CO Code § 8-43-307 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 8 - Labor and Industry|Article 43 - Procedure|Part 3 - Review Procedures|§ 8-43-307. Appeals to Court of Appeals

  The final order of the panel constitutes the final order of the division. If a person in interest, including Pinnacol Assurance, is dissatisfied with any final order of the division that determines compensability of a claim or liability of any party, that requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits, or that denies a claimant any benefit or penalty, the person may commence an action in the court of appeals against the industrial claim appeals office as defendant to modify or vacate the order on the grounds set forth in section 8-43-308.    All such actions shall have precedence over any civil cause of a different nature pending in such court, and the court of appeals shall always be deemed open for the trial thereof, and such actions shall be tried and determined by the court of appeals in the manner provided for other civil actions.    (Deleted by amendment,L. 95, p. 235, § 3, effective April 17, 1995.)    In any case before the court of appeals pursuant to this section, the court may apply the sanctions of rule 38 of the Colorado appellate rules if the court finds such application to be appropriate.     History. Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 511, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: (1) and (3) amended and (4) added, p. 1324, § 37, effective July 1. L. 95: (1) and (3) amended, p. 235, § 3, effective April 17. L. 2002: (1) amended, p. 1883, § 31, effective July 1. L. 2021: (1) amended,(HB 21-1050), ch. 384, p. 2575, § 12, effective September 7.    Editor's note:    This section is similar to former § 8-53-119 as it existed prior to 1990.    Section 13(2)(a) of chapter 384 (HB 21-1050), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to workers' compensation claims pending or filed on or after September 7, 2021.     ANNOTATION   Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.   Failure to state the commission's name in the caption of a petition for review does not, in itself, violate the terms of this statute. Newman v. McKinley Oil Field Serv., 696 P.2d 238 (Colo. 1984).   Limiting review of workers' compensation case denied by industrial claim appeals office to certiorari is unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. Allison v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 884 P.2d 1113 (Colo. 1994).   Right of parties to have disputes considered by judges subject to popular vote is protected by authorization of judicial review by direct appeal to the court of appeals. MGM Supply Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 62 P.3d 1001 (Colo. App. 2002).   Requirement of “final order”. Although an order no longer needs to dispose of all issues pending before the agency in order to be received by the court of appeals, there still must be agency action which administratively resolves the issue in dispute and which may be considered a “final order” for purposes of this statute. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 731 P.2d 144 (Colo. App. 1986).   Final order is lacking and decision by industrial claim appeals office is not yet subject to review where penalty was imposed and matter was remanded to administrative law judge for further determination. Oxford Chemicals, Inc. v. Richardson, 782 P.2d 843 (Colo. App. 1989).   Order remanding for further proceedings on the merits of the penalty issue was not a final order and was not ripe for appellate review. U.S. Fidelity Guar., Inc. v. Kourlis, 868 P.2d 1158 (Colo. App. 1994).   The amount of the penalty must be determined before the ruling as to the penalties is final for judicial review. UPS, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 988 P.2d 1146 (Colo. App. 1999).   Employer's agreement to pay one of claimant's expenses does not alter the industrial claim appeals office order to remand the matter to the administrative law judge for determination of the benefits and compensation payable to the claimant and does not constitute an award of benefits by the office or the judge. Therefore, the office's decision is not a final order and is not ripe for review. Flint Energy Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 194 P.3d 448 (Colo. App. 2008).   Colorado appellate rules govern service of petition for review under this section and, accordingly, service upon the industrial commission may be effectuated by serving the attorney general. Butkovich v. Indus. Comm'n, 723 P.2d 1306 (Colo. 1985).   Failure to effect service upon an opposing party within the time limits of this section and § 8-53-111 and this section is not jurisdictionally fatal. Dept. of Inst. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 780 P.2d 72 (Colo. App. 1989).   Director correctly reopened case on basis of mistake. Where order is ambiguous, the director correctly determined that a “good faith dispute exists between the parties as to the meaning of the order,” regarding the proper amount of benefits owed to claimant. Edlund v. Indus. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 75 (Colo. App. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 759 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1988) (decided prior to 1986 amendment).   Petitioner's failure to name employer in petition for review of industrial commission order does not constitute a jurisdictional defect under subsection (1). Pittsinger v. Indus. Comm'n, 711 P.2d 707 (Colo. App. 1985) (decided prior to 1986 abolishment of industrial commission).   Court will not address issue raised in answer brief absent respondent's petition for review. Beatrice Foods Co., Inc. v. Padilla, 747 P.2d 685 (Colo. App. 1987).   Industrial claim appeals office order setting aside award of permanent partial disability benefits is not subject to judicial review. Natkin & Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo. App. 1989).   Notice of appeal sufficient to satisfy requirements of this section and to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals where the document complied with the requirements of C.A.R. 3.1(d) and this section but merely failed to bear the caption “Petition for Review”. Hawkins v. State Comp. Ins. Auth., 790 P.2d 893 (Colo. App. 1990).   1991 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, which took effect on July 1, 1991, and specifically to this section authorizing the imposition of sanctions under C.A.R. 38 could not be applied retroactively to cases in which a work injury occurred prior to July 1, 1991, since the amendments to the Act apply to cases in which a worker's injury occurred on or after that date. Martinez v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 832 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App. 1992).   Subsection (4), allowing sanctions under C.A.R. 38, cannot be applied retroactively. Even if it is assumed that the statute is procedural, it does not automatically follow that the statute can be applied retroactively. Although a change in procedural law is generally applicable to existing causes of action, this rule is inapposite when the general assembly has expressed a contrary intent. Martinez v. Reg'l Trans. Dist., 832 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App. 1992).   The administrative and judicial review provisions of the Act are complete, definitive, and organic, without the need of supplementation from other legislative acts or the procedural relief afforded by C.R.C.P. 16. Gardner v. Friend, 849 P.2d 817 (Colo. App. 1992).   Applied in F.R. Orr Construction v. Rinta, 717 P.2d 965 (Colo. App. 1985).