GA Code § 40-8-25 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 40 - Motor Vehicles and Traffic|Chapter 8 - Equipment and Inspection of Motor Vehicles|Article 1 - Equipment Generally|Part 2 - Lighting Equipment|§ 40-8-25. Brake Lights and Turn Signals Required

  It shall be unlawful for any person to sell any motor vehicle manufactured after January 1, 1954, including any motorcycle or motor driven cycle manufactured after January 1, 1954, in this state or for any person to drive such vehicle on the highways unless it is equipped with at least one brake light meeting the requirements of Code Section 40-8-26.   If a motor vehicle is manufactured with two brake lights, both must be operational.   No person shall sell or offer for sale or operate on the highways any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer registered in this state and manufactured or assembled after January 1, 1954, unless it is equipped with mechanical or electrical turn signals meeting the requirements of Code Section 40-8-26. This subsection shall not apply to any motorcycle or motor driven cycle manufactured prior to January 1, 1972.     (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 108; Code 1933, § 68E-206, enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 165, § 4; Code 1981, §40-8-25, enacted by Ga. L. 1982, p. 165, § 10.)   Cross references.   - Provisions regarding turn signals as required equipment on vehicles, § 40-6-124.   Code Commission notes.   - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, "motor driven" was substituted for "motor-driven" in subsections (a) and (c).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Violation as basis for traffic stop.    - Conviction for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii) was affirmed. District court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress since the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by a traffic stop as: (1) the stop was not pretextual since the defendant was in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-25(b); (2) only 15-17 minutes elapsed between the initial stop and the defendant's arrest; (3) the district court did not err in finding that the defendant consented to a search of the vehicle and that the search did not exceed the scope of permission given; and (4) to the extent that the defendant argued that the dog sniff was illegal because the traffic stop was illegal, that argument failed because the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to stop the defendant's car. United States v. Terry, F.3d (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2007)(Unpublished).   Mistaken belief of officer regarding violation does not invalidate stop.    - Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress because, even if the officer was mistaken in the belief that the center light was a brake light and that all brake lights had to be illuminated under O.C.G.A. § 40-8-25, the officer's reasonable belief that an offense had been committed as the center light was not illuminated, though the officer might have been mistaken either as to fact or law, was a sufficient founding suspicion to enable the trial court to determine that the stop was not mere arbitrariness or harassment, which was the real question; furthermore, the trial court's reasoning that a crime had to have been committed for the stop to have been valid was improper. State v. Cartwright, 329 Ga. App. 154, 764 S.E.2d 175 (2014).    Cited in Williams v. Herr, 112 Ga. App. 529, 145 S.E.2d 639 (1965); Thomson Whsle. Grocery Co. v. Merritt, 116 Ga. App. 764, 159 S.E.2d 107 (1967); Lancaster v. State, 261 Ga. App. 348, 582 S.E.2d 513 (2003).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 201, 205.   C.J.S.   - 60 C.J.S, Motor Vehicles, § 43 et seq. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 625 et seq. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 1639, 1640.