CO Code § 2-4-101 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 2 - Legislative|Article 4 - Construction of Statutes|Part 1 - Construction of Words and Phrases|§ 2-4-101. Common and Technical Usage

 Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.   History. Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1422, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 135-1-101. History. Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1422, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 135-1-101.    ANNOTATION   Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.   Words and phrases found in statute are to be construed according to their familiar and generally accepted meaning. Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52 , 515 P.2d 95 (1973); Humana, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 189 Colo. 79 , 537 P.2d 741 (1975); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986); State Bd. of Nursing v. Crickenberger, 757 P.2d 1167 (Colo. App. 1988); Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Needham, 759 P.2d 799 (Colo. App. 1988); Cartwright v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 796 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1990); Husson v. Meeker, 812 P.2d 731 (Colo. App. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 902 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1995); Pearson v. District Court, 18th Jud. Dist., 924 P.2d 512 (Colo. 1996).   Forced, subtle, strained, or unusual interpretation should never be resorted to where statutory language is plain, its meaning is clear, and no absurdity is involved. Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52 , 515 P.2d 95 (1973); Humana, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 189 Colo. 79 , 537 P.2d 741 (1975); Federal Land Bank v. Neddham, 759 P.2d 700 (Colo. App. 1988); Colonial Penn v. Colo. Ins. Guar., 799 P.2d 448 (Colo. App. 1990).   Statutory provisions are to be construed according to their plain and obvious meaning and should not be subjected to strained or forced interpretation. People v. Browning, 809 P.2d 1086 (Colo. App. 1990); People v. Thomas, 867 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1994).   The courts must interpret statutory language by first looking to the plain meaning, then to the objective of the general assembly, giving a sensible, yet harmonious effect to the statute. Matter of Title, Ballot Title for 1997-98 No. 62, 961 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1998).   It is a well settled rule of statutory construction that all words and phrases used in a statute shall be understood and construed according to the approved and common usage of the language and that some meaning shall be given to every word used. Thomas v. City of Grand Junction, 13 Colo. App. 80, 56 P. 665 (1889); People v. J.J.H., 17 P.3d 159 (Colo. 2001).   This rule is expressly recognized and declared to be a law of this state. Thomas v. City of Grand Junction, 13 Colo. App. 80, 56 P. 665 (1899).   However, it is equally a well settled rule of construction that if no sensible meaning can be given to a word or phrase, or if it would defeat, manifestly, the real object of the enactment, it should be eliminated. Thomas v. City of Grand Junction, 13 Colo. App. 80, 56 P. 665 (1899).   Also, for the same reason words may be rejected as surplusage. Thomas v. City of Grand Junction, 13 Colo. App. 80, 56 P. 665 (1899).   And to carry out the intention of the general assembly, another word may be read for the word used, where the word used would manifestly defeat the legislative intent and the substitution of the other would carry it out. Thomas v. City of Grand Junction, 13 Colo. App. 80, 56 P. 665 (1899).   These may be said to be the exceptions to the general rule as announced. Thomas v. City of Grand Junction, 13 Colo. App. 80, 56 P. 665 (1899).   But these exceptions, are almost if not quite in as general use as the general rule itself. Thomas v. City of Grand Junction, 13 Colo. App. 80, 56 P. 665 (1899).   Especially with reference to the words “or” and “and” has it been frequently necessary to invoke this latter rule. Thomas v. City of Grand Junction, 13 Colo. App. 80, 56 P. 665 (1899).   Although words employed should not be held cumulative or meaningless, unless it be impossible to attribute a rational purpose to them when considered in connection with the context. Garfield County Court v. Schwartz, 13 Colo. 291 , 22 P. 783 (1889).   And general terms are to receive reasonable interpretation leaving the provision of the statute practically operative. Harding v. People, 10 Colo. 387 , 15 P. 727 (1887). See Electro-Magnetic Mining & Dev. Co. v. Van Auken, 9 Colo. 204 , 11 P. 80 (1886).   When a statutory term may be used in different senses, it is permissible for the court to apply the definition which will “best effectuate the legislative intent in the enactment of the law”. Clown's Den, Inc. v. Canjar, 33 Colo. App. 212, 518 P.2d 957 (1974).   Prior judicial construction of language used in subsequent legislation. It is to be presumed that a general assembly is cognizant of and adopts the construction which prior judicial decisions have placed on particular language when such language is employed in subsequent legislation. Thompson v. People, 181 Colo. 194 , 510 P.2d 311 (1973).   Also, the use of two different words or phrases, each of which expresses the same common meaning, does not render a statute internally inconsistent. Howe v. People, 178 Colo. 248 , 496 P.2d 1040 (1972).   Words permissive in form when public duty is involved are considered as mandatory. Duprey v. Anderson, 184 Colo. 70 , 518 P.2d 807 (1974) (decided under present section).   The word “may” when used in a statute to denote choice of procedure not affecting it or any party of interest is not mandatory, but generally construed to mean “must” where a substantial interest is affected. Duprey v. Anderson, 184 Colo. 70 , 518 P.2d 807 (1974).   Where persons or the public have an interest in having an act done by a public body, the word “may” in a statute means “must”. Duprey v. Anderson, 184 Colo. 70 , 518 P.2d 807 (1974).   In the absence of any emergency clause, the expression “after the passage of the act”, as used in the law, can have but one meaning, namely after the act goes into effect. Harding v. People, 10 Colo. 387 , 15 P. 727 (1887).   Also parent is a common word, and the court in construing a contract, will give it its common meaning. Mund v. Rehaume, 51 Colo. 129 , 117 P. 159, 1913A Ann. Cas. 1243 (1911).   Finally the word “employment” as used should be construed according to its ordinary meaning. Brannaman v. Richlow Mfg. Co., 106 Colo. 317 , 104 P.2d 897 (1940).   The word “service”, when used in interpreting unemployment compensation statute, was to be given its ordinary meaning. Weld County Kirby Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 676 P.2d 1253 (Colo. App. 1983).   The term “includes”, as it is commonly understood, operates to extend rather than limit. Lyman v. Town of Bow Mar, 188 Colo. 216 , 533 P.2d 1129 (1975); People v. Pipkin, 762 P.2d 736 (Colo. App. 1988).   When giving statutory language its plain and obvious meaning creates an absurd result, the intention of the framers will prevail over such interpretation. People v. Bowman, 812 P.2d 725 (Colo. App. 1991).   There is a presumption that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory. Williams Natural Gas Co. v. Mesa Operating Limited P'ship, 778 P.2d 309 (Colo. App. 1989); Pearson v. District Court, 18th Jud. Dist., 924 P.2d 512 (Colo. 1996).   Term which has been statutorily defined is required to be given its statutory definition and is applicable whenever it appears in statute, unless a contrary intention plainly appears. R.E.N. v. City of Colo. Springs, 823 P.2d 1359 (Colo. 1992).   Statutory reference to the popular name of a federal act encompassed all benefits payable under that act. No exclusion would be inferred from a subsequent, arguably more restrictive reference to federal benefits for purposes of offsetting state workers' compensation benefits. L.E.L. Construction v. Goode, 867 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1994).   Applied in Lemler v. Real Estate Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 489, 558 P.2d 591 (1976); Wasson v. Hogenson, 196 Colo. 183 , 583 P.2d 914 (1978); Wigent v. Shinsato, 43 Colo. App. 83, 60l P.2d 653 (1979) (all three cases decided under present section); Lepore v. Bd. of Trustees, 628 P.2d 625 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. District Court, 638 P.2d 65 (Colo. 1981); Meyer v. Indus. Comm'n, 644 P.2d 46 (Colo. App. 1981); Nat'l Ass'n of Credit Mgt. v. Burke, 645 P.2d 1323 (Colo. App. 1982); Engelbrecht v. Hartford Acc. & Idem. Co., 680 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1984); Calhan Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. El Paso County, 686 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1984); Twilight Jones Lounge v. Showers, 732 P.2d 1230 (Colo. App. 1986); Lucero v. Climax Molybdenum Co., 732 P.2d 642 (Colo. 1987); Stevens v. People, 796 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1990); City of Craig v. Hammat, 809 P.2d 1034 (Colo. App. 1990); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Apostolou, 866 P.2d 1384 (Colo. 1994).