CO Code § 18-1.3-602 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 1.3 - Sentencing in Criminal Cases|Part 6 - Restitution|§ 18-1.3-602. Definitions

 As used in this part 6, unless the context otherwise requires:    “Collections investigator” means a person employed by the judicial department whose primary responsibility is to administer, enforce, and collect on court orders or judgments entered with respect to fines, fees, restitution, or any other accounts receivable of the court, judicial district, or judicial department.    “Conviction” means a verdict of guilty by a judge or jury or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere that is accepted by the court for a felony, misdemeanor, petty offense, or traffic misdemeanor offense, or adjudication for an offense that would constitute a criminal offense if committed by an adult. “Conviction” also includes having received a deferred judgment and sentence or deferred adjudication; except that a person shall not be deemed to have been convicted if the person has successfully completed a deferred sentence or deferred adjudication.  (2.3) “Money advanced by a governmental agency for a service animal” means costs incurred by a peace officer, law enforcement agency, fire department, fire protection district, or governmental search and rescue agency for the veterinary treatment and disposal of a service animal that was harmed while aiding in official duties and for the training of an animal to become a service animal to replace a service animal that was harmed while aiding in official duties, as applicable.  (2.5) Repealed.      “Restitution” means any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim and includes but is not limited to all out-of-pocket expenses, interest, loss of use of money, anticipated future expenses, rewards paid by victims, money advanced by law enforcement agencies, money advanced by a governmental agency for a service animal, adjustment expenses, and other losses or injuries proximately caused by an offender's conduct and that can be reasonably calculated and recompensed in money. “Restitution” does not include damages for physical or mental pain and suffering, loss of consortium, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of future earnings, or punitive damages.  (a.5) “Restitution” includes, for a person convicted of assault in the first, second, or third degree, as described in section 18-3-202 , 18-3-203 , or 18-3-204 , all or any portion of the financial obligations of medical tests performed on and treatment prescribed for a victim, peace officer, firefighter, emergency medical care provider, or emergency medical service provider.     “Restitution” may also include extraordinary direct public and all private investigative costs.      “Restitution” shall also include all costs incurred by a government agency or private entity to: (c) (I) “Restitution” shall also include all costs incurred by a government agency or private entity to:   Remove, clean up, or remediate a place used to manufacture or attempt to manufacture a controlled substance or which contains a controlled substance or which contains chemicals, supplies, or equipment used or intended to be used in the manufacturing of a controlled substance;    Store, preserve, or test evidence of a controlled substance violation; or    Sell and provide for the care of and provision for an animal disposed of under the animal cruelty laws in accordance with part 2 of article 9 of this title or article 42 of title 35, C.R.S.       Costs under this paragraph (c) shall include, but are not limited to, overtime wages for peace officers or other government employees, the operating expenses for any equipment utilized, and the costs of any property designed for one-time use, such as protective clothing.       “Restitution” shall also include costs incurred by a governmental agency or insurer that provides medical benefits, health benefits, or nonmedical support services directly related to a medical or health condition to a victim for losses or injuries proximately caused by an offender's conduct, including but not limited to costs incurred by medicaid and other care programs for indigent persons. (3.5) “Service animal” means any animal, the services of which are used to aid the performance of official duties by a peace officer, law enforcement agency, fire department, fire protection district, or governmental search and rescue agency.         “Victim” means any person aggrieved by the conduct of an offender and includes but is not limited to the following:   Any person against whom any felony, misdemeanor, petty, or traffic misdemeanor offense has been perpetrated or attempted;    Any person harmed by an offender's criminal conduct in the course of a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity;    Any person who has suffered losses because of a contractual relationship with, including but not limited to, an insurer, or because of liability under section 14-6-110, C.R.S., for a person described in subparagraph (I) or (II) of this paragraph (a);    Any victim compensation board that has paid a victim compensation claim;    If any person described in subparagraph (I) or (II) of this paragraph (a) is deceased or incapacitated, the person's spouse, parent, legal guardian, natural or adopted child, child living with the victim, sibling, grandparent, significant other, as defined in section 24-4.1-302 (4), C.R.S., or other lawful representative;    Any person who had to expend resources for the purposes described in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of subsection (3) of this section.       “Victim” shall not include a person who is accountable for the crime or a crime arising from the same conduct, criminal episode, or plan as defined under the law of this state or of the United States.    Any “victim” under the age of eighteen is considered incapacitated, unless that person is legally emancipated or the court orders otherwise.    It is the intent of the general assembly that this definition of the term “victim” shall apply to this part 6 and shall not be applied to any other provision of the laws of the state of Colorado that refers to the term “victim”.    Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, “victim” includes a person less than eighteen years of age who has been trafficked by an offender, as described in section 18-3-503 or 18-3-504.        History. Source: L. 2002: Entire article added with relocations, p. 1420, § 2, effective October 1. L. 2003: (2) and (3)(a) amended and (2.5) added, p. 1049, § 2, effective September 1. L. 2004: (2.5) repealed, p. 904, § 27, effective May 21. L. 2005: (2.3) and (3.5) added and (3)(a) amended, p. 192, § 1, effective July 1; (3)(c) and (4)(a)(VI) added, p. 1498, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 2006: (3)(c)(I) amended, p. 895, § 4, effective August 7. L. 2012: (4)(e) added,(HB 12-1151), ch. 174, p. 626, § 8, effective August 8. L. 2013: (3)(d) added and (4)(a)(VI) amended,(SB 13-229), ch. 272, p. 1429, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2014: (4)(e) amended,(HB 14-1273), ch. 282, p. 1154, § 16, effective July 1. L. 2016: (3)(a.5) added,(HB 16-1393), ch. 304, p. 1225, § 2, effective July 1.    Editor's note:   This section is similar to former § 16-18.5-102 as it existed prior to 2002.   ANNOTATION   Attorney general not a “collections investigator”. The attorney general is not part of the judicial department. People v. Robb, 215 P.3d 1253 (Colo. App. 2009).   Because the definition of “restitution” includes “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim”, including “loss of use of money”, trial courts are required to include pre-judgment interest in probationary restitution orders. The term “loss of use of money” means not only the amount of money stolen but also the value of the use of the money stolen from the victim from the date the money was stolen to the date of the restitution award. Roberts v. People, 130 P.3d 1005 (Colo. 2006).   Because the definition of restitution includes “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim” including “other losses or injuries proximately caused by an offender's conduct and that can be reasonably calculated and recompensed in money”, the victim was entitled to the fair rental value of stolen equipment even if the victim did not rent replacement equipment. People v. Suttmiller, 240 P.3d 504 (Colo. App. 2010).   Used vacation and sick leave are pecuniary losses compensable to a victim and therefore fit under the definition of restitution. People v. Perez, 2017 COA 52 M, 413 P.3d 266.   Proximate cause for purposes of restitution has been defined as a cause which in natural and probable sequence produced the claimed injury and without which the claimed injury would not have been sustained. People v. Clay, 74 P.3d 473 (Colo. App. 2003); People v. Bryant, 122 P.3d 1026 (Colo. App. 2005); People v. Steinbeck, 186 P.3d 54 (Colo. App. 2007).   Restitution statute only requires that the conduct underlying the basis of defendant's criminal conviction proximately caused the victim's losses. It does not require that a defendant be charged with a specific act to be ordered to pay restitution. People v. Steinbeck, 186 P.3d 54 (Colo. App. 2007).   Restitution is not limited to the value of the damaged item. It may include repair costs, even if those costs exceed the damage object's value. People v. Smith, 181 P.3d 324 (Colo. App. 2007).   Counseling and mental health costs are considered medical expenses, provided proximate cause is shown. People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272 (Colo. App. 2010).   Cost of sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) examination qualifies for restitution under statute as an “extraordinary” direct public or private investigative cost. Teague v. People, 2017 CO 66, 395 P.3d 782.   Cost of burglar alarm system for victim not within definition of “restitution”. The trial court's findings do not support any loss by the victim other than a generalized feeling of insecurity. Crime victim's feeling of insecurity could have multiple causes and the solutions they select are subjective and potentially numerous and varied. People v. Trujillo, 75 P.3d 1133 (Colo. App. 2003).   Cost of installing bars on victim's window does not qualify as restitution. There was no finding that the expense was the result of a specific, ongoing threat related to defendant's conduct as opposed to a general feeling of insecurity. People v. Martinez, 2015 COA 37 , 378 P.3d 761.   Court erred by ordering defendant to pay for expenses related to home sale because prosecution did not prove that the expenditures were proximately caused by the juvenile offender's unlawful conduct. If a victim incurs expenses to avoid or mitigate the consequences of a specific and ongoing threat related to the offender's unlawful conduct, such expenditures qualify as compensable restitution under subsection (3)(a); however, expenditures resulting from a generalized feeling of insecurity are too attenuated from the offender's conduct, and thus do not qualify. People ex rel. D.W., 232 P.3d 182 (Colo. App. 2009).   Prosecution failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant proximately caused the damage to the victim's vehicle. The district court's conclusion was speculative. The purported gap of time, almost a year, between when the car was stolen and when defendant claims to have obtained possession of the car is problematic in determining defendant proximately caused the damage. People v. Rice, 2020 COA 143 , 478 P.3d 1276.   The statutory 50 percent penalty applied against defendant pursuant to § 8-81-101 was not properly included in the amount of restitution owed because the prosecution did not demonstrate that the amount of the penalty equaled the costs actually incurred by the department of labor and employment in enforcing compliance with the Colorado Employment Security Act. People v. Welliver, , 317 P.3d 1192; People v. Russell, 2013 COA 121 , 310 P.3d 284 (decided prior to 2013 amendment to § 8-81-101 ).   Towing company is a “victim” for purposes of restitution because it sustained a pecuniary loss as a result of defendant's criminal conduct and is therefore a person aggrieved by the offender's conduct. People v. Clay, 74 P.3d 473 (Colo. App. 2003).   Department of human services not a “victim” when the underlying crime was child abuse. The department is not eligible to recover costs incurred as result of fulfilling its statutorily mandated duty to provide care in cases of child abuse or neglect because the underlying crime of child abuse defines the victim as the child. People v. Padilla-Lopez, 2012 CO 49, 279 P.3d 651.   Department of health care policy and financing not a “victim” when the underlying crime was vehicular assault, which defines a “victim” as a human being. Because the legislature did not specifically include the department as a victim in the enumerated examples in this section and because the elements of vehicular assault do not establish the department as a victim, the department is not eligible for restitution under this section. People v. McCarthy, 2012 COA 133 , 292 P.3d 1090.   It is not necessary for the “victim” to be specifically named as a party in a criminal indictment or information. A defendant is responsible for restitution if there is sufficient evidence in the record to determine that an individual is directly and immediately aggrieved by the defendant's conduct. People v. Jones, 701 P.2d 868 (Colo. App. 1984); People v. Dubois, 216 P.3d 27 (Colo. App. 2007); aff'd on other grounds, 211 P.3d 41 (Colo. 2009).   Peace officer and law enforcement agency who were indirectly aggrieved by defendant's conduct fall within the meaning of “victim”. The restitution statute no longer limits restitution only to persons injured by the conduct alleged as the basis for the defendant's conviction. Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41 (Colo. 2009).   Peace officers are generally entitled to restitution only when the underlying crime defines a peace officer as the victim or when a peace officer has been specifically included by the legislature. Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41 (Colo. 2009); People v. Rogers, 2014 COA 110 , 410 P.3d 544, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Teague v. People, 2017 CO 66, 395 P.3d 782.   Police department not a “victim” under former subsection (4)(a) because the underlying sexual assault statute did not encompass the police or any related governmental entity as a primary victim. People v. Rogers, 2014 COA 110 , 410 P.3d 544 (decided under law in effect prior to the 2013 amendment), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Teague v. People, 2017 CO 66, 395 P.3d 782.   City's risk management department was a “victim”, and workers' compensation death benefits were permissible elements of “restitution”, where city was a self-insured employer of police officers. The contractual relationship required by subsection (4)(a)(III) was established by circumstantial evidence although the police officer did not have a written contract of insurance directly with the police department; instead, the officer and her surviving dependents were third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the risk management department and the police department. People v. Oliver, 2016 COA 180 M, 405 P.3d 1165.   Workers' compensation death benefits are not excluded from restitution as “future earnings”, although the amount of benefits is determined with reference to the deceased employee's average weekly wage. Such benefits are more properly considered the insurer's “out-of-pocket expenses” and “anticipated future expenses”, both of which are included in the definition of restitution. Moreover, the rights to these benefits are considered rights of the employee's dependents, not of the employee. People v. Oliver, 2016 COA 180 M, 405 P.3d 1165.   Likewise, workers' compensation permanent partial disability benefits are not excluded from restitution as “future earnings”. People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24 , 471 P.3d 1159.   Restitution is warranted where a peace officer is involved in an accident while responding to a crime in which another peace officer is statutorily defined as the victim. Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41 (Colo. 2009); People v. Ortiz, 2016 COA 58 , 381 P.3d 410.   Even though subsection (4)(a)(V) refers to a deceased person's sibling, it is read to include siblings. Section 2-4-102 requires interpreting singular statutes to include the plural and vice versa. There was no error when the court awarded restitution to all three of a victim's siblings. People v. Lane, 2014 COA 48 , 343 P.3d 1019.   When a victim compensation board pays a victim compensation claim, the board is the victim for purposes of restitution. The person whose claim the board pays need not also meet the statutory definition of victim. People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24 , 471 P.3d 1159.   Even though an injured trooper was not deceased or incapacitated, which is a prerequisite under the statute for payment of restitution directly to a family member, the board's payments for the injured trooper's brother's travel expenses and the injured trooper's girlfriend's lost wages were appropriate because the board was the victim for purposes of this statute and the travel expenses and lost wages were proximately caused by the defendant's conduct. People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24 , 471 P.3d 1159.   Defendant's act of stealing the vehicle was the proximate cause of the towing company's losses because, without it, such losses would not have been sustained. While the police department's failure to impound the vehicle on its own lot and the vehicle owner's failure to retrieve the vehicle earlier may have contributed to the towing company's losses, there is no evidence that these events were not reasonably foreseeable. People v. Clay, 74 P.3d 473 (Colo. App. 2003).   Order of restitution for travel expenses of victim's parents to attend memorial service for victim was not an abuse of trial court's discretion. Parents' attendance at a memorial service was a natural and probable consequence that would not have occurred without defendant's actions, and therefore, defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of their attendance. People v. Lassek, 122 P.3d 1029 (Colo. App. 2005), overruled on other grounds in Sullivan v. People, 2020 CO 58, 465 P.3d 25.   A specific threat that is still outstanding against the victim is sufficient to be considered the “proximate cause” of the victim's monetary loss, and, thus, defendant can be ordered to pay restitution for those losses. People v. Bryant, 122 P.3d 1026 (Colo. App. 2005).   Company employing defendant was a “victim” for purposes of restitution because it sustained a pecuniary loss as a result of defendant's conduct, and, while “victim” is defined as a “person” in this section, “person” as defined for the Colorado revised statutes in § 2-4-401 does include corporations and other legal entities, and such a reading fits within the context of “victim” in subsection (4) of this section. People v. Webb-Johnson, 113 P.3d 1253 (Colo. App. 2005).   Company's claimed medical expenses properly included in the restitution order as anticipated future expenses. People v. Webb-Johnson, 113 P.3d 1253 (Colo. App. 2005).   “Lost wages”, for purposes of criminal restitution, are wages not received by the victim from the date the crime was committed to the date restitution is imposed or sooner if the victim is comparably employed prior to that date. “Loss of future earnings” are earnings not expected to be received by the victim after restitution is imposed. People v. Bryant, 122 P.3d 1026 (Colo. App. 2005).   Juvenile court lacked authority to transfer defendant's restitution obligation from an unrelated juvenile case to defendant's adult case, and district court had no authority to include the juvenile court's restitution order in its community corrections or department of corrections sentence in an unrelated case. People v. Brooks, 250 P.3d 771 (Colo. App. 2010).   With regard to a victim compensation board's payment of a victim compensation claim, the definition of “victim” in § 24-4.1-102 (10) prevails over the definition of “victim” in this statute because the definition in § 24-4.1-102 (10) deals only with restitution payments made to a victim compensation board and is, therefore, the more specific statute. People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24 , 471 P.3d 1159.   Applied in People v. Lowe, 60 P.3d 753 (Colo. App. 2002) (decided under former § 16-18.5-102 ); People v. Juanda, 2012 COA 159 , 303 P.3d 128.