2023 Colorado Revised Statutes › Title 15 - PROBATE, TRUSTS, AND FIDUCIARIES (§§ 15-1-101 — 15-24-403) › POWERS OF APPOINTMENT (§§ 15-2-101 — 15-2.5-603) › Article 2.5 - UNIFORM POWERS OF APPOINTMENT ACT (§§ 15-2.5-101 — 15-2.5-603) › Part 3 - EXERCISE OF POWER OF APPOINTMENT (§§ 15-2.5-301 — 15-2.5-314) › Section 15-2.5-304 - Substantial compliance with donor-imposed formal requirement

(1)
A powerholder's substantial compliance with a formal requirement of appointment imposed by the donor, including a requirement that the instrument exercising the power of appointment make reference or specific reference to the power, is sufficient if:
(a)
The powerholder knows of and intends to exercise the power; and
(b)
The powerholder's manner of attempted exercise of the power does not impair a material purpose of the donor in imposing the requirement.
Added by 2014 Ch. 209, § 1, eff. 7/1/2015.
L. 2014: Entire article added, (HB 14-1353), ch. 209, p. 777, § 1, effective 7/1/2015.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
This section adopts a substantial-compliance rule for donor-imposed formal requirements. This section only applies to formal requirements imposed
by the donor
. It does not apply to formal requirements imposed by law, such as the requirement that a will must be signed and attested. The section also does not apply to
substantive
requirements imposed by the donor, for example a requirement that the powerholder attain a certain age before the power is exercisable.
Whenever the donor imposes formal requirements with respect to the instrument of appointment that exceed the requirements imposed by law, the donor's purpose in imposing the additional requirements is relevant to whether the powerholder's attempted exercise satisfies the rule of this section. To the extent the powerholder's failure to comply with the additional requirements will not impair the accomplishment of a material purpose of the donor, the powerholder's attempted appointment in a manner that substantially complies with a donor-imposed requirement does not fail for lack of perfect compliance with that requirement.
For example, a donor's formal requirement that the power of appointment is exercisable "by will" may be satisfied by the powerholder's attempted exercise in a nontestamentary instrument that is functionally similar to a will, such as the powerholder's revocable trust that remains revocable until the powerholder's death. See Restatement Third of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 19.9, Comment b ("Because a revocable trust operates in substance as a will, a power of appointment exercisable "by will" can be exercised in a revocable-trust document, as long as the revocable trust remained revocable at the [powerholder]'s death.").
A formal requirement commonly imposed by the donor is that, in order to be effective, the powerholder's attempted exercise must make specific reference to the power. Specific-reference clauses were a pre-1942 invention designed to prevent an inadvertent exercise of a general power. The federal estate tax law then provided that the value of property subject to a general power was included in the powerholder's gross estate if the general power was exercised. The idea of requiring specific reference was designed to thwart unintended exercise and, hence, estate taxation.
The federal estate tax law has changed. For a general power created after October 21, 1942, estate tax consequences do not depend on whether the power is exercised.
Nevertheless, donors continue to impose specific-reference requirements. Because the original purpose of the specific-reference requirement was to prevent an inadvertent exercise of the power, it seems reasonable to presume that that this is still the donor's purpose in doing so. Consequently, a specific-reference requirement still overrides any applicable state law that presumes that an ordinary residuary clause was intended to exercise a general power. Put differently: An ordinary residuary clause may manifest the powerholder's
intent to exercise
(under Section 301(1)(b)(I)) but does not satisfy the
requirements of exercise
if the donor imposed a specific-reference requirement (this section and Section 301(1)(b)(II)).
A more difficult question is whether a
blanket-exercise clause
satisfies a specific-reference requirement. If it could be shown that the powerholder had knowledge of and intended to exercise the power, the blanket-exercise clause would be sufficient to exercise the power, unless it could be shown that the donor's intent was not merely to prevent an inadvertent exercise of the power but instead that the donor had a material purpose in insisting on the specific-reference requirement. In such a case, the possibility of applying Uniform Probate Code § 2-805 or Restatement Third of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 12.1 to reform the powerholder's attempted appointment to insert the required specific reference should be explored.
This rule of this section is consistent with, but an elaboration of, Uniform Probate Code § 2-704: "If a governing instrument creating a power of appointment expressly requires that the power be exercised by a reference, an express reference, or a specific reference, to the power or its source, it is presumed that the donor's intent, in requiring that the [powerholder] exercise the power by making reference to the particular power or to the creating instrument, was to prevent an inadvertent exercise of the power."
The rule of this section is consistent with, and this Comment draws on, Restatement Third of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 19.10 and the accompanying Commentary.