2023 Colorado Revised Statutes › Title 14 - DOMESTIC MATTERS (§§ 14-1-101 — 14-15-119) › DESERTION AND NONSUPPORT (§§ 14-5-101 — 14-7-105) › Article 5 - UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (§§ 14-5-101 — 14-5-1007) › Part 7 - SUPPORT PROCEEDING UNDER CONVENTION (§§ 14-5-701 — 14-5-713) › Section 14-5-708 - Recognition and enforcement of registered Convention support order

(a)
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce a registered Convention support order.
(b)
The following grounds are the only grounds on which a tribunal of this state may refuse recognition and enforcement of a registered Convention support order:
(1)
Recognition and enforcement of the order is manifestly incompatible with public policy, including the failure of the issuing tribunal to observe minimum standards of due process, which include notice and an opportunity to be heard;
(2)
The issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction consistent with section
14-5-201
;
(3)
The order is not enforceable in the issuing country;
(4)
The order was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure;
(5)
A record transmitted in accordance with section
14-5-706
lacks authenticity or integrity;
(6)
A proceeding between the same parties and having the same purpose is pending before a tribunal of this state and that proceeding was the first to be filed;
(7)
The order is incompatible with a more recent support order involving the same parties and having the same purpose if the more recent support order is entitled to recognition and enforcement under this article in this state;
(8)
Payment, to the extent alleged arrears have been paid in whole or in part;
(9)
In a case in which the respondent neither appeared nor was represented in the proceeding in the issuing foreign country:
(A)
If the law of that country provides for prior notice of proceedings, the respondent did not have proper notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard; or
(B)
If the law of that country does not provide for prior notice of the proceedings, the respondent did not have proper notice of the order and an opportunity to be heard in a challenge or appeal on fact or law before a tribunal; or
(10)
The order was made in violation of section
14-5-711
.
(c)
If a tribunal of this state does not recognize a Convention support order under subsection (b)(2), (4), or (9) of this section:
(1)
The tribunal may not dismiss the proceeding without allowing a reasonable time for a party to request the establishment of a new Convention support order; and
(2)
The state department of human services shall take all appropriate measures to request a child support order for the obligee if the application for recognition and enforcement was received under section
14-5-704
.
Added by 2015 Ch. 173,§ 32, eff. 7/1/2015.
L. 2015: Entire part R&RE, (HB 15-1198), ch. 173, p. 565, § 32, effective July 1.
COMMENT
Enforceability; the general rule, with exceptions.
Subsection (a) states the general proposition that if a child-support order is issued by a tribunal in a Convention country, except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the order shall be recognized and enforced. In domestic cases UIFSA requires recognition of child-support order of a sister state,
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B
, Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA). Receipt of a child-support order from a sister state is routinely processed and enforced. Critical examination of the sister state order for defects is not called for; it is the responsibility of the respondent to assert any defenses available. Moreover, experience has shown that child-support orders are generally valid, for relatively modest amounts, and seldom subject to claims of fraud. The most common defect is one of mistake, rather than deliberate misconduct.
Subsection (b) combines provisions from four separate articles in the Convention. These articles provide an extensive number of specific reasons for a tribunal or support enforcement agency of one Convention country to refuse to recognize a child-support order from another Convention country. For this act to be consistent with the Convention, it is necessary to identify the potential defects of a support order from a Convention country in which a defendant might raise a challenge based on lack of jurisdiction, due process, or enforceability of an order for arrearages. The majority of these defects arguably are self-explanatory, and almost all are subject to factual dispute to be resolved by the tribunal, to wit: (b)(1) "manifestly incompatible" with public policy, including violation of minimum standards of due process; (b)(2) issued without personal jurisdiction over the individual party
(discussed at length below)
; (b)(3) unenforceable in the issuing country; (b)(4) obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure; (b)(5) the record lacks authenticity or integrity, e.g., forged; (b)(6) a prior proceeding is pending; (b)(7) a more recent support order is controlling; (b)(8) full or partial payment; (b)(9)(A),(B), no appearance, notice, or opportunity to be heard
(discussed below)
; and, (b)(10) exceeds limitations and restraints on modification. As with domestic cases, the norm will be to recognize and enforce a foreign order absent a challenge by the respondent. Three provisions most likely to trigger a tribunal to refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign support order require more attention, i.e., subsections (b)(2), (4) and (9)(A), (B).
Of particular note, subsection (c) applies to a refusal to recognize and enforce a Convention order under any of these grounds. From the perspective of the United States, subsection (b)(2) is likely to be the primary reason for a tribunal to refuse to recognize and enforce a registered Convention support order. Key to its participation in the negotiations leading to the Convention, the United States insisted that a support order may be refused recognition by a tribunal if the issuing foreign tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the respondent. The facts underlying the Convention support order must be measured by a tribunal as consistent with the long-arm jurisdictional provisions of UIFSA.
See
Sections 201-202. A potential problem occurs only if a Convention support order cannot be enforced by a tribunal because there was no appropriate nexus between the foreign country and the respondent.
Subsection (c) provides that any of the reasons enumerated for not recognizing and enforcing a registered Convention support order, i.e., (b)(2), (4) and (9), will trigger the obligation of the tribunal not to dismiss the proceeding before allowing a reasonable time for a party to seek the establishment of a new child-support order. Moreover, if the Title IV-D support enforcement agency is involved, it must "take all appropriate measures to request a child-support order;" i.e., file a petition seeking to establish an initial child-support order by the tribunal. In that case, the tribunal shall treat the request for recognition and enforcement as a petition for establishment of a new order.
Two systems; direct and indirect jurisdiction.
In drafting the Convention, the subject of the requisite jurisdiction to issue a support order generated considerable discussion. The choice divided itself into two distinct categories; rules of direct and indirect jurisdiction. Direct jurisdiction provides explicit bases on which a tribunal is vested with the power to assert its authority and enter a support order.
See
Section 201.
The UIFSA long-arm provisions are paradigm rules of direct jurisdiction. Section 201 identifies the bases on which a tribunal may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual, obligor or obligee, without regard to the current residence of the individual or child. As discussed in the comment to Section 201,
supra
, these long-arm jurisdictional rules for child support and spousal support orders were fashioned case-by-case by the Supreme Court,
see Estin v. Estin
, 334 U.S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561 (1948);
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt
, 354 U.S. 416, 77 S. Ct. 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d 1456 (1957) (spousal support);
Kulko v. Superior Court
, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978) (child support).
An initial difficulty arose because some authorities from foreign countries expressed concern about the UIFSA long-arm statute. This was especially true regarding Section 201(a)(1), i.e., service of legal process that creates personal jurisdiction, sometimes called "tag or ambush jurisdiction." Some experts in civil law countries regard the claim that jurisdiction can be acquired merely by serving documents on an individual passing through, with no fundamental ties to the jurisdiction, as "exorbitant," and fundamentally unfair. Another provision eliciting criticism was Section 201(a)(6), which literally reads that an allegation of engaging in sexual intercourse in the state that "may have" resulted in conception will suffice to support a basis for issuing a child support-order.
Similarly, rules of jurisdiction recognized by civil law countries are contrary to the principles that apply to proceedings in the United States. The fact that residence of a child or an obligee in a forum is sufficient basis in most foreign countries to support a child-support order, even though the obligor has no personal nexus with the forum, is generally viewed as wholly inconsistent with notions of due process in the United States. Assuming the obligor has never been physically present in the forum and has not participated in any of the acts described in Section 201, an assertion of jurisdiction to establish a support order based solely on the residence of the obligee or child in that forum is widely regarded in the United States as unconstitutional.
The Convention adopts a rule of indirect jurisdiction which requires a tribunal to register and enforce the order of another tribunal if certain basic jurisdictional requirements have been satisfied. The Convention does not actually prescribe the bases on which the tribunal may assert jurisdiction, as UIFSA does in Section 201. Most commonly, in countries other than the United States if a child is a "habitual resident" of a country, a support order of a tribunal of that country will be recognized in another country. As a practical matter, although "habitual residence" of the obligee provides no basis for assertion of personal jurisdiction over the obligor in the United States, the home tribunal is almost always the preferred forum if the obligee has any basis under Section 201 to obtain long-arm jurisdiction over a non-resident obligor. That is, the actual custodian of the child is almost always the person who seeks to establish and enforce child support and, if possible, chooses to bring a proceeding in the state of residence of the obligee and the child. A tribunal that recognizes "habitual residence" as a basis for indirect jurisdiction would, accordingly, register and enforce an order from a tribunal in the "habitual residence" of the obligee or child without concern about whether the obligor has a nexus with that tribunal. Thus, most foreign concerns about the tenuous reaches of long-arm jurisdiction in the United States are obviated in practice.
The Convention eschews rules of direct jurisdiction, choosing instead to rely on half-a-dozen indirect rules of jurisdiction, "habitual residence" of any of the parties (respondent, creditor or child) being the most common. The focus of the Convention is to identify the bases on which a tribunal of one Convention country will be required to recognize the assertion of jurisdiction by a tribunal of another Convention country. When the Convention is in force in both countries, a support order issued by a tribunal of Country A will be enforced by a tribunal of Country B, provided that the order is enforceable in Country A, plus the host of other possible considerations discussed above. There are a limited number of exceptions, or "reservations," to such rules permitted under the Convention, which give rise to additional procedures noted below. Once recognition is accorded to a support order, the normal procedures available to enforce the order come into play. The routes to arrive at enforcement by way of direct or indirect jurisdiction are different, but the destination is the same.
Virtually all foreign countries recognize and enforce a child-support order based on the residence of the obligee or the child. The U.S. requirement of personal jurisdiction over the obligor is often regarded abroad as idiosyncratic. Nonetheless, the new Convention requires recognition of U.S. orders based on long-arm jurisdiction asserted over the obligor, a.k.a. "debtor" if the forum state is also the state of residence of the obligee, a.k.a. "creditor." From the perspective of a foreign tribunal, such an order should be considered valid, if only for creditor- or child-based jurisdictional reasons. The fact that the state tribunal requires a personal nexus between the parties and the tribunal is irrelevant to the foreign tribunal.
These distinct views of appropriate jurisdiction presented a genuine issue for resolution. The United States delegation took the position that, as a matter of constitutional law, its tribunals could not recognize and enforce creditor- or child-based support orders under certain factual circumstances accepted in other countries as providing appropriate jurisdiction. The conclusion of the delegation was that this approach conflicts with the
Kulko
decision,
supra
. The potential lack of nexus with the obligor, if jurisdiction was based solely on the "habitual residence" of the obligee, would present an impenetrable barrier to participation in the Convention by the United States.
Fairly early on in the Convention negotiations, a consensus developed that these different systems of jurisdiction could be accommodated. On the U.S. side, a challenge to a foreign child-support order will be rejected if the factual circumstances are sufficient to support an assertion of long-arm jurisdiction in the foreign tribunal. Rather obviously, the foreign tribunal need not, and almost certainly will not, consider whether there is a factual basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over the absent obligor based upon "minimum contacts" with the forum. This is not a part of the jurisprudence of the foreign tribunal. If a challenge to a support order is raised by the obligor when the order is sought for enforcement in a United States tribunal, however, that tribunal shall undertake a determination of whether the jurisdictional bases of Section 201 would have been applicable if that issue had been raised in the foreign tribunal. If so, the order is enforceable in this country, notwithstanding that the foreign tribunal based its decision on jurisdiction on the fact that the child or the obligee resided in that forum.
See
Convention art. 20(1)(c)-(d).
Asserting long-arm jurisdiction to establish a support order by a tribunal in a proceeding under UIFSA will be unaffected by the entry into force of the Convention. This will be true irrespective of whether the nonresident respondent resides in another state or in a foreign country, or even resides in a non-Convention foreign nation.
The term "habitually resident" is used in a number of private international law conventions, including the 2007 Maintenance Convention. The term is not defined in any of them. Rather, in common law countries its meaning is determined on a case-by-case basis by the practice and case law of each country. In the United States and elsewhere there is no consistent interpretation of the term by the courts considering it in the context of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The negotiators of the Convention from the United States made it clear that case law on the meaning of "habitually resident" in the child abduction context should not automatically be applied to child support cases. That is because the effect of the use of "habitual residence" in the 1980 Child Abduction Convention is intended to restrict the ability of a person to obtain a new custody order shortly after arriving in another country. In fact, one of the objects of the 1980 Convention is to limit the ability of a parent unhappy with the custody order of one court to "forum shop" by moving to another country and seeking a new order. In the 2007 Maintenance Convention, the object is to make it easier for an obligee to recover child support in an international case, not to restrict the ability of an obligee to apply for that support.
Due process under the Convention.
Subsection (b)(9)(A) applies to a failure to give a party prior notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, which is the classic denial of due process in a proceeding in the United States.
Subsection (b)(9)(B) will be unfamiliar to practitioners in this country and requires some explanation. This provision recognizes the legitimacy of, and provides a method for challenge of, a support order which may be routinely entered in some administrative systems in an ex parte proceeding. The support order is issued without prior notice to the obligor or opportunity to be heard. The due process opportunity is provided after the ex parte decision. This system is currently in use in administrative proceedings in Australia and New Zealand. Because the respondent will not have participated in the original proceeding, the post facto due process allows the obligor an opportunity to challenge the decision on fact or law.
Convention source:
art. 20. Bases for recognition and enforcement; art. 21. Severability and partial recognition and enforcement; art. 22. Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement; art. 23. Procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement; art. 25. Documents.
Related to Convention:
art. 11. Application contents.