CO Code § 24-10-114 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 24 - Government - State|Article 10 - Governmental Immunity|§ 24-10-114. Limitations on Judgments - Recommendation to General Assembly - Authorization of Additional Payment - Lower North Fork Wildfire Claims

    The maximum amount that may be recovered under this article in any single occurrence, whether from one or more public entities and public employees, shall be: (1) (a) The maximum amount that may be recovered under this article in any single occurrence, whether from one or more public entities and public employees, shall be:   For any injury to one person in any single occurrence, the sum of three hundred fifty thousand dollars;    For an injury to two or more persons in any single occurrence, the sum of nine hundred ninety thousand dollars; except that, in such instance, no person may recover in excess of three hundred fifty thousand dollars.       The amounts specified in subsection (1)(a) of this section shall be adjusted by an amount reflecting the percentage change over a four-year period in the United States department of labor, bureau of labor statistics, consumer price index for Denver-Aurora-Lakewood for all items and all urban consumers, or its applicable predecessor or successor index. On or before January 1, 2018, and by January 1 every fourth year thereafter, the secretary of state shall calculate the adjusted dollar amount for the immediately preceding four-year period as of the date of the calculation. The adjusted amount shall be rounded upward to the nearest one-thousand-dollar increment. The secretary of state shall certify the amount of the adjustment for the particular four-year period and shall publish the amount of the adjustment on the secretary of state's website. (1.5) For purposes of subsection (1) of this section, an assignment or subrogation to recover damages paid or payable for an injury shall not be deemed to be a separate occurrence.       The governing body of a public entity, by resolution, may increase any maximum amount set out in subsection (1) of this section that may be recovered from the public entity for the type of injury described in the resolution. The amount of the recovery that may be had shall not exceed the amount set out in such resolution for the type of injury described therein. Any such increase may be reduced, increased, or repealed by the governing body by resolution. A resolution adopted pursuant to this subsection    Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the recovery of damages for types of actions authorized under part 2 of article 21 of title 13, C.R.S., in an amount in excess of the amounts specified in said article.      A public entity shall not be liable either directly or by indemnification for punitive or exemplary damages or for damages for outrageous conduct, except as otherwise determined by a public entity pursuant to section 24-10-118 (5). (4) (a) A public entity shall not be liable either directly or by indemnification for punitive or exemplary damages or for damages for outrageous conduct, except as otherwise determined by a public entity pursuant to section 24-10-118 (5).    A railroad operating in interstate commerce that sells to a public entity, or allows the public entity to use, such railroad's property or tracks for the provision of public passenger rail service shall not be liable either directly or by indemnification for punitive or exemplary damages or for damages for outrageous conduct to any person for any accident or injury arising out of the operation and maintenance of the public passenger rail service by a public entity.       Notwithstanding the maximum amounts that may be recovered from a public entity set forth in subsection (1) of this section, an amount may be recovered from the state under this article in excess of the maximum amounts only if paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection (5) applies:   The general assembly acting by bill authorizes payment of all or a portion of any judgment against the state that exceeds the maximum amount. Any claimant may present either proof of judgment or an order of a district court granting a claimant's request for entry of judgment in the amount of an award of damages recommended by a special master or a comparable order to the general assembly and request payment of that portion of the judgment or order that exceeds the maximum amount. Any such judgment or order approved for payment by the general assembly shall be paid from the general fund.      Except as otherwise provided in subparagraphs (II) and (III) of this paragraph (b), the state claims board created in section 24-30-1508 (1), referred to in this paragraph (b) as the board, acting in accordance with its authority under section 24-30-1515, compromises or settles a claim on behalf of the state for the maximum liability limits under this article and determines, in its sole discretion, to recommend to the general assembly that an additional payment be made and the general assembly, by bill, authorizes all or any portion of the additional payment. In determining whether to make such recommendation, the board shall consider interests of fairness, the public interest, and the interests of the state. A recommendation made under this paragraph (b) shall not include payment for noneconomic loss or injury and shall be reduced to the extent the claimant's loss is or will be covered by another source, including, without limitation, any insurance proceeds that have been paid or will be paid, and no insurer has a right of subrogation, assignment, or any other right against the claimant or the state for any additional payment or any portion of such payment that is approved by the general assembly. Any additional payment or any portion of such payment approved by the general assembly shall be paid from the general fund. For purposes of this paragraph (b), an "additional payment" means the payment to a claimant in excess of the maximum liability limits pursuant to this paragraph (b) that may be authorized by the general assembly upon a recommendation from the board. (b) (I) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraphs (II) and (III) of this paragraph (b), the state claims board created in section 24-30-1508 (1), referred to in this paragraph (b) as the board, acting in accordance with its authority under section 24-30-1515, compromises or settles a claim on behalf of the state for the maximum liability limits under this article and determines, in its sole discretion, to recommend to the general assembly that an additional payment be made and the general assembly, by bill, authorizes all or any portion of the additional payment. In determining whether to make such recommendation, the board shall consider interests of fairness, the public interest, and the interests of the state. A recommendation made under this paragraph (b) shall not include payment for noneconomic loss or injury and shall be reduced to the extent the claimant's loss is or will be covered by another source, including, without limitation, any insurance proceeds that have been paid or will be paid, and no insurer has a right of subrogation, assignment, or any other right against the claimant or the state for any additional payment or any portion of such payment that is approved by the general assembly. Any additional payment or any portion of such payment approved by the general assembly shall be paid from the general fund. For purposes of this paragraph (b), an "additional payment" means the payment to a claimant in excess of the maximum liability limits pursuant to this paragraph (b) that may be authorized by the general assembly upon a recommendation from the board.    In connection with a recommendation made by the board under subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) to make an additional payment to one or more claimants resulting from a claim of an injury arising out of the lower north fork wildfire in March 2012 that is received by the general assembly while the general assembly is adjourned sine die, upon certification from the department of law that the requirements of this paragraph (b) have been satisfied and on or after July 1, 2013, the office of the state controller may pay one or more additional payments to such claimants from moneys previously appropriated by bill until such specifically appropriated moneys are exhausted or replenished.    In connection with any claim arising out of an injury occurring on or after May 25, 2013, that is not described in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b), where the board has made a recommendation to the general assembly for an additional payment under this paragraph (b) while the general assembly is adjourned sine die, the payment is authorized where all of the members of the joint budget committee have voted to authorize the additional payment; except that payment in accordance with the recommendation shall not be made until the general assembly has ratified by bill the authorization to make the payment.           (2) shall apply only to injuries occurring subsequent to the adoption of such resolution.   Source: L. 71: p. 1210, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-14 . L. 79: (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended, p. 863, § 4, effective July 1. L. 81: (2) amended, p. 1152, § 1, effective April 30. L. 86: IP(1) and (4) amended, p. 879, §§ 11, 12, effective July 1. L. 92: (1) amended and (5) added, p. 1118, § 6, effective January 1, 1993. L. 2006: (1.5) added, p. 455, § 3, effective April 18. L. 2007: (4) amended, p. 1025, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2012: (5) amended, (HB 12-1361), ch. 242, p. 1146, § 3, effective June 4. L. 2013: (5)(b) amended, (SB 13-288), ch. 291, p. 1560, § 1, effective May 25; (1) amended, (SB 13-023), ch. 134, p. 443, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2014: (5)(a) amended, (SB 14-223), ch. 399, p. 2007, § 1, effective June 6. L. 2015: (1) amended, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 959, § 64, effective August 5. L. 2018: (1)(b) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1705, § 36, effective May 29.   Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2006 act enacting subsection (1.5), see section 1 of chapter 132, Session Laws of Colorado 2006.   (2) For information concerning payments to claimants in connection with the Lower North Fork Wildfire, see section 2 of chapter 399, Session Laws of Colorado 2014.   ANNOTATION   Limitation on judgments is within province of the general assembly and does not violate claimant's rights to equal protection or due process. State is liable to victims of accident in which highway worker dislodged boulder which rolled down hill and into tour bus killing and injuring passengers to the extent set forth in law. State v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992).   Accident victims, as passengers on tour bus injured by negligent highway worker, are in a class the classification of which requires a rational basis review. State v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992).   Due process of law is not applicable to statute limiting recovery of damages from state. Guarantee of access to courts does not address adequacy of remedy. State v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992).   General assembly may simultaneously create governmental liability and place limitations on actions brought against state. State v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992).   Governmental immunity concerning municipal police officers matter of concurrent local and statewide concern. Governmental immunity for tortious acts of municipal police officers and, specifically, limitations on compensatory damages for personal injuries in actions against municipal governments, based on such tortious conduct, are matters of concurrent local and statewide concern. Frick v. Abell, 198Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979).   Action by estate for damages barred for failure to give the requisite notice pursuant to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 72 P.3d 384 (Colo. App. 2002).   A municipality may provide greater monetary compensation to the victims of torts committed by the municipality's own police officers than is provided under state statutory provisions. Frick v. Abell, 198Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979).   Limitations in subsection (1) of this section operate independently of the amount of damages requested under § 24-10-109. Pyles-Knutzen v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 781 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1989).   The CGIA specifies the amount of plaintiff's maximum recovery from public entities or public employees, and this rule establishes the procedure by which defendant may deposit an undisputed sum into the court registry. Rudnick v. Ferguson, 179 P.3d 26 (Colo. App. 2007).   Trial court did not err in permitting defendants to tender $150,000 into the court registry and in dismissing the case as moot without requiring defendants to confess judgment, admit their liability, or enter into a settlement with the plaintiffs. Rudnick v. Ferguson, 179 P.3d 26 (Colo. App. 2007).   The CGIA unambiguously limits the recovery that a victim may receive from public entities or employees regardless of whether the recovery was obtained by settlement or judgment, absent a finding that the public employee acted in a willful and wanton manner. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 72 P.3d 384 (Colo. App. 2002).   The statute clearly limits the total recovery by a claimant, not individual judgments obtained by a claimant. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 72 P.3d 384 (Colo. App. 2002).   Claim is moot when plaintiff is offered the maximum amount that could be recovered at trial. Rudnick v. Ferguson, 179 P.3d 26 (Colo. App. 2007).   Claim is moot regardless of whether all defendants contributed to the maximum amount deposited in the court registry. Rudnick v. Ferguson, 179 P.3d 26 (Colo. App. 2007).   Subsection (1)(b) applicable where two persons own single tract. Subsection (1)(b) applies where the injury is to a single tract but two persons each own an undivided one-half interest in the property. City of Colo. Springs v. Gladin, 198Colo. 333, 599 P.2d 907 (1979).   Maximum recovery of $150,000 pursuant to this section for injury caused to child by negligence of pharmacy at state hospital includes anything recoverable pursuant to § 13-17-202. Costs recoverable under § 13-17-202 are available only to extent recovery pursuant to this section does not equal maximum recovery available. DeCordova v. State, 878 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1994).   The operative injury for purposes of a wrongful death action is the wrongful death itself; thus the $150,000 per injury damages cap in the CGIA does not apply separately to each party in a wrongful death action but rather to the wrongful death action as a whole. Steedle v. Sereff, 167 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2007).   Section <cite class="occo"><a href="gov.co.crs.title.24.html#t24-administration-ar10-s24-10-103" target="_self"> 24-10-103</a></cite> (2) defines an "injury" as including "death"; therefore, the operative injury for purposes of a wrongful death action is the wrongful death itself, and subsection (1)(a) of this section limits damages to $150,000. Steedle v. Sereff, 167 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2007).   Punitive damage awards against public entities are prohibited under subsection (4). Lopez v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254 (Colo. App. 1994).   Limitation on judgment in this section is not an affirmative defense and is not waived if not presented in the pleadings, at trial, or in the motion for a new trial. City of Colo. Springs v. Gladin, 198Colo. 333, 599 P.2d 907 (1979); Lee v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).   CGIA does not permit a jury to enter a verdict and judgment in excess of the statutory limitations. DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 72 P.3d 384 (Colo. App. 2002).   Public entity exclusively responsible for payment of entire judgment. Lee v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).   Statute limits recovery to amounts specified. Lee v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).   Costs and interest may be awarded within amounts specified. Lee v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).   Entry of an order confirming the amount of the award and reducing the judgment to $150,000 in accordance with this section is sufficient "proof of judgment" for purposes of subsection (5). Nieto v. State, 952 P.2d 834 (Colo. App. 1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).   For dismissal of claim for exemplary damages against public entities, see Subryan v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 789 P.2d 472 (Colo. App. 1989).   For dismissal of claim of outrageous conduct against the board of trustees of a university, see Barham v. Scalia, 928 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1996).   For award of costs against a public entity, see Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1986).   For dismissal of claim for punitive damages against public entities, see Healy v. Counts, 536 F. Supp. 600 (D.Colo. 1982).   Dismissal of claim of outrageous conduct against municipal defendants. Hutton v. Mem'l Hosp., 824 P.2d 61 (Colo. App. 1991).   Applied in Martin v. County of Weld, 43 Colo. App. 49, 598 P.2d 532 (1979); Belfiore v. Colo. Dept. of Hwys., 847 P.2d 244 (Colo. App. 1993).