GA Code § 30-5-8 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 30 - Handicapped Persons|Chapter 5 - Protection of Disabled Adults and Elder Persons|§ 30-5-8. Criminal Offenses and Penalties

    It shall be unlawful for any person or official required by paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Code Section 30-5-4 to report a case of disabled adult or elder person abuse to fail knowingly and willfully to make such report.   Any person violating the provisions of this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.     Any violation of this Code section shall constitute a separate offense.     (Code 1981, §30-5-8, enacted by Ga. L. 1984, p. 785, § 3; Ga. L. 1997, p. 700, § 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 562, § 8; Ga. L. 2001, p. 484, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 298, § 1A; Ga. L. 2007, p. 219, § 2/HB 233; Ga. L. 2009, p. 725, § 2/HB 457; Ga. L. 2010, p. 878, § 30/HB 1387; Ga. L. 2012, p. 351, § 1/HB 1110; Ga. L. 2013, p. 524, § 1-9/HB 78.)   Cross references.   - Adult Day Center for Aging Adults Licensure Act, § 49-6-80 et seq.   Editor's notes.   - Ga. L. 1999, p. 562, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Crimes Against Elderly Act of 1999'."   JUDICIAL DECISIONS    Construction of O.C.G.A. § 30-5-8. - Trial court erred when the court denied the defendant's motion to quash the count of an indictment charging the defendant with exploitation of a disabled adult in violation of the Disabled Adults and Elder Persons Protection Act, O.C.G.A. § 30-5-1 et seq., because the legislature did not intend for O.C.G.A. § 30-5-8(a) to apply to sexual acts such as that alleged in the indictment; the most reasonable construction of § 30-5-8(a) is that the legislature did not intend for the statute to apply to sexual acts because the legislature intended for § 30-5-8 to apply only to specifically defined non-sexual acts, and the statute gradually increased the penalties for these non-sexual acts in response to a perceived need to protect disabled persons from "abuse," "neglect," and "exploitation" as defined by the Act, O.C.G.A. § 30-5-3. Smith v. State, 311 Ga. App. 757, 717 S.E.2d 280 (2011).   Evidence sufficient for conviction.    - Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for unlawful abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an elder person and unauthorized practice of law, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 15-19-51(a)(7) and30-5-8(a)(1), because the defendant befriended an 89-year-old widower, falsified identification as an attorney, and eventually obtained the widower's car, jewelry, use of the widower's credit cards for unauthorized purposes, and the defendant also forged documents and coerced the widower into changing other documents regarding the widower's estate; the widower was within the definition of "elder person" under O.C.G.A. § 30-5-3(7.1) (now paragraph (6)), and the acts were within the definition of "exploitation" pursuant to § 30-5-3(9) (now paragraph (8)). Marks v. State, 280 Ga. 70, 623 S.E.2d 504 (2005).    Because there was evidence to support each fact necessary to make out the state's case, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of family violence battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1, criminal trespass, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21, and abuse of an elder person, O.C.G.A. § 30-5-8; the victim's recollection of what occurred on the night at issue was contradicted by the victim's contemporaneous statements to neighbors and the police, as well as the victim's statements to the daughter the next morning that the defendant had grabbed the victim by the arm and twisted the arm, thereby causing the wound and other bruises. Laster v. State, 311 Ga. App. 360, 715 S.E.2d 768 (2011).    Evidence that the defendant falsely convinced the first victim that the victim's grandson needed bail money and falsely convinced the second victim that the defendant was in financial difficulty in Malaysia and trying to return to children in the U.S. was sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty of two counts of exploitation of an elderly person. Akintoye v. State, 340 Ga. App. 777, 798 S.E.2d 720 (2017).    Evidence that the defendant assisted the victim in removing $300,000 from the victim's account, the defendant instructed the victim to write the check to "Cash", the defendant deposited the money into the defendant's own account, the victim suffered from dementia and had never given such a large monetary gift, and the signature on the victim's other checks did not match the signature on the $300,000 check supported a conviction for abuse or exploitation of any disabled adult or elder person. Escamilla v. State, 344 Ga. App. 654, 811 S.E.2d 77 (2018).    Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of exploitation of a disabled adult and theft by taking because the jury was presented evidence sufficient from which the jury could conclude that the defendant acted with guilty knowledge and criminal intent when taking funds from the defendant's mother's account, especially after the defendant became the mother's guardian and the conservator of the mother's assets. The evidence showed that the defendant concealed required information on the petition for appointment of a guardian and/or conservator the defendant wrote checks and executed transfers from the mother's individual account to joint accounts and then transferred the money to the defendant's individual account and used the money to pay the defendant's personal expenses. Law v. State, 349 Ga. App. 823, 824 S.E.2d 778 (2019).    Sufficient evidence supported the appellant's convictions on two counts of exploitation of elder person, two counts of theft by taking, and 11 counts of financial-transaction-card fraud based on at least circumstantial evidence that the appellant's mother did not authorize the appellant's near total depletion of various financial accounts by transfers to the appellant's account, ATM withdrawals, money sent to another country, and buying online merchandise, furniture, and jewelry. Anderson v. State, 350 Ga. App. 369, 829 S.E.2d 453 (2019).   Construction with other law.    - In a wrongful death action filed by a decedent-lessee's administrator in which the decedent was killed when crossing a public highway that the lessor did not control, the lessor was properly granted summary judgment, as the administrator failed to show that the lessor was negligent per se, violated O.C.G.A. § 30-5-8, or that the lessor breached either a common law or private duty owed to the lessee. Walton v. UCC X, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 847, 640 S.E.2d 325 (2006).   Requirement of residency in long term care facility.    - An adult did not qualify for protection under the Disabled Adults and Elder Persons Protection Act, O.C.G.A. § 30-5-1 et seq. Although there was credible testimony and evidence that the adult suffered from disabilities following a stroke, under this Act, a disabled adult was limited to a resident of a long-term care facility under O.C.G.A. § 30-5-8(a)(2)(A). Thompson v. Hornyak (In re Hornyak), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 1, 2010).   Evidence of disabled adult.    - Trial court did not err when the court denied the defendant's motion to quash the count of an indictment charging the defendant with exploitation of a disabled adult in violation of the Disabled Adults and Elder Persons Protection Act, O.C.G.A. § 30-5-1 et seq., specifically O.C.G.A. § 30-5-8, on the ground that the victim was not "disabled" because the victim read at a first- or second-grade level, did not understand monetary denominations, could not do personal care on a daily basis, and had an IQ of 30, which was well below the borderline of mental retardation. Smith v. State, 311 Ga. App. 757, 717 S.E.2d 280 (2011).    RICO conviction did not establish violation of O.C.G.A. § 30-5-8. - Trial court properly denied an investor's motion for partial summary judgment against a business person on the investor's claim against the business person for improper exploitation of an elderly person, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 30-5-8, because, although the investor established the business person's civil liability to the investor for the business person's RICO violations, such finding did not establish that the business person also violated § 30-5-8 because the crimes involved exploiting an elderly person and did not correspond to the acts of racketeering activity alleged by the state in the criminal RICO proceedings against the business person. Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates Ltd., 319 Ga. App. 101, 734 S.E.2d 883 (2012).   OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL   Fingerprintable offenses.    - Violations of O.C.G.A. § 30-5-8(a)(1) and (b)(1) are designated as offenses for which those charged are to be fingerprinted. 1999 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 99-17.   RESEARCH REFERENCES   ALR.   - Validity, construction, and application of state civil and criminal elder abuse laws, 113 A.L.R.5th 431.