reglab/statecodes huggingface dataset:
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 408 Compromise, offers to compromise, and mediation proceedings.

Rule 408 Compromise, offers to compromise, and mediation proceedings.
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, or (3) mediation or attempts to mediate a claim which was disputed, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations or mediation proceedings is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations or mediation proceedings. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. [L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; am L 1989, c 119, §1]
RULE 408 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 408. The rule has been accepted in Hawaii, see First Bank of Hilo v. Maguire, 25 H. 43, 49-50 (1919); HRCP 68.
RULE 408 SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY
The Act 119, Session Laws 1989 amendment added paragraph (3) relating to mediation. The federal note does not specifically address mediation.
Case Notes
Based on record, no evidence that statements made in course of compromise negotiations. 67 H. 389, 688 P.2d 1145 (1984).
Trial court properly excluded evidence of insurer's settlement offer which court determined would be used to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. 82 H. 120, 920 P.2d 334 (1996).
In a criminal trial, evidence of an accused's offer to pay value to a complainant in an attempt to avoid prosecution is not excludable under this rule. 92 H. 161, 988 P.2d 1153 (1999).
This rule applies in criminal proceedings. 92 H. 161, 988 P.2d 1153 (1999).
Testimony properly excluded where it concerned memo regarding settlement agreement. 5 H. App. 174, 683 P.2d 833 (1984).
By virtue of this rule, related compromises or attempts to compromise civil liability are not admissible in a criminal trial because of danger that the evidence may be taken as criminal guilt. 79 H. 265 (App.), 900 P.2d 1332 (1995).
Seller's offer to pay buyer $22,000 in exchange for buyer's cancellation of DROA was promise to pay a valuable consideration to compromise a claim disputed as to validity or amount and was thus not admissible to prove liability for, or invalidity of, buyer's claim against seller. 84 H. 162 (App.), 931 P.2d 604 (1997).
Mentioned: 129 H. 250 (App.), 297 P.3d 1106 (2013).
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 409 Payment of medical and similar expenses.

Rule 409 Payment of medical and similar expenses.
Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury. [L 1980, c 164, pt of §1]
RULE 409 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 409, the Advisory Committee's Note to which says:
Contrary to Rule 408, dealing with offers of compromise, the present rule does not extend to conduct or statements not a part of the act of furnishing or offering or promising to pay. This difference in treatment arises from fundamental differences in nature. Communication is essential if compromises are to be effected, and consequently broad protection of statements is needed. This is not so in cases of payments or offers or promises to pay medical expenses, where factual statements may be expected to be incidental in nature.
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 410 Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and related statements.

Rule 410 Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and related statements.
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:
(1) A plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(2) A plea of nolo contendere;
(3) Any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of the Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure or comparable federal or state procedure regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or
(4) Any statements made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1
RULE 410 COMMENTARY
This rule is similar to Fed. R. Evid. 410. It substitutes "Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure or comparable federal or state procedure" in paragraph (3) for the federal language, "Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure." The intent of both rules is the same.
Fed. R. Evid. 410 was amended in 1979 to clarify the scope of the exclusion, particularly in regard to plea offers and plea discussions. The intent of the rule is "the promotion of disposition of criminal cases by compromise." See the Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Evid. 410; compare Rule 408 supra. Under the original federal formulation of this rule, however, some federal courts excluded statements of defendants who offered pleas to law enforcement officers, see, e.g., United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1977). This rule conforms to the amended federal rule in that plea offers or discussions are excluded only if made in the course of Rule 11 proceedings or in discussions with the prosecuting attorney. Statements made to law enforcement officers should be assessed, not under this rule, but under the body of law dealing with police interrogation, see, e.g., State v. Santiago, 53 H. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
Case Notes
Defendant's statements were inadmissible because defendant was a participant in plea discussions. 70 H. 46, 760 P.2d 670 (1988).
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 411 Liability insurance.

Rule 411 Liability insurance.
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; gen ch 1985
RULE 411 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 411. The virtual unanimity of judicial rejection of evidence that a party is or is not insured against liability is soundly based on both legal and policy considerations. Foremost among these is the question of relevance. The fact that a party to an action does or does not carry liability insurance provides no logical basis for an inference of negligence or lack of negligence. Of equal concern is the danger that knowledge of the existence or the lack of liability insurance coverage might bias the jurors and influence them to make a decision on irrelevant and improper grounds. See Carr v. Kinney, 41 H. 166, 176 (1955); Gilliam v. Gerhardt, 34 H. 466 (1938).
Case Notes
Where relevant evidence of witness' potential bias was elicited at trial, trial court properly balanced the prejudice concerns of defendant with the relevance and probative value of liability insurance evidence to reveal witness' potential bias; thus, trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting evidence of bias, interest or motive with due regard for rule 403. 106 H. 298 (App.), 104 P.3d 336 (2004).
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 501 Privileges recognized only as provided.

Rule 501 Privileges recognized only as provided.
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Hawaii, or provided by Act of Congress or Hawaii statute, and except as provided in these rules or in other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii, no person has a privilege to:
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object or writing. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1
RULE 501 COMMENTARY
This rule closely resembles Uniform Rule of Evidence 501 and Cal. Evid. Code §911, the commentary to which states: "This section codifies the existing law that privileges are not recognized in the absence of statute."
The resolution of privilege rules was perhaps the most controversial aspect in the promulgation of the federal evidence rules. The U.S. Supreme Court proposed for adoption thirteen privilege rules that were ultimately rejected by Congress, which enacted one rule, Fed. R. Evid. 501. The U.S. Senate Report to Fed. R. Evid. 501 explains:
Since it was clear that no agreement was likely to be possible as to the content of specific privilege rules, and since the inability to agree threatened to forestall or prevent passage of an entire rules package, the determination was made that the specific privilege rules proposed by the Court should be eliminated and a single rule (rule 501) substituted, leaving the law in its current condition to be developed by the courts of the United States utilizing the principles of the common law. In addition, a proviso was approved requiring Federal courts to recognize and apply state privilege law in civil cases governed by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, ... as under present Federal case law. [S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).]
The Supreme Court's proposed privilege rules can be found in Rules of Evidence for U.S. Courts and Magistrates as promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court, 28 App. U.S. Code Service, App. 6 (1975), and these unenacted rules, as well as the Uniform Rule of Evidence, served as models for the present article.
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 502 Required reports privileged by statute.

Rule 502 Required reports privileged by statute.
A person, corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public or private, making a return or report required by law to be made has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing the return or report, if the law requiring it to be made so provides. A public officer or agency to whom a return or report is required by law to be made has a privilege to refuse to disclose the return or report if the law requiring it to be made so provides. No privilege exists under this rule in actions involving perjury, false statements, fraud in the return or report, or other failure to comply with the law in question. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1
RULE 502 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with the U.S. Supreme Court's proposed Rule 502, see Rules of Evidence for U.S. Courts and Magistrates as promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court, 28 App. U.S. Code Service, App. 6 (1975). A number of Hawaii statutes requiring that reports be made or information be supplied incorporate provisions against unauthorized disclosure of such reports or information. This has the effect of creating a qualified privilege for the reporting party and for the recipient on the reporting party's behalf.
Characteristic of such privilege provisions are those found in statutes dealing with social services, vital statistics, health, and motor vehicle safety. See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. §346-10 (Supp. 1979), which provides for confidentiality of records maintained by the Department of Social Services and Housing; Hawaii Rev. Stat. §334-5 (1976), which provides for qualified confidentiality of mental health records; Hawaii Rev. Stat. §324-23 (1976), which limits the use in legal proceedings of reports and information made to the Hawaii Tumor Registry; and Hawaii Rev. Stat. §287-14 (1976), which establishes a privilege against disclosure of certain motor vehicle accident reports in civil actions to recover damages.
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 506 Communications to clergy.

Rule 506 Communications to clergy.
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "member of the clergy" is a minister, priest, rabbi, Christian Science practitioner, or other similar functionary of a religious organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the communicant.
(2) A communication is "confidential" if made privately and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the communication.
(b) General rule of privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a member of the clergy in the latter's professional character as spiritual advisor.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the communicant or by the communicant's guardian, conservator, or personal representative. The member of the clergy may claim the privilege on behalf of the communicant. Authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. [L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; am L 1992, c 191, §2(3)]
RULE 506 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with the U.S. Supreme Court proposal for Rule 506, see Rules of Evidence for U.S. Courts and Magistrates as promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court, 28 App. U.S. Code Service, App. 6 (1975), except that "accredited Christian Science Practitioner" has been added to the definition of "clergyman" in subsection (a)(1), consistent with Uniform Rule of Evidence 505(a)(1). The rule supersedes a prior Hawaii statute, Hawaii Rev. Stat. §621-20 (1976) (repealed 1980) (originally enacted as L 1876, c 32, §55; am L 1933, c 45, §1; am L 1972, c 104, §1(n)):
No clergymen of any church or religious denomination shall, without the consent of the person making the confidential communication, divulge in any action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, any confidential communication made to him in his professional character according to the uses of the church or religious denomination to which he belongs.
The present rule accords generally with the prior statute but broadens the scope of the privilege slightly in two particulars. Under the prior statute the privilege was limited to confidential communications made "according to the uses of the church or religious denomination to which [the clergyman] belongs." There seems no good reason to limit the privilege in this way so long as confidentiality was intended by the communicant. The present rule clarifies that uncertain point, granting the privilege to all confidential communications made to the clergyman in his professional capacity as a spiritual adviser. In addition, the privilege is extended to cover confidential communications to one who is not a clergyman if the person making the communication reasonably believes that he is.
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 507 Political vote.

Rule 507 Political vote.
Every person has a privilege to refuse to disclose the tenor of the person's vote at a political election conducted pursuant to chapter 11, by secret ballot unless the vote was cast illegally. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; gen ch 1985
RULE 507 COMMENTARY
This rule is similar to Uniform Rule of Evidence 506 and to the unenacted U.S. Supreme Court proposal for Rule 507, see Rules of Evidence for U.S. Courts and Magistrates as promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court, 28 App. U.S. Code Service, App. 6 (1975). The Advisory Committee's Note to proposed Rule 507 pointed out: "Secrecy in voting is an essential aspect of effective democratic government, insuring free exercise of the franchise and fairness in elections. Secrecy after the ballot has been cast is as essential as secrecy in the act of voting."
The present rule applies only if the election in question was "political [and] conducted pursuant to chapter 11 [of the Hawaii Rev. Stat. (1976)]." The scope is accordingly governed by Hawaii Rev. Stat. §11-3 (1976): "This chapter shall apply to all elections, primary, special primary, general, special general, special, or county, held in the State." Provision in the rule for an exception in the event of an illegally cast vote is consistent with the law of election offenses and crimes, Hawaii Rev. Stat. ch. 19 (1976).
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 508 Trade secrets.

Rule 508 Trade secrets.
A person has a privilege, which may be claimed by the person or the person's agent or employee, to refuse to disclose and to prevent other persons from disclosing a trade secret owned by the person, if allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice. When disclosure is directed, the judge shall take such protective measure as the interests of the holder of the privilege and of the parties and the furtherance of justice may require. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; gen ch 1985
RULE 508 COMMENTARY
This rule is similar to Uniform Rule of Evidence 507. Unlike the other privileges in this section, the rule provides a qualified right against disclosure, subject to broad judicial discretion. Hawaii courts have not addressed the issue at the appellate level; however, HRCP 26(c)(7) provides qualified protection against such disclosure during pre-trial discovery, investing the court with discretion to order "that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way." This rule extends that protection to the trial stage.
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 509 Privilege against self-incrimination.

Rule 509 Privilege against self-incrimination.
To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of Hawaii, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate the person. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; gen ch 1985
RULE 509 COMMENTARY
This rule is similar to Cal. Evid. Code §940. It derives directly from the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination assured by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and by Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii. It was also incorporated in a prior statute, Hawaii Rev. Stat. §621-18 (1976) (repealed 1980) (originally enacted as L 1876, c 32, §53; am L 1927, c 164, §1; am L 1971, c 151, §1; am L 1972, c 104, §1(m)), which provided in part:
Nothing herein shall render any person who in any criminal proceeding is charged with the commission of any indictable offense, or any offense punishable on summary conviction, compellable to be a witness against himself; or, except as otherwise provided, shall render any person compellable to answer any question tending to incriminate himself....
In a landmark case nearly a century ago, Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the privilege against self-incrimination extended not only to the accused in a criminal case but also to witnesses generally: "The object [of the privilege] was to insure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime. The privilege is limited to criminal matters, but is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard." See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment privilege applicable to states); State v. Santiago, 53 H. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
This privilege may be lost in only two ways. The first is through voluntary disclosure by the holder of the privilege, see Rule 511 infra. The second is through a grant of immunity, as provided for by statute, see Hawaii Rev. Stat. ch. 621C (Supp. 1979); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 512 Privileged matter disclosed under compulsion or without opportunity to claim privilege.

Rule 512 Privileged matter disclosed under compulsion or without opportunity to claim privilege.
Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not admissible against the holder of the privilege if the disclosure was (1) compelled erroneously, or (2) made without opportunity to claim the privilege. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1
RULE 512 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with the U.S. Supreme Court proposal for Rule 512, see Rules of Evidence for U.S. Courts and Magistrates as promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court, 28 App. U.S. Code Service, App. 6 (1975). The original Advisory Committee's Note said: "Confidentiality, once destroyed, is not susceptible of restoration, yet some measure of repair may be accomplished by preventing use of the evidence against the holder of the privilege. The remedy of exclusion is therefore made available...." Rejecting the argument that the holder of the privilege should resist erroneous compulsion by exhausting all remedies, including appeal from a judgment of contempt, the Note explained: "[T]his exacts of the holder greater fortitude in the face of authority than ordinary individuals are likely to possess, and assumes unrealistically that a judicial remedy is always available." This rule also resembles Uniform Rule of Evidence 511.
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 601 General rule of competency.

Rule 601 General rule of competency.
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1
RULE 601 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with the first sentence of Fed. R. Evid. 601. The second sentence of Fed. R. Evid. 601, providing that "in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law," has been omitted as extraneous.
The rule embodies the intent expressed in the Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Evid. 601 to abolish "religious belief, conviction of crime, and connection with the litigation as a party or interested person or spouse of a party or interested person" as bases for disqualification of a witness. Proper grounds for witness disqualification are set forth in Rules 602 and 603.1 infra.
Although earlier Hawaii statute and case law preserved some of the traditional common-law witness disqualifications, see, e.g., The King v. Brown, 3 H. 114 (1869) (parties in interest), these disqualifications were eliminated by later statutes. See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § §621-14, 621-17 (1976) (repealed 1980) (originally enacted as L 1876, c 32, § §49, 51; am L 1943, c 146, §1; am L 1972, c 104, §1(i), (j), (l)). Thus, Rule 601 effects no change in existing Hawaii law.
This rule is subject to Rule 505 supra, providing that "the spouse of the accused [in a criminal case] has a privilege not to testify against the accused." In addition, conviction of crime and interest in the litigation may be provable under Rules 609 and 609.1 infra, to impeach the credibility of witnesses.
Case Notes
Witness incompetent to testify as to all matters dealt with in hypnotherapy sessions. Hypnotically induced recollection held per se inadmissible. 68 H. 233, 709 P.2d 103 (1985).
Where evidence was insufficient to find officer had present recollection of field sobriety test, officer not qualified to testify as witness to that matter. 80 H. 138 (App.), 906 P.2d 624 (1995).
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 603 Oath or affirmation.

Rule 603 Oath or affirmation.
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the witness' duty to do so. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; gen ch 1985
RULE 603 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 603. Its intent is to retain the common-law requirement that a witness must solemnly undertake to tell the truth. As the Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Evid. 603 puts it: "[N]o special verbal formula is required."
Although under early common law, refusal of a witness to affirm his belief in a supreme being or to invoke the deity according to a specified formulary oath rendered him incompetent, modern law is contrary. In United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1969), the court said: "The common law ... requires neither an appeal to God nor the raising of a hand as a prerequisite to a valid oath. All that the common law requires is a form or statement which impresses upon the mind and conscience of a witness the necessity for telling the truth."
The liberal requirement for an "oath or affirmation" is broadly consistent with Hawaii law. Hawaii Rev. Stat. §1-21 (1976) provides that "[t]he word 'oath' includes a solemn affirmation." A prior statute, superseded by this rule, stated: "Every court ... may administer the following oath-affirmation to all witnesses legally called before them: Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?" Hawaii Rev. Stat. §621-12 (1976) (repealed 1980) (originally enacted as L 1876, c 32, §48; am L 1973, c 155, §1). In State v. Ponteras, 44 H. 71, 75, 351 P.2d 1097, 1100 (1960), the court, in determining the issue of the sufficiency of an oath administered to a minor, stated: "No particular words are required in exacting the declaration or promise from a child to tell the truth."
The rule is also in accord with Hawaii's statutes on perjury. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § §710-1060 through 710-1062 (1976) all proscribe false statements under oath, and Hawaii Rev. Stat. §710-1000(10) (1976) defines "oath" for the purposes of these statutes: "'Oath' includes an affirmation and every other mode authorized by law of attesting to the truth of that which is stated...." In addition, Hawaii Rev. Stat. §710-1068 (1976) provides that it is no defense that "the oath was administered or taken in an irregular manner."
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 604 Interpreters.

Rule 604 Interpreters.
An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules relating to qualification as an expert and the administration of an oath or affirmation that the interpreter will make a true translation. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; gen ch 1985
RULE 604 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 604. In Hawaii, circuit and district court judges are empowered to appoint interpreters by Hawaii Rev. Stat. §606-9 (1976). In addition, HRCP 43(f) and HRCrP 28(b) authorize the courts to appoint and to determine the compensation for interpreters.
Under this rule, an interpreter is regarded as a witness for purposes of the oath requirement of Rule 603 supra, and as an expert, consistent with provisions of Rule 702 infra, for the purpose of determining his qualifications to interpret or to translate in the matter at issue. Under Hawaii law, preliminary determination of his qualifications is a matter within the discretion of the court, John Ii Estate v. Judd, 13 H. 319 (1901). Hawaii law also holds that opportunity for a thorough cross-examination to test the qualifications of witnesses offered as expert translators is essential, McCandless v. Water Co., 35 H. 314, 320 (1940).
A line of Hawaii Supreme Court decisions establishes that the Hawaiian language may be judicially noticed by the court, see Territory v. Bishop Trust Co., 41 H. 358, 367 (1956); McCandless v. Water Co., 35 H. 314, 321-22 (1940); commentary to Rule 201 supra. "In this jurisdiction the Hawaiian language is not to be regarded as a foreign language, but as one of which the courts and judges must take judicial notice.... [T]he trial judge was at liberty to use his own knowledge of the Hawaiian language and also to call to his assistance the official interpreters of the court and, if it was deemed advisable, other experts." 35 H. at 321.
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 605 Competency of judge as witness.

Rule 605 Competency of judge as witness.
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1
RULE 605 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 605, the Advisory Committee's Note to which says:
The solution here presented is a broad rule of incompetency, rather than such alternatives as incompetency only as to material matters, leaving the matter to the discretion of the judge, or recognizing no incompetency. The choice is the result of inability to evolve satisfactory answers to questions which arise when the judge abandons the bench for the witness stand. Who rules on objections? Who compels him to answer? Can he rule impartially on the weight and admissibility of his own testimony? Can he be impeached or cross-examined effectively? Can he, in a jury trial, avoid conferring his seal of approval on one side in the eyes of the jury? Can he, in a bench trial, avoid an involvement destructive of impartiality? The rule of general incompetency has substantial support.
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 607 Who may impeach.

Rule 607 Who may impeach.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; gen ch 1985
RULE 607 COMMENTARY
This rule, which is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 607, rejects the traditional theory that a party calling a witness "vouches" for his truthfulness and therefore is barred from impeaching him. See generally McCormick §38. As the Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Evid. 607 puts it:
A party does not hold out his witnesses as worthy of belief, since he rarely has a free choice in selecting them. Denial of the right [to impeach] leaves the party at the mercy of the witness and the adversary.... The substantial inroads into the old rule made over the years by decisions, rules, and statutes are evidence of doubts as to its basic soundness and workability.
This rule supersedes a statute, Hawaii Rev. Stat. §621-25 (1976) (repealed 1980) (originally enacted as L 1876, c 32, §58; am L 1972, c 104, §1(r)), which precluded a party from impeaching his own witness "by general evidence of bad character" but permitted impeachment by prior inconsistent statement when the witness "prove[d] adverse." In construing the provisions of the prior statute, the Hawaii courts suggested that a witness would "prove adverse" if his testimony was materially inconsistent with the prior statement, his inconsistency came as a surprise to the party offering his testimony, and he either expressly denied or, by evasion, implied a denial of the prior statement, Territory v. Witt, 27 H. 177 (1923); see also Kwong Lee Wai v. Ching Shai, 11 H. 444 (1898). Rule 607 thus effects a significant change in Hawaii law in accord with a growing trend in other jurisdictions, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code §785. Another good reason for abandoning the old impeachment limitation is that, as applied to defense witnesses, its constitutionality is suspect in criminal cases, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 610 Religious beliefs or opinions.

Rule 610 Religious beliefs or opinions.
Evidence of beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; gen ch 1985
RULE 610 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 610, the Advisory Committee's Note to which says:
While the rule forecloses inquiry into the religious beliefs or opinions of a witness for the purpose of showing that his character for truthfulness is affected by their nature, an inquiry for the purpose of showing interest or bias because of them is not within the prohibition. Thus disclosure of affiliation with a church which is a party to the litigation would be allowable under the rule.
Case Notes
Trial court did not err in allowing witness to testify regarding witness' religious beliefs where prosecution did not inquire into witness' religious beliefs for the purpose of enhancing witness' credibility but was instead seeking to establish why witness did not murder person defendant sought to have witness murder. 99 H. 390, 56 P.3d 692 (2002).
The State did not elicit evidence of complainant's "beliefs or opinions on matters of religion" in violation of this rule where prosecutor's questions regarding the religious necklace were relevant to showing complainant's ability to positively identify the items complainant was wearing during defendant's assaults. 106 H. 365 (App.), 105 P.3d 242 (2004).
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 616 Televised testimony of child.

Rule 616 Televised testimony of child.
In any prosecution of an abuse offense or sexual offense alleged to have been committed against a child less than eighteen years of age at the time of the testimony, the court may order that the testimony of the child be taken in a room other than the courtroom and be televised by two-way closed circuit video equipment to be viewed by the court, the accused, and the trier of fact, if the court finds that requiring the child to testify in the physical presence of the accused would likely result in serious emotional distress to the child and substantial impairment of the child's ability to communicate. During the entire course of such a procedure, the attorneys for the defendant and for the State shall have the right to be present with the child, and full direct and cross-examination shall be available as a matter of right. L 1985, c 279, §1; am L 1993, c 198, §1(2)
Cross References
Televised testimony of victims and witnesses, see §801D-7.
RULE 616 COMMENTARY
This rule, which was recommended by the Hawaii Supreme Court in its Final Report of the Committee on Hawaii Rules of Evidence 30 (1991), resembles Uniform Rule of Evidence 807(d). The preliminary determination that taking the child witness' testimony in the accused's presence "would likely result in serious emotional distress to the child and substantial impairment of the child's ability to communicate" is necessary to avoid offending the Confrontation Clause, see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). This preliminary determination is for the court under Rule 104(a).
Case Notes
Subsection (b) (1985), which permitted introduction of child victim's videotaped statement without showing of necessity, impermissibly infringed on defendant's right of confrontation. 79 H. 128, 900 P.2d 135 (1995).
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 704-416 overrides this rule. 71 H. 591, 801 P.2d 27 (1990).

Rule 702.1 Cross-examination of experts.
(a) General. A witness testifying as an expert may be cross-examined to the same extent as any other witness and, in addition, may be cross-examined as to (1) the witness' qualifications, (2) the subject to which the witness' expert testimony relates, and (3) the matter upon which the witness' opinion is based and the reasons for the witness' opinion.
(b) Texts and treatises. If a witness testifying as an expert testifies in the form of an opinion, the witness may be cross-examined in regard to the content or tenor of any scientific, technical, or professional text, treatise, journal, or similar publication only if:
(1) The witness referred to, considered, or relied upon such publication in arriving at or forming the witness' opinion, or
(2) Such publication qualifies for admission into evidence under rule 803(b)(18). [L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; gen ch 1985]
RULE 702.1 COMMENTARY
This rule has no counterpart in Fed. R. Evid. It is modeled on Cal. Evid. Code §721.
Subsection (a): An expert witness differs from a lay witness principally in his ability to draw and to testify to inferences that are beyond the competence of the trier of fact. In addition, the expert is not restricted to firsthand knowledge and may base his opinions and inferences on a wide variety of data and facts perceived by him or made known to him, whether or not they are admissible in evidence, see Rule 703 infra.
Such a broad testimonial range suggests the need for an equally broad cross-examination, and subsection (a) of this rule provides the appropriate latitude. Subsection (a) restates existing law, see McCandless v. Waiahole Water Co., Ltd., 35 H. 314, 320 (1940).
Subsection (b): This subsection clarifies the permissible use of texts and treatises on cross-examination. Hawaii courts have long recognized that an expert may be subjected to cross-examination concerning publications upon which he has relied, see Fraga v. Hoffschlaeger, 26 H. 557, 567 (1922).
Subsection (b)(2) parallels Rule 803(b)(18) which, agreeably with Fed. R. Evid. 803(18), exempts from the hearsay exclusion those texts and treatises that are used on cross-examination. The criterion of Rule 803(b)(18) is that the material be "established as a reliable authority," regardless of whether or not the witness has relied on it. Use of such material on cross-examination was approved in Ruth v. Fenchel, 37 N.J. Super. 295, 117 A.2d 284 (1955), aff'd, 21 N.J. 171, 121 A.2d 373 (1956). The Ruth case was cited approvingly by Chief Justice Richardson in Tittle v. Hurlbutt, 53 H. 526, 534, 497 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1972), in connection with the following statement: "This court recognizes the wisdom of enlarging the scope of use of medical texts on cross-examination." That wisdom is codified in subsection (b).
Case Notes
Section 704-416 overrides this rule. 71 H. 591, 801 P.2d 27 (1990).
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 706 Court-appointed experts.

Rule 706 Court-appointed experts.
In the exercise of its discretion, the court may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that a particular expert witness was appointed by the court. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1
RULE 706 COMMENTARY
Fed. R. Evid. 706 purports to govern the appointment and compensation of expert witnesses. It also contains a subdivision (c) entitled, "Disclosure of appointment," which is similar to this rule. The Advisory Committee's Note to the federal rule points out that a trial judge has inherent power to appoint an expert witness, and defends subdivision (c) as "essential if the use of court appointed experts is to be fully effective."
Hawaii judges are empowered to appoint experts of their own choosing by HRCrP 28(a) and by Kamahalo v. Coelho, 24 H. 689 (1919). This rule does not address appointment or compensation because those matters are more appropriately dealt with in court rules than in rules of evidence.
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 802 Hearsay rule.

Rule 802 Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Hawaii supreme court, or by statute. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1
RULE 802 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 802, except for the substitution of the phrase "by the Hawaii supreme court or by statute" for the federal rule formulation, "by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress," and the addition of a comma after "rules" to increase clarity.
The exclusionary rule does not apply to statements that fall under any of the various hearsay exceptions categorized in Rules 802.1, 803, and 804. Another important limitation to the rule is the provision excepting rules prescribed by the Hawaii Supreme Court. Some examples of this exception are HRCP 4(g), allowing proof of service by affidavit; HRCP 43(e), allowing affidavits on a motion based on facts not appearing of record; HRCP 56, allowing affidavits in summary judgment proceedings; and HRCP 65(b), allowing showing by affidavit for a temporary restraining order.
The Hawaii Supreme Court has frequently and routinely affirmed the truism that hearsay is inadmissible unless it qualifies under a hearsay exception, e.g., State v. Bannister, 60 H. 658, 660, 594 P.2d 133, 134 (1979). The rationale, noted the Bannister court, is that "the trier of fact is unable to test the [declarant's] trustworthiness."
Case Notes
Where store security manager's testimony regarding the price/value of items, based on a universal price code with the price on the item that the manager verified through the store register system, was inadmissible hearsay, State failed to introduce substantial evidence of the value of the items necessary to support the charged offense of second or third degree theft; however, evidence was sufficient to support conviction of lesser included offense of fourth degree theft. 95 H. 169 (App.), 19 P.3d 752 (2001).
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 805 Hearsay within hearsay.

Rule 805 Hearsay within hearsay.
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1
RULE 805 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 805. Because the principal concern in determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence is the assurance of trustworthiness, multiple hearsay creates a multi-level requirement for such assurance. However, if each level of hearsay independently meets the requirements for admissibility under an applicable hearsay exception, the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness for such a statement is as great as for single-level hearsay.
Instances of multi-level hearsay evidence are by no means uncommon. For example, former testimony of an unavailable witness, which qualifies for admissibility under Rule 804(b)(1), might contain testimony of an excited utterance, a statement against interest, or an admission by a party-opponent. Business records evidence presents multiple hearsay problems in cases where informants are not under a business duty, see the commentary to Rule 803(b)(6) supra. As long as each level meets the requirement of independent qualification, this type of evidentiary complexity offers no unique problem.
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 806 Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant.

Rule 806 Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant.
When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1; gen ch 1985
RULE 806 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 806 except that the phrase, "or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E)," is omitted as superfluous, inasmuch as these categories of party-opponent admissions are treated in these rules as hearsay exceptions under Rule 803(a) supra. As the Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Evid. 806 puts it: "The declarant of a hearsay statement which is admitted in evidence is in effect a witness. His credibility should in fairness be subject to impeachment and support as though he had in fact testified."
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 903 Subscribing witness' testimony unnecessary.

Rule 903 Subscribing witness' testimony unnecessary.
The testimony of a subscribing witness is not necessary to authenticate a writing. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1
RULE 903 COMMENTARY
This rule is similar to Fed. R. Evid. 903, except that the present rule eliminates the clause, "unless required by the laws of the jurisdiction whose laws govern the validity of the writing." It supersedes a statute, Hawaii Rev. Stat. §622-1 (1976) (repealed 1980) (originally enacted as L 1876, c 32, §62; am L 1972, c 104, §2(a)), which provided: "It shall not be necessary to prove an instrument by the attesting witness if attestation was not required in order for the instrument to be valid...."
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 1002 Requirement of original.

Rule 1002 Requirement of original.
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1
RULE 1002 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 1002 except that "statute" is substituted for "Act of Congress." Rule 1002 states the so-called "best evidence rule," requiring the production of the original document whenever the proponent seeks to prove the document's contents. See, e.g., Ripley v. Kapiolani Estate, 22 H. 86 (1914). The present rule applies this requirement to writings, recordings, and photographs as those terms are defined in Rule 1001.
Note that this rule applies only when the effort is to "prove the content of a writing." The Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Evid. 1002 addresses this point: "Thus an event may be proved by nondocumentary evidence, even though a written record of it was made. If, however, the event is sought to be proved by the written record, the rule applies. For example, payment may be proved without producing the written receipt which was given. Earnings may be proved without producing books of account in which they are entered." Cf. Brown v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 14 H. 80 (1902).
Case Notes
Although this rule would ordinarily have precluded the admission of testimony about cell phone text messages because such testimony was not an "original", the testimony was admissible because rule 1004(1) applied to the text messages such that other evidence could be admitted to prove the content of the text messages; as complainant no longer had the actual text messages because complainant no longer had the cell phone or cell phone service, for purposes of rule 1004(1), the original text messages were "lost or destroyed". 117 H. 127, 176 P.3d 885 (2008).
2023 Hawaii Revised Statutes › Title 33. Evidence › 626. Hawaii Rules of Evidence › 1003 Admissibility of duplicates.

Rule 1003 Admissibility of duplicates.
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original, or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. L 1980, c 164, pt of §1
RULE 1003 COMMENTARY
This rule is identical with Fed. R. Evid. 1003. It restates a prior statute, Hawaii Rev. Stat. §622-3 (1976) (repealed 1980) (originally enacted as L 1876, c 32, §44; am L 1945, c 17, §1; am L 1972, c 104, §2(c)), which similarly provided for liberal use of facsimile copies in lieu of originals. See Territory v. Morgenstein, 39 H. 602 (1952). "Duplicate" is defined in Rule 1001(4) supra.
Case Notes
Trial court's denial of an objection to the admissibility of a duplicate under this rule is reviewed under abuse of discretion standard. 83 H. 50 (App.), 924 P.2d 544 (1996).