reglab/housing_qa huggingface dataset:
HI Rev Stat § 702-216 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-216 Reckless or negligent causation; different result from that within the risk.

  §702-216 Reckless or negligent causation; different result from that within the risk. In the following instances, recklessly or negligently causing a particular result shall be deemed to be established even though the actual result caused by the defendant may not have been within the risk of which the defendant was or, in the case of negligence, should have been aware:  (1) The actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or  (2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence or too dependent on another's volitional conduct to have a bearing on the defendant's liability or on the gravity of the defendant's offense. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1973, c 136, §3(a); am L 1975, c 163, §2; gen ch 1993] COMMENTARY ON §702-216  Much of what has been said in the commentary on § §702-214 and 215 applies with equal force to this section. The only difference is that this section deals with reckless and negligent causation. Here the Code is concerned with results which differ from those within the risk of which the defendant was aware or of which the defendant should have been aware. However, the factors which are to be considered are the same: whether the actual harm is more extensive or serious than the probable result and whether the actual result is too remote or accidental in its occurrence or too dependent on another's volitional conduct. For a fuller discussion, the reader is referred to the commentary on § §702-214 and 215. SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §702-216  Act 136, Session Laws 1973, amended paragraph (1) by deleting the words "intended or contemplated" which followed the word "harm" and amended paragraph (2) by substituting the phrase "probable result" for the phrase "intended or contemplated result." References to the words "intended or contemplated" were eliminated since they "connote an intentional act on the part of the accused which is inconsistent with 'reckless' or 'negligent' as defined in §702-206." Senate Standing Committee Report No. 858, House Standing Committee Report No. 726.  Act 163, Session Laws 1975, amended this section in order to phrase the propositions in positive rather than negative language. It was felt that this change would make these propositions clearer when included in jury instructions. This amendment was not intended to change the section in substance but only in form. Conference Committee Report No. 19.
HI Rev Stat § 702-217 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-217 Causation in offenses of absolute liability. §702-217 Commentary:

  §702-217 Causation in offenses of absolute liability. When causing a particular result is an element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the defendant's conduct. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] COMMENTARY ON §702-217  The elimination of mens rea or culpability requirements from a penal offense should not make the accused liable for improbable consequences of the accused's conduct. The specter of such liability would be too precarious and capricious to induce an actor to make rational adjustments in the actor's behavior in order to avoid the sanction. The futility of an attempt to impose penal liability for the improbable consequences of conduct has been succinctly expressed by Hart and Honore:  ... [S]urely, the elimination of mens rea as... [a requisite for penal] liability does not mean that the accused is to be liable for harm, even if it only occurred through the conjunction of his act with the deliberate act of some independent person or with some quite extraordinary event. The plain man's protest would be that in such cases the accused 'did not do it', even though the harm would not have occurred without what he did.1  This section is not repetitive of §702-216 (dealing with negligent causation). There will undoubtedly be situations where a person will fail to perceive a risk of a probable consequence although the person's failure of perception did not involve a "gross deviation from the standard of care that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation." __________  §702-217 Commentary: 1. Hart & Honore, Causation in the Law 361 (1959).
HI Rev Stat § 702-219 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-219 Ignorance or mistake; reduction in grade and class of the offense. §702-219 Commentary:

  §702-219 Ignorance or mistake; reduction in grade and class of the offense. Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as the defendant supposed. In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and class of the offense of which the defendant may be convicted to those of the offense of which the defendant would be guilty had the situation been as the defendant supposed. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993] COMMENTARY ON §702-219  This section is addressed to a limited problem. A defendant intending to commit a certain offense, may, because of reasonable ignorance or mistake on the defendant's part, engage in conduct which (if the requisite state of mind were present) would be sufficient for conviction of a graver offense. It would not be fair to convict the defendant of the graver offense (unless some reduction in penalty were made to reflect the defendant's actual culpability) and it would not be fair to allow a complete acquittal because the defendant intended some other offense than the one with which the defendant is charged.  The problem may be stated by borrowing an example from the Model Penal Code commentary:  Burglary of a dwelling house may, for example, reasonably be treated as an offense of greater gravity than burglary of a store; and it is not unreasonable to require knowledge that the structure is a dwelling or at least recklessness that such may be the case. If we conceive of a defendant who had every ground to think that it was a store, although it actually was a dwelling, it may not be right to hold him for the graver crime. The doctrine that when one intends a lesser crime he may be convicted of a graver offense committed inadvertently leads to anomalous results if it is generally applied in the penal law....  If the defendant in the circumstances supposed is exculpated of the graver crime, it seems clear, however, that he should not be acquitted.1 The Code, following the suggestion of the Model Penal Code, resolves the dilemma by authorizing conviction for the graver offense while limiting the sentence (the grade and class) to that authorized for the offense which the defendant would have committed had the situation been as the defendant supposed. This limitation reflects the defendant's limited culpability. __________  §702-219 Commentary: 1. M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 4, comments at 137 (1955).
HI Rev Stat § 702-223 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-223 Liability for conduct of another; complicity with respect to the result.

  §702-223 Liability for conduct of another; complicity with respect to the result. When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing the result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if the accomplice acts, with respect to that result, with the state of mind that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993] COMMENTARY ON §702-223  This section is intended to make clear that a defendant charged, on the basis of the defendant's complicity in the conduct of another, with causing a particular result will not be allowed to escape accountability for the result because the defendant solicited or aided, etc., a different or more limited result if the defendant had the requisite state of mind with respect to the actual result.  Thus, for example, one who urges a driver to increase the speed of an automobile, disregarding known risks to pedestrians, would stand in the same position as the driver on a charge of reckless homicide and would not be allowed to defend on the ground that one solicited the violation of the traffic law and not the homicide law. Case Notes  Instruction on law of principals and accomplices was not erroneous. 59 H. 625, 586 P.2d 250 (1978).  Accomplice in commission of robbery. 62 H. 25, 608 P.2d 855 (1980).
HI Rev Stat § 702-226 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-226 Liability for conduct of another; multiple convictions; different degrees. §702-226 Commentary:

  §702-226 Liability for conduct of another; multiple convictions; different degrees. When, pursuant to any section from section 702-221 through section 702-223, two or more persons are liable for an offense which is divided into degrees, each person is guilty of the degree of the offense which is consistent with the person's own state of mind and with the person's own accountability for an aggravating fact or circumstance. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993] COMMENTARY ON §702-226  This section provides that when, by reason of accountability for conduct, two or more defendants are liable for the same offense, which is divided into degrees, each defendant shall be convicted of the degree which is consistent with the defendant's own state of mind or mental culpability and the defendant's own accountability for aggravating facts and circumstances.  This section is a sorely-needed correction of Hawaii law which has been interpreted to require, in the case of an accomplice, not only that the defendant stand in the same shoes as the person for whose conduct the defendant is accountable, but that the defendant be held to think the same thoughts.1 __________  §702-226 Commentary: 1. See State v. Shon, 47 Haw. 158, 385 P.2d 830 (1963), interpreting §252-4 R.L.H. (1955), subsequently H.R.S. §704-4.
HI Rev Stat § 702-229 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-229 Definitions relating to corporations and unincorporated associations.

  §702-229 Definitions relating to corporations and unincorporated associations. As used in sections 702-227 and 702-228:  "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation or association and, in the case of an unincorporated association, a member of such association.  "Corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program.  "High managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or an unincorporated association, or, in the case of a partnership, a partner, or any other agent of a corporation or unincorporated association having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or the unincorporated association. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] Revision Note  Numeric designations deleted and definitions rearranged pursuant to §23G-15. COMMENTARY ON §702-229  It seems clear that, in dealing with corporate penal liability, government corporations must be exempt. Penal liability in such a case is pointless.  The phrases "agent" and "high managerial agent" are broadly and inclusively defined. Given the wide variety of employment and other agency relationships, the definitions must present criteria which are very general. Further refinement or elaboration should be left to a case-by-case determination.
HI Rev Stat § 702-232 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-232 Military orders.

  §702-232 Military orders. It is an affirmative defense to a penal charge that the defendant, in engaging in the conduct or causing the result alleged, which the defendant did not know to be unlawful, did no more than execute an order of the defendant's superior in the armed services. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993] COMMENTARY ON §702-232  This section provides an affirmative defense in the narrow case where a defendant engages in conduct because ordered to do so by the defendant's superior in the armed services. The defense obtains only when the defendant did not know the conduct to be unlawful.
HI Rev Stat § 702-233 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-233 Consent; general. §702-233 Commentary:

  §702-233 Consent; general. In any prosecution, the victim's consent to the conduct alleged, or to the result thereof, is a defense if the consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] COMMENTARY ON §702-233  This section states the general view that the victim's consent to the defendant's conduct, or to the result of the defendant's conduct, is a defense if it negatives an element of the offense (e.g., consent to sexual intercourse on charge of rape) or precludes the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense (e.g., consent by the victim to allow the defendant to demonstrate a wrestling hold or maneuver upon the victim). It is obvious that this general principle should not be extended to all types of evils or harms and therefore this section is intended to be read in conjunction with §702-234 (consent to bodily injury) and §702-235 (ineffective consent).  Although this general principle has not been previously codified in Hawaii, it has been impliedly recognized.1 Case Notes  Based on the facts and the charged offenses in the case, the alternative theories of absence of consent and ineffective consent did not represent separate crimes; rather, they were alternative means of proving the attendant circumstance element of a single crime. 96 H. 161, 29 P.3d 351 (2001).  In sexual assault case, jury instruction as to ineffective consent prejudicially affected defendant's rights to due process because (1) jury was instructed that it could convict defendant based on the absence of consent under this section or any of the four grounds of ineffective consent under §702-235, (2) there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict was based on at least one of the four grounds of ineffective consent, and (3) there was legally insufficient evidence to support any of the four grounds of ineffective consent presented to the jury. 96 H. 161, 29 P.3d 351 (2001). __________  §702-233 Commentary: 1. Territory v. Lee, 29 Haw. 30 (1926) (where a bank teller mistakenly paid out too much money on a check, it was held that the teller's mistake was not "consent" to the taking which would afford a defense to a charge of larceny).
HI Rev Stat § 702-234 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-234 Consent to bodily injury. §702-234 Commentary:

  §702-234 Consent to bodily injury. In any prosecution involving conduct which causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such injury is a defense if:  (1) The conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic event or competitive sport; or  (2) The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under chapter 703. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] COMMENTARY ON §702-234  This section specifies the types of cases in which consent to conduct which threatens or causes physical injury will constitute a defense.  Where the conduct and injury are the reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport, the injury to one participant, whether it be deliberate (boxing) or fortuitous (basketball or football), should not import penal liability to the other party.  Subsection (2) permits effective consent when it is given in the context of a situation which would constitute a defense of justification under chapter 703. For example, a parent may intrust the care of a child to another person, thus, under some circumstances, consenting to the use of corporal punishment, which would be sufficient to establish justification for the use of moderate physical force. Again, an adult might submit to certain medical procedures which necessarily entail severe bodily injury.  Consent to bodily harm has not been dealt with in previous Hawaii penal law.1 SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §702-234  Section 234 in the Proposed Draft of the Code provided for a defense, in addition to the above text, where "the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious." The legislature, in enacting the Code in 1972, rejected this defense. Conference Committee Report No. 2 (1972) stated: "The Committee finds that the law should not permit the defense of consent to have such a broad application... and that the subsection should not permit, by consent, the type of conduct which would result in bodily injury and disruption of our social fabric." __________  §702-234 Commentary: 1. But see Burrows v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 49 Haw. 351, 360, 417 P.2d 816, 821 (1966) ("Consent is a defense to assault and battery cases as well as to others, unless consent is against the policy of the law.").
HI Rev Stat § 703-300 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|703. General Principles of Justification|703-300 Definitions relating to justification.

  §703-300 Definitions relating to justification. In this chapter, unless a different meaning is plainly required:  "Believes" means reasonably believes.  "Deadly force" means force which the actor uses with the intent of causing or which the actor knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Intentionally firing a firearm in the direction of another person or in the direction which another person is believed to be constitutes deadly force. A threat to cause death or serious bodily injury, by the production of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor's intent is limited to creating an apprehension that the actor will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute deadly force.  "Dwelling" means any building or structure, though movable or temporary, or a portion thereof, which is for the time being a home or place of lodging.  "Force" means any bodily impact, restraint, or confinement, or the threat thereof.  "Unlawful force" means force which is employed without the consent of the person against whom it is directed and the employment of which constitutes an offense or would constitute an offense except for a defense not amounting to a justification to use the force. Assent constitutes consent, within the meaning of this section, whether or not it otherwise is legally effective, except assent to the infliction of death or serious or substantial bodily injury. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1986, c 314, §5; gen ch 1993] Revision Note  Definitions rearranged pursuant to §23G-15. COMMENTARY ON §703-300  This section provides statutory definitions of terms used repeatedly in this chapter; a discussion of the definitions, when needed or appropriate, is found in the commentary on the section employing the defined terms. SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §703-300  Chapter 703 provides for a defense based on the legal concept of justification. An extended definition of justification is provided in § §703-302 through 309. In most instances, the critical factor in determining whether an actor's conduct is justified is the actor's state of mind or belief respecting facts and circumstances. The legislature changed §300 of the Proposed Draft by adding the definition of "believes." The definition adopts "the reasonable man standard with respect to justification for the use of force in self-protection, in the protection of property, and in the protection of others. It is your Committee's finding that the requirement that a person's belief be 'reasonable' for these defenses to be available will provide an objective basis by which to gauge whether or not the use of force was justified." Conference Committee Report No. 2 (1972). Case Notes  Subsection (1) cited: 9 H. App. 115, 826 P.2d 884 (1992).  Substantial evidence of record supported trial court's finding that defendant's use of the knife constituted deadly force. 77 H. 429 (App.), 886 P.2d 766 (1994).
HI Rev Stat § 703-301 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|703. General Principles of Justification|703-301 Justification a defense; civil remedies unaffected. §703-301 Commentary:

  §703-301 Justification a defense; civil remedies unaffected. (1) In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 703-302 through 703-309, is a defense.  (2) The fact that conduct is justifiable under this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for such conduct which is available in any civil action. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] COMMENTARY ON §703-301  This section does not attempt to define the defense of justification. An extended definition is given in the sections which follow. Subsection (1) merely establishes that justification is a defense. This places the burden of producing some credible evidence of the existence of justification on the defendant. If the defendant produces such evidence, or if it appears as part of the prosecution's case, the defendant is entitled to have the defense considered by the jury. The prosecution, however, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, facts which negative the defense.  Subsection (2) preserves civil remedies for conduct which may give rise to a defense of justification. Civil standards of conduct are higher than we propose for criminal liability. For example, unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant might suffice for civil liability whereas criminal liability will turn on the defendant's own subjective mental state. It therefore seems desirable explicitly to preserve civil remedies.  Prior Hawaii statutory and case law recognized some of the defenses which the Code unites in this chapter under the defense of justification. Reference to such recognition will be made in the commentary under the sections which follow. There is some language in old Hawaii case law which indicates that the defense of justification is affirmative in nature;1 to the extent that this language would be followed today, the Code represents a change. Case Notes  Justification is not an affirmative defense and prosecution has burden of disproving it once evidence of justification has been adduced. 60 H. 259, 588 P.2d 438 (1978).  Defendant's claim of justification, in defense against prosecution for terroristic threatening, was established regardless of whether or not defendant used deadly force. 1 H. App. 167, 616 P.2d 229 (1980).  "Choice of evils" defense applies to violations. 9 H. App. 115, 826 P.2d 884 (1992). __________  §703-301 Commentary: 1. King v. Bridges, 5 Haw. 467, 472 (1885); Provisional Government v. Caecires, 9 Haw. 522, 533 (1894).