HI Rev Stat § 302A-1134 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 18. Education|302A. Education|302A-1134 Exclusion from school.

  §302A-1134 Exclusion from school. (a) If for any reason a child becomes a detriment to the morals or discipline of any school, the child may be precluded from attending school by the principal, with the approval of the complex area superintendent; provided that this section shall not apply to children participating in the executive office on early learning public prekindergarten program pursuant to section 302L-7. The department shall seek the active participation of other public and private agencies in providing help to these children before and after they have left school. An appeal may be taken on behalf of the child to the superintendent of education within ten days from the date of such action.  (b) Any child who, while attending school, is found to be in possession of a firearm, shall be excluded from attending school for not less than one year. The due process procedures of chapter 19 of the Department of Education, Hawaii Administrative Rules, shall apply to any child who, while attending school, is alleged to be in possession of a firearm. The superintendent, on a case-by-case basis, may modify the exclusion of a child found to be in possession of a firearm while attending school. If a child is excluded from attending school, the superintendent shall ensure that substitute educational activities or other appropriate assistance shall be provided. The superintendent shall submit to the United States Department of Education, the state board of education, and the legislature an annual report indicating the number of students excluded, the types of firearms found in their possession, and the schools from which they were excluded.  (c) Unless otherwise required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400, et seq., no person who is twenty years of age or over on the first instructional day of the school year shall be eligible to attend a public school; provided that if a person reaches twenty years of age after the first instructional day of the school year, the person shall be eligible to attend public school for the full school year. [L 1996, c 89, pt of §2 and am c 90, §3; am L 2003, c 187, §10; am L 2010, c 163, §1; am L 2014, c 215, §3; am L 2020, c 24, §2] Case Notes  Because student was ineligible under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act when student commenced student's administrative challenge to Act 163, L 2010 [which amended subsection (c)], student was fully entitled to an automatic injunction preserving student's placement at a private school during the pendency of the dispute; that automatic injunction should have held in abeyance any changes to student's educational placement, whether the result of Act 163 or some other cause. 727 F.3d 911 (2013).  Where student argued that department of education's (DOE) appeal became moot when student turned twenty-two, and the sole object of student's challenge to Act 163, L 2010 [which amended subsection (c)], was to secure educational services until student reached the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act's default eligibility age of twenty-two, the appeal was not moot because, inter alia, the DOE was reasonably likely to face these challenges to the law again. 727 F.3d 911 (2013).  Act 163 [L 2010, amending subsection (c)] barring both general education and special needs students from attending public school after the last day of the school year in which they turned twenty violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The department of education's community schools for adults, which were exempt from Act 163, offered, at taxpayer expense, the opportunity for nondisabled twenty- and twenty-one-year-olds to complete their secondary educations and earn high school diplomas. Providing IDEA services to disabled children of those ages would be consistent with "[S]tate law or practice ... respecting the provision of public education", so the State must do so. However, plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act because plaintiffs failed to produce evidence of the existence of a reasonable accommodation; plaintiffs did not identify changes to the structure or curricula of the community schools for adults that would make them generally accessible to disabled students. 728 F.3d 982 (2013).