CO Code § 31-2-106 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 31 - Government - Municipal|Article 2 - Formation and Reorganization|Part 1 - Incorporation|§ 31-2-106. Legal Incorporation - Validation - Dedication of Public Property

  Any city or town which is formed, organized, or incorporated and which exercises the rights and powers of a city or town and has in office a governing body exercising its duties is deemed legally incorporated. The legality of such formation or organization shall not be legally denied or questioned after six months from the date thereof; it is deemed a legally incorporated city or town; and its formation, organization, or incorporation shall not thereafter be questioned.    All cities and towns organized pursuant to the general laws of this state prior to July 1, 1975, are hereby validated, and the proceedings adopted therein, and obligations incurred by such cities and towns are hereby validated and confirmed.    All streets, parks, and other places designated or described as for public use on the map or plat of any city or town are public property, and the fee title thereto is vested in such city or town.     History. Source: L. 75: Entire title R&RE, p. 1012, § 1, effective July 1.    Editor's note:   This section is similar to former §§ 31-1-108 and 31-1-109 as they existed prior to 1975.   ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. PUBLIC DEDICATION.     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Annotator's note. Since § 31-2-106 is similar to former §§ 31-1-108 and 31-1-109 prior to the 1975 repeal and reenactment of this title, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.   Legal existence conclusively presumed. The legal existence of a municipal corporation will be conclusively presumed under this section when, without question, a board of municipal officers exercising their official duties has been maintained for more than one year (now six months). People v. Curley, 5 Colo. 412 (1880).   Where it appears that a town, acting as such, has, for more than 12 years, exercised the powers of a municipal corporation, and for more than two years has had a full complement of officials, exercising their offices, the regularity of its organization is conclusively presumed. Lavelle v. Town of Julesburg, 49 Colo. 290 , 112 P. 774 (1910).   Compliance with § 31-2-105 prerequisite to application of this section. Where a decree rendered under § 31-1-105 (now § 31-2-103 ) recited that a town was adjudged incorporated “upon the further compliance with the law in such cases made and provided”, the quoted phrase had reference to § 31-3-107 (now § 31-2-105 ) and a compliance with the provisions thereof was necessary before the limitation prescribed by this section would begin to run. Norton v. People ex rel. Rudbeck, 102 Colo. 489 , 81 P.2d 393 (1938).   II. PUBLIC DEDICATION.   Law reviews. For article, “Resubdividing and Replatting”, see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 529 (1956). For note, “Ownership of Streets and Rights of Abutting Land -- Owners in Colorado”, see 40 Den. L. Ctr. J. 26 (1963).   Annotator's note. For additional annotations concerning the dedication of public property, see § 31-23-107 .   The intent and purpose of subsection (3) is to clothe the city in its governmental capacity with the entire title to the streets, as such, for public use, and not for the “profit or emolument of the city”. City of Leadville v. Bohn Mining Co., 37 Colo. 248 , 86 P. 1038 (1906).   Upon the incorporation of a town, all avenues, streets, and alleys appearing on the map annexed to the petition for incorporation became public property and the fee thereof became vested in the town. Brell v. Ovid, 88 Colo. 198 , 293 P. 961 (1930).   Subsection (3) applies only to cities and towns and does not apply to county or state highways. Buell v. Redding Miller, Inc., 163 Colo. 286 , 430 P.2d 471 (1967).   Term “fee” means a “complete” title in city. Because under subsection (3) the general assembly intended, by the use of the term “street”, to vest in the city such estate or interest as is reasonable necessary to enable it to utilize the surface and so much of the ground underneath as might be required for laying gas pipes, building sewers, and other municipal purposes. In other words, the general assembly used the term “fee”, not according to its technical legal meaning, but as vesting in the city a complete, perpetual, and continuous title to the space designated as streets, so long as it used them for the purpose intended. City of Leadville v. Bohn Mining Co., 37 Colo. 248 , 86 P. 1038 (1906).   The fee passes by statutory dedication, unburden of a trust. City of Leadville v. Colo. Mining Co., 29 Colo. 17 , 67 P. 289 (1901).   But a city has no interest in the ores that may exist under a street. City of Leadville v. Bohn Mining Co., 37 Colo. 248 , 86 P. 1038 (1906).   Where, in an action to recover lands formerly included in certain streets alleged to have reverted to the original grantor, it appears from the complaint that the map or plat of the town was duly recorded in the office of the recorder of the county and that the plats of the streets in controversy were also duly recorded, it will be presumed as against the pleader that all the plats mentioned were made, certified, acknowledged, and recorded as required by law; and from a further allegation that this town was later included in another town duly incorporated, it will be presumed that the limits of the latter town were extended in the manner recognized by law, and that the title to said streets dedicated by the plats became vested therein by statutory dedication, which divests the original grantor of title without acceptance by the town, in accordance with this section. Bothwell v. Denver Union Stockyards Co., 39 Colo. 221 , 90 P. 1127 (1907).   No statutory dedication. When a plat plan specifically excludes an avenue from the dedication of other streets and avenues to public use, no statutory dedication of the excluded avenue has taken place. State Dept. of Highways v. Town of Silverthorne, 707 P.2d 1017 (Colo. App. 1985), cert. dismissed, 736 P.2d 411 (1987).   Where it was undisputed that land used as a park was not designated for public use on a map or plat, it was not statutorily dedicated as a park. Save Cheyenne v. City of Colo. Springs, , 425 P.3d 1174 (decided based on 1877 statutory language similar to subsection (3)).