2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 52 - Civil Actions › Chapter 915 - Habeas Corpus › Section 52-466. - Application for writ of habeas corpus. Service. Return.

(a)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus, other than an application pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection, shall be made to the superior court, or to a judge thereof, for the judicial district in which the person whose custody is in question is claimed to be illegally confined or deprived of such person's liberty.
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus claiming illegal confinement or deprivation of liberty, made by or on behalf of an inmate or prisoner confined in a correctional facility as a result of a conviction of a crime, shall be made to the superior court, or to a judge thereof, for the judicial district of Tolland.
(b) The application shall be verified by the affidavit of the applicant for the writ alleging that he truly believes that the person on whose account the writ is sought is illegally confined or deprived of his liberty.
(c) The writ shall be directed to some proper officer to serve and return, who shall serve the same by putting a true and attested copy of it into the hands of the person who has the custody of the body of the person who is directed to be presented upon the writ. If the officer fails to make immediate return of the writ, with his actions thereon, he shall pay fifty dollars to the person so held in custody.
(d) Any judge of the Superior Court to whom an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made may make the writ returnable before any other judge of the court, the consent of the other judge being first obtained; and the other judge shall thereupon proceed with the matter with the same authority as though the application had been originally presented to him.
(e) If the application is made to a judge, the judge may certify the proceedings into court and the case shall thereupon be entered upon the docket and proceeded with as though the application had originally been made to the court.
(f) A foster parent or an approved adoptive parent shall have standing to make application for a writ of habeas corpus regarding the custody of a child currently or recently in his care for a continuous period of not less than ninety days in the case of a child under three years of age at the time of such application and not less than one hundred eighty days in the case of any other child.
(1949 Rev., S. 8202; 1949, S. 3212d; 1963, P.A. 459, S. 2; February, 1965, P.A. 604; P.A. 76-436, S. 410, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 110, 127; P.A. 82-160, S. 169; P.A. 83-5; P.A. 85-69; P.A. 86-186, S. 18; P.A. 87-282, S. 19; P.A. 88-332, S. 3, 4; P.A. 06-152, S. 5.)
History: 1963 act added proviso re application by or on behalf of person confined in State Prison; 1965 act added alternative of application to court or judge in Tolland county to said proviso; P.A. 76-436 removed court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, and added references to judicial districts, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-280 restated provisions, deleting special provisions re conditions of making application to judges applicable dependent upon whether court was or was not in session to reflect fact that court now sits continuously and, deleting references to counties generally, substituted judicial district of Tolland for Tolland county and judicial district of Hartford-New Britain for Hartford county; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 83-5 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting the provision which allowed an inmate at the correctional institution at Somers to make his application to either the Tolland judicial district or the Hartford-New Britain judicial district; P.A. 85-69 amended Subsec. (a) by requiring an inmate at the correctional institution at Enfield to make his application to the Tolland judicial district; P.A. 86-186 replaced the “Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield” with the “Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Medium or the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Minimum”; P.A. 87-282 changed the name of the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Minimum to the Carl Robinson Correctional Institution, Enfield; P.A. 88-332 added Subsec. (f) which gives a foster parent or an approved adoptive parent standing to make application for a writ of habeas corpus; P.A. 06-152 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing provisions as Subdiv. (1) and amending same by inserting exception for application pursuant to Subdiv. (2), making technical changes and deleting provision re application by person confined in Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Medium or Carl Robinson Correctional Institution, Enfield, and by adding Subdiv. (2) re application for writ by inmate or prisoner confined in correctional facility.
See Sec. 51-186 re hearings on petitions for writ of habeas corpus held at Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers.
Annotations to former statute:
Imprisonment on mesne process of one fraudulently decoyed from another state for the purpose is illegal, and the debtor may be released on this writ. 32 C. 589. Mere irregularities of procedure or the sufficiency of evidence are not reviewable on such a writ. 59 C. 386; 67 C. 349. Demurrer to return, and also an answer raising an issue of fact, cannot be pending at the same time. Id., 358. Where answer to return sets up facts upon which jurisdiction is claimed and demurrer is filed, court will determine jurisdiction on facts so alleged. 93 C. 361. As applied to determination of custody of child; 69 C. 291; 91 C. 156; 97 C. 442; 100 C. 207; detention of person for extradition; bail. 78 C. 150. Trial court may admit to bail pending appeal from decision dismissing writ. 100 C. 296. Habeas corpus will not lie as between coordinate courts while court first taking jurisdiction has power, upon same representations, to discharge prisoner; truth of jurisdictional recitals in judgment of court of general jurisdiction cannot be attacked collaterally on writ of habeas corpus claiming judgment a nullity. Id., 499. Bond or recognizance for costs not required. 113 C. 740.
Court of common pleas is possessed of power in habeas corpus proceedings to consider matters affecting the custody of minor children. 10 CS 275. Where defendant father from whom custody of a nonresident child is sought is not resident in this state, court has no jurisdiction under section. 20 CS 1. Writ of habeas corpus should not be used as substitute for appeal of an original action, or for a writ of error, or for a petition for a new trial. 21 CS 73.
Annotations to present section:
Where no showing of law of Norway re modification of custody orders, court entitled to assume Norwegian law same as ours; where there is material change in circumstances, custody order could be modified. 151 C. 172. Not violation of full faith and credit to Rhode Island custody decree where shown, under that forum's law, that court lost jurisdiction. Id., 315. Where defendant had moved to erase support order entered in habeas corpus proceeding brought by plaintiff to determine custody of minor children, claiming lack of jurisdiction, held that motion was properly denied since habeas corpus proceeding is by its nature equitable and the court, having assumed jurisdiction to do complete justice, had jurisdiction to enter the order of support. 152 C. 464, 465. Where plaintiff's appeal under section was taken after he had served his sentence and had been released from jail and the original period of probation had expired, held that, since he is no longer “confined or deprived of his liberty”, the issues he sought to raise are moot and the appeal should be dismissed. 153 C. 206, 207. Where information charging defendant as a second offender was correct except for a mistake in naming the crime committed and he pleaded guilty to the charge, raising no claim of error, held he established no right to relief by habeas corpus in the absence of a showing that he had suffered prejudice or injustice. Id., 599, 602. Habeas corpus to review 11-year-old conviction upon grounds it resulted from unlawfully obtained evidence and incriminating statements denied; rules in 384 U.S. 436 and 367 U.S. 643 not retroactive. 155 C. 316. Cited. 156 C. 205; 183 C. 383; 184 C. 366; 198 C. 138; 230 C. 459; 234 C. 51. History and purpose of writ of habeas corpus establish that habeas court lacks power to act on habeas petition absent petitioner's allegedly unlawful custody and therefore custody requirement in section is jurisdictional, and petitioner whose conviction has expired fully prior to filing of habeas petition is not in “custody” on that conviction within meaning of section, despite alleged existence of collateral consequences flowing from that conviction. 274 C. 507. Habeas court lacked jurisdiction over petition for writ of habeas corpus because petitioner was not in custody, as defined by statute, when he filed his petition; the challenged convictions had expired completely by the time he filed his petition and deportation proceedings that resulted from expired larceny conviction were collateral and insufficient to render him in custody. 280 C. 514. Custody qua custody does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of section; petitioner must be in custody on the conviction under attack at the time the habeas petition is filed. 298 C. 690.
Cited. 31 CA 400; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 459; 34 CA 129; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 51; 43 CA 176. To satisfy custody requirement, petitioner must be under some legal restraint, e.g. imprisoned or paroled, at the time petition is filed. 83 CA 10. Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear petition filed when petitioner was no longer in custody with respect to the challenged conviction. 107 CA 507. Holding in 515 U.S. 39, that defendant satisfied “in custody” requirement for a habeas challenge to an expired sentence because he was still serving a consecutive sentence, should not be extended to nonconsecutive enhanced sentences that petitioner is serving for commission of later unrelated crime. 117 CA 727. Although custody requirement has been construed liberally, petitioner cannot bring habeas claim on the basis of an expired conviction despite remaining in custody for a different conviction pursuant to a concurrent sentence, and merger concept of Sec. 53a-38(b) does not alter fact that concurrent sentences remain separate terms of imprisonment that the legislature has permitted to be served at one time. 139 CA 173.
Padilla v. Kentucky
, 559 U.S. 356, which held that before an alien criminal defendant pleads guilty to a criminal offense for which he is subject to deportation, his defense attorney must advise him of the deportation consequences of his plea and resulting conviction, did not eliminate the custodial requirement for habeas corpus jurisdiction. 150 CA 68.
Cited. 23 CS 298. Claim of brutal treatment of a prisoner may not be considered in a habeas corpus proceeding. 25 CS 519. Habeas corpus does not lie when petitioner is out on bail as he is presently at liberty. 26 CS 430. Habeas corpus is available to challenge illegality of confinement under unchallenged judgment of criminal conviction, as when petitioner has been deprived of constitutional rights beyond those curtailed by judgment. 34 CS 89. Probationer does fit within the second prong of section because to reach a contrary conclusion would be to totally deprive person whose sentence consists solely of a period of probation of the right to file a habeas petition attacking that conviction and that could not have been legislature's intent in enacting section. 48 CS 470.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2): Judgment of the Appellate Court determining that habeas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is affirmed on the ground that amendment to Subdiv., enacted as part of Public Act 06-152, was technical in nature and not intended to overrule the court's precedent holding that a petitioner whose conviction has expired fully prior to the filing of a habeas petition is not in custody on such conviction within the meaning of section despite the alleged existence of collateral consequences flowing from the conviction and, therefore, the question of whether to expand the custody requirement of this section, in this area where the legislature has spoken, is one of public policy and for the legislature to determine. 334 C. 636.
P.A. 06-152, Sec. 5, which modified Subdiv. (2), did not eliminate 274 C. 507 “in custody” requirement. 117 CA 740. Subdiv. (1) unequivocally authorizes a person, not an animal, to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus, thus elephants do not have standing in first instance to allow petitioner to satisfy the prerequisites for establishing next friend standing. 192 CA 36. Mere fact that petitioner in present matter was incarcerated at the time he filed the habeas petition is not sufficient to satisfy custody requirement for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction. 200 CA 296.
Cited. 40 CS 251.