CO Code § 42-2-125 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 42 - Vehicles and Traffic|Article 2 - Drivers' Licenses|Part 1 - Drivers' Licenses|§ 42-2-125. Mandatory Revocation of License and Permit

  The department shall immediately revoke the license or permit of any driver or minor driver upon receiving a record showing that the driver has:   Been convicted of vehicular homicide or vehicular assault as described in sections 18-3-106 and 18-3-205, C.R.S., or of criminally negligent homicide as described in section 18-3-105, C.R.S., while driving a motor vehicle;    Been convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5), C.R.S.;  (b.5) In the case of a driver twenty-one years of age or older, been convicted of an offense described in section 42-4-1301 (1)(a) or (2)(a). Except as provided in section 42-2-132.5 , the period of revocation based upon this paragraph (b.5) shall be nine months. The provisions of this paragraph (b.5) shall not apply to a person whose driving privilege was revoked pursuant to section 42-2-126 (3)(a)(I) for a first offense based on the same driving incident.     Been convicted of any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle was used;    Been convicted of failing to stop and render aid as required by section 42-4-1601;    Been convicted of perjury in the first or second degree or the making of a false affidavit or statement under oath to the department under any law relating to the ownership or operation of a motor vehicle;    Been three times convicted of reckless driving of a motor vehicle for acts committed within a period of two years;      Been twice convicted of any combination of DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI for acts committed within a period of five years; (g) (I) Been twice convicted of any combination of DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI for acts committed within a period of five years;    In the case of a minor driver, been convicted of DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI committed while such driver was under twenty-one years of age;  (g.5) In the case of a minor driver, been convicted of UDD committed when such driver was under twenty-one years of age;        Been determined to be mentally incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction and for whom a court has entered, pursuant to part 3 or part 4 of article 14 of title 15, C.R.S., or section 27-65-109 (4) or 27-65-127, C.R.S., an order specifically finding that the mental incompetency is of such a degree that the person is incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle;    Been convicted of DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI and has two previous convictions of any of those offenses. The department shall revoke the license of any driver for an indefinite period and only reissue it upon proof to the department that the driver has completed a level II alcohol and drug education and treatment program certified by the office of behavioral health in the department of human services pursuant to section 42-4-1301.3 and that the driver has demonstrated knowledge of the laws and driving ability through the regular motor vehicle testing process. The department shall not reissue the license in less than two years.    Been required to file and maintain proof of financial responsibility for the future as provided by section 42-4-1410 or article 7 of this title and who, at the time of a violation of any provision of this title, had not filed or was not maintaining such proof;    Repealed.    Been found to have knowingly and willfully left the scene of an accident involving a commercial motor vehicle driven by the person;      Been convicted of violating section 18-13-122 (3) or 44-3-901 (1)(c) or (1)(d) or any counterpart municipal charter or ordinance offense to such sections and having failed to complete an alcohol evaluation or assessment, an alcohol education program, or an alcohol treatment program ordered by the court in connection with such conviction; or (m) (I) Been convicted of violating section 18-13-122 (3) or 44-3-901 (1)(c) or (1)(d) or any counterpart municipal charter or ordinance offense to such sections and having failed to complete an alcohol evaluation or assessment, an alcohol education program, or an alcohol treatment program ordered by the court in connection with such conviction; or    Been convicted of violating section 18-13-122 (3) or 44-3-901 (1)(c) or (1)(d) or any counterpart municipal charter or ordinance offense to such sections and has a previous conviction for such offenses;       (Deleted by amendment, L. 2009, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1816, § 8, effective August 5, 2009.)    Been:   (Deleted by amendment, L. 2009, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1816, § 8, effective August 5, 2009.)    Convicted of, or has received a deferred judgment for, an offense described in section 18-4-409 or 18-4-503 (1)(c), C.R.S., or a comparable municipal charter or ordinance offense.    (Deleted by amendment,L. 2007, p. 504, § 3, effective July 1, 2007.)          Unless otherwise provided in this section, the period of revocation shall be not less than one year; except that the period of revocation based on paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of this section involving a commercial motor vehicle transporting hazardous materials as defined under section 42-2-402 (7) shall result in a revocation period of three years. (2.3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2007, p. 504 , § 3, effective July 1, 2007.) (2.4) After the expiration of the period of revocation pursuant to this section and any subsequently imposed periods of revocation, any person whose license is revoked under subparagraph (I) of paragraph (g) or paragraph (i) of subsection (1) of this section shall be required to have a restricted license pursuant to the provisions of section 42-2-132.5 . (2.5) The period of revocation under paragraph (g.5) of subsection (1) of this section for a person who is less than twenty-one years of age at the time of the offense and who is convicted of driving with an alcohol content of at least 0.02 but not more than 0.05 under section 42-4-1301 (2)(d) is as follows:   Except as provided in subsection (2.7) of this section, three months for a first offense;    Six months for a second offense;    One year for a third or subsequent offense.   (2.7) (a) A person whose license is revoked for a first offense under paragraph (g.5) of subsection (1) of this section may request that, in lieu of the three-month revocation, the person's license be revoked for a period of not less than thirty days, to be followed by a suspension period of such length that the total period of revocation and suspension equals three months. If the hearing officer approves such request, the hearing officer may grant such person a probationary license that may be used only for the reasons provided in section 42-2-127 (14)(a).    The hearing to consider a request under paragraph (a) of this subsection (2.7) may be held at the same time as the hearing held under subsection (4) of this section; except that a probationary license may not become effective until at least thirty days have elapsed since the beginning of the revocation period. (2.8) Repealed.          Upon revoking the license of any person as required by this section, the department shall immediately notify the licensee as provided in section 42-2-119 (2). Where a minor driver's license is revoked under paragraph (m) of subsection (1) of this section, such revocation shall not run concurrently with any previous or subsequent suspension, revocation, cancellation, or denial that is provided for by law.    Upon receipt of the notice of revocation, the licensee or the licensee's attorney may request a hearing in writing, if the licensee has returned said license to the department in accordance with the provisions of section 42-2-133. The department, upon notice to the licensee, shall hold a hearing at the district office of the department closest to the residence of the licensee; except that, at the discretion of the department, all or part of the hearing may be conducted in real time, by telephone or other electronic means in accordance with section 42-1-218.5. The department shall hold the hearing not less than thirty days after receiving such license and request through a hearing commissioner appointed by the executive director of the department, which hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 24-4-105, C.R.S. After such hearing, the licensee may appeal the decision of the department to the district court as provided in section 42-2-135. Should a driver who has had his or her license revoked under this section be subsequently acquitted of such charge by a court of record, the department shall immediately, in any event not later than ten days after the receipt of such notice of acquittal, reinstate said license to the driver affected.    Except where more than one revocation occurs as a result of the same episode of driving, license revocations made pursuant to this section shall not run concurrently with any previous or subsequent revocation or denial in lieu of revocation which is provided for by law. Any revocation unused pursuant to this section shall not preclude other actions which the department is required to take pursuant to the provisions of this title, and unless otherwise provided by law, this subsection (5) shall not prohibit revocations from being served concurrently with any suspension or denial in lieu of suspension of driving privileges.      Any person who has a license revoked pursuant to paragraph (m) of subsection (1) of this section shall be subject to the following revocation periods: (6) (a) Any person who has a license revoked pursuant to paragraph (m) of subsection (1) of this section shall be subject to the following revocation periods:   After a first conviction and failure to complete an ordered evaluation, assessment, or program, three months;    After a second conviction, six months;    After any third or subsequent conviction, one year.    (Deleted by amendment,L. 2008, p. 833, § 3, effective January 1, 2009.)       (Deleted by amendment,L. 2007, p. 504, § 3, effective July 1, 2007.)    Repealed.       (Deleted by amendment, L. 2009, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1816, § 8, effective August 5, 2009.)    If a suspension or revocation of a license is authorized or required for conviction of an offense under state law, a final finding of guilt for a violation of a municipal ordinance governing a substantially equivalent offense in a municipality, county, or another state for purposes of a suspension or revocation shall be deemed as a conviction of the corresponding offense under state law. A stay of sentence or a pending appeal shall not deprive the department of the authority to suspend, revoke, or deny a driver's license or minor driver's license pending a final determination of a conviction on appeal.     History. Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2133, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (1)(m) amended, p. 314, § 2, effective July 1. L. 96: (1)(j) amended, p. 1207, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: (1)(g) and (1)(i) amended and (1)(g.5), (2.5), and (2.7) added, p. 1460, § § 3, 2, effective July 1; (1)(m) amended, p. 305, § 22, effective July 1; (1)(n) and (7) added and (3) amended, p. 1537, § § 3, 4, effective July 1. L. 98: IP(2.5) amended, p. 173, § 2, effective April 6; (1)(k), (3), and (6) amended, p. 1434, § 3, effective July 1. L. 99: (1)(n) amended, p. 391, § 2, effective July 1; (2.3) and (2.4) added, p. 1158, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(g) and (2.4) amended, p. 1075, § 2, effective July 1; IP(1), (1)(g)(II), (1)(g.5), (1)(k)(II), (3), and (7) amended, p. 1353, § 24, effective July 1, 2001; (6)(c)(II) added by revision, pp. 1353, 1362, § § 24, 49. L. 2001: (4) amended, p. 553, § 3, effective May 23. L. 2002: (1)(i) amended, p. 1921, § 17, effective July 1; (1)(k) repealed, p. 1585, § 16, effective July 1. L. 2003: (1)(n) amended, p. 1905, § 5, effective July 1; (1)(o) and (2.8) added, pp. 1845, 1846, § § 3, 5, effective July 1. L. 2005: IP(1)(o) amended and (8) added, p. 647, § 15, effective May 27. L. 2007: (1)(d), (1)(o), (2), (2.3), (2.8), (3), IP(6)(a), (6)(b), and (8) amended, p. 504, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2008: (1)(g), (1)(g.5), and (1)(i) amended, p. 245, § 7, effective July 1; (1)(b.5) added and (1)(g)(I) and (2) amended, p. 832, § 2, effective January 1, 2009. L. 2009: (1)(m), (1)(n), (1)(o)(I), (3), (6)(a), and (7) amended, (HB 09-1266), ch. 347, p. 1816, § 8, effective August 5. L. 2010: (1)(h) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 807, § 85, effective April 29. L. 2011: (1)(i) amended, (HB 11-1303), ch. 264, p. 1179, § 101, effective August 10. L. 2012: (1)(b) amended, (HB 12-1311), ch. 281, p. 1631, § 88, effective July 1. L. 2013: (1)(b), (1)(g), and (1)(i) amended, (HB 13-1325), ch. 331, p. 1880, § 7, effective May 28. L. 2014: (1)(m) amended, (SB 14-129), ch. 387, p. 1939, § 11, effective June 6. L. 2015: IP(2.5) amended, (HB 15-1043), ch. 262, p. 997, § 6, effective August 5. L. 2016: (2.8) repealed, (SB 16-065), ch. 277, p. 1143, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2017: IP(1) and (1)(i) amended, (SB 17-242), ch. 263, p. 1257, § 20, effective May 25. L. 2018: (1)(m) amended, (HB 18-1025), ch. 152, p. 1082, § 23, effective October 1.    Editor's note:    This section is similar to former § 42-2-122 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-125 was relocated to § 42-2-133.    Amendments to subsection (1)(g)(II) by Senate Bill 00-018 and Senate Bill 00-011 were harmonized, effective July 1, 2001. Amendments to subsection (1)(g)(I) by House Bill 08-1166 and House Bill 08-1194 were harmonized, effective January 1, 2009.    Subsection (6)(c)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (6)(c), effective July 1, 2001. (See L. 2000, pp. 1353, 1362.)     Cross references:   For the legislative declaration contained in the 2008 act enacting subsection (1)(b.5) and amending subsections (1)(g)(I) and (2), see section 1 of chapter 221, Session Laws of Colorado 2008. For the legislative declaration in SB 17-242, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2017.   ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “Highlights of the 1955 Legislative Session — Criminal Law and Procedure”, see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 69 . For article, “Due Process in Involuntary Civil Commitment and Incompetency Adjudication Proceedings: Where Does Colorado Stand?”, see 46 Den. L.J. 516 (1969). For article, “The New Colorado Per Se DUI Law”, see 12 Colo. Law. 1451 (1983). For article, “Drinking and Driving: An Update on the 1989 Legislation”, see 18 Colo. Law. 1943 (1989). For article, “There Must Be Fifty Ways to Lose Your (Driver's) License”, see 22 Colo. Law. 2385 (1993).   Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-125 is similar to 42-2-122 as it existed prior to the amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1 and to § 13-4-22 as it existed prior to its repeal, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.   There is no denial of equal protection in imposition of statutory sanctions on habitual offender. Charnes v. Kiser, 617 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1980).   The failure of the implied consent statute to provide for a probationary license does not violate equal protection of the laws. DeScala v. Motor Vehicle Div., 667 P.2d 1360 (Colo. 1983).   Disparity in eligibility for probationary license held constitutional. Although under the implied consent law a person refusing to submit to a chemical test is subject to a mandatory revocation without any opportunity for a probationary license, while a person actually convicted of driving under the influence is subject to a mandatory revocation but nonetheless may apply for a probationary license, this disparity in treatment does not violate equal protection of the laws. Drake v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 674 P.2d 359 (Colo. 1984).   Revocation of license no burden on right to travel interstate. While the right to travel interstate is without question a fundamental right under the United States constitution, revocation of a driver's license pursuant to this section does not burden this fundamental right. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194 , 613 P.2d 884 (1980).   Primary purpose of this section and §§ 42-2-121 and 42-2-123 is to protect the public safety upon the highways. Heil v. Charnes, 44 Colo. App. 225, 616 P.2d 980 (1980).   The implied consent statute serves the distinct governmental purpose of facilitating citizen cooperation in achieving traffic safety by the use of the administrative sanction of revocation upon a refusal to submit to a test, while the statutory authorization for a probationary license is expressly directed towards the “alcohol and drug traffic driving education or treatment” of the convicted traffic offender. DeScala v. Motor Vehicle Div., 667 P.2d 1360 (Colo. 1983).   Laws aimed at drivers under influence of alcohol. The traffic laws and the revocation procedures contained in this section and § 42-2-203 are aimed at all drivers who operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or while their ability is impaired, regardless of their status as alcoholics or problem drinkers. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194 , 613 P.2d 884 (1980).   Proceeding not barred by one-year delay. A one-year delay in commencing these administrative proceedings pursuant to § 42-2-123 does not ipso facto constitute a bar to the hearing. Berry v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 721 (Colo. App. 1982).   Issuance of driver's license does not confer upon licensee right that is independently entitled to protection against any and all governmental interference or restriction. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194 , 613 P.2d 884 (1980).   Categorization of alcohol-related driving offenses reasonably related to governmental interest. To the extent that one might consider as a classification the categorization of alcohol-related driving offenses in subsections (1)(g) and (1)(i), and § 42-2-202 (2)(a)(I) , such classification is reasonably related to the expressed governmental interest of providing maximum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highway. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194 , 613 P.2d 884 (1980) (decided prior to the 1981 amendment to subsections (1)(g) and (1)(i)).   Where a driver's license has been revoked, it continues revoked until a new license has been granted, and such revocation does not terminate with the expiration date of the license. People v. Lopez, 143 Colo. 523 , 354 P.2d 491 (1960).   Completion of alcohol education program was not mitigating factor to be considered in granting or denial of probationary driver's license, but rather was prerequisite for application. Hoth v. Charnes, 736 P.2d 1264 (Colo. App. 1987).   Former subsection (4) of this section required the completion of a Level II alcohol treatment program as a prerequisite to the issuance of a probationary license for a driver twice convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol within a five-year period. Smith v. Dept. of Rev., 793 P.2d 611 (Colo. App. 1990) (decided under law in effect prior to 1990 repeal and reenactment of subsection (4)).   Probationary license sought pursuant to former subsection (4) was properly denied since the original revocation period expired for driver twice convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol within five years and driver was eligible for reinstatement, notwithstanding the fact the revocation remained in effect until the driver completed Level II alcohol treatment. Smith v. Dept. of Rev., 793 P.2d 611 (Colo. App. 1990) (decided under law in effect prior to 1990 repeal and reenactment of subsection (4)).   The application of the 1990 amendments to deny a probationary license was not unlawful as being retroactive in operation or in violation of defendant's vested rights because the revocation and probationary license issues were not triggered until defendant's criminal convictions occurred after the effective date of the 1990 amendments. Rogers v. Dept. of Rev., 841 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1992).   Indefinite revocation is a remedial action designed to assure the general public safety in the use of its highways and is not cruel and unusual punishment. Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202 , 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).   Notice need not give facts warranting revocation to be adequate. The notice received from the division of motor vehicles is not defective because it does not give adequate notice of the facts warranting revocation unless the driver was genuinely surprised. Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202 , 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).   The function of the hearing examiner under this statute is purely ministerial. Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202 , 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).   Revocation proper even though offenses occurred prior to amendment. Application of the mandatory revocation provision of subsection (1)(g) is not improper even though only one of the offenses upon which the revocation of the license is based occurred after the effective date of the 1981 amendment. Sanchez v. State, Dept. of Rev., 667 P.2d 779 (Colo. 1983).   Only the triggering offense must occur after the effective date of the act. Zaragoza v. Dept. of Rev., 702 P.2d 274 (Colo. 1985); Sommer v. Dept. of Rev., 714 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1986).   There is no due process violation in suspending the driver's license of any person convicted of any felony drug offense. The sanction is reasonably related to the governmental objective of preventing the possession, use, or sale of controlled substances. People v. Zinn, 843 P.2d 1351 (Colo. 1993).   Revocation of license proper for driver who was properly requested to take urine test to detect presence of drugs but refused to provide requisite sample. Halter v. Dept. of Rev., 857 P.2d 535 (Colo. App. 1993).   Requirement to surrender license to the court upon conviction under § 18-18-406 is simply an additional sanction specifically authorized by the general assembly to be imposed. Since the imposition of that sanction has received proper legislative approval, no double jeopardy problems arise. People v. Smith, 944 P.2d 639 (Colo. App. 1997).   Due process not violated where police report concerning basis of conclusion that driver was under the influence of marijuana was admitted into evidence but officer who prepared report was not present at revocation hearing since report was available for discovery before hearing and driver could have called officer to testify. Halter v. Dept. of Rev., 857 P.2d 535 (Colo. App. 1993).   Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to review the suspension or revocation of a driver's license when the driver-defendant has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Kriz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 916 P.2d 659 (Colo. App. 1996).   Remedy for driver who has had his driver's license revoked or suspended may be available pursuant to § 24-4-105 (10) where the Colorado department of revenue does not hold an administrative hearing prior to the expiration of 60 days as the department is under statutory obligation to hold an administrative hearing within 60 days under either this section or § 42-2-126 . Kriz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 916 P.2d 659 (Colo. App. 1996).   Applied in People v. Heinz, 195 Colo. 71 , 589 P.2d 931 (1979); Fuhrer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 197 Colo. 325 , 592 P.2d 402 (1979); Reasoner v. Dept. of Rev., 628 P.2d 187 (Colo. App. 1981); Hedstrom v. Motor Vehicle Div., 662 P.2d 173 (Colo. 1983).