reglab/statecodes huggingface dataset:
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53 - Crimes › Chapter 949g - Computer Crimes › Section 53-452. - Civil actions. Recovery of attorney's fees and costs. Damages. Statute of limitations.

(a) Any person whose property or person is injured by reason of a violation of any provision of section 53-451 may bring a civil action in the Superior Court to enjoin further violations and to recover the actual damages sustained by reason of such violation and the costs of the civil action. Without limiting the generality of the term, “damages” includes loss of profits.
(b) If the injury arises from the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail, the injured person, other than an electronic mail service provider, may also recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and may elect, in lieu of actual damages, to recover the lesser of ten dollars for each and every unsolicited bulk electronic mail message transmitted in violation of section 53-451 or twenty-five thousand dollars per day for each day of violation. The injured person shall not have a cause of action against the electronic mail service provider that merely transmits the unsolicited bulk electronic mail over its computer network.
(c) If the injury arises from the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail, an injured electronic mail service provider may also recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs and may elect, in lieu of actual damages, to recover the greater of ten dollars for each and every unsolicited bulk electronic mail message transmitted in violation of section 53-451 or twenty-five thousand dollars per day.
(d) At the request of any party to an action brought pursuant to this section, the court may, in its discretion, conduct all legal proceedings in such a way as to protect the secrecy and security of the computer, computer network, computer data, computer program and computer software involved in order to prevent any possible recurrence of the same or a similar act by another person and to protect any trade secrets of any party.
(e) The provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit any person's right to pursue any additional civil remedy otherwise allowed by law.
(f) A civil action under this section shall not be commenced but within two years from the date of the act complained of. In actions alleging injury arising from the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail, personal jurisdiction may be exercised pursuant to section 52-59b.
(P.A. 99-160, S. 2.)
See Sec. 52-570b re civil action for computer-related offenses.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53 - Crimes › Chapter 949g - Computer Crimes › Section 53-453. - Civil enforcement by Attorney General.

The Attorney General, acting on behalf of the state of Connecticut, may bring an action in the superior court for the judicial district in which a violation of any provision of section 53-451 occurs to enforce the provisions of said section. In any such action, the Attorney General may obtain, for the benefit of persons adversely affected by the violations of section 53-451, any relief to which such persons may be entitled. The Attorney General may combine such action with any other action within the Attorney General's power to maintain, including an action under chapter 735a. Nothing in this section shall limit the right of a person adversely affected by violations of the law from bringing a private cause of action under section 53-452 or any other law that may entitle such person to relief.
(P.A. 99-160, S. 3.)
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53 - Crimes › Chapter 949g - Computer Crimes › Section 53-454. - Misrepresentation as on-line Internet business. Civil enforcement by Attorney General or aggrieved person. Damages. Exclusions. Penalty.

(a) For purposes of this section:
(1) “Electronic mail message” means a message sent to a unique destination that consists of a unique user name or mailbox and a reference to an Internet domain, whether or not displayed, to which such message can be sent or delivered.
(2) “Identifying information” means specific details that can be used to access a person's financial accounts or to obtain goods or services, including, but not limited to, such person's Social Security number, driver's license number, bank account number, credit or debit card number, personal identification number, automated or electronic signature, unique biometric data or account password.
(b) No person shall, by means of an Internet web page, electronic mail message or otherwise using the Internet, solicit, request or take any action to induce another person to provide identifying information by representing that the person, either directly or by implication, is an on-line Internet business, without the authority or approval of such on-line Internet business.
(c) The Attorney General or any person aggrieved by a violation of subsection (b) of this section may file a civil action in Superior Court to enforce the provisions of this section and to enjoin further violations of this section. The Attorney General or such aggrieved person may recover actual damages or twenty-five thousand dollars, whichever is greater, for each violation of subsection (b) of this section.
(d) In a civil action under subsection (c) of this section, the court may increase the damage award to an amount equal to not more than three times the award provided in said subsection (c) if the court determines that the defendant has engaged in a pattern and practice of violating subsection (b) of this section.
(e) An interactive computer service provider shall not be held liable or found in violation of this section for identifying, removing or disabling access to an Internet web page or other on-line location that such provider believes in good faith is being used to engage in a violation of this section.
(f) A violation of subsection (b) of this section shall be a class D felony. Multiple violations resulting from a single action or act shall constitute one violation for the purposes of this subsection.
(P.A. 06-50, S. 1.)
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 950 - Penal Code: General Provisions › Section 53a-2. - Application and scope.

The provisions of this title shall apply to any offense defined in this title or the general statutes, unless otherwise expressly provided or unless the context otherwise requires, and committed on or after October 1, 1971, and to any defense to prosecution for such an offense.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 2.)
Cited. 192 C. 154; 201 C. 505; 207 C. 456; 211 C. 258; 228 C. 758.
Cited. 2 CA 204; 11 CA 665; 29 CA 591.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-4. - Saving clause.

The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed as precluding any court from recognizing other principles of criminal liability or other defenses not inconsistent with such provisions.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 4.)
Cited. 209 C. 75; 227 C. 32; 229 C. 60; 233 C. 174; 236 C. 266.
Cited. 23 CA 615; 30 CA 470; Id., 527; 32 CA 224; 36 CA 680.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-5. - Criminal liability; mental state required.

When the commission of an offense defined in this title, or some element of an offense, requires a particular mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms “intentionally”, “knowingly”, “recklessly” or “criminal negligence”, or by use of terms, such as “with intent to defraud” and “knowing it to be false”, describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 5.)
Cited. 173 C. 35; 186 C. 45; 201 C. 505; 202 C. 520; 209 C. 75; 235 C. 477; 242 C. 211. When a statute requires state to prove that defendant intentionally engaged in the statutorily proscribed conduct, section does not require court to presume that the statute requires state to prove that defendant had knowledge of a circumstance described in the statute. 265 C. 35.
Cited. 9 CA 161; Id., 686; 17 CA 339; 19 CA 609; 40 CA 643.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-6. - Effect of ignorance or mistake.

(a) A person shall not be relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief of fact, unless: (1) Such factual mistake negates the mental state required for the commission of an offense; or (2) the statute defining the offense or a statute related thereto expressly provides that such factual mistake constitutes a defense or exemption; or (3) such factual mistake is of a kind that supports a defense of justification.
(b) A person shall not be relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless (1) the law provides that the state of mind established by such mistaken belief constitutes a defense, or unless (2) such mistaken belief is founded upon an official statement of law contained in a statute or other enactment, an administrative order or grant of permission, a judicial decision of a state or federal court, or an interpretation of the statute or law relating to the offense, officially made or issued by a public servant, agency or body legally charged or empowered with the responsibility or privilege of administering, enforcing or interpreting such statute or law.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 6.)
Defendant entitled as matter of law to a theory of defense instruction when evidence of defense under section is placed before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 199 C. 537; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75.
Cited. 17 CA 326.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 198 C. 454; 210 C. 132. When mistake of fact defense arises and when jury instruction re mistake of fact is required. 246 C. 268.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-7. - Effect of intoxication.

Intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge, but in any prosecution for an offense evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to negate an element of the crime charged, provided when recklessness or criminal negligence is an element of the crime charged, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of or disregards or fails to perceive a risk which he would have been aware of had he not been intoxicated, such unawareness, disregard or failure to perceive shall be immaterial. As used in this section, “intoxication” means a substantial disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 7.)
Cited. 172 C. 65; 173 C. 35; 176 C. 224; 178 C. 480. Defendant is entitled, as matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction when evidence under section is before jury. Id., 704. Cited. 184 C. 121; 185 C. 63; 186 C. 414; 189 C. 611; 193 C. 632; 196 C. 341; 198 C. 560; Id., 644; 199 C. 102; 201 C. 190; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 210 C. 481; 212 C. 195; 217 C. 648; 223 C. 41; Id., 273; 234 C. 139.
Cited. 1 CA 260; 6 CA 701; 10 CA 643; 11 CA 122; 16 CA 358; 22 CA 521; 23 CA 315; Id., 502; 24 CA 678; 25 CA 456; 27 CA 73; 35 CA 699; 37 CA 404; 41 CA 361; 44 CA 818. Application of section. 51 CA 345. Trial court did not improperly exclude proffered evidence re defendant's claim of intoxication at time of murder. 91 CA 169. While intoxication is neither a defense nor an affirmative defense to a murder charge, evidence of defendant's intoxication is relevant to negate specific intent which is an essential element of crime of murder; however, intoxication does not automatically negate intent. 95 CA 263.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-9. - Lack of criminal responsibility; absence of prosecution or conviction not a defense.

In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another person under section 53a-8 it shall not be a defense that: (1) Such other person is not guilty of the offense in question because of lack of criminal responsibility or legal capacity or awareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in question or of the defendant's criminal purpose or because of other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of the offense in question; or (2) such other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based upon the conduct in question, or has been acquitted thereof, or has legal immunity from prosecution therefor; or (3) the offense in question, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class or classes of persons, and the defendant, not belonging to such class or classes, is for that reason legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 9.)
Cited. 179 C. 1; 209 C. 75; 242 C. 409. Section clearly abrogates judicially created doctrine of collateral estoppel to the extent that the doctrine would preclude retrial of the issue of the principal's guilt. 270 C. 458.
Cited. 35 CA 138; Id., 360.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-10. - Defense.

(a) In any prosecution in which the criminal liability of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another person under section 53a-8, it shall be a defense that the defendant terminated his complicity prior to the commission of the offense under circumstances: (1) Wholly depriving it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense, and (2) manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
(b) For purposes of this section, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 10; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 3.)
History: 1971 act deleted word “affirmative” modifying “defense” in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 176 C. 451. Defendant is entitled, as matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 225 C. 270; 242 C. 409.
Cited. 22 CA 216; 40 CA 526.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-11. - Criminal liability of individual for conduct in name of or on behalf of corporation or limited liability company.

A person shall be criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which such person performs or causes to be performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation or limited liability company to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in such person's own name or on such person's behalf.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 11; P.A. 00-11; P.A. 10-32, S. 151.)
History: P.A. 00-11 included conduct performed in the name of or in behalf of a limited liability company and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 10-32 made technical changes, effective May 10, 2010.
Cited. 209 C. 75; 242 C. 345.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-12. - Defenses; burden of proof.

(a) When a defense other than an affirmative defense, is raised at a trial, the state shall have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
(b) When a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 12.)
Cited. 186 C. 414; 191 C. 659; 196 C. 519. Instructing jury that it was the state's burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt did not adequately inform jury that it was the state's burden to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt. 199 C. 273. Cited. 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; Id., 733; 218 C. 349; 219 C. 314; 225 C. 450; 227 C. 456; 228 C. 281; 230 C. 183; 236 C. 342.
Cited. 6 CA 701; 8 CA 667; 10 CA 697; 11 CA 665; 14 CA 511; 17 CA 200; Id., 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579.
Cited. 34 CS 612. Statute does not become constitutionally vulnerable by reason of imposing on defendants the burden of establishing affirmative defenses. 35 CS 555.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 186 C. 654; 188 C. 237; Id., 653; 194 C. 376; 203 C. 212; 209 C. 322; 210 C. 110; 220 C. 602; 228 C. 335; 231 C. 484; 232 C. 537; 233 C. 1; 234 C. 381.
Cited. 3 CA 289; 5 CA 338; 10 CA 643, 647; 11 CA 102; 17 CA 97; 20 CA 75; 24 CA 556; Id., 624; 29 CA 262; 31 CA 140; 33 CA 782; 34 CA 368, see also 233 C. 517; 46 CA 216.
Cited. 38 CS 619.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 388; 193 C. 695; 207 C. 374; 209 C. 733; 214 C. 540; 217 C. 648; 227 C. 456; 228 C. 281; 229 C. 328; 230 C. 351; 233 C. 403; 236 C. 189; Id., 342; 242 C. 93. Legislature not required to expressly declare an exception to culpability to be an affirmative defense for it to operate as an affirmative defense; statute does not prohibit judicially recognized affirmative defenses. 254 C. 107.
Cited. 12 CA 32; 14 CA 511; 20 CA 342; 24 CA 678; Id., 670; 28 CA 91.
Held unconstitutional insofar as it places a burden of proof on the defense. 33 CS 28.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-14. - Duress as defense.

In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced by the use or threatened imminent use of physical force upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. The defense of duress as defined in this section shall not be available to a person who intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 14.)
Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Duress as defense discussed. 184 C. 157. Instruction to jury that it was the state's burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt did not adequately inform jury that it was the state's burden to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt. 199 C. 273. Cited. 201 C. 211; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75. Trial court did not err in refusing to provide a jury instruction that would have allowed jury to factor defendant's age into his defense of duress, independent and regardless of how defendant's age relates to age of his coercers, so as to account for the differences in how adolescents evaluate risk; duress defense has both subjective and objective components; subjective component is that defendant actually must have been coerced into the criminal action; objective component requires that defendant have been coerced in circumstances under which a reasonable person in his situation would have been likewise unable to resist. 282 C. 281.
Cited. 15 CA 34; 26 CA 367; 46 CA 486. Court did not err in charging jury re statutory exception to defense of duress by failing to define the term “situation”; because “situation” is not defined in section, it is taken that the jury, as a matter of common knowledge, comprehends the term and, therefore, the trial court was not obligated to define it. 125 CA 125.
Cited. 34 CS 612.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-15. - Entrapment as defense.

In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced to do so by a public servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, for the purpose of institution of criminal prosecution against the defendant, and that the defendant did not contemplate and would not otherwise have engaged in such conduct.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 15.)
Cited. 173 C. 197; Id., 431. Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 195 C. 70; 201 C. 211; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 229 C. 60. Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on defense of entrapment because there was no evidence presented that defendant was initially unwilling to commit a crime or that the actions of the officers actually implanted a criminal design in defendant's mind. 305 C. 330.
Cited. 8 CA 158; 20 CA 395; 21 CA 326; 23 CA 392; 30 CA 470; 42 CA 751; 46 CA 486.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-16. - Justification as defense.

In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 53a-17 to 53a-23, inclusive, shall be a defense. Justification as a defense does not include provocation that resulted solely from the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, nonforcible, romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic relationship. As used in this section, “gender identity or expression” means gender identity or expression, as defined in section 53a-181i.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 16; P.A. 19-27, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 19-27 added provisions re discovery, knowledge or potential disclosure of victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression.
Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 188 C. 237; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75.
Cited. 3 CA 289; 8 CA 667; 10 CA 643; Id., 697; 11 CA 665; 17 CA 200; Id., 326; Id., 602; 18 CA 303; 24 CA 195; 31 CA 58; Id., 140; 45 CA 390. State did not fail to disprove defense of justification. 75 CA 80.
Cited. 38 CS 619.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-16a. - Affirmative defense in certain situations involving firearms; exceptions.

In any prosecution for an offense under section 53a-55a, 53a-56a, 53a-60a, 53a-92a, 53a-94a, 53a-102a or 53a-103a, it shall be an affirmative defense that the pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not a weapon from which a shot could be discharged, but it shall not be an affirmative defense to any prosecution under section 53a-55, 53a-56, 53a-60, 53a-92, 53a-94, 53a-102 or 53a-103.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 2; P.A. 81-27, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-27 removed references to prosecutions under repealed sections 53a-72, 53a-75 and 53a-78; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 198 C. 190; 209 C. 75.
Cited. 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-16b. - Affirmative defense of coparticipant to offense with firearm.

In any prosecution for an offense under section 53a-55a, 53a-56a, 53a-60a, 53a-92a, 53a-94a, 53a-102a or 53a-103a in which the defendant was not the only participant, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant: (1) Was not armed with a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm, and (2) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 13; P.A. 92-260, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law where evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 209 C. 75.
Cited. 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-17. - Conduct required or authorized by law or judicial decree.

Unless inconsistent with any provision of this chapter defining justifiable use of physical force, or with any other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable when such conduct is required or authorized by a provision of law or by a judicial decree, including but not limited to (1) laws defining duties and functions of public servants, (2) laws defining duties of private citizens to assist public servants in the performance of certain of their functions, (3) laws governing the execution of legal process, (4) laws governing the military services and the conduct of war, and (5) judgments and orders of courts.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 17.)
Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 197 C. 588; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; Id., 322. Evidence that defendant sought to introduce concerning a dispute over tribal leadership and defendant's alleged responsibilities as a tribal official was relevant to defendant's defense of justification under section and, therefore, was improperly excluded. 263 C. 602.
Cited. 8 CA 667; 18 CA 303; 21 CA 138; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-20. - Use of physical force in defense of premises.

A person in possession or control of premises, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be in or upon such premises, is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises; but he may use deadly physical force under such circumstances only (1) in defense of a person as prescribed in section 53a-19, or (2) when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent an attempt by the trespasser to commit arson or any crime of violence, or (3) to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry by force into his dwelling as defined in section 53a-100, or place of work, and for the sole purpose of such prevention or termination.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 20; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 6; P.A. 73-639, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 5.)
History: 1971 act specified use of “reasonable” physical force; P.A. 73-639 allowed use of deadly physical force when necessary to prevent crime of violence and deleted language allowing use of deadly physical force “not earlier in time” than necessary to prevent or terminate unlawful entry in dwelling or workplace by force; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing “believes it is necessary” and “believes it necessary” with “believes such to be necessary”.
Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 199 C. 383; 203 C. 466; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 242 C. 211. Defendant's due process right to fair trial was violated when trial court failed to explicitly instruct jury that state bore burden of disproving defendant's defense of premises theory. 294 C. 399. The term “crime of violence” includes only those offenses that fall within the traditional common law definition of the term, such as arson and burglary, and do not necessarily involve the use of deadly force or infliction of great bodily harm. 314 C. 618.
Cited. 2 CA 617; 8 CA 667; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390.
Common-law right referred to; unnecessary to decide whether Sec. 53a-23 creates an exception. 34 CS 531. Cited. 43 CS 46.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-21. - Use of physical force in defense of property.

A person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent an attempt by such other person to commit larceny or criminal mischief involving property, or when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to regain property which he reasonably believes to have been acquired by larceny within a reasonable time prior to the use of such force; but he may use deadly physical force under such circumstances only in defense of person as prescribed in section 53a-19.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 21; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 7; P.A. 92-260, S. 6.)
History: 1971 act specified use of “reasonable” physical force; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing “believes it necessary” with “believes such to be necessary”.
Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. An act injurious to the physical well-being of a child is prohibited; statute is not unconstitutionally vague. 192 C. 37. Cited. 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 226 C. 601. Section does not bar defendant from claiming that he did not commit a larceny in order to defend against a robbery charge where larceny is an element of the robbery offense. 317 C. 338.
Cited. 2 CA 617; judgment overruled in part, see 317 C. 338; 8 CA 667; judgment overruled in part, see 317 C. 338; 16 CA 455; 19 CA 445; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 29 CA 283; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795; 31 CA 58; 32 CA 687; 34 CA 368, see also 233 C. 517; 45 CA 390. Privilege to enter another's home to retrieve goods does not exist when defendant voluntarily gave his property to the victim. 116 CA 112. Section mandates that a defendant must use reasonable physical force upon another person to invoke defense of property; section is inapplicable to crimes involving the use of force against property. 187 CA 813; judgment affirmed on alternate grounds, see 335 C. 720.
Cited. 34 CS 612.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability › Section 53a-23. - Use of physical force to resist arrest not justified.

A person is not justified in using physical force to resist an arrest by a reasonably identifiable peace officer, whether such arrest is legal or illegal.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 22; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 9; P.A. 05-180, S. 3; P.A. 08-150, S. 51; P.A. 10-36, S. 17; P.A. 19-108, S. 5; P.A. 22-117, S. 11.)
History: 1971 act deleted definition of peace officer; P.A. 05-180 included a special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b within purview of section; P.A. 08-150 included Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed under Sec. 14-8 and certified pursuant to Sec. 7-294d within purview of section; P.A. 10-36 replaced “Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed” with “motor vehicle inspector designated” and made technical changes, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 19-108 deleted reference to motor vehicle inspectors, and made a technical change; P.A. 22-117 deleted reference to special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b, effective May 27, 2022.
Cited. 170 C. 99. Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 191 C. 433; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 221 C. 788. Trial court's instructions pertaining to statute virtually eliminated state's burden of proving that the police officers were acting in the performance of their duties and had effect of depriving defendant of a defense to the charges against him, in violation of his due process rights. 261 C. 553.
Cited. 1 CA 709; 5 CA 616; 8 CA 153; Id., 667; 21 CA 326; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; Id., 473; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788; 27 CA 49; 40 CA 601; 45 CA 390. Under section, illegality of an arrest is not a defense to charges under Sec. 53a-167c; statute was intended to require an arrestee to submit to an arrest, even though he believes, and may ultimately establish, that the arrest was without probable cause or was otherwise unlawful; it was not intended to require an arrestee to submit to egregiously unlawful conduct, such as an unprovoked assault, by the police in the course of an arrest, whether the arrest was legal or illegal. 79 CA 667.
Section restricts common-law right to resist illegal arrest; not applicable to prosecution under Sec. 53a-167a; unnecessary to decide whether this section creates exception to Sec. 53a-20 or common-law right to defend premises. 34 CS 531. Cited. 38 CS 364; Id., 400.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses › Section 53a-24. - Offense defined. Application of sentencing provisions to motor vehicle and drug selling violators.

(a) The term “offense” means any crime or violation which constitutes a breach of any law of this state or any other state, federal law or local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state, for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine, or both, may be imposed, except one that defines a motor vehicle violation or is deemed to be an infraction. The term “crime” comprises felonies and misdemeanors. Every offense which is not a “crime” is a “violation”. Conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, the provisions of sections 53a-28 to 53a-44, inclusive, shall apply to motor vehicle violations. Said provisions shall apply to convictions under section 21a-278 except that the execution of any mandatory minimum sentence imposed under the provisions of said section may not be suspended.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 24; 1972, P.A. 294, S. 39; P.A. 75-380, S. 15; 75-577, S. 8, 126; P.A. 92-260, S. 8.)
History: 1972 act added provision in Subsec. (b) re applicability of Secs. 53a-28 to 53a-44 with respect to convictions under Sec. 19-480a; P.A. 75-380 amended Subsec. (a) to include breach of federal and other states' laws as offense; P.A. 75-577 included infractions in exception to “offense” definition in Subsec. (a); P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
Cited. 166 C. 449; 209 C. 98; 226 C. 191; 228 C. 758; 229 C. 716.
Cited. 6 CA 505; 9 CA 686; 22 CA 108; 24 CA 195; 27 CA 225; 41 CA 454; 45 CA 722. Defendant charged with an infraction has no constitutional right to a jury trial because such right applies only to criminal prosecutions, and an infraction is not a crime pursuant to section. 134 CA 175. Classification by legislature of infractions as noncriminal acts payable by fine operates as a presumption that infractions do not constitute criminal offenses for purposes of double jeopardy analysis, albeit one that is rebuttable by clear proof to the contrary. Id., 346.
Cited. 36 CS 527; Id., 551.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses › Section 53a-25. - Felony: Definition, classification, designation.

(a) An offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year is a felony.
(b) Felonies are classified for the purposes of sentence as follows: (1) Class A, (2) class B, (3) class C, (4) class D, (5) class E, (6) unclassified, and (7) capital felonies under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012.
(c) The particular classification of each felony defined in this chapter is expressly designated in the section defining it.
(d) Any offense defined in any section of the general statutes which, by virtue of an expressly specified sentence, is within the definition set forth in subsection (a) of this section, but for which a particular classification is not expressly designated, shall be deemed: (1) A class E felony if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is in excess of one year but not more than three years; or (2) an unclassified felony if the maximum term of imprisonment is otherwise within the definition set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 25; P.A. 73-137, S. 6; P.A. 92-260, S. 9; P.A. 12-5, S. 17; P.A. 13-258, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 73-137 added capital felonies classification in Subsec. (b); P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsecs. (a) and (c) and amended Subsec. (b)(6) to delete “for which the sentence of death may be imposed as provided in sections 53a-46a and 53a-54b”; P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (b)(6) to add reference to provisions of Sec. 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, re capital felonies, effective April 25, 2012; P.A. 13-258 amended Subsec. (b) to add new Subdiv. (5) re class E felony and redesignate existing Subdivs. (5) and (6) as Subdivs. (6) and (7), designated provision of Subsec. (c) re unclassified felony as Subsec. (d) and amended same to make applicable to any felony offense defined in any section of the general statutes for which a particular classification is not expressly designated, add Subdiv. (1) re class E felony, and designate existing reference to unclassified felony as Subdiv. (2) and amend same by adding provision re felony offense where maximum term of imprisonment is otherwise within definition in Subsec. (a).
See Secs. 53a-35 and 53a-35a re sentences for felonies.
See Sec. 53a-41 re fines for felonies.
Cited. 170 C. 601. Police officer may arrest without previous complaint or warrant any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony. 171 C. 105. Cited. 196 C. 305.
Cited. 9 CA 686; 11 CA 11; 28 CA 91.
Cited. 36 CS 527; Id., 551.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses › Section 53a-26. - Misdemeanor: Definition, classification, designation.

(a) An offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than one year is a misdemeanor.
(b) Misdemeanors are classified for the purposes of sentence as follows: (1) Class A, (2) class B, (3) class C, (4) class D, and (5) unclassified.
(c) The particular classification of each misdemeanor defined in this chapter is expressly designated in the section defining it.
(d) Any offense defined in any section of the general statutes which, by virtue of an expressly specified sentence, is within the definition set forth in subsection (a) of this section, but for which a particular classification is not expressly designated, shall be deemed: (1) A class A misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is one year; (2) a class B misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is six months; (3) a class C misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is three months; (4) a class D misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is thirty days; and (5) an unclassified misdemeanor if the maximum term of imprisonment specified is a term other than a term set forth in subdivision (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this subsection.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 26; P.A. 92-260, S. 10; P.A. 12-80, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (b); P.A. 12-80 amended Subsec. (b) to add new Subdiv. (4) re class D misdemeanor and redesignate existing Subdiv. (4) as Subdiv. (5), designated provision of Subsec. (c) re unclassified misdemeanor as Subsec. (d) and amended same to make applicable to any offense defined in any section of the general statutes for which a particular classification is not expressly designated and add Subdivs. (1) to (5) re deemed classification of misdemeanors.
See Sec. 53a-36 re sentences for misdemeanors.
See Sec. 53a-42 re fines for misdemeanors.
Cited. 202 C. 443.
Cited. 9 CA 686; 41 CA 476; 43 CA 1.
Cited. 36 CS 527; Id., 551.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses › Section 53a-27. - Violation: Definition, designation.

(a) An offense, for which the only sentence authorized is a fine, is a violation unless expressly designated an infraction.
(b) Every violation defined in this chapter is expressly designated as such. Any offense defined in any other section which is not expressly designated a violation or infraction shall be deemed a violation if, notwithstanding any other express designation, it is within the definition set forth in subsection (a).
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 27; P.A. 75-577, S. 4, 126.)
History: P.A. 75-577 excluded offenses expressly designated as infractions from consideration as violation.
See chapter 881b re infractions.
Cited. 9 CA 686; 27 CA 225; 40 CA 762; 41 CA 454.
Cited. 36 CS 527; Id., 551.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses › Section 53a-28a. - Enforcement of orders of financial restitution.

All financial obligations ordered pursuant to subsection (c) of section 53a-28 or subsection (a) of section 53a-30 may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action by the party or entity to whom the obligation is owed. The party or entity seeking enforcement of the financial obligations as a judgment in a civil action shall file with the Superior Court a copy of the court's order of restitution ordered pursuant to section 53a-28 or 53a-30 together with an affidavit prepared by the agency or entity monitoring payment of the obligations, on a form prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator, attesting to the terms of restitution and manner of performance fixed by the court or the Court Support Services Division, identifying the amount of the obligation that has been paid and the amount of the obligation that is owed. Such obligations may be enforced at any time during the twenty-year period following the offender's release from confinement or termination of probation, or not later than twenty years after the entry of the order and sentence, whichever is longer. There shall be no entry fee for filing an enforcement action pursuant to this section. Not later than thirty days after the date of filing of the judgment and the affidavit, the party or entity seeking enforcement of such judgment shall mail notice of filing of the judgment by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the offender at such offender's last-known address. The proceeds of an execution shall not be distributed to the party or entity seeking enforcement of such judgment earlier than thirty days after the date of filing proof of service with the clerk of the court in which enforcement of such judgment is sought. No fee shall be required for the filing of an execution. The payment of marshal's fees for service of an execution shall be collected in accordance with the provisions of section 52-261.
(P.A. 95-175, S. 2; P.A. 17-87, S. 4; 17-99, S. 18.)
History: P.A. 17-87 replaced reference to 10-year period with reference to 20-year period, and made technical changes; P.A. 17-99 added reference to Sec. 53a-30(a), added provisions re party or entity seeking enforcement of financial obligations as judgment in civil action to file copy of court's order of restitution with affidavit, entry fee for filing enforcement action, party or entity seeking enforcement of judgment to mail notice of filing of judgment, distribution of proceeds of execution, fee for filing execution, and collection of payment of marshal's fees for service of execution.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses › Section 53a-33. - Termination of probation or conditional discharge.

The court or sentencing judge may at any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, after hearing and for good cause shown, terminate a sentence of probation or conditional discharge before the completion thereof, except a sentence of probation imposed for conviction of a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000, section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 33; P.A. 92-260, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 11; P.A. 01-84, S. 17, 26; P.A. 19-189, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 92-260 added “a sentence of”; P.A. 95-142 specified that a sentence of probation or conditional discharge may be terminated “before the completion thereof” and precluded termination of a sentence of probation imposed for conviction of a violation of Sec. 53-21(2) or Sec. 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b; P.A. 01-84 replaced reference to “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21” with “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000,” and included a violation of “subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21”, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 19-189 replaced “53a-70b,” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or”.
Cited. 165 C. 73; 170 C. 128; 219 C. 752; 222 C. 299; 225 C. 46.
Cited. 9 CA 686; 32 CA 1; 34 CA 1; 36 CA 440.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses › Section 53a-34. - Unconditional discharge: Criteria; effect.

(a) The court may impose a sentence of unconditional discharge in any case where it is authorized to impose a sentence of conditional discharge under section 53a-29, if the court is of the opinion that no proper purpose would be served by imposing any condition upon the defendant's release.
(b) When the court imposes a sentence of unconditional discharge, the defendant shall be released with respect to the conviction for which the sentence is imposed without imprisonment, probation supervision or conditions. A sentence of unconditional discharge is for all purposes a final judgment of conviction.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 34.)
Cited. 170 C. 128; 180 C. 557; 182 C. 595; 188 C. 557; 222 C. 299.
Cited. 9 CA 686; 12 CA 32; 32 CA 1; 34 CA 1; 36 CA 440.
2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses › Section 53a-35b. - “Life imprisonment” defined.

A sentence of life imprisonment means a definite sentence of sixty years, unless the sentence is life imprisonment without the possibility of release, imposed pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a, in which case the sentence shall be imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's natural life.
(P.A. 80-442, S. 11, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 3; P.A. 95-19, S. 2; P.A. 12-5, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 80-442 effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added provision re life imprisonment without the possibility of release; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change; P.A. 12-5 substituted “life imprisonment means” for “imprisonment for life shall mean” and “subparagraph (A) or (B) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a” for “subsection (g) of section 53a-46a”, effective April 25, 2012.
See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
Cited. 198 C. 92; 201 C. 276; 207 C. 374; 215 C. 231; 216 C. 282; 219 C. 752; 220 C. 169; 221 C. 430; 234 C. 139. Statutory provision affects substantive rights; in the absence of any clear and unequivocal expression by legislature rebutting presumption of prospective application, statute does not apply retroactively to persons sentenced prior to its enactment. 282 C. 317. Section does not apply to indeterminate life sentences imposed pursuant to Sec. 53a-35(b)(1), regardless of when the sentence was imposed, but applies solely to definite life sentences imposed pursuant to Sec. 53a-35a. 300 C. 649.
Cited. 9 CA 686; 24 CA 612.