GA Code § 44-14-162.2 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 44 - Property|Chapter 14 - Mortgages, Conveyances to Secure Debt, and Liens|Article 7 - Foreclosure|Part 1 - In General|§ 44-14-162.2. Sales Made on Foreclosure Under Power of Sale - Mailing or Delivery of Notice to Debtor - Procedure

  Notice of the initiation of proceedings to exercise a power of sale in a mortgage, security deed, or other lien contract shall be given to the debtor by the secured creditor no later than 30 days before the date of the proposed foreclosure. Such notice shall be in writing, shall include the name, address, and telephone number of the individual or entity who shall have full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage with the debtor, and shall be sent by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested, to the property address or to such other address as the debtor may designate by written notice to the secured creditor. The notice required by this Code section shall be deemed given on the official postmark day or day on which it is received for delivery by a commercial delivery firm. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require a secured creditor to negotiate, amend, or modify the terms of a mortgage instrument.   The notice required by subsection (a) of this Code section shall be given by mailing or delivering to the debtor a copy of the notice of sale to be submitted to the publisher.    (Ga. L. 1981, p. 834, § 2; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1212, § 6; Ga. L. 2008, p. 624, § 2/SB 531.)    The 2000 amendment,  effective July 1, 2000, substituted "certified mail or statutory overnight delivery" for "certified mail" in the second sentence of subsection (a).    The 2001 amendment,  effective July 1, 2001, added "or day on which it is received for delivery by a commercial delivery firm" at the end of the last sentence in subsection (a) and inserted "or delivering" in subsection (b).    The 2008 amendment,  effective May 13, 2008, in subsection (a), substituted "30 days" for "15 days" in the first sentence, inserted ", shall include the name, address, and telephone number of the individual or entity who shall have full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage with the debtor," near the beginning of the second sentence, and added the last sentence; and, in subsection (b), deleted "the published legal advertisement or a copy of" preceding "the notice" and inserted "to be" near the end.   Editor's notes.   - Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that this Act is applicable with respect to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.   Ga. L. 2001, p. 1212, § 7, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that this Act is applicable with respect to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2001.   Law reviews.   - For article surveying developments in Georgia real property law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 219 (1981). For survey article on real property law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 345 (2008). For annual survey on real property law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 301 (2009). For annual survey of law on real property, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 283 (2010). For annual survey on real property, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 233 (2013).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS    Notice via certified mail to property address is sufficient to comply with O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 despite lender's actual notice of debtor's new address where debtor failed to provide written notice to lender of debtor's new address. Zeller v. Home Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 220 Ga. App. 843, 471 S.E.2d 1 (1996); Wright v. Barnett Mtg. Co., 226 Ga. App. 94, 485 S.E.2d 583 (1997).   Notice sufficient when sent to property address.    - In an action that arose from foreclosure proceedings on two rental properties owned by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's claim for wrongful foreclosure pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 based on improper notice was dismissed because based on the plaintiff's concession that notices were sent to the rental properties it was clear that the notice defendants provided was sufficient; if the plaintiff wished to receive notice at a location other than the rental properties, the plaintiff was required to specify another address in writing, and the defendants' actual knowledge of the plaintiff's California address did not trigger a duty for the defendants to send the notice to that address. Desouza v. Fed. Home Mortg. Corp., F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2012).    Borrower's claim that the lenders' notices of foreclosure were defective because the notices were mailed to the rental properties and not to the borrower's California residential address, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a), was rejected because the borrower never notified the lenders of the borrower's address, although the lenders had actual knowledge of the borrower's address. DeSouza v. Fed. Home Mortg. Corp., 572 Fed. Appx. 719 (11th Cir. 2014)(Unpublished).   Requirements for notice to debtor.    - O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 does not require a secured creditor to be identified in the notice to the debtors as all the statute requires is the name, address, and telephone number of the entity with authority to negotiate, amend, and modify the terms of the mortgage with the debtor. You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 293 Ga. 67, 743 S.E.2d 428 (2013).    Where a homeowner appealed a district court's decision to grant a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion in favor of a bank, the homeowner unsuccessfully contended that the foreclosure notice letter violated O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 because it failed to identify the secured creditor. That statute did not categorically require the foreclosure notice to name either the secured creditor or the note holder. Abdullahi v. Bank of Am., 549 Fed. Appx. 864 (11th Cir. 2013)(Unpublished).    Trial court did not err in finding the lending company failed to comply with the foreclosure notice provisions of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 because the company's attorney failed to offer any reasonable explanation as to why, despite knowing that the debtor was the record owner of the properties, the company only sent the notices to the predecessor in interest, and its agent, and the lending company was not entitled to equitable estoppel despite actual notice to the debtor. DIP Lending I, LLC v. Cleveland Avenue Properties, LLC, 345 Ga. App. 155, 812 S.E.2d 532 (2018).    Claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,  15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., was not sufficiently alleged against a law firm representing the bank because the firm's involvement was limited to two statutorily required foreclosure notifications that the firm sent to homeowners and there was no allegation that the firm had engaged in conduct related to debt collection. Saint Vil v. Perimeter Mortg. Funding Corp., 630 Fed. Appx. 928 (11th Cir. 2015)(Unpublished).   Debtor has no standing to challenge assignment.    - Trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's breach of contract claim for failure to state a claim because the notice of foreclosure that was attached to and incorporated into the complaint clearly showed that it included the required information and was, thus, sufficient as a matter of law under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2. Bankston v. RES-GA Twelve, LLC, 334 Ga. App. 302, 779 S.E.2d 80 (2015).    Lower court correctly determined that the debtors lacked standing to challenge the assignment of the security deed to a bank because the security deed afforded the debtors no right to dispute the assignment as the debtors were not third-party beneficiaries of the assignment as a whole and were not intended to directly benefit from the transfer of the power of sale. Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 298 Ga. 732, 783 S.E.2d 614 (2016).   Notice of foreclosure sale held sufficient.    - Because the debtor failed to send written notice of the correct address of the subject property to the bank or its agents, and could not assert an absent grantee's priority to escape the consequences of his own failure to provide a correct property address to all future holders of the note and deed, the foreclosure sale was not set aside; thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the bank and the assignees of the security interest on the ground that the bank provided sufficient notice of the foreclosure sale. Jackson v. Bank One, 287 Ga. App. 791, 652 S.E.2d 849 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0335, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 169 (Ga. 2008).    Trial court did not err in confirming a nonjudicial sale of certain property because the mortgagee's notice of foreclosure substantially complied with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 and was legally sufficient for purposes of confirming the sale since the notice included the name, address, and telephone number of the mortgagee's attorney; O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 does not require the individual or entity be expressly identified as having full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage. TKW Partners, LLC v. Archer Capital Fund, L.P., 302 Ga. App. 443, 691 S.E.2d 300 (2010).    Creditor's notice of a foreclosure sale that was sent to the debtor's original address listed in the loan documents complied with O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2, although the creditor was aware that the debtor had a new address. The debtor's obligation to provide written notice of the address change was not satisfied by a phone call to the creditor, nor the debtor's return address on the debtor's payment envelopes, nor even the creditor's actual notice of the new address. Colbert v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 302 Ga. App. 687, 691 S.E.2d 598 (2010).    Trial court did not err in granting a bank and a law firm summary judgment in a former husband's action alleging that they wrongfully foreclosed on property that the husband obtained from the former wife via a divorce decree because the bank and law firm provided the wife with notice of the impending foreclosure sale as required under the terms of the security deed and O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2; because the husband did not obtain any legal interest in the property until the quitclaim deed from his wife was filed, the husband was not the owner of the property at the time the bank and law firm were required to provide notice of the foreclosure sale. Farris v. First Fin. Bank, 313 Ga. App. 460, 722 S.E.2d 89 (2011).    Bank gave proper statutory notification of a foreclosure sale to property owners pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162(a) when the bank sent to the property's address and the property owners' primary residence, by certified mail, a written notice of the foreclosure sale that specified the bank as the foreclosing party by name, address, and telephone number pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2. Mortensen v. Bank of Am., N.A., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 2011).    Former spouse did not demonstrate that a bank and law firm failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a) because following the former spouse's alleged acquisition of the property, the former spouse provided no evidence that a written request was made that the bank and law firm send any notices regarding the property to a different address; thus, the bank and law firm complied with the statute by the certified mailing of the foreclosure notice to the property address. Farris v. First Fin. Bank, 313 Ga. App. 460, 722 S.E.2d 89 (2011).   Foreclosure Notice document - whose authenticity had not been challenged by plaintiff - clearly demonstrated that the Notice complied with all statutory requirements where the trustee was the proper secured creditor and was identified, the Notice was sent to the property address, which was authorized under the statute, and plaintiff had not alleged that plaintiff requested the Notice be sent to an alternate address. Bowman v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2013).   District court did not err in dismissing the debtor's wrongful foreclosure claim against the bank and a law firm without leave to amend because the debtor could no longer amend as a matter of course, and amending the complaint would be futile as the debtor alleged no facts suggesting that the bank did not have legal right to foreclose, and the record reflected that the bank, through the law firm, gave adequate notice, so the debtor would not have been able to state a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, wrongful foreclosure claim, or trespass claim as each of those claims would have been predicated on improper foreclosure proceedings. Muhammad v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, F.3d (11th Cir. May 29, 2014)(Unpublished).   Foreclosure notice substantially complied with Georgia's statutory notice requirements, even though the notice incorrectly identified the loan servicer as the entity with full authority to modify the borrowers' loan because the servicer directed the borrowers to Fannie Mae, the entity with full authority to modify their loan. Haynes v. McCalla Raymer LLC, 793 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2015).   In an action by a decedent's estate administrator, seeking to enjoin, inter alia, the non-judicial foreclosure sale of certain real property, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction because a foreclosure law firm had been fraudulently joined due to the lack of a possible claim against it as the notice of sale identified the proper entity with full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage. Shannon v. Albertelli Firm, P.C., F.3d (11th Cir. May 7, 2015)(Unpublished).   In an action by a decedent's estate administrator, seeking to enjoin, inter alia, the non-judicial foreclosure sale of certain real property, notice was appropriate because it identified the entity with full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage, although another entity held the note. Shannon v. Albertelli Firm, P.C., F.3d (11th Cir. May 7, 2015)(Unpublished).   When a homeowner appealed a district court's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of a case arising from an attempted non-judicial foreclosure, the homeowner's claim that the notice of foreclosure was deficient because the notice omitted the words full and all was rejected. Kurtzman v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, F.3d (11th Cir. Oct. 10, 2017)(Unpublished).   Notice of foreclosure proceedings sufficient.    - Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the mortgagee in a wrongful foreclosure action because the mortgagee submitted evidence that the mortgagee's attorney mailed written notice of the initiation of foreclosure proceedings on the mortgagor by certified mail and by regular mail to the property address and to the mortgagor's post office box and, although there is no evidence that the mortgagor received any of the notices, the evidence of the proof of mailing was sufficient. Thompson-El v. Bank of Am., N.A., 327 Ga. App. 309, 759 S.E.2d 49 (2014).    Trial court did not err in finding that the foreclosure notice satisfied the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 because the loan servicing corporation complied with the statute by sending the mortgagor a notice of foreclosure more than 30 days before the non-judicial foreclosure sale and the notice specifically informed the mortgagor that the loan servicing corporation had authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of their note and security deed. Reese v. Provident Funding Assocs., LLP, 327 Ga. App. 266, 758 S.E.2d 329 (2014).   Lender directed the homeowners to Fannie Mae to modify their loan and the notice the homeowners received substantially complied with the statutory notice requirements. Haynes v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, F.3d (11th Cir. July 10, 2015)(Unpublished).   Requirement that a notice of foreclosure must be sent by the secured party means by the foreclosing party, i.e., the name of the party with the authority to negotiate, amend, and modify the terms of the loan, and the required notice need not expressly identify the foreclosing party as a secured creditor. Sheely v. Bank of Am., N.A., 36 F. Supp. 3d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2014).    District court did not err in granting summary judgment to a mortgage company on the pro se plaintiffs' wrongful foreclosure claim as there were no genuine issues of material fact; as a matter of contract, the mortgage company complied with all the terms of the security deed's power of sale provision, and the notice of default also showed that it substantially complied with the statutory requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a). Aning v. Fannie Mae, 633 Fed. Appx. 773 (11th Cir. 2016)(Unpublished).   Material question of fact regarding sufficiency of notice.    - There remained a material question of fact as to plaintiff debtors' claim to set aside a foreclosure sale based on the lack of proper statutory notice because, under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(b), nonjudicial foreclosure procedure required that a "copy" of the notice submitted to the publisher be sent to the debtor. The notice sent to the debtors differed from the one published. Rainey v. FMF Capital, LLC, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2012).    Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a loan servicer on a borrower's claim for wrongful foreclosure because there was evidence that the servicer failed to provide notice of the foreclosure to the borrower's attorney as the borrower had requested in compliance with O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2. Zhong v. PNC Bank, N.A., 345 Ga. App. 135, 812 S.E.2d 514 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1034, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 696 (Ga. 2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1032, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 700 (Ga. 2018).   Notice held insufficient.    - Trial court's grant of summary judgment to a mortgagee was error in property owners' wrongful foreclosure action, as the foreclosure was invalid under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162(a) since the notice did not comply with O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a); the notice not only did not properly identify the secured creditor, but rather, the notice misidentified the creditor. Reese v. Provident Funding Assocs., LLP, 317 Ga. App. 353, 730 S.E.2d 551 (2012).    While the bank's first letter was sent by certified mail, it was not a notice of the initiation of proceedings to exercise a power of sale, but was an initial correspondence letter and the bank's second letter to the debtors was a notice of foreclosure sale for the property, but was only sent by first class mail, which did not satisfy the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a). Peters v. CertusBank Nat'l Ass'n, 329 Ga. App. 29, 763 S.E.2d 498 (2014).   Right to notice other than by advertisement.    - Only the property owner was entitled to receive any notice of the initiation of foreclosure proceedings other than by advertisement. Breitzman v. Heritage Bank, 180 Ga. App. 171, 348 S.E.2d 713 (1986).    Deed of sale need not be set aside where only 14 days' notice was received by property owner who had defaulted on installment payments, even though O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.4 requires that a deed under power contain a recital setting forth the giving of 15-day notice. Abdalla v. Reagin Enters., Inc., 256 Ga. 279, 347 S.E.2d 585 (1986).   Actual receipt of properly mailed notice immaterial.    - Where it was undisputed that the grantee mailed a notification of the sale under power correctly addressed to the grantor in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2, the actual receipt (or want of receipt) by the grantor of the notice of sale under power was immaterial to the right of the grantee to sale under power. McCollum v. Pope, 261 Ga. 835, 411 S.E.2d 874 (1992).   The notice is complete upon mailing to the address of record with the creditor and the debtor's actual receipt of the notice is immaterial. Davis v. Victor Warren Properties, Inc., 216 Bankr. 898 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997).    Trial court properly refused to set aside a foreclosure sale and a deed under a power of sale, as plaintiffs, first and second mortgagors, received the 15-day notice of the sale that was required by O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2; plaintiffs' failure to accept the certified letter containing the notice constituted receipt, as the letter was properly addressed and mailed to their post office box. Arrington v. Reynolds, 255 Ga. App. 291, 564 S.E.2d 870 (2002).   Although the debtors did not receive the Notice of Acceleration and Foreclosure because it was delivered to and signed for by their granddaughter who lives next door, it was undisputed that the Notice was correctly addressed. Accordingly, the lack of receipt was immaterial under Georgia law. 21st Mortg. Corp. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Feb. 18, 2015).   Chapter 13 debtor's wrongful foreclosure claim failed because the bank mailed notice of the sale under power to the debtor in accordance with the requirements of Georgia law, and actual receipt was immaterial to the right of the bank. Because there was no state action involved, constitutional due process was not implicated. McCallum v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re McCallum), Bankr. (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2018).   Foreclosure of unimproved lots.    - The notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 were not applicable to the foreclosure of unimproved lots. Stepp v. Farm & Home Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. App. 257, 474 S.E.2d 108 (1996).   Complaint was not sufficient to state a claim.    - Borrower was not allowed to add a claim under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 against the assignee lender since the claims were based on the assertion that the assignee did not have full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify the terms of the loan because it was merely a servicing agent, the Georgia Supreme Court had indicated that a servicing agent could have full authority within the meaning of § 44-14-162.2, and the assignee was specifically assigned both the security deed and the promissory note as well as all powers, options, privileges, and immunities arising under those instruments. Hall v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., F.3d (11th Cir. Sept. 19, 2014)(Unpublished).   Claim for wrongful foreclosure was insufficient to state a claim because the foreclosing bank, as the assignee of a deed of trust, had authority to conduct the non-judicial foreclosure despite the fact the bank did not hold the note. Muhammad v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. June 19, 2013).   Complaint stated claim for wrongful foreclosure.    - Trial court erred in dismissing a pro se borrower's complaint for wrongful foreclosure and breach of contract against his lender's alleged assignee; the trial court could not consider documents attached to the motion to dismiss, and the complaint adequately alleged failure to give the borrower notice and improper advertising, contrary to O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-162.2 and44-14-162(a). Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A., 324 Ga. App. 750, 751 S.E.2d 545 (2013).   Damages for wrongful foreclosure without notice.    - In a suit brought by a purchaser seeking damages for wrongful foreclosure of certain real property after two foreclosure sales, the trial court erred in granting the second foreclosing bank attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, based on frivolous litigation, as that second bank had knowledge of the purchaser's acquisition of the property via the first foreclosure, therefore, the purchaser's suit did not lack substantial justification as to the second bank and the second's bank failure to provide proper notice of the sale to the purchaser. Roylston v. Bank of Am., N.A., 290 Ga. App. 556, 660 S.E.2d 412 (2008).   Allegation of failure to provide notice supports wrongful foreclosure claim.    - Trial court erred in finding that a mortgagor's claim that the mortgagee breached the mortgagee's duty in failing to provide proper notice of the foreclosure sale showed no basis for a wrongful foreclosure claim because an allegation that the lender failed to provide notice of foreclosure as required by O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 supported a wrongful foreclosure claim under Georgia law and the trial court erroneously considered the mortgagee's evidence outside of the pleadings. Mbigi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 336 Ga. App. 316, 785 S.E.2d 8 (2016).   Application to foreclosure sales.    - Trial court properly granted summary judgment to two banks in a purchaser's suit seeking the excess proceeds from two foreclosure sales and damages based upon claims that the banks failing to provide proper notice of the foreclosure sales as required by the Georgia Residential Mortgage Act, O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2, did not apply to the foreclosure sales at issue, rather, the statute only applies to the sale of a mortgage loan. Roylston v. Bank of Am., N.A., 290 Ga. App. 556, 660 S.E.2d 412 (2008).   Rescission of foreclosure sale.    - Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a bank in a suit alleging wrongful rescission by a purchaser after the bank rescinded a foreclosure sale because the case law holding that substantial compliance with O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 is sufficient in the notice to the debtor did not apply retroactively to avoid the bank's avail of the safe harbor provision of O.C.G.A. § 9-13-172.1(d)(1). Stowers v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 317 Ga. App. 893, 731 S.E.2d 367 (2012).   Res judicata barred subsequent suit against bank following foreclosure.    - Trial court properly granted the bank's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure claims under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs' previous litigation against the bank could have included the plaintiffs' new claims and, thus, were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Harris v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 338 Ga. App. 838, 792 S.E.2d 111 (2016).   Proof of notice was insufficient to support motion to dismiss.    - Court found that the notice of foreclosure letter did not meet all of the statutory requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2. The notice failed to indicate whether it was sent by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, and thus the court could not dismiss the borrower's wrongful foreclosure claim on this basis. Rule v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. May 18, 2012).   Wrongful foreclosure claim was unavailing.    - In a wrongful foreclosure action, the property owner did not show that a bank breached a legal duty owed to the owner with respect to providing notice under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 because the owner did not show that the bank breached a legal duty owed to the owner, the owner's wrongful foreclosure claim was unavailing. Carr v. U.S. Bank, N.A., F.3d (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2013)(Unpublished).   Trial court erred by failing to confirm sale.    - Trial court erred by denying a creditor's petition to confirm the foreclosure sale of six townhouses because the sale satisfied applicable notice and advertisement requirements and the uncontradicted evidence showed that the townhouses did sell for at least fair market value. RBC Real Estate Fin., Inc. v. Winmark Homes, Inc., 318 Ga. App. 507, 736 S.E.2d 117 (2012).    Cited in Funderburke v. Kellet, 257 Ga. 822, 364 S.E.2d 845 (1988); Dickens v. Calhoun First Nat'l Bank, 197 Ga. App. 517, 398 S.E.2d 814 (1990).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   ALR.   - Recognition of action for damages for wrongful foreclosure - types of actions, 82 A.L.R.6th 43.