2023 District of Columbia Code › Title 28 - Commercial Instruments and Transactions. [Enacted title] › Subtitle I - Uniform Commercial Code › Article 1 - General Provisions › Part II - General Definitions and Principles of Interpretation › § 28:1–203. Lease distinguished from security interest

§ 28:1–203. Lease distinguished from security interest.
(a) Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a lease or security interest is determined by the facts of each case.
(b) A transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest if the consideration that the lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the lease and is not subject to termination by the lessee, and:
(1) The original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of the goods;
(2) The lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods;
(3) The lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement; or
(4) The lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement.
(c) A transaction in the form of a lease does not create a security interest merely because:
(1) The present value of the consideration the lessee is obligated to pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is substantially equal to or is greater than the fair market value of the goods at the time the lease is entered into;
(2) The lessee assumes risk of loss of the goods;
(3) The lessee agrees to pay, with respect to the goods, taxes, insurance, filing, recording, or registration fees, or service or maintenance costs;
(4) The lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner of the goods;
(5) The lessee has an option to renew the lease for a fixed rent that is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market rent for the use of the goods for the term of the renewal at the time the option is to be performed; or
(6) The lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for a fixed price that is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market value of the goods at the time the option is to be performed.
(d) Additional consideration is nominal if it is less than the lessee’s reasonably predictable cost of performing under the lease agreement if the option is not exercised. Additional consideration is not nominal if:
(1) When the option to renew the lease is granted to the lessee, the rent is stated to be the fair market rent for the use of the goods for the term of the renewal determined at the time the option is to be performed; or
(2) When the option to become the owner of the goods is granted to the lessee, the price is stated to be the fair market value of the goods determined at the time the option is to be performed.
(e) The remaining economic life of the goods and reasonably predictable fair market rent, fair market value, or cost of performing under the lease agreement must be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances at the time the transaction is entered into.
(Dec. 30, 1963, 77 Stat. 636, Pub. L. 88-243, § 1; Mar. 16, 1982, D.C. Law 4-85, § 3, 29 DCR 309; July 22, 1992, D.C. Law 9-128, § 2(c)(2), 39 DCR 3830; Oct. 26, 2000, D.C. Law 13-201, § 201(b)(2), 47 DCR 7576; Apr. 27, 2013, D.C. Law 19-299, § 2, 60 DCR 2634.)
Prior Codifications
2001 Ed., § 28:1-201(37).
1981 Ed., § 28:1-203.
1973 Ed., § 28:1-203.
Section References
This section is referenced in § 28:1-201.
Uniform Commercial Code Comment
Source:
Former Section 1-201(37).
Changes from former law:
This section is substantively identical to those portions of former Section 1-201(37) that distinguished “true” leases from security interests, except that the definition of “present value” formerly embedded in Section 1-201(37) has been placed in Section 1-201(28).
1. An interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation is a “security interest.” See Section 1-201(37). Security interests are sometimes created by transactions in the form of leases. Because it can be difficult to distinguish leases that create security interests from those that do not, this section provides rules that govern the determination of whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest.
2. One of the reasons it was decided to codify the law with respect to leases was to resolve an issue that created considerable confusion in the courts: what is a lease? The confusion existed, in part, due to the last two sentences of the definition of security interest in the 1978 Official Text of the Act, Section 1-201(37). The confusion was compounded by the rather considerable change in the federal, state and local tax laws and accounting rules as they relate to leases of goods. The answer is important because the definition of lease determines not only the rights and remedies of the parties to the lease but also those of third parties. If a transaction creates a lease and not a security interest, the lessee’s interest in the goods is limited to its leasehold estate; the residual interest in the goods belongs to the lessor. This has significant implications to the lessee’s creditors. “On common law theory, the lessor, since he has not parted with title, is entitled to full protection against the lessee’s creditors and trustee in bankruptcy ____ ” 1 G. Gilmore,
Security Interests in Personal Property
Section 3.6, at 76 (1965).
Under pre-UCC chattel security law there was generally no requirement that the lessor file the lease, a financing statement, or the like, to enforce the lease agreement against the lessee or any third party; the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9) did not change the common law in that respect. Coogan, Leasing and the Uniform Commercial Code, in
Equipment Leasing-Leveraged Leasing
i.e.
, leases intended as security; however, the definition became vague and outmoded.
681, 700 n.25, 729 n.80 (2d ed. 1980). The Article on Leases (Article 2A) did not change the law in that respect, except for leases of fixtures. Section 2A-309. An examination of the common law will not provide an adequate answer to the question of what is a lease. The definition of security interest in Section 1-201(37) of the 1978 Official Text of the Act provided that the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9) governs security interests disguised as leases,
Lease is defined in Article 2A as a transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a term, in return for consideration. Section 2A-103(1)(j). The definition continues by stating that the retention or creation of a security interest is not a lease. Thus, the task of sharpening the line between true leases and security interests disguised as leases continues to be a function of this Article.
This section begins where Section 1-201(35) leaves off. It draws a sharper line between leases and security interests disguised as leases to create greater certainty in commercial transactions.
Prior to enactment of the rules now codified in this section, the 1978 Official Text of Section 1-201(37) provided that whether a lease was intended as security (
i.e.
, a security interest disguised as a lease) was to be determined from the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase did not itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee would become, or had the option to become, the owner of the property for no additional consideration, or for a nominal consideration, did make the lease one intended for security.
Reference to the intent of the parties to create a lease or security interest led to unfortunate results. In discovering intent, courts relied upon factors that were thought to be more consistent with sales or loans than leases. Most of these criteria, however, were as applicable to true leases as to security interests. Examples include the typical net lease provisions, a purported lessor’s lack of storage facilities or its character as a financing party rather than a dealer in goods. Accordingly, this section contains no reference to the parties’ intent.
Subsections (a) and (b) were originally taken from Section 1(2) of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (act withdrawn 1943), modified to reflect current leasing practice. Thus, reference to the case law prior to the incorporation of those concepts in this article will provide a useful source of precedent. Gilmore,
Security Law, Formalism and Article 9
e.g., In re Royer’s Bakery, Inc.
In re Gehrke Enters.
In re Celeryvale Transp.
In re Berge
, 32 Bankr. 370, 371-73 (Bankr.W.D.Wis. 1983).
, 44 Bankr. 1007, 1014-15 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn. 1984). The fourth of these tests, subparagraph (4), is whether the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration. All of these tests focus on economics, not the intent of the parties.
, 1 Bankr. 647, 651-52 (Bankr.W.D.Wis. 1979). The third of these tests, subparagraph (3), is whether the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration, which is defined later in this section.
, 1 U.C.C. Rep.Serv. (Callaghan) 342 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1963)) and if one of four additional tests is met. The first of these four tests, subparagraph (1), is that the original lease term is equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of the goods. The second of these tests, subparagraph (2), is that the lessee is either bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or to become the owner of the goods.
, 47 Neb.L.Rev. 659, 671 (1968). Whether a transaction creates a lease or a security interest continues to be determined by the facts of each case. Subsection (b) further provides that a transaction creates a security interest if the lessee has an obligation to continue paying consideration for the term of the lease, if the obligation is not terminable by the lessee (thus correcting early statutory gloss,
The focus on economics is reinforced by subsection (c). It states that a transaction does not create a security interest merely because the transaction has certain characteristics listed therein. Subparagraph (1) has no statutory derivative; it states that a full payout lease does not
per se
Rushton v. Shea
Compare All- States Leasing Co. v. Ochs
with In re Tillery
Compare Arnold Mach. Co. v. Balls
Aoki v. Shepherd Mach. Co.
, 665 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.1982).
, 624 P.2d 678 (Utah 1981), with
, 571 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir.1978). Subparagraph (4) restates and expands the provisions of the 1978 Official Text of Section 1-201(37) to make clear that the option can be to buy or renew. Subparagraphs (5) and (6) treat fixed price options and provide that fair market value must be determined at the time the transaction is entered into.
, 42 Or.App. 319, 600 P.2d 899 (Ct.App. 1979),
, 419 F.Supp. 1349, 1365 (D.Del. 1976). Subparagraphs (2) and (3) provide the same regarding the provisions of the typical net lease.
create a security interest.
The relationship of subsection (b) to subsection (c) deserves to be explored. The fixed price purchase option provides a useful example. A fixed price purchase option in a lease does not of itself create a security interest. This is particularly true if the fixed price is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market value of the goods at the time the option is to be performed. A security interest is created only if the option price is nominal and the conditions stated in the introduction to the second paragraph of this subsection are met. There is a set of purchase options whose fixed price is less than fair market value but greater than nominal that must be determined on the facts of each case to ascertain whether the transaction in which the option is included creates a lease or a security interest.
It was possible to provide for various other permutations and combinations with respect to options to purchase and renew. For example, this section could have stated a rule to govern the facts of
In re Marhoefer Packing Co.
, 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir.1982). This was not done because it would unnecessarily complicate the definition. Further development of this rule is left to the courts.
Subsections (d) and (e) provide definitions and rules of construction.
Emerging Issues Analysis: Professor Margit Livingston on Putative Leases as Article 9 Secured Transactions. In most cases, filing a financing statement will protect the lessor/secured party from other secured parties. However, one type of transaction has bedeviled the courts for many years: the secured transaction disguised as a lease. Professor Livingston examines whether a corporation’s possessory repairman’s lien take priority over a lessor’s security interest.