reglab/housing_qa huggingface dataset:
CO Code § 18-2-204 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 2 - Inchoate Offenses|Part 2 - Criminal Conspiracy|§ 18-2-204. Duration of Conspiracy

  Conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct which terminates when the crime or crimes which are its object are committed or the agreement that they be committed is abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom he conspired.    Abandonment is presumed if neither the defendant nor anyone with whom he conspired does any overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy during the applicable period of limitation.    If an individual abandons the agreement, the conspiracy is terminated as to him only if and when he gives timely notice to those with whom he conspired of his abandonment and the notice is evidenced by circumstances corroborating the giving of the same, or he informs the law enforcement authorities, having jurisdiction, of the existence of the conspiracy and of his participation therein.     History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 416, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-2-204 .    ANNOTATION   Completion of the object of the conspiracy completes the conspiracy. United States v. Mares, 260 F. Supp. 741 (D. Colo. 1966 ), rev'd on other grounds, 383 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963, 89 S. Ct. 1314, 22 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1969).   The ending of a conspiracy depends upon the particular facts and purposes of such conspiracy. The conspiracy does not come to an abrupt and automatic end simultaneously with the completion of the offense nor even the arrest of a conspirator. United States v. Mares, 260 F. Supp. 741 (D. Colo. 1966 ), rev'd on other grounds, 383 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963, 89 S. Ct. 1314, 22 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1969).   A conspiracy to commit a crime of stealth for material gain usually has a minimum routine development from plan, to commission, to division of fruits, if any, among the conspirators. United States v. Mares, 260 F. Supp. 741 (D. Colo. 1966 ), rev'd on other grounds, 383 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963, 89 S. Ct. 1314, 22 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1969).   District court has proper jurisdiction over conspiracy charge that began when defendant was a juvenile but continued after defendant became an adult. People v. McGlotten, 166 P.3d 182 (Colo. App. 2007).   Applied in Jeffrey v. District Court, 626 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1981); Corr v. District Court, 661 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1983).
CO Code § 18-2-205 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 2 - Inchoate Offenses|Part 2 - Criminal Conspiracy|§ 18-2-205. Incapacity, Irresponsibility, or Immunity of Party to Conspiracy

  It is immaterial to the liability of a person who conspires with another to commit a crime that:   He or the person with whom he conspires does not occupy a particular position or have a particular characteristic which is an element of the crime, if he believes that one of them does; or    The person with whom he conspires is irresponsible or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction for the commission of the crime.        History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 416, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-2-205 .
CO Code § 18-2-401 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 2 - Inchoate Offenses|Part 4 - Renunciation and Abandonment|§ 18-2-401. Nonavailability of Defenses

  Renunciation and abandonment are not voluntary and complete so as to be a defense to prosecution under this article if they are motivated in whole or in part by:   A belief that a circumstance exists which increases the probability of detection or apprehension of the defendant or another or which makes more difficult the consummation of the crime; or    A decision to postpone the crime until another time or to substitute another victim or another but similar objective.        History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 417, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-2-401 .    ANNOTATION   Where defense of abandonment available in attempt cases. Even though the crime of attempt is complete once the actor intentionally takes a substantial step towards the commission of the crime, the affirmative defense of abandonment is present if he thereafter voluntarily renunciates his criminal intent. People v. Johnson, 41 Colo. App. 220, 585 P.2d 306 (1978).   A defendant cannot abandon and renounce the crimes charged after they are completed. People v. Mason, 642 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1982); People v. Jacobs, 91 P.3d 438 (Colo. App. 2003).   Abandonment is no defense to completed crime of criminal mischief. People v. Johnson, 41 Colo. App. 220, 585 P.2d 306 (1978).   To present an affirmative defense for abandonment to the jury, defendant must present “some credible evidence” on the issue of the claimed defense. It is not necessarily the case, however, that the defense of abandonment is not available once defendant has injured the victim. O'Shaughnessy v. People, 2012 CO 9, 269 P.3d 1233.
CO Code § 18-3-206 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 3 - Offenses Against the Person|Part 2 - Assaults|§ 18-3-206. Menacing

 [ ] A person commits the crime of menacing if, by any threat or physical action, he or she knowingly places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Menacing is a class 1 misdemeanor, but it is a class 5 felony if committed by the use of a firearm, knife, or bludgeon or a simulated firearm, knife, or bludgeon.  Editor's note: This version of this section is effective March 1, 2022.  History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 421, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-3-206 . L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 961, § 12, effective July 1. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 694, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2021: Entire section amended,(SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3173, § 195, effective March 1, 2022.
CO Code § 18-3-208 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 3 - Offenses Against the Person|Part 2 - Assaults|§ 18-3-208. Reckless Endangerment

 [ ] A person who recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to another person commits reckless endangerment, which is a class 3 misdemeanor.  Editor's note: This version of this section is effective until March 1, 2022.  History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 421, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-3-208 . L. 2021: Entire section amended,(SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3173, § 196, effective March 1, 2022.    Editor's note:   Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.   ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “Mens Rea and the Colorado Criminal Code”, see 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 167 (1981). For article, “The Legal Risks of AIDS: Moving Beyond Discrimination”, see 18 Colo. Law. 606 (1989).   Offense not lesser included offense of third degree assault. The establishment of every element of third degree assault would not necessarily include proving conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, an element of reckless endangerment. Third degree assault requires proof of bodily injury but not proof of a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. Therefore reckless endangerment is not a lesser included offense of third degree assault. People v. Berner, 42 Colo. App. 520, 600 P.2d 112 (1979).   Trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser nonincluded offense of reckless endangerment, because there was no rational basis upon which the jury could have convicted defendant of that offense and acquitted him of child abuse resulting in death. People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602 (Colo. App. 2001).   There is no right to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense if the element that distinguishes the greater from the lesser is uncontested. Where it is undisputed that death occurred as a result of defendant's conduct, there is no right to an instruction on reckless endangerment in a reckless manslaughter case. People v. Hall, 59 P.3d 298 (Colo. App. 2002).   Applied in People v. Sepeda, 196 Colo. 13 , 581 P.2d 723 (1978); Perea v. District Court, 199 Colo. 27 , 604 P.2d 25 (1979); People v. McPherson, 200 Colo. 429 , 619 P.2d 38 (1980).
CO Code § 18-3-208 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 3 - Offenses Against the Person|Part 2 - Assaults|§ 18-3-208. Reckless Endangerment

 [ ] A person who recklessly engages in conduct that creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to another person commits reckless endangerment, which is a class 2 misdemeanor.  Editor's note: This version of this section is effective March 1, 2022.  History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 421, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-3-208 . L. 2021: Entire section amended,(SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3173, § 196, effective March 1, 2022.
CO Code § 18-3-305 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 3 - Offenses Against the Person|Part 3 - Kidnapping|§ 18-3-305. Enticement of a Child

  A person commits the crime of enticement of a child if he or she invites or persuades, or attempts to invite or persuade, a child under the age of fifteen years to enter any vehicle, building, room, or secluded place with the intent to commit sexual assault or unlawful sexual contact upon said child. It is not necessary to a prosecution for attempt under this subsection (1) that the child have perceived the defendant's act of enticement.    Enticement of a child is a class 4 felony. It is a class 3 felony if the defendant has a previous conviction for enticement of a child or sexual assault on a child or for conspiracy to commit or the attempted commission of either offense, or if the enticement of a child results in bodily injury to that child.    When a person is convicted, pleads nolo contendere, or receives a deferred sentence for a violation of the provisions of this section and the court knows the person is a current or former employee of a school district in this state or holds a license or authorization pursuant to the provisions of article 60.5 of title 22, C.R.S., the court shall report such fact to the department of education.     History. Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 715, § 2, June 7. L. 87: (2) amended, p. 606, § 12, effective July 1. L. 90: (3) added, p. 1025, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1) amended, p. 711, § 48, effective July 1; (3) amended, p. 1846, § 30, effective August 2.    ANNOTATION   Attempted sexual assault of any degree sufficient. This statute requires proof only that the defendant acted with the intent to cause the result of a sexual assault of some degree upon a victim younger than fifteen years of age. Failure to complete sexual assault of particular degree is irrelevant. People v. Black, 759 P.2d 746 (Colo. App. 1988).   This section does not preclude a presentence remedy such as a deferred sentence under § 18-1.3-102 . Until defendant is sentenced, the Lifetime Supervision Act does not apply. People v. Loveall, 203 P.3d 540 (Colo. App. 2008), aff'd, 231 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2010).   Communication with an adult intermediary is sufficient to prove the “invite or persuade” element. Statute does not require evidence of direct communication between the defendant and a child. People v. Douglas, 2012 COA 57 , 296 P.3d 234.   Defendant's invitation to child to sit on the couch satisfies the element of “inviting or persuading the child to enter a room”. Invitation necessarily invited the child to enter a particular room in the home where the couch was located. People v. Douglas, 2012 COA 57 , 296 P.3d 234.
CO Code § 18-3-306 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 3 - Offenses Against the Person|Part 3 - Kidnapping|§ 18-3-306. Internet Luring of a Child

  An actor commits internet luring of a child if the actor knowingly communicates over a computer or computer network, telephone network, or data network or by a text message or instant message to a person who the actor knows or believes to be under fifteen years of age and, in that communication or in any subsequent communication by computer, computer network, telephone network, data network, text message, or instant message, describes explicit sexual conduct as defined in section 18-6-403 (2)(e), and, in connection with that description, makes a statement persuading or inviting the person to meet the actor for any purpose, and the actor is more than four years older than the person or than the age the actor believes the person to be.    It shall not be a defense to this section that a meeting did not occur.      (Deleted by amendment,L. 2007, p. 1688, § 8, effective July 1, 2007.)       Internet luring of a child is a class 5 felony; except that luring of a child is a class 4 felony if committed with the intent to meet for the purpose of engaging in sexual exploitation as defined in section 18-6-403 or sexual contact as defined in section 18-3-401.    For purposes of this section, “in connection with” means communications that further, advance, promote, or have a continuity of purpose and may occur before, during, or after the invitation to meet.     History. Source: L. 2006: Entire section added, p. 2055, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2007: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1688, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2009: (1) amended,(HB 09-1132), ch. 341, p. 1792, § 2, effective July 1.    ANNOTATION   The statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad. The statute does not suppress a large amount of speech subject to constitutional protection. People v. Boles, 280 P.3d 55 (Colo. App. 2011).   The statute is not unconstitutionally vague. A person of common intelligence can determine what is prohibited by the statute. People v. Boles, 280 P.3d 55 (Colo. App. 2011).   The statute does not violate the dormant commerce clause. Since the statute regulates conduct by adults who send sexually explicit messages that endanger the welfare of minors, there is no legitimate commerce that would be limited by the statute. People v. Boles, 280 P.3d 55 (Colo. App. 2011).   The statute as applied to defendant was not unconstitutional. The record contains numerous sexually explicit messages from the defendant that were obscene in nature. People v. Boles, 280 P.3d 55 (Colo. App. 2011).   Convictions for internet luring of a child and internet sexual exploitation of a child under a complicity theory vacated because prosecution failed to prove that defendant committed the crimes or that defendant acted as an accomplice to a principal who committed the crimes. People v. Douglas, 2012 COA 57 , 296 P.3d 234.
CO Code § 18-3-405.4 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 3 - Offenses Against the Person|Part 4 - Unlawful Sexual Behavior|§ 18-3-405.4. Internet Sexual Exploitation of a Child

  An actor commits internet sexual exploitation of a child if the actor knowingly importunes, invites, or entices through communication via a computer network or system, telephone network, or data network or by a text message or instant message, a person whom the actor knows or believes to be under fifteen years of age and at least four years younger than the actor, to:   Expose or touch the person's own or another person's intimate parts while communicating with the actor via a computer network or system, telephone network, or data network or by a text message or instant message; or    Observe the actor's intimate parts via a computer network or system, telephone network, or data network or by a text message or instant message.       (Deleted by amendment, L. 2009, (HB 09-1163), ch. 343, p. 1797, § 1, effective July 1, 2009.)    Internet sexual exploitation of a child is a class 4 felony.     History. Source: L. 2006: Entire section added, p. 2056, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2009: Entire section amended,(HB 09-1163), ch. 343, p. 1797, § 1, effective July 1; (1) amended,(HB 09-1132), ch. 341, p. 1793, § 3, effective July 1.    Editor's note:   Amendments to subsection (1) by House Bill 09-1163 and House Bill 09-1132 were harmonized.   ANNOTATION   Internet child exploitation does not violate the dormant commerce clause. People v. Helms, 2016 COA 90 , 396 P.3d 1133.   Internet child exploitation is not unconstitutionally overbroad. The crime does not punish a substantial amount of protected speech. People v. Helms, 2016 COA 90 , 396 P.3d 1133.   Internet child exploitation is not unconstitutionally vague. The elements are clear and defendant offered no example of how the statute was capable of more than one interpretation. People v. Helms, 2016 COA 90 , 396 P.3d 1133.   “Importuning, inviting, or enticing” requires a defendant to do more than allow a viewer to continue viewing the defendant's intimate parts after the defendant comes to know or believe that the viewer is younger than 15 years old. People v. Heywood, 2014 COA 99 , 357 P.3d 201.   Convictions for internet luring of a child and internet sexual exploitation of a child under a complicity theory vacated because prosecution failed to prove that defendant committed the crimes or that defendant acted as an accomplice to a principal who committed the crimes. People v. Douglas, 2012 COA 57 , 296 P.3d 234.   Defendant's request to send him pictures of a sex act that he thought were taken during a previous communication does not constitute an attempt to persuade a child to engage in a sex act “while communicating” with the defendant. Defendant's conviction cannot be sustained on that evidence. People v. Helms, 2016 COA 90 , 396 P.3d 1133.
CO Code § 18-3-405.6 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 3 - Offenses Against the Person|Part 4 - Unlawful Sexual Behavior|§ 18-3-405.6. Invasion of Privacy for Sexual Gratification

  A person who knowingly observes or takes a photograph of another person's intimate parts without that person's consent, in a situation where the person observed or photographed has a reasonable expectation of privacy, for the purpose of the observer's own sexual gratification, commits unlawful invasion of privacy for sexual gratification.      Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), invasion of privacy for sexual gratification is a class 1 misdemeanor and is an extraordinary risk crime subject to the modified sentencing range specified in section 18-1.3-501 (3).    Invasion of privacy for sexual gratification is a class 6 felony and is an extraordinary risk crime subject to the modified sentencing range specified in section 18-1.3-401 (10) if either of the following circumstances exist:   The offense is committed subsequent to a prior conviction, as defined in section 16-22-102 (3), C.R.S., for unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), C.R.S.; or    The person observes or takes a photograph of the intimate parts of a person under fifteen years of age. This subparagraph (II) shall not apply if the defendant is less than four years older than the person observed or photographed.          For purposes of this section, “photograph” includes a photograph, motion picture, videotape, live feed, print, negative, slide, or other mechanically, electronically, or chemically produced or reproduced visual material.      History. Source: L. 2010: Entire section added, (SB 10-128), ch. 415, p. 2045, § 2, effective July 1, 2012.
CO Code § 18-3-405.7 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 3 - Offenses Against the Person|Part 4 - Unlawful Sexual Behavior|§ 18-3-405.7. Unlawful Sexual Conduct by a Peace Officer - Definition

  A peace officer commits unlawful sexual conduct by a peace officer by knowingly engaging in sexual contact, sexual intrusion, or sexual penetration under any of the following circumstances:   In the same encounter, the peace officer contacts the victim for the purpose of law enforcement or contacts the victim in the exercise of the officer's employment activities or duties;    The peace officer knows that the victim is, or causes the victim to believe that he or she is, the subject of an active investigation, and the peace officer uses that knowledge to further the sexual contact, intrusion, or penetration; or    In furtherance of sexual contact, intrusion, or penetration, the peace officer makes any show of real or apparent authority.         Unlawful sexual conduct by a peace officer under circumstances when the victim is subject to sexual contact is a class 4 felony.    Unlawful sexual conduct by a peace officer under circumstances in which sexual intrusion or penetration is inflicted on the victim is a class 3 felony.       For the purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “peace officer” means any person described in article 2.5 of title 16.    It is not a defense to this section that the victim consented to the sexual contact, intrusion, or penetration.    This section does not apply to sexual contact or intrusion that occurs incident to a lawful search.      History. Source: L. 2019: Entire section added, (HB 19-1250), ch. 287, p. 2662, § 1, effective July 1.
CO Code § 18-3-407.7 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 3 - Offenses Against the Person|Part 4 - Unlawful Sexual Behavior|§ 18-3-407.7. Sexual Assault Victim Emergency Payment Program - Creation - Eligibility

  There is hereby created the sexual assault victim emergency payment program, referred to in this section as the “program”, in the division of criminal justice in the department of public safety. The purpose of the program is to assist medical-reporting victims of sexual assault with medical expenses associated with a sexual assault that are not otherwise covered pursuant to section 18-3-407.5 or any other victim compensation program.      A medical-reporting victim must request and receive a medical forensic examination to be eligible to have medical costs and fees covered through the program. The division of criminal justice shall develop a policy for administering the program. The policy must include a requirement to establish a cap for the amount payable per victim based on actual and reasonable costs and available funds, but the minimum cap must not be less than one thousand dollars. The program must cover medical fees and costs associated with obtaining the medical forensic examination, including but not limited to emergency department fees and costs, laboratory fees, prescription medication, and physician's fees, as long as funds are available. The program may also cover medical fees and costs for injuries directly related to the sexual assault. The program may also pay for any uncovered direct costs of the medical forensic examination for a medical-reporting victim. The total amount paid for all expenses must not exceed the annual cap established by the division of criminal justice.    The program shall be the payer of last resort.    A hospital shall limit the amounts charged for emergency or associated fees and costs eligible for payment pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) to not more than the lowest negotiated rate from a private health plan.       The division of criminal justice may waive any requirement set forth in this section for good cause shown or in the interests of justice, if it is so required.      History. Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (HB 13-1163), ch. 215, p. 895, § 3, effective May 13.