CO Code § 13-52-102 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 13 - Courts and Court Procedure|Article 52 - Property Subject to Levy|§ 13-52-102. Property Subject to Execution - Lien - Real Estate

  All goods and chattels, lands, tenements, and real estate of every person against whom any judgment is obtained in any court of record in this state, either at law or in equity, or against whom any foreign judgment is filed with the clerk of any court of this state in accordance with the provisions of the “Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act” pursuant to article 53 of this title, which judgment, in either case, is for any debt, damages, costs, or other sum of money are liable to be sold on execution to be issued upon such judgment. A transcript of the judgment record of such judgment, certified by the clerk of such court, may be recorded in any county; and from the time of recording such transcript, and not before, the judgment shall become a lien upon all the real estate, not exempt from execution in the county where such transcript of judgment is recorded, owned by such judgment debtor or which such judgment debtor may afterwards acquire in such county, until such lien expires. The lien of such judgment shall expire six years after the entry of judgment unless, prior to the expiration of such six-year period, such judgment is revived as provided by law and a transcript of the judgment record of such revived judgment, certified by the clerk of the court in which such revived judgment was entered, is recorded in the same county in which the transcript of the original judgment was recorded, in which event the lien shall continue for six years from the entry of the revived judgment. A lien may be obtained with respect to a revived judgment in the same manner as an original judgment and the lien of a revived judgment may be continued in the same manner as the lien of an original judgment. The lien of any judgment shall expire if the judgment is satisfied or considered as satisfied as provided in this section. The lien created by recording a notice of lien of a judgment for child support or maintenance or arrears thereof or child support debt pursuant to section 14-10-122, C.R.S., shall be governed by such section. The lien created by recording a transcript of an order for restitution pursuant to section 16-18.5-104 (5)(a), C.R.S., shall be governed by article 18.5 of title 16, C.R.S.      Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), execution may issue on any judgment described in subsection (1) of this section to enforce the same at any time within twenty years from the entry thereof, but not afterwards, unless revived as provided by law, and, after twenty years from the entry of final judgment in any court of this state, the judgment shall be considered as satisfied in full, unless so revived.      With respect to judgments entered in county courts on or after July 1, 1981, the time limitation within which execution may issue is six years from the entry thereof, but not afterwards, unless revived as provided by law, and, after six years from the entry of final judgment in any county court of this state, the judgment shall be considered as satisfied in full, unless so revived. (b) (I) With respect to judgments entered in county courts on or after July 1, 1981, the time limitation within which execution may issue is six years from the entry thereof, but not afterwards, unless revived as provided by law, and, after six years from the entry of final judgment in any county court of this state, the judgment shall be considered as satisfied in full, unless so revived.    The twenty-year limitation contained in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) shall not apply to judgments entered for restitution pursuant to article 18.5 of title 16, C.R.S. Execution may issue on judgments for restitution at any time until paid in full.       If, after the date that a transcript of judgment is recorded in a county, some portion or all of such county is merged with, annexed to, or otherwise becomes part of some other county or city and county, whether then existing or newly formed, then:   It shall not be necessary to record the transcript of judgment in such other county or city and county in order to continue the lien of the judgment and the priority thereof as to any real estate that the judgment debtor acquired before or acquires after the date of recording of the transcript of judgment if such real estate was in the county in which the transcript of judgment was recorded on or after the date of recording of the transcript of judgment; and    If such judgment is revived as provided by law, timely recording of a transcript of the revived judgment in such other county or city and county is necessary to continue the lien of the original judgment and the priority thereof with respect to any real estate that was in the county in which the transcript of the original judgment was recorded on or after the date of recording the transcript of the original judgment but, at the time of recording of the transcript of the revived judgment, is in such other county or city and county.          The term “real estate” as used in this section includes all interests of the defendant or any person to his use held or claimed by virtue of any deed, bond, covenant, or otherwise for a conveyance or as mortgagor of lands in fee, for life, or for years.      Any person, including a title insurance company as defined by article 11 of title 10, C.R.S., who makes representations concerning the existence of any judgment lien on the real property of another shall have the duty to make a bona fide good faith effort, prior to the making of such representations, to determine whether the person against whom the judgment was obtained is the same person as the person who holds an interest in the real property which is the subject of the representation. If a bona fide good faith effort is made and such effort fails to disclose satisfactory information as to whether or not the person against whom the judgment was obtained is the same person as the person who holds an interest in the real property which is the subject of the representation, then, in that event, the person or title insurance company who makes the representation may require the person who holds an interest in the real property which is the subject of the representation to provide satisfactory evidence or information that he is not the same person as the judgment debtor.    Any person, including a title insurance company as defined by article 11 of title 10, C.R.S., who makes representations concerning the existence of any judgment lien on the real property of another without making a bona fide good faith effort, prior to the making of such representations, to determine whether the person against whom the judgment was obtained is the same person as the person who holds an interest in the real property which is the subject of the representation is liable to any person damaged by the failure to make such effort in a sum of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars for his actual and exemplary damages. The prevailing party shall recover the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the court. No action pursuant to this paragraph (b) shall be brought more than one year after the date of the representation concerning the existence of the judgment lien.    As used in this subsection (4), “bona fide good faith effort” means honesty in fact in the effort to discover and determine the actual and true identity of the judgment debtor against whom the judgment lien attaches. The effort shall include but need not be limited to an examination of the judgment debtor's social security number, his driver's license, his address, his birth record, and the court record in the action which resulted in the judgment lien, if available.        History. Source: R.S. P. 370, § 1. G.L. § 1409. G.S. § 1835. L. 1891: P. 246, § 1. L. 01: P. 231, § 1. R.S. 08: § 3609. L. 17: P. 329, § 1. C.L. § 5898. CSA: C. 93, § 2. CRS 53: § 77-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 77-1-2. L. 80: (4) added, p. 517, § 1, effective July 1. L. 81: (2) amended, p. 889, § 1, effective July 1. L. 92: (1) amended, p. 218, § 24, effective August 1. L. 93: (1) amended, p. 1563, § 14, effective September 1. L. 2000: (1) and (2) (b) amended, p. 1051, § 23, effective September 1. L. 2002: (1), (2) (a), and (2) (b) (II) amended and (2) (c) added, p. 49, § 1, effective March 21. History. Source: R.S. P. 370, § 1. G.L. § 1409. G.S. § 1835. L. 1891: P. 246, § 1. L. 01: P. 231, § 1. R.S. 08: § 3609. L. 17: P. 329, § 1. C.L. § 5898. CSA: C. 93, § 2. CRS 53: § 77-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 77-1-2. L. 80: (4) added, p. 517, § 1, effective July 1. L. 81: (2) amended, p. 889, § 1, effective July 1. L. 92: (1) amended, p. 218, § 24, effective August 1. L. 93: (1) amended, p. 1563, § 14, effective September 1. L. 2000: (1) and (2) (b) amended, p. 1051, § 23, effective September 1. L. 2002: (1), (2) (a), and (2) (b) (II) amended and (2) (c) added, p. 49, § 1, effective March 21.    Cross references:   For procedures in execution and other proceedings after judgment, see C.R.C.P. 69.   ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. INTERESTS SUBJECT TO EXECUTION.    III. NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIEN.     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Law reviews. For article, “State Statutes of Limitation Contrasted and Compared”, see 3 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 106 (1931). For article, “Enforcement of Justice Court Judgments”, see 12 Dicta 274 (1935). For note, “Revived Judgments and the Full Faith and Credit Clause”, see 22 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 87 (1949). For article, “Reaching Fraudulent Conveyances and Equitable Interests of Debtors”, see 27 Dicta 137 (1950). For article, “Executions and Levies on Tangible Property”, see 27 Dicta 143 (1950). For article, “Transmissibility of Future Interest in Colorado”, see 27 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1 (1954). For article, “Marketable Title: What Certifiable Copies of Court Papers Should Appear of Record”, see 34 Dicta 7 (1957). For article, “One Year Review of Domestic Relations”, see 38 Dicta 84 (1961). For comment, “The Effect of Certified Realty Corp. v. Smith on Mortgage Foreclosure in Colorado”, see 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 301 (1981). For article, “Some Malpractice Pitfalls in Collection Cases”, which discusses malpractice by collection attorneys, see 13 Colo. Law. 2235 (1984). For article, “The Nuts and Bolts of Collecting Support”, see 19 Colo. Law. 1595 (1990).   The duly recorded judgment became a lien upon all real property which the judgment debtor then owned or thereafter acquired. Sky Harbor, Inc. v. Jenner, 164 Colo. 470 , 435 P.2d 894 (1968).   Under this section, execution may issue at any time within 20 years after the entry of the judgment. Balfe v. Rumsey & Sikemeier Co., 55 Colo. 97 , 133 P. 417 (1913).   The running of the six-year statute of limitations established by this section for collection of payment of a debt through execution on a judgment lien does not extinguish the debt. It bars execution of the judgment lien, but payment of the debt may be enforced by other available legal means. Mortgage Invs. Corp. v. Battle Mtn. Corp., 70 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2003).   If more than six, but less than twenty, years have passed since the entry of judgment, a creditor may obtain a judgment lien if he or she first revives the judgment and records the transcript of the revived judgment. Sec. Credit Servs., LLC v. Hulterstrom, 2019 COA 7 , 436 P.3d 593; In re Kellogg, 601 B.R. 537 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019 ).   If a judgment creditor allows its judgment lien to expire and it does not properly revive the judgment before the six-year period lapses, the creditor can no longer execute because its lien has expired. In re Kellogg, 601 B.R. 537 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019 ).   To obtain a new lien against the debtor's property, the judgment creditor must necessarily establish that the debtor owes the creditor a judgment debt, but it cannot if that debt has been discharged. In re Kellogg, 601 B.R. 537 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019 ).   Section also governs time within which body executions may issue. The sections relating to body executions do not prescribe any different time limit than that mentioned in the instant section for the issuance of such executions. Both body executions and property executions are issued on judgments, “to enforce the same”. In our opinion this section prescribes the time within which body executions may issue. Roll v. Davis, 85 Colo. 594 , 277 P. 767 (1929).   The general assembly may, while a judgment is in full life, extend the time within which execution may issue. Balfe v. Rumsey & Sikemeier Co., 55 Colo. 97 , 133 P. 417 (1913).   Generally, court may not impair creditor's right to enforce collection. As a general rule, a court may not stay execution and thereby impair or destroy the statutory right of a judgment creditor to enforce collection of its judgment against nonexempt property of the judgment debtor. First Nat'l Bank v. District Court, 652 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1982).   Right to enforce may be statutorily limited. The substantive right of a judgment creditor to enforce collection of the judgment may be statutorily limited, as by § 7-60-128 . First Nat'l Bank v. District Court, 652 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1982).   A judgment directing restitution of money is a judgment for a “sum of money” as that phrase is used in this section. Scott v. Woodhams, 79 Colo. 528 , 246 P. 1027 (1926).   Execution may issue on order for permanent and temporary alimony. Under the provisions of this section an execution is authorized not only on an order for permanent alimony, but on temporary alimony also. Daniels v. Daniels, 9 Colo. 133 , 10 P. 657 (1886); Paul v. Marty, 72 Colo. 399 , 211 P. 667 (1922); Hauck v. Schuck, 143 Colo. 324 , 353 P.2d 79 (1960).   Alimony and support installments are judgments, and are enforceable during the entire period of the statute of limitations. Hauck v. Schuck, 143 Colo. 324 , 353 P.2d 79 (1960).   Creditor may file bill in equity to remove fraudulent obstruction. The right of a judgment creditor to come into a court of equity to remove a fraudulent obstruction to the collection of his judgment, and to enforce a claim against property which ought to be subject thereto, is well established. Barnes v. Beighly, 9 Colo. 475 , 12 P. 906 (1887).   Once lien exists. In some way the lien must be acquired and exist at the time a bill is filed in equity to remove fraudulent obstructions. Barnes v. Beighly, 9 Colo. 475 , 12 P. 906 (1887).   Levy must become visible and accessible to be valid. The designation is a mental act; but, in order that it may be valid as a levy, it must be embodied in some visible memorial--some record of what was done, accessible to the judgment debtor and to the public. Strictly speaking, the record is not itself a levy, it is merely the evidence that the levy was made, but as the statute does not require that the record shall be made upon the writ, no reason is apparent why it may not be made elsewhere, provided it is equally public and permanent. Herr v. Broadwell, 5 Colo. App. 467, 39 P. 70 (1895); Jones v. Olson, 17 Colo. App. 144, 67 P. 349 (1902).   Judgment itself does not constitute a lien upon realty; the creditor must go a step further and acquire a specific lien. Robison v. Gumaer, 43 Colo. 310 , 95 P. 935 (1908).   Mere recording of transcript does not effect execution. The recording of the transcript of judgment does not, in and of itself, effect an execution upon the property of the debtor. Rocky Mt. Ass'n of Credit Mgt. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 344 , 565 P.2d 1345 (1977).   Creditor may, prior to sale, bring action to determine nature and extent of debtor's interest in land. While under the statute every interest in land, whether legal or equitable, is subject to levy and sale on execution, and the purchaser of such interest may maintain an action to determine the extent thereof, yet the judgment creditor may resort to an action prior to the sale. for the purpose of having the debtor's interest determined, and the question of title settled in advance of the sale. O'Connell v. Taney, 16 Colo. 353 , 27 P. 888 (1891).   Estate, not subjected specifically to a judgment lien before it was homesteaded, is exempt from execution. Weare v. Johnson, 20 Colo. 363 , 38 P. 374 (1894).   Proviso as to suspension of statute applies to supersedeas on appeal. The proviso in the statute, suspending the running of the statute when issue of execution is restrained by injunction, applies to a suspension of issue by supersedeas on appeal. Gottlieb v. Thatcher, 151 U.S. 271, 14 S. Ct. 319, 38 L. Ed. 157 (1894).   General appearance and motion to quash by debtor waives defects in service. A general appearance, and motion to quash an execution, upon the sole ground that more than 10 (now 20) years elapsed between the entry of judgment and the issuance of execution, and that the judgment had not been revived, is a waiver of all defects and irregularities in the service or return of the summons. Balfe v. Rumsey & Sikemeier Co., 55 Colo. 97 , 133 P. 417 (1913).   Court-ordered foreclosure need not conform to this section. The district court's order foreclosing the chattel mortgages and directing sale of the personalty was not entered by way of execution. The procedures specified in articles 51 to 61 of title 13 for levies on execution were not violated by the district court's order of foreclosure and sale. Terrell v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 165 Colo. 463 , 439 P.2d 989 (1968).   Judicial liens in bankruptcy. Judicial liens impair a bankruptcy debtor's equity where they are created subsequent to the establishment of a homestead right and no waiver is obtained from the property owner. Consequently, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522 and §§ 13-54-107 , 38-41-201 and 38-41-202 , these liens are null and void as judicial liens. Lincoln v. Cherry Creek Homeowners Ass'n, 30 B.R. 905 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983 ).   Good faith improver doctrine did not apply to exempt a residence from a judgment lien which had been recorded against judgment debtor before debtor's successor in interest began construction of such residence. Mooring v. Brown, 763 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1985).   For execution sale by one creditor not divesting lien of another creditor, see Casserleigh v. Spar Consol. Mining Co., 23 Colo. App. 239, 128 P. 863 (1912).   Personal and real property not owned by judgment debtor is not subject to execution, absent another statute creating liability. Brink v. McNeil, 761 P.2d 271 (Colo. App. 1988).   Twenty-year period prescribed for execution upon judgments in this section and not the six-year period in § 13-80-103.5 is the applicable statute of limitations for child support arrearages. In re Aragon, 773 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 1989).   Seizure of jointly held personal property pursuant to writ of attachment or execution to secure debt of one joint owner does not constitute conversion. Ruscitti v. Sackheim, 817 P.2d 1046 (Colo. App. 1991).   Property subject to homestead exemption is exempt from execution and therefore from judgment lien. City Ctr. Nat'l Bank v. Barone, 807 P.2d 1251 (Colo. App. 1991).   If bank could not assert a lien against property while party retained title, it could not enforce a lien against the party's grantees, provided the transaction was bona fide. City Ctr. Nat'l Bank v. Barone, 807 P.2d 1251 (Colo. App. 1991).   Issuance of a writ of execution and the filing of a certificate of levy does not extend the six-year term of a judgment lien. Regardless of when acquired, writs of execution or certificates of levy merely serve as means to enforce the lien. Great W. Exch., Inc. v. Walters, 819 P.2d 1093 (Colo. App. 1991).   Nothing in this section requires a judgment creditor to obtain a valid judgment lien as a prerequisite to obtaining a writ of execution and certificate of levy or to execute on the judgment. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Galvan, 2019 COA 107 , 457 P.3d 749.   When calculating the six-year time limit on a judgment lien under this section that originated as a foreign judgment lien under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, the time begins to run when the judgment was entered in the foreign jurisdiction, not when it was filed in Colorado. Baum v. Baum, 820 P.2d 1122 (Colo. 1991); Mortg. Inv. Corp. v. Battle Mtn. Corp., 56 P.3d 1104 (Colo. App. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 70 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2003); Indep. Bank v. Pandy, , 383 P.3d 64, aff'd on other grounds, 2016 CO 49, 372 P.3d 1047 .   Judgment lien, based on a domesticated out-of-state judgment, must be revived under Colorado procedural law for the lien to be extended. To extend a judgment lien beyond six years after the date of judgment, Colorado procedural law requires a judgment to be revived pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(h) and a transcript of the revival to be filed with the clerk and recorder. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Kopfman, 205 P.3d 437 (Colo. App. 2008), aff'd, 226 P.3d 1068 (Colo. 2010).   Personal property not owned by judgment debtor not subject to execution to satisfy judgment. Ruscitti v. Sackheim, 817 P.2d 1046 (Colo. App. 1991).   Applied in Baker v. Allen, 34 Colo. App. 363, 528 P.2d 922 (1974); Mohler v. Buena Vista Bank & Trust Co., 42 Colo. App. 4, 588 P.2d 894 (1978); Lucero v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 4 B.R. 659 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980 ); Trimble v. McCoy Bros., 11 B.R. 512 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981 ); Lease Fin. Inc. v. Cohen, 705 P.2d 1008 (Colo. App. 1985).   II. INTERESTS SUBJECT TO EXECUTION.   Under this section every interest in land, whether legal or equitable, is subject to levy and sale on execution. McFarran v. Knox, 5 Colo. 217 (1880); Stock-Growers' Bank v. Newton, 13 Colo. 245 , 22 P. 444 (1889); O'Connell v. Taney, 16 Colo. 353 , 27 P. 888 (1891); Arnett v. Coffey, 1 Colo. App. 34, 27 P. 614 (1891).   It is to be presumed that when the general assembly used the term “real estate” it intended a lien upon whatever real estate on which there might be a levy. McFarran v. Knox, 5 Colo. 217 (1880).   Creditor's interest is superior to third party's equitable interest if he has no notice. A creditor who, acting in good faith and without notice of equitable interests, acquires a lien under the statutes against the apparent interest of his judgment debtor, acquires a valid lien superior to a third party's equitable interests. Sky Harbor, Inc. v. Jenner, 164 Colo. 470 , 435 P.2d 894 (1968); Shearton Serv. Corp. v. Johnson, 5 P.3d 395 (Colo. App. 2000).   Filing dissolution action does not give a debtor's spouse any rights that predate attachment of a judgment lien creditor's rights. Thus, if judgment lien creditor perfects a lien on real property before debtor's spouse asserts and perfects a claim to the property in dissolution proceeding, then the rights of debtor's spouse to the property are subordinate to those of the judgment lien creditor. Shearton Serv. Corp. v. Johnson, 5 P.3d 395 (Colo. App. 2000).   A lease of land for a term of years is real estate. Liggett v. Enneking, 101 Colo. 254 , 72 P.2d 1118 (1937).   The equity of redemption of a mortgagor in chattels is not subject to an execution at law where the possession of the chattels has been transferred to the mortgagee. Metzler v. James, 12 Colo. 322 , 19 P. 885 (1888).   Where one also has right of possession, land is subject to execution. Twogood v. Ocsay, 97 Colo. 300 , 49 P.2d 437 (1935).   Where a judgment debtor had neither a legal nor an equitable interest in a property, recording a judgment does not create a lien on the property, because there is no interest on which the lien could attach. Junior creditor who successfully exposes a fraudulent transfer by filing suit takes priority over senior creditors holding judgments recorded prior to the junior creditor uncovering the fraud. Shepler v. Whalen, 119 P.3d 1084 (Colo. 2005); In re Bryan, 469 B.R. 348 (Bankr. D. Colo.), aff'd, 483 B.R. 738 (D. Colo. 2012 ).   The interest must be vested and based on legal or equitable title. Under this provision it is clear that if appellant was vested with any interest in the property, either legal or equitable, then such interest was liable to seizure and sale under the execution. It must appear, however, that the interest was a vested interest, which attached to the body of the land itself, and was held by him under a legal or equitable title, within the meaning of the law. Fallon v. Worthington, 13 Colo. 559 , 22 P. 960 (1889).   A chose in action is not such an interest. A vendor of real estate who enters into a subsequent contract with his vendee, whereby the trust-deed given to secure instalments of purchase money is released, a lien merely being reserved, has only a chose in action, and no interest in the land which can be subjected to sale on execution. Fallon v. Worthington, 13 Colo. 559 , 22 P. 960 (1889).   An inchoate interest is liable to execution. The inchoate interest of a purchaser of lands, under an executory agreement for the future conveyance thereof, is liable to execution. under this section. Salisbury v. La Fitte, 57 Colo. 358 , 141 P. 484 (1914).   Interest of joint tenants unsatisfactory to creditor of one joint tenant. The real property interest of two joint tenants cannot be used to satisfy the judgment creditor of one joint tenant. First Nat'l Bank v. Energy Fuels Corp., 200 Colo. 540 , 618 P.2d 1115 (1980).   For ineffectiveness of judgment against lessee of debtor whose leasehold interest antedates recordation, see Routt County Mining Co. v. Stutheit, 101 Colo. 254 , 72 P.2d 692 (1937).   For C.R.C.P. 69(a) not curtailing rights given by this section, see Jones v. District Court, 135 Colo. 468 , 312 P.2d 503 (1957).   III. NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIEN.   Lien attaches immediately upon filing and recording of judgment. A judgment being filed for record and recorded as required by the statutes, a lien attaches at once upon the real estate of the judgment debtor. Gottlieb v. Thatcher, 151 U.S. 271, 14 S. Ct. 319, 38 L. Ed. 157 (1894).   Or upon levy of execution. A judgment creditor has no lien upon real property by virtue of his judgment until he files a transcript of the judgment with the county clerk and recorder or levies execution upon the property. Routt County Min. Co. v. Stutheit, 101 Colo. 254 , 72 P.2d 692 (1937).   In each county where the transcript is filed. The filing of a transcript of a judgment in La Plata county fastened a lien securing its payment upon the interest of the coal and coke company in its real estate in that county, under this statute. Schofield v. Ute Coal & Coke Co., 92 F. 269 (8th Cir. 1879).   The recording of the transcript of judgment establishes a lien only against property owned by the debtor within the county where it is recorded. Mtn. States Bank v. Irvin, 809 P.2d 1113 (Colo. App. 1991).   Lien is not lost by failure to return execution within 90 days. The lien on real estate created by the filing of a transcript of judgment in the office of the county recorder is not lost by the failure to return an execution issued on the judgment within 90 days as required by law. Davis Bros. Drug Co. v. Counter, 75 Colo. 239 , 225 P. 245 (1924).   It attaches not only to property owned at the time the execution was so received, but to property acquired thereafter while the writ is in force. In this respect, the execution lien in the present case is similar to the lien of a chattel mortgage covering after-acquired property. Indian Creek Coal Mining Co. v. Home Sav. & Merchants' Bank, 80 Colo. 96 , 249 P. 499 (1926); Robinson v. Wright, 90 Colo. 417 , 9 P.2d 618 (1932).   An attachment lien merges in that of the judgment when a judgment lien is acquired, but the latter relates back to the date of the former. Floyd v. Sellers, 7 Colo. App. 498, 44 P. 373 (1896).   And its priority is preserved. When a transcript of the judgment is filed with the recorder, it becomes a lien upon all the real estate of the judgment defendant situated in the county for six years from the rendition of the judgment. The lien of the attachment becomes merged in that of the judgment, but its priority is preserved, and the lien of the judgment, insofar as the specific real estate attached is concerned, relates back to the lien of the attachment. Floyd v. Sellers, 7 Colo. App. 498, 44 P. 373 (1896).   It continues for six years where the creditor secures no judgment lien by the filing of a transcript of the judgment docket. Emery v. Yount, 7 Colo. 107 , 1 P. 686 (1883); Floyd v. Sellers, 7 Colo. App. 498, 44 P. 373 (1896).   Purchaser who fails to record deed is inferior to judgment creditor who thereafter files transcript without knowledge of conveyance. Where a judgment debtor having the record title to real property conveys it to another, he parts with his title and thereafter does not have even a naked legal title; and yet if before the recording of the deed, the judgment creditor, without notice of the conveyance, files a transcript of the judgment, the lien of his judgment is superior to the rights of the grantee in the deed. Wedman v. Carpenter, 65 Colo. 63 , 173 P. 57 (1918); Donahue v. Kohler-McLister Paint Co., 81 Colo. 244 , 254 P. 989 (1927).   For judgment creditor's priority over resulting trust, see W. Chem. Mfg. Co. v. McCaffrey, 47 Colo. 397 , 107 P. 1081 (1910).   A proper lien is necessary before judgment creditor may bring bill for discovery. A bill will not lie by a judgment creditor for discovery, and to have land in another county than that in which the judgment was rendered, alleged to be held in trust for the judgment debtor, who is residing on such land, made subject to the judgment, where the judgment has not been made a lien upon the land claimed to be subjected by filing a transcript of the judgment with the recorder of the county in which the land is situated, as is provided by this section. Barnes v. Beighly, 9 Colo. 475 , 12 P. 906 (1887).   A judgment must be a lien on the real estate sought to be subjected to sale on execution through the aid of a creditor's bill, where it has not been made a lien on real estate in another county in the manner herein provided. Barnes v. Beighly, 9 Colo. 475 , 12 P. 906 (1887).   No lien created on property where the debt created by a recorded judgment was discharged in bankruptcy prior to the acquisition of the property. In re Yates, 47 Bankr. 460 (D. Colo. 1985 ).