reglab/housing_qa huggingface dataset:
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:1-9 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:1-9 - When prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense

2C:1-9. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense  A prosecution of a defendant for a violation of the same provision of the statutes based upon the same facts as a former prosecution is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances: a. The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal by a finding of not guilty by the trier of fact or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater inclusive offense, although the conviction is subsequently set aside. b. The former prosecution was terminated, after the complaint had been filed or the indictment found, by a final order or judgment for the defendant, which has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated and which necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition that must be established for conviction of the offense. This subsection shall not apply to an order or judgment quashing an indictment prior to trial. c. The former prosecution resulted in a conviction. There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which has not been reversed or vacated, a verdict of guilty which has not been set aside and which is capable of supporting a judgment, or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. In the latter two cases failure to enter judgment must be for a reason other than a motion of the defendant. d. The former prosecution was improperly terminated. Except as provided in this subsection, there is an improper termination of a prosecution if the termination is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and it takes place after the jury was impaneled and sworn or, in a trial before a court without a jury, after the first witness was sworn but before findings were rendered by the trier of facts. Termination under any of the following circumstances is not improper: (1) The defendant consents to the termination or waives, by motion to dismiss or otherwise, his right to object to the termination. (2) The trial court finds that the termination is necessary because of the failure of the jury to agree upon a verdict after a reasonable time for deliberation has been allowed. (3) The trial court finds that the termination is required by a sufficient legal reason and a manifest or absolute or overriding necessity. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:1-10 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:1-10 - When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense

2C:1-10. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense  A prosecution of a defendant for a violation of a different provision of the statutes or based on different facts than a former prosecution is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances: a. The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section 2C:1-9 and the subsequent prosecution is for: (1) Any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution; or (2) Any offense for which the defendant should have been tried on the first prosecution under section 2C:1-8 unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense; or (3) The same conduct, unless (a) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil, or (b) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began. b. The former prosecution was terminated, after the complaint was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense. c. The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as improper termination is defined in section 2C:1-9, and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been improperly terminated. d. Nothing in this section shall bar the disposition of a nonindictable complaint after disposition of an indictable offense except as required by the Federal and State constitutions. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1981, c. 290, s. 3, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:1-11 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:1-11 - Former prosecution in another jurisdiction: when a bar

2C:1-11. Former prosecution in another jurisdiction: when a bar  When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this State and of the United States, a prosecution in the District Court of the United States is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this State under the following circumstances: a. The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction, or in an improper termination as defined in section 2C:1-9 and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless (1) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil or (2) the offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted is intended to prevent a substantially more serious harm or evil than the offense of which he was formerly convicted or acquitted or (3) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or b. The former prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the offense of which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-11, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:1-12 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:1-12 - Former prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or when fraudulently procured by the defendant

2C:1-12. Former prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or when fraudulently procured by the defendant  A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of sections 2C:1-9, 10 and 11 under any of the following circumstances: a. The former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense tried in that court; or b. The former prosecution was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting officer; or c. The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which was held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on a petition for post-conviction relief or similar process, except that any bar as to reprosecution for a greater inclusive offense created by section 2C:1-9a. shall apply. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-12, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:1-13 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:1-13 - Proof beyond a reasonable doubt; affirmative defenses; burden of proving fact when not an element of an offense

2C:1-13. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt; affirmative defenses; burden of proving fact when not an element of an offense  a. No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed. b. Subsection a. of this section does not: (1) Require the disproof of an affirmative defense unless and until there is evidence supporting such defense; or (2) Apply to any defense which the code or another statute requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence or such other standard as specified in this code. c. A defense is affirmative, within the meaning of subsection b.(1) of this section, when: (1) It arises under a section of the code which so provides; or (2) It relates to an offense defined by a statute other than the code and such statute so provides; or d. When the application of the code depends upon the finding of a fact which is not an element of an offense, unless the code otherwise provides: (1) The burden of proving the fact is on the prosecution or defendant, depending on whose interest or contention will be furthered if the finding should be made; and (2) The fact must be proved to the satisfaction of the court or jury, as the case may be. e. When the code or other statute defining an offense establishes a presumption with respect to any fact which is an element of an offense, it has the meaning accorded it by the law of evidence. f. In any civil action commenced pursuant to any provision of this code the burden of proof shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-13, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:2-1 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:2-1 - Requirement of voluntary act; omission as basis of liability; possession as an act

2C:2-1 Requirement of voluntary act; omission as basis of liability; possession as an act  2C:2-1. Requirement of Voluntary Act; Omission as Basis of Liability; Possession as an act. a. A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable. A bodily movement that is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual, is not a voluntary act within the meaning of this section. b. Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless: (1) The omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or (2) A duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law, including but not limited to, laws such as the "Uniform Fire Safety Act," P.L.1983, c.383 (C.52:27D-192 et seq.), the "State Uniform Construction Code Act," P.L.1975, c.217 (C.52:27D-119 et seq.), or any other law intended to protect the public safety or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder. c. Possession is an act, within the meaning of this section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession. L.1978, c.95; amended 1997,c.180,s.1.
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:2-3 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:2-3 - Causal relationship between conduct and result; divergence between result designed, contemplated or risked and actual result

2C:2-3. Causal relationship between conduct and result; divergence between result designed, contemplated or risked and actual result  a. Conduct is the cause of a result when: (1) It is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred; and (2) The relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by the code or by the law defining the offense. b. When the offense requires that the defendant purposely or knowingly cause a particular result, the actual result must be within the design or contemplation, as the case may be, of the actor, or, if not, the actual result must involve the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and not be too remote, accidental in its occurrence, or dependent on another's volitional act to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense. c. When the offense requires that the defendant recklessly or criminally negligently cause a particular result, the actual result must be within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of criminal negligence, of which he should be aware, or, if not, the actual result must involve the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and must not be too remote, accidental in its occurrence, or dependent on another's volitional act to have a just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense. d. A defendant shall not be relieved of responsibility for causing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what was designed, contemplated or risked is that a different person or property was injured or affected or that a less serious or less extensive injury or harm occurred. e. When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:2-4 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:2-4 - Ignorance or mistake

2C:2-4. Ignorance or mistake  a. Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if the defendant reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the mistake and: (1) It negatives the culpable mental state required to establish the offense; or (2) The law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense. b. Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed. In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed. c. A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when: (1) The statute defining the offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged; or (2) The actor acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (a) a statute, (b) judicial decision, opinion, judgment, or rule, (c) an administrative order or grant of permission, or (d) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense; or (3) The actor otherwise diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the meaning and application of the offense to his conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his conduct is not an offense in circumstances in which a law-abiding and prudent person would also so conclude. The defendant must prove a defense arising under subsection c. of this section by clear and convincing evidence. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:2-5 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:2-5 - Defenses generally

2C:2-5. Defenses generally  Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is excused or alleviated by reason of any defense now provided by law for which neither the code nor other statutory law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved and a legislative purpose to exclude the defense claimed does not otherwise plainly appear. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:2-6 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:2-6 - Liability for conduct of another; complicity

2C:2-6. Liability for conduct of another; complicity  a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; (2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense; (3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or (4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person. c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he (a) Solicits such other person to commit it; (b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. d. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity. e. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (1) He is a victim of that offense; (2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (3) He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C:5-1 d. prior to the commission of the offense. Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence. f. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-6, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:2-7 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:2-7 - Liability of corporations and persons acting, or under a duty to act, in their behalf

2C:2-7. Liability of corporations and persons acting, or under a duty to act, in their behalf  a. A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if: (1) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation unless the offense is one defined by a statute which indicates a legislative purpose not to impose criminal liability on corporations. If the law governing the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply; (2) The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or (3) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation. b. As used in this section: (1) "Corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program; (2) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation; (3) "High managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or any other agent of a corporation having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation. c. In any prosecution of a corporation for the commission of an offense included within the terms of subsection a. (1) of this section, other than an offense for which absolute liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission. This paragraph shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense. d. Nothing in this section imposing liability upon a corporation shall be construed as limiting the liability for an offense of an individual by reason of his being an agent of the corporation. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:2-8 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:2-8 - Intoxication

2C:2-8. Intoxication  a. Except as provided in subsection d. of this section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense. b. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial. c. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of chapter 4. d. Intoxication which (1) is not self-induced or (2) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Intoxication under this subsection must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. e. Definitions. In this section unless a different meaning plainly is required: (1) "Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body; (2) "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime; (3) "Pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-8, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1983, c. 306, s. 1, eff. Aug. 26, 1983.
NJ Rev Stat § 2C:2-9 (2021)
2021 New Jersey Revised Statutes|Title 2C - The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice|Section 2C:2-9 - Duress

2C:2-9. Duress  a. Subject to subsection b. of this section, it is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. b. The defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was criminally negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever criminal negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged. In a prosecution for murder, the defense is only available to reduce the degree of the crime to manslaughter. c. It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense under this section. The presumption that a woman, acting in the presence of her husband, is coerced is abolished. L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.