CO Code § 39-1-102 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 39 - Taxation|Article 1 - General Provisions|§ 39-1-102. Definitions

 As used in articles 1 to 13 of this title 39, unless the context otherwise requires:    “Administrator” means the property tax administrator.  (1.1) “Agricultural and livestock products” means plant or animal products in a raw or unprocessed state that are derived from the science and art of agriculture, regardless of the use of the product after its sale and regardless of the entity that purchases the product. “Agriculture”, for the purposes of this subsection (1.1), means farming, ranching, animal husbandry, and horticulture.  (1.3) “Agricultural equipment which is used on the farm or ranch in the production of agricultural products”:   Means any personal property used on a farm or ranch, as defined in subsections (3.5) and (13.5) of this section, for planting, growing, and harvesting agricultural products or for raising or breeding livestock for the primary purpose of obtaining a monetary profit; and    Includes:   Any mechanical system used on the farm or ranch for the conveyance and storage of animal products in a raw or unprocessed state, regardless of whether or not such mechanical system is affixed to real property; and    Silviculture personal property that is designed, adapted, and used for the planting, growing, maintenance, or harvesting of trees in a raw or unprocessed state. (1.6)   “Agricultural land”, whether used by the owner of the land or a lessee, means one of the following:   (A) A parcel of land, whether located in an incorporated or unincorporated area and regardless of the uses for which such land is zoned, that was used the previous two years and presently is used as a farm or ranch, as defined in subsections (3.5) and (13.5) of this section, or that is in the process of being restored through conservation practices. Such land must have been classified or eligible for classification as “agricultural land”, consistent with this subsection (1.6), during the ten years preceding the year of assessment. Such land must continue to have actual agricultural use. “Agricultural land” under this subparagraph (I) shall not include two acres or less of land on which a residential improvement is located unless the improvement is integral to an agricultural operation conducted on such land. “Agricultural land” also includes the land underlying other improvements if such improvements are an integral part of the farm or ranch and if such other improvements and the land area dedicated to such other improvements are typically used as an ancillary part of the operation. The use of a portion of such land for hunting, fishing, or other wildlife purposes, for monetary profit or otherwise, shall not affect the classification of agricultural land. For purposes of this subparagraph (I), a parcel of land shall be “in the process of being restored through conservation practices” if: The land has been placed in a conservation reserve program established by the natural resources conservation service pursuant to 7 U.S.C. secs. 1 to 5506; or a conservation plan approved by the appropriate conservation district has been implemented for the land for up to a period of ten crop years as if the land has been placed in such a conservation reserve program.    A parcel of land that consists of at least forty acres, that is forest land, that is used to produce tangible wood products that originate from the productivity of such land for the primary purpose of obtaining a monetary profit, that is subject to a forest management plan, and that is not a farm or ranch, as defined in subsections (3.5) and (13.5) of this section. “Agricultural land” under this subparagraph (II) includes land underlying any residential improvement located on such agricultural land.    A parcel of land that consists of at least eighty acres, or of less than eighty acres if such parcel does not contain any residential improvements, and that is subject to a perpetual conservation easement, if such land was classified by the assessor as agricultural land under subparagraph (I) or (II) of this paragraph (a) at the time such easement was granted, if the grant of the easement was to a qualified organization, if the easement was granted exclusively for conservation purposes, and if all current and contemplated future uses of the land are described in the conservation easement. “Agricultural land” under this subparagraph (III) does not include any portion of such land that is actually used for nonagricultural commercial or nonagricultural residential purposes.    A parcel of land, whether located in an incorporated or unincorporated area and regardless of the uses for which such land is zoned, used as a farm or ranch, as defined in subsections (3.5) and (13.5) of this section, if the owner of the land has a decreed right to appropriated water granted in accordance with article 92 of title 37, C.R.S., or a final permit to appropriated groundwater granted in accordance with article 90 of title 37, C.R.S., for purposes other than residential purposes, and water appropriated under such right or permit shall be and is used for the production of agricultural or livestock products on such land;    A parcel of land, whether located in an incorporated or unincorporated area and regardless of the uses for which such land is zoned, that has been reclassified from agricultural land to a classification other than agricultural land and that met the definition of agricultural land as set forth in subparagraphs (I) to (IV) of this paragraph (a) during the three years before the year of assessment. For purposes of this subparagraph (V), the parcel of land need not have been classified or eligible for classification as agricultural land during the ten years preceding the year of assessment as required by subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (a).         Except as provided in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b), all other agricultural property that does not meet the definition set forth in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1.6) shall be classified as all other property and shall be valued using appropriate consideration of the three approaches to appraisal based on its actual use on the assessment date. (b) (I) Except as provided in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b), all other agricultural property that does not meet the definition set forth in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1.6) shall be classified as all other property and shall be valued using appropriate consideration of the three approaches to appraisal based on its actual use on the assessment date.    On and after January 1, 2015, “all other agricultural property” includes greenhouse and nursery production areas used to grow food products, agricultural products, or horticultural stock for wholesale purposes only that originate above the ground.       An assessor must determine, based on sufficient evidence, that a parcel of land does not qualify as agricultural land, as defined in subparagraph (IV) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1.6), before land may be changed from agricultural land to any other classification.    Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, property that is used solely for the cultivation of medical marijuana shall not be classified as agricultural land.             “Assessor” means the elected assessor of a county, or his or her appointed successor, and, in the case of the city and county of Denver, such equivalent officer as may be provided by its charter, and, in the case of the city and county of Broomfield, such equivalent officer as may be provided by its charter or code. (2.5) “Bed and breakfast” means an overnight lodging establishment, whether owned by a natural person or any legal entity, that is a residential dwelling unit or an appurtenance thereto, in which the innkeeper resides, or that is a building designed but not necessarily occupied as a single family residence that is next to, or directly across the street from, the innkeeper's residence, and in either circumstance, in which:   Lodging accommodations are provided for a fee;    At least one meal per day is provided at no charge other than the fee for the lodging accommodations; and    There are not more than thirteen sleeping rooms available for transient guests.       “Board” means the board of assessment appeals.  (3.1) “Commercial lodging area” means a guest room or a private or shared bathroom within a bed and breakfast that is offered for the exclusive use of paying guests on a nightly or weekly basis. Classification of a guest room or a bathroom as a “commercial lodging area” shall be based on whether at any time during a year such rooms are offered by an innkeeper as nightly or weekly lodging to guests for a fee. Classification shall not be based on the number of days that such rooms are actually occupied by paying guests.  (3.2) “Conservation purpose” means any of the following purposes as set forth in section 170 (h) of the federal “Internal Revenue Code of 1986”, as amended:   The preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation, the education of the public, or the protection of a relatively natural habitat for fish, wildlife, plants, or similar ecosystems; or    The preservation of open space, including farmland and forest land, where such preservation is for the scenic enjoyment of the public or is pursuant to a clearly delineated federal, state, or local government conservation policy and where such preservation will yield a significant public benefit.  (3.5) “Farm” means a parcel of land which is used to produce agricultural products that originate from the land's productivity for the primary purpose of obtaining a monetary profit.  (3.7) “Fee simple estate” means the largest possible estate allowed by law, an estate that has potentially infinite duration.       “Fixtures” means those articles which, although once movable chattels, have become an accessory to and a part of real property by having been physically incorporated therein or annexed or affixed thereto. “Fixtures” includes systems for the heating, air conditioning, ventilation, sanitation, lighting, and plumbing of such building. “Fixtures” does not include machinery, equipment, or other articles related to a commercial or industrial operation which are affixed to the real property for proper utilization of such articles. In addition, for property tax purposes only, “fixtures” does not include security devices and systems affixed to any residential improvements, including but not limited to security doors, security bars, and alarm systems.  (4.3) “Forest land” means land of which at least ten percent is stocked by forest trees of any size and includes land that formerly had such tree cover and that will be naturally or artificially regenerated. “Forest land” includes roadside, streamside, and shelterbelt strips of timber which have a crown width of at least one hundred twenty feet. “Forest land” includes unimproved roads and trails, streams, and clearings which are less than one hundred twenty feet wide.   (4.4) “Forest management plan” means an agreement which includes a plan to aid the owner of forest land in increasing the health, vigor, and beauty of such forest land through use of forest management practices and which has been either executed between the owner of forest land and the Colorado state forest service or executed between the owner of forest land and a professional forester and has been reviewed and has received a favorable recommendation from the Colorado state forest service. The Colorado forest service shall annually inspect each parcel of land subject to a forest management plan to determine if the terms and conditions of such plan are being complied with and shall report by March 1 of each year to the assessor in each affected county the legal descriptions of the properties and the names of their owners that are eligible for the agricultural classification. The report shall also contain the legal descriptions of those properties and the names of their owners that no longer qualify for the agricultural classification because of noncompliance with their forest management plans. No property shall be entitled to the agricultural classification unless the legal description and the name of the owner appear on the report submitted by the Colorado state forest service. The Colorado state forest service shall charge a fee for the inspection of each parcel of land in such amount for the reasonable costs incurred by the Colorado state forest service in conducting such inspections. Such fee shall be paid by the owner of such land prior to such inspection. Any fees collected pursuant to this subsection (4.4) shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly.   (4.5) “Forest management practices” means practices accepted by professional foresters which control forest establishment, composition, density, and growth for the purpose of producing forest products and associated amenities following sound business methods and technical forestry principles.  (4.6) “Forest trees” means woody plants which have a well-developed stem or stems, which are usually more than twelve feet in height at maturity, and which have a generally well-defined crown.    Repealed. (5.5)   “Hotels and motels” means improvements and the land associated with such improvements that are used by a business establishment primarily to provide lodging, camping, or personal care or health facilities to the general public and that are predominantly used on an overnight or weekly basis; except that “hotels and motels” does not include:   A residential unit, except for a residential unit that is a hotel unit;    A residential unit that would otherwise be classified as a hotel unit if the residential unit is held as inventory by a developer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the developer's trade or business, is marketed for sale by the developer, and either has been held by the developer for less than two years since the certificate of occupancy for the residential unit has been issued or is not depreciated under the internal revenue code, as defined in section 39-22-103 (5.3), while owned by the developer; or    A residential unit that would otherwise be classified as a hotel unit if the residential unit has been acquired by a lender or an owners' association through foreclosure, a deed in lieu of foreclosure, or a similar transaction, is marketed for sale by the lender or owners' association and is not depreciated under the internal revenue code, as defined in section 39-22-103 (5.3), while owned by the lender or owners' association.    Repealed.       If any time share estate, time share use period, undivided interest, or other partial ownership interest in any hotel unit is owned by any non-hotel unit owner, then, unless a declaration or other express agreement binding on the non-hotel unit owners and the hotel unit owners provides otherwise:   The hotel unit owners shall pay the taxes on the hotel unit not required to be paid by the non-hotel unit owners pursuant to subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b).    Each non-hotel unit owner shall pay that portion of the taxes on the hotel unit equal to the non-hotel unit owner's ownership or usage percentage of the hotel unit multiplied by the property tax that would have been levied on the hotel unit if the actual value and valuation for assessment of the hotel unit had been determined as if the hotel unit was residential real property.    For purposes of determining the amount due from any hotel unit owner or non-hotel unit owner pursuant to subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b), the assessor shall, upon the request of any hotel unit owner or non-hotel unit owner, calculate the property tax that would have been levied on the hotel unit if the actual value and valuation for assessment of the hotel unit had been determined as if the hotel unit were residential real property. A hotel unit owner or non-hotel unit owner may petition the county board of equalization for review of the assessor's calculation pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 39-10-114. Any appeal from the decision of the county board shall be governed by section .5.       As used in this subsection (5.5):   “Condominium unit” means a unit, as defined in section 38-33.3-103 (30), C.R.S., and also includes a time share unit.    “Hotel unit owners” means any person or member of a group of related persons whose ownership and use of a residential unit cause the residential unit to be classified as a hotel unit.    “Hotel units” means more than four residential unit ownership equivalents in a project that are owned, in whole or in part, directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediate entities, by one person or by a group of related persons if the person or group of related persons uses the residential units or parts thereof in connection with a business establishment primarily to provide lodging, camping, or personal care or health facilities to the general public predominantly on an overnight or weekly basis. “Hotel unit” means any residential unit included in hotel units. For purposes of this subparagraph (III):   “Control” means the power to direct the business or affairs of an entity through direct or indirect ownership of stock, partnership interests, membership interests, or other forms of beneficial interests.    “Related persons” means individuals who are members of the same family, including only spouses and minor children, or persons who control, are controlled by, or are under common control with each other. Persons are not related persons solely because they engage a common agent to manage or rent their residential units, they are members of an owners' association or similar group, they enter into a tenancy in common or a similar agreement with respect to undivided interests in a residential unit, or any combination of the foregoing.       “Project” means one or more improvements that contain residential units if the boundaries of the residential units are described in or determined by the same declaration, as defined in section 38-33.3-103 (13), C.R.S.    “Residential unit” means a condominium unit, a single family residence, or a townhome.    “Non-hotel unit owner” means any owner of a time share estate, time share use period, undivided interest, or other partial ownership interest in any hotel unit who is not a hotel unit owner with respect to the hotel unit.    “Residential unit ownership equivalent” means:   In the case of time share units, time share interests or time share use periods in one or more time share units that in the aggregate entitle the owner of such time share interests or time share use periods to three hundred sixty-five days of use in any calendar year or three hundred sixty-six days of use in any calendar year that is a leap year; and    In the case of residential units other than time share units, undivided interests or other ownership interests in one or more such residential units that total one hundred percent. For purposes of this sub-subparagraph (B), any undivided interest or other ownership interest not stated in terms of a percentage of total ownership shall be converted to a percentage of total ownership based on the rights accorded to the holder of the undivided interest or other ownership interest.       “Time share unit” means a condominium unit that is divided into time share estates as defined in section 38-33-110 (5) or that is subject to a time share use as defined in section 12-10-501 (4). (5.6) “Hotels and motels” as defined in subsection (5.5) of this section shall not include bed and breakfasts.          “Household furnishings” means that personal property, other than fixtures, in residential structures and buildings which is not used for the production of income at any time.  (6.3) “Improvements” means all structures, buildings, fixtures, fences, and water rights erected upon or affixed to land, whether or not title to such land has been acquired.  (6.8) “Independently owned residential solar electric generation facility” means personal property that:   Is located on residential real property;    Is owned by a person other than the owner of the residential real property;    Is installed on the customer's side of the meter;    Is used to produce electricity from solar energy primarily for use in the residential improvements located on the residential real property; and    Has a production capacity of no more than one hundred kilowatts.       (Deleted by amendment, L. 2010, (HB 10-1267), ch. 425, p. 2198, § 1, effective August 11, 2010.)  (7.1) “Innkeeper” means the owner, operator, or manager of a bed and breakfast.  (7.2) “Inventories of merchandise and materials and supplies which are held for consumption by a business or are held primarily for sale” means those classes of personal property which are held primarily for sale by a business, farm, or ranch, including components of personal property to be held for sale, or which are held for consumption by a business, farm, or ranch, or which are rented for thirty days or less. For the purposes of this subsection (7.2), “personal property rented for thirty days or less” means personal property rented for thirty days or less which can be returned at the option of the person renting the property, in a transaction on which the sales or use tax is actually collected before being finally sold, whether or not such personal property is subject to depreciation. It is the purpose of the general assembly to exempt “personal property rented for thirty days or less” from property tax because of the similarity of such property to inventories of merchandise held by retail stores. Further, the general assembly intends this exemption to encompass a transaction under a rental agreement in which the customer pays rent in order to use an item for a brief period of time; it is not intended to encompass an equipment lease contract covering a specific period of time and which includes financial penalties for early cancellation. Except for “personal property rented for thirty days or less”, the term “inventories of merchandise and materials and supplies which are held for consumption by a business or are held primarily for sale” does not include personal property which is held for rent or lease or is subject to an allowance for depreciation. For property tax years commencing on or after January 1, 1984, the term does include inventory which is owned by and which is in the possession of the manufacturer of such inventory unless:   Such inventory is in the possession of the manufacturer after having previously been leased by the manufacturer to a customer; and    Such manufacturer has not designated such inventory for scrapping, substantial reconditioning, renovating, or remanufacturing in accordance with its customary practices. For the purposes of this paragraph (b), normal maintenance shall not constitute substantial reconditioning, renovating, or remanufacturing.  (7.5) Repealed.   (7.7) “Livestock” includes all animals.  (7.8) “Manufactured home” means any preconstructed building unit or combination of preconstructed building units that:   Includes electrical, mechanical, or plumbing services that are fabricated, formed, or assembled at a location other than the residential site of the completed home;    Is designed and used for residential occupancy in either temporary or permanent locations;    Is constructed in compliance with the “National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974”, 42 U.S.C. sec. 5401 et seq., as amended;    Does not have motive power;    Is not licensed as a vehicle; and    Is eligible for a certificate of title pursuant to part 1 of article 29 of title 38, C.R.S. (7.9) “Minerals in place” means, without exception, metallic and nonmetallic mineral substances of every kind while in the ground.          “Mobile home” means a manufactured home built prior to the adoption of the “National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974”, 42 U.S.C. sec. 5401 et seq., as amended. (8.3) “Modular home” means any preconstructed factory-built building that:   Is ineligible for a certificate of title pursuant to part 1 of article 29 of title 38, C.R.S.;    Is not constructed in compliance with the “National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974”, 42 U.S.C. sec. 5401 et seq., as amended; and    Is constructed in compliance with building codes adopted by the division of housing in the department of local affairs.  (8.4) “Natural cause” means fire, explosion, flood, tornado, action of the elements, act of war or terror, or similar cause beyond the control of and not caused by the party holding title to the property destroyed.   (8.5) “Not for private gain or corporate profit” means the ownership and use of property whereby no person with any connection to the owner thereof shall receive any pecuniary benefit except for reasonable compensation for services rendered and any excess income over expenses derived from the operation or use of the property and all proceeds from the sale of the property of the owner shall be devoted to the furthering of any exempt purpose.  (8.7) “Perpetual conservation easement” means a conservation easement in gross, as described in article 30.5 of title 38, C.R.S., that qualifies as a perpetual conservation restriction pursuant to section 170 (h) of the federal “Internal Revenue Code of 1986”, as amended, and any regulations issued thereunder.       “Person” means natural persons, corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, associations, and other legal entities which are or may become taxpayers by reason of the ownership of taxable real or personal property.    “Personal effects” means such personal property as is or may be worn or carried on or about the person, and such personal property as is usually associated with the person or customarily used in personal hobby, sporting, or recreational activities and which is not used for the production of income at any time.    “Personal property” means everything that is the subject of ownership and that is not included within the term “real property”. “Personal property” includes machinery, equipment, and other articles related to a commercial or industrial operation that are either affixed or not affixed to the real property for proper utilization of such articles. Except as otherwise specified in articles 1 to 13 of this title, any pipeline, telecommunications line, utility line, cable television line, or other similar business asset or article installed through an easement, right-of-way, or leasehold for the purpose of commercial or industrial operation and not for the enhancement of real property shall be deemed to be personal property, including, without limitation, oil and gas distribution and transmission pipelines, gathering system pipelines, flow lines, process lines, and related water pipeline collection, transportation, and distribution systems. Structures and other buildings installed on an easement, right-of-way, or leasehold that are not specifically referenced in this subsection (11) shall be deemed to be improvements pursuant to subsection (6.3) of this section.    “Political subdivision” means any entity of government authorized by law to impose ad valorem taxes on taxable property located within its territorial limits.  (12.1) Repealed.   (12.3) and (12.4) Repealed.  (12.5) “Professional forester” means any person who has received a bachelor's or higher degree from an accredited school of forestry.    “Property” means both real and personal property.  (13.2) “Qualified organization” means a qualified organization as defined in section 170 (h)(3) of the federal “Internal Revenue Code of 1986”, as amended.  (13.5) “Ranch” means a parcel of land which is used for grazing livestock for the primary purpose of obtaining a monetary profit. For the purposes of this subsection (13.5), “livestock” means domestic animals which are used for food for human or animal consumption, breeding, draft, or profit.    “Real property” means:   All lands or interests in lands to which title or the right of title has been acquired from the government of the United States or from sovereign authority ratified by treaties entered into by the United States, or from the state;    All mines, quarries, and minerals in and under the land, and all rights and privileges thereunto appertaining; and    Improvements. (14.3) “Residential improvements” means a building, or that portion of a building, designed for use predominantly as a place of residency by a person, a family, or families. The term includes buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, amenities, and water rights that are an integral part of the residential use. The term also includes a manufactured home as defined in subsection (7.8) of this section, a mobile home as defined in subsection (8) of this section, and a modular home as defined in subsection (8.3) of this section. (14.4)     “Residential land” means a parcel of land upon which residential improvements are located. The term also includes: (a) (I)“Residential land” means a parcel of land upon which residential improvements are located. The term also includes:   Land upon which residential improvements were destroyed by natural cause after the date of the last assessment as established in section 39-1-104 (10.2);    Two acres or less of land on which a residential improvement is located where the improvement is not integral to an agricultural operation conducted on such land; and    A parcel of land without a residential improvement located thereon, if the parcel is contiguous to a parcel of residential land that has identical ownership based on the record title and contains a related improvement that is essential to the use of the residential improvement located on the identically owned contiguous residential land.       “Residential land” does not include any portion of the land that is used for any purpose that would cause the land to be otherwise classified, except as provided for in section 39-1-103 (10.5).    As used in this subsection (14.4):   “Contiguous” means that the parcels physically touch; except that contiguity is not interrupted by an intervening local street, alley, or common element in a common-interest community.    “Related improvement” means a driveway, parking space, or improvement other than a building, or that portion of a building designed for use predominantly as a place of residency by a person, a family, or families.            Notwithstanding section 39-1-103 (5)(c) and except as provided in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b), when residential improvements are destroyed, demolished, or relocated as a result of a natural cause on or after January 1, 2010, that, were it not for their destruction, demolition, or relocation due to such natural cause, would have qualified the land upon which the improvements were located as residential land for the following property tax year, the residential land classification shall remain in place for the year of destruction, demolition, or relocation and the two subsequent property tax years. The residential land classification may remain in place for additional subsequent property tax years, not to exceed a total of five subsequent property tax years, if the assessor determines there is evidence the owner intends to rebuild or locate a residential improvement on the land. For purposes of this determination, the assessor may consider, but shall not be limited to considering, a building permit or other land development permit for the land, construction plans for such residential improvement, efforts by the owner to obtain financing for a residential improvement, or ongoing efforts to settle an insurance claim related to the destruction, demolition, or relocation of the residential improvement due to a natural cause. (b) (I) Notwithstanding section 39-1-103 (5)(c) and except as provided in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b), when residential improvements are destroyed, demolished, or relocated as a result of a natural cause on or after January 1, 2010, that, were it not for their destruction, demolition, or relocation due to such natural cause, would have qualified the land upon which the improvements were located as residential land for the following property tax year, the residential land classification shall remain in place for the year of destruction, demolition, or relocation and the two subsequent property tax years. The residential land classification may remain in place for additional subsequent property tax years, not to exceed a total of five subsequent property tax years, if the assessor determines there is evidence the owner intends to rebuild or locate a residential improvement on the land. For purposes of this determination, the assessor may consider, but shall not be limited to considering, a building permit or other land development permit for the land, construction plans for such residential improvement, efforts by the owner to obtain financing for a residential improvement, or ongoing efforts to settle an insurance claim related to the destruction, demolition, or relocation of the residential improvement due to a natural cause.    The residential land classification of the land described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) shall change according to current use if:   A new residential improvement or part of a new residential improvement is not constructed or placed on the land in accordance with applicable land use regulations prior to the January 1 after the period described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b), unless the property owner provides documentary evidence to the assessor that during such period a good-faith effort was made to construct or place a new or part of a new residential improvement on the land but that additional time is necessary;    The assessor determines that the classification at the time of destruction, demolition, or relocation as a result of a natural cause was erroneous; or    A change of use has occurred. For purposes of this sub-subparagraph (C), a change of use shall not include the temporary loss of the residential use due to the destruction, demolition, or relocation as a result of a natural cause of the residential improvement.            Notwithstanding section 39-1-103 (5)(c) and except as provided in subsection (14.4)(c)(II) of this section, when residential improvements are destroyed, demolished, or relocated on or after January 1, 2018, that, were it not for their destruction, demolition, or relocation, would have qualified the land upon which the improvements were located as residential land for the following property tax year, the residential land classification shall remain in place for the year of destruction, demolition, or relocation and one subsequent property tax year if the assessor determines there is evidence that the owner intends to rebuild or locate a residential improvement on the land. For purposes of this determination, the assessor may consider, but is not limited to considering, a building permit or other land development permit for the land, construction plans for such residential improvement, or efforts by the owner to obtain financing for a residential improvement. (c) (I) Notwithstanding section 39-1-103 (5)(c) and except as provided in subsection (14.4)(c)(II) of this section, when residential improvements are destroyed, demolished, or relocated on or after January 1, 2018, that, were it not for their destruction, demolition, or relocation, would have qualified the land upon which the improvements were located as residential land for the following property tax year, the residential land classification shall remain in place for the year of destruction, demolition, or relocation and one subsequent property tax year if the assessor determines there is evidence that the owner intends to rebuild or locate a residential improvement on the land. For purposes of this determination, the assessor may consider, but is not limited to considering, a building permit or other land development permit for the land, construction plans for such residential improvement, or efforts by the owner to obtain financing for a residential improvement.    The residential land classification of the land described in subsection (14.4)(c)(I) of this section shall change according to current use if:   A new residential improvement or part of a new residential improvement is not constructed or placed on the land in accordance with applicable land use regulations prior to the January 1 after the period described in subsection (14.4)(c)(I) of this section;    The assessor determines that the classification of the land at the time of the destruction, demolition, or relocation was erroneous; or    A change of use has occurred. For purposes of this subsection (14.4)(c)(II)(C), a change of use shall not include the temporary loss of the residential use due to the destruction, demolition, or relocation of the residential improvement. (14.5) “Residential real property” means residential land and residential improvements but does not include hotels and motels as defined in subsection (5.5) of this section.                Repealed. (15.5)   “School” means:   An educational institution having a curriculum comparable to that of a publicly supported elementary or secondary school or college, or any combination thereof, and requiring daily attendance; or    An institution that is licensed as a child care center pursuant to article 6 of title 26, C.R.S., that is:   Operated by and as an integral part of a not-for-profit educational institution that meets the requirements of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (a); or    A not-for-profit institution that offers an educational program for not more than six hours per day and that employs educators trained in preschool through eighth grade educational instruction and is licensed by the appropriate state agency and that is not otherwise qualified as a school under this paragraph (a) or as a religious institution.          “School” includes any educational institution that meets the requirements set forth in subparagraph (I) or (II) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (15.5), even if such educational institution maintains hours of operation in excess of the minimum hour requirements of section 22-32-109 (1)(n)(I), C.R.S.       “Taxable property” means all property, real and personal, not expressly exempted from taxation by law.    “Treasurer” means the elected treasurer of a county or his or her appointed successor, and, in the case of the city and county of Denver, such equivalent officer as may be provided by its charter, in the case of the city and county of Broomfield, such equivalent officer as may be provided by its charter or code, and in the case of any home rule county, the treasurer or such equivalent officer as provided by its charter.    “Works of art” means those items of personal property that are original creations of visual art, including, but not limited to:   Sculpture, in any material or combination of materials, whether in the round, bas-relief, high relief, mobile, fountain, kinetic, or electronic;    Paintings or drawings;    Mosaics;    Photographs;    Crafts made from clay, fiber and textiles, wood, metal, plastics, or any other material, or any combination thereof;    Calligraphy;    Mixed media composed of any combination of forms or media; or    Unique architectural embellishments.        History. Source: L. 64: R&RE, p. 674, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 137-1-1. L. 65: P. 1095, § 1. L. 67: P. 945, § 1. L. 70: P. 379, § 8. L. 73: P. 237, § 17. L. 75: (8) repealed, p. 1473, § 30, effective July 18. L. 77: (7.5), (12.3), and (12.4) added, p. 1728, § 1, effective June 20; (8) RC&RE, p. 1740, § 1, effective January 1, 1978. L. 78: (12.1) added, p. 467, § 1, effective July 1. L. 79: (12.1) amended, p. 1400, § 1, effective March 13; (12.1)(a) amended, p. 1059, § 9, effective June 20; (12.1) repealed, p. 1456, § 4, effective July 1, 1981. L. 80: (18) added, p. 711, § 1, effective April 16. L. 81: (12.1)(d) R&RE, p. 1872, § 4, effective June 29; (12.1)(a)(II) amended, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: (15) repealed, p. 1485, § 11, effective April 22; (1.1), (1.3), (1.6), (3.5), (5.5), (7.2), (7.8), (13.5), and (14.3) to (14.5) added, (5) repealed, and (12.3)(b) amended, pp. 1486, 1488, §§ 1, 6, 4, effective June 1. L. 84: (7.2) amended, p. 983, § 1, effective May 8. L. 85: IP(7.2) amended and (7.9) added, pp. 1215, 1210, §§ 1, 2, effective May 9. L. 87: (1.3) amended, p. 1382, § 1, effective May 8; (7.5), (12.3), and (12.4) repealed, p. 1304, § 1, effective May 20. L. 88: (4) and (11) amended and (12.1) repealed, pp. 1269, 1275, §§ 4, 14, effective May 29. L. 89: (15.5) added, p. 1482, § 3, effective April 23. L. 90: (1.6)(a) amended, (4.3) to (4.6) and (12.5) added, p. 1706, § 1, effective April 16; (9) amended, p. 450, § 26, effective April 18; (1.6)(a) and (13.5) amended and (8.5) added, pp. 1695, 1703, 1701, §§ 16, 37, 33, effective June 9. L. 91: IP(7.2) amended, p. 1980, § 1, effective April 20; (8) amended, p. 1394, § 2, effective April 27. L. 92: (4) amended, p. 2216, § 3, effective June 2. L. 94: (8) and (14.3) amended, p. 2568, § 86, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: IP(1.6)(a) amended and (1.6)(a)(III), (3.2), (8.7), and (13.2) added, pp. 173, 174, §§ 1, 2, effective April 7. L. 97: (1.1) and (1.6) amended, p. 509, § 1, effective April 24. L. 98: (11) amended, p. 1276, § 1, effective June 1. L. 99: (15.5) amended, p. 1299, § 1, effective June 3. L. 2000: (15.5)(a)(II) amended, p. 1499, § 1, effective August 2. L. 2001: (2) and (17) amended, p. 268, § 14, effective November 15. L. 2002: (5.5) amended, p. 1939, § 1, effective August 7; (2.5), (3.1), (5.6), and (7.1) added, (5.5)(a)(IV) repealed, and (14.4) amended, pp. 1671, 1673, §§ 1, 3, effective January 1, 2003. L. 2004: (1.6)(a)(I) amended, p. 1208, § 86, effective August 4. L. 2008: (14.3) amended, p. 1914, § 129, effective August 5. L. 2009: (7.7) and (8.3) added and (7.8), (8), and (14.3) amended, (SB-040), ch. 9, p. 70, § 12, effective July 1; (8.5) amended,(SB 09-042), ch. 176, p. 779, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2010: (1.1) amended,(SB 10-177), ch. 392, p. 1861, § 1, effective August 11; (1.6)(a)(III) amended,(HB 10-1197), ch. 175, p. 634, § 1, effective August 11; (6.3) and (6.8) added and (7) and (11) amended,(HB10-1267), ch. 425, p. 2198, § 1, effective August 11. L. 2011: (8.4) added and (14.4) amended,(HB 11-1042), ch. 138, p. 479, § 1, effective May 4; (1.6)(d) added,(HB 11-1043), ch. 266, p. 1213, § 23, effective July 1; (1.6)(a)(I) and (14.4) amended,(HB 11-1146), ch. 166, p. 571, § 1, effective January 1, 2012. L. 2013: (14.4)(a) amended,(HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1699, § 116, effective August 7. L. 2014: (8.5) amended,(HB 14-1349), ch. 230, p. 854, § 4, effective May 17; (1.6)(b) amended,(SB 14-043), ch. 53, p. 248, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2016: (14.4)(b)(II)(A) amended,(SB 16-012), ch. 66, p. 169, § 1, effective April 5. L. 2017: IP, (1.1), and (1.3) amended,(SB 17-302), ch. 311, p. 1675, § 1, effective June 2. L. 2018: (14.4)(c) added,(HB 18-1283), ch. 270, p. 1665, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2019: (5.5)(c)(VIII) amended,(HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1727, § 249, effective October 1. L. 2020: (17) amended,(HB 20-1077), ch. 80, p. 324, § 5, effective September 14. L. 2021: (3.7) added,(HB 21-1312), ch. 299, p. 1791, § 3, effective July 1; (14.4)(a) amended,(HB 21-1061), ch. 63, p. 252, § 1, effective September 7. History. Source: L. 64: R&RE, p. 674, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 137-1-1. L. 65: P. 1095, § 1. L. 67: P. 945, § 1. L. 70: P. 379, § 8. L. 73: P. 237, § 17. L. 75: (8) repealed, p. 1473, § 30, effective July 18. L. 77: (7.5), (12.3), and (12.4) added, p. 1728, § 1, effective June 20; (8) RC&RE, p. 1740, § 1, effective January 1, 1978. L. 78: (12.1) added, p. 467, § 1, effective July 1. L. 79: (12.1) amended, p. 1400, § 1, effective March 13; (12.1)(a) amended, p. 1059, § 9, effective June 20; (12.1) repealed, p. 1456, § 4, effective July 1, 1981. L. 80: (18) added, p. 711, § 1, effective April 16. L. 81: (12.1)(d) R&RE, p. 1872, § 4, effective June 29; (12.1)(a)(II) amended, § 5, effective July 1. L. 83: (15) repealed, p. 1485, § 11, effective April 22; (1.1), (1.3), (1.6), (3.5), (5.5), (7.2), (7.8), (13.5), and (14.3) to (14.5) added, (5) repealed, and (12.3)(b) amended, pp. 1486, 1488, §§ 1, 6, 4, effective June 1. L. 84: (7.2) amended, p. 983, § 1, effective May 8. L. 85: IP(7.2) amended and (7.9) added, pp. 1215, 1210, §§ 1, 2, effective May 9. L. 87: (1.3) amended, p. 1382, § 1, effective May 8; (7.5), (12.3), and (12.4) repealed, p. 1304, § 1, effective May 20. L. 88: (4) and (11) amended and (12.1) repealed, pp. 1269, 1275, §§ 4, 14, effective May 29. L. 89: (15.5) added, p. 1482, § 3, effective April 23. L. 90: (1.6)(a) amended, (4.3) to (4.6) and (12.5) added, p. 1706, § 1, effective April 16; (9) amended, p. 450, § 26, effective April 18; (1.6)(a) and (13.5) amended and (8.5) added, pp. 1695, 1703, 1701, §§ 16, 37, 33, effective June 9. L. 91: IP(7.2) amended, p. 1980, § 1, effective April 20; (8) amended, p. 1394, § 2, effective April 27. L. 92: (4) amended, p. 2216, § 3, effective June 2. L. 94: (8) and (14.3) amended, p. 2568, § 86, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: IP(1.6)(a) amended and (1.6)(a)(III), (3.2), (8.7), and (13.2) added, pp. 173, 174, §§ 1, 2, effective April 7. L. 97: (1.1) and (1.6) amended, p. 509, § 1, effective April 24. L. 98: (11) amended, p. 1276, § 1, effective June 1. L. 99: (15.5) amended, p. 1299, § 1, effective June 3. L. 2000: (15.5)(a)(II) amended, p. 1499, § 1, effective August 2. L. 2001: (2) and (17) amended, p. 268, § 14, effective November 15. L. 2002: (5.5) amended, p. 1939, § 1, effective August 7; (2.5), (3.1), (5.6), and (7.1) added, (5.5)(a)(IV) repealed, and (14.4) amended, pp. 1671, 1673, §§ 1, 3, effective January 1, 2003. L. 2004: (1.6)(a)(I) amended, p. 1208, § 86, effective August 4. L. 2008: (14.3) amended, p. 1914, § 129, effective August 5. L. 2009: (7.7) and (8.3) added and (7.8), (8), and (14.3) amended, (SB-040), ch. 9, p. 70, § 12, effective July 1; (8.5) amended,(SB 09-042), ch. 176, p. 779, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2010: (1.1) amended,(SB 10-177), ch. 392, p. 1861, § 1, effective August 11; (1.6)(a)(III) amended,(HB 10-1197), ch. 175, p. 634, § 1, effective August 11; (6.3) and (6.8) added and (7) and (11) amended,(HB10-1267), ch. 425, p. 2198, § 1, effective August 11. L. 2011: (8.4) added and (14.4) amended,(HB 11-1042), ch. 138, p. 479, § 1, effective May 4; (1.6)(d) added,(HB 11-1043), ch. 266, p. 1213, § 23, effective July 1; (1.6)(a)(I) and (14.4) amended,(HB 11-1146), ch. 166, p. 571, § 1, effective January 1, 2012. L. 2013: (14.4)(a) amended,(HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1699, § 116, effective August 7. L. 2014: (8.5) amended,(HB 14-1349), ch. 230, p. 854, § 4, effective May 17; (1.6)(b) amended,(SB 14-043), ch. 53, p. 248, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2016: (14.4)(b)(II)(A) amended,(SB 16-012), ch. 66, p. 169, § 1, effective April 5. L. 2017: IP, (1.1), and (1.3) amended,(SB 17-302), ch. 311, p. 1675, § 1, effective June 2. L. 2018: (14.4)(c) added,(HB 18-1283), ch. 270, p. 1665, § 1, effective August 8. L. 2019: (5.5)(c)(VIII) amended,(HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1727, § 249, effective October 1. L. 2020: (17) amended,(HB 20-1077), ch. 80, p. 324, § 5, effective September 14. L. 2021: (3.7) added,(HB 21-1312), ch. 299, p. 1791, § 3, effective July 1; (14.4)(a) amended,(HB 21-1061), ch. 63, p. 252, § 1, effective September 7.    Editor's note:    Amendments to subsection (1.6)(a) by House Bill 90-1229 harmonized with House Bill 90-1018.    Amendments to subsection (14.4) by House Bill 11-1042 and House Bill 11-1146 were harmonized, effective January 1, 2012.     Cross references:    For the creation of the property tax administrator, see § 39-2-101.    For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1312, see section 1 of chapter 299, Session Laws of Colorado 2021.     ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. PERSONAL PROPERTY.    II. PROPERTY.    III. REAL PROPERTY.     I. PERSONAL PROPERTY.   Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.   Membership or contract in Associated Press is “personal property”. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Rocky Mt. News Printing Co., 15 Colo. App. 189, 61 P. 494 (1900).   Signs that can easily be removed and kitchen and bath displays of a temporary nature are not fixtures and are therefore personal property. Also, despite being affixed to or permanently incorporated into a building, pneumatic and sensormatic systems were primarily tied to a business and therefore were not fixtures and were properly classified as personal property. Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Pueblo County Bd. of Comm'rs, 50 P.3d 916 (Colo. App. 2002).   II. PROPERTY.   Bank deposits not “property” of bank but are credits belonging to depositors. Murray v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 67 Colo. 14 , 185 P. 262 (1919).   III. REAL PROPERTY.   To determine the proper classification of land for assessment, the trial court must make findings of fact regarding conflicting evidence. C.A. Staack v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 802 P.2d 1191 (Colo. App. 1990).   Primary factor to be considered in determining proper classification of property for property tax purposes is the actual use of the property on the relevant assessment date. Farny v. Bd. of Equaliz., 985 P.2d 106 (Colo. App. 1999); Hogan v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2018 COA 86 , 459 P.3d 629, aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Mook v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Summit, 2020 CO 12, 457 P.3d 568.   If a property owner's use of the parcel on the assessment date satisfies the requirements for residential classification, then it is irrelevant if the owner has future plans to sell the parcel or make nonresidential use of it. Hogan v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2018 COA 86 , 459 P.3d 629, aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Mook v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Summit, 2020 CO 12, 457 P.3d 568.   In determining a parcel's proper classification for the present assessment year, the board of assessment appeals may not reject a final decision previously rendered by an appropriate tribunal as to the parcel's use during a previous tax year and re-visit that issue. However, a decision with respect to a previous tax year is not binding with respect to the issues presented in a protest of the assessment for a later year. Von Hagen v. Bd. of Equaliz., 948 P.2d 92 (Colo. App. 1997).   The taxpayer has the burden of proof to show any qualifying ranching or farming uses of land in support of a claim for agricultural classification. Palmer v. Bd. of Equaliz., 957 P.2d 348 (Colo. App. 1998); Hepp v. Boulder County Assessor, 113 P.3d 1268 (Colo. App. 2005).   Property properly classified as nonagricultural residential property. A 35-acre parcel that was subject to a perpetual conservation easement and included a residence was properly classified as residential. Under subsection (1.6)(a)(III), a parcel that includes a residential improvement is only agricultural based on a perpetual conservation easement if it consists of at least 80 acres. The parcel also did not qualify for agricultural classification based on farming use under subsection (1.6)(a)(I) because the owner did not establish three years of agricultural use and did not qualify for agricultural classification based on forestry use under subsection (1.6)(a)(II) because it was smaller than 40 acres. Andrew v. Teller County Bd. of Equaliz., 2012 COA 104 , 284 P.3d 172.   To qualify as “agricultural land” under subsection (1.6), the land must (1) be presently used as a farm or ranch; (2) have been so used during the two-year period prior to the assessment; (3) have been classified or eligible for classification as agricultural land during the 10 years preceding the assessment year; and (4) continue to have actual agricultural use. Boulder County Bd. of Equaliz. v. M.D.C. Constr. Co., 830 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1992).   Second element of test applied in Aberdeen Inv'rs v. Adams County, 240 P.3d 398 (Colo. App. 2009).   Definition of “agricultural land” does not require that the use of the residential improvements be related to the agricultural use of the land. C.A. Staack v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 802 P.2d 1191 (Colo. App. 1990).   Definition of “agricultural land” does not differentiate between a lessee's primary purpose in using the land and the landowner's primary purpose in acquiring and maintaining ownership of the land, nor does the landowner need to profit or intend to profit from agricultural operations on the land conducted by the owner's lessees. Boulder Cty. Bd. of Equaliz. v. M.D.C. Const. Co., 830 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1992).   Lessees' use of property as a ranch for the primary purpose of making a profit was the determinative factor in qualifying property as agricultural land. Boulder Cty. Bd. of Equaliz. v. M.D.C. Const. Co., 830 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1992).   Subsections (1.6) and (13.5) require that, in order to qualify for agricultural tax treatment, the taxpayer must prove that actual grazing of the parcel took place in the applicable tax year unless the reason the land was not grazed related to a conservation practice or unless the land in question is part of a larger agricultural unit on which grazing or conservation practices have occurred during the relevant tax years. Douglas County Bd. of Equaliz. v. Clarke, 921 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1996).   Whether a party's use constitutes agricultural use is primarily a factual question, but an interpretation of what the legislature intended when it required agricultural use in order for the property to be classified as agricultural for tax purposes is a question of law for the courts to decide. Douglas County Bd. of Equaliz. v. Clarke, 921 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1996).   Initial question that the board of assessment appeals must consider in reviewing a county assessor's classification of land as agricultural is whether it is a segregated parcel that should be treated as a single unit or whether it is part of an integrated larger parcel. This is a factual determination, controlled by whether the land is sufficiently contiguous to and connected by use with other land to qualify it as part of a large unit or whether it is a parcel segregated by geography or type of use from the balance of the unit. Douglas County Bd. of Equaliz. v. Clarke, 921 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1996).   The plain meaning of the phrase “used for grazing” is that livestock actually graze on the land. There must be actual grazing on the parcel during each relevant tax year to qualify for agricultural classification unless the land is subject to non-use for conservation purposes. Douglas County Bd. of Equaliz. v. Clarke, 921 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1996).   In order for land that is not used for grazing to qualify for conservation, the taxpayer must prove that the non-use was reasonably related to the overall grazing operation. A professionally prepared conservation plan is not required. The non-use must be both purposeful and an integral part of the grazing operation. Neglect by the landowner or lessee or basic unsuitability of the land for grazing will not suffice. Douglas County Bd. of Equaliz. v. Clarke, 921 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1996); Johnston v. Park County Bd. of Equaliz., 979 P.2d 578 (Colo. App. 1999).   Under subsection (1.6)(a)(I), land can only qualify as agricultural land by virtue of being “in the process of being restored through conservation practices” if it has been subjected to a federally established conservation reserve program or a conservation plan approved by an appropriate conservation district as specified in that subsection. Hepp v. Boulder County Assessor, 113 P.3d 1268 (Colo. App. 2005).   There is no indication in the text that the landowner must actually profit or intend to profit from agricultural operations on the land conducted by the owner's lessees. Boulder Cty. Bd. of Equaliz. v. M.D.C. Const. Co., 830 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1992).   Definition of “ranch” does not require that the owner of the land own the livestock grazing on his land to classify the land as agricultural. The owner may lease the land for grazing, and, if such use is for the primary purpose of obtaining a monetary profit from the grazing activity, it constitutes an agricultural use. C.A. Staack v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 802 P.2d 1191 (Colo. App. 1990); Boulder Cty. Bd. of Equaliz. v. M.D.C. Const. Co., 830 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1992).   So long as a parcel of land is used for grazing livestock for profit, it qualifies as a “ranch”, even if the owner of the property is not the one who is conducting the grazing operation. Estes v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 805 P.2d 1174 (Colo. App. 1990).   “Trespass grazing” does not meet the statutory requirements for agricultural classification as a matter of law. In interpreting subsections (1.6)(a)(I) and (13.5), a court must give appropriate deference to provisions of the property tax administrator's reference manuals that expressly provide that “trespass grazing” is an insufficient basis for finding that land is “agricultural land”. Besch v. Jefferson County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 20 P.3d 1195 (Colo. App. 2000).   The 10-year requirement for agricultural land must be interpreted to mean that the land was classified, or eligible for classification, as agricultural land at some time during the preceding 10 years, not for the whole of that period. Hence, if a property's agricultural use ceases, that property may, nevertheless, be again classified as agricultural land if it is used for such purpose for three years within 10 years from the date of the original abandonment of that use. Von Hagen v. Bd. of Equaliz., 948 P.2d 92 (Colo. App. 1997).   Owner's intentions for future use of his land may not be considered in classifying the property as “agricultural land”. C.A. Staack v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 802 P.2d 1191 (Colo. App. 1990).   Focus of the statutory definition of agricultural land is clearly on present and past surface use of the land without regard to any future intent on the part of the owner to develop the land for nonagricultural purposes. Boulder Cty. Bd. of Equaliz. v. M.D.C. Const. Co., 830 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1992).   Land was held not to be “agricultural land” because the primary use of the land during the three years in question was not for farming with the intent to obtain a profit. Arapahoe P'ship v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 813 P.2d 766 (Colo. App. 1990).   The two-year requirement that land be used as a farm or ranch does not require such use be continuous during the prior two years; the plain language of the statute and legislative intent only require that the land be used as such at some point during both of the prior two tax years to the assessment. Aberdeen Inv'rs v. Adams County, 240 P.3d 398 (Colo. App. 2009).   In determining whether the two-year requirement that land be used as a farm or ranch was met, use that begins mid-year suffices. Although January 1 is the relevant date for classification purposes, use that began in July counts towards the two-year use requirement. Aberdeen Inv'rs v. Adams County, 240 P.3d 398 (Colo. App. 2009).   Parcel of land did not qualify as agricultural land for ad valorem tax purposes under the first criterion of subsection (1.6). Subsection (1.6) requires that the land be used as a farm or ranch currently and for the previous two years. It is the actual use during the relevant time period that is dispositive. In 2006, the actual use of the subject land was not as a farm, or as part of a farm, but as a construction site. C.P. Bedrock, LLC v. Denver County Bd. of Equaliz., 259 P.3d 514 (Colo. App. 2011).   Parcel of land did not qualify as being in the process of being restored through conservation practices because it did not satisfy the condition of the second criterion in subsection (1.6) that the parcel “has been placed in a conservation reserve program”. Under subsection (1.6) the appropriate government agency must have at least approved the owner or lessee's application for inclusion in the conservation reserve program at some point before the end of the tax year. The government agencies in question did not approve the application of the farmer lessee of the taxpayer to add the subject land to the conservation program until 2007. Because the subject land was not placed in the conservation program in 2006, the land was not “being restored through conservation practices” under subsection (1.6)(a)(I) during the relevant period. C.P. Bedrock, LLC v. Denver County Bd. of Equaliz., 259 P.3d 514 (Colo. App. 2011).   Parcel of land also did not meet the alternative condition of being subject to “a conservation plan approved by the appropriate conservation district . . . for up to a period of ten crop years”. There was effectively no conservation plan covering the subject land for 2006 or the years prior. Accordingly, the subject land did not qualify as “agricultural land” under subsection (1.6)(a)(I) by virtue of being “in the process of being restored through conservation practices”. Therefore, taxpayer cannot receive favorable tax treatment for the subject land for the 2007 and 2008 tax years on this basis. C.P. Bedrock, LLC v. Denver County Bd. of Equaliz., 259 P.3d 514 (Colo. App. 2011).   Where the administrative agency and administrative law judge responsible for administering the tax code disagree on the interpretation of a statute, the property tax administrator's interpretation is not entitled to judicial deference if it was not embodied in the assessor's reference library and is inconsistent with the statutory text. Moreover, the board of assessment appeals' interpretation deserves greater deference where its interpretation is consistent with its previous opinions. Aberdeen Investors v. Adams County, 240 P.3d 398 (Colo. App. 2009).   Definition of “farm” does not include land used for greenhouses, where the agricultural products produced in the greenhouses do not originate from the land's productivity. Accordingly, such land may not be classified and valued as agricultural land for property tax purposes. Welby Gardens Co. v. Adams County Bd. of Equaliz., 56 P.3d 1121 (Colo. App. 2002), aff'd, 71 P.3d 992 (Colo. 2003).   Subsection (1.6)(b) defines “other agricultural property” generally and does not provide specific guidance on how it should be valued. A court, therefore, should defer to the administrative interpretations of the statute. Jefferson County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. S.T. Spano Greenhouses, Inc., 155 P.3d 422 (Colo. App. 2006).   The provisions of the assessor's reference library interpreting subsection (1.6)(b) require the land component of other agricultural property to be valued based on comparable sales of other agricultural land that is as similar as possible to the subject land in size, location, and present use. Jefferson County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. S.T. Spano Greenhouses, Inc., 155 P.3d 422 (Colo. App. 2006).   The grazing and boarding of “pleasure horses” does not qualify as a “ranching” use. Only the grazing of “livestock” for the purpose of obtaining a monetary profit constitutes a “ranching” use, and horses may constitute “livestock” only if they are used for food or for human or animal consumption, breeding, draft, or profit. The taxpayer's profit motive alone in boarding and grazing horses on his land is insufficient. Palmer v. Bd. of Equaliz., 957 P.2d 348 (Colo. App. 1998).   Production of eggs in self-contained unit within which the livestock does not touch the ground where the eggs are sold for monetary profit as an agricultural product falls under the statutory definition of a farm, and the eggs fall under the definition of agricultural products. Morning Fresh Farms v. Bd. of Equaliz., 794 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1990).   Reservoir rights used upon land are taxable as real estate like improvements upon the land on which they are applied. Antero & Lost Park Reservoir Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 65 Colo. 375 , 177 P. 148 (1918).   Water rights are included within and constitute a part of the real estate upon which the water is applied. Kendrick v. Twin Lakes Reservoir Co., 58 Colo. 281 , 144 P. 884 (1914).   Mineral reservation not real property. A right to prospect for and to remove minerals if found is not a reservation of an estate in the real property involved, but a mere license, subject to revocation before its exercise by the owner of the fee simple estate. Radke v. Union P.R.R., 138 Colo. 189 , 334 P.2d 1077 (1959).   Waterworks system deemed realty. Water mains, pipes, and hydrants laid in the public streets and alleys of a city, and the machinery connected therewith and necessary to the operation of a waterworks plant, are realty for the purpose of taxation. Colo. Fuel & Iron Co. v. Pueblo Water Co., 11 Colo. App. 352, 53 P. 232 (1898).   In Colorado, all real property, except that which is expressly exempted by law, is subject to ad valorem taxation. Mesa Verde Co. v. Montezuma County Bd. of Equaliz., 898 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1995).   Development rights are property interests subject to taxation. Vill. at Treehouse v. Prop. Tax Adm'r, 2014 COA 6 , 321 P.3d 624.   Lessee of real property is liable for property tax when the lessee is, for all practical purposes, the owner of the real property. When the terms of a lease require the lessee to construct, maintain, and insure an aircraft hangar facility on the leased land at its own expense and give lessee the exclusive right to possess, use, operate, receive revenue from, claim tax advantages from, and, with authorization, assign or transfer the hangar facility, the lessee was properly assessed property tax for its ownership of the hangar facility. Rare Air Ltd. v. Prop. Tax Adm'r, 2019 COA 134 , 459 P.3d 547.   Possessory interest of concessionaire on national park land owned by the United States was an “interest in land” and thus constituted “real property” as defined in this section. Mesa Verde Co. v. Montezuma County Bd. of Equaliz., 898 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1995).   Possessory interests in land constitute real property as defined in subsection (14) and therefore also constitute taxable property as defined in subsection (16). Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 19 P.3d 1263 (Colo. 2001).   Reservoir dam not “improvement”. A reservoir dam is not subject to taxation as realty as it is not an improvement upon the land on which it is situated. Antero & Lost Park Reservoir Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 65 Colo. 375 , 177 P. 148 (1918).   Golf club membership not an “interest in land”. Rather, based on the terms of the membership agreement, the membership was a license. Roaring Fork Club v. Pitkin Bd. of Equaliz., 2013 COA 167 , 342 P.3d 467.   Definition of “residential land” contains no prescribed limit on the amount of acreage that may be so classified. Rather, the size of a residential tract must be determined on a case-by-case basis according to the amount of acreage which is being used as a unit in conjunction with the residential improvements on each particular property. Gyurman v. Weld County Bd. of Equaliz., 851 P.2d 307 (Colo. App. 1993); Farny v. Bd. of Equaliz., 985 P.2d 106 (Colo. App. 1999).   Based on a reading of the constitutional definition of residential real property and this section together, residential land must contain a residential dwelling unit and be used as a unit in conjunction with the residential improvements on the residential land. Fifield v. Pitkin County Bd. of Comm'rs, 2012 COA 197 , 292 P.3d 1207.   Common ownership requires identical parties. Contiguous parcels are under common ownership for purposes of qualifying all of the parcels as residential land under subsection (14.4) only if identical parties, and not merely overlapping parties, hold record title to each contiguous parcel. Lannie v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Eagle County, 2020 COA 77 , 471 P.3d 1207.   For purposes of subsection (14.4)(a), a parcel that does not include a residential improvement is “used as a unit” with a contiguous residential parcel under common ownership if the parcels are used as though they are a greater, single parcel of land and the landowner does not use the parcel for nonresidential property uses. Sandra K. Morrison Trust v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2020 COA 74 , 465 P.3d 582.   The plain meaning of “integral” in subsection (14.4)(a) is that parts are formed as a unit, not that all parts are necessary or essential. Hogan v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2018 COA 86 , 459 P.3d 629, aff'd sub nom. Mook v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Summit, 2020 CO 12, 457 P.3d 568.   The definition of “residential land” in subsection (14.4)(a) unambiguously means that two parcels must actually touch to be contiguous. Bringle Family Trust v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2018 COA 64 , 459 P.3d 615; Mook v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Summit, 2020 CO 12, 457 P.3d 568.   The definition of “contiguous” in subsection (14.4)(a) refers only to parcels of land that physically touch. Thus, residential land includes physically touching parcels of land upon which residential improvements are located. Therefore, for a multi-parcel assemblage to satisfy the contiguity requirement, a parcel of land must physically touch another parcel containing a residential improvement. Ziegler v. Park County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2020 CO 13, 457 P.3d 584.   Definition of residential land does not require active use of contiguous parcels. Hogan v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2018 COA 86 , 459 P.3d 629, aff'd sub nom. Mook v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Summit, 2020 CO 12, 457 P.3d 568.   Land on a parcel contiguous to another commonly owned parcel with a residential dwelling unit need only be used as a unit in conjunction with that residential dwelling unit or associated residential improvement to qualify as residential land. Fifield v. Pitkin County Bd. of Comm'rs, 2012 COA 197 , 292 P.3d 1207.   A residential improvement is not needed on each contiguous and commonly owned parcel of land for that parcel to be “used as a unit”. Ziegler v. Park County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2020 CO 13, 457 P.3d 584.   Subsection (14)(a) requires a property owner to use contiguous residential and vacant parcels together as a collective unit of property for only residential purposes to satisfy the “used as a unit” requirement. The use of contiguous vacant parcels does not have to be essential to the enjoyment or use of the residential property. Ziegler v. Park County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2020 CO 13, 457 P.3d 584.   Property tax assessors must rely on county records when deciding whether properties are held under common ownership for purposes of subsection (14.4). Mook v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Summit, 2020 CO 12, 457 P.3d 568.   Subsection (14.4) only requires that landowners use a collective unit of property composed of multiple, individual parcels, together with the residential improvements located on that collective unit. Nothing in the statute mandates that residential improvements exist on each parcel to be classified as residential land. Mook v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Summit, 2020 CO 12, 457 P.3d 568.   A residential dwelling must be situated upon a lot zoned for residential use in order for the lot to qualify as “residential real property” eligible for the percentage ratio of valuation for assessment as determined in accordance with Colo. Const., art. X, § 3(1)(b). Vail Assocs., Inc. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 765 P.2d 593 (Colo. App. 1988).   Definition of “residential improvement” requires that a structure be designed for use predominantly as a residence rather than simply “actually used” as a residence. Mission Viejo v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equaliz., 881 P.2d 462 (Colo. App. 1994).   For purposes of “residential improvements,” the phrase “designed for use” means that the building at the relevant time is devoted to or intended for actual use predominantly as a place of residence. Mission Viejo Co. v. Douglas County Bd. of Equaliz., 881 P.2d 462 (Colo. App. 1994); Manor Vail Condominium Ass'n v. Bd. of Equaliz., 956 P.2d 654 (Colo. App. 1998); Farny v. Bd. of Equaliz., 985 P.2d 106 (Colo. App. 1999).   Small structure built on 320-acre parcel qualified for residential classification since taxpayers actually used structure predominantly as a place of residence and it was at least minimally suitable for such residential purposes. Farny v. Bd. of Equaliz., 985 P.2d 106 (Colo. App. 1999).   Restaurant and meeting rooms were not residential improvements. Manor Vail Condominium Ass'n v. Bd. of Equaliz., 956 P.2d 654 (Colo. App. 1998).   Building originally designed as a residence could be reclassified based on actual use. Fact that building was originally designed as residence did not conclusively require classification as a residential property under this section. Mission Viejo v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equaliz., 881 P.2d 462 (Colo. App. 1994).   Plaintiff, a quasi-municipal corporation and political subdivision of the state, was not a “person” under subsection (9) and did not have standing to seek damages pursuant to § 39-10-115 (3) . Bear Creek Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Jefferson County, 902 P.2d 904 (Colo. App. 1995).   Vacant parcel of land did not qualify for residential classification even though it was zoned for residential use, adjacent to the taxpayer's residence, and used in conjunction with the residence as part of the taxpayer's backyard because the adjacent residential parcel was owned by the taxpayer's wife, not the taxpayer, and the vacant parcel did not have a residential dwelling unit on it. Sullivan v. Bd. of Equaliz., 971 P.2d 675 (Colo. App. 1998).   Residential classification upheld for second home that was sometimes rented out on a short-term basis. The board of assessment appeals' classification of the home as residential had a reasonable basis in law and was supported by substantial evidence in the record where the property: was designed for use as a residence and built for personal use; the owners' intent was to use the property as a second residence and an inheritance for their sons; short-term rentals were allowed primarily to offset expenses and share the outdoors experience with visitors rather than to profit; most rental activity occurred only during the summer; and the owners themselves regularly used the property. O'Neil v. Conejos County Bd. of Comm'rs, 2017 COA 30 , 395 P.3d 1185.   Applied in Del Mesa Farms v. Bd. of Equaliz., 656 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1998).