2023 New Mexico Statutes › Chapter 55 - Uniform Commercial Code › Article 3 - Negotiable Instruments › Part 4 - LIABILITY OF PARTIES › Section 55-3-420 - Conversion of instrument.

(a) The law applicable to conversion of personal property applies to instruments. An instrument is also converted if it is taken by transfer, other than a negotiation, from a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or a bank makes or obtains payment with respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or receive payment. An action for conversion of an instrument may not be brought by (i) the issuer or acceptor of the instrument or (ii) a payee or indorsee who did not receive delivery of the instrument either directly or through delivery to an agent or a co-payee.
(b) In an action under Subsection (a), the measure of liability is presumed to be the amount payable on the instrument, but recovery may not exceed the amount of the plaintiff's interest in the instrument.
(c) A representative, other than a depositary bank, who has in good faith dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the person entitled to enforce the instrument is not liable in conversion to that person beyond the amount of any proceeds that it has not paid out.
History:
1978 Comp., § 55-3-420, enacted by Laws 1992, ch. 114, § 145.
OFFICIAL COMMENTS
UCC Official Comments by ALI & the NCCUSL. Reproduced with permission of the PEB for the UCC. All rights reserved.
1. Section 3-420 [55-3-520 NMSA 1978] is a modification of former Section 3-419. The first sentence of Section 3-420(a) [55-3-520 NMSA 1978] states a general rule that the law of conversion applicable to personal property also applies to instruments. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of former Section 3-419(1) are deleted as inappropriate in cases of noncash items that may be delivered for acceptance or payment in collection letters that contain varying instructions as to what to do in the event of nonpayment on the day of delivery. It is better to allow such cases to be governed by the general law of conversion that would address the issue of when, under the circumstances prevailing, the presenter's right to possession has been denied. The second sentence of Section 3-420(a) [55-3-420 NMSA 1978] states that an instrument is converted if it is taken by transfer other than a negotiation from a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or taken for collection or payment from a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or receive payment. This covers cases in which a depositary or payor bank takes an instrument bearing a forged indorsement. It also covers cases in which an instrument is payable to two persons and the two persons are not alternative payees, e.g., a check payable to John and Jane Doe. Under Section 3-110(d) [55-3-110 NMSA 1978] the check can be negotiated or enforced only by both persons acting jointly. Thus, neither payee acting without the consent of the other, is a person entitled to enforce the instrument. If John indorses the check and Jane does not, the indorsement is not effective to allow negotiation of the check. If Depositary Bank takes the check for deposit to John's account, Depositary Bank is liable to Jane for conversion of the check if she did not consent to the transaction. John, acting alone, is not the person entitled to enforce the check because John is not the holder of the check. Section 3-110(d) [55-3-110 NMSA 1978] and Comment 4 to Section 3-110 [55-3-110 NMSA 1978]. Depositary Bank does not get any greater rights under Section 4-205(1) [55-4-205 NMSA 1978]. If it acted for John as its customer, it did not become holder of the check under that provision because John, its customer, was not a holder.
Under former Article 3, the cases were divided on the issue of whether the drawer of a check with a forged indorsement can assert rights against a depositary bank that took the check. The last sentence of Section 3-420(a) [55-3-420 NMSA 1978] resolves the conflict by following the rule stated in
Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First National Bank & Trust Co.
, 184 N.E.2d 358 (Mass.1962). There is no reason why a drawer should have an action in conversion. The check represents an obligation of the drawer rather than property of the drawer. The drawer has an adequate remedy against the payor bank for recredit of the drawer's account for unauthorized payment of the check.
There was also a split of authority under former Article 3 on the issue of whether a payee who never received the instrument is a proper plaintiff in a conversion action. The typical case was one in which a check was stolen from the drawer or in which the check was mailed to an address different from that of the payee and was stolen after it arrived at that address. The thief forged the indorsement of the payee and obtained payment by depositing the check to an account in a depositary bank. The issue was whether the payee could bring an action in conversion against the depositary bank or the drawee bank. In revised Article 3, under the last sentence of Section 3-420(a) [55-3-420 NMSA 1978], the payee has no conversion action because the check was never delivered to the payee. Until delivery, the payee does not have any interest in the check. The payee never became the holder of the check nor a person entitled to enforce the check. Section 3-301 [55-3-301 NMSA 1978]. Nor is the payee injured by the fraud. Normally the drawer of a check intends to pay an obligation owed to the payee. But if the check is never delivered to the payee, the obligation owed to the payee is not affected. If the check falls into the hands of a thief who obtains payment after forging the signature of the payee as an indorsement, the obligation owed to the payee continues to exist after the thief receives payment. Since the payee's right to enforce the underlying obligation is unaffected by the fraud of the thief, there is no reason to give any additional remedy to the payee. The drawer of the check has no conversion remedy, but the drawee is not entitled to charge the drawer's account when the drawee wrongfully honored the check. The remedy of the drawee is against the depositary bank for breach of warranty under Section 3-417(a)(1) or 4-208(a)(1) [55-3-417 or 55-4-208 NMSA 1978, respectively]. The loss will fall on the person who gave value to the thief for the check.
The situation is different if the check is delivered to the payee. If the check is taken for an obligation owed to the payee, the last sentence of Section 3-310(b)(4) [55-3-310 NMSA 1978] provides that the obligation may not be enforced to the extent of the amount of the check. The payee's rights are restricted to enforcement of the payee's rights in the instrument. In this event the payee is injured by the theft and has a cause of action for conversion.
The payee receives delivery when the check comes into the payee's possession, as for example when it is put into the payee's mailbox. Delivery to an agent is delivery to the payee. If a check is payable to more than one payee, delivery to one of the payees is deemed to be delivery to all of the payees. Occasionally, the person asserting a conversion cause of action is an indorsee rather than the original payee. If the check is stolen before the check can be delivered to the indorsee and the indorsee's indorsement is forged, the analysis is similar. For example, a check is payable to the order of A. A indorses it to B and puts it into an envelope addressed to B. The envelope is never delivered to B. Rather, Thief steals the envelope, forges B's indorsement to the check and obtains payment. Because the check was never delivered to B, the indorsee, B has no cause of action for conversion, but A does have such an action. A is the owner of the check. B never obtained rights in the check. If A intended to negotiate the check to B in payment of an obligation, that obligation was not affected by the conduct of Thief. B can enforce that obligation. Thief stole A's property not B's.
2. Subsection (2) of former Section 3-419 is amended because it is not clear why the former law distinguished between the liability of the drawee and that of other converters. Why should there be a conclusive presumption that the liability is face amount if a drawee refuses to pay or return an instrument or makes payment on a forged indorsement, while the liability of a maker who does the same thing is only presumed to be the face amount? Moreover, it was not clear under former Section 3-419(2) [55-3-419 NMSA 1978] what face amount meant. If a note for $10,000 is payable in a year at 10% interest, it is common to refer to $10,000 as the face amount, but if the note is converted the loss to the owner also includes the loss of interest. In revised Article 3, Section 3-420(b) [55-3-420 NMSA 1978], by referring to "amount payable on the instrument," allows the full amount due under the instrument to be recovered.
The "but" clause in subsection (b) addresses the problem of conversion actions in multiple payee checks. Section 3-110(d) [55-3-110 NMSA 1978] states that an instrument cannot be enforced unless all payees join in the action. But an action for conversion might be brought by a payee having no interest or a limited interest in the proceeds of the check. This clause prevents such a plaintiff from receiving a windfall. An example is a check payable to a building contractor and a supplier of building material. The check is not payable to the payees alternatively. Section 3-110(d) [55-3-110 NMSA 1978]. The check is delivered to the contractor by the owner of the building. Suppose the contractor forges supplier's signature as an indorsement of the check and receives the entire proceeds of the check. The supplier should not, without qualification, be able to recover the entire amount of the check from the bank that converted the check. Depending upon the contract between the contractor and the supplier, the amount of the check may be due entirely to the contractor, in which case there should be no recovery, entirely to the supplier, in which case recovery should be for the entire amount, or part may be due to one and the rest to the other, in which case recovery should be limited to the amount due to the supplier.
3. Subsection (3) of former Section 3-419 drew criticism from the courts, that saw no reason why a depositary bank should have the defense stated in the subsection.
See Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co.
, 477 A.2d 806 (N.J.1984). The depositary bank is ultimately liable in the case of a forged indorsement check because of its warranty to the payor bank under Section 4-208(a)(1) [55-4-208 NMSA 1978] and it is usually the most convenient defendant in cases involving multiple checks drawn on different banks. There is no basis for requiring the owner of the check to bring multiple actions against the various payor banks and to require those banks to assert warranty rights against the depositary bank. In revised Article 3, the defense provided by Section 3-420(c) [55-3-420 NMSA 1978] is limited to collecting banks other than the depositary bank. If suit is brought against both the payor bank and the depositary bank, the owner, of course, is entitled to but one recovery.
ANNOTATIONS
Effective dates.
— Laws 1992, ch. 114, § 238 made the act effective July 1, 1992.
No liability for paying on forged endorsement on bearer paper.
— A check drawn to a fictitious payee is the same as if it were made payable to bearer; and, since an endorsement on such paper is not necessary to its validity or negotiability, a bank is not liable for paying on a forged endorsement on bearer paper.
Airco Supply Co. v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank
, 1961-NMSC-031, 68 N.M. 195, 360 P.2d 386 (decided under former law).
Drawee bank has no right to debit account of depositor
on a check which bears a forged signature of the drawer.
Airco Supply Co. v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank
, 1961-NMSC-031, 68 N.M. 195, 360 P.2d 386 (decided under former law).
Generally, bank converts instrument when pays over unauthorized indorsement.
— Absent negligence on the part of an indorser, a bank converts an instrument when it pays over an unauthorized indorsement.
Casarez v. Garcia
, 1983-NMCA-013, 99 N.M. 508, 660 P.2d 598, cert. denied, 99 N.M. 578, 661 P.2d 478.
Cashier check's true owner entitled to sue bank.
— The true owner of a cashier's check has a right to bring an action for conversion or negligence against a bank as drawee when it pays on an unauthorized indorsement.
Casarez v. Garcia
, 1983-NMCA-013, 99 N.M. 508, 660 P.2d 598, cert. denied, 99 N.M. 578, 661 P.2d 478.
Law reviews.
— For comment on Jomack Lumber Co. v. Grants State Bank, 75 N.M. 787, 411 P.2d 759 (1966), see 7 Nat. Resources J. 106 (1967).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. —
11 Am. Jur. 2d Bills and Notes §§ 101, 510.
Nature of property rights other than tangible chattels which may be subject of conversion, 44 A.L.R.2d 927.
Payee's right of recovery, in conversion under UCC § 3-419(1)(c), for money paid on unauthorized indorsement, 23 A.L.R.4th 855.
Bank's "reasonable commercial standards" defense under UCC § 3-419(3), 49 A.L.R.4th 888.
Payee's and drawer's right of recovery, in conversion under pre-1990 UCC § 3-419, or post-1990 UCC § 3-420 [rev], for money paid on unauthorized indorsement, 91 A.L.R.5th 89.
9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 382 et seq.; 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes §§ 12 et seq., 139; 89 C.J.S. Trover and Conversion § 13 et seq.