CO Code § 15-12-1001 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 15 - Probate, Trusts, and Fiduciaries|Article 12 - Probate of Wills and Administration|Part 10 - Closing Estates|§ 15-12-1001. Formal Proceedings Terminating Administration - Testate or Intestate - Order of General Protection

  A personal representative or any interested person may petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate. The personal representative may petition at any time, and any other interested person may petition after one year from the appointment of the original personal representative; except that no petition under this section may be entertained until the time for presenting claims which arose prior to the death of the decedent has expired. The petition may request the court to determine testacy, if not previously determined, to consider the final account or compel or approve an accounting and distribution, to construe any will or determine heirs, and to adjudicate the final settlement and distribution of the estate. After notice to all interested persons and hearing, the court may enter an order or orders, on appropriate conditions, determining the persons entitled to distribution of the estate, and, as circumstances require, approving settlement and directing or approving distribution of the estate and discharging the personal representative from further claim or demand of any interested person.    If one or more heirs or devisees were omitted as parties in, or were not given notice of, a previous formal testacy proceeding, the court, on proper petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate under this section, and after notice to the omitted or unnotified persons and other interested parties determined to be interested on the assumption that the previous order concerning testacy is conclusive as to those given notice of the earlier proceeding, may determine testacy as it affects the omitted persons and confirm or alter the previous order of testacy as it affects all interested persons as appropriate in the light of the new proofs. In the absence of objection by an omitted or unnotified person, evidence received in the original testacy proceeding shall constitute prima facie proof of due execution of any will previously admitted to probate, or of the fact that the decedent left no valid will if the prior proceedings determined this fact.     History. Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1604, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 153-3-1001. History. Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1604, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 153-3-1001.    Cross references:   For the termination of a conservatorship, see § 15-14-431 .   ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “How Many Times”, see 19 Dicta 231 (1942). For article, “Colorado Bar Association Meeting”, see 23 Dicta 261 (1946). For article, “Denver Institute”, see 24 Dicta 168 (1947). For article, “Testamentary Trusts Should Remain Under County Court Jurisdiction”, see 27 Dicta 283 (1950). For article, “The Inventory and Final Report”, see 27 Dicta 291 (1950). For article, “Commitment Procedures in Colorado”, see 29 Dicta 273 (1952). For article, “Marketable Title: What Certifiable Copies of Court Papers Should Appear of Record?”, see 34 Dicta 7 and 335 (1957). For article, “An Aspect of Estate Planning in Colorado: The Revocable Inter Vivos Trust”, see 43 Den. J. 296 (1966). For article, “A Potpourri of Probate Practice Aids”, see 11 Colo. Law. 1850 (1982).   Annotator's note. Since § 15-12-1001 is similar to repealed § 153-14-11, C.R.S. 1963, and CSA, C. 176, § 227, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section. Annotator's note. Since § 15-12-1001 is similar to repealed § 153-14-11, C.R.S. 1963, and CSA, C. 176, § 227, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.   This section provides for the final settlement of an estate. Archuleta v. Archuleta, 160 Colo. 32 , 413 P.2d 704 (1966).   Section operates retroactively. It is likely that this section, being purely remedial and procedural in character, properly could be given a retroactive operation and no contract obligation or vested right would be violated in so doing. Dunklee v. County Court, 106 Colo. 77 , 103 P.2d 484 (1940).