CO Code § 31-15-713 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 31 - Government - Municipal|Article 15 - Exercise of Municipal Powers|Part 7 - Public Property and Improvements|§ 31-15-713. Power to Sell Public Works - Real Property

  The governing body of each municipality has the power:   To sell and dispose of waterworks, ditches, gasworks, geothermal systems, solar systems, electric light works, or other public utilities, public buildings, real property used or held for park purposes, or any other real property used or held for any governmental purpose. Before any such sale is made, the question of said sale and the terms and consideration thereof shall be submitted at a regular or special election and approved in the manner provided for authorization of bonded indebtedness by section 31-15-302 (1)(d).    To sell and dispose of, by ordinance, any other real estate, including land acquired from the federal government, owned by the municipality upon such terms and conditions as the governing body may determine at a regular or special meeting. With respect to such land acquired from the federal government, which land is located within or contiguous to the municipality, such terms and conditions shall be designed to prevent speculation and assure that benefits accrue to the municipality when the sale or disposition of said land is for municipal expansion or residential purposes. Nothing in this paragraph (b) or in section 31-15-101 (1) shall be construed to invalidate the acceptance of federal land by a municipality or the sale and disposal by a municipality of land acquired from the federal government, where such acceptance or disposal was consummated prior to April 1, 1976, and municipal authority for any such acceptance or disposal is hereby confirmed.    To lease any real estate, together with any facilities thereon, owned by the municipality when deemed by the governing body to be in the best interest of the municipality. Any lease for a period of more than one year shall be by ordinance. Any lease for one year or less than one year shall be by resolution or ordinance.       All leases and deeds of conveyance executed and acknowledged by the proper officers of such municipalities and purporting to have been made pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be deemed prima facie evidence of due compliance with all the requirements of this section.    Any town holding title to any land settled and occupied as the site of such town pursuant to and by virtue of the act of congress entitled “An Act for the relief of the inhabitants of cities and towns upon the public lands.”, approved March 2, 1867, 43 U.S.C. sections 718-723, and an act of congress entitled “An Act respecting the limits of reservations for town sites upon the public domain.”, 43 U.S.C. sections 725-727, and any amendments thereto may dispose of and convey the title to such land in the manner provided in this section.     History. Source: L. 75: Entire title R&RE, p. 1120, § 1, effective July 1. L. 76: (1)(b) amended, p. 697, § 2, effective April 6.    Editor's note:    The provisions of this section are similar to provisions of several former sections as they existed prior to 1975. For a detailed comparison, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.    43 U.S.C. secs. 718-723 and 725-727, referenced in subsection (3), were repealed, effective October 21, 1976. A savings provisions was contained in the act repealing said sections, stating “repeal by Pub. L. 94-579 not to be construed as terminating any valid lease, permit, patent . . . existing on Oct. 21, 1976”, and said references have been left in this section for historical reference.     ANNOTATION   Annotator's note. Since § 31-15-713 is similar to former § 31-12-102 prior to the 1975 repeal and reenactment of this title, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.   The only power formerly possessed by a town over property was the power “to sell and dispose of” it and nothing short of a deed of conveyance was a compliance with the statute because the term “sell and dispose of” as used in this statute meant to get rid of, to finish with, to fully relinquish all interest in the property, to transfer and convey the same. Centennial Props., Inc. v. City of Littleton, 154 Colo. 191 , 390 P.2d 471 (1964); City of Idaho Springs v. Golden Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 29 Colo. App. 119, 480 P.2d 847 (1970).   But a city could properly convey real property, yet retain a possibility of reverter to it, because possibility of reverter is merely the possibility that the land will come back to the grantor, and the holder of a bare possibility of reverter did not have a present “vested” interest or “estate” in the land. City of Idaho Springs v. Golden Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 29 Colo. App. 119, 480 P.2d 847 (1970).   Subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) demonstrate a legislative intent to distinguish between property held or used for any governmental purpose, the sale of which must be approved by election, and any other real estate, which may be sold by ordinance. Although town held subject property for several years, it did not use or hold it for any governmental purpose. Although town entered into lease and option agreement in the context of relocating town hall to the subject property, the contingencies for construction failed to materialize. Therefore, the applicable statutory provision was subsection (1)(b), which applies to “any other real estate”, and not subsection (1)(a), which applies to property held for “any governmental purpose”. Because town did not use or hold subject property for any governmental purpose, no election was required for the approval of its sale. New Stanley Assocs., LLLP v. Town of Estes Park, 200 P.3d 1118 (Colo. App. 2008).   Consideration of potential uses for subject property, without any dedication to a particular use, is not a governmental purpose within the meaning of subsection (1)(a). Moreover, town's retention of subject property for the purpose of using its sale proceeds for construction of infrastructure for a performing arts center site is not a governmental purpose. The relevant statutory provisions address the use or purpose for which real estate is held and not the use or purpose of the proceeds from its sale. Further, appropriation of public funds for the acquisition of subject property does not mean the property is held for a governmental purpose. The general assembly has recognized two types of property in subsection (1), and the distinction is not based on the method of appropriation of funds for the property. Equating the acquisition of property by means of appropriated municipal funds pursuant to § 31-15-302 with “any governmental purpose” under subsection (1)(a) would render meaningless the distinction between subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b). New Stanley Assocs., LLLP v. Town of Estes Park, 200 P.3d 1118 (Colo. App. 2008).