CO Code § 38-8-103 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 38 - Property - Real and Personal|Article 8 - Fraudulent Transfers|§ 38-8-103. Insolvency

  A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation.    A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they become due is presumed to be insolvent.    A partnership is insolvent under subsection (1) of this section if the sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate of all of the partnership's assets, at a fair valuation, and the sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership debts.    Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under this article.    Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor not included as an asset.     History. Source: L. 91: Entire article added, p. 1684, § 1, effective July 1.    Editor's note - Colorado legislative change: This section was numbered as section 2 in the uniform act. In subsection (3), the phrase “at a fair valuation” has been moved from immediately after “aggregate” to immediately after the first “assets”.   OFFICIAL COMMENT    Subsection (a) (numbered as subsection (1) in C.R.S.) is derived from the definition of “insolvent” in § 101(29)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. The definition in subsection (a) and the correlated definition of partnership insolvency in subsection (c) (numbered as subsection (3) in C.R.S.) contemplate a fair valuation of the debts as well as the assets of the debtor. As under the definition of the same term in § 2 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act exempt property is excluded from the computation of the value of the assets. See § 1(2) supra. (numbered as section 38-8-102 (2) in C.R.S.) For similar reasons interests in valid spendthrift trusts and interests in tenancies by the entireties that cannot be severed by a creditor of only one tenant are not included. See the Comment to § 1(2) supra. (numbered as section 38-8-102 (2) in C.R.S.) Since a valid lien also precludes an unsecured creditor from collecting the creditor's claim from the encumbered interest in a debtor's property, both the encumbered interest and the debt secured thereby are excluded from the computation of insolvency under this Act. See § 1(2) supra (numbered as section 38-8-102 (2) in C.R.S.) and subsection (e) of this section (numbered as subsection (5) in C.R.S.).    Section 2(b) (numbered as section 38-8-103 (2) in C.R.S.) establishes a rebuttable presumption of insolvency from the fact of general nonpayment of debts as they become due. Such general nonpayment is a ground for the filing of an involuntary petition under § 303(h)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. See also U.C.C. § 1-201(23), which declares a person to be “insolvent” who “has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business.” The presumption imposes on the party against whom the presumption is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of insolvency as defined in § 2(a) is more probable than its existence. See Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974 Act), Rule 301(a). The 1974 Uniform Rule 301(a) conforms to the Final Draft of Federal Rule 301 as submitted to the United States Supreme Court by the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence. “The so-called ‘bursting bubble' theory, under which a presumption vanishes upon the introduction of evidence which would support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, even though not believed, is rejected as according presumptions too ‘slight and evanescent' an effect.” Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 301. See also 1 J.Weinstein & M.Berger, Evidence 301 [01] (1982).    Subsection (c) (numbered as subsection (3) in C.R.S.) is derived from the definition of partnership insolvency in § 101(29)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. The definition conforms generally to the definition of the same term in § 2(2) of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.    Subsection (d) (numbered as subsection (4) in C.R.S.) follows the approach of the definition of “insolvency” in § 101(29) of the Bankruptcy Code by excluding from the computation of the value of the debtor's assets any value that can be realized only by avoiding a transfer of an interest formerly held by the debtor or by discovery or pursuit of property that has been fraudulently concealed or removed.    Subsection (e) (numbered as subsection (5) in C.R.S.) is new. It makes clear the purpose not to render a person insolvent under this section by counting as a debt an obligation secured by property of the debtor that is not counted as an asset. See also Comments to §§ 1(2) (numbered as section 38-8-102 (2) in C.R.S.) and 2(a) supra (numbered as section 38-8-103 (1) in C.R.S.).     The requirement of § 550(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code that a transferee be “without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer” in order to be protected has been omitted as inappropriate. Knowledge of the facts rendering the transfer voidable would be inconsistent with the good faith that is required of a protected transferee. Knowledge of the voidability of a transfer would seem to involve a legal conclusion. Determination of the voidability of the transfer ought not to require the court to inquire into the legal sophistication of the transferee.   The presumption is established in recognition of the difficulties typically imposed on a creditor in proving insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, as provided in subsection (a) (numbered as subsection (1) in C.R.S.). See generally Levit, The Archaic Concept of Balance-Sheet Insolvency, 47 Am.Bankr.L.J. 215 (1973). Not only is the relevant information in the possession of a noncooperative debtor but the debtor's records are more often than not incomplete and inaccurate. As a practical matter, insolvency is most cogently evidenced by a general cessation of payment of debts, as has long been recognized by the laws of other countries and is now reflected in the Bankruptcy Code. See Honsberger, Failure to Pay One's Debts Generally as They Become Due: The Experience of France and Canada, 54 Am.Bankr.L.J. 153 (1980); J. MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 13, 63-64, 436 (1956). In determining whether a debtor is paying its debts generally as they become due, the court should look at more than the amount and due dates of the indebtedness. The court should also take into account such factors as the number of the debtor's debts, the proportion of those debts not being paid, the duration of the nonpayment, and the existence of bona fide disputes or other special circumstances alleged to constitute an explanation for the stoppage of payments. The court's determination may be affected by a consideration of the debtor's payment practices prior to the period of alleged nonpayment and the payment practices of the trade or industry in which the debtor is engaged. The case law that has developed under § 303(h)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code has not required a showing that a debtor has failed or refused to pay a majority in number and amount of his or her debts in order to prove general nonpayment of debts as they become due. See, e.g., Hill v. Cargill, Inc. (In re Hill), 8 B.R. 779, 3 C.B.C.2d 920 (Bk.D.Minn. 1981) (nonpayment of three largest debts held to constitute general nonpayment, although small debts were being paid); In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 6 B.C.D. 586, 2 C.B.C.2d 449 (Bk.S.D.Tex. 1980) (missing significant number of payments or regularly missing payments significant in amount said to constitute general nonpayment; missing payments on more than 50% of aggregate of claims said not to be required to show general nonpayment; nonpayment for more than 30 days after billing held to establish nonpayment of a debt when it is due); In re Kreidler Import Corp., 4 B.R. 256, 6 B.C.D. 608, 2 C.B.C.2d 159 (Bk.D.Md. 1980) (nonpayment of one debt constituting 97% of debtor's total indebtedness held to constitute general nonpayment). A presumption of insolvency does not arise from nonpayment of a debt as to which there is a genuine bona fide dispute, even though the debt is a substantial part of the debtor's indebtedness. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1), as amended by § 426(b) of Public Law No. 98-882, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.   ANNOTATION   The fair value balance sheet method for determining insolvency is essentially mandated for individuals. The Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act method of determining insolvency mirrors the balance sheet test for insolvency under the federal bankruptcy code. The balance sheet test for insolvency requires that the court determine the fair value of the debtor's assets and the extent of its liabilities at the time of each contested transfer. In re Blair, 588 B.R. 605 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018 ).   Subsection (2)'s presumption appears to be based only on a simple factual inquiry: At the time of the alleged fraudulent transfers, was the debtor paying its debts as they became due, or not? It is a factual question and not really the province for an expert analysis. No expert knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education seems needed to ascertain whether someone is paying their debts. In re Blair, 588 B.R. 605 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018 ).