reglab/housing_qa huggingface dataset:
WI Stat § 891.45 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 891 - Presumptions.|891.45 - Presumption of employment-connected disease; heart or respiratory impairment or disease.

891.45  Presumption of employment-connected disease; heart or respiratory impairment or disease. (1) In this section:(a) “County fire fighter" means any person employed by a county whose duties primarily include active fire suppression or prevention.(b) “Municipal fire fighter" includes any person designated as primarily a fire fighter under s. 60.553 (2), 61.66 (2), or 62.13 (2e) (b) and any person under s. 60.553, 61.66, or 62.13 (2e) whose duties as a fire fighter during the 5-year qualifying period took up at least two-thirds of his or her working hours. (c) “State fire fighter" means any person employed by the state whose duties primarily include active fire suppression or prevention and who is a protective occupation participant, as defined in s. 40.02 (48). (2) Except as provided in s. 891.453, in any proceeding involving the application by a state, county, or municipal fire fighter or his or her beneficiary for disability or death benefits under s. 40.65 (2) or any pension or retirement system applicable to fire fighters, where at the time of death or filing of application for disability benefits the deceased or disabled fire fighter had served a total of 5 years as a state, county, or municipal fire fighter and a qualifying medical examination given prior to the time of his or her becoming a state, county, or municipal fire fighter showed no evidence of heart or respiratory impairment or disease, and where the disability or death is found to be caused by heart or respiratory impairment or disease, such finding shall be presumptive evidence that such impairment or disease was caused by such employment. History:  1977 c. 83; 1981 c. 278 s. 6; 1983 a. 191 s. 6; 1987 a. 399; 1987 a. 403 s. 256; 1997 a. 173; 2001 a. 16; 2009 a. 284; 2011 a. 32.
WI Stat § 891.453 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 891 - Presumptions.|891.453 - Presumption of employment-connected disease; infectious disease.

891.453  Presumption of employment-connected disease; infectious disease. (1) In this section:(a) “Correctional officer" means any person employed by the state or by a county or a municipality as a guard or officer whose principal duties are the supervision and discipline of inmates.(b) “Emergency medical service provider" means a person employed by the state or by a county or municipality and who is an emergency medical services practitioner under s. 256.01 (5) or an emergency medical responder under s. 256.01 (4p).(c) “Fire fighter" means a state, county, or municipal fire fighter who is covered under s. 891.45 and any person under s. 60.553, 61.66, or 62.13 (2e) whose duties as a fire fighter took up at least two-thirds of his or her working hours. (d) “Law enforcement officer" means any person employed by the state or by a county or a municipality for the purpose of detecting and preventing crime and enforcing laws or ordinances, who is authorized to make arrests for violations of the laws or ordinances which he or she is employed to enforce. “Law enforcement officer" includes a person under s. 60.553, 61.66, or 62.13 (2e) whose duties as a police officer took up at least two-thirds of his or her working hours.  (2) (a) In this subsection, “infectious disease" includes the human immunodeficiency virus, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, tuberculosis, hepatitis A, hepatitis B, hepatitis C, hepatitis D, diphtheria, meningococcal meningitis, methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus, and severe acute respiratory syndrome.(b) In any proceeding involving the application by a correctional officer, an emergency medical service provider, a fire fighter, or a law enforcement officer or his or her beneficiary for disability or death benefits under s. 40.65 (2) or any pension or retirement system applicable to correctional officers, emergency medical service providers, fire fighters, or law enforcement officers, if a qualifying medical examination given prior to the time of his or her becoming a correctional officer, an emergency medical service provider, a fire fighter, or a law enforcement officer showed no evidence of an infectious disease, and if the disability or death is found to be caused by an infectious disease, the finding shall be presumptive evidence that the infectious disease was caused by the employment. History:  2009 a. 284; 2011 a. 32; 2017 a. 12.
WI Stat § 891.455 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 891 - Presumptions.|891.455 - Presumption of employment-connected disease; cancer.

891.455  Presumption of employment-connected disease; cancer. (1) In this section, “state, county, or municipal fire fighter" means a fire fighter who is covered under s. 891.45 and any person under s. 60.553, 61.66, or 62.13 (2e) whose duties as a fire fighter during the 10-year qualifying period specified in sub. (2) took up at least two-thirds of his or her working hours. (2) In any proceeding involving an application by a state, county, or municipal fire fighter or his or her beneficiary for disability or death benefits under s. 40.65 (2) or any pension or retirement system applicable to fire fighters, where at the time of death or filing of application for disability benefits the deceased or disabled fire fighter had served a total of 10 years as a state, county, or municipal fire fighter and a qualifying medical examination given prior to the time of his or her becoming a state, county, or municipal fire fighter showed no evidence of cancer, and where the disability or death is found to be caused by cancer, such finding shall be presumptive evidence that the cancer was caused by such employment. (3) The presumption under sub. (2) shall only apply to cancers affecting the skin, breasts, central nervous system or lymphatic, digestive, hematological, urinary, skeletal, oral or reproductive systems. (4) The presumption under sub. (2) for cancers caused by smoking or tobacco product use shall not apply to any municipal fire fighter who smokes cigarettes, as defined in s. 139.30 (1m), or who uses a tobacco product, as defined in s. 139.75 (12), after January 1, 2001. History:  1997 a. 173; 1999 a. 9; 2001 a. 16; 2005 a. 25; 2011 a. 32.
WI Stat § 891.46 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 891 - Presumptions.|891.46 - Mailed service.

891.46  Mailed service. Unless otherwise specifically provided by statute or rule adopted under s. 751.12, summonses, citations, notices, motions and other papers required or authorized to be served by mail in judicial or administrative proceedings are presumed to be served when deposited in the U.S. mail with properly affixed evidence of prepaid postage.History:  Sup. Ct. Order, No. 95-10, 195 Wis. 2d xv (1996).Judicial Council Note, 1995:  The purpose of this statute is to overrule the statement in Boeck v. State Highway Commission, 36 Wis. 2d 440, 444, 153 N.W.2d 610, 612 (1967), that “as a general rule in the absence of the statutory provision, ... service of notice would not become effective until the party received it." The creation of this rule does not affect the presumptions and shifting of burdens of mailing articulated in State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994).
WI Stat § 893.01 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 893 - Limitations of commencement of actions and proceedings; procedure for claims against governmental units.|893.01 - Civil actions; objection as to time of commencing.

893.01  Civil actions; objection as to time of commencing. Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this chapter, except when, in special cases, a different limitation is provided by statute. An objection that the action was not commenced within the time limited may only be taken by answer or motion to dismiss under s. 802.06 (2) in proper cases.History:  Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 770 (1975); 1979 c. 323.Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section remains from previous ch. 893 and is revised only for purposes of textual clarity. [Bill 326-A]Estoppel can be invoked to preclude a defense based on a statute of limitations when a defendant has been guilty of fraudulent or inequitable conduct. The conduct need not constitute actual fraud, but may be equivalent to a representation upon which the plaintiff may have relied to his or her disadvantage by not commencing his or her action within the statutory period. That conduct must have occurred before the expiration of the limitation period with no unreasonable delay by the aggrieved party after the inducement therefor has ceased to operate. State ex rel. Susedik v. Knutson, 52 Wis. 2d 593, 191 N.W.2d 23 (1971).A court has no authority to enlarge the time in which to file a complaint. Pulchinski v. Strnad, 88 Wis. 2d 423, 276 N.W.2d 781 (1979).When a limitation period would otherwise expire on a legal holiday, s. 990.001 (4) (b) permits the commencement of an action on the next secular day. Cuisinier v. Sattler, 88 Wis. 2d 654, 277 N.W.2d 776 (1979).Statutes of limitations are substantive statutes and are not given retroactive effect. Betthauser v. Medical Protective Co. 172 Wis. 2d 141, 493 N.W.2d 40 (1992).A circuit court may use its equitable powers to set aside a statute of imitations if certain enumerated circumstances are present. Williams v. Kaerek Builders, Inc. 212 Wis. 2d 150, 568 N.W.2d 313 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2396.The primary reason for applying equitable estoppel to bar a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations is when the conduct and representations of the defendant were so unfair and misleading as to outbalance the public's interest in setting a limitation on bringing actions. Wosinski v. Advance Cast Stone Co. 2017 WI App 51, 377 Wis. 2d 596, 901 N.W.2d 797, 14-1961.A defendant was estopped from pleading the statute of limitations by fraudulent conduct that prevented the plaintiff from filing a timely suit. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (1984).Remedying the Confusion Between Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Wisconsin — A Conceptual Guide, La Fave, 88 MLR 927 (2005)
WI Stat § 893.02 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 893 - Limitations of commencement of actions and proceedings; procedure for claims against governmental units.|893.02 - Action, when commenced.

893.02  Action, when commenced. Except as provided in s. 893.415 (3), an action is commenced, within the meaning of any provision of law which limits the time for the commencement of an action, as to each defendant, when the summons naming the defendant and the complaint are filed with the court, but no action shall be deemed commenced as to any defendant upon whom service of authenticated copies of the summons and complaint has not been made within 90 days after filing.History:  Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 770 (1975); 1975 c. 218; 1979 c. 323; 1997 a. 187; 2003 a. 287.Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.39 of the statutes renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]In a products liability action, a new cause of action for punitive damages brought after the statute of limitations expired related back to the date of filing the original pleading. Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 293 N.W.2d 897 (1980).An action against an unnamed defendant under s. 807.12 that was filed on the last day of a limitation period, in which amended process naming the defendant was served within 60 days after filing, was not time barred. The relation back requirements of s. 802.09 (3) were inapplicable. Lak v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 100 Wis. 2d 641, 302 N.W.2d 483 (1981).Service of process did not commence an action when the plaintiff failed to file the summons and complaint. The defendant's answer did not waive the statute of limitations defense or estop the defendant from raising it after the limitation period expired. Hester v. Williams, 117 Wis. 2d 634, 345 N.W.2d 426 (1984).A fictitiously designated defendant's right to extinction of an action does not effectively vest until 60 days after the statute of limitations runs. Lavine v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 140 Wis. 2d 434, 410 N.W.2d 623 (Ct. App. 1987).Timely Service Abroad in Diversity Suits. La Fave. Wis. Law. Nov. 2000.
WI Stat § 893.03 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 893 - Limitations of commencement of actions and proceedings; procedure for claims against governmental units.|893.03 - Presenting claims.

893.03  Presenting claims. The presentation of any claim, in cases where by law such presentment is required, to the circuit court shall be deemed the commencement of an action within the meaning of any law limiting the time for the commencement of an action thereon.History:  1977 c. 449 s. 497; 1979 c. 323.Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.41 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]A statute of limitations is not tolled by filing an action in a court completely lacking jurisdiction and later refiling in the proper court after the statute has run. Schafer v. Wegner, 78 Wis. 2d 127, 254 N.W.2d 193 (1977).
WI Stat § 893.05 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 893 - Limitations of commencement of actions and proceedings; procedure for claims against governmental units.|893.05 - Relation of statute of limitations to right and remedy.

893.05  Relation of statute of limitations to right and remedy. When the period within which an action may be commenced on a Wisconsin cause of action has expired, the right is extinguished as well as the remedy.History:  1979 c. 323.Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This new section is a codification of Wisconsin case law. See Maryland Casualty Company v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390, 14 N.W.2d 177 (1944), in which it is stated at page 393: “In Wisconsin the running of the statute of limitations absolutely extinguishes the cause of action for in Wisconsin limitations are not treated as statutes of repose. The limitation of actions is a right as well as a remedy, extinguishing the right on one side and creating a right on the other, which is as of high dignity as regards judicial remedies as any other right and it is a right which enjoys constitutional protection". [Bill 326-A]The expiration of the limitations period extinguishes the cause of action of the potential plaintiff and it also creates a right enjoyed by the would-be defendant to insist on that statutory bar. A defendant, having acquired a right to assert the statute of limitations bar by operation of law, would suffer plain legal prejudice if a plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal were granted. Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Trust Co., 477 F.3d 924 (2007).
WI Stat § 893.10 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 893 - Limitations of commencement of actions and proceedings; procedure for claims against governmental units.|893.10 - Actions, time for commencing.

893.10  Actions, time for commencing. The period within which an action may be commenced shall not be considered to have expired when the court before which the action is pending is satisfied that the person originally served knowingly gave false information to the officer with intent to mislead the officer in the performance of his or her duty in the service of any summons or civil process. If the court so finds, the period of limitation is extended for one year.History:  1979 c. 323.Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.14 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]Many Wisconsin statutes of limitation use commencement of “an action” to set the time by which a claimant must act to timely preserve a claim. A party can possess a claim without it commencing an action, but a party cannot properly commence an action without it asserting at least one valid claim. Because a claim provides the basis for an action, a claim necessarily exists before an action is brought, and what matters for limitations purposes is whether an action is timely commenced asserting that claim. The legislative choice to refer to an “action” reflects these basic principles. Town of Burnside v. City of Independence, 2016 WI App 94, 372 Wis. 2d 802, 889 N.W.2d 186, 16-0034.
WI Stat § 893.11 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 893 - Limitations of commencement of actions and proceedings; procedure for claims against governmental units.|893.11 - Extension of time if no person to sue.

893.11  Extension of time if no person to sue. The fact that there is no person in existence who is authorized to bring an action on a cause of action at the time it accrues shall not extend the time within which, according to this chapter, an action may be commenced upon the cause of action to more than double the period otherwise prescribed by law.History:  1979 c. 323.Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.50 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893 and revised for the purpose of textual clarity only. [Bill 326-A]
WI Stat § 893.12 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 893 - Limitations of commencement of actions and proceedings; procedure for claims against governmental units.|893.12 - Advance payment of damages; limitation extended.

893.12  Advance payment of damages; limitation extended. The period fixed for the limitation for the commencement of actions, if a payment is made as described in s. 885.285 (1), shall be either the period of time remaining under the original statute of limitations or 3 years from the date of the last payment made under s. 885.285 (1), whichever is greater.History:  1979 c. 323.Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is created to place the statute extending statute of limitations when there has been a settlement and advance payment of claim for damages into the subchapter of chapter 893 on extension of statute of limitations. The provisions of prior s. 885.285 (4) are contained without change in newly created s. 893.12. [Bill 326-A]Any payment made in advance or settlement of either personal injury or property damage claims, when the plaintiff has both, extends the limitation for a personal injury claim, if it is made within the 3-year limit period of s. 893.54 (1). Abraham v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co. 115 Wis. 2d 678, 341 N.W.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1983).This section does not apply to foreign causes of action. Section 893.07 (1) prevents s. 893.12 from extending foreign statutes of limitation. Thimm v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. 148 Wis. 2d 332, 434 N.W.2d 842 (Ct. App. 1988).The tolling provision applies only to the party that received a settlement or advance payment under s. 885.285. It does not apply to a stranger to the settlement. Riley v. Doe, 152 Wis. 2d 766, 449 N.W.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1989).For a period of limitations to be extended under this section as the result of a “payment" by check, the check must be accepted and negotiated. Parr v. Milwaukee Bldg. & Const. Trades, 177 Wis. 2d 140, 501 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1993).To be a payment under s. 885.285 that will toll or extend the statute of limitations, a payment must be related to fault or liability. Gurney v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Co. 188 Wis. 2d 68, 523 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1994).The waiver by the defendant medical provider in a medical malpractice action of the copayment portion of the amount due for the plaintiff's medical treatment did not constitute a payment under s. 885.285 or 893.12. Young v. Aurora Medical Center, 2004 WI App 71, 272 Wis. 2d 300, 679 N.W.2d 549, 03-0224.
WI Stat § 893.135 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 893 - Limitations of commencement of actions and proceedings; procedure for claims against governmental units.|893.135 - Tolling of statute of limitations for marital property agreements.

893.135  Tolling of statute of limitations for marital property agreements. Any statute of limitations applicable to an action to enforce a marital property agreement under ch. 766 is tolled as provided under s. 766.58 (13).History:  1985 a. 37; 1987 a. 393.
WI Stat § 893.137 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 893 - Limitations of commencement of actions and proceedings; procedure for claims against governmental units.|893.137 - Tolling of statute of limitations for certain time-share actions.

893.137  Tolling of statute of limitations for certain time-share actions. Any statute of limitations affecting the right of an association organized under s. 707.30 (2) or a time-share owner, as defined in s. 707.02 (31), against a developer, as defined in s. 707.02 (11), is tolled as provided in s. 707.34 (1) (bm).History:  1987 a. 399.
WI Stat § 893.14 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 893 - Limitations of commencement of actions and proceedings; procedure for claims against governmental units.|893.14 - Limitation on use of a right of action as a defense or counterclaim.

893.14  Limitation on use of a right of action as a defense or counterclaim. Unless otherwise specifically prescribed by law, the period within which a cause of action may be used as a defense or counterclaim is computed from the time of the accrual of the cause of action until the time that the plaintiff commences the action in which the defense or counterclaim is made. A law limiting the time for commencement of an action is tolled by the assertion of the defense or the commencement of the counterclaim until final disposition of the defense or counterclaim. If a period of limitation is tolled under this section and the time remaining after final disposition in which an action may be commenced is less than 30 days, the period within which the action may be commenced is extended to 30 days from the date of final disposition.History:  1979 c. 323.Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is based upon previous ss. 893.48 and 893.49. The section provides, however, that a statute of limitations is tolled only from the assertion of the defense or counterclaim until the final disposition of the defense or counterclaim. Under previous s. 893.49 a statute of limitations was tolled from the commencement of the action in which the defense or counterclaim was asserted until the termination of the action. [Bill 326-A]When an action to recover damages for injuries to the person is commenced as a counterclaim pursuant to this section, the statute of limitations established by s. 893.54 applies. The tolling of the statute of limitation under this section begins on the date the defendant files the counterclaim. The phrase “unless otherwise specifically prescribed by law" applies to counterclaims that were already barred at the time the plaintiff filed his or her claim; such claims are not resurrected by the plaintiff's filing. Donaldson v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, 2009 WI App 134, 321 Wis. 2d 244, 773 N.W.2d 470, 08-2289.In determining whether a client exercised reasonable diligence to discover a claim against its attorney, the existence of a fiduciary relationship, rather than excusing a client entirely from its obligation to investigate, is merely one factor to be considered. Under the circumstances of this case, although a fiduciary relationship existed, the client was a sophisticated corporate actor and that its president and CEO harbored suspicions about the attorney's conduct for approximately one year before the transaction in question closed. Those facts gave rise to a duty to investigate, regardless of the fiduciary relationship. Sands v. Menard, 2016 WI App 76, 372 Wis. 2d 126, 887 N.W.2d 94, 12-2377.Affirmed on other grounds. 2017 WI 110, 379 Wis. 2d 1, 904 N.W.2d 789, 12-2377.