2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 52 - Civil Actions › Chapter 915 - Habeas Corpus › Section 52-470. - Summary disposal of habeas corpus case. Determination of good cause for trial. Appeal by person convicted of crime.

(a) The court or judge hearing any habeas corpus shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts and issues of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments in the case, and shall inquire fully into the cause of imprisonment and thereupon dispose of the case as law and justice require.
(b) (1) After the close of all pleadings in a habeas corpus proceeding, the court, upon the motion of any party or, on its own motion upon notice to the parties, shall determine whether there is good cause for trial for all or part of the petition.
(2) With respect to the determination of such good cause, each party may submit exhibits including, but not limited to, documentary evidence, affidavits and unsworn statements. Upon the motion of any party and a finding by the court that such party would be prejudiced by the disclosure of the exhibits at that stage of the proceedings, the court may consider some or all of the exhibits in camera.
(3) In order to establish such good cause, the petition and exhibits must (A) allege the existence of specific facts which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief under applicable law, and (B) provide a factual basis upon which the court can conclude that evidence in support of the alleged facts exists and will be presented at trial, provided the court makes no finding that such evidence is contradicted by judicially noticeable facts. If the petition and exhibits do not establish such good cause, the court shall hold a preliminary hearing to determine whether such good cause exists. If, after considering any evidence or argument by the parties at such preliminary hearing, the court finds there is not good cause for trial, the court shall dismiss all or part of the petition, as applicable.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of a petition challenging a judgment of conviction has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of the following: (1) Five years after the date on which the judgment of conviction is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) October 1, 2017; or (3) two years after the date on which the constitutional or statutory right asserted in the petition was initially recognized and made retroactive pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Court or Appellate Court of this state or the Supreme Court of the United States or by the enactment of any public or special act. The time periods set forth in this subsection shall not be tolled during the pendency of any other petition challenging the same conviction.
(d) In the case of a petition filed subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of the following: (1) Two years after the date on which the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) October 1, 2014; or (3) two years after the date on which the constitutional or statutory right asserted in the petition was initially recognized and made retroactive pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Court or Appellate Court of this state or the Supreme Court of the United States or by the enactment of any public or special act. For the purposes of this section, the withdrawal of a prior petition challenging the same conviction shall not constitute a judgment. The time periods set forth in this subsection shall not be tolled during the pendency of any other petition challenging the same conviction. Nothing in this subsection shall create or enlarge the right of the petitioner to file a subsequent petition under applicable law.
(e) In a case in which the rebuttable presumption of delay under subsection (c) or (d) of this section applies, the court, upon the request of the respondent, shall issue an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed. The petitioner or, if applicable, the petitioner's counsel, shall have a meaningful opportunity to investigate the basis for the delay and respond to the order. If, after such opportunity, the court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for the delay, the court shall dismiss the petition. For the purposes of this subsection, good cause includes, but is not limited to, the discovery of new evidence which materially affects the merits of the case and which could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence in time to meet the requirements of subsection (c) or (d) of this section.
(f) Subsections (b) to (e), inclusive, of this section shall not apply to (1) a claim asserting actual innocence, (2) a petition filed to challenge the conditions of confinement, or (3) a petition filed to challenge a conviction for a capital felony for which a sentence of death is imposed under section 53a-46a.
(g) No appeal from the judgment rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by or on behalf of a person who has been convicted of a crime in order to obtain such person's release may be taken unless the appellant, within ten days after the case is decided, petitions the judge before whom the case was tried or, if such judge is unavailable, a judge of the Superior Court designated by the Chief Court Administrator, to certify that a question is involved in the decision which ought to be reviewed by the court having jurisdiction and the judge so certifies.
(1949 Rev., S. 8206; 1957, P.A. 482; 1967, P.A. 182; P.A. 82-160, S. 171; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 47, 82; P.A. 02-132, S. 78; P.A. 12-115, S. 1.)
History: 1967 act provides for petition by appellant within ten days after case is decided rather than certification by judge within said period; P.A. 82-160 inserted Subsec. indicators and made minor wording change in Subsec. (b); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 included reference to appellate court and deleted reference to supreme court and substituted the court “having jurisdiction” in lieu thereof in Subsec. (b); P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “a judge of the Supreme Court or Appellate Court” with “if such judge is unavailable, a judge of the Superior Court designated by the Chief Court Administrator” and making technical changes; P.A. 12-115 made technical changes in Subsec. (a), added new Subsec. (b) re determination of whether there is good cause for trial, added Subsecs. (c) to (e) re rebuttable presumption that filing of petition challenging conviction has been delayed without good cause, added Subsec. (f) re when Subsecs. (b) to (e) shall not apply, and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (g), effective October 1, 2012, and applicable to petitions filed on or after that date.
The judgment may be reversed on error. 33 C. 328. Applicant may demur to the return, deny it or confess and avoid its effect. 67 C. 358. Cited. 111 C. 251; 151 C. 746; 153 C. 75; Id., 673. “In a summary way” construed. 117 C. 265. Constitutionality of out-of-state conviction and punishment not proper subjects for review in Connecticut upon a writ of habeas corpus. 146 C. 509. Where defendant had been represented by a special public defender who failed to proceed with appeal on grounds that he could not do so conscientiously and court denied motion for appointment of other counsel, his rights have been violated under equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment to U.S. Constitution and there was no error in habeas corpus proceeding directing that he be discharged from prison unless, at his further request, counsel is appointed and necessary extensions of time to perfect the appeal are granted. 152 C. 504–507. In latter case, plaintiff cannot demand that other counsel be appointed if new counsel also concludes that there is no substantial error which he can assign on appeal. Id., 505. Where on habeas corpus, it has been properly determined that a right of appeal required by federal constitution has been denied, any rule restricting an appeal because of lapse of time is inapplicable. Id., 508. Petitioner may collaterally raise federal constitutional claims in habeas corpus proceeding even though he has failed to appeal his federal constitutional claims if he alleges and proves that he did not deliberately bypass direct appeal. 154 C. 363. Review allowed where plaintiff claimed conviction based on unlawfully obtained evidence and incriminating statements; plaintiff permitted to pursue appeal in forma pauperis. 155 C. 316. Cited. 156 C. 341. Mere occurrence of constitutional violation is not sufficient to render plea of guilty involuntary and subject to nullification in habeas corpus proceeding; court's finding that plaintiff voluntarily pleaded guilty because his photograph was taken and his companion informed and not because his room had been illegally searched was supported by the record. 157 C. 143. Cited. Id., 400. Where there is complete lack of merit to plaintiff's claim, case should not be certified for review. 158 C. 45. Appellee's direct challenge to late filing of appeal can only be made pursuant to Sec. 697 of Practice Book within 10 days from time of filing appeal and may not be effectively challenged by motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id., 486. Cited. 159 C. 150; 161 C. 337. Plaintiff's petition for certification of appeal to Supreme Court denied. 168 C. 254. Cited. 170 C. 121; 178 C. 207. Section serves only to delineate the proper scope of a hearing if one is legally required; does not address whether a hearing is, in the first instance, legally required. 180 C. 153. Cited. 187 C. 109. Writ of error, not habeas corpus, is appropriate method to review a summary, criminal contempt citation. 189 C. 663. Cited. 191 C. 142; 194 C. 510. Habeas court has no discretion to consider untimely petition for certification to appeal. 222 C. 254; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 689 and Id., 723. Cited. 226 C. 757; 229 C. 178; Id., 397; 230 C. 608; 234 C. 139. A request for an order to show cause why a habeas petition should be permitted when the petition was filed outside the two-year limitation period is governed by Subsec. (e), rather than Subsec. (b), and the habeas court has discretion to determine when it should act on the request. 329 C. 711. A habeas court's determination of whether a petitioner has satisfied the good cause standard under Subsecs. (d) and (e) is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion; although the legislature contemplated a petitioner's lack of knowledge of a change in the law as potentially sufficient to establish good cause under Subsecs. (d) and (e), the legislature did not intend for a petitioner's lack of knowledge of the law, standing alone, to establish that a petitioner has met the evidentiary burden of establishing good cause. 343 C. 424.
Cited. 10 CA 520; 23 CA 559; 29 CA 274; 36 CA 695; 39 CA 473; 42 CA 17; 46 CA 486. Petitioner's inability to obtain transcripts of prior proceedings despite due diligence nor his ignorance of the law does not constitute good cause for delay in commencing habeas proceeding. 185 CA 528. The absence of a detailed statutory definition of the good cause standard indicates that the legislature intended the habeas corpus court to exercise significant discretion in making determinations regarding “good cause”; to rebut successfully the presumption of unreasonable delay in section, petitioner generally will be required to demonstrate that something outside the control of petitioner or habeas counsel caused or contributed to the delay, including, but not limited to (1) whether external forces outside the control of petitioner had any bearing on the delay, (2) whether and to what extent petitioner or petitioner's counsel bears any personal responsibility for any excuse proffered for the untimely filing, (3) whether the reasons proffered by petitioner in support of a finding of good cause are credible and supported by evidence in the record and (4) how long after the expiration of the filing deadline did petitioner file the petition, and no single factor necessarily will be dispositive and the court should evaluate all relevant factors in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances presented. 202 CA 21; judgment affirmed, see 343 C. 424.
Does not preclude any right of appeal. 15 CS 274. Right of indigent accused to appeal to Supreme Court cannot be defeated by time limitations if he was deprived of federal constitutional right at his trial. 28 CS 464. Cited. 42 CS 371.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 230 C. 88. Section required defendant be granted specific performance of plea agreement; judgment of Appellate Court in 35 CA 374 reversed. 235 C. 413.
Cited. 29 CA 162; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 397; 39 CA 485; 41 CA 515; 46 CA 689. Habeas court abused its discretion when it denied petition for writ of habeas corpus without holding an evidentiary hearing for petitioner, even though she had finished serving her sentence. 110 CA 134.
Subsec. (b):
Section places the burden on the habeas petitioner who wants to avoid dismissal pursuant to Subsec. (b) to (1) state a legally cognizable claim in the petition for writ of habeas corpus, including the allegation of specific facts that, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief, and (2) submit documentary exhibits sufficient to demonstrate evidence in support of the alleged specific facts. 178 CA 299.
Subsec. (d):
The term “prior petition” is silent as to whether it includes a federal petition, but given the text of the section and that it occurs within a statutory framework concerning state procedures for state habeas petitions, it is plain and unambiguous because the only reasonable interpretation of the section is that such term is limited to a prior state petition and does not include a federal petition. 202 CA 503.
Subsec. (g) (former Subsec. (b)):
Cited. 193 C. 439; 200 C. 553; 213 C. 38; Id., 97; 218 C. 479; 222 C. 87; 223 C. 180; Id., 411; 227 C. 124; Id., 147; 229 C. 193; 235 C. 82; 240 C. 708. 10-day limitation on filing for certification to appeal from judgment does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction; judgment in 222 C. 254, to the extent it conflicts with this decision, overruled. 242 C. 689. Judgment of Appellate Court reversed in accordance with decision in 242 C. 689. Id., 723. In absence of demonstrable prejudice, legislature did not intend terms of the habeas court's grant of certification to be limitation on specific issues subject to appellate review. 245 C. 132. There is no exception to the requirement that a habeas petitioner expressly allege and explain in his brief how habeas court abused discretion in denying certification when the petitioner is self-represented. 341 C. 508,
Cited. 5 CA 277; 6 CA 518; 12 CA 343; 19 CA 686; 23 CA 63; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 112; 26 CA 48; 28 CA 195; 31 CA 771; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 88; 33 CA 902; 35 CA 762; 40 CA 553; 43 CA 374; Id., 698. Subsec. intended to discourage frivolous habeas appeals. 61 CA 350. Petitioner's claim that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying a petition for certification to appeal must be predicated on an issue that was an underlying claim in the habeas petition. 68 CA 1. Petitioner's claims that he was being treated as a slave and a prisoner at war were frivolous. 125 CA 220. Subsec. prevents reviewing court from hearing the merits of a habeas appeal following denial of certification of appeal unless petitioner establishes that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 159 CA 537.