CO Code § 43-2-302 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 43 - Transportation|Article 2 - State, County, and Municipal Highways|Part 3 - Vacation Proceedings: Roads, Streets, and Highways|§ 43-2-302. Vesting of Title Upon Vacation

  Subject to the requirements set forth in sections 43-1-210 (5) and 43-2-106 governing the disposition of certain property by the department of transportation, whenever any roadway has been designated on the plat of any tract of land or has been conveyed to or acquired by a county or incorporated town or city or by the state or by any of its political subdivisions for use as a roadway, and thereafter is vacated, title to the lands included within such roadway or so much thereof as may be vacated shall vest, subject to the same encumbrances, liens, limitations, restrictions, and estates as the land to which it accrues, as follows:   In the event that a roadway which constitutes the exterior boundary of a subdivision or other tract of land is vacated, title to said roadway shall vest in the owners of the land abutting the vacated roadway to the same extent that the land included within the roadway, at the time the roadway was acquired for public use, was a part of the subdivided land or was a part of the adjacent land.    In the event that less than the entire width of a roadway is vacated, title to the vacated portion shall vest in the owners of the land abutting such vacated portion.    In the event that a roadway bounded by straight lines is vacated, title to the vacated roadway shall vest in the owners of the abutting land, each abutting owner taking to the center of the roadway, except as provided in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection (1). In the event that the boundary lines of abutting lands do not intersect said roadway at a right angle, the land included within such roadway shall vest as provided in paragraph (d) of this subsection (1).    In all instances not specifically provided for, title to the vacated roadway shall vest in the owners of the abutting land, each abutting owner taking that portion of the vacated roadway to which his land, or any part thereof, is nearest in proximity.    No portion of a roadway upon vacation shall accrue to an abutting roadway.    Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection (1), a board of county commissioners may provide that title to the vacated roadway shall vest, subject to a public-access easement or private-access easement to benefit designated properties, in the owner of the land abutting the vacated roadway, in other owners of land who use the vacated roadway as access to the owners' land, or in a legal entity that represents any owners of land who use the vacated roadway as access to the owners' land. Title shall vest to the owner of the land abutting the vacated roadway as otherwise required by paragraphs (a) to (d) of this subsection (1), unless the board expressly requires the title to vest pursuant to the authority set forth in this paragraph (f) in the resolution to vacate the roadway that is approved by the board.        History. Source: L. 49: P. 620, § 2. CSA: C. 143, § 69(2). CRS 53: § 120-1-12. C.R.S. 1963: § 120-14-2. L. 96: IP(1) amended, p. 1456, § 3, effective June 1. L. 2007: (1)(f) added, p. 591, § 1, effective September 1. History. Source: L. 49: P. 620, § 2. CSA: C. 143, § 69(2). CRS 53: § 120-1-12. C.R.S. 1963: § 120-14-2. L. 96: IP(1) amended, p. 1456, § 3, effective June 1. L. 2007: (1)(f) added, p. 591, § 1, effective September 1.    ANNOTATION   By the dedication under § 31-1-108 , the original owner divests himself of the power of disposition of the property and vests the city with this legal power. Buell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 205 F. Supp. 865 (D. Colo. 1962 ), modified, 321 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1963).   This section vests complete legal title. This section operates to vest in the adjoining owner not only the title which initially passed to the city and county but the complete legal title to both surface and subsurface rights to vacated roadway. Buell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 321 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1963).   Because vacation is not the same as abandonment, owners of property abutting a roadway who had claimed that the roadway was abandoned, but had not claimed that it was vacated, could not seek title to the roadway under this section. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Morgan County v. Kobobel, 74 P.3d 401 (Colo. App. 2002).   Section does not deprive dedicator of property unconstitutionally. One dedicating highways to the public by filing plats showing highways located thereon is not unconstitutionally deprived of its property by this section which provides that upon vacation of the highway the title shall vest in the abutting owner. Buell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 205 F. Supp. 865 (D. Colo. 1962 ), modified, 321 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1963).   Dedicator is on notice. A dedicator, even though not immediately divested of subsurface rights, is on notice at the time of dedication that if a portion of the dedicated street should be vacated by the city and county unconditional title would vest in the adjoining owner. Buell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 321 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1963).   Vacating resolution is final on enactment, and cannot be rescinded if the rights of third parties have vested. Sutphin v. Mourning, 642 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1981); LeSatz v. Deshotels, 757 P.2d 1090 (Colo. App. 1988).   Recording deed after vacation conveys lots only and not vacated street. Since in legal effect there was no deed outstanding, the recording of the original deed after the street vacation served to convey only the lots and not a portion of the already vacated street. Sky Harbor, Inc. v. Jenner, 164 Colo. 470 , 435 P.2d 894 (1968).   Subsection (1)(a) clearly contemplates the vacation of the entire roadway. Buell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 205 F. Supp. 865 (D. Colo. 1962 ), modified, 321 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1963).   While subsection (1)(b) was designed to cover the vacation of less than the entire width of a highway. Buell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 205 F. Supp. 865 (D. Colo. 1962 ), modified, 321 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1963).   Subsection (1)(d) prevents disjointed tracts. Subsection (1)(d) would appear to carry out the policy of the general assembly to prevent the creation of any disjointed tracts. In all situations the vacated roadway vests in the owners of abutting land. Buell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 205 F. Supp. 865 (D. Colo. 1962 ), modified, 321 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1963).   Subsection (1)(e) expresses a clear intent to exclude an unvacated highway as an abutting owner. Buell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 205 F. Supp. 865 (D. Colo. 1962 ), modified, 321 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1963).   This section does not apply to the abandonment of railroad rights-of-way. Subsection (1)(c) therefore does not allow the owner of land adjacent to an abandoned railroad right-of-way to claim presumptive ownership to the centerline of the right-of-way under the common law centerline presumption absent evidence that the adjacent landowner's title derives from the owner of the land underlying the right-of-way. Asmussen v. United States, 2013 CO 54, 304 P.3d 552.