CO Code § 44-3-312 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 44 - Revenue - Regulation of Activities|Article 3 - Alcohol Beverages|Part 3 - State and Local Licensing|§ 44-3-312. Results of Investigation - Decision of Authorities

  Not less than five days prior to the date of hearing, the local licensing authority shall make known its findings based on its investigation in writing to the applicant and other interested parties. The local licensing authority has authority to refuse to issue any licenses provided in sections 44-3-309 (1) and 44-4-107 for good cause, subject to judicial review.      Before entering any decision approving or denying the application, the local licensing authority shall consider, except where this article 3 specifically provides otherwise, the facts and evidence adduced as a result of its investigation, as well as any other facts, the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood for the type of license for which application has been made, the desires of the adult inhabitants, the number, type, and availability of alcohol beverage outlets located in or near the neighborhood under consideration, and any other pertinent matters affecting the qualifications of the applicant for the conduct of the type of business proposed; except that the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood shall not be considered in the issuance of a club liquor license. For the merger and conversion of retail liquor store licenses to a single liquor-licensed drugstore license in accordance with section 44-3-410 (1)(b), the local licensing authority shall consider the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood and the desires of the adult inhabitants of the neighborhood.    Any petitioning otherwise required to establish the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood shall be waived for a bed and breakfast permit applicant unless the local licensing authority has previously taken affirmative, official action to rescind the availability of such waiver in all subsequent cases.       Any decision of a local licensing authority approving or denying an application shall be in writing stating the reasons therefor within thirty days after the date of the public hearing, and a copy of the decision shall be sent by certified mail to the applicant at the address shown in the application.    No license shall be issued by any local licensing authority after approval of an application until the building in which the business is to be conducted is ready for occupancy with such furniture, fixtures, and equipment in place as is necessary to comply with the applicable provisions of this article 3 and article 4 of this title 44, and then only after inspection of the premises has been made by the licensing authority to determine that the applicant has complied with the architect's drawing and the plot plan and detailed sketch for the interior of the building submitted with the application.    After approval of any application, the local licensing authority shall notify the state licensing authority of the approval, who shall investigate and either approve or disapprove such application.      History. Source: L. 2018: Entire article added with relocations,(HB 18-1025), ch. 152, p. 986, § 2, effective October 1.    Editor's note:   This section is similar to former § 12-47-312 as it existed prior to 2018.   ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “A Primer on Liquor License Application Hearings in Colorado”, see 31 Colo. Law. 11 (Sept. 2002).   Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.   In forfeiture removal action, absent the owner's permission, it is a trespass for the officers to remain on the premises longer than is necessary to remove the seized property. Walker v. City of Denver, 720 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1986).   While the right of public officers to seize personal property carries with it the right to remove the property from the premises, such removal is unjustified if it would result in the destruction or substantial damage to the real property. Walker v. City of Denver, 720 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1986).   The fact that a particular type of license is not authorized in the neighborhood does not require the issuance of such a license if, in fact, the needs of the neighborhood, with respect to the type of beverage authorized to be sold by the license requested, are being met by the existing licenses. Canjar v. Huerta, 193 Colo. 388 , 566 P.2d 1071 (1977).   Date of city council's written decision commenced 30-day period. Where the city council approved an application for a package liquor license and entered its written decision in the form of a statement of approval upon the license application form, which was signed by the mayor and attested by the city clerk, it is the date of the written decision, endorsed upon the application form, and not the date on which applicants received the letter of notification, which commences the 30-day period within which to appeal the decision. White v. City Council, 33 Colo. App. 97, 515 P.2d 487 (1973).   The period of limitation under subsection (3) of this section was properly measured from the conclusion of a second hearing where, at the conclusion of the first hearing on the license application, the matter was tabled for further consideration, and no final action was taken. U-Tote-M of Colo., Inc. v. City of Greenwood Vill., 39 Colo. App. 28, 563 P.2d 373 (1977).   The intent of a law which grants discretionary power to licensing officers, whether expressly or by necessary implication, is that the discretionary decision shall be the outcome of examination and consideration, in other words, that it shall constitute a discharge of official duty, and not a mere expression of personal will. Goehring v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 172 Colo. 1 , 469 P.2d 137 (1970).   Basis for capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion. Capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion by an administrative board can arise by failing to give candid and honest consideration of the evidence before it on which it is authorized to act in exercising its discretion, and by exercising its discretion in such manner after a consideration of the evidence before it as to clearly indicate that its action is based on conclusions from the evidence such that reasonable men fairly and honestly considering the evidence must reach contrary conclusions. Anderson v. Spencer, 162 Colo. 328 , 426 P.2d 970 (1967); Goehring v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 172 Colo. 1 , 469 P.2d 137 (1970).   “Neighborhood” doesn't include whole county. No authority justifies the conclusion that the “neighborhood” involved in an application for a liquor license can be expanded to include and entire county. Bolton v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 164 Colo. 112 , 432 P.2d 761 (1967).   Boundary lines of a city do not exclude residents on one side or the other from the “neighborhood” to be considered in connection with applications for liquor licenses. Anderson v. Spencer, 162 Colo. 328 , 426 P.2d 970 (1967).   The existence or nonexistence of outlets on either side of a city boundary are to be considered by the licensing authority in determining whether reasonable requirements of the neighborhood are being met. Anderson v. Spencer, 162 Colo. 328 , 426 P.2d 970 (1967).   “In or near” are spatial concepts; “in” means inside of, within the bounds or limits of, and “near” denotes close by, neighboring, or not far from. Anderson v. Spencer, 162 Colo. 328 , 426 P.2d 970 (1967).   In noting the “nearness” of the other outlets the board must consider also their “availability”, and “availability” contemplates suitableness for the accomplishment of a given purpose, capability of advantageous use or employment. Anderson v. Spencer, 162 Colo. 328 , 426 P.2d 970 (1967).   The licensing authority can require compliance with a zoning law before permitting a store to open. Goehring v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 172 Colo. 1 , 469 P.2d 137 (1970).   Opportunity to comply with the zoning laws and restrictions would of necessity be granted to anyone desiring to open a lawful business. Goehring v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 172 Colo. 1 , 469 P.2d 137 (1970).   If the absence of adequate toilet facilities violated a county zoning resolution, it would not be ground in and of itself for denial of the application for a liquor license. Goehring v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 172 Colo. 1 , 469 P.2d 137 (1970).   The existence of “desire” for a new outlet is some evidence that the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood were not being met. Anderson v. Spencer, 162 Colo. 328 , 426 P.2d 970 (1967).   Consideration of size of outlet. In the absence of guidelines on the size of a proposed outlet in the statute and in the absence of a county zoning requirement for the location involved, a denial based on such grounds is not lawful. Goehring v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 172 Colo. 1 , 469 P.2d 137 (1970).   What findings must include. When a board considers “other pertinent matters” during the course of making its investigation, it must in its findings point out how it feels the applicant's qualifications to conduct the proposed business were affected by those matters. Wadlow v. Hartman, 191 Colo. 196 , 551 P.2d 201 (1976).   Trial court had no jurisdiction. Where there was no showing in the trial court that protestants had exhausted their administrative remedies or that certiorari proceedings to review the decision of a local licensing authority to grant an application for a retail liquor store license were not moot, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the certiorari proceedings and should have dismissed the action. Larson v. City & County of Denver, 33 Colo. App. 153, 516 P.2d 448 (1973).   Specifications and inspection mandatory. Under subsection (4), the filing of plans and specifications is mandatory and may not be waived and prior to granting a liquor license the local authority must inspect the premises to determine that the applicant has complied with the architect's drawing and plans and specifications submitted upon the application. Norris v. Grimsley, 41 Colo. App. 231, 585 P.2d 925 (1978).   City council's denial of liquor license application was unsupported by competent evidence and was arbitrary where evidence presented by applicant established a prima facie case for issuance and the only rebuttal evidence was the existence of other liquor stores and a survey result that 26%; percent expressed opposition. Brass Monkey v. Louisville City Council, 870 P.2d 636 (Colo. App. 1994).   Applied in Kornfeld v. Yost, 37 Colo. App. 483, 551 P.2d 219 (1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Kornfeld v. Perl Mack Liquors, Inc., 193 Colo. 442 , 567 P.2d 383 (1977).