CO Code § 31-15-501 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 31 - Government - Municipal|Article 15 - Exercise of Municipal Powers|Part 5 - Regulation of Businesses|§ 31-15-501. Powers to Regulate Businesses

  The governing bodies of municipalities have the following powers to regulate businesses:   To prohibit within the limits of the municipality any offensive or unwholesome business or establishment and also to prohibit the carrying on of any business or establishment in an offensive and unwholesome manner within the limits of the municipality;    To compel the owner of any grocery, cellar, soap or tallow candlery, tannery, stable, pigsty, privy, sewer, or other unwholesome or nauseous house or place to cleanse, abate, or remove the same, and to regulate the location thereof;    To license, regulate, and tax, subject to any law of this state, any lawful occupation, business place, amusement, or place of amusements and to fix the amount, terms, and manner of issuing and revoking licenses issued therefor; except that, for purposes of the application of any occupational privilege tax, oil and gas wells and their associated production facilities have not been, are not, and shall not be considered an occupation or business place subject to such tax;    To direct the location and regulate the management and construction of slaughterhouses, packing houses, renderies, tallow candleries, bone factories, soap factories, tanneries, and dairies within the limits of the municipality;    To direct the location and regulate the use and construction of breweries, distilleries, livery stables, blacksmith shops, and foundries within the limits of the municipality;      To license, regulate, and control the laying of railroad tracks, to provide for and change the location, grade, and crossing of any railroad, and to control, regulate, and prohibit the use of steam engines and locomotives propelled by steam power within the corporate limits; (f) (I) To license, regulate, and control the laying of railroad tracks, to provide for and change the location, grade, and crossing of any railroad, and to control, regulate, and prohibit the use of steam engines and locomotives propelled by steam power within the corporate limits;    To require railroad companies to fence their respective railroads or any portion of the same and to construct cattle guards at crossings of streets and public roads and keep the same in repair within the limits of the municipality;    To require railroad companies to keep flagmen at railroad crossings of streets and to provide protection against injury to persons and property in the use of such railroads;    To compel such railroads to raise or lower their railroad tracks to conform to any grade which may at any time be established by such municipality and, when such tracks run lengthwise of any street, alley, or highway, to keep their tracks on a level with the street surface so that such tracks may be crossed at any place on such street, alley, or highway;    To compel and require railroad companies to make, keep open, and keep in repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their railroad tracks so that filthy or stagnant pools of water cannot stand on their grounds or rights-of-way and so that the natural drainage of adjacent property shall not be impeded;       To license, tax, regulate, suppress, and prohibit hucksters, peddlers, pawnbrokers, and keepers of ordinaries, theatrical and other exhibitions, shows, and amusements and to revoke such license at pleasure;    To license, tax, and regulate hackmen, omnibus drivers, carters, cabmen, porters, expressmen, and all others pursuing like occupations and to prescribe the compensation;    To license, regulate, tax, and restrain runners for stages, cars, public houses, or other things or persons;    To license, regulate, tax, or prohibit and suppress billiard, bagatelle, pigeonhole, or any other tables or implements kept or used for a similar purpose in any place of public resort and pin alleys and ball alleys;    To regulate the sale of meats, poultry, fish, butter, cheese, lard, vegetables, and all other provisions and to provide for the place and manner of selling the same. It is unlawful for any municipality to impose by ordinance or otherwise any license, assessment, or other charge upon any person bringing food products to such municipality for sale, either in bulk or by retail, from house to house if said food products were grown or raised by the person so having them for sale and are products of the state of Colorado.    To regulate the sale of bread in the municipality and to prescribe the weight and quality of the bread in the loaf;    To provide for and regulate the inspection of meats, poultry, fish, butter, cheese, lard, vegetables, flour, meal, and other provisions;    To provide for the inspection and sealing of weights and measures;    To enforce the keeping and use of proper weights and measures by vendors;    To tax, license, and regulate auctioneers, lumberyards, livery stables, public scales, money changers, and brokers; except that the exercise of their powers shall not interfere with sales made by sheriffs, tax collectors, coroners, marshals, executors, guardians, any assignees of insolvent debtors, bankrupts, or debtors under the federal bankruptcy code of 1978 (title 11 of the United States Code), or any other persons required by law to sell real or personal property at auction;    To tax, license, and regulate secondhand and junk stores, to forbid their purchasing or receiving from minors without the written consent of their parents or guardians any article, and to compel a record of purchases to be kept, subject at all times to the inspection by the police;    To charge a fee for a local license and establish licensing requirements on businesses engaged in the storage, extraction, processing, or manufacturing of industrial hemp, as defined in section 35-61-101 (7), or industrial hemp products, as defined in section 25-5-426 (2)(g.5). A municipality shall not impose additional food production regulations on industrial hemp processors or products if the regulations conflict with state law.       Repealed.      History. Source: L. 75: Entire title R&RE, p. 1110, § 1, effective July 1. L. 80: (1)(p) amended, p. 785, § 12, effective June 5. L. 96: (1)(c) amended, p. 346, § 2, effective April 17. L. 99: (1)(a) and (1)(d) amended, p. 63, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2006, 1st Ex. Sess.: (2) added, p. 29, § 3, effective January 1, 2007. L. 2019: (1)(r) added,(SB 19-240), ch. 351, p. 3245, § 3, effective May 29. L. 2021: (2) repealed,(SB 21-077), ch. 186, p. 998, § 6, effective September 7; (2) repealed,(SB 21-199), ch. 351, p. 2283, § 6, effective July 1, 2022.    Editor's note:   The provisions of this section are similar to provisions of several former sections as they existed prior to 1975. For a detailed comparison, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.   ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. SUBSECTION (1)(c).    III. SUBSECTION (1)(g).    IV. SUBSECTION (1)(j).     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Law reviews. For article, ”2006 Immigration Legislation in Colorado“, see 35 Colo. Law. 79 (Oct. 2006).   Annotator's note. Since § 31-15-501 is similar to former §§ 31-12-101 and 31-15-301 prior to the 1975 repeal and reenactment of this title, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.   Application of subsection (1)(a) to privies. Subsection (1)(a) gave the city sufficient authority to compel all buildings embraced within the power to connect with the sewer. It also confers ample power to prohibit the keeping of any privy within a sewer district, or within 400 feet of the sewer; but this does not mean the city has power to compel one who does not desire to make the connection to connect an outside or open privy or vault with the sewer. It can prohibit the maintenance and use of the privy, and can fine the keeper and abate the nuisance, if it is a nuisance, and can compel owners of buildings to connect with the sewer. This would seem sufficient power to rid any sewer district of all privies and vaults, and to compel owners to connect all buildings with the sewer. Gault v. City of Ft. Collins, 57 Colo. 324 , 142 P. 171 (1914).   Subsection (1)(b) was intended to apply to those things which are offensive to the senses, or unwholesome in the sense in which the terms are ordinarily used, and they refer to such things as dead carcasses, offensive and unwholesome slaughterhouses, privy vaults, pig sties, feeding pens, and the like. Wolfe v. Abbott, 54 Colo. 531 , 131 P. 386 (1913).   Not as nuisances. Subsection (1)(b) does not confer upon towns and cities the power by ordinance to prohibit and abate a nuisance within a mile beyond the outer boundaries. Wolfe v. Abbott, 54 Colo. 531 , 131 P. 386 (1913).   Enforced through fine and imprisonment. The town must prohibit the things mentioned in subsection (1)(b), and enforced the prohibition by fine and imprisonment. Wolfe v. Abbott, 54 Colo. 531 , 131 P. 386 (1913).   Subsection (1)(b) does not apply to liquor, and if it did, there is no power given to declare the enumerated matters a nuisance with power to abate the same. Wolfe v. Abbott, 54 Colo. 531 , 131 P. 386 (1913).   Valid subsection (1)(h) ordinance. A city ordinance providing that hotel runners, stage and omnibus drivers, hackmen, and expressmen, plying their respective vocations at any passenger depot of any railroad in such city on the arrival and departure of trains, should occupy no part of the depot grounds or premises except that portion allotted and designated to them by the station agent of such depot is not to be construed as giving a railroad company the right to exclude from its depot grounds or premises any person lawfully engaged in serving the traveling public either with or without vehicles, nor to confer upon such company the power to grant exclusive rights and privileges to persons engaged in such occupations; but such ordinance, being authorized by subsection (1)(h), is to be upheld as a reasonable regulation to promote the convenience of the traveling public and to prevent disorder at railway stations. City of Colo. Springs v. Smith, 19 Colo. 554 , 36 P. 540 (1894).   Municipal weights and measures divisions authorized. There is no conflict between the 1877 grant of powers to cities and towns with the weights and measures statute because the general assembly, in enacting the weights and measures statute, expressly recognized that cities and towns may have established and maintained weights and measures divisions pursuant to statutory consent of 1877. Blackman v. County Court, 169 Colo. 345 , 455 P.2d 885 (1969).   Matter of both state and local concern. The regulation of weights and measures to prevent misrepresentations and frauds in commercial transactions between vendor and vendee is a matter of both statewide and local concern and may be regulated under the police power at the state level and concurrently at the municipal level, providing there are no conflicting regulatory provisions. Blackman v. County Court, 169 Colo. 345 , 455 P.2d 885 (1969).   Ticket brokers subject to subsection (1)(p). The power to license ticket brokers has been conferred by subsection (1)(p). Upon the city council of cities, but that body may not relinquish the delegated power, or any essential part of it, to a private person or corporation or a purely voluntary private association, or confer upon any such association power to perform any municipal function whatever. Munson v. City of Colo. Springs, 35 Colo. 506 , 84 P. 683 (1906).   Unreasonable city ordinance as to ticket brokers. A city ordinance regulating the licensing of railroad ticket brokers which requires an applicant for license to file with the city clerk a certificate of membership in some reputable ticket brokers' association before a license will be issued in unreasonable and invalid. Munson v. City of Colo. Springs, 35 Colo. 506 , 84 P. 683 (1906).   Railroad crossings may be abolished by public utilities commission (PUC). This section does not prohibit the PUC from abolishing railroad crossings in the interest of public safety, pursuant to section 40-4-106 . City of Craig v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 656 P.2d 1313 (Colo. 1983).   Applied in City of Colo. Springs v. Smith, 19 Colo. 554 , 36 P. 540 (1894); Rancho Colo., Inc. v. City of Broomfield, 196 Colo. 444 , 586 P.2d 659 (1978); Central City Opera House Ass'n v. City of Central, 650 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1982).   II. SUBSECTION (1)(c).   A tax on income is in excess of the powers delegated to Colorado municipalities. Bd. of Trustees v. Foster Lumber Co., 190 Colo. 479 , 548 P.2d 1276 (1976).   Income and occupation tax differentiated. An income tax, whether net or gross, bears a direct relation to the income or receipts of a business. An occupation tax bears no such relationship. The latter is a tax upon the very privilege of doing business, and does not fluctuate from month to month depending upon the financial success or sales of the enterprise. Bd. of Trustees v. Foster Lumber Co., 190 Colo. 479 , 548 P.2d 1276 (1976).   An occupation tax is a tax on the privilege of doing business and does not fluctuate from month to month depending upon the financial success or sales of the enterprise. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Colo. Springs, 194 Colo. 404 , 572 P.2d 834 (1977).   A true business or occupational tax is not an income tax nor a tax on real property, and the fact that the business necessarily involves and concerns realty does not change the nature of the tax. City of Englewood v. Wright, 147 Colo. 537 , 364 P.2d 569 (1961).   Gross income and net income taxes are both 'income taxes” and their difference is a matter of degree. Bd. of Trustees v. Foster Lumber Co., 190 Colo. 479 , 548 P.2d 1276 (1976).   Admissions tax not tax on privilege of doing business. An admissions tax imposed upon persons patronizing businesses is not a tax on the privilege of doing business as authorized by this section. City of Sheridan v. City of Englewood, 199 Colo. 348 , 609 P.2d 108 (1980).   Occupation tax authorized. The general assembly has given the power to impose an occupation privilege tax at a fixed rate regardless of the nature of the employment, to tax the privilege of all to engage in occupations within the municipality's territorial limits. City & County of Denver v. Duffy Storage & Moving Co., 168 Colo. 91 , 450 P.2d 339, appeal dismissed per curiam, 369 U.S. 2, 90 S. Ct. 23, 24 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1969).   Subsection (1)(c) authorized municipalities to impose occupation taxes on local businesses. Bd. of Trustees v. Foster Lumber Co., 190 Colo. 479 , 548 P.2d 1276 (1976).   The purpose of an occupation tax is to tax the owners of businesses for the privilege of conducting various classes of businesses within the boundaries of the city. Bd. of Trustees v. Foster Lumber Co., 190 Colo. 479 , 548 P.2d 1276 (1976).   As revenue measure. A home-rule city has the undoubted power to impose a business or occupational tax for the sole purpose of raising revenue. City of Englewood v. Wright, 147 Colo. 537 , 364 P.2d 569 (1961).   Language denoting tax not indicative of true nature. The language used by the legislative body in denominating the nature of a tax assessed is not determinative of its true character. Bd. of Trustees v. Foster Lumber Co., 190 Colo. 479 , 548 P.2d 1276 (1976).   Business defined. Business is a very comprehensive term and embraces everything about which a person can be employed, that which occupies the time, attention, and labor of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit, and corporations organized for the purpose of doing business, and actually engaged in such activities as leasing property, collecting rents, managing office buildings, making investments of profits, or leasing ore lands and collecting royalties, managing wharves, dividing profits, and in some cases investing the surplus, are engaged in business within the meaning of this statute. City of Englewood v. Wright, 147 Colo. 537 , 364 P.2d 569 (1961).   The renting of residential or commercial property is a “business” and as such is subject to the power to impose a business or occupational tax. City of Englewood v. Wright, 147 Colo. 537 , 364 P.2d 569 (1961).   One who acquires realty and then improves, subdivides, and sells the land for building sites is also engaged in a business which can be subjected to an occupational tax. City of Englewood v. Wright, 147 Colo. 537 , 364 P.2d 569 (1961).   Those who purchase land at tax sales are subject to a business or occupational tax. City of Englewood v. Wright, 147 Colo. 537 , 364 P.2d 569 (1961).   Tax of two dollars per day for each room rented is a valid occupation tax. This roughly approximates the amount of use that the hotels, through their employees and customers, make of the town's services and facilities. Variation in the amount of tax paid during each taxing period caused by calculations based on factors other than income is not fatal to a valid occupation tax. Town of Eagle v. Scheibe, 10 P.3d 648 (Colo. 2000).   A city ordinance passed by a city of the second class making any sale in the furtherance of business taxable, and imposing a tax on businesses and professions graduated according to the number of employees in each business or profession, did not contravene the right to acquire property without undue interference and so did not violate § 3 of art. II, Colo. Const.Jackson v. City of Glenwood Springs, 122 Colo. 323 , 221 P.2d 1083 (1950).   Exercise of licensing power subject to judicial review. While the general power to license is conferred by this subdivision of this section, the mode of its exercise is not prescribed, hence the reasonableness, as well as the constitutionality, of an ordinance prescribing the mode of exercise of the power is a matter of judicial cognizance. Munson v. City of Colo. Springs, 35 Colo. 506 , 84 P. 683 (1906).   Applied in Orman v. City of Pueblo, 8 Colo. 292 , 6 P. 931 (1885).   III. SUBSECTION (1)(g).   Subsection (1)(g) ordinances constitutional. The adoption of a municipal ordinance restricting the operations of peddlers and solicitors at private residences is an authorized and reasonable exercise of police powers of the state delegated to municipal legislative bodies; such ordinances do not deprive the parties affected of any right guaranteed by either the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution or provisions of the state fundamental law. McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493 , 99 P.2d 969 (1939).   And not a burden on interstate commerce. A restrictive municipal ordinance concerning the operations of peddlers and solicitors is not a regulation of, or burden upon, interstate commerce within the intent and meaning of the interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution. McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493 , 99 P.2d 969 (1939).   Peddler defined. To constitute a peddler within the meaning of subsection (1)(g), the trader must be one who carries with him the goods which he intends to sell. Kennedy v. People ex rel. La Junta, 9 Colo. App. 490, 49 P. 373 (1897).   One who sells by sample merely, for future delivery, is not a peddler. Kennedy v. People ex rel. La Junta, 9 Colo. App. 490, 49 P. 373 (1897).   No exclusive power to license shows, etc. There is nothing in subsection (1)(g) which shows any intention to take away from the county its power, or to grant unto cities and towns the exclusive power to license shows and amusements within their respective limits. Godfrey v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 53 Colo. 196 , 124 P. 190 (1912).   Statutory licensing power only. Under subsection (1)(g) and the other pertinent provisions of this subsection, the authority of municipal corporations to grant licenses for occupations carried on within their limits exists by force of the statute alone, and they cannot legally exact license fees from those engaged in business pursuits not included or covered by the statute. Bernheimer v. City of Leadville, 14 Colo. 518 , 24 P. 332 (1890).   The general assembly did not intend to deprive the county of any of its revenue by enacting subsection (1)(g). Godfrey v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 53 Colo. 196 , 124 P. 190 (1912).   Licensing ordinance allowing too much discretion violative of fundamental law. An ordinance passed under the authority of paragraph (g) requiring one peddling artesian water within the city limits to have a license, and giving the city council power to give or withhold such license at its discretion, is void in that it is violative of the fundamental law of the state and nation, because the right to pursue a lawful calling is a natural right, subject only to such restrictions as the legislative authority may impose upon all alike, and it is not dependent upon the will or caprice, or the pleasure or prejudice or discretion of a city council. City of La Junta v. Heath, 38 Colo. 372 , 88 P. 459 (1906).   IV. SUBSECTION (1)(j).   No constitutional right. Section 3 of art. II, Colo. Const., does not confer upon the citizen a constitutional right to conduct a business which may be inimical to the public morals, such as the use of pinball machines as gambling devices. Bunzel v. City of Golden, 150 Colo. 276 , 372 P.2d 161 (1962).   Discouragement or prohibition proper. With respect to those occupations or forms of business, however, that are not useful, but are inherently harmful and dangerous to society or the public welfare, license requirements and exactions may be so imposed as to discourage and even amount to a prohibition of them. Bunzel v. City of Golden, 150 Colo. 276 , 372 P.2d 161 (1962).   Pinball machines. The supreme court has held that pinball machines may be used as gambling devices and has refused to enjoin officers from seizing them under the terms of local ordinances. Bunzel v. City of Golden, 150 Colo. 276 , 372 P.2d 161 (1962).   A city is specifically authorized to prohibit entirely the use of such pinball machines. Bunzel v. City of Golden, 150 Colo. 276 , 372 P.2d 161 (1962).   License fee, etc., constitutional. An ordinance exacting a license fee of $100 per machine from a person who owns and operates four or more machines in his own place of business, and a lesser fee for those operating fewer than four machines, does not deprive the former of equal protection of the law. Bunzel v. City of Golden, 150 Colo. 276 , 372 P.2d 161 (1962).