GA Code § 51-11-20 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 51 - Torts|Chapter 11 - Defenses to Tort Actions|Article 2 - Satisfaction|§ 51-11-20. Satisfaction and Settlement of Tort Authorized; What Agreements Allowed Where Tort Constitutes Crime

  If a tort does not amount to a crime, the person injured may consent to a satisfaction and settlement thereof.     If a tort amounts to a crime, the person injured may agree upon and receive compensation for the personal injury.   However, any attempt to satisfy the public offense or to suppress a prosecution therefor is illegal and will vitiate the entire agreement, except in those cases for which the law expressly allows such a settlement. Such an attempt to satisfy or to suppress prosecution of a public offense which amounts to a felony is itself an offense under this Code; and, even if executed, an agreement to this effect shall be no defense to an action for the tort. If the offense does not amount to a felony and the agreement is fully executed, such agreement shall constitute satisfaction for the private tort.      (Orig. Code 1863, §§ 2986, 2987; Code 1868, §§ 2999, 3000; Code 1873, §§ 3054, 3055; Code 1882, §§ 3054, 3055; Civil Code 1895, §§ 3894, 3895; Civil Code 1910, §§ 4491, 4492; Code 1933, §§ 105-1901, 105-1902.)   Cross references.   - Penalty for compounding a crime, § 16-10-90.   JUDICIAL DECISIONS    When each of two persons relinquishes claim against other mutual accord and satisfaction is effected regardless of respective amounts involved, and this bars any further recourse on the part of either as to such claims. Reese v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 10, 90 S.E.2d 683 (1955).    Accord without satisfaction is no bar; it is only complete when all is done that was to be done in satisfaction. Campbell Coal Co. v. Pano, 51 Ga. App. 232, 180 S.E. 139 (1935).    Willingness or readiness to pay or perform is not equivalent of performance or payment, and is therefore not satisfaction; nothing short of actual performance or payment, meaning performance or payment accepted, will suffice. Campbell Coal Co. v. Pano, 51 Ga. App. 232, 180 S.E. 139 (1935).    Release of one joint tort-feasor releases all. Rowland v. Lewis, 109 Ga. App. 755, 137 S.E.2d 387 (1964).   The release of one joint tort-feasor automatically, by operation of law, operates to release them all, regardless of intent. Henslee v. Houston, 566 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1978).   Release extinguishes claim.    - There can be but one satisfaction of the same damage or injury; and if, instead of merely dismissing one's suit against one of two defendants sued jointly, the plaintiff proceeds, for a consideration, to fully settle and satisfy the plaintiff's claim against one, he cannot by the terms of such accord and satisfaction, when the injury or damage complained of is the same, limit the release to the defendant thus dealt with, but in such case the claim itself becomes extinguished. Moore v. Smith, 78 Ga. App. 49, 50 S.E.2d 219 (1948); Giles v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 540, 56 S.E.2d 860 (1949).    There may be but one compensation for single injury. Rowland v. Lewis, 109 Ga. App. 755, 137 S.E.2d 387 (1964).   Settlement for personal injury will bar property claims in most cases.    - A single wrongful or negligent act which injures both one's person and one's property gives one but a single cause of action, in the absence of a waiver by the defendant to the bringing of separate suits for the injuries to one's person and to one's property, and a settlement of the personal damage will bar an action for damage on account of injuries to the property when the property and personal damages are the result of a single wrongful or negligent act. Giles v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 540, 56 S.E.2d 860 (1949).    A single negligent act which injures both one's person and one's property gives rise to but a single cause of action, and the injured person may not by settlement extinguish a part of the cause of action and then proceed with the remainder. Gregory v. Schnurstein, 94 Ga. App. 330, 94 S.E.2d 514 (1956).   Full compensation bars further claims.    - It is a well-settled doctrine of the law that complete satisfaction for an injury received from one person in consideration of one's release operates to discharge all who are liable therefor, whether they be joint or several wrongdoers. Edmondson v. Hancock, 40 Ga. App. 587, 151 S.E. 114 (1929).    When automobile owner has been fully compensated for damage to the owner's automobile by payment by the owner's insured of damages less the deductible amount, and by payment by other party to the collision of the deductible amount, an automobile owner has no cause of action against the other party and may not maintain suit in the owner's name for use of the owner and the owner's insurer, as subrogee. King v. Prince, 89 Ga. App. 588, 80 S.E.2d 222 (1954).   Release for full settlement includes claims for injury resulting from improper treatment.    - A release, executed and delivered to the employer by an injured employee in consideration of the payment of a certain sum, acknowledging full satisfaction of all claims arising from the accident in question, covered and included a claim for injurious results alleged to have been caused by malpractice of a physician who was employed at the time of the injury to treat the employee. Edmondson v. Hancock, 40 Ga. App. 587, 151 S.E. 114 (1929).    There is decided difference between consequence of accord and satisfaction, and that of mere covenant not to sue one of the defendants. Moore v. Smith, 78 Ga. App. 49, 50 S.E.2d 219 (1948).   Covenant not to sue does not release other defendants.    - The release from liability, for a consideration, of one of two defendants sued jointly released the other, for there can be but one satisfaction of the same claim for damage or injury; but when the clear intendment of the agreement between the plaintiff and the dismissed defendant is but a covenant not to sue and not an accord and satisfaction of the claim itself, the other defendant is not released. Moore v. Smith, 78 Ga. App. 49, 50 S.E.2d 219 (1948).    Fraud in procurement of release will render it voidable.  Henslee v. Houston, 566 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1978).   Avoiding release fraudulently obtained.    - One seeking to avoid the effects of a release and a plea of accord and satisfaction based thereon on the ground of fraud must show either a rescission and tender back to the other party of the fruits of that contract before commencing the suit, or an excuse for the failure to so rescind and tender back such fruits; this case is distinguishable from those cases wherein the allegations or facts show that the payment made to the plaintiff under the purported agreement was in fact made in satisfaction of another and entirely distinct obligation which was owing the plaintiff by the defendant and was in no way connected with the occurrence complained of in the petition. Drew v. Lyle, 88 Ga. App. 121, 76 S.E.2d 142 (1953).    Parol evidence is not admissible to vary terms of release. Maxey v. Hospital Auth., 245 Ga. 480, 265 S.E.2d 779 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Williams v. Physicians & Surgeons Community Hosp., 249 Ga. 480, 292 S.E.2d 705 (1982).   When it is sought to set aside a written instrument which is a full contract of release from all further claims, and not merely a receipt, a parol evidence is not admissible to vary or alter its terms. Henslee v. Houston, 566 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1978).    Third parties cannot dispose of chose in action belonging exclusively to another without one's consent prior to the disposition or one's ratification of the act thereafter. Rowland v. Lewis, 109 Ga. App. 755, 137 S.E.2d 387 (1964).   Release of servant releases master.    - When the liability, if any, of the master to a third person is purely derivative and dependent entirely upon the principle of respondeat superior, and although not technically a joint tort-feasor, the master may be sued alone or jointly with the servant but a judgment in favor of the servant on the merits (and by analogy, a release of the servant from liability) will bar an action against the master, when the injury and damage are the same. Giles v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 540, 56 S.E.2d 860 (1949).    When in an action for damages growing out of a collision between the truck of the plaintiffs, driven by their servant, and the truck of the defendants, driven by their servant, which resulted in certain property damage to the plaintiffs' truck and certain personal injuries to the defendants' servant, the plaintiffs and the defendants' servant enter into an agreement, whereby the defendants' servant for and in consideration of the payment of a certain sum by the plaintiffs, releases the plaintiffs from all claims, anticipated and unanticipated, growing out of the collision, the release constitutes a settlement of the plaintiffs' claims against the servant, and a settlement of the plaintiffs' claims against the servant necessarily constitutes a release of the defendants as there can be only one satisfaction of the same injuries. Giles v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 540, 56 S.E.2d 860 (1949).   Settlement by employer not necessarily bar to action by employee.    - The mere fact that an employer chose to make a settlement and obtained a release of all claims purporting to release both the employer and employee, following a motor vehicle collision, will not bar the employee from the employee's own right of action. Rowland v. Lewis, 109 Ga. App. 755, 137 S.E.2d 387 (1964).    Alleged payment of money by the plaintiff demanded for the plaintiff's release from illegal imprisonment, did not amount to accord and satisfaction or bar the plaintiff from maintaining an action for false imprisonment or for slander. Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951).    Release may be given to discharge claim of fraud.  Henslee v. Houston, 566 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1978).   Failure to prosecute not criminal compounding when not consideration for civil settlement.    - When property was damaged in the commission of a felony, and the owner accepted promissory notes in settlement of the damage and thereby released the one suspected of the crime from any civil liability for damage done, and no settlement of the criminal offense was attempted, although afterwards the owner failed to institute a criminal prosecution against the offender, but, since the failure to prosecute was not a part of the consideration, the transaction did not amount to a compounding of a crime, but amounted only to a satisfaction of the civil wrong which grew out of the perpetration of the criminal act. Hill v. Jones, 40 Ga. App. 289, 149 S.E. 323 (1929).   Instruments given to prevent prosecution.    - A note given to prevent the prosecution of an agent who fails to account for funds the agent has collected is void even in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value. Godwin v. Crowell, 56 Ga. 566 (1876); Wheaton v. Ansley, 71 Ga. 35 (1883); Jones v. Dannenberg Co., 112 Ga. 426, 37 S.E. 729, 52 L.R.A. 271 (1900).    Deed given to secure release of embezzler is void. Southern Express Co. v. Duffey, 48 Ga. 358 (1873).   Amount equal to compensation immaterial.    - It makes no difference that the amount received or agreed to be paid is not more than a fair competition for the injury, if the settlement of the felony forms any part of the agreement. Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85 (1869).   Equitable estoppel not allowed.    - A prosecutor who received a deed of property under an agreement to compound a felony can not invoke the aid of an equitable estoppel against the true owner, who was not a party to the deed. Deen v. Williams, 128 Ga. 265, 57 S.E. 427 (1907); Cromer v. Evett, 11 Ga. App. 654, 75 S.E. 1056 (1912).   Recovery of property transferred to suppress prosecution.    - A wife may recover her property, given by her husband, without her consent, to suppress a criminal prosecution. Harris v. Webb & Rutledge, 101 Ga. 84, 28 S.E. 620 (1897).    Once indictment occurs, O.C.G.A. § 17-8-2 (presentment of indictment to jury) applies, and the defendant and victim may not settle the offense between themselves without approval of the court. Pratt v. State, 167 Ga. App. 819, 307 S.E.2d 714 (1983).    Cited in Shepard v. Morrison, 121 Ga. App. 762, 175 S.E.2d 407 (1970); Solleck v. Laseter, 126 Ga. App. 137, 190 S.E.2d 148 (1972); Smith v. Hornbuckle, 140 Ga. App. 871, 232 S.E.2d 149 (1977).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction, § 6.   C.J.S.   - 1 C.J.S., Accord and Satisfaction, § 8.   ALR.    - Avoidance of release of claims for personal injuries on ground of mistake or fraud relative to the extent or nature of injuries, 48 A.L.R. 1462; 71 A.L.R.2d 82.    What amounts to settlement of action within contractual provision in relation to compensation of attorney, 55 A.L.R. 428.    Employment or reinstatement as consideration for release of claim for injuries, 58 A.L.R. 1312.    Release of one tort-feasor as affecting liability of others, 66 A.L.R. 206; 104 A.L.R. 846; 124 A.L.R. 1298; 148 A.L.R. 1270.    Retention of consideration paid under release in settlement of claim as ratification, 76 A.L.R. 344.    Rule that release of one tort-feasor releases others, as applicable to cause of action which is punitive rather than compensatory in its nature, 85 A.L.R. 1164.    Representation by insurer's agent as to nonliability as fraud avoiding release, 96 A.L.R. 1001.    Jurisdiction of court of law to avoid or reform release of claim for personal injuries on ground of mutual mistake, 96 A.L.R. 1144.    Release or compromise by parent of cause of action for injuries to child as affecting right of child, 103 A.L.R. 500.    Amount paid by one alleged joint tort-feasor in consideration of covenant not to sue (or a release not effectively a full release of the other joint tort-feasor), as pro tanto satisfaction of damages recoverable against other joint tort-feasor, 104 A.L.R. 931.    Rule that release of one joint tort-feasor releases other as applicable in case of anticipatory release prior to accident or injury, 112 A.L.R. 78.    Release by insured after accident or disability which ultimately results in his death as affecting right of beneficiary in respect of indemnity under accident policy or life policy with accident or disability feature, 115 A.L.R. 425.    Agreement with one tort-feasor that any judgment that may be recovered will not be enforced against him, as affecting liability of cotort-feasor, 160 A.L.R. 870.    Payment of, or proceeding to collect, judgment against one tort-feasor as release of others, 166 A.L.R. 1099.    Release as covering claims of which releasor was ignorant, 171 A.L.R. 184.   Discretion of court to vacate its approval of settlement or release in respect of personal injury to minor, 8 A.L.R.2d 460.   Release of one of joint and several defalcating tortfeasors as releasing insurer which was surety on fidelity bond of each, 35 A.L.R.2d 1122.   Collision insurance: insured's release of tortfeasor before settlement by insurer as releasing insurer from liability, 38 A.L.R.2d 1095.   Rights and remedies of insurer paying loss as against insured who has released or settled with third person responsible for loss, 51 A.L.R.2d 697.   Interest on consideration returned or tendered as condition of setting aside release or compromise, 53 A.L.R.2d 749.   Right of action for fraud, duress, or the like, causing instant plaintiff to release or compromise a cause of action against third person, 58 A.L.R.2d 500.   Avoidance of release of claims for personal injuries on ground of fraud or mistake as to the extent or nature of injuries, 71 A.L.R.2d 82.   Settlement with or release of person directly liable for injury or death as releasing liability under civil damage act, 78 A.L.R.2d 998.   Release of (or covenant not to sue) master or principal as affecting liability of servant or agent for tort, or vice versa, 92 A.L.R.2d 533.   Propriety of separate trials of issues of tort liability and of validity and effect of release, 4 A.L.R.3d 456.   Release of one responsible for injury as affecting liability of physician or surgeon for negligent treatment of injury, 39 A.L.R.3d 260.   Construction and effect of statute authorizing dismissal of criminal action upon settlement of civil liability growing out of act charged, 42 A.L.R.3d 315.   Validity of release from civil liability where release is executed by person while incarcerated, 86 A.L.R.3d 1230.   Modern status of rules as to avoidance of release of personal injury claim on ground of mistake as to nature and extent of injuries, 13 A.L.R.4th 686.   Prospective juror's connection with defendant's insurance company as ground for challenge for cause, 9 A.L.R.5th 102.   Validity and effect of "Mary Carter" or similar agreement setting maximum liability of one cotortfeasor and providing for reduction or extinguishment thereof relative to recovery against nonagreeing cotortfeasor, 22 A.L.R.5th 483.