CO Code § 18-1-103 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 1 - Provisions Applicable to Offenses Generally|Part 1 - Purpose and Scope of Code - Classification of Offenses|§ 18-1-103. Scope and Application of Code

  Except as otherwise expressly provided by sections 18-1.3-402 and 18-1.3-504, or unless the context otherwise requires, the provisions of this code govern the construction of and punishment for any offense defined in any statute of this state, whether in this title or elsewhere, and which is committed on or after July 1, 1972, as well as the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense.    Except as otherwise provided by section 18-1-410, the provisions of this code do not apply to or govern the construction of, prosecution for, and punishment for any offense committed prior to July 1, 1972, or the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense. Such an offense shall be tried and disposed of according to the provisions of law existing at the time of the commission thereof in the same manner as if this code had not been enacted. All pending actions shall proceed to final disposition in the same manner as if this code had not been enacted.    The provisions of this code do not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture, or other remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in a civil action for any conduct which this code makes punishable; and the civil injury is not merged in the offense.     History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 389, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-103 . L. 73: P. 533, § 1. L. 95: (3) amended, p. 16, § 8, effective March 9. L. 2002: (1) amended, p. 1509, § 176, effective October 1.    Cross references:   For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (1), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.   ANNOTATION   The only purpose of this section was to ensure that the substantive crime definitions and penalty provisions in the repealed chapter 40 of Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, rather than those in this title, would continue in force as to crimes committed prior to July 1, 1972. People v. Montera, 195 Colo. 118 , 575 P.2d 1294 (1978).   The provisions of this section are not jurisdictional in nature, therefore, the protections of this section may be waived by entry of a voluntary and knowing plea of guilty. People v. Sandreschi, 849 P.2d 873 (Colo. App. 1992).   The reference in subsection (2) to “this code” must be read to refer only to the “Colorado Criminal Code” of which it is a part. People v. Montera, 195 Colo. 118 , 575 P.2d 1294 (1978).   Application of subsection (2). Subsection (2) applies only to the criminal code, and not to the code of criminal procedure. People v. Loger, 188 Colo. 291 , 535 P.2d 210 (1975).   1 U.S.C. § 109 nullifies abatement of indictments and prosecutions for acts committed under former code. Because subsection (2) does not obviate prosecutions for illegal activities occurring before July 1, 1972, 1 U.S.C. § 109 operates to nullify any abatement of an indictment and subsequent prosecution for criminal acts committed under the former criminal code. United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 416 U.S. 917, 94 S. Ct. 1625, 40 L. Ed. 2d 286, cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936, 94 S. Ct. 1934, 40 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1974).   Section 18-1-405 not applicable to offense committed prior to July 1, 1972. The speedy trial provision of § 18-1-405 does not apply to an action where the alleged offense was committed prior to July 1, 1972. People v. Reliford, 186 Colo. 6 , 525 P.2d 467 (1974).   Nor § 18-1-409 . Since the offense for which the defendant was sentenced was committed prior to July 1, 1972, the right of appeal under § 18-1-409 is not available to him. People v. Knight, 185 Colo. 364 , 525 P.2d 425 (1974).   Preemption of municipal ordinance by code. Where state assault statute was repealed when criminal code took effect on July 1, 1972, and defendant was charged with violation of municipal assault ordinance occurring on July 7, 1972, municipal assault ordinance was not preempted, on July 7, by state assault ordinance; however, it could be argued that municipal assault ordinance was preempted by assault provisions of criminal code. City of Lakewood v. District Court, 181 Colo. 69 , 506 P.2d 1228 (1973).   Where defense requested instruction defining “intentionally” in terms of new statute which became effective July 1, 1972, but offense had occurred prior to that time, trial court did not err in refusing such request. People v. Crawford, 191 Colo. 504 , 553 P.2d 827 (1976).   Body execution statute unconstitutional under fourteenth amendment. Kinsey v. Preeson, 746 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1987).   Applied in People v. Marlott, 191 Colo. 304 , 552 P.2d 491 (1976); Barreras v. People, 636 P.2d 686 (Colo. App. 1981).