CO Code § 8-43-301 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 8 - Labor and Industry|Article 43 - Procedure|Part 3 - Review Procedures|§ 8-43-301. Petitions to Review

  Any order, corrected order, or supplemental order is final unless a petition to review or appeal has been filed in accordance with this article.        If a party is dissatisfied with an order that determines compensability of a claim or liability of any party, that requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits, or that denies a claimant any benefit or penalty, the party may file a petition to review the order. If the order was entered by the director, the party must file the petition with the division. If the order was entered by an administrative law judge, the party must file the petition at the Denver office of the office of administrative courts in the department of personnel. The party must serve the petition to review by regular or electronic mail on all the parties. (a) (I)If a party is dissatisfied with an order that determines compensability of a claim or liability of any party, that requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits, or that denies a claimant any benefit or penalty, the party may file a petition to review the order. If the order was entered by the director, the party must file the petition with the division. If the order was entered by an administrative law judge, the party must file the petition at the Denver office of the office of administrative courts in the department of personnel. The party must serve the petition to review by regular or electronic mail on all the parties.    The party must file the petition to review within twenty days after the date of the certificate of mailing of the order, and, unless timely filed, the order is final.       A dissatisfied party may file the petition to review by regular or electronic mail, and the petition is deemed filed upon the date of mailing, as determined by the certificate of mailing, if the certificate of mailing indicates that the petition to review was mailed to the division or to the Denver office of the office of administrative courts in the department of personnel, as appropriate. The petition to review must be in writing and must set forth in detail the particular errors and objections of the petitioner. A petitioner must, at the time of filing the petition, order any transcript relied upon for the petition to review, arrange with the hearing reporter to pay for the transcript, and notify opposing parties of the transcript ordered. Opposing parties must order any other transcript not ordered by the petitioner and arrange with the hearing reporter to pay for the other transcript within twenty days after the date of the certificate of mailing of the petition to review the order.       If transcripts of hearings are ordered as part of the record in a petition to review, the director or administrative law judge cannot rule on the petition until the transcripts are lodged with the division.    When the record upon which a petition to review has been filed is complete, the parties shall be notified in writing. The petitioner shall have twenty days after the date of the certificate of mailing of the notice to file a brief in support of the petition. The opposing parties shall have twenty days after the date of the certificate of mailing of the petitioner's brief to file briefs in opposition thereto. After the briefs are filed or the time for filing has run, the director or administrative law judge shall have thirty days to enter a supplemental order or transmit the file to the industrial claim appeals office for review.    In ruling on a petition to review, the director or administrative law judge may issue a supplemental order labeled as such limited to the matters raised in the petition to review, and, as to those matters, the director or administrative law judge may amend or alter the original order or set the matter for further hearing. In any event, if it has not already been done, the administrative law judge or director, following a petition to review an order, shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to support such order.    A party dissatisfied with a supplemental order may file a petition for review by the panel. The petition shall be filed with the division if the supplemental order was issued by the director or at the Denver office of the office of administrative courts in the department of personnel if the supplemental order was issued by an administrative law judge. The petition shall be filed within twenty days after the date of the certificate of mailing of the supplemental order. The petition shall be in writing, shall set forth in detail the particular errors and objections relied upon, and shall be accompanied by a brief in support thereof. The petition and brief shall be mailed by petitioner to all other parties at the time the petition is filed. All parties, except the petitioner, shall be deemed opposing parties and shall have twenty days after the date of the certificate of mailing of the petition and brief to file with the division or the Denver office of the office of administrative courts, as appropriate, briefs in opposition to the petition.    When any petition for review by the panel is filed, the division or the Denver office of the office of administrative courts shall, when all briefs are submitted to the division or the Denver office of the office of administrative courts or within fifteen days after the date briefs were due, certify and transmit the record to the industrial claim appeals office along with the petitions and briefs. The division or the Denver office of the office of administrative courts, as appropriate, shall simultaneously send notice to the parties including the date that the record has been transmitted to the industrial claim appeals office.    The industrial claim appeals office shall have sixty days after receipt of the certified record to enter its order. The panel may issue a summary order affirming the order of the administrative law judge or director. The panel may correct, set aside, or remand any order but only upon the following grounds: That the findings of fact are not sufficient to permit appellate review; that conflicts in the evidence are not resolved in the record; that the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence; that the findings of fact do not support the order; or that the award or denial of benefits is not supported by applicable law. If the findings of fact entered by the director or administrative law judge are supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be altered by the panel.    The panel shall have the power to issue such procedural orders as may be necessary to carry out its appellate review under subsection (7) of this section, including but not limited to, orders concerning completion of the record and filing of briefs. In those cases where the parties file a stipulated motion requesting that consideration of the appeal be deferred pending ongoing settlement negotiations, the panel may extend the time for entry of its order up to a maximum of thirty days.    The panel's order must be mailed to all parties of record. Any party dissatisfied with the panel's order has twenty-one days after the date of the certificate of mailing of such order to commence an action for judicial review in the court of appeals.    If the panel has failed to enter its order within sixty days of the receipt of the certified record, the order of the director or administrative law judge is deemed the order of the panel and final unless, within thirty-five days after the end of the sixty-day period, the petitioner commences an action for judicial review in the court of appeals. If the panel has not acted on the sixtieth day, the industrial claim appeals office shall send a written notice to all parties stating that the parties have thirty-five days after the date of the certificate of mailing of the notice to commence such an action.    If a petition to review is filed, a hearing may be held and orders entered on any other issue in the case during the pendency of the petition to review. If the order which is under petition to review concerns compensability, orders entered on these later issues are final and appealable when entered, but not enforceable until the review of the order on compensability is completed.    If the order which is under petition to review does not concern compensability, but concerns the respective liability of two or more employers or insurance carriers, and the injury or illness was found compensable in a hearing held pursuant to section 8-43-215, the employer or insurance carrier found liable by the director or administrative law judge shall pay benefits in accordance with the order under review until the review process is completed, at which time it shall be reimbursed by the other employer or carrier if reimbursement is necessary to comply with the final order.    The signature of an attorney on a petition to review or brief in support thereof constitutes a certificate by the attorney that such attorney has read the petition or brief; that, to the best of the attorney's knowledge, information, or belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause delay, or unnecessarily increase the cost of litigation. If a petition or brief is signed in violation of this subsection (14), the director, the administrative law judge, or the panel shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the party incurring the fees and costs as a result of the improper actions.     History. Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 507, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: (10) and (11) amended and (14) added, p. 1322, § 33, effective July 1. L. 92: (2) amended, p. 1803, § 1, effective April 16. L. 94: (14) amended, p. 1878, § 10, effective June 1. L. 95: (10) and (11) amended, p. 234, § 2, effective April 17. L. 2009: (2), (6), and (7) amended,(SB 09-070), ch. 49, p. 176, § 3, effective August 5. L. 2010: (6) and (7) amended,(HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2064, § 11, effective August 11. L. 2014: (10) and (11) amended,(HB 14-1347), ch. 208, p. 768, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2021: (2) amended,(HB 21-1050), ch. 384, p. 2574, § 10, effective September 7.    Editor's note:    This section is similar to former § 8-53-111 as it existed prior to 1990.    Section 13(2)(a) of chapter 384 (HB 21-1050), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to workers' compensation claims pending or filed on or after September 7, 2021.     ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. FINAL ORDERS.    III. METHODS OF REVIEW.    IV. HEARING OFFICER OR DIRECTORAS FACT FINDER.    V. REVIEW BY THE INDUSTRIALCLAIM APPEALS PANEL.    VI. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS.    VII. NOTICE.     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Law reviews. For article on “Colorado Practice in Workmen's Compensation”, see 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 500 (1959). For comment on the administrative review of workmen's compensation claims, see 45 U. Colo. L. Rev. 195 (1973). For article, “Update on Colorado Appellate Decisions In Workers' Compensation Law”, see 32 Colo. Law. 87 (March 2003). For article, “Update on Colorado Appellate Decisions in Workers' Compensation Law”, see 33 Colo. Law. 83 (April 2004).   Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.   Constitutionality. The general assembly's grant of limited authority in this section to administrative law judges (ALJs) and the industrial claim appeals office over the area of workers' compensation matters does not create a substantial threat to the separation of powers doctrine under article III of the Colorado Constitution, nor does it violate the requirement that district courts have original jurisdiction in civil cases as mandated in article VI, § 9(1), of the Colorado Constitution.Dee Enters. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 89 P.3d 430 (Colo. App. 2003).   Requirements of this section are jurisdictional in nature, and if there is a failure to comply with the requirements of this section, there can be no subsequent review or appeal. Sanchez v. Straight Creek Constructors, 41 Colo. App. 19, 580 P.2d 827 (1978); Brodeur v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 159 P.3d 810 (Colo. App. 2007); Speier v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 181 P.3d 1173 (Colo. App. 2008); Youngs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, , 316 P.3d 50 .   Panel may remand only on grounds enumerated in subsection (7) (now subsection (8)). London v. El Paso County, 757 P.2d 169 (Colo. App. 1988).   Administrative procedure act inapplicable. The appeal procedures under the workmen's compensation act are complete and definitive and constitute an organic act which is self-operational without the need of supplementation from the administrative procedure act. Zappas v. Indus. Comm'n, 36 Colo. App. 319, 543 P.2d 101 (1975); Maxon v. Indus. Comm'n, 40 Colo. App. 196, 571 P.2d 319 (1977).   Designation of record. When the brief referred to specific portions of the record which were relied upon, the petition, together with the transcript on file, was sufficient compliance. Goeglein v. Indus. Comm'n, 686 P.2d 1377 (Colo. App. 1984).   Neither an employer nor an employer's insurer is a claimant as that term is used in the workers' compensation act, but subsection (2) nonetheless does not deny an employer or its insurer the right to review of an order denying recovery of a penalty. However, an immediate right of appeal exists for the denial of a penalty only when the denial is no longer an interlocutory order. BCW Enters. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 964 P.2d 533 (Colo. App. 1997).   Because the ALJ's order is not a final order, and because the order neither denies nor awards benefits but instead continues benefits previously ordered, the order is interlocutory and not subject to review under subsection (2). Jefferson County Pub. Sch. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 181 P.3d 1199 (Colo. App. 2008).   Decision to hold additional hearing or to refer case is at the discretion of the hearing officer or director. Coven v. Indus. Comm'n, 694 P.2d 366 (Colo. App. 1984).   Industrial claim appeals office order setting aside award of permanent partial disability benefits is not subject to judicial review. Natkin & Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo. App. 1989).   Subsection (8) does not violate due process in limiting the agency's review to determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. So long as judicial review is provided, due process does not require administrative review as well. Also, where administrative review is provided, the extent of the agency's review authority may be statutorily limited without due process implications. Wecker v. TBL Excavating, Inc., 908 P.2d 1186 (Colo. App. 1995).   Applied in City of Aurora v. Indus. Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 132, 609 P.2d 129 (1980); Cibere v. Indus. Comm'n, 624 P.2d 920 (Colo. App. 1980); Gates Rubber Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 647 P.2d 244 (Colo. App. 1982); Indus. Comm'n v. Riley, 653 P.2d 723 (Colo. 1982); Hanson v. Indus. Comm'n, 716 P.2d 477 (Colo. App. 1986); Potomac Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 744 P.2d 765 (Colo. App. 1987); Mosley v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 78 P.3d 1150 (Colo. App. 2003).   II. FINAL ORDERS.   Order granting claimant's petition to reopen claim was not final order subject to review, since it neither required nor denied payment of penalty or benefits. Dir., Div. of Labor v. Smith, 725 P.2d 1161 (Colo. App. 1986).   Referee's order requiring an insurer to pay claimant's medical expenses was an order to pay “benefits” under subsection (2) and was thus reviewable. Am. Express v. Indus. Comm'n, 712 P.2d 1132 (Colo. App. 1985); Bestway Concrete and TIG Ins. Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 984 P.2d 680 (Colo. App. 1999).   It is not necessary that all aspects of a claim be ruled upon before there is a final order. Bestway Concrete and TIG Ins. Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 984 P.2d 680 (Colo. App. 1999).   In the context of subsection (2), the term “penalty” is a “term of art” and applies to statutory sanctions imposed on a party for failing to obey orders or for failing to take required procedural steps. Am. Express v. Indus. Comm'n, 712 P.2d 1132 (Colo. App. 1985).   Order remanding for further proceedings on the merits of the penalty issue was not a final order and was not ripe for appellate review. U.S. Fidelity Guar., Inc. v. Kourlis, 868 P.2d 1158 (Colo. App. 1994).   But an order that denies benefits in addition to remanding on a separate issue is a final, appealable order. Sanchez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2017 COA 71 , 411 P.3d 245.   An order denying sanctions under C.R.C.P. 37 is not a final order; therefore, subsection (2) does not apply. Reed v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 13 P.3d 810 (Colo. App. 2000).   An order that neither awards nor denies benefits is an interlocutory order that is not ripe for review under this section but becomes reviewable when appealed incident to or in connection with a final order. Youngs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 54 , 316 P.3d 50.   III. METHODS OF REVIEW.   Annotator's note. Cases included in the annotations to this section which refer to the industrial commission were decided prior to the enactment of 1986 Senate Bill No. 12 which abolished said commission and transferred its powers, duties, and functions under this section to the industrial claim appeals panel.   Petition for review serves same purpose as motion for new trial in court procedure, the petition calling attention to concrete matters so that any errors indicated may be corrected. It thus defines the limits of inquiry for courts and any errors or objections not specified in the petition will not be considered in subsequent judicial proceedings. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933).   Under this section, any party dissatisfied with an order entered by the referee or director may petition to review the same. The order may be amended or modified and shall be a final award unless objection be made thereto by further petition for review. Colo. Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962).   The procedure of reopening a claim, being jurisdictional, requires no findings. Even if it be determined that certain of the findings were not supported by the record, such determination would not justify a reversal of the judgment entered by the trial court. Zurek v. Gates Rubber Co., 163 Colo. 321 , 430 P.2d 465 (1967).   Where no appeal is taken from an award, it becomes final. Colo. Dept. of Agriculture v. Wayne, 30 Colo. App. 311, 493 P.2d 683 (1971).   Except that this section does not preclude a change or modification of an award under § 8-53-119 (now § 8-53-113 ), even though no petition for a review has been filed. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm'n, 80 Colo. 130 , 249 P. 653 (1926); Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 83 Colo. 315 , 265 P. 99 (1928); Colo. Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Colo. Dept. of Agriculture v. Wayne, 30 Colo. App. 311, 493 P.2d 683 (1971).   Thus, there are two methods of reviewing an award: That prescribed by this section and that prescribed by § 8-53-119 (now § 8-53-113 ). Tyler v. Hagerman, 88 Colo. 60 , 291 P. 1033 (1930); Hoover v. Indus. Comm'n, 156 Colo. 147 , 397 P.2d 223 (1964).   Parties must be advised whether proceeding is under this section or § 8-53-119 (now § 8-53-113 ). Where an award of a referee or the commission is to be reviewed, claimant, insured and insurer must be advised whether the proceeding is to be under this section or § 8-53-119 , in order that they may protect themselves accordingly. Tyler v. Hagerman, 88 Colo. 60 , 291 P. 1033 (1930).   “Final award” means only that the matter has been concluded unless reopened as provided by § 8-53-119 (now § 8-53-113 ). Graden Coal Co. v. Yuarralde, 137 Colo. 527 , 328 P.2d 105 (1958).   Remand for failure to make supplemental findings unnecessary. Where no supplemental findings were made by the referee, this failure normally would necessitate a remand of the matter to the commission for further findings, but where the petitioners filed a petition for review requesting that the matter be referred to the commission without further hearing or order by the referee, a procedure which was permitted under this section, such remand is unnecessary. Keystone Int'l, Inc. v. Gale, 33 Colo. App. 216, 518 P.2d 296 (1973).   Issuance of supplemental order is discretionary in ruling on a petition for review. It is not an abuse of discretion for ALJ to decline to issue supplemental order in ruling on a petition for review when party represents that a fact is uncontested, awaits outcome of ALJ's order, and then presents a question for the first time in petition for review. Broadmoor Ins. Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 939 P.2d 460 (Colo. App. 1996).   Statement of stipulated facts equivalent of transcript. Where the record necessary for judicial review consists of a statement of stipulated facts, that statement should be considered the equivalent of a transcript. Riley v. Indus. Comm'n, 628 P.2d 147 (Colo. App. 1981), aff'd, 653 P.2d 723 (Colo. 1982).   IV. HEARING OFFICER OR DIRECTOR AS FACT FINDER.    Annotator's note. Cases included in the annotations to this section which refer to the industrial commission were decided prior to the 1973 amendment which transferred fact-finding powers from the industrial commission to the director of the division.   Due process requires second referee to hear or read evidence prior to issuing order, although an employee was not denied due process of law on the basis that the referee who issued the order had not read the transcript of the first hearing where the referee issued a supplemental order after reading the transcript. Ski Depot Rentals, Inc. v. Lynch, 714 P.2d 516 (Colo. App. 1985).   In workmen's compensation cases the industrial commission is the fact finder. Skinner v. Indus. Comm'n, 152 Colo. 97 , 381 P.2d 253 (1963); State v. Richards, 158 Colo. 155 , 405 P.2d 675 (1965); Clodfelter v. Indus. Comm'n, 160 Colo. 39 , 413 P.2d 700 (1966); Breit v. Indus. Comm'n, 160 Colo. 205 , 415 P.2d 858 (1966); Levy v. Everson Plumbing Co., 171 Colo. 468 , 468 P.2d 34 (1970); Sena v. World of Sleep, Inc., 173 Colo. 348 , 478 P.2d 671 (1970).   The industrial commission is the fact finder upon petition for review commission shall make findings of fact. Upon petition for review the commission may do one of several things, but in any event, if it has not already done so, it shall, following a petition to review the order, make findings of fact which shall include all evidentiary and ultimate facts necessary to support the order. Alvin H. Watkins, Inc. v. Hamilton, 159 Colo. 257 , 411 P.2d 15 (1966).   Thus, section operates prospectively. The statutory provision that findings of fact shall be made which shall include all evidentiary and ultimate facts necessary to support an order operates prospectively and not retroactively. Game & Fish Dept. v. Pardoe, 147 Colo. 363 , 363 P.2d 1067 (1961).   It is the duty of the commission to make specific findings of fact from the evidence adduced, and mere recitals of the evidence taken and conclusions of law do not meet that test. Parrish v. Indus. Comm'n, 151 Colo. 538 , 379 P.2d 384 (1963); State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Foulds, 167 Colo. 123 , 445 P.2d 716 (1968); Womack v. Indus. Comm'n, 168 Colo. 364 , 451 P.2d 761 (1969).   The hearing officer must make only findings of fact sufficient to make review possible. Ferguson v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 734 P.2d 131 (Colo. App. 1986).   However, it is necessary only that evidentiary and ultimate facts be specific. It is not required that the degree of specificity of the findings encompass the specific rejection of evidence which was not persuasive. In order to comply with the requirements of this section, it is necessary only that the evidentiary and ultimate findings be specific as to that evidence which is deemed to be persuasive and determinative of the issues to be resolved. In re Claim of Crandall v. Watson-Wilson Transp. Sys., 171 Colo. 329 , 467 P.2d 48 (1970); Tague v. Coors Porcelain Co., 29 Colo. App. 226, 481 P.2d 424 (1971); Churchill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 720 P.2d 171 (Colo. 1986).   Evidentiary and ultimate facts. Evidentiary facts are those facts which are necessary for determination of the ultimate facts. Ultimate facts are the substance of the conclusions from the evidence. Parrish v. Indus. Comm'n, 151 Colo. 538 , 379 P.2d 384 (1963); Womack v. Indus. Comm'n, 168 Colo. 364 , 451 P.2d 761 (1969); Tague v. Coors Porcelain Co., 29 Colo. App. 226, 481 P.2d 424 (1971); Apache Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 717 P.2d 1000 (Colo. App. 1986).   Ultimate facts, as opposed to evidentiary facts, involve a conclusion of law or a determination of a mixed question of law and fact, and settle the rights and liabilities of the parties. Therefore, commission may alter findings of ultimate fact. Raisch v. Indus. Comm'n, 721 P.2d 693 (Colo. App. 1986) (decided prior to 1986 abolishment of industrial commission).   Unless the commission first finds the evidentiary and ultimate facts, it is futile for the reviewing court to examine the record, because it cannot sit as a fact-finding body to ascertain facts from the testimony in the first instance, and it cannot on review determine whether the testimony is sufficient to establish facts that have not been found by the commission. Metros v. Denver Coney Island, 110 Colo. 40 , 129 P.2d 911 (1942); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 128 Colo. 68 , 259 P.2d 869 (1952); Alvin H. Watkins, Inc. v. Hamilton, 159 Colo. 257 , 411 P.2d 15 (1966); Tague v. Coors Porcelain Co., 29 Colo. App. 226, 481 P.2d 424 (1971).   Determination of whether disability has causal connection with original accident is conclusive. In a workmen's compensation case it is for the commission, in the exercise of sound discretion, to determine whether, under the evidence, a permanent disability has a causal connection with the original accident, and its determination of that issue is conclusive on the courts. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933).   Where the original referee does not enter an order and a second referee who was not at the hearing is called upon to enter the order, the second referee must base his findings and conclusions on an independent examination of the facts contained in the record. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Fulkerson, 680 P.2d 1325 (Colo. App. 1984); Legouffe v. Prestige Homes, Inc., 689 P.2d 697 (Colo. App. 1984); El Paso County Sch. Dist. No. 11 v. Bunger, 713 P.2d 935 (Colo. App. 1985).   For discussion of what constitutes an evidentiary fact, see F.R. Orr Constr. v. Rinta, 717 P.2d 965 (Colo. App. 1985).   Where hearing officer entered supplemental order only addressing and altering findings unrelated to claim of entitlement to workmen's compensation death benefits made by claimant and where hearing officer elected not to supplement his order concerning claimant's contentions, the hearing officer should have forwarded the file to the panel and the claimant was not required to file a second petition for review of order of hearing officer as first petition for review was still pending. Michalski v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 757 P.2d 1146 (Colo. App. 1988).   Jurisdictional challenge to hearing officer. Additional hearing required where claimant alleged that hearing officer lacked jurisdiction to enter an order after the hearing officer had terminated his employment. Welch v. Indus. Comm'n, 722 P.2d 439 (Colo. App. 1986).   V. REVIEW BY THE INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL.    Annotator's note. Cases included in the annotations to this section which refer to the industrial commission were decided prior to the enactment of 1986 Senate Bill No. 12 which abolished said commission and transferred its powers, duties, and functions under this section to the industrial claim appeals panel. Cases which refer to referees were decided prior to the 1983 repeal and reenactment which changed the term to hearing officer.   Procedural changes in statute are applicable to all cases pending at the time the new statute became effective unless a contrary legislative intent is expressed and, since the procedural changes were imposed in conjunction with the abolition of the industrial commission and the creation of the industrial claim appeals office, it would be illogical to conclude that the general assembly intended the panel to apply a standard of review other than that set forth in its grant of authority. Kinninger v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 759 P.2d 766 (Colo. App. 1988).   Further petition for review. In a case first heard by a referee, where a petition for a review had been duly filed after the award, and the entire case is thereafter referred to the commission (now director), this section clearly contemplates a further petition for review. Carlson v. Indus. Comm'n, 79 Colo. 124 , 244 P. 68 (1926).   Commission may reject claim as untimely. The commission may reject a claim for disfigurement which is asserted for the first time in a petition for review, on the ground that it has not been timely presented. Dziewior v. Michigan Gen. Corp., 672 P.2d 1026 (Colo. App. 1983).   It is commission's responsibility independently to review entire record and either make new findings or adopt the referee's findings of fact. Thompson v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 369, 520 P.2d 139 (1974).   Meaningful review not possible when referee makes no findings of evidentiary fact. Beech Aircraft, Inc. v. Reif, 678 P.2d 1049 (Colo. App. 1983); Raisch v. Indus. Comm'n, 721 P.2d 693 (Colo. App. 1986).   Referee's findings part of record which commission considers in reaching decision. The fact that a referee is required by law to make findings of fact sufficient to support his award presupposes that the referee's findings will be a part of the record and that the commission will consider such findings in reaching its independent decision. Thompson v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 369, 520 P.2d 139 (1974).   Commission may adopt referee's findings. The commission is not required to make independent findings of fact, but may adopt the referee's findings when affirming a decision. Mattison v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 203, 516 P.2d 1143 (1973).   Adopted findings should be adequate. While generally the commission's adoption of specific factual findings entered by the referee suffices, this procedure presupposes that the adopted findings are adequate. Grand Valley Enters., Inc. v. Claimants in re Death of Wonders, 39 Colo. App. 166, 562 P.2d 1119 (1977).   Commission cannot avoid being influenced by referee's findings and conclusions, when he had the only opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of the witnesses, including that of the claimant. Thompson v. Indus. Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 369, 520 P.2d 139 (1974).   Prior to 1973, the commission was not limited merely to review of the director's order, but could on the record make findings of its own and enter an award thereon. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 96 Colo. 571 , 45 P.2d 895 (1935); Colo. Dept. of Agriculture v. Wayne, 179 Colo. 258 , 499 P.2d 1188 (1972).   To hold that the commission had no independent fact-finding authority would in effect emasculate the commission's function to that of a mere rubber stamp approving the referee's findings. Harrison W. Corp. v. Hicks' Claimants, 185 Colo. 142 , 522 P.2d 722 (1974).   The statutory phrase in former § 8-53-106 “contrary to the weight of the evidence” means unless the findings are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and the preponderance standard is met when the existence of a contested fact is more probable than not. Therefore, the commission properly exercised its authority when it found that the claimant failed to sustain its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of his symptoms was a prior injury. Indus. Comm'n v. Jones, 688 P.2d 1116 (Colo. 1984).   If the findings of fact by the administrative law judge are supported by substantial evidence they are binding on the panel, leaving only conclusions of law to be fully reviewed. The difference in the language of this section and that of comparable provisions of the State Administrative Procedure Act exhibits a conscious legislative intent to abolish this section's previous distinction between evidentiary and ultimate findings. May D & F v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 752 P.2d 589 (Colo. App. 1988) (decided under law in existence prior to 1987 amendment).   Findings of fact by the ALJ are binding upon the panel if supported by substantial evidence. Conversely, if the ALJ's findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or if the ALJ's orders are not supported by the findings of fact or applicable law, then they are not binding upon the panel and may be corrected or set aside. Matter of Death of Smithour, 778 P.2d 302 (Colo. App. 1989).   Although the evidence could support the industrial claim appeals office's conclusion, the office exceeded its authority by reweighing the evidence and overlooking other supported findings of the administrative law judge. Apex Transp., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2014 COA 25 , 321 P.3d 630.   Under the substantial evidence standard established in subsection (8), the evidence supporting a finding is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or if it constitutes a mere conclusion. Wecker v. TBL Excavating, Inc., 908 P.2d 1186 (Colo. App. 1995).   This section requires the panel to accept the ALJ's findings of ultimate facts as well as evidentiary facts, if supported by substantial evidence in the record; however, both the panel and this court may review a conclusion of law for error. Schrieber v. Brown & Root, Inc., 888 P.2d 274 (Colo. App. 1993).   Commission may rule de novo on weight and sufficiency of evidence. The industrial commission, as the ultimate fact finder, is not bound by the referee's findings but may rule de novo on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in a workmen's compensation case. Casa Bonita Restaurant v. Indus. Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1340 (Colo. App. 1981).   Commission's findings are binding upon appellate review. The industrial commission's findings, where supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon appellate review. Casa Bonita Restaurant v. Indus. Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1340 (Colo. App. 1981).   Commission's order reversing the hearing officer's denial of benefits is interlocutory and not reviewable until issues of the extent of disability and duration of benefits are determined. Indus. Comm'n v. Fort Logan, 682 P.2d 1185 (Colo. 1984).   Commission determines proper characterization of employment relationship. The determination of the proper characterization of the employment relationship depends upon the facts in each case. This determination must properly be made by the commission rather than the court, even though the facts are largely undisputed, because this matter is not within the court's scope of review. Schultz v. Indus. Comm'n, 34 Colo. App. 122, 523 P.2d 164 (1974).   Commission authorized to make its own finding of ultimate conclusions of fact. City & County of Denver v. Indus. Comm'n, 690 P.2d 199 (Colo. 1984); State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Bldg. Sys., 713 P.2d 940 (Colo. App. 1985).   Causation may in certain circumstances be an ultimate fact and in other circumstances be an evidentiary fact. Baca v. Helm, 682 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1984); Raisch v. Indus. Comm'n, 721 P.2d 693 (Colo. App. 1986).   Whether an injury “caused” a disability, i.e., had a role in the chain of events leading to the disability, is a question of evidentiary fact. Baca v. Helm, 682 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1984).   The determination of causation may involve an evidentiary fact or an ultimate fact and an ultimate fact may involve a mixed question of law and fact or solely a question of law. If facts are undisputed and reasonable minds could draw but one inference from them, causation is a question of law for the court. Smith v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 749 P.2d 462 (Colo. App. 1987); Schrieber v. Brown & Root, Inc., 888 P.2d 274 (Colo. App. 1993).   Whether an evidentiary fact of causation justifies the legal conclusion that a disability was “proximately caused” by a work-related injury is an ultimate fact, i.e., a question of statutory interpretation. Baca v. Helm, 682 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1984).   Credibility of witnesses. Resolution of the credibility of witnesses by the hearing officer is a question of evidentiary fact which is binding on review. Prestige Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, 658 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1983); Varsity Contractors & Home Ins. Co. v. Baca, 709 P.2d 55 (Colo. App. 1985).   There is a clear distinction between the terms “no evidence” and “no credible evidence” and, where the record failed to support the finding that there was no evidence of causation regarding worker's claim to total disability benefits for occupational lung disease, the industrial claim appeals panel should have set the order aside and remanded the cause for additional findings. Hall v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 757 P.2d 1132 (Colo. App. 1988).   The scope of the “quasi-course of employment doctrine”, like the scope of the doctrine of duty, can be a question of law involving public policy considerations and there was no error in Panel's failure to remand to the ALJ for an initial determination of that question of law. Schrieber v. Brown and Root, Inc., 888 P.2d 274 (Colo. App. 1993).   VI. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS.   The filing of the petition as provided by this section is jurisdictional. Indus. Comm'n v. Plains Utils. Co., 127 Colo. 506 , 259 P.2d 282 (1953); Brodeur v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 159 P.3d 810 (Colo. App. 2007); Youngs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 54 , 316 P.3d 50.   Timely filing of a petition for certiorari is a jurisdictional requirement. Accordingly, statutory provisions governing appellate review must be strictly enforced. Picken v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 874 P.2d 485 (Colo. App. 1994); Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 969 P.2d 817 (Colo. App. 1998).   Mailing to attorney triggers 20-day period under subsection (2). The claimant, represented by an attorney, was not required to receive her own separate copy of the order. Brodeur v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 159 P.3d 810 (Colo. App. 2007).   General rule on time computation does not affect specific provision of subsection (10). A party to a proceeding who received notice of the panel's order by mail was not entitled to the additional three days allowed by C.A.R. 26(c) for service by mail, in view of the fact that mailing time is already accounted for in this section. Indus. Claim Appeals Office v. Zarlingo, 57 P.3d 736 (Colo. 2002).   General three-day mailing provision in C.R.C.P. 6(e) does not modify the 20-day time limit set forth in subsection (2). Speier v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 181 P.3d 1173 (Colo. App. 2008).   Filing deadline may not be extended for excusable neglect. Speier v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 181 P.3d 1173 (Colo. App. 2008).   Court of appeals lacked authority to extend time for filing of petition for writ of certiorari in workers compensation case. Neither this statute nor C.A.R. 46.1 permit an extension of time within which to file petition. Picken v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 874 P.2d 485 (Colo. App. 1994).   Failure to specify in detail in a petition the alleged errors committed is not jurisdictional and the industrial claim appeals office has jurisdiction to consider such a petition if it elects to do so. Oxford Chemicals, Inc. v. Richardson, 782 P.2d 843 (Colo. App. 1989).   Failure to file a brief or the untimely filing of a brief under subsection (3) is not a jurisdictional defect. Ortiz v. Indus. Comm'n, 734 P.2d 642 (Colo. App. 1986).   A second ALJ did not lack jurisdiction under subsection (12) to consider a petition to reopen because the first ALJ's order was on appeal. Ward v. Ward, 928 P.2d 739 (Colo. App. 1996).   Procedure for review must be followed. In order to avail oneself of the provisions of the workmen's compensation act the procedure for review of findings or awards must be followed, and, unless followed, the order or award may not be reviewed. Indus. Comm'n v. Plains Utils. Co., 127 Colo. 506 , 259 P.2d 282 (1953); Vigil v. Indus. Comm'n, 160 Colo. 23 , 413 P.2d 904 (1966); Miller v. Indus. Comm'n, 28 Colo. App. 462, 474 P.2d 177 (1970).   The words “must” and “shall” as used in this section are not susceptible of any construction except as mandatory. Indus. Comm'n v. Plains Utils. Co., 127 Colo. 506 , 259 P.2d 282 (1953); Logan County Hosp. v. Slocum, 165 Colo. 232 , 438 P.2d 240 (1968).   Thus, award “shall be final” unless challenged in manner prescribed. Under the provisions of the statute, an award “shall be final” unless challenged in the particular manner and within the time provided by the act. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co. v. Casteel, 128 Colo. 289 , 261 P.2d 228 (1953).   The commission's order after consideration of the referee's award is final, except during the pendency before the commission of a petition for review. Carver v. Indus. Comm'n, 40 Colo. App. 126, 570 P.2d 256 (1977).   Award will be res judicata. The statute clearly contemplates that all objections to an award shall be raised, if at all, by specified procedures and shall be barred from later relitigation by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata. The whole policy of the law is against the retrial of issues already litigated by the parties. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Luna, 156 Colo. 106 , 397 P.2d 231 (1964).   More specifically, a petition for review “shall be in writing and specify in detail the particular errors and objections”. Gadbois v. Allan, 105 Colo. 19 , 94 P.2d 688 (1939); Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co. v. Casteel, 128 Colo. 289 , 261 P.2d 228 (1953); Williams v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 136 Colo. 458 , 319 P.2d 1078 (1957); Youngs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 54 , 316 P.3d 50.   Where claimant timely files petition to review final order but does not list a previous ALJ interlocutory order or identify errors in that order, the petition was inadequate to appeal the interlocutory order, and the industrial claim appeals office loses jurisdiction to review that order. Youngs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 54 , 316 P.3d 50.   Phrase “any party dissatisfied”, as used in subsection (2), includes an independent claims adjustment service acting for a self-insured employer. Tozer v. Scott Wetzel Servs., Inc., 883 P.2d 496 (Colo. App. 1994).   Standing to request review of an ALJ's order arises under this section only when a party is dissatisfied with an order which requires a party to pay a penalty or benefits and, therefore, insurer did not have standing to challenge an ALJ's determination as to the award of attorney fees which award did not impose a penalty upon the insurer, did not assess any additional benefits nor deny any benefit to the claimant, or place additional liability on the insurer. Bradley v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 841 P.2d 1071 (Colo. App. 1992).   Sufficiency of writing and specificity of objections. This section, providing that a petition for review of an award of the commission shall be in writing and specify in detail the particular errors or objections, is sufficiently complied with where a referee of the commission advises a claimant that a petition, filed by claimant, lacks detail, and extends the time within which to secure a transcript of the testimony and present a petition in compliance with the rules; the fact that the referee order is a more detailed statement and grants time within which to file it, cannot work a default or a forfeiture of a claimant's right to review. Williams v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 136 Colo. 458 , 319 P.2d 1078 (1957).   Letter as petition for review. A letter sent by counsel for petitioner, marked as being received, and entered as part of the record, which prompts the referee's order to hold a supplemental hearing, is in sufficient compliance with the requirements set forth by the statute and acts as a valid petition for review when it states specific reasons for necessity of amending the order. Miller v. Indus. Comm'n, 28 Colo. App. 462, 474 P.2d 177 (1970).   In addition, a petition for review must be submitted within 15 days (now 20 days) after the referee's order, and unless filed within this allotted period the petition for review must be stricken and the order declared final. Midget Consol. Gold Mining Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 69 Colo. 218 , 193 P. 493 (1920); Indus. Comm'n v. Bracken, 83 Colo. 72 , 262 P. 521 (1927); Pollard v. Indus. Comm'n, 95 Colo. 572 , 37 P.2d 1093 (1934); Zimmerman v. Indus. Comm'n, 108 Colo. 552 , 120 P.2d 636 (1941); Miller v. Indus. Comm'n, 28 Colo. App. 462, 474 P.2d 177 (1970); Irrigation Motor & Pump Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 30 Colo. App. 289, 494 P.2d 144 (1971).   A petition for review, whether it is denominated an appeal or a cross appeal, must be filed within 20 days after the date of the certificate of mailing of the industrial claim appeals panel's final order and this deadline may not be extended. Western Empire v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 769 P.2d 1089 (Colo. App. 1989).   Petition for review of interlocutory order submitted prior to issuance of final order was premature. Subsection (2) requires a petition for review to be filed “within 20 days after the date of the certificate of mailing” of the final, appealable order. Under section's plain meaning, claimant was required to submit petition to review first ALJ's interlocutory order after second ALJ issued a final order. Youngs v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2013 COA 54 , 316 P.3d 50.   Actions are not commenced in the court of appeals until they are actually received by the court; they are not commenced on the day they are mailed. Therefore, petition was filed late where petitioner mailed it on the 20th day after the industrial claim appeals office entered its order. Rice v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 937 P.2d 893 (Colo. App. 1997).   Claimant's petition for review of decision was timely filed despite fact that certificate of mailing did not indicate petition was mailed to ALJ where cover letter attached to petition disclosed that petition was mailed within 20 days of order. Rendon v. United Airlines, 881 P.2d 482 (Colo. App. 1994).   Twenty-day limit within which to file a petition for writ of certiorari set forth in this section and C.A.R. 46.1 is applicable to injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1991. Picken v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 874 P.2d 485 (Colo. App. 1994).   Effect of failure to seek timely administrative review. Where a claimant fails to seek, within the statutorily prescribed 15-day (now 20-day) period, administrative review of an order entered pursuant to a hearing, that failure deprives the court of appeals of jurisdiction to consider the merits of claimant's alleged denial of due process. Wallace v. Indus. Comm'n, 629 P.2d 1091 (Colo. App. 1981).   Where further time was granted by the referee within 15 days (now 20 days) after the date when the order was entered, the statute does not require that a subsequent granting of additional time must also be sought and obtained prior to the expiration of the extended time within which to file the petition for review. The supreme court is disinclined to judicially establish such a strict rule of procedure where the request for additional time was filed before the expiration of the extended time theretofore granted by the referee. City & County of Denver v. Phillips, 166 Colo. 312 , 443 P.2d 379 (1968).   Furthermore, a transcript of the proceedings must be filed within 30 days (now 20 days) after submission of the petition for review. Logan County Hosp. v. Slocum, 165 Colo. 232 , 438 P.2d 240 (1968); Vieweg v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 170 Colo. 71 , 459 P.2d 759 (1969); Miller v. Indus. Comm'n, 28 Colo. App. 462, 474 P.2d 177 (1970).   For without submission of the transcript of the first proceedings, the referee is without jurisdiction to hold a second hearing on the matter, and the commission is correct in declaring the order of the second hearing a nullity, and in reinstating the order made after the first hearing. Miller v. Indus. Comm'n, 28 Colo. App. 462, 474 P.2d 177 (1970).   Claimant's timely filed petition for review of hearing officer's order was sufficient despite failure simultaneously to order record and transcript of hearings. Martinez v. Indus. Comm'n, 709 P.2d 49 (Colo. App. 1985).   Order filed by administrative law judge more than 30 days after filing of briefs is void. Hillebrand Const. Co. v. Worf, 780 P.2d 24 (Colo. App. 1989).   Failure of commission to act within time period does not bar review. Where petitioner timely files a motion for extension of the period for filing the transcript, pursuant to subsection (3), he does not lose his right to review simply because the commission does not rule on the motion until the 30-day period expires. Hewgley v. Indus. Comm'n, 657 P.2d 989 (Colo. App. 1982).   Brief not required. There is no requirement under this section that a brief be filed in support of a petition to review a referee's decision or an order of the commission. Saxton v. Indus. Comm'n, 41 Colo. App. 309, 584 P.2d 638 (1978).   Withdrawal of attorney and claimant's ignorance of necessity for petition do not excuse noncompliance with this section. Suver v. Indus. Comm'n, 80 Colo. 429 , 252 P. 361 (1927).   Procedural requirements may not be waived, enlarged, diminished, or destroyed by consent, and cannot be estopped. Vieweg v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 170 Colo. 71 , 459 P.2d 759 (1969).   The procedural requirements for review under this act constitute limits on the commission's jurisdiction and cannot be waived or destroyed by consent. Hasbrouck v. Indus. Comm'n, 685 P.2d 780 (Colo. App. 1984).   Failure to effect service upon an opposing party within the time limits of this section and § 8-53-119 is not jurisdictionally fatal. Dept. of Inst. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 780 P.2d 72 (Colo. App. 1989).   Where a claimant fails to deliver a petition for review to the office designated in the order of the administrative law judge, and such failure results in an untimely filing, the petition is jurisdictionally defective and a review of the claim on the merits is barred. Buschmann v. Gallegos Masonry, Inc., 805 P.2d 1193 (Colo. App. 1991).   Court not at liberty to imply a “mailing window” analogous to that provided under C.R.C.P. (6)(e) into the plain language of subsection (2). Digital Equip. Corp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 894 P.2d 54 (Colo. App. 1995).   Commission has no authority to grant an extension of time for filing a petition with court of appeals and, therefore, failure to timely seek review deprives court of appeals of jurisdiction. Cornstubble v. Indus. Comm'n, 722 P.2d 448 (Colo. App. 1986) (decided prior to 1986 abolishment of industrial commission).   Time at which awards become final where separate hearings had on two claims arising out of same accident. Where claims are filed against the insurance carrier of a lessee and the lessor for compensation growing out of the same accident, each being heard and determined separately, the award becomes final in each case at the expiration of 15 days, and not at the expiration of 15 days from the time of the last award. Indus. Comm'n v. Bracken, 83 Colo. 72 , 262 P. 521 (1927).   Requirements for filing petition with court of appeals. Prior to filing a petition for review with the court of appeals, the claimant must not only petition the referee and the commission to review the referee's order, but he must also petition the commission to review its own action on the referee's decision, so that any error may be corrected without the necessity of judicial review. Maxon v. Indus. Comm'n, 40 Colo. App. 196, 571 P.2d 319 (1977).   Objection for failure to file in time may be waived. An objection to a review under this section, because the petition therefor was not filed within the statutory or extended time, should be sustained, but the objection is waived if the hearing is had and the objecting party participates therein. Tyler v. Hagerman, 88 Colo. 60 , 291 P. 1033 (1926).   Parties are estopped to complain of noncompliance by taking part in supplemental proceedings. Parties to a workmen's compensation proceeding by their conduct in applying for, and taking part in, supplemental proceedings before the director, held estopped to complain of noncompliance with this section. Indus. Comm'n v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 78 Colo. 267 , 241 P. 729 (1925).   Parties thereby waive question of authority of director to enter additional award. After original award by the director, on petition to reopen the case, of which employer and insurance carrier have notice, if they appear and participate in further proceedings without objection, they will be deemed to have waived any question of the authority of the director to enter an additional award. Indus. Comm'n v. State Ins. Comp. Fund, 71 Colo. 106 , 203 P. 215 (1922).   VII. NOTICE.   Presumably, a person's address is the place of his domicile and residence. Devore v. Indus. Comm'n, 129 Colo. 10 , 266 P.2d 774 (1954).   Claimant has duty to provide place for delivery of notice. For the purpose of receiving mail or notice, the address of a claimant is the designation of the place where delivery is desired. That place is best known to claimant and it is his duty to provide the place of residence or other designation of place for delivery of notice for inclusion in the files of his claim. Devore v. Indus. Comm'n, 129 Colo. 10 , 266 P.2d 774 (1954).   Filing period commences to run against party who receives actual notice. An interpretation that until such time as all parties in interest are given due notice of the award, the statutory time within which a petition to review may be filed does not commence to run, even as against the party in interest who has in fact received actual notice, is not supported by the statute. Davis v. Indus. Comm'n, 161 Colo. 80 , 420 P.2d 147 (1966).   Effect of no notice or insufficient notice. Where no notice or an insufficient notice of an award is given the parties in interest in a workmen's compensation case, the time within which a petition for review must be filed does not run. Indus. Comm'n v. Martinez, 102 Colo. 31 , 77 P.2d 646 (1938).   Ruling on merits impliedly accepts petitioner's notice allegation. When the industrial commission rules upon a petition for administrative review, having before it the affidavits of petitioner's attorney and his two employees stating that notice of the commission's order had not in fact been received by them, the commission impliedly accepts petitioner's allegation that notice had not been received by her attorney, thereby making the filing of the petition timely. Cline v. Indus. Comm'n, 43 Colo. App. 123, 599 P.2d 973 (1979).   Notice misstating date of entry of award insufficient. Notice of an award which misstates the date of entry, resulting in a curtailment of time within which the petition for review may be filed, is insufficient. Zimmerman v. Indus. Comm'n, 108 Colo. 552 , 120 P.2d 636 (1941).   Supreme court not inclined to favor ruling which forecloses right to review. Where the jurisdiction of the district court in a workmen's compensation case is questioned, unless the provisions of this section concerning notice of an award have been strictly followed, the supreme court, in reviewing the judgment, will not be inclined to favor a ruling which would foreclose the right of a party to a judicial review of the commission's action. Zimmerman v. Indus. Comm'n, 108 Colo. 552 , 120 P.2d 636 (1941).   Thus, review of an award without notice to the claimant is unlawful. Indus. Comm'n v. Nissen, 84 Colo. 19 , 267 P. 791 (1928).