CO Code § 15-1-1103 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 15 - Probate, Trusts, and Fiduciaries|Article 1 - Fiduciary|Part 11 - Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act|§ 15-1-1103. Standard of Conduct in Managing and Investing Institutional Fund

  Subject to the intent of a donor expressed in a gift instrument, an institution, in managing and investing an institutional fund, shall consider the charitable purposes of the institution and the purposes of the institutional fund.    In addition to complying with the duty of loyalty imposed by law other than this part 11, each person responsible for managing and investing an institutional fund shall manage and invest the institutional fund in good faith and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.    In managing and investing an institutional fund, an institution:   May incur only costs that are appropriate and reasonable in relation to the assets, the purposes of the institution, and the skills available to the institution; and    Shall make a reasonable effort to verify facts relevant to the management and investment of the institutional fund.       An institution may pool two or more institutional funds for purposes of management and investment.    Except as otherwise provided by a gift instrument, the following rules apply:   In managing and investing an institutional fund, the following factors, if relevant, must be considered:   General economic conditions;    The possible effect of inflation or deflation;    The expected tax consequences, if any, of investment decisions or strategies;    The role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall investment portfolio of the institutional fund;    The expected total return from income and the appreciation of investments;    Other resources of the institution;    The needs of the institution and the institutional fund to make distributions and to preserve capital; and    An asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the charitable purposes of the institution.    To make or cause to be made discretionary distributions of either principal or income to or for the direct or indirect benefit of such trustee; except that such a power may be exercised by such trustee to the extent that it may be exercised to provide for that trustee's health, education, maintenance, or support as described under sections 2041 and 2514 of the federal “Internal Revenue Code of 1986”, as amended;       Management and investment decisions about an individual asset must be made not in isolation but rather in the context of the institutional fund's portfolio of investments as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the institutional fund and to the institution.    Except as otherwise provided by law other than this part 11, an institution may invest in any kind of property or type of investment consistent with this section.    An institution shall diversify the investments of an institutional fund unless the institution reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the institutional fund are better served without diversification.    Within a reasonable time after receiving property, an institution shall make and carry out decisions concerning the retention or disposition of the property or to rebalance a portfolio, in order to bring the institutional fund into compliance with the purposes, terms, and distribution requirements of the institution as necessary to meet other circumstances of the institution and the requirements of this part 11.    A person that has special skills or expertise, or is selected in reliance upon the person's representation that the person has special skills or expertise, has a duty to use those skills or that expertise in managing and investing institutional funds.        History. Source: L. 2008: Entire part R&RE, p. 560, § 1, effective September 1.    Editor's note:   This section is similar to former §§ 15-1-1106 and 15-1-1108 as they existed prior to 2008.   OFFICIAL COMMENT   Purpose and Scope of Revisions. This section adopts the prudence standard for investment decision making. The section directs directors or others responsible for managing and investing the funds of an institution to act as a prudent investor would, using a portfolio approach in making investments and considering the risk and return objectives of the fund. The section lists the factors that commonly bear on decisions in fiduciary investing and incorporates the duty to diversify investments absent a conclusion that special circumstances make a decision not to diversify reasonable. Thus, the section follows modern portfolio theory for investment decision making. Section 3 applies to all funds held by an institution, regardless of whether the institution obtained the funds by gift or otherwise and regardless of whether the funds are restricted.   The Drafting Committee discussed extensively the standard that should govern nonprofit managers. UMIFA states the standard as “ordinary business care and prudence under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the action or decision.” Since the decision in Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (1974), the trend has been to hold directors of nonprofit corporations to a standard nominally similar to the corporate standard but with the recognition that the facts and circumstances considered include the fact that the entity is a charity and not a business corporation.   The language of the prudence standard adopted in UPMIFA is derived from the RMNCA and from the prudent investor rule of UPIA. The standard is consistent with the business judgment standard under corporate law, as applied to charitable institutions. That is, a manager operating a charitable organization under the business judgment rule would look to the same factors as those identified by the prudent investor rule. The standard for prudent investment set forth in Section 3 first states the duty of care as articulated in the RMNCA, but provides more specific guidance for those managing and investing institutional funds by incorporating language from UPIA. The criteria derived from UPIA are consistent with good practice under current law applicable to nonprofit corporations.   Trust law norms already inform managers of nonprofit corporations. The Preamble to UPIA explains: “Although the Uniform Prudent Investor Act by its terms applies to trusts and not to charitable corporations, the standards of the Act can be expected to inform the investment responsibilities of directors and officers of charitable corporations.” See also, Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 379, Comment b, at 190 (1992) (stating that “absent a contrary statute or other provision, the prudent investor rule applies to investment of funds held for charitable corporations.”). Trust precedents have routinely been found to be helpful but not binding authority in corporate cases.   The Drafting Committee decided that by adopting language from both the RMNCA and UPIA, UPMIFA could clarify that common standards of prudent investing apply to all charitable institutions. Although the principal trust authorities, UPIA § (2)(a), Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 337, UTC § 804, and Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 (prudent administration) use the phrase “care, skill and caution,” the Drafting Committee decided to use the more familiar corporate formulation as found in RMNCA. The standard also appears in Sections 3, 4 and 5 of UPMIFA. The Drafting Committee does not intend any substantive change to the UPIA standard and believes that “reasonable care, skill, and caution” are implicit in the term “care” as used in the RMNCA. The Drafting Committee included the detailed provisions from UPIA, because the Committee believed that the greater precision of the prudence norms of the Restatement and UPIA, as compared with UMIFA, could helpfully inform managers of charitable institutions. For an explanation of the Prudent Investor Act, see John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 641 (1996), and for a discussion of the effect UPIA has had on investment decision making, see Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J. L. & Econ. (forthcoming 2007).   Section 3 has incorporated the provisions of UPIA with only a few exceptions. UPIA applies to private trusts and is entirely default law. The settlor of a private trust has complete control over virtually all trust provisions. See UTC § 105. Because UPMIFA applies to charitable organizations, UPMIFA makes the duty of care, the duty to minimize costs, and the duty to investigate mandatory. The duty of loyalty is mandatory under applicable organization law, corporate or trust. Other than these duties, the provisions of Section 3 are default rules. A gift instrument or the governing instruments of an institution can modify these duties, but the charitable purpose doctrine limits the extent to which an institution or a donor can restrict these duties. In addition, subsection (a) of Section 3 reminds the decision maker that the intent of a donor expressed in a gift instrument will control decision making. Further, the decision maker must consider the charitable purposes of the institution and the purposes of the institutional fund for which decisions are being made. These factors are specific to charitable organizations; UPIA § 2(a) states the duty to consider similar factors in the private trust context.   UPMIFA does not include the duty of impartiality, stated in UPIA § 6, because nonprofit corporations do not confront the multiple beneficiaries problem to which the duty is addressed. Under UPIA, a trustee must treat the current beneficiaries and the remainder beneficiaries with due regard to their respective interests, subject to alternative direction from the trust document. A nonprofit corporation typically creates one charity. The institution may serve multiple beneficiaries, but those beneficiaries do not have enforceable rights in the institution in the same way that beneficiaries of a private trust do. Of course, if a charitable trust is created to benefit more than one charity, rather than being created to carry out a charitable purpose, then UPIA will apply the duty of impartiality to that trust.   In other respects, the Drafting Committee made changes to language from UPIA only where necessary to adapt the language for charitable institutions. No material differences are intended. Subsection (e)(1)(D) of Section 3 of UPMIFA does not include a clause that appears at the end of UPIA § 2(c)(4) (“which may include financial assets, interest in closely held enterprises, tangible and intangible personal property, and real property.”). The Drafting Committee deemed this clause unnecessary for charitable institutions. The language of subsection (e)(1)(G) reflects a modification of the language of UPIA § (2)(c)(7). Other minor modifications to the UPIA provisions make the language more appropriate for charitable institutions.   The duties imposed by this section apply to those who govern an institution, including directors and trustees, and to those to whom the directors or managers delegate responsibility for investment and management of institutional funds. The standard applies to officers and employees of an institution and to agents who invest and manage institutional funds. Volunteers who work with an institution will be subject to the duties imposed here, but state and federal statutes may provide reduced liability for persons who act without compensation. UPMIFA does not affect the application of those shield statutes.   Subsection (a). Donor Intent and Charitable Purposes. Subsection (a) states the overarching duty to comply with donor intent as expressed in the terms of the gift instrument. The emphasis in the Act on giving effect to donor intent does not mean that the donor can or should control the management of the institution. The other fundamental duty is the duty to consider the charitable purposes of the institution and of the institutional fund in making management and investment decisions. UPIA § 2(a) states a similar duty to consider the purposes of a trust in investing and managing assets of a trust.   Subsection (b). Duty of Loyalty. Subsection (b) reminds those managing and investing institutional funds that the duty of loyalty will apply to their actions, but Section 3 does not state the loyalty standard that applies. The Drafting Committee was concerned, at least nominally, that different standards of loyalty may apply to directors of nonprofit corporations and to trustees of charitable trusts. The RMNCA provides that under the duty of loyalty a director of a nonprofit corporation should act “in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.” RMNCA § 8.30. The trust law articulation of the loyalty standard uses “sole interests” rather than “best interests.” As the Restatement of Trusts explains, “[t]he trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.” Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 (1). Although the standards for loyalty, like the standard of care, are merging, see Evelyn Brody, Charitable Governance: What's Trust Law Got to do With It? Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (2005); John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest, 114 Yale L.J. 929 (2005), the Drafting Committee concluded that formulating a duty of loyalty provision for UPMIFA was unnecessary. Thus the duty of loyalty under nonprofit corporation law will apply to charities organized as nonprofit corporations, and the duty of loyalty under trust law will apply to charitable trusts.   Subsection (b). Duty of Care. Subsection (b) also applies the duty of care to performance of investment duties. The language derives from § 8.30 of the RMNCA. This subsection states the duty to act in good faith, “with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.” Although the language in the RMNCA and in UPMIFA is similar to that of § 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act (3d ed. 2002), the standard as applied to persons making decisions for charities is informed by the fact that the institution is a charity and not a business corporation. Thus, in UPMIFA the references to “like position” and “similar circumstances” mean that the charitable nature of the institution affects the decision making of a prudent person acting under the standard set forth in subsection (b). The duty of care involves considering the factors set forth in subsection (e)(1).   Subsection (c)(1). Duty to Minimize Costs. Subsection (c)(1) tracks the language of UPIA § 7 and requires an institution to minimize costs. An institution may prudently incur costs by hiring an investment advisor, but the costs incurred should be appropriate under the circumstances. See UPIA § 7 cmt; Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227, cmt. M, at 58 (1992); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 188 (1959). The duty is consistent with the duty to act prudently under § 8.30 of the RMNCA.   Subsection (c)(2). Duty to Investigate. This subsection incorporates the traditional fiduciary duty to investigate, using language from UPIA § 2(d). The subsection requires persons who make investment and management decisions to investigate the accuracy of the information used in making decisions.   Subsection (d). Pooling Funds. An institution holding more than one institutional fund may find that pooling its funds for investment and management purposes will be economically beneficial. The Act permits pooling for these purposes. The prohibition against commingling no longer prevents pooling funds for investment and management purposes. See UPIA § 3, cmt. (duty to diversify aided by pooling); UPIA § 7, cmt. (pooling to minimize costs); Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Duty to Segregate and Identify Trust Property § 84 (T.D. No. 4 2005). Funds will be considered individually for other purposes of the Act, including for the spending rule for endowment funds of Section 4 and the modification rules of Section 6.   Subsection (e)(1). Prudent Decision Making. Subsection (e)(1) takes much of its language from UPIA § 2(c). In making decisions about whether to acquire or retain an asset, the institution should consider the institution's mission, its current programs, and the desire to cultivate additional donations from a donor, in addition to factors related more directly to the asset's potential as an investment.   Subsection (e)(1)(C) reflects the fact that some organizations will invest in taxable investments that may generate unrelated business taxable income for income tax purposes.   Assets held primarily for program-related purposes are not subject to UPMIFA. The management of those assets will continue to be governed by other laws applicable to the institution. Other assets may not be held primarily for program-related purposes but may have both investment purposes and program-related purposes. Subsections (a) and (e)(1)(H) indicate that a prudent decision maker can take into consideration the relationship between an investment and the purposes of the institution and of the institutional fund in making an investment that may have a program-related purpose but not be primarily program-related. The degree to which an institution uses an asset to accomplish a charitable purpose will affect the weight given that factor in a decision to acquire or retain the asset.   Subsection (e)(2). Portfolio Approach. This subsection reflects the use of portfolio theory in modern investment practice. The language comes from UPIA § 2(b), which follows the articulation of the prudent investor standard in Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227(a) (1992).   Subsection (e)(3). Broad Investment Authority. Consistent with the portfolio theory of investment, this subsection permits a broad range of investments. The language derives from UPIA § 2(e).   Section 4 of UMIFA indicated that an institution could invest “without restriction to investments a fiduciary may make.” The committee removed this language from subsection (e)(3) as unnecessary, because states no longer have legal lists restricting fiduciary investing to the specific types of investments identified in statutory lists.   Subsection (e)(3) also provides that other law may limit the authority under this subsection. In addition, all of subsection (e) is subject to contrary provisions in a gift instrument, and a gift instrument may restrict the ability to invest in particular assets. For example, the gift instrument for a particular institutional fund might preclude the institution from investing the assets of the fund in companies that produce tobacco products.   In her book, Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and Regulation 434 (Harv. Univ. Press 2004), Marion R. Fremont-Smith reports that some large charities pledge their endowment funds as security for loans. Subsection (e)(3) permits this sort of debt financing, subject to the guidelines of subsection (e)(1).   Subsection (e)(4). Duty to Diversify. This subsection assumes that prudence requires diversification but permits an institution to determine that nondiversification is appropriate under exceptional circumstances. A decision not to diversify must be based on the needs of the charity and not solely for the benefit of a donor. A decision to retain property in the hope of obtaining additional contributions from the same donor may be considered made for the benefit of the charity, but the appropriateness of that decision will depend on the circumstances. This subsection derives its language from UPIA § 3. See UPIA § 3 cmt. (discussing the rationale for diversification); Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 (1992).   Subsection (e)(5). Disposing of Unsuitable Assets. This subsection imposes a duty on an institution to review the suitability of retaining property contributed to the institution within a reasonable period of time after the institution receives the property. Subsection (e)(5) requires the institution to make a decision but does not require a particular outcome. The institution may consider a variety of factors in making its decision, and a decision to retain the property either for a period of time or indefinitely may be a prudent decision.   Section 4(2) of UMIFA specifically authorized an institution to retain property contributed by a donor. The comment explained that an institution might retain property in the hope of obtaining additional contributions from the donor. Under UPMIFA the potential for developing additional contributions by retaining property contributed to the institution would be among the “other circumstances” that the institution might consider in deciding whether to retain or dispose of the property. The institution must weigh the potential for obtaining additional contributions with all other factors that affect the suitability of retaining the property in the investment portfolio.   The language of subsection (e)(5) comes from UPIA § 4, which restates Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 229 (1992), which adopted language from Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 231 (1959). See UPIA § 4 cmt.   Subsection (e)(6). Special Skills or Expertise. Subsection (e)(6) states the rule provided in UPIA § 2(f) requiring a trustee to use the trustee's own skills and expertise in carrying out the trustee's fiduciary duties. The comment to RMNCA § 8.30 describes the existence of a similar rule under the law of nonprofit corporations. Section 8.30(a)(2) provides that in discharging duties a director must act “with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances. . . .” The comment explains that“[t]he concept of under similar circumstances' relates not only to the circumstances of the corporation but to the special background, qualifications, and management experience of the individual director and the role the director plays in the corporation.” After describing directors chosen for their ability to raise money, the comment notes that “[n]o special skill or expertise should be expected from such directors unless their background or knowledge evidences some special ability.”   The intent of subsection (e)(6) is that a person managing or investing institutional funds must use the person's own judgment and experience, including any particular skills or expertise, in carrying out the management or investment duties. For example, if a charity names a person as a director in part because the person is a lawyer, the lawyer's background may allow the lawyer to recognize legal issues in connection with funds held by the charity. The lawyer should identify the issues for the board, but the lawyer is not expected to provide legal advice. A lawyer is not expected to be able to recognize every legal issue, particularly issues outside the lawyer's area of expertise, simply because the board member is lawyer. See ALI Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, Preliminary Draft No. 3 (May 12, 2005) § 315 (Duty of Care), cmt. c.   UMIFA contained two provisions that authorized investments in pooled or common investment funds. UMIFA §§ 4(3), 4(4). The Drafting Committee concluded that Section 3(e)(3) of UPMIFA authorizes these investments. The decision not to include the two provisions in UPMIFA implies no disapproval of such investments.