reglab/housing_qa huggingface dataset:
HI Rev Stat § 701-113 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|701. Preliminary Provisions|701-113 Former prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or when fraudulently procured by the defendant.

  §701-113 Former prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or when fraudulently procured by the defendant. A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of sections 701-110, 701-111, and 701-112 under any of the following circumstances:  (1) The former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.  (2) The former prosecution was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting officer and with the purpose of avoiding the sentence which might otherwise be imposed.  (3) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which was held invalid on appeal or in a subsequent proceeding on a writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or similar process. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] COMMENTARY ON §701-113  A subsequent prosecution should not be barred when the former prosecution was before a court lacking jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense. A prosecution by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and reprosecuting the defendant does not place the defendant twice in jeopardy because the defendant never in fact was in jeopardy. Likewise, if the defendant improperly procured the former prosecution without the knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting officer and with the intention of avoiding the sentence which might otherwise be imposed, the former prosecution is not a bar. Finally, if defendant succeeds in having the former proceeding held invalid by means of habeas corpus or coram nobis, a reprosecution should not be barred.
HI Rev Stat § 701-116 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|701. Preliminary Provisions|701-116 Proving applicability of the Code. §701-116 Commentary:

  §701-116 Proving applicability of the Code. When the application of the Code depends on the finding of a fact which is not required to be found beyond a reasonable doubt:  (1) The burden of proving the fact is on the prosecution or defendant, depending on whose interest or contention will be furthered if the finding should be made; and  (2) The fact must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] COMMENTARY ON §701-116  The draft follows the Model Penal Code in defining a standard of proof of facts called for in application of the Code. It would cover, for example, a finding that the defendant lacks mental capacity to proceed.[1] It logically places the burden of proof on the side whose interest or contention would be furthered if the finding is made. Proof must be by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus when facts making the defendant subject to increased penalties must be proved,[2] the prosecution need not prove them beyond a reasonable doubt, but only by preponderant evidence. The Model Penal Code draftsmen explain:  ... proof that satisfies the court is not likely to leave room for a substantial doubt; and this, in our view, affords an adequate protection in an area where we deliberately have sought to broaden the discretion of the court.3 __________  §701-116 Commentary: 1. Cf. § §704-403 to 406. 2. Cf. §706-662. 3. M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 4, comments at 114 (1955).
HI Rev Stat § 701-117 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|701. Preliminary Provisions|701-117 Prima facie evidence.

  §701-117 Prima facie evidence. Prima facie evidence of a fact is evidence which, if accepted in its entirety by the trier of fact, is sufficient to prove the fact. Prima facie evidence provisions in this Code are governed by section 626-1, rule 306. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1986, c 314, §3] COMMENTARY ON §701-117  In drafting the Code, we have substituted the concept of prima facie evidence for presumptions, which appear to create insurmountable difficulties for lawyers, courts, and juries. Often it is desirable to enable the prosecution to get to the jury on something less than positive proof of a fact which may be almost solely within the knowledge of the defendant. As an example, §701-106(4) makes proof of the finding of a body of a homicide victim within the State prima facie evidence that the bodily impact causing death or the death itself occurred within the State, giving Hawaii's courts jurisdiction. Obviously it may be very difficult to prove where the criminal result occurred, and the presence of the body is a good indication that the result occurred here. On the other hand, although the prosecution's case gets to the jury on this point, the defendant can win by suggesting a reasonable doubt that the death or bodily impact did occur within the State. Thus, the prima facie evidence rule helps the prosecution to get its case to the jury without necessarily meeting its burden of persuasion. This is consistent with modern rules of evidence. See California Evidence Code § §601-02, 604. Law Journals and Reviews  The Lum Court and the First Amendment. 14 UH L. Rev. 395 (1992). Case Notes  Section merely creates a permissible inference of fact. 57 H. 526, 560 P.2d 110 (1977); 61 H. 99, 595 P.2d 1072 (1979).
HI Rev Stat § 701-118 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|701. Preliminary Provisions|701-118 General definitions.

  §701-118 General definitions. In this Code, unless a different meaning plainly is required:  "Act" or "action" means a bodily movement whether voluntary or involuntary.  "Acted" includes, where relevant, "omitted to act".  "Actor" includes, a person who acts, or, where relevant, a person guilty of omission.  "Another" means any other person and includes, where relevant, the United States, this State and any of its political subdivisions, and any other state and any of its political subdivisions.  "Conduct" means an act or omission, or, where relevant, a series of acts or a series of omissions, or a series of acts and omissions.  "Law enforcement officer" means any public servant, whether employed by the State or county or by the United States, vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or, to make arrests for offenses or to enforce the criminal laws, whether that duty extends to all offenses or is limited to a specific class of offenses.  "Omission" means a failure to act.  "Person", "he", "him", "actor", and "defendant" include any natural person, including any natural person whose identity can be established by means of scientific analysis, including but not limited to scientific analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid and fingerprints, whether or not the natural person's name is known, and, where relevant, a corporation or an unincorporated association.  "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.  "Statute" includes the Constitution of the State and a local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of the State. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 2001, c 91, §2; am L 2005, c 112, §3] Revision Note  Numeric designations deleted and definitions rearranged pursuant to §23G-15. Cross References  Other definitions, see specific chapters of this Code. COMMENTARY ON §701-118  Act 91, Session Laws 2001, amended this section by providing a definition of "law enforcement officer." The term "peace officer," as used in the Penal Code, caused the Intermediate Court of Appeals to question whether the term meant "law enforcement officer." Act 91 resolved the ambiguity by providing a definition of "law enforcement officer" and substituting that term for "peace officer" [in the Penal Code]. Conference Committee Report No. 23.  Act 112, Session Laws 2005, established a statewide deoxyribonucleic acid database and data bank identification program for all convicted felons. Conference Committee Report No. 184. Act 112 amended this section by amending the definition of "person," "he," "him," "actor," and "defendant." Case Notes  A dolphin is not "another" within the meaning of paragraph (8). 1 H. App. 19, 613 P.2d 1328 (1980).
HI Rev Stat § 701-119 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|701. Preliminary Provisions|701-119 REPEALED.

  §701-119 REPEALED. L 1988, c 260, § §4, 7; L 1996, c 104, §6. Cross References  Forfeiture of property used as benefit or pecuniary benefit in the commission of an offense, see §710-1001.  Forfeiture of property used in illegal gambling, see §712-1230.  Hawaii omnibus criminal forfeiture act, see chapter 712A.
HI Rev Stat § 702-201 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-201 "Voluntary act" defined. §702-201 Commentary:

  §702-201 "Voluntary act" defined. "Voluntary act" means a bodily movement performed consciously or habitually as the result of the effort or determination of the defendant. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] COMMENTARY ON §702-201  This section defines "voluntary act" in general terms relying chiefly on the characteristic of voluntariness--the effort and determination of the defendant. The Code's formulation is intended to exclude from the category of voluntary action such bodily movements as (a) reflex or convulsions, (b) bodily movements during unconsciousness and sleep, (c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion, and (d) any other bodily movement that is not a product of the effort and determination of the defendant, either conscious or habitual.  The exclusion of involuntary action from the scope of penal liability must be viewed in the light of the provisions of chapter 704 on physical disease, disorder, and defect which exclude penal responsibility. In that chapter acquittal is conditioned on submission to treatment or commitment tailored to the condition which excludes responsibility. The Code attempts to provide "therapy or ... custodial commitment"[1] for those dangerous individuals who are unable to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law because of some condition which would be difficult to regard as a "mental disease or defect" under orthodox treatment of penal irresponsibility. At the same time, because treatment is flexible and tailored to the condition in question, it does not bear "harshly on the individual whose condition is nonrecurrent."[2]  No prior Hawaii statutory provision dealt with the issue of voluntariness of acts (other than in its relation to duress or mental disease, disorder, or defect), however, a recent case tends to support the position of the Code.3 __________  §702-201 Commentary: 1. M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 4, comments at 119 (1955). 2. Id. at 121. 3. See State v. Matsuda, 50 Haw. 128, 432 P.2d 888 (1967).
HI Rev Stat § 702-202 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-202 Voluntary act includes possession. §702-202 Commentary:

  §702-202 Voluntary act includes possession. Possession is a voluntary act if the defendant knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or if the defendant was aware of the defendant's control of it for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate the defendant's possession. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993] COMMENTARY ON §702-202  Offenses of possession are pervasive in the law, but possession per se is not a bodily movement or an omission, although the course of conduct leading to or continuing possession might include a voluntary act or omission. Therefore, this section makes it explicit that possession is an act, within the meaning of § §702-200 and 201, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate possession. The "thing possessed" refers to the physical object per se, knowledge of particular qualities or properties of the physical object possessed is dealt with as a mens rea problem in subsequent sections.  Hawaii law has had many statutes making various kinds of possession illegal.[1] When considered with the previous statutory requirement that penal liability must be based on "doing what the penal law forbids"2 the logical implication of such statutes was that possession is an act within the penal law. This section merely states that position with greater clarity. Case Notes  For purposes of §134-6(e), "carry" must be analyzed employing a two-pronged analysis: (1) the voluntary act of "carrying" an object is, by way of this section, established when an individual acts knowingly with respect to that conduct; and (2) the requisite state of mind with respect to the circumstances attendant to "carrying" that object, i.e., the object's particular attributes rendering its carrying a criminal offense--the quality of being a firearm--is, by way of §702-204, established by proof of a reckless state of mind. 93 H. 87, 997 P.2d 13 (2000).  For the purposes of §134-7(b), "possession" must be analyzed using a two-pronged analysis: (1) the voluntary act of "possession" of an object "itself" is, by way of this section, satisfied where an individual acts knowingly with respect to his or her conduct; and (2) the requisite state of mind with respect to the attendant circumstances--i.e., the particular qualities of the object that make it illegal to possess it--is, by way of §702-204, satisfied by a reckless state of mind. 93 H. 87, 997 P.2d 13 (2000). __________  §702-202 Commentary: 1. E.g., H.R.S. §134-51 (concealed deadly weapon); H.R.S. §134-52 (switchblade knife). 2. H.R.S. §701-1.
HI Rev Stat § 702-207 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-207 Specified state of mind applies to all elements. §702-207 Commentary:

  §702-207 Specified state of mind applies to all elements. When the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] COMMENTARY ON §702-207  This section makes it clear that the specified state of mind requirement applies to all elements of an offense. This resolves a latent ambiguity found in many penal statutes. If, for example, a statute were to make it an offense to intentionally or knowingly break and enter the dwelling of another, it is probably clear that the specified state of mind applies to entering as well as breaking, however it should also be made clear that it applies to the attendant circumstances "dwelling of another."  The phrase "unless a contrary purpose plainly appears" is intended to allow the courts to avoid an improper result when the language of a statute fails to indicate that the specified state of mind applies to less than all elements and legislative history indicates that this was intended.  Prior Hawaii law did not recognize the principle that culpability must be proven as to each element of an offense. This stems in part from the fact that the concept of "elements of an offense" had not been fully explored. A case involving a charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor stated by way of dictum that culpability with respect to the age of the victim did not have to be proven.1 To the extent that this section modifies the previous law, it merely rejects those few instances where absolute penal liability was imposed indirectly. __________  §702-207 Commentary: 1. Territory v. Delos Santos, 42 Haw. 102 (1957).
HI Rev Stat § 702-208 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-208 Substitutes for negligence, recklessness, and knowledge. §702-208 Commentary:

  §702-208 Substitutes for negligence, recklessness, and knowledge. When the law provides that negligence is sufficient to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. When the law provides that recklessness is sufficient to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When the law provides that acting knowingly is sufficient to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] COMMENTARY ON §702-208  Since intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence are in a descending order of culpability, this section establishes that "it is only necessary to articulate the minimal basis of liability for the more serious bases to be implied."1 The proposition is essentially axiomatic. __________  §702-208 Commentary: 1. M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 4, comments at 129 (1955).
HI Rev Stat § 702-209 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-209 Conditional intent.

  §702-209 Conditional intent. When a particular intent is necessary to establish an element of an offense, it is immaterial that such intent was conditional unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law prohibiting the offense. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] COMMENTARY ON §702-209  This section provides that when the law requires that a particular intent is necessary to establish an element of an offense, that intent is established notwithstanding its conditional nature, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented. The section provides for a common sense result, and the cases in which the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented will not be many; nevertheless the distinction should be stated.  The section can best be illustrated by example. A person accused of burglary would not be excused because the person intended to steal only if no one else was in the building, whereas a person charged with attempted rape, predicated on a preliminary assault, would be excused of that offense if the person intended to effect sexual intercourse only if the mature victim consented. In the latter case, however, the person would, most likely, be guilty of an assault.
HI Rev Stat § 702-211 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-211 State of mind as determinant of grade or class of a particular offense. §702-211 Commentary:

  §702-211 State of mind as determinant of grade or class of a particular offense. When the grade or class of a particular offense depends on whether it is committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, its grade or class shall be the lowest for which the determinative state of mind is established with respect to any element of the offense. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] COMMENTARY ON §702-211  In many statutes the grade (felony, misdemeanor, or violation) or class (e.g., class A or class B felony) of an offense turns on whether the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. Since a defendant may have differing states of mind with respect to the defendant's conduct, circumstances attendant thereto, and the result of the defendant's conduct, the Code makes it clear that, in those cases where distinctions are drawn on the basis of the defendant's state of mind, the conviction ought to be the lowest for which the determinative state of mind is established with respect to any element of the offense. As it has been put, "it is the lowest common denominator that indicates the quality of the defendant's conduct."1  The law of homicide provides a ready illustration of the application of the above principle. Intentional killing is usually treated as crime of higher class than reckless killing. If a defendant intentionally killed another, recklessly mistaken that the other's conduct threatened the defendant with serious bodily harm or death, the homicide ought to be viewed as reckless killing because that is all that is established with respect to attendant circumstances negativing the defense of self defense. __________  §702-211 Commentary: 1. M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 4, comments at 131 (1955).
HI Rev Stat § 702-214 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|702. General Principles of Penal Liability|702-214 Causal relationship between conduct and result. §702-214 Commentary:

  §702-214 Causal relationship between conduct and result. Conduct is the cause of a result when it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1] COMMENTARY ON §702-214  This section and the following three sections deal with the problem of causation, which is of critical importance in those offenses in which a particular result of conduct is an element. The difficulty of the problem of causation does not lie in making a determination of actual causation, but rather in setting the appropriate standard for determining those instances in which the defendant will not be held liable for the result of the defendant's conduct because the defendant did not intend or contemplate the result or was unaware of the risk that it would obtain. The law has in some cases, under the inarticulate phrase "proximate cause," divorced the result of the defendant's conduct from the conduct because the defendant's state of mind with respect to the result would not allow the just imposition of liability. The four sections commencing here attempt a rational articulation of the factors which ought properly to be considered.  The section states the definition of actual causation. It is commonly called the "but-for" test. Once it is established that the defendant's conduct was the antecedent but for which the prohibited result would not have occurred, consideration of causality in its strict sense is finished and attention must then shift to § §702-215 and 216 which deal with the defendant's culpability with respect to the result. Section 702-217 deals with causation in offenses of absolute liability.  Hawaii law has previously not dealt directly with the problem of causation in the penal law context. However, in a case of murder, where the defendant claimed lack of intent on the basis that the victim was accidently killed when the victim stepped between the defendant and the intended victim, the court held that the defendant's intent was sufficient culpability.1 A more sound rationale for the decision is supplied by §702-215; actual causation of the result having been established, the defendant will not be relieved of liability for an unintended result merely because another person, rather than the intended victim, was injured. __________  §702-214 Commentary: 1. Territory v. Alcantara, 24 Haw. 197 (1918).