reglab/statecodes huggingface dataset:
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:1-10 - When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense

2C:1-10. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense
A prosecution of a defendant for a violation of a different provision of the statutes or based on different facts than a former prosecution is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
a. The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section 2C:1-9 and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(1) Any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution; or
(2) Any offense for which the defendant should have been tried on the first prosecution under section 2C:1-8 unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense; or
(3) The same conduct, unless (a) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil, or (b) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.
b. The former prosecution was terminated, after the complaint was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense.
c. The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as improper termination is defined in section 2C:1-9, and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been improperly terminated.
d. Nothing in this section shall bar the disposition of a nonindictable complaint after disposition of an indictable offense except as required by the Federal and State constitutions.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1981, c. 290, s. 3, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:1-11 - Former prosecution in another jurisdiction: when a bar

2C:1-11. Former prosecution in another jurisdiction: when a bar
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this State and of the United States, a prosecution in the District Court of the United States is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this State under the following circumstances:
a. The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction, or in an improper termination as defined in section 2C:1-9 and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless (1) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil or (2) the offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted is intended to prevent a substantially more serious harm or evil than the offense of which he was formerly convicted or acquitted or (3) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or
b. The former prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the offense of which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-11, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:1-12 - Former prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or when fraudulently procured by the defendant

2C:1-12. Former prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or when fraudulently procured by the defendant
A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of sections 2C:1-9, 10 and 11 under any of the following circumstances:
a. The former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense tried in that court; or
b. The former prosecution was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting officer; or
c. The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which was held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on a petition for post-conviction relief or similar process, except that any bar as to reprosecution for a greater inclusive offense created by section 2C:1-9a. shall apply.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-12, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:1-13 - Proof beyond a reasonable doubt; affirmative defenses; burden of proving fact when not an element of an offense

2C:1-13. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt; affirmative defenses; burden of proving fact when not an element of an offense
a. No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed.
b. Subsection a. of this section does not:
(1) Require the disproof of an affirmative defense unless and until there is evidence supporting such defense; or
(2) Apply to any defense which the code or another statute requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence or such other standard as specified in this code.
c. A defense is affirmative, within the meaning of subsection b.(1) of this section, when:
(1) It arises under a section of the code which so provides; or
(2) It relates to an offense defined by a statute other than the code and such statute so provides; or
d. When the application of the code depends upon the finding of a fact which is not an element of an offense, unless the code otherwise provides:
(1) The burden of proving the fact is on the prosecution or defendant, depending on whose interest or contention will be furthered if the finding should be made; and
(2) The fact must be proved to the satisfaction of the court or jury, as the case may be.
e. When the code or other statute defining an offense establishes a presumption with respect to any fact which is an element of an offense, it has the meaning accorded it by the law of evidence.
f. In any civil action commenced pursuant to any provision of this code the burden of proof shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-13, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:2-1 - Requirement of voluntary act; omission as basis of liability; possession as an act

2C:2-1 Requirement of voluntary act; omission as basis of liability; possession as an act
2C:2-1. Requirement of Voluntary Act; Omission as Basis of Liability; Possession as an act. a. A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable. A bodily movement that is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual, is not a voluntary act within the meaning of this section.
b. Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless:
(1) The omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or
(2) A duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law, including but not limited to, laws such as the "Uniform Fire Safety Act," P.L.1983, c.383 (C.52:27D-192 et seq.), the "State Uniform Construction Code Act," P.L.1975, c.217 (C.52:27D-119 et seq.), or any other law intended to protect the public safety or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder.
c. Possession is an act, within the meaning of this section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1997,c.180,s.1.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:2-3 - Causal relationship between conduct and result; divergence between result designed, contemplated or risked and actual result

2C:2-3. Causal relationship between conduct and result; divergence between result designed, contemplated or risked and actual result
a. Conduct is the cause of a result when:
(1) It is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred; and
(2) The relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by the code or by the law defining the offense.
b. When the offense requires that the defendant purposely or knowingly cause a particular result, the actual result must be within the design or contemplation, as the case may be, of the actor, or, if not, the actual result must involve the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and not be too remote, accidental in its occurrence, or dependent on another's volitional act to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense.
c. When the offense requires that the defendant recklessly or criminally negligently cause a particular result, the actual result must be within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of criminal negligence, of which he should be aware, or, if not, the actual result must involve the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and must not be too remote, accidental in its occurrence, or dependent on another's volitional act to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense.
d. A defendant shall not be relieved of responsibility for causing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what was designed, contemplated or risked is that a different person or property was injured or affected or that a less serious or less extensive injury or harm occurred.
e. When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:2-4 - Ignorance or mistake

2C:2-4. Ignorance or mistake
a. Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if the defendant reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the mistake and:
(1) It negatives the culpable mental state required to establish the offense; or
(2) The law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.
b. Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed. In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed.
c. A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when:
(1) The statute defining the offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged; or
(2) The actor acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (a) a statute, (b) judicial decision, opinion, judgment, or rule, (c) an administrative order or grant of permission, or (d) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense; or
(3) The actor otherwise diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the meaning and application of the offense to his conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his conduct is not an offense in circumstances in which a law-abiding and prudent person would also so conclude.
The defendant must prove a defense arising under subsection c. of this section by clear and convincing evidence.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:2-5 - Defenses generally

2C:2-5. Defenses generally
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is excused or alleviated by reason of any defense now provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the defense claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:2-6 - Liability for conduct of another; complicity

2C:2-6. Liability for conduct of another; complicity
a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.
b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:
(1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct;
(2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense;
(3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or
(4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.
c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:
(1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he
(a) Solicits such other person to commit it;
(b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or
(2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.
d. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.
e. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if:
(1) He is a victim of that offense;
(2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or
(3) He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C:5-1 d. prior to the commission of the offense. Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence.
f. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-6, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:2-7 - Liability of corporations and persons acting, or under a duty to act, in their behalf

2C:2-7. Liability of corporations and persons acting, or under a duty to act, in their behalf
a. A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation unless the offense is one defined by a statute which indicates a legislative purpose not to impose criminal liability on corporations. If the law governing the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply;
(2) The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or
(3) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation.
b. As used in this section:
(1) "Corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program;
(2) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation;
(3) "High managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or any other agent of a corporation having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation.
c. In any prosecution of a corporation for the commission of an offense included within the terms of subsection a. (1) of this section, other than an offense for which absolute liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission. This paragraph shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense.
d. Nothing in this section imposing liability upon a corporation shall be construed as limiting the liability for an offense of an individual by reason of his being an agent of the corporation.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:2-8 - Intoxication

2C:2-8. Intoxication
a. Except as provided in subsection d. of this section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.
b. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.
c. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of chapter 4.
d. Intoxication which (1) is not self-induced or (2) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Intoxication under this subsection must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
e. Definitions. In this section unless a different meaning plainly is required:
(1) "Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body;
(2) "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime;
(3) "Pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-8, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1983, c. 306, s. 1, eff. Aug. 26, 1983.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:2-9 - Duress

2C:2-9. Duress
a. Subject to subsection b. of this section, it is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
b. The defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was criminally negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever criminal negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged. In a prosecution for murder, the defense is only available to reduce the degree of the crime to manslaughter.
c. It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense under this section. The presumption that a woman, acting in the presence of her husband, is coerced is abolished.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:2-10 - Consent

2C:2-10. Consent
a. In general. The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
b. Consent to bodily harm. When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense if:
(1) The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or
(2) The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a concerted activity of a kind not forbidden by law; or
(3) The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under chapter 3 of the code.
c. Ineffective consent. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:
(1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or
(2) It is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature of harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute an offense; or
(3) It is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:2-11 - De minimis infractions

2C:2-11. De minimis infractions
The assignment judge may dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's conduct:
a. Was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negated by the person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense;
b. Did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or
c. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in forbidding the offense. The assignment judge shall not dismiss a prosecution under this section without giving the prosecutor notice and an opportunity to be heard. The prosecutor shall have a right to appeal any such dismissal.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-11, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:2-12 - Entrapment

2C:2-12. Entrapment
a. A public law enforcement official or a person engaged in cooperation with such an official or one acting as an agent of a public law enforcement official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(1) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
b. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.
c. The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-12, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:3-1 - Justification an affirmative defense; civil remedies unaffected

2C:3-1. Justification an affirmative defense; civil remedies unaffected
a. In any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable under this chapter, justification is an affirmative defense.
b. The fact that conduct is justifiable under this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for such conduct which is available in any civil action.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:3-2 - Necessity and other justifications in general

2C:3-2. Necessity and other justifications in general
a. Necessity. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity to the extent permitted by law and as to which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
b. Other justifications in general. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of any defense of justification provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:3-3 - Execution of public duty

2C:3-3. Execution of public duty
a. Except as provided in subsection b. of this section, conduct is justifiable when it is required or authorized by:
(1) The law defining the duties or functions of a public officer or the assistance to be rendered to such officer in the performance of his duties;
(2) The law governing the execution of legal process;
(3) The judgment or order of a competent court or tribunal;
(4) The law governing the armed services or the lawful conduct of war; or
(5) Any other provision of law imposing a public duty.
b. The other sections of this chapter apply to:
(1) The use of force upon or toward the person of another for any of the purposes dealt with in such sections; and
(2) The use of deadly force for any purpose, unless the use of such force is otherwise expressly authorized by law.
c. The justification afforded by subsection a. of this section applies:
(1) When the actor reasonably believes his conduct to be required or authorized by the judgment or direction of a competent court or tribunal or in the lawful execution of legal process, notwithstanding lack of jurisdiction of the court or defect in the legal process; and
(2) When the actor reasonably believes his conduct to be required or authorized to assist a public officer in the performance of his duties, notwithstanding that the officer exceeded his legal authority.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:3-5 - Use of force for the protection of other persons

2C:3-5. Use of force for the protection of other persons
a. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable to protect a third person when:
(1) The actor would be justified under section 2C:3-4 in using such force to protect himself against the injury he believes to be threatened to the person whom he seeks to protect; and
(2) Under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such protective force; and
(3) The actor reasonably believes that his intervention is necessary for the protection of such other person.
b. Notwithstanding subsection a. of this section:
(1) When the actor would be obliged under section 2C:3-4 b. (2)(b) to retreat or take other action he is not obliged to do so before using force for the protection of another person, unless he knows that he can thereby secure the complete safety of such other person, and
(2) When the person whom the actor seeks to protect would be obliged under section 2C:3-4 b. (2)(b) to retreat or take similar action if he knew that he could obtain complete safety by so doing, the actor is obliged to try to cause him to do so before using force in his protection if the actor knows that he can obtain complete safety in that way; and
(3) Neither the actor nor the person whom he seeks to protect is obliged to retreat when in the other's dwelling to any greater extent than in his own.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:3-8 - Use of force by persons with special responsibility for care, discipline or safety of others

2C:3-8. Use of force by persons with special responsibility for care, discipline or safety of others
The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable as permitted by law or as would be a defense in a civil action based thereon where the actor has been vested or entrusted with special responsibility for the care, supervision, discipline or safety of another or of others and the force is used for the purpose of and, subject to section 2C:3-9(b), to the extent necessary to further that responsibility, unless:
a. The code or the law defining the offense deals with the specific situation involved; or
b. A legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed otherwise plainly appears; or
c. Deadly force is used, in which case such force must be otherwise justifiable under the provisions of this chapter.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-8, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:3-9 - Mistake of law as to unlawfulness of force or legality of arrest; reckless or negligent use of excessive but otherwise justifiable force; reckless or negligent injury or risk of injury to innocent persons

2C:3-9. Mistake of law as to unlawfulness of force or legality of arrest; reckless or negligent use of excessive but otherwise justifiable force; reckless or negligent injury or risk of injury to innocent persons
a. The justification afforded by sections 2C:3-4 to 2C:3-7 is unavailable when:
(1) The actor's belief in the unlawfulness of the force or conduct against which he employs protective force or his belief in the lawfulness of an arrest which he endeavors to effect by force is erroneous; and
(2) His error is due to ignorance or mistake as to the provisions of the code, any other provisions of the criminal law or the law governing the legality of an arrest or search.
b. (Deleted by amendment; P.L.1981, c. 290.)
c. When the actor is justified under sections 2C:3-3 to 2C:3-8 in using force upon or toward the person of another but he recklessly or negligently injures or creates a risk of injury to innocent persons, the justification afforded by those sections is unavailable in a prosecution for such recklessness or negligence towards innocent persons.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1981, c. 290, s. 6, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:3-10 - Justification in property crimes

2C:3-10. Justification in property crimes
Conduct involving the appropriation, seizure or destruction of, damage to, intrusion on, or interference with, property is justifiable under circumstances which would establish a defense of privilege in a civil action based thereon, unless:
a. The code or the law defining the offense deals with the specific situation involved; or
b. A legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed otherwise plainly appears.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:3-11 - Definitions.

2C:3-11 Definitions.
2C:3-11. Definitions. In this chapter, unless a different meaning plainly is required: a. "Unlawful force" means force, including confinement, which is employed without the consent of the person against whom it is directed and the employment of which constitutes an offense or actionable tort or would constitute such offense or tort except for a defense (such as the absence of intent, negligence, or mental capacity; duress, youth, or diplomatic status) not amounting to a privilege to use the force. Assent constitutes consent, within the meaning of this section, whether or not it otherwise is legally effective, except assent to the infliction of death or serious bodily harm.
b. "Deadly force" means force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or which he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Purposely firing a firearm in the direction of another person or at a vehicle, building or structure in which another person is believed to be constitutes deadly force unless the firearm is loaded with less-lethal ammunition and fired by a law enforcement officer in the performance of the officer's official duties. A threat to cause death or serious bodily harm, by the production of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor's purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute deadly force.
c. "Dwelling" means any building or structure, though movable or temporary, or a portion thereof, which is for the time being the actor's home or place of lodging except that, as used in 2C:3-7, the building or structure need not be the actor's own home or place of lodging.
d. "Serious bodily harm" means bodily harm which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or which results from aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault.
e. "Bodily harm" means physical pain, or temporary disfigurement, or impairment of physical condition.
f. "Less-lethal ammunition" means ammunition approved by the Attorney General which is designed to stun, temporarily incapacitate or cause temporary discomfort to a person without penetrating the person's body. The term shall also include ammunition approved by the Attorney General which is designed to gain access to a building or structure and is used for that purpose.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.11; 1981, c.290, s.7; 1987, c.120, s.3; 2005, c.250, s.1.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:4-1 - Insanity defense

2C:4-1. Insanity defense
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Insanity is an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:4-1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 11A, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:4-2 - Evidence of mental disease or defect admissible when relevant to element of the offense

2C:4-2. Evidence of mental disease or defect admissible when relevant to element of the offense
2C:4-2. Evidence of mental disease or defect admissible when relevant to element of the offense.
Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense. In the absence of such evidence, it may be presumed that the defendant had no mental disease or defect which would negate a state of mind which is an element of the offense.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.11B; 1981,c.290,s.8; 1990,c.63.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:4-3 - Requirement of notice

2C:4-3. Requirement of notice
a. If a defendant intends to claim insanity pursuant to section 2C:4-1 or the absence of a requisite state of mind pursuant to section 2C:4-2, he shall serve notice of such intention upon the prosecuting attorney in accordance with the Rules of Court.
b. When a defendant is acquitted on the ground of insanity, the verdict and judgment shall so state.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:4-3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 12, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:4-4 - Mental incompetence excluding fitness to proceed

2C:4-4. Mental incompetence excluding fitness to proceed
a. No person who lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.
b. A person shall be considered mentally competent to stand trial on criminal charges if the proofs shall establish:
(1) That the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things; and
(2) That his elementary mental processes are such that he comprehends:
(a) That he is in a court of justice charged with a criminal offense;
(b) That there is a judge on the bench;
(c) That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge;
(d) That he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him against that charge;
(e) That he will be expected to tell to the best of his mental ability the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed if he chooses to testify and understands the right not to testify;
(f) That there is or may be a jury present to pass upon evidence adduced as to guilt or innocence of such charge or, that if he should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to plead guilty, that he comprehend the consequences of a guilty plea and that he be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon such entry of a guilty plea; and
(g) That he has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:4-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 13, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:4-7 - Disposition

2C:4-7. Disposition
If a defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity the court shall dispose of the case as provided for in section 2C:4-8 of this chapter.
L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:4-7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:4-8 - Commitment of a person by reason of insanity

2C:4-8. Commitment of a person by reason of insanity
2C:4-8. Commitment of a Person by Reason of Insanity. a. After acquittal by reason of insanity, the court shall order that the defendant undergo a psychiatric examination by a psychiatrist of the prosecutor's choice. If the examination cannot take place because of the unwillingness of the defendant to participate, the court shall proceed as in section 2C:4-5c. The defendant, pursuant to this section, may also be examined by a psychiatrist of his own choice.
b. The court shall dispose of the defendant in the following manner:
(1) If the court finds that the defendant may be released without danger to the community or himself without supervision, the court shall so release the defendant; or
(2) If the court finds that the defendant may be released without danger to the community or to himself under supervision or under conditions, the court shall so order; or
(3) If the court finds that the defendant cannot be released with or without supervision or conditions without posing a danger to the community or to himself, it shall commit the defendant to a mental health facility approved for this purpose by the Commissioner of Human Services to be treated as a person civilly committed. In all proceedings conducted pursuant to this section and pursuant to section N.J.S.2C:4-6 concerning a defendant who lacks the fitness to proceed, including any periodic review proceeding, the prosecuting attorney shall have the right to appear and be heard. The defendant's continued commitment, under the law governing civil commitment, shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence, during the maximum period of imprisonment that could have been imposed, as an ordinary term of imprisonment, for any charge on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity. Expiration of that maximum period of imprisonment shall be calculated by crediting the defendant with any time spent in confinement for the charge or charges on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity.
c. No person committed under this section shall be confined within any penal or correctional institution or any part thereof.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.15; 1981, c.290, s.9; 1996, c.133, s.2.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:4-9 - Release of persons committed by reason of insanity

2C:4-9. Release of persons committed by reason of insanity
2C:4-9. Release of Persons Committed by Reason of Insanity.
a. If a person has been committed pursuant to section 2C:4-8 or section 2C:4-6 and if the commissioner, or his designee, or the superintendent of the institution to which the person has been committed, is of the view that a person committed to his custody, pursuant to section 2C:4-8 or section 2C:4-6, may be discharged or released on condition without danger to himself or to others, or that he may be transferred to a less restrictive setting for treatment, the commissioner or superintendent shall make application for the discharge or release of such person in a report to the court by which such person was committed and shall transmit a copy of such application and report to the prosecutor, the court, and defense counsel. The court may, in its discretion, appoint at least two qualified psychiatrists, neither of whom may be on the staff of the hospital to which the defendant had been committed, to examine such person and to report within 30 days, or such longer period as the court determines to be necessary for the purpose, their opinion as to his mental condition.
b. The court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the committed person may be safely discharged, released on condition without danger to himself or others, or treated as in civil commitment. The hearing shall be held upon notice to the prosecutor and with the prosecutor's opportunity to be heard. Any such hearing shall be deemed a civil proceeding. According to the determination of the court upon the hearing, the court shall proceed as in section 2C:4-8b. (1), (2) or (3).
c. A committed person may make application for his discharge or release to the court by which he was committed, and the procedure to be followed upon such application shall be the same as that prescribed above in the case of an application by the commissioner.
d. Each defendant's case shall be specifically reviewed as provided by the law governing civil commitment.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.16; 1996, c.133, s.3.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:4-10 - Statements for purposes of examination or treatment inadmissible except on issue of mental condition.

2C:4-10. Statements for purposes of examination or treatment inadmissible except on issue of mental condition.
2C:4-10. Statements for Purposes of Examination or Treatment Inadmissible Except on Issue of Mental Condition.
A statement made by a person subjected to psychiatric or psychological examination or treatment pursuant to section 2C:4-5, 2C:4-6 or 2C:4-9 for the purposes of such examination or treatment shall not be admissible in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding on any issue other than that of his mental condition but it shall be admissible upon that issue, whether or not it would otherwise be deemed a privileged communication. When such a statement constitutes an admission of guilt of the crime charged or of an element thereof, it shall only be admissible where it appears at trial that conversations with the examining psychiatrist or licensed psychologist were necessary to enable him to form an opinion as to a matter in issue.
L.1978, c.95; amended 1997,c.77,s.3.
2023 New Jersey Revised Statutes › Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice › Section 2C:4-11 - Immaturity excluding criminal conviction; transfer of proceedings to family court

2C:4-11. Immaturity excluding criminal conviction; transfer of proceedings to family court
a. A person shall not be tried for or convicted of an offense if:
(1) At the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense he was less than 14 years of age, in which case the family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction unless pursuant to section 8 of the "New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice" the juvenile has demanded indictment and trial by jury; or
(2) At the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense he was 14, 15, 16 or 17 years of age, unless:
(a) The family court has no jurisdiction over him;
(b) The family court has, pursuant to section 7 of "New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice," entered an order waiving jurisdiction and referring the case to the county prosecutor for the institution of criminal proceedings against him;
(c) The juvenile has, pursuant to section 8 of the "New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice," demanded indictment and trial by jury.
b. No court shall have jurisdiction to try and convict a person of an offense if criminal proceedings against him are barred by subsection a. of this section. When it appears that a person charged with the commission of an offense may be of such an age that proceedings may be barred under subsection a. of this section, the court shall hold a hearing thereon, and the burden shall be on such person to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the proceeding is barred upon such grounds. If the court determines that the proceeding is barred, custody of the person charged shall be surrendered to the family court and the case, including all papers and processes relating thereto shall be transferred.
L.1978,c.95; amended 1982,c.77,s.32.