CO Code § 13-6-311 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 13 - Courts and Court Procedure|Article 6 - County Courts|Part 3 - General Procedural Provisions|§ 13-6-311. Appeals From County Court - Simplified Procedure

     If either party in a civil action believes that the judgment of the county court is in error, he or she may appeal to the district court by filing notice of appeal in the county court within fourteen days after the date of entry of judgment and by filing within the said fourteen days an appeal bond with the clerk of the county court. The bond shall be furnished by a corporate surety authorized and licensed to do business in this state as surety, or one or more sufficient private sureties, or may be a cash deposit by the appellant and, if the appeal is taken by the plaintiff, shall be conditioned to pay the costs of the appeal and the counterclaim, if any, and, if the appeal is taken by the defendant, shall be conditioned to pay the costs and judgment if the appealing party fails. The bond shall be approved by the judge or the clerk.    Upon filing of the notice of appeal, the posting and approval of the bond, and the deposit by the appellant of an estimated fee in advance for preparing the record, the county court shall discontinue all further proceedings and recall any execution issued. The appellant shall then docket his or her appeal in the district court. A motion for new trial is not required as a condition of appeal. If a motion for new trial is made within fourteen days, the time for appeal shall be extended until fourteen days after disposition of the motion, but only matters raised on the motion for new trial shall be considered on an appeal thereafter.         Upon the deposit of the estimated record fee, the clerk of the court shall prepare and issue as soon as possible a record of the proceedings in the county court, including the summons, the complaint, proof of service, and the judgment. The record shall also include a transcription of such part of the actual evidence and other proceedings as the parties may designate or, in lieu of transcription, to which they may stipulate. If a stenographic record has been maintained or the parties agree to stipulate, the party appealing shall lodge with the clerk of the court the reporter's transcript of the designated evidence or proceedings or a stipulation covering such items within forty-two days after the filing of the notice of appeal. If the proceedings have been recorded electronically, the transcription of designated evidence and proceedings shall be prepared in the office of the clerk of the county court, either by him or her or under his or her supervision, within forty-two days after the filing of the notice of appeal.    The clerk shall notify, in writing, the opposing parties of the completion of the record, and the parties have fourteen days within which to file objections. If none are received, the record shall be certified forthwith by the clerk. If objections are made, the parties shall be called for hearing and the objections settled by the county judge as soon as possible and the record then certified.       When the record has been duly certified and any additional fees therefor paid, it shall be filed with the clerk of the district court by the clerk of the county court, and the opposing parties shall be notified of such filing by the clerk of the county court.    A written brief setting out matters relied upon as constituting error and outlining any arguments to be made shall be filed in the district court by the appellant within twenty-one days after filing of the record therein. A copy of the brief shall be served on the appellee. The appellee may file an answering brief within twenty-one days after such service. In the discretion of the district court, time for filing of briefs and answers may be extended.    Unless there is further review by the supreme court upon writ of certiorari and pursuant to the rules of that court, after final disposition of the appeal by the district court, the judgment on appeal therein shall be certified to the county court for action as directed by the district court, except upon trials de novo held in the district court or in cases in which the judgment is modified, in which cases the judgment shall be that of the district court and enforced therefrom.    Repealed.      History. Source: L. 64: P. 428, § 54. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-16-18 . L. 80: (1) and (2)(b) amended, p. 511, § 1, effective April 6. L. 85: (6) repealed, p. 572, § 12, effective November 14, 1986. L. 2012: (1), (2), and (4) amended,(SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 822, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2013: (1) and (2)(b) amended,(HB 13-1126), ch. 58, p. 192, § 3, effective July 1; (2) amended,(HB 13-1086), ch. 32, p. 77, § 1, effective July 1.    Editor's note:   Amendments to subsection (2)(b) by House Bill 13-1086 and House Bill 13-1126 were harmonized.   ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. APPEAL BOND.     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Law reviews. For comment on Miller v. Miller, appearing below, see 31 Dicta 160 (1954). For article, “Appeals of County Court, Municipal Court, and Magistrate Rulings”, see 47 Colo. Law. 32 (Oct. 2018).   Annotator's note. Since § 13-6-311 is similar to repealed § 37-6-11 , CRS 53, CSA, C. 46, §§ 167, 168, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.   This section is mandatory; and, although appellant, after the expiration of the prescribed time, dockets his appeal by paying his docket fee, the transcript should be remitted to the lower court on appellee's motion, so that the latter might proceed as though no appeal had been taken. Tierney v. Campbell, 7 Colo. App. 299, 44 P. 948 (1896); Thomas v. Beattie, 42 Colo. 235 , 93 P. 1093 (1908).   Good faith and reasonable promptness are sufficient. On appeal from county to district court, when appellant has acted in good faith, with reasonable promptness, and no one has suffered, this section ought not to be so strictly construed as to deny the right of appeal. Markey v. People, 73 Colo. 466 , 216 P. 526 (1923).   This section requires that after taking an appeal there shall be filed in the district court the record, including original process, pleadings, and other papers relating to the suit, and filed in the county court. Miller v. Miller, 129 Colo. 462 , 271 P.2d 411 (1954).   If appeal is not filed in time, district court lacks jurisdiction. Where a party does not lodge her appeal in a district court within the time required by this section, the court acquires no jurisdiction in the matter and has no authority to proceed in any manner in that action. McKelvey v. District Court, 140 Colo. 557 , 345 P.2d 726 (1959).   A motion to dismiss will be sustained after that time. Where an appeal from the county to the district court was not made within 10 days after the judgment, and no order extending the time in which to perfect an appeal was obtained, a motion to dismiss it should be sustained. Grove v. Foutch, 6 Colo. App. 357, 40 P. 852 (1895); Slattery v. Robinson, 7 Colo. App. 22, 42 P. 179 (1895).   This section provides for the filing of the original process, pleadings, and other papers with the clerk of a district court and for the docketing of the action in that court in appeals. Andrews v. Lull, 139 Colo. 536 , 341 P.2d 475 (1959).   A motion for new trial filed in apt time suspends a judgment so that it becomes final only when the motion is overruled. Kinney v. Yoelin Bros. Mercantile Co., 74 Colo. 295 , 220 P. 998 (1923); Charles v. Sprott, 75 Colo. 90 , 224 P. 222 (1924), citing Bates v. Woodward, 66 Colo. 555 , 185 P. 351 (1919).   Time for docketing. Subsection (1)(b) and rule 411(a)(1) of the county court rules clearly provide that the docketing must take place no later than the time allowed for completing and lodging the record. Tumbarello v. Superior Court, 195 Colo. 83 , 575 P.2d 431 (1978).   Section applies only to civil actions. Where an information filed against defendant charges him with misdemeanors, the action is not a civil suit; hence is not governed by this section. Naranjo v. People, 130 Colo. 236 , 274 P.2d 607 (1954).   Appeal to superior court. The district court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the appeal process between the county and superior courts. Petry v. County Court, 666 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1983) (decided prior to abolition of superior courts in 1986).   Fact that district court may enforce its order in the event that there is no appeal does not impact the appellate process: Proper appeal from district court action is by writ of certiorari to the supreme court. Gallagher v. Ingram, 32 P.3d 50 (Colo. App. 2001).   II. APPEAL BOND.   The essential step in the perfection of an appeal is the filing of a bond; even though the party had given a notice of appeal, or had in some other manner manifested intent to appeal, the judicial requirement of a bond filed within 10 days would still remain. Wellmuth v. Rogers, 25 Colo. App. 386, 138 P. 69 (1914); Swingle v. Estate of Pollo, 145 Colo. 591 , 360 P.2d 808 (1961).   The filing of bond is a condition precedent to appeal. The filing of the bond required by this section, in the county court, “and its approval by the judge or clerk of said court”, is a condition precedent to the appeal, and unless such steps are taken the district court is without jurisdiction. Fuller v. Fuller's Estate, 7 Colo. App. 555, 44 P. 72 (1896).   An appeal is not made until the bond is approved. This clause requires appeals to the district court to be “made” within 10 days after judgment is rendered. An appeal is not “made” until the appeal bond is approved. Zimmerman v. Combs, 91 Colo. 313 , 14 P.2d 693 (1932).   Giving appeal bond is not equivalent to a general appearance in the district court. This section clearly contemplates that in an appeal from the county to the district court, the appellant, if he has not entered his appearance in the county court, may be heard upon his appeal to object to the form of the summons, or the manner of serving the same, if he made that objection in the county court. Necessarily, therefore, giving of the appeal bond is not equivalent to a general appearance in the district court. White House Mt. Gold Mining Co. v. Powell, 30 Colo. 397 , 70 P. 679 (1902).   Section does not prescribe any particular manner or form in which the appeal bond on appeal from a county court to a district court must be approved. Stephens v. Wheeler, 60 Colo. 351 , 153 P. 444 (1915); Zimmerman v. Combs, 91 Colo. 313 , 14 P.2d 693 (1932), citing Adams v. Decker, 50 Colo. 326 , 114 P. 654 (1911).   A county court party found to be indigent and allowed to proceed in forma pauperis is not required to post a judgment bond before appealing to district court. O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 186 P.3d 46 (Colo. 2008).   However, as with appeals from the district court to the court of appeals, the prevailing party in the county court would be able to execute the judgment while the appeal is still pending because the judgment would not have been stayed by a judgment bond. O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 186 P.3d 46 (Colo. 2008).   Judgment against sureties on appeal bond. On an appeal from the county to the district court from a judgment against the appellant where judgment in the district court is in favor of appellee, the court in entering up an absolute and unconditional judgment against the sureties on the appeal bond does simply what it is required to do by this section. By serving a scire facias upon the sureties they are given an opportunity to show cause why the judgment should not be enforced against them. Gutheil Suburban Inv. Co. v. Fahey, 12 Colo. App. 487, 55 P. 946 (1899).   Bond not containing proper statutory conditions. Where on appeal from the county court to the district court the appeal bond was conditioned to pay all costs and damages adjudged to the appellee on appeal and to satisfy the judgment appealed from instead of the statutory condition to pay any judgment the district court should render, and the district court rendered a judgment against appellant in a greater amount than that of the county court, the measure of the liability of the sureties on the appeal bond was the original judgment of the county court with interest and costs. Barela v. Tootle, 29 Colo. 52 , 66 P. 899 (1901).   This section is not to be regarded as providing another mode of commencing civil actions; it does not provide for introducing a new cause of action into the suit in which the undertaking is given; but the true construction of the section is that by executing the undertaking the sureties are deemed to consent that they shall, under the contingencies specified in the undertaking, be considered parties to the original suit, and liable to judgment for the original cause of action against their principal. Shannon v. Dodge, 18 Colo. 164 , 32 P. 61 (1893).   For the sufficiency of the bond, see Swingle v. Estate of Pollo, 145 Colo. 591 , 360 P.2d 808 (1961).