2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 806 - Civil procedure — judgment. › 806.04 - Uniform declaratory judgments act.

806.04
Uniform declaratory judgments act.
(1)
Scope. Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree, except that finality for purposes of filing an appeal as of right shall be determined in accordance with s. 808.03 (1).
(2)
Power to construe, etc. Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. No party shall be denied the right to have declared the validity of any statute or municipal ordinance by virtue of the fact that the party holds a license or permit under such statutes or ordinances.
(3)
Before breach. A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof.
(4)
Representatives, etc. Any person interested as or through a personal representative, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust in the administration of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent, infant, individual adjudicated incompetent, or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect to the administration of the trust or estate for any of the following purposes:
(a)
To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin or others; or
(b)
To direct the personal representatives or trustees to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or
(c)
To determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills and other writings.
(5)
Enumeration not exclusive. The enumeration in subs. (2), (3) and (4) does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in sub. (1) in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.
(6)
Discretionary. The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.
(7)
Review. All orders, judgments and decrees under this section may be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees.
(8)
Supplemental relief. Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.
(9)
Jury trial. When a proceeding under this section involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is pending.
(10)
Costs. In any proceeding under this section the court may make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just.
(11)
Parties. When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration may prejudice the right of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, the municipality shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard. If a statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, or to be in violation of or preempted by federal law, or if the construction or validity of a statute is otherwise challenged, the attorney general shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard. If a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional, or to be in violation of or preempted by federal law, or if the construction or validity of a statute is otherwise challenged, the speaker of the assembly, the president of the senate, and the senate majority leader shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding, and the assembly, the senate, and the state legislature are entitled to be heard. If the assembly, the senate, or the joint committee on legislative organization intervenes as provided under s. 803.09 (2m), the assembly shall represent the assembly, the senate shall represent the senate, and the joint committee on legislative organization shall represent the legislature. In any proceeding under this section in which the constitutionality, construction or application of any provision of ch. 227, or of any statute allowing a legislative committee to suspend, or to delay or prevent the adoption of, a rule as defined in s. 227.01 (13) is placed in issue by the parties, the joint committee for review of administrative rules shall be served with a copy of the petition and, with the approval of the joint committee on legislative organization, shall be made a party and be entitled to be heard.
(12)
Construction. This section is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered.
(13)
Words construed. The word “person" wherever used in this section, shall be construed to mean any person, partnership, joint stock company, unincorporated association or society, or municipal or other corporation of any character whatsoever.
(14)
Provisions severable. The several subsections and provisions of this section except subs. (1) and (2) are declared independent and severable, and the invalidity, if any, of any part or feature thereof shall not affect or render the remainder of the statute invalid or inoperative.
(15)
Uniformity of interpretation. This section shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it, and to harmonize, as far as possible, with federal laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees.
(16)
Short title. This section may be cited as the “Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act".
History:  Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 718 (1975); 1975 c. 218; Sup. Ct. Order, 82 Wis. 2d ix (1978); 1977 c. 449; 1979 c. 38, 89, 175; 1979 c. 330 s. 13; 1979 c. 352, 355; 1981 c. 96 s. 67; 1981 c. 187 s. 10; 1981 c. 390 s. 252; 1983 a. 255 s. 6; 1985 a. 182 s. 57, Sup. Ct. Order, 166 Wis. 2d xix (1992); 2001 a. 102, 109; 2005 a. 177, 387; 2017 a. 369.
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1977: Sub. (3m), as created by ch. 263, laws of 1973, is added. Sub. (3m), which was created during the time the rules of civil procedure were in the process of being adopted, was inadvertently not included in new s. 806.04 along with the other provisions of former s. 269.56. The only intent of the Judicial Council during the preparation of the Rules of Civil Procedure in regard to old s. 269.56 was to renumber it to s. 806.04. [Re Order effective July 1, 1978]
Judicial Council Note, 1991: Sub. (1) is amended to clarify that a declaratory judgment is not appealable as of right unless it disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties. [Re Order effective July 1, 1992]
A hospital's action for declaratory judgment to define a law enforcement officer's right to demand that doctors take blood samples for intoxication tests did not lie when the complaint did not cite a statute under which the doctors were threatened with prosecution or sufficient facts to determine the application of a particular statute. Waukesha Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Baird, 45 Wis. 2d 629, 173 N.W.2d 700 (1970).
In most cases a court may not know that a declaratory judgment would not terminate a controversy giving rise to the proceeding until it has heard the evidence, but a court need not go through trial to arrive at a foregone conclusion when it appears on the face of the complaint that a declaratory judgment will not terminate the controversy. Language in Miller, 208 Wis. 199 (1932), intimating otherwise is modified. American Medical Services, Inc. v. Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 52 Wis. 2d 198, 188 N.W.2d 529 (1971).
Sub. (5) qualifies the specific powers enumerated in subs. (1) to (4) and the discretionary power in sub. (6) applies to all cases. Even if a complaint states a cause of action for declaratory relief, it may be dismissed if a declaratory judgment would not terminate the controversy. American Medical Services, Inc. v. Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 52 Wis. 2d 198, 188 N.W.2d 529 (1971).
In an action for declaratory judgment, the complaint should not be dismissed when the judgment declares the rights on the complaint or the merits are decided. Dismissal is proper when for a valid reason the merits are not reached and the suit should not be entertained. City of Kenosha v. Unified School District No. 1, 55 Wis. 2d 642, 201 N.W.2d 66 (1972).
A declaratory judgement action was an appropriate vehicle for a putative father seeking a determination of his paternity. Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
A request for declaratory judgment to declare the proper procedure to be followed in an administrative proceeding could not be entertained because the purpose of the statute was to expedite justice and to avoid long and complicated litigation, not to interrupt legal proceedings presently in operation. State v. WERC, 65 Wis. 2d 624, 223 N.W.2d 543 (1974).
The service of a copy of the proceedings upon the attorney general under sub. (11) is not only mandatory but goes to the jurisdiction of the court to hear the action in the first instance. Bollhoffer v. Wolke, 66 Wis. 2d 141, 223 N.W.2d 902 (1974).
A declaratory judgment to effect dissolution of a corporation did not lie because: 1) the determination of the corporation's right to exist would affect members not before the court as parties; 2) sub. (11) required that all persons who “would be affected by the declaration" shall be made parties; and 3) a corporation may only be dissolved by voluntary act of its shareholders or involuntary proceedings initiated by the attorney general. Rudolph v. Indian Hills Estates, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 768, 229 N.W.2d 671 (1975).
Hospitals are “direct objects" of s. 70.11 (4m) for purposes of standing to bring a declaratory judgment action seeking a tax exemption for medical equipment leased by the hospital from a commercial lessor. Madison General Hospital Ass'n v. City of Madison, 71 Wis. 2d 259, 237 N.W.2d 750 (1976).
The use of the declaratory judgment act to attempt to fix the state's responsibility to respond to a monetary claim is not authorized. Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).
In a declaratory judgment action by taxpayers against a school board, legal conclusions in the complaint challenging the constitutionality of a taxing statute were permissible. Discussing declaratory judgment actions. Tooley v. O'Connell, 77 Wis. 2d 422, 253 N.W.2d 335 (1977).
Service on the attorney general is a jurisdictional prerequisite under sub. (11) even when the constitutional issue is collateral to or a preliminary step in the determination of the rights sought to be declared. O'Connell v. Board of Education, 82 Wis. 2d 728, 264 N.W.2d 561 (1978).
Service under sub. (11) on the attorney general is timely if made in time to permit a defense against a claim of unconstitutionality. Town of Walworth v. Village of Fontana-on-Geneva Lake, 85 Wis. 2d 432, 270 N.W.2d 442 (Ct. App. 1978).
If the constitutionality of a statute is challenged in an action other than a declaratory judgment action, the attorney general must be served, but the failure to do so at the trial court level was cured by service at the appellate level. William B. Tanner Co. v. Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declaring rights that would be created if a proposed release agreement were executed. Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).
Attorney fees are not recoverable as “costs" under sub. (10). Kremers-Urban Co. v. American Employers Insurance Co., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984).
Under sub. (11), the plaintiff must serve the joint committee for review of administrative rules within the time limits under s. 893.02. Richards v. Young, 150 Wis. 2d 549, 441 N.W.2d 742 (1989).
The Declaratory Judgments Act is singularly suited to test the validity of legislative action prior to enforcement. Weber v. Town of Lincoln, 159 Wis. 2d 144, 463 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1990).
Declaratory judgment is appropriate if: 1) there is a controversy in which a claim is asserted against a party with an interest in contesting it; 2) the controversy is between adverse parties; 3) the party seeking relief has a legally protectible interest; and 4) the issue in controversy is ripe for determination. Miller Brands-Milwaukee, Inc. v. Case, 162 Wis. 2d 684, 470 N.W.2d 290 (1991).
Supplemental relief under sub. (8) may include attorney fees incurred by an insured in establishing coverage under a policy. Elliott v. Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 485 N.W.2d 403 (1992).
If the issue of insurance coverage involves a party not a party to the underlying lawsuit, coverage may be determined by either a bifurcated trial or a separate declaratory judgment action. The plaintiff and any other party asserting a claim in the underlying suit must be named and consolidation with the underlying action may be required. Fire Insurance Exchange v. Basten, 202 Wis. 2d 74, 549 N.W.2d 690 (1996), 94-3377.
By definition, ripeness required in a declaratory judgment is different from ripeness required in other actions. A plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment need not actually suffer an injury before seeking relief under sub. (2). Nonetheless, a matter is not ripe unless the facts are sufficiently developed to allow a conclusive adjudication. Milwaukee District Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 2001 WI 65, 244 Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866, 98-1126.
To have standing to bring an action for declaratory judgment, a party must have a personal stake in the outcome and must be directly affected by the issues in controversy. A party's status as a taxpayer, property owner, or one who disagrees with municipal decisions does not confer standing. Lake Country Racquet & Athletic Club, Inc. v. Village of Hartland, 2002 WI App 301, 259 Wis. 2d 107, 655 N.W.2d 189, 02-0198.
Sub. (2) does not address the application of the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. The doctrine may apply even though a party seeks relief that falls within sub. (2). Although administrative agencies do not have the power to declare statutes unconstitutional and the lack of authority has been a basis for not applying the exhaustion doctrine, if the agency has the authority to provide the relief requested without invalidating the rule, a constitutional basis for the claim does not in itself support an exception to the exhaustion rule. Metz v. Veterinary Examining Board, 2007 WI App 220, 305 Wis. 2d 788, 741 N.W.2d 244, 06-1611.
Sub. (11) does not require that, when a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a statute or ordinance is sought, every person whose interests are affected by the statute or ordinance must be made a party to the action. If the statute were so construed, the remedy would be rendered impractical and indeed often worthless for determining the validity of legislative enactments, either state or local, since such enactments commonly affect the interests of large numbers of people. Helgeland v. Wisconsin Municipalities, 2008 WI 9, 307 Wis. 2d 1, 745 N.W.2d 1, 05-2540.
Ripeness, as it pertains to declaratory judgments, is a legal conclusion subject to de novo review. Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, 309 Wis. 2d 365, 749 N.W.2d 211, 05-2257.
Parties to a written instrument may seek a declaration of the construction or validity of the instrument, and a contract may be construed either before or after a breach. Thus, the plaintiffs did not need to allege a breach of obligations regarding the construction of a driveway over an easement granted in a recorded instrument in order to seek a declaration of those obligations. Mnuk v. Harmony Homes, Inc., 2010 WI App 102, 329 Wis. 2d 182, 790 N.W.2d 514, 09-1178.
This section should be construed together with the statute on class actions, s. 803.08, and therefore it does not exclude the procedure of representative defense of the interests of a class from an action for declaratory relief. Ewer v. Lake Arrowhead Ass'n, 2012 WI App 64, 342 Wis. 2d 194, 817 N.W.2d 465, 11-0113.
A matter is justiciable if the party seeking declaratory relief has a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say a legally protectable interest, which is often expressed in terms of standing. The plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment interpreting a newly enacted statute was not justiciable when the plaintiffs failed to show how they possibly could be in violation of the statute. Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimel, 2016 WI App 19, 367 Wis. 2d 712, 877 N.W.2d 604, 14-2085.
Lake Country, 2002 WI App 301, stands for the proposition that the successful invocation of taxpayer standing requires an allegation of either direct harm to the plaintiff's property or a risk of pecuniary loss or substantial injury. The alleged unlawful expenditure of public funds, if otherwise sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, is sufficient to support taxpayer standing. Voters with Facts v. City of Eau Claire, 2017 WI App 35, 376 Wis. 2d 479, 899 N.W.2d 706, 15-1858.
Affirmed on other grounds. 2018 WI 63, 382 Wis. 2d 1, 913 N.W.2d 131, 15-1858.
In themselves, doctrines that can confer standing on a party cannot be substituted for a statutory or constitutional provision that creates a legally protectable interest. Standing is an issue that can arise in the first place only if a constitutional or statutory provision underlies the claim. Standing refers to a party's role that enables it to enforce a substantive right, not to a substantive right in itself. Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce v. Evers, 2021 WI App 35, 398 Wis. 2d 165, 960 N.W.2d 442, 20-2081.
Affirmed on other grounds. 2022 WI 38, 401 Wis. 2d 699, 974 N.W.2d 753, 20-2081.
There is no authority for the proposition that a governmental entity provided notice of a constitutional challenge to one of its statutes in the context of private litigation must intervene or suffer the consequences. While the attorney general may have a general duty to defend Wisconsin statutes against constitutional attack, this does not mandate intervention and justify the application of preclusion principles. Intervention is a strategic decision left to the better judgment of the attorney general. Flying J, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 597 F. Supp. 2d 848 (2009).