GA Code § 16-2-21 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses|Chapter 2 - Criminal Liability|Article 2 - Parties to Crimes|§ 16-2-21. Prosecution of Parties Who Did Not Directly Commit the Crime

 Any party to a crime who did not directly commit the crime may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished for commission of the crime upon proof that the crime was committed and that he was a party thereto, although the person claimed to have directly committed the crime has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime, or is not amenable to justice or has been acquitted.   (Code 1933, § 26-802, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1.)   Law reviews.   - For note discussing organized crime in Georgia with respect to the application of state gambling laws, and suggesting proposals for combatting organized crime, see 7 Ga. St. B. J. 124 (1970).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Identity of all participants not prerequisite to conviction of one participant.    - One may be found guilty of a crime committed by more than one person even though identity of other participants is known Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 282 S.E.2d 61, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 973, 102 S. Ct. 524, 70 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Pruitt v. Keenan, 264 Ga. 279, 443 S.E.2d 842 (1994).   Indictment not required to allege party status.    - Indictment's failure to allege that a defendant was a party to aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and first-degree child cruelty under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a),16-5-24(a), and16-5-70(b) did not require a showing that the defendant was the principal perpetrator under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21; the defendant's status as a party to the crimes was not an essential element used to increase the sentences for the crimes, and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant could be convicted either as the principal perpetrator of the crimes or as a party thereto. Hill v. State, 282 Ga. App. 743, 639 S.E.2d 637 (2006).    Contrary to a defendant's argument, the state was not required to indicate in the defendant's armed robbery indictment that the defendant was being charged as a party to that crime; O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21 required only that the defendant be indicted, convicted, and punished for the armed robbery upon proof that the defendant was in fact a party to the crime. Byrum v. State, 282 Ga. 608, 652 S.E.2d 557 (2007).   Sufficiency of indictment.    - Trial court erred in quashing an indictment for counts of residential mortgage fraud, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-102, and counts of felony theft by deception, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-3, because each count was sufficient to charge each of the named defendants as either the actual perpetrator or as a party to the crime pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20(a) and16-2-21. State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 700 S.E.2d 912 (2010).    Acquittal of one party does not bar separate, distinct prosecution and conviction of another party. Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 208 S.E.2d 791 (1974).    Acquittal of defendant's wife on the same charges does not affect the validity of the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. Worthy v. State, 180 Ga. App. 506, 349 S.E.2d 529 (1986).    While the acquittal of the principals could be introduced as some evidence that the defendant did not aid, abet, or encourage any crime of child molestation or cruelty to children, it did not preclude defendant from being indicted, tried, convicted or punished for commission of the crime. State v. Roberts, 234 Ga. App. 522, 507 S.E.2d 194 (1998).    Conspiracy need not be alleged in the indictment. Brooks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 543, 314 S.E.2d 115 (1984).    Accessory after the fact is not a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21, but the act constitutes the separate offense of obstruction of justice under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. Martinez v. State, 222 Ga. App. 497, 474 S.E.2d 708 (1996); Crumpton v. State, 240 Ga. App. 422, 523 S.E.2d 624 (1999); Stewart v. State, 243 Ga. App. 860, 534 S.E.2d 544 (2000).   Effect of equal access to drugs, where ownership not shown.    - When the state did not show the indicia giving rise to a presumption of ownership or exclusive control of a vehicle, no presumption arose and, therefore, there was no triggering of the equal access defense, but by showing circumstantially that each of the defendants had equal access to the drugs, the state was able to support the state's theory that all of the defendants were parties to the crime and thus guilty of joint constructive possession of the drugs. Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817, 305 S.E.2d 629 (1983).   When codefendant pleads to lesser offense.    - Court did not err in failing to quash indictments for murder on the grounds that a codefendant is permitted to plead to the lesser offense of conspiracy. Owens v. State, 251 Ga. 313, 305 S.E.2d 102 (1983).   When numerous people are concerned in crime, language of section may be charged.    - By virtue of former Code 1933, §§ 26-801 and 26-802 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-2-21), when evidence in a criminal case shows that two or more persons were concerned in the commission of an alleged crime, it is not harmful error for the trial court to charge in the language of these provisions or to charge the jury on the law of conspiracy. Battle v. State, 231 Ga. 501, 202 S.E.2d 449 (1973); Holland v. State, 205 Ga. App. 695, 423 S.E.2d 694 (1992).    Convicted felon in possession of a firearm who furnishes it to another for the purpose of shooting a third person may be found guilty of felony murder even though the trigger-man is found guilty of malice murder. Whitehead v. State, 255 Ga. 526, 340 S.E.2d 885 (1986).   Evidence showing acquittal of codefendant held admissible.    - Defendant could introduce in trial as an alleged aider and abettor a certified copy of the indictment, plea, and verdict showing that the codefendant, the alleged principal, had been acquitted. White v. State, 257 Ga. 236, 356 S.E.2d 875 (1987).    When the defendants were charged in accusation with directly committing specific acts of shoplifting, but neither was specifically accused of being a party to the other's commission of the offense, there was no error in charging the jury under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21. Jenkins v. State, 172 Ga. App. 715, 324 S.E.2d 491 (1984).   Inference that defendant participated in tampering with evidence.    - When the defense to a tampering with evidence charge was that no one saw the defendant pull up and destroy marijuana plants, but police officers saw the defendant on the property with the plants, advised the defendant not to remove the plants, returned in two hours to find the plants missing, and saw no one else around the premises at either time, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant at the very least participated in the destruction and that in itself would justify conviction. Parrish v. State, 182 Ga. App. 247, 355 S.E.2d 682 (1987).   Defendant who admitted being party to armed robbery entitled to instruction on defense of coercion.    - Defendant who had admitted the elements of armed robbery as a party to the crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21, and who testified that defendant committed such acts because a codefendant pointed a gun at the defendant and threatened to shoot the defendant or defendant's family was entitled to a jury charge on coercion under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-26, and the trial court erred in failing to so instruct the jury even in the absence of a request by the defendant. Mathis v. State, 299 Ga. App. 831, 684 S.E.2d 6 (2009).   Requested jury instruction not warranted.    - Because the defendant was neither indicted nor tried for felony obstruction of justice, the court did not err in refusing to give the requested charge that an accomplice was one who was present at the commission of a crime, aiding and abetting the perpetrator, or an accessory before the fact; moreover, the court's own charge, which included pattern charges on parties to a crime, knowledge, mere presence at the scene of a crime, and mere association with others committing a crime, substantially covered the same legal principles as the requested charge. Buruca v. State, 278 Ga. App. 650, 629 S.E.2d 438 (2006).    Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense with regard to defendant's trial for aggravated assault and criminal trespass as the evidence did not support such a charge as the record established that the victim was sitting in a vehicle when defendant struck the victim in the head with a pipe, causing serious injury, and defendant had to leave defendant's home to do the act, which was leaving a place of safety. Burnette v. State, 291 Ga. App. 504, 662 S.E.2d 272 (2008), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).    Trial court properly denied a requested instruction on "accessory after the fact." The defendant was not charged with being an accessory, and the trial court fully charged the jury on parties to a crime, mere presence, mere association, intent, and knowledge. Daugherty v. State, 291 Ga. App. 541, 662 S.E.2d 318 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1587, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 792 (Ga. 2008).    Trial court did not err by failing to give the defendant's requested charges on mere presence and party to the crime because the trial court substantially covered all of the relevant legal principles relating to mere presence, mere association, and parties to a crime. Allen v. State, 288 Ga. 263, 702 S.E.2d 869 (2010).   Jury instruction on accessory after fact not warranted.    - In an armed robbery prosecution, defense counsel was not deficient in not requesting jury charges on the law of abandonment and accessory after-the-fact as there was no evidence that the defendant abandoned the crime before an overt act occurred, or that the defendant was an accessory after the fact rather than a party to the robbery. Bihlear v. State, 295 Ga. App. 486, 672 S.E.2d 459 (2009).   Jury instruction supported by evidence.    - Trial court did not err in giving the jury a "party to the crime" instruction even though the defendant was not specifically indicted as a party to the shoplifting because O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21 allowed the defendant to be convicted as a party to a crime if the evidence supported a finding in that regard; evidence that defendant and an accomplice took a cart with merchandise into a restricted area, lied about their purpose of being in the area, surveyed various emergency exits from a store, abandoned the merchandise at a jammed exit, and lacked any means of paying for the merchandise supported the trial court's giving of the instruction. Alford v. State, 292 Ga. App. 514, 664 S.E.2d 870 (2008).    There was slight evidence to justify a charge as to parties to the crime as two or more persons could have been involved; it was possible that the defendant acted with an accomplice who fled the scene in a yellow car, while the defendant fled the scene in a green car, because several witnesses claimed to have seen the robber leave in a yellow car, and other witnesses said the perpetrator got into a green car. Williams v. State, 312 Ga. App. 22, 717 S.E.2d 532 (2011).   Evidence sufficient to support conviction.    - Convicted felon's conviction for possession of a shotgun was authorized, even though the shotgun was not in the felon's immediate possession, where the evidence supported a finding that the felon was a party to the crime of burglary and the felon and a codefendant were coconspirators. Coursey v. State, 196 Ga. App. 135, 395 S.E.2d 574 (1990).    When the defendant assisted the defendant's spouse in committing burglaries by not only driving with the spouse to the scene of the crimes, but by serving as the getaway driver, the defendant was a party to the defendant's spouse's crimes. Head v. State, 261 Ga. App. 185, 582 S.E.2d 164 (2003).    Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant was trafficking in cocaine. Carter v. State, 261 Ga. App. 204, 583 S.E.2d 126 (2003).    Trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 was proper, as the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e); there was clearly evidence that the sale of the drug involved more than 28 grams of methamphetamine, that defendant either possessed or sold the methamphetamine through the defendant's presence when the drug was being cut, weighed, packaged, and sold, and that the defendant was liable as an aider and abettor under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21 even if there was no evidence that the defendant either arranged the sale or received any money in connection therewith. Blackwood v. State, 277 Ga. App. 870, 627 S.E.2d 907 (2006).    Evidence that the defendant intentionally struck the victim with a stick and that either the defendant or one of the other parties to the assault intentionally struck the victim with their fists and a concrete block supported an aggravated assault conviction; further, although the victim was the only person who testified about having been hit with a concrete block, and was not sure which of the attackers struck that blow, this testimony was sufficient to establish that the victim was hit with a concrete block because it made no difference whether an accomplice, and not the defendant, assaulted the victim in the manner alleged in the indictment. Oliver v. State, 278 Ga. App. 425, 629 S.E.2d 63 (2006).    Despite the defendant's claim of innocence, convictions for armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault were upheld on appeal, given sufficient evidence showing that the defendant waited at the scene of the robbery and then assisted the codefendants in an attempted escape; hence, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal and the state was not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt, as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). Jordan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 419, 636 S.E.2d 151 (2006).    Defendant's aggravated assault and robbery convictions were upheld as evidence including the defendant's admission and flight from the scene authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant went to an apartment complex intending to participate in the robbery, and in fact participated in the robbery by acting as a lookout and an additional show of force; hence, the jury was authorized to infer criminal intent from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Millender v. State, 286 Ga. App. 331, 648 S.E.2d 777 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1717, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 80 (Ga. 2008).    Because sufficient evidence was presented that a juvenile was a party to the crime of entering an automobile with the intent to commit a theft or felony, and the evidence was corroborated by a police officer who questioned the juvenile's cohort, an adjudication based on the juvenile's commission of the act was upheld on appeal; thus, the juvenile's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. In the Interest of B.D., 287 Ga. App. 185, 651 S.E.2d 129 (2007).    Evidence supported a conviction of aggravated assault with a knife when two codefendants repeatedly struck the victim, the defendant struck the victim and threatened the victim's life, the defendant and the first codefendant entered a pharmacy to buy duct tape, and while alone with the victim, the second codefendant held a knife on the victim where the second codefendant could reach it and where the victim could see it; this authorized the conclusion that the second codefendant committed aggravated assault and that the defendant was a party. Rhines v. State, 288 Ga. App. 128, 653 S.E.2d 500 (2007).    Although no evidence was presented as to the ownership of a Nissan Pathfinder parked at the scene of the crime, the defendant was not entitled to a judgment of acquittal, as sufficient evidence was presented to not only link the defendant with the vehicle where the trafficking amount of drugs was found, but also to support a finding of guilt as a party to the crime; moreover, the jury could conclude that as a party to the crimes charged, the defendant was actively involved in a criminal enterprise to possess the methamphetamine stashed inside the vehicle. Sherrer v. State, 289 Ga. App. 156, 656 S.E.2d 258, cert. denied, No. S08C0875, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 391 (Ga. 2008).    Evidence was sufficient to sustain a defendant's convictions of two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-11-106 because the defendant's admission that defendant was holding a rifle throughout the crimes' commission, along with evidence of the defendant's flight, authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant participated in the crimes by acting as a lookout. Gant v. State, 291 Ga. App. 823, 662 S.E.2d 895 (2008).    Trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for directed verdict and convicting the defendant of armed robbery as the evidence established that defendant's presence and actions at the scene of the crime, when coupled with defendant's behavior afterwards, were sufficient to support the jury's verdict against defendant as a party to the crime of armed robbery. While the jury could have concluded from the evidence that even if defendant had not planned the robbery with the codefendant in advance, defendant chose to participate in the crime after the crime was begun. Cox v. State, 293 Ga. App. 98, 666 S.E.2d 379 (2008).    There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the state showed that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted a home invasion in which the home was burglarized and the homeowner's teenage child was detained and robbed by use of a handgun. Even in the absence of evidence sufficient to show that the defendant directly committed the charged offenses, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant was a party to the offenses in that the defendant and a person armed with a gun loaded a truck with property stolen from the home during the two-hour home invasion, the defendant was present speaking with the armed person during the home invasion, and the defendant confirmed that the child was home alone. Whitley v. State, 293 Ga. App. 605, 667 S.E.2d 447 (2008).    Following evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions, as a party or perpetrator, of felony murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault: (1) the defendant and two codefendants robbed four occupants of a duplex at gunpoint; (2) a codefendant hit a victim in the head with a gun; (3) the defendant and codefendants moved the victims into another room; and (4) a codefendant fatally shot a delivery person who entered the duplex. Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240, 675 S.E.2d 28 (2009).    Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30.1 for possessing with intent to distribute a substance represented to be cocaine and possessing with intent to distribute a substance represented to be methamphetamine because, although the defendant argued that the defendant was merely a backseat passenger in a vehicle involved in the underlying transaction who was not shown to be in either actual or constructive possession of the substance at issue, evidence established that the defendant negotiated to sell to an agent a substance expressly represented to be cocaine and a substance expressly represented to be methamphetamine; this material was in the car with the defendant, who handed it to a third person who was to deliver the substance to the agent, and, the claim that the defendant acted innocently was refuted by the third person's testimony that the third person and the defendant knew what was going on and that the third person called the defendant to ask about drugs in connection with this transaction. Any rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a party to the crimes. Diaz v. State, 296 Ga. App. 589, 676 S.E.2d 252 (2009).    Evidence was sufficient to show that a mother aided and abetted her husband's sexual abuse of their twin daughters when they were between four and eight years old, but only as to one charged incident, because one daughter told a therapist that she told her mother about this incident, and the record showed that the mother knew about and saw this offense and that she also lent her approval to her husband's conduct. Naylor v. State, 300 Ga. App. 401, 685 S.E.2d 383 (2009).    Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder and aggravated assault because the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the crimes supported the finding that the defendant was a party thereto, notwithstanding the jury's acquittal of the defendant on three weapons charges. Allen v. State, 288 Ga. 263, 702 S.E.2d 869 (2010).    Trial court did not err in finding that the defendant was a party to the crime because there was ample evidence, based upon the defendant's actions and the defendant's presence, companionship, conduct, and demeanor before, during, and after the commission of the crime, to conclude that the defendant was more than "merely present" during the commission of the crimes; while in a car with the victim and companions, the front-seat passenger pulled out a gun and shot the victim, and during the incident, the defendant did not say or do anything to intervene. Cook v. State, 314 Ga. App. 289, 723 S.E.2d 709 (2012).    Jury was authorized to find that the defendant was a party to the codefendant's crime of cruelty to children in the first degree in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-5-70(b) because the victim's testimony showed that the defendant was present during the codefendant's beating of the victim yet did nothing to stop the codefendant or otherwise help the victim; there was also evidence that the defendant was not only aware of prior abuse that the victim sustained via a belt but had also participated in such prior abuse. Tabb v. State, 313 Ga. App. 852, 723 S.E.2d 295 (2012).    Evidence that the defendant drove the car and remained there while the defendant's boyfriend took the victim's backpack at gunpoint was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant aided and abetted the boyfriend. Teele v. State, Ga. App. , 733 S.E.2d 395 (2012).    Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery based on the fact that while the defendant may not have had a gun, the defendant drove the car and remained in the vehicle while the codefendant took the victim's backpack at gunpoint and, after the armed robbery had occurred, the defendant appeared to wait for the codefendant to return to the vehicle before driving away; whether the defendant was a party to the crime and aided and abetted the codefendant was a jury question, and the jury rejected the defendant's argument that the defendant had no knowledge of the robbery and was merely driving the car. Teele v. State, 319 Ga. App. 448, 738 S.E.2d 277 (2012).    Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's armed robbery, false imprisonment, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during a felony conviction, despite the defendant's claim that the defendant took nothing from the victim and did not point a weapon at the victim, because: (1) it was undisputed that the crime occurred; and, (2) whether the defendant or the defendant's accomplice pointed the gun and took the property, the defendant could be convicted through the defendant's role as a party, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21. Bush v. State, 317 Ga. App. 439, 731 S.E.2d 121 (2012).    Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for new trial as the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant intentionally helped in the commission of the murder and related crimes and was a party to the offenses because the defendant brought the gun used to kill the victim; the defendant stood over the victim after the accomplice shot the victim at close range and made a statement indicating the defendant's approval of the shooting; and the defendant fled from the scene with the accomplice, leaving the victim for dead. State v. Jackson, 294 Ga. 9, 748 S.E.2d 902 (2013).    Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony theft by deception, instead of misdemeanor theft, as a party because the defendant unlawfully obtained $1,500 from 25 listed individuals by creating a false impression that the animal shelter was a no-kill shelter and that payment of funds would ensure that the listed individual's animal would not be euthanized; and all sponsorship money, whether in the form of cash or other payment, was directed to and controlled by the defendant, who retained sole discretion to determine the money's direction and use. Kilby v. State, 335 Ga. App. 238, 780 S.E.2d 411 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0653, No. S16C0653, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 437 (Ga. 2016).   Evidence insufficient to support conviction.    - Because the evidence presented at trial did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the driver had stolen the truck without defendant's knowledge or participation prior to the time defendant started riding around in the truck, defendant's conviction for theft by taking the truck was insupportable as a matter of law. Grant v. State, 227 Ga. App. 243, 488 S.E.2d 763 (1997).    Except as to one incident, the evidence was insufficient to show that a mother aided and abetted her husband's sexual abuse of their twin daughters when they were between four and eight years old, because the record showed that the mother had no knowledge of seven of the eight incidents until she took the children to therapy, and the prosecution's circumstantial evidence - including the fact of the family's nudist lifestyle, the existence of pornographic movies in the home, and the fact that, during therapy, the mother advised the girls to not talk about their father - was insufficient to prove aiding and abetting beyond a reasonable doubt. Naylor v. State, 300 Ga. App. 401, 685 S.E.2d 383 (2009).    Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine because the evidence showed nothing more than defendant's mere presence in the owner's house at a time when methamphetamine was not being actively manufactured. Denson v. State, 353 Ga. App. 450, 838 S.E.2d 117 (2020).   Rape sentence within statutory range.    - Fairness of a defendant's sentence of life imprisonment for being a party to rape was not examined because, contrary to the defendant's claims, the plain terms of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1(a)(5) did not prohibit the defendant from applying for scrutiny of the sentence by the Georgia Sentence Review Panel; as the defendant conceded, the sentence fell within the statutory limits under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-21 and16-6-1, and as a rule, sentences that fell within such limits were not reviewed for legal error. Johnson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 99, 640 S.E.2d 644 (2006).    Cited in Henderson v. State, 227 Ga. 68, 179 S.E.2d 76 (1970); Hannah v. State, 125 Ga. App. 596, 188 S.E.2d 401 (1972); Wells v. State, 127 Ga. App. 109, 192 S.E.2d 567 (1972); Pippin v. State, 128 Ga. App. 355, 196 S.E.2d 664 (1973); McKenzie v. State, 231 Ga. 513, 202 S.E.2d 417 (1973); Walker v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1973); Freeman v. State, 130 Ga. App. 718, 204 S.E.2d 445 (1974); McRoy v. State, 131 Ga. App. 307, 205 S.E.2d 445 (1974); Strong v. State, 232 Ga. 294, 206 S.E.2d 461 (1974); Griffin v. State, 133 Ga. App. 508, 211 S.E.2d 382 (1974); Payne v. State, 135 Ga. App. 245, 217 S.E.2d 476 (1975); Rucker v. State, 135 Ga. App. 468, 218 S.E.2d 146 (1975); Garland v. State, 235 Ga. 522, 221 S.E.2d 198 (1975); Phillips v. State, 238 Ga. 632, 235 S.E.2d 12 (1977); Sullens v. State, 239 Ga. 766, 238 S.E.2d 864 (1977); Lunsford v. State, 145 Ga. App. 446, 243 S.E.2d 655 (1978); Hubbard v. State, 145 Ga. App. 714, 244 S.E.2d 639 (1978); Garrett v. State, 147 Ga. App. 666, 250 S.E.2d 1 (1978); Davis v. State, 242 Ga. 901, 252 S.E.2d 443 (1979); Stephens v. Balkcom, 245 Ga. 492, 265 S.E.2d 596 (1980); Jones v. State, 245 Ga. 592, 266 S.E.2d 201 (1980); Whitaker v. State, 246 Ga. 163, 269 S.E.2d 436 (1980); Koza v. State, 158 Ga. App. 709, 282 S.E.2d 131 (1981); Martin v. State, 159 Ga. App. 31, 282 S.E.2d 656 (1981); Ellis v. State, 164 Ga. App. 366, 296 S.E.2d 726 (1982); Barnes v. State, 168 Ga. App. 925, 310 S.E.2d 777 (1983); Widdowson v. State, 171 Ga. App. 134, 318 S.E.2d 820 (1984); McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Harrell v. State, 253 Ga. 474, 321 S.E.2d 739 (1984); Roberts v. State, 257 Ga. 180, 356 S.E.2d 871 (1987); Jones v. State, 258 Ga. 25, 365 S.E.2d 263 (1988); Cordova v. State, 191 Ga. App. 297, 381 S.E.2d 436 (1989); Brinson v. State, 261 Ga. 884, 413 S.E.2d 443 (1992); Lark v. State, 263 Ga. 573, 436 S.E.2d 1 (1993); Bishop v. State, 223 Ga. App. 422, 477 S.E.2d 422 (1996); Johnson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 668, 478 S.E.2d 404 (1996); State v. Johnson, 269 Ga. 370, 499 S.E.2d 56 (1998); Johnson v. State, 269 Ga. 632, 501 S.E.2d 815 (1998); Hudson v. State, 234 Ga. App. 895, 508 S.E.2d 682 (1998); Haney v. State, 234 Ga. App. 214, 507 S.E.2d 18 (1998); Eason v. State, 234 Ga. App. 595, 507 S.E.2d 175 (1998); Nealy v. State, 239 Ga. App. 651, 522 S.E.2d 34 (1999); Davis v. State, 271 Ga. 527, 520 S.E.2d 218 (1999); Granados v. State, 244 Ga. App. 153, 34 S.E.2d 886 (2000); Grimes v. State, 245 Ga. App. 277, 537 S.E.2d 720 (2000); Nanthabouthdy v. State, 245 Ga. App. 456, 538 S.E.2d 101 (2000); Jett v. State, 246 Ga. App. 429, 540 S.E.2d 209 (2000); Carter v. State, 249 Ga. App. 354, 548 S.E.2d 102 (2001); Rayshad v. State, 295 Ga. App. 29, 670 S.E.2d 849 (2008); Jordan v. State, 320 Ga. App. 265, 739 S.E.2d 743 (2013); Benton v. State, 301 Ga. 100, 799 S.E.2d 743 (2017).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Conspiracy, § 20. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 166 et seq.   C.J.S.   - 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law: Substantive Principles, § 185 et seq.   ALR.    - Criminal responsibility of one cooperating in offense which he is incapable of committing personally, 5 A.L.R. 782; 74 A.L.R. 1110; 131 A.L.R. 1322.    Individual criminal responsibility of officer or employee for larceny or embezzlement, through corporate act, of property of third person, 33 A.L.R. 787.   Who other than actor is liable for manslaughter, 95 A.L.R.2d 175.   Acquittal of principal, or his conviction of lesser degree of offense, as affecting prosecution of accessory, or aider and abettor, 9 A.L.R.4th 972.