NM Stat § 52-1-6 (2021)
2021 New Mexico Statutes|Chapter 52 - Workers' Compensation|Article 1 - Workers' Compensation|Section 52-1-6 - Application of provisions of act.

A. The provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act shall apply to employers of three or more workers; provided that act shall apply to all employers engaged in activities required to be licensed under the provisions of the Construction Industries Licensing Act [Chapter 60, Article 13 NMSA 1978] regardless of the number of employees. The provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act shall not apply to employers of private domestic servants and farm and ranch laborers. B. An election to be subject to the Workers' Compensation Act by employers of private domestic servants or farm and ranch laborers, by persons for whom the services of qualified real estate sales persons are performed or by a partner or self-employed person may be made by filing, in the office of the director, either a sworn statement to the effect that the employer accepts the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act or an insurance or security undertaking as required by Section 52-1-4 NMSA 1978. C. Every worker shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act if his employer is subject to the provisions of that act and has complied with its requirements, including insurance. D. Such compliance with the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, including the provisions for insurance, shall be, and construed to be, a surrender by the employer and the worker of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation or determination thereof or to any cause of action at law, suit in equity or statutory or common-law right to remedy or proceeding whatever for or on account of personal injuries or death of the worker than as provided in the Workers' Compensation Act and shall be an acceptance of all of the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act and shall bind the worker himself and, for compensation for his death, shall bind his personal representative, his surviving spouse and next of kin, as well as the employer and those conducting his business during bankruptcy or insolvency. E. The Workers' Compensation Act provides exclusive remedies. No cause of action outside the Workers' Compensation Act shall be brought by an employee or dependent against the employer or his representative, including the insurer, guarantor or surety of any employer, for any matter relating to the occurrence of or payment for any injury or death covered by the Workers' Compensation Act. Nothing in the Workers' Compensation Act, however, shall affect or be construed to affect, in any way, the existence of or the mode of trial of any claim or cause of action that the worker has against any person other than his employer or another employee of his employer, including a management or supervisory employee, or the insurer, guarantor or surety of his employer. History: 1978 Comp., § 52-1-6, enacted by Laws 1990 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 4. ANNOTATIONSRepeals and reenactments. — Laws 1990 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 4 repealed 52-1-6 NMSA 1978, as amended by Laws 1990 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 3, and enacted a new section, effective January 1, 1992. Cross references. — For employees who come within act, see 52-1-2 NMSA 1978. For coverage by state agencies, see 52-1-3 NMSA 1978. For application of provisions of act to certain corporations' employees, see 52-1-7 NMSA 1978. For right to compensation as exclusive, see 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.Section constitutionally enacted. — The claim that this section was enacted in violation of N.M. Const., art. IV, § 16 is without merit. Varela v. Mounho, 1978-NMCA-086, 92 N.M. 147, 584 P.2d 194, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324. Independent retaliatory discharge action allowed. — An employee who alleges that he or she was wrongfully discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation action has a cause of action for damages independent from that set out in Section 52-1-28.2 NMSA 1978 (civil penalty for retaliatory discharge). Michaels v. Anglo Am. Auto Auctions, Inc., 1994-NMSC-015, 117 N.M. 91, 869 P.2d 279. Claim must be against employer. — Claims based on the Occupational Disease Disablement Act or Workers' Compensation Act can be raised only against an employer. Garrity v. Overland Sheepskin Co., 1996-NMSC-032, 121 N.M. 710, 917 P.2d 1382. No cause of action against insurer for refusal to pay medical claims. — An injured employee who is receiving workmen's [workers'] compensation benefits and medical expenses from his employer or his insurer does not have a cause of action against the employer's insurer for a refusal of the insurer to pay some of the medical expenses which the employee claims are owing. Dickson v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 1982-NMSC-090, 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1. Scope of act's immunity. — The immunity of an employee for an injury done to a fellow employee is not limited to negligent injury; rather, the provisions of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act accord immunity for all causes of action, all common-law rights and remedies, for negligence or wrong including intentional torts. Gallegos v. Chastain, 1981-NMCA-014, 95 N.M. 551, 624 P.2d 60, overruled in part by Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148. Contract for additional benefits permitted. — An employee may privately contract with his employer for disability benefits in addition to those provided by the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act. Segura v. Molycorp, Inc., 1981-NMSC-116, 97 N.M. 13, 636 P.2d 284. Contract substituting less compensation scheme for act invalid. — A contract between an employer and employee providing that the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act should not apply to their relationship, which substituted a scheme for less compensation for injury or death, was invalid as against public policy, and the contract could not be introduced in evidence in a suit to recover compensation. Christensen v. Dysart, 1938-NMSC-008, 42 N.M. 107, 76 P.2d 1. There is no express consent by state to be sued in a Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation proceeding involving the state penitentiary and the consent is not to rest on implication. Day v. Penitentiary of N.M., 1954-NMSC-064, 58 N.M. 391, 271 P.2d 831. Right of removal to federal court not waived by election of act. — The claimant's argument that the employer elected to be governed by the laws of New Mexico, by having sought the protection afforded by the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act and thus should not be able to remove a case thereunder to a federal forum was without merit since a state cannot constitutionally provide, by statute, an instrumentality whereby the right to remove a case to a federal tribunal can be waived. Valencia v. Stearns Roger Mfg. Co., 124 F. Supp. 670 (D.N.M. 1954) (decided under former law). Failure to file did not waive venue or removal rights. — Failure to file an election not to accept the provisions of this article did not constitute an acceptance of the provision fixing venue of actions in the state court for recovery of benefits and did not waive any right to remove the cause to the federal court. Fresquez v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 238 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1956) (decided under former law). Injury subsequent to discharge. — Workers' Compensation Law (Chapter 52, Article 1 NMSA 1978) is not automatically terminated by the firing or quitting of an employee, but applies to injury occurring during a reasonable period while employee winds up affairs and leaves premises. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351. Employer's loss of immunity to tort action. — An employer becomes vulnerable to a tort action by an employee and loses the immunity of Subsection D if the employer possesses a second persona sufficiently independent from and unrelated to the status of employer. Salswedel v. Enerpharm, Ltd., 1988-NMCA-089, 107 N.M. 728, 764 P.2d 499. Tort law governs acts of hospital in treating employee for accident. — Section 52-1-49 NMSA 1978 coupled with this section and Section 52-1-56 NMSA 1978 clearly demonstrate a legislative intent that ordinary tort law, except as modified by said Sections 52-1-49 and 52-1-56 NMSA 1978, shall govern the tortious acts of medical personnel and hospitals charged with the care and treatment of an employee for a compensable accident. Security Ins. Co. v. Chapman, 1975-NMSC-052, 88 N.M. 292, 540 P.2d 222. Shot while at work as in course of employment. — Where the mentally disturbed husband was aroused by an act of decedent while he was at work, and the husband then went to the employer's premises while decedent was there at work, and shot him, the risk was connected with the employment and the injury arose out of the employment. Hence, the exclusionary provision of the insurance policy precludes recovery where policy excludes "injury arising out of, or in the course of, any employment," and plaintiff is seeking to recover the remaining balance unpaid after recovery under the workmen's [workers'] compensation law. Roskell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 529 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1976). Juror who suffers accidental injury while in performance of his duties is not entitled to an award of compensation for his injury. Seward v. County of Bernalillo, 1956-NMSC-032, 61 N.M. 52, 294 P.2d 625. II. ACCEPTANCE OF THE ACT.Workers' Compensation Act is compulsory, not elective, and compliance may be accomplished by filing an undertaking in the nature of insurance, by filing a certificate in evidence thereof, or by qualifying as a self-insurer; the failure of an employer to comply in any way constitutes a violation of the act and subjects him to a claim in tort for negligence by an employee. Montano v. Williams, 1976-NMCA-017, 89 N.M. 86, 547 P.2d 569, aff'd, 89 N.M. 252, 550 P.2d 264. Presumed acceptance of act. — In view of the conclusive presumption provided for by Laws 1929, ch. 113, § 4 (now repealed), an employee could assume that unless employer filed a rejection of the act with the county clerk, it was accepted according to its terms. Points v. Wills, 1939-NMSC-041, 44 N.M. 31, 97 P.2d 374. Employer conclusively presumed to accept act where not exempted. — Where an employer had not exempted himself from the operation of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act, he is conclusively presumed to have accepted its provisions. Addison v. Tessier, 1957-NMSC-002, 62 N.M. 120, 305 P.2d 1067 (decided under former law). Employee presumed to accept act where employer followed act requirements. — If an employer had been carrying insurance, or had relieved himself from so doing, as required by the act, it would have been conclusively presumed that the employee had himself accepted the provisions of the act, and an action at law could not have been maintained because in that case the remedy under said act is exclusive. Addison v. Tessier, 1957-NMSC-002, 62 N.M. 120, 305 P.2d 1067. Where act not followed, no presumption and action at law lies. — Where an employer did not carry workmen's [workers'] compensation insurance, nor had he relieved himself of such requirement as required by Section 52-1-4 NMSA 1978, the employer was not operating under the provisions of the act, and his employee, under such circumstances, could not have been conclusively presumed to have accepted the provisions thereof. Consequently, action at law lies in favor of the employee and against the employer, and the defenses enumerated in Section 52-1-8 NMSA 1978 were not available to employer. Addison v. Tessier, 1957-NMSC-002, 62 N.M. 120, 305 P.2d 1067 (decided under former law). The employee could not be conclusively presumed to have accepted the provisions of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act since the employer had not complied with its requirements, including insurance. Until there is a compliance with the requirements of the act relating to insurance by the employer, then, no presumption arises that the employee is bound by the act. Addison v. Tessier, 1957-NMSC-002, 62 N.M. 120, 305 P.2d 1067. Employer cannot invoke estoppel to bar employee's action. — Employer at all times knew that he did not carry workmen's [workers'] compensation insurance and had not relieved himself of so doing as provided by the act; therefore, he is not in a position to invoke the doctrine of estoppel as a bar to employee's cause of action. Addison v. Tessier, 1957-NMSC-002, 62 N.M. 120, 305 P.2d 1067. Failure of employer to comply with the filing provisions. — Where an employer did not substantially comply with the filing provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, the exclusive remedy provisions of this section and Sections 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 did not apply to bar a wrongful death action against the employer. Peterson v. Wells Fargo Armored Servs. Corp., 2000-NMCA-043, 129 N.M. 158, 3 P.3d 135, cert. denied, 129 N.M. 207, 4 P.3d 35. Act became operative unless contract provided otherwise. — As soon as a person entered another's employ the act became operative, unless the contract of employment provided the act should not apply or written notice was given to that effect. Jones v. George F. Getty Oil Co., 92 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644, 58 S. Ct. 644, 82 L. Ed. 1106 (1938). Where decedent did not affirmatively elect not to accept provisions of act, nor was such election denied, decedent accepted the provisions of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act and plaintiff is bound thereby. Shope v. Don Coe Constr. Co., 1979-NMCA-013, 92 N.M. 508, 590 P.2d 656. Delay in filing does not remove limitation on liability. — A delay in filing pursuant to Section 52-1-4 NMSA 1978 does not remove the limitation on the employer's liability because the statutory purpose is met when the employer obtains compensation protection for his workmen. Quintana v. Nolan Bros., 1969-NMCA-083, 80 N.M. 589, 458 P.2d 841. What constitutes sufficient election by employer to be bound by act. — The decision in Eaves v. Contract Trucking Co., 1951-NMSC-066, 55 N.M. 463, 235 P.2d 530, where the supreme court held the failure of the employer to file a written election to be subject to the act in the office of the clerk of the district court rendered the employer and his insurer immune to action under the act, although the bond was actually filed, was too strict, but the legislature has cured the error in the Eaves v. Contract Trucking Co., supra, case by providing that the filing by the employer of a statement he elected to be bound by the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act or the filing of a bond is a sufficient election by the employer to be bound by the act. Garrison v. Bonfield, 1953-NMSC-073, 57 N.M. 533, 260 P.2d 718 (decided under former law). Third party under Subsection D. — A partnership in which the employer participates can be considered a third party for purposes of Subsection D. Salswedel v. Enerpharm, Ltd., 1988-NMCA-089, 107 N.M. 728, 764 P.2d 499. III. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY.The Workers' Compensation Act does not prohibit a worker from filing an intentional tort action while receiving interim workers' compensation benefits. Salazar v. Torres, 2007-NMSC-019, 141 N.M. 559, 158 P.3d 449. Act's remedy exclusive. — Once the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act provides a remedy, that act is exclusive and the claimant has no right to bring an action in common-law negligence against his employer. Galles Chevrolet Co. v. Chaney, 1979-NMSC-027, 92 N.M. 618, 593 P.2d 59; Segura v. Molycorp, Inc., 1981-NMSC-116, 97 N.M. 13, 636 P.2d 284. The New Mexico Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act expressly makes the remedies provided by the act the sole and exclusive remedies available to an employee for claims against his employer or insurer. Dickson v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 1982-NMSC-090, 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1. Contribution remedy contravenes exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Tom Growney Equip. Co. v. Jouett, 2005-NMSC-015, 137 N.M. 497, 113 P.3d 320. Tort claims. — The New Mexico Supreme Court opinion in Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M.272, 34 P.3d 1148, in replacing the "actual intent" test with a three-pronged inquiry to determine "willfulness" did not permit action for tort when worker's injuries were caused by negligence of the employee. Cordova v. Peavey Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D.N.M. 2003). Tort claim barred. — Summary judgment appropriate where temporary staffing agency employee is injured while performing a task that was not authorized or known about by his employer the injured special employee is limited to compensation under the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act. Cordova v. Peavey Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D.N.M. 2003). Claim for refusal to make medical payments barred. — An independent cause of action for bad-faith refusal to make medical payments is barred by the exclusivity provision of this act. Cruz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1995-NMSC-006, 119 N.M. 301, 889 P.2d 1223. Applicability to intentional acts. — Exclusivity provisions of Workers' Compensation Law (Chapter 52, Article 1 NMSA 1978) apply to injury to claimant's hand caused by manager intentionally slamming locker door. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351. Worker's claim for intentional spoliation of evidence against his employer was not barred by the act's exclusive remedy provisions. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 1995-NMSC-063, 120 N.M. 645, 905 P.2d 185. Employee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against her employer was not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, but her claim for infliction of emotional distress against co-employees was barred by that provision. Snowdon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 932 F. Supp. 1267 (D. N.M. 1996). Employer's liability where worker settles with third party. — An injured worker who entered into a stipulated settlement with third party responsible for his injury, making him financially whole, cannot subsequently claim compensation from his employer. Because he received compensation benefits from the employer, he surrendered his rights to any other form of compensation from employer. Apodaca v. Formwork Specialists, 1990-NMCA-102, 110 N.M. 778, 800 P.2d 212, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 749, 799 P.2d 1121, overruled on other grounds by Montoya v. AKAL Sec., Inc., 1992-NMSC-056, 114 N.M. 354, 838 P.2d 971. Exclusivity provision does not preclude action against third party. — The exclusivity provision of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act does not preclude an employee or his estate from seeking damages against a third party who is not an employer, co-employee, or insurer or guarantor of his employer. Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated Lines, Inc., 1979-NMCA-095, 93 N.M. 511, 602 P.2d 195. Loss of consortium claim barred. — Since the workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy of a deceased employee's survivors, the claim of the employee's husband for loss of consortium was barred as a remedy at law under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Singhas v. N.M. State Hwy. Dep't, 1995-NMCA-089, 120 N.M. 474, 902 P.2d 1077, aff'd, 1997-NMSC-054, 124 N.M. 42, 946 P.2d 645. An action for loss of consortium by the spouse of an injured worker is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act. Archer v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 1997-NMSC-003, 122 N.M. 703, 930 P.2d 1155. Estate of deceased worker not entitled to recover under employer's uninsured motorist insurance. — Where estate of decedent sought to recover damages under decedent's employer's uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage after decedent was killed in the course of his employment by a co-worker operating an employer-owned motor vehicle, decedent's estate was not entitled to recover damages under the employer's uninsured motorist insurance, because the uninsured motorist statute, 66-5-301(A) NMSA 1978, only benefits persons "legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles", and under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), 52-1-1 to -70 NMSA 1978, an employee who was injured in a workplace accident caused by an employer or its representative may only seek a remedy authorized under the WCA, and under the WCA such a employee is not legally entitled to recover damages under the uninsured motorist statute. Vasquez v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, 2017-NMSC-003. IV. EMPLOYERS COVERED.Special employee, coemployee. — A contractor that is the direct employer of special employees is immune under the act from common law suits brought by other special employees working for the same special employer, but under a different contract with a different direct employer. The contractor is not a special employee in this case, is not a coemployee for purposes of the act, and thus is not immune from suit. Street v. Alpha Constr. Servs., 2006-NMCA-121, 140 N.M. 425, 143 P.3d 187, cert. quashed 2007-NMCERT-004, 141 N.M. 569, 158 P.3d 459. Burden of proving who is employer. — Once corporation made prima facie showing that it was worker's employer, the burden shifted to worker, who was suing the employer for negligence, to demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts to rebut this conclusion. Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076, cert. denied, 2005-NMCERT-004, 137 N.M. 454, 112 P.3d 1111. Directors and officers as "workers". — Where corporate payments to directors and officers represented repayment of loans, not wages or salary, the directors and officers were not "workers" as contemplated by this section. Garcia v. Watson Tile Works, Inc., 1990-NMCA-126, 111 N.M. 209, 803 P.2d 1114. Sole proprietor as worker. — A self-employed person must file either a sworn statement that he has elected to be covered under the Workers' Compensation Act as an employee/worker or file an insurance or security undertaking expressly stating that he is covered as an employee/worker under the act. Consequently, an insurance certificate demonstrating a self-employed person or sole proprietor has purchased insurance for his workers is insufficient to demonstrate that the sole proprietor had elected to be considered a worker under the act for purposes of coverage. Junge v. John D. Morgan Constr. Co., 1994-NMCA-106, 118 N.M. 457, 882 P.2d 48. Illegally employed minor has common-law action for injury. — The employment contract of illegally employed minor is voidable, giving that minor employee the right to pursue a common-law action against the employer if the minor is injured in the employment. Howie v. Stevens, 1984-NMCA-052, 102 N.M. 300, 694 P.2d 1365, cert. quashed, 102 N.M. 293, 694 P.2d 1358. When number of workers calculated. — If an employer has once regularly employed enough workers to come under the act, he remains there even when the number employed may temporarily fall below the minimum. Garcia v. Watson Tile Works, Inc., 1990-NMCA-126, 111 N.M. 209, 803 P.2d 1114. Worker's use of own tools. — Where in an attempt to show that corporation had no right to control his work, worker presented evidence that he used his own tools on the job, this fact is not determinative. Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076, cert. denied, 2005-NMCERT-004, 137 N.M. 454, 112 P.3d 1111. Existence of employment relationship is question of fact. Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076, cert. denied, 2005-NMCERT-004, 137 N.M. 454, 112 P.3d 1111. Co-employee was "a person other than the employer" against whom a negligence action for damages might be maintained. Hockett v. Chapman, 1961-NMSC-163, 69 N.M. 324, 366 P.2d 850 (decided under former law). Total number of employees considered where three proprietorships owned. — Defendant who solely owned and operated three businesses as sole proprietorships, and who cumulatively employed a total of four or more employees in those three sole proprietorships, was an employer under this act, even though the business for which claimant worked did not employ four employees. Clark v. Electronic City, 1977-NMCA-048, 90 N.M. 477, 565 P.2d 348, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485. Applicability to state employees. — Employees of the public defender's department who were injured in the course of their employment were employees of the state for purposes of the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, and the exclusivity rule applied to tort claims asserted against the state highway department by such employees. Singhas v. N.M. State Hwy. Dep't, 1995-NMCA-089, 120 N.M. 474, 902 P.2d 1077, aff'd, 1997-NMSC-054, 124 N.M. 42, 946 P.2d 645. Because the state highway department is not recognized by law as a legal entity distinct from the state itself, the state could not be both employer and third party tortfeasor in an action against the highway department by employees of the public defender's department who were injured while traveling in the course of their employment, and the "dual persona" doctrine did not apply to extend immunity to highway department under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Singhas v. N.M. State Hwy. Dep't, 1995-NMCA-089, 120 N.M. 474, 902 P.2d 1077, aff'd, 1997-NMSC-054, 124 N.M. 42, 946 P.2d 645. Peace officer covered for injury received while in private employment. — A peace officer may, by accepting private employment, receive compensation benefits as any other private employee, if his employer is covered by the act, or has elected to be bound thereby, and his injury is one received incident to his duties as a private employee. Chapman v. Anison, 1959-NMSC-021, 65 N.M. 283, 336 P.2d 323. Ensilage cutting does not fall within occupation of milling. — Ensilage cutting does not fall within the statutorily designated extra-hazardous occupation of milling, and workman [worker] injured by ensilage cutting machine was not entitled to workmen's [workers'] compensation. Graham v. Wheeler, 1967-NMSC-036, 77 N.M. 455, 423 P.2d 980 (decided under prior law). V. EMPLOYERS EXCLUDED.Farm and ranch laborers exclusion does not survive rational basis review. — Section 52-1-6(A) NMSA 1978, which excludes farm and ranch laborers from the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, creates differential treatment among injured farm and ranch laborers from other employees of agricultural employers, and such a classification is not supported by evidence in the record nor a firm legal rationale sufficient to establish a rational relationship between the exclusion and the purported interests of cost savings to the agricultural industry, the unique administrative challenges created by farm and ranch workers, the unique economic aspects of agriculture, the protection of New Mexico's farming and ranching traditions, or in the application of tort law for injuries suffered by farm and ranch laborers, while any other workplace injury suffered by an employee of an agricultural employer goes through the workers' compensation system. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2016-NMSC-029, aff'g 2015-NMCA-097, 356 P.3d 546. Constitutionality of farm and ranch laborers exclusion. — Section 52-1-6(A) NMSA 1978, which excludes farm and ranch laborers from the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, violates the guarantee of equal protection where farm and ranch laborers seeking compensation for work-related injuries or disabilities are similarly situated to, but are treated differently than, other workers in the state who are likewise seeking compensation. The government's purported interests in the efficient administration of workers' compensation cases and in protecting the agricultural industry from the cost of providing workers' compensation coverage are without any rational basis and do not justify the arbitrary classification created by the exclusion. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2015-NMCA-097, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008, and cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008. Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act does not apply to employers in farm and ranch operations. McKinney v. Davis, 1972-NMSC-077, 84 N.M. 352, 503 P.2d 332. "Farm and ranch laborers" construed. — Where a worker's primary responsibilities were performed in a packing shed and were not performed on land where crops were grown, nor were his duties an essential part of the cultivation of crops or related to some essential part of the cultivation process such as irrigation or fertilization, the worker was not a farm laborer. Holguin v. Billy the Kid Produce, Inc., 1990-NMCA-073, 110 N.M. 287, 795 P.2d 92. Exemption only applicable to farm and ranch laborers. — In subsection A, the legislature did not intend to permit employers to exempt their entire work force from the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act by employing a few farm and ranch laborers: this exemption applies only with respect to farm and ranch laborers. Cueto v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 1980-NMCA-036, 94 N.M. 223, 608 P.2d 535. Exempt status of farm employee should be judged from general character of work rather than his activity on any particular day. Cueto v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 1980-NMCA-036, 94 N.M. 223, 608 P.2d 535. "Farm and ranch laborers" construed from the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act, by Subsection A of this section, to the extent of employment of farm labor. Varela v. Mounho, 1978-NMCA-086, 92 N.M. 147, 584 P.2d 194, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324. A beekeeper's assistant was a "farm laborer" for purposes of workers' compensation. Tanner v. Bosque Honey Farm, Inc., 1995-NMCA-053, 119 N.M. 760, 895 P.2d 282. Private employers of farm and ranch laborers are expressly exempted from application of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act. Williams v. Cooper, 1953-NMSC-050, 57 N.M. 373, 258 P.2d 1139. Exemption of sole executive employee does not exempt the employer. — Section 52-1-6 NMSA 1978 requires all incorporated construction companies to abide by the requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act, even those companies who employ only executive employees that have elected to individually opt out of coverage under 52-1-7 NMSA 1978. Jackson Constr., Inc. v. Smith, 2012-NMCA-033, 277 P.3d 470. Where the sole owner of an incorporated construction company was the president and sole board member of the company; the company did not employ any workers or executives other than the owner; the owner elected to exempt the owner from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act pursuant to 52-1-7 NMSA 1978, and the owner acknowledged that the owner was an employee of the company, the company was subject to the act and was required to procure worker's compensation insurance. Jackson Constr., Inc. v. Smith, 2012-NMCA-033, 277 P.3d 470. The purpose of the statute is to afford the employer a means of electing whether or not he shall come under the act. Those engaged in extra-hazardous occupations come within the act automatically unless affirmative action is taken to exempt themselves from the act. 1955 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 55-6289 (opinion rendered under former law). Extending coverage. — A county or other employer may extend coverage of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act to employees not listed specifically as engaged in extra-hazardous employment by filing an election to that effect with the clerk of the district court and taking out a policy of workmen's [workers'] compensation insurance. 1949 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 49-5194 (opinion rendered under former law). Law reviews. — For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Torts," see 11 N.M.L. Rev. 217 (1981). For comment, "Comparative Fault Principles Do Not Affect Negligent Employer's Right to Full Reimbursement of Compensation Benefits Out of Worker's Partial Third-Party Recovery - Taylor v. Delgarno Transp., Inc.," see 14 N.M.L. Rev. 437 (1984). For survey of workers' compensation law in New Mexico, see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 579 (1988). For annual survey of New Mexico Workers' Compensation Law, see 20 N.M.L. Rev. 459 (1990). For note, "Workers' Compensation Law - Bad Faith Refusal of an Insurer To Pay Workers' Compensation Benefits: Russell v. Protective Insurance Company," see 20 N.M.L. Rev. 757 (1990). For survey of 1990-91 workers' compensation law, see 22 N.M.L. Rev. 845 (1992). For note, "The District Court Should Make the Initial Determination of Jurisdiction in Workers' Compensation Cases Involving Intentional Tort Claims - Eldridge v. Circle K Corp.," see 28 N.M.L. Rev. 665 (1998). For note, "Workers' Compensation Law the Sexual Harassment Claim Quandary: Workers' Compensation as an Inadequate and Unavailable Remedy, Cox v. Chino Mines/Phelps Dodge," see 24 N.M. L. Rev. 565 (1994). Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation §§ 99, 127 to 132. Employer's taking out insurance covering employees not otherwise within Workmen's Compensation Act as election to accept act, 103 A.L.R. 1523. What conduct is willful, intentional, or deliberate within Workmen's Compensation Act provision authorizing tort action for such conduct, 96 A.L.R.3d 1064. Modern status of effect of state Workmen's Compensation Act on right of third-person tortfeasor to contribution or indemnity from employer of injured or killed workman, 100 A.L.R.3d 350. Willful, wanton, or reckless conduct of co-employee as ground of liability despite bar of workers' compensation law, 57 A.L.R.4th 888. Workers' compensation: third-party tort liability of corporate officer to injured workers, 76 A.L.R.4th 365. Workers' compensation statute as barring illegally employed minor's tort action, 77 A.L.R.4th 844. Workers' compensation as precluding employee's suit against employer for sexual harassment in the workplace, 51 A.L.R.5th 163. 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 37 to 58, 89, 120 to 129.