CO Code § 44-3-302 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 44 - Revenue - Regulation of Activities|Article 3 - Alcohol Beverages|Part 3 - State and Local Licensing|§ 44-3-302. License Renewal - Rules

     Ninety days before the expiration date of an existing license, the state licensing authority shall notify the licensee of the expiration date by any method reasonably likely to actually notify the licensee. The state licensing authority shall promulgate rules setting the procedure to notify a licensee in accordance with this subsection (1)(a).    For the renewal of an existing license, the licensee must apply to the local licensing authority not less than forty-five days and to the state licensing authority not less than thirty days before the date of expiration. The local licensing authority shall not accept an application for renewal of a license after the date of expiration, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section. Filing with the local licensing authority is deemed filing with the state licensing authority. The state licensing authority shall process all renewal applications that are filed with the local licensing authorities before the expiration date and subsequently approved and shall extend the expiration date until the state license application process is completed. The state or the local licensing authority, for good cause, may waive the forty-five- or thirty-day time requirements set forth in this subsection (1)(b).    The local licensing authority may hold a hearing on the application for renewal, but not until a notice of hearing has been conspicuously posted on the licensed premises for ten days and notice of the hearing has been provided the applicant at least ten days before the hearing. The licensing authority may refuse to renew any license for good cause, subject to judicial review. The state licensing authority shall hold any renewal hearing in accordance with section 44-3-305 (2).         Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, a licensee whose license has been expired for not more than ninety days may file a late renewal application upon the payment of a nonrefundable late application fee of five hundred dollars each to the state and local licensing authorities. A licensee who files a late renewal application and pays the requisite fees may continue to operate until both state and local licensing authorities have taken final action to approve or deny the licensee's late renewal application.    A state or local licensing authority shall not accept a late renewal application more than ninety days after the expiration of a licensee's permanent annual license. Any licensee whose permanent annual license has been expired for more than ninety days must apply for a new license pursuant to section 44-3-311 or a reissued license pursuant to subsection (2)(d) of this section.    Notwithstanding the amount specified for the fee in subsection (2)(a) of this section, the state licensing authority by rule or as otherwise provided by law may reduce the amount of the fee if necessary pursuant to section 24-75-402 (3) to reduce the uncommitted reserves of the fund to which all or any portion of the fee is credited. After the uncommitted reserves of the fund are sufficiently reduced, the state licensing authority by rule or as otherwise provided by law may increase the amount of the fee as provided in section 24-75-402 (4).      Notwithstanding subsection (2)(b) of this section, with the permission of the licensing authority, a licensee whose permanent annual license has been expired for more than ninety days but less than one hundred eighty days may submit to the local licensing authority, or to the state licensing authority in the case of a licensee whose alcohol beverage license is not subject to issuance or approval by a local licensing authority, an application for a reissued license. The licensing authority has the sole discretion to determine whether to allow a licensee to apply for a reissued license. (d) (I) Notwithstanding subsection (2)(b) of this section, with the permission of the licensing authority, a licensee whose permanent annual license has been expired for more than ninety days but less than one hundred eighty days may submit to the local licensing authority, or to the state licensing authority in the case of a licensee whose alcohol beverage license is not subject to issuance or approval by a local licensing authority, an application for a reissued license. The licensing authority has the sole discretion to determine whether to allow a licensee to apply for a reissued license.    If the licensing authority does not allow the licensee's application, then the licensee must apply for a new license pursuant to section 44-3-311. A person who has applied for a new license shall not sell, or possess for sale in public view, any alcohol beverage until all required licenses have been obtained.    For licensees subject to issuance or approval by a local licensing authority, if the local licensing authority allows the licensee to apply for a reissuance of the expired license, the licensee must submit to the local licensing authority:   An application for a reissued license;    Payment of a five-hundred-dollar late application fee; and    Payment of a fine of twenty-five dollars per day for each day the license has been expired beyond ninety days.       After the local licensing authority accepts the application, late application fee, and fine, the licensee may continue to operate and sell alcohol beverages until the state licensing authority and local licensing authority have each taken final action on the licensee's application for license reissuance.    If the local licensing authority approves the reissuance of the licensee's license, the local licensing authority shall forward the approved application to the state licensing authority for review. In addition to the late application fee and fine imposed by the local licensing authority, the state licensing authority shall impose a five-hundred-dollar late application fee and a fine of twenty-five dollars per day for each day the license has been expired beyond ninety days.    For licensees who are not subject to issuance or approval by a local licensing authority, if the state licensing authority allows the licensee to apply for a reissuance of the expired license, the licensee must submit to the state licensing authority:   An application for a reissued license;    Payment of a five-hundred-dollar late application fee; and    Payment of a fine of twenty-five dollars per day for each day the license has been expired beyond ninety days.       After the state licensing authority accepts the application, late application fee, and fine, the licensee may continue to operate and sell alcohol beverages until the state licensing authority takes final action on the licensee's application for license reissuance.    If the state licensing authority approves the reissuance, the licensee will maintain the same license period dates as if the license had been renewed prior to the expiration date.    If either the local or state licensing authority denies the licensee's application for reissuance of the expired license, then the licensee may apply for a new license pursuant to section 44-3-311.    Neither the state nor local licensing authority may grant a licensee's application for license reissuance more than three times in any five-year period.           History. Source: L. 2018: Entire article added with relocations,(HB 18-1025), ch. 152, p. 972, § 2, effective October 1. L. 2020: (1) amended,(SB 20-086), ch. 67, p. 269, § 1, effective September 14.    Editor's note:   This section is similar to former § 12-47-302 as it existed prior to 2018.   ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. NEIGHBORHOOD REQUIREMENTS.     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Law reviews. For comment on Campbell v. City Council, appearing below, see 35 U. Colo. L. Rev. 252 (1963). For note, “The Liquor Code -- Colorado Revised Statute Antiquated”, see 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 248 (1965).   Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.   Statute is not unconstitutionally vague. A licensee has no property right in the renewal of a license and need not be provided procedural due process protections attendant to a property right. Morris-Schindler, LLC v. City & County of Denver, 251 P.3d 1076 (Colo. App. 2010).   Delegation of legislative authority to the Department of Excise and Licenses to adopt rules and conduct hearings on applications to renew liquor licenses is not unconstitutional on the basis that the statute fails to provide sufficient standards for defining “good cause”. Squire Restaurant and Lounge v. Denver, 890 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1994).   Statutory licensing guide. The licensing authority is by statute charged with the duty and task of determining whether a license should be granted or denied, and the statutory guide provided for the board in performing this duty is found in this section. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Salardino, 138 Colo. 66 , 329 P.2d 629 (1958).   Supreme court decisions. Another source of guidance for the board in performing its duties as a licensing authority is the numerous pronouncements of the supreme court. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Salardino, 138 Colo. 66 , 329 P.2d 629 (1958).   Three principles pervade all of the pertinent decisions: (1) The licensing authorities are vested with a very wide discretion; (2) all reasonable doubts as to the correctness of the board's rulings are to be resolved in favor of the board; (3) the determination of the board will not be disturbed by the courts unless it appears that the board has abused its discretion. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Salardino, 138 Colo. 66 , 329 P.2d 629 (1958).   The issuance of licenses under the liquor code depends in the final analysis on the judgment of the licensing authority and not upon that of citizens or the court; and all reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the licensing authority. Kornfeld v. Yost, 37 Colo. App. 483, 551 P.2d 219 (1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Kornfeld v. Perl Mack Liquors, Inc., 193 Colo. 442 , 567 P.2d 383 (1977).   It was the intention of the general assembly to vest a wide discretion in local licensing authorities in the issuance of licenses for sale of alcoholic beverages. Gem Beverage Co. v. Geer, 138 Colo. 420 , 334 P.2d 744 (1959).   Governed by facts and circumstances. While a wide discretion is vested in the county commissioners with respect to the issuance of liquor licenses, the exercise of that discretion must be governed by a proper consideration of the facts and circumstances in each case. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Buckley, 121 Colo. 108 , 213 P.2d 608 (1949).   The exercise of this discretion cannot be dispensed with by the adoption of a policy to deny all applications. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Buckley, 121 Colo. 108 , 213 P.2d 608 (1949).   The discretion of the licensing officer in granting or refusing a license is well established by the decisions of the supreme court. Cronin v. Ward, 144 Colo. 192 , 355 P.2d 655 (1960).   The general assembly has established the public policy for the entire state, and this cannot be overridden by local governments by mere fiat nor ignored by the courts. Le Pore v. Larkin, 146 Colo. 311 , 361 P.2d 343 (1961).   No contrary local policy authorized. The wide discretion which is vested in the licensing authority in granting or denying licenses is not to be construed as authority to establish a local public policy either by express resolution or by secret agreement contrary to the state statutes which have legalized the issuance of this particular type of license. Ladd v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 146 Colo. 366 , 361 P.2d 627 (1961).   Licensing procedures must not be used as a means of establishing local option and circumventing statutory requirements. Le Pore v. Larkin, 146 Colo. 311 , 361 P.2d 343 (1961).   Local authority to license, not to regulate. The board of county commissioners has no authority to regulate the sale of malt and vinous liquors, other than 3.2 percent beer, but only to grant, suspend, or revoke licenses as provided by this section. Gettman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 122 Colo. 185 , 221 P.2d 363 (1950).   A resolution of a city council limiting the number of liquor licenses on the basis of citywide population is invalid as tantamount to a prejudgment of any application. This article requires a hearing and issuance or denial of a license on the merits of each application. City of Colo. Springs v. Graham, 143 Colo. 97 , 352 P.2d 273 (1960).   No authority to regulate hours. This section makes no attempt to delegate to the board of county commissioners any authority of regulation as to hours when malt or vinous liquors may be sold or the authority to promulgate other rules and regulations. Gettman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 122 Colo. 185 , 221 P.2d 363 (1950).   Personal right vested in licensee. A liquor license vests a personal right in the licensee and confers the right to do that which without the license would be unlawful, such right being coextensive with the duration of the license and is restricted to a certain location, unless change thereof is granted upon application to, and after a hearing by, the licensing authority. A. D. Jones & Co. v. Parsons, 136 Colo. 434 , 319 P.2d 480 (1957).   Liquor license is a property right entitled to due process protection including notice and an opportunity to be heard and, therefore, due process was denied when claimant for liquor license renewal was not notified that evidence would be taken on the needs and desires of the neighborhood. Price Haskel v. Denver Dept. of Excise & Licenses, 694 P.2d 364 (Colo. App. 1984).   This section permits removal to another location of a hotel and restaurant license upon a proper showing. A. D. Jones & Co. v. Parsons, 136 Colo. 434 , 319 P.2d 480 (1957).   While the section permits removal to another location of a hotel or restaurant license upon a proper showing, a contract by which the parties agree that the licensee will not exercise this privilege, but upon termination of the tenancy will surrender the license to the licensing authority, is not in violation of the law since it is not an agreement for the transfer of the license. A. D. Jones & Co. v. Parsons, 136 Colo. 434 , 319 P.2d 480 (1957).   Full, fair, and impartial hearing. Where an applicant was given full opportunity to present all testimony and documentary evidence it desired, and availed itself of such opportunity, the fact that the chairman of the board of county commissioners at beginning of hearing expressed the opinion that needs of the neighborhood were presently met falls short of denial to applicant of a full, fair, and impartial hearing. Lab Dev. Co. v. Hill, 152 Colo. 338 , 381 P.2d 811 (1963).   No court may substitute its judgment for that of the local licensing authority when there is any evidence in the record that supports the conclusion of the licensing authority. Canjar v. Huerta, 193 Colo. 388 , 566 P.2d 1071 (1977); Duren, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 709 P.2d 74 (Colo. App. 1985).   Denial upheld where not arbitrary or capricious. While not supported by a preponderance, the denial of a retail license will be upheld if supported by sufficient evidence, if the licensing authority did not act arbitrarily and capriciously. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Thompson, 167 Colo. 402 , 448 P.2d 639 (1968).   The nonrenewal of a liquor license is not a sanction. Morris-Schindler, LLC v. City & County of Denver, 251 P.3d 1076 (Colo. App. 2010).   “Good cause” standard fails to give sufficient notice. Standard in liquor code of “good cause” as the criterion for determining if a liquor license is renewed, without any implementing rules, fails to give sufficient definiteness of what conduct and conditions are required to avoid nonrenewal, fails to insure rational and consistent administrative action and effective subsequent judicial review of that action, and therefore violates due process. Some limit must be provided by the Department of Excise and Licenses to guide discretion in determining if “good cause” for refusing to renew a liquor license exists. Squire Restaurant & Lounge v. Denver, 890 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1994) (decided under former law).   Any violation of a provision of the Colorado Liquor Code constitutes good cause for nonrenewal. Morris-Schindler, LLC v. City & County of Denver, 251 P.3d 1076 (Colo. App. 2010).   Abuse of discretion. An example of refusal for good cause is where the board of county commissioners refused to grant a liquor license to an operator of a rural hotel and based its decision on the fact that the premises could be reached only by a dangerous, winding country road in a mountainous area and also on the ground of the proximity of young people at a nearby college, it was held not to be an abuse of discretion. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Buckley, 121 Colo. 108 , 213 P.2d 608 (1949).   The right of a licensing authority to refuse for good cause, of necessity vests in the board of county commissioners in any county in the first instance the right to determine what is good cause for refusal. Van DeVegt v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 98 Colo. 161 , 55 P.2d 703 (1936); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Buckley, 121 Colo. 108 , 213 P.2d 608 (1949).   Prior license action not binding. The board is not bound by any prior action of any licensing authority with relation to the facts pertaining to the issuance of any license for former years, but is called upon to exercise its own discretion as of the date of a new application. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Salardino, 138 Colo. 66 , 329 P.2d 629 (1958).   Conceivably, the licensing authority passing upon a new application, in the exercise of its discretion, might with propriety reject an application which a former board, upon the same facts, approved, and in so doing the board would not, of necessity, be guilty of an abuse of discretion, or an arbitrary and capricious exercise thereof. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Salardino, 138 Colo. 66 , 329 P.2d 629 (1958); Cronin v. Ward, 144 Colo. 192 , 355 P.2d 655 (1960).   That a licensing officer had previously denied the application to another to operate an establishment at the same premises does not preclude the issuance of a license to an applicant who in his judgment and discretion is qualified therefor. Cronin v. Ward, 144 Colo. 192 , 355 P.2d 655 (1960).   Evidence at second court-ordered hearing. Upon a second hearing on an application for a liquor license, held pursuant to an order of court, the licensing authority is not limited only to the exhibits offered at the first hearing and the testimony of those witnesses only who testified therein. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Salardino, 138 Colo. 66 , 329 P.2d 629 (1958).   Sanctions criteria set forth in § 12-47-601 do not govern a decision not to renew under subsection (1) of this section. Morris-Schindler, LLC v. City & County of Denver, 251 P.3d 1076 (Colo. App. 2010).   Applied in Awr Corp. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 154 Colo. 511 , 391 P.2d 675 (1964); Smith v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 155 Colo. 175 , 394 P.2d 840 (1964).   II. NEIGHBORHOOD REQUIREMENTS.   Applications are considered and determined upon a geographical basis, a neighborhood, and not upon a citywide population basis. City of Colo. Springs v. Graham, 143 Colo. 97 , 352 P.2d 273 (1960).   Determined by city council. The members of a city council, as the local licensing authority, knowing the area which they represent and the problems confronting it, are better able to consider what should constitute the “neighborhood” after considering all of the evidence presented to it than is the supreme court. Campbell v. City Council, 150 Colo. 471 , 374 P.2d 348 (1962).   The geographic extent of the neighborhood will vary from case to case. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Johnson, 170 Colo. 259 , 460 P.2d 770 (1969).   Never entire county. No authority justifies the conclusion that the “neighborhood” involved in an application for a liquor license can be expanded to include an entire county. Bolton v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 164 Colo. 112 , 432 P.2d 761 (1967).   Boundary lines of a city do not exclude residents on one side or the other from the “neighborhood” to be considered in connection with applications for liquor licenses. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bickel, 155 Colo. 465 , 395 P.2d 208 (1964); Anderson v. Spencer, 162 Colo. 328 , 426 P.2d 970 (1967).   The existence or nonexistence of outlets on either side of a city boundary are to be considered by the licensing authority in determining whether reasonable requirements of the neighborhood are being met. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bickel, 155 Colo. 465 , 395 P.2d 208 (1964); Anderson v. Spencer, 162 Colo. 328 , 426 P.2d 970 (1967).   The fact that a particular type of license is not authorized in the neighborhood does not require the issuance of such a license if, in fact, the needs of the neighborhood, with respect to the type of beverage authorized to be sold by the license requested, are being met by existing licenses. Canjar v. Huerta, 193 Colo. 388 , 566 P.2d 1071 (1977).   The licensing of so-called “fringe stores” is not a matter that in and of itself is a bar to the issuance of licenses, but is merely a circumstance to which the board is entitled to give such reasonable weight as it shall determine. Van DeVegt v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 98 Colo. 161 , 55 P.2d 703 (1936).   Applicant's showing of neighborhood. It is incumbent upon an applicant for a liquor license to show with some degree of clarity the area of the neighborhood requiring the service proposed to be rendered. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Salardino, 138 Colo. 66 , 329 P.2d 629 (1958).   The test under subsection (2) is still the “desires of the inhabitants” and “the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood”. Tavella v. Eppinger, 152 Colo. 506 , 383 P.2d 314 (1963).   Before a liquor license can be issued under subsection (2), two requirements must be affirmatively established: 1. that the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood are not being met by existing outlets, and 2. that the inhabitants of the neighborhood desire its issuance. Heinz v. Bauer, 150 Colo. 589 , 375 P.2d 520 (1962).   The licensing authority must determine both the reasonable requirements of a neighborhood and the desires of its inhabitants. Canjar v. Huerta, 193 Colo. 388 , 566 P.2d 1071 (1977).   Unless both requirements are met no license may issue. Heinz v. Bauer, 150 Colo. 589 , 375 P.2d 520 (1962).   Establishing these two requirements is the statutory responsibility of the board. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Johnson, 170 Colo. 259 , 460 P.2d 770 (1969).   Showing of inadequate service required. An applicant is entitled to a license only on proof that the neighborhood sought to be served is not adequately served by the other licensed outlets. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Salardino, 138 Colo. 66 , 329 P.2d 629 (1958).   This section does not relieve applicants of the duty to prove a reasonable requirement for the proposed outlet, an essential prerequisite to the granting of a license. Hauf Brau v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 145 Colo. 522 , 359 P.2d 659 (1961).   Where there are a number of licensed outlets in an area, an applicant for an additional liquor license has the burden to establish by competent evidence that the needs of the community are not being adequately met by existing outlets. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Evergreen Lanes, Inc., 154 Colo. 413 , 391 P.2d 372 (1964).   Lack of proof of the fact that the neighborhood is not adequately served precludes the issuance of a license. Hauf Brau v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 145 Colo. 522 , 359 P.2d 659 (1961).   Economic competition considered. Whether any benefit will result to the public from competition in the sale of intoxicating liquor in a particular area, is a matter which the licensing authority may consider in determining the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood and the desires of the inhabitants, the weight to be accorded such matter being within the sound discretion of the authority. Lab Dev. Co. v. Hill, 152 Colo. 338 , 381 P.2d 811 (1963).   The weight to be accorded to such matters as whether any benefit will result to the public from economic competition lies within the sound discretion of the board of county supervisors. Lab Dev. Co. v. Hill, 152 Colo. 338 , 381 P.2d 811 (1963).   Number and proximity of other outlets considered. Besides considering the number of outlets in the area, the board of county commissioners may properly take into account in its consideration of the case the fact that close to the location for which a license is sought there are existing outlets to serve the public. Jennings v. Hoskinson, 152 Colo. 276 , 382 P.2d 807 (1963).   The existence of a desire for a new outlet is some evidence that the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood were not being met. Anderson v. Spencer, 162 Colo. 328 , 426 P.2d 970 (1967).   Regardless of their reasons, the desires of the inhabitants are to be considered. Van DeVegt v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 98 Colo. 161 , 55 P.2d 703 (1936).   Where protests were based on the general policy that liquor is evil, and secondly that there was a package store nearby, such protests were not relevant and should not have been considered since the application was for liquor by the drink, and since there was no competent evidence before the board to negate the affirmative showing by the applicant, and the board arbitrarily restricted the neighborhood, the license should have been granted. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Johnson, 170 Colo. 259 , 460 P.2d 770 (1969).   Consideration of proof unlimited. This section in no way limits the board in giving proper consideration to other proof of the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood or the desires of the inhabitants thereof. Hauf Brau v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 145 Colo. 522 , 359 P.2d 659 (1961).   Effect of petitions and remonstrances of inhabitants. While the expression of opinions as to the requirements of the neighborhood and the needs of the inhabitants thereof, contained in petitions and remonstrances, are entitled to consideration, they are not controlling since this section requires that the issuance of licenses shall depend on the judgment of the licensing authority and not on that of citizens or the court. MacArthur v. Presto, 122 Colo. 202 , 221 P.2d 934 (1950); MacArthur v. Sanzalone, 123 Colo. 166 , 225 P.2d 1044 (1950).   The statute precludes the board from granting a license until it has given good-faith consideration to inhabitants' petitions and remonstrances. Hauf Brau v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 145 Colo. 522 , 359 P.2d 659 (1961).   Geographical distinctions within a neighborhood do not determine the efficacy of petitions or remonstrances in liquor licensing cases. Anderson v. Spencer, 162 Colo. 328 , 426 P.2d 970 (1967).   The fact that a greater number of inhabitants had signed petitions favoring issuance of the license does not of itself mandate issuance thereof. Kornfeld v. Yost, 37 Colo. App. 483, 551 P.2d 219 (1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Kornfeld v. Perl Mack Liquors, Inc., 193 Colo. 442 , 567 P.2d 383 (1977).   Where remonstrances against the granting of a beverage license are signed by others than those resident in a defined neighborhood of a licensee's outlet, and its issuance is supported by several hundred persons resident in the immediate neighborhood, the petitions supporting the application are sufficient to justify its issuance, and there being nothing to indicate that a city council acted arbitrarily or capriciously in granting a license, the courts will not interfere. Hanna v. Henderson, 140 Colo. 481 , 345 P.2d 384 (1959).   Votes in local option election. The desires of the citizens “otherwise” expressed by their votes in a local option election is likewise admissible evidence to be considered in ascertaining the “desires of the inhabitants”, and given such weight as the board of commissioners deemed proper under this section. Van DeVegt v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 98 Colo. 161 , 55 P.2d 703 (1936).   Needs of traveling public. In determining the reasonable requirements of neighborhood upon application for a restaurant liquor license, evidence of the reasonable need of the traveling public and transients is valid to show such need and demand. Campbell v. City Council, 150 Colo. 471 , 374 P.2d 348 (1962).   Showing of inadequate service sufficient. Where the record discloses that there are no restaurant liquor licenses in the city, and no such license in the entire county, the nearest outlet of the kind being 50 miles distant, it cannot be said that the reasonable requirements of the area have been met. Farmer v. City Council, 153 Colo. 306 , 385 P.2d 596 (1963).   Where there is a substantial showing that a liquor outlet is desired in a community, it cannot be said that the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood are being served when it appears that the nearest outlet of the kind sought is 12 or 13 miles distant from the location requested. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Whale, 154 Colo. 271 , 389 P.2d 588 (1964).   Where the only licenses presently existing in a city are for private clubs and package liquor stores, and more favor than disfavor the license in the immediate neighborhood, there is no basis upon which the application of plaintiff may legally be denied since there are no licenses of the type sought within a five mile radius. Le Pore v. Larkin, 146 Colo. 311 , 361 P.2d 343 (1961).   Where the general assembly has authorized the issuance of hotel and restaurant liquor licenses throughout the state, thus determining the public policy, and where the evidence disclosed that no such license had ever been issued in city of size and population disclosed by the record, and substantial support for the issuance of such license is shown, it cannot be said that reasonable requirements of the area have been met. KBT Corp. v. Walker, 148 Colo. 274 , 365 P.2d 685 (1961).   Denial arbitrary and capricious. Where there is no liquor outlet of a given classification within a radius of several miles, the refusal to grant such a license is arbitrary and capricious where substantial support for the issuance thereof is shown. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bickel, 155 Colo. 465 , 395 P.2d 208 (1964); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Johnson, 170 Colo. 259 , 460 P.2d 770 (1969).   Where an application for a hotel and restaurant liquor license was denied and evidence disclosed that there was no such outlet within a radius of 35 miles of city, the determination of city council that the neighborhood was adequately supplied by existing outlets was arbitrary and capricious. KBT Corp. v. Walker, 148 Colo. 274 , 365 P.2d 685 (1961).   Showing of inadequate service insufficient. Where there are a number of licensed outlets in an area in which a restaurant license is sought, evidence that many residents of the neighborhood desired to dine at applicants' restaurant and desired to be served liquor with their meals, does not alone establish that existing outlets were inadequate to satisfy the desires of the inhabitants and the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bova, 153 Colo. 230 , 385 P.2d 590 (1963).   The finding of the trial court that the applicant plans to provide a general recreation facility and that such facility is unlike any presently existing in the area, and this is fully borne out by the evidence and is undisputed, does not evidence the fact that the neighborhood in question requires another liquor outlet, especially where the undisputed evidence is that the proposed development will proceed whether or not a liquor license is granted. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Evergreen Lanes, Inc., 154 Colo. 413 , 391 P.2d 372 (1964).   Though the applicant proved the majority of those interested desired the license to issue, and it undoubtedly would be a convenience to have such a store within the shopping center where there is more adequate parking and one stop service, nevertheless it is also true that the physical facts could, and in the judgment of the authority did, show that the present reasonable requirements of the neighborhood are being met. Brentwood Liquors, Inc. v. Schooley, 147 Colo. 324 , 363 P.2d 670 (1961).   Denial not capricious or arbitrary. Where even though the desire of the neighborhood was that the license should issue, nonetheless the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood were adequately met by the existing outlets, in particular a liquor store next door to the applicant, the city council in so finding did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, but well within the limits of its discretionary power. McIntosh v. Council of City of Littleton, 145 Colo. 533 , 360 P.2d 136 (1961).   Where the evidence in the record showed the existence of many licensed restaurants and liquor stores in the vicinity, this was potent evidence to support the finding that the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood had been met and that the denial of a license was not capricious or arbitrary. MacArthur v. Presto, 122 Colo. 202 , 221 P.2d 934 (1950).   Where evidence disclosed three existing hotel and restaurant liquor licenses in an area designated as a neighborhood and others in close proximity thereto, a finding by the licensing authority of lack of need for issuance of license applied for, based upon a fair appraisal of the evidence, cannot be held to be arbitrary. Schooley v. Steinberg, 148 Colo. 222 , 365 P.2d 245 (1961).   Where the record disclosed two package liquor outlets and two establishments serving liquor by the drink within half to three quarters of a mile of applicant's location, denial of a package liquor license by board of county commissioners was not arbitrary or capricious. Malouff v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 150 Colo. 11 , 370 P.2d 161 (1962).   Where the board of commissioners did not refuse to receive any evidence offered, and the evidence showed the location of the proposed dispensary to be in close proximity to state college, and where the board had before it protests admitted to have been made by many of the officials of the college and of the public schools, as well as petitions signed by citizens, the court could not say that the board acted arbitrarily or capriciously in refusing a license when such action was based on evidence from which reasonable men might honestly draw different conclusions. Van DeVegt v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 98 Colo. 161 , 55 P.2d 703 (1936).   Prima facie need for license shown. Where prior to condemnation by the state for highway purposes, there were two successful outlets in Silver Plume; that because of the condemnation proceedings there were none at the time of the application; that the nearest such outlet was two and one-half miles away; that 34 residents indicated the need for such an outlet; and where after denial of the application, but prior to the district court's review thereof, the trustees issued a similar license to a nearby establishment, the evidence constitutes a prima facie showing of need for the license. Booth v. Trustees of Town of Silver Plume, 28 Colo. App. 470, 474 P.2d 227 (1970).