GA Code § 15-11-415 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 15 - Courts|Chapter 11 - Juvenile Code|Article 5 - Child in Need of Services|Part 4 - Preadjudication Custody and Release of Children|§ 15-11-415. Detention Decision; Findings

  Restraints on the freedom of a child prior to adjudication shall be imposed only when there is probable cause to believe that a child committed the act of which he or she is accused, there is clear and convincing evidence that such child's freedom should be restrained, that no less restrictive alternatives will suffice, and:   Such child's detention or care is required to reduce the likelihood that he or she may inflict serious bodily harm on others during the interim period; or   Such child's detention is necessary to secure his or her presence in court to protect the jurisdiction and processes of the court.     A child alleged to be a child in need of services shall not be detained:   To punish, treat, or rehabilitate such child;   To allow his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian to avoid his or her legal responsibilities;   To satisfy demands by a victim, law enforcement, or the community;   To permit more convenient administrative access to him or her;   To facilitate further interrogation or investigation; or   Due to a lack of a more appropriate facility.     Whenever a child alleged to be a child in need of services cannot be unconditionally released, conditional or supervised release that results in the least necessary interference with the liberty of such child shall be favored over more intrusive alternatives.   Whenever the curtailment of the freedom of a child alleged to be a child in need of services is permitted, the exercise of authority shall reflect the following values:   Respect for the privacy, dignity, and individuality of such child and his or her family;   Protection of the psychological and physical health of such child;   Tolerance of the diverse values and preferences among different groups and individuals;   Assurance of equality of treatment by race, class, ethnicity, and sex;   Avoidance of regimentation and depersonalization of such child;   Avoidance of stigmatization of such child; and   Assurance that such child has been informed of his or her right to consult with an attorney and that, if the child is an indigent person, an attorney will be provided.     If a child alleged to be a child in need of services can remain in the custody of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through the provision of services to prevent the need for removal, the court shall order that such services shall be provided.     (Code 1981, §15-11-415, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-31/SB 364.)   Cross references.   - Definition of grandparent and securing of rights, § 19-7-3.   Law reviews.   - For article discussing due process in juvenile court procedures in California and Georgia, in light of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 9 (1971). For note criticizing jurisdiction of juvenile justice system over runaways and advocating alternative legal approaches, see 24 Emory L. J. 1075 (1975). For comment on grandparents' visitation rights in Georgia, see 29 Emory L. J. 1083 (1980).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Editor's notes.   - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1401, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-18.1, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-46.1, which were subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.   Jurisdiction linked to petition.    - Former statute indicated that assumption of jurisdiction by a juvenile court was linked to an authorized petition. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1401).   Imposition of interim control or detention.    - Act of placing a juvenile in the back seat of a patrol car and taking the juvenile to police headquarters was not "the imposition of interim control or detention" within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-18.1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-415). In re C.W., 227 Ga. App. 763, 490 S.E.2d 442 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-18.1)   Probable cause found.    - By restraining the child at an initial hearing, the juvenile court implicitly found probable cause, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-46.1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-415). The juvenile court therefore erred in later deciding that a 10-day adjudication hearing was actually a detention hearing and in resetting the 10-day adjudication hearing. In the Interest of K.L., 303 Ga. App. 679, 694 S.E.2d 372 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-46.1)   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 66 et seq.   C.J.S.   - 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 140 et seq., 239.   U.L.A.   - Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 14.   ALR.    - What constitutes delinquency or incorrigibility justifying commitment of infant, 85 A.L.R. 1099.