GA Code § 35-8-2 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 35 - Law Enforcement Officers and Agencies|Chapter 8 - Employment and Training of Peace Officers|§ 35-8-2. Definitions

 As used in this chapter, the term:    "Applicant" means a prospective peace officer who has not commenced employment or service with a law enforcement unit.   "Candidate" means a peace officer who, having satisfied preemployment requirements, has commenced employment with a law enforcement unit but who has not satisfied the training requirement provided for in this chapter.   "Council" means the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council.   "Department head" means the chief executive or head of a state department or agency, a county, a municipality, or a railroad who is a peace officer and whose responsibilities include the supervision and assignment of one or more employees or the performance of administrative and managerial duties of a police agency or law enforcement unit. Such term does not include the Attorney General, the director of the Georgia Drugs and Narcotics Agency, a district attorney, a solicitor-general, a county or municipal fire chief, or peace officers employed exclusively as investigators of any such offices who do not exercise any law enforcement supervisory or managerial duties. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any sheriff or to any head of any law enforcement unit within the office of sheriff.  (4.1) "Detention facility" means a municipal or county jail used for the detention of persons charged with or convicted of a felony, a misdemeanor, or a municipal or county ordinance, but shall not include a facility customarily used to hold one or more persons for a period not to exceed eight hours while any such person awaits processing, booking, court appearance, or release.    "Emergency peace officers" means any peace officers who are employed or appointed to act as peace officers during an emergency or disaster which has been so declared by the chief executive officer of the state and whose status as peace officers is intended to be temporary and for that limited purpose.  (5.1) "Jail officer" means any person who is employed or appointed by a county or a municipality and who has the responsibility of supervising inmates who are confined in a municipal or county detention facility.   (5.2) "Juvenile correctional facility" means a facility operated by the Department of Juvenile Justice and used for the detention of youth who are delinquent or who are alleged to be delinquent or a facility operated by the Department of Juvenile Justice used for the care, treatment, and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders.   (5.3) "Juvenile correctional officer" means any person employed or appointed by the Department of Juvenile Justice who has the primary responsibility for the supervision and control of youth confined in its programs and facilities.    "Law enforcement support personnel" means persons, other than peace officers, whose primary employment with a law enforcement unit consists of performing functions directly related to the prevention, detection, or investigation of crime.   "Law enforcement unit" means:   Any agency, organ, or department of this state, a subdivision or municipality thereof, or a railroad whose primary functions include the enforcement of criminal or traffic laws, the preservation of public order, the protection of life and property, or the prevention, detection, or investigation of crime;   The Office of Permits and Enforcement of the Department of Transportation, the Department of Juvenile Justice and its institutions and facilities for the purpose of personnel who are authorized to exercise the power of arrest and who are employed or appointed by such department or institutions, and the office or section in the Department of Juvenile Justice in which persons are assigned who have been designated by the commissioner to investigate and apprehend delinquent children and any child with a pending juvenile court case alleging the child to be a child in need of services; and   The Department of Corrections, the Department of Community Supervision, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, municipal correctional institutions employing 300 or more correctional officers, and county correctional institutions for the purpose of personnel who are authorized to exercise the power of arrest and who are employed or appointed by such department, board, or institutions.     "Peace officer" means, for purposes of this chapter only:   An agent, operative, or officer of this state, a subdivision or municipality thereof, or a railroad who, as an employee for hire or as a volunteer, is vested either expressly by law or by virtue of public employment or service with authority to enforce the criminal or traffic laws through the power of arrest and whose duties include the preservation of public order, the protection of life and property, and the prevention, detection, or investigation of crime;   An enforcement officer who is employed by the Department of Transportation in its Office of Permits and Enforcement and any person employed by the Department of Juvenile Justice who is designated by the commissioner to investigate and apprehend delinquent children and any child with a pending juvenile court case alleging the child to be a child in need of services;  (B.1) Personnel who are authorized to exercise the power of arrest, who are employed or appointed by the Department of Juvenile Justice, and whose full-time duties include the preservation of public order, the protection of life and property, the detection of crime, the supervision of delinquent children in the department's institutions, facilities, or programs, or the supervision of delinquent children under intensive supervision in the community;    Personnel who are authorized to exercise the power of arrest and who are employed or appointed by the Department of Corrections, the Department of Community Supervision, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, municipal correctional institutions employing 300 or more correctional officers, county probation systems, and county correctional institutions; and   An administrative investigator who is an agent, operative, investigator, or officer of this state whose duties include the prevention, detection, and investigation of violations of law and the enforcement of administrative, regulatory, licensing, or certification requirements of his or her respective employing agency.  Law enforcement support personnel are not peace officers within the meaning of this chapter, but they may be certified upon voluntarily complying with the certification provisions of this chapter.     (8.1) "Requesting entity" means any law enforcement agency or other entity within this state empowered by law to maintain a law enforcement unit.   (8.2) "Retired correctional officer" means any retired correctional officer certified by the council.    "Retired peace officer" means a retired law enforcement officer who, prior to his or her retirement from service with the state or a subdivision or municipality thereof, was a peace officer within the meaning of such term as defined in paragraph (8) of this Code section. A retired peace officer may be certified or registered upon voluntarily complying with the certification or registration provisions of this chapter. Such term shall also mean a retired law enforcement officer who retired from service with the United States who meets all criteria as specified by the council for such classification; provided, however, that such classification shall not exempt such officer from satisfying the minimum employment and training requirements of this chapter if such officer is appointed or employed as a peace officer by the state or a subdivision or municipality thereof.   "School" means any school, college, university, academy, or training program approved by the council which offers basic law enforcement training and which consists of a combination of a course curriculum, instructors, and facilities.  (10.1) "School resource officer" means a peace officer whose primary employment or assigned duties with a law enforcement unit is assignment or appointment to a public elementary school or secondary school.    "Speed detection device" means that particular device designed to measure the speed or velocity of a motor vehicle and marketed under the name "Vascar," any device designed to measure the speed or velocity of motor vehicles using the Doppler principle of radio detection and ranging and commonly marketed under the name "radar," or any similar device, including but not limited to laser, operating under the same or similar principle, which device is approved by the Department of Public Safety for the measurement of speed, including any device for the measurement of speed or velocity based upon the Doppler principle of radar or speed timing principle of laser.    (Ga. L. 1970, p. 208, §§ 2, 14; Ga. L. 1975, p. 1165, §§ 2, 3, 10; Ga. L. 1976, p. 395, §§ 1-5; Ga. L. 1978, p. 992, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2299, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 979, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 778, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 35; Ga. L. 1982, p. 2478, §§ 1, 2, 5, 6; Ga. L. 1985, p. 283, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1141, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 568, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 91, § 35; Ga. L. 1993, p. 966, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1995, p. 880, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 1238, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1281, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 582, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1453, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1488, §§ 2A, 2B, 7A, 7B; Ga. L. 1998, p. 128, § 35; Ga. L. 1998, p. 224, § 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 777, §§ 2, 3; Ga. L. 2012, p. 775, § 35/HB 942; Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 4-45/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 382, § 1/SB 324; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-56/HB 310; Ga. L. 2017, p. 673, § 1-1/SB 149; Ga. L. 2020, p. 481, § 1/SB 341.)    The 2017 amendment,  effective July 1, 2017, added paragraph (10.1).    The 2020 amendment,  effective January 1, 2021, added paragraphs (8.1) and (8.2).   Code Commission notes.   - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1998, "Department of Juvenile Justice" was substituted for "Department of Children and Youth Services" in subparagraph (8)(B).   Editor's notes.   - Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 5-1/HB 242, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2014, and shall apply to all offenses which occur and juvenile proceedings commenced on and after such date. Any offense occurring before January 1, 2014, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior adjudication for the purpose of imposing a disposition that provides for a different penalty for subsequent adjudications, of whatever class, pursuant to this Act. The enactment of this Act shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before January 1, 2014, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecutions."   Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that this Act shall apply to sentences entered on or after July 1, 2015.   Administrative Rules and Regulations.   - Definitions, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council, Sec. 464-2-.01.   Law reviews.   - For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 231 (2015). For review of 1996 use of radar speed detection devices legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 244 (1996).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Power to direct owner from burning building.    - Under the police power, a deputy sheriff is authorized to go upon private property and direct the owner to move back from a burning building, when the deputy has been made aware of the possibility of an explosion, and in the deputy's opinion the safety of a 21/2-year-old child was unnecessarily endangered because of the proximity to the burning structure. Veit v. State, 182 Ga. App. 753, 357 S.E.2d 113 (1987).   Construction with other law.    - Juvenile's interference with a juvenile probation officer's attempt to take the juvenile into custody, after the juvenile tested positive for illegal drug use, was sufficient to support an adjudication under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b); moreover, the appeals court was not persuaded by the juvenile's contention that O.C.G.A. § 42-8-30 specifically limited the role of the "probation supervisor" over juveniles to those counties in which no juvenile probation system existed. In the Interest of M.M., 287 Ga. App. 233, 651 S.E.2d 155 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 95 (Ga. 2008).   Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.    - Trial court erred by entering a default judgment against a police officer for failing to timely answer because the officer was immune from suit on the claim brought under state law; thus, the default judgment entered on that claim was a nullity and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and should have dismissed the state law cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ferrell v. Young, 323 Ga. App. 338, 746 S.E.2d 167 (2013).   Discretionary authority.    - With respect to law enforcement officers claiming qualified immunity in a case alleging that certain searches violated Fourth Amendment rights, the officers could show that the officers were acting within the officers' discretionary authority because it is clear that performing searches and assisting in arrests are legitimate job-related functions within the power of law enforcement bodies under O.C.G.A. § 35-8-2(8)(A). Mehta v. Foskey, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Ga. 2012).   Immunity when probation officer assisting local law enforcement in pursuit.    - In a suit by a passenger against a Department of Corrections (DOC) probation officer whose vehicle collided with the passenger's vehicle during a police chase, because the officer's actions were consistent with DOC's non-defective policy, which allowed the officer to assist law enforcement, DOC had sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6). Britt v. Jackson, 348 Ga. App. 159, 819 S.E.2d 677 (2018), cert. denied, No. S19C0483, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 539 (Ga. 2019).    Cited in Talley v. State, 129 Ga. App. 479, 199 S.E.2d 908 (1973); Smith v. Price, 616 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980); State v. Lockett, 259 Ga. App. 179, 576 S.E.2d 582 (2003); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003); Love v. State, 290 Ga. App. 486, 659 S.E.2d 835 (2008).   OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL   Power to arrest is essential to status of peace officer.   - Employee of agency who is required by oath of office to preserve public order and protect life and property, but does not have power to make arrests, is not a peace officer under this definition. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-31.   Power to arrest confers duty to preserve public order.   - There are two conditions provided for in the definition of a peace officer, but it must be understood that once a person is given the power to arrest it necessarily follows that the person has a duty to preserve the public order. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-31.   District attorney not law enforcement officer or peace officer.   - District attorney does not fit under any definition of a law enforcement officer or peace officer in this state. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-33.   Park security officers not "peace officers".   - Though the security officers of the North Georgia Mountains Authority do have the power of arrest, the security officers fail to meet the definition of "peace officer" on two other grounds: (1) the security officers are not responsible for the enforcement of the criminal laws of the state or its political subdivisions; and (2) the security guards are not employed by the Department of Public Safety, a municipality, or a county. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-27. (See also 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. 90-11).    Sheriffs and deputy sheriffs of municipal courts are not "peace officers"  as defined by this section since they are not employed by a law enforcement unit. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-7.   Independent communications department not "law enforcement unit".    - Communications department, independent from the law enforcement agencies the department serves, which is primarily an information transmitting department, is not a "law enforcement unit" as defined in paragraph (7) of O.C.G.A. § 35-8-2. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-67.    Intent of General Assembly regarding certification of persons employed to use speed detection devices  was to have people certified no matter which type of device is used as long as the device itself fits within the definition provided for under paragraph (11) of this section. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-77.    Paragraph (11) does not include devices not considered under § 40-14-1. - Paragraph (11) of Ga. L. 1970, p. 208, §§ 2 and 14 (see now O.C.G.A. § 35-8-2) specifically defines certain devices and does not bring in any additional types of devices not considered under the definition found in Ga. L. 1970, p. 435, § 3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-14-1). 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-77.    Definition of "speed detection device" in Ga. L. 1970, p. 208, §§ 2 and 14 (see now O.C.G.A. § 35-8-2) does not conflict with the definition for the same device in Ga. L. 1970, p. 435, § 3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-14-1). 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-77.   Stopwatch as "speed detection device".   - Although not normally thought to be a "speed detection device," a stopwatch meets this definition when the stopwatch is being used in traffic enforcement. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-77.    Stopwatch is a mechanism similar to "Vascar."  In actuality "Vascar" is a type of stopwatch combined with a computer which handles the mathematical functions. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-77.   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 947, 948.   C.J.S.   - 23 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused, § 852. 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 573 et seq.