2023 Connecticut General Statutes › Title 53a - Penal Code › Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses › Section 53a-62. - Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony.

(a) A person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when: (1) By physical threat, such person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, (2) (A) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person, or (B) such person threatens to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, or (3) violates subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection and the person threatened is in a building or on the grounds of a (A) house of religious worship, (B) religiously-affiliated community center, (C) public or nonpublic preschool, school or institution of higher education, or (D) day care center, as defined in section 19a-87g, during operational, preschool, school or instructional hours or when a building or the grounds of such house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center are being used for the provision of religious or community services, or house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center-sponsored activities.
(b) For the purposes of this section, “religiously-affiliated community center” has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-61aa.
(c) Threatening in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor, except that a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 63; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 8, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 16; P.A. 16-67, S. 7; P.A. 17-111, S. 4.)
History: Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 renamed offense by replacing “threatening” with “threatening in the second degree” where appearing and amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes, delete Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit a crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience and delete Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience, said provisions being reenacted as part of Sec. 53a-61aa by same act, effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 02-97 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provision re a person, by physical threat, intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury as Subdiv. (1), add Subdiv. (2) re threatening to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person and add Subdiv. (3) re threatening to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror; P.A. 16-67 amended Subsec. (a) by redesignating existing Subdiv. (2) as Subdiv. (2)(A), redesignating existing Subdiv. (3) as Subdiv. (2)(B) and adding new Subdiv. (3) re person threatened is at a preschool, school or institution of higher education and amended Subsec. (b) by adding provision re class D felony for violation of Subsec. (a)(3); P.A. 17-111 amended Subsec. (a) to add references to house of religious worship, religiously-affiliated community center and day care center, added new Subsec. (b) defining “religiously-affiliated community center”, redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c), and made technical and conforming changes.
See Sec. 54-130g re pardon.
Cited. 175 C. 204; 182 C. 585; part of ruling in 182 C. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 C. 1; 193 C. 602; 195 C. 636; 201 C. 115; 202 C. 343; 205 C. 262; 207 C. 565; 208 C. 689; 209 C. 34; Id., 52; 222 C. 331; 224 C. 494; 227 C. 829; 241 C. 413; 242 C. 648.
Cited. 2 CA 617; 3 CA 289; 8 CA 190; Id., 496; 9 CA 161; 14 CA 6; Id., 526; 25 CA 149; Id., 334; 26 CA 481; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 494; 28 CA 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; Id., 708; 31 CA 497; 33 CA 103; 40 CA 805; 41 CA 47. Words of defendant's threat to young victim, along with surrounding circumstances of the threat, were such that it was reasonable for jury to infer that defendant had placed the victim in fear of “imminent” serious physical injury. 75 CA 103. Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction. 83 CA 489.
Cited. 37 CS 664; 42 CS 574; 43 CS 46.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 169 C. 566; 197 C. 485; 201 C. 462. Judgment of Appellate Court in 28 CA 581 reversed. 226 C. 601. Cited. 227 C. 153; 228 C. 147; 232 C. 707; 233 C. 403. Subdiv. (3): Statements made that “more of what happened to your son is going to happen to you” and “I'm going to be there to watch it happen”, when spoken to one whose son had suffered serious physical injuries, did not constitute a true threat due to subsequent apology and lack of other animosity between the parties; to ensure that only serious expressions of an intention to commit an act of unlawful violence are punished, as the first amendment requires, state must do more than demonstrate that a statement could be interpreted as a threat. 313 C. 434. Imminence is only one factor for a court to consider in determining whether a statement constitutes a true threat under section, and not a requirement. 327 C. 1. Subsec. is divisible, with offenses requiring proof of an intentional mental state under Subdivs. (1) and (2) and recklessness under Subdiv. (3); threatening offense committed with reckless disregard under Subdiv. (3) does not constitute a crime of moral turpitude under Second Circuit case law and for purposes of immigration consequences. 328 C. 198.
Subdiv. (2): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647. Cited. 11 CA 80; 13 CA 386; Id., 438; 18 CA 643; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707; 35 CA 262; 37 CA 276; Id., 733; 38 CA 306; Id., 777; 39 CA 617; 40 CA 515; 41 CA 584; Id., 701. Subdiv. (2) was not unconstitutionally vague on its face; statute's application to defendant's conduct was proper and did not interfere with his duty to protect his child and statute was not vague as applied to facts of case; there is no indication that legislature did not intend to create separate crimes prohibited by Secs. 53a-181 (a)(3) and Subdiv. (2). 81 CA 248. Convictions for threatening in second degree in violation of Subdivs. (1) and (2) did not violate right against double jeopardy because each conviction arose from a different violation. 154 CA 45. Subdiv. (3): Objective standard for true threats doctrine remains valid and subdivision is constitutionally sound. 185 CA 287; judgment affirmed, see 337 C. 92.