CO Code § 27-65-111 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 27 - Behavioral Health|Article 65 - Care and Treatment of Persons With Mental Health Disorders|§ 27-65-111. Hearing Procedures - Jurisdiction

  Hearings before the court pursuant to section 27-65-107, 27-65-108, or 27-65-109 are conducted in the same manner as other civil proceedings before the court. The burden of proof is on the person or facility seeking to detain the respondent. The court or jury shall determine that the respondent is in need of care and treatment only if the court or jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person has a mental health disorder and, as a result of the mental health disorder, is a danger to others or to himself or herself or is gravely disabled.    The court, after consultation with respondent's counsel to obtain counsel's recommendations, may appoint a professional person to examine the respondent for whom short-term treatment or long-term care and treatment is sought and to testify at the hearing before the court as to the results of his or her examination. The court-appointed professional person shall act solely in an advisory capacity, and no presumption shall attach to his or her findings.    Every respondent subject to an order for short-term treatment or long-term care and treatment shall be advised of his or her right to appeal the order by the court at the conclusion of any hearing as a result of which such an order may be entered.    The court in which the petition is filed under section 27-65-106 or the certification is filed under section 27-65-107 shall be the court of original jurisdiction and of continuing jurisdiction for any further proceedings under this article. When the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice would be promoted by a change in the court having jurisdiction, the court may order a transfer of the proceeding to another county. Until further order of the transferee court, if any, it shall be the court of continuing jurisdiction.      In the event that a respondent or a person found not guilty by reason of impaired mental condition pursuant to section 16-8-103.5 (5), C.R.S., or by reason of insanity pursuant to section 16-8-105 (4) or 16-8-105.5, C.R.S., refuses to accept medication, the court having jurisdiction of the action pursuant to subsection (4) of this section, the court committing the person or defendant to the custody of the department pursuant to section 16-8-103.5 (5), 16-8-105 (4), or 16-8-105.5, C.R.S., or the court of the jurisdiction in which the designated facility treating the respondent or person is located shall have jurisdiction and venue to accept a petition by a treating physician and to enter an order requiring that the respondent or person accept such treatment or, in the alternative, that the medication be forcibly administered to him or her. The court of the jurisdiction in which the designated facility is located shall not exercise its jurisdiction without the permission of the court that committed the person to the custody of the department. Upon the filing of such a petition, the court shall appoint an attorney, if one has not been appointed, to represent the respondent or person and hear the matter within ten days.    In any case brought under paragraph (a) of this subsection (5) in a court for the county in which the treating facility is located, the county where the proceeding was initiated pursuant to subsection (4) of this section or the court committing the person to the custody of the department pursuant to section 16-8-103.5 (5), 16-8-105 (4), or 16-8-105.5, C.R.S., shall either reimburse the county in which the proceeding pursuant to this subsection (5) was filed and in which the proceeding was held for the reasonable costs incurred in conducting the proceeding or conduct the proceeding itself using its own personnel and resources, including its own district or county attorney, as the case may be.    In the case of a defendant who is found incompetent to proceed pursuant to section 16-8.5-103, C.R.S., and who refuses to accept medication, the jurisdiction for the petition for involuntary treatment procedures shall be as set forth in section 16-8.5-112, C.R.S.       All proceedings under this article, including proceedings to impose a legal disability pursuant to section 27-65-127, shall be conducted by the district attorney of the county where the proceeding is held or by a qualified attorney acting for the district attorney appointed by the district court for that purpose; except that, in any county or in any city and county having a population exceeding fifty thousand persons, the proceedings shall be conducted by the county attorney or by a qualified attorney acting for the county attorney appointed by the district court. In any case in which there has been a change of venue to a county other than the county of residence of the respondent or the county in which the certification proceeding was commenced, the county from which the proceeding was transferred shall either reimburse the county to which the proceeding was transferred and in which the proceeding was held for the reasonable costs incurred in conducting the proceeding or conduct the proceeding itself using its own personnel and resources, including its own district or county attorney, as the case may be. Upon request of a guardian appointed pursuant to article 14 of title 15, C.R.S., the guardian may intervene in any proceeding under this article concerning his or her ward and, through counsel, may present evidence and represent to the court the views of the guardian concerning the appropriate disposition of the case.      History. Source: L. 2010: Entire article added with relocations,(SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 690, § 2, effective April 29. L. 2017: (1) amended,(SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1345, § 239, effective May 25.    Editor's note:   This section is similar to former § 27-10-111 as it existed prior to 2010.   Cross references:   For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.   ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “Commitment Procedures in Colorado”, see 29 Dicta 273 (1952). For article, “New Legislation Concerning the Mentally Disabled”, see 11 Colo. Law. 2131 (1982). For article, “Respect for the Values and Preferences of Mental Patients: The Medina Trilogy”, see 11 Colo. Law. 3014 (1982). For article, “The Clinton Mental Health Case -- A Civil Procedure Lesson”, see 19 Colo. Law. 1809 (1990).   Annotator's note. Since § 27-65-111 is similar to § 27-10-111 as it existed prior to the 2010 amendments to this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.   Involuntary commitment to mental hospital is deprivation of liberty which the state cannot accomplish without procedural safeguards. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).   Privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable to civil commitment proceedings. Due process does not require that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination be extended to Colorado's civil commitment proceedings. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).   Former §§ 27-10-111 (1) and 27-10-107 (3) , read together, clearly and unambiguously grant a right to a jury hearing to a person being certified for short-term treatment. People in Interest of Hoylman, 865 P.2d 918 (Colo. App. 1993).   The term “danger” in subsection (1) does not offend due process as long as the state proves by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the individual's mental illness results in a present danger to herself or others or renders her gravely disabled. People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1988).   Standard of proof meets minimum standards of procedural due process. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).   Less restrictive alternatives need not be considered as a condition precedent to certification. Civil commitment constitutes a severe infringement of liberty requiring due process protection. However, the statutory scheme set forth in this article contains a number of procedural safeguards that greatly reduce the inherent risk of erroneous deprivation. Therefore, due process does not require a mandatory hearing at the time of certification since the statute provides for a hearing on request. People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1988).   “Clear and convincing evidence”, required by subsection (1), is evidence which is stronger than a preponderance of the evidence, and which is unmistakable and free from serious or substantial doubt. People v. Lane, 196 Colo. 42 , 581 P.2d 719 (1978).   Where three medical experts testified at the certification hearing that appellant was potentially dangerous to herself or to others, there was clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable basis to believe that appellant's mental illness resulted in a present danger to herself or others, thereby satisfying the prerequisite conditions for short-term certification pursuant to former § 27-10-107 . People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1988).   The need for electroconvulsive therapy for a person involuntarily committed must be established by clear and convincing evidence. People in Interest of M.K.M., 765 P.2d 1075 (Colo. App. 1988).   If it is shown that person is mentally ill, short-term involuntary commitment cannot be justified unless it is shown that, as a result of such illness, the person is: (1) a danger to others; (2) a danger to himself; (3) “gravely disabled” because of an inability to take care of basic personal needs; or (4) “gravely disabled” because the person is “making irrational or grossly irresponsible decisions concerning his person and lacks the capacity to understand this is so”. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).   Mere disability alone is insufficient to warrant involuntary commitment. Mere disability alone, even if found in conjunction with mental illness, is not enough to warrant involuntary commitment. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).   Dangerousness to others may be shown by evidence of injurious acts, attempts, or threats. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).   Dangerousness to oneself may be shown by similar evidence, where the individual's injurious behavior is directed toward himself. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).   Passive injury to oneself, because of an inability to take care of one's most basic personal needs, may be as dangerous or damaging to the individual as the active threat posed by suicide. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).   Former § 27-10-107 requires that a causal nexus be established between a person's mental illness and the condition of being a danger to others or to himself or gravely disabled. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).   Uncorroborated psychiatric opinion sufficient. In some cases, a psychiatric opinion, not corroborated by evidence of recent dangerous conduct, may constitute “clear and convincing evidence” of dangerousness, and therefore may be sufficient to sustain a commitment based on dangerousness. People v. Lane, 196 Colo. 42 , 581 P.2d 719 (1978).   Right of indigent appellant to transcript at state expense. An indigent appellant in a mental health proceeding for involuntary confinement and treatment has a right under the due process guarantees of the United States and Colorado constitutions to a transcript at state expense. Goedecke v. State Dept. of Insts., 198 Colo. 407 , 603 P.2d 123 (1979).   Stringent release standards reasonably related to public safety. The more stringent standards of release applicable to the criminally committed defendant reflect the increased risk to the public associated with the release decision, and, as in the case of automatic commitment, they are reasonably related to the state's interest in public safety. People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981).   Court order required for administering medication to incompetent absent his consent. Absent an emergency situation calling for immediate action (in which event the least intrusive means should be used by the physician to meet the emergency), antipsychotic medication shall not be administered to a mentally incompetent institutionalized patient who has not given his consent to this medication unless ordered by a court following a proper hearing. People in Interest of Medina, 662 P.2d 184 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985); People v. Pflugbeil, 834 P.2d 843 (Colo. App. 1992).   Test in People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985), for forcibly administering medication applies equally to a forcible increase in medication dosage. The second Medina element requires a patient to be deteriorating, which does not mean the same thing as “not improving”. A patient who is simply not improving will not satisfy the Medina test for forcible administration of medication. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, 364 P.3d 499.   The statutory authorization to forcibly administer medication related to mental illnesses does not grant the state unlimited authority to administer any medical treatment or medication, even if the four Medina factors are satisfied. The involuntary chemical castration of a person committed by the state to the care of the state hospital by virtue of his mental illness may only be authorized by the general assembly through statute, which it is not. People in Interest of C.J.R., 2016 COA 133 , 409 P.3d 536.   The possibility that a certain medication may no longer be an effective treatment, or may not be taken voluntarily, at some unspecified time in the future is insufficient to justify the entry of an order authorizing the immediate administration of multiple other medications. As such, the people failed to meet the burden set forth under People in Interest of Medina. People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99 M, __ P.3d __.   For presence of respondent at hearing, see Isham v. People, 82 Colo. 550 , 262 P. 89 (1927).   For reopening of proceedings under earlier provisions, see Wood v. Throckmorton, 26 Colo. 248 , 57 P. 699 (1899); Ex parte Rainbolt, 64 Colo. 581 , 172 P. 1068 (1918); People ex rel. Best v. County Court, 110 Colo. 249 , 132 P.2d 799 (1942); In re People in Interest of Hill, 118 Colo. 571 , 198 P.2d 450 (1948).   Assistant county attorney is absolutely immune from suit concerning her actions and omissions related to the fulfillment of her statutory obligation pursuant to former subsection (5) to conduct commitment proceedings once the petition for a 72-hour evaluation has been submitted. Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897 (10th Cir. 2000).   Applied in Sisneros v. District Court, 199 Colo. 179 , 606 P.2d 55 (1980); In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981); In re P.F. v. Walsh, 648 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982).