Judgment Case ID: 2204

Judgment:
Appeal No. 51 of 1964. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated January 3	 1962 of the Punjab High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 1958 of 1959. Bishan Narain and Sadhu Singh	 for the appellant. J. P. Goyal and Raghunath Singh	 for respondents Nos. 1 (a) to 1 (d). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava	 J. This appeal arises out of a suit brought for possession of some land which was admittedly owned at one time by one Labhu. Labhu died in the year 1917 and	 on his death his widow	 Smt. Harnam Kaur	 who filed the suit as plaintiff	 came into possession of the land. She continued in possession of the land until the year 1954 when	 on an application made by the collaterals of Labhu	 the Naib Tehsildar	 by his order dated 26th June	 1954	 effected mutation in favour of these collaterals. These collaterals were defendants 1 to 4	 Mangal Singh	 Amer Singh	 Santa Singh and Ishar Singh. These collaterals	 on the basis of the order of the Naib Tehsildar	 dispossessed Smt. Harnam Kaur. Harnam Kaur 's appeal against the order of the Naib Tehsildar was dismissed by the Collector. The claim of these collaterals was that Smt. Harnam Kaur had entered into karewa marriage with one of these collaterals	 Ishar Singh. defendant No. 4 and	 consequently	 she had lost her right to hold the land of her first husband Labhu. Harnam Kaur denied that she had entered into any karewa marriage with Ishar Singh and	 on the basis of this denial	 instituted the suit claiming possession of that land. She pleaded that the four defendants had no right to this land and had wrongfully dispossessed her	 so that they were mere trespassers. This suit was instituted on 1st March	 1956. After the institution of the suit	 the (No. 30 of 1956) hereinafter referred to as "the Act" came into force on 17th June	 1956. The suit was	 at that time	 pending and it continued to remain pending until the year 1958 when Smt. Harnam Kaur died. Thereupon	 Smt. Rattno applied to be substituted as plaintiff in place of Smt. Harnam Kaur as her legal representative. This application was allowed		 though 456 it was opposed by defendants 1 to 3. In the trial of the suit defendants 1 to 3 took the plea that Smt. Harnam Kaur	 the original plaintiff	 had lost her right to the land because of her karewa marriage with Ishar Singh	 defendant No. 4. Defendant No. 4	 however	 admitted the claim of Smt. Hamarn Kaur in his written statement	 denied that he had dispossessed her and also denied the allegation of her karewa marriage with him. In these circumstances	 two main questions came up for decision by the trial court. The first question was whether Smt. Hamam Kaur had entered into a karewa marriage with Ishar Singh	 defendant No. 4	 so as to lose her right to the disputed land as widow of the previous mal e owner	 Labhu ? The second question that arose was whether Smt. Rattno	 who was substituted as the legal representative of Smt. Hamam Kaur	 was entitled to succeed to the property of Smt. Hamam Kaur ? This second question depended on whether Smt. Harnam Kaur had	 or had not	 become full owner of the land under section 14 of the Act. The trial court held that Smt. Hamam Kaur had contracted karewa marriage with Ishar Singh	 defendant No. 4	 and had lost her rights. The further finding of the trial court was that Smt. Hamam Kaur had been dispossessed before the Act came into force and	 consequently	 section 14 of the Act did not apply	 with the result that Smt. Rattno could not claim succession to Smt. Hamam Kaur under that provision of law. On these findings	 the trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal	 the Additional District Judge	 Patiala	 recorded the finding that Smt. Hamam Kaur had not entered into karewa marriage with Ishar Singh	 defendant No. 4	 and	 further	 that section 14 of the Act was applicable to the present case	 as the land in suit was possessed by Smt. Harnam Kaur so as to make her full owner of this land under that provision of law. On these findings	 the first appellate Court decreed the suit against defendants 1 to 3 with costs in both courts	 after making a comment that Ishar Singh 	 defendant No. 4	 was a profoma defendant. Defendants 1 to 3	 thereupon	 came up in second appeal to the High Court of Punjab and impleaded as respondents Smt. Rattno as well as Ishar Singh. The High Court dismissed the appeal and	 thereupon	 defendants 1 to 3 have come up to this Court in appeal under special leave granted to them. In this appeal also	 defendants 1 to 3 impleaded both Smt. Rattno and Ishar Singh as respondents. During the pendency of this appeal	 one of the defendants appellants died and his legal representatives were brought on the record as appellants. Rattno also died and her legal representatives were impleaded as respondents. Further	 Ishar Singh	. defendant No. 4	 who was a respondent in this appeal	 also died. The application to bring his legal representatives on record was dismissed by the order of this Court dated 14th September	 1965 457 in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 1589 of 1965. In view of this order	 a preliminary objection was raised at the time of hearing of this appeal by learned counsel for the respondents	 who had been impleaded as legal representatives of Smt. Rattno	 that the appeal had abated on account of the failure of the appellants to implead the legal representatives of Ishar Singh respondent. It	 however	 appears that	 on the pleadings of parties and the nature of the dispute that came to be settled by the lower courts	 it cannot be held that this appeal must abate as a whole	 or must fail because of its abatement against Ishar Singh on his death. We have already mentioned that	 though the plaintiff	 Smt. Harnam Kaur	 had come forward with the allegation that she had been dispossessed by all the four defendants 1 to 4	 Ishar Singh	 defendant No. 4	 in his written statement	 repudiated this claim. He put forward the plea that he had not dispossessed the plaintiff and	 further	 supported the claim of the plaintiff by pleading that there had been no karewa marriage between them. 'The suit was dismissed by the trial court. It was decreed by the first appellate Court only against defendants 1 to 3	 treating Ishar Singh as a profoma defendant. In these circumstances	 it is obvious that	 when the case came up before the High Court	 the dispute was confined between Smt. Rattno	 legal representative of the original plaintiff on the one side	 and defendants 1 to 3 on the other. Defendants 1 to 3 sought vacation of the decree for possession which had been granted against them in favour of Smt. Rattno. lshar Singh	 against whom the suit had not been decreed at all	 thus became an unnecessary party. In these circumstances even if Ishar Singh had not been impleaded as respondent in the High Court	 the relief claimed by defendants 1 to 3 in that Court against Smt. Rattno could have been granted	 without bringing into effect any contradictory decrees. In the appeal in this Court also	 in these circumstances	 Ishar Singh was an unnecessary party and	 consequently	 the failure to implead his legal representatives as respondents in the appeal after his death does not affect the right of defendants 1 to 3 to claim the relief for which they have come up to this Court in appeal. The preliminary objection	 therefore	 fails and is rejected. On merits	 we are of the opinion that the decision given by the High Court against the defendant appellants must be upheld. The first appellate Court	 which was the final Court for deciding question of fact	 clearly recorded a finding that the karewa marriage alleged to have been entered into by the plaintiff	 Smt. Harnam Kaur	 with Ishar Singh	 defendant No. 4	 was not proved. That finding of fact was binding on the High Court and was rightly accepted by it. It is no longer open to the appellants to challenge that finding of fact in this Court. On this finding	 it has to be held that the rights to the land	 to which Smt. Hamam Kaur had succeeded as widow of Labhu	 were not lost by her 458 until her death	 and that her dispossession by defendants 1 to 3 in the year 1954 was illegal. They had no right to this land in ' preference to Smt. Hamam Kaur. It was	 however	 urged on behalf of the appellants that	 when Smt. Hamam Kaur died	 she was not in actual possession of this land. She had been dispossessed in the year 1954 and	 at the time of her death in 1958	 this suit instituted by her for possession of that land was still pending. In the suit	 her own pleading was there that the land was in actual possession of defendants 1 to 3 as trespassers	 and	 in such circumstances	 it should be held that the land was not possessed by Smt. Hamam Kaur at any time after the Act came into force	 so that section 14 of the Act never became	 applicable and she never became full owner of that land. It may be mentioned that there was no dispute in the High Court	 nor was it disputed before us that	 if it be held that section 14 of the Act had become applicable and Smt. Hamam Kaur became full owner of this land	 her rights would pass on her death to Smt. Rattno and	 subsequently	 on the latter 's death	 to the present respondents in this appeal. The only question for decision in this appeal	 therefore	 is whether it can be held that this property was possessed by Smt. Harnam Kaur as envisaged by section 14 of the Act	 so that she became full owner of this land. Section 14(1) of the Act is as follows "14. (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu	 whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act	 shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation. In this sub section	 "property" includes both movable and immovable; "property	 acquired" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise	 or at a partition	 or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance	 or by gift from any person	 whether a relative or not	 before	 at or after her marriage	 or by her own skill or exertion	 or by purchase or by prescription	 or in any other manner whatsoever	 and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. " The dispute in the case has arisen	 because this section confers the right of full ownership on a Hindu female only in respect of property possessed by her	 whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act; and	 in the present case	 admittedly	 the plaintiff had been dispossessed in the year 1954 and was not able to recover possession from the defendants apppellants until her death in the year 1958. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that	 in order to attract the provisions of section 14 (1) of the Act	 it must be shown that the female Hindu was either in actual 459 physical possession	 or constructive possession of the disputed property. On the other side	 it was urged that	 even if a female Hindu be	 in fact	 out of actual possession	 the property must be held to be possessed by her	 if her ownership rights in that property still exist and	 in exercise of those ownership rights	 she is capable of obtaining actual possession of it. It appears to us that	 on the language used in section 14(1) of the Act	 the latter interpretation must be accepted. It is significant that the Legislature begins section 14(1) with the words "any property possessed by a female Hindu" and not "any property in possession of a female Hindu". If the expression used had been "in possession of" instead of "possessed by"	 the proper interpretation would probably have been to hold that	 in order to apply this provision	 the property must be such as is either in actual possession of the female Hindu or in her constructive possession. The constructive possession may be through a lessee. mortgagee	 licensee	 etc. The use of the expression "possessed by" instead of the expression "in possession of '	 in our opinion	 was intended to enlarge the meaning of this expression. It is commonly known in English language that a property is said to be possessed by a person	 if he is its owner	 even though he may	 for the time being	 be out of actual possession or even constructive possession. The expression "possessed by" is quite frequently used in testamentary documents	 where the method of expressing the property	 which is to pass to the legate	 often adopted is to say that "all property I die possessed of shall pass to. . . In such documents	 wills	 etc.	 where this language is used	 it is clear that whatever rights the testator had in the property would pass to the legate	 even though	 at the time when the will is executed or when the will becomes effective	 the testator might not be in actual	 physical or constructive possession of it. The legate will	 in such a case	 succeed to the right to recover possession of that property in the same manner in which the testator could have done. Stroud in his Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases	 Vol. 3	 at p. 2238	 has brought out this aspect when defining the scope of the words "possess" and "Possessed". When dealing with the meaning of the word "possession"	 Stroud defines " possession" as being in two ways	 either actual possession or possession in law. He goes on to say that "actual possession is when a man enters in deed into lands or tenements to him descended	 or otherwise. Possession in law is when lands or tenements are descended to a man	 and he has not as yet really	 actually	 and in deed	 entered into them. " In Wharton 's Law Lexicon	 14th Edn.	 at p. 777	 the word "possession" is defined as being equivalent to 'the state of owning or having a thing in one 's own hands or power." Thus	 three different meanings are given; one is the state of owning	 the second is having a thing in one 's own bands	 and the third is having a thing in one 's own 460 power. In case where property is in actual physical possession	 obviously it would be in one 's own hands. If it is in constructive possession	 it would be in one 's own power. Then	 there is the third case where there may not be actual	 physical or constructive possession and	 yet	 the person still possesses the right to recover actual physical possession or constructive possession; that would be a case covered by the expression "the state of owning". In fact	 elaborating further the meaning of the word "possession '	 Wharton goes on to say that "it is either actual	 where a person enters into lands or tenements descended or conveyed to him; apparent	 which is a species of presumptive title where land descended to the heir of an abator	 intruder	 or disseisor	 who died seised; in law	 when lands	 etc.	 have descended to a man	 and he has not actuary entered into them	 or naked	 that is	 more possession	 without colour of right. " It appears to us that the expression used in section 14(1) of the Act was intended to cover cases of possession in law also	 where lands may have descended to a female Hindu and she has not actually entered into them. It would of course	 cover the other cases of actual or constructive possession. On the language of section 14(1)	 therefore	 we hold that this prorovision will become applicable to any property which is owned by a female Hindu	 even though she is not in actual	 physical or constructive possession of that property. Section 14(1) came up for interpretation in various cases before a number of High Courts	 and was considered by this Court also in several cases. In none of those cases	 however	 did the question directly arise as to whether section 14(1) will be applicable	 if the female Hindu is out of actual	 physical or constructive possession and the property happens to have been wrongfully taken into possession by a trespasser. Most of those cases were cases where the female Hindu had either alienated her rights by a	 deed of transfer or had made a gift	 and it was only incidentally; that	 in some of those cases	 comments were made on the question whether section 14(1) of the Act will be attracted or not in cases the female Hindu bad been dispossessed by a trespasser. So far as this Court is concerned	 the earliest case is that of Gummalpura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami vs Setra Veeravva and others(1). Dealing with the scope of section 14(1) of the Act in that case	 this Court cited from a decision of Viswanatha Sastri	 J. in Gaddam Venkavamma vs Gaddam Veerayya (2) 	 and noticed the fact that in that case it was held that the word "possessed" is used in section 14 in a broad sense and	 in the context	 possession means the state of owning or having in one 's bands or power. It was also noticed that the learned Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in that case had expressed the view that even if a trespasser were in possession of the land belonging to a female (1) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 968. (2) A. I.R. 461 owner	 it might conceivably be regarded as being in possession of the female owner	 provided the trespasser had not perfected his	 title. Since in that case this Court was not concerned with a situation where a trespasser had actually dispossessed the female owner	 the Court went on to hold: "We do not think that it is necessary in the present case to go to the extent to which the learned Judges went. It is sufficient to say that "possessed" in section 14 is used in a broad sense and	 in the context	 means the state of owning or having in one 's hand or power. " Thus	 in that case decided by this Court	 the broad meaning of the word "possessed ' was accepted as even including cases where the state of owning the property exists. Learned counsel for the appellants	 when bringing to our notice the views expressed by this Court in that case	 also drew our attention to another part of the judgment	 where this Court remarked: "Reference to property acquired before the commencement of the Act certainly makes the provisions of the section retrospective	 but even in such a case	 the property must be possessed by a	 female Hindu at the time the Act came into force in order to make the provisions of the section applicable. There is no question in the present case that Veerawa acquired the property of her deceased husband before the commencement of the Act. In order that the provisions of section 14 may apply to the present case	 it will have to be further established that the property was possessed by her at the time the Act came into force. " Learned counsel	 from these words	 tried to draw an inference that this Court had laid down that section 14(1) will only apply to cases where the property was possessed by the Hindu female at the commencement of the Act. We do not think that any such interpretation can be placed on the words used by this Court. Section 14(1) covers any property possessed by a female Hindu	 whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act. On the face of it	 property acquired after the commencement of the Act by a female Hindu could not possibly be possessed by her at the commencement of the Act. This Court	 when it made the comments relied upon by learned counsel	 was	 in fact	 concerned with a case of a female Hindu	 who had acquired the right to the property before the commencement of the Act	 but was alleged to be no longer possessed of it because of having adopted a son before the commencement of the Act. It was in these circumstances that the Court in that particular case was concerned with the question whether the female Hindu was possessed of the property in dispute or not at the time the Act came into force. The Court was not laying down any general principle that section 14(1) will not be attracted at all to cases where the female Hindu was not possessed of the property at the date of the commencement of the Act. In fact	 there are no words used in section 14(1) which would lead to the interpretation that the property must be possessed by the female Hindu at the date of the 462 commencement of the Act. It appears to us that the relevant date	 on which the female Hindu should be possessed of the property in dispute	 must be	 the date on which the question of applying the provisions of section 14(1) arises. If	 on that date	 when the provisions of this section are sought to be applied	 the property is possessed by a female Hindu	 it would be held that she is full owner of it and not merely a limited owner. Such a question may arise in her own life time or may arise subsequently when succession to her property opens on her death. The case before us falls in the second category	 because Smt. Harnam Kaur was a limited owner of the property before the commencement of the Act	 and the question that has arisen is whether Smt. Rattno was entitled to succeed to her rights in this disputed property on her death which took place in the year 1958 after the commencement of the Act. The next case in which section 14 was considered by this Court was Brahmdeo Singh and Another vs Deomani Missir and Others(1) In that case	 the female Hindu	 who had succeeded to the property as the widow of her husband	 Ramdeo Singh	 had transferred the property under two sale deeds. It was held that the sale deeds were not for legal necessity; and the question arose whether	 in those circumstances	 when the Act came into force	 it could be held that the widow was possessed of that property. This Court	 after citing the judgment in the case of Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami(2) held that the conflict of judicial opinion on this question had already been resolved in that earlier case	 where the Court had observed : "The provisions in section 14 of the Act were not intended to benefit alienees who	 with their eyes open	 purchased the property from a limited owner without justifying necessity before the Act came into force and at a time when the vendor had only a limited interest of a Hindu woman. " The ;Court further dealt with the contention that the possession of the alienees is the possession of the widow herself who is still alive	 and held : "We are unable to accept this contention as correct. It is well settled that an alienation made by a widow or other limited heir of property inherited by her	 without legal necessity and without the consent of the next reversioners	 though not binding on the reversioners	 is	 nevertheless	 binding on her so as to pass her own interest (i.e. life interest) to the alienee. " It was	 thus	 made clear in that case that the property was held not to be possessed by the widow	 because	 the alienation made by her being binding on her	 she had no longer any legal right left in that property even in the sense of being in the state of owning it. The case	 thus	 explains why	 in cases of alienation or a gift made by a widow	 even though that alienation or gift may not be bind (1) Civil Appeal No. 130 of 1960 decided on October 15	 1962. (2) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 968. 463 ing on a reversioner	 the property will not be held to be possessed by the widow	 because the alienation or the gift would be binding on her for her life time and she	 at least	 would not possess any such rights under which she could obtain actual or constructive possession from her transferee or donee. Having completely partted with her legal rights in the property	 she could not be said to be possessed of that property any longer. The third case of this Court brought to our notice is that of section section Minna Lal vs section section Rajkumar and Others(1). In that case	 a Digamber Jain of the Porwal sect died in 1934 leaving behind his widow	 his son and three grand sons. His son died in 1939. In 1952	 a son of one of the grandsons filed a suit for partition of the joint family properties	 while the widow was still alive. While the suit was still pending	 the widow died. Amongst other questions arising in the partition suit	 one question that arose was whether the 1/4th share of the widow declared in the preliminary decree was possessed by her and whether	 on her death	 it descended to her grandsons in accordance with the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the Act. Dealing with this question	 this Court explained the scope of section 14(1) by stating that	 by section 14(1)	 the Legislature sought to convert the interest of a Hindu female which	 under the Sastric Hindu law	 would have been regarded as a limited interest into an absolute interest. It was held that	 by section 14(1)	 manifestly	 it was intended to convert the interest	 which a Hindu female has in property	 however restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be	 into absolute estate. It was also noticed that "under the Sastric Hindu law	 the share given to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or her grandsons was in lieu of her right to maintenance	 and she was not entitled to claim partition. But the Legislature	 by enacting the Hindu Women 's Right to Property Act	 1937	 made a significant departure in that branch of the law; the Act gave a Hindu widow the same interest in the property which her husband had at the time of his death	 and if the estate was partitioned	 she became owner in severalty of her share	 subject	 of course	 to the restrictions on disposition and the peculiar rule of extinction of the estate on death actual or civil. " Applying these principles to the facts of that case	 it was remarked : "In the light of the scheme of the Act and its avowed purpose	 it would be difficult	 without doing violence to the language used in the enactment	 to assume that a right declared in property in favour of a person under a decree for partition is not a right to property. If	 under a preliminary decree	 the right in favour of a Hindu male be regarded as property	 the right declared in favour of a Hindu female must also be regarded as property. The High Court was	 therefore	 in our judgment	 in error in holding that the right declared in favour of Khilonabai (1) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 418. 464 was not possessed by her	 nor are we able to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for Rajkumar that it was not property within the meaning of section 14 of the Act. " In that case	 it will be noticed that the widow died	 while the suit for partition was still pending	 and she was not in actual	 physical or constructive possession of the property which was held to be possessed by her at the time of her death. Only a preliminary decree declaring her right to the share had been passed. That decree was passed before the Act came into force and the widow died after the Act came into force. On these facts	 the Court came to the finding that the disputed property was possessed by the widow; and this finding was given despite the circumstance that she was not in actual possession or constructive possession of the property	 but had merely obtained the right to the property under the preliminary decree. The principle laid down in that case	 thus	 supports the broader meaning given to the expression "possessed by" indicated by us earlier. The last case of this Court brought to our notice is Eramma vs Veerupana and Others(1). That was a converse case in which the female Hindu	 in fact	 did not possess any legal right or title to the property	 though she was actually in physical possession of it. It was held: "The property possessed by a female Hindu	 as contemplated in the section	 is clearly property to which she has acquired some kind of title	 whether before or after the commencement of the Act. It may be noticed that the Explanation to section 14(1) sets out the various modes of acquisition of the property by a female Hindu and indicated that the section applies only to property to which the female Hindu has acquired some kind of title	 however restricted the nature of her interest may be. The words "as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner" as given in the last portion of sub section (1) of section 14 clearly suggest that the legislature intended that the limited ownership of a Hindu female should be changed into full ownership. In other words	 section 14 (1) of the Act contemplates that a Hindu female who	 in the absence of this provision	 would have been limited owner of the property	 will now become full owner of the same by virtue of this section. The object of the section is to extinguish the estate called "limited estate" or "widow 's estate" in Hindu Law and to make a Hindu woman	 who	 under the old law	 would have been only a limited owner	 a full owner of the property with all powers of disposition and to make the estate heritable by her own heirs and not revertible to the heirs of the last male holder. " In the concluding part	 it was held : "It follows	 therefore	 that the section cannot be interpreted so as to validate the illegal possession of a female Hindu and it does not confer any title on a mere trespasser. In other words	 the provisions of section 14(1) of the Act cannot be attracted in the case of a Hindu female who is in possession of the property (1) A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1879. 465 of the last male holder on the date of the commencement of the Act when she is only a trespasser without any right to property. " This case also	 thus	 clarifies that the expression "possessed by" is not intended to apply to a case of mere possession without title	 and that the legislature intended this provision for cases where the Hindu female possesses the right of ownership of the property in question. Even mere physical possession of the property without the right of ownership will not attract the provisions of this section. This case also	 thus	 supports our view that the expression "possessed by" was used in the sense of connoting state of ownership and	 while the Hindu female possesses the rights of ownership	 she would become full owner if the other conditions mentioned in the section are fulfilled. The section will	 however	 not apply at all to cases where the Hindu female may have parted with her rights so as to place herself in a position where she could	 in no manner	 exercise her rights of ownership in that property any longer. In this view that we have taken	 it does not appear to be necessary for us to refer to the decisions of the various High Courts which were cited before us by learned counsel for the appellants. The cases mentioned were : Sansir Patelin and Another vs Satyabatt Naikani and Another(1); Ganesh Mahanta and Others vs Sukria Bewa and Others(2); Harak Singh vs Kailash Singh and Another(3); Ram Gulam Singh and others vs Palakdhari Singh and others(4) ; Nathuni Prasad Singh and Another vs Mst. Kachnar Kuer & Others(5); and Mst. Mukhtiar Kaur vs Mst. Kartar Kaur and Others(4). All these were cases relating to situations where the widow had made some alienation of her rights in the property and none of them was concerned with a case where the female Hindu might have been dispossessed by a trespasser. The reasons given by the High Courts in those cases are	 therefore	 of no assistance in deciding the applicability of section 14(1) of the Act to a case of the nature before us. On the interpretation of section 14(1) of the Act that we have accepted above	 it must be held that the property involved in the present suit was possessed by Smt. Harnam Kaur when she died in the year 1958 and	 consequently	 Smt. Rattno and	 after her	 the present respondents must be deemed to have succeeded to those rights. We have already mentioned above that it was not disputed that	 if it is held that Smt. Hamam Kaur had become full owner of this property	 it would pass on her death to Smt. Rattno. As a result	 the decision given by the High Court must be upheld. The appeal is dismissed with costs. G. C. (1) A.I.R. 1958 Orissa 75. (3) A.I.R. 1958 Patna 581. (5) A.I.R. 1965 Patna 160. Appeal dismissed. (2) A.I.R. 1963 Orissa 167. (4) A.T.R. 1961 Patna 60. (6) A.I.R. 1966 Pun.

Summary:
A Hindu widow in the Punjab came into possession of her husband 's land on his death in 1917. She continued in possession till 1954 when on an application made by certain collaterals of her late husband the Naib Tehsildar effected a mutation in favour of the collaterals. On the basis of the Naib Tehsildar 's order the collaterals dispossessed the widow. She filed a suit for recovery of possession of the land. After the institution of the suit the 	 came into force. During the pendency of the suit	 in 1958	 the widow died and her daughter was substituted as legal representative. The defendants pleaded that the widow had lost her right to the land because of her karewa marriage with one of the collateral&		 and that the daughter could not succeed to the land as she was not in possession of the land on the coming into force of the so as to become full owner of the land under section 14 thereof. The trial court dismissed the suit but the first appellate court decreed it	 holding that there was no karewa marriage as alleged by the defendants	 and that section 14 was applicable to the case. The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants who came to this court by special leave. HELD : (i) The finding of fact by the first appellate court that there was no karewa marriage was binding on the defendants	 and the High Court rightly accepted it. It was not open to the defendants to challenge the finding in this Court. [457H] (ii) The use of the expression "possessed by" instead of the expression "in possession of" in section 14(1) was intended to enlarge the meaning of this expression to cover cases of ion in law. On the language of section 14(1) the provision will become applicable to any property which is owned by a female Hindu even though she is not in actual physical or constructive possession of the property. [459C D; 460D] The section however will not apply to cases where the Hindu female may have parted with her rights so as to place herself in a position where she could in no manner exercise her rights in that property any longer. [465C] On the facts of the case the plaintiff widow had acquired full rights of ownership of the land under s 14 of the . On her death in 1958 the property passed to her daughter. The High. Court	 rightly dismissed the defendants	 appeal. [465G] Gimmalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami vs Setra Veerayya & Ors	 [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 968 and Brahmdeo Singh vs Deomani Missir C.A. No. 130/1960 dated 15 10 1962	 distinguished. 455 section section Munna Lal vs section section Rajkumar	 [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 418 and Eramma vs Veerupana	 A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1879	 applied. Gaddam Venkayamma vs Gaddanz Veerayya	 A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 280	 Sansir Patelin & Anr. vs Satyabati Naikani & Anr. A.I.R. 1958 Orissa 75	 Gajesh Mahanta vs Sukria Bewa	 A.I.R. 1963 Orissa 167	 Hapak Singh vs Kailash Singh & Anr. A.I.R. 1958 Patna 581	 Ram Gulam Singh vs Palakdhari Singh	 A.I.R. 1961 Patna 60. ' Nathuni Prasad Singh vs Mst. Kachnar Kuer	 A.I.R. 1965 Patna 160 and Mst. Mukhtiar Kaur vs Mst. Kartar Kaur & Ors.	 A.I.R. 1966 Pun. 31	 referred to.