GA Code § 15-11-582 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 15 - Courts|Chapter 11 - Juvenile Code|Article 6 - Delinquency|Part 10 - Adjudication|§ 15-11-582. Adjudication Hearing; Time Limitations; Findings

  The court shall fix a time for the adjudication hearing. If an alleged delinquent child is in detention, the hearing shall be held no later than ten days after the filing of the delinquency petition. If a child is not in detention, the hearing shall be held no later than 60 days after the filing of such petition.   Adjudication hearings shall be conducted:   By the court without a jury;   In accordance with Article 5 and Part 1 of Article 6 of Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 of Title 17, unless otherwise provided in this article;   In accordance with the rules of evidence set forth in Title 24; and   In language understandable to the child subject to the delinquency petition and participants, to the fullest extent practicable.     The court shall determine if the allegations of the petition alleging delinquency are admitted or denied in accordance with the provisions of Code Section 15-11-580.   After hearing all of the evidence, the court shall make and record its findings on whether the delinquent acts ascribed to a child were committed by such child. If the court finds that the allegations of delinquency have not been established, it shall dismiss the delinquency petition and order such child be released from any detention or legal custody imposed in connection with the proceedings.   The court shall make a finding that a child has committed a delinquent act based on a valid admission made in open court of the allegations of the delinquency petition or on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If the court finds that a child has committed a delinquent act, the court may proceed immediately or at a postponed hearing to make disposition of the case.     (Code 1981, §15-11-582, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-43/SB 364.)   Cross references.   - Amendment to Juvenile Court petition, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 6.6.   Continuance of adjudicatory hearing in Juvenile Court, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 11.3.   Law reviews.   - For article discussing due process in juvenile court procedures in California and Georgia, in light of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 9 (1971). For article, "The Child as a Party in Interest in Custody Proceedings," see 10 Ga. St. B. J. 577 (1974). For article, "Termination of Parental Rights: Recent Judicial and Legislative Trends," see 30 Emory L. J. 1065 (1981). For note criticizing jurisdiction of juvenile justice system over runaways and advocating alternative legal approaches, see 24 Emory L. J. 1075 (1975).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   ANALYSIS    General Consideration   Dispositional Hearings   Evidentiary Issues    Editor's notes.   - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 24A-1701 and 24A-2201, pre-2000 Code Sections 15-11-26 and 15-11-33, and pre-2014 Code Sections 15-11-39 and 15-11-65, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.    Time limits set forth in the former statute were jurisdictional and the adjudicatory hearing must be set for a time not later than that prescribed by statute. J.T.G. v. State, 141 Ga. App. 184, 233 S.E.2d 40 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).    Time limits established by the General Assembly in the Juvenile Code are jurisdictional and must be strictly adhered to. Crews v. Brantley County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 146 Ga. App. 408, 246 S.E.2d 426 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).    Language of former statute was mandatory and the time for the hearing must be set for a time not later than ten days after the petition was filed. J.B.H. v. State, 139 Ga. App. 199, 228 S.E.2d 189 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701); Crews v. Brantley County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 146 Ga. App. 408, 246 S.E.2d 426 (1978); Irvin v. Department of Human Resources, 159 Ga. App. 101, 282 S.E.2d 664 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701);(decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).    Language of former subsection (a) of this section was mandatory and the adjudicatory hearing must be set for a time not later than that prescribed. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).    Goal sought to be accomplished by the ten-day hearing requirement for detained children was the same goal for the 60-day hearing requirement for non-detained children and, thus, the latter requirement was mandatory, rather than directory. In re R.D.F., 266 Ga. 294, 466 S.E.2d 572 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).   Time limits for speedy trial must be strictly adhered to.    - If a legislative body has defined the right to speedy trial in terms of days, then the time limits must be strictly complied with. J.B.H. v. State, 139 Ga. App. 199, 228 S.E.2d 189 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).    Trial court erred in setting the date for a hearing twelve days, rather than ten days, from the date of the filing of a petition charging a juvenile with the commission of the delinquent act of burglary. In re M.D.C., 214 Ga. App. 59, 447 S.E.2d 143 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).    Provision of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-582) that the time for a hearing shall not be later than ten days after filing of the petition if the child was in custody was the equivalent of a speedy trial demand which did not require a specific demand by the child. However, the statute's protection could be waived if not properly raised and, furthermore, the trial court had discretion to grant a continuance of a hearing properly set for a date within ten days from the filing of the petition. In re M.D.C., 214 Ga. App. 59, 447 S.E.2d 143 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).    Former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-582) did not constitute a speedy trial demand and, therefore, the failure to comply with the former statute's provisions resulted in dismissal of the petition without prejudice. In re R.D.F., 266 Ga. 294, 466 S.E.2d 572 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).   Time limits satisfied by hearing adjudicatory in nature.    - When a juvenile and the juvenile's parents were summoned to appear at a hearing to defend against charges and to show cause why the juvenile should not be dealt with according to law, were instructed to remain in attendance at the hearing until final adjudication of the petition, were informed of the possibility of a continuance, and were told that the state would seek transfer to the superior court, the hearing was adjudicatory in nature and satisfied the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26. In re L.A.E., 265 Ga. 698, 462 S.E.2d 148 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).   Construction with other law.    - Because a juvenile's allegations that the state failed to comply with the procedural requirements under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-49(c)(1) and (e) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-102,15-11-145,15-11-151,15-11-472, and15-11-521) should have been raised in the superior court, and had no bearing on the validity of the delinquency petitions or the substantive charges against the juvenile in juvenile court, the court properly denied the presentation of evidence regarding the delinquency and substantive issues. In the Interest of K.C., 290 Ga. App. 416, 659 S.E.2d 821 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).   Arraignment during adjudicatory hearing.    - In the absence of a transcript, a juvenile failed to establish that former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-582) was violated since a hearing was timely scheduled and held, an arraignment was conducted at the beginning, the juvenile requested legal counsel and was found eligible to receive counsel, and a continuance was granted so counsel could be secured; conducting an arraignment was not inconsistent with an adjudicatory hearing. In re R.D.F., 266 Ga. 294, 466 S.E.2d 572 (1996), reversing In re R.D.F., 216 Ga. App. 563, 455 S.E.2d 77 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).    Arraignment hearing scheduled within the 60-day time period is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement that an adjudicatory hearing must be set within that period. In re R.O.B., 216 Ga. App. 181, 453 S.E.2d 776 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).   Hearing requirement applicable when child in detention when petition filed.    - Ten-day hearing requirement was applicable when a child was "in detention" on the date the petition was filed in court. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).   Time for adjudicatory hearing is not mandatory.    - Former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441 and15-11-582) required that an adjudicatory hearing date be set within ten days after a filing of a petition charging a minor with commission of delinquent acts, but does not require that a hearing be actually held within ten days after the filing of the petition. P.L.A. v. State, 172 Ga. App. 820, 324 S.E.2d 781 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26); Johnson v. State, 183 Ga. App. 168, 358 S.E.2d 313 (1987); In re L.T.W., 211 Ga. App. 441, 439 S.E.2d 716 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26); In re B.W.S., 265 Ga. 567, 458 S.E.2d 847 (1995);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).    Ten-day hearing rule was not absolute, and a continuance could be granted in the sound discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. State, 183 Ga. App. 168, 358 S.E.2d 313 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).   Adjudicatory hearing timely.    - Juvenile court did not err in denying the defendant juvenile's motion to dismiss a petition because the adjudicatory hearing was set and held within ten days of the filing of the petition pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-582), although the hearing was then continued, which was an action that was within the juvenile court's discretion. In the Interest of C.H., 306 Ga. App. 834, 703 S.E.2d 407 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).   Waiver of procedural requirements.    - Time limits on setting juvenile hearings are mandatory, but procedural requirements can be waived. J.T.G. v. State, 141 Ga. App. 184, 233 S.E.2d 40 (1977) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26) Cox v. Department of Human Resources, 148 Ga. App. 338, 250 S.E.2d 728 (1978); 156 Ga. App. 338, 274 S.E.2d 728 (1980), overruled on other grounds,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).    With regard to a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency for acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the offense of child molestation, the juvenile court did not err by denying the juvenile's motion to dismiss, which was based on an extended pre-trial detention as the juvenile and defense counsel agreed to a continuance and acquiesced in a hearing date delaying the adjudication for at least 48 days following the filing of the delinquency petition, which caused the juvenile to waive the right to complain that the adjudication hearing date was not set to occur in compliance with former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-582). However, the adjudication was reversed and the case was remanded to the juvenile court since the juvenile court erroneously applied a clear and convincing standard of proof and the standard of proof on charges of a criminal nature was the same as that used in criminal proceedings against adults, namely proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the Interest of A.S., 293 Ga. App. 710, 667 S.E.2d 701 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).    Juvenile waived the right under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-582) to have an adjudicatory hearing within 10 days of the delinquency petition being filed by failing to object to the date proposed for the adjudicatory hearing, which was one month after the filing of the petition. In re A. T., 302 Ga. App. 713, 691 S.E.2d 642 (2010), overruled in part by Worthen v. State, 304 Ga. 862, 823 S.E.2d 291 (2019) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).    Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to comply with former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-582) because the defendant's parent, the defendant's representative, and an attorney acknowledged that the parent did not object when, at the arraignment hearing, it was announced that the adjudicatory hearing would be set outside of the 60-day window; the parent also did not object within the statutorily prescribed 60-day-time period, and the motion to dismiss was filed outside of the 60-day requirement. In the Interest of I.M.W., 313 Ga. App. 624, 722 S.E.2d 586 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).   Hearing time limit can be waived.    - If the party does not enter an objection during the course of the trial the party will not be heard to complain on appeal and if a hearing is set within the statutory time limit, the court may in the court's discretion grant a continuance. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code § 24A-1701); In re J.B., 183 Ga. App. 229, 358 S.E.2d 620; 183 Ga. App. 906, 358 S.E.2d 620 (1987), cert. denied,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).    Juvenile was entitled to a copy of the delinquency petition filed against the juvenile, and pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39.1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-161,15-11-282,15-11-400,15-11-424, and15-11-531), the juvenile had a right to receive the petition at least 24 hours prior to the adjudicatory hearing; however, the juvenile waived any objection based on the grounds of improper service since the juvenile received notice right before the hearing as the juvenile did not make an objection or request a continuance on the basis that the juvenile was unprepared. In the Interest of E.S., 262 Ga. App. 768, 586 S.E.2d 691 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).   Continuance requested by parent did not violate time limit.    - When a hearing on a deprivation petition was held within ten days of the petition's filing, but the case was continued for eight days because the mother's counsel had a scheduling conflict, there was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39(a)'s (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-18115-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-582) ten-day time limit. In the Interest of C.R., 292 Ga. App. 346, 665 S.E.2d 39 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).   Parent's right to appeal delinquency adjudication.    - As parties to their child's delinquency action pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-160,15-11-423, and15-11-530), the child's parents had the right to appeal the juvenile court's judgment and to participate in the appellate process. In the Interest of J.L.B., 280 Ga. App. 556, 634 S.E.2d 514 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).   Adjudication hearing required after an initial hearing.    - By restraining the child at an initial hearing, the juvenile court implicitly found probable cause, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-46.1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-415 and15-11-503). The juvenile court therefore erred in later deciding that a 10-day adjudication hearing was actually a detention hearing and in resetting the 10-day adjudication hearing. In the Interest of K.L., 303 Ga. App. 679, 694 S.E.2d 372 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39).   Delay negotiated by defendant waives time limit.    - If the statute does not require dismissal as a matter of law regardless of the reason for the delay, it is clear that a delay negotiated and obtained by the defendant personally would constitute a waiver of the 60-day requirement. E.S. v. State, 134 Ga. App. 724, 215 S.E.2d 732 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).   Proceeding null when no waiver of rights nor proper service.    - If, in a juvenile court proceeding, there was neither waiver of the right of a mother, nor proper service upon the parties and if the hearing is not taken under oath, or waived by any of the parties, the proceeding is an absolute nullity. McBurrough v. Dep't of Human Resources, 150 Ga. App. 130, 257 S.E.2d 35 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).    Failure to follow mandated procedures warrants dismissal without prejudice of a petition alleging deprivation of a child. Another petition can be filed without delay if there is reason to believe the child is being neglected or abused. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 140 Ga. App. 175, 230 S.E.2d 139 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).   Motion to dismiss necessary if no provision for automatic dismissal.    - If there is no provision in the statute for automatic dismissal, there should be a motion to dismiss directed to the trial judge and it should appear that the delay is not due to the actions of the defendant. E.S. v. State, 134 Ga. App. 724, 215 S.E.2d 732 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).   Allegation of failure to comply with time requirements not appealable.    - If the defendant, prior to a hearing to determine the defendant's delinquency, appealed from the juvenile court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss based solely upon an alleged failure to comply with the time requirements of subsection (a) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-582), the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal since a motion under that Code section cannot be analogized to the denial of a O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170 motion and did not involve a question of speedy trial rights which would be directly appealable. In re M.O.B., 190 Ga. App. 474, 378 S.E.2d 898 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).   Violation of ten-day mandate does not deprive jurisdiction.    - Violation of the statutory mandate to set the hearing date not later than ten days after filing of the petition if the child is in detention would not deprive the court of jurisdiction that would otherwise exist. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 138 Ga. App. 49, 225 S.E.2d 441, rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).   Legislature intended incarceration be limited according to calendar days.    - General Assembly intended that a juvenile who is incarcerated after the court has had a preliminary detention hearing should have the juvenile's incarceration limited and the juvenile's fate determined according to calendar days, not "working days." J.B.H. v. State, 139 Ga. App. 199, 228 S.E.2d 189 (1976), overruled on other grounds, In re R.D.F., 266 Ga. 294, 466 S.E.2d 572 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).   No habeas corpus if compliance with statutory requirements.    - Habeas corpus will not lie if the juvenile court, after notice and hearing, enters an order pursuant to former Code 1933, § 24-2409 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-211,15-11-212, and15-11-215). Chaffins v. Lowndes County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 243 Ga. 528, 255 S.E.2d 360 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).   Effect of failure to show compliance with hearing requirement.    - If the parents, in their petition seeking return of their children, allege that there has been no hearing as required by statute, and the record of prior juvenile court proceedings is silent as to whether such a hearing was ever set, continued, or held, and since the hearing requirement was mandatory, the defendant County Family and Children Services Department did not show compliance with the hearing requirement, and the parents stated claims for habeas relief which may be granted. Chaffins v. Lowndes County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 243 Ga. 528, 255 S.E.2d 360 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1701).    Permitting state's mid-trial amendment of petition to change the charge against the juvenile from a misdemeanor to a felony was error since the amendment was done without notice and provision of a continuance to allow additional time for preparation of a defense. In re D.W, 232 Ga. App. 777, 503 S.E.2d 647 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).   Illegal detention.    - If a petition was not presented within 72 hours of a detention hearing as required by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-21(e) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-145,15-11-400,15-11-413,15-11-414, and15-11-472), the state cannot thus illegally detain the child and then render such a jurisdictional defect harmless by setting the adjudication hearing within 13 days (72 hours plus 10 days) of the detention hearing under subsection (a) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-582). In re B.A.P., 180 Ga. App. 433, 349 S.E.2d 218 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26).   Limited restraining order appropriate disposition.    - After a juvenile attacked a store detective, and subsequently displayed violent behavior and threatened another store employee, the court's conclusion that the juvenile was in need of treatment and rehabilitation, and the court's limited restraining order preventing the juvenile from entering any store owned by the company in Fulton County, except in the immediate presence of a parent or adult relative, was an appropriate disposition and justified by the evidence. In re J.M., 237 Ga. App. 298, 513 S.E.2d 742 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-33).    Separate trials (adjudication and dispositional) with each having different goals are required. See D.C.A. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 234, 217 S.E.2d 470 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2201); J.B. v. State, 139 Ga. App. 545, 228 S.E.2d 712 (1976);(decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2201).   Purpose of division of juvenile trials into two phases.    - In dividing juvenile trials into two phases lawmakers intended to give the juvenile judge an opportunity to conduct the "functional equivalent" of a regular trial (the adjudicatory hearing) in a manner which would satisfy the required constitutional procedures concomitant with the usual legal rules, such as those dealing with admissibility of evidence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and similar requirements applicable to adults. Thereafter, at the dispositional phase, the judge was to explore all available additional avenues, including psychiatric and sociological studies, which would enable the judge to provide a solution for the youngster and the family aimed at making the child a secure law-abiding member of society. D.C.A. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 234, 217 S.E.2d 470 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2201).   Disposition made following finding of delinquency.    - Decision that the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation, based upon clear and convincing evidence, is made following a finding of delinquency. A.C.G. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 156, 205 S.E.2d 435 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2201).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 66 et seq., 110 et seq.   C.J.S.   - 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 195 et seq.   U.L.A.   - Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) §§ 22, 29.   ALR.   - Omission of signature of issuing officer on civil process or summons as affecting jurisdiction of the person, 37 A.L.R.2d 928.   Applicability of rules of evidence in juvenile delinquency proceeding, 43 A.L.R.2d 1128.   Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings, 5 A.L.R.4th 234.   Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 83 A.L.R.4th 1135.   Applicability of rules of evidence to juvenile transfer, waiver, or certification hearings, 37 A.L.R.5th 703.