CO Code § 8-3-104 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 8 - Labor and Industry|Article 3 - Labor Peace Act|§ 8-3-104. Definitions

 As used in this article 3, unless the context otherwise requires:       “Agricultural employer” means a person that:   Regularly engages the services of one or more employees or contracts with any person who recruits, solicits, hires, employs, furnishes, or transports employees; and    Is engaged in any service or activity included in section 203 (f) of the federal “Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938”, 29 U.S.C. sec. 201 et seq., as amended, or engaged in “agricultural labor” as defined in section 3121 (g) of the federal “Internal Revenue Code of 1986”, as amended.       The meaning of “agricultural employer” must be liberally construed for the protection of persons providing services to an employer. (1.5) “All-union agreement” means a contractual provision between an employer or group of employers and a collective bargaining unit representing some or all of the employees of the employer or group of employers providing for any type of union security and compelling an employee's financial support or allegiance to a labor organization. “All-union agreement” includes, but is not limited to, a contractual provision for a union shop, a modified union shop, an agency shop (meaning a contractual provision that provides for periodic payment of a sum in lieu of union dues but does not require union membership), a modified agency shop, a prehire agreement, maintenance of dues, or maintenance of membership.       “Authority” means the state of Colorado; any board, commission, agency, or instrumentality thereof; or any district, municipality, city and county, county, or combination thereof, which acquires or operates a mass transportation system.    “Collective bargaining” means negotiation by an employer and the representative of a majority of his employees who are in a collective bargaining unit or their representatives concerning representation or terms and conditions of employment of such employees in a mutually genuine effort to reach an agreement with reference to the subject under negotiation.    “Collective bargaining unit” means an organization selected by secret ballot, as provided in section 8-3-107, by a majority vote of the employees of one employer employed within the state who vote at an election for the selection of such unit; except that, where a majority of such employees engaged in a single craft, division, department, or plant have voted by secret ballot that the employees of such single craft, division, department, or plant shall constitute their collective bargaining unit, it shall be so considered. Two or more collective bargaining units may bargain collectively through the same representative or where a majority of the employees in each separate unit have voted to do so by secret ballot, as provided in section 8-3-107.       Repealed.    “Company union” means an organization of employees, the members of which are the employees of only one employer.    “Director” means the director of the division of labor standards and statistics.    “Division” means the division of labor standards and statistics in the department of labor and employment.    “Election” means a proceeding in which the employees authorized by this article cast a secret ballot to select a collective bargaining unit or for any other purpose specified in this article, including elections conducted by the division of labor standards and statistics or by any tribunal having competent jurisdiction or whose jurisdiction has been accepted by the parties.      “Employee” includes any person:   Working for another for hire in the state of Colorado in a nonexecutive or nonsupervisory capacity, and is not limited to the employees of a particular employer and includes any individual whose work has ceased solely as a consequence of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice on the part of an employer; and    (A) Who has not refused or failed to return to work upon the final disposition of a labor dispute or a charge of an unfair labor practice by a tribunal having competent jurisdiction of the same or whose jurisdiction was accepted by the employee or the employee's representative;       “Employee” does not include:   An independent contractor;    Domestic servants employed in and about private homes;    An individual employed by the individual's parent or spouse;    An employee who is subject to the federal “Railway Labor Act”, 45 U.S.C. sec. 151 et seq., as amended; or    A parent, spouse, or child of an agricultural employer's immediate family.              “Employer” means a person who regularly engages the services of eight or more employees, other than persons within the classes expressly exempted under the terms of subsection (11) of this section. (a) (I)“Employer” means a person who regularly engages the services of eight or more employees, other than persons within the classes expressly exempted under the terms of subsection (11) of this section.    “Employer” includes:   Any person acting on behalf of an employer within the scope of the employer's authority, express or implied; and    An agricultural employer.          “Employer” does not include the state or any political subdivision thereof, except where the state or any political subdivision thereof acquires or operates a mass transportation system or any carrier by railroad, express company, or sleeping car company subject to the federal “Railway Labor Act”, 45 U.S.C. sec. 151 et seq., as amended, or any labor organization or anyone acting in behalf of such organization other than when the employer is acting as an employer-in-fact.         “Labor dispute” means any controversy between an employer and such of his employees as are organized in a collective bargaining unit concerning the rights or process or details of collective bargaining. The entering into of a contract for an all-union agreement or the refusal of an employer to enter into an all-union agreement shall not constitute a labor dispute. It shall not be a labor dispute where the disputants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. No jurisdictional dispute or controversy between two or more unions as to which of them has or shall have jurisdiction over certain kinds of work; or as to which of two or more bargaining units constitutes the collective bargaining unit as to which the employer stands impartial or ready to negotiate or bargain with whichever is legally determined to be such bargaining unit, shall constitute a labor dispute.    The general right of an employer to select his own employees is recognized and shall be fully protected. It shall not constitute a labor dispute if an employer discharges or refuses to employ an employee on account of incompetence, neglect of work, unsatisfactory service, or dishonesty; but the discharge of an employee or the refusal to employ an employee shall constitute a labor dispute only when such discharge or refusal to employ is founded upon membership in a union or labor organization or activity therein or when such discharge or failure to employ is in violation of a contract.    No controversy between an employer and his employee shall constitute a labor dispute until after a bargaining unit in accordance with this article is created and a dispute arises between the bargaining unit and the employer.    No labor dispute shall arise from the refusal of an employer to join a union or to cease work in his own business.       “Local union” means an organization of employees employed in this state, the membership of which includes employees of one or more employers, whether or not they are affiliated with an organization of employees employed in one or more other states.    “Mass transportation system” means any system which transports the general public by bus, rail, or any other means of conveyance moving along prescribed routes, except any railroad subject to the federal “Railway Labor Act”, 45 U.S.C. sec. 151 et seq.    “Person” includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, or receivers.    “Representative” includes any person who is the duly authorized agent of a collective bargaining unit.    “Secondary boycott” includes causing or threatening to cause, and combining or conspiring to cause or threaten to cause, injury to one not a party to the particular labor dispute, to aid which such boycott is initiated or continued, whether by:   Withholding patronage, labor, or other beneficial business intercourse;    Picketing;    Refusing to handle, install, use, or work on particular materials, equipment, or supplies; or    Any other unlawful means in order to bring him against his will into a concerted plan to coerce or inflict damage upon another or to compel the party with whom the labor dispute exists to comply with any particular demands.        History. Source: L. 43: P. 394, § 2. CSA: C. 97, § 94(2). CRS 53: § 80-5-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 80-4-2. L. 65: P. 810, § 1. L. 69: Pp. 594, 731, §§ 72, 2. L. 77: (1) R&RE, p. 419, § 1, effective June 29. L. 86: (5) and (6) repealed, p. 502, § 125, effective July 1. L. 96: (11)(f) added, p. 293, § 1, effective April 12. L. 2016: (8), (9), and (10) amended,(HB 16-1323), ch. 131, p. 377, § 9, effective August 10. L. 2021: IP, (1), (11), and (12) amended and (1.5) added,(SB 21-087), ch. 337, p. 2174, § 2, effective June 25. History. Source: L. 43: P. 394, § 2. CSA: C. 97, § 94(2). CRS 53: § 80-5-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 80-4-2. L. 65: P. 810, § 1. L. 69: Pp. 594, 731, §§ 72, 2. L. 77: (1) R&RE, p. 419, § 1, effective June 29. L. 86: (5) and (6) repealed, p. 502, § 125, effective July 1. L. 96: (11)(f) added, p. 293, § 1, effective April 12. L. 2016: (8), (9), and (10) amended,(HB 16-1323), ch. 131, p. 377, § 9, effective August 10. L. 2021: IP, (1), (11), and (12) amended and (1.5) added,(SB 21-087), ch. 337, p. 2174, § 2, effective June 25.    ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. ALL-UNION AGREEMENT.    III. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIT.    IV. EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER.    V. LABOR DISPUTE.    VI. PERSON.    VII. MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM.     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Law reviews. For article, “Labor Injunctions Under the Colorado Labor Peace Act”, see 26 Dicta 63 (1949). For note, “Rural Poverty and the Law in Southern Colorado”, see 47 Den. L.J. 82 (1970).   Applied in Ruff v. Kezer, 199 Colo. 182 , 606 P.2d 441 (1980).   II. ALL-UNION AGREEMENT.   Regulation not limited to closed shop agreements. In view of the emphatic language contained in the legislative declaration of rights of employees in § 8-3-106 , regulation of “all-union agreements” is not limited to closed shop agreements. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. W. Elec. Co., 191 Colo. 128 , 551 P.2d 1065 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1067, 97 S. Ct. 799, 50 L. Ed. 2d 785, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 923, 97 S. Ct. 1341, 51 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1977).   Any financial obligation imposed upon employees pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement executed and sought to be enforced in Colorado has features of compulsory unionism and as such is to be considered an “all-union agreement” under subsection (1). Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. W. Elec. Co., 191 Colo. 128 , 551 P.2d 1065 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1067, 97 S. Ct. 799, 50 L. Ed. 2d 785, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 923, 97 S. Ct. 1341, 51 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1977).   Compulsory monetary support of a union is the “practical equivalent” of compulsory membership. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. W. Elec. Co., 191 Colo. 128 , 551 P.2d 1065 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1067, 97 S. Ct. 799, 50 L. Ed. 2d 785, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 923, 97 S. Ct. 1341, 51 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1977).   Procedures for establishment are incident to state's power. The procedures for establishing a collective bargaining unit under this article are merely an incident of the state's power to prohibit the application of union security agreements under the permissive grant of authority contained in section 14(b) of the federal Taft-Hartley act. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. W. Elec. Co., 191 Colo. 128 , 551 P.2d 1065 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1067, 97 S. Ct. 799, 50 L. Ed. 2d 785, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 923, 97 S. Ct. 1341, 51 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1977).   “Collective bargaining unit” for purposes of § 8-3-108 (1)(c) . In Colorado a “collective bargaining unit”, for purposes of the union security agreement provision of this article, may be something different than a collective bargaining unit for other purposes of labor-management relations. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. W. Elec. Co., 191 Colo. 128 , 551 P.2d 1065 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1067, 97 S. Ct. 799, 50 L. Ed. 2d 785, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 923, 97 S. Ct. 1341, 51 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1977).   Such unit must be established pursuant to requirements of subsection (4). In the context of § 8-3-108 (1)(c) , a collective bargaining unit is a unique entity which may only be established pursuant to the requirements of subsection (4). Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. W. Elec. Co., 191 Colo. 128 , 551 P.2d 1065 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1067, 97 S. Ct. 799, 50 L. Ed. 2d 785, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 923, 97 S. Ct. 1341, 51 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1977).   Condition precedent to right to enter into all-union agreement with employer. A collective bargaining unit, as defined by subsection (4), is a condition precedent to any labor organization's right to enter into an all-union agreement with an employer under Colorado law. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. W. Elec. Co., 191 Colo. 128 , 551 P.2d 1065 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1067, 97 S. Ct. 799, 50 L. Ed. 2d 785, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 923, 97 S. Ct. 1341, 51 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1977).   Application of subsection (4) is severable. The application of subsection (4) to the union security provisions of this article is severable from its application in other contexts of the act. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. W. Elec. Co., 191 Colo. 128 , 551 P.2d 1065 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1067, 97 S. Ct. 799, 50 L. Ed. 2d 785, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 923, 97 S. Ct. 1341, 51 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1977).   III. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIT.   The words “craft, division, department or plant” of subsection (4) are drawn out of custom and usage of industrial and business organization. Dry Cleaners & Laundry Workers Local 304 v. Sunnyside Cleaners & Shirt Laundry, 146 Colo. 31 , 360 P.2d 446 (1961).   And determinations of what constitutes a “craft, division, department or plant” is left to the discretion of the fact finder. Dry Cleaners & Laundry Workers Local 304 v. Sunnyside Cleaners & Shirt Laundry, 146 Colo. 31 , 360 P.2d 446 (1961).   IV. EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER.   In defining the terms “employer”, and “employee”, this section does not exclude an employer such as a nonprofit school for handicapped children nor its employees from the labor peace act. Indus. Comm'n v. Wallace Vill. for Children, 165 Colo. 10 , 437 P.2d 62 (1968).   Furthermore, none of the phraseology of this section premises an interpretation of exclusion of nonindustrial employers and employees. Indus. Comm'n v. Wallace Vill. for Children, 165 Colo. 10 , 437 P.2d 62 (1968).   Public employees. There is no state legislation concerning the rights of public employees to engage in collective bargaining. This article, with an exception, excludes the state or any political subdivision thereof. Greeley Police Union v. City Council, 191 Colo. 419 , 553 P.2d 790 (1976).   Coming within the statutory definition of an “employer” is a necessary basis for jurisdiction under the labor peace act. UMW v. Sunlight Coal Co., 129 Colo. 374 , 270 P.2d 776 (1954).   For the labor peace act does not apply where an employer employs less than eight employees. Associated Master Barbers Local 115 v. Journeymen Barbers Local 205, 132 Colo. 52 , 285 P.2d 599 (1955).   However, it is not necessary that eight employees should be employed during the entire year, but it is sufficient if such employment continues through a reasonably definite period of time and is not casual. UMW v. Sunlight Coal Co., 129 Colo. 374 , 270 P.2d 776 (1954).   Since this section does not define an “employer” as one who has an average employment of eight or more employees through the preceding year or as one who has regularly engaged the services of eight or more employees for any specified period of time, as the term “regularly engages” is not further defined in this section. UMW v. Sunlight Coal Co., 129 Colo. 374 , 270 P.2d 776 (1954).   Rather, “regularly”, as used in subsection (12), refers to the question whether the occurrence is or is not in an established mode or plan in the operation of the business and has no reference to the constancy of the occurrence. UMW v. Sunlight Coal Co., 129 Colo. 374 , 270 P.2d 776 (1954).   As the word “regularly” is not synonymous with constantly or continuously; the work may be intermittent and yet regular, and men may be regularly but not continuously employed. UMW v. Sunlight Coal Co., 129 Colo. 374 , 270 P.2d 776 (1954).   Labor Peace Act does not limit or constrain the law on metropolitan sewage disposal districts concerning the determination of prevailing rates of pay. Such a district is not required to negotiate or engage in collective bargaining in fixing employee compensation at prevailing rates for equivalent work. Local 1 v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation, 876 P.2d 82 (Colo. App. 1994).   V. LABOR DISPUTE.   The definition of a “labor dispute” in subsection (13) is not invalid on the ground that it is too narrow. Denver Milk Producers v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 116 Colo. 389 , 183 P.2d 529 (1947); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Green, 119 Colo. 92 , 200 P.2d 924 (1948).   One need not be in a “labor dispute” as defined by this section to have a right under the fourteenth amendment to express a grievance in a labor matter by publication unattended by violence, coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive. Pueblo Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Harper Constr. Co., 134 Colo. 469 , 307 P.2d 468 (1957).   For the right of free speech does not depend in such a case on whether or not a “labor dispute” as defined in this section is involved. Pueblo Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Harper Constr. Co., 134 Colo. 469 , 307 P.2d 468 (1957).   And forbidding resort to peaceful persuasion through picketing because there is no immediate employer-employee dispute is such a ban of free communications as to be inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of speech. Pueblo Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Harper Constr. Co., 134 Colo. 469 , 307 P.2d 468 (1957).   As union members have a right to picket a nonunion employer in the absence of a “labor dispute” as defined by subsection (13), because a state cannot exclude working men from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him. the interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace, and so the right of free communication cannot, therefore, be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a “dispute” with an employer, even though they are not in his employ. Pueblo Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Harper Constr. Co., 134 Colo. 469 , 307 P.2d 468 (1957).   Moreover, a labor dispute as defined in this section may exist even though there is no controversy between an employer and his own employees. Pueblo Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Harper Constr. Co., 134 Colo. 469 , 307 P.2d 468 (1957).   But a bona fide dispute must exist to allow picketing. Where the record shows the absence of any negotiations having taken place, or a dispute having occurred, or a statement of grievances having been submitted by the individuals striking and picketing to the individuals against whom the strike is called and against whom the pickets are picketing, it is against public interest to allow such picketing because a bona fide dispute has not been shown to exist. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Publix Cab Co., 119 Colo. 208 , 202 P.2d 154 (1949).   Subsection (13)(d), which cannot give rise to a legal labor dispute, cannot become the basis of a rupture of harmonious labor relations which admittedly existed prior to it. A labor union, or an employer cannot use such a provision as the basis for disturbing preexisting labor relations. To attempt any other construction would be to abandon all logic and reason, to ignore the plain meaning of words, and to discard all fundamental rules of statutory construction. Journeymen Barbers Local 205 v. Indus. Comm'n, 128 Colo. 121 , 260 P.2d 941 (1953).   A suit for an injunction to restrain a union from picketing and engaging in a secondary boycott for the purpose of forcing an employer to sign a union contract does not arise out of a “labor dispute” as defined in subsection (13) of this section. Denver Milk Producers v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 116 Colo. 389 , 183 P.2d 529 (1947); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Green, 119 Colo. 92 , 200 P.2d 924 (1948).   No “labor dispute” as defined by this section found to exist. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Green, 119 Colo. 92 , 200 P.2d 924 (1984).   For “labor dispute” under former provision, see Local 13, Teamsters v. Perry Truck Lines, Inc., 106 Colo. 25 , 101 P.2d 436 (1940); Local 13, Teamsters v. Buckingham Transp. Co., 108 Colo. 419 , 118 P.2d 1088 (1941).   Applied in People ex rel. Shaffer v. Teamsters Local 961, 175 Colo. 187 , 486 P.2d 10 (1971).   VI. PERSON.   Definition of “person” does not exclude nonprofit school for handicapped children. Indus. Comm'n v. Wallace Vill. for Children, 165 Colo. 10 , 437 P.2d 62 (1968).   VII. MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM.   City-operated bus company is considered a “mass transportation system” operated by a political subdivision of the state for purposes of the “Labor Peace Act”. Hoff v. Amal. Transit Un., Div. 662, 758 P.2d 674 (Colo. App. 1987).   Regional Transportation District is an “authority” within meaning of this section. Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Dept. of Labor, 830 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1992).