2023 New Mexico Statutes › Chapter 52 - Workers' Compensation › Article 3 - Occupational Disease Disablement › Section 52-3-32 - Occupational diseases; proximate causation.

The occupational diseases defined in Section 52-3-33 NMSA 1978 shall be deemed to arise out of the employment only if there is a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease and which can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment and which can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause. The disease must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. The disease need not have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a natural consequence. In all cases where the defendant denies that an alleged occupational disease is the material and direct result of the conditions under which work was performed, the worker must establish that causal connection as a medical probability by medical expert testimony. No award of compensation benefits shall be based on speculation or on expert testimony that as a medical possibility the causal connection exists.
History:
1941 Comp., § 57-1119, enacted by Laws 1945, ch. 135, § 19; 1953 Comp., § 59-11-20; Laws 1965, ch. 299, § 17; 1989, ch. 263, § 57.
ANNOTATIONS
Work-related factors need not be predominate causative agent of occupational disease or death,
so long as the work-related factors can be reasonably categorized by medical experts as a nonnegligible contributing cause as a matter of medical probability.
Buchanan v. Kerr-McGee Corp.
, 1995-NMCA-131, 121 N.M. 12, 908 P.2d 242, cert. denied, 120 N.M. 715, 905 P.2d 1119.
Establishment of neurosis as compensable disease under this law.
— Since anxiety neurosis can be a work-connected injury compensable under the Workmen's (Workers') Compensation Act, by analogy, a petitioner's anxiety neurosis should be equally compensable under the Occupational Disease Disablement Law, if it is established that his neurosis is peculiar to his occupation, is due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such and is attributable to exposure to or contact with radioactive materials in the course of his employment.
Martinez v. University of Cal.
, 1979-NMSC-073, 93 N.M. 455, 601 P.2d 425.
Determination of disease as occupational disease.
— Whether an employee's anxiety neurosis is an occupational disease depends upon whether there is a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of his job.
Martinez v. University of Cal.
, 1979-NMSC-073, 93 N.M. 455, 601 P.2d 425.
Link between neurosis and occupation established compensable injury.
— The highly toxic and dangerous materials the petitioner worked with, coupled with the incidences of cancer, blindness and fatal illness among petitioner's fellow workers, provides a "recognizable link" between his neurosis and his occupation as a foundry technician, therefore, the petitioner is eligible for benefit under the Occupational Disease Disablement Law.
Martinez v. University of Cal.
, 1979-NMSC-073, 93 N.M. 455, 601 P.2d 425.
Petitioner not required to show anxiety neurosis suffered exclusively
by members of his occupation in order for him to qualify for benefits under the act.
Martinez v. University of Cal.
, 1979-NMSC-073, 93 N.M. 455, 601 P.2d 425.
Evidence supported judge's determination that worker's compensable occupational disease was caused by work environment.
Bryant v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Corp.
, 1993-NMCA-052, 115 N.M. 502, 853 P.2d 753, cert. denied, 115 N.M. 535, 854 P.2d 362.
Expert testimony.
— The standard for admitting expert testimony established by
Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), as adopted in New Mexico by
State v. Alberico
, 1993-NMSC-047, 116 N.M. 156, 861 P.2d 192, does not apply to the testimony of a health care provider pursuant to 52-1-28(B) or 52-3-32 NMSA 1978.
Banks v. IMC Kalium Carlsbad Potash Co.
, 2003-NMSC-026, 134 N.M. 421, 77 P.3d 1014.
The "expert" testimony required by Section 52-1-28(B) NMSA 1978, which should be construed to have the same meaning as this section, refers to testimony based on the treating health care provider's training, experience and familiarity.
Banks v. IMC Kalium Carlsbad Potash Co.
, 2003-NMSC-026, 134 N.M. 421, 77 P.3d 1014.
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. —
27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship §§ 253, 254; 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation §§ 263, 264, 317, 326.
99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 163, 169.