2023 Colorado Revised Statutes › Title 14 - DOMESTIC MATTERS (§§ 14-1-101 — 14-15-119) › DESERTION AND NONSUPPORT (§§ 14-5-101 — 14-7-105) › Article 5 - UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (§§ 14-5-101 — 14-5-1007) › Part 2 - JURISDICTION (§§ 14-5-201 — 14-5-211) › Section 14-5-205 - Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify child support order

(a)
A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support order if the order is the controlling order and:
(1)
At the time of the filing of a request for modification, this state is the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued; or
(2)
Even if this state is not the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued, the parties consent in a record or in open court that the tribunal of this state may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its order.
(b)
A tribunal of this state that has issued a child support order consistent with the law of this state may not exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order if:
(1)
All of the parties who are individuals file consent in a record with the tribunal of this state that a tribunal of another state that has jurisdiction over at least one of the parties who is an individual or that is located in the state of residence of the child may modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction; or
(2)
Its order is not the controlling order.
(c)
If a tribunal of another state has issued a child support order pursuant to the "Uniform Interstate Family Support Act", or a law substantially similar to that act, which modifies a child support order of a tribunal of this state, tribunals of this state shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal of the other state.
(d)
A tribunal of this state that lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify a child support order may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another state to modify a support order issued in that state.
(e)
A temporary support order issued ex parte or pending resolution of a jurisdictional conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the issuing tribunal.
(f)
(Deleted by amendment, L. 2003, p. 1245, § 5, effective July 1, 2004.)
L. 93: Entire article R&RE, p. 1585, § 1, effective 1/1/1995. L. 97: (a)(2), (b), IP(c), and (d) amended, p. 534, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 1245, § 5, effective 7/1/2004.
COMMENT
This section is perhaps the most crucial provision in UIFSA. Consistent with the precedent of the federal PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT,
28 U.S.C. §1738A
, except in very narrowly defined circumstances the issuing tribunal retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child-support order, commonly known as CEJ. First introduced by UIFSA in 1992, this principle is in force and widely accepted in all states. Indeed CEJ is fundamental to the principle of one-child-support-order-at-a-time.
As long as one of the individual parties or the child continues to reside in the issuing state, and as long as the parties do not agree to the contrary, the issuing tribunal has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its child-support order which in practical terms means that it may modify its order. The statute takes an even-handed approach. The identity of the party remaining in the issuing state obligor or obligee does not matter. Indeed, if the individual parties have left the issuing state but the child remains behind, CEJ remains with the issuing tribunal. Even if the parties and the child no longer reside in the issuing state, the support order continues in existence and is fully enforceable unless and until a modification takes place in accordance with the requirements of Article 6,
infra
. Note, however, that the CEJ of the issuing tribunal over a spousal-support order is permanent,
see
Section 211,
infra
.
Subsection (a)(1) states the basic rule, and subsection (a)(2) states an exception to that rule. First, the time to measure whether the issuing tribunal has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order, or whether the parties and the child have left the state, is explicitly stated to be at the time of filing a proceeding to modify the child-support order. Second, the term in subsection (a)(1) "is the residence" makes clear that any interruption of residence of a party between the date of the issuance of the order and the date of filing the request for modification does not affect jurisdiction to modify. Thus, if there is but one order, it is the controlling order in effect and enforceable throughout the United States, notwithstanding the fact that everyone at one time had left the issuing state. If the order is not modified during this time of mutual absence, a return to reside in the issuing state by a party or child immediately identifies the proper forum at the time of filing a proceeding for modification. Although the statute does not speak explicitly to the issue, temporary absence should be treated in a similar fashion. Temporary employment in another state may not forfeit a claim of residence in the issuing state. Of course, residence is a fact question for the trial court, keeping in mind that the question is residence, not domicile.
From the beginning of the implementation of the CEJ principle, questions have been raised about why a tribunal may not modify its own order if the parties agree that it should do so even after the parties have left the state. The move of the parties and the child from the state may have been of a very short distance and, although the parties no longer reside in the issuing state, they may prefer to continue to have the child-support order be governed by the same issuing tribunal because they continue to have a strong affiliation with it. For example, the child-support order may have been issued by a tribunal of Washington, D.C. Subsequently the obligee and child have moved to Virginia, the obligor now resides in Maryland, and perhaps one or both parties continue to be employed in Washington. Subsection (a)(2) authorizes retention of CEJ by the issuing state when the parties reasonably may prefer to continue to deal with the issuing tribunal even though the state is "not the residence" of the parties or child as an exception to the general rules of CEJ for modifications of a support order.
The other side of the coin follows logically. Just as subsection (a) defines the retention of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, by clear implication the subsection also identifies how jurisdiction to modify may be lost. That is, if all the relevant persons the obligor, the individual obligee, and the child have permanently left the issuing state, absent an agreement the issuing tribunal no longer has an appropriate nexus with the parties or child to justify the exercise of jurisdiction to modify its child-support order. Further, the issuing tribunal will have no current evidence readily available to it about the factual circumstances of anyone involved, and the taxpayers of that state will have no reason to expend public funds on the process. Note, however, that the original order of the issuing tribunal remains valid and enforceable. That order is in effect not only in the issuing state, but also in those states in which the order has been registered. The order also may be registered and enforced in additional states even after the issuing tribunal has lost its power to modify its order, see Sections 601-604,
infra
. In sum, the original order remains in effect until it is properly modified in accordance with the narrow terms of Sections 609-612,
infra
.
Subsection (b)(1) explicitly provides that the parties may agree in a record that the issuing tribunal should relinquish its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify so that a tribunal in another state may assume CEJ to modify the child-support order. It is believed that such consent seldom occurs because of the almost universal desire of each party to prefer his or her local tribunal. The principle that the parties should be allowed to agree upon an alternate forum if they so choose also extends to a situation in which all the parties and the child have left the issuing state and are in agreement that a tribunal of the state in which only the movant resides shall assume modification jurisdiction,
see
Section 611.
Although subsections (a) and (b) identify the methods for the retention and the loss of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction by the issuing tribunal, this section does not confer jurisdiction to modify on another tribunal. Modification requires that a tribunal have personal jurisdiction over the parties and meet other criteria as provided in Sections 609 through 615,
infra
.
Related to Convention:
art. 18. Limit on proceedings.