GA Code § 43-12-1 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 43 - Professions and Businesses|Chapter 12 - Disabled Veterans and Blind Persons Engaging in Peddling, Operating Businesses, or Practicing Professions|§ 43-12-1. Exemption From Payment of Occupation Tax, Administrative Fee, or Regulatory Fee

 Subject to the limitations provided in this chapter, the following classes of persons may peddle, conduct business, or practice the professions and semiprofessions in any county or municipality in this state without paying an occupation tax, administrative fee, or regulatory fee for the privilege of so doing, provided such person receives a certificate of exemption issued by the commissioner of veterans service:    Any disabled veteran of any war or armed conflict in which any branch of the armed forces of the United States engaged, whether under United States command or otherwise;   Any blind person; or   Any veteran of peace-time service in the United States armed forces who has a physical disability incurred during the period of such service.    (Code 1868, § 569; Code 1873, § 534; Code 1882, § 534; Ga. L. 1882-83, p. 64, § 1; Ga. L. 1889, p. 50, § 1; Ga. L. 1890-91, p. 63, § 1; Ga. L. 1895, p. 19, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 1642; Ga. L. 1897, p. 24, § 1; Ga. L. 1898, p. 46, § 1; Civil Code 1910, § 1888; Ga. L. 1918, p. 116, § 1; Ga. L. 1919, p. 91, § 1; Code 1933, § 84-2011; Ga. L. 1935, p. 163, § 2; Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 431, § 2; Ga. L. 1971, p. 348, § 1; Ga. L. 1972, p. 456, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1401, § 13; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1268, § 1.)   Editor's notes.   - Ga. L. 1983, p. 1401, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provided: "It is the intent of this Act to implement certain changes required by Article IV, Section V, Paragraph I, subparagraph (b) of the [1976] Constitution of the State of Georgia." See Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. V, Para. I.   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Disabled veterans cannot be compelled to pay city for privilege of doing business.    - Disabled soldier of World War I, who is a resident of this state, has a right to conduct a business without paying license for privilege of doing so to a town or city in which business is conducted. City of Marietta v. Brantley, 170 Ga. 258, 152 S.E. 232 (1930).   Tax as equivalent of paying for privilege of doing business.    - To require a soldier to pay a tax would be to require the soldier to pay a license for privilege of conducting a business. Tyner v. Winslett, 174 Ga. 267, 162 S.E. 807 (1932).    Statutory exemption was only from occupation taxes, and did not purport to confer any additional right or privilege. McKinney v. Patton, 176 Ga. 719, 169 S.E. 16 (1933); Snipes v. Flournoy, 178 Ga. 815, 174 S.E. 617 (1934).    Statute neither expressly nor by implication takes away police powers of towns, cities, or counties. City of Marietta v. Howard, 208 Ga. 719, 69 S.E.2d 246 (1952).   Exemptions construed strictly against grantee.    - Purported exemptions from taxation, being in derogation of sovereign authority of the state, are construed strictly against grantee. Snipes v. Flournoy, 178 Ga. 815, 174 S.E. 617 (1934).   Although exempt from fee, disabled veteran must obtain license to operate common motor carrier.    - When a person was exempted from paying license fees under the provisions of this statute, the person must still obtain the necessary license to operate a common motor carrier and may not operate without the license. McKinney v. Patton, 176 Ga. 719, 169 S.E. 16 (1933).    Even though a veteran may hold the certificate contemplated by statute, the veteran still may not conduct business of a motor carrier without obtaining from the Public Service Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity as other persons are required to do. McKinney v. Patton, 176 Ga. 719, 169 S.E. 16 (1933); Snipes v. Flournoy, 178 Ga. 815, 174 S.E. 617 (1934).    Exemption does not apply to state license taxes, and such exemption would not authorize a disabled veteran to carry on the business of a real estate broker without obtaining a license from the Georgia Real Estate Commission. Dixon v. Brooke, 44 Ga. App. 608, 162 S.E. 287 (1932).   Exemption applied although veteran did not own peddled goods.    - Defendant was authorized to peddle under certificate of exemption issued in the defendant's own name under this statute despite the fact that the defendant did not own the goods being peddled. Roberts v. City of Eatonton, 50 Ga. App. 592, 179 S.E. 144 (1935).   Certificate of exemption as proof that one was a disabled veteran.    - Any disabled veteran of the World War, resident in this state, may peddle or conduct business in any town, city, or county without obtaining a license; and the certificate of exemption stating the fact that the individual was a disabled or indigent veteran shall be sufficient proof. Smith v. City of Atlanta, 51 Ga. App. 17, 179 S.E. 558 (1935).   Certificate cannot be transferred.    - Disabled veteran, resident of this state, may not transfer or grant disabled veteran's privilege to peddle goods without a license to any other person. Smith v. City of Atlanta, 51 Ga. App. 17, 179 S.E. 558 (1935).   Veteran's remedy was at law, not injunction against city arrest.    - After a suit was instituted by a Confederate soldier claiming an exemption under this statute to enjoin the city from arresting the soldier and from in any way interfering with the soldier's business as a peddler, a court of equity would not interfere by injunction to restrain execution of municipal ordinance of a criminal nature, on ground of invalidity of such ordinance, nor on further ground that the plaintiff is exempt from operation of the ordinance. The person affected has a full and adequate remedy at law to test the validity of the ordinance, as well as the question of exemption from the ordinance's operation. City of Marietta v. Brantley, 170 Ga. 258, 152 S.E. 232 (1930).    Cited in Campbell v. Williams, 215 Ga. 717, 113 S.E.2d 143 (1960).   OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL   ANALYSIS    General Considerations   Limitations on Veterans' Exemption