2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 52 - Civil Actions › Chapter 900 - Court Practice and Procedure › Section 52-216a. - Reading of agreements or releases to jury prohibited. Adjustments for excessive and inadequate verdicts permitted.

An agreement with any tortfeasor not to bring legal action or a release of a tortfeasor in any cause of action shall not be read to a jury or in any other way introduced in evidence by either party at any time during the trial of the cause of action against any other joint tortfeasors, nor shall any other agreement not to sue or release of claim among any plaintiffs or defendants in the action be read or in any other way introduced to a jury. If the court at the conclusion of the trial concludes that the verdict is excessive as a matter of law, it shall order a remittitur and, upon failure of the party so ordered to remit the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial. If the court concludes that the verdict is inadequate as a matter of law, it shall order an additur, and upon failure of the party so ordered to add the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial. This section shall not prohibit the introduction of such agreement or release in a trial to the court.
(P.A. 76-197; P.A. 77-604, S. 33, 84; P.A. 82-160, S. 106; 82-406, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 77-604 referred to agreements “with any tortfeasor” not to bring legal action rather than to agreements not to bring legal action “by any tortfeasor”; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section; P.A. 82-406 deleted provision re authority of court to deduct any amount of money received as settlement from verdict and added provision re authority of court to order remittitur or additur.
See Sec. 52-572e re release of joint tortfeasor.
Cited. 176 C. 245; Id., 383; 179 C. 269. Found unconstitutional as violating the right to trial by jury by permitting trial court to interfere with fact-finding function of jury. 186 C. 337. Cited. 187 C. 1. Statute as amended by public act 82-406, S. 3 held constitutional. 196 C. 53. Statute codifies proper procedure with regard to out-of-court settlements of joint tortfeasors. 196 C. 341. Cited. 203 C. 607; 206 C. 16; 208 C. 82; 211 C. 67; 212 C. 509; 219 C. 314; 223 C. 786; 229 C. 716; 230 C. 795; 231 C. 500; 234 C. 660; 239 C. 144. Section provides a directive to trial court that if defendant rejects the additur, trial court must set aside verdict and order a new trial, because initial verdict was necessarily inadequate as a matter of law; there is no irreconcilable conflict between Secs. 52-228b and 52-216a mandating that one be accepted and the other abandoned. 246 C. 170. Trial court should examine the evidence to decide whether jury reasonably could have found that plaintiff had failed in his proof of the issue; that decision should be made, not on the assumption that jury made a mistake, but, rather, on the supposition that jury did exactly what it intended to do. 252 C. 174. Statute inapplicable to an action brought pursuant to defective highway statute in which municipality is the sole tortfeasor because express language of statute applies solely to actions in which there are, or could be, joint tortfeasors. 258 C. 574. Under section, a trial court may, in exercise of its discretion, reduce a jury award to account for pretrial settlement payments; however, before doing so, the court first must determine that the settlement payments, when added to the jury award, render that award excessive as a matter of law, a threshold that is met only when the total amount received so far exceeds what is fair and reasonable as to be unconscionable. 284 C. 645. Because section merely codified the pre-existing common law standards, there is no reason to conclude that the legislature intended to modify the established abuse of discretion standard of review. 331 C. 777.
Cited. 8 CA 407; Id., 642; 26 CA 509; 31 CA 584; 38 CA 685; 43 CA 475. It is not the size of the verdict but, rather, whether it falls within the uncertain limits of just damages or shocks the sense of justice so as to lead to the conclusion that the jury was improperly influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption. 136 CA 224.
Statute does not preclude an allegation of payments from a joint tortfeasor as a special defense. 40 CS 263.