CO Code § 8-73-108 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 8 - Labor and Industry|Article 73 - Benefits - Eligibility - Disqualification|§ 8-73-108. Benefit Awards - Definitions

     In the granting of benefit awards, it is the intent of the general assembly that the division at all times be guided by the principle that unemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own; and that each eligible individual who is unemployed through no fault of his own shall be entitled to receive a full award of benefits; and that every person has the right to leave any job for any reason, but that the circumstances of his separation shall be considered in determining the amount of benefits he may receive, and that certain acts of individuals are the direct and proximate cause of their unemployment, and such acts may result in such individuals receiving a disqualification.    A full award of benefits shall be the total amount of benefits computed under sections 8-73-102 and 8-73-104. Benefits payable under the provisions of this section shall be awarded, subject to other applicable provisions of articles 70 to 82 of this title.       Repealed.        The most recent separation and all separations from base period employers, excluding those defined in subparagraph (II) of paragraph (e) of this subsection (3), shall be considered. In the event a claimant has more than one separation from the same adjudicable employer, the most recent separation shall be controlling as to the determination of eligibility for benefits attributable to that employer. (a) (I)The most recent separation and all separations from base period employers, excluding those defined in subparagraph (II) of paragraph (e) of this subsection (3), shall be considered. In the event a claimant has more than one separation from the same adjudicable employer, the most recent separation shall be controlling as to the determination of eligibility for benefits attributable to that employer.    Benefits remaining from a previous full award shall be reduced if a disqualification is granted on the most recent separation from that employer.    Benefits previously reduced due to a disqualification shall become available if a full award is granted on the most recent separation. If a disqualification was previously imposed, then the employee must work ten consecutive workdays for the same employer before a full award may be granted on the most recent separation.       An additional claim filed during an existing benefit year because of a recurrence of unemployment shall require the claimant to report all job separations subsequent to the effective date of the initial claim which may be considered by the division. Those job separations that are considered shall result in a full award or a disqualification. If a disqualification is imposed on the most recent separation, a ten-week deferral of benefits shall be imposed.    The gross misconduct of an individual causing his discharge from employment shall result in a disqualification of twenty-six weeks. “Gross misconduct” means conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests or negligence or harm of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability or wrongful intent, or assault or threatened assault upon supervisors, coworkers, or others at the work site.    Benefits shall not be denied to any individual by reason of cancellation of wage credits or total reduction of his benefit rights for any cause other than discharge for gross misconduct connected with his work, fraud in connection with a claim for benefits, or receipt of disqualifying income.      Benefit payments will be charged against the experience rating accounts of the base period employers in inverse chronological order. (e) (I) Benefit payments will be charged against the experience rating accounts of the base period employers in inverse chronological order.    When the total amount of base period wages, as defined in section 8-70-141 (1)(a), paid by a base period employer is less than one thousand dollars:   Such wages shall be included in the computation of wage credits under the provisions of section 8-73-104; and    Benefits paid with respect to such wages shall not be charged against the experience rating account of an employer but will be charged against the fund; and    Separations from such employers, other than the last employer, shall not be adjudicated.       Repealed.       Benefit payments shall not be charged against the experience rating account of an employer and shall be charged against the fund when:   The benefits are paid for unemployment directly caused by a major natural disaster;    The president has declared the event a disaster pursuant to section 102 (2) of the federal “Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act”, as amended, 42 U.S.C. sec. 5122(2); and    The benefits are paid to an individual who would have otherwise been eligible for disaster unemployment assistance with respect to that unemployment but for the individual's receipt of unemployment compensation benefits.          Full award. An individual separated from a job must be given a full award of benefits if the division determines that any of the following reasons and pertinent related conditions exist. The determination of whether or not the separation from employment must result in a full award of benefits is the responsibility of the division. The following reasons must be considered, along with any other factors that may be pertinent to such determination:   Laid off for lack of work;      The health of the worker is such that the worker is separated from his or her employment and must refrain from working for a period of time that exceeds the greater of the employer's medical leave of absence policy or the provisions of the federal “Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993”, if applicable, or the worker's health is such that the worker must seek a new occupation, or the health of the worker or the worker's spouse, partner in a civil union, or dependent child is such that the worker must leave the vicinity of the worker's employment; except that, if the health of the worker or the worker's spouse, partner in a civil union, or dependent child has caused the separation from work, the worker, in order to be entitled to a full award, must have complied with the following requirements: Informed the worker's employer in writing, if the employer has posted or given actual advance notice of this writing requirement, of the condition of the worker's health or the health of the worker's spouse, partner in a civil union, or dependent child prior to separation from employment and allowed the employer the opportunity to make reasonable accommodations for the worker's condition; substantiated the cause by a competent written medical statement issued by a licensed practicing physician or physician assistant authorized under section 12-240-107 (6) prior to the date of separation from employment when so requested by the employer prior to the date of separation from employment or within a reasonable period thereafter; submitted himself or herself or the worker's spouse, partner in a civil union, or dependent child to an examination by a licensed practicing physician or licensed practicing physician assistant authorized under section 12-240-107 (6) selected and paid by the interested employer when so requested by the employer prior to the date of separation from employment or within a reasonable period thereafter; or provided the division, when so requested, with a written medical statement issued by a licensed practicing physician or licensed practicing physician assistant authorized under section 12-240-107 (6). For purposes of providing the medical statement or submitting to an examination for an employer, “a reasonable period thereafter” includes the time before adjudication by either a deputy or referee of the division. An award of benefits pursuant to this subsection (4)(b)(I) includes benefits to a worker who, either voluntarily or involuntarily, is separated from employment because of pregnancy and who otherwise satisfies the requirements of this subsection (4)(b)(I). (b) (I) The health of the worker is such that the worker is separated from his or her employment and must refrain from working for a period of time that exceeds the greater of the employer's medical leave of absence policy or the provisions of the federal “Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993”, if applicable, or the worker's health is such that the worker must seek a new occupation, or the health of the worker or the worker's spouse, partner in a civil union, or dependent child is such that the worker must leave the vicinity of the worker's employment; except that, if the health of the worker or the worker's spouse, partner in a civil union, or dependent child has caused the separation from work, the worker, in order to be entitled to a full award, must have complied with the following requirements: Informed the worker's employer in writing, if the employer has posted or given actual advance notice of this writing requirement, of the condition of the worker's health or the health of the worker's spouse, partner in a civil union, or dependent child prior to separation from employment and allowed the employer the opportunity to make reasonable accommodations for the worker's condition; substantiated the cause by a competent written medical statement issued by a licensed practicing physician or physician assistant authorized under section 12-240-107 (6) prior to the date of separation from employment when so requested by the employer prior to the date of separation from employment or within a reasonable period thereafter; submitted himself or herself or the worker's spouse, partner in a civil union, or dependent child to an examination by a licensed practicing physician or licensed practicing physician assistant authorized under section 12-240-107 (6) selected and paid by the interested employer when so requested by the employer prior to the date of separation from employment or within a reasonable period thereafter; or provided the division, when so requested, with a written medical statement issued by a licensed practicing physician or licensed practicing physician assistant authorized under section 12-240-107 (6). For purposes of providing the medical statement or submitting to an examination for an employer, “a reasonable period thereafter” includes the time before adjudication by either a deputy or referee of the division. An award of benefits pursuant to this subsection (4)(b)(I) includes benefits to a worker who, either voluntarily or involuntarily, is separated from employment because of pregnancy and who otherwise satisfies the requirements of this subsection (4)(b)(I).    In the event of an injury or sudden illness of the worker that would preclude verbal or written notification of the employer prior to such occurrence, the failure of the worker to notify the employer prior to such occurrence will not in itself constitute a reason for the denial of benefits if the worker has notified the employer at the earliest practicable time after such occurrence. Such notice shall be given no later than two working days following such occurrence unless the worker's physician or physician assistant authorized under section 12-240-107 (6) provides a written statement to the employer within one week after the employer's request that the worker's condition made giving such notice impracticable and substantiating the illness or injury.    Any physician or physician assistant authorized under section 12-240-107 (6) who makes or is present at any examination required under these provisions shall testify as to the results of the physician's or physician assistant's examination; except that no such physician or physician assistant shall be required to disclose any confidential communication imparted to him or her for the purpose of treatment that is not necessary to a proper understanding of the case.    The off-the-job or on-the-job use of not medically prescribed intoxicating beverages or controlled substances, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5), may be reason for a determination for a full award pursuant to this subsection (4)(b), but only if:   The worker has declared to the division that he or she has an alcohol or substance use disorder;    The worker has substantiated the alcohol or substance use disorder by a competent written medical statement issued by a physician licensed to practice medicine pursuant to article 240 of title 12, or by a licensed physician assistant authorized under section 12-240-107 (6), or has substantiated the successful completion of, or ongoing participation in, a treatment program as described in subsection (4)(b)(IV)(C) of this section within four weeks after the claimant's admission. The substantiation must be in writing to the division and signed by an authorized representative of the approved treatment program.    A worker who is not affiliated with an approved treatment program must present to the division within four weeks after the date of the medical statement referred to in sub-subparagraph (B) of this subparagraph (IV), substantiation of registration in a program of corrective action that will commence within four weeks after the date of the medical statement and that is provided by an approved private treatment facility or an approved public treatment facility as defined in section 27-81-102 (2) or (3), C.R.S., or by an alcoholics anonymous program. The substantiation shall be in writing to the division and signed by an authorized representative of the approved treatment program.    (Deleted by amendment,L. 2006, p. 653, § 1, effective April 24, 2006.) (IV.5) Any benefits awarded to the claimant under the provisions of subparagraph (IV) of this paragraph (b) and normally chargeable to the employer will be charged to the fund.       A potentially chargeable employer may notify the division concerning the failure of the worker to participate in or complete an approved program of corrective action to deal with the alcohol or substance use disorder within fifteen calendar days after the date on which he or she discovers the existence of such a disorder. The worker must be given an opportunity to respond to the employer's allegations. The division, upon review of additional information, may modify a prior decision pursuant to subsection (5)(e)(XXIV) of this section.       Unsatisfactory or hazardous working conditions when so determined by the division. In determining whether or not working conditions are unsatisfactory for an individual, the degree of risk involved to his health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his experience and prior earnings, the distance of the work from his residence, and the working conditions of workers engaged in the same or similar work for the same and other employers in the locality shall be considered. For the purpose of this paragraph (c), “hazardous working conditions” means such conditions, as are determined by the division to exist, that could result in a danger to the physical or mental well-being of the worker. In any such determination the division shall consider, but shall not be limited to a consideration of, the following: The safety measures used or the lack thereof and the condition of equipment or lack of proper equipment. No work shall be considered hazardous if the working conditions surrounding a worker's employment are the same or substantially the same as the working conditions generally prevailing among workers performing the same or similar work for other employers engaged in the same or similar type of activity.    A substantial change in the worker's working conditions, said change in working conditions being substantially less favorable to the worker; but requiring a worker to work a different shift shall not be considered a substantial change in working conditions unless such requirement would be a violation of seniority rights which entitle the worker to shift preferential, but in any such case the burden of proving such seniority rights shall rest upon the worker. No change in working conditions shall be considered substantial if it is determined by the division that the conditions prevailing after the change are those generally prevailing for other workers performing the same or similar work.    Unreasonable reduction in the worker's rate of pay as determined by the division. In determining whether or not there has been an unreasonable reduction in the worker's rate of pay, the division shall consider, but shall not be limited to a consideration of, whether or not the reduction in pay was applied by the employer to all workers in the same or similar class or merely to this individual, the general economic conditions prevailing in the state, the financial condition of the employer involved, and whether or not the reduction in wage was agreed to by other workers employed in the same or similar work. The worker's loss of a shift differential or overtime pay shall not be considered an unreasonable reduction in the worker's rate of pay under this paragraph (e), unless such shift differential or overtime pay was guaranteed by the employer.      Due to the particular nature of the building and construction industry, construction workers who quit a construction job to accept a different construction job in any of the following circumstances: (f) (I) Due to the particular nature of the building and construction industry, construction workers who quit a construction job to accept a different construction job in any of the following circumstances:   Quitting within thirty days immediately prior to the established termination date of the job quit; and at the time of quitting, the construction worker had been offered and had accepted another construction job and the specific starting date of the new job was within thirty days from the date of quitting the prior job; and the new job offered employment for a longer period of time than remained available on the job quit unless the new job was terminated by a contract cancellation; or    Unsatisfactory working conditions with respect to the distance of his work from his residence when so determined by the division; or    Quitting a construction job that is outside the state of Colorado in order to accept a construction job within the state of Colorado, if such construction worker has maintained a residence in this state; or    Leaving a job to comply with a condition of an apprenticeship assignment of an employer, which condition was imposed to meet the conditions of a joint apprenticeship or other apprenticeship program which is in accordance with requirements for programs registered with the federal government; or    Quitting a job outside the worker's regular apprenticeable trade to return to work in his or her regular apprenticeable trade. For purposes of this paragraph (f), a “regular apprenticeable trade” is a skilled trade or occupation in the construction industry in which, by longstanding and recognized practice of a significant segment of the industry, a worker generally must complete a period of apprenticeship or training pursuant to a joint apprenticeship or other apprenticeship program which is in accordance with requirements for programs registered with the federal government. A worker may have more than one regular apprenticeable trade.       If the provisions of either sub-subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E) of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (f) are met, any benefits normally chargeable to the employer for whom the employee worked immediately prior to accepting the new job will be charged to the fund. Benefits shall not be awarded pursuant to this paragraph (f) unless the worker has subsequently separated from the new job under conditions which would result in a full award under this subsection (4).       After being given the choice by his employer between being terminated, furloughed, or laid off and replacing another worker, the worker has elected to accept a termination, furlough, or layoff;    Quitting employment because of a violation of the written employment contract by the employer; except that before such quitting the worker must have exhausted all remedies provided in such written contract for the settlement of disputes before quitting his job;    Being discharged from employment without the employer informing either the worker or the division, after a request from the division as to the reason for the discharge;    Being physically or mentally unable to perform the work or unqualified to perform the work as a result of insufficient educational attainment or inadequate occupational or professional skills. In cases where an individual quits because of physical or mental inability to perform the work because of domestic abuse, any award of benefits will be made in accordance with paragraph (r) of this subsection (4).    Refusing with good cause to work overtime without reasonable advance notice. Good cause as used in this paragraph (k) shall be restricted to reasonable, compelling personal reasons as determined by the division affecting either the worker or the worker's immediate family.    Being instructed or requested to perform a service or commit an act which is in violation of an ordinance or statute;    Involuntary retirement in accordance with company policy or at the volition of the employer;    Quitting employment under conditions which would not have resulted in a denial of benefits under the provisions of paragraph (b) of subsection (5) of this section;    Quitting employment because of personal harassment by the employer not related to the performance of the job;      Business closure because the employer is, or was, a member of the military reserves or National Guard and was called to active military duty. (p) (I) Business closure because the employer is, or was, a member of the military reserves or National Guard and was called to active military duty.    Any benefits awarded to the claimant under the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (p) and normally chargeable to the employer will be charged to the fund.       Repealed.      Separating from a job because of domestic violence may be reason for a determination for a full award if the worker reasonably believes that the worker's continued employment would jeopardize the safety of the worker or any member of the worker's immediate family. (r) (I) Separating from a job because of domestic violence may be reason for a determination for a full award if the worker reasonably believes that the worker's continued employment would jeopardize the safety of the worker or any member of the worker's immediate family.    If the worker does not meet the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (r), the worker shall be held to have voluntarily terminated employment for the purposes of determining benefits pursuant to subparagraph (XXII) of paragraph (e) of subsection (5) of this section.    Any benefits awarded to the claimant under the provisions of this paragraph (r) normally chargeable to the employer shall be charged to the fund.    The director of the division shall adopt rules as necessary to implement and administer this paragraph (r).    Repealed.          Repealed.      Separating from a job due to a change in location of the employment of the worker's spouse or partner in a civil union that necessitates a new place of residence for the worker, either within or outside Colorado, from which it is impractical to commute to the worker's place of employment, and upon arrival at the new place of residence, the individual is in all respects available for suitable work. The director of the division shall adopt rules as necessary to implement and administer this paragraph (u). (u) (I) Separating from a job due to a change in location of the employment of the worker's spouse or partner in a civil union that necessitates a new place of residence for the worker, either within or outside Colorado, from which it is impractical to commute to the worker's place of employment, and upon arrival at the new place of residence, the individual is in all respects available for suitable work. The director of the division shall adopt rules as necessary to implement and administer this paragraph (u).    Any benefits awarded to the claimant under this paragraph (u) normally chargeable to the employer shall be charged to the fund.         Separating from a job because a member of the worker's immediate family is suffering from an illness that requires the worker to care for the immediate family member for a period that exceeds the greater of the employer's medical leave of absence policy or the provisions of the federal “Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993” if the worker meets the following requirements: (v) (I) Separating from a job because a member of the worker's immediate family is suffering from an illness that requires the worker to care for the immediate family member for a period that exceeds the greater of the employer's medical leave of absence policy or the provisions of the federal “Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993” if the worker meets the following requirements:   The worker informed his or her employer, if the employer has posted or given actual advance notice of the requirement to so inform the employer, of the condition of the worker's immediate family member; and    The worker provides the division, when requested, a competent statement verifying the condition of the worker's immediate family member.       Separating from a job because a member of the worker's immediate family is suffering from a disability that requires the worker to care for the immediate family member for a period that exceeds the greater of the employer's medical leave of absence policy or the provisions of the federal “Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993” if the worker meets the following requirements:   The worker informed his or her employer, if the employer has posted or given actual advance notice of the requirement to so inform the employer, of the condition of the worker's immediate family member; and    The worker provides the division, when requested, a competent statement verifying the condition of the worker's immediate family member.       The director of the division shall adopt rules as necessary to implement and administer this paragraph (v).    Any benefits awarded to the claimant under this paragraph (v) normally chargeable to the employer shall be charged to the fund, and any such benefits shall not affect an employer's premium.    As used in this subsection (4)(v):   “Disability” means all types of verified disability, including, without limitation, mental and physical disabilities; permanent and temporary disabilities; and partial and total disabilities.    “Illness” means verified poor health or sickness.    Repealed.          Separating from employment because the employer requires the employee to work in an environment that is not in compliance with:   Federal centers for disease control and prevention guidelines applicable to the employer's business and workplace at the time of the determination;    State and federal laws, rules, and regulations concerning disease mitigation and workplace safety;    An executive order issued by the governor requiring the employer to close the business or modify the operation of the business; and    Any public health order issued by the department of public health and environment or a local government to close the business or modify the operation of the business;       Separating from employment because the employee is the primary caretaker of:   A child enrolled in a school that is closed due to a public health emergency; or    A family member or household member who is quarantined due to an illness during a public health emergency;       Separating from employment because the employee is immunocompromised and more susceptible to illness or disease during a public health emergency as evidenced by the employee's health care provider.       Disqualification.   An individual who refuses to accept suitable work or refuses a referral to suitable work shall be disqualified from receiving benefits for a period of twenty weeks beginning with the week in which the refusal occurred, and his total benefits shall be reduced by an amount equal to the number of weeks of disqualification multiplied by his weekly benefit amount. The determination of whether or not an individual has refused to accept suitable work or refused to accept a referral to suitable work shall be the responsibility of the division.    The division shall consider the refusal of suitable work or refusal of referral to suitable work at any time after the last separation from employment that occurred prior to the time of filing the initial claim in determining the direct and proximate cause of the separation. In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the division shall consider the degree of risk involved to the individual's health, safety, and morals, the individual's physical fitness and prior training, the individual's experience and prior earnings, the individual's length of unemployment and prospects for securing work in the individual's customary occupation, and the distance of the available local work from the individual's residence. Notwithstanding any other provisions of articles 70 to 82 of this title 8, the division shall not deem work to be suitable and shall not deny benefits under articles 70 to 82 of this title 8 to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions:   If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute;    If the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality;    If as a condition of being employed the individual would be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization;    The employer requires the individual to work in an environment that is not in compliance with:   Federal centers for disease control and prevention guidelines applicable to the employer's business and workplace at the time of the determination;    State or federal laws, rules, and regulations concerning disease mitigation and workplace safety;    An executive order issued by the governor requiring the employer to close the business or modify the operation of the business; and    Any public health order issued by the department of public health and environment or a local government to close the business or modify the operation of the business;       The individual is the primary caretaker of:   A child enrolled in a school that is closed due to a public health emergency; or    A family member or household member who is quarantined due to an illness during a public health emergency; or       The employee is immunocompromised and more susceptible to illness or disease during a public health emergency as evidenced by the employee's health care provider.       An award shall not be denied to an individual more than once for failure to apply for or to accept the same or a similar position with the same employer.    Repealed.    Subject to the maximum reduction consistent with federal law, and insofar as consistent with interstate agreements, if a separation from employment occurs for any of the following reasons, the employer from whom such separation occurred must not be charged for benefits which are attributable to such employment and, because any payment of benefits which are attributable to such employment out of the fund as defined in section 8-70-103 (13) is deemed to have an adverse effect on the employer's account in such fund, a payment of such benefits must not be made from such fund:   Quitting employment because of dissatisfaction with prevailing rates of pay in that industry, standard hours of work, standard working conditions, or working conditions which generally prevail for other workers performing the same or similar work, regularly assigned duties, or opportunities for advancement;    Quitting employment because of dissatisfaction with a supervisor with no evidence to indicate that the supervision is other than that reasonably to be expected in the proper performance of work;    Quitting to marry, irrespective of whether or not such marriage occurs subsequent to the separation from employment;    Quitting to move to another area as a matter of personal preference, unless such move was pursuant to other provisions of subsection (4) of this section;    Quitting to seek other work; or quitting to accept other employment if such employment does not meet the requirements of paragraph (f) of subsection (4) of this section;    Insubordination such as: Deliberate disobedience of a reasonable instruction of an employer or an employer's duly authorized representative, refusal or failure to obtain, maintain, or renew licenses, certifications, credentials, conditions, or other professional designations which are necessary to permit the claimant to perform a job, failure to keep in good standing with the union because of nonpayment of dues, or repeated acts of agitation against employer working conditions, pay scale, policies, or procedures; except that orderly action on the part of an employee or through union negotiation shall not be so considered if such action does not interfere with work performance;    Violation of a statute or of a company rule which resulted or could have resulted in serious damage to the employer's property or interests or could have endangered the life of the worker or other persons, such as: Mistreatment of patients in a hospital or nursing home; serving liquor to minors; selling prescription items without prescriptions from licensed doctors; immoral conduct which has an effect on worker's job status; divulging of confidential information which resulted or could have resulted in damage to the employer's interests; failure to observe conspicuously posted safety rules; intentional falsification of expense accounts, inventories, or other records or reports whether or not substantial harm or injury was incurred; or removal or attempted removal of employer's property from the premises of the employer without proper authority;    Off-the-job use of not medically prescribed intoxicating beverages or controlled substances, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5), C.R.S., to a degree resulting in interference with job performance;    On-the-job use of or distribution of not medically prescribed intoxicating beverages or controlled substances, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5), C.R.S.;  (IX.5) The presence in an individual's system, during working hours, of not medically prescribed controlled substances, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5) , C.R.S., or of a blood alcohol level at or above 0.04 percent, or at or above an applicable lower level as set forth by federal statute or regulation, as evidenced by a drug or alcohol test administered pursuant to a statutory or regulatory requirement or a previously established, written drug or alcohol policy of the employer and conducted by a medical facility or laboratory licensed or certified to conduct such tests;     Incarceration after conviction of a violation of any law, or loss of license, certification, credential, condition, or other professional designation that is essential to job performance;    Theft;    Assaulting or threatening to assault under circumstances such as to cause a reasonably emotionally stable person to become concerned as to his physical safety;    Willful neglect or damage to an employer's property or interests;    Rudeness, insolence, or offensive behavior of the worker not reasonably to be countenanced by a customer, supervisor, or fellow worker;    Careless or shoddy work. In determining whether or not work has been performed in a careless or shoddy manner, the division shall consider the length of time the worker has been performing the work satisfactorily and industry standards for such work. No work shall be considered careless or shoddy that comes within the area of reasonable mistakes and errors normally made by workers engaging in the same or similar work.    Failure to properly safeguard, maintain, or account for the employer's property when this obligation is an essential part of the job;    Taking unauthorized vacations or failing to return to work as scheduled after an authorized vacation or other leave of absence unless such failure to return to work was caused by circumstances which would result in a full award under the provisions of this section;    Refusal without good cause to work a different shift when no violation of seniority rights, as provided in paragraph (d) of subsection (4) of this section, is involved;    Refusal without good cause to accept transfer to another department which does not involve a substantial change in working conditions or a substantial loss in wages;    For other reasons including, but not limited to, excessive tardiness or absenteeism, sleeping or loafing on the job, or failure to meet established job performance or other defined standards, unless such failure is attributable to factors listed in paragraph (b) of subsection (4) of this section;    Lack of transportation. Transportation shall be the responsibility of the worker; if, however, in the opinion of the division, it would have been unreasonable to require the worker to continue in employment with his same employer at a new jobsite substantially less accessible or substantially more distant from the worker's residence than the site at which he had worked, benefits shall not be denied because of his refusal to continue in employment at the new site.    Quitting under conditions involving personal reasons, unless the personal reasons were compelling pursuant to other provisions of subsection (4) of this section;    Voluntary retirement;    Failure to participate in or failure to complete an approved program of corrective action to deal with an alcohol or substance use disorder pursuant to subsection (4)(b)(IV) of this section. The determination of whether or not an individual has failed to participate in or complete an approved program of corrective action to deal with an alcohol or substance use disorder is the responsibility of the division. In making such a decision, the division may consider extenuating circumstances for the individual's failure to participate in or complete the approved program of corrective action which would justify a decision not to disqualify the individual from receiving benefits, but only if the individual presents a program of corrective action in accordance with subsection (4)(b)(IV)(C) of this section. The only extenuating circumstances which may be considered by the division are whether the individual suffered an illness not related to the alcohol or substance use disorder or received incapacitating injuries in an accident or whether the death of an immediate family member of the individual occurred which contributed to the failure of the individual to participate in or complete the program of corrective action. The burden of proof that an extenuating circumstance existed lies with the claimant.       Repealed.    If a separation from employment subject to adjudication under this subsection (5) occurs for any of the reasons enumerated in paragraph (e) of this subsection (5) and such separation is the most recent separation from employment, any benefits to which the claimant is entitled shall be deferred for ten weeks. In the event that the last separation does not include wages in the base period and the job separation results in a disqualification, the receipt of any benefits from qualifying employment in the base period shall be deferred for a period of ten weeks from the effective date of the claim. A subsequent initial claim in which such wages are within the base period shall result in the maximum reduction of benefits attributable to such employment consistent with federal law and interstate agreements. Such deferral shall begin with the effective date of the valid initial or additional claim. As used in this paragraph (g), “most recent separation from employment” means the claimant's last employment prior to filing a valid initial or additional claim.    Repealed.       to (9) Repealed.     History. Source: L. 36, 3rd Ex. Sess.: P. 19, § 5. CSA: C. 167A, § 5. L. 41: P. 766, § 5. L. 49: P. 722, § 3. L. 53: P. 624, § 5. CRS 53: § 82-4-9. L. 57: P. 517, § 5. L. 59: Pp. 562, 564, §§ 3, 6. L. 63: P. 668, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 82-4-8. L. 65: P. 833, § 5. L. 69: P. § 5. L. 71: Pp. 933-935, 946, 947, §§ 8-11, 19, 2. L. 76: (2)(b)(I) amended, p. 299, § 20, May 20; entire section R&RE, p. 339, § 12, effective October 1; (6)(a) amended, p. 358, § 2, effective October 1. L. 77: (4)(f)(I) amended, p. 292, § 3, effective May 26; (4)(b)(I) amended and (7)(b) repealed, pp. 480, 481, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1; (2)(b)(I), (2)(b)(II), (2)(b)(III), (2)(b)(IV), (2)(c)(I), and (4)(f)(I) amended, (4)(f)(V) and (4)(f)(VI) added, and (7) repealed, pp. 464, 465, 471, §§ 15, 16, 27, effective July 7; (1), (2)(b)(I), (2)(b)(II), (2)(b)(III), (2)(b)(IV), (2)(c)(I), (3), IP(4), and IP(5) amended and (2)(b)(V), (2)(d)(III), (2)(f), (6), and (7) repealed, pp. 483, 485, §§ 2, 5, effective October 1; (2)(f) repealed, p. 471, § 27, effective January 1, 1978. L. 79: (2)(b) amended, p. 1665, § 135, effective July 19; (1), (2), and (3) R&RE, (4)(f)(VI), IP(5), and (5)(d) amended, and (4)(o) and (8) added, pp. 348, 350, 351, §§ 10, 11, 12, effective September 30. L. 81: (3)(e)(II)(B) amended, p. 510, § 4, effective July 1; (5) R&RE and (9) added, p. 515, 516, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 83: (3)(e)(II)(B) amended, (3)(e)(II)(C) added, and (3)(e)(III) repealed, pp. 429, 433, §§ 3, 14, effective June 3; (4)(f)(VII) added, p. 2043, § 6, effective October 1. L. 84: (1)(a), (3)(b), and IP(4) amended, (5) R&RE, and (2), (8), and (9) repealed, pp. 325, 326, 330, §§ 1, 2, 6, effective July 1; (9)(a)(XXI) added, p. 323, § 2, effective July 1. L. 85: (3)(d) amended, p. 361, § 6, effective April 4; (3)(a), (3)(b), IP(3)(e)(II), (3)(e)(II)(C), (4)(n), and (5)(g) amended and (5)(f) and (5)(h) repealed, pp. 367, 369, §§ 4, 7, effective July 1. L. 86: (4)(h) amended, p. 543, § 6, effective July 1. L. 88: (4)(f)(IV) amended, p. 1429, § 4, effective June 11; (4)(b)(IV) and (4)(b)(V) added, p. 393, § 1, effective July 1; IP(4)(f) amended, p. 394, § 2, effective July 1; (5)(e)(XXIV) added, p. 394, § 3, effective July 1. L. 89: (3)(a) and (4)(b)(I) amended, p. 425, § 4, effective July 1; (4)(f) R&RE, p. 427, § 1, effective July 1; (5)(d) repealed, p. 426, § 5, effective July 1; (5)(e)(IV) and (5)(e)(V) amended, p. 428, § 2, effective July 1. L. 90: IP(3)(e)(II) amended, p. 603, § 7, effective April 3; (3)(a) R&RE, p. 608, § 5, effective April 16. L. 91: (4)(f) amended, p. 1287, § 1, effective May 16; (4)(p) added, p. 1289, § 2, effective May 16. L. 92: (4)(b)(I) amended, p. 1794, § 3, effective April 10; (4)(q) added, p. 1822, § 1, effective April 10. L. 94: (5)(e)(IX.5) added, p. 1998, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: (4)(b)(I), (4)(b)(II), (4)(b)(IV), (4)(e), (4)(k), (5)(e)(VI), (5)(e)(VII), (5)(e)(IX), and (5)(e)(X) amended, p. 273, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: IP(3)(e)(II) and (3)(e)(II)(B) amended and (3)(f) added, p. 382, § 6, effective April 17. L. 97: (4)(b)(IV.5) added, p. 479, § 1, effective April 24. L. 98: (4)(q) repealed, p. 91, § 4, effective March 23; IP(4) and (4)(b)(IV) amended, p. 375, § 1, effective April 21. L. 99: (4)(j) and (5)(e)(XXII) amended and (4)(r) added, p. 397, § 3, effective August 15. L. 2003: (4)(r)(I)(A) amended, p. 1009, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2005: (4)(s) added, p. 972, § 1, effective June 2; (4)(r)(I) amended, p. 320, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2006: (4)(b)(IV)(D), IP(4)(r)(I), and (4)(s)(I) amended, p. 653, § 1, effective April 24; (3)(f)(II) amended, p. 1489, § 7, effective June 1. L. 2008: (4)(s) amended, p. 1721, § 1, effective June 2. L. 2009: (4)(t) added,(HB 09-1054), ch. 65, p. 230, § 1, effective March 25; (4)(r)(I), (5)(e)(IV), and (5)(e)(XXII) amended and (4)(r)(IV), (4)(r)(V), (4)(u), and (4)(v) added, (SB 09-247), ch. 405, pp. 2229, 2231, 2230, §§ 3, 5, 4, effective July 1. L. 2010: (4)(b)(IV)(C) amended,(SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 777, § 5, effective April 29. L. 2012: IP(4)(b)(IV), (5)(e)(VIII), (5)(e)(IX), and (5)(e)(IX.5) amended,(HB 12-1311), ch. 281, p. 1609, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2013: (4)(b)(I), (4)(r), (4)(s)(I), (4)(t)(I), (4)(u)(I), and (4)(v) amended(SB 13-011), ch. 49, p. 157, § 6, effective May 1. L. 2016: (4)(b)(I), (4)(b)(II), (4)(b)(III), and (4)(b)(IV)(B) amended,(SB 16-158), ch. 204, p. 721, § 5, effective August 10. L. 2018: IP(4), IP(4)(b)(IV), (4)(b)(IV)(A), (4)(b)(IV)(B), (4)(b)(V), IP(5)(e), and (5)(e)(XXIV) amended,(SB 18-091), ch. 35, p. 379, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2019: (4)(b)(I), (4)(b)(II), (4)(b)(III), and (4)(b)(IV)(B) amended,(HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1648, § 26, effective October 1. L. 2020: (4)(w), (4)(x), (4)(y), (5)(b)(IV), (5)(b)(V), and (5)(b)(VI) added and IP(5)(b) amended,(SB 20-207), ch. 296, p. 1471, § 4, effective July 14; (4)(r)(I) and IP(4)(v)(V) amended and (4)(r)(V) and (4)(v)(V)(C) repealed,(SB 20-170), ch. 297, p. 1477, § 1, effective January 1, 2021. History. Source: L. 36, 3rd Ex. Sess.: P. 19, § 5. CSA: C. 167A, § 5. L. 41: P. 766, § 5. L. 49: P. 722, § 3. L. 53: P. 624, § 5. CRS 53: § 82-4-9. L. 57: P. 517, § 5. L. 59: Pp. 562, 564, §§ 3, 6. L. 63: P. 668, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 82-4-8. L. 65: P. 833, § 5. L. 69: P. § 5. L. 71: Pp. 933-935, 946, 947, §§ 8-11, 19, 2. L. 76: (2)(b)(I) amended, p. 299, § 20, May 20; entire section R&RE, p. 339, § 12, effective October 1; (6)(a) amended, p. 358, § 2, effective October 1. L. 77: (4)(f)(I) amended, p. 292, § 3, effective May 26; (4)(b)(I) amended and (7)(b) repealed, pp. 480, 481, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1; (2)(b)(I), (2)(b)(II), (2)(b)(III), (2)(b)(IV), (2)(c)(I), and (4)(f)(I) amended, (4)(f)(V) and (4)(f)(VI) added, and (7) repealed, pp. 464, 465, 471, §§ 15, 16, 27, effective July 7; (1), (2)(b)(I), (2)(b)(II), (2)(b)(III), (2)(b)(IV), (2)(c)(I), (3), IP(4), and IP(5) amended and (2)(b)(V), (2)(d)(III), (2)(f), (6), and (7) repealed, pp. 483, 485, §§ 2, 5, effective October 1; (2)(f) repealed, p. 471, § 27, effective January 1, 1978. L. 79: (2)(b) amended, p. 1665, § 135, effective July 19; (1), (2), and (3) R&RE, (4)(f)(VI), IP(5), and (5)(d) amended, and (4)(o) and (8) added, pp. 348, 350, 351, §§ 10, 11, 12, effective September 30. L. 81: (3)(e)(II)(B) amended, p. 510, § 4, effective July 1; (5) R&RE and (9) added, p. 515, 516, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 83: (3)(e)(II)(B) amended, (3)(e)(II)(C) added, and (3)(e)(III) repealed, pp. 429, 433, §§ 3, 14, effective June 3; (4)(f)(VII) added, p. 2043, § 6, effective October 1. L. 84: (1)(a), (3)(b), and IP(4) amended, (5) R&RE, and (2), (8), and (9) repealed, pp. 325, 326, 330, §§ 1, 2, 6, effective July 1; (9)(a)(XXI) added, p. 323, § 2, effective July 1. L. 85: (3)(d) amended, p. 361, § 6, effective April 4; (3)(a), (3)(b), IP(3)(e)(II), (3)(e)(II)(C), (4)(n), and (5)(g) amended and (5)(f) and (5)(h) repealed, pp. 367, 369, §§ 4, 7, effective July 1. L. 86: (4)(h) amended, p. 543, § 6, effective July 1. L. 88: (4)(f)(IV) amended, p. 1429, § 4, effective June 11; (4)(b)(IV) and (4)(b)(V) added, p. 393, § 1, effective July 1; IP(4)(f) amended, p. 394, § 2, effective July 1; (5)(e)(XXIV) added, p. 394, § 3, effective July 1. L. 89: (3)(a) and (4)(b)(I) amended, p. 425, § 4, effective July 1; (4)(f) R&RE, p. 427, § 1, effective July 1; (5)(d) repealed, p. 426, § 5, effective July 1; (5)(e)(IV) and (5)(e)(V) amended, p. 428, § 2, effective July 1. L. 90: IP(3)(e)(II) amended, p. 603, § 7, effective April 3; (3)(a) R&RE, p. 608, § 5, effective April 16. L. 91: (4)(f) amended, p. 1287, § 1, effective May 16; (4)(p) added, p. 1289, § 2, effective May 16. L. 92: (4)(b)(I) amended, p. 1794, § 3, effective April 10; (4)(q) added, p. 1822, § 1, effective April 10. L. 94: (5)(e)(IX.5) added, p. 1998, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: (4)(b)(I), (4)(b)(II), (4)(b)(IV), (4)(e), (4)(k), (5)(e)(VI), (5)(e)(VII), (5)(e)(IX), and (5)(e)(X) amended, p. 273, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: IP(3)(e)(II) and (3)(e)(II)(B) amended and (3)(f) added, p. 382, § 6, effective April 17. L. 97: (4)(b)(IV.5) added, p. 479, § 1, effective April 24. L. 98: (4)(q) repealed, p. 91, § 4, effective March 23; IP(4) and (4)(b)(IV) amended, p. 375, § 1, effective April 21. L. 99: (4)(j) and (5)(e)(XXII) amended and (4)(r) added, p. 397, § 3, effective August 15. L. 2003: (4)(r)(I)(A) amended, p. 1009, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2005: (4)(s) added, p. 972, § 1, effective June 2; (4)(r)(I) amended, p. 320, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2006: (4)(b)(IV)(D), IP(4)(r)(I), and (4)(s)(I) amended, p. 653, § 1, effective April 24; (3)(f)(II) amended, p. 1489, § 7, effective June 1. L. 2008: (4)(s) amended, p. 1721, § 1, effective June 2. L. 2009: (4)(t) added,(HB 09-1054), ch. 65, p. 230, § 1, effective March 25; (4)(r)(I), (5)(e)(IV), and (5)(e)(XXII) amended and (4)(r)(IV), (4)(r)(V), (4)(u), and (4)(v) added, (SB 09-247), ch. 405, pp. 2229, 2231, 2230, §§ 3, 5, 4, effective July 1. L. 2010: (4)(b)(IV)(C) amended,(SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 777, § 5, effective April 29. L. 2012: IP(4)(b)(IV), (5)(e)(VIII), (5)(e)(IX), and (5)(e)(IX.5) amended,(HB 12-1311), ch. 281, p. 1609, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2013: (4)(b)(I), (4)(r), (4)(s)(I), (4)(t)(I), (4)(u)(I), and (4)(v) amended(SB 13-011), ch. 49, p. 157, § 6, effective May 1. L. 2016: (4)(b)(I), (4)(b)(II), (4)(b)(III), and (4)(b)(IV)(B) amended,(SB 16-158), ch. 204, p. 721, § 5, effective August 10. L. 2018: IP(4), IP(4)(b)(IV), (4)(b)(IV)(A), (4)(b)(IV)(B), (4)(b)(V), IP(5)(e), and (5)(e)(XXIV) amended,(SB 18-091), ch. 35, p. 379, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2019: (4)(b)(I), (4)(b)(II), (4)(b)(III), and (4)(b)(IV)(B) amended,(HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1648, § 26, effective October 1. L. 2020: (4)(w), (4)(x), (4)(y), (5)(b)(IV), (5)(b)(V), and (5)(b)(VI) added and IP(5)(b) amended,(SB 20-207), ch. 296, p. 1471, § 4, effective July 14; (4)(r)(I) and IP(4)(v)(V) amended and (4)(r)(V) and (4)(v)(V)(C) repealed,(SB 20-170), ch. 297, p. 1477, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.    Editor's note:    Subsection (4)(s)(IV) provided for the repeal of subsection (4)(s), effective July 1, 2018. (SeeL. 2008, p. 1721.)    Subsection (4)(t)(V) provided for the repeal of subsection (4)(t), effective July 1, 2019. (SeeL. 2009, p. 230.)     Cross references:   For the legislative declaration in SB 16-158, see section 1 of chapter 204, Session Laws of Colorado 2016. For the legislative declaration in SB 18-091, see section 1 of chapter 35, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.   ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. DISQUALIFICATION FORBENEFITS.    III. FULL AWARD.   A. In General.    B. Unsatisfactory or HazardousWorking Conditions.    C. Substantial Change inWorking Conditions.    D. Accepting a Better Job.    E. Employer's Violation ofEmployment Contract.    F. Unable or Unqualifiedto Perform Work.    G. Health of Worker.    H. Refusing With Good Causeto Work Overtime.    I. False Reports.       IV. REDUCED AWARDS.    V. NO AWARD.    VI. EVIDENCE.     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Law reviews. For article, “Unemployment Insurance in Colorado - Eligibility and Disqualification”, see 25 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 180 (1953). For article, “The Conflict Between Collective Bargaining and Unemployment Insurance”, see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 185 (1956). For article, “One Year Review of Constitutional Law”, see 40 Den. L. Ctr. J. 134 (1963). For note, “The Unemployment Compensation Recipient - Should He Accept a Job?”, see 44 Den. L.J. 147 (1967). For article, “Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws”, see 44 Den. L.J. 147 (1967). For article, “Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws”, see 44 Den. L.J. 344 (1967). For article, “Defending an Unemployment Compensation Claim”, see 13 Colo. Law. 69 (1984). For article, “Drug Testing in Colorado: Problems And Advice for Private Employers”, see 19 Colo. Law. 413 (1990). For article, “Alcoholism and Unemployment Insurance in Colorado”, see 18 Colo. Law. 1963 (1989).   Annotator's notes. (1) In light of the repeal and reenactment of this section in 1976, annotations from cases pertaining to this section as it read prior to 1976 have been treated as decided under former law. Moreover, the annotations to this section have been modified and updated to reflect various amendments and repeals, especially the repeal in 1977 of former subsections (7) and (8), relating to optional and special awards; the transfer in 1977 of the provisions of former subsection (6), relating to making of no awards, to subsection (5), relating to reduced awards, and amendment in 1984 of that subsection (5) to make it pertain to disqualification from benefits; the repeal in 1984 of former subsection (8) (added in 1979), relating to denial of benefits; and the repeal of former subsection (9), relating to employer's release from charge for benefits being paid following certain types of employee separation.   (2) Cases included in the annotations to this section which refer to the industrial commission were decided prior to the enactment of 1986 Senate Bill No. 12 that abolished said commission and transferred its powers, duties, and functions under this section to the director of the division.   Constitutionally impermissible application. While the employment security act is neutral on its face, application of the act to defendant had the effect of forcing him to choose between fidelity to his religious beliefs and the forfeiture of benefits on the one hand and abandonment of said beliefs to accept suitable work on the other. Therefore, in its application, the act offended the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality because it unduly burdened defendant's free exercise of religion. Engraff v. Indus. Comm'n, 678 P.2d 564 (Colo. App. 1983).   Constitutionality of classifications within this section. In view of the general policy and intent of this section as spelled out by the general assembly, there is no unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the law by reason of the classifications adopted by the general assembly; they are reasonable and based on proper justifiable distinctions. Cottrell Clothing Co. v. Teets, 139 Colo. 558 , 342 P.2d 1016 (1959); Miller v. Indus. Comm'n, 173 Colo. 476 , 480 P.2d 565 (1971).   Equal protection challenge to subsection (4)(f) which singles out construction workers for special consideration must fail. As a statutory classification, the provision is valid unless there is no rational basis for the distinction or it is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Because the legislature declared that the statute was enacted because construction workers are subjected to working conditions not generally encountered by other employees, the legislature has determined that there is a rational basis for treating construction workers differently for unemployment compensation purposes. The statutory exception is therefore rationally related to the legitimate state interest of addressing the problems associated with the construction industry and does not violate equal protection. Getts v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 804 P.2d 282 (Colo. App. 1990).   Subsection (4)(f) on its face does not operate to deny equal protection to nonconstruction workers. The difference in treatment of construction and nonconstruction workers is rationally related to differences arising from the nature of the construction industry. Baldwin v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 813 P.2d 807 (Colo. App. 1991) (distinguishing Higgs v. W. Landscaping & Sprinkler Sys., Inc., 804 P.2d 161 (Colo. 1991)).   Subsection (5)(e)(IV) did not violate claimant's constitutional right to travel under art. II, § 3, of the state constitution. Subsection (5)(e)(IV) does not prevent a person from moving either interstate or intrastate. Rather, it precludes a claimant from receiving unemployment benefits only when the claimant quits to move to another area as a matter of personal preference. Nagl v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2015 COA 51 , 351 P.3d 577.   Although subsection (5)(e)(IV) penalizes certain claimants who voluntarily quit to move to another area, the effect on the right to travel is a secondary impact and does not render the statute unconstitutional as applied. Nagl v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2015 COA 51 , 351 P.3d 577.   Subsection (5)(e)(IV), as applied to a claimant who voluntarily quit to move, does not adversely affect the fundamental right to travel in a constitutionally significant sense. Conditioning governmental payments of monetary benefits upon a showing that a claimant has not caused his or her own unemployment has, at most, only an incidental effect on the claimant's right to travel. Nagl v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2015 COA 51 , 351 P.3d 577.   Underlying principle. The Colorado program of unemployment insurance is based on the principle that only those persons who are willing and able to work are entitled to unemployment benefits. Sylvara v. Indus. Comm'n, 191 Colo. 92 , 550 P.2d 868 (1976) (decided under former law).   State interest preserved. The state has a legitimate interest in providing unemployment benefits only to conscientious persons. But that interest is preserved by the statutory requirement that in order to receive benefits a claimant must be available for work and actively seeking employment. Kistler v. Indus. Comm'n, 192 Colo. 172 , 556 P.2d 895 (1976) (decided under former law).   Unemployment compensation acts are to be liberally construed to further their remedial and beneficent purposes. Andersen v. Indus. Comm'n, 167 Colo. 281 , 447 P.2d 221 (1968); Montano v. Indus. Comm'n, 171 Colo. 92 , 464 P.2d 518 (1970); Tague v. Coors Porcelain Co., 30 Colo. App. 158, 490 P.2d 96 (1971); Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52 , 515 P.2d 95 (1973); Anyon v. Indus. Comm'n, 42 Colo. App. 88, 589 P.2d 1390 (1979); Colo. Div. of Emp. & Train. v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989).   But it is not the function of “liberal” construction to twist the facts in order to reach a result favorable to an employee. Montano v. Indus. Comm'n, 171 Colo. 92 , 464 P.2d 518 (1970); Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52 , 515 P.2d 95 (1973); Pierce v. Indus. Comm'n, 195 Colo. 10 , 576 P.2d 1012 (1978).   Entitlement should not be confused with eligibility. Where claimant did not fulfill eligibility requirements of § 8-73-107 , claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits. McClaflin v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 126 P.3d 288 (Colo. App. 2005).   The intent of the general assembly is to provide unemployment benefits for those who are “unemployed through no fault of their own”. Donnell v. Indus. Comm'n, 149 Colo. 228 , 368 P.2d 777 (1962); Andersen v. Indus. Comm'n, 167 Colo. 281 , 447 P.2d 221 (1968); Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Emp., 40 Colo. App. 381, 579 P.2d 651 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 197 Colo. 335 , 592 P.2d 808 (1979); Int'l Typographical Union v. Indus. Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 29, 609 P.2d 634 (Colo. App. 1980); Parker v. Daniels Motors, Inc., 738 P.2d 68 (Colo. App. 1987); Nielson v. AMI Indus., Inc., 759 P.2d 834 (Colo. App. 1988); Colo. Div. of Emp. & Train. v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989).   It is the expressed intent of the general assembly that unemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons who become unemployed through no fault of their own. Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52 , 515 P.2d 95 (1973) (decided under former law).   The intent of the general assembly is that each eligible individual is entitled to a full award of benefits if he is unemployed through no fault of his own. Zelingers v. Indus. Comm'n, 679 P.2d 608 (Colo. App. 1984).   However, there is a specific exception to this with regard to pregnancy if the other requirements of subsection (4)(b)(I) of this section are met. Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 734 P.2d 142 (Colo. App. 1986), cert. dismissed, 738 P.2d 1185 (Colo. 1987).   Claimant is entitled to a determination whether he was “at fault” for his separation notwithstanding the applicability of the disqualifying provisions of § 8-73-105.5 . To determine otherwise would abrogate the overriding legislative policy that unemployment benefits are to be awarded only to those claimants who are unemployed through no fault of their own. No legislative intent to treat unemployment compensation claimants who work for temporary help agencies differently from other unemployment compensation claimants with regard to the issue of fault. Accordingly, matter must be remanded to panel for it to consider “fault” issue and, based on its resolution of that issue, to enter a new order on whether claimant is entitled to benefits. Velo v. Emp't Sols. Pers., 988 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1998).   The unemployment law is intended to provide a speedy determination of eligibility through a simplified administrative procedure. Colo. Div. of Emp. & Train. v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989).   Unless reason for discharge comes within one of grounds provided in this section. One who is discharged from his employment is entitled to unemployment compensation unless the reason for his discharge comes within one of the grounds provided for the act. Sayers v. Am. Janitorial Serv., Inc., 162 Colo. 292 , 425 P.2d 693 (1967); Salida Sch. Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987); Colo. Div. of Emp. & Train. v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989).   Matters within discretion of general assembly. The establishment of reasonable classifications of workers, the grounds upon which compensation may be awarded, the standards of eligibility and disqualification, and the formula by which distributions are to be made are all matters within the sound discretion of the general assembly. Miller v. Indus. Comm'n, 173 Colo. 476 , 480 P.2d 565 (1971).   Using standards adopted by the general assembly, the office is delegated the responsibility of determining whether, under all circumstances from a case, benefits are to be awarded for a particular separation from employment. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Fredrickson, 812 P.2d 723 (Colo. App. 1991).   If decision of office as to which section of Employment Security Act applies is supported by substantial evidence and inferences drawn therefrom, decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Fredrickson, 812 P.2d 723 (Colo. App. 1991).   Commission has wide latitude to determine which provisions apply. Some unemployment benefit cases fall within two or more provisions of this statute, and in such instances, the commission has wide latitude in determining which section will be applied. Mattison v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 203, 516 P.2d 1143 (1973) (decided under former law); Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 697 P.2d 418 (Colo. App. 1985); Sw. Forest Indus. v. Indus. Comm'n, 719 P.2d 1098 (Colo. App. 1986).   And must exercise discretion in executing legislative intent. In order for the commission to carry out the legislative intent as expressed in subsections (1) and (5) it must at times exercise discretion in determining whether to grant a claimant a reduced award. The intent of the general assembly to confer such discretion on the commission is reflected by the 1979 amendment adding subsection (5)(s) to this section. Sims v. Indus. Comm'n, 627 P.2d 1107 (Colo. 1981); Dunn v. Indus. Comm'n, 640 P.2d 1146 (Colo. 1982).   Commission is not at liberty to apply the converse of a section of this statute in making a determination of benefits. Mattison v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 203, 516 P.2d 1143 (1973) (decided under former law).   It is the reason for separation that determines which subsection applies. Kortz v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 411, 557 P.2d 842 (1976) (decided under former law).   The reason for separation from employment determines the amount of benefits to which a claimant is entitled. Stavros v. Indus. Comm'n, 631 P.2d 1192 (Colo. App. 1981).   If claimant meets initial burden of establishing eligibility by filing a claim reflecting a discharge from covered employment, then employer has burden to rebut claimant's prima facie case by proving disqualification. Yellow Front Stores v. Indus. Comm'n, 694 P.2d 882 (Colo. App. 1985).   The claimant has the initial burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of eligibility for benefits. If the initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the employer to establish the statutory disqualification of benefits. Colo. Div. of Emp. & Train. v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989); Ward v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 916 P.2d 605 (Colo. App. 1995).   Procedures for a claimant to establish a prima facie case of eligibility at a hearing vary depending on whether the claimant was awarded or disqualified from receipt of benefits by the deputy. If the deputy found that the claimant's claim documentation established a prima facie case, the claimant may simply rely upon the documentation at the hearing. If not, the claimant must make out a prima facie case at the hearing. Ward v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 916 P.2d 605 (Colo. App. 1995).   Hearing officer has discretion to determine the order and manner of presentation of witnesses and evidence. Ward v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 916 P.2d 605 (Colo. App. 1995).   Responsibility for separation from employment is determination of fact. Sims v. Indus. Comm'n, 627 P.2d 1107 (Colo. 1981).   The reason for separation from employment is a question of fact, and the commission's determination in this regard may not be altered on review, if it is supported by the evidence. Mohawk Data Sciences Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 660 P.2d 922 (Colo. App. 1983); Jones v. Indus. Comm'n, 705 P.2d 530 (Colo. App. 1985); Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 719 P.2d 739 (Colo. App. 1986).   The word “fault” is not limited to something worthy of censure but must be construed as meaning failure or volition. Denver Post Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 677 P.2d 436 (Colo. App. 1984).   The qualifying and disqualifying sections are not couched in terms of fault. Even if one of the disqualifying sections applies, a claimant may still be entitled to benefits if the totality of the circumstances show the claimant was not at fault in his separation. Collins v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 813 P.2d 804 (Colo. App. 1991).   “Fault” under the statute is not necessarily related to culpability, but must be construed as requiring a volitional act. Zelingers v. Indus. Comm'n, 679 P.2d 608 (Colo. App. 1984); Pepsi-Cola Bottling v. Colo. Div. of Emp., 754 P.2d 1382 (Colo. App. 1988).   And in the absence of a volitional act, there can be no “fault” on claimant's part within the meaning of the unemployment statute. Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 719 P.2d 739 (Colo. App. 1986).   “Fault” means that the claimant, at a minimum, must have performed some volitional act resulting in the discharge from employment. Nielson v. AMI Indus., Inc., 759 P.2d 834 (Colo. App. 1988).   The concept of fault means a volitional act, and is not necessarily related to culpability. Thus, in the absence of a volitional act by the employee, there can be no fault on the employee's part within the meaning of the unemployment statute. Rulon v. Indus. Comm'n, 728 P.2d 739 (Colo. App. 1986).   An employee may not be denied benefits under subsection (1)(a) absent some “fault” on the employee's behalf, i.e., that it was a “volitional” act on the employee's part that caused the employment termination and the circumstances surrounding the termination must be one of those that is specifically described in the statute as being disqualifying. Goddard v. E G & G Rocky Flats, Inc., 888 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1994).   A claimant may still be entitled to benefits if the totality of the circumstances establishes that the claimant's separation occurred through “no fault” of his own, even if the findings of the hearing officer support the application of one of the disqualifying sections of the statute. Velo v. Emp't Sols. Pers., 953 P.2d 1295 (Colo. App. 1998).   Claimant is entitled to a determination whether he was “at fault” for his separation even though he was disqualified pursuant to the provisions of § 8-73-105.5 and not directly under one of the statutory disqualifying subsections of this section. Velo v. Emp't Sols. Pers., 953 P.2d 1295 (Colo. App. 1998).   A finding of “willful intent” is not necessary before a claimant may be determined to be “at fault” for his own job termination. “Fault” is not necessarily related to culpability, but only requires a volitional act. Richards v. Winter Park Recreational Ass'n, 919 P.2d 933 (Colo. App. 1996).   The determination of fault in a job separation is a question of fact to be determined by the commission, and it will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial evidence. Wilson v. Indus. Comm'n, 730 P.2d 911 (Colo. App. 1986).   The determination as to whether a claimant is at fault for a separation from employment because of a violation of the residency requirement must be determined on a case-by-case basis, with due consideration given to the totality of the circumstances in each particular situation. Morris v. City & County of Denver, 843 P.2d 76 (Colo. App. 1992).   The determination as to whether a claimant was responsible or “at fault” for the separation from employment is not a question of evidentiary fact, but rather is an ultimate legal conclusion to be based on the established findings of evidentiary fact. Bd. of Water Comm'rs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 881 P.2d 476 (Colo. App. 1994); Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 964 P.2d 617 (Colo. App. 1998).   Factual defense to application of subsection (5)(e)(XVII) may not be raised if not stated in claimant's notice of appeal. Sands v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 801 P.2d 12 (Colo. App. 1990).   There must be disclosure prior to the hearing of one party's intent to dispute the other party's specific factual allegations. Monarrez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 835 P.2d 607 (Colo. App. 1992).   Resolution of conflicting evidence is a matter properly left to the commission in its fact-finding role. Mohawk Data Sciences Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 660 P.2d 922 (Colo. App. 1983).   The commission is not held to a crystalline standard when it articulates its findings of fact. Allmendinger v. Indus. Comm'n, 40 Colo. App. 210, 571 P.2d 741 (1977) (decided under former law); Muhlenkamp v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 802 P.2d 1127 (Colo. App. 1990).   And lack of clarity in the factual findings of an order does not require a remand. Jones v. Indus. Comm'n, 705 P.2d 530 (Colo. App. 1985).   Where the decision is justified, it may not be set aside “on the technicality of unclarity of expression on the part of the commission”. Allmendinger v. Indus. Comm'n, 40 Colo. App. 210, 571 P.2d 741 (1977) (decided under former law); Muhlenkamp v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 802 P.2d 1127 (Colo. App. 1990).   Conclusion permitted by substantial evidence not disturbed on review. Where substantial evidence permits the conclusion drawn by the commission, it will not be disturbed on review. Allmendinger v. Indus. Comm'n, 40 Colo. App. 210, 571 P.2d 741 (1977) (decided under former law); Sims v. Indus. Comm'n, 627 P.2d 1107 (Colo. 1981).   Where evidence is conflicting or susceptible to conflicting inferences, decisions based on a choice between plausible inferences from such evidence are to be affirmed. McGinn v. Indus. Comm'n, 31 Colo. App. 6, 496 P.2d 1080 (1972); Jones v. Indus. Comm'n, 705 P.2d 530 (Colo. App. 1985).   Employer's remedies for defalcation by claimant. Where it is admitted that claimant voluntarily left employment with petitioner for a better job and so that award of benefits based on the better job section was appropriate, the employer must rely on other available remedies to obtain redress from any defalcation by claimant. Kortz v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 411, 557 P.2d 842 (1976) (decided under former law).   Claimant's failure to pursue employer's grievance procedures should not be dispositive of her eligibility for benefits. The pursuit of such a course of action is not required by statute as a prerequisite to an award of benefits. Larsen-Oldaker v. Indus. Comm'n, 735 P.2d 209 (Colo. App. 1987).   Determination of monetary eligibility is not a final disposition of entitlement. Although a finding that a claimant is not monetarily eligible to receive benefits is a final disposition, a finding of monetary eligibility does not mean that a claimant is eligible to receive benefits. Arteaga v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 781 P.2d 98 (Colo. App. 1989).   Once claimant's eligibility is decided, a determination that claimant was not entitled to benefits is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata is only applicable when a determination of a course of action in one legal proceeding is being used to foreclose a different determination of the same cause of action in a second subsequent different legal proceeding. Arteaga v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 781 P.2d 98 (Colo. App. 1989).   Error not to be inferred from failure to enter written findings on every factor raised in deciding whether claimant had shown good cause for raising new issue at hearing, where findings indicated that the relevant issues had been considered. Sands v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 801 P.2d 12 (Colo. App. 1990).   Police report that averred that claimant had made nuisance telephone calls to the home of one of the employer's supervisors was valid basis for discharge and disqualification for benefits. Lucero v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 812 P.2d 1191 (Colo. App. 1991).   For decisions under former subsection (5), relating to 50 percent awards, see Mattison v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 203, 516 P.2d 1143 (1973); Olivas v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 273, 518 P.2d 304 (1974).   For decisions under former subsection (6), relating to no award of benefits, see Olivas v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 273, 518 P.2d 304 (1974); Allen v. Indus. Comm'n, 36 Colo. App. 330, 540 P.2d 358 (1975); Pierce v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 85, 553 P.2d 402 (1976); Everitt Lumber Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 39 Colo. App. 336, 565 P.2d 967 (1977); Ross v. Indus. Comm'n, 39 Colo. App. 204, 566 P.2d 367 (1977); Michals v. Indus. Comm'n, 40 Colo. App. 5, 568 P.2d 108 (1977); Pierce v. Indus. Comm'n, 195 Colo. 10 , 576 P.2d 1012 (1978).   For decision under former subsection (7), relating to optional awards, see Mattison v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 203, 516 P.2d 1143 (1973).   For decisions under former subsection (8), relating to special awards, see Briggs v. Indus. Comm'n, 36 Colo. App. 292, 539 P.2d 1303 (1975); Sylvara v. Indus. Comm'n, 191 Colo. 92 , 550 P.2d 868 (1976); Kistler v. Indus. Comm'n, 192 Colo. 172 , 556 P.2d 895 (1976); Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Emp., 38 Colo. App. 298, 559 P.2d 252 (1976).   Applied in Olsgard v. Indus. Comm'n, 190 Colo. 472 , 548 P.2d 910 (1976) (decided under former law); Yanish v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 492, 558 P.2d 1007 (1976) (decided under former law); Nesbit v. Indus. Comm'n, 43 Colo. App. 398, 607 P.2d 1024 (1979); Armijo v. Indus. Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 171, 610 P.2d 107 (1980); Martinez v. Indus. Comm'n, 618 P.2d 738 (Colo. App. 1980); Stern v. Indus. Comm'n, 653 P.2d 742 (Colo. 1982); Asche v. Indus. Comm'n, 654 P.2d 813 (Colo. 1982); Trujillo v. Indus. Comm'n, 648 P.2d 1094 (Colo. App. 1982); Johnson v. Indus. Comm'n, 652 P.2d 1109 (Colo. App. 1982); Seethaler v. Indus. Comm'n, 660 P.2d 11 (Colo. App. 1982); Stern v. Indus. Comm'n, 667 P.2d 244 (Colo. App. 1983); FlaHavhan v. Hewlett Packard Co., 675 P.2d 19 (Colo. App. 1983); City of Arvada v. Indus. Comm'n, 701 P.2d 623 (Colo. App. 1985); Colo. Springs v. Indus. Comm'n, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1988); Marquez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 868 P.2d 1175 (Colo. App. 1994); Boeheim v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 23 P.3d 1247 (Colo. App. 2001).   II. DISQUALIFICATION FOR BENEFITS.    Payment of unemployment compensation subject to disqualification. This section authorizes payment of unemployment compensation to employee who left employment voluntarily without good cause or extenuating circumstances, subject to disqualification of benefits for not less than 13 nor more than 25 weeks. Morrison Rd. Bar, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 138 Colo. 16 , 328 P.2d 1076 (1958); Donnell v. Indus. Comm'n, 149 Colo. 228 , 368 P.2d 777 (1962).   And disqualification does not violate state or federal constitution. This section which purports to give to the commission the power to disqualify “for not less than ten weeks nor more than thirty-two and one-half weeks” is not repugnant to and does not violate art. V, § 1, Colo. Const., and the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States in that the provisions of said statute constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power and fail to set forth adequate standards. Donnell v. Indus. Comm'n, 149 Colo. 228 , 368 P.2d 777 (1962).   Limiting period of disqualification does not deprive employer of due process. Limiting the disqualification of benefits of disqualified persons to a maximum of 16 weeks does not deprive an employer of his property without due process of law. Cottrell Clothing Co. v. Teets, 139 Colo. 558 , 342 P.2d 1016 (1959).   Commission error. Commission erred in entering order of disqualification for benefits after July 1, 1981, based on repealed subsection (5)(x). Nazzaro v. Indus. Comm'n, 671 P.2d 983 (Colo. App. 1983).   An objective standard must be applied in analyzing a disqualification under subsection (5)(e)(VI) for insubordination. Under that standard, the panel must use its independent judgment to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of each case, the request that claimant refused was one that a reasonable person would have refused. Bell v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 93 P.3d 584 (Colo. App. 2004).   Subsection (5)(e)(IX.5) does not exclusively govern a disqualification for failure to pass a drug test at work. Other provisions, by their terms, may apply to disqualifications based on drug testing. M & A Acquisition Corp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2019 COA 173 , 456 P.3d 102.   Presence of medical marijuana in an individual's system during working hours is a ground for disqualification from unemployment benefits under this section. Medical use of marijuana by an employee holding a registry card under § 14 of article XVIII of the state constitution does not constitute the use of “medically prescribed controlled substances” within the meaning of subsection (5)(e)(IX.5). Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2011).   Although medical certification permitting the possession and use of marijuana may insulate claimant from state criminal prosecution, it does not preclude claimant from being denied unemployment benefits based on a separation from employment for testing positive for marijuana in violation of an employer's express zero-tolerance drug policy. Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2011).   Disqualification pursuant to subsection (5)(e)(XX) is warranted for claimant who was aware of employer's drug testing requirement and who tested positive for use of cocaine. Bd. of Water Comm'rs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 881 P.2d 476 (Colo. App. 1994).   Disqualification was established pursuant to subsection (5)(e)(XX) when an employer established that the claimant did not do the job for which he was hired and which he knew was expected of him. Pabst v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 833 P.2d 64 (Colo. App. 1992); Richards v. Winter Park Recreational Ass'n, 919 P.2d 933 (Colo. App. 1996).   Unemployment insurance claimant was properly disqualified from receiving benefits where he was discharged for unsatisfactory performance and where it was established that he did not do the job for which he was hired and which he knew was expected of him, despite the fact that he was not explicitly warned that his job was in jeopardy. Pabst v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 833 P.2d 64 (Colo. App. 1992).   Disqualification was established pursuant to subsection (5)(e)(VI) where claimant directly disobeyed an order of his employer, notwithstanding that the employer did not follow all progressive disciplinary procedures before discharging claimant, because claimant received adequate notice that his conduct had placed him at risk of losing his job and he nonetheless persisted. Keil v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 847 P.2d 235 (Colo. App. 1993).   “Fellow workers” who fall within the ambit of the statute are not limited to those who are employed by the same employer as the claimant. Tilley v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 924 P.2d 1173 (Colo. App. 1996).   A finding that a claimant quit because of dissatisfaction with standard working conditions is proper only when there has been no substantial change in claimant's work environment, duties, and conditions. Wargon v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 787 P.2d 668 (Colo. App. 1990).   Employer may not rely on information it received subsequent to termination of employee to justify termination and render the employee ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Pepsi-Cola Bottling v. Colo. Div. of Emp., 754 P.2d 1382 (Colo. App. 1988).   Disqualifying provisions are not mandatory if the totality of the circumstances establishes that a claimant was unemployed through no fault of his own. Zelingers v. Indus. Comm'n, 679 P.2d 608 (Colo. App. 1984); Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 719 P.2d 739 (Colo. App. 1986); Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 964 P.2d 617 (Colo. App. 1998).   When an employee's job performance gives rise to a “last chance” settlement agreement, and the employee refuses to sign the agreement, the employee may be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Such disqualification may be premised on the actions and omissions that gave rise to the employer's original dissatisfaction with the employee's performance not on the refusal to sign the agreement. Bell v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 93 P.3d 584 (Colo. App. 2004).   Where claimant refused to provide written verification explaining her unexcused absence, her unemployment benefits were properly denied pursuant to subsection (5)(e)(VI). Stevenson v. Indus. Comm'n, 705 P.2d 1020 (Colo. App. 1985).   Disqualification under subsection (5)(e)(IX.5) for marijuana use requires employer to show that testing laboratory was licensed or certified. Absent some form of waiver or stipulation by claimant, this requirement may not be deemed inapplicable or satisfied without evidentiary proof. Sosa v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 259 P.3d 558 (Colo. App. 2011).   Disqualification under subsection (5)(e)(XI) for theft is allowed whether or not the theft occurs in the course of employment. Jefferson County v. Kiser, 876 P.2d 122 (Colo. App. 1994).   Absence of specific finding regarding value of item allegedly taken by employee does not preclude disqualification for theft under subsection (5)(e)(XI), however, to disqualify employee for theft, employer must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the mens rea required in theft or larceny cases. Starr v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 224 P.3d 1056 (Colo. App. 2009).   A claimant is not disqualified for benefits under subsection (5)(e)(XXII) (quitting for personal reasons) if she is otherwise eligible for benefits under one of the other provisions of this section. Colo. Div. of Emp. & Train. v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989).   No error in determination by hearing officer that disqualifying provisions of subsection (5)(e)(XXII) of this section and § 8-73-105.5 (5) are applicable to claimant. On the last day of his final assignment, employer temporary help contracting firm notified claimant that his assignment was ending. Subsequently, employer offered claimant additional assignments which claimant did not accept. There is no evidence that claimant informed his employer that he was available for further assignments. Moreover, claimant did not contact employer in accordance with the written contract he had received. Accordingly, court upheld that portion of hearing officer's order stating that claimant was responsible for his separation and should be disqualified from the receipt of his unemployment benefits pursuant to subsection (5)(e)(XXII) of this section and § 8-73-105.5 (5) . Velo v. Emp't Sols. Pers., 988 P.2d 1139 (Colo. App. 1998).   No evidence of harassment by employer for purposes of subsection (5)(e)(XXII). Claimant's coworker was not an employer under any of the criteria of § 8-70-113 . The general assembly's use of different terms to refer to an employer and a coworker signals its intent that these terms have different meanings. Yotes v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 124 , 310 P.3d 288.   The industrial claim appeals office panel's conclusion that the term “employer” includes coworkers renders the latter term meaningless. Yotes v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 124 , 310 P.3d 288.   Because the industrial claim appeals office panel did not find that the employer fostered or condoned the actions of the coworker, the panel erred when it concluded that claimant quit “because of personal harassment by the employer not related to the performance of the job” and was entitled to benefits under subsection (4)(o). Yotes v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 124 , 310 P.3d 288.   Claimant not entitled to benefits under subsection (4)(c), and thus was disqualified from receiving benefits under subsection (5)(e)(XXII) because employer had indefinitely removed claimant from the adverse working conditions and claimant did not wait to learn whether the adverse conditions would be eliminated before quitting. Yotes v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 124 , 310 P.3d 288.   Referee's conclusion that claimant's termination was “under conditions involving personal reasons,” was unsupported by record showing that claimant's employment termination had been determined by the employer to be necessary and imminent, that claimant had been given choice between being involuntarily laid off or accepting a voluntary layoff, and that claimant was told his chances were good that he would receive unemployment compensation. Goddard v. E G & G Rocky Flats, Inc., 888 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1994).   As a matter of law, if an employee is given notification of a pending layoff, but is offered severance pay in return for a waiver of reemployment rights, which the employee accepts, the resulting employment termination cannot be considered to be the “fault” of the employee. The employment separation in such case must be viewed as no more the voluntary act of the employee than if the employee had refused the offer and the employer had laid him or her off. Goddard v. E G & G Rocky Flats, Inc., 888 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1994).   Claimant who used employer's equipment for private benefit was properly denied full unemployment benefits because his discharge was based on violation of company rule which could have resulted in serious damage to employer's interest, even if exact value of such damage could not be estimated. Madrid v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 728 P.2d 1299 (Colo. App. 1986).   Disqualification from unemployment compensation was proper when evidence showed that the claimant struck a coemployee, the claimant was the aggressor, the attack resulted in a sizeable bruise on the coemployee's arm, and the employer had a policy requiring summary dismissal of an employee for fighting or hitting another employee. Baca v. Marriott Hotels, Inc., 732 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1986).   The term “assaulting”, as used in this section to disqualify a person from receiving unemployment compensation for assaulting or threatening to assault, means an actual harmful or offensive contact similar to the common law tort of battery. Baca v. Marriott Hotels, Inc., 732 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1986).   The phrase “threatening to assault”, as used in this section to disqualify a person from receiving unemployment compensation for assaulting or threatening to assault, means the apprehension of harmful or offensive contact similar to the common law tort of assault. Baca v. Marriott Hotels, Inc., 732 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1986).   Mental state of coemployee irrelevant in determining whether to deny unemployment benefits to claimant when claimant was found to have assaulted coemployee. Baca v. Marriott Hotels, Inc., 732 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1986).   Claimant who quit job to accept better position and was subsequently terminated from better job for a disqualifying reason was disqualified from receiving all unemployment benefits. Carleno v. Littleton Sch. Dist. No. 6, 750 P.2d 926 (Colo. App. 1988).   Claimant who voluntarily quit his employment and thus was at fault for the separation is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits from that employer under subsection (5)(e)(IV) regardless of whether the claimant later qualified for benefits through subsequent employment. Nagl v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2015 COA 51 , 351 P.3d 577.   Employee discharged pursuant to employer-generated disciplinary guidelines not automatically ineligible. While employer's disciplinary policy may form an appropriate basis for discharge, it cannot serve as a rule of law automatically disqualifying the employee from statutory benefits. Gonzales v. Indus. Comm'n, 740 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1987); Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Fredrickson, 812 P.2d 723 (Colo. App. 1991).   Employee discharged other than in accordance with employer-generated disciplinary guidelines not automatically eligible. Volitional act of employee may result in disqualification under this section notwithstanding employer's failure to follow progressive disciplinary procedures before discharging employee. Principles concerning wrongful discharge set forth in Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987), and related cases are not engrafted onto unemployment-compensation statutes. Keil v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 847 P.2d 235 (Colo. App. 1993).   Claimant who requested transfer from Montana to Colorado was not disqualified under subsection (5)(e)(IV) from benefits relating to employment in Montana. Claimant's interstate transfer within the same company does not constitute a separation from employment, and her tenure with employer is not separate periods of employment with different employers. Dewhurst v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 148 P.3d 378 (Colo. App. 2006).   Statutory presumptions concerning blood alcohol content in traffic cases not applicable to unemployment cases. Blood alcohol content is only one evidentiary factor to be weighed along with all the other evidence presented at the hearing. Safeway Stores v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 754 P.2d 773 (Colo. App. 1988).   An objective standard is the proper standard for reviewing the reasonableness of an employer's request pursuant to subsection (5)(e)(VI) and, in assessing the reasonableness of such a request, the industrial claim appeals panel must consider the facts and circumstances of each case, using its independent judgment to determine whether the request the claimant refused was one that a reasonable person would have refused. Rose Med. Ctr. Hosp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 757 P.2d 1173 (Colo. App. 1988).   An objective standard is the proper standard for determining whether a claimant has engaged in disqualifying behavior under subsection (5)(c). Davis v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 903 P.2d 1243 (Colo. App. 1995).   Case remanded where referee's finding of fault was that claimant unreasonably agreed to perform a job duty which he was not required to perform but did not include finding of whether claimant was aware of unwritten policy that he would not be dismissed if he refused to perform job duty. Nielson v. AMI Indus., Inc., 759 P.2d 834 (Colo. App. 1988).   Evidence and findings support conclusion claimant should be disqualified because of incarceration after conviction of violation of law. Smith v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 817 P.2d 635 (Colo. App. 1991).   Where company policy provided for immediate termination for possession of drugs and possession was clearly shown, hearing officer erred in addressing the issue of ownership of such drugs and in determining that subsection (5)(e)(VII) was inapplicable. Phelps Tointon v. Div. of Emp. & Train., 824 P.2d 827 (Colo. App. 1991).   City employee who was discharged from employment for violation of residency requirement not disqualified from receipt of unemployment benefits pursuant to subsection (5)(e)(VII) where there was no finding that serious harm to city's interests would result by virtue of the violation. Morris v. City & County of Denver, 843 P.2d 76 (Colo. App. 1992).   Claimant was at fault for his termination and he should be disqualified from receiving benefits since claimant knew he was required to perform an anti-collision test as part of his job, had forgotten to perform the test, and represented to his supervisor that he had done so. Claimant's supervisor's failure to check claimant's work did not absolve claimant of his own responsibility. Richards v. Winter Park Recreational Ass'n, 919 P.2d 933 (Colo. App. 1996).   Based on established findings of evidentiary fact, panel properly ruled that claimant was responsible or “at fault” for her separation by her volitional choice to quit under the circumstances shown, notwithstanding her health problems. Factual findings and the record support the conclusion that claimant quit this employment for subjective, personal reasons that do not provide an objective basis for an award of benefits. Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 964 P.2d 617 (Colo. App. 1998).   Applied in Short v. Steves Holiday Liquors, Inc., 727 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1986).   III. FULL AWARD.   A. In General.   Commission discretion to grant full award. The commission has discretion to grant a full award even though none of the paragraphs of subsection (4) is cited or applicable. Such discretion is necessary to effect the legislative mandate that each individual who is unemployed through no fault of his own shall receive a full award of benefits. Sante Fe Energy Co. v. Baca, 673 P.2d 374 (Colo. App. 1983).   In determining direct and proximate cause of claimant's separation and whether that claimant is entitled either to a full or a reduced award of benefits (now disqualification), the division and the commission shall consider the “reasons” specifically enumerated in the statute and “any other factors which may be pertinent to such determination”. Albaitis v. Indus. Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 55, 609 P.2d 1118 (1980), aff'd, 627 P.2d 1107 (Colo. 1981).   Conditions for full award. Where claimant would not have left her job and job would not have been filled by another person had she not become pregnant and requested maternity leave, she was not laid off for lack of work, nor for any condition of health, injury or illness, nor for any of the other conditions specified therein for which a full award could be made. Miller v. Indus. Comm'n, 173 Colo. 476 , 480 P.2d 565 (1971).   When employee is fired in violation of employer's stated policy, claimant is entitled to a full award of benefits because of discharge through no fault of her own even though found to be sleeping on the job. Hosp. Shared Serv. of Colo. v. Indus. Comm'n, 677 P.2d 447 (Colo. App. 1984).   Full unemployment compensation benefits were available to flight attendants on mandatory maternity leave commencing in twenty-eighth week of pregnancy. Such claimants were separated from employment even though they were receiving employment benefits and had the right to resume employment. Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 734 P.2d 142 (Colo. App. 1986), cert. dismissed, 738 P.2d 1185 (Colo. 1987).   Subsection (4)(l) is applied in Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 775 P.2d 97 (Colo. App. 1989).   Claimant who was unable to work at a particular job due to health reasons was not eligible for unemployment benefits since he was able to perform the same work under different employment conditions and was not, therefore, required to seek a new occupation. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Ingle, 794 P.2d 1374 (Colo. App. 1990).   Where employer failed to request written substantiation of claimant's health condition, claimant is not precluded from eligibility for unemployment benefits. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Ingle, 794 P.2d 1374 (Colo. App. 1990).   Applied in Patterson v. Indus. Comm'n, 39 Colo. App. 255, 567 P.2d 385 (1977).   B. Unsatisfactory or Hazardous Working Conditions.    Evidence of unsatisfactory conditions. The hearing officer must consider evidence presented of the factors listed in subsection (4)(a), but a claimant's failure to submit proof of working conditions of workers engaged in the same or similar work for the same or other employers in the locality does not prevent an award of benefits. Campbell v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 97 P.3d 204 (Colo. App. 2003).   The standard for determining whether a claimant is entitled to benefits under the hazardous working conditions provisions of subsection (4)(c) is whether a reasonable person in the claimant's position would have found the actual working conditions, as determined by the hearing officer to have existed, detrimental to that worker's physical or mental well-being so as to warrant resignation from employment. Rodco Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 981 P.2d 699 (Colo. App. 1999).   A hazardous condition may be created when, by an objective standard, the situation was hazardous to the employee's health or morals and was not normal. Rodco Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 981 P.2d 699 (Colo. App. 1999).   When determining whether working conditions are unsatisfactory or hazardous, the division of employment and training must consider the working conditions that existed when the separation from employment occurred and the extent to which the conditions were likely to continue. Yotes v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 124 , 310 P.3d 288.   Claimant not entitled to benefits under subsection (4)(c), and thus was disqualified from receiving benefits under subsection (5)(e)(XXII) because employer had indefinitely removed claimant from the adverse working conditions and claimant did not wait to learn whether the adverse conditions would be eliminated before quitting. Yotes v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 124 , 310 P.3d 288.   Evidence insufficient to prove “unsatisfactory or hazardous working conditions”. Rotenberg v. Indus. Comm'n, 42 Colo. App. 161, 590 P.2d 521 (1979); Sw. Forest Indus. v. Indus. Comm'n, 719 P.2d 1098 (Colo. App. 1986).   Evidence of significant unilateral increase in working hours sufficient to prove unsatisfactory working conditions. Thus, claimant was entitled to receive a full award of benefits, pursuant to subsection (4)(c). Campbell v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 97 P.3d 204 (Colo. App. 2003).   C. Substantial Change in Working Conditions.    Change in working conditions. Where claimant was fully satisfied with her position but was then transferred without notice, and the conditions under which she then worked were not the same conditions prevailing for other workers performing the same or similar work, it was error to deny benefits. Indus. Comm'n v. McIntyre, 162 Colo. 277 , 425 P.2d 279 (1967).   Division not required to investigate “conditions . . . generally prevailing”. In determining eligibility for unemployment benefits, the division is an adjudicatory, not investigatory, body. Therefore, its function and responsibility are to conduct a neutral adjudication of unemployment claims not to investigate the factual basis for such claims. Chris the Crazy Trader, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2003).   Whether a change in working conditions constitutes a substantial change and, if so, whether the substantial change is substantially less favorable to the worker must be judged by an objective standard rather than by claimant's subjective outlook. Consequently, in assessing the evidence, the issue is whether a reasonable employee in claimant's position would find the change in working conditions to be not only substantial but also substantially less favorable. Wargon v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 787 P.2d 668 (Colo. App. 1990); Arias v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 850 P.2d 161 (Colo. App. 1993).   Finding of dissatisfaction with working conditions proper only where no change in conditions. A finding that the petitioner quit his job because he was dissatisfied with standard working conditions or regularly assigned duties is proper only when there has been no change in working conditions or duties. Martinez v. Indus. Comm'n, 657 P.2d 457 (Colo. App. 1982).   Where an employee's termination followed a change in his work environment or in his duties, the statutory provision concerning dissatisfaction with standard working conditions (former subsection (9)(a)(I)) was inapplicable. Martinez v. Indus. Comm'n, 657 P.2d 457 (Colo. App. 1982); Musgrave v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Inst., 731 P.2d 142 (Colo. App. 1986); Wargon v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 787 P.2d 668 (Colo. App. 1990).   It is not required that working conditions become impossible, only that there be a substantial change. Gray Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 419, 560 P.2d 482 (1976); Gray Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 422, 560 P.2d 484 (1976).   Denial of benefits for termination due to changes in working conditions affirmed where claimant acquiesced in those changes. Jennings v. Indus. Comm'n, 682 P.2d 518 (Colo. App. 1984).   Denial of benefits upheld where evidence showed that the changes in working conditions experienced by claimant were substantially the same as changes experienced by other employees and claimant acquiesced in the changes. Collins v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 813 P.2d 804 (Colo. App. 1991).   Acquiescence is matter of intent and does not necessarily depend upon the lapse of time. Musgrave v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 762 P.2d 686 (Colo. 1988).   Acquiescence to change in conditions not established based on fact that employee continued to work for employer where evidence showed claimant filed a grievance and a civil action protesting the change. Nimmo v. Town of Monument, 736 P.2d 435 (Colo. App. 1987).   Change of attitude and treatment by supervisor. Where claimant quit his job because of a change in his working conditions which became intolerable because of a change of attitude and treatment by his supervisor and the assignment of the least desirable jobs when the employer learned that claimant, who is black, was dating a female coemployee who is Caucasian, there was sufficient evidence to support a full award. Gray Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 419, 560 P.2d 482 (1976).   Where claimant, a Caucasian, had had a good personal and working relationship within the company up to the time she began dating a coemployee who was black, and after that personal relationship became known, she was subjected to harassment from fellow employees and supervisors, so that she felt she had to quit as working conditions became impossible, there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that “claimant quit her job because of a change in her working conditions which became intolerable because of the ostracism she was receiving from fellow employees and supervisors of the company” and claimant was entitled to a full award. Gray Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 422, 560 P.2d 484 (1976).   Claimant's working conditions constituted a demotion, despite the fact that her job title and salary were to remain the same, and she was therefore entitled to a full award of unemployment benefits. Warburton v. Indus. Comm'n, 678 P.2d 1076 (Colo. App. 1984).   A substantial change occurs if a claimant is relieved of supervisory and administrative responsibilities, even if the claimant's salary remains the same. Warburton v. Indus. Comm'n, 678 P.2d 1076 (Colo. App. 1984).   Employee whose salary was cut, job responsibilities divided, and title diminished suffered a substantial change in working conditions. Musgrave v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Inst., 731 P.2d 142 (Colo. App. 1986).   Change in job title and removal of supervisory duties constituted a substantial change in working conditions. Nimmo v. Town of Monument, 736 P.2d 435 (Colo. App. 1987).   A change in duties or a demotion may be a change in working conditions that is substantially less favorable, as may be a situation in which a claimant has been relieved of administrative or supervisory responsibilities or received a salary reduction. Wargon v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 787 P.2d 668 (Colo. App. 1990).   Demotion with a decrease in pay and job responsibilities constituted a substantial change in working conditions. Larsen-Oldaker v. Indus. Comm'n, 735 P.2d 209 (Colo. App. 1987).   As a matter of law, to a reasonable person in claimant's position, the change in compensation method from salary to commission constituted a substantially less favorable change in working conditions, where the claimant left a commissioned job to work for the employer because she wanted the security and stability of a salary due to her dissatisfaction with a commission and the resultant fluctuation and unpredictability of monthly income, increased competition among the sales force, and increased job pressure. Wargon v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 787 P.2d 668 (Colo. App. 1990).   Statute does not condition the receipt of benefits on disparate treatment by supervisor. Receipt of unemployment compensation by one who has quit because of treatment by supervisor does not require a showing of disparate treatment by supervisor as it does not matter that it was uniformly applied to all employees as long as the supervision was unreasonable. Heller v. Indus. Comm'n, 738 P.2d 64 (Colo. App. 1987).   D. Accepting a Better Job.   Subsection (4)(f) not violative of equal protection clause. Provision of subsection (4)(f), that in order to qualify as a better job the new job must last at least 90 days from the first date of employment, did not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52 , 515 P.2d 95 (1973).   However former provision of subsection (4)(f)(I) violated fourteenth amendment. The purpose of the employment security act, as stated in § 8-70-102 , is subverted by the former provision of subsection (4)(f)(I) which read “but a job shall not be considered better if it lasts less than 90 days due to lack of work, the absence of said knowledge and control notwithstanding”, because this provision made an invidious distinction between (1) those who obtain a better job which terminates prior to 90 days because of lack of work with no fault of their own and (2) those who obtain a better job which terminates prior to 90 days because of some other factor other than lack of work with no fault of their own, and such a distinction involved an unconstitutional overclassification forbidden by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.Spann v. Indus. Comm'n, 181 Colo. 153 , 508 P.2d 385 (1973).   “Accepting a better job” and the 90-day period. A claimant does not actually have to have been on the job performing services in the new employment for at least three months before it can be adjudged that he has terminated old employment by “accepting a better job”. Lidke v. Indus. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 580 , 413 P.2d 200 (1966).   Clarification of the 90-day limitation. This section is only a clarification of the previous statute and only indicates that the completion of the 90-day limitation shall be computed from the date of actual performance of services on the new job and was not meant to preclude claims arising out of events which occurred between the date of accepting the better job and actually commencing work. Adams v. Indus. Comm'n, 31 Colo. App. 340, 501 P.2d 1334 (1972).   The fact that claimant agreed and understood that his employment would end at the expiration of a fixed term is not a basis for denying him benefits under the Colorado employment security act. Intermountain Jewish News, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 39 Colo. App. 258, 564 P.2d 132 (1977).   A worker who quits his employment to take a better job must work at the new job at least 90 days in order to be eligible for unemployment compensation. If the worker fails to work this minimum period, it is not considered a “better job” and the commission is required to deny all unemployment benefits. Gatewood v. Russell, 29 Colo. App. 11, 478 P.2d 679 (1970).   Under the plain language of this statute a job must, in order to qualify as a better job, last at least 90 days from the commencement of work unless the employee is unable to complete the 90 days of employment through no fault of his own. Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52 , 515 P.2d 95 (1973).   But a worker may cease employment within the 90-day period and still be eligible for benefits, if the reasons for termination of this employment were conditions over which the worker had no knowledge at the time he accepted employment, and over which he had no control after commencing work. Whether or not the worker lacked this knowledge and control is a question of fact to be determined by the commission. Gatewood v. Russell, 29 Colo. App. 11, 478 P.2d 679 (1970).   Ninety-day provision applies to occupancy not duration of job. The 90-day provision of subsection (4)(f) is not interpreted as applying to the duration of the job but rather the employee's occupancy of the job. Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52 , 515 P.2d 95 (1973).   Ninety-day provision designed to prevent job hopping. Concerning the 90-day employment requirement of the better job provision, there is justification for compulsory compliance with this requirement, as it is obviously designed to prevent job hopping and to secure continuity of employment. Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52 , 515 P.2d 95 (1973).   And prevents depletion of insurance fund account of past employer. The 90-day requirement of the better-job provision, together with other prescribed better-job conditions, prevents the depletion of the insurance fund account of the past employer who in no way contributed to the job separation of the worker who voluntarily separates under conditions of disqualification. Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52 , 515 P.2d 95 (1973).   Failure to meet the requirements of making a new job a better job. Petitioner left his job of his own accord to take a different job which he deemed a better job. However, it is not petitioner's qualitative judgment which determines whether the new job was a better job. The statute sets forth various requirements which must be met. Petitioner stated he was hired for a specific period of two months, hence, the one year requirement was not met. Furthermore, the job in fact lasted only two months, therefore, the three months requirement was also not met. The undisputed evidence conclusively established that petitioner was not entitled to unemployment compensation under the statute. Anderson v. Indus. Comm'n, 29 Colo. App. 263, 482 P.2d 403 (1971).   Subsection (4)(f)(III) does not mean that because new job did not materialize, an award of compensation is necessarily barred. Spann v. Indus. Comm'n, 181 Colo. 153 , 508 P.2d 385 (1973).   Evidence failed to sustain denial of unemployment benefits to claimant who alleged he was offered and accepted a better job, but who employer claimed was fired prior to accepting a new job. Olivas v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 78, 515 P.2d 110 (1973).   Award held improper. Where claimant's sole proof as to any other job offer consisted of her recitation of alleged interviews and telephone calls between herself and third persons, and no evidence corroborative of the hearsay was offered, the industrial commission's award could not stand. Rocky Mt. Radiologists Prof'l Corp. v. Dept. of Labor & Emp., 39 Colo. App. 183, 562 P.2d 1123 (1977).   E. Employer's Violation of Employment Contract.    Violation of contract by changing days of work. Where there is a contract between the parties specifying a five-day work week and where, thereafter, the employer causes the employee to resign by unilaterally changing the number of days in the work week, the employee is entitled to a full award of benefits. Wade v. Hurley, 33 Colo. App. 30, 515 P.2d 491 (1973).   Subsection (4)(o) harassment need not be continuous. There is nothing in subsection (4)(o) stating that harassment must be continuous and substantial. Marlin Oil Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 641 P.2d 312 (Colo. App. 1982).   Failure to pay benefits under collective bargaining agreement resulted in full award to claimants who terminated their employment. Centennial Drywall Co., Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 724 P.2d 685 (Colo. App. 1986).   Gender-based harassment is encompassed within the more general term “personal harassment”, and a claimant who carries burden of proving that she quit her job because of personal harassment will receive employment benefits. Colo. Div. of Emp. & Train. v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989).   Improper conduct need not take the stereotypical form of sexual conduct to, at least arguably, contravene public policy. Hewlett v. Div. of Emp. & Train., 753 P.2d 791 (Colo. App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989).   Where claimant contends that her separation from government employment resulted from assertion of a constitutionally protected right, the three factor test described in Ward v. Indus. Commission (699 P.2d 960) is used to determine whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment benefits. Colo. Div. of Emp. & Train. v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989).   Where such a question is presented, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her conduct which led to her discharge was constitutionally protected and that the conduct was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in the decision to terminate her employment. If plaintiff carries that burden of proof, the employer must show that it would have reached the same decision in the absence of the protected conduct. Colo. Div. of Emp. & Train. v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989).   Denial of benefits disallowed. Employee who notified employer of his intent to resign as of future date but who was terminated earlier could not be denied unemployment benefits for period between his termination and effective date of his resignation. Diringer v. Indus. Comm'n, 712 P.2d 1091 (Colo. App. 1985).   F. Unable or Unqualified to Perform Work.    The mental inability referred to by subsection (4)(j) is not a narrow definition pertaining solely to intellectual or educational attainment. The statute merely provides that if an employee is unable to perform because of mental incapacity, then he is entitled to benefits. It does not state that the mental incapacity or inability must result solely from educational or intellectual deficiencies, rather than illness. Tague v. Coors Porcelain Co., 30 Colo. App. 158, 490 P.2d 96 (1971).   Where the division has determined a claimant was “mentally unable to perform the work” under subsection (4)(j), neither the text of the subsection nor related case law contemplates further inquiry into the cause of the claimant's mental condition. Moreover, such an inquiry is beyond the scope of the simplified administrative proceedings to determine a claimant's eligibility for benefits. Mesa County Pub. Lib. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2017 CO 78, 396 P.3d 1114.   Physical inability to work, as used in subsection (4)(j), has been defined as the inability to perform the labor, or equally remunerative work, that an injured person was engaged in at the time of his injury. Colo. State Judicial Dept. v. Indus. Comm'n, 630 P.2d 102 (Colo. App. 1981).   Need not be disabling. The language of subsection (4)(j) is sufficiently broad that illness which is not necessarily disabling can constitute a physical inability to perform the work. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 637 P.2d 401 (Colo. App. 1981).   Excessive absenteeism due to incidental illness. The general assembly did not intend to deny compensation to an employee who, although excessively absent, is so because of incidental illness. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 637 P.2d 401 (Colo. App. 1981).   A full award of benefits is justified under subsection (4)(j) where an employee, discharged for excessive absenteeism, suffered a disabling injury which rendered him unable to get out of bed or unable to remain in a standing or sitting position for sustained periods. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 637 P.2d 401 (Colo. App. 1981).   Alcoholism. Whether worker is disqualified from receipt of benefits is based on the volitional or nonvolitional nature of worker's alcoholism and must be determined under particular facts of each case. City & County of Denver v. Indus. Comm'n, 756 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1988) (decided under law in effect prior to 1988 amendment adding subsection (4)(b)(IV) and (V)).   Claimant's consumption of alcohol warranted the denial of unemployment compensation benefits for resulting discharge where consumption of alcohol occurred during a rest break on employer's property and the claimant was paid for the time he was on the break. Longmont Turkey Proc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 765 P.2d 1073 (Colo. App. 1988).   An individual who is physically or mentally unable to perform work may be awarded unemployment benefits and such inability need not be the result of insufficient educational or occupational skills. Elec. Fab Tech. Corp. v. Wood, 749 P.2d 470 (Colo. App. 1987).   Nonvolitional conduct does not make employee at fault for termination. Mesa County Pub. Lib. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2016 COA 96 , 399 P.3d 760, aff'd, 2017 CO 78, 396 P.3d 1114.   No implied requirement of notice that employee's “job is in jeopardy”. Where hearing officer found that claimant knew what was expected of him and failed to perform satisfactorily, findings were sufficient to support disqualification under subsection (5)(e)(XX). Pabst v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 833 P.2d 64 (Colo. App. 1992).   G. Health of Worker.   Medical statement required only when employer makes timely request. There is no requirement in subsection (4)(b)(I) that, before he can be entitled to benefits, the claimant must be advised by a physician to terminate his employment. A medical statement to substantiate the claimant's assertion that he was required to leave his employment because of health reasons is required only if the employer requests it prior to the date of quitting or within a reasonable period thereafter. Andersen v. Indus. Comm'n, 167 Colo. 281 , 447 P.2d 221 (1968).   Denial of benefits is error as matter of law. When under the circumstances the statute does not require proof of a doctor's advice to actually quit, the denial of benefits on the ground that the claimant did not have such specific advice is error as a matter of law. Andersen v. Indus. Comm'n, 167 Colo. 281 , 447 P.2d 221 (1968).   Prior notification is not required in the case of a sudden injury or illness under subsection (4)(b)(II) as long as the employer is notified “at the earliest practicable time after such occurrence”. Montano v. Indus. Comm'n, 171 Colo. 92 , 464 P.2d 518 (1970).   Sudden illness. Where an employee was discovered lying down before his scheduled break and told his superiors when questioned that he had felt dizzy and had to lie down, and that he suspected that his medication had made him drowsy, the industrial commission was justified in finding that the employee had complied with the statutory notice requirement, and was further justified in awarding him full benefits under subsection (4)(b)(II). Samsonite Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 665 P.2d 1037 (Colo. App. 1983).   Eligibility where claimant unable to perform “normal” work for health reasons. Where an unemployment compensation claimant is, for health reasons, unable to perform such claimant's “normal” work for a period of time, the claimant may nevertheless be eligible for benefits if the claimant is able to perform and is available for other suitable work. Bartholomay v. Indus. Comm'n, 642 P.2d 50 (Colo. App. 1982).   Employee must inform employer he is leaving for health reasons. In order to be entitled to a full award of benefits under subsection (4)(b)(I), an employee must inform his employer upon or prior to leaving that he is quitting (now separating) because of the condition of his health. Slazas v. Indus. Comm'n, 660 P.2d 513 (Colo. App. 1983).   Employee need not specifically inform employer at or prior to termination that employee is leaving because of the condition of the employee's health. Hodges v. Canon Lodge Med. Investors, Ltd., 879 P.2d 476 (Colo. App. 1994) (disagreeing with Slazas v. Indus. Comm'n, 660 P.2d 513 (Colo. App. 1983)).   H. Refusing With Good Cause to Work Overtime.    Compelling personal reasons under subsection (4)(k) are circumstances so significant that they would deprive a reasonable person of the ability to make a truly volitional choice about whether to work overtime. Action Key Punch Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n, 709 P.2d 970 (Colo. App. 1985).   Desire to give birthday party for husband is not compelling personal reason under subsection (4)(k). Action Key Punch Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n, 709 P.2d 970 (Colo. App. 1985).   Objective standard applies. Facts giving rise to a claim of compelling personal reason under subsection (4)(k) are to be judged by an objective standard rather than by the claimant's subjective outlook. Action Key Punch Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n, 709 P.2d 970 (Colo. App. 1985).   Violation of company rule and 50 percent award. The commission “cleared” the employee of stealing from his employer; the discharge was found to have been caused, not by any act of thievery, but only because of a violation of a company rule. He is entitled to a 50 percent award where the violation “did not or could not” result in serious damage to the employer's property or interests. Ruby v. Yellow Cab, Inc., 163 Colo. 297 , 430 P.2d 463 (1967).   Discharge for violation of company rule. When an employee is discharged for violating a company rule, benefits may not be reduced unless the violation could have resulted in “serious damage” to the employer's interests or endangered the “life of the worker or other employee”. Damon v. Indus. Comm'n, 677 P.2d 431 (Colo. App. 1983).   Violation of company rules under subsection (5)(e)(VII). Whether employee's conduct violated company rules is applied in Richardson v. Indus. Comm'n, 701 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1985).   Quitting for personal reasons known to the division. Court harmonizes subsection (5)(c) and former subsection (8) which prescribe different results for quitting for personal reasons known to the division by holding that when a person quits for personal reasons which are known to the division and which are not covered under other provisions, then subsection (5)(c), which was enacted later in time, prevails. Ortega v. Indus. Comm'n, 682 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 1984) (decided prior to 1984 repeal of subsection (8)).   Eligibility provisions of § 8-73-107 came into play only after claim filed. While any refusal of suitable work may well be independent grounds for a reduced benefits decision under former subsection (5), the “eligibility” provisions of § 8-73-107 including limited availability only come into play with respect to conditions existing after filing of the claim. Olivas v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 273, 518 P.2d 304 (1974).   Marital obligation not ground for full compensation. Where a wife quits employment in order to move her residence with her husband, a claim for full compensation cannot be supported on a marital obligation ground. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Emp., 197 Colo. 335 , 592 P.2d 808 (1979).   Reduced benefits after violation of union contract. The commission may reduce a claimant's benefits where he violated a specific provision of his union contract and the contract gave him notice that, by such violation, he was jeopardizing his employment status. Anyon v. Indus. Comm'n, 42 Colo. App. 88, 589 P.2d 1390 (1979).   Where reduced award justified. Where industrial commission, in affirming the referee's determination on the basis of evidence it considered competent, in effect adopted the referee's finding on such “pertinent factors” as the claimant's absenteeism, tardiness, and poor attitude, and the employer's dissatisfaction with her work, a reduced award was justified under former subsection (5)(x) despite the fact that the statutory subsection was not expressly cited. Kiesling v. Indus. Comm'n, 616 P.2d 1002 (Colo. App. 1980).   Reason for absenteeism is finding of fact. The determination of whether absence resulting from a minor illness is more for the employee's comfort rather than a physical inability to perform the work, in which case an employee discharged for absenteeism due to illness is entitled only to a reduced award, is a factual question for the commission. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 637 P.2d 401 (Colo. App. 1981).   For reduced award due to “careless or shoddy work”, pursuant to former subsection (9)(a)(XV), see Anders v. Indus. Comm'n, 649 P.2d 732 (Colo. App. 1982).   Constitutionally protected activity as basis for reduced award. When the claimant asserts that his exercise of the right to free speech has been used by a state employer to justify a reduction of benefits, the commission's decision must reflect application of the three-part test announced in Mt. Healthy City Sch. District Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle (429 U.S. 274 (1977)). Claimant's activities cannot be relied upon to reduce benefits if he can establish that such activities are constitutionally protected and that they were a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to reduce benefits. The employer has the burden of establishing that the same result would have been reduced even in the absence of constitutionally protected conduct. Ward v. Indus. Comm'n, 699 P.2d 960 (Colo. 1985).   I. False Reports.   The phrase “other records or reports” only applies to those documents that relate directly to an employer's assets and liabilities. According to the doctrine of ejusdem generis and the manifest intent of the general assembly, the records and reports in subsection (5)(e)(VII) are concerned with the types of documents that give an employee the ability to misappropriate property. Mounkes v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 251 P.3d 485 (Colo. App. 2010).   IV. REDUCED AWARDS.   Annotator's note. Subsection (5), which formerly dealt with reduced awards, was amended in 1984 to relate to disqualification from benefits. Annotations appearing under this heading were decided under the former subsection (5), relating to reduced awards.   Grant of reduced award for non-enumerated reason. The commission is empowered to grant a reduced award in a case even though the precise reason for the claimant's termination is not enumerated in former subsections (5)(a) to (5)(w) in effect at that time. Dunn v. Indus. Comm'n, 640 P.2d 1146 (Colo. 1982).   Computation of eligibility. Wages earned by a claimant not used in determining monetary eligibility on a combined-wage claim are properly available for transfer to another state to be used in computing monetary eligibility. Denver v. Indus. Comm'n, 712 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 1985).   For purposes of collateral estoppel, board of education's decision to dismiss the teacher is “final judgment”, not the hearing officer's recommendation to retain her. Moffat County Sch. Dist. RE-No. 1 v. Indus. Comm'n, 717 P.2d 995 (Colo. App. 1985), aff'd, 732 P.2d 616 (Colo. 1987).   Even though a teacher is dismissed because she has inadequate professional skills, she may nonetheless be entitled to unemployment benefits. Indus. Comm'n v. Moffat County Sch. Dist. RE-No. 1, 732 P.2d 616 (Colo. 1987).   V. NO AWARD.   Subsection (5)(g) refers to the deferral of any benefits attributable to other employments to which claimant may be entitled, and does not negate the plain disqualification provisions of subsection (5)(e). Parker v. Daniels Motors, Inc., 738 P.2d 68 (Colo. App. 1987).   If the division determines an employee is separated from employment for just reasons, then the employee shall be given no award of benefits. McGinn v. Indus. Comm'n, 31 Colo. 6 , 496 P.2d 1080 (1972).   The determination of whether an employer's actions constitute “personal harassment” under subsection (4)(o) is governed by an objective standard. The standard is whether a reasonable person in the claimant's position would have found the employer's conduct to be so, troubling, and annoying as to warrant resignation from employment. Survey Sols., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 956 P.2d 1275 (Colo. App. 1998).   An employer's comment relating to claimant's daughter was not conduct that a reasonable person would find to be so vexing, troubling, and annoying as to warrant quitting a job, and thus falls short of the required standard for “personal harassment”. Survey Sols., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 956 P.2d 1275 (Colo. App. 1998).   Where the record shows that employer criticized claimant's husband, but does not indicate what the actual comments were nor that the comments had been directed to the claimant, the record does not support a finding of “personal harassment”. Survey Solutions, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 956 P.2d 1275 (Colo. App. 1998).   Unemployment found voluntary. Where a claimant voluntarily retires from his full-time position and continues as a union auditor during 12 weeks per year, his unemployment during the remainder of the year is not involuntary and he is not entitled to unemployment compensation. Int'l Typographical Union v. Indus. Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 29, 609 P.2d 634 (Colo. App. 1980).   No award when claimant leaves job only because dissatisfied. It is apparent that the statutory scheme intended by the general assembly was to provide certain benefits during unemployment if a claimant did not quit because of dissatisfaction with standard working conditions, and that former § 82-4-8 (5)(a) (i) therefore applies to a claimant who leaves his job where there has been no change in his working conditions, but where, nevertheless, he is dissatisfied with them. Indus. Comm'n v. McIntyre, 162 Colo. 227 , 425 P.2d 279 (1967).   No award will be made where an employee voluntarily quits work to get married, and a judgment imposing the maximum disqualification under the unemployment compensation act is not error. Cottrell Clothing Co. v. Teets, 139 Colo. 567 , 342 P.2d 1021 (1959).   An award shall not be granted to an employee who quits to seek other work, not having first accepted an offer of other employment. The testimony of the petitioner establishes that at the time he terminated his employment there had not been a definite offer of employment made to him which he had accepted. The new employer represented to him some possibility and hope of future employment but it had not ripened into a contract of hire. Anderson v. Valspar Corp., 29 Colo. App. 294, 482 P.2d 992 (1971).   Insubordination connotes a willful, deliberate, or purposeful refusal to follow the reasonable directions or instructions of the employer. Beatty v. Automatic Catering, Inc., 165 Colo. 219 , 438 P.2d 234 (1968).   What is “willful” depends on facts. It is difficult to mark the precise connotative boundaries of the terms “deliberate” or “willful”, as employed by the law, since the word carries various shades of meaning; it takes on the color of its context, and therefore, what is “willful” depends primarily upon a determination of factual matters. Sayers v. Am. Janitorial Serv., Inc., 162 Colo. 292 , 425 P.2d 693 (1967).   Willful misconduct does not necessarily require actual intent to wrong the employer. It is enough if there is a conscious indifference to the perpetration of a wrong, or a reckless disregard of the employee's duty to his employer. Sayers v. Am. Janitorial Serv., Inc., 162 Colo. 292 , 425 P.2d 693 (1967).   Violation of a company rule. The employee conceded that he broke a company rule, though he offered several excuses for his conduct. These excuses were in no sense “binding” on the commission. Nor do they in any manner alter the fact that there has been a violation of a company rule. Ruby v. Yellow Cab Inc., 163 Colo. 297 , 430 P.2d 463 (1967).   Such as when an employee refused to leave employer's nightclub in violation of policy whereby employer permitted employees to be in nightclub when club was not crowded. Where refusal caused employer to terminate employee's employment, such conduct prevented claimant from receiving unemployment benefits. Radis v. Indus. Comm'n, 31 Colo. App. 389, 502 P.2d 977 (1972).   Deliberate disobedience of reasonable instruction. Claimant, who refused to provide his employer with medical report, report of motor vehicle accident in which claimant was charged with driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor, and current copy of claimant's driving record, deliberately disobeyed reasonable instruction of employer and, thus, was at fault in causing his separation from employment and was ineligible for unemployment benefits. Wilson v. Indus. Comm'n, 730 P.2d 911 (Colo. App. 1986).   No award because of careless work. Where the industrial commission concluded that a claimant's employment had been terminated because his work was unsatisfactory and not up to the standard required by the company and that he was not entitled to compensation pursuant to subsection (6)(q), which provides for no award of benefits where the employment is terminated due to careless or negligent work, and the division specifically found that, although claimant, who had suffered two nervous breakdowns, might not have been restored to complete mental health, he had been certified as fit to return to work by the treating physician, and, absent other evidence, the division determined that petitioner had failed to prove he was mentally unable to perform his work, which would qualify him for a full award. Tague v. Coors Porcelain Co., 30 Colo. App. 158, 490 P.2d 96 (1971).   “Failure to meet established job performance standards” means that claimant did not do the job for which he was hired and which he knew was expected of him. Parker v. Daniels Motors, Inc., 738 P.2d 68 (Colo. App. 1987).   Thus, where the right to unemployment benefits did not accrue until after the amendment to subsection (4)(f) became effective, denying benefits under the amended terms of the section was not a retroactive application of the section, even though the claimant would have been entitled to benefits under the unamended terms of the section. Collins v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 813 P.2d 804 (Colo. App. 1991).   Subsection (9)(a)(XX) is not void for vagueness. “Failure to meet established job performance or other defined standards” means that claimant did not do the job for which she was hired and in which she knew what was expected of her. Dawson v. Indus. Comm'n, 660 P.2d 924 (Colo. App. 1983).   Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of the grounds for terminating a tenured teacher under subsection (9)(a)(XX) in a hearing for unemployment compensation benefits where a board of education votes to terminate a teacher after a full administrative hearing and finding of facts, even through the board's action is still subject to review. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Indus. Comm'n, 698 P.2d 1350 (Colo. App. 1984).   “Fault” under the statute is not necessarily related to culpability, but must be construed as requiring a volitional act. Zelingers v. Indus. Comm'n, 679 P.2d 608 (Colo. App. 1984).   Voluntary violation of residence requirement. A police officer who married and moved outside the city voluntarily violates a charter requirement and police department regulation that is a condition of employment. This constitutes fault on the part of the police officer, and precludes an award of full unemployment benefits, pursuant to subsection (8). City & County of Denver v. Indus. Comm'n, 666 P.2d 160 (Colo. App. 1983).   No award where claimant's misrepresentations about his academic credentials were material. Denberg v. Loretto Heights Coll., 694 P.2d 375 (Colo. App. 1984).   In determining the suitability of the offered employment, this section offers the following considerations: The degree of risk involved to claimant's health, safety, and morals; his physical fitness and prior training, his experience and prior earnings; his length of unemployment and prospects for securing work in his customary occupation; and the distance of the available local work from his residence. Toston v. Indus. Comm'n, 160 Colo. 281 , 417 P.2d 1 (1966).   Denial of compensation to claimants who were offered similar work 175 miles away on the other side of the continental divide, but who insisted that the work was not suitable and declined to accept, was held improper under this section. Indus. Comm'n v. Lazar, 111 Colo. 69 , 137 P.2d 405 (1943).   The beneficent purposes of the act do not include a guaranty that a job offer must be for wages equal to that of the old job in order to be deemed as suitable work. Bayly Mfg. Co. v. Dept. of Emp., 155 Colo. 433 , 395 P.2d 216 (1964).   A refusal to accept an offer of temporary employment does not, in and of itself, constitute a refusal to accept suitable work. Toston v. Indus. Comm'n, 160 Colo. 281 , 417 P.2d 1 (1966).   A claimant is entitled to a reasonable time in which to compete in the labor market for available jobs of a permanent nature for which he has the skill, and at a rate of pay commensurate with his prior earnings. Bayly Mfg. Co. v. Dept. of Emp., 155 Colo. 433 , 395 P.2d 216 (1964); Toston v. Indus. Comm'n, 160 Colo. 281 , 417 P.2d 1 (1966).   Thus, work at a substantially lower wage should not be deemed “suitable” unless a claimant has been given a reasonable period to compete in the labor market for available jobs for which he has the skill at a rate of pay commensurate with his prior earnings. Bayly Mfg. Co. v. Dept. of Emp., 155 Colo. 433 , 395 P.2d 216 (1964); Indus. Comm'n v. Zavatta, 166 Colo. 365 , 443 P.2d 982 (1968).   And a reasonable time is a question of fact. What constitutes a reasonable time in these cases is not a matter to be answered by rigid formulas. Rather, it must initially be determined as a question of fact under the circumstances of each individual case by the appropriate agency. Bayly Mfg. Co. v. Dept. of Emp., 155 Colo. 433 , 395 P.2d 216 (1964); Toston v. Indus. Comm'n, 160 Colo. 281 , 417 P.2d 1 (1966).   Nevertheless, “unsuitable” work may become “suitable”. Work which may be deemed “unsuitable” at the inception of the claimant's unemployment, and for a reasonable time thereafter, because it pays less, may thereafter become “suitable” work when consideration is given to the length of unemployment and the prospects for obtaining customary work at his prior earning capacity. Bayly Mfg. Co. v. Dept. of Emp., 155 Colo. 433 , 395 P.2d 216 (1964); Toston v. Indus. Comm'n, 160 Colo. 281 , 417 P.2d 1 (1966).   And a claimant may not justify his refusal of a job offer on sole grounds that it is nonunion; and if in fact the job offered is not “suitable”, then the reason for the claimant's refusal is immaterial. Indus. Comm'n v. Zavatta, 166 Colo. 365 , 443 P.2d 982 (1968).   If wages offered are substantially less than prevailing wage, work is not “suitable”. Romero v. Indus. Comm'n, 616 P.2d 992 (Colo. App. 1980).   Claimant entitled to benefits where he defended himself against unprovoked assault. Where the evidence was uncontradicted that claimant acted only to defend himself against an unprovoked assault by a coemployee, he could not be denied unemployment benefits. Escamilla v. Indus. Comm'n, 670 P.2d 815 (Colo. App. 1983).   Industrial commission was without authority to award unemployment benefits to hospital employees who accepted and continued to receive employee benefits, i.e. they were nurses who were part of the nursing pool and were employed, albeit intermittently. St. Anthony Hosp. Sys. v. Indus. Comm'n, 709 P.2d 967 (Colo. App. 1985).   Denial of compensation improper when employment offered was at substantially less favorable wage. Indus. Comm'n v. Brady, 128 Colo. 490 , 263 P.2d 578 (1953).   No substantial unfavorable change in working conditions occurred justifying an award of benefits, where claimant's termination was precipitated by a reduction in his income but no change in the method of his compensation. Claimant was hired to serve both as a warehouse worker and a relief driver under terms by which he was paid more for working as a warehouse worker than he was paid for working as a relief driver. When the claimant's relief driver duties increased, he refused to perform them unless he was paid more and, consequently, was discharged. Muhlenkamp v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 802 P.2d 1127 (Colo. App. 1990).   In determining a claimant's entitlement to benefits, the law in effect on the date the claimant's right to benefits accrues is the law which governs. Baldwin v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 813 P.2d 807 (Colo. App. 1991).   When an employee voluntarily resigns and the employer refuses to accept an attempted retraction of the resignation prior to the effective date, the employee's resignation is considered to have been voluntary for the purposes of determining unemployment compensation benefits. Cunliffe v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 51 P.3d 1088 (Colo. App. 2002).   Applied in Stensvad v. Indus. Comm'n, 167 Colo. 140 , 445 P.2d 898 (1968); Debalco v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 32 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2001).   VI. EVIDENCE.   Function of hearsay. Though hearsay evidence may be received in an unemployment benefits proceeding, it alone cannot be the basis of the commission's order. Allen v. Indus. Comm'n, 36 Colo. App. 330, 540 P.2d 358 (1975) (decided under former law).   Hearsay evidence, though admissible in administrative hearings, cannot alone support an order of the industrial commission. Romero v. Indus. Comm'n, 616 P.2d 992 (Colo. App. 1980).   Hearsay may have probative value and should be considered as corroborative evidence. Yellow Front Stores v. Indus. Comm'n, 694 P.2d 882 (Colo. App. 1985).   Hearsay evidence alone may be basis of determination in an unemployment compensation proceeding but only if such evidence is reliable and trustworthy and possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. Flower Stop Mktg. Corp. v. Kilgore, 762 P.2d 747 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 782 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1989) (applying Kirke v. State Dept. of Rev., 724 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1986) and overruling the “residuum rule” holding in Sims v. Indus. Comm'n, 627 P.2d 1107 (Colo. 1981) and subsequent cases which applied such rule).   Factors useful in determining whether hearsay evidence is reliable, trustworthy, and of some probative value are set forth in Indus. Claim Appeals Office v. Flower Stop Mktg. Corp., 782 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1989).   Evidence of specific illness inadmissible in unemployment compensation hearing where claimant did not provide employer with prior notice that a specific illness was the reason for claimant's failure to report to work. Sands v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 801 P.2d 12 (Colo. App. 1990).   Resolution of conflicting evidence is a matter properly left to the commission in its fact-finding role. Mohawk Data Scis. Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 660 P.2d 922 (Colo. App. 1983).   Appeals court would not take judicial notice of facts not in evidence in disqualification case. Where the evidentiary record before the hearing officer contained nothing to indicate the testing laboratory that allegedly found marijuana in claimant's system was licensed or certified as required by statute, a reference to the lab's web site in connection with the appeal was not an acceptable substitute. Similarly, the claimant's admission that he had ingested marijuana two days prior to the test would not permit the inference that he was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the test, absent medical evidence of the length of time marijuana remains detectable in the human system. Sosa v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 259 P.3d 558 (Colo. App. 2011).