CO Code § 15-11-514 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 15 - Probate, Trusts, and Fiduciaries|Article 11 - Intestate Succession and Wills|Part 5 - Wills and Will Contracts and Custody and Deposit of Wills|§ 15-11-514. Contracts Concerning Succession

 A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate, if executed after July 1, 1995, may be established only by (i) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract, (ii) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract, or (iii) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract. The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills.   History. Source: L. 94: Entire part R&RE, p. 1002, § 3, effective July 1, 1995.    Editor's note:   This section is similar to former § 15-11-701 as it existed prior to 1995.   ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “Ten Years of Domestic Relations in Colorado -- 1940-1950”, see 27 Dicta 399 (1950). For article, “Trusts and Estates”, see 30 Dicta 435 (1953). For article, “Reciprocal Wills and Contracts to Will”, see 29 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 453 (1957). For article, “Trust Termination and Modification”, see 15 Colo. Law. 389 (1986). For article, “Estate Planning Tools for Second Marriages”, see 45 Colo. Law. 45 (Dec. 2016).   Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.   Section prescribes the only way in which a contract to make a will or devise , or not to revoke a will or devise, can be established. Rieck v. Rieck, 724 P.2d 674 (Colo. App. 1986).   Agreements as to heirship are not against public policy. In a controversy over the estate of a deceased person, there is no rule under which it is the absolute duty of the district court to decide the question of heirship irrespective of agreements between the parties; such agreements are not against public policy, and when valid and not questioned, are controlling of the rights of the parties thereto. In re Schofield's Estate, 101 Colo. 443 , 73 P.2d 1381 (1937).   When the clear and unambiguous terms of a will are not the same as those of an alleged contract, the will does not constitute a sufficient memorandum of the agreement. Witmer v. Perini, 32 Colo. App. 110, 508 P.2d 413 (1973).   This section is analogous to the customary statute of frauds, the application of which requires that a sufficient memorandum must contain the terms of the contract sought to be enforced. Witmer v. Perini, 32 Colo. App. 110, 508 P.2d 413 (1973).   A claim alleging fraudulent conduct is not precluded by the succession statute even if the alleged fraudulent conduct consists of oral statements that could not be enforced as creating contractual obligations because they fail to satisfy the requirements of the succession statute. Brody v. Bock, 897 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1995).   Whether a will is a contract will must be determined under the laws of the state in which the will was drafted. Using the law of the state of residence of the second to die at the time of death would allow surviving spouses to move to a state where contract wills are not recognized, or where more stringent requirements are imposed, and thereafter unilaterally revoke the contract will. In re Estate of Loflin, 81 P.3d 1112 (Colo. App. 2003).   Applied in Tarr v. Hicks, 155 Colo. 159 , 393 P.2d 557 (1964).