GA Code § 15-11-401 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 15 - Courts|Chapter 11 - Juvenile Code|Article 5 - Child in Need of Services|Part 3 - Formal Court Procedures|§ 15-11-401. Child in Need of Services; Venue

  A proceeding under this article may be commenced in the county in which the act complained of took place or in the county in which the child alleged to be a child in need of services legally resides.   If a proceeding is commenced in the county in which the act complained of took place, the court shall transfer the case to the county in which the child alleged to be a child in need of services legally resides for further proceedings.   When a proceeding is transferred, certified copies of all legal and social documents and records on file with the clerk of court pertaining to the proceeding shall accompany such transfer.     (Code 1981, §15-11-401, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)   Cross references.   - Venue for criminal actions generally, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and § 17-2-2.   Intrastate transfer of cases among Juvenile Courts, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 5.3.   Law reviews.   - For article discussing venue problems in juvenile court practice and suggesting solutions, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 341 (1972). For article, "An Outline of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction with Focus on Child Custody," see 10 Ga. St. B. J. 275 (1973).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Editor's notes.   - Many of the following annotations should be examined in light of the amendment to Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI) which took effect November 1, 1981.   In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 24A-1101, 24A-1201, pre-2000 Code Sections 15-11-15 and 15-11-16 and pre-2014 Code Sections 15-11-29 and 15-11-30, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.   County of parent's residence.    - Revision of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI), providing that venue in juvenile court cases may be determined by the provisions of the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia, removed any constitutional impediment to applying former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-17,15-11-270, and15-11-401) to parental termination proceedings when the parent resides in a different county from that in which an allegedly deprived child is found. In re R.A.S., 249 Ga. 236, 290 S.E.2d 34 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).    Action to terminate parental rights on ground of deprivation need not be brought in county of parents' residence. In re S.H., 163 Ga. App. 419, 294 S.E.2d 621 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).   Determining legal residence.    - Juvenile proceeding for delinquency or unruly conduct may be tried either in the county where the child resides or in the county where the unruly or delinquent conduct occurred. In re A.M.C., 213 Ga. App. 897, 446 S.E.2d 760 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).    In determining where a juvenile resides for purposes of venue, it is generally the legal residence that controls. In re A.M.C., 213 Ga. App. 897, 446 S.E.2d 760 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).    In a proceeding against a juvenile for the status offense of unruliness, the juvenile's legal residence for purposes of venue was in the county of the Department of Family & Children Services having custody over the juvenile, even though the place of the offense and the juvenile's family residence were in other counties. In re A.M.C., 213 Ga. App. 897, 446 S.E.2d 760 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).    Adjudication proceeding is actually nothing more than pretrial hearing held in the county where the child was apprehended and in the custody of local authorities for committing the alleged unruly acts or delinquent behavior. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).   Venue lies in county where juvenile committed criminal act.    - Although some of the proceedings in juvenile court are of a criminal character, not all are. For those that are, delinquency, unruliness and juvenile traffic offenses, the venue provisions of the Juvenile Code and the state constitution, that venue lies in the county in which the act was committed, are in accord. Quire v. Clayton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 242 Ga. 85, 249 S.E.2d 538 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).   Dispositional hearings conducted in county where defendant resides.    - It was at the dispositional hearings provided for in former Code 1933, § 24A-2201 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-101 and15-11-210) that the actual "case" was tried, thereby comporting with the constitutional mandate that civil cases shall be tried in the county where the defendant resided. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).    In a deprivation proceeding, the court erred in basing venue on the childrens' brief visit to the county where the deprivation petitions were filed because the children were residing and attending school in another county at the time. In re B.G., 238 Ga. App. 227, 518 S.E.2d 451 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15).    Because a child was born in Lee County and had lived with the child's mother and maternal grandparents in Lee County for ten out of the 16 months of the child's life when a petition alleging deprivation was filed under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-270 and15-11-401), Lee County was the proper venue for the action. In the Interest of C.R., 292 Ga. App. 346, 665 S.E.2d 39 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).   Service on mother in county of residence sufficient.    - Service of process on the mother in the county of this state in which the mother of an illegitimate child resides is sufficient to give the county juvenile court jurisdiction over both the mother and the child regardless of whether there was a "detention" of the child and in spite of the fact that a welfare worker obtained possession of the child outside of the state. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 138 Ga. App. 49, 225 S.E.2d 441, rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).   Venue exists despite absence of child.    - If a particular county is the residence of the child and of the child's mother, venue properly exists there for temporary custody actions even if the child was not personally present within the boundaries of that county on the date of the filing of the petition to the court for temporary custody. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 138 Ga. App. 49, 225 S.E.2d 441, rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101).   Venue in county of child's residence and where child born.    - Requirements for proving that venue was properly in Cobb County were met because a mother was residing in Cobb County when her child was born and when the underlying proceeding alleging deprivation commenced and that the child remained in the custody of Cobb County Department of Family and Children Services through the time the juvenile court entered the court's deprivation and non-reunification order. In re R. B., 309 Ga. App. 407, 710 S.E.2d 611 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).   Challenge to court's jurisdiction unsuccessful.    - Although former Code 1933, § 79-404 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-2-4) provided that the domicile of an illegitimate child shall be that of his or her mother, yet, where the plea to the jurisdiction alleged "this court has accepted jurisdiction and custody of the minor child . . . and is holding said child subject to the order of this court," which clearly showed that the child was before the court, and there was no allegation showing the domicile of the mother, who was present in court, or any other reason why the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction, it was not error to overrule the plea. Springstead v. Cook, 215 Ga. 154, 109 S.E.2d 508 (1959) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 87, § 3).    Child was residing in Cobb County when an underlying proceeding alleging deprivation commenced and had remained in the custody of Cobb County Department of Family and Children Services through the time a termination of parental rights order was entered; accordingly, requirements for venue in Cobb County were met. In re R. J. D. B., 305 Ga. App. 888, 700 S.E.2d 898 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).    There was sufficient evidence that venue was proper in Douglas County, Georgia, in a deprivation proceeding, as the Douglas County Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS) had been involved with the family for some time; the subject child's parent lived in a shelter in Douglas County in May and June of 2010, and at the time the deprivation petition was filed the child was in the custody of the Douglas County DFCS, where the child remained through the entry of the deprivation order. In the Interest of D. S., 316 Ga. App. 296, 728 S.E.2d 890 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-29).   Transfer provisions were not violative of Constitution.    - Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1, by providing that after adjudication of delinquency in a court of another county the proceeding shall be transferred to the county of the child's residence for disposition, is not violative of the Georgia Constitution. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1201).   Failure to transfer prior to notice of appeal.    - If it is undisputed that a child was a "nonresident child" as defined in former paragraph (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30 at the time of the delinquent act and at the time of the adjudication of delinquency, in that the child then resided in Spalding County, Georgia, the juvenile court of Henry County erred in failing to transfer the case to the county of the child's residence for disposition prior to the filing of the child's notice of appeal in accordance with former subsection (b) of that section. In re R.W., 186 Ga. App. 885, 368 S.E.2d 824 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-16).   Dispositional hearings held in county where defendant resides constitutional.    - It was at the dispositional hearings provided for in former Code 1933, § 24A-2201 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-110 and15-11-210) that the actual "case" was tried, thereby comporting with the constitutional mandate that civil cases shall be tried in the county where the defendant resided. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1201).   Authority to grant new trials.    - Juvenile courts are courts of record; therefore, juvenile courts are authorized to grant new trials. In re T.A.W., 265 Ga. 106, 454 S.E.2d 134 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-16).   No jurisdiction for acts punishable by loss of life or confinement for life.    - Juvenile court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over delinquent acts for which a child (under 17 years old) may be punished by loss of life or confinement for life in the penitentiary. Nevertheless, the statutory safeguards provided were applicable to both criminal and juvenile cases. Jackson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 375, 246 S.E.2d 407 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1402).    Incriminating statements obtained in violation of the Juvenile Code are not rendered per se inadmissible; rather, the issue to be considered is whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver by the appellant of the appellant's constitutional rights in making the incriminating statements. Lattimore v. State, 265 Ga. 102, 454 S.E.2d 474 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19); Barber v. State, 267 Ga. 521, 481 S.E.2d 813 (1997); Skidmore v. State, 226 Ga. App. 130, 485 S.E.2d 540 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19); Gilliam v. State, 268 Ga. 690, 492 S.E.2d 185 (1997); Simon v. State, 269 Ga. 208, 497 S.E.2d 231 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19); Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998); Attaway v. State, 244 Ga. App. 5, 534 S.E.2d 580 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).   Evidence not inadmissible because of technical violations.    - Since no injury appeared to have resulted, technical violations of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-133,15-11-410,15-11-411,15-11-412,15-11-501, and15-11-502) would not render infirm evidence obtained as a result of such violations. In re J.D.M., 187 Ga. App. 285, 369 S.E.2d 920 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).   Guardian cooperating with police.    - By notifying the defendant's guardian of the defendant's arrest and the grounds therefor, the police complied with subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-501). That the guardian cooperated with the police in the police investigation of the defendant's involvement in the crime did not require a finding that the statement was not voluntarily made. Burnham v. State, 265 Ga. 129, 453 S.E.2d 449 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).   OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL   Editor's notes.   - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1201, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.   Failure to comply prejudices constitutional rights of child.   - Failure to comply with the transfer provisions of former subsection (b) of Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1 would prejudice the rights of the child under the venue provisions of the Georgia Constitution to have a dispositional hearing in the county of the child's residence. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U79-4 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1201).   Transfer after delinquency or unruliness adjudication.   - Once a child has been adjudicated delinquent or unruly in juvenile court, the child would have to be transferred to the juvenile court in the county of the child's residence. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U79-4 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1201).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 27 et seq. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 39 et seq.   C.J.S.   - 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 12 et seq.   U.L.A.   - Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) §§ 11, 12.   ALR.   - Right of indigent parent to appointed counsel in proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights, 92 A.L.R.5th 379.