Judgment Case ID: 4551

Judgment:
ATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3379 of 1981 Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 14th December	 1981 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 1104 of 1981. F.S. Nariman	 Arvind V. Savant and M.N. Shroff for the Appellant. A.L. Settwal	 and Mrs. Jayshree Wad for Respondent No. 1. D.R. Dhanuka	 Lalit Bhasin	 Vinay Bhasin	 Suraj M. Shah and Vineet Kumar for Respondent No. 2. L.N. Sinha	 Attorney General	 M.K. Banerjee	 Additional Solicitor General of India and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 3. S.B. Bhasme	 S.V. Tambwekar and R.G. Bhadekar for Interveners 1 6. V.N. Ganpule for Intervener No. 7. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN	 J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court dated December 14	 1981. By its judgment the High Court struck down an order dated August 27	 1981 by which the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court	 in exercise of his powers under sub section (3) of section 51 of the States Reorganization Act	 1956 (Act XXXVII of 1956) (for short 'the Act ') with the prior approval of the Governor of Maharashtra	 directed that the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court of 660 Bombay shall also sit at Aurangabad with effect from August 27	 1981 for the disposal of cases arising out of the Marathwada region of the State of Maharashtra. By an order dated May 4	 1982 we allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court since it did not appear to us that the impugned order issued by the Chief Justice suffered from any infirmity	 legal or constitutional. We now proceed to give our reasons. By virtue of sub section (1) of section 49	 the High Court of Bombay exercising immediately before the appointed day i.e. November 1	 1956	 jurisdiction in relation to the existing State of Bombay	 was deemed to be the High Court for the new State of Bombay constituted under sub section (1) of section 8 of the Act. Immediately before the appointed day	 i.e. on October 27	 1956	 the Central Government while telegraphically communicating to the then Chief Justice (Chagla	 C.J.) the issue of a Presidential Order under sub section (1) of section 51 of the Act appointing Bombay to be the principal seat of the High Court for the new State of Bombay with effect from November 1	 1956	 conveyed that as from that date the High Court shall function only at that place unless the Chief Justice issued an order under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act that temporary Benches may also function at other places. The then Chief Justice was advised that he should issue such notification on the appointed day	 i.e. November 1	 1956	 for the establishment of Circuit Benches at Nagpur and Rajkot with a view to preserve the continuity of judicial administration	 since the High Court of Madhya Pradesh had its principal seat at Nagpur and the High Court of Saurashtra at Rajkot	 prior to the appointed day. The then Chief Justice accordingly issued an order under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act with the prior approval of the Governor by which he appointed Nagpur and Rajkot to be places at which the Judges and Division Courts of the Bombay High Court would also sit with effect from November 1	 1956. The two Benches at Nagpur and Rajkot continued to function till May 1	 1960 when the bilingual State of Bombay was bifurcated into two separate States The State of Maharashtra and the State of Gujarat by the Bombay Reorganization Act	 1960 (Act	 XI OF 1960). Prior to the constitution of the States Reorganization Commission in December 1953	 leaders of political parties from the Marathi speaking areas in the Vidarbha and Marathwada regions and of the then State of Bombay signed an agreement or pact called 661 the Nagpur pact on September 23	 1953 which formed a basis for joint representation to the States Reorganization Commission and was the basis for the formation of Maharashtra as a new State for the Marathi speaking people of the former State of Bombay	 the Vidarbha region of the former State of Madhya Pradesh	 and the Marathwada region of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad. (7) of the Nagpur Pact provides that the provision with regard to the establishment of a permanent Bench of the High Court at Nagpur shall apply mutatis mutandis to the Marathwada region. It appears that due to continued demand of the people of Marathwada region for the establishment of a permanent Bench of the High Court at Aurangabad under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act	 the State Government first took up the issue with the then Chief Justice (Kantawala	 C.J.) in 1977. On March 22	 1978	 the State Legislative Assembly passed a unanimous resolution supporting a demand for the establishment of a permanent Bench of the High Court at Aurangabad to the effect: "With a view to save huge expenses and to reduce the inconvenience of the people of the Marathwada and Pune regions in connection with legal proceedings	 this Assembly recommends to the Government to make a request to the President to establish a permanent Bench of the Bombay High Court having jurisdiction in Marathwada and Pune regions	 one at Aurangabad and the other at Pune." The said demand for the constitution of a permanent Bench of the High Court at Aurangabad was supported by the State Bar Council of Maharashtra	 Advocates '. Association of Western India	 several bar associations and people in general. It is necessary here to mention that the resolution at originally moved made a demand for the setting up of a permanent Bench of the High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad for the Marathwada region	 and there was no reference to Pune which was added by way of amendment. Initially	 the State Government made a recommendation to the Central Government in 1978 for the establishment of two permanent Benches under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act	 one at Aurangabad and the other at Pune	 but later in 1981 confined its recommendation to Aurangabad alone. The State Government thereafter took a Cabinet decision in January	 1981 to establish a permanent Bench of the High Court at 662 Aurangabad and this was conveyed by the Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra	 Law & Judiciary Department	 communicated by his letter dated February 3	 1981 to the Registrar and he was requested	 with the permission of the Chief Justice	 to submit proposals regarding accommodation for the Court and residential bungalows for the Judges	 staff	 furniture etc. necessary for setting up the Bench. As a result of this communication	 the Chief Justice wrote to the Chief Minister on February 26	 1981 signifying his consent to the establishment of a permanent Bench at Aurangabad. After adverting to the fact that his predecessors had opposed such a move and had indicated	 amongst other things	 that such a step involved	 as it does	 breaking up of the integrity of the institution and the Bar	 which would necessarily impair the quality and quantity of the disposals	 he nonetheless went on to say: "As against that I am personally aware of the difficulties to which the litigant public of Marathwada is subjected to	 in regard to their causes in this High Court since the Marathwada area became a part of the Bombay State with effect from 1.11.1956	 resulting virtually in the stifling of the genuine litigation therefrom. Grievances on this count are many and genuine to my knowledge. Establishment and continued existence of the Benches in the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh	 Uttar Pradesh	 Bihar	 Kerala and a Bench at Nagpur in our own State	 make it difficult for them to believe that their claim for a Bench alone is liable to be ignored because of any such view of the Law Commission or the Jurists. This only goes to deepen the bitterness and sense of injustice that is prevalent among them. " It however became evident by the middle of June	 1981 that the Central Government would take time in reaching a decision on the proposal for the establishment of a permanent Bench under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act at Aurangabad as the question involved a much larger issue	 viz. the principles to be adopted and the criterion laid down for the establishment of permanent Benches of High Courts generally. This meant that there would be inevitable delay in securing concurrence of the Central Government and the issuance of a Presidential Notification under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act. On June 12	 1981	 the State Government accordingly took a Cabinet decision that pending the establishment of a permanent Bench under 663 sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act at Aurangabad for the Marathwada region	 resort be had to the provisions of sub section (3) thereof. On June 20	 1981 Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra	 Law and Judiciary Department wrote to the Registrar stating that there was a possibility of the delay in securing concurrence of the Central Government and the issuance of a notification by the President under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act for the establishment of a permanent Bench at Aurangabad and in order to tide over the difficulty	 the provisions of sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act may be resorted to and he therefore requested the Chief Justice to favour the Government with his views in the matter at an early date. On July 5	 1981	 the Law Secretary waited on the Chief Justice in that connection. On July 7	 1981 the Chief Justice wrote a letter to the Chief Minister in which he stated that the Law Secretary had conveyed to him the decision of the State Government to have a Circuit Bench at Aurangabad under sub section (3) of section 51 pending the decision of the Central Government to establish a permanent Bench there under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act. The Chief Justice then added: "I agree that some such step is necessary in view of the preparations made by the Government at huge costs and the mounting expectations of the people there." Rest of the letter deals with the problem of finding residential accommodation for the Judges	 staff	 increase in strength of Judges etc. On July 20	 1981	 the Law Secretary addressed a letter to the Registrar requesting him to forward	 with the permission of the Chief Justice	 proposal as is required under sub section (3) of section 51 for the setting up of a Bench at Aurangabad. In reply to the same	 the Registrar by his letter dated July 24	 1981 conveyed that the Chief Justice agreed with the suggestion of the State Government that action had to be taken under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act for which the approval of the Governor was necessary and he enclosed a copy of the draft order which the Chief Justice proposed to issue under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act. On August 10	 1981	 the Law Secretary conveyed to the Registrar the approval of the Governor. On August 27	 1981	 the Chief Justice issued an order under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act to the effect: 664 "In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (3) of section 51 of the State Reorganization Act	 1956 (No. 37 of 1956) and all other powers enabling him in this behalf	 the Hon 'ble the Chief Justice	 with the approval of the Governor of Maharashtra	 is pleased to appoint Aurangabad as a place at which the Hon 'ble Judges and Division Courts of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay may also sit. " The High Court has set aside the impugned notification issued by the Chief Justice under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act on the following grounds	 namely: (1) The impugned order issued by the Chief Justice under sub section (3) of s.51 of the Act was not directly connected with or related to problems arising out of the reorganization of the States i.e. there is no nexus between the purpose and objects of the Act and the setting up of Aurangabad as a venue for additional seat of the High Court	 (2) The provisions of the Act and in particular of section 51 were not intended to be operative in definitely and they were meant to be exercised either immediately or within a reasonable time and therefore the exercise of the power by the Chief Justice under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act appointing Aurangabad as a place where the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court may also sit after a lapse of 26 years is constitutionally impermissible	 (3) The State of Maharashtra was not a new State within the meaning of section 51 read with section 2(1) of the Act after the bifurcation of the bilingual State of Bombay into the State of Maharashtra and the newly constituted State of Gujarat under section 3 of the Bombay Reorganization Act	 1960 and therefore the power of the President of India to establish a permanent Bench or Benches of the High Court under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act and that of the Chief Justice to appoint with the prior approval of the Governor a place or places where the Judges and the Division Courts of the High Court may also sit under sub section (3) thereof	 can no longer be exercised	 (4) The power conferred on the Chief Justice under sub s.(3) of section 51 of the Act to appoint a place or places where the Judges or the Division Courts of the High Court may also sit	 does not include a power to establish a Bench or Benches at such places	 and he had no power or authority under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act to issue administrative directions for the filing or institution of proceedings at such a place and (5) The impugned notification issued by the Chief Justice under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act was a colourable exercise of power and therefore liable to be struck down. We are afraid	 the High Court has proceeded on wholly wrong premises. 665 Section 51 of the Act provides as follows: "51. Principal seat and other places of sitting of High Courts for new States. (1) The principal seat of the High Court for a new State shall be at such place as the President may	 be notified order	 appoint. (2) The President may	 after consultation with the Governor of a new State and the Chief Justice of the High Court for that State	 by notified order	 provide for the establishment of a permanent bench or benches of that High Court at one or more places within the State other than the principal seat of the High Court and for any matters connected therewith. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) or sub section (2)	 the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court for a new State may also sit at such other place or places in that State as the Chief Justice may	 with the approval of the Governor	 appoint. " There questions arise for consideration in this appeal: (1): Whether the power of the President under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act or that of the Chief Justice of the High Court under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act	 can no longer be exercised due to lapse of time. (2) Whether the exercise of power by the Chief Justice under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act appointing Aurangabad to be a place at which the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court shall also sit is co related to the reorganization of the States	 or he has no nexus with the object and purposes sought to be achieved by the Act and is only a part of the demand for decentralization of the administration justice in general. (3) Whether the power of the Chief Justice under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act does not include a power to establish a Bench or Benches at such place or places carving out territorial jurisdiction for such Benches and authorising the filing or institution of proceedings at such places. It is difficult to agree with the High Court that the High Court of Bombay is not the High Court of a new State within the meaning 666 of sub section (1) of section 49 of the Act	 merely because the bilingual State of Bombay was bifurcated into two separate States of Maharashtra and Gujarat under section 3 of the Bombay Reorganization Act	 1960. Nor do we see any valid basis for the view taken by the High Court that the power of the President to establish a permanent Bench or Benches of the High Court under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act or that of the Chief Justice to appoint	 with the approval of the Governor	 a place or places where the Judges and Division Courts may also sit under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act	 can no longer be exercised	 in relation to the High Court of Bombay. It was right by not disputed before us that the High Court of Bombay was the High Court for the new State of Bombay within the meaning of sub section (1) of section 49 of the Act and therefore the provisions of section 51 of the Act are still applicable. That must be so because the High Court of Bombay owes its principal seat at Bombay to the Presidential Order issued under sub section (1) of section 51 of the Act. The expression "new State" occurring in sub section (1) of section 49 of the Act is defined in section 2(i) to mean "a State formed under the provisions of Part II". The State of Bombay was a new State formed under section 8 of the Act	 which occurs in Part II. The Bombay Reorganization Act	 1960 (Act No. XI of 1960) which reconstituted the erstwhile State of Bombay into the State of Maharashtra and the State of Gujarat provides	 inter alia	 by sub section (1) of section 28 that	 as from the appointed day	 i.e. May 1	 1960	 there shall be a separate High Court for the State of Gujarat and that the High Court of Bombay shall become the High Court for the State of Maharashtra. Sub section (2) of section 28 of that Act provides that the principal seat of the Gujarat High Court shall be at such place as the President may	 by notified order	 appoint. It is rather significant that the Bombay Reorganization Act	 1960 contains no similar provision with regard to the principal seat of the High Court of Bombay. That being so	 the continued existence of the principal seat of the Bombay High Court at Bombay is still governed by sub section (1) of section 51 of the Act. This conclusion of ours is reinforced by the opening words of section 41 of that Act which provides for the setting up of a permanent bench of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur	 and it reads: "41. Permanent Bench of Bombay High Court at Nagpur Without prejudice to the provisions of section 51 of the States Reorganization Act	 1956	 such Judges of the High Court at Bombay	 being not less than three in 667 number	 as the Chief Justice may from time to time nominate	 shall sit at Nagpur in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of Buldana	 Akola	 Amravati	 Yeotmal	 Wardha	 Nagpur	 Bhandara	 Chanda and Rajpura: Provided that the Chief Justice may	 in his discretion	 order that any case arising in any such districts shall be heard at Bombay. " The legislative intent is clear and explicit by the use of the words "Without prejudice to the provisions of section 51 of the States Reorganization Act	 1956". The legislature pre supposed the continued existence of section 51 of the Act in relation to the High Court of Bombay. That shows that while enacting s.41 of the Act	 Parliament retained the power of the President of India both under sub section (1) and sub section (2) of s.51 of the Act and that of the Chief Justice under sub section (3) thereof. If there is continued existence of sub section (1) of s.51 of the Act in relation to the principal seat of the High Court for a new State	 a fortiori	 there is	 to an equal degree	 the continued	 existence of the provisions contained in sub sections (2) and (3) of section 51 of the Act. This is also clear from the provisions of section 69 of the Act which in terms provides that Part V which contains s.51 of the Act shall have effect subject to any provision that may be made	 on or after the appointed day with respect to the High Court of a new State	 by the Legislature or any other authority having power to make such provision. Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that the power of the President under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act	 or that of the Chief Justice of the High Court of a new State under sub section (3) of that section	 can no longer be exercised due to lapse of time. The High Court is of the view that the provisions of the Act and in particular of section 51 were meant to be exercised either immediately or within a reasonable time of the reorganization of the States and therefore the exercise of the power by the Chief Justice under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act appointing Aurangabad as a place where the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court may also sit	 after a lapse of 26 years	 is constitutionally impermissible. Any other view	 according to the High Court	 is bound to give rise to a very anamolous situation as in nine out of sixteen States not affected by the Act	 668 the creation of a permanent Bench of a High Court must be by an Act of Parliament while in seven new States formed under the Act	 the same could be achieved by a Presidential Notification under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act. Furthermore	 in States where the High Courts were established by Letters Patent	 the powers conferred on the Chief Justices of the High Courts qua sittings of single Judges and Division Courts can be exercised only with legislative sanction whereas under sub section (3) of section 51 it can be done by the Chief Justice of the High Court for a new State	 with the approval of the Governor of that State. Such a construction of the provisions of section 51 of the Act would	 according to the High Court	 result in creating discrimination between the States. The reasoning of the High Court that the Act being of a transitory nature	 the exercise of the power of the President under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act	 or of the Chief Justice under sub section (3) thereof	 after	 a lapse of 26 years	 would be a complete nullity	 does not impress us at all. The provisions of sub sections (2) and (3) of section 51 of the Act are supplemental or incidental to the provisions made by Parliament under articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution. article 3 of the Constitution enables Parliament to make a law for the formation of a new State. The Act is a law under article 3 for the reorganization of the States. article 4 of the Constitution provides that the law referred to in article 3 may contain "such supplemental	 incidental and consequential provisions as Parliament may deem necessary". Under the scheme of the Act	 these powers continue to exist by reason of Part V of the Act unless Parliament by law otherwise directs. The power of the President under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act	 and that of the Chief Justice of the High Court under sub section (3) thereof are intended and meant to be exercised from time to time as occasion arises	 as there is no intention to the contrary manifested in the Act within the meaning of section 14 of the . The High Court has assumed that the provisions of sub ss (2) and (3) of section 51 of the Act have 'ebbed out ' by lapse of time. This assumption is plainly contrary to the meaning and effect of section 69 of the Act which in terms provides that Part V which contains section 51 of the Act	 shall have effect subject to any provision that may be made on or after the appointed day with respect to the High Court of any State	 by the Legislature or any other authority having power to make such provision. It is a matter of common knowledge that Parliament considered it necessary to reorganize the existing States in India and to provide for it and other matters connected therewith and with that end in view	 the States Reorganization Act	 1956 was enacted. As a result 669 of reorganization	 boundaries of various States changed. Some of the States merged into other States in its entirety	 while some States got split and certain parts thereof merged into one State and other parts into another. These provisions were bound to give rise	 and did give rise	 to various complex problems. These problems are bound to arise from time to time. The Act is a permanent piece of legislation on the Statute Book. Section 14 of the provides that	 where	 by any Central Act or Regulation	 any power is conferred	 then unless a different intention appears	 that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion arises. The Section embodies a uniform rule of construction. That the power may be exercised from time to time when occasion arises unless a contrary intention appears is therefore well settled. A statute can be abrogated only by express or implied repeal. It cannot fall into desuetude or become inoperative through obsolescence or by lapse of time. In R. vs London Country Council(1)	 Scrutton L.J. put the matter thus: "The doctrine that	 because a certain number of people do not like an Act and because a good many people disobey it	 the Act is therefore "obsolescent" and no one need pay any attention to	 it is a very dangerous proposition to hold in any constitutional country. So long as an Act is on the statutebook	 the way to get rid of it is to repeal or alter it in Parliament	 not for subordinate bodies	 who are bound to obey the law	 to take upon themselves to disobey an Act of Parliament." As to the theory of desuetude	 Allen in his 'Law in the Making	 5th edn. p. 454 observes: "Age cannot wither an Act of Parliament	 and at no time	 so far as I am aware	 has it ever been admitted in our jurisprudence that a statute might become inoperative through obsolescence." The learned author mentions that there was at one time a theory which	 in the name of 'non observance ' came very near to the doctrine of Desuetude	 that if a statute had been in existence for any considerable period without ever being put into operation it may be of little or no effect. The rule concerning desuetude has 670 always met with such general disfavour that it seems hardly profitable to discuss it further. It cannot be said that sub section (2) or (3) of section 51 of the Act can be regarded as obsolescent. The opening words of section 41 of the Bombay Reorganization Act	 1960 manifest a clear legislative intention to preserve the continued existence of the provisions contained in section 51 of the Act. It was as recent as December 8	 1976 that the President issued a notification under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act for the establishment of a permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. The High Court is therefore not right in observing that the provisions of section 51 of the Act were not intended to be operative indefinitely and they were meant to be exercised either immediately or within a reasonable time	 or that the powers of the President or the Chief Justice thereunder can no longer be exercised in relation to the High Court of Bombay. The conclusion reached by the High Court that the impugned notification issued by the Chief Justice under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act was not directly connected with the reorganization of the States	 or had no nexus with the objects and purposes sought to be achieved by the Act but was only as part of the demand for decentralization of the administration of justice in general	 can only be justified as a necessary corollary flowing from its views expressed on other aspects of the matter. The creation of 14 new States by Part II of the Act based on a linguistic basis virtually led to the re drawing of the political map of India as a whole. Even after the reorganization of the States in 1956	 the political map of India continued to change owing to the growing pressure of political considerations and circumstances. The formation of the linguistic State of Bombay constituted under section 8 of the Act became the source of struggle between the Gujarati and Marathi speaking people as a result of which the State of Bombay was further bifurcated in 1960. These political changes necessarily affected the constitution and structure of the High Court. Under the Constitution	 Parliament alone has the legislative competence to make a law relating to the subject under Entry 78 of List I of the Seventh Schedule which reads: "78. Constitution and organisation (including vacations) of the High Courts except provisions as to officers and servants of High Courts: persons entitled to practise before the High Courts: Under the scheme of the Act	 it would appear that having constituted a High Court for the new State of Bombay under sub section 671 (1) of section 49 of the Act and conferred jurisdiction on it under section 52 in relation to the territories of the new State	 Parliament left it to the various high Constitutional functionaries designated in the three sub sections of section 51 of the Act to determine the place where the principal seat of the High Court should be located and places where permanent Bench or Benches of the High Court may be established or where the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court may also sit. on the reorganization of the States as from the appoint day	 i.e. November 1	 1956	 the territories of the new State of Bombay formed under section 8 of the Act and with it the jurisdiction of the High Court was considerably extended. The merger of the new territories of the Vidarbha region of the former State of Madhya Pradesh and the Marathwada region of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad together with the Saurashtra region of the newly constituted State of Gujarat was an additional source of strength of the High Court. It became necessary for the more convenient transaction of judicial business to establish	 as from the appointed day	 two Benches of the High Court at Nagpur and Rajkot to deal with matters arising from Vidarbha and Saurashtra regions respectively. The formation of the separate State of Gujarat in 1960 under section 3 of the Bombay Reorganization Act	 1960 resulted in severance of ties not only with the Saurashtra region but also with the Gujarat districts over which the High Court had exercised jurisdiction for about a century. The High Court of Bombay therefore underwent a major transformation in 1956 when the bilingual State of Bombay was formed under section 8 of the Act and then again in 1960 when with the formation of a separate State of Gujarat under section 3 of the Bombay Reorganization Act	 the residuary State of Bombay was to be known as the State of Maharashtra. Nagpur which ceased to be the seat of the High Court of the new State of Madhya Pradesh	 was given a Bench by an order issued by the then Chief Justice of the High Court under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act. The arrangement was made permanent by section 41 of that Act which provided for the establishment of a permanent Bench at Nagpur to deal with cases arising out of the Vidarbha region. It was a solemn assurance given to the people of the Marathwada region of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad by cl. (7) of the Nagpur Pact that the provision with regard to the establishment of a permanent Bench at Nagpur shall also apply mutatis mutandis to the Marathwada region. There has been a long standing demand ever since the formation of the bilingual State of Bombay under section 8 of the Act for the establishment of a permanent Bench of the Bombay High Court at 672 Aurangabad under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act for the disposal of cases arising out of the Marathwada region of the State of Maharashtra and the matter is still under the active consideration of the Central Government. Pending the decision of the Central Government regarding the establishment of a permanent Bench of the High Court under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act at Aurangabad for the Marathwada region	 the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court issued the impugned order for the establishment of a Bench at Aurangabad with effect from August 27	 1981. The only other point to be considered	 and this was the point principally stressed in this appeal	 is whether the power conferred on the Chief Justice under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act to appoint a place or places where the Judges and Division Courts may also sit	 does not include a power to establish a Bench or Benches at such place or places	 nor that he had any power or authority thereunder to issue administrative directions for the filing or institution of proceedings at such a place. There is quite some discussion in the judgment of the High Court on the distinction between the "sittings" of the Judges and Division Courts and the "seat" of the High Court and after going into the history of the constitution of the various High Courts in India and the Letters Patent constituting such High Courts	 the High Court holds that the exercise of the power by the Chief Justice under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act is bad in law as it brings about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court. According to the High Court	 the Judges and Division Courts at Aurangabad were competent to hear and decide cases arising out of the districts of the Marathwada region assigned to them by the Chief Justice	 but the Chief Justice had no power or authority under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act to issue administrative directions for the filing or institution of proceedings at such a place. The judgment of the High Court mainly rests on the decision of the Kerala High Court in Manickam Pillai Subbayya Pillai vs Assistant Registrar	 High Court Kerala	 Trivandrum(1) and the minority view of Raina	 J. in Abdul Taiyab Abbasbhai Malik & Ors. vs The Union of India & Ors.	(2) following the Kerala view. It is not necessary for our purposes to go into the distinction sought to be drawn between the "sittings" of the Judges and Division Courts at a place and the "seat" of the High Court. It is 673 difficult to comprehend how the Chief Justice can arrange for the sittings of the Judges and Division Courts at a particular place unless there is a seat at that place. It may be true in the juristic sense that the seat of the High Court must mean "the principal seat of such High Court	 i.e. the place where the High Court is competent to transact every kind of business from any part of the territories within its jurisdiction. It is impossible to conceive of a High Court without a seat being assigned to it. The place where it would sit to administer justice or, in other words, where its jurisdiction can be invoked is an essential and indispensable feature of the legal institution, known as a Court. Where there is only one seat of the High Court, it must necessarily have all the attributes of the principal seat. But where the High Court has more than one seat, one of them may or may not be the principal seat according to the legislative scheme. It is both sound reason and commonsense to say that the High Court of Bombay is located at its principal seat at Bombay, but it also has a seat at the permanent Bench at Nagpur. When the Chief Justice makes an order in terms of sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act that Judges and Division Courts of the High Court shall also sit at such other places, the High Court in the genetic sense has also a seat at such other places. We may drew some analogy from the provisions of article 130 of the Constitution which reads: 130. The Supreme Court shall sit in Delhi or in such other place or places	 as the Chief Justice of India may	 with the approval of the President	 from time to time	 appoint. " It is necessary to emphasize that besides administering justice	 the High Court has the administrative control over the subordinate judiciary in State. The High Court must necessarily carry on its administrative functions from the principal seat	 i.e. the place where the High Court transacts every Kind of business in all its capacities. The High Court as such is located there	 but it may have more than one seat for transaction of judicial business. The constitution and structure of the High Court depends on the statute creating it. The decision in Nasiruddin vs State Transport Appellate Tribunal(1) is not directly in point as it turned on the construction of the provisions of the U.P. High Courts (Amalgamation) order	 1948. It is however an authority for the proposition that after the 674 amalgamation of the High Court of Allahabad and the Chief Court of Oudh	 the two High Courts ceased to exist and became Benches of the newly constituted High Court by the name of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. Further	 the Court held that a case "instituted" at a particular Bench had to be "heard" at that Bench. It recognized that there can be two seats of the High Court without a principal seat. It must here be mentioned that provisions similar to sub s.(3) of section 51 of the Act existed in almost all the Letters Patent or the Acts under which the various High Courts have been constituted. While introducing the Bill of 1861 in the British Parliament for the establishment of the High Courts for the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William and also at Madras and Bombay	 Sir Charles Wood	 Secretary of State for India	 laid stress on the advantage of the Judges of the new Courts going on circuit to try criminal cases. He said: "Now according to the provisions of this Bill	 the Judges of the Supreme Court may be sent on circuit throughout the country. It may be impossible in a country like India to bring justice to every man 's door	 but at all events the system now proposed will bring it far nearer than at present." When we examine the constitution of the various High Courts in India	 one thing is clear that whenever a High Court was established by Letters patent under section 1 of the Indian High Courts Act	 1861 called the Charter Act	 or under section 113 of the Government of India Act	 1935	 the High Court was created and established at a particular place mentioned in the Letters Patent. section 1 of the Charter Act provided that it shall be lawful for Her Majesty	 by Letters Patent under the great seal of the United Kingdom	 to erect and establish a High Court of Judicature at Fort William at Bengal for the Bengal Division of the Presidency of the Fort William	 and by like Letters Patent	 to erect and establish like High Courts at Madras and Bombay for these Presidencies respectively. In pursuance of these provisions by Letters Patent issued by Her Majesty in 1862	 the Chartered High Courts of Calcutta	 Madras and Bombay were established. In virtue of the powers conferred by section 16 of the Act the Crown by Letters Patent established in 1866 at Agra a High Court of Judicature for North Western Provinces for the Presidency of Fort William	 to be called a High Court of Judicature for North 675 Western Provinces. The seat of the High Court for the North Western Provinces was shifted from Agra to Allahabad in 1869 and its designation was altered to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by Supplementary Letters Patent issued in 1919 in pursuance of section 101 (5) of the Government of India Act	 1915. The expression "erect and establish" in relation to a High Court meant nothing more than to indicate the establishment of the High Court at a particular place where the High Court was competent to transact every kind of business arising from any part of the territory within its jurisdiction. Cl. 31 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of Calcutta provides for "exercise of jurisdiction elsewhere than at the ordinary place of sitting of the High Court" and it reads as follows: "And we do further ordain that whenever it shall appear to the Governor General in Council convenient that the jurisdiction and power by these our Letters Patent	 or by the recited Act	 vested in the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal	 should be exercised in any place within the jurisdiction of any Court now subject to the superintendence of the said High Court	 other than the usual place of sitting of the said High Court	 or at several such places by way of circuit	 the proceedings in cases before the said High Court at such place or places shall be regulated by any law relating thereto which has been or may be made by competent legislative authority for India. " The Letters Patent for the High Courts of Madras and Bombay are mutatis mutandis in almost the same terms. Cl. 31 of these Letters Patent similarly provided for "exercise of jurisdiction elsewhere than at the ordinary place of sitting of the High Court. " It would appear therefrom that the power to direct that the High Court shall sit at a place or places other than the usual place of sitting of these High Courts was a power of the Governor General in Council	 and the proceedings in cases before the said High Courts at such place or places were to be regulated by any law relating thereto which had been or might be made by competent legislative authority for India. It is clear upon the terms of section 51 of the Act that undoubtedly the President has the power under sub section (1) to appoint the principal 676 seat of the High Court for a new State. Likewise	 the power of the President under sub section (2) thereof	 after consultation with the Governor of a new State and the Chief Justice of the High Court for that State	 pertains to the establishment of a permanent Bench or Benches of that High Court of a new State at one or more places within the State other than the place where the principal seat of the High Court is located and for any matters connected therewith clearly confer power on the President to define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation to the principal seat as also for the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction to such permanent Bench to hear cases arising in districts falling within its jurisdiction. The creation of a permanent Bench under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act must therefore bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court. Under sub section (1) and sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act the President has to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers as ordained by article 74(1) of the Constitution. In both the matters the decision lies with the Central Government. In contrast	 the power of the Chief Justice to appoint under sub s.(3) of section 51 of the Act the sittings of the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court for a new State at places other than the place of the principal seat or the permanent Bench is in the unquestioned domain of the Chief Justice	 the only condition being that he must act with the approval of the Governor. It is basically an internal matter pertaining to the High Court. He has full power	 authority and jurisdiction in the matter of allocation of business of the High Court which flows not only from the provision contained in sub s.(3) of section 51 of the Act but inheres in him in the very nature of things. The opinion of the Chief Justice to appoint the seat of the High Court for a new State at a place other than the principal seat under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act must therefore normally prevail because it is for the more convenient transaction of judicial business. The non obstante clause contained in sub section (3) of section 51 given an overriding effect to the power of the Chief Justice. There is no territorial bifurcation of the High Court merely because the Chief Justice directs under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act that the Judges and Division Courts shall also sit at such other places as he may	 with the approval of the Governor	 appoint. It must accordingly be held that there was no territorial bifurcation of the Bombay High Court merely because the Chief Justice by the impugned notification issued under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act directed that the Judges and Division Courts shall also sit at Aurangabad. The Judges and Division Courts at Aurangabad are 677 part of the same High Court as those at the principal seat at Bombay and they exercise jurisdiction as Judges of the High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad. The Chief Justice acted within the scope of his powers. We see no substance in the charge that the impugned notification issued by the Chief Justice under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act was a colourable exercise of power. As to the scope and effect of sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act	 the question came up for consideration before Chagla	 C.J. and Badkas	 J. in Seth Manji Dana vs Commissioner of Income tax	 Bombay & Ors.(1) decided on July 22	 1958. This was an application by which the validity of r. 254 of the Appellate Side Rules was challenged insofar as it provided that all income tax references presented at Nagpur should be heard at the principal seat of the High Court at Bombay	 and the contention was that the result of this rule was that it excluded income tax references from the jurisdiction of the High Court functioning at Nagpur. In repelling the contention	 Chagla	 C. J. observed : "Legally	 the position is quite clear	 under section 51 (3) of the State Reorganization Act	 the Judges sitting at Nagpur constitute a part of the High Court of Bombay. They are as much a part of the High Court of Bombay	 and if we might say so distinguished part of the High Court of Bombay	 as if they were sitting under the same roof under which Judges function in Bombay. All that happens is that the Chief Justice	 under the powers given to him under the Letters Patent distributes the work to various Judges and various Divisional Benches	 and acting under that power he distributes certain work to the Judges sitting at Nagpur. " He then continued: "All that rule 254 does is to permit as a matter of convenience certain matters to be presented at Nagpur to the Deputy Registrar. If rule 254 had not been enacted	 all matters would have to be presented at Bombay and then the Chief Justice would have distributed those matters to different Judges	 whether sitting in Bombay or at Nagpur. It is out of regard and consideration for the 678 people of Vidarbha and for their convenience that this rule is enacted	 so that litigants should not be put to the inconvenience of going to Bombay to present certain matters. Therefore	 this particular rule has nothing whatever to do either with section 51 (3) of the or with the Constitution. " With regard to r. 254	 he went on to say : "Now	 having disposed of the legal aspect of the matter	 we turn to the practical aspect	 and let us consider whether this rule inconveniences the people at Nagpur. If it does	 it would certain call for an amendment of that rule. Now	 there is particular reason why all Income Tax References should be heard in Bombay and that reason is this. The High Court of Bombay for many years	 rightly or wrongly	 has followed a particular policy with regard to Income Tax References and that policy is that the same Bench should hear Income Tax References	 so that there should be a continuity with regard to the decisions given on these References. I know that other High Courts have referred to this policy with praise because they have realised that the result of this policy has been that Income Tax Law has been laid down in a manner which has received commendation from various sources. The other reason is and we hope we are not mistaken in saying so that the number of Income Tax References from Nagpur are very few. If the number was large	 undoubtedly a very strong case would be made out for these cases to be heard at Nagpur. " He then concluded : "After all	 Courts exist for the convenience of the litigants and not in order to maintain any particular system of law or any particular system of administration. Whenever a Court finds that a particular rule does not serve the convenience of litigants	 the Court should be always prepared to change the rule. " 679 The ratio to be deduced from the decision of Chagla	 C. J. is that the Judges and Division Courts sitting at Nagpur were functioning as if they were the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court at Bombay. In Manickam Pillai 's case (supra)	 the Kerala High Court held that the curtailment of the territorial jurisdiction of the main seat of the High Court of a new State is a necessary concomitant to the establishment of a permanent Bench under sub section (2) of section 51 of the Act while contrasting sub section (3) with sub section There	 a question arose whether the temporary Bench of the High Court of Kerala with its principal seat at Ernakulam created by the Chief Justice at Trivandrum by an order issued under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act was not the High Court of Kerala	 and the Judges and Division Courts sitting at Trivandrum were precisely in the same position as Judges and Division Courts sitting in the several court rooms of the High Court at its principal seat in Ernakulam. In other words	 the contention was that the Judges and Division Courts sitting at Trivandrum could only hear and dispose of such cases as were directed to be posted before them by the Chief Justice but no new case could be instituted there. Raman Nayar	 J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court held that the Trivandrum Bench was not the High Court of Kerala and the Judges and Division Courts sitting at Trivandrum could hear and dispose of only such cases as may be assigned to them. With respect	 we are of the opinion that the view expressed by Chagla	 C. J. in Manji Dana 's case	 (supra)	 is to be preferred. Chagla	 C. J. rightly observes that the Judges and Division Courts at a temporary Bench established under sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act function as Judges and Division Courts of the High Court at the principal seat	 and while so sitting at such a temporary Bench they may exercise the jurisdiction and power of the High Court itself in relation to all the matters entrusted to them. In the result	 the appeal must succeed and is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 is dismissed. In terms of the order passed by us on May 4	 1982	 we direct that in accordance with the notification issued by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Bombay dated August 27	 1981	 the sittings of the Judges and Division Courts may be held and continue to be held at Aurangabad with full and normal powers to entertain and dispose of all matters 680 arising out of the Marathwada region	 that is to say	 the area comprising the districts of Aurangabad	 Bhir	 Jalna	 Nanded	 Osmanabad and Parbani. All cases pertaining to that region and pending as on May 4	 1982 at the main seat of the High Court at Bombay shall be dealt with and disposed of as the Chief Justice of the High Court may direct. consistently with the terms of the aforesaid notification dated August 27	 1981. There shall be no order as to costs. H. L. C. Appeal dismissed.

Summary:
Sub section (3) of section 51 of the States Reorganization Act	 1956	 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (1) or sub s.(2) thereof the Judges and division Courts of the High Court of a new State may also sit at such other place or places in that State as the Chief Justice may	 with the approval of the Governor	 appoint. Prior to the constitution of the States Reorganization Commission	 leaders of political parties from the Marathi speaking areas in the country had signed an agreement called the 'Nagpur Pact ' which ultimately formed the basis for the creation of the Maharashtra State. Clause (7) of this agreement stipulated that the provision with regard to the establishment of a permanent Bench of the High Court at Nagpur shall apply mutatis mutandis to the Marathwada region. The brought into being the new State of Bombay with effect from November 1	 1956. By virtue of sub s.(1) of section 49	 the existing High Court of Bombay was deemed to be the High Court for the New State of Bombay and	 by a Presidential Order issued under sub section (1) of section 51	 Bombay was declared to be its principal seat. The then Chief Justice issued an order under sub section (3) of section 51 appointing Nagpur to be a place at which the Judges and division Courts of the High Court would also sit with effect from November 1	 1956. The Bench at Nagpur continued to function till May 1	 1960 when the State was bifurcated into Maharashtra and Gujarat and section 41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act	 1960 provided for the establishment of a permanent Bench at Nagpur. Due to the continued demand of the people of Marathwada region and the passing of a unanimous resolution in support by the Legislative Assembly the 656 State Government recommended to the Central Government in 1978 that a permanent Bench of the High Court be established at Aurangabad under sub section (2) of section 51 and simultaneously made preparations	 in consultation with the Chief Justice for setting up the Bench. However	 when it became evident that the Central Government would take time in reaching a decision on the proposal	 it was decided	 in view of the preparations made and the mounting expectations of the people	 that	 pending the establishment of a permanent Bench under sub section (2) of s 51	 resort be had to the provisions of sub section (3) thereof. Accordingly	 on August 27	1981	 the Chief Justice	 with the prior approval of the Governor of the State	 issued an Order under sub section (3) of section 51 appointing Aurangabad as a place at which the Judges and division Courts of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay may also sit. The respondents challenged the validity of the order and the High Court set aside the same on the following grounds: 1. The Act being of a transitory nature	 the exercise of the power under sub section (3) of section 51 after a lapse of 26 years was constitutionally impermissible. There was no nexus between the purpose. and objects of the Act and the setting up of Aurangabad as an additional venue for sittings of Judges and division Courts of the High Court. After the bifurcation of the bilingual State of Bombay	 the power of the Chief Justice under sub. section (3) of section 51 would no longer be exercised as the State of Maharashtra was not a 'new State ' within the meaning of section 51 read with section 2(1) of the Act. The Order was bad in law as it had brought about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court. Under sub section (3) of section 51 the Chief Justice had neither the power to establish a Bench at any place nor the power to issue administrative directions for filing or institution of proceedings at such a place. Allowing the appeal	 ^ HELD: The Act is a permanent piece of legislation enacted by Parliament under Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution. Section 14 of the 	 provides that	 where	 by any Central Act or Regulation	 any power is conferred	 then	 unless a different intention appears	 that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion arises. A statute can be abrogated only by express or implied repeal. It cannot fall into desuetude or become inoperative through obsolescence or by lapse of time. The powers conferred on the President and the Chief Justice under sub sections (2) and (3) of section 51 are intended to be exercised from time to time as occasion arises	 as there is no intention to the contrary manifested in the Act. The assumption that these provisions have ebbed out by lapse of time is plainly contrary to the meaning and effect of section 69 of the Act which in terms provides that Part V which contains section 51 shall have. effect subject to any provision that may be made on or after the appointed day with respect to the High Court of any State by the Legislature or any other authority having power to make such provision. Further	 the opening words of section 41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act	 1960 manifest a clear legislative intention to preserve the continued existence of the provisions contained in section 51 of the . [669 B C	 668 E G	 670 A B] 657 R.v. London County Council	 referred to. 2. It cannot be said that the impugned Order is not directly connected with the reorganisation of States. There has been a long standing demand for the establishment of a permanent Bench of the Bombay High Court at Aurangabad. A solemn assurance in this behalf had been given to the people of Marathwada region by cl. (7) of the 'Nagpur Pact '. Under the scheme of the Act it would appear that having constituted a High Court for the new State of Bombay and conferred jurisdiction on it under section 52 in relation to the territories of the new State	 Parliament left it to the various high Constitutional functionaries designated in section 51 to determine the place where the principal seat of the High Court should be located and places where permanent Bench or Benches of the High Court may be established	 or where the Judges and division Courts of the High Court may also sit. While Nagpur was given a Bench by an order issued under sub s (3) of section 51 and the arrangement made permanent by s.41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act	 1960	 the proposal for setting up a permanent Bench at Aurangabad is still under the active consideration of the Central Government. [670 D	 671 H	 672 A B	 661 B	 670 H	 671 F G	 672 A] 3. The expression "new State" occurring in sub section (1) of section 49 of the Act is defined in section 2(1) to mean "a State formed under the provisions of Part II". The State of Bombay was a 'new State ' formed under section 8 of the Act which occurs in Part II. The High Court of Bombay was the High Court for the new State of Bombay within the meaning of sub section (1) of section 49 and therefore the provisions of section 51 are still applicable. Sub section (1) of section 28 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act	 1960 provides that as from May 1	1960	 there shall be a separate High Court for the State of Gujarat and that the High Court of Bombay shall become the High Court for the State of Maharashtra and sub s	 (2) thereof provides that the principal seat of the Gujarat High Court shall be at such place as the President may	 by notified order	 appoint. It is significant that the Act contains no similar provision with regard to the principal seat of the High Court of Bombay. That being so	 the continued existence of the principal seat of the Bombay High Court at Bombay is still governed by sub section (1) of section 51. If there is continued existence of sub section (1) of section 51 in relation to the principal seat of the High Court for a new State	 a fortiori there is to an equal degree	 the continued existence of the provisions contained in sub sections (2) and (3) of section 51. That the Legislature pre supposed the continued existence of section 51 in relation to the High Court of Bombay is clear from the opening words of section 41 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act	 1960 which provides for the setting up of a permanent Bench of the High Court at Nagpur. That section begins with the words "Without prejudice to the provisions of section 51 of the ". Thus while enacting that section	 Parliament retained in tact the power conferred on the President of India and the Chief Justice under section 51 of the . [666 D	 665 H	 666 E G	 657 C E] 4. (a) The Constitution and structure of a High Court depends on the statute creating it. It is clear from sub sections (1) and (2) of section 51 that the President has the power to appoint the principal seat of the High Court for a new State and also establish a permanent Bench of that High Court at one or more places within the State. Under these provisions the President has the power not only to define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation to the 658 principal seat but also confer on it exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases arising in the territory falling within its jurisdiction. The creation of a permanent Bench under sub section (2) of section 51 must therefore	 bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court. In contrast	 the power of the Chief Justice to appoint	 under sub section (3) of section 51	 the sittings of the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court at places other than the place of the principal seat or the permanent Bench	 is in the unquestioned domain of the Chief Justice	 the only condition being that he must act Justice	 the only condition being that he must act with the approval of the Governor. It is basically an internal matter pertaining to the High Court. The Chief Justice has full power	 authority and jurisdiction in the matter of allocation of the business of the High Court and this flows not only from the provisions contained in sub section (3) of section 51 but inheres in him in the very nature of things. The non obstante clause contained in sub section (3) of section 51 gives an over riding effect to the power of the Chief Justice. There is no territorial bifurcation of the High Court merely because the Chief Justice directed under sub section (3) of section 51 that the Judges and division Courts shall also sit at Aurangabad. The Judges and division Courts at Aurangabad are part of the same High Court and they exercise jurisdiction as Judges of the High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad.[673 G	 675 H	 676 A C	 D H	 677 A] Seth Manji Dhana vs Commissioner of Income tax	 Bombay Bombay on July 22	 1958)	 approved. Manickam Pillai Subbayya Pillai vs Assistant Registrar	 High Court of Kerala	 Trivandrum	 ; overruled. (b) It is difficult to comprehend how the Chief Justice can arrange for the sittings of the Judges and Division Courts at a particular place unless there is a seat at that place. It may be true in the juristic sense that the seat of the High Court must mean "the principal seat of such High Court" i.e. the place where the High Court is competent to transact every kind of business from any part of the territories within its jurisdiction. It is impossible to conceive of a High Court without a seat being assigned to it. The place where its jurisdiction can be invoked is an essential and indispensable feature of the legal institution known as 'Court '. Where there is only one seat of the High Court it must necessarily have all the attributes of the principal seat. But where the High Court has more than one seat	 one of them may or may not be the principal seat according to the legislative scheme. When the Chief Justice makes an order in terms of sub section (3) of section 51 that Judges and Division Courts of the High Court shall also sit at such other place	 the High Court in the generic sense has also a seat at such other place. It is both sound reason and commonsense to say that the High Court of Bombay is located at its principal seat at Bombay	 but it also has a seat at the permanent Bench at Nagpur. Besides administering Justice	 the High Court has the administrative control over the subordinate judiciary in the State. The High Court must necessarily carry on the administrative functions from the principal seat but it may have more than one seat for transaction of judicial business.[673 A G] Nasiruddin vs State Transport Appellate Tribunal	 [1976] 1 S.C.R. 505; distinguished. 659 (c) Provisions similar to sub section (3) of section 51 of the Act existed in almost all the Letters Patent of the Acts under which the various High Courts have been constituted. Clause 31 in each of the Letters Patent under which the High Courts of Calcutta	 Madras and Bombay were established provided for "exercise of jurisdiction elsewhere than at the ordinary place of sitting of the High Court" Whenever a High Court was established by Letters Patent under section 1 of the Indian High Courts Act	 1861	 or under section 113 of the Government of India Act	 1935. The High Court was 'erected and established ' at a particular place mentioned in the Letters Patent. The expression 'erect and establish ' in relation to a High Court meant nothing more than to indicate the establishment of the High Court at a particular place where the High Court was competent to transact every kind of business arising from any part of the territory within its jurisdiction. [674 C