reglab/statecodes huggingface dataset:
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions. › 939.617 - Minimum sentence for certain child sex offenses.

939.617
Minimum sentence for certain child sex offenses.
(1)
Except as provided in subs. (2) and (3), if a person is convicted of a violation of s. 948.05, 948.075, or 948.12, the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under s. 973.01. The term of confinement in prison portion of the bifurcated sentence shall be at least 5 years for violations of s. 948.05 or 948.075 and 3 years for violations of s. 948.12. Otherwise the penalties for the crime apply, subject to any applicable penalty enhancement.
(2)
If the court finds that the best interests of the community will be served and the public will not be harmed and if the court places its reasons on the record, the court may impose a sentence that is less than the sentence required under sub. (1) or may place the person on probation under any of the following circumstances:
(a)
If the person is convicted of a violation of s. 948.05, the person is no more than 48 months older than the child who is the victim of the violation.
(b)
If the person is convicted of a violation of s. 948.12, the person is no more than 48 months older than the child who engaged in the sexually explicit conduct.
(3)
This section does not apply if the offender was under 18 years of age when the violation occurred.
History:  2005 a. 433; 2011 a.272; 2013 a. 165 s. 115.
The legislature had reasonable and practical grounds for making a conviction for using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime under s. 948.075 (1r) subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. Thus, there was a rational basis for the penalty enhancer in sub. (1), and sub. (1) was not unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. State v. Heidke, 2016 WI App 55, 370 Wis. 2d 771, 883 N.W.2d 162, 15-1420.
This section has a plain and unambiguous meaning. When faced with a conviction for possessing child pornography, sub. (1) requires the court to impose a bifurcated sentence with at least three years' initial confinement. Sub. (2) allows the court to depart from this minimum and impose less initial confinement or probation only if the defendant is not more than 48 months older than the child-victim. State v. Holcomb, 2016 WI App 70, 371 Wis. 2d 647, 886 N.W.2d 100, 15-0996.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions. › 939.618 - Mandatory minimum sentence for repeat serious sex crimes.

939.618
Mandatory minimum sentence for repeat serious sex crimes.
(1)
In this section, “serious sex crime" means a violation of s. 940.225 (1) or (2).
(2)
(a)
Except as provided in par. (b), if a person has one or more prior convictions for a serious sex crime and subsequently commits a serious sex crime, the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under s. 973.01. The term of confinement in prison portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed under this subsection may not be less than 3 years and 6 months, but otherwise the penalties for the crime apply, subject to any applicable penalty enhancement. The court may not place the defendant on probation.
(b)
If a person has one or more prior convictions for a violation of s. 940.225 (1) or for a comparable crime under federal law or the law of any state and subsequently is convicted of a violation of s. 940.225 (1), the maximum term of imprisonment for the violation of s. 940.225 (1) is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or extended supervision.
History:  1993 a. 97, 227; 1997 a. 326; 2001 a. 109; 2005 a. 271; 2005 a. 433 s. 16; Stats. 2005 s. 939.618.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions. › 939.619 - Mandatory minimum sentence for repeat serious violent crimes.

939.619
Mandatory minimum sentence for repeat serious violent crimes.
(1)
In this section, “serious violent crime" means a violation of s. 940.02, 940.03, 940.05, 940.06, 940.09, 940.19 (5), 940.21, 940.305, 940.31, 941.327 (2) (b) 2., 3., or 4., 943.02, 943.231 (1), 943.32 (2), 943.87, 948.03 (2) (a) or (5), 948.051, or 948.30 (2).
(2)
If a person has one or more prior convictions for a serious violent crime or a crime punishable by life imprisonment and subsequently commits a serious violent crime, the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under s. 973.01. The term of confinement in prison portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed under this subsection may not be less than 5 years, but otherwise the penalties for the crime apply, subject to any applicable penalty enhancement. The court may not place the defendant on probation.
History:  1993 a. 97; 2001 a. 109; 2005 a. 433 s. 17; Stats. 2005 s. 939.619; 2017 a. 309; 2023 a. 10.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions. › 939.6195 - Mandatory minimum sentence for repeat firearm crimes.

939.6195
Mandatory minimum sentence for repeat firearm crimes.
(1)
In this section:
(a)
“Firearm violation" means any of the following:
1.
A violation of s. 941.29 or 941.2905.
2.
A commission of any crime specified under chs. 939 to 951 and 961 if the person uses a firearm in the commission of the crime.
(b)
“Repeater" has the meaning given in s. 939.62 (2).
(2)
If a person who is a repeater is convicted of a firearm violation, the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under s. 973.01. Notwithstanding s. 973.01 (2) (b), the term of confinement in prison portion of the bifurcated sentence shall be at least 4 years, but otherwise the penalties for the crime apply, subject to any applicable penalty enhancement. The court may not place the person on probation.
(3)
This section does not apply to sentences imposed after July 1, 2022.
(4)
The department of justice shall, after consulting with persons the department determines to be appropriate, including the city of Milwaukee and the Milwaukee police department, prepare a report on the efficacy of the mandatory minimum sentence under this section. No later than August 1, 2022, the department of justice shall submit the report to the chief clerk of each house of the legislature, for distribution to the legislature under s. 13.172 (2).
History:  2017 a. 145.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions. › 939.623 - Increased penalty for elder person victims.

939.623
Increased penalty for elder person victims.
(1)
In this section, “elder person” means any individual who is 60 years of age or older.
(2)
If the crime victim is an elder person, and the present conviction is for any crime for which imprisonment may be imposed, the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may be increased as follows:
(a)
A maximum term of imprisonment of one year or less may be increased to not more than 2 years.
(b)
A maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year but not more than 10 years may be increased by not more than 4 years.
(c)
A maximum term of imprisonment of more than 10 years may be increased by not more than 6 years.
(3)
This section applies irrespective of whether the defendant had actual knowledge of the crime victim's age. A mistake regarding the crime victim's age is not a defense to an increased penalty under this section.
History:  2021 a. 76.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions. › 939.63 - Penalties; use of a dangerous weapon.

939.63
Penalties; use of a dangerous weapon.
(1)
If a person commits a crime while possessing, using or threatening to use a dangerous weapon, the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may be increased as follows:
(a)
The maximum term of imprisonment for a misdemeanor may be increased by not more than 6 months.
(b)
If the maximum term of imprisonment for a felony is more than 5 years or is a life term, the maximum term of imprisonment for the felony may be increased by not more than 5 years.
(c)
If the maximum term of imprisonment for a felony is more than 2 years, but not more than 5 years, the maximum term of imprisonment for the felony may be increased by not more than 4 years.
(d)
The maximum term of imprisonment for a felony not specified in par. (b) or (c) may be increased by not more than 3 years.
(2)
The increased penalty provided in this section does not apply if possessing, using or threatening to use a dangerous weapon is an essential element of the crime charged.
(3)
This section applies only to crimes specified under chs. 939 to 951 and 961.
History:  1979 c. 114; 1981 c. 212; 1987 a. 332 s. 64; 1995 a. 448; 2001 a. 109.
The fact that the maximum term for a misdemeanor may exceed one year under sub. (1) (a) does not upgrade the crime to felony status. State v. Denter, 121 Wis. 2d 118, 357 N.W.2d 555 (1984).
Possession encompasses both actual and constructive possession. To prove a violation of this section, the state must prove that the defendant possessed the weapon to facilitate the predicate offense. State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994). See also State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 564 N.W.2d 753 (1997), 95-0770.
An automobile may constitute a dangerous weapon under s. 939.22 (10). State v. Bidwell, 200 Wis. 2d 200, 546 N.W.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996).
Under Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4 (1994), there is sufficient evidence of possession if the evidence allows a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon in order to use it or threaten to use it, even if the defendant did not use or threaten to use it in the commission of the crime. State v. Page, 2000 WI App 267, 240 Wis. 2d 276, 622 N.W.2d 285, 99-2015.
When two penalty enhancers are applicable to the same crime, the length of the second penalty enhancer is based on the maximum term for the base crime as extended by the first penalty enhancer. State v. Quiroz, 2002 WI App 52, 251 Wis. 2d 245, 641 N.W.2d 715, 01-1549.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions. › 939.635 - Increased penalty for certain crimes against children committed by a child care provider.

939.635
Increased penalty for certain crimes against children committed by a child care provider.
If a person commits a violation of s. 948.02, 948.025, or 948.03 (2), (3), or (5) (a) 1., 2., 3., or 4. against a child for whom the person was providing child care for compensation, the maximum term of imprisonment for that crime may be increased by not more than 5 years.
History:  2011 a. 82; 2015 a. 366.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions. › 939.645 - Penalty; crimes committed against certain people or property.

939.645
Penalty; crimes committed against certain people or property.
(1)
If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crime are increased as provided in sub. (2):
(a)
Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b)
Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is committed or selects the property that is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime under par. (a) in whole or in part because of the actor's belief or perception regarding the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property, whether or not the actor's belief or perception was correct.
(2)
(a)
If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a misdemeanor other than a Class A misdemeanor, the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum term of imprisonment is one year in the county jail.
(b)
If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor, the penalty increase under this section changes the status of the crime to a felony and the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum term of imprisonment is 2 years.
(c)
If the crime committed under sub. (1) is a felony, the maximum fine prescribed by law for the crime may be increased by not more than $5,000 and the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for the crime may be increased by not more than 5 years.
(3)
This section provides for the enhancement of the penalties applicable for the underlying crime. The court shall direct that the trier of fact find a special verdict as to all of the issues specified in sub. (1).
(4)
This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry or proof of any person's perception or belief regarding another's race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry is required for a conviction for that crime.
History:  1987 a. 348; 1991 a. 291; 2001 a. 109.
When two penalty enhancers are applicable to the same crime, the length of the second penalty enhancer is based on the maximum term for the base crime as extended by the first penalty enhancer. State v. Quiroz, 2002 WI App 52, 251 Wis. 2d 245, 641 N.W.2d 715, 01-1549.
The “hate crimes" law, this section, does not unconstitutionally infringe upon free speech. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 124 L. Ed. 2d 436 (1993).
Hate Crimes—New Limits on the Scope of First Amendment Protection? Resler. 77 MLR 415 (1994).
Put to the Proof: Evidentiary Considerations in Wisconsin Hate Crime Prosecutions. Read. 89 MLR 453 (2005).
Talking About Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of American and Canadian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech. Moran. 1994 WLR 1425.
Hate Crimes. Kassel. Wis. Law. Oct. 1992.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions. › 939.65 - Prosecution under more than one section permitted.

939.65
Prosecution under more than one section permitted.
Except as provided in s. 948.025 (3), if an act forms the basis for a crime punishable under more than one statutory provision, prosecution may proceed under any or all such provisions.
History:  1993 a. 227.
Due process does not require that a person know with certainty which crime, among several, the person is committing, at least until the prosecution exercises its charging discretion. Harris v. State, 78 Wis. 2d 357, 254 N.W.2d 291 (1977).
The district attorney had the discretion to charge the defendant with a Class A misdemeanor offense of sexual intercourse with a child age 16 or older under s. 948.09, a Class I felony offense of exposing intimate parts under s. 948.10 (1), and a Class D felony offense of child enticement with intent to expose intimate parts under s. 948.07 (3). It was not absurd to penalize the defendant for the felony crime of exposing intimate parts, which would be practically necessary for the misdemeanor intercourse to occur. State v. Matthews, 2019 WI App 44, 388 Wis. 2d 335, 933 N.W.2d 152, 18-0845.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions. › 939.70 - Presumption of innocence and burden of proof.

939.70
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof.
No provision of chs. 939 to 951 shall be construed as changing the existing law with respect to presumption of innocence or burden of proof.
History:  1979 c. 89; 1987 a. 332 s. 64.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions. › 939.71 - Limitation on the number of convictions.

939.71
Limitation on the number of convictions.
If an act forms the basis for a crime punishable under more than one statutory provision of this state or under a statutory provision of this state and the laws of another jurisdiction, a conviction or acquittal on the merits under one provision bars a subsequent prosecution under the other provision unless each provision requires proof of a fact for conviction which the other does not require.
Misdemeanor battery is an included crime of felony battery, but they are not the same offense. Acquittal on felony battery charges does not prevent subsequent prosecution for misdemeanor battery. State v. Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 330, 579 N.W.2d 35 (1998), 97-0938.
This section does not bar a subsequent prosecution for an offense arising from the same acts that could not have been charged at the time of the first prosecution and thus did not bar prosecuting a defendant for first-degree intentional homicide for the same act which led to battery convictions when the victim died after having been in a coma for four years. State v. McKee, 2002 WI App 148, 256 Wis. 2d 547, 648 N.W.2d 34, 01-1966.
Under this section, a subsequent prosecution is not prohibited if each provision requires proof of a fact for conviction that the other does not require, even if the same conduct was involved in the two prosecutions. In contrast, s. 961.45 provides that if a violation of ch. 961 is a violation of a federal law or the law of another state, a conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. The difference in the two statutes does not violate equal protection. State v. Swinson, 2003 WI App 45, 261 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 12, 02-0395.
This section substantially enacts the Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), test for determining whether two offenses are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. The test for determining whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not. State v. Triebold, 2021 WI App 13, 396 Wis. 2d 176, 955 N.W.2d 415, 19-1209.
This section did not prohibit the defendant's convictions for failure to update his address information in both Minnesota and Wisconsin because the states' respective sex offender registration statutes required proof of different facts. Criminal liability under either statute was predicated upon a failure to comply with the applicable registration requirements of the particular state—here, the failure to update address information to the relevant state agency. The defendant was not prosecuted in Wisconsin with failing to provide his new address to Minnesota authorities. Rather, the defendant was separately required under this state's law to provide his updated address information to the Wisconsin Department of Corrections under s. 301.45 (4). State v. Triebold, 2021 WI App 13, 396 Wis. 2d 176, 955 N.W.2d 415, 19-1209.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions. › 939.72 - No conviction of both inchoate and completed crime.

939.72
No conviction of both inchoate and completed crime.
A person shall not be convicted under both:
(1)
Section 939.30 for solicitation and s. 939.05 as a party to a crime which is the objective of the solicitation; or
(2)
Section 939.31 for conspiracy and s. 939.05 as a party to a crime which is the objective of the conspiracy; or
(3)
Section 939.32 for attempt and the section defining the completed crime.
History:  1991 a. 153; 2001 a. 109.
Sub. (3) does not bar convicting the defendant who shot at one person but killed another of both murder and attempted murder. Austin v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 213, 271 N.W.2d 668 (1978).
Sub. (3) does not bar convictions for possession of burglarious tools and burglary arising out of a single transaction. Dumas v. State, 90 Wis. 2d 518, 280 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979).
This section refers to convictions, not charges. The state may properly charge a defendant with both being a party to an attempt to commit a crime and conspiracy to commit the crime. State v. Moffett, 2000 WI 130, 239 Wis. 2d 629, 619 N.W.2d 918, 99-1768.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.06 - Second-degree reckless homicide.

940.06
Second-degree reckless homicide.
(1)
Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human being is guilty of a Class D felony.
(2)
Whoever recklessly causes the death of an unborn child is guilty of a Class D felony.
History:  1987 a. 399; 1997 a. 295; 2001 a. 109.
Judicial Council Note, 1988: Second-degree reckless homicide is analogous to the prior offense of homicide by reckless conduct. The revised statute clearly requires proof of a subjective mental state, i.e., criminal recklessness. See s. 939.24 and the NOTE thereto. [Bill 191-S]
Second-degree reckless homicide is not a lesser included offense of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998), 96-2830.
The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.
The second-degree reckless homicide statute requires both the creation of an objectively unreasonable and substantial risk of human death or great bodily harm and the actor's subjective awareness of that risk. The circuit court's refusal to instruct the jury about the effect of the parents' sincere belief in prayer treatment for their child on the subjective awareness element of second-degree reckless homicide did not undermine the parents' ability to defend themselves. The second-degree reckless homicide statute does not require that the actor be subjectively aware that the actor's conduct is a cause of the death of the actor's child. The statute and the jury instructions require only that the actor be subjectively aware that the actor's conduct created the unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560, 11-1044.
The only difference between first-degree and second-degree reckless homicide is that “utter disregard for human life" is a required element for first-degree, but not second-degree, reckless homicide. In this case, there was evidence that the defendant acted in fear for his own life, not necessarily with utter disregard for the victim's life. Based on that evidence, the circuit court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree reckless homicide as well as first-degree reckless homicide. State v. Johnson, 2021 WI 61, 397 Wis. 2d 633, 961 N.W.2d 18, 18-2318.
The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision. Dickey, Schultz, & Fullin. 1989 WLR 1323.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.07 - Homicide resulting from negligent control of vicious animal.

940.07
Homicide resulting from negligent control of vicious animal.
Whoever knowing the vicious propensities of any animal intentionally allows it to go at large or keeps it without ordinary care, if such animal, while so at large or not confined, kills any human being who has taken all the precautions which the circumstances may permit to avoid such animal, is guilty of a Class G felony.
History:  1977 c. 173; 2001 a. 109.
The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.08 - Homicide by negligent handling of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire.

940.08
Homicide by negligent handling of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire.
(1)
Except as provided in sub. (3), whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class G felony.
(2)
Whoever causes the death of an unborn child by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class G felony.
(3)
Subsection (1) does not apply to a health care provider acting within the scope of his or her practice or employment.
History:  1977 c. 173; 1985 a. 293; 1987 a. 399; 1997 a. 295; 2001 a. 109; 2011 a. 2.
Judicial Council Note, 1988: The definition of the offense is broadened to include highly negligent handling of fire, explosives and dangerous weapons in addition to firearm, airgun, knife or bow and arrow. See s. 939.22 (10). [Bill 191-S]
The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.
In order to establish that the defendant was guilty of the crime of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon under sub. (1), the state had to prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the defendant operated or handled a dangerous weapon; 2) the defendant operated or handled a dangerous weapon in a manner constituting criminal negligence; and 3) the defendant's operation or handling of a dangerous weapon in a manner constituting criminal negligence caused the death of another human being. State v. Langlois, 2018 WI 73, 382 Wis. 2d 414, 913 N.W.2d 812, 16-1409.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.10 - Homicide by negligent operation of vehicle.

940.10
Homicide by negligent operation of vehicle.
(1)
Whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class G felony.
(2)
Whoever causes the death of an unborn child by the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class G felony.
History:  1987 a. 399; 1997 a. 295; 2001 a. 109.
Judicial Council Note, 1988: Homicide by negligent operation of vehicle is analogous to prior s. 940.08. The mental element is criminal negligence as defined in s. 939.25. [Bill 191-S]
A motorist was properly convicted under this section for running a red light at 50 m.p.h., even though the speed limit was 55 m.p.h. State v. Cooper, 117 Wis. 2d 30, 344 N.W.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1983).
The definition of criminal negligence as applied to homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Barman, 183 Wis. 2d 180, 515 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1994).
A corporation may be subject to criminal liability under this section. State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 196 Wis. 2d 86, 537 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1995), 93-1898. See also State v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 511, 589 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1998), 98-0104.
It is not a requirement for finding criminal negligence that the actor be specifically warned that the actor's conduct may result in harm. State v. Johannes, 229 Wis. 2d 215, 598 N.W.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2239.
The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.11 - Mutilating or hiding a corpse.

940.11
Mutilating or hiding a corpse.
(1)
Whoever mutilates, disfigures or dismembers a corpse, with intent to conceal a crime or avoid apprehension, prosecution or conviction for a crime, is guilty of a Class F felony.
(2)
Whoever hides or buries a corpse, with intent to conceal a crime or avoid apprehension, prosecution, or conviction for a crime or notwithstanding s. 946.90 (2) or (3), 946.91 (2), 946.92, or 946.93 (2) or (3) with intent to collect benefits under the assistance program for families with dependent children administered under ss. 49.141 to 49.161, the Medical Assistance program administered under subch. IV of ch. 49, or the food stamp program, as defined in s. 49.79 (1) (c), is guilty of a Class F felony.
(3)
A person may not be subject to prosecution under both this section and s. 946.47 or under both this section and s. 948.23 (2) for his or her acts regarding the same corpse.
History:  1991 a. 205; 2001 a. 109; 2011 a. 268; 2013 a. 226; 2015 a. 147.
Evidence that the defendant dragged a corpse behind a locked gate into a restricted, secluded wildlife area, then rolled the corpse into water at the bottom of a ditch was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant hid a corpse in violation of this section. State v. Badker, 2001 WI App 27, 240 Wis. 2d 460, 623 N.W.2d 142, 99-2943.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.13 - Abortion exception.

940.13
Abortion exception.
No fine or imprisonment may be imposed or enforced against and no prosecution may be brought against a woman who obtains an abortion or otherwise violates any provision of any abortion statute with respect to her unborn child or fetus, and s. 939.05, 939.30 or 939.31 does not apply to a woman who obtains an abortion or otherwise violates any provision of any abortion statute with respect to her unborn child or fetus.
History:  1985 a. 56.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.15 - Abortion.

940.15
Abortion.
(1)
In this section, “viability" means that stage of fetal development when, in the medical judgment of the attending physician based on the particular facts of the case before him or her, there is a reasonable likelihood of sustained survival of the fetus outside the womb, with or without artificial support.
(2)
Whoever intentionally performs an abortion after the fetus or unborn child reaches viability, as determined by reasonable medical judgment of the woman's attending physician, is guilty of a Class I felony.
(3)
Subsection (2) does not apply if the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman, as determined by reasonable medical judgment of the woman's attending physician.
(4)
Any abortion performed under sub. (3) after viability of the fetus or unborn child, as determined by reasonable medical judgment of the woman's attending physician, shall be performed in a hospital on an inpatient basis.
(5)
Whoever intentionally performs an abortion and who is not a physician is guilty of a Class I felony.
(6)
Any physician who intentionally performs an abortion under sub. (3) shall use that method of abortion which, of those he or she knows to be available, is in his or her medical judgment most likely to preserve the life and health of the fetus or unborn child. Nothing in this subsection requires a physician performing an abortion to employ a method of abortion which, in his or her medical judgment based on the particular facts of the case before him or her, would increase the risk to the woman. Any physician violating this subsection is guilty of a Class I felony.
(7)
Subsections (2) to (6) and s. 939.05, 939.30 or 939.31 do not apply to a woman who obtains an abortion that is in violation of this section or otherwise violates this section with respect to her unborn child or fetus.
History:  1985 a. 56; 2001 a. 109.
The constitution does not confer a right to abortion. Therefore, a rational-basis review is the appropriate standard for a constitutional challenge to abortion laws. A law regulating abortion, like other health and welfare laws, is entitled to a strong presumption of validity. It must be sustained if there is a rational basis on which the legislature could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022).
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.16 - Partial-birth abortion.

940.16
Partial-birth abortion.
(1)
In this section:
(a)
“Child" means a human being from the time of fertilization until it is completely delivered from a pregnant woman.
(b)
“Partial-birth abortion" means an abortion in which a person partially vaginally delivers a living child, causes the death of the partially delivered child with the intent to kill the child, and then completes the delivery of the child.
(2)
Except as provided in sub. (3), whoever intentionally performs a partial-birth abortion is guilty of a Class A felony.
(3)
Subsection (2) does not apply if the partial-birth abortion is necessary to save the life of a woman whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical disorder, physical illness or physical injury caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself, and if no other medical procedure would suffice for that purpose.
History:  1997 a. 219.
A Nebraska statute that provides that no partial birth abortion can be performed unless it is necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury is unconstitutional. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 147 L. Ed. 2d 743 (2000). But see Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022).
The constitution does not confer a right to abortion. Therefore, a rational-basis review is the appropriate standard for a constitutional challenge to abortion laws. A law regulating abortion, like other health and welfare laws, is entitled to a strong presumption of validity. It must be sustained if there is a rational basis on which the legislature could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022).
Enforcement of this section is enjoined under Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603 (2001). But see Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022).
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.19 - Battery; substantial battery; aggravated battery.

940.19
Battery; substantial battery; aggravated battery.
(1)
Whoever causes bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another without the consent of the person so harmed is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
(2)
Whoever causes substantial bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a Class I felony.
(4)
Whoever causes great bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a Class H felony.
(5)
Whoever causes great bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause great bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a Class E felony.
(6)
Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to another by conduct that creates a substantial risk of great bodily harm is guilty of a Class H felony. A rebuttable presumption of conduct creating a substantial risk of great bodily harm arises if the person harmed has a physical disability, whether congenital or acquired by accident, injury or disease, that is discernible by an ordinary person viewing the physically disabled person, or that is actually known by the actor.
History:  1977 c. 173; 1979 c. 111, 113; 1987 a. 399; 1993 a. 441, 483; 2001 a. 109; 2021 a. 76.
Under the “elements only" test, offenses under subsections that require proof of nonconsent are not lesser included offenses of offenses under subsections for which proof of nonconsent is not required. State v. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d 1, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985).
Discussing “physical disability." State v. Crowley, 143 Wis. 2d 324, 422 N.W.2d 847 (1988).
First-degree reckless injury, s. 940.23 (1), is not a lesser included offense of aggravated battery. State v. Eastman, 185 Wis. 2d 405, 518 N.W.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1994).
The act of throwing urine that strikes another and causes pain constitutes a battery. State v. Higgs, 230 Wis. 2d 1, 601 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1811.
Section 941.20 (1), first-degree recklessly endangering safety, is not a lesser included offense of sub. (5), aggravated battery. State v. Dibble, 2002 WI App 219, 257 Wis. 2d. 274, 650 N.W.2d 908, 02-0538.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.195 - Battery to an unborn child; substantial battery to an unborn child; aggravated battery to an unborn child.

940.195
Battery to an unborn child; substantial battery to an unborn child; aggravated battery to an unborn child.
(1)
Whoever causes bodily harm to an unborn child by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that unborn child, to the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or another is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
(2)
Whoever causes substantial bodily harm to an unborn child by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that unborn child, to the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or another is guilty of a Class I felony.
(4)
Whoever causes great bodily harm to an unborn child by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that unborn child, to the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or another is guilty of a Class H felony.
(5)
Whoever causes great bodily harm to an unborn child by an act done with intent to cause great bodily harm to that unborn child, to the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or another is guilty of a Class E felony.
(6)
Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to an unborn child by conduct that creates a substantial risk of great bodily harm is guilty of a Class H felony.
History:  1997 a. 295; 2001 a. 109.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.198 - Physical abuse of an elder person.

940.198
Physical abuse of an elder person.
(1)
Definitions. In this section:
(a)
“Elder person” means any individual who is 60 years of age or older.
(b)
“Recklessly” means conduct that creates a situation of unreasonable risk of harm to and demonstrates a conscious disregard for the safety of the elder person.
(2)
Intentional causation of bodily harm.
(a)
Whoever intentionally causes great bodily harm to an elder person is guilty of a Class C felony.
(b)
Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to an elder person is guilty of a Class H felony.
(c)
Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to an elder person under circumstances or conditions that are likely to produce great bodily harm is guilty of a Class F felony.
(3)
Reckless causation of bodily harm.
(a)
Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to an elder person is guilty of a Class E felony.
(b)
Whoever recklessly causes bodily harm to an elder person is guilty of a Class I felony.
(c)
Whoever recklessly causes bodily harm to an elder person under circumstances or conditions that are likely to produce great bodily harm is guilty of a Class H felony.
(4)
Knowledge of age not required. This section applies irrespective of whether the defendant had actual knowledge of the victim's age. A mistake regarding the victim's age is not a defense to a prosecution under this section.
History: 2021 a. 76.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.201 - Battery or threat to witnesses.

940.201
Battery or threat to witnesses.
(1)
In this section:
(a)
“Family member" means a spouse, child, stepchild, foster child, parent, sibling, or grandchild.
(b)
“Witness" has the meaning given in s. 940.41 (3).
(2)
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class H felony:
(a)
Intentionally causes bodily harm or threatens to cause bodily harm to a person who he or she knows or has reason to know is or was a witness by reason of the person having attended or testified as a witness and without the consent of the person harmed or threatened.
(b)
Intentionally causes bodily harm or threatens to cause bodily harm to a person who he or she knows or has reason to know is a family member of a witness or a person sharing a common domicile with a witness by reason of the witness having attended or testified as a witness and without the consent of the person harmed or threatened.
History:  1997 a. 143; 2001 a. 109; 2009 a. 28.
Battery to a prospective witness is prohibited by s. 940.206 [now this section]. McLeod v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 787, 271 N.W.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1978).
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.204 - Battery or threat to health care providers and staff.

940.204
Battery or threat to health care providers and staff.
(1)
In this section:
(a)
“Family member” means a parent, spouse, sibling, child, stepchild, or foster child.
(b)
“Health care facility” means any of the following:
1.
A hospital, as defined in s. 50.33 (2).
2.
A clinic, which is a location with the primary purpose of providing outpatient diagnosis, treatment, or management of health conditions.
3.
A pharmacy that is licensed under s. 450.06.
4.
An adult day care center, as defined in s. 49.45 (47) (a).
5.
An adult family home, as defined in s. 50.01 (1).
6.
A community-based residential facility, as defined in s. 50.01 (1g).
7.
A residential care apartment complex, as defined in s. 50.01 (6d).
8.
A nursing home, as defined in s. 50.01 (3).
9.
A mental health or substance use disorder facility, which is a location that provides diagnosis, treatment, or management of mental health or substance use disorders.
10.
An ambulatory surgical center, as defined in 42 CFR 416.2.
(c)
“Health care provider” means any of the following:
1.
A health care provider, as defined in s. 146.81 (1) (a) to (hp), (q), (r), or (s).
2.
A radiographer or limited X-ray machine operator licensed or permitted under ch. 462.
3.
A driver of an ambulance, as defined in s. 256.01 (1t).
(2)
Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm or threatens to cause bodily harm to a person who works in a health care facility or to a family member of a person who works in a health care facility under all of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class H felony:
(a)
At the time of the act or threat, the actor knows or should have known that the victim works or formerly worked in a health care facility or is a family member of the person who works or formerly worked in a health care facility.
(b)
The act or threat is in response to an action occurring at the health care facility or an action by an official, employee, or agent of the health care facility acting in his or her official capacity.
(c)
There is no consent by the person harmed or threatened.
(3)
Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm or threatens to cause bodily harm to a health care provider or to a family member of a health care provider under all of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class H felony:
(a)
At the time of the act or threat, the actor knows or should have known that the victim is a health care provider or is a family member of a health care provider.
(b)
The act or threat is in response to an action by the health care provider acting in his or her capacity as a health care provider.
(c)
There is no consent by the person harmed or threatened.
(4)
The department of justice shall post on its website model language that health care facilities may post at their entrances alerting persons to the penalties under this section.
History:  2021 a. 209; s. 35.17 correction in (1) (b) 4., (c) 1., (4).
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.205 - Battery or threat to department of revenue employee.

940.205
Battery or threat to department of revenue employee.
(1)
In this section, “family member" means a parent, spouse, sibling, child, stepchild, or foster child.
(2)
Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm or threatens to cause bodily harm to the person or family member of any department of revenue official, employee or agent under all of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class H felony:
(a)
At the time of the act or threat, the actor knows or should have known that the victim is a department of revenue official, employee or agent or a member of his or her family.
(b)
The official, employee or agent is acting in an official capacity at the time of the act or threat or the act or threat is in response to any action taken in an official capacity.
(c)
There is no consent by the person harmed or threatened.
History:  1985 a. 29; 1993 a. 446; 2001 a. 109; 2009 a. 28.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.207 - Battery or threat to department of safety and professional services or department of workforce development employee.

940.207
Battery or threat to department of safety and professional services or department of workforce development employee.
(1)
In this section, “family member" means a parent, spouse, sibling, child, stepchild, or foster child.
(2)
Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm or threatens to cause bodily harm to the person or family member of any department of safety and professional services or department of workforce development official, employee or agent under all of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class H felony:
(a)
At the time of the act or threat, the actor knows or should have known that the victim is a department of safety and professional services or department of workforce development official, employee or agent or a member of his or her family.
(b)
The official, employee or agent is acting in an official capacity at the time of the act or threat or the act or threat is in response to any action taken in an official capacity.
(c)
There is no consent by the person harmed or threatened.
History:  1993 a. 86, 446; 1995 a. 27 ss. 7227 to 7229, 9116 (5), 9130 (4); 1997 a. 3; 2001 a. 109; 2009 a. 28; 2011 a. 32.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.208 - Battery to certain employees of counties, cities, villages, or towns.

940.208
Battery to certain employees of counties, cities, villages, or towns.
Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to an employee of a county, city, village, or town under all of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class I felony:
(1)
At the time of the act, the actor knows or should know that the victim is an employee of a county, city, village, or town.
(2)
The victim is enforcing, or conducting an inspection for the purpose of enforcing, a state, county, city, village, or town zoning ordinance, building code, or other construction law, rule, standard, or plan at the time of the act or the act is in response to any such enforcement or inspection activity.
(2p)
The enforcement or inspection complies with any law, ordinance, or rule, including any applicable notice requirement.
(3)
There is no consent by the victim.
History:  2007 a. 193.
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.21 - Mayhem.

940.21
Mayhem.
Whoever, with intent to disable or disfigure another, cuts or mutilates the tongue, eye, ear, nose, lip, limb or other bodily member of another is guilty of a Class C felony.
History:  1977 c. 173; 2001 a. 109.
The forehead qualifies as an “other bodily member" under this section because “other bodily member" encompasses all bodily parts. State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447, 06-0499.
Failure to instruct a jury that great bodily harm is an essential element of mayhem was reversible error. Cole v. Young, 817 F. 2d 412 (1987).
2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security. › 940.235 - Strangulation and suffocation.

940.235
Strangulation and suffocation.
(1)
Whoever intentionally impedes the normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of another person is guilty of a Class H felony.
(2)
Whoever violates sub. (1) is guilty of a Class G felony if the actor has a previous conviction under this section or a previous conviction for a violent crime, as defined in s. 939.632 (1) (e) 1.
History:  2007 a. 127.