CO Code § 13-90-101 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 13 - Courts and Court Procedure|Article 90 - Witnesses|Part 1 - General Provisions|§ 13-90-101. Who May Testify - Interest

 All persons, without exception, other than those specified in sections 13-90-102 to 13-90-108 may be witnesses. Neither parties nor other persons who have an interest in the event of an action or proceeding shall be excluded; nor those who have been convicted of crime; nor persons on account of their opinions on matters of religious belief. In every case the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question, as now provided by law, but the conviction of any person for any felony may be shown for the purpose of affecting the credibility of such witness. The fact of such conviction may be proved like any other fact, not of record, either by the witness himself, who shall be compelled to testify thereto, or by any other person cognizant of such conviction as impeaching testimony or by any other competent testimony. Evidence of a previous conviction of a felony where the witness testifying was convicted five years prior to the time when the witness testifies shall not be admissible in evidence in any civil action.   History. Source: L. 1883: P. 289, § 1. G.S. § 3647. R.S. 08: § 7266. C.L. § 6555. CSA: C. 177, § 1. L. 41: P. 924, § 1. CRS 53: § 153-1-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 154-1-1. History. Source: L. 1883: P. 289, § 1. G.S. § 3647. R.S. 08: § 7266. C.L. § 6555. CSA: C. 177, § 1. L. 41: P. 924, § 1. CRS 53: § 153-1-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 154-1-1.    ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION.     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Law reviews. For article, “Fearing Hell as Essential to Validity of Affidavit”, see 18 Dicta 144 (1941). For note, “Impeachment of Nonreligious Witnesses”, see 13 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 336 (1941). For article, “The Right to Practice Law as Dependent on Fear of Hell”, see 19 Dicta 206 (1942). For article, “Bishop Rice's Last Battle for Civil Rights”, see 22 Dicta 139 (1945). For note, “Some Problems Relating to Testamentary Witnesses”, see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 458 (1951). For article, “Evidence in Estate Proceedings”, see 24 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 437 (1952). For article, “One Year Review of Wills, Estates, and Trusts”, see 38 Dicta 115 (1960). For comment, “Reporter's Privilege: Pankratz v. District Court”, see 58 Den. L.J. 681 (1981). For article, “Termination of a Personal Representative”, see 19 Colo. Law. 213 (1990). For article, “The Defendant's Decision Not to Testify”, see 19 Colo. Law. 1589 (1990). For article, “Admissibility of Prior Felony Convictions for Impeachment Purposes”, see 32 Colo. Law. 79 (Nov. 2003). For article, “Age Requirements in Colorado: A Guide for Estate Planners”, see 34 Colo. Law. 87 (Aug. 2005).   Annotator's note. Cases material to § 13-90-101 decided prior to its earliest source, L. 1883, p. 289 , § 1, have also been included in the annotations to this section.   This section is constitutional. People v. Honey, 198 Colo. 64 , 596 P.2d 751 (1979).   Section does not violate § 21 of art. VI, Colo. Const., as an intrusion into matters exclusively judicial. Legislative policymaking and judicial rulemaking powers may overlap to some extent as long as there is no substantial conflict between statute and rule. People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367 , 585 P.2d 275 (1978); People v. Diaz, 985 P.2d 83 (Colo. App. 1999).   For constitutionality of this section, see Trackman v. People, 22 Colo. 83 , 43 P. 662 (1896).   The right to testify in the courts of the state is not a privilege or immunity protected by the fourteenth amendment, and the state general assembly has the power to declare who shall be competent to testify, and to regulate the production of evidence in the state courts. Estate of Freeman v. Young, 172 Colo. 322 , 473 P.2d 704 (1970).   This section does not endow party witnesses in a civil action with a fundamental right to testify. Rather, it simply renders a party competent to testify and the testimony of all witnesses remains subject to the applicable rules of evidence. Williams v. Chrysler Ins. Co., 928 P.2d 1375 (Colo. App. 1996).   The general assembly has the right to control the general competency of witnesses and the subjects of their testimony; but a court cannot be empowered to make a party a competent witness contrary to the general law. Estate of Freeman v. Young, 172 Colo. 322 , 473 P.2d 704 (1970).   Language of this section is mandatory and not discretionary. Havens v. Hardesty, 43 Colo. App. 162, 600 P.2d 116 (1979).   It removes the disqualification of witnesses on the ground of interest, or the conviction of crime, except as set forth in the following sections. Palmer v. Hanna, 6 Colo. 55 (1881); Estate of Freeman v. Young, 172 Colo. 322 , 473 P.2d 704 (1970).   There is a presumption that a witness is competent to testify. People v. Piro, 671 P.2d 1341 (Colo. App. 1983).   Rule excluding parties interested in outcome of suit abolished. General common-law rule, that the testimony of all parties to a lawsuit and of all persons who stood to gain or lose by the outcome of the case was excluded as incompetent has been abolished in Colorado. Wise v. Hillman, 625 P.2d 364 (Colo. 1981).   The parties to an action are competent witnesses in their own behalf, and they are thus placed on an equality. Whitsett v. Kershow, 4 Colo. 419 (1878); Levy v. Dwight, 12 Colo. 101 , 20 P. 12 (1888).   Defendant testifying on own behalf is witness. When a defendant takes the stand in his own defense, he becomes a witness within the meaning of this section. People v. Evans, 630 P.2d 94 (Colo. App. 1981).   It was the intention of the general assembly, by this section, to entirely remove the disqualification theretofore resting upon husband and wife on account of the marriage relation, or, as stated by Chancellor Kent, on account of public policy. Butler v. Phillips, 38 Colo. 378 , 88 P. 480 (1906).   Husband may testify in suit involving wife's property. Under this and the following section the husband may be permitted to testify in a cause wherein the separate property of the wife is concerned. Hanna v. Barker, 6 Colo. 303 (1882).   There still are certain exceptions. At common law, a party to a suit could not testify at all in his own behalf, and while this statute has changed this rule of the common law, certain exceptions are still provided for. Cliff v. Cliff, 23 Colo. App. 183, 128 P. 860 (1912).   Objection to competency of witnesses must be made in trial court. An objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence on the ground of the competency of a witness must be made in the trial court. Otherwise, it will not be considered on review. Holm v. People, 72 Colo. 257 , 210 P. 698 (1922).   This section has no application to proceeding inquiring into a party's mental health. In the special statutory proceeding to inquire into the mental health of a party, the provisions of this section have no application to such proceedings being neither civil nor criminal, and in no sense adversary, a wife may testify as to the mental condition of her husband as illustrated by his acts. Sabon v. People, 142 Colo. 323 , 350 P.2d 576 (1960).   Prosecuting attorney as witness. In Colorado, a prosecuting attorney is competent to be a witness for the state, but ordinarily he should withdraw from active participation in a case when he learns he will be a witness. People v. Hauschel, 37 Colo. App. 114, 550 P.2d 876 (1976).   Where the district attorney's participation in the trial was limited, and pursuant to court order, after he testified he took no further part in the trial, nor was the nature of the district attorney's testimony here as significant or damning as that in People v. Spencer (182 Colo. 189 , 512 P.2d 260 (1973)), the district attorney's indiscretion did not rise to the seriousness of constituting a denial of a fair trial, and thus the refusal to grant a mistrial after his testimony was not reversible error. People v. Hauschel, 37 Colo. App. 114, 550 P.2d 876 (1976).   Testimony properly allowed despite witness's hearing deficiency. Although defendant's mother was incapacitated by reason of a hearing loss, her testimony was properly allowed where the record reveals that although the witness had a hearing deficiency and several questions had to be repeated her answers were responsive to the questions asked, which clearly indicates that she perceived the meaning of the questions. People v. Forbes, 185 Colo. 410 , 524 P.2d 1377 (1974).   Impeachment of defendant may not be accomplished by attacking witness's general character. While evidence of prior misconduct, including misdemeanor convictions, may be admitted to attack the veracity of specific testimony by a defendant, impeachment of a defendant may not be accomplished by attacking the general character of the witness. People v. Sasson, 628 P.2d 120 (Colo. App. 1980).   Witness is presumed to be competent, and whether or not a witness is competent is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling may be disturbed only upon a finding of clear abuse of discretion. People v. Woertman, 786 P.2d 443 (Colo. App. 1989).   Cross-examination regarding prior misdemeanor conviction was proper in trial for violation of custody where prior conviction was for violation of custody and was directly relevant to defendant's state of mind and tended to refute defendant's own testimony that he had no prior arrest record. People v. Metcalf, 926 P.2d 133 (Colo. App. 1996).   Grand jury proceedings constitute judicial proceedings which entitle witnesses to absolute immunity from subsequent civil liability for his or her testimony. Wagner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 933 P.2d 1311 (Colo. 1997).   For history of section, see People v. Yeager, 182 Colo. 397 , 513 P.2d 1057 (1973).   Applied in Williams v. People, 157 Colo. 443 , 403 P.2d 436 (1965); People v. Lambert, 194 Colo. App. 421, 572 P.2d 847 (1977); People v. Stinson, 632 P.2d 631 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9 (Colo. 1984).   II. PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION.   Section is constitutional. Section which specifically allows previous felony conviction to be shown for the purpose of affecting the credibility of a witness is constitutional. Velarde v. People, 179 Colo. 207 , 500 P.2d 125 (1972); People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367 , 585 P.2d 275 (1978); People v. Thompson, 197 Colo. 299 , 592 P.2d 803 (1979); People v. Griffith, 197 Colo. 544 , 595 P.2d 231 (1979).   Section does not deprive defendant of due process of law under amendment XIV, U.S. Const., and § 25 of art. II, Colo. Const., in that it precludes the exercise of any judicial discretion in admitting prior felony convictions for purposes of impeachment. People v. Meyers, 617 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1980).   Distinction in handling defendant's evidence not violative of equal protection guarantees. Distinction between admitting evidence of prior felony convictions when a defendant chooses to testify, and excluding such evidence when the defendant has chosen not to take the witness stand does not violate equal protection guarantees. People v. Layton, 200 Colo. 59 , 612 P.2d 83 (1980); People v. Diaz, 985 P.2d 83 (Colo. App. 1999).   This section does treat those defendants who choose to testify on their behalf differently than those defendants who do not take the witness stand, but these two classes of defendants are not similarly situated. People v. Layton, 200 Colo. 59 , 612 P.2d 83 (1980).   This section is not violative of defendant's right to due process and does not impermissibly chill the exercise of his right to testify on his own behalf. People v. Henry, 195 Colo. 309 , 578 P.2d 1041, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 961, 99 S. Ct. 445, 58 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1978); People v. Diaz, 985 P.2d 83 (Colo. App. 1999).   It is within the province of the Colorado general assembly to make provision for use of prior convictions in the event a defendant-witness testifies. The Colorado statutory procedure does not impermissibly affect a defendant's due process rights and right to testify in his own behalf, and thus impeachment of a defendant-witness by showing prior convictions is not unconstitutional. Hubbard v. Wilson, 401 F. Supp. 495 (D. Colo. 1975 ).   Fact that this does not apply to criminal actions does not violate equal protection. The argument that this section should also be applied to criminal actions, and that if the limitation does not apply to criminal prosecutions then there has been a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Colorado and United States Constitutions is without merit. Nunez v. People, 173 Colo. 236 , 477 P.2d 366 (1970); Garcia v. People, 174 Colo. 372 , 483 P.2d 1347 (1971).   Criminal defendant was not denied equal protection of the laws because his testimony was impeached by a felony conviction committed more than five years prior to his court testimony, even though this statute does not provide for impeachment by felony convictions over five years old in civil cases. People v. Casey, 185 Colo. 58 , 521 P.2d 1250 (1974).   Statute which permits impeachment in a criminal case by felony conviction over five years old, while such is not permissible in a civil proceeding, does not deny equal protection of the law. People v. Davis, 183 Colo. 228 , 516 P.2d 120 (1973); People v. Velarde, 196 Colo. 254 , 586 P.2d 6 (1978).   Fact that this statute limits, for purpose of impeachment in civil actions, evidence of a conviction of a witness to those felonies occurring within five years of the time of his testifying, whereas, in criminal cases there is no time limitation, does not deny equal protection of the law to criminal defendants. People v. Yeager, 182 Colo. 397 , 513 P.2d 1057 (1973).   Distinction has a reasonable basis. It cannot be said that the general assembly's distinction between impeachment tools permitted in civil and criminal actions is without a reasonable basis, considering the grave consequences of criminal proceedings where both the personal freedom of the accused and the interests of society as a whole are weighed in a delicate balance. Lee v. People, 170 Colo. 268 , 460 P.2d 796 (1969).   Evidence of prior criminal convictions admissible for impeachment purposes. Notwithstanding its inherent prejudiciality, evidence of prior criminal convictions may properly be admitted to impeach the credibility of a defendant's testimony. People v. Chavez, 621 P.2d 1362 (Colo.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 3019, 69 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1981); People v. McGhee, 677 P.2d 419 (Colo. App. 1983); People v. Hardy, 677 P.2d 429 (Colo. App. 1983); Molnar v. Law, 776 P.2d 1156 (Colo. App. 1989); People v. Ziglar, 45 P.3d 1266 (Colo. 2002).   While this section does not permit the use of a witness's prior misdemeanor conviction for impeachment purposes, it was never intended to prohibit testimony tending to show motive, bias, prejudice or interest of a witness in the outcome of a trial. People v. Jones, 635 P.2d 904 (Colo. App. 1981).   To warrant suppression of a prior conviction, the accused must make a prima facie showing of a constitutional violation, and the mere showing of uncertainty as to whether a violation has occurred is insufficient. People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo. App. 1991).   A balancing test is not required prior to admitting evidence of felony convictions for purposes of impeachment of an accused, given that this state has not adopted a rule of evidence similar to Fed. R. Evid. 609. People v. Diaz, 985 P.2d 83 (Colo. App. 1999).   Evidence of defendant's prior misdemeanor convictions not admissible. People v. Sasson, 628 P.2d 120 (Colo. App. 1980).   Evidence of prior misdemeanor convictions involving false statements to police held admissible for impeachment purposes where focus was on the specific instances of lying, not on the convictions themselves, and jury was instructed to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose of evaluating defendant's credibility. People v. Gillis, 883 P.2d 554 (Colo. App. 1994).   Military conviction admissible for impeachment. A military conviction for an offense that would be punishable as a felony under the law of Colorado is admissible for impeachment under this section. People v. Apodaca, 668 P.2d 941 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 712 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1985).   A court does not err in allowing the people to attack the defendant's credibility by questioning him about a prior Air Force court martial conviction for assault with intent to commit rape. People v. Ortega, 672 P.2d 215 (Colo. App. 1983).   Whether a military conviction qualifies as a felony conviction under Colorado's impeachment statute should be resolved on the basis of the following two-part test: (1) Whether the maximum penalty applicable to the military offense is substantially equivalent to the punishment reserved for a felony offense in Colorado; and (2) whether the same criminal conduct if committed in Colorado, would be classified as a felony under Colorado law. Apodaca v. People, 712 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1985).   Defendant's conviction of rape under Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice qualifies as a felony conviction within the intendment of this section since the maximum sentence, life imprisonment, is a penalty applicable for the most serious felonies in Colorado and the offense of rape, if committed in Colorado, would constitute either the class 2 or class 3 felony of sexual assault in the first degree, or the class 4 felony of sexual assault in the second degree. Apodaca v. People, 712 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1985).   Defendant's prior military conviction is admissible to impeach the defendant only if the court has ruled that the conviction was obtained in a constitutionally valid manner. Apodaca v. People, 712 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1985).   Prior felony conviction which had been expunged after three years of probation was not a “prior felony conviction” within the meaning of this section. People v. Wright, 678 P.2d 1072 (Colo. App. 1984).   A juvenile adjudication may not be used for impeachment purposes, as a juvenile adjudication is not a criminal proceeding. People v. Apodaca, 668 P.2d 941 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 712 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1985); People v. Armand, 873 P.2d 7 (Colo. App. 1993).   Trial court committed reversible error in allowing the impeachment of defendant's credibility with a New York youthful offender adjudication that is defined as not being a judgment of conviction for a crime or any other offense. People v. D'Apice, 735 P.2d 882 (Colo. App. 1986).   This section limits inquiry concerning any felony conviction to a proceeding five years in civil actions. Nunez v. People, 173 Colo. 236 , 477 P.2d 366 (1970); Taylor v. People, 176 Colo. 316 , 490 P.2d 292 (1971).   This is exclusionary in character. Pasternak v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 417 F.2d 1292 (10th Cir. 1969).   This section is not applicable to federal courts. The fact that certain evidence might be inadmissible under a state exclusionary rule or a state statute is not controlling in the federal courts. While state rules of admissibility are controlling in the federal courts, state exclusionary rules are not, and evidence of a conviction five and one-half years prior to the date of testifying must be received even though the state courts would hold otherwise. Pasternak v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 417 F.2d 1292 (10th Cir. 1969).   A “conviction” based on a plea of nolo contendere is within the meaning of that word as it is used in this section. Lacey v. People, 166 Colo. 152 , 442 P.2d 402 (1968); Reynolds v. People, 172 Colo. 137 , 471 P.2d 417 (1970).   A “conviction” based on a guilty plea is also admissible. People v. Gallegos, 950 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1997).   So is a conviction in a sister state or in a federal court for the purpose of affecting the credibility of a witness, unless the statute authorizing the use of such evidence precludes a so-called foreign conviction. The Colorado statute contains no such limiting language. Lacey v. People, 166 Colo. 152 , 442 P.2d 402 (1968).   This section permits use of only final convictions, for purpose of impeachment. People v. Goff, 187 Colo. 57 , 530 P.2d 512 (1974).   Policy behind requirement that judgment of conviction be final before it is utilized for impeachment purposes is to guarantee that an accused will be subject to impeachment only after the trial judge has passed upon a motion for a new trial and has imposed sentence. People v. Goff, 187 Colo. 57 , 530 P.2d 512 (1974).   Conviction for impeachment purposes does not require imposition of sentence. Since it is immaterial whether guilt is established by a verdict of guilty, supported by a denial of a motion for new trial, or be a plea of guilty, that a conviction for impeachment purposes does not require the imposition of sentence is as applicable to convictions arising from the acceptance of a guilty plea as it is to convictions following a guilty verdict. People v. Baca, 44 Colo. App. 167, 610 P.2d 1083 (1980).   Conviction may be used for impeachment purposes at a later proceeding even if the appeal of the conviction is pending. People v. McNeely, 68 P.3d 540 (Colo. App. 2002).   Use of untested, unsentenced jury verdict prohibited. A jury verdict which has not been tested by a motion for a new trial and has not been then supported by the imposition of sentence cannot be used for the purpose of impeachment. People v. Goff, 187 Colo. 57 , 530 P.2d 512 (1974).   Portion of rule in People v. Goff does not stand alone. That portion of the rule in People v. Goff, supra, requiring sentencing as a condition precedent to subsequent use of a conviction for impeachment purposes, does not stand alone and does not go to the heart of the “truth-finding function” or raise “serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts”. People v. Johnson, 192 Colo. 483 , 560 P.2d 465 (1977).   The essential function of the rule articulated in People v. Goff, supra, i.e., that a jury verdict which has not been tested by motion for new trial “and has not been supported by the imposition of sentence” cannot be used for impeachment purposes, was to ensure that impeachment would not be based upon a conviction which had not withstood the test of judicial scrutiny and the review provided by a motion for a new trial. People v. Johnson, 192 Colo. 483 , 560 P.2d 465 (1977).   A felony conviction, after denial of a motion for a new trial but prior to sentencing, may be used for impeachment purposes. People v. Johnson, 192 Colo. 483 , 560 P.2d 465 (1977).   Credibility of “remote” conviction jury question. A previous felony conviction of a witness, whatever its age, may be shown to affect credibility, and the effect on credibility of a “remote” conviction must be left to the judgment of the jury. People v. Yeager, 182 Colo. 397 , 513 P.2d 1057 (1973).   Use of prior felony convictions for impeachment of witnesses is not discretionary with trial judge. People v. Yeager, 182 Colo. 397 , 513 P.2d 1057 (1973); People v. Wright, 678 P.2d 1072 (Colo. App. 1984); Molnar v. Law, 776 P.2d 1156 (Colo. App. 1989); People v. Gallegos, 950 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1997).   The decisions of Colorado supreme court interpreting this section have not granted the trial judge discretion to foreclose the use of prior felony convictions to impeach a defendant's testimony. People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 225 , 519 P.2d 951 (1974); People v. Medina, 40 Colo. App. 490, 583 P.2d 293 (1978); People v. Velarde, 196 Colo. 254 , 586 P.2d 6 (1978); People v. Renstrom, 657 P.2d 461 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Gallegos, 950 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1997).   The nature of the conviction can be established by a brief recital of the circumstances. Only the extent of the examination into those circumstances is within the trial court's discretion. People v. Gallegos, 950 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1997).   Felony conviction obtained by a guilty plea is admissible to the same extent as one obtained by a jury verdict. People v. Gallegos, 950 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1997).   This section makes no exception for guilty pleas by an alleged accomplice that are based on the same incident leading to the charges against the defendant. People v. Gallegos, 950 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1997).   Where witness plead guilty to a felony drug offense after being found by the court to be a person in need of treatment and after having the proceedings suspended without an imposition of a sentence, court had no discretion to prohibit the use of the felony conviction to impeach the witness's testimony, despite the fact that the felony conviction might be set aside after successful completion of the rehabilitation program. People v. Silva, 987 P.2d 909 (Colo. App. 1999).   Where, before the defendant testified in his defense, he moved that the court prohibit the prosecution from showing on cross-examination that he had been previously convicted of a felony, the court correctly denied the motion to suppress as it was without discretion to prohibit such evidence. People v. Bueno, 183 Colo. 304 , 516 P.2d 434 (1973).   Judge may determine whether questioning is in good faith. Questions posed to a defendant who has taken the stand in his own behalf about prior felonies must be asked by the prosecuting attorney in good faith; and it is within the judge's discretion to determine whether good faith is present. People v. Thompson, 182 Colo. 198 , 511 P.2d 909 (1973).   One convicted of a felony is a competent witness in a criminal case as well as in a civil action, whose credibility is a matter for the jury to determine. Trackman v. People, 22 Colo. 83 , 43 P. 662 (1896).   Right to testify deemed subject to impeachment. While the possibility of impeachment by prior conviction may present a defendant with a difficult strategic decision on whether to testify, the constitutional right to testify does not include a right to foreclose impeachment by evidence of a prior conviction. People v. Montez, 197 Colo. 126 , 589 P.2d 1368 (1979).   A prosecutor may utilize a defendant's prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes if the defendant elects to testify in his own behalf. People v. Griffith, 197 Colo. 544 , 595 P.2d 231 (1979).   Ruling on defendant's motion to suppress prior conviction evidence. A timely judicial ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress prior conviction evidence for the purpose of impeachment serves the vital function of providing the defendant with the meaningful opportunity to make the type of informed decision contemplated by the fundamental nature of the right to testify in one's own defense. Apodaca v. People, 712 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1985).   The trial court's refusal to rule on the defendant's motion to prohibit prosecutorial use of defendant's 1976 military conviction until such time as the prosecution actually sought to impeach the defendant constituted an impermissible burden on the defendant's constitutional right to testify in his own defense. Apodaca v. People, 712 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1985).   Evidentiary hearing required on admissibility of prior conviction evidence. Trial court must hold evidentiary hearing on defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding prior conviction evidence offered for the purpose of defendant's impeachment. Bales v. People, 713 P.2d 1280 (Colo. 1986).   Weaknesses and misdeeds which may not be used for impeachment purposes. Even though conviction of a felony may be made the subject of cross-examination for impeachment purposes, supposed weaknesses or misdeeds attributed to the witness which fall short of criminal conviction and which attempt to discredit or impeach a witness by impugning the witness's character may not be utilized for this purpose. People v. Roberts, 37 Colo. App. 490, 553 P.2d 93 (1976).   In this state, it is improper to ask questions pertaining to a witness's purported drug addiction merely for purposes of attacking the credibility of the witness. People v. Roberts, 37 Colo. App. 490, 553 P.2d 93 (1976).   It is permissible to prove a former conviction of crime as bearing upon the credibility of a witness, but the showing must be limited to evidence of conviction. Questions as to indictment, arrest, commission of offenses, or immoral acts are not permitted. Dennison v. People, 65 Colo. 15 , 174 P. 595 (1918); Tarling v. People, 69 Colo. 477 , 194 P. 939 (1921); Hoffman v. People, 72 Colo. 552 , 212 P. 848 (1923); Hendricks v. People, 78 Colo. 264 , 241 P. 734 (1925).   This section permits the showing of prior felony convictions for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of any witness, including a defendant. People v. Huguley, 39 Colo. App. 481, 568 P.2d 1177 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 195 Colo. 259 , 577 P.2d 746 (1978).   Whether the nature of the crime was elicited from defendant or codefendant is immaterial if the fact of the conviction is otherwise admissible. Hampton v. People, 146 Colo. 570 , 362 P.2d 864 (1961).   A wide latitude is allowed in the cross-examination of witnesses upon matters which bear upon their credibility. Tarling v. People, 69 Colo. 477 , 194 P. 939 (1921); Davis v. People, 77 Colo. 546 , 238 P. 25 (1925).   A witness may be asked on cross-examination if he has been convicted of a crime. Dively v. People, 74 Colo. 268 , 220 P. 991 (1923).   Scope of questioning as to prior conviction limited. The court has discretion to limit cross-examination as to prior felony convictions to exclude detailed cross-questioning concerning the facts involved in the appellant's prior conviction. People v. Medina, 40 Colo. App. 490, 583 P.2d 293 (1978); People v. Renstrom, 657 P.2d 461 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Gallegos, 950 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1997).   Cross-examination held proper. Where the record discloses that the cross-examination was directed at another, permissible purpose, i.e., attempting to prove that the witnesses were under the influence of the narcotic substance at the time of the occurrence as to which they were testifying, or at the time of testifying at trial, matters which might affect the witnesses' ability to perceive, remember, or testify as to a particular event, then the cross-examination was properly related to a material matter, and did not constitute impermissible impeachment of credibility. People v. Roberts, 37 Colo. App. 490, 553 P.2d 93 (1976).   In impeaching a witness, the inquiry ought to be directed to the witness's credibility rather than to his moral character. People v. Couch, 179 Colo. 324 , 500 P.2d 967 (1972).   The nature and name of the crime may be brought out. The inquiry is not confined to the mere fact of conviction of some crime, but the nature or name of the particular crime of which the witness was convicted may be brought out. Davis v. People, 77 Colo. 546 , 238 P. 25 (1925); Hendricks v. People, 78 Colo. 264 , 241 P. 734 (1925); Hampton v. People, 146 Colo. 570 , 362 P.2d 864 (1961).   Where the district attorney asked only if defendant had pled guilty to the charge of possession of burglar tools in a prior unrelated case, the inquiry was not beyond the proper scope concerning a prior felony conviction where evidence of the nature of the offense is permissible. People v. Bueno, 183 Colo. 304 , 516 P.2d 434 (1973).   This section does not prohibit showing the number and place of convictions. Questions, such as are complained of, have generally been held proper. It was not error to allow them in the instant case. Dively v. People, 74 Colo. 268 , 220 P. 991 (1923).   Counsel may offer proof if prior conviction denied. The only way that counsel can establish good faith in asking questions about prior felonies if the defendant denies prior felony convictions is to make an offer of proof to the court. People v. Thompson, 182 Colo. 198 , 511 P.2d 909 (1973).   Question as to prior conviction when it is known there was none is reversible error. Asking defendant, who had taken the stand in his own defense, whether he had ever been arrested for a felony when the district attorney knew that there was no prior felony conviction was reversible error. People v. Robles, 183 Colo. 4 , 514 P.2d 630 (1973).   The general rule is that evidence of arrests and of pending charges against a witness before conviction is not admissible as bearing upon the witness's credibility for the reason that want of credibility may not logically be inferred from naked accusations of which the law presumes a person innocent until convicted, but the rule was never intended to prohibit testimony tending to show motive, bias, prejudice, or interest of a witness in the outcome of the trial. People v. King, 179 Colo. 94 , 498 P.2d 1142 (1972).   A witness in a criminal trial may only be impeached by showing a prior felony conviction, and it is immaterial what the grounds for arrest or the original charges were. People v. Robles, 183 Colo. 4 , 514 P.2d 630 (1973).   Absent special circumstances, a defendant may be impeached with felony convictions that occurred after the offense for which he or she is being tried. People v. Bradley, 25 P.3d 1271 (Colo. App. 2001).   Where evidence is offered to show the motive of a paid informant witness and that he is interested in the outcome of the case by reason of pending criminal charges against him, the prosecution of which may or may not be pursued by reason of the testimony he has given on behalf of the people, such evidence is competent and to deny its admissibility would erode defendant's right of confrontation. People v. King, 179 Colo. 94 , 498 P.2d 1142 (1972).   Or when he may be testifying in hope of leniency for him. A trial court should allow broad cross-examination of a prosecution witness with respect to the witness's motive for testifying, especially where such witness is charged with or threatened with criminal prosecution for other alleged offenses not connected with the case in which he testifies, and where his testimony against the defendant might be influenced by a promise of, or hope or expectation of, immunity or leniency with respect to the pending charges against him, as a consideration for testifying against the defendant. People v. King, 179 Colo. 94 , 498 P.2d 1142 (1972).   When a defendant offers himself as a witness in his own behalf, he is subject to the general rules of examination applicable to other witnesses, including examination as to matters which tend to show him unworthy of belief. Tarling v. People, 69 Colo. 477 , 194 P. 939 (1921); Routa v. People, 117 Colo. 564 , 192 P.2d 436 (1948); Mitchell v. People, 137 Colo. 5 , 320 P.2d 342 (1958); Hampton v. People, 146 Colo. 5 70, 362 P.2d 864 (1961); Candelaria v. People, 177 Colo. 136 , 493 P.2d 355 (1972); People v. Medina, 40 Colo. App. 490, 583 P.2d 293 (1978); People v. Renstrom, 657 P.2d 461 (Colo. App. 1982).   Evidence of defendant's prior conviction may be considered only regarding his credibility. The defendant voluntarily testified during the trial and his credibility thereupon became an issue in the case. On cross-examination the defendant admitted that he had been convicted of a felony. Such evidence was for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the defendant so limited by the court's instructions to the jury, was clearly within the ambit of this section. Diaz v. People, 161 Colo. 172 , 420 P.2d 824 (1966); Taylor v. People, 176 Colo. 71 , 490 P.2d 292 (1971).   A defendant who elects to be a witness in his own behalf in a criminal case subjects his credibility to question, like any other witness, and he may therefore be examined on the matter of previous felony convictions. People v. Thompson, 182 Colo. 198 , 511 P.2d 909 (1973).   Evidence cannot be used in an attempt to show common scheme. The district attorney in bringing out defendant's prior felony assault conviction in a forgery trial was not attempting to show common scheme, device, or plan, but was doing so in an effort to attack his credibility as a witness in the case, as is permitted by this section. Lacey v. People, 166 Colo. 152 , 442 P.2d 402 (1968).   A criminal contempt is such a crime as may be shown on cross-examination under our statute, to impeach the credibility of a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf. Dockerty v. People, 96 Colo. 338 , 44 P.2d 1013 (1935).   Colorado law determines what is a “felony”. The sections now limits evidence of this nature to felony convictions. There is no such thing as a felony in New Jersey; crimes in that state are classified as either misdemeanors, or high misdemeanors. This “labeling” or “classifying” of crimes by New Jersey is not controlling. In interpreting a Colorado statute, reference should be made to § 4 of art. XVIII, Colo. Const., which defines the term “felony”. The word “felony” as used in our statute includes any crime in a sister state which carries with it as a possible penalty, incarceration in the state penitentiary. Lacey v. People, 166 Colo. 152 , 442 P.2d 402 (1968).   Classification of crimes based on classification at time offense committed. For purposes of the impeachment statute, the classification of a felony hinges on its classification at the time of the commission of the offense. People v. Anders, 38 Colo. App. 185, 559 P.2d 239 (1976).   A subsequent reclassification of defendant's prior offense from a felony to a misdemeanor does not change the fact that the defendant did, at the time, commit a felony. People v. Anders, 38 Colo. App. 185, 559 P.2d 239 (1976).   For waiver of protection of this section when no objection is made to evidence of convictions more than five years prior, see Yarber v. City & County of Denver, 116 Colo. 540 , 182 P.2d 897 (1947).   A felony conviction which has been set aside under the Federal Youth Correction Act, 18 USC §§ 5005-5026, is no longer a viable conviction and cannot be used for purposes of impeachment. People v. Jones, 743 P.2d 44 (Colo. App. 1987).   Conviction arising from same set of facts as civil action may be used for impeachment. Clark v. Buhring, 761 P.2d 266 (Colo. App. 1988).   The advisement by the trial court of the defendant's right to testify was inadequate when the court failed to inform defendant that the decision to testify was personal to the defendant and failed to advise defendant as to the limited evidentiary use of any admission by the defendant. People v. Chavez, 832 P.2d 1026 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 853 P.2d 1149 (Colo. 1993).   Applied in Cheney v. Hailey, 686 P.2d 808 (Colo. App. 1984).