Judgment Case ID: 3052

Judgment:
No. 136 of 1971. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 6	 1970 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court	 Indore Bench in Civil Revision No. 415 of 1969 I. N. Shroff	 for the appellant. section V.Gupte	 section K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta	for respondent No.1. Vaidialingam	 J. Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 5801 of 1971	 is by the first respondent	 is an application under sections 17 and 29 of the (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) to pass a judgment and decree according to the Award of the arbitrator dated August 24	 1971 and to grant interest from the date of the decree	 on the amount found payable by the appellant. Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 5802 of 1971	 by the State of Madhya Pradesh	 the appellant in the Civil Appeal	 is an application requesting this Court to decline to take the Award dated August 24	 1971 on its file. Without prejudice to the above prayer	 there is a further request made to this Court to set aside or modify the Award in certain respects. The relevant facts leading up to the filing of the two applications may be adverted to The erstwhile State of Madhya Bharat and entered into a contract with M/s. Saith & Skelton ( P.) Ltd.	 the first respondent	 for the supply and erection of Pen	 stocks for Gandhi Sagar Power Station	 Chambal Hydel works. The acceptance of the contract was by tender No. Project/SE/ 235 2522 F/II/25 dated June 5	 1956. Under the said contract	 the first respondent firm was required to supply material for the five penstocks of P.O.R. Jhalwar Road	 Railway Station at Rs. 1	570 per M. Ton within the time stipulated	 the total quantity being 463.939 M. Tons. The material was to be transported from Jhalwar Road Railway Station to the works site by the consignee	 		he Madhya Bharat Government	 and the work of erection was to commence on the receipt at the work site of running length of 96 ft. for any of the penstocks. Clause 21 of the contract provided for any question or dispute	 arising under the conditions of the contract or in connection therewith	 to be referred to the arbitrators	 one to be nominated by the State and the other by the firm The said clause also provided for the matter being referred to an Umpire to be appointed by the arbitrators in case of disagreement between them. That clause also referred to certain other matters relating to arbitration proceedings. Disputes arose between the appellant and the respondent firm with reference to the performance of the contract. The firm intimated the appellant on December 31	 1959 nominating one Shri T. R. Sharma	 as an arbitrator under Cl. 21 of the contract and also called upon the appellant to nominate an arbitrator. The Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals	 who were acting as the agent of the Madhya Bharat Government	 nominated one Shri G. section Gaitonde	 as an arbitrator on behalf of the appellant. But the said arbitrator resigned his appointment and in consequence on April 26	 1960 one Shri R. R. Desai	 was nominated as an arbitrator on behalf of the appellant. This nomination was also by the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals. On September 6	 1960	 the two arbitrators appointed one Sri R. C. Soni	 as an Umpire. The two arbitrators disagreed in their views resulting in the matter being referred to the Umpire on October 20	 1961. According to the appellant	 the appointment of Shri Gaitonde	 in the first instance and of Shri R. R. Desai	 later	 as an arbitrator	 by the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals was without any authority from the appellant. Later on	 the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals again reappointed Shri R. R. Desai as an arbitrator on behalf of the appellant on January 4	 1961. According to the appellant the appointment of Shri R. C. Sone	 as Umpire on September 6	 1960 was not valid. Accordingly	 the appellant filed in the Court of the Additional District Judge	 Mandsaur	 Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 16 of 1962 under section 5 of the Act	 for setting aside the nominations	 as arbitrators of Shri T. R. Sharma and Shri R. R. Desai	 as well as the appointment by them of Shri R. C. Soni	 as the Umpire. By order dated October 19	 1963	 the Addl. District Judge	 Mandsaur held that the appointments of Shri R. R. Desai	 as an arbitrator and Shri 236 R. C. Soni	 as Umpire	 were both invalid and not binding on the appellant. The firm filed all appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh against the order of the Addl. District Judge. This appeal was later oil treated as a Revision and numbered as Civil Revision No. 415 of 1969. The High Court	 by its order dated August 6	 1970 appointed Shri R. C. Soni as the Sole Arbitrator under section 12(2) of the Act and accordingly modified the order of the Addl. District Judge	 Mandsaur. The appellant filed Special Leave Petition No. 2370 of 1970 in this Court for grant of Special Leave to Appeal against the order of the High Court dated August 6	 1970. The firm entered caveat. On January 29	 1971	 this Court ranted Special Leave land	 by consent of parties	 appointed an arbitrator	 whose Award is sought to be made a decree of the Court by the respondent in its application C.M.P. No. 5801 of 1971 and is sought to be set aside by the appellant by C.M.P. No. 5802 of 1971. As the terms of the order passed by this Court are material	 it is reproduced below : Special Leave is granted. The appeal is allowed The appointment of Shri R. C. Soni as the sole arbitrator is set aside by consent of the parties. Mr. V. section Desai	 Senior Advocate	 is appointed Arbitrator by consent of the parties to go into all the questions in this matter and make his awar. The remuneration for the arbitrator would be Rs. 5	000	 which will be shared by both the parties equally. The arbitrator will make his award within three months from today. The parties will be at liberty 1 to mention for extension of time	 for making the award. G. K. Mitter J	 January 29	 1971. A. N. Ray J." On February 1	 1971 this Court gave directions in the appeal		 in the presence of the counsel for both parties	 that the records of the arbitration be called for forthwith and sent to the sole arbitrator Mr. V. section Desai	 appointed as per order dated January 29	 1971. Again on April 30	 1971	 this Court		 in the presence of the counsel for both the parties	 extended the time for making the Award by four months and also permitted the arbitrator to hold the arbi tration proceedings at Bombay. The arbitrator gave his Award on August 24	 1971 and filed the same in this Court	 the next day. He also crave notice to the parties of the Making and signing of 237 the Award. A signed copy of the Award was also sent to both the parties. The operative part of the Award is as follows : (1) The opponents	 the State of Madhya Pradesh will pay to the claimants a sum of Rs. 1	79	653.18 p. for the balance payable to them in respect of the price of supply and erection of the 5 penstocks. (2) The State will also pay interest on the said amount at 9% per annum simple interest from 7th June	 1958 to the date of decree. The State will also refund to t	he claimants a sum of Rs. 15	414	19 p. which they have recovered from the claimants as excess railway freight. V. section Desai	 Sole Arbitrator. " In C.M.P. No. 5801 of 1971	 the firm prays for passing a judgment and decree	 according to the Award and also prays for grant of interest from the date of decree at the rate of 9% per annum. On the other hand	 the appellant State	 in its application C.M.P. No. 5802 of 1971 prays for an order declining to take the Award on its file or in any event to set aside or modify the award in respect of interest granted prior to August 24	 1971 as well as the direction regarding the refund by the appellant of the sum of Rs. 15	414.19 P. The Award is also sought to be modified on the ground that the award of interest at 9% is very excessive. The question of pronouncing judgment according to the Award	 as provided under section 17 of the Act and which is the prayer in C.M.P. No. 5801 of 1971 will arise only if the prayer to set aside the Award made in C.M.P. No. 5802 of 1971	 by the State	 is rejected. Therefore	 we will proceed to consider the contentions raised by Mr. 1. N. Shroff	 learned counsel for the appellant	 in support of the application C.M.P. No. 5802 of 1971. Mr. Shroff has raised the following four contentions: (1) The arbitrator had no power to suo motu file his Award	 as he has done in this case	 and as such no action can be taken on such an Award; (2) This Court is not the Court as contemplated by section 14(2) read with section 2(c) of the Act. Hence the filing of the Award in ' this Court is illegal and ineffective in law; (3) The arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest from a period anterior to the date of the award or reference; and (4) The Arbitrator has committed a manifest error in directing the refund of Rs. 15	414.19 P. when this amount has already been taken into account in arriving at the figure of Rs. 1	79	653.18 P. 238 We will now proceed to deal with these contentions scriatim. With regard to the first contention	 which relates to the validity of the filing of the Award in this Court suo motu	 reliance is placed by Mr. Shroff on section 14(2) of the Act. It is the contention of the counsel that under this section an arbitrator can cause an award to be filed in court only under two circumstances : (a) when a request to do so is made by any party to the ' arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party; and (b) when the arbitrator is directed by the Court to file the award. In this case	 it is pointed out		 that no such request was made by any of the parties to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party to the arbitrator to file the Award. It is pointed out that there was no direction by this Court to the arbitrator to file the Award. Hence it is urged that the filing of the Award suo motu is illegal	 as being contrary to the terms of section 14(2) of the Act. Mr. section V. Gupte	 learned counsel for the respondent firm	 referred us to section 38 of the Act and pointed out that the scheme of the Act clearly shows that the Award has to be filed in the Court by the arbitrator either suo motu or on request made by the parties to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or on being directed by the Court. The counsel pointed out	 there is no prohibition in section 14(2) of the Act	 against the arbitrator filing the Award in Court suo motu. The question specifically arose before the Nagpur High Court in Narayan Bhawu vs Dewajibhawu(1). The High Court held that there is nothing in section 14(2) of the Act	 which precludes the arbitrator from filing the Award suo motu and it is not correct to say that the Award should be filed only if the parties make a request to the arbitrator to file the award or make an application to the Court for that purpose. We are in agreement with this view of the law	 especially when there is no prohibition in the Act	 particularly in section 14(2) against the arbitrator filing suo motu his Award in Court. Mr. Shroff referred us to the decision in Parasramka Com mercial Company vs Union of India(2). From the facts stated in the said decision	 it is seen that the arbitrator made his Award and signed the same on April	 26	 1950. The arbitrator without sending any notice of the making and signing of the Award	 sent a copy of the signed Award to the parties. The appellant therein acknowledged receipt of the said signed copy of the Award by his letters dated 5th and 16th May	 1950; but he filed an application on March 30	 1951 in the Subordinate Judge 's Court for passing a decree in terms of the Award. An objection was raised by the (1) A I R (2) ; 239 opponent that the application was out of time under article 178 of the Indian Limitation Act	 1908	 as not having been filed within 90 days of the date of service of the notice of the making of the Award. It is also seen that the arbitrator on July 3	 1951 filed the original Award before the Court suo motu. The Subordinate Judge rejected the application filed on March 30	 1951 as barred by time. That order was confirmed by the High Court. This Court	 after a consideration of section 14(1) of the Act held that the serving	 by the arbitrator on the appellant before this Court of a signed copy of the Award amounted to giving him notice in writing of the making of the Award. This Court further upheld	 as correct	 the view of the Subordinate Judge and the High Court that the application filed by the appellant	 beyond the period prescribed under article 178 of the Indian Limitation Act	 1908	 was barred. This Court did not express any view regarding the action taken by the arbitrator in filing suo motu the Award and left open the question as follows : ". . But we make it clear that the other part of the case	 namely what is to happen to the award sent by the Arbitrator himself to the court has yet to be determined and what we say here will not affect the determination. of that question. Obviously enough that matter arises under the second sub section of section 14 and will have to be considered quite apart from the application made by the company to have the award made into rule of Court. " Again the question whether a plea of limitation can be raised with respect to the suo matu filing of the award by the arbitrator was left open as. follows : ". As to whether	 similar objections can be raised in answer to the award filed at the instance of the arbitrator is a question which we cannot go into the present appeal and no expression of opinion must be attributed to us on that point." Therefore	 it is clear from what is stated above that in the said decision this Court had no occasion to consider whether an award can be filed suo motu by an arbitrator nor the further question whether such filing should be within the period of limitation provided under the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act. In the case before us the period of limitation is dealt with under Entry 119 of the Schedule to the . As the arbitrator in this case made his Award on August 24	 1971 and filed the same the next day	 the question of limitation	 if any	 does not at all arise. We do not express any opinion whether the period of limitation will apply when the arbitrator files his award Suo 887Sup. CI/72 240 motu. As the filing of the Award by the Arbitrator suo motu is legal	 the first contention of Mr. Shroff has to be rejected. The second contention of Mr. Shroff is that this Court is not "Court" as &fined under section 2(c) of the Act	 where the Award could be filed. Section 2 (c) of the Act is as follows : "2. In this Act	 unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context	 (c) "Court" means a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the reference if the same had been the subject matter of a suit	 but does not	 except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under section 21	 include a Small Cause Court." According to Mr. Shroff the Award should have been filed	 not in this Court	 but in the Court of the Addl. District Judge	 Mandsaur	 as that is the Court which will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit regarding the subject matter of the reference. We are not inclined to accept this contention of Mr. Shroff. It should be noted that the opening words of section 2 are "In this Act	 unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. Therefore the expression "Court ' will have to be understood as defined in section 2(c) of the Act	 only if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context. It is in that light that the expression "Court" occurrmg in section	 14(2) of the Act will have to be understood and interpreted. It was this Court that appointed Shri V. section Desai on January 29	 1971	 by consent of parties	 on an arbitrator and to make his Award. It will be seen that no further directions were given in the said order which will indicate that this Court had not divested itself of its jurisdiction to deal with the Award or matters arising out of the Award. In fact the indications are to the contrary. The direction in the order dated January 29	 1971 is that the arbitrator is "to make his Award". Surely the law contemplates further steps to be taken after the Award has been made	 and quite naturally the forum for taking the further action is only this Court. There was also direction to the effect that the parties are at liberty to apply for extension of time for making the Award. 	 In the absence of anv other court having been invested with such jurisdiction by the order	 the only concluonsion that is possible is that such a request must be made only to the court which passed that order	 namely	 this Court. That this Court retained complete control over the arbitration proceedings is made clear by its orders dated February 1	 1971 and April 30	 1971. On the former date	 after hearing counsel for both the parties	 this Court gave direction that the record of 241 the arbitration proceedings be called for and delivered to the Sole Arbitrator Mr. V. section Desai. On the latter date	 again	 after hearing the counsel	 this Court extended the time for making the Award by four months and further permitted the arbitrator to hold the arbitration proceedings at Bombay. The nature of the order passed on January 29	 1971 and the subsequent proceedings	 referred to above	 clearly show that this Court retained full control over the arbitration proceedings. Mr. Shroff referred us to the fact that in the order dated January 29	 1971	 it is clearly stated "The appeal is allowed". According to him	 when the appeal has come to an end finally	 this Court had lost all jurisdiction regarding the arbitration proceedings and therefore the filing of the Award should be only in the Court as defined in section 2(c) of the Act. Here again	 we are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Shroff. That the appeal was allowed	 is no doubt correct. But the appeal was allowed by setting aside the order of the High Court and this Court in turn appointed Mr. V. section Desai as the Sole Arbitrator. All other directions contained in the order dated January 29	 1971 and the further proceedings	 as pointed out earlier	 indicate the retention of full control by this Court over the arbitration proceedings. In Ct. A. Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar and others vs Cf. A. Cf. Subramaniam Chettiar(1)	 the question arose whether the trial eourt had jurisdiction to refer the subject matter of a suit to an arbitrator when the decree passed in the suit was pending appeal before the High Court. Based upon section 21	 it was urged before this Court that the reference made by the trial court	 when the appeal was pending	 and the award made in consequence of such reference	 were both invalid as the trial court was mot competent to make the order of reference. This Court rejected the said contention and after a reference to sections 2(c) and 21 of the Act held that the expression "Court" occurring in section 21 includes also the Appellate Court	 proceedings before which are a continuance of the suit. It was further held that the word "suit" in section 21 includes also appellate proceedings. In our opinion	 applying the analogy of the above decision	 the expression "Court" occurring in section 14 (2) of the Act will have to be understood	in the context in which it occurs. So understood	 it follows that this Court is the Court under section 14(2) where the arbitration Award could be validly field. The decision in Union of India vs Surjeet Singh Atwal(2) relied on by Mr. Shroff	 dealt with a different aspect and therefore	 it is not necessary for us to refer to the same. The above reasoning leads us to the conclusion that the filing of the Award in this Court by the arbitrator was valid and legal. The second contention of Mr. Shroff will stand rejected. (1) ; (2) 242 The third contention of Mr. Shroff is that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest from a period anterior to the date of award or reference. Before we deal with this contention	 it is necessary to refer to the findings of the arbit rator in his Award. Issues Nos. 6	 7 and 19 frame by the arbitrator and which are relevant on this aspect are as follows: "6 (a) Was the claimant entitled to the payment for supply as well as for erection on the total weight of 463.939 M. tons inclusive of electrodes ? 6 (b) If not	 what are the weights on which the price of supply and the erection charges are to be calculated. What is due to the claimant from the respondent in respect of the supply and erection of the penstocks ? 19. Are any of the parties entitled to interest and/ or any other relief. " On issue No. 6(a) the arbitrator found that the firm was entitled to the same weight both for the calculation of price as well as for the price for erection and the said weight was 463.939 M. Tons inclusive of electrodes. In view of the above finding on issue No. 6(a)	 the arbitrator held that issue No. 6(b) does not survive. On issue No. 7 he found that for the price of supply and erection of 463.939 M. Tons at the rate specified in contract	 the total price due to the firm comes to Rs. 12	15	520.18P. It was admitted before the arbitrator that the firm had been paid by the State of sum of Rs. 10	35	867/. In view of this admission the arbitrator found that the balance payable to the firm towards the price for supply and erection is	 Rs. 1	79	653.18 P. On issue No. 19	 the arbitrator found that the firm is entitled to interest at 9% per annum on the balance of Rs. 1	79	653.18 P. from June 7	 1958	 the date on which the final inspection of the	 penstock took place. The interest was to be paid till the date of the decree. It is on the basis of the above findings that the arbitrator made the Award	 the operative part of which has already been extracted in the earlier part of the judgment. The direction regarding the payment of Rs. 1	79	653.18 P. is not challenged by the State. It is only the direction regarding the period from which interest is payable	 that is under challenge. The arbitrator has made the interest payable from June 7	 243 1958	 on the ground that it was the date on which final inspection took place and when the amount become payable to the. respondent. Mr. Shroff referred us to a decision of the Judicial Com mittee and to certain decisions of this Court to the effect that section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not apply to the proceedings before an arbitrator	 as he is not a Court and that interest cannot be awarded by way of damages. He further referred to those decisions in support of his contention that in the absence of any usage or contract	 express or implied	 or of any provision of law to justify the award of interest on an amount for a period before the institution of the suit	 interest anterior to the date of the suit cannot be allowed. The decisions referred to by Mr. Shroff are Bengal Nagpur Raliway Company Limited vs Ruttanji Ramji and others(1)		 Seth Thawardas Pherumal vs The Union of India(2)	 Mahabir Prashad Rungta vs Durga Datt(3)	 Union of India vs A. L. Rallia Ram(4)	 Vithal Das vs Rupchand and others(5) and Union of India vs Bungo Steel ' Furniture Pvt. Ltd. (6). It is no doubt true that for awarding interest under the Interest Act	 1939	 or under section 34 of the. Code of Civil Procedure	 certain circumstances must exist. But one of the principles laid down is that interest prior to the institution of a suit can be awarded if there is any provision of a suit can be awarded if there is any provision of law to justify the award of such interest. In the cases	 referred to above	 it is seen that there was neither any agreement pleaded for payment of interest; nor was any provision of law entitling the party to recover interest prior to the period of the suit or arbitration proceedings	 referred to or relied upon. Under such circumstances it was held that the arbitrator or a court had no power to award interest prior to the date of the Award. In Union of India vs Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. 17)this Court recognised the power of an arbitrator to award interest on the amount of the award from the date of the award till the date of the decree. According to Mr. Shroff	 the power of the arbitrator to award interest is only from the date of the award and not for any period anterior to that date. In Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan vs Hukamchand Mills Ltd. Indore(7)	 the power of the arbitrator	 to whom the subject matter of a suit had been referred for arbitration	 to award pendente life interest was considered by this Court. It was held in (1) L.R. 65 I.A. 66. (2) (3) ; (4) ; (5) [1966] Supp. S.C.R. 164. (6) ; (7) ; 244 the said decision that all the disputes in the suit were referred to the arbitrator for his decision. One of the disputes	 so referred	 was whether the respondent therein was entitled to pendente lite interest. h was held that though in terms	 section 34 C.P.C. does not apply to the arbitration	 it was an implied term of the reference in the suit that the arbitrator was to decide the dispute	 according to law	 to grant such relief with regard to pendente lite interest as the Court itself could give	 if it decided the dispute. It was further held that such a power of the arbitrator was not fettered either by arbitration agreement or by the Act. The decision in Seth Thawardas Pherumal vs The Union of India(1) distinguished on the ground that the said decision is silent on the question whether an arbitrator can award interest during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings if all the disputes in the suit including the claim for interest were referred for arbition. From the decision in Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan vs Hukamchand Mills Ltd. Indore(2)	 it is clear that if all the disputes are referred for arbitration	 the arbitrator has power to award interest pendente lite	 i.e. during the	 pendency of the arbitration proceedings. In the case before there is no controvery that all the disputes including a claim for payment of the amount with interest was referred to the arbitrator. The arbitrator	 as pointed out earlier	 found that the firm was entitled to the Payment as price in the sum of Rs. 1	79	653.18 P. The arbitrator has further found that this amount became payable as balance price for the goods supplied by the firm on June 7	 1958	 on which date the final inspection took place. If that is so	 section 61 of the Sat 	 of Goods Act	 1930 squarely applies and it saves the right of the seller (in this case the firm) to recover interest	 where by law interest is recoverable. Sub section (2) of section 61	 which is material is as follows : "61 (2) In the absence of a contract to the contrary the Court may award interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the amount of the 'Price 	 (a) to the seller in a suit by him for the amount of the price from the date of the tender of the or from the date on which the price was payable. (b) to the buyer in a suit by him for the refund of the price in a case of a breach of the contract on the part of the seller from the date on which the payment was made." (1) (2) ; 245 in the case before us	 admittedly the contract does not pro vide that no interest is payable on the amount that may be found due to any one of them. if so	 it follows that the seller	 namely	 the firm is entitled to claim interest from the date on which the price became due and payable. The finding of the arbitrator in this case is that the price became payable on June 7	 1958. As held by this Court in Union of India vs A. L. Rallia Ram(1)	 which related to an arbitration proceeding	 under sub section (2) of section 61	 in the absence of a contract to the contrary	 the seller is eligible to be awarded interest on the amount of the price for the goods sold. On this principle it follows that the award of interest from June 7	 1958 is justified. If the contention of Mr. Shroff that under no circumstances anarbitrator can award interest prior to the date of the Award	 or prior to the date of reference	 is accepted	 then the position will be very anomalous. As an illustration	 we may point out that there may be cases where the only question that is referred to the arbitrator is whether any of the parties is entitled to claim interest on the amount due to him from a date which may be long anterior to the date of reference. When such a question is referred to the arbitrator	 naturally he has to decide whether the claim for award of interest from the date referred to by the parties is acceptable or not. If the arbitrator accepts that claim	 he will be awarding interest from the date which will be long prior even to the date of reference. Therefore	 the question ultimately will be whether the dispute referred to the arbitrator included the claim for interest from any particular period or whether the party is entitled by contract or usage or by a provision of law for interest from a particular date. Mr. Shroff further contended that the award of interest at 9% per annum is exorbitant. The short answer for negativing this contention is that it is seen from the claim statement filed by both the appellant and the respondent firm that each of them claimed for payment of the amount	 due to them with interest at 12% per annum under section 61 of the . Therefore	 it follows that the rate of interest awarded is not excessive. As we have already held that the arbitrator has got power in this case to award interest from June 7	 1958 at the rate specified by him	 the third contention of Mr. Shroff will have to be rejected. The last contention of Mr. Shroff relates to the direction regarding the refund of Rs. 15	414.19 P. The contention is that this amount has already been taken into account by the arbitrator when he directed the payment of Rs. 1	79	653.18 P. Mr. Shroff (1) ; 246 was not able to satisfy us that the amount	 directed to be paid as refund	 has been already taken into account in the amount fixed as the balance price payable by the State. Therefore	 this contention also will have to be rejected . Now that we have rejected all the contentions of Mr. Shroff raised in C.M.P. No. 5802 of 1971	 it follows that the prayer asked for	therein cannot be granted. Now coming to C.M.P. No. 5801 of 1971	 filed by the firm	 that application is accepted and a judgment and decree are passed on the basis of the Award as against the State is favour of the respondent firm. The appellant State will pay to the respondent firm a sum of Rs. 1	79	653.18 P. with 9% per annum simple interest from June 7	 1958	 till the date of the decree and thereafter at 6% till the date of payment. The appellant State will also refund to the respondent firm a sum of Rs. 15	414.19 P. which they have recovered from them as excess railway freight. In the result	 C.M.P. No. 5802 of 1971 will stand dismissed with costs. C.M.P. No. 5801 of 1971 is allowed with costs. A. decree as stated above will issue.

Summary:
Disputes having arisen between the appellant and the respondent with reference to the performance of a contract which provided for arbitration	 steps were taken to appoint arbitrators and an umpire. The appellant filed a petition in the District Judge 's Court	 having jurisdiction over the matter	 for setting aside the nominations. When the matter came up to this Court in appeal	 this Court appointed a sole arbitrator with consent of the parties. Thereafter in the presence ' of counsel for both parties this Court gave directions in the appeal that the arbitration records be sent to the sole arbitrator	 and later extended the time for making the award	 and gave directions regarding the venue. The arbitrator gave his award	 directing the payment of a certain sum by the appellant to the respondent with simple interest at 9% from a date anterior to the reference	 and filed the award ip. this Court 'the next day. The respondent filed a petition for passing a decree in terms of the award but the appellant opposed the petition. On the questions : (1) Whether the arbitrator had no power suo motu to file his award; Whether the award should not have been filed in this Court as it is not the Court contemplated by sections Z((4) and 14(2) of the ; and (3) Whether the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to. award the interest from a date anterior to the date of award or reference	 HELD : (1) There is nothing in section 14(2) of the Act which precludes the arbitrator from filing the award suo motu and it is not correct to say that the award should be filed only if the parties make a request to the arbitrator to file it	 or make an application to the Court for that purpose. The arbitrator having filed the award the next day after making it	 no question of limitation arises. [239 G B] Narayan Bhawu vs Dewajibhawu	 A.I.R. 1945 Nag. 117	 approved. (2) The expresion 'Court ' occurring in section 14(2) of the Act will have to be understood in the context in which it occurs	 because	 the definition of the word in section 2(c) applies only when there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context. The word 'Court ' would include 'an appellate court ' and the word 'suit ' would include 'appellate proceedings '. Merely because the order of this Court appointing the sole arbitrator stated 'the 	appeal is allowed ' it is not as if this Court had lost all jurisdiction regarding the arbitration proceedings. The various directions given by this Court indicate that this Court retained full control over the arbitration proceedings. Therefore this Court is the Court under section 14(2) where the arbitration award should be validly filed. [240 E. H; 241 B D] 234 Ct. A. Ct. Nachiappa. Chettiar & Ors. V. Ct. A. Ct. Subramaniam Chettiar; 	 	 referred to. (3) In the present case	 all the disputes including the claim for the payment of interest had been referred to the arbitrator. The contract does not provide that no interest was payable on the amount that may be found due. Therefore the respondent was entitled	 under section 61 (2) of the 	 to claim interest from the date on which the price became due and payable. The arbitrator had found that the price had become payable from a date anterior to the date of the award. There fore	 the award of interest from the anterior date was justified. The award of interest at 9% 'is also not exorbitant because the parties themselves claimed interest at 12%	 [245 A G] Union of India vs A. L. Rallia Ram	 ; and Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan vs Hukumchand Mills Ltd. Indore; 	 	 followed