GA Code § 9-7-2 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 9 - Civil Practice|Chapter 7 - Auditors|§ 9-7-2. When Facts Referred to Auditor; on Application and Notice; on Court's Own Motion

 Upon application of either party, after notice to the opposite party, the judge of the superior court, in equitable proceedings if the case shall require it, may refer any part of the facts to an auditor to investigate and report the result to the court. Furthermore, the judge may, upon his own motion, when in his judgment the facts and circumstances of any such case require it, refer the same to an auditor.   (Ga. L. 1894, p. 123, § 3; Ga. L. 1895, p. 47, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 4581; Civil Code 1910, § 5127; Code 1933, § 10-101.)   Law reviews.   - For article, "Special Master; Mastering the Pretrial Discovery Process," see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 22 (2007).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS    Whether auditor shall be appointed is, as general rule, in discretion of court; and, unless there has been an abuse of such discretion, the appointment by the court of an auditor will not be disturbed. Ten-Fifty Ponce De Leon Co. v. Citizens' & S. Nat'l Bank, 170 Ga. 642, 153 S.E. 751 (1930).    Proper case may be referred to auditor over objections of parties. Lamar v. Allen, 108 Ga. 158, 33 S.E. 958 (1899).    Causes properly referable to auditors are those involving long and complicated commercial transactions supposed to require too much time for careful investigation and accurate computations to be properly referred to a jury. Barber v. Southern Serv. Corp., 182 Ga. 124, 185 S.E. 93 (1936).    Party who prays for reference to auditor will not thereafter be heard to complain that cause was so referred; nor is it within the right of any party to select or reject any particular person to be appointed by the court. Edwards v. National Fin. Co., 172 Ga. 884, 159 S.E. 256 (1931).    Judge is not required to submit entire case to auditor. Branch v. Branch, 194 Ga. 575, 22 S.E.2d 124 (1942).    All or any part of facts may be referred to auditor, but such a reference is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the court, and the exercise of such discretion will not be interfered with unless abused. Mobley v. Faulk, 42 Ga. App. 314, 156 S.E. 40 (1930).   Question of prejudice to be raised before auditor.    - The auditor having been appointed by the court in the exercise of its prerogative, the question of prejudice, bias, or other disqualification of the auditor should have been raised before the auditor personally and before the auditor's decision in the first instance. Edwards v. National Fin. Co., 172 Ga. 884, 159 S.E. 256 (1931).   Suit for losses due to alleged mismanagement.    - Where the suit was against bank directors for losses due to alleged mismanagement, it was not an abuse of discretion for the presiding judge to overrule a motion to refer the proceeding to an auditor, and submit the case to a jury. Mobley v. Faulk, 42 Ga. App. 314, 156 S.E. 40 (1930).   Appointment of auditor in divorce proceeding where jury trial requested.    - Where one spouse made a proper demand for a jury trial which was not otherwise waived, it was reversible error for the court to enter a final judgment based upon the findings of an auditor, without a trial by jury. Franklin v. Franklin, 267 Ga. 82, 475 S.E.2d 890 (1996).    Cited in Mitchem v. Georgia Cotton Oil Co., 139 Ga. 519, 77 S.E. 627 (1913); Henderson v. Lott, 170 Ga. 261, 152 S.E. 98 (1930); Howell v. Jackson, 171 Ga. 245, 155 S.E. 26 (1930); Candler v. Bryan, 189 Ga. 851, 8 S.E.2d 81 (1940); Henry v. Century Fin. Co., 110 Ga. App. 498, 139 S.E.2d 123 (1964); Ruskin v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 49, 643 S.E.2d 333 (2007); Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 300 Ga. 91, 793 S.E.2d 402 (2016).   OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL   Establishment of special master to hear divorce matters improper.    - Establishing a special master, employed by the court to hear evidence in a divorce settlement and paid from court funds, is not permissible in view of the mechanisms capable of handling this type of problem already in place under O.C.G.A. § 9-7-2 and in view of the lack of specific statutory basis for such an expense of court under O.C.G.A. § 15-6-24. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-19.   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 27A Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, § 226 et seq.