CO Code § 18-1.3-104 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 1.3 - Sentencing in Criminal Cases|Part 1 - Alternatives in Sentencing|§ 18-1.3-104. Alternatives in Imposition of Sentence

  Within the limitations of the applicable statute pertaining to sentencing and subject to the provisions of this title 18, the trial court has the following alternatives in entering judgment imposing a sentence:   The defendant may be granted probation unless any provision of law makes him or her ineligible for probation. The granting or denial of probation and the conditions of probation including the length of probation shall not be subject to appellate review unless probation is granted contrary to the provisions of this title.    Subject to the provisions of sections 18-1.3-401 and 18-1.3-401.5, in class 2, class 3, class 4, class 5, and class 6 felonies and level 1, level 2, level 3, and level 4 drug felonies, the defendant may be sentenced to imprisonment for a definite period of time.    (b.5) (I) Except as otherwise provided by subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b.5), any defendant who, in the determination of the court, is a candidate for an alternative sentencing option and who would otherwise be sentenced to imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) may, as an alternative, be sentenced to a specialized restitution and community service program pursuant to section 18-1.3-302, which may include restorative justice practices, as defined in section 18-1-901 (3)(o.5), if such defendant is determined eligible and is accepted into such program. To be eligible for restorative justice practices, the defendant shall not have been convicted of unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), C.R.S., a crime in which the underlying factual basis involves domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), stalking as defined in section 18-3-602, or violation of a protection order as defined in section 18-6-803.5. If the court orders the defendant to attend a restorative justice practices victim-offender conference, the facilitator of the conference shall provide his or her services for a fee of no more than one hundred twenty-five dollars, based on a sliding scale; however, the fee may be waived by the court. Any statements made during the conference shall be confidential and shall not be used as a basis for charging or prosecuting the defendant unless the defendant commits a chargeable offense during the conference.    (A) The court shall consider and may sentence any defendant who is a nonviolent offender as defined in sub-subparagraph (B) of this subparagraph (II) pursuant to subsection (2) of this section.       The defendant shall be sentenced to death in those cases in which a death sentence is required pursuant to section 18-1.3-1201 for an offense charged prior to July 1, 2020, or pursuant to section 18-1.3-1302 for an offense charged prior to July 1, 2020, or pursuant to section 18-1.4-102.    The defendant may be sentenced to the payment of a fine or to a term of imprisonment or to both a term of imprisonment and the payment of a fine; except that a person who has been twice convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, any other state, or the United States prior to the conviction for which he or she is being sentenced is not eligible to receive a fine in lieu of imprisonment. No fine shall be imposed for conviction of a felony except as provided in sections 18-1.3-401 and 25-15-310, articles 22 to 29 of title 39, or article 3 of title 42, C.R.S.    The defendant may be sentenced to comply with any other court order authorized by law.    The defendant may be sentenced to payment of costs.    The defendant may be sentenced pursuant to part 4 or 5 of this article.      If the defendant is eligible pursuant to section 18-1.3-407.5 or section 19-2.5-801 (5), the defendant may be sentenced to the youthful offender system in accordance with section 18-1.3-407. (h) (I) If the defendant is eligible pursuant to section 18-1.3-407.5 or section 19-2.5-801 (5), the defendant may be sentenced to the youthful offender system in accordance with section 18-1.3-407.    Repealed.       Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection (1) to the contrary, the court shall sentence any person convicted of a sex offense, as defined in section 18-1.3-1003 (5), committed on or after November 1, 1998, pursuant to the provisions of part 10 of this article.         The sentencing court shall consider the following factors in sentencing nonviolent offenders:   The nature and character of the offense;    The character and record of the nonviolent offender, including whether the offender is a first-time offender;    The offender's employment history;    The potential rehabilitative value of the sentencing alternatives available to the court;    Any potential impact on the safety of the victim, the victim's family, and the general public based upon sentencing alternatives available to the court; and    The offender's ability to pay restitution to the victim or the victim's family based upon the sentencing alternatives available to the court.       Repealed.    The court shall consider and may sentence a nonviolent offender to any one or any combination of the sentences described in this paragraph (c) if, upon consideration of the factors described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), the court does not grant probation pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection (2) or does not sentence the offender to the department of corrections as provided under paragraph (d) of this subsection (2):   A community corrections program pursuant to section 18-1.3-301;    A home detention program pursuant to section 18-1.3-105; or    A specialized restitution and community service program pursuant to section 18-1.3-302.       Nothing in this subsection (2) shall be construed as prohibiting a court from exercising its discretion in sentencing a nonviolent offender to the department of corrections based upon, but not limited to, any one or more factors described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2).         In determining the appropriate sentencing alternative for a defendant who has been convicted of unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), the sentencing court shall consider the defendant's previous criminal and juvenile delinquency records, if any, set forth in the presentence investigation report prepared pursuant to section 16-11-102 (1)(a), C.R.S.    For purposes of this subsection (3), “convicted” means a conviction by a jury or by a court and shall also include a deferred judgment and sentence, a deferred adjudication, an adjudication, and a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.       Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(b.5)(II)(B) is effective until March 1, 2022.  (B) [ ] As used in this section, “nonviolent offender” means a person convicted of a felony other than a crime of violence as defined in section 18-1.3-406 (2) , one of the felonies set forth in section 18-3-104 , 18-4-203 , 18-4-301 , or 18-4-401 (2)(c) or (5), or a felony offense committed against a child as set forth in articles 3, 6, and 7 of this title 18, and who is not subject to the provisions of section 18-1.3-801 .  Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(b.5)(II)(B) is effective March 1, 2022.  History. Source: L. 2002: Entire article added with relocations, p. 1368, § 2, effective October 1. L. 2002, 3rd Ex. Sess.: (1)(c) amended, p. 32, § 24, effective October 1. L. 2003: IP(1), (1)(a), and (1)(b) amended, p. 975, § 12, effective April 17. L. 2004: (1)(h)(II) repealed, p. 243, § 1, effective April 5. L. 2009: (1)(h)(I) amended,(HB 09-1122), ch. 77, p. 280, § 3, effective October 1. L. 2010: (1)(h)(I) amended,(HB 10-1413), ch. 264, p. 1204, § 4, effective August 11. L. 2011: (1)(b.5)(I) amended,(HB 11-1032), ch. 296, p. 1402, § 7, effective August 10. L. 2013: (1)(b) amended and (2)(b) repealed,(SB 13-250), ch. 333, p. 1935, § 53, effective October 1. L. 2014: (1)(b) amended,(SB 14-163), ch. 391, p. 1972, § 9, effective June 6. L. 2020: IP(1) and (1)(c) amended,(SB 20-100), ch. 61, p. 208, § 9, effective March 23. L. 2021: (1)(h)(I) amended,(SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 718, § 40, effective October 1; (1)(b.5)(II)(B) amended,(SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3168, § 181, effective March 1, 2022.    Editor's note:    This section is similar to former § 16-11-101 as it existed prior to 2002.    Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.     Cross references:   For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (1)(c), see section 16 of chapter 1 of the supplement to the Session Laws of Colorado 2002, Third Extraordinary Session.   ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “Colorado Felony Sentencing”, see 11 Colo. Law. 1478 (1982). For article, “Pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field: 1985-1986”, which discusses a case relating to increased sentence after retrial, see 15 Colo. Law. 1604 (1986). For article, “Criminal Law”, which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with questions of criminal sentencing, see 63 Den. U.L. Rev. 291 (1986).   Annotator's note. Since § 18-1.3-104 is similar to § 16-11-101 as it existed prior to the 2002 relocation of certain criminal sentencing provisions, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.   Only the general assembly may define crimes and prescribe punishments. People v. Hinchman, 196 Colo. 526 , 589 P.2d 917 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941, 99 S. Ct. 2883, 61 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1979).   It is the general assembly's prerogative to define crimes and prescribe punishments; the courts have no jurisdiction to impose sentences not in accord with the minimum and maximum terms specified by statute. People v. Trujillo, 631 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1981).   Trial court had no authority to order alternate sentence in the event that death penalty statute was later found unconstitutional and, therefore, alternate sentence is illegal and void. People v. Corbett, 713 P.2d 1337 (Colo. App. 1985).   The purpose of this section is to give greater flexibility in sentencing. Nugent v. District Court, 184 Colo. 353 , 520 P.2d 592 (1974).   Probation is accorded only to a defendant who seeks it or is willing to accept it as a sentence. People v. Rollins, 771 P.2d 32 (Colo. App. 1989).   A trial court cannot impose a sentence to probation without the defendant's consent to the terms and conditions of the probationary sentence. Veith v. People, 2017 CO 19, 390 P.3d 403.   Defendant consented to probation in lieu of incarceration; the trial court exceeded the scope of defendant's consent when it imposed a sentence of ten years of incarceration in addition to probation. The trial court lacked authority to impose that sentence. Veith v. People, 2017 CO 19, 390 P.3d 403.   The court may impose a fine in lieu of incarceration or probation without the consent of the prosecutor where defendant is convicted of a class 2 felony not involving violence or an assault on a firefighter or a peace officer. People v. Thompson, 897 P.2d 857 (Colo. App. 1994).   Under this section, the trial court may grant probation, if a defendant is eligible for probation, or the trial court may impose a sentence of imprisonment for a definite period of time. Chae v. People, 780 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1989).   Under parole procedures an indeterminate sentence usually results in an earlier release. It cannot be said to be harsh or excessive so as to require the scrutiny of an appellate court. Nugent v. District Court, 184 Colo. 353 , 520 P.2d 592 (1974).   Convicted defendant entitled to indeterminate sentence where act effective prior to conviction. A defendant convicted in a criminal proceeding which was not yet final was entitled to indeterminate sentencing in a Crim. P. 35 proceeding since this section and § 16-11-304 requiring such sentencing became effective after the commission of the crime but prior to the date of conviction and sentencing. People v. Griswold, 190 Colo. 136 , 543 P.2d 1251 (1975).   Section 18-1-409 entitled defendant to benefit of this section. Defendant, who was sentenced prior to the effective date of the 1973 amendments to this section and § 16-11-304 -- which legislation provided for the imposition of indeterminate sentences for class 4 and class 5 felonies -- was entitled to the benefit of this legislation under relief sought by § 18-1-409 . People v. Thornton, 187 Colo. 202 , 529 P.2d 628 (1974).   A defendant who was sentenced to a term with a fixed minimum and fixed maximum for conviction of a class 4 felony was entitled under § 18-1-409 to the benefits of this section and § 16-11-304 . People v. Race, 187 Colo. 204 , 529 P.2d 629 (1974).   Repeal of subsection (1)(d) after sentence no ground for relief. Where the effective date (July 1, 1979) of the repeal of § 16-11-101 (1)(d) was more than three months after the defendant was sentenced under its provisions, the repeal did not entitle the defendant to relief under § 18-1-410 (1)(f)(I) . People v. Steelman, 200 Colo. 177 , 613 P.2d 334 (1980).   Supreme court was without power to alter minimum sentence to indeterminate sentence. Where defendant, who was sentenced to a minimum term of three years for the crime of manslaughter, sought a declaration that he was immediately eligible for parole consideration on the ground that this section and § 16-11-304 , enacted subsequent to his sentencing, required that a maximum sentence be imposed but eliminated the minimum sentence for the crime of manslaughter, the supreme court held that it did not have the power to alter defendant's minimum sentence to make the sentence indeterminate. People v. Davis, 186 Colo. 186 , 526 P.2d 312 (1974).   Duration of period of probation is limited to maximum term of imprisonment specified for the offense in question, and the provision of § 16-11-202 permitting the court to grant probation “for such a period and upon such terms and conditions as it deems best”, does not give the court the authority to extend the terms of probation beyond the maximum term of imprisonment. People v. Knaub, 624 P.2d 922 (Colo. App. 1980); People v. Benavidez, 58 P.3d 1142 (Colo. App. 2002).   For the period of probation allowable for offenses within the presumptive ranges established by § 18-1-105 , see People v. Flenniken, 749 P.2d 395 (Colo. 1988) and People v. Hunter, 757 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1988).   A trial court may not impose a probationary term that is greater than the longest possible period of incarceration for the underlying misdemeanor. People v. Kennaugh, 80 P.3d 315 (Colo. 2003).   The maximum sentences established in § 18-1-105 for imprisonment periods do not apply to probation periods to which a defendant may be sentenced. People v. Flenniken, 749 P.2d 395 (Colo. 1988).   District court possessed jurisdiction to sentence defendant to a term of probation which did not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment in the aggravated range for the crime committed; the term of probation was not limited to the presumptive range for the crime committed. Hunter v. People, 757 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1988).   Incarceration a possible condition of probation. Incarceration, while a sentencing alternative, is also a possible specific condition of probation. People v. Horton, 628 P.2d 117 (Colo. App. 1980).   Sentencing following revocation of deferred judgment. When a deferred judgment is revoked in a felony case, sentencing to the penitentiary is not mandatory. The type of sentence to be imposed after the revocation of the deferred sentence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and a defendant is entitled to a consideration of all statutory sentencing alternatives at the time the deferred sentence is revoked and judgment of conviction is entered against him. Adair v. People, 651 P.2d 389 (Colo. 1982).   Court cannot suspend portion of sentence to alter limits of sentence. The court may not circumvent legislative dictates by first sentencing within legislatively prescribed parameters, and then suspending a portion of the minimum and maximum, for to do so would be an invasion of the general assembly's exclusive province to set punishments. People v. Hinchman, 196 Colo. 526 , 589 P.2d 917 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941, 99 S. Ct. 2883, 61 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1979).   Trial court may not suspend sentence after denying probation. There are no provisions in this article authorizing the suspension of imposition or execution of sentence apart from a concomitant grant of probation, and a trial court may not circumvent the statutory requirements by denying probation and thereafter undertaking to suspend a sentence validly imposed. People v. Patrick, 38 Colo. App. 103, 555 P.2d 182 (1976).   A trial court, having rejected probation, cannot circumvent legislative dictates by sentencing within prescribed parameters, suspending the sentence, and then imposing conditions which are authorized only in connection with probation. People v. District Court, 673 P.2d 991 (Colo. 1983); People v. Flenniken, 749 P.2d 395 (Colo. 1988).   District court had no statutory authority to suspend the sentence of imprisonment and to impose conditions on that suspension. Chae v. People, 780 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1989).   Decision to deny probation is not subject to appellate review where trial court considered all circumstances and available evidence. People v. Godwin, 679 P.2d 1095 (Colo. App. 1983); People v. Graham, 678 P.2d 1043 (Colo. App. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216, 104 S. Ct. 2660, 81 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1984); People v. Robinson, 713 P.2d 1333 (Colo. App. 1985); People v. Emery, 812 P.2d 665 (Colo. App. 1990).   Appellate court has jurisdiction to review conditions of probation. The appellate court has jurisdiction under subsection (1)(a) to review the conditions of defendant's probation where the argument is that the conditions of probation are contrary to the provisions of this title. People v. Cera, 673 P.2d 807 (Colo. App. 1983); People v. Brockelman, 916 P.2d 592 (Colo. App. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 933 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1997); People v. Watkins, 2012 COA 15 , 282 P.3d 500; People v. Jenkins, 2013 COA 76 , 305 P.3d 420.   However, the appellate court has no jurisdiction under subsection (1)(a) to review the conditions of probation where the argument is that the conditions of probation are contrary to the provisions of title 17. People v. Smith, 681 P.2d 525 (Colo. App. 1983).   When credit for presentence confinement presumed. Credit for presentence confinement must be presumed when the sentence imposed, plus the presentence confinement, does not exceed the maximum possible sentence. People v. Lobato, 192 Colo. 357 , 559 P.2d 224 (1977).   Having initially taken into consideration the presentence confinement, it was not necessary for a court in resentencing to again recite what had been expressly stated before -- that presentence confinement had been considered by the court. People v. Lobato, 192 Colo. 357 , 559 P.2d 224 (1977).   This section defines the sentencing alternatives that are within a court's jurisdiction which do not include the authority to enter orders modifying parole eligibility. People v. Anaya, 894 P.2d 28 (Colo. App. 1994).   The substance of the principles articulated in the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 3.5, insofar as they are consistent with the stated general purposes of the Colorado code of criminal procedure, may be deemed to be “authorized by law” within the meaning of paragraph (f) of subsection (1) of this section and Crim. P. 32(b). People v. Lewis, 193 Colo. 203 , 564 P.2d 111 (1977).   Applied in People v. Sandoval, 36 Colo. App. 403, 541 P.2d 105 (1975); People v. Soper, 628 P.2d 604 (Colo. 1981); People v. Hotopp, 632 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1981); People v. Quintana, 634 P.2d 413 (Colo. 1981), overruled on other grounds in People v. Porter, 2015 CO 34, 348 P.3d 922; People v. Madonna, 651 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1982); People v. Manley, 707 P.2d 1021 (Colo. App. 1985).