HI Rev Stat § 706-630 (2021)
2021 Hawaii Revised Statutes|Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code|706. Disposition of Convicted Defendants|706-630 Discharge of defendant. §706-630 Commentary:

  §706-630 Discharge of defendant. Upon the termination of the period of the probation or the earlier discharge of the defendant, the defendant shall be relieved of any obligations imposed by the order of the court and shall have satisfied the disposition of the court, except as to any action under this chapter to collect unpaid fines, restitution, attorney's fees, costs, or interest. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1986, c 314, §31; am L 1998, c 269, §5] COMMENTARY ON §706-630  This section provides that the court may discharge the defendant prior to the termination of the period of suspension or probation and that, if the defendant is not so discharged, no formal discharge is required upon termination of the statutory period of suspension or probation. Upon termination of the statutory period, the defendant is relieved of any further obligation by operation of law. This provision is a continuation of prior Hawaii law.1 SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §706-630  Act 269, Session Laws 1998, amended this section to allow victims of crime to enforce a criminal restitution order in the same manner as a civil judgment. Conference Committee Report No. 89. Case Notes  Consistent with §706-625(1), because petitioner, who was sentenced to probation under §706-622.5(1), had completed petitioner's probation term and was subsequently discharged and thus "satisfied the disposition of the court", as provided by this section, petitioner had, in effect, complied with the terms and conditions of probation for purposes of expungement under §706-622.5(4). 129 H. 363, 300 P.3d 1022 (2013).  Where defendant paid all monthly restitution amounts imposed as a condition of probation sentence, there were no other grounds in record to revoke defendant's probation, and probation term had expired, under this section (1993), defendant should have been relieved of the obligations imposed by the probation sentence; trial court thus erred in imposing "free-standing" restitution order remaining in full force and effect beyond termination of defendant's term of probation. 92 H. 36 (App.), 986 P.2d 987 (1999).  Where Act 269's 1998 amendment took effect after defendant was sentenced, by its own terms did not apply retroactively to extend defendant's obligation to pay restitution beyond defendant's period of probation, and did not empower the trial court to resentence defendant to a freestanding restitution order, as defendant was not in violation of defendant's conditions of probation stated in the 1995 resentencing order, trial court had no authority to resentence defendant on May 4, 2000, by its restitution order. 98 H. 137 (App.), 44 P.3d 288 (2002).  Where defendant's term of probation had already ended when the State charged defendant with criminal contempt for violating the no-contact condition of probation, and the State failed to take any steps during defendant's probation to revoke, modify or enlarge its terms and thereby toll the period of probation, the district court no longer had jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation or modify or enlarge its terms; thus, by convicting defendant of criminal contempt as a sanction for a probation violation, the court essentially extended defendant's probation term for two years, which was inconsistent with this section. 120 H. 312 (App.), 205 P.3d 577 (2009). __________  §706-630 Commentary: 1. See H.R.S. §711-80.