CO Code § 44-3-802 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 44 - Revenue - Regulation of Activities|Article 3 - Alcohol Beverages|Part 8 - Judicial Review and Civil Liability|§ 44-3-802. Judicial Review

 Any person applying to the courts for a review of the state or any local licensing authority's decision shall apply for review within thirty days after the date of decision of refusal by a local licensing authority or, in the case of approval by a local licensing authority, within thirty days after the date of decision by the state licensing authority and shall be required to pay the cost of preparing a transcript of proceedings before the licensing authority when a transcript is demanded by the person taking the appeal or when a transcript is furnished by the licensing authority pursuant to court order.   History. Source: L. 2018: Entire article added with relocations,(HB 18-1025), ch. 152, p. 1049, § 2, effective October 1.    Editor's note:   This section is similar to former § 12-47-802 as it existed prior to 2018.   ANNOTATION   Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.   Cases Decided Under Former § 12-46-118 .   No unbridled authority. Licensing authority's power to act is not a completely unbridled one because their action is subject to judicial review. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Nat'l Tea Co., 149 Colo. 80 , 367 P.2d 909 (1962).   Three principles of review pervade all pertinent decisions of the supreme court: (1) The licensing authorities are vested with a very wide discretion; (2) all reasonable doubts as to the correctness of the board's rulings are to be resolved in favor of the board; (3) the determination of the board will not be disturbed by the courts unless it appears that the board has “abused its discretion”. La Junta Easy Shops, Inc. v. Hendren, 164 Colo. 55 , 432 P.2d 754 (1967); Kerr v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 170 Colo. 227 , 460 P.2d 235 (1969).   A reviewing court is concerned only with the question of whether the decision of the licensing authority was supported by competent evidence, and not whether the trial court or the reviewing court would have arrived at a different conclusion were they the licensing authority. City of Manitou Springs v. Walk, 149 Colo. 43 , 367 P.2d 744 (1961).   Abuse of discretion grounds for disturbing determination. The determination of the board of county commissioners will not be disturbed by the courts unless it appears that the board has abused its discretion. Bailey v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 151 Colo. 115 , 376 P.2d 519 (1962).   Arbitrary and capricious refusal basis for order to issue license. Since the licensing authority's rulings are subject to review by the courts, if its action in refusing to grant a license is found to be arbitrary or capricious, then a court has the authority, and the duty, to order the license to issue. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Salardino, 136 Colo. 421 , 318 P.2d 596 (1957); Adams County Golf, Inc. v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 199 Colo. 423 , 610 P.2d 97 (1980).   Findings of fact sufficient for review. It is not required that the licensing authority make findings of fact equivalent to that of a trial court, but they must be sufficient to furnish a basis for judicial review if the statutory requirements are to be fulfilled. Le Pore v. Larkin, 146 Colo. 311 , 361 P.2d 343 (1961).   Findings of fact should be sufficient in content to apprise the parties and a reviewing court of the factual basis of an action of the administrative agency, so that the parties and the reviewing tribunal may determine whether the decision has support in the evidence and in the law. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Salardino, 136 Colo. 421 , 318 P.2d 596 (1957).   Reversal because of imperfect and contradictory findings. Where the findings and determination of the board are so imperfect and contradictory as to preclude a trial court from basing a considered judgment thereon, the supreme court, being in no better position than a trial judge, has but one course to pursue, reversal. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Salardino, 136 Colo. 421 , 318 P.2d 596 (1957).   Cases Decided Under Former § 12-47-141 .   Special proceedings. The proceedings provided for reviewing the action of the state licensing authority in refusing a license is a special proceeding, and is subject to, and controlled by, the special provisions, if any, contained in this section and article. Saunders v. Norton, 98 Colo. 537 , 58 P.2d 482 (1936).   If the local licensing authority denies the license, appeal therefrom to the district court would lie because the state alone could not authorize the issuance. Kornfeld v. Yost, 37 Colo. App. 483, 551 P.2d 219 (1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Kornfeld v. Perl Mack Liquors, Inc., 193 Colo. 442 , 567 P.2d 383 (1977).   Such review predicated on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Before one protesting issuance of a license may seek review in the district court, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies before the state licensing authority. Kornfeld v. Yost, 37 Colo. App. 483, 551 P.2d 219 (1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Kornfeld v. Perl Mack Liquors, Inc., 193 Colo. 442 , 567 P.2d 383 (1977).   Evidence before authority and arbitrary and capricious nature of action subject to review. The question before the supreme court is not as to whether there was any evidence to support the decision of the trial court, but rather whether there was any evidence to support the decision of the licensing authority, or whether he acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146 , 309 P.2d 606 (1957).   The findings and conclusions of the licensing authority should not be too uncertain for judicial interpretation, and administrative hearings should be decided according to the evidence and the law. Geer v. Presto, 135 Colo. 536 , 313 P.2d 980 (1957).   Even where the final order rests in whole or in part upon judicial notice of facts, specific findings must appear in sufficient detail to enable the court on appeal to determine whether proper limits, in supplementing the testimony by judicial knowledge, have been observed. Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146 , 309 P.2d 606 (1957).   A determination on review cannot be made unless the basis for denial is disclosed, and if the court fails to require disclosure it cannot properly perform its function of review, and thereby the statute is circumvented. Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146 , 309 P.2d 606 (1957).   Basis must appear on record for review. When a court is called upon to review the action of an administrative agency, it should be placed in the same position as such agency, and if the administrative agency has knowledge of some fact and acts upon such knowledge, the agency should see to it that what it knows becomes part of the record in order to permit the reviewing court to evaluate the matter so known, only then can the court be in the same position as the agency in a consideration of the problem successively confronting agency and court. Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146 , 309 P.2d 606 (1957).   In a proceeding to review the granting of a liquor license, the reviewing court is limited to the proceedings before the licensing officer, and it is error to consider matters outside the record and for the trial court to substitute its judgment for that of the licensing officer. Cronin v. Ward, 144 Colo. 192 , 355 P.2d 655 (1960).   The reviewing court is only concerned as to whether or not the decision of the licensing authority was supported by competent evidence. MacArthur v. Presto, 122 Colo. 202 , 221 P.2d 934 (1950); MacArthur v. Sanzalone, 123 Colo. 166 , 225 P.2d 1044 (1950); Kornfeld v. Yost, 37 Colo. App. 483, 551 P.2d 219 (1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Kornfeld v. Perl Mack Liquors, Inc., 193 Colo. 442 , 567 P.2d 383 (1977).   The reviewing court may not substitute its opinion for the determination made by the local licensing authority in granting or denying a license, nor interfere with the exercise of its discretion where its action is based on evidence from which reasonable men might draw different conclusions. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bova, 153 Colo. 230 , 385 P.2d 590 (1963).   Neither the supreme court nor the trial court may substitute its opinion for the determination made by the local licensing authority in granting or denying a license nor interfere with the exercise of its discretion where its action is based on evidence from which reasonable men might honestly draw different conclusions. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bova, 153 Colo. 230 , 385 P.2d 590 (1963).   If there is evidence to support the board's determination, it is the duty of the trial court and it is the duty of the supreme court to affirm the action of the board. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bova, 153 Colo. 230 , 385 P.2d 590 (1963).   If there is evidence to support the determination of the board of county commissioners, it is the duty of the trial court to affirm the action of the board. Jennings v. Hoskinson, 152 Colo. 276 , 382 P.2d 807 (1963).   All reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the findings of the licensing authority and unless it clearly appears that under the whole record an action of that authority is arbitrary and capricious the supreme court may not order a different result. Gem Beverage Co. v. Geer, 138 Colo. 420 , 334 P.2d 744 (1959); Quedens v. J. S. Dillon Co., 146 Colo. 161 , 360 P.2d 984 (1961).   Where the courts review the decisions of a licensing authority regarding the issuance of licenses for the sale of spirituous liquors all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the licensing authority. MacArthur v. Presto, 122 Colo. 202 , 221 P.2d 934 (1950); MacArthur v. Sanzalone, 123 Colo. 166 , 225 P.2d 1044 (1950); Lab Dev. Co. v. Hill, 152 Colo. 338 , 381 P.2d 811 (1963).   Arbitrary and capricious actions subject to change on review. The various licensing authorities have discretionary power in granting or denying licenses and their actions will not be disturbed on review unless arbitrary or capricious. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bonicelli, 151 Colo. 308 , 377 P.2d 124 (1962).   The refusal of a local licensing authority to grant a license may be reviewed by the court, as in the case of a refusal of license by the state licensing authority, by writ of certiorari or otherwise, and if the court having jurisdiction shall determine that such action was capricious or arbitrary it shall order the issuance of the license. MacArthur v. Presto, 122 Colo. 202 , 221 P.2d 934 (1950); MacArthur v. Sanzalone, 123 Colo. 166 , 225 P.2d 1044 (1950).   Capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion by an administrative board can arise in only three ways: (a) By neglecting or refusing to use reasonable diligence and care to procure such evidence as it is by law authorized to consider in exercising the discretion vested in it; (b) by failing to give candid and honest consideration of the evidence before it on which it is authorized to act in exercising its discretion; (c) by exercising its discretion in such manner after a consideration of evidence before it as clearly to indicate that its action is based on conclusions from the evidence such that reasonable men fairly and honestly considering the evidence must reach contrary conclusions. Goehring v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 172 Colo. 1 , 469 P.2d 137 (1970).   Where there is no showing in the record that a city council has abused its discretion or exceeded its authority in a refusal to grant a liquor license, and it seems to have acted in the premises according to law and its own conception of right and duty, a decree of the district court directing the city council forthwith to issue a liquor license to the plaintiff is wrong. Heuston v. Gilman, 98 Colo. 301 , 56 P.2d 40 (1936).   Mandamus. In harmony with the rule that resort may be had to mandamus to compel the exercise of authority or discretion vested in an administrative body or board, courts cannot control or direct how such authority or discretion shall be exercised unless it appears clearly that its action has been capricious or arbitrary. Van DeVegt v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 98 Colo. 161 , 55 P.2d 703 (1936).   Mandamus to compel issuance of license must be brought in county where application was made. See Saunders v. Norton, 98 Colo. 537 , 58 P.2d 482 (1936).   The rule ordinarily applicable to writs of error before the supreme court is that the supreme court must approach the facts of a case by constantly keeping in mind the exclusive vantage point of the trial judge in that he was able in the trial to use his eyes, ears, and intelligence to discern wherein was truth, and wherein credit and weight should be given to the testimony of witnesses. Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146 , 309 P.2d 606 (1957).   Granting of license to other applicant while review proceeding. Where a party applied for a liquor license which was denied, a proceeding to review such denial under this section does not operate to stay the hand of the licensing officer in receiving and acting upon the application of another party for a license to operate at the same location. Cronin v. Ward, 144 Colo. 192 , 355 P.2d 655 (1960).   Order to republish notice and hold hearing proper. In an action to compel a board of county commissioners to issue a liquor license, where it is shown that the board refuses to issue the license but held no hearing and gave no reasons for such refusal, an order requiring the applicant to republish his notice and directing the board to hold a regular hearing thereon with a court reporter present is proper, since a liquor license cannot be secured by default. Sheeley v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 137 Colo. 350 , 325 P.2d 275 (1958).   No court order available to interfere with issuance, etc. Since the statutes give the liquor licensing authority the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of issuing, transferring, or revocation of a liquor license, the superior court does not have by injunctive proceedings or any other court order, jurisdiction to interfere with the functions of the manager of safety in his capacity as the Denver liquor licensing authority. Hilst v. Bennett, 175 Colo. 78 , 485 P.2d 880 (1971).   The actions of the Denver liquor licensing authority are subject to judicial review, but until he has exercised his authority, the courts do not have jurisdiction to interfere with the administrative authority vested in the manager. Hilst v. Bennett, 175 Colo. 78 , 485 P.2d 880 (1971).   Competitor may not appeal issuance of license. An operator of a competing liquor store does not have standing to appeal a decision of a local licensing authority granting issuance of a liquor license, either under this section or as a person “substantially aggrieved” by the disposition of a case in the lower court, pursuant to Rule 106, C.R.C.P., since economic injury from lawful competition does not confer standing to question the legality of a competitor's operations. Norris v. Grimsley, 41 Colo. App. 231, 585 P.2d 925 (1978).