2023 Tennessee Code › Title 35 - FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST ESTATES (§§ 35-1-101 — 35-50-125) › Chapter 3 - INVESTMENT OF TRUST FUNDS (§§ 35-3-101 — 35-3-124) › Section 35-3-117 - Investment in securities of management investment company or investment trust by bank or trust company - Fiduciary liability - Abuse of fiduciary discretion

(a)
Notwithstanding any other law, a bank or trust company, to the extent it acts at the direction of another person authorized to direct investment of funds held by the bank or trust company, or to the extent that it exercises investment discretion as a fiduciary, custodian, managing agent, or otherwise with respect to the investment and reinvestment of assets that it maintains in its trust department, may invest and reinvest the assets, subject to the standard contained in this section, in the securities of any open-end or closed-end management investment company or investment trust registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1
-
80a-64
). The fact that the bank or trust company, or any affiliate of the bank or trust company, is providing services to the investment company or trust as investment advisor, sponsor, distributor, custodian, transfer agent, registrar or otherwise, and receiving reasonable remuneration for the services, does not preclude the bank or trust company from investing in the securities of the investment company or trust.
(b)
In the absence of express provisions to the contrary in the governing instrument, a fiduciary will not be liable to the beneficiaries or to the trust with respect to a decision regarding the allocation and nature of investments of trust assets unless the court determines that the decision was an abuse of the fiduciary's discretion. A court shall not determine that a fiduciary abused its discretion merely because the court would not have exercised the discretion in the same manner.
(c)
If a court determines that a fiduciary has abused its discretion regarding the allocation and nature of investments of trust assets, the remedy is to restore the income and remainder beneficiaries to the positions they would have occupied if the fiduciary had not abused its discretion, according to the following rules:
(1)
To the extent that the abuse of discretion has resulted in no distribution to a beneficiary or a distribution that is too small, the court shall require a distribution from the trust to the beneficiary in an amount that the court determines will restore the beneficiary, in whole or in part, to the beneficiary's appropriate position, taking into account all prior distributions to the beneficiary;
(2)
To the extent that the abuse of discretion has resulted in a distribution to a beneficiary that is too large, the court shall restore the beneficiaries, the trust, or both, in whole or in part, to their appropriate positions, taking into account all prior distributions, by requiring the fiduciary to withhold an amount from one (1) or more future distributions to the beneficiary who received the distribution that was too large or requiring that beneficiary to return some or all of the distribution to the trust;
(3)
To the extent that the court is unable, after applying subdivisions (c)(1) and (2), to restore the beneficiaries, the trust, or both, to the position they would have occupied if the fiduciary had not abused its discretion, the court may require the fiduciary to pay an appropriate amount from its own funds to one (1) or more of the beneficiaries or the trust or both.
(d)
Upon a petition by the fiduciary, the court having jurisdiction over the trust or agency account shall determine whether a proposed plan of investment by the fiduciary will result in an abuse of the fiduciary's discretion. If the position describes the proposed plan of investment and contains sufficient information to inform the beneficiaries of the reasons for the proposal, the facts upon which the fiduciary relies, and an explanation of how the income and remainder beneficiaries will be affected by the proposed plan of investment, a beneficiary who challenges the proposed plan of investment has the burden of establishing that it will result in an abuse of discretion.
Acts 1951, ch. 125, §§ 1-6 (Williams, §§9596.12-9596.17); Acts 1968, ch. 518, § 1; 1971, ch. 61, § 1; 1974, ch. 634, §1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 35-319 -- 35-324; Acts 1989, ch. 288, §2; 1991, ch. 386, § 1; 2001, ch. 57, §§ 1, 2; 2002, ch. 696, § 15.