GA Code § 15-11-281 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 15 - Courts|Chapter 11 - Juvenile Code|Article 4 - Termination of Parental Rights|Part 3 - Petition and Summons|§ 15-11-281. Issuance of Summons

  The court shall direct the issuance of a summons to the mother, legal father or biological father, guardian, legal custodian, attorney, and guardian ad litem, if any, of the child named in the petition to terminate parental rights and any other persons who appear to the court to be proper or necessary parties to the proceeding, requiring them to appear before the court at the time fixed to answer the allegations of the petition. A copy of such petition shall accompany the summons unless the summons is served by publication, in which case the published summons shall indicate the general nature of the allegations and where a copy of such petition can be obtained.   The court shall direct notice and a copy of the petition be provided to the child named in the petition if the child is 14 years of age or older.   The summons shall include the notice of effect of a termination judgment as set forth in Code Section 15-11-284 and shall state that a party is entitled to an attorney in the proceedings and that the court will appoint an attorney if the party is an indigent person.   The court may endorse upon the summons an order directing the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child named in the petition to appear personally at the hearing or directing the person having the physical custody or control of such child to bring such child to the hearing.   A party other than the child named in the petition may waive service of summons by written stipulation or by voluntary appearance at the hearing.     (Code 1981, §15-11-281, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)   Cross references.   - Amendment to Juvenile Court petition, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 6.6.   Continuance of adjudicatory hearing in Juvenile Court, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 11.3.   Law reviews.   - For article discussing due process in juvenile court procedures in California and Georgia, in light of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 9 (1971).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Editor's notes.   - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-26, pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-39, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-83, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-96, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.   Service of process by correctional officer on incarcerated parent.    - Personal service of a summons and a petition of deprivation, by a correctional officer upon an incarcerated parent, was sufficient as the service procedures in the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et seq., were not adopted nor were binding on the juvenile court, and the correctional officer was acting under the direction of the court for the purposes of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39.1(c) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-161,15-11-282,15-11-400,15-11-424, and15-11-531). In the Interest of A.J.M., 277 Ga. App. 646, 627 S.E.2d 399 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).   Waiver of notice.    - In a juvenile delinquency case, although neither defendants nor their parents were served with copies of the petitions and hearing summonses as required by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-162,15-11-281,15-11-423,15-11-425, and15-11-532), the defendants and their parents appeared at the hearings with their attorneys without objecting to lack of notice; thus, the defendants and their parents waived the notice issue. In the Interest of T.K.L., 277 Ga. App. 461, 627 S.E.2d 98 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).   Waiver of procedural requirements.    - Time limits on setting juvenile hearings are mandatory, but procedural requirements can be waived. J.T.G. v. State, 141 Ga. App. 184, 233 S.E.2d 40 (1977) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26) Cox v. Department of Human Resources, 148 Ga. App. 338, 250 S.E.2d 728 (1978); 156 Ga. App. 338, 274 S.E.2d 728 (1980), overruled on other grounds,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).   Implied waiver of service on behalf of child.    - If a child is present at a juvenile court hearing with the child's parent and counsel, the child's parent impliedly may waive service of a summons on a child's behalf by voluntary appearance at a hearing without objection to lack of service. Fulton County Detention Center v. Robertson, 249 Ga. 864, 295 S.E.2d 101 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).   Parent's right to appeal delinquency adjudication.    - As parties to their child's delinquency action pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-160,15-11-423, and15-11-530), the child's parents had the right to appeal the juvenile court's judgment and to participate in the appellate process. In the Interest of J.L.B., 280 Ga. App. 556, 634 S.E.2d 514 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).   Proceeding null when no waiver of rights nor proper service.    - If, in a juvenile court proceeding, there was neither waiver of the right of a mother, nor proper service upon the parties and if the hearing is not taken under oath, or waived by any of the parties, the proceeding is an absolute nullity. McBurrough v. Dep't of Human Resources, 150 Ga. App. 130, 257 S.E.2d 35 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).   Constitutionality.    - Former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-281,15-11-282, and15-11-283) was not unconstitutional because the statute required the biological father to exercise his interest in the child by filing a petition to legitimate. In the Interest of D.B., 243 Ga. App. 473, 533 S.E.2d 737 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96).    Requiring fathers of children born out of wedlock to legitimate their children in order to preserve their parental rights does not violate equal protection because unwed fathers and unwed mothers are not similarly situated. In the Interest of V.M.T., 243 Ga. App. 732, 534 S.E.2d 452 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96).   Construction with former provisions.    - Because former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(c) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-281 and15-11-282) related specifically to service in termi- nation-of-parental-rights proceedings, the trial court's reliance on the service provisions of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39.1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-161,15-11-282,15-11-400,15-11-424, and15-11-531), a statute dealing with service in juvenile court proceedings generally, was misplaced; moreover, for purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute prevailed over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. In the Interest of C.S., 282 Ga. 7, 644 S.E.2d 812 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96).   Putative father entitled to counsel.    - Putative father clearly fell within the general definition of a "party" for the purposes of the paternity hearing mandated by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-83 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-281,15-11-282, and15-11-283) and was therefore entitled to appointed counsel. Wilkins v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 337 S.E.2d 20 (1985) (decided under former law).    Content of summons served upon father did not have to require him to appear in court on any fixed date in order to answer allegations in a petition to terminate his parental rights. In re W.R.S., 213 Ga. App. 616, 445 S.E.2d 367 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-83).   Failure to give notice not error.    - Failure to give notice to a father pursuant to subsections (e) and (g) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-83 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-281 and15-11-282) was not error since such notice requirements related only to the availability of the abbreviated termination procedures contained therein and did not affect the jurisdiction of the court to consider a termination proceeding; the absence of an attempt by the father to legitimate the children did not contribute to the judgment terminating the father's parental rights. In re C.M.S., 218 Ga. App. 487, 462 S.E.2d 398 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-83); In re J.K., 239 Ga. App. 142, 520 S.E.2d 19 (1999); In the Interest of L.S., 244 Ga. App. 626, 536 S.E.2d 533 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-83);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-83).