22 should be taken as having been used to import a sinister motive. It was therefore held that under section 22 the Authorised officer is entitled to declare as void only those transfers which are sham and nominal entered into with the avowed object of defeating the provisions of the Act without any bona fide intention to transfer title. ^ HELD: (1) If any transfer defeats the provisions of the Act by reducing the extent of surplus land in excess of the ceiling available from any person such transaction	 bona fide or not	 is void in the matter of computation of the permissible area and the surplus area. The Authorised officer is within his power if he ignores it as void for purposes of section 22	 section 7 and other ceiling related provisions. [1132C] 1122 (2) Looking at the words of section 22 in the light of the scheme of prohibition of transfers to preserve the surplus land for distribution there is no justification for importing into section 22 more than its words convey. The section says what it means. A simple scan of the provision reveals that any transfer	 gift	 surrender	 settlement or other alienations may be declared void by the Authorized Officer	 if he finds that the transfer or the partition defeats any of the provision of this Act. The trichotomy is obvious: There must be a transfer or other n alienation; it must have taken place during the period mentioned in the section; it must have the effect of defeating any of the provisions of the Act. if these three elements are present	 the Authorised officer must void the transfer. There is no rule for importing a fourth principle that the transfer should be sham	 nominal or bogus nor is there any additional consideration that if the transfer is bona fide for family necessity or other urgency then it is good even though it defeats the provisions of the Act. The provision seeks to provide social justice for the landless and it defeats the purpose if	 by the interpretative process	 soft justice to large land holders is brought about. [1130B D] (3) The literal meaning of the section is that any transfer or other alienation mentioned in it which reduces or impairs the otherwise available extent of surplus land beyond the ceiling defeats the provisions of the Act. This is the plain meaning of the section which gives no room for doubt or justification for importation of any further condition like sham	 bogus etc. (4) The High Court was wrong in its view that the Act being confiscatory one	 the public authority "invested with the power to enquire into and to invalidate a transfer should act reasonably	 and that such a power should be construed beneficially in favour of the subject who is affected by the statute. " The approach of the High Court is inept and inapplicable when once considers agrarian reform legislation whose avowed purpose is to take away as much extent of land as policy dictates so that distribution thereof among the landless may be achieved. When a whole legislation is geared to deprivation of property	 rules which have frowned upon confiscatory legislation cannot apply at all. The jurisprudential principles in such a situation cannot be the same as have been inherited from a culture which postulates the State vs the subject. [1126E G] (5) While dealing with welfare legislation of so fundamental 3 character as agrarian reform	 the Court must constantly remember that the statutory pilgrimage to destination social justice should be helped	 not hampered	 by judicial interpretation. It is true that Judges are constitutional invigilators and statutory interpreters; but they are also responsive and responsible to Part IV of the Constitution. The judiciary	 in its sphere	 shares the revolutionary purpose of the constitutional order and when called upon to decode social legislation it must be animated by the goal oriented approach. [1123E H]