2023 New Mexico Statutes › Chapter 3 - Municipalities › Article 17 - Ordinances › Section 3-17-1 - Ordinances; purposes.

The governing body of a municipality may adopt ordinances or resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of New Mexico for the purpose of:
A. effecting or discharging the powers and duties conferred by law upon the municipality;
B. providing for the safety, preserving the health, promoting the prosperity and improving the morals, order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants; and
C. enforcing obedience to the ordinances by prosecution in the municipal court and metropolitan courts and upon conviction the imposition of:
(1) except for those violations of ordinances described in Paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection, a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisonment for not more than ninety days or both;
(2) for a violation of an ordinance prohibiting driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or imprisonment for not more than three hundred sixty-four days or both; and
(3) for violations of an industrial user wastewater pretreatment ordinance as required by the United States environmental protection agency, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) a day for each violation.
History:
1953 Comp., § 14-16-1, enacted by Laws 1965, ch. 300; 1967, ch. 146, § 5; 1987, ch. 92, § 1; 1989, ch. 234, § 1; 1990, ch. 100, § 1; 1990, ch. 113, § 1; 1993, ch. 66, § 1.
ANNOTATIONS
Cross references.
— For zoning authority of county or municipality,
see
3-21-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.
For jurisdiction of municipal courts,
see
35-14-2 NMSA 1978.
For proceedings to enforce violations of ordinances,
see
35-15-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.
The 1993 amendment,
effective January 1, 1994, deleted "third and every subsequent conviction of" preceding "violation" and substituted "three hundred sixty-four days" for "six months" in Paragraph (2) of Subsection C.
1990 amendments.
— Laws 1990, ch. 100, § 1, effective July 1, 1990, in Subsection C, substituting "for a second" for "for a third" at the beginning of Paragraph (2), inserting the subparagraph designation "(a)" in Paragraph (2) and adding a Subparagraph (b) thereof, relating to impoundment or immobilization for not more than 60 days of the motor vehicle the convicted person was driving at the time of the offense, was approved March 5, 1990. However, Laws 1990, ch. 113, § 1, effective May 16, 1990, in Subsection C, inserting "and metropolitan courts" in the introductory clause, substituting "Paragraphs (2) and (3)" for "Paragraph (2)" in Paragraph (1), adding Paragraph (3) and making a minor stylistic change, was approved later on March 5, 1990. The section is set out as amended by Laws 1990, ch. 113, § 1.
See
12-1-8 NMSA 1978.
The 1989 amendment,
effective July 1, 1989, substituted "five hundred dollars ($500)" for "three hundred dollars ($300)" in Subsection C(1).
The 1987 amendment,
effective June 19, 1987, in Subsection C, in the opening clause, substituted "prosecution in municipal court and upon conviction the imposition of" for all the material following "enforcing obedience to the ordinances by" as set out in the main pamphlet and added Paragraphs (1) and (2).
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
No standing to challenge civil forfeiture ordinance.
— Where the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they or their members have suffered an injury in fact or experienced the imminent threat of injury by the enforcement of a municipal ordinance that provided for the civil forfeiture of vehicles operated by persons arrested for DWI, the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the ordinance under the requirements for traditional standing, organizational standing, facial constitutional challenge of the ordinance, or the doctrine of great public importance.
ACLU v. City of Albuquerque
, 2007-NMCA-092, 142 N.M. 259, 164 P.3d 958,
aff'd
, 2008-NMSC-045, 144 N.M. 471, 188 P.3d 1222.
Police officer may make warrantless arrest for misdemeanor
if he has probable cause to believe the offense occurred in his presence.
Tanberg v. Shlotis
, 401 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2005).
Home rule municipalities.
— Powers set forth in this section and 3-18-1 NMSA 1978 are independent municipal powers within the meaning of the home rule amendment because they are powers delegated to municipalities completely independent from the home rule amendment.
New Mexicans for Free Enterprise v. City of Santa Fe
, 2006-NMCA-007, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149.
Delegation of authority by municipal officers improper.
— There is no authority that municipal officers may delegate their authority regarding the conduct of municipal affairs to a state official in whose appointment they have no voice and over whom they have no control.
Adams v. City of Albuquerque
, 1957-NMSC-006, 62 N.M. 208, 307 P.2d 792.
While courts are not bound by declarations of a legislative body that its enactment is in the interest of the public safety and welfare,
they are not to be ignored; indeed, they are entitled to great weight and will ordinarily be respected, unless obviously untrue or absurd.
Farnsworth v. City of Roswell
, 1957-NMSC-053, 63 N.M. 195, 315 P.2d 839.
Authority of Subsection A.
— A municipality may adopt ordinances for the purpose of protecting its inhabitants and preserving peace and order under authority of Subsection A of this section.
City of Hobbs v. Biswell
, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473 P.2d 911.
Authority of Subsection B.
— The ordinance adopting authority of Subsection B of this section, often referred to as a general welfare clause, is independent of and in addition to ordinance adopting authority conferred by specific statutes.
City of Hobbs v. Biswell
, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473 P.2d 911.
Power to regulate use of the streets
is a delegation of the police power of the state government and whatever reasonably tends to make regulation effective is a proper exercise of that power.
City of Roswell v. Mitchell
, 1952-NMSC-027, 56 N.M. 201, 242 P.2d 493.
Extra-territorial public works.
— When public rights and needs come in conflict with other interests, the municipality can exercise its discretionary authority to adopt a public policy whose objective is the greatest public good. Thus, the city's decision to build the bridge across the river, even though involving land outside the city's limits, was legal and presumed valid.
State ex rel. Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. City of Albuquerque
, 1994-NMSC-126, 119 N.M. 150, 889 P.2d 185.
Municipalities are not authorized to withhold utility service
from a subsequent owner.
Bettini v. City of Las Cruces
, 1971-NMSC-054, 82 N.M. 633, 485 P.2d 967.
Presumption of validity.
— If there is a relationship between an ordinance and its purpose, then unless its determination of the best method for preserving public health and safety is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be equivalent to fraud, it will not be set aside.
City of Hobbs v. Chesport, Ltd
., 1966-NMSC-158, 76 N.M. 609, 417 P.2d 210;
Fowler v. City of Santa Fe
, 1963-NMSC-045, 72 N.M. 60, 380 P.2d 511;
Martinez v. Cook
, 1952-NMSC-034, 56 N.M. 343, 244 P.2d 134.
Franchise without referendum.
— A franchise to maintain and operate an existing water plant, and to make additions, extensions and betterments thereto, may be granted by ordinance by a city without a referendum to the people.
Asplund v. City of Santa Fe
, 1926-NMSC-002, 31 N.M. 291, 244 P. 1067.
Prosecution for violation of a municipal ordinance is a quasi-criminal proceeding.
City of Roswell v. Gallegos
, 1966-NMSC-246, 77 N.M. 170, 420 P.2d 438;
City of Santa Fe v. Baker
, 1980-NMCA-169, 95 N.M. 238, 620 P.2d 892.
Board members required to take final action.
— Where municipal ordinance, which created a personnel board of five members, provides that a majority of all board members shall constitute a quorum and that final action may be taken by the majority of members present at a meeting, the ordinance does not require that final action be taken by all five members of the board.
Smyers v. City of Albuquerque
, 2006-NMCA-095, 140 N.M. 198, 141 P.3d 542.
Validity of action where board members' terms have expired.
— Where municipal ordinance provides that a board member remains in office until a successor has been duly qualified, the validity of a board's action was not affected by the fact that the term of two members of the board had expired.
Smyers v. City of Albuquerque
, 2006-NMCA-095, 140 N.M. 198, 141 P.3d 542.
II. VALIDITY.
Business license.
— An ordinance which required businesses to retain a license and pay a license fee of 1% of annual gross business was invalid as a revenue measure.
Town of Mesilla v. Mesilla Design Center & Book Store, Inc
., 1962-NMSC-156, 71 N.M. 124, 376 P.2d 183.
Door to door soliciting.
— A municipality has the power to enforce reasonable door to door soliciting and canvassing regulations to protect its citizens from crime and undue annoyances. However, an ordinance which conditions the solicitation of aid upon the determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause lays a forbidden burden upon the exercise of First Amendment liberties.
Weissman v. City of Alamogordo
, 472 F. Supp. 425 (D. N.M. 1979).
Vagueness.
— City ordinance which specifically prohibited maintaining solid waste and inoperable vehicles on property was not void for vagueness in that a reasonable person would be on notice as to what conduct would constitute violation of ordinance.
City of Roswell v. Hancock
, 1998-NMCA-130, 126 N.M. 109, 967 P.2d 447.
Recital in ordinance not prerequisite to validity.
— No New Mexico statute requires a recital in city ordinance as a prerequisite to the validity of ordinances adopted under this section, and absent a showing of such a prerequisite, an ordinance with the enacting clause required by 3-17-2 NMSA 1978 is validly adopted.
City of Hobbs v. Biswell
, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473 P.2d 911.
Drug paraphernalia ordinance.
— A drug paraphernalia ordinance is neither vague nor overbroad which requires proof of subjective intent to engage in proscribed conduct.
Weiler v. Carpenter
, 695 F. 2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1982).
Forfeiture hearing.
— An ordinance which failed to provide for hearing in connection with forfeiture of drug paraphernalia violates due process.
Weiler v. Carpenter
, 695 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1982).
Noise ordinance.
— A noise ordinance which made it unlawful to create any unreasonably loud, disturbing or unnecessary noise or noise of such character, intensity or duration as to be detrimental to the repose, life or health of others and listed certain specific acts that were prohibited was not unconstitutionally vague for failing to specify permissible decibel levels.
City of Farmington v. Wilkins
, 1987-NMCA-088, 106 N.M. 188, 740 P.2d 1172, cert. denied, 106 N.M. 174, 740 P.2d 1158.
Parking meter ordinance.
— Where parking meter ordinance was enacted primarily as a traffic regulation and not for the revenue incidental thereto, the ordinance is not unconstitutional or otherwise invalid because, incidentally, the city's receipts of money are increased.
City of Roswell v. Mitchell
, 1952-NMSC-027, 1982-NMSC-078, 56 N.M. 201, 242 P.2d 493.
Location of adult bookstore.
— An ordinance which prohibited the location of an adult bookstore within 1,000 feet of certain specified facilities, including a residential area was unconstitutionally vague.
Harris Books, Inc. v. City of Santa Fe
, 1982-NMSC-078, 98 N.M. 235, 647 P.2d 868.
Loitering.
— Portions of an ordinance which prohibited loitering in public streets, places and gatherings, businesses or private property without lawful business, and which prohibited loitering about a public, private or parochial school, college or buildings, on foot or in a vehicle, without lawful business were unconstitutional because they condemned acts to which no reasonable person would attribute wrong doing or misconduct.
Balizer v. Shaver
, 1971-NMCA-010, 82 N.M. 347, 481 P.2d 709.
Inoperable automobiles.
— An ordinance which made it unlawful to keep solid waste and inoperable vehicles on private property was not void for vagueness.
City of Roswell v. Hancock
, 1998-NMCA-130, 126 N.M. 109, 967 P.2d 449, cert. denied, 126 N.M. 107, 967 P.2d 447.
Pit bull dogs.
— An ordinance banning the ownership or possession of a dog of the breed known as the American Pit Bull Terrier, was not void for vagueness, did not violate substantive or procedural due process, and did not take private property without just compensation in view of the fact that prior to the enactment of the ordinance residents had repeatedly been attacked in their persons and animals by pit bulls and a child had been severely mauled by a pit bull while walking home from school.
Garcia v. Village of Tijeras
, 1988-NMCA-090, 108 N.M. 116, 767 P.2d 355, cert. denied, 107 N.M 785, 765 P.2d 758.
Disorderly house.
— In an ordinance which made it unlawful to keep any "common, ill-governed disorderly house", the words "common" and "ill-governed" were unconstitutionally vague, but the word "disorderly" was not unconstitutionally vague and the constitutional words would be severed from the ordinance.
City of Farmington v. Phillips
, 1978-NMCA-120, 92 N.M. 304, 587 P.2d 451.
Loitering on school grounds.
— To interpret a city ordinance prohibiting loitering on school grounds without lawful business there as saying that no one had the right to be on school property without permission would raise serious constitutional questions, where the ordinance did not state that permission to be on school grounds was required.
Anderson v. Shaver
, 290 F. Supp. 920 (D.N.M. 1968).
III. PREEMPTION.
Preemption test.
— The test for state preemption of a municipal ordinance is not whether the municipality misstates the law in findings stated in the ordinance or whether some overlap exists between an ordinance and a statute. The test is whether the ordinance permits an act the statute prohibits, or vice versa.
Rio Grande Kennel Club v. City of Albuquerque
, 2008-NMCA-093, 144 N.M. 636, 190 P.3d 1131.
State law preemption.
— Both the state law regarding DWI and Section 3-17-1C(2) NMSA 1978 demonstrate by their plain language that the legislature did not intend to preempt the field of DWI legislation and preclude municipalities from enacting DWI ordiances. New Mexico's DWI statutes clearly contemplate the existence of municipal DWI ordinances in that the statutes discuss the proper interaction between such ordinances and the statutes.
City of Rio Rancho v. Mazzi
, 2010-NMCA-054, 148 N.M. 553, 239 P.3d 149, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-005, 148 N.M. 574, 240 P.3d 1048.
IV. ORDINANCE AND STATUTE.
Lesser penalties.
— The city did not exceed its authority by enacting an ordinance providing a lesser penalty than state DWI statutes thereby limiting the right to a jury trial. Such an ordinance is not inconsistent with the laws of New Mexico because it does not permit an act prohibited by the general law or vice versa.
City of Rio Rancho v. Mazzei
, 2010-NMCA-054, 148 N.M. 553, 239 P.3d 149, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-005, 148 N.M. 574, 240 P.3d 1048.
Petty misdemeanor penalty for DWI.
— Where a municipal ordinance prohibited exactly the same acts as those acts prohibited by state DWI statutes, and the only substantive difference between the ordinance and state law was that the ordinance imposed a petty misdemeanor penalty and state law imposed a misdemeanor penalty, the ordinance was not inconsistent with state law.
City of Rio Rancho v. Mazzei
, 2010-NMCA-054, 148 N.M. 553, 239 P.3d 149, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-005, 148 N.M. 574, 240 P.3d 1048.
A home rule municipality is free to impose any penalty for DWI
that complies with Article X, Section 6 of the New Mexico Constitution and 3-17-1(C)(2) NMSA 1978.
City of Rio Rancho v. Mazzei
, 2010-NMCA-054, 148 N.M. 553, 239 P.3d 149, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-005, 148 N.M. 574, 240 P.3d 1048.
The legislature has not preempted the field of DWI legislation.
City of Rio Rancho v. Mazzei
, 2010-NMCA-054, 148 N.M. 553, 239 P.3d 149, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-005, 148 N.M. 574, 240 P.3d 1048.
More restrictive ordinances.
— An ordinance can be more restrictive than a state law, as long as it supplements, compliments or duplicates the state statute, but does not conflict with it.
ACLU of New Mexico v. City of Albuquerque
, 2006-NMCA-078, 139 N.M. 761, 137 P.3d 1215.
Regulation of water wells.
— An ordinance which prohibited drilling of water wells within 200 feet of a water distribution line did not conflict with a statute which prohibited the drilling of a water well within 300 feet of a water distribution line because the ordinance was less restrictive.
Stennis v. City of Santa Fe
, 2008-NMSC-008, 143 N.M. 320, 176 P.3d 309.
Ordinance may duplicate or complement statutory regulation.
— The fact of double regulation does not result in the withdrawal of the municipality's authority to regulate. An ordinance may duplicate or complement statutory regulations.
City of Hobbs v. Biswell
, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473 P.2d 911.
Exclusive garbage contract.
— A municipal ordinance providing for the letting of an exclusive garbage contract and the contract awarded under the ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the municipality's police power to protect the health and welfare of the community.
Gomez v. City of Las Vegas
, 1956-NMSC-021, 61 N.M. 27, 293 P.2d 984.
Ordinance more strict than state statute was not inconsistent with state law on the same subject
because it provided for greater restrictions or prescribed higher standards than the law.
City of Hobbs v. Biswell
, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473 P.2d 911.
Exclusive garbage contract.
— The burning, removal and disposal of garbage involve public health and safety and an ordinance granting an exclusive contract to collect, remove and dispose of garbage, and making it unlawful to burn garbage related to public health and safety, was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
Barber's Supermarkets, Inc. v. City of Grants
, 1969-NMSC-115, 80 N.M. 533, 458 P.2d 785.
Motor vehicle ordinances.
— Under statute municipality may enact motor vehicle ordinances notwithstanding that state statute likewise covers same subject matter and provides penalty for violations.
Mares v. Kool
, 1946-NMSC-032, 51 N.M. 36, 177 P.2d 532.
Inspections permitted.
— Where city ordinance is broader than the state statute in that it permits inspection by persons not necessarily police officers, but nothing in the state statute prohibits inspection by other than police officers, there was no conflict between city and state regulations.
City of Hobbs v. Biswell
, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473 P.2d 911.
V. SPECIFIC ORDINANCES.
Minimum wage.
— Minimum wage ordinance enacted by City of Santa Fe is within the power of the city to enact and is constitutional.
New Mexicans for Free Enterprise v. City of Santa Fe
, 2006-NMCA-007, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149.
Home rule municipality may set minimum wage higher than that required by the state Minimum Wage Act because of the independent powers possessed by municipalities in New Mexico and the absence of any conflict with state law.
New Mexicans for Free Enterprise v. City of Santa Fe
, 2006-NMCA-007, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149.
Sale of intoxicating liquor.
— A municipality has sufficient charter power to enact ordinance prohibiting sale of intoxicating liquor.
City of Clovis v. Dendy
, 1931-NMSC-007, 35 N.M. 347, 297 P. 141 (decided under prior law).
Garbage collection and disposal.
— The authority to establish health measures is authority for the municipality to place garbage collection and disposal exclusively with itself.
City of Hobbs v. Chesport, Ltd
., 1966-NMSC-158, 76 N.M. 609, 417 P.2d 210.
Keeping of livestock.
— In action attacking validity of ordinance prohibiting the keeping of livestock within restricted district of city, plaintiffs must prove specific facts showing ordinance unreasonable to overcome finding of city board, stated in preamble, that such keeping was a nuisance and endangered public health, and fact that plaintiffs' stables were kept clean and sanitary was no ground for holding ordinance invalid.
Mitchell v. City of Roswell
, 1941-NMSC-007, 45 N.M. 92, 111 P.2d 41, explained in
Green v. Town of Gallup
, 1941-NMSC-050, 46 N.M. 71, 120 P.2d 619.
Regulation of pawnbrokers.
— City had authority to enact ordinances under its general welfare power and its police power to regulate pawnbrokers.
City of Hobbs v. Biswell
, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473 P.2d 911 (decided under prior law).
Regulation of warehousemen.
— Under this section, municipal corporations are authorized to regulate the business of warehousemen, such business being affected with a public interest.
Daniel v. City of Clovis
, 1929-NMSC-061, 34 N.M. 239, 280 P. 260 (decided under prior law).
City may require a druggist to give bond as security
that he will obey the law in dispensing liquor, but where the bond is made collectible only upon conviction for violation of the ordinance, it becomes a penalty limited to $300.
City of Roswell v. Jacoby
, 1916-NMSC-034, 21 N.M. 702, 158 P. 419 (decided under prior law).
State misdemeanor statute does not preempt municipal ordinance.
— The state statute providing a full misdemeanor penalty for certain acts of domestic violence does not preclude prosecution of an offense under a municipal ordinance that only provides a petty misdemeanor penalty. 2008 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 08-06.
While an ordinance cannot conflict with a state statute,
it is proper for an ordinance to cover the same subject matter as a state law. Local ordinances and state statutes may complement, support, implement and strengthen one another. 1963 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 63-40 (rendered under former law).
Ordinance may not punish criminal act less severely.
— Where an offense is identified as a felony under state law, a municipality may not enact an ordinance which purports to punish the same offense and set a lesser penalty therefor. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-24.
Traffic ordinances.
— The city of Roswell has authority to enact a traffic ordinance and prescribe a penalty for a violation of same by including payment of fine or imprisonment, or both, as long as the penalties and the imprisonment do not exceed the sum of $300 or 90 days in jail, or both. 1953 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 53-5828.
Wearing of crash helmets by motorcycle riders.
— A municipality may not require by ordinance the wearing of crash helmets by riders of motor-driven cycles having not more than five horsepower. The adoption of such an ordinance would be an unconstitutional restriction upon a person's civil liberty, for the ordinance would seek to restrict his liberty when such restriction would not result in a benefit to the public at large or tend to preserve the safety of the community. The municipality might constitutionally require all motorcycle riders under a certain age to wear safety helmets, so long as the grouping does not include adults. 1966 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-15.
Restrictions on political activities.
— A county personnel ordinance can contain prohibitions against a covered employee holding a political position which is incompatible with his county employment, or provide that if the holding of a political office interfered with the full-time performance of his county employment, it would be grounds for termination of his employment. 1964 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 64-144.
A county ordinance which precludes any person from soliciting contributions for any political party or for any partisan political purpose from covered county employees if he knows that they are covered employees would be valid only if limited to working hours. 1964 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 64-144.
Regulation of fireworks.
— The Fireworks Licensing and Safety Act (60-2C-1 et seq. NMSA 1978) expressly removed for municipalities their general authority to regulate fireworks and replaced it with limited authority to regulate the use of aerial and ground audible devices. To the extent that municipalities have regulatory authority over specified devices, those devices are subject to double regulation as long as municipal regulations do not conflict with the act's requirements. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-11.
The Fireworks Licensing and Safety Act (60-2C-1 et seq. NMSA 1978) denies all municipalities, including those with home rule charters, from regulating fireworks other than as provided by the statute. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-11.
Section limits enforcement.
— This section is clearly a limitation on the powers of cities and towns to provide for enforcement of municipal ordinances. 1960 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 60-199.
The town of Grants may impose a jail sentence alone, or a fine and a jail sentence, for the violation of one of its ordinances, subject to the limitations imposed in this section. 1958 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 58-217.
Law reviews.
— For note, "County Regulation of Land Use and Development," see 9 Nat. Resources J. 266 (1969).
For article, "Prisoners Are People," see 10 Nat. Resources J. 869 (1970).
For article, "Rights of New Mexico Municipalities Regarding the Siting and Operation of Privately Owned Landfills," see 21 N.M.L. Rev. 149 (1990).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references.
— 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions §§ 343 to 345.
"Radius," meaning of the term employed in ordinance as descriptive of area, location or distance, 10 A.L.R.2d 605.
Emergency: conclusiveness of declaration of emergency in ordinance, 35 A.L.R.2d 586.
Simultaneous repeal and reenactment of all, or part, of legislative act, effect of, 77 A.L.R.2d 336.
Validity and construction of statute or ordinance requiring or prohibiting posting or other publication of price of commodity or services, 89 A.L.R.2d 901, 80 A.L.R.3d 740.
Validity of regulations as to contraceptives or the dissemination of birth control information, 96 A.L.R.2d 955.
Mining or quarrying operations or oil production within municipal limits, ordinance prohibiting or regulating, 10 A.L.R.3d 1226.
Curfew: validity and construction of curfew statute, ordinance or proclamation, 59 A.L.R.3d 321, 83 A.L.R.4th 1056.
Initiative process: adoption of zoning ordinance or amendment thereto through initiative process, 72 A.L.R.3d 991.
Referendum: adoption of zoning ordinance or amendment thereto as subject of referendum, 72 A.L.R.3d 1030.
Validity, construction, and effect of "Sunday closing" or "blue" laws - modern status, 10 A.L.R.4th 246.
Right of municipal corporation to review of unfavorable decision in action or prosecution for violation of ordinance - modern status, 11 A.L.R.4th 399.
62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 160, 248.