NY Penal L § 125.27 (2021)
2021 New York Laws PEN - Penal Part 3 - Specific Offenses Title H - Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation Article 125 - Homicide and Related Offenses 125.27 - Murder in the First Degree.

§ 125.27 Murder in the first degree.   A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:   1.  With  intent  to  cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; and  (a) Either:  (i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision 34 of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time  of the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and the  defendant  knew  or  reasonably should have known that the intended victim was a police officer; or  (ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a of subdivision  twenty-one,  subdivision  twenty-three,  twenty-four  or sixty-two  (employees  of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties,  and  the  defendant  knew  or reasonably  should  have  known  that  the  intended  victim  was such a uniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or  employee of the division for youth; or  (ii-a)  the  intended  victim  was  a  firefighter,  emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or  registered  nurse involved  in  a first response team, or any other individual who, in the course of official duties, performs emergency  response  activities  and was  engaged in such activities at the time of killing and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim  was  such firefighter,  emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or registered nurse; or  (iii) the intended victim was an  employee  of  a  state  correctional institution  or  was  an  employee  of  a local correctional facility as defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction  law,  who was  at  the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have  known that  the  intended  victim  was  an  employee  of  a state correctional institution or a local correctional facility; or  (iv) at the time of the commission of the killing, the  defendant  was confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise in custody upon  a  sentence  for  the term of his natural life, or upon a sentence commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an indeterminate term the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the maximum  of which was natural life, or at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant had escaped from such confinement or custody while serving such  a  sentence  and  had not yet been returned to such confinement or custody; or  (v) the intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a  prior occasion  and  the  death  was  caused for the purpose of preventing the intended victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether or not such action or proceeding had been  commenced,  or  the  intended victim  had  previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of  exacting  retribution  for such  prior  testimony,  or  the intended victim was an immediate family member of a witness to a crime committed on a  prior  occasion  and  the killing  was  committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the testimony of such witness, or  the  intended  victim  was  an  immediate family  member  of  a witness who had previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and the killing was committed for  the  purpose  of exacting retribution upon such witness for such prior testimony. As used in  this  subparagraph  "immediate family member" means a husband, wife, father, mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent, grandparent, stepchild or grandchild; or  (vi) the defendant committed the killing or procured commission of the killing pursuant to an agreement with a person other than  the  intended victim  to  commit  the  same  for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement or from  a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction of a party to such agreement; or  (vii) the victim was killed while the defendant was in the  course  of committing  or  attempting  to  commit  and  in  furtherance of robbery, burglary in the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in  the  first degree,  arson  in  the first degree or second degree, rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree,  sexual  abuse  in  the first  degree,  aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree or escape in the first degree, or in the  course  of  and  furtherance  of  immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit any such crime or in the course of and furtherance of immediate flight after attempting to commit the  crime  of murder in the second degree; provided however, the victim is not a participant in one of the aforementioned crimes  and,  provided further  that,  unless  the  defendant's  criminal  liability under this subparagraph is based upon the defendant having commanded another person to cause the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to  section 20.00  of  this  chapter,  this  subparagraph  shall not apply where the defendant's criminal liability is based  upon  the  conduct  of  another pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter; or  (viii)  as  part of the same criminal transaction, the defendant, with intent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an additional person or persons, causes the death of an additional person or  persons; provided,  however,  the  victim  is  not  a participant in the criminal transaction; or  (ix) prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been convicted of murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this  article, or  had  been  convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of either of  such sections; or  (x)  the  defendant  acted  in  an  especially cruel and wanton manner pursuant to a course of  conduct  intended  to  inflict  and  inflicting torture  upon  the  victim  prior to the victim's death. As used in this subparagraph, "torture" means the intentional and depraved infliction of extreme physical pain;  "depraved"  means  the  defendant  relished  the infliction   of   extreme  physical  pain  upon  the  victim  evidencing debasement or perversion or that the  defendant  evidenced  a  sense  of pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain; or  (xi)  the  defendant  intentionally  caused  the  death of two or more additional persons within the state in  separate  criminal  transactions within  a  period  of  twenty-four  months  when  committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan; or  (xii) the intended victim  was  a  judge  as  defined  in  subdivision twenty-three  of  section  1.20  of  the  criminal procedure law and the defendant killed such victim because such victim was, at the time of the killing, a judge; or  (xiii) the victim was killed in furtherance of an act of terrorism, as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section  490.05  of  this chapter; and  (b)  The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime.   2. In any prosecution under subdivision  one,  it  is  an  affirmative defense that:  (a)  (i)  The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse,  the  reasonableness  of  which  is  to  be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's  situation  under  the  circumstances  as  the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute  a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree. (ii) It shall not be a "reasonable explanation or excuse" pursuant to subparagraph (i) of  this  paragraph  when  the  defendant's conduct  resulted  from  the  discovery,  knowledge or disclosure of the victim's  sexual  orientation,  sex,  gender,  gender  identity,  gender expression or sex assigned at birth; or  (b)  The  defendant's  conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress  or  deception,  another  person  to  commit  suicide. Nothing  contained  in  this  paragraph  shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.   Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony.