GA Code § 36-82-23 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 36 - Local Government|Chapter 82 - Bonds|Article 2 - Validation of Bonds|Part 1 - General Provisions|§ 36-82-23. Hearing and Judgment on Show Cause Order; Parties to Proceedings; Appeal

 Within the time prescribed in the order or such further time as he may fix, the judge of the superior court shall proceed to hear and determine all questions of law and of fact in the case and shall render judgment thereon. Any citizen of this state who is a resident of the county, municipality, or political subdivision desiring to issue the bonds may become a party to the proceedings at or before the time set for the hearing. Any party to the proceedings who is dissatisfied with the judgment of the court confirming and validating the issuance of the bonds or refusing to confirm and validate the issuance of the bonds may appeal from the judgment under the procedure provided by law in cases of injunction. No appeal may be taken by any person who was not a party at the time the judgment appealed from was rendered.   (Ga. L. 1897, p. 82, § 3; Civil Code 1910, § 447; Code 1933, § 87-304; Ga. L. 1946, p. 726, § 1; Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 279, § 4; Ga. L. 1966, p. 76, § 2.)   Law reviews.   - For annual survey article on local government law, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 341 (2000).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Court can determine validity of votes.    - In a proceeding to validate bonds, it is within the power and jurisdiction of the superior court, upon proper pleadings and sufficient evidence, to pass upon the validity of any votes cast in the election, and to eliminate such votes as are shown by the pleadings and the evidence to be illegal. Turk v. Royal, 34 Ga. App. 717, 131 S.E. 119 (1925).    Generally there can be but one action to validate either certificates or bonds; in either case all interventions would be heard in the validation proceedings, and the allegation that a declaratory judgment is necessary to avoid a multiplicity of actions is a conclusion of the pleader, contrary to the statutory provisions pertaining to validation of revenue anticipation certificates or bonds. Liner v. City of Rossville, 212 Ga. 664, 94 S.E.2d 862 (1956).   Burden on state to prove material facts.    - When statutory proceedings were brought for the purpose of validating bonds under former Civil Code 1910, §§ 446 and 447 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 36-82-21 and36-82-23), and were contested by citizens who became parties thereto and deny the truth of the substantial allegations of the petition, the burden was on the state to prove the material facts which were requisite to obtain validation. Harrell v. Town of Whigham, 141 Ga. 322, 80 S.E. 1010 (1914); Stephens v. School Dist. No. 3, 154 Ga. 275, 114 S.E. 197 (1922); Moody v. Board of Comm'rs, 29 Ga. App. 21, 113 S.E. 103 (1922); Clay v. Austell Sch. Dist., 35 Ga. App. 109, 132 S.E. 127 (1926).    Burden of proof on state even when solicitor general (now district attorney) alleges facts sufficient to warrant validation of bonds and answers filed by defendant admits facts alleged. Harrell v. Town of Whigham, 141 Ga. 322, 80 S.E. 1010 (1914); Jennings v. New Bronwood Sch. Dist., 156 Ga. 15, 118 S.E. 560 (1923).   Final judgment prerequisite to bill of exceptions.    - When an answer filed by intervenors is dismissed as being insufficient to prevent validation, but the order of dismissal provides merely that the petitioners "may take an order confirming and validating," it does not constitute a final judgment confirming and validating the issuance of the bonds from which a bill of exceptions will lie as provided by this section. Veal v. Deepstep Consol. Sch. Dist., 34 Ga. App. 67, 128 S.E. 223 (1925).   Proper date to present objection to validation.    - When a judge fixed a certain date as the day for the hearing on the question of validating a proposed bond issue, and for providential reasons failed to hold court on that day but recessed the court until four days later, and upon calling the case on this date a qualified objector presented an objection, it was error to refuse to allow such otherwise qualified objector to present the objections merely because the objector had not presented the objection on the date originally fixed for the hearing. Horton v. Downs Consol. Sch. Dist., 59 Ga. App. 77, 200 S.E. 469 (1938).   Petition that judgment be reopened.    - When, upon a petition duly filed praying for the validation of certain county bonds, all the proceedings appeared on their face to have been regular, including the notice provided for by law, and the court rendered a judgment validating the bonds, and, 16 days thereafter and after the court had adjourned, certain persons filed a petition merely alleging that the people were taxpayers and asking that the order validating the bonds be vacated or reopened, and that the people be heard on the question as to the regularity or irregularity of the election held to authorize the bonds, the court did not err in dismissing the petition, on the ground that it came too late. Ballard v. Morgan County, 24 Ga. App. 371, 100 S.E. 763 (1919).   Injunction refused when writ of error not timely.    - After the validation of certain municipal bonds, no writ of error to the judgment validating the bonds having been sued out within the time prescribed by law, it was not error for the court below to refuse to enjoin the issuance of those bonds. Holton v. City of Camilla, 134 Ga. 560, 68 S.E. 472 (1910); Edwards v. Town of Guyton, 140 Ga. 553, 79 S.E. 195 (1913).   Assigning error as to amount.    - Intervenors cannot for the first time, in their bill of exceptions, successfully assign error to the judgment on the ground that it did not affirmatively appear that the proposed bond issue was within the constitutional limitation of amount. Sewell v. City of Tallapoosa, 145 Ga. 19, 88 S.E. 577 (1916).   Judgment conforms to pleading when judgment contains same recitals.    - Judgment validating bonds conformed to the pleadings upon which based, when the judgment contained the same recitals as pleadings as to character and amount of bonds raised. Sewell v. City of Tallapoosa, 145 Ga. 19, 88 S.E. 577 (1916).   Sufficiency of allegations of fraud.    - When it does not appear that the county attorney made any misrepresentation as to any fact or facts concerning the hearing, or the postponement thereof, or waived the filing of any objections, or promised to continue the hearing, and it appearing from the petition that the petitioners knew of the time legally set for the validation proceeding, and the only conclusion to be drawn being that through their laches and negligence the petitioners failed to file objections, the petition does not allege facts sufficient to show such fraud as would warrant the setting aside of the judgment. Swicord v. Grady County, 24 Ga. App. 522, 101 S.E. 395 (1919).   Intervention procedure not required.    - O.C.G.A. § 36-82-23 does not provide for intervention by third parties; thus, becoming a party does not require mandatory compliance with the procedure of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24. Hay v. Development Auth., 239 Ga. App. 803, 521 S.E.2d 912 (1999), appeal dismissed sub nom. Hay v. Newton County, 246 Ga. App. 44, 538 S.E.2d 181 (2000).    Cited in Gibbs v. Ty Ty Consol. Sch. Dist., 168 Ga. 379, 147 S.E. 764 (1929); Chappell v. Small, 194 Ga. 143, 20 S.E.2d 916 (1942); Dade County v. State, 201 Ga. 241, 39 S.E.2d 473 (1946).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Securities and Obligations, §§ 369, 372.   C.J.S.   - 64A C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 2173 et seq.   ALR.    - Estoppel to deny validity of municipal bonds issued under an unconstitutional statute, 37 A.L.R. 1310.