GA Code § 31-11-8 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 31 - Health|Chapter 11 - Emergency Medical Services|Article 1 - General Provisions|§ 31-11-8. Liability of Persons Rendering Emergency Care; Liability of Physicians Advising Ambulance Service Pursuant to Code Section 31-11-50; Limitation to Gratuitous Services

  Any person, including agents and employees, who is licensed to furnish ambulance service and who in good faith renders emergency care to a person who is a victim of an accident or emergency shall not be liable for any civil damages to such victim as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering such emergency care to such victim.   A physician shall not be civilly liable for damages resulting from that physician's acting as medical adviser to an ambulance service, pursuant to Code Section 31-11-50, if those damages are not a result of that physician's willful and wanton negligence.   The immunity provided in this Code section shall apply only to those persons who perform the aforesaid emergency services for no remuneration.    (Code 1933, § 88-3114, enacted by Ga. L. 1972, p. 625, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 692, §§ 1, 2.)   Cross references.   - Statement of emergency vehicle driver's duty of care with regard to other drivers and pedestrians in operation of vehicle, §§ 40-6-74,40-6-99.    Liability of persons rendering emergency care generally, § 51-1-29.   Law reviews.   - For article surveying judicial and legislative developments in Georgia's tort laws, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 229 (1979). For annual survey on local government law, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 205 (2013). For comment, "Good Samaritan Laws - Legal Disarray: An Update," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 1439 (1987).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS    Legislative intent behind this section, see Anderson v. Little & Davenport Funeral Home, 242 Ga. 751, 251 S.E.2d 250 (1978).    This section is definite and certain in the statute's meaning. Men of common intelligence would not differ as to application of the statute's provisions. Anderson v. Little & Davenport Funeral Home, 242 Ga. 751, 251 S.E.2d 250 (1978).   Immunity granted only as to acts or omissions in rendering emergency care.    - This section is carefully drawn so as to grant immunity to providers of ambulance service only for their acts and omissions in rendering such emergency care. Anderson v. Little & Davenport Funeral Home, 242 Ga. 751, 251 S.E.2d 250 (1978).    Ambulance service was not entitled to emergency care providers' immunity under O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8(a) because the ambulance did not render emergency care, but rather, it was the ambulance's inability to provide prompt emergency care that formed the basis of a lawsuit alleging damage from a delay in emergency transport. Crewey v. Am. Med. Response of Ga., Inc., 303 Ga. App. 258, 692 S.E.2d 851 (2010).   Code section only applies to rendition of health care.    - Trial court erred in charging O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8 when liability was not founded upon the rendition of health care but was based upon the intentional torts of assault and robbery because an ambulance attendant removed the passenger/plaintiff's ring. Bricks v. Metro Ambulance Serv., Inc., 177 Ga. App. 62, 338 S.E.2d 438 (1985).   Immunity not extended to negligence causing motor vehicle accident.    - Legislature saw fit not to extend immunity to negligence of ambulance driver for injuries resulting from motor vehicle accidents. Anderson v. Little & Davenport Funeral Home, 242 Ga. 751, 251 S.E.2d 250 (1978).   Immunity requires that one act in good faith.    - Once licensed, providers of ambulance service are granted immunity from civil liability provided, however, emergency care is rendered in good faith. Anderson v. Little & Davenport Funeral Home, 242 Ga. 751, 251 S.E.2d 250 (1978).    Because the totality of the paramedics' actions showed that the paramedics acted in good faith with the intent to save the decedent's life, O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8 provided immunity against liability for the paramedics' conduct. Thomas v. DeKalb County, 227 Ga. App. 186, 489 S.E.2d 58 (1997).    Since plaintiff presented no evidence that defendants, emergency medical technicians, believed the defendant's conduct was unconscionable or that the circumstances required further investigation, even if the defendants exercised bad judgment and acted negligently, such conduct did not amount to a lack of good faith and, accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants. Bixler v. Merritt, 244 Ga. App. 82, 534 S.E.2d 837 (2000).    Paramedic was an employee of the county emergency medical services, which was licensed to provide ambulance services and the administratrix did not present any evidence suggesting that defendants did not act in good faith; viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the administratrix, the evidence showed, at best, that the defendants exercised bad judgment and acted negligently in caring for the decedent but this was not enough to show a lack of good faith for purposes of statutory immunity. Further, immunity under O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8 applied despite the fact that the defendants charged a fee to defray the administrative costs of patient transportation. Presley v. City of Blackshear, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Ga. 2008).    Paramedic who examined an arrestee who appeared ill was entitled to immunity under O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8 as to state law negligence claims asserted by the administratrix of the arrestee's estate after the arrestee died due to ingestion of crack cocaine, of which the paramedic was unaware, because the administratrix alleged mere negligence on the part of the paramedic in failing to conduct a complete examination of the arrestee, which was insufficient to show that the paramedic acted without good faith. Presley v. City of Blackshear, F.3d (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2009)(Unpublished).   Code section treats all recipients of treatment by ambulance service in same way.    - This Code section is uniform in that the statute treats all persons who receive emergency medical treatment from providers of a licensed ambulance service in the same way. Anderson v. Little & Davenport Funeral Home, 242 Ga. 751, 251 S.E.2d 250 (1978).   No remuneration for performance of emergency cases.    - Municipality received no remuneration within the meaning of subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8 for the performance of emergency services when the municipality levied a transportation charge against those persons transported to a hospital. A fee charged by a governmental organization to assist in defraying the administrative costs of transporting a person to a hospital is not the equivalent of receiving remuneration for providing emergency care. Ramsey v. City of Forest Park, 204 Ga. App. 98, 418 S.E.2d 432 (1992).    There is no requirement under O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8(c) that the "emergency services" rendered specifically denote medical intervention; the immunity provided in § 31-11-8 shall apply only to those persons who perform the aforesaid emergency services for no remuneration. Martin v. Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth., 250 Ga. App. 663, 551 S.E.2d 415 (2001).    Fee charged by a governmental organization to assist in defraying the administrative costs of transporting a person to a hospital is not the equivalent of receiving remuneration for providing stated emergency care within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8(c). Presley v. City of Blackshear, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Ga. 2008).    Paramedic who examined an arrestee who appeared ill was entitled to immunity under O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8 as to state law negligence claims asserted by the administratrix of the arrestee's estate after the arrestee died due to ingestion of crack cocaine, of which the paramedic was unaware, because the paramedic acted with good faith and without remuneration; there was no evidence that the arrestee's estate was billed for paramedic services, even if the administratrix was billed for the ambulance transportation and mileage. Presley v. City of Blackshear, F.3d (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2009)(Unpublished).   Remuneration for performance of emergency cases.    - In an action for failure to properly and timely address injuries, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the ambulance service because there was a rendering of emergency services and the ambulance service received remuneration when the service billed for advanced life support services. Ortega v. Coffey, 348 Ga. App. 794, 824 S.E.2d 690 (2019), cert. denied, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 691 (Ga. 2019).    Fees for transportation and mileage do not constitute remuneration under O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8(c). Presley v. City of Blackshear, F.3d (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2009)(Unpublished).   County and ambulance crew members entitled to immunity.    - Trial court did not err when the court granted summary judgment to a county and ambulance crew members on the ground that the members were entitled to immunity under O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8 in a wrongful death action because as a "person" licensed to provide "emergency care" the county was entitled to immunity for the alleged misconduct of the county's employees, the county never charged the decedent or the decedent's spouse for the crew's first visit to the house, which was the occasion when the alleged negligence occurred, and the crew members were employed by the county's state-licensed ambulance service; the record provided no evidence to support the suggestion that the crew members acted in bad faith in the course of their response. Beursken v. Gwinnett County, 311 Ga. App. 467, 716 S.E.2d 540 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0057, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 62 (Ga. 2012).    When a plaintiff sued a county to recover for injuries that the plaintiff allegedly sustained when a county-operated ambulance was involved in a collision while transporting the plaintiff to a local hospital, the trial court correctly ruled that O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8 was controlling in the case and that the county was entitled to statutory immunity thereunder; the undisputed evidence showed that the emergency medical technicians did not have access to an X-ray machine at the scene and could not accurately exclude the possibility that the plaintiff had internal injuries or fractures that required immediate care. Anderson v. Tattnall County, 318 Ga. App. 877, 734 S.E.2d 843 (2012).   Immunity cannot be waived by persons to whom statute applies.    - Unlike sovereign immunity, a claim of immunity under O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8 cannot be waived by those persons to whom the statute applies; and among those persons to whom the statute applies are municipalities and counties. Presley v. City of Blackshear, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Ga. 2008).   Immunity not waived by purchase of insurance.    - Immunity under O.C.G.A. § 31-11-8 could not be waived by a county's purchase of insurance. Johnson v. Gwinnett County, 215 Ga. App. 79, 449 S.E.2d 856 (1994).    Cited in Ramsey v. City of Forest Park, 204 Ga. App. 98, 418 S.E.2d 432 (1992); Schulze v. DeKalb County, 230 Ga. App. 305, 496 S.E.2d 273 (1998); Abdel-Samed v. Dailey, 294 Ga. 758, 755 S.E.2d 805 (2014).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Hospitals and Asylums, § 12.   C.J.S.   - 61 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 946, 947, 1005.   ALR.   - Liability for personal injury or property damage from operation of ambulance, 84 A.L.R.2d 121.   Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported, 68 A.L.R.4th 14.   Construction and application of "Good Samaritan" statutes, 68 A.L.R.4th 294.   Rescue doctrine: liability of one who negligently causes motor vehicle accident for injuries to person subsequently attempting to rescue persons or property, 73 A.L.R.4th 737.   Application of "firemen's rule" to bar recovery by emergency medical personnel injured in responding to, or at scene of, emergency, 89 A.L.R.4th 1079.   Liability for negligence of ambulance attendants, emergency medical technicians, and the like, rendering emergency medical care outside hospital, 16 A.L.R.5th 605.