Judgment Case ID: 1622

Judgment:
Appeal No. 197 of 1961. Appeal by special leave from the judgments and decrees dated January 29	 30	 1957 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeals from Original Orders Nos. 122 and 156 of 1956 respectively. 413 G.S. Pathak	 A.N. Sinha and P.K. Mukherjee	 for the appellants. A.V Vismanatha Sastri	 B. R.L. lyengar and section N. mukherjee for the respondents. April 26. The judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta affirming the decision of a Single judge of that Court refusing to set aside the award of an arbitrator dated May 27	 1955. One Hemendra Nath Sen	 father of the second appellant	 died intestate in 1929 leaving his widow Premtarangini Debi and 8 sons. Respondents 1	2	3	 4	 6 and 7 are the brothers of the 2nd appellant. The 5th respondent is the widow of a deceased brother who died in 1933 while the 8th respondent is the wife of the 2nd respondent. The 1st appellant is the wife of the 2nd appellant. The parties were governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu law. Hemendra Nath left considerable properties and on his death disputes arose between his several heirs but an agreement dated January 31	 1933 these were settled By then one of the sons the husband of the 5th respondent had died leaving a widow (the 5th respondent) and these viz.	 the widow	 the 7 sons and the widowed daughter in law entered into this agreement by which the properties left by the deceased were partitioned among them Broadly stated	 the agreement specified the shares of the 9 parties thereto as equal i.e.	 one ninth each	 with however the two widows being allotted their respective shares for their life as for their maintenance. There was also a provision that in regard to a glass factory the 2nd appellant was to have a 5 annas share	 the rest of the member dividing the balance of the II annas 414 (presumably because the 1st appellant 's money went in for the initial capital for starting the concern) till certain specified contingencies occurred. Fresh disputes however	 arose between the parties and by a formal agreement dated May 11	 1953	 they set out those disputes between themselves and agreed to refer the same to the sole aribitration of Dr. Radha Binode Pal an eminent lawyer and jurist of Calcutta. As the terms of reference have some relevance to the points urged before us in the appeal it would be convenient to set them out. It read : "We the I undersigned hereby agree	 First to refer all disputes arising out of or in connection with or in relation to the New Indian Glass Works Ltd.	 including the management thereof and the acts of any of the parties in respect of or in relation to or arising out of the said Company	 and for future management thereof including the dispute regarding the alleged lease in favour of R. N. Sen (7th respondent) and of the alleged	prior leases in favour of A. N. Sen (2nd appellant) and F. N. Sen (6th respondent) of the said Company 's business	 the legality and validity thereof and Secondly all disputes whatsoever in relation to the joint properties as per Schedule hereunder written or otherwise which were or are owned by the parties or some of them	 to the sole Arbitration of Dr. Radha Binode Pal	 Advocate. The said Arbitrator is to enquire	 ascertain and partition the said joint properties. We agree that the	 said Dr. Radha Binode Pal would have summary powers and the award which would be made by him would be final and conclusive and binding upon the parties. " This was followed by a Schedule in which the joint properties were specified and to this document all the family members affixed their signatures. 415 Before	 however	 the reference was submitted to the arbitrator	 the respondents made an application to the High Court of Calcutta on its original side on July 12.	 1954 under section 20 of the Indian for an order directing the agreement to be filed into Court and for making a reference to the arbitrator appointed by the parties. Notices were issued to the appellants who were impleaded as respondents to that application and after a hearing	 an order was made on November 29	 1954 referring the disputes set out in the agreement to the arbitrator named therein. The arbitrator entered on the reference on January 16	 1955 and the parties thereafter filed statements of cases before him setting out their respective claims and contentions. Evidence was taken and counsel were heared and thereafter ' the arbitrator pronounced his award on May 27	 1955. It is the validity of this award that is under challenge in these proceedings. We might	 merely to clear the ground	 mention even at this stage that no 'misconduct ' is alleged against the arbitrator but the main ground on which the award is impugned is that it is incomplete. The award is a long document and purports to decide all the disputes which had been referred to him. It does not set out the arguments or even the contentions urged by the parties in regard to any specific matter or even the reasons for the particular decisions recorded but corresponds in form to what might for convenience be termed a decree in a civil suit. The award was filed into Court on June 29	 1955	 and thereupon the appellants made an appli cation for setting it aside on various grounds the principal of which was	 as already indicated	 that the award was incomplete	 in that all the disputes which had been referred for arbitration had not been disposed of by it. The application came on for hearing before a learned Single judge on the original side and it was dismissed on May 26	 1956	 the 416 learned judge directing a decree to be passed in terms of the award. The appellants preferred two appeals one from the order refusing to set aside the award and the other from the decree in terms thereof. These were heard and disposed of by a common judgment dated January 29	 1957 which directed the dismissal of the appeals and thereafter they applied for and obtained special leave of this court and in pursuance thereof the present appeal which is a consolidated one against the judgment in the two appeals in the High Court has been filed. Before the High Court a very large number of objections were taken to the validity or legality of the award and they have been elaborately considered and dealt with by the judge of first instance and by the appellate Bench. Most of these	 however	 were not repeated before us and Mr. Pathak learned Counsel for the appellants intimated that he would press only three of the grounds: (1) that all the disputes which had been referred to the arbitrator had not been disposed of by the award	 and that for this reason the award was incomplete and had to be set aside. He submitted that there was this incompleteness in respect of three matters : (a) the award had given no direction regarding the rendition of accounts and profits with reference to a lease of the Glass Works Ltd.	 which the award had declared was invalid and not binding on the Company in which all the shares were owned by the parties	 (b) the parties had specifically required the arbitrator in their agreement of reference that he should give directions as regards the future management of the Glass Co. 	 but the award had failed to comply with this request. 	 (c) there was an allegation made in the reference	 and as regards which evidence was led before the arbitrator	 as to misappropriation of moneys by the 6th respondent. The arbitrator had not specified in his award as to whether this allegation of misappropriation had been 417 made out or not	 nor had he given any direction in regard to the matter. These related to the head of objections touching the incompleteness of the award. (2) The second ground urged was this : This award had directed that a piece of land situated at Ketugram in the district of Burdwan be allotted to the 7th respondent in trust for sale for meeting the costs and charges of filing the award and other Court proceedings in reference thereto and to distribute the balance remaining after meeting the said costs and charges	 equally between himself and 6 other named. Learned Counsel urged that it was beyond the power of the arbitrator to have created this trust of the property in dispute. (3) The values of the several items of property were specified in the award and the division effected was on the basis of this valuation. Learned Counsel urged that the arbitrator failed in his duty in not valuing the properties himself but had adopted the values suggested by one or other of the parties. We shall now deal with these points. As however	 we consider that it is only the 1st of the above points about the incompleteness of the award that merits any consideration and that the other two have really no substance and it would be convenient first to dispose of the second and the third of the above points. The trust created by the award to which point No. 2 relates is in the following terms. Clause 13 of the award which the relevant clause runs : "That the land at Ketugram	 Katwa in the District of Burdwan is allotted to Sri Dhirendra Nath Sen	 in trust for selling the same to meet the costs and charges of filing the award together with minutes of the arbitration proceedings	 depositions and documents to be filed in court with the award and to distribute the balance if 418 any	 left after meeting the said costs and charges	 equally amongst himself and the 6 other sons. " and then the award proceeds to make provisions for the contingency of the sale proceeds being insufficient. It was submitted by learned Counsel that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to create a trust in respect of property which he was called upon to divide between the parties. This contention however proceeds on a misreading of what the arbitrator had done	 for he has done nothing of the sort alleged. He has merely made provision for the payment of the costs to be incurred in filing the award which obviously	 if it were a valid award	 would have to be borne by all the parties whose property was being divided under the award and he had made provision just for that purpose and had directed a division of the surplus sale proceeds among the parties entitled to the property. When this aspect of the matter was pointed out to learned Counsel the contention was not seriously maintained. The third point about the arbitrator not having determined the values of the property himself has even less merit than the one we now disposed of The minutes of the proceedings before the arbitrator were produced before the court and those clearly showed that the estimated values of the items	 as set out in the award	 were those to which the parties themselves had agreed. The point	 therefore	 does not call for any further consideration. Coming next to the point regarding the in completeness of the award	 we shall deal first with the contention based on the absence in the award of a direction to account for profits with regard to a lease of the Glass factory which was declared void. The relevant facts relating to this objection are as follows. Under the arbitration agreement the 1st 419 head of the disputes referred was this " disputes arising out of or in connection with or in relation to the New Indian Glass Works Ltd. including the management thereof and the acts of any of the parties in respect of or in relation to or arising out of the said company". This was amplified in a statement filed before the arbitrator on February 12	 1955 by the 1st appellant. "Para 12. Dhirendra Nath Sen	 Phanindra Nath Sen	 Satyendra Nath Sen	 Rabindra Nath Sen and jitendra Nath Sen should render true accounts of their dealings with the assets and/or properties of the said Company (New Indian Glass Works) and an award be passed for my share of the amount found due on accounting. The alleged leases in favour of Rabindra Nath Sen and Phanindra Nath Sen were fraud ulently made in order to defraud me. I claim for an adjudgment that the said leases are void and I pray for accounts	 against the said alleged lessees and an award for my share of the profits on accounting. " The arbitrator decided in paragraph 9 (c) of the award that "the alleged lease of the factory to Rabindra Nath Sen to be declared void and to be of no binding effect on the Company or on the shareholders. " The award contained	 however	 no further direction ordering or refusing to order Rabindra Nath Sen to account for the profits with regard to this lease declared void. The point that is now urged is that the award is incomplete	 in that it has not followed up this declaration or invalidity of the lease by making a consequential order for accounting or by rejecting the claim of the appellants to the accounting and for their share of the amounts found due on the taking of such accounts. The learned 420 Single judge on the original side as well as the appellate Bench rejected this objection on the authority of an English decision in Harrison vs Creswick (1)	 where Parke	 B.	 delivering the judgment of the court	 stated : "The silence of the Arbitrator upon the subject placed before him means that the Arbitrator has negatived such plea. " It was submitted by Mr. Pathak that this decision had been misunderstood by the learned judges of the High Court	 and that	 in fact	 it was an authority in his favour. The contention urged before the Court of common pleas as a ground for setting aside the award was that the defendant bad pleaded a cross claim before the arbitrator and that The award bad granted the plaintiff a decree for a certain sum without specifically allowing or negativing the defendant 's cross claim. Dealing with this objection Parke	 B. who spoke for the Court	 observed : "The only question is whether the arbitrator has not by his award impliedly	 if not in express terms	 finally disposed of the matter. The rule as laid down in the notes to Birks vs Trippett is	 that	 where an award professes to be made de praemissis 'Even where there is no award of general releases	 the silence of the award as to some of the matters submitted and brought before the arbitrator	 does not per se prevent it from being a sufficient exercise of the authority vested in him by the submission. An award is good	 notwithstanding the arbit rator has not made a distinct adjudiction on each or any of the several distinct matters submitted to him	 provided that it does not appear that he has excluded any. . Where an award is made de praemissis	 the presump tion is	 that the arbitrator intended to dispose (1) 421 finally of all the matters in difference; and his award will be held final	 if by any intendment it can be made so. The rule is this where there is a further claim made by the plaintiff	 or a cross demand set up by the defendant	 and the award	 professing to be made of and concerning the matters referred	 is silent respecting such	 further claim or crossdemand	 the award amounts to an adjudiction that the plaintiff has DO such further claim	 or that the defendant 's cross demand is untenable : but where the matter so set up from its nature requires to be specifically adjudicated upon	 mere silence will not do. " It is this last sentence on which Mr. Pathak relies in support of the submission that in the case now before us there was a need for the arbitrator to have rendered a decision in express terms accepting or rejecting the claim for the accounting and that a rejection of that claim could not be inferred from the mere failure of the arbitrator to deal with it. Learned Counsel pointed out that a case of a cross demand or a cross claim with which Parke	 B. was dealing was quite different from an independent claim such as that for accounting made by the appellants in the present case	 for where a sum is decreed to a plaintiff it necessarily involves the acceptance or rejection of the cross claim made by the defendant but the position is different where the claim made stands on independent footing. Before dealing with this point it is necessary to emphasize certain basic positions. The first of them is that a Court should approach an award with a desire ' 'to support it	 if that is reasonably possible	 rather than to destroy it by calling it illegal (See Salby vs Whitbread and Co.	 (1). Besides it is obvious that unless the reference to arbitration specifically so requires the arbitrator is not bound to deal with each (1) 	 748. 422 claim or matter separately	 but can deliver a consolidated award. The legal position is clear that unless so specifically required an award need not formally express the decision of the arbitrator on each matter of difference. (Vide Re. Brown and The Croydon Canal Co. (1) and Jewell vs Christie (). Further	 as parke	 B. himself put it during the course of arguments in Harrison vs Creswick (3) : "Unless the contrary appears the court will presume that the award disposes finally of all the matters in difference." and to repeat a sentence from the extract quoted earlier : "Where an award is made de praemissis	 the presumption is	 that the arbitrator intended to dispose finally of all the matters in difference ; and his award will be held final	 if by any intendment it can be made so. " We shall approach the argument addressed to us in the light of these considerations. Now the award opens with a paragraph which recites	 after setting out the reference : "Whereas I have heard and duly considered all the allegations advanced	 evidence adduced before me regarding the respective cases of the parties. . I do hereby make and publish this	 my award in writing as to all the disputes mentioned above. " It need hardly be added that the arbitration agreement and the statements filed extracts from which we have set out earlier were among the documents incorporated with this award and included among the matters considered by the arbitrator which (1) (1839) 9 Ad. & Ell. (2) (1867]	 L.R. 2 C.P. 296 (3) ; 423 disputes he intended to resolve by this award. The award	 therefore	 on its face intended and purported s to decide all the disputesr aised for this adjudication and therefore the Court will assume that he has Di	 considered and disposed of every claim made or defence raised. Since the award now impugned or expressly states that it is made "de pruemissis	 i.e., of and concerning all the matters in dispute referred to the arbitrator, there is a presumption that the award is complete. In the circumstances the principle of construction enunciated by Parke, B. aptly covers the case and the silence of the award as regards the claim for accounting must, therefore, be taken to be intended as a decision rejecting the claim to that relief. We shall next turn to the Submission that the nature of the claim here made required a specific adjudication and the appellants were logically entitled to the relief of accounting when once the lease of the factory was declared void and that viewed from that angle the award must be treated as incomplete as not expressly dealing with a legal consequence of the declaration granted. We do not consider this contention sound, for two reasons : (1) If the lease were held to be void because of technical informality it need not necessarily involve any accounting since accounting postulates, the lease being for an improperly low rental. If the lease be set aside for such a reason, it would not necessarily follow that the relief of accounting was implicit in the declaration of the invalidity of the lease, (2) Non constat, the amount due on taking on an accounting has not been taken into account or adjusted in making the other provisions of the award. This objection, there fore, has to be repelled. The next item alleged as regards the incompleteness of the award was the failure on the part of the arbitrator to provide by his award, for the future 424 management of the New Indian Glass Works Ltd. We consider that there is no substance in this objection either The award had declared the shares ' of the parties in the Glass Company and by cl. 9 (b) had set aside the agreements or arrangements put forward as regards the management of the affairs of the company regarding whose validity and pro priety disputes had been raised. When those alleged agreements were set aside and declared not to be binding on the parties, the law would step in and the provisions of the Indian Companies Act as regards the management of the business and affairs of the company would come into operation, and the arbitrator may well have considered that the provisions contained in the law of the land sufficient to safeguard the interests of the shareholders. The silence of the arbitrator in this regard and his failure to make any specific provision therefor in regard to the management did not therefore leave any lacuna as regards the rights of the parties to manage but must be taken to have left the right of the parties to be determined by the relevant general law applicable to the management of the company. If the arbitrator considered that these provisions sufficiently secured the rights of the parties and did not consider that any special provision as regards this matter was needed the award would be silent on that point and that might be the explanation for the state of affairs. The last of the points urged was that the award had not referred to or decided the claim of the appellants to relief from the respondents or some of them on the ground that they had misappropriated the moneys of the company and were, therefore, bound to bring the money back into hotch potch for division among the parties. The absence of any provision in regard to this claim is capable only of one interpretation and that is that arbitrator rejected the claim. It is, therefore, an instance where the silence of the award is a clear indication, having regard to 425 the adjudication being professedly complete and de praemissis, that the claim in that respect was not upheld. This would not render the award incomplete. We consider therefore that none of the three points urged in challenge of the validity of the award on the ground of its incompleteness has any substance. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 
1144	Appeal No. 112 of 1957. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated January 28, 1954, of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 69 of 1950. Purshottam Trikamdas and Naunit Lal for the appellants. C. K. Daphtary,Solicitor General of India, section N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and P. L. Vohra for respond ents Nos. I and 2. B R. L. Iyengar for respondents Nos. 6 to 9. 1961. February 21. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH, J. The genealogy which sets out the relationship between some of the principal parties in this litigation is as follows: Mallappa | | | | | Balappa Shivappa Basavanappa Chanamalappa | | Basalingappa | Rachappa | (Parvatewa Balappa deft. 9 | respdt. 12) | | | | | | | Shrishailappa Shivappa | (Plaintiff 1) (plaintiff 2) | | | | | | | | | malappa Chanabasappa Balappa Basavanappa Shrishailppa (deft. 5) (deft.6) (adopted by (deft. 7) (deft. 8) Chanamalappa Mallappa had four sons Balappa, Shivappa, Basavanappa and Chanamalappa. These four sons, formed a joint Hindu family. Chanamalappa separated himself from the joint family sometime in the year 1909 and his other three brothers continued to remain joint. Shivappa was the Manager of the joint family 898 after the death of Mallappa. Shivappa died in 1928. and Rachappa became the Manager of, the family. The joint family possessed lands in seventeen, villages and many houses in Khanapur. The family had also an extensive money lending business. One Bashettappa Neeli hereinafter referred to as Bashettappawas married to the sister of Rachappa. On July 29, 1929, Bashettappa executed a deed of simple mortgage in favour of Rachappa in respect of certain parcels of lands and houses belonging to him to secure repayment of Rs. 1,73,000/ , Rs. 76,700/ out of which were received in cash and the balance represented amounts which Rachappa agreed to pay to Bashettappa 's creditors. To one Gurappa, Bashettappa owed Rs. 8,000/ as an unsecured debt and Rachappa agreed to pay that debt. In Insolvency Application No. 22 of 1929 of the file of the First Class Subordinate Judge, Dharwar, Bashettappa was adjudicated an insolvent and receivers were appointed by the Insolvency Court to administer his estate. The receivers applied for a declaration that the mortgage deed, in favour of Rachappa was in fraud of creditors and was 'accordingly void. The Assistant Judge, Dharwar, in Appeal No. 25 of 1934 from the order of the Insolvency Court held that Rachappa was entitled out of the mortgage amount to recover Rs. 45,700/ as a secured debt and Rs. 31,000/ as unsecured debt. Gurappacreditor of Bashettappa in the meanwhile filed Suit No. 84 of 1932 against Rachappa and other members of his family in the court of the First Class Subordinate Judge, Dharwar, for a decree for Rs. 8,000/claiming that Rachappa had, acting on behalf of the joint family of which he was the manager, undertaken under the deed of mortgage to pay that amount and. that he Gurappa had accepted that undertaking. ; A decree exparte was passed in that suit against Rachappa on February 28,1933, and the claim against the other members of the family was either withdrawn ' or rejected. On July 23, 1939, the three branches of the joint family by mutual agreement severed the joint status and properties movables and immovables beloning to the family were divided. Pursuant to 899 this division, lands and houses which fell to the shares of the three branches were mutated in the Revenue and Municipal records in the names of the managers of the respective branches. Movables were also divided. The mortgage amount recoverable from Bashettappa and a claim against one Desai were ' it is the case of the plaintiff in the suit out of which this appeal Arises, kept joint. Gurappa after making certain infructuous attempts to execute the decree filed dharkhast No. 176 of 1940 to recover Rs. 11,061 6 9 and prayed for an order of attachment and sale of the rights of Rachappa under the mortgage bond dated July 29,1929. One Ganpatrao N. Madiman hereinafter referred to as Madiman offered the highest bid at the court auction and the mortgage bond was sold to him for Rs. 20,000/ An application filed by Rachppa for setting aside the sale pleading that the sale was vitiated by material irregularities and fraud in publishing and conducting the sale was rejected. The mortgage bond was delivered by the executing court to Madiman and orders were issued against Bashettappa and the receivers of his estate prohibiting them from making payments of the dues under the mortgage or any interest thereon, to any person or personal except the purchaser Madiman. In Miscellaneous Application No. 57 of 1944, Madiman applied, to the Insolvency Court to be recognised as an unsecured creditor for Rs. 31,000/., and the application was granted on the footing that the entire interest under the mortgage bond was purchased by him. Receivers appointed by the Insolvency Court thereafter put up for sale. the equity of redemption in the mortgaged properties and the same was purchased for Rs. 15,500/. by Madiman. The sale deed in this behalf was executed by the receivers in favour of Madiman on January 28, 1947. Madiman accordingly became the owner of the equity of redemption and claimed to be entitled to the entire mortgagee right as a purchaser of the right, title and interest of Rachappa. Basalingappa who was the natural brother of Rachappa and was adopted by his uncle Basavanappa died in 1946 leaving him surviving his widow 900 Parvatewa, and two sons Shrishailappa and Shivappa. The sons of Basalingappa who will hereinafter be referred to as the plaintiffs filed Suit No. 253 of 1947 for a decree for Rs. 1,23,400/ by enforcing the mortgage deed executed by Bashettappa claiming that Madiman had at the court auction acquired in the mortgagee right only the right, title and interest of Rachappa which was a third and the plaintiffs and defendants 5 to 8 sons of Shivappa continued to remain owners of the remaining two third share. The plaintiffs prayed for a decree that the amount due under the mortgage be awarded to them and in default of payment the amount be realised by sale of the mortgaged property. To this suit were impleaded Bashettappa as defendant No. 1, receivers of his estate as defendants Nos. 2 and 3,Madiman as defendant No. 4, sons of Shivappa as defendants Nos. 5 to 8 and Rachappa and his son as defendants Nos. 9 and 10. Madiman died after the institution of this suit and his sons were impleaded as defendants Nos. 4A to 4C and his widow as defendant 4D. Madiman 's sons were the principal contesting defendants and the main contentions raised by them were: (1) that the mortgagee right was the separate property of Rachappa and it did not belong at any time to the joint family, of Rachappa defendants 5 to 8 and the plaintiffs, (2) that in any event, at the partition between the three branches the mortgagee right had failed to the share of Rachappa and that it was not kept undivided as alleged by the plaintiffs, and (3) that in Execution Petition No. 176 of 1940, the entire interest of the joint family was sold and it was purchased by Madiman and consequently, the plaintiffs could not enforce the mortgage. The trial court negatived the contentions raised by the sons of Madiman and held that only a third share in the mortgagee right was purchased at the court auction by Madiman. The court accordingly passed a decree against defendants Nos., 4A to 4D for payment of Rs. 60,933 5 4 and proportionate costs ',with future interest at 6% per annum 'on Rs. 30,466,10 8 901 from the date of the suit to the plaintiffs and defendants 5 to 8 within six months and in default of payment for sale of the mortgaged property. Against that decree, defendants 4A to 4C hereinafter referred to as the appellants appealed to the High Court at Bombay. The High Court held that the mortgagee right belonged to the joint family, that the agreement to pay Rs. 8,000/ to Gurappa was not binding upon that family and therefore in execution of the decree passed in favour of Gurappa only the right, title and interest of Rachappa was purchased by Madiman. The High Court further held that there was in 1939 severance of joint family status between the members of the family of Rachappa, plaintiffs and others, but as in the state of the record in the view of the court a finding on the question whether the mortgage debt was kept undivided could not be recorded, they remanded the case for recording a finding on the following issue:  Whether it is proved that the mortgage debt of 29th July	 1929	 fell to the share of defendant No. 9 at the family partition of July	 1939	 " and directed the trial court to allow both the parties to lead evidence upon this issue and to certify its findings thereon. The trial court recorded a negative finding on that issue. It held that the mortgage claim was kept undivided at the partition. The High Court confirmed this finding and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants	 subject to a slight modification as to the rate of interest awarded by the trial court. With special leave under article 136 of the Constitution	 this appeal is preferred. No serious argument was advanced before us on the plea that the amount due under the mortgage from Bashettappa was not the property of the joint family. At the material time when the mortgage deed was executed by Bashettappa	 Rachappa was the manager of the joint family. In Suit No. 84 of 1932 filed by Gurappa it was alleged that Rachappa was the manager of the joint family consisting of himself and the branches of Shivappa and Basavanappa and that the mortgage transaction was for the benefit of the joint family and that Raohappa had entered into that 902 transaction for and on behalf of the joint family and in that suit Rachappa alone was declared liable to pay Rs. 8	000/ . Partition of the year 1930 is supported by evidence which has remained unchallenged. Intimation was given to the village and Municipal authorities pursuant to the partition for mutating the names of the different branches to whom the shares were allotted. The evidence of Rachappa and Mallappa that the partition took place also has remained uncontradicted. The question which calls for consideration is whether at the partition	 the mortgagee right under the deed executed by Bashettappa was kept undivided. Mallappa defendant No. 5 in his evidence when he was examined after remand stated that " an equal division was made of the lands according to the income and that Rachappa was not given a smaller share in the lands. " He also stated that the houses were divided in equal shares and the outstandings in the money lending business except two bonds the mortgage bond executed by Bashettappa and one Desai were kept undivided. He denied the suggestion that the mortgage debt due from Bashettappa was allotted exclusively to Rachappa. Rachappa in his evidence also stated that the mortgage bond was kept undivided between the three branches and that it was not true that it was allotted to his shares at the partition. Devidas defendant No. 4 A had evidently no personal knowledge about this partition or the terms thereof His statement that Rachappa had told him at the time when Madiman offered his bid at the court auction that the mortgage bond was allotted exclusively to Rachappa 's share could not in the circumstances of the case be true and was rightly "believed by the trial court and the High Court.

Summary:
The appellant as well as the respondents are the heirs of one Hemendra Nath Sen who died intestate in 1929 leaving considerable properties. Dispute having arisen between his heirs an agreement for partition was entered into determining their shares Among other provisions there was one by which the 2nd appellant was to have 5 annas shares in a glass factory and the rest of the members dividing the balance of the II annas share Further disputes arose and the parties executed an arbitration agreement in which the dispute between the parties was set out Before the reference was submitted to the arbitrator the respondents applied to the High Court under section 20 of the Arbitration Act for an order directing the agreement to be filed in the Court and for making a reference to the arbitrator appointed by the parties. The present appellants were impleaded as respondents. The court made an order referring the disputes to the 411 arbitrator named in the agreement. The arbitrator entered on the reference and after following the prescribed procedure he pronounced the award. The award was filed in the court where upon the appellants applied for setting it aside on various grounds the principal of which was that the award was incomplete. 	 in that all the disputes which had been referred for arbitration had not been disposed of by it. The Single judge before whom the application came for hearing rejected the application and directed a decree to be passed in terms of the award. The two appeals filed by the appellants in the High Court	 one from the order refusing to set aside the award and the other from the decree in terms of the award were dismissed. The present appeal is by way of special leave granted by this Court The main contention raised was that the award was incomplete in as much as the award did not dispose of three matters referred to the arbitrator. These three matters were (a) the award bad given no direction regarding the rendition of accounts and profits with reference to a lease of the Glass Works Ltd. which the award had declared invalid (b) the award had failed to comply with the request	 contained in the arbitration agreement	 that the arbitrator should give directions as regards the future management of the Glass Co.	 (c) there was an allegation in the arbitration agreement as regards which evidence was led before the arbitrator	 in relation as to miappropriation of moneys by 6th respondent but the arbitrator had not specified in the award whether this allegation had been made out or not and no direction had been given in regard to the matter. Held that a court should approach an award with a desire to support it if that is reasonably possible	 rather than to destroy it by calling it illegal. Salby vs Whitbread and Co. [1917] I.K.B.736 referred to. Unless the reference to arbitration specifically so requires the arbitrator is not bound to deal	 with each claim or matter separately	 but can deliver a consolidated award. Re Brown and the Croydon Canal Co. (1839) 9 Ad & E11 522 : ; and Jewell vs Christe 	 referred to. The silence of the arbitrator upon the subject placed before him means that the arbitrator has negatived such plea. Unless the contrary appears the court will presume that the 412 award disposes of finally all the matters in difference. Where an award is made de praemissis	 the presumption is that the arbitrator intended to dispose finally of all the matters in difference and his award will be held final if by any intendment it can be made so. Harrison vs Creswick	 ; referred to. Since the impugned award expressly states that it is made de praemissis"	 i.e. of and concerning all matters in dispute referred to the arbitrator	 there is a presumption that the award is complete. The silence of the award as regards the claim for accounting must therefore be taken to be intended as a decision rejecting the claim to the relief. If the lease were set aside because of technical informality. it would not necessarily follow that the relief of accounting was implicit in the declaration of the invalidity of the lease. Non constat	 the amount due on taking an account has not been taken into account adjusted in making the other provisions of the award. Hence the contention that the nature of the claims required a specific adjudication is repelled. The silence of the arbitrator on the question of the award in the facts and circumstances of the case	 on the question of future management of the Glass Company and his failure to make any specific provision in regard to the management did not therefore leave any lacuna as regards the rights and must be taken to have left the right of the parties to be determined by the relevant general law applicable to the management of the company. The absence of any provision regarding the claims of the appellants to relief from the respondents on the ground that they misappropriated the money of the company is capable of only one interpretation and that is that the arbitrator rejected the claims.