GA Code § 23-4-31 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 23 - Equity|Chapter 4 - Equity Procedure|Article 3 - Decrees|§ 23-4-31. Power of Court to Mold and Enforce Decrees

 A superior court shall have full power to mold its decrees so as to meet the exigencies of each case and shall have full power to enforce its decrees when rendered.   (Orig. Code 1863, § 4123; Code 1868, § 4154; Code 1873, § 4213; Code 1882, § 4213; Civil Code 1895, § 4853; Civil Code 1910, § 5426; Code 1933, § 37-1203.)   Law reviews.   - For article comparing sections of the Georgia Civil Practice Act with preexisting provisions of the Georgia Code, see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 295 (1967).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS    Decree may be partly final and partly interlocutory; final as to its determination of all issues of law and fact, and interlocutory as to its mode of execution. Johnson v. James, 246 Ga. 680, 272 S.E.2d 692 (1980).    A final decree disposing of all the substantial equities of the case is not made interlocutory by the mere reservation of the right to direct the mode of its execution. Johnson v. James, 246 Ga. 680, 272 S.E.2d 692 (1980).    Judgment of the court should conform to the reasonable intendment of the verdict upon which it is based. McGill v. McGill, 247 Ga. 428, 276 S.E.2d 587 (1981).    Decree of a court of equity must in every case follow the verdict, and may not embrace questions which the verdict does not cover. Burke v. Wilkins, 49 Ga. 257 (1873); Hall v. Huff, 80 Ga. 31, 5 S.E. 49 (1887); Gray v. Junction City Mfg. Co., 195 Ga. 33, 22 S.E.2d 847 (1942).   Decree may be molded to meet exigencies of the case.    - After a jury returns a general verdict finding a nuisance exists, the trial court is authorized to mold its decree so as to meet the exigencies of the case and the prayers of the plaintiffs. Tufts v. DuBignon, 61 Ga. 322 (1878); Parnell v. Wooten, 202 Ga. 443, 43 S.E.2d 673 (1947); City of Cordele v. Hobby, 240 Ga. 207, 240 S.E.2d 16 (1977); Cotts v. Cotts, 245 Ga. 138, 263 S.E.2d 163 (1980).    Trial court was entitled to enter an order molding the verdict in continuing a nuisance case pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-4-31, as doing so was necessary to meet the exigencies of the case and the prayers of the landowners, and the order entered three months after judgment did not modify the judgment in any matter of substance not contemplated by the parties at the time the judgment was entered. City of Columbus v. Barngrover, 250 Ga. App. 589, 552 S.E.2d 536 (2001).   Enforcement order proper.    - Trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in balancing the equities and entering a second order requiring conveyance of property in exchange for payment of the sum determined in its original order, plus interest, and refusing to order either party to reimburse the other for taxes, maintenance, or rental value related to the property. Nowlin v. Davis, 278 Ga. 240, 599 S.E.2d 128 (2004).   Enforcement of divorce decree not an impermissible modification.    - Trial court's order requiring a husband to return to the wife items of jewelry which were not mentioned in the original decree was not an impermissible modification of the decree but an enforcement of a settlement agreement reached between the parties themselves, as permitted by the decree, which the court could enforce under O.C.G.A. § 23-4-31. Doritis v. Doritis, 294 Ga. 421, 754 S.E.2d 53 (2014).   Manner of enforcement of decree is within discretion of judge.    - In molding a decree upon the jury's verdict upon the facts, the chancellor (now judge) has a very broad discretion in determining what steps shall be taken to secure the enforcement of the rights awarded by the verdict, to the end that equity may afford adequate and complete relief, and this discretion will not in any case be controlled unless it is manifest there has been an abuse of discretion in a material matter. Bank of Tupelo v. Collier, 191 Ga. 852, 14 S.E.2d 59 (1941); Bregman v. Rosenthal, 212 Ga. 95, 90 S.E.2d 561 (1955).    An order entered by the trial court after appeal was not an impermissible modification of a final judgment, where the second decree became necessary only because the owner refused to obey the first decree. Gallogly v. Bradco, Inc., 260 Ga. 311, 392 S.E.2d 529 (1990).   Out-of-term modification of order not permitted.    - Where the trial court's order is final in that the case is no longer pending in the trial court, the trial court lacks authority, in a succeeding term, to modify that order so as to relieve parties from their duty of compliance. Cobb County v. Buchanan, 261 Ga. 854, 413 S.E.2d 198 (1992).   Creation of trust for child support effectuated jury's intent.    - Where, in a divorce case, the jury clearly intended to create a trust for the purpose of providing support for the minor child during his minority and they also intended that there be monthly payments from the trust for the use of the child, but the husband failed to take any substantive steps to set up the trust, there was no error in the trial court naming a trustee and providing the necessary provisions to effectuate the trust for the purpose of providing monthly child support, such as requiring the husband to make the payments necessary to keep current on his obligations for his share of the debts, encumbrances and maintenance of the trust property. Aycock v. Aycock, 251 Ga. 104, 303 S.E.2d 456 (1983).    Cited in Wade v. Peacock, 121 Ga. 816, 49 S.E. 826 (1905); Swift & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 161 Ga. 543, 132 S.E. 99 (1926); Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 135 S.E. 481 (1926); Watters v. Southern Brighton Mills, 168 Ga. 15, 147 S.E. 87 (1929); Holst v. City of La Grange, 175 Ga. 402, 165 S.E. 217 (1932); Westberry v. Reddish, 178 Ga. 116, 172 S.E. 10 (1933); Jarecky v. Arnold, 51 Ga. App. 954, 182 S.E. 66 (1935); Kirk v. Bray, 181 Ga. 814, 184 S.E. 733 (1935); Snyder v. Elkan, 187 Ga. 164, 199 S.E. 891 (1938); Payne v. Home Sav. Bank, 193 Ga. 406, 18 S.E.2d 770 (1942); Hughes v. Cobb, 195 Ga. 213, 23 S.E.2d 701 (1942); Johnson v. Wilson, 212 Ga. 264, 91 S.E.2d 758 (1956); G.S. & M. Co. v. Dixon, 220 Ga. 329, 138 S.E.2d 662 (1964); Moon v. Moon, 222 Ga. 650, 151 S.E.2d 714 (1966); Bradley v. Bradley, 233 Ga. 83, 210 S.E.2d 1 (1974); Brown v. Techdata Corp., 238 Ga. 622, 234 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Gorman v. Gorman, 239 Ga. 312, 236 S.E.2d 652 (1977); Golden v. Frazier, 244 Ga. 685, 261 S.E.2d 703 (1979); Holman v. Ruesken, 246 Ga. 557, 272 S.E.2d 292 (1980); Hudson v. Hudson, 258 Ga. 692, 373 S.E.2d 372 (1988); Getman v. Ackerly, 259 Ga. 534, 384 S.E.2d 651 (1989); Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 261 Ga. 22, 401 S.E.2d 530 (1991).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, § 251.   C.J.S.   - 30 C.J.S., Equity, § 12. 31 C.J.S., Equity, § 612 et seq.   ALR.    - Constitutionality of statute conferring on chancery courts power to abate public nuisance, 22 A.L.R. 542; 75 A.L.R. 1298.    Power of equity to require acceptance of damages in lieu of injunctive relief asked, 105 A.L.R. 1381.