2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-22. - Use of physical force in making arrest or preventing escape.

(a)(1) For purposes of this section, a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense means a reasonable belief in facts or circumstances which if true would in law constitute an offense. If the believed facts or circumstances would not in law constitute an offense, an erroneous though not unreasonable belief that the law is otherwise does not render justifiable the use of physical force to make an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody.
(2) A peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles who is effecting an arrest pursuant to a warrant or preventing an escape from custody is justified in using the physical force prescribed in subsections (b), (c) and (d) of this section unless such warrant is invalid and is known by such officer to be invalid.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) or (d) of this section, a peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles is justified in using physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such use to be necessary to: (1) Effect an arrest or prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense, unless he or she knows that the arrest or custody is unauthorized; or (2) defend himself or herself or a third person from the use or imminent use of physical force while effecting or attempting to effect an arrest or while preventing or attempting to prevent an escape.
(c) (1) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, a peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person for the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section only when his or her actions are objectively reasonable under the given circumstances at that time, and:
(A) He or she reasonably believes such use to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person from the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or
(B) He or she (i) has reasonably determined that there are no available reasonable alternatives to the use of deadly physical force, (ii) reasonably believes that the force employed creates no unreasonable risk of injury to a third party, and (iii) reasonably believes such use of force to be necessary to (I) effect an arrest of a person whom he or she reasonably believes has committed or attempted to commit a felony which involved the infliction of serious physical injury, and if, where feasible, he or she has given warning of his or her intent to use deadly physical force, or (II) prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he or she reasonably believes has committed a felony which involved the infliction of serious physical injury and who poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to others, and if, where feasible, he or she has given warning of his or her intent to use deadly physical force.
(2) For purposes of evaluating whether actions of a peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles are reasonable under subdivision (1) of this subsection, factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, whether (A) the person upon whom deadly physical force was used possessed or appeared to possess a deadly weapon, (B) the peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles engaged in reasonable deescalation measures prior to using deadly physical force, and (C) any unreasonable conduct of the peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles led to an increased risk of an occurrence of the situation that precipitated the use of such force.
(d) A peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles is justified in using a chokehold or other method of restraint applied to the neck area or that otherwise impedes the ability to breathe or restricts blood circulation to the brain of another person for the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section only when he or she reasonably believes such use to be necessary to defend himself or herself from the use or imminent use of deadly physical force.
(e) Except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, a person who has been directed by a peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles to assist such peace officer, special policeman or official to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody is justified in using reasonable physical force when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to carry out such peace officer's, special policeman's or official's direction.
(f) A person who has been directed to assist a peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles under circumstances specified in subsection (e) of this section may use deadly physical force to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody only when: (1) He or she reasonably believes such use to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or (2) he or she is directed or authorized by such peace officer, special policeman or official to use deadly physical force, unless he or she knows that the peace officer, special policeman or official himself or herself is not authorized to use deadly physical force under the circumstances.
(g) A private person acting on his or her own account is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such use to be necessary to effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person whom he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense and who in fact has committed such offense; but he or she is not justified in using deadly physical force in such circumstances, except in defense of person as prescribed in section 53a-19.
(h) In determining whether use of force by a peace officer who is a police officer, as defined in subsection (a) of section 29-6d, is justified pursuant to this section, the trier of fact may draw an unfavorable inference from a police officer's deliberate failure in violation of section 29-6d to record such use of physical force.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 23; 1971, P.A. 826; 871, S. 8; P.A. 86-231; 86-403, S. 87, 132; P.A. 92-260, S. 7; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-6, S. 23, 28; P.A. 04-257, S. 119; P.A. 05-108, S. 6; 05-180, S. 2; P.A. 08-150, S. 50; P.A. 10-36, S. 16; P.A. 19-90, S. 4; 19-108, S. 4; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1, S. 29; P.A. 21-4, S. 1, 2; 21-33, S. 8.)
History: 1971 acts applied provisions of Subsecs. (a) to (f) to authorized officials of department of correction and specified authority to use physical force to prevent escape from custody in Subsec. (a) and deleted former Subsec. (g) which had allowed peace officers employed in correctional facilities to use force to prevent a prisoner's escape and specified use of “reasonable” physical force; P.A. 86-231 amended Subsec. (c)(2) to add provision that the felony involve the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury and that the officer or official give a warning if feasible of his intent to use deadly physical force; P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (b); P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing “believes it necessary”, “believes that such is necessary” and “believes it is necessary” with “believes such to be necessary”; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-6 amended Subsecs. (a) to (e), inclusive, to add authorized officials of the Board of Parole, effective July 1, 1994; P.A. 04-257 amended Subsecs. (a) to (e), inclusive, to delete references to an authorized official of the Board of Parole, effective June 14, 2004; P.A. 05-108 amended Subsecs. (a) to (e), inclusive, to restore references to an authorized official of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective June 7, 2005; P.A. 05-180 amended Subsecs. (a) to (e), inclusive, to include a special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b within the purview of said Subsecs. and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality throughout; P.A. 08-150 amended Subsecs. (a) to (e) to include Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed under Sec. 14-8 and certified pursuant to Sec. 7-294d within purview of said Subsecs.; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsecs. (a) to (e) to replace “Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed” with “motor vehicle inspector designated” and make technical changes, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 19-90 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by designating existing provision re effecting an arrest as Subpara. (A) and adding Subpara. (B) re preventing an escape; P.A. 19-108 deleted references to motor vehicle inspectors; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing provisions as Subdivs. (1) and (2) and adding reference to Subsec. (d) in Subdiv. (2), amended Subsec. (b) by adding reference to Subsec. (d), amended Subsec. (c) by designating existing provisions as Subdiv. (1) and adding new Subpara. designators (A) and (B), adding exception re Subsec. (d) and provision re actions that are objectively reasonable under the circumstances, adding provision re exhaustion of reasonable alternatives, reasonable belief that use of force creates no substantial risk third party and reasonable belief such use of force is necessary and deleting “or threatened infliction” in new Subpara. (B), and adding new Subdiv. (2) re evaluating reasonableness of actions, added new Subsec. (d) re use of chokehold or other method or restraint applied to neck area, redesignated existing Subsecs. (d) to (f) as Subsecs. (e) to (g), and made technical and conforming changes throughout, effective April 1, 2021; P.A. 21-4 amended Subsec. (c) by changing the standard in Subdiv. (1) from “objectively reasonable under the circumstances” to “objectively reasonable under the given circumstances at that time”, changing the requirement in Subdiv. (1)(B)(i) that all reasonable alternatives be exhausted to having reasonably determinated that no reasonable alternative is available, substituting “no unreasonable risk” for “no substantial risk” in Subdiv. (1)(B)(ii), adding warning language in Subdiv. (1)(B)(iii)(I) and language re posing a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to others in Subdiv. (1)(B)(iii)(II) and specifying in Subdiv. (2)(C) that the conduct evaluated is unreasonable conduct, effective January 1, 2022, and changed effective date of Sec. 29 of P.A. 20-1 of the July special session from April 1, 2021, to January 1, 2022, effective March 31, 2021; P.A. 21-33 added Subsec. (h) re drawing an unfavorable inference from a deliberate failure in violation of Sec. 29-6d to record use of force, effective January 1, 2022.