GA Code § 9-13-141 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 9 - Civil Practice|Chapter 13 - Executions and Judicial Sales|Article 7 - Judicial Sales|Part 1 - Advertisement|§ 9-13-141. Timing of Advertisements

 In all cases where the law requires citations, notices, or advertisements by probate court judges, clerks, sheriffs, county bailiffs, administrators, executors, guardians, trustees, or others to be published in a newspaper for 30 days or for four weeks or once a week for four weeks, it shall be sufficient and legal to publish the same once a week for four weeks, that is, one insertion each week for each of the four weeks, immediately preceding the term or day when the order is to be granted or the sale is to take place. The number of days between the date of the first publication and the term or day when the order is to be granted or the sale is to take place, whether more or less than 30 days, shall not in any manner invalidate or render irregular the notice, citation, advertisement, order, or sale.   (Ga. L. 1876, p. 99, § 1; Code 1882, § 2628a; Ga. L. 1890-91, p. 241, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 5458; Civil Code 1910, § 6063; Code 1933, § 39-1102.)   Law reviews.   - For comment, "Are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac State Actors? State Action, Due Process, and Nonjudicial Foreclosure," see 65 Emory L.J. 107 (2015).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS    This section is constitutional, and a foreclosure pursuant to it does not violate procedural due process rights. National Community Bldrs., Inc. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 232 Ga. 594, 207 S.E.2d 510 (1974).   Legislative intent.    - The week of seven days was not intended to be taken as the period in which one publication only of the notice must necessarily be made because such was the statute as interpreted by the court at the time of the passage of the Act codified in this section; hence this section, in referring to the publication to be made once a week for four weeks, means a calendar week, and if notice shall be made on any day of a calendar week, that shall be counted as a publication for that week. Bush v. Growers' Fin. Corp., 176 Ga. 99, 167 S.E. 105 (1932).   Modification of previous rule as to stated weeks.   - This section modifies the rule that advertisement for stated weeks means full weeks must elapse between the first appearance of the advertisement and the sale. Arthur v. Terry, 131 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1942).    This section is without reference to number of days which may elapse between the day of the first insertion and the day of sale. Smith v. Associated Mtg. Cos., 186 Ga. 121, 197 S.E. 222 (1938).   Day of sale not to be within same week as last publication.    - This section requires that day of sale shall not be within same week as last publication. Conley v. Redwine, 109 Ga. 640, 35 S.E. 92 (1900). But see Bush v. Growers' Fin. Corp., 176 Ga. 99, 167 S.E. 105 (1932).   Notice may be made within week when sale to occur.    - This section appears to allow notice to be made on day within week when sale is to take place because the act expressly excludes computation of days. Bush v. Growers' Fin. Corp., 176 Ga. 99, 167 S.E. 105 (1932). But see Conley v. Redwine, 109 Ga. 640, 35 S.E. 92 (1900).    This section does not apply to creditor holding deed as security with power of sale. Wright v. Harris, 221 F. 736 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd, 228 F. 1021 (5th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 658, 36 S. Ct. 287, 60 L. Ed. 1225 (1916); Proudfit v. Oliver, 150 Ga. 707, 105 S.E. 241 (1920).   Municipal charter provisions relating to advertisement of tax sales.    - This section does not affect provisions of municipal charter relating to advertisement of tax sales. Montford v. Allen, 111 Ga. 18, 36 S.E. 305 (1900).    "Week" in required notices is calendar week and not period of seven days. DeKalb County v. Carriage Woods Civic Ass'n, 228 Ga. 380, 185 S.E.2d 752 (1971).    Powers of sale executed in individual transactions may be construed in light of this section as to the length of time requisite for advertisement of such sales. Plainville Brick Co. v. Williams, 170 Ga. 75, 152 S.E. 85 (1930).    Advertisement was sufficient when published four times at weekly intervals  though less than four full weeks intervened between the first publication and the day of sale. Champion Box Co. v. Manatee Crate Co., 75 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1935).    While former Code 1933, § 39-1101 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-13-140) required publications weekly, for four weeks, former Code 1933, § 39-1102 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-13-141) made it clear that a publication on any day of each of the four weeks preceding the sale is sufficient, regardless of the number of days between the date of the first publication and the sale. Champion Box Co. v. Manatee Crate Co., 75 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1935).    Required weekly publication for four weeks is complied with by the insertion of the advertisement in each of the four calendar weeks preceding that in which the sale was had, although 28 days did not elapse between the date of the first insertion and the date of the sale. Heist v. Dunlap & Co., 193 Ga. 462, 18 S.E.2d 837 (1942).    When the return of the appraisers to record was entered within less than 28 days from the first publication of citation and it appears that the citation was published once a week for four calendar weeks next preceding the date of the order, this was a compliance with the law, even though the first publication may have been made less than 28 days before the order was passed. Johnson v. City of Blackshear, 196 Ga. 652, 27 S.E.2d 316 (1943).   Foreclosure sale was void when the required legal advertisement was not published during the week immediately preceding the sale. Foster v. F & M Bank, 108 Bankr. 361 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989).    Not every irregularity furnishes a basis for voiding a foreclosure sale. Crucial point of the inquiry on confirmation is to insure that the sale was not chilled and the price bid was in fact market value. Stripling v. F & M Bank, 175 Ga. App. 75, 332 S.E.2d 373 (1985).   Sale not absolutely void because of failure to advertise four weeks.    - Alleged failure to advertise the four weeks immediately preceding the sale pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-13-141 would not render the sale absolutely void. Stripling v. F & M Bank, 175 Ga. App. 75, 332 S.E.2d 373 (1985).    Cited in Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S.E. 479 (1911); McDonald v. City of Baxley, 40 Ga. App. 713, 151 S.E. 413 (1930); Hardin v. Dodd, 176 Ga. 119, 167 S.E. 277 (1932); Heist v. Dunlap & Co., 193 Ga. 462, 18 S.E.2d 837 (1942); Georgia Cracker v. Hesters, 193 Ga. 706, 20 S.E.2d 7 (1942); Sellers v. Johnson, 207 Ga. 644, 63 S.E.2d 904 (1951); Bracewell v. Warnock, 208 Ga. 388, 67 S.E.2d 114 (1951); Verner v. McLarty, 213 Ga. 472, 99 S.E.2d 890 (1957); DeKalb County v. Carriage Woods Civic Ass'n, 228 Ga. 380, 185 S.E.2d 752 (1971); Law v. USDA, 366 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 410 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Ga. 1975); Foster v. F & M Bank, 105 Bankr. 746 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989); Howser Mill Homes, LLC v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 318 Ga. App. 148, 733 S.E.2d 441 (2012).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judicial Sales, §§ 56, 57.   C.J.S.   - 50A C.J.S., Judicial Sales, § 14 et seq.