CO Code § 13-40-107.5 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 13 - Courts and Court Procedure|Article 40 - Forcible Entry and Detainer - General Provisions|§ 13-40-107.5. Termination of Tenancy for Substantial Violation - Definition - Legislative Declaration

  The general assembly finds and declares that:   Violent and antisocial criminal acts are increasingly committed by persons who base their operations in rented homes, apartments, and commercial properties;    Such persons often lease such property from owners who are unaware of the dangerous nature of such persons until after the persons have taken possession of the property;    Under traditional landlord and tenant law, such persons may have established the technical, legal right to occupy the premises for a fixed term which continues long after they have demonstrated themselves unfit to coexist with their neighbors and co-tenants; furthermore, such persons often resist eviction as long as possible;    In certain cases it is necessary to curtail the technical, legal right of occupancy of such persons in order to protect the equal or greater rights of neighbors and co-tenants, the interests of property owners, the values of trust and community within neighborhoods, and the health, safety, and welfare of all the people of this state.       It is declared to be an implied term of every lease of real property in this state that the tenant shall not commit a substantial violation while in possession of the premises.    As used in this section, “substantial violation” means any act or series of acts by the tenant or any guest or invitee of the tenant that, when considered together:   Occurs on or near the premises and endangers the person or willfully and substantially endangers the property of the landlord, any co-tenant, or any person living on or near the premises; or    Occurs on or near the premises and constitutes a violent or drug-related felony prohibited under article 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, or 18 of title 18, C.R.S.; or    Occurs on the tenant's leased premises or the common areas, hallway, grounds, parking lot, or other area located in the same building or complex in which the tenant's leased premises are located and constitutes a criminal act in violation of federal or state law or local ordinance that:   Carries a potential sentence of incarceration of one hundred eighty days or more; and    Has been declared to be a public nuisance under state law or local ordinance based on a state statute.            A tenancy may be terminated at any time on the basis of a substantial violation. The termination shall be effective three days after service of written notice to quit.    The notice to quit shall describe the property, the particular time when the tenancy will terminate, and the grounds for termination. The notice shall be signed by the landlord or by the landlord's agent or attorney.         In any action for possession under this section, the landlord has the burden of proving the occurrence of a substantial violation by a preponderance of the evidence.    In any action for possession under this section, it shall be a defense that:   (Deleted by amendment,L. 2005, p. 402, § 2, effective July 1, 2005.)    The tenant did not know of, and could not reasonably have known of or prevented, the commission of a substantial violation by a guest or invitee but immediately notified a law enforcement officer of his or her knowledge of the substantial violation.         The landlord shall not have a basis for possession under this section if the tenant or lessee is the victim of domestic violence, as that term is defined in section 18-6-800.3, C.R.S., or of domestic abuse, as that term is defined in section 13-14-101 (2), which domestic violence or domestic abuse was the cause of or resulted in the alleged substantial violation and which domestic violence or domestic abuse has been documented pursuant to the provisions set forth in section 13-40-104 (4). (c) (I) The landlord shall not have a basis for possession under this section if the tenant or lessee is the victim of domestic violence, as that term is defined in section 18-6-800.3, C.R.S., or of domestic abuse, as that term is defined in section 13-14-101 (2), which domestic violence or domestic abuse was the cause of or resulted in the alleged substantial violation and which domestic violence or domestic abuse has been documented pursuant to the provisions set forth in section 13-40-104 (4).    Nothing in this paragraph (c) shall prevent the landlord from seeking possession against a tenant or lessee of the premises who perpetuated the violence or abuse that was the cause of or resulted in the alleged substantial violation.           History. Source: L. 94: Entire section added, p. 1467, § 2, effective May 31. L. 98: IP(3) and (3)(b) amended and (3)(c) added, p. 419, § 1, effective April 21. L. 2003: (5)(b)(I) amended, p. 1010, § 11, effective July 1. L. 2005: (5) amended, p. 402, § 2, effective July 1.    ANNOTATION   Section does not conflict with city ordinances that impose strict liability for over-occupancy. To the contrary, the section and the ordinances appear to be complimentary in that they provide mechanisms to deal with lease violations. Boulder County Apt. Ass'n v. City of Boulder, 97 P.3d 332 (Colo. App. 2004).   Lessee committed no substantial breach that would allow landowners to defeat the lease pursuant to this section. Whether a breach of a contract is material, and therefore excuses further performance by a party, is a question of fact. Because the trial court's findings that no breach of a lease to remove sand, gravel, and rock from a landowner's property are supported by the record, lessee committed no substantial breach. Carder, Inc. v. Cash, 97 P.3d 174 (Colo. App. 2003).   Court erred in granting restitution of the premises where owner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that tenant violated lease covenant by committing criminal activity. Unlawful detention for violation of a lease covenant requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the covenant was actually violated, not merely that the owner had reasonable grounds to believe that it was violated. Miles v. Fleming, 214 P.3d 1054 (Colo. 2009).