2023 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations › Chapter 62 - Cities. › 62.11 - Common council.

62.11
Common council.
(1)
How constituted. The mayor and alderpersons shall be the common council. The mayor shall not be counted in determining whether a quorum is present at a meeting, but may vote in case of a tie. When the mayor does vote in case of a tie the mayor's vote shall be counted in determining whether a sufficient number of the council has voted favorably or unfavorably on any measure.
(2)
Time of meeting. The council shall meet at least once a month, and on the first Tuesday unless a different day be fixed by the council. More frequent regular meetings may be established by the council. The mayor may call a special meeting by notifying members in a manner likely to give each member notice of the meeting and providing the notice at least 6 hours before the meeting. Following a regular city election the new council shall first meet on the 3rd Tuesday of April.
(3)
Procedure.
(a)
The council shall be the judge of the election and qualification of its members, may compel their attendance, and may fine or expel for neglect of duty.
(b)
Two-thirds of the members shall be a quorum, except that in cities having not more than 5 alderpersons a majority shall be a quorum. A less number may compel the attendance of absent members and adjourn. A majority of all the members shall be necessary to a confirmation. In case of a tie the mayor shall have a casting vote as in other cases.
(c)
Meetings shall be open to the public; and the council may punish by fine members or other persons present for disorderly behavior.
(d)
The ayes and noes may be required by any member. On confirmation and on the adoption of any measure assessing or levying taxes, appropriating or disbursing money, or creating any liability or charge against the city or any fund thereof, the vote shall be by ayes and noes. All aye and nay votes shall be recorded in the journal.
(e)
The council shall in all other respects determine the rules of its procedure.
(f)
The style of all ordinances shall be: “The common council of the city of .... do ordain as follows".
(4)
Publication.
(a)
Proceedings of the council shall be published in the newspaper designated under s. 985.06 as a class 1 notice, under ch. 985. The proceedings for the purpose of publication shall include the substance of every official action taken by the governing body. Except as provided in this subsection every ordinance shall be published either in its entirety, as a class 1 notice, under ch. 985, or as a notice, as described under par. (c) 2., within 15 days of passage, and shall take effect on the day after the publication or at a later date if expressly prescribed.
(b)
All ordinances passed by the governing body of any city of the second class between January 1, 1914, and January 1, 1924, which were or may have been required to be published before becoming effective, but which were not published, shall be valid to the same extent as if they had been published in the first instance, as required by law, providing said ordinances and all amendments thereto are printed in the official journal of any such body together with the record of the passage of the same; however, the provisions of this paragraph shall not be effective in any city unless the governing body thereof shall so elect by a vote of two-thirds of its members.
(c)
1.
In this paragraph, “ summary" has the meaning given in s. 59.14 (1m) (a).
2.
A notice of an ordinance that may be published under this paragraph shall be published as a class 1 notice under ch. 985 and shall contain at least all of the following:
a.
The number and title of the ordinance.
b.
The date of enactment.
c.
A summary of the subject matter and main points of the ordinance.
d.
Information as to where the full text of the ordinance may be obtained, including the phone number of the city clerk, a street address where the full text of the ordinance may be viewed, and a website, if any, at which the ordinance may be accessed.
(5)
Powers. Except as elsewhere in the statutes specifically provided, the council shall have the management and control of the city property, finances, highways, navigable waters, and the public service, and shall have power to act for the government and good order of the city, for its commercial benefit, and for the health, safety, and welfare of the public, and may carry out its powers by license, regulation, suppression, borrowing of money, tax levy, appropriation, fine, imprisonment, confiscation, and other necessary or convenient means. The powers hereby conferred shall be in addition to all other grants, and shall be limited only by express language.
History:  1991 a. 316; 1993 a. 184; 1995 a. 225; 2007 a. 72; 2017 a. 50; 2017 a. 365 s. 112.
Cross-reference:  See s. 118.105 for control of traffic on school premises.
When a municipality's power to contract is improperly or irregularly exercised and the municipality receives a benefit under the contract, it is estopped from asserting the invalidity of the contract. Village of McFarland v. Town of Dunn, 82 Wis. 2d 469, 263 N.W.2d 167 (1978).
Madison's power to forbid chemical treatment of Madison lakes was withdrawn by s. 144.025 (2) (i) [now s. 281.17 (2)]. Wisconsin Environmental Decade, Inc. v. DNR, 85 Wis. 2d 518, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978).
When a city council creates a governing board for a utility under s. 66.068 (1) [now s. 66.0805 (1)], the council is prohibited by s. 66.068 (3) [now s. 66.0805 (3)] from fixing wages for utility employees. Schroeder v. City of Clintonville, 90 Wis. 2d 457, 280 N.W.2d 166 (1979).
Sub. (5) authorizes an ordinance regulating massage parlors. City of Madison v. Schultz, 98 Wis. 2d 188, 295 N.W.2d 798 (Ct. App. 1980).
There is a four-part test in evaluating whether a municipality may regulate a matter of state-wide concern: 1) whether the legislature has expressly withdrawn the power of municipalities to act; 2) whether the ordinance logically conflicts with the state legislation; 3) whether the ordinance defeats the purpose of the state legislation; or 4) whether the ordinance goes against the spirit of the state legislation. Anchor Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities Commission, 120 Wis. 2d 391, 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984).
The common council and mayor properly limited the power of the police and fire commission to promote police officers. State ex rel. Wilson v. Schocker, 142 Wis. 2d 179, 418 N.W.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1987).
Liberally construing home rule authority, a city is not authorized to institute a public safety officer program. Local Union No. 487 v. City of Eau Claire, 147 Wis. 2d 519, 433 N.W.2d 578 (1989).
The power granted under sub. (5) is broader than that granted under article XI, section 3, of the Wisconsin Constitution. Sub. (5) does not limit a city's authority to act only in local affairs. A city may act in matters of state-wide concern if the conditions of the four-part test stated in this case are met. DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek, 191 Wis. 2d 46, 528 N.W.2d 468 (Ct. App. 1995).
The state regulatory scheme for tobacco sales preempts municipalities from adopting regulations that are not in strict conformity with those of the state. U.S. Oil, Inc. v. City of Fond du Lac, 199 Wis. 2d 333, 544 N.W.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1995), 95-0213.
One who deals with a municipality does so at his or her own risk and may be subject to any provisions of law that might prevent him or her from being paid by a municipality even though the services are rendered. Unless the power to bind the municipality financially has been specifically delegated, the only entity with the statutory authority to contract is the municipality. Holzbauer v. Safway Steel Products, Inc., 2005 WI App 240, 288 Wis. 2d 250, 712 N.W.2d 35, 04-2058.
When a challenge to the exercise of police powers is directed at the legislative means employed, the issue is properly framed as one of substantive due process. The legislative means chosen must have a rational relationship to the purpose or object of the enactment; if it has, and the object is a proper one, the exercise of the police power is valid. The fundamental inquiry is not whether the challenged provisions in an ordinance are rationally related to the stated purpose of the ordinance but whether the challenged provisions are rationally related to any legitimate municipal objective. Metropolitan Milwaukee Ass'n of Commerce, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2011 WI App 45, 332 Wis. 2d 459, 798 N.W.2d 287, 09-1874.
An ordinance is not invalid as unreasonable merely because substantially the same result might be accomplished by the enactment of a different type of ordinance, or because a less burdensome course might have been adopted to accomplish the end. The correct standard is whether the legislative means chosen has a rational relationship to the permissible object. Metropolitan Milwaukee Ass'n of Commerce, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2011 WI App 45, 332 Wis. 2d 459, 798 N.W.2d 287, 09-1874.
The fact that the regulation of sex offenders is a matter of statewide concern does not preclude municipalities from using their home-rule powers to impose further restrictions consistent with those imposed by the state. An ordinance regulating an area of statewide concern is preempted only if: 1) the legislature has expressly withdrawn the power of municipalities to act; 2) the ordinance logically conflicts with state legislation; 3) the ordinance defeats the purpose of state legislation; or 4) the ordinance violates the spirit of state legislation. City of South Milwaukee v. Kester, 2013 WI App 50, 347 Wis. 2d 334, 830 N.W.2d 710, 12-0724.
A city probably can contract with a county to provide fire protection to a county institution located outside of boundaries of the city. 62 Atty. Gen. 84.
A municipality has no jurisdiction over chemical treatment of waters to suppress aquatic nuisances. The Department of Natural Resources is granted statewide supervision over aquatic nuisance control under s. 144.025 (2) (i) [now s. 281.17 (2)]. Applications for permits to chemically treat aquatic nuisances under s. 144.025 (2) (i) may be denied even though statutory and regulatory requirements have been met if the chemical treatment would be counter-productive in achieving the goals set out in s. 144.025 (1) [now s. 281.11]. 63 Atty. Gen. 260.
Local units of government may not create and accumulate unappropriated surplus funds. However, a local unit of government may maintain reasonable amounts necessary in the exercise of sound business principles to meet the immediate cash flow needs of the municipality during the current budgetary period or to accumulate needed capital in non-lapsing funds to finance specifically identified future capital expenditures. 76 Atty. Gen. 77.
Article VIII, section 5 restricts the state from levying taxes to create a surplus having no public purpose. Although the constitutional provision does not apply directly to municipalities, the same limitation applies indirectly to them because the state cannot delegate more power than it has. 76 Atty. Gen. 77.
Conflicts Between State Statute and Local Ordinance in Wisconsin. Solheim. 1975 WLR 840.
Madison's Minimum-Wage Ordinance, Section 104.001, and the Future of Home Rule in Wisconsin. Burchill. 2007 WLR 151.