CO Code § 14-13-201 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 14 - Domestic Matters|Article 13 - Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act|Part 2 - Jurisdiction|§ 14-13-201. Initial Child-Custody Jurisdiction

  Except as otherwise provided in section 14-13-204, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only if:   This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within one hundred eighty-two days before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;    A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under a provision of law adopted by that state that is in substantial conformity with paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under a provision of law adopted by that state that is in substantial conformity with section 14-13-207 or 14-13-208, and:   The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and    Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships;       All courts having jurisdiction under a provision of law adopted by that state that is in substantial conformity with paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection (1) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under a provision of law adopted by that state that is in substantial conformity with section 14-13-207 or 14-13-208; or    No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in a provision of law adopted by that state that is in substantial conformity with paragraph (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection (1).       Subsection (1) of this section is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child-custody determination by a court of this state.    Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child-custody determination.     History. Source: L. 2000: Entire article R&RE, p. 1524, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2012: (1)(a) amended,(SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 834, § 36, effective July 1.    Editor's note:   This section is similar to former § 14-13-104 as it existed prior to 2000.   OFFICIAL COMMENT   This section provides mandatory jurisdictional rules for the original child custody proceeding. It generally continues the provisions of the UCCJA § 3. However, there have been a number of changes to the jurisdictional bases.   1. Home State Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the home State has been prioritized over other jurisdictional bases. Section 3 of the UCCJA provided four independent and concurrent bases of jurisdiction. The PKPA provides that full faith and credit can only be given to an initial custody determination of a “significant connection” State when there is no home State. This Act prioritizes home state jurisdiction in the same manner as the PKPA thereby eliminating any potential conflict between the two acts.   The six-month extended home state provision of subsection (1)(a) has been modified slightly from the UCCJA. The UCCJA provided that home state jurisdiction continued for six months when the child had been removed by a person seeking the child's custody or for other reasons and a parent or a person acting as a parent continues to reside in the home State. Under this Act, it is no longer necessary to determine why the child has been removed. The only inquiry relates to the status of the person left behind. This change provides a slightly more refined home state standard than the UCCJA or the PKPA, which also requires a determination that the child has been removed “by a contestant or for other reasons.” The scope of the PKPA's provision is theoretically narrower than this Act. However, the phrase “or for other reasons” covers most fact situations where the child is not in the home State and, therefore, the difference has no substantive effect.   In another sense, the six-month extended home state jurisdiction provision is this Act is narrower than the comparable provision in the PKPA. The PKPA's definition of extended home State is more expansive because it applies whenever a “contestant” remains in the home State. That class of individuals has been eliminated in this Act. This Act retains the original UCCJA classification of “parent or person acting as parent” to define who must remain for a State to exercise the six-month extended home state jurisdiction. This eliminates the undesirable jurisdictional determinations which would occur as a result of differing state substantive laws on visitation involving grandparents and others. For example, if State A's law provided that grandparents could obtain visitation with a child after the death of one of the parents, then the grandparents, who would be considered “contestants” under the PKPA, could file a proceeding within six months after the remaining parent moved and have the case heard in State A. However, if State A did not provide that grandparents could seek visitation under such circumstances, the grandparents would not be considered “contestants” and State B where the child acquired a new home State would provide the only forum. This Act bases jurisdiction on the parent and child or person acting as a parent and child relationship without regard to grandparents or other potential seekers of custody or visitation. There is no conflict with the broader provision of the PKPA. The PKPA in § (c)(1) authorizes States to narrow the scope of their jurisdiction.   2. Significant connection jurisdiction. This jurisdictional basis has been amended in four particulars from the UCCJA. First, the “best interest” language of the UCCJA has been eliminated. This phrase tended to create confusion between the jurisdictional issue and the substantive custody determination. Since the language was not necessary for the jurisdictional issue, it has been removed.   Second, the UCCJA based jurisdiction on the presence of a significant connection between the child and the child's parents or the child and at least one contestant. This Act requires that the significant connections be between the child, the child's parents or the child and a person acting as a parent.   Third, a significant connection State may assume jurisdiction only when there is no home State or when the home State decides that the significant connection State would be a more appropriate forum under Section 14-13-207 or 14-13-208 . Fourth, the determination of significant connections has been changed to eliminate the language of “present or future care.” The jurisdictional determination should be made by determining whether there is sufficient evidence in the State for the court to make an informed custody determination. That evidence might relate to the past as well as to the “present or future.”   Emergency jurisdiction has been moved to a separate section. This is to make it clear that the power to protect a child in crisis does not include the power to enter a permanent order for that child except as provided by that section.   Paragraph (1)(c) provides for jurisdiction when all States with jurisdiction under paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) determine that this State is a more appropriate forum. The determination would have to be made by all States with jurisdiction under subsection (1)(a) and (b). Jurisdiction would not exist under this paragraph because the home State determined it is a more appropriate place to hear the case if there is another State that could exercise significant connection jurisdiction under subsection (1)(b).   Paragraph (1)(d) retains the concept of jurisdiction by necessity as found in the UCCJA and in the PKPA. This default jurisdiction only occurs if no other State would have jurisdiction under subsections (1)(a) through (1)(c).   Subsections (2) and (3) clearly State the relationship between jurisdiction under this Act and other forms of jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction over, or the physical presence of, a parent or the child is neither necessary nor required under this Act. In other words neither minimum contacts nor service within the State is required for the court to have jurisdiction to make a custody determination. Further, the presence of minimum contacts or service within the State does not confer jurisdiction to make a custody determination. Subject to Section 14-13-204 , satisfaction of the requirements of subsection (1) is mandatory.   The requirements of this section, plus the notice and hearing provisions of the Act, are all that is necessary to satisfy due process. This Act, like the UCCJA and the PKPA is based on Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in , 345 U.S. 528 (1953). As pointed out by Professor Bodenheimer, the reporter for the UCCJA, no “workable interstate custody law could be built around [Justice] Burton's plurality opinion ... .” Bridgette Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1207,1233 (1969). It should also be noted that since jurisdiction to make a child custody determination is subject matter jurisdiction, an agreement of the parties to confer jurisdiction on a court that would not otherwise have jurisdiction under this Act is ineffective.  May v. Anderson  ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation: Modification of Custody in and out of State”, see 46 U. Colo. L. Rev. 495 (1974-75). For article, “The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act”, see 11 Colo. Law. 1224 (1982). For article, “Interstate Custody Problems Revisited”, see 11 Colo. Law. 2596 (1982). For article, “Waking the Dormant PKPA in Colorado”, see 21 Colo. Law. 2209 (1992). For article, “Nuts and Bolts of the PKPA”, see 22 Colo. Law. 2397 (1993).   Annotator's note. Cases relevant to § 14-13-104 decided prior to its earliest source, L. 73, p. 557 , § 1, have been included in the annotations to this section. Since § 14-13-201 is similar to § 14-13-104 as it existed prior to the 2000 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision also have been included in the annotations to this section.   Section must be read in conjunction with other provisions of act. In order to effectuate the general purposes of this act and to deter jurisdictional fishing with children as bait, this section must be read in conjunction with other provisions of the act. Brock v. District Court, 620 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1980).   Primary purposes of act are to avoid jurisdictional conflicts with other states over child custody issues, to discourage parents from “jurisdictional fishing,” and to ensure that the state making the custody decision is the state with the closest connection to the child and the child's family. Nistico v. District Ct., 791 P.2d 1128 (Colo. 1990); L.G. v. People in Interest of K.G., 890 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1995); G.B. v. Arapahoe County Ct., 890 P.2d 1153 (Colo. 1995).   The uniform act was enacted to extend full faith and credit to child custody decrees, and therefore discourage the noncustodial parent from kidnapping and forum shopping. L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1995).   Court not required to exercise jurisdiction. A court which has jurisdiction over a custody issue is not required to exercise its jurisdiction. In re Nicholson, 648 P.2d 681 (Colo. App. 1982).   The question of whether jurisdiction exists is distinct from the question of whether it should be exercised. Even if a determination that jurisdiction exists is made, the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction, or it may stay the proceedings upon the condition that custody proceedings be initiated in another state. Johnson v. District Court, 654 P.2d 827 (Colo. 1982); Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986).   Section neither grants courts of state right, nor imposes upon them duty, to modify out-of-state custody decrees under any and all circumstances merely because of a claimed emergency and a threshold showing that some form of judicial intervention might be appropriate. Brock v. District Court, 620 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1980).   State courts authorized to exercise jurisdiction over custody matters in emergency situations when the child is physically present in the state and is threatened with mistreatment, abuse, or is otherwise neglected or dependent even if its orders contravene those of a sister state that still retains jurisdiction over custody. Brock v. District Court, 620 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1980).   Finding of either “significant connection” or “emergency” sufficient for jurisdiction. The “significant connection” and “substantial evidence” ground for jurisdiction of subsection (1)(b) is different from the “emergency” ground of subsection (1)(c), and a finding of either is sufficient to bestow jurisdiction. Johnson v. District Court, 654 P.2d 827 (Colo. 1982).   Temporary emergency jurisdiction did not provide court with jurisdiction to enter permanent order terminating parental rights without the court first obtaining home state jurisdiction pursuant to this section. The record does not disclose a basis on which the court could infer home state jurisdiction. Both “significant connection” and “more appropriate forum” jurisdiction requires the home state to affirmatively decline jurisdiction before another state can invoke it. Declining jurisdiction under the UCCJEA means more than just the absence of litigation in the home state. The home state must have had an opportunity to weigh in and been made aware of a possible reason to do so. People in Interest of S.A.G., 2020 COA 45 , __ P.3d __.   Jurisdiction conferred on court where matter first raised. Where two states could exercise jurisdiction, this article establishes the rule that exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the court in which the matter is first raised. In re Edilson, 637 P.2d 362 (Colo. 1981); People in Interest of K.G., 876 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1993).   Court entering dissolution decree always has jurisdiction. A court which enters a dissolution decree, where custody is one of the issues in that proceeding, will always have jurisdiction as to the custody issue, even where the parties and the child have left the state. In re Nicholson, 648 P.2d 681 (Colo. App. 1982), overruled in Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986).   Holding that court always has jurisdiction is overly broad and overlooks the intent and purposes of the uniform act that under certain circumstances the state of original jurisdiction can and should lose jurisdiction. In re Dunn, 701 P.2d 158 (Colo. App. 1985).   In deciding whether to entertain a child custody proceeding, the court shall conduct a two-pronged inquiry. It must first be determined whether jurisdiction exists in this state and if so, then whether jurisdiction should be exercised. Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986); In re Nielsen, 782 P.2d 868 (Colo. 1989).   Instances giving rise to subject matter jurisdiction. The uniform act attempts to limit custody determination jurisdiction to only one state. Thus, this section confines subject matter jurisdiction to: (a) The home state of at least one parent, and of the child for the last six months; or (b) the state where there are other strong contacts with the child and his family and it is in the child's best interest; or (c) the state where the child is present if the child has been abandoned, or if there is an emergency case of child neglect; or (d) the state of the forum if it is in the child's best interest and no other state could or would assume jurisdiction. In re Glass, 36 Colo. App. 91, 537 P.2d 1092 (1975).   Court had jurisdiction to modify an existing Oklahoma custody decree based on the home state provision of subsection (1)(a) where the child resided in Colorado for thirteen months before the alleged incident of sexual molestation by the child's father. People in Interest of K.G., 876 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1993).   Two-step analysis. Where Colorado has jurisdiction as a matter of law, the court must then determine whether its jurisdiction is exclusive or nonexclusive, and, if nonexclusive, the court must determine whether or not it should defer to another state's jurisdiction. Lynch v. Lynch, 770 P.2d 1383 (Colo. App. 1989); People in Interest of K.G., 876 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1993); L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1995).   Intent to remain in the state is not grounds for exercise of initial child-custody jurisdiction. Court erred in failing to conduct jurisdictional analysis required pursuant to the Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) for initial child-custody jurisdiction. While court apparently concluded that this state was not the child's home state, the court did not determine whether another state was the child's home state. If no state qualifies as the child's home state, the court must look to the language of the statute to determine appropriate jurisdiction. Except in the event of an emergency, the UCCJEA delineates the exclusive jurisdictional bases for making a child-custody determination by a court of this state. Madrone v. Madrone, 2012 CO 70, 290 P.3d 478.   Serving best interests of children where parents are located in separate jurisdictions. The best interests of children who are subjects of contested custody where the parents are located in separate jurisdictions are served when the forum determining custody has a significant connection and optimum access to relevant evidence about them. Wheeler v. District Court, 186 Colo. 218 , 526 P.2d 658 (1974).   Jurisdictional considerations under subsection (1)(b) are governed by the best interest of the child and by the child's connections to the prospective forum state rather than the best interests of the feuding parties or the parties' connections to a prospective forum state. Nistico v. District Court, 791 P.2d 1128 (Colo. 1990).   The trial court had jurisdiction even though the mother had abducted the child, because this article provides that unclean hands do not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Nelson v. District Court, 186 Colo. 381 , 527 P.2d 811 (1974).   Improper retention of the child should affect only the court's decision to exercise its jurisdiction. Nelson v. District Court, 186 Colo. 381 , 527 P.2d 811 (1974).   Exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction under subsection (1)(c) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances. In re Glass, 36 Colo. App. 91, 537 P.2d 1092 (1975); Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986).   Jurisdiction when domicile changes. Under subsection (1)(a), where mother and child have moved to another state after a dissolution of marriage proceeding in a court of this state, jurisdiction over issues of child custody is with the state that is the home state of the child at the commencement of the custody proceeding then pending before the court. Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986).   Where the child lived in Michigan during the six-month period preceding the filing of the father's motion of schedule visitation, Colorado does not have home state jurisdiction under subsection (1)(a). Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986).   Loss of jurisdiction of original state. While the intent of the uniform act is that the original state shall have continuing jurisdiction under § 14-13-115 , such jurisdiction can be lost by the erosion of a child's and parents' significant connections with the state. McCarron v. District Court ex rel. County of Jefferson, 671 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1983); Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986).   No authority to modify unless other court without jurisdiction. A Colorado court is not authorized to modify an existing custody decree from another state even in an emergency unless the court which rendered that decree no longer has, or has declined to assume, jurisdiction of the matter. In re Thomas, 36 Colo. App. 96, 537 P.2d 1095 (1975).   Modification authorized where Colorado is home state. When Colorado is the home state of the children, Colorado has the jurisdiction to modify a sister state's decree in the best interests of the children. Kudler v. Smith, 643 P.2d 783 (Colo. App. 1981).   State court had jurisdiction. Where all of the individuals who had an interest in the child's future care, well-being, and custody were either domiciled in Colorado or sought to enforce their legal rights by way of habeas corpus or permanent custody petitions in the courts of Colorado, and sufficient evidence was available in Colorado from which the trial court could have concluded that the Colorado court could best resolve the issues relating to the child's future care and training, the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the issues raised in a petition for permanent custody although the child's domicile was not in Colorado. Nelson v. District Court, 186 Colo. 381 , 527 P.2d 811 (1974).   Trial court properly held that Colorado is child's home state since she maintained significant connections here. Child has lived with her mother and attended school in Colorado for years, and both her guardian ad litem and therapist are here. Furthermore, the California courts in two districts both declined to exercise jurisdiction, which satisfies one of the alternative requirements of former § 14-13-04 (1)(d) . In re Dickson, 983 P.2d 44 (Colo. App. 1998) (decided prior to 2000 repeal and reenactment).   Colorado court had jurisdiction in proceeding brought by children's mother to enforce a custody decree rendered in a sister state, which had originally given custody of the children to the father and had allowed the father to move the children to Colorado, where the children and the father were domiciled in Colorado and the children attended Colorado schools. Wheeler v. District Court, 186 Colo. 218 , 526 P.2d 658 (1974).   Allegations by parents against each other do not justify jurisdiction. Although the allegations of both the father and the mother may indicate that the best interests of the child mandate judicial review of the fitness of each parent to have custody of the child, that does not necessarily justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this state. Roberts v. District Court, 198 Colo. 79 , 596 P.2d 65 (1979).   Jurisdiction to modify foreign visitation order. A modification of visitation rights is a “custody determination” under § 14-13-103(2) , and so, pursuant to this section, where a child and his parents have been living in this state for over a year, a trial court of this state has the jurisdiction to modify a foreign child visitation order. In re Bechard, 40 Colo. App. 516, 577 P.2d 778 (1978).   Foreign state without jurisdiction. Foreign state court which originally granted temporary custody to the petitioner, a paternal aunt, has lost jurisdiction since the residence of the parties in the foreign state was premised solely on a military assignment, and both the father and the mother have returned to the site of their domicile -- Denver, Colorado -- and the child's natural father, mother, and grandparents are all residents of Colorado and have significant connections to Colorado. Nelson v. Schweitzer, 189 Colo. 511 , 542 P.2d 382 (1975).   Court lacked basis to grant noncustodial parent temporary custody of wrongfully retained minor child. Where no compelling reason exists for the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction, and the child has been retained in this state by the noncustodial parent after the term of visitation has expired, the court has no basis in fact or law to grant the noncustodial parent temporary custody of the minor child. Brock v. District Court, 620 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1980).   Colorado without jurisdiction. Where, on the date father filed his complaint in Colorado, all significant connections of child and mother were with Kansas and child's contacts with Colorado were minimal, Kansas had jurisdiction to make a custody determination. Hence, pursuant to § 14-13-115 (1) , the Colorado court could not modify the existing Kansas custody decree. In re Thomas, 36 Colo. App. 96, 537 P.2d 1095 (1975).   To interpret § 14-13-115 as a prohibition against a Colorado court's exercise of jurisdiction to enter temporary and protective custody orders in order to protect children endangered by their surroundings would, in effect, vitiate the very purpose of the parens patriae jurisdiction granted by this section. E.P. v. District Court, 696 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1985).   Where on the date the Colorado petition for permanent custody of a child was filed by the father, a Colorado resident, in Colorado, and the uniform act was operable in California, and on that date, the mother was still a domiciliary of California, the child's home state under the uniform act was and is California, and, for all but the last three months before the petition was filed, the child lived with his mother and grandparents in California and had only minimal contacts with Colorado, therefore, California had jurisdiction to make a custody determination under the uniform act. Hence, by virtue of § 14-13-115(1) , the Colorado court could not modify the existing California custody decree. In re Glass, 36 Colo. App. 91, 537 P.2d 1092 (1975).   A parent's self-serving statements that his child appeared unwell are not enough to confer jurisdiction, under subdivision (1)(c), on a district court in this state while a foreign court has continuing jurisdiction over the child. Woodhouse v. District Court, 196 Colo. 558 , 587 P.2d 1199 (1978).   Court rejects mother's assertion that, because a Colorado court denied the immediate return of the children to Canada under the Hague Convention's “grave risk” exception, final custody determinations must be made in Colorado, and not in Canada, which was undisputedly the children's habitual residence. Under the Hague Convention, the country to which a child has been removed has jurisdiction to decide the merits of the return claim, but not necessarily the merits of the underlying custody dispute. Applying the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Canada was the appropriate jurisdiction to enter the final custody determination for the children. In re T.L.B., 2012 COA 8 , 272 P.3d 1148.   In a continuing custody dispute where none of the parties still live in Colorado, the fact that any proceedings related to custody inherently arise from an initial custody order, which was made by Colorado courts, does not necessarily give Colorado continuing jurisdictional authority. In re Pritchett, 80 P.3d 918 (Colo. App. 2003).   Under the uniform act, the Colorado court was without jurisdiction to resolve a second contempt proceeding once it had relinquished jurisdiction over all matters except the first contempt proceeding, and the North Dakota court was properly exercising jurisdiction. In re Pritchett, 80 P.3d 918 (Colo. App. 2003).   “The time of commencement of the proceeding” means the pending motion affecting custody or visitation rather than the initial dissolution action which resulted in the rendition of the custody decree. Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986).   Declining jurisdiction over controversy held not error. Garcia v. Martinez, 642 P.2d 53 (Colo. App. 1982).   Where both states had jurisdiction over child and trial court found that South Carolina was “home state” of child, trial court did not err in declining to exercise continuing jurisdiction. People in Interest of S.B., 742 P.2d 935 (Colo. App. 1987), cert. denied, 754 P.2d 1177 (Colo. 1988).   Under the doctrine of parens patriae, where an emergency existed concerning the immediate needs and welfare of a child within this state, our courts could have in such circumstances, entered custodial orders for the protection of such child, notwithstanding the child's domicile elsewhere and the existence of otherwise valid orders to the contrary theretofore entered in a sister state having jurisdiction of the parties, and such power could have been exercised not only in ordinary custody proceedings, but also in habeas corpus proceedings. Wilson v. Wilson, 172 Colo. 566 , 474 P.2d 789 (1970).   Where the father alleged the existence of an emergency situation which he claimed required the Colorado court to intervene and modify the Kansas divorce decree, under such circumstances, the Colorado court, under its general parens patriae jurisdiction over a child physically present in the state, could properly make a temporary order to protect the child. In re Thomas, 36 Colo. App. 96, 537 P.2d 1095 (1975).   The forum of the domicile where the parties were known, where the matrimonial difficulties occurred, and where the evidence was available, was most likely to make just decisions of such issues, and it promoted neither justice nor respect for the courts to permit a spouse in prospect of an unfavorable decision to find sanctuary in another jurisdiction where adverse evidence was not available and the other spouse may not be able to appear. Evans v. Evans, 136 Colo. 6 , 314 P.2d 291 (1957); Petition of Kraudel v. Benner, 148 Colo. 525 , 366 P.2d 667 (1961).   The courts of this state had jurisdiction, in a proper case, to hear all relevant testimony offered by either party in regard to the custody of a minor child domiciled in this state, and enter such judgment as would have been for the best interests of the minor, even though the judgment be different from that entered by a sister state, where it was shown to the courts of this state that the condition of the parties had so changed since the entry of the judgment by the sister state that the welfare of the minor required that the courts of this state hear and determine the question presented. Evans v. Evans, 136 Colo. 6 , 314 P.2d 291 (1957); Petition of Kraudel v. Benner, 148 Colo. 525 , 366 P.2d 667 (1961).   State exercising jurisdiction under the uniform act should be state with closest connection to the child and the child's family and with access to the maximum amount of evidence concerning the child's residence. L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1995).   After a final decree in divorce, either party could change domicile at will, and the child's domicile then changed with that of the parent in whose custody he had been placed and the court of new domicile had jurisdiction over proceedings as to custody. Evans v. Evans, 136 Colo. 6 , 314 P.2d 291 (1957).   After a change of domicile it was held that any modification of the provisions of the final decree as to custody by the court of the former domicile was without extraterritorial effect in Colorado. Evans v. Evans, 136 Colo. 6 , 314 P.2d 291 (1957).   Award of custody by a court having jurisdiction should be recognized by other states and the facts upon which the award is based held res judicata. Evans v. Evans, 136 Colo. 6 , 314 P.2d 291 (1957); Petition of Kraudel v. Benner, 148 Colo. 525 , 366 P.2d 667 (1961); Wilson v. Wilson, 172 Colo. 566 , 474 P.2d 789 (1970).   Where the primary and controlling issue was the welfare of the child, and that issue was considered and determined by the court of another state, it could not and should not have been readjudicated in Colorado. Evans v. Evans, 136 Colo. 6 , 314 P.2d 291 (1957).   While the custody issue may be decided in another state, there is no legal basis for a trial court to defer to another state on issues of maintenance and child support. In re Doria, 855 P.2d 28 (Colo. App. 1993).   Colorado courts do not have jurisdiction in case in which child was born in California and continued to reside there. The record suggests that California, not Colorado, is the state containing substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships. Nistico v. District Court, 791 P.2d 1128 (Colo. 1990).   The district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising jurisdiction, even though it did not make findings as to the basis for its exercise of jurisdiction, where Colorado had jurisdiction based on the home state provision of the act and Oklahoma met none of the criteria outlined in either the Colorado or the substantially similar Oklahoma jurisdictional prerequisite provisions. People in Interest of K.G., 876 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1993).   Even though Colorado both had jurisdiction and could have exercised that jurisdiction under the act to modify an Oklahoma custody decree, under the federal parental kidnapping prevention act of 1980, the Colorado court was required to decline jurisdiction in favor of Oklahoma because Oklahoma was the state of the original custody determination and, therefore, had continuing jurisdiction under Oklahoma law since the father remained a resident of Oklahoma and he had exercised his visitation rights in Oklahoma. Therefore, the portion of the Colorado court's judgment that modified mother's custody and father's visitation rights under the Oklahoma custody determination could not stand. People in Interest of K.G., 876 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1993).   Foreign custody decree could be modified by a Colorado court where the decree has been docketed in Colorado and Colorado is now the home state of the children. In re Whitley, 775 P.2d 95 (Colo. App. 1989).   Colorado not required to give full faith and credit to another state's custody order if order was not entered in compliance with the PKPA. Under the PKPA, a state's custody determination is in conformance with the PKPA if the court of the state has jurisdiction under its own law and the exercise of jurisdiction meets one of the conditions set forth in the PKPA. Because Nebraska, like Colorado, has adopted the UCCJEA, and the UCCJEA is substantively identical to the PKPA, the provisions of Nebraska's state law conform to the PKPA. Therefore, because Nebraska lacked jurisdiction to enter the custody order under its own law, it lacked jurisdiction to enter the order under the PKPA and Colorado is not required to recognize and enforce the order pursuant to the PKPA. In re L.S., 257 P.3d 201 (Colo. 2011).   Where New York family court referee determined that it lacked exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to modify New York custody order and declined jurisdiction, a New York Supreme Court (trial court) lacked jurisdiction to enter order in a subsequent motion to modify custody. New York has adopted the UCCJEA and, therefore, the jurisdictional provisions of New York law are substantially identical to the PKPA. Consequently, because the second New York court did not have jurisdiction over the matter under New York law, the PKPA does not require that Colorado accord full faith and credit to the second court's custody modification order and the Colorado court erred in enforcing the New York order modifying custody. In re Dedie & Springston, 255 P.3d 1142 (Colo. 2011).   When the parties to a divorce remarry each other, the court's jurisdiction over the parties is terminated and the provisions of the prior decree for matters of child support, custody, and maintenance are nullified. In re Doria, 855 P.2d 28 (Colo. App. 1993).   Applied in Zumbrun v. Zumbrun, 42 Colo. App. 37, 592 P.2d 16 (1978); In re Tricamo, 42 Colo. App. 493, 599 P.2d 273 (1979); Lopez v. District Court, 199 Colo. 207 , 606 P.2d 853 (1980); In re Severn, 44 Colo. App. 109, 608 P.2d 381 (1980); In re Johnson, 634 P.2d 1034 (Colo. App. 1981); In re Tatum, 653 P.2d 74 (Colo. App. 1982); Bakke v. District Court, 719 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1986); In re Tonnessen, 937 P.2d 863 (Colo. App. 1996); In Interest of B.C.B., 2015 COA 42 , 411 P.3d 926.