CO Code § 16-11.7-105 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 16 - Criminal Proceedings|Article 11.7 - Standardized Treatment Program for Sex Offenders|§ 16-11.7-105. Sentencing of Sex Offenders - Treatment Based Upon Evaluation and Identification Required

  Each adult sex offender and juvenile who has committed a sexual offense sentenced by the court for an offense committed on or after January 1, 1994, shall be required, as a part of any sentence to probation, commitment to the department of human services, sentence to community corrections, incarceration with the department of corrections, placement on parole, or out-of-home placement to undergo treatment to the extent appropriate to such offender based upon the recommendations of the evaluation and identification made pursuant to section 16-11.7-104 or based upon any subsequent recommendations by the department of corrections, the judicial department, the department of human services, or the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety, whichever is appropriate. The treatment and monitoring shall be provided by an approved provider pursuant to section 16-11.7-106, and the offender shall pay for the treatment to the extent the offender is financially able to do so.    For offenders who begin community supervision on or after August 10, 2016, the supervising agency of each adult sex offender and juvenile who has committed a sexual offense shall provide the offender with a choice of two appropriate treatment provider agencies staffed by approved providers unless the supervising agency documents in the file that, based upon the nature of the program offered, the needs of the offender, or the proximity of the appropriate treatment provider agency, fewer than two such agencies can meet the specific needs of the offender, ensure the safety of the public, and provide the supervising agency with reasonable access to the treatment provider agency and the offender during the course of treatment. Once selected, the treatment provider agency may not be changed by the offender without the approval of the community supervision team, the multidisciplinary team, or the court.     History. Source: L. 92: Entire article added, p. 460, § 3, effective June 2. L. 94: (1) amended, p. 2651, § 126, effective July 1. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 236, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2011: Entire section amended,(HB 11-1138), ch. 236, p. 1023, § 5, effective May 27. L. 2016: Entire section amended,(HB 16-1345), ch. 347, p. 1415, § 2, effective August 10.    Cross references:   For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending subsection (1), see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994.   ANNOTATION   Because application of the sex offender treatment program did not affect the legal consequences of defendant's crime or increase his punishment, there is no ex post facto violation. The department of corrections reduced the monthly ten days of earned time credit defendant received to seven days when defendant did not participate in the program because he denied the alleged sexually assaultive behavior. Application of the program to defendant did not increase his punishment, however, because he possessed no vested right in a particular parole date or parole hearing date. Chambers v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 205 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2000).   The stigmatizing consequences of being labeled a sex offender coupled with the mandatory treatment program as preconditions for parole eligibility create the kind of deprivations of liberty that require procedural due process protections. Chambers v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 205 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2000); Fisher v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 56 P.3d 1210 (Colo. App. 2002).   Prisoner has a liberty interest in participation in a statutorily mandated sex offender treatment program. Beebe v. Heil, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Colo. 2004 ).   In evaluating prisoner's substantive due process claim, the court must consider whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a liberty interest and deprived prisoner of that interest in such a way that the behavior of the governmental officers was so egregious, so outrageous that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience. The deliberate indifference standard is sensibly employed when actual deliberation is practical. Beebe v. Heil, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Colo. 2004 ).   Due process must be provided to a convicted sex offender before he can be excluded from such a program. Beebe v. Heil, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Colo. 2004 ).   The court must consider first, whether prisoner's exclusion from the treatment program itself constitutes an atypical and significant hardship and, second, whether the failure of the prison officials to provide prisoner with due process before terminating him from sex offender treatment constitutes an atypical and significant hardship. To evaluate whether a prisoner's freedom has been restrained in a manner that imposes atypical and significant hardship, the court must carefully examine the conditions of the prisoner's confinement, including the duration and degree of prisoner's restrictions as compared with other inmates. Beebe v. Heil, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Colo. 2004 ).   This section requires the court to order a sex offender specific evaluation to be conducted as part of the presentence report for every sex offender sentenced for an offense committed on or after January 1, 1994, whether or not the sex offender is to be considered for probation, and for the court to consider that evaluation in sentencing. People v. Lenzini, 986 P.2d 980 (Colo. App. 1999).   Provision that requires a sex offender specific evaluation be conducted prior to sentencing applies in case of a deferred judgment. People v. Manzanares, 85 P.3d 604 (Colo. App. 2003).   Court may not impose sex offender conditions as a part of a deferred judgment without first ordering a sex offender specific evaluation. People v. Manzanares, 85 P.3d 604 (Colo. App. 2003).   Subsection (1) does not always require a sentencing court to impose sex offender treatment as a condition of probation when a sex offender commits a subsequent offense of any kind. When the recommendations of the sex offender evaluation and the facts of the case do not support the need for sex offender treatment, a sentencing court is not required to order treatment. Hernandez v. People, 176 P.3d 746 (Colo. 2008).   When the sex offender evaluation and recommendations and the facts of the case support the need for sex offender treatment, the sentencing court's discretion is tightly constrained by the statutory language. Hernandez v. People, 176 P.3d 746 (Colo. 2008).