CO Code § 31-12-601 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 31 - Government - Municipal|Article 12 - Annexation- Consolidation - Disconnection|Part 6 - Disconnection by Court Decree - Statutory Cities|§ 31-12-601. Petition to Disconnect Territory

 When a tract or contiguous tracts of land, aggregating twenty or more acres in area, are embraced within the municipal limits of any city, which are upon or contiguous to the border thereof, the owners of said tracts of land may petition the district court for the county in which such land, or any part thereof, is situated to have the same disconnected from said city.   History. Source: L. 75: Entire title R&RE, p. 1101, § 1, effective July 1.    Editor's note:   This section is similar to former § 31-8-401 as it existed prior to 1975.   ANNOTATION   Annotator's note. Since § 31-12-601 is similar to former § 31-8-401 prior to the 1975 repeal and reenactment of this title, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.   Procedures specified. The provisions of this section and § 31-12-701 specify the procedure to be followed and the standards which obtain where disconnection is sought. City of Littleton v. Wagenblast, 139 Colo. 346 , 338 P.2d 1025 (1959).   Mandatory. This section permitting the owner of lands upon the border of the town to procure the disconnection thereof from the town is mandatory. Hendricks v. Town of Julesburg, 55 Colo. 59 , 132 P. 61 (1913).   This section being mandatory, when the facts required by this section to be established have been established by competent evidence, it becomes the duty of the court to disconnect the territory without regard to its views concerning the justice and equity of the matter. Anaconda Mining Co. v. Town of Anaconda, 33 Colo. 70 , 80 P. 144 (1905).   The procedures for disconnection by court decree of territory from a city as provided for in this section are mandatory. Master Kraft Bldrs. Corp. v. City of Lakewood, 44 Colo. App. 90, 615 P.2d 47 (1980).   The words tracts or tracts apply to the pieces making the aggregate of 20 acres or more in any city and apply to the 20 acres or more as a unit for consideration under the petition. Gypsum v. Lundgren, 61 Colo. 332 , 157 P. 195 (1916).   The ”border“ of the city, as used in this section, means the corporate limits of the city and not the area adjacent to that part which is in actual use for municipal purposes. Anaconda Mining Co. v. Town of Anaconda, 33 Colo. 70 , 80 P. 144 (1905).   This section does not require that each of the separate tracts should be upon or contiguous to the border, if contiguous to each other, that one of them is upon the border brings the case within this section. Gypsum v. Lundgren, 61 Colo. 332 , 157 P. 195 (1916).   Tract not contiguous. A tract of land of irregular shape of an average width of about 600 feet and an average length of about 1,500 feet, and which extends from the border of an incorporated town several hundred feet into the town and to the platted portion of the town, and only about 150 feet in width of the tract touches the border, is not upon or contiguous to the border of the town within the meaning of this section. Anaconda Mining Co. v. Town of Anaconda, 33 Colo. 70 , 80 P. 144 (1905).   Court's finding as to acreage presumed legal. In absence of any direct statement as to amount of acreage involved, either in petition or evidence, the court was in position, from legal description of lands before it, to determine acreage, and presumption as to legality of finding and judgment on that point must be followed. Sheridan v. Fox Metal Prods. Corp., 123 Colo. 94 , 227 P.2d 1003 (1950).   No review of special statutory proceeding. Because the statute conferring jurisdiction upon the court of appeals to review the final judgments of inferior courts in civil cases applied only to final judgments or decrees in actions at law or suits in equity, and did not apply to special statutory proceedings, the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to review a judgment of the county court in a proceeding under this section providing for the disconnection of outlying territory from cities and towns. Martin v. Simpkins, 20 Colo. 438 , 38 P. 1092 (1894); Phillips v. Corbin, 25 Colo. 62 , 49 P. 279 (1898); Town of Fletcher v. Smith, 18 Colo. App. 201, 70 P. 697 (1902).   This section does not apply to disconnection from home rule municipalities, because the applicable definition of ”city“ specifically does not include any city which has chosen to adopt a home rule charter pursuant to the provisions of article XX of the state constitution. Allely v. City of Evans, 124 P.3d 911 (Colo. App. 2005).   Trial court did not err by requiring that landowners' petition to disconnect from home rule municipality contain all of the statutory elements required in a petition filed under this section because those procedural elements are incorporated by reference in § 31-12-119 . While this section applies to petitions to disconnect from statutory cities, § 31-12-119 applies to petitions to disconnect from municipalities, and those petitions must follow the procedures set forth in § 31-12-602 . Radcliff Props. v. City of Sheridan, 2012 COA 82 , 296 P.3d 310.   The record supports the court's denial of landowners' petition because landowners failed to show that municipality did not, upon demand, provide landowners' parcels the same municipal services on the same general terms and conditions that the rest of the municipality received. Radcliff Props. v. City of Sheridan, 2012 COA 82 , 296 P.3d 310.   Landowners' petition to disconnect from home rule municipality filed under § 31-12-119 is not precluded by § 31-12-603 (1) . Radcliff Props. v. City of Sheridan, 2012 COA 82 , 296 P.3d 310.