CO Code § 4-9-301 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 4 - Uniform Commercial Code|Article 9 - Secured Transactions|Part 3 - Perfection and Priority|§ 4-9-301. Law Governing Perfection and Priority of Security Interests

 Except as otherwise provided in sections 4-9-303 to 4-9-306 , the following rules determine the law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral:    Except as otherwise provided in this section, while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral.    While collateral is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a possessory security interest in that collateral.    Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (4) of this section, while tangible negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, or tangible chattel paper is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs:   Perfection of a security interest in the goods by filing a fixture filing;    Perfection of a security interest in timber to be cut; and    The effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a nonpossessory security interest in the collateral.       The local law of the jurisdiction in which the wellhead or minehead is located governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in as-extracted collateral.     History. Source: L. 2001: Entire article R&RE, p. 1341, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2006: IP(3) amended, p. 501, § 37, effective September 1.    Cross references:   For offenses relating to this title, see part 5 of article 5 of title 18.   Official Comments   Copyright by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Reproduced with the permission of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. All rights reserved. —   Editor's note:   The Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code are available only in the printed book form of Colorado Revised Statutes. As noted above, the Official Comments are subject to copyright by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. At this time, Colorado has a license to reprint the Official Comments in the printed book form.   Editor's note:    The numbering and sequencing of C.R.S. subsections do not necessarily correspond with the numbering and sequencing of subsections in the uniform act.    This article was numbered as article 9 of chapter 155, C.R.S. 1963. The provisions of this article were repealed and reenacted in 2001, resulting in the addition, relocation, and elimination of sections as well as subject matter. For amendments to this article prior to 2001, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated. For a detailed comparison of this article, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.     Law reviews:   For article, “Lien and Security Interest Provision of AAPL Model Operating Agreement”, see 13 Colo. Law. 1216 ; for a discussion of a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with secured transactions, see 66 Den. U. L. Rev. 795 (1989); for article, “Mastering The Maze of Secured Transactions - Part 1”, see 21 Colo. Law. 2329 (1992); for article, “Remastering the Maze: Revisions to UCC Article 9 Filing Provisions”, see 25 Colo. Law. 3 (June 1996); for article, “Introducing Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code”, see 30 Colo. Law. 9 (Sept. 2001); for article, “Perfecting Security Interests in Intellectual Property”, see 32 Colo. Law. 85 (April 2003).   Editor's note:   This section is similar to former § 4-9-103 as it existed prior to 2001.   OFFICIAL COMMENT   1. Source. Former Sections 9-103(1)(a), (b), 9-103(3)(a), (b), 9-103(5), substantially modified.   2. Scope of This Subpart. Part 3, Subpart 1 (Sections 9-301 through 9-307) contains choice-of-law rules similar to those of former Section 9-103. Former Section 9-103 generally addresses which State's law governs “perfection and the effect of perfection or non- perfection of” security interests. See, e.g., former Section 9-103(1)(b). This Article follows the broader and more precise formulation in former Section 9-103(6)(b), which was revised in connection with the promulgation of Revised Article 8 in 1994: “perfection, the effect of perfection or non-perfection, and the priority of” security interests. Priority, in this context, subsumes all of the rules in Part 3, including “cut off” or “take free” rules such as Sections 9-317(b), (c), and (d), 9-320(a), (b), and (d), and 9-332. This subpart does not address choice of law for other purposes. For example, the law applicable to issues such as attachment, validity, characterization (e.g., true lease or security interest), and enforcement is governed by the rules in Section 1-301; that governing law typically is specified in the same agreement that contains the security agreement. And, another jurisdiction's law may govern other third-party matters addressed in this Article. See Section 9-401, Comment 3.   3. Scope of Referral. In designating the jurisdiction whose law governs, this Article directs the court to apply only the substantive (“local”) law of a particular jurisdiction and not its choice-of-law rules.   Example 1: Litigation over the priority of a security interest in accounts arises in State X. State X has adopted the official text of this Article, which provides that priority is determined by the local law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. See Section 9-301(1). The debtor is located in State Y. Even if State Y has retained former Article 9 or enacted a nonuniform choice-of-law rule (e.g., one that provides that perfection is governed by the law of State Z), a State X court should look only to the substantive law of State Y and disregard State Y's choice-of-law rule. State Y's substantive law (e.g., its Section 9-501) provides that financing statements should be filed in a filing office in State Y. Note, however, that if the identical perfection issue were to be litigated in State Y, the court would look to State Y's former Section 9-103 or nonuniform 9-301 and conclude that a filing in State Y is ineffective.   Example 2: In the preceding Example, assume that State X has adopted the official text of this Article, and State Y has adopted a nonuniform Section 9-301(1) under which perfection is governed by the whole law of State X, including its choice-of-law rules. If litigation occurs in State X, the court should look to the substantive law of State Y, which provides that financing statements are to be filed in a filing office in State Y. If litigation occurs in State Y, the court should look to the law of State X, whose choice-of-law rule requires that the court apply the substantive law of State Y. Thus, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the litigation arises, the financing statement should be filed in State Y.   4. Law Governing Perfection: General Rule. Paragraph (1) contains the general rule: the law governing perfection of security interests in both tangible and intangible collateral, whether perfected by filing or automatically, is the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor's location, as determined under Section 9-307.   Paragraph (1) substantially simplifies the choice-of-law rules. Former Section 9-103 contained different choice-of-law rules for different types of collateral. Under Section 9-301(1), the law of a single jurisdiction governs perfection with respect to most types of collateral, both tangible and intangible. Paragraph (1) eliminates the need for former Section 9-103(1)(c), which concerned purchase-money security interests in tangible collateral that is intended to move from one jurisdiction to the other. It is likely to reduce the frequency of cases in which the governing law changes after a financing statement is properly filed. (Presumably, debtors change their own location less frequently than they change the location of their collateral.) The approach taken in paragraph (1) also eliminates some difficult priority issues and the need to distinguish between “mobile” and “ordinary” goods, and it reduces the number of filing offices in which secured parties must file or search when collateral is located in several jurisdictions.   5. Law Governing Perfection: Exceptions. The general rule is subject to several exceptions. It does not apply to goods covered by a certificate of title (see Section 9-303), deposit accounts (see Section 9-304), investment property (see Section 9-305), or letter-of-credit rights (see Section 9-306). Nor does it apply to possessory security interests, i.e., security interests that the secured party has perfected by taking possession of the collateral (see paragraph (2)), security interests perfected by filing a fixture filing (see subparagraph (3)(A)), security interests in timber to be cut (subparagraph (3)(B)), or security interests in as-extracted collateral (see paragraph (4)).   a. Possessory Security Interests. Paragraph (2) applies to possessory security interests and provides that perfection is governed by the local law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located. This is the rule of former Section 9-103(1)(b), except paragraph (2) eliminates the troublesome “last event” test of former law.   The distinction between nonpossessory and possessory security interests creates the potential for the same jurisdiction to apply two different choice-of-law rules to determine perfection in the same collateral. For example, were a secured party in possession of an instrument or document to relinquish possession in reliance on temporary perfection, the applicable law immediately would change from that of the location of the collateral to that of the location of the debtor. The applicability of two different choice-of-law rules for perfection is unlikely to lead to any material practical problems. The perfection rules of one Article 9 jurisdiction are likely to be identical to those of another. Moreover, under paragraph (3), the relative priority of competing security interests in tangible collateral is resolved by reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located, regardless of how the security interests are perfected.   b. Fixture Filings. Under the general rule in paragraph (1), a security interest in fixtures may be perfected by filing in the office specified by Section 9-501(a) as enacted in the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. However, application of this rule to perfection of a security interest by filing a fixture filing could yield strange results. For example, perfection of a security interest in fixtures located in Arizona and owned by a Delaware corporation would be governed by the law of Delaware. Although Delaware law would send one to a filing office in Arizona for the place to file a financing statement as a fixture filing, see Section 9-501, Delaware law would not take account of local, nonuniform, real-property filing and recording requirements that Arizona law might impose. For this reason, paragraph (3)(A) contains a special rule for security interests perfected by a fixture filing; the law of the jurisdiction in which the fixtures are located governs perfection, including the formal requisites of a fixture filing. Under paragraph (3)(C), the same law governs priority. Fixtures are “goods” as defined in Section 9-102.   The filing of a financing statement to perfect a security interest in collateral of a transmitting utility constitutes a fixture filing with respect to goods that are or become fixtures. See Section 9-501(b). Accordingly, to perfect a security interest in goods of this kind by a fixture filing, a financing statement must be filed in the office specified by Section 9-501(b) as enacted in the jurisdiction in which the goods are located. If the fixtures collateral is located in more than one State, filing in all of those States will be necessary to perfect a security interest in all the fixtures collateral by a fixture filing. Of course, a security interest in nearly all types of collateral (including fixtures) of a transmitting utility may be perfected by filing in the office specified by Section 9-501(b) as enacted in the jurisdiction in which the transmitting utility is located. However, such a filing will not be effective as a fixture filing except with respect to goods that are located in that jurisdiction.   c. Timber to Be Cut. Application of the general rule in paragraph (1) to perfection of a security interest in timber to be cut would yield undesirable results analogous to those described with respect to fixtures. Paragraph (3)(B) adopts a similar solution: perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the timber is located. As with fixtures, under paragraph (3)(C), the same law governs priority. Timber to be cut also is “goods” as defined in Section 9-102.   Paragraph (3)(B) applies only to “timber to be cut,” not to timber that has been cut. Consequently, once the timber is cut, the general choice-of-law rule in paragraph (1) becomes applicable. To ensure continued perfection, a secured party should file in both the jurisdiction in which the timber to be cut is located and in the state where the debtor is located. The former filing would be with the office in which a real property mortgage would be filed, and the latter would be a central filing. See Section 9-501.   d. As-Extracted Collateral. Paragraph (4) adopts the rule of former Section 9-103(5) with respect to certain security interests in minerals and related accounts. Like security interests in fixtures perfected by filing a fixture filing, security interests in minerals that are as-extracted collateral are perfected by filing in the office designated for the filing or recording of a mortgage on the real property. For the same reasons, the law governing perfection and priority is the law of the jurisdiction in which the wellhead or minehead is located.   6. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the debtor changes its location to another jurisdiction, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under paragraph (1) changes, as well. Similarly, the law governing perfection of a possessory security interest in collateral under paragraph (2) changes when the collateral is removed to another jurisdiction. Nevertheless, these changes will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9-316(a), (b).   7. Law Governing Effect of Perfection and Priority: Goods, Documents, Instruments, Money, Negotiable Documents, and Tangible Chattel Paper. Under former Section 9-103, the law of a single jurisdiction governed both questions of perfection and those of priority. This Article generally adopts that approach. See paragraph (1). But the approach may create problems if the debtor and collateral are located in different jurisdictions. For example, assume a security interest in equipment located in Pennsylvania is perfected by filing in Illinois, where the debtor is located. If the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located were to govern priority, then the priority of an execution lien on goods located in Pennsylvania would be governed by rules enacted by the Illinois legislature.   To address this problem, paragraph (3)(C) divorces questions of perfection from questions of “the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a security interest.” Under paragraph (3)(C), the rights of competing claimants to tangible collateral are resolved by reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located. A similar bifurcation applied to security interests in investment property under former Section 9-103(6). See Section 9-305.   Paragraph (3)(C) applies the law of the situs to determine priority only with respect to goods (including fixtures), instruments, money, negotiable documents, and tangible chattel paper. Compare former Section 9-103(1), which applied the law of the location of the collateral to documents, instruments, and “ordinary” (as opposed to “mobile”) goods. This Article does not distinguish among types of goods. The ordinary/mobile goods distinction appears to address concerns about where to file and search, rather than concerns about priority. There is no reason to preserve this distinction under the bifurcated approach.   Particularly serious confusion may arise when the choice-of-law rules of a given jurisdiction result in each of two competing security interests in the same collateral being governed by a different priority rule. The potential for this confusion existed under former Section 9-103(4) with respect to chattel paper: Perfection by possession was governed by the law of the location of the paper, whereas perfection by filing was governed by the law of the location of the debtor. Consider the mess that would have been created if the language or interpretation of former Section 9-308 were to differ in the two relevant States, or if one of the relevant jurisdictions (e.g., a foreign country) had not adopted Article 9. The potential for confusion could have been exacerbated when a secured party perfected both by taking possession in the State where the collateral is located (State A) and by filing in the State where the debtor is located (State B) a common practice for some chattel paper financers. By providing that the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located governs priority, paragraph (3) substantially diminishes this problem.   8. Non-U.S. Debtors. This Article applies the same choice-of-law rules to all debtors, foreign and domestic. For example, it adopts the bifurcated approach for determining the law applicable to security interests in goods and other tangible collateral. See Comment 5.a., above. The Article contains a new rule specifying the location of non-U.S. debtors for purposes of this Part. The rule appears in Section 9-307 and is explained in the Comments to that section. Former Section 9-103(3)(c), which contained a special choice-of-law rule governing security interests created by debtors located in a non-U.S. jurisdiction, proved unsatisfactory and was deleted.   ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, "Buyer-Secured Party Conflicts Under Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code", see 46 U. Colo. L. Rev. 333 (1974-75).   Annotator's note. Since § 4-9-301 is similar to § 4-9-103 as it existed prior to the 2001 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.   The validity of foreign security interests in personal property is governed by this section except to the extent that motor vehicle titles are governed by § 42-6-131 , and the usage of the broad term “motor vehicle titles” indicates the legislative intent that whenever the question as to title to a motor vehicle arises with regard to a foreign security interest, the question is to be answered by application of § 42-6-131 and is precluded from the application of the provisions of § 4-9-103(3) . Doenges-Glass, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 175 Colo. 518 , 488 P.2d 879 (1971).   Code as enacted in New York determined validity and perfection of security interest. Where seller's only office is located in New York, and assignee of seller's accounts receivable is a New York corporation, the requirements of the uniform commercial code as enacted by New York determines the validity and perfection of assignee's security interest in accounts receivable. Barocas v. Bohemia Import Co., 33 Colo. App. 263, 518 P.2d 850 (1974).   The right to collect annual campground membership dues is a right to payment for services rendered, which is an ordinary commercial account receivable. If the security interest is in accounts, the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located governs the perfection and the effect of perfection or nonperfection of the security interest. Therefore, since the debtor was located at its place of business in Florida, Florida was the proper jurisdiction in which to file in order to perfect a security interest in the collateral, making the location of the collateral in Colorado irrelevant. Capitran Inc. v. Great Western Bank, 872 P.2d 1370 (Colo. App. 1994).   Farm combine which was type used by custom crop cutting in multi-state operations is mobile equipment within the meaning of § 4-9-103 (3)(a) . Golden Plains Credit Union v. Konkel, 759 P.2d 788 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 778 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1989).   The provisions of this section and § 4-9-401 (1) are not mutually exclusive and, if equipment meets the requirements of both statutory provisions, it must be considered to fall into both categories. Golden Plains Credit Union v. Konkel, 759 P.2d 788 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 778 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1989).