CO Code § 39-10-114 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 39 - Taxation|Article 10 - Collection|§ 39-10-114. Abatement - Cancellation of Taxes

        Except as otherwise provided in subsections (1)(a)(I)(D) and (1)(a)(I)(E) of this section, if taxes have been levied erroneously or illegally, whether due to erroneous valuation for assessment, irregularity in levying, clerical error, or overvaluation, the treasurer shall report the amount thereof to the board of county commissioners, which shall proceed to abate such taxes in the manner provided by law. The assessor shall make such report if the assessor discovers that taxes have been levied erroneously or illegally. If such taxes have been collected by the treasurer, the board of county commissioners shall authorize refund of the same in the manner provided by law. Except as provided in subsections (1)(a)(I)(E) and (1)(a)(I)(F) of this section and section 39-5-125 (4), in no case shall an abatement or refund of taxes be made unless a petition for abatement or refund is filed within two years after January 1 of the year following the year in which the taxes were levied. For purposes of this subsection (1)(a)(I)(A), “clerical error” shall include, but shall not be limited to, any clerical error made by a taxpayer in completing personal property schedules pursuant to the provisions of article 5 of this title. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, for purposes of this subsection (1)(a)(I)(A), “erroneous valuation” shall include, but shall not be limited to: Any reclassification of property from agricultural land to any other classification of property for the property tax year commencing January 1, 1996, if the property in question qualifies for classification as agricultural land as determined pursuant to section 39-1-102 (1.6), as amended by Senate Bill 97-039, enacted at the first regular session of the sixty-first general assembly; and any denial of exemption from taxation for property claimed as agricultural and livestock products for the property tax year commencing January 1, 1996, if the property in question qualifies as agricultural and livestock products as determined pursuant to section 39-1-102 (1.1), as amended by Senate Bill 97-039, enacted at the first regular session of the sixty-first general assembly. (a) (I) (A) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (1)(a)(I)(D) and (1)(a)(I)(E) of this section, if taxes have been levied erroneously or illegally, whether due to erroneous valuation for assessment, irregularity in levying, clerical error, or overvaluation, the treasurer shall report the amount thereof to the board of county commissioners, which shall proceed to abate such taxes in the manner provided by law. The assessor shall make such report if the assessor discovers that taxes have been levied erroneously or illegally. If such taxes have been collected by the treasurer, the board of county commissioners shall authorize refund of the same in the manner provided by law. Except as provided in subsections (1)(a)(I)(E) and (1)(a)(I)(F) of this section and section 39-5-125 (4), in no case shall an abatement or refund of taxes be made unless a petition for abatement or refund is filed within two years after January 1 of the year following the year in which the taxes were levied. For purposes of this subsection (1)(a)(I)(A), “clerical error” shall include, but shall not be limited to, any clerical error made by a taxpayer in completing personal property schedules pursuant to the provisions of article 5 of this title. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, for purposes of this subsection (1)(a)(I)(A), “erroneous valuation” shall include, but shall not be limited to: Any reclassification of property from agricultural land to any other classification of property for the property tax year commencing January 1, 1996, if the property in question qualifies for classification as agricultural land as determined pursuant to section 39-1-102 (1.6), as amended by Senate Bill 97-039, enacted at the first regular session of the sixty-first general assembly; and any denial of exemption from taxation for property claimed as agricultural and livestock products for the property tax year commencing January 1, 1996, if the property in question qualifies as agricultural and livestock products as determined pursuant to section 39-1-102 (1.1), as amended by Senate Bill 97-039, enacted at the first regular session of the sixty-first general assembly.    The assessor shall certify the proportional amount of the total amount of abatements and refunds granted pursuant to the provisions of this section to the appropriate taxing entities at the same time that the certification of valuation for assessment is made pursuant to the provisions of section 39-5-128. Any taxing entity may adjust the amount of its tax levy authorized pursuant to the provisions of section 29-1-301, C.R.S., by an additional amount which does not exceed the proportional share of the total amount of abatements and refunds made pursuant to the provisions of this section. After calculating the amount of property tax revenues necessary to satisfy the requirements of the “Public School Finance Act of 1994”, article 54 of title 22, C.R.S., any school district shall add an amount equal to the proportional share of the total amount of abatements and refunds granted pursuant to the provisions of this section prior to the setting of the mill levy for such school district. Any additional amount added pursuant to the provisions of this subsection (1) shall not be included in the total amount of revenue levied in said year for the purposes of computing the limit for the succeeding year pursuant to the provisions of section 29-1-301, C.R.S. Where a final determination is made granting an abatement or refund pursuant to the provisions of this section, the abatement or refund granted shall be payable at such time as determined by the board of county commissioners after consultation with affected taxing entities but no later than upon the payment of property taxes for the property tax year in which said final determination was made. For the purposes of this sub-subparagraph (B), a taxing entity's proportional share of the total amount of abatements and refunds granted shall be based upon the amount of tax levied by a taxing entity on such real property in proportion to the total amount of tax levied on such real property by such taxing entities. (B.5) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-subparagraph (B) of this subparagraph (I), no school district shall be required to levy additional amounts for abatements and refunds which are the result of any protests or appeals of valuation upon which final orders or judgments rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction have been issued and which reduce the valuation for assessment of the district by more than twenty percent. Any school district which is currently levying for abatements, refunds, or both and which would not be required to levy such amounts if this sub-subparagraph (B.5) had been in effect for the tax year in which the court orders or judgments were issued shall have no further obligation to levy for uncollected amounts.    The change or adjustment of any ratio of valuation for assessment shall not constitute grounds for abatement of taxes as provided in subsection (1)(a)(I)(A) of this section.    An abatement or refund of taxes must not be made based upon the ground of overvaluation of property if an objection or protest to such valuation has been made and a notice of determination has been mailed to the taxpayer pursuant to section 39-5-122; except that this prohibition does not apply to personal property when a notice of determination has been mailed to the taxpayer, an objection or protest is withdrawn or not pursued, and the county assessor has undertaken an audit of such personal property that shows that a reduction in value is warranted.    Notwithstanding the periods of limitation for filing a petition for and determining the amount of an abatement or refund of taxes provided in sub-subparagraphs (A) and (D) of this subparagraph (I), when an audit of prior years' taxes for the period described in section 39-10-101 (2)(b) discloses that taxes are due and owing on personal property or on mines and on oil and gas leaseholds, such taxes shall be subtracted from any overpayment of such taxes determined to be due pursuant to this subparagraph (I) for any years during such period and prior to computing delinquent interest.    Notwithstanding the periods of limitation for filing a petition for and determining the amount of an abatement or refund of taxes provided in sub-subparagraph (A) or (D) of this subparagraph (I), an abatement or refund of taxes may be made to any common interest community for property taxes levied for property tax years commencing on or after January 1, 1985, but prior to January 1, 1996, on property not valued in accordance with section 39-1-103 (10), if a petition for abatement or refund is filed on or before June 1, 1997.       Repealed.       Any taxes illegally or erroneously levied and collected, and delinquent interest thereon, are refunded pursuant to this section, together with refund interest at the same rate as that provided for delinquent interest set forth in section 39-10-104.5; except that refund interest shall not be paid if the taxes were erroneously levied and collected as a result of an error made by the taxpayer in completing personal property schedules pursuant to the provisions of article 5 of this title 39. For abatements or refunds made pursuant to a petition for abatement or refund filed prior to January 1, 2018, refund interest accrues from the date payment of taxes and delinquent interest thereon was received by the treasurer from the taxpayer; except that refund interest accrues from the date a complete abatement petition is filed if the taxes were erroneously levied and collected as a result of an error or omission made by the taxpayer in completing the statements required pursuant to the provisions of article 7 of this title 39 and the county pays the abatement or refund within the time frame set forth in subsection (1)(a)(I)(B) of this section. For abatements or refunds made pursuant to a petition for abatement or refund filed on or after January 1, 2018, refund interest accrues from the date a complete abatement petition is filed. Beginning January 1, 2020, refund interest accrues from the date a complete abatement petition is filed or the date payment of taxes was received by the treasurer, whichever is later.    Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if a county, board of assessment appeals, court of competent jurisdiction, or the property tax administrator determines that a property is exempt from taxation under sections 39-3-106 to 39-3-113.5 or section 39-3-116, and if the county, board, court, or administrator finds competent evidence that said property became or remained subject to taxation for a period as a result of an error or omission made by the taxpayer, then the county, the board of assessment appeals, court of competent jurisdiction, or the property tax administrator may award refund interest or any other type of interest for not greater than two property tax years. Any interest awarded pursuant to this paragraph (c) shall be at the same rate as provided in section 39-10-104.5.         Any taxes levied on personal property, including but not limited to mobile homes, which are determined to be uncollectible after a period of one year after the date of their becoming delinquent may be canceled by the board of county commissioners.    When any real property has been stricken off to a county by virtue of a tax sale and there has been no transfer by the county of a certificate of purchase thereon, the taxes on such property may be determined to be uncollectible after a period of six years from the date of becoming delinquent, and they may be canceled by the board of county commissioners. Such cancellation shall not affect the rights of the county under article 11 of this title to subsequently transfer any tax sale certificate nor its right to receive a tax deed and to exercise its rights thereunder with respect to such property.       The treasurer shall keep a complete record of all taxes abated, refunded, or determined to be uncollectible and canceled by the board of county commissioners as provided in subsection (2) of this section. The treasurer shall file an annual report with the administrator by August 25 of each year that shall include all taxes abated, refunded, or determined to be uncollectible and canceled. Such report shall include the name of each owner of taxable property granted such abatement, refund, or cancellation of property taxes, the amount of property taxes abated, refunded, or canceled, and the date such abatement, refund, or cancellation was granted. The treasurer shall also file an annual report with the department of revenue by August 10 of each year that shall include all taxes on personal property abated or refunded. Such report shall include the name of each owner of taxable personal property granted such abatement or refund of personal property taxes, the schedule number that was the basis for the imposition of the taxes abated or refunded, if applicable, the amount of personal property taxes abated or refunded, and the date such abatement or refund was granted.      History. Source: L. 64: R&RE, p. 722, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 137-10-14. L. 70: P. 390, § 4. L. 80: (2)(a) amended, p. 500, § 5, effective July 1. L. 81: (1) amended, p. 1837, § 2, effective January 1, 1982. L. 88: (1)(a) and (3) amended, p. 1290, § 24, effective May 23. L. 89: (1)(a)(I)(A) amended, p. 1459, § 19, effective June 7. L. 90: (1)(b) amended, p. 1719, § 8, effective June 7; (1)(a)(I)(B) amended and (1)(a)(I)(D) added, p. 1702, § 36, effective June 9; (1)(b) amended, p. 1088, § 56, effective July 1. L. 91: (1)(a)(I)(A), (1)(a)(I)(B), and (1)(a)(I)(D) amended, p. 1963, § 3, effective June 5. L. 92: (1)(b) and (2)(a) amended, pp. 2230, 2236, §§ 16, 2, effective April 9; (1)(a)(I)(A) and (1)(a)(I)(D) amended and (1)(a)(I)(E) added, p. 2239, § 2, effective April 10; (1)(b) amended, p. 2186, § 68, effective June 2. L. 93: (1)(b) amended, p. 306, § 7, effective April 7; (1)(a)(I)(B.5) added, p. 998, § 1, effective June 2. L. 94: (1)(a)(I)(B) amended, p. 825, § 57, effective April 27. L. 96: (1)(a)(I)(A) and (3) amended, p. 115, § 3, effective March 25; (1)(a)(I)(A) and (1)(b) amended and (1)(a)(I)(F) added, p. 573, § 1, effective April 25; (1)(a)(I)(D) and (1)(a)(I)(E) amended, p. 650, §§ 4, 5, effective May 1. L. 97: (1)(a)(I)(A) amended, p. 511, § 2, effective April 24. L. 2000: (3) amended, p. 751, § 4, effective May 23. L. 2002: (1)(b) amended, p. 843, § 6, effective August 7. L. 2003: (1)(b) amended, p. 919, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2009: (1)(c) added,(HB 09-1265), ch. 47, p. 170, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2013: (1)(a)(I)(D) amended,(HB 13-1113), ch. 11, p. 32, § 7, effective March 8; (1)(c) amended,(HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1705, § 124, effective August 7. L. 2017: (1)(a)(I)(A) and (1)(b) amended,(HB 17-1049), ch. 148, p. 494, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2020: (1)(a)(I)(D) amended,(SB 20-136), ch. 70, p. 293, § 38, effective September 14; (1)(b) amended,(HB 20-1077), ch. 80, p. 327, § 17, effective September 14. L. 2021: (1)(a)(I)(C) amended,(SB 21-293), ch. 301, p. 1813, § 13, effective June 23. History. Source: L. 64: R&RE, p. 722, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 137-10-14. L. 70: P. 390, § 4. L. 80: (2)(a) amended, p. 500, § 5, effective July 1. L. 81: (1) amended, p. 1837, § 2, effective January 1, 1982. L. 88: (1)(a) and (3) amended, p. 1290, § 24, effective May 23. L. 89: (1)(a)(I)(A) amended, p. 1459, § 19, effective June 7. L. 90: (1)(b) amended, p. 1719, § 8, effective June 7; (1)(a)(I)(B) amended and (1)(a)(I)(D) added, p. 1702, § 36, effective June 9; (1)(b) amended, p. 1088, § 56, effective July 1. L. 91: (1)(a)(I)(A), (1)(a)(I)(B), and (1)(a)(I)(D) amended, p. 1963, § 3, effective June 5. L. 92: (1)(b) and (2)(a) amended, pp. 2230, 2236, §§ 16, 2, effective April 9; (1)(a)(I)(A) and (1)(a)(I)(D) amended and (1)(a)(I)(E) added, p. 2239, § 2, effective April 10; (1)(b) amended, p. 2186, § 68, effective June 2. L. 93: (1)(b) amended, p. 306, § 7, effective April 7; (1)(a)(I)(B.5) added, p. 998, § 1, effective June 2. L. 94: (1)(a)(I)(B) amended, p. 825, § 57, effective April 27. L. 96: (1)(a)(I)(A) and (3) amended, p. 115, § 3, effective March 25; (1)(a)(I)(A) and (1)(b) amended and (1)(a)(I)(F) added, p. 573, § 1, effective April 25; (1)(a)(I)(D) and (1)(a)(I)(E) amended, p. 650, §§ 4, 5, effective May 1. L. 97: (1)(a)(I)(A) amended, p. 511, § 2, effective April 24. L. 2000: (3) amended, p. 751, § 4, effective May 23. L. 2002: (1)(b) amended, p. 843, § 6, effective August 7. L. 2003: (1)(b) amended, p. 919, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2009: (1)(c) added,(HB 09-1265), ch. 47, p. 170, § 1, effective August 5. L. 2013: (1)(a)(I)(D) amended,(HB 13-1113), ch. 11, p. 32, § 7, effective March 8; (1)(c) amended,(HB 13-1300), ch. 316, p. 1705, § 124, effective August 7. L. 2017: (1)(a)(I)(A) and (1)(b) amended,(HB 17-1049), ch. 148, p. 494, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2020: (1)(a)(I)(D) amended,(SB 20-136), ch. 70, p. 293, § 38, effective September 14; (1)(b) amended,(HB 20-1077), ch. 80, p. 327, § 17, effective September 14. L. 2021: (1)(a)(I)(C) amended,(SB 21-293), ch. 301, p. 1813, § 13, effective June 23.    Editor's note:    Subsection (1)(a)(II)(B) provided for the repeal of subsection (1)(a)(II), effective January 1, 1989. (SeeL. 88, p. 1290.)    Amendments to subsection (1)(a)(I)(A) by House Bill 96-1131 and House Bill 96-1290 were harmonized.     Cross references:    For the authorization for school districts to apply to the state contingency reserve for assistance relating to abatements and refunds of taxes, see § 22-54-117; for the administrative procedure for abatement of taxes, see § 39-1-113; for approval of tax abatements and rebates by the property tax administration, see § 39-2-116.    For the legislative declaration in SB 20-136, see section 1 of chapter 70, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.     ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS.    III. EQUITY JURISDICTION.     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Law reviews. For article, “A Calendar of Tax Procedure in Colorado”, see 6 Dicta 17 (July 1929). For article, “The Tax Refund Statute Speaks”, see 10 Dicta 196 (1933). For article, “The Reluctant Taxpayer: His Remedy by Injunction”, see 15 Dicta 137 (1938). For article, “Some Aspects of Colorado Taxpayers' Remedies”, see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 145 (1950). For article, “Property Tax Assessments in Colorado”, see 12 Colo. Law. 563 (1983). For article, “Legislative Update on Property Taxation and New Arbitration Procedures”, see 17 Colo. Law. 1751 (1988).   Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.   Subsection (1)(a)(I)(B) is consistent with art. X, § 20 of the state constitution. Bolt v. Arapahoe County Sch. Dist. No. 6, 898 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1995).   Court of appeals' review of order of board of assessment appeals (BAA) as to illegality of excess mill levy neither violates the separation of powers nor constitutes an advisory opinion. The State Administrative Procedure Act specifically empowers the judicial branch to review executive action. Parties may appeal a BAA decision to the court of appeals under § 39-10-114.5 (2) . Statutory interpretations are not excluded from these appeals. Prospect 34, LLC v. Gunnison County Bd., 2015 COA 160 , 363 P.3d 819.   The advisory opinion doctrine does not preclude an appellate court from considering an issue because it is involved in a pending but entirely separate district court action. The excess mill levy question presents an actual controversy, not one based on hypothetical or uncertain facts. Prospect 34, LLC v. Gunnison County Bd., 2015 COA 160 , 363 P.3d 819.   Purpose of section. Recognizing the law and appreciating the necessity of prompt payment of the public revenue as an essential prerequisite to efficient government, the general assembly enacted this section. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 52 Colo. 609 , 125 P. 528 (1912).   Action under this section not forum to attack voidable judgment. A judgment ordering a tax levy for payment of another judgment alleged to have been procured by fraud and collusion is binding upon the taxpayers, unless and until the alleged voidable judgment is set aside in a direct proceeding brought for that purpose. An action under this section to recover taxes paid is not such direct proceeding. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 95 Colo. 435 , 37 P.2d 761 (1934).   Since no specific method for judicial review of the board's ruling under this section is provided, the State Administrative Procedure Act, §§ 24-4-101 et seq., applies and judicial review is proper in the city and county of Denver. Gunnison County v. Bd. of Assess. Appeals, 693 P.2d 400 (Colo. App. 1984).   Protest and adjustment procedures are separate and independent from abatement and refund procedures. An appeal for a trial de novo under § 39-8-108 is not an “alternate petition” for abatement or refund under subsection (1)(a)(I) of this section. Wyler/Pebble Creek Ranch v. Colo. Bd. of Assess. Appeals, 883 P.2d 597 (Colo. App. 1994).   Taxpayer's petition for abatement and refund is not precluded by subsection (1)(a)(I)(D) because it is based upon an erroneous valuation for assessment, which is a legal issue, rather than overvaluation, which is a factual issue. Taxpayer's abatement petition asserts that, as a matter of law, absent unusual conditions that are not at issue, the assessments for 1999 and 2000 must be the same, and the argument requires a legal, rather than a factual, determination. Boulder Country Club v. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs, 97 P.3d 119 (Colo. App. 2003).   This section does not contain a provision for abatement or refund of property taxes paid by a taxpayer through self-reporting of personal property it knows does not exist. Boulder County Bd. of Comm'rs v. HealthSouth Corp., 246 P.3d 948 (Colo. 2011).   The power of the BAA to order taxes abated under subsection (1)(a)(I)(A) extends to taxpayer's assertion that the tax at issue exceeded the maximum mill levy allowed in special district's service plan. The phrase “irregularity in levying” encompasses an unlawful or illegal mill levy. Prospect 34, LLC v. Gunnison County Bd., 2015 COA 160 , 363 P.3d 819.   Refund interest is interest paid to the taxpayer by the county to compensate the taxpayer for having paid erroneously levied taxes; therefore refund interest begins to accrue until the taxpayer pays the tax, and not on the date of a lien sale. Dove Valley Bus. Park Assocs. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Arapahoe County, 923 P.2d 242 (Colo. App. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 945 P.2d 395 (Colo. 1997).   Applied in Lowden v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 101 Colo. 52 , 69 P.2d 779 (1937); Laredo Hous. Apts., Ltd. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 628 P.2d 135 (Colo. App. 1980); Laredo Hous. Apts., Ltd. v. Bd. of Assmt. Appeals, 675 P.2d 23 (Colo. App. 1983); Lucchesi v. State, 807 P.2d 1185 (Colo. App. 1990).   II. OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS.   This is substantive law, giving a new right; this section has nothing to do directly with the law of procedure. Union P. R. R. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 222 F. 651 (8th Cir. 1915), rev'd on other grounds, 247 U.S. 282, 38 S. Ct. 510, 62 L. Ed. 1110 (1918).   This section imposes upon county commissioners duty of refunding taxes which have been paid and are found to be illegal. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Benedict, 229 U.S. 481, 33 S. Ct. 942, 57 L. Ed. 1288 (1913); Union P. R. R. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 247 U.S. 282, 38 S. Ct. 510, 62 L. Ed. 1110 (1918).   Correlative right upon taxpayer to maintain action for refund. This section confers upon the taxpayer a correlative right to enforce the county commissioners' duty of refunding taxes by an action at law. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Benedict, 229 U.S. 481, 33 S. Ct. 942, 57 L. Ed. 1288 (1913); Union P. R. R. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 247 U.S. 282, 38 S. Ct. 510, 62 L. Ed. 1110 (1918).   Taxpayer has right to maintain suit at law in state court for recovery of a tax not legally laid, or growing out of an illegal assessment, or the validity of which he has right to question. Baker v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 106 F.2d 525 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 620, 60 S. Ct. 296, 84 L. Ed. 518 (1939); Northcutt v. Burton, 127 Colo. 145 , 254 P.2d 1013 (1953), overruled in Bd. of Assess. Appeals v. Benbrook, 735 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1987).   Property owner's remedy for levy of excessive tax. In Colorado, the remedy of a property owner for the levy of an excessive tax is to pay under protest and to bring an action against the county to recover the same. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 10 F.2d 506 (D. Colo. 1926 ).   Tax must be illegal and void for recovery in action at law. An error as to valuation of property for taxation, even if excessive, does not render the tax illegal and void, which is necessary in order to recover in an action at law. S. Broadway Nat'l Bank v. City & County of Denver, 51 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1931).   Excessive application of tax. An equity in school lands is a property right notwithstanding it may have no cash value. If the land is of no value, an assessment thereon for tax purposes would be merely excessive and not illegal. Bordner v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 92 Colo. 81 , 18 P.2d 323 (1932).   Taxpayer's burden to show illegal assessment. Where one attempts to maintain a proceeding for a tax refund pursuant to this section, he has the burden of showing that the tax was illegally laid, is erroneous in its entirety, and is incapable of adjustment. Weidenhaft v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 131 Colo. 432 , 283 P.2d 164 (1955).   When section provides taxpayer relief from overassessment. The provisions of this section provide taxpayer relief from the overassessment of his property in situations where his knowledge of the excessive charge is acquired subsequent to the usual statutory deadlines for protests. Modular Cmtys., Inc. v. McKnight, 191 Colo. 101 , 550 P.2d 866 (1976).   The term “erroneous valuation for assessment” in this section and “excessive valuation” under the protest adjustment provisions of § 39-5-122 refer to the same process of assessment, and the remedies available to the taxpayer under this section apply to refunds ordered pursuant to § 39-8-109 . Bd. of Assess. Appeals v. Benbrook, 735 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1987).   This section and § 39-1-113 provide a remedy for the abatement or refund of taxes that cannot be challenged under § 39-5-122 . Valley Country Club v. Bd. of Assess. Appeals, 778 P.2d 285 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 792 P.2d 299 (Colo. 1990).   Section does not provide rights for tax lien purchasers. Hughey v. Jefferson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 921 P.2d 76 (Colo. App. 1996).   The abatement procedure may be used to provide taxpayer relief from the overassessment of his property in situations where his knowledge of excessive charges is acquired subsequent to the usual statutory deadlines for protest. Valley Country Club v. Bd. of Assess. Appeals, 778 P.2d 285 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 792 P.2d 299 (Colo. 1990).   Subject to specified exception, relief under subsection (1)(a)(I)(A) is not available for taxes levied prior to January 1, 1988. Capital Assoc. Intern. v. Arapahoe Com'rs., 802 P.2d 1180 (Colo. App. 1990).   Prior to suit, taxpayer must exhaust administrative remedies. The remedies contained in this section and § 39-1-113 are complete and adequate; thus, prior to commencing a suit on illegal taxation issues, taxpayers are required to exhaust the administrative remedies detailed in these sections. Davison v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 41 Colo. App. 344, 585 P.2d 315 (1978); S. Cafeteria, Inc. v. Propty. Tax Adm'r, 677 P.2d 362 (Colo. App. 1983).   Administrative remedies available under this article cannot be dispensed with. First Nat'l Bank v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 264 U.S. 450, 44 S. Ct. 385, 68 L. Ed. 784 (1924).   Invocation of administrative remedies must be alleged. A complaint is fatally defective where it does not contain the indispensable allegation that administrative remedies have been invoked. Bordner v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 92 Colo. 81 , 18 P.2d 323 (1932).   County is liable to one who pays tax imposed without authority of law. An unsatisfied judgment recovered by the taxpayer against the collector is no bar to his action against the county, even though the collector made no return to the county and converted the money to his own use. Spaulding Mfg. Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 63 Colo. 438 , 168 P. 34 (1917).   Illegal or erroneous tax. Where one owner of a converted condominium, after pursuing administrative remedies under § 39-5-122 , obtained a declaration from district court that the imposition of an increased tax on his converted condominium was illegal, petitioners, as owners of identical condominiums, were entitled to seek relief under the abatement and refund provisions of § 39-1-113 and this section because the tax had been declared illegal. Bd. of Assess. Appeals v. Benbrook, 735 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1987); Am. Airlines v. Bd. of Equaliz., 749 P.2d 986 (Colo. App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 773 P.2d 1033 (Colo. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 851, 110 S. Ct. 151, 107 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1989).   There is no need to characterize the tax paid as wholly illegal before the taxpayer may obtain abatement and refund. Bd. of Assess. Appeals v. Benbrook, 735 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1987).   The administrator's determination that 1989 property tax was excessive does not render the tax illegal or otherwise erroneous and did not thereby provide an avenue for taxpayer to obtain an abatement of 1990 taxes because there was no evidence of changed or unusual conditions between 1989 and 1990. Yale Invs., Inc. v. Prop. Tax Adm'r, 897 P.2d 890 (Colo. App. 1995).   Where assessor failed to give timely notice of property valuation, proper remedy is not to invalidate tax but to allow taxpayer to seek abatement of the tax increase pursuant to this section. Bea Kay Real Estate Corp. v. Aragon, 782 P.2d 837 (Colo. App. 1989).   While subsection (1)(a)(I)(D) bars a petition for abatement only in those situations in which the determination of the prior protest “has been mailed to the taxpayer”, there was sufficient evidence to show the determination was mailed to an agent of the taxpayer and as such was authorized to receive the notice on behalf of the taxpayer. Yale Invs., Inc. v. Prop. Tax Adm'r, 897 P.2d 890 (Colo. App. 1995).   Abatement and refund allowed for illegally or erroneously levied taxes based on overvaluation caused by taxpayer error. Where overvaluation of property and consequent overpayment of property tax results solely from the taxpayer's inadvertent error, the taxpayer has a right to seek abatement and refund under subsection (1)(a)(I)(A). OXY USA Inc. v. Mesa County Bd. of Comm'rs, 2017 CO 104, 405 P.3d 1142.   Where error is due at least in part to the taxing authority, a taxpayer can recover a refund under the clerical error provision of this section, after the time to protest under § 39-5-122 has passed. Coquina Oil Corp. v. Bd. of Equaliz., 770 P.2d 1196 (Colo. 1989).   Section does not enlarge right to contest an overvaluation. It expresses an intent merely to restrict the statute of limitations as to abatement claims. 5050 S. Broadway Corp. v. Arapahoe County Bd. of Comm'rs, 815 P.2d 966 (Colo. App. 1991).   Clerical error doesn't encompass the mistakes of an assessor who makes factual errors in property valuations. A challenge to a valuation that involves a claim that comparable properties used were overvalued is not clerical error. 5050 S. Broadway Corp. v. Arapahoe County Bd. of Comm'rs, 815 P.2d 966 (Colo. App. 1991).   Nor taxpayer's error in failing to insure that recorded deed correctly described land conveyed. Citibank v. Bd. of Assess. Appeals, 826 P.2d 871 (Colo. 1992).   Taxpayer may seek an abatement and refund under this section even though taxpayer initially protested valuation of the property under § 39-5-122 , because the taxpayer did not base its petition for abatement on the ground of overvaluation but on the arbitrator's clerical error. Landmark Petroleum v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 870 P.2d 610 (Colo. App. 1993).   When arbitrator made a clerical error in an award and award does not reflect the valuation intended by the arbitrator, a taxpayer may file for an abatement and refund. Arbitrator attempted to remedy the error within a reasonable time by reporting the error within two days of entering the award. Landmark Petroleum v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 870 P.2d 610 (Colo. App. 1993).   Taxpayer sufficiently demonstrated an injury to a legally protected right when he sought relief for an alleged overvaluation of property. Utah Motel Assocs. v. Denver County Bd. of Comm'rs, 844 P.2d 1295 (Colo. App. 1992).   Abatement is not the only remedy for overvaluation of property when property has filed a timely protest to assessor's valuation and appealed. Tenney v. Bd. of Assess. Appeals, 856 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1993).   Challenges based on overvaluation. Although taxpayers challenged the amount of taxes assessed as excessive, this was not an “overvaluation” as the term is used in this statute because, due to the taxpayers' wrongful inaction, the assessor's BIA valuations are presumed to be valid. Therefore, for purposes of this statute, the assessor's valuation cannot be considered an overvaluation, and this section may not be asserted by a taxpayer to avoid the provisions of § 39-5-118 and the protest procedure under § 39-5-122 . Prop. Tax Adm'r v. Prod. Geophysical, 860 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1993).   Application of abatement procedure to personal property taxes. The protest procedure set forth in § 39-5-122 , as opposed to the abatement procedure set forth in this section, is the exclusive method for challenging personal property BIA evaluations. Prop. Tax Adm'r v. Prod. Geophysical, 860 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1993); Spectra Pub. v. Prop. Tax Adm'r, 860 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1993).   Taxpayer did not lack standing to file for abatement even though he was the purchaser of the property on which the taxes were due and did not himself pay the taxes. Utah Motel Assocs. v. Denver County Bd. of Comm'rs, 844 P.2d 1295 (Colo. App. 1992).   The four-year time limitation for bringing suit under § 20 of article X of the Colorado Constitution (TABOR) does not affect the two-year time limitation set forth in this section. Prop. Tax Adjustment Specialists, Inc. v. Mesa County Bd. of Comm'rs, 956 P.2d 1277 (Colo. App. 1998).   In calculating the two-year limitation for filing a personal property tax abatement petition pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(I)(A), the day from which the two-year period runs is excluded and the last day is included. If the last day is a holiday, the period is extended one day. Golden Aluminum v. Weld County Comm'rs, 867 P.2d 190 (Colo. App. 1993).   Two-year limitation period may not be applied to park and recreation district that was required to pay taxes due from the previous owner of land but did not receive various notices required by statute. S. Suburban Park and Recreation Dist. v. Bd. of Assess. Appeals, 894 P.2d 771 (Colo. App. 1994).   Refunds and abatements for tax years before 1990 are time barred, unless a petition was filed prior to January 2, 1992. Woodmoor Imp. v. Prop. Tax Adm'r, 895 P.2d 1087 (Colo. App. 1994).   No violation of the prohibition against retrospective laws existed in court's application of two-year statute of repose, rather than prior six-year statute, to homeowners' association's petition for abatement and refund. Woodmoor Imp. v. Prop. Tax Adm'r, 895 P.2d 1087 (Colo. App. 1994).   It is appropriate for court to give deference to contemporaneous construction of statute by the agency charged with its administration. The property tax administrator had issued a memorandum to county tax assessors to the same effect as the court's holding. Bd. of Assess. Appeals v. Country Club, 792 P.2d 299 (Colo. 1990); Utah Motel Associates v. Denver County Bd. of Comm'rs, 844 P.2d 1295 (Colo. App. 1992).   Statutes governing abatement and refund procedure do not address whether multiple abatement-refund petitions are permissible regarding same property for same tax year, but second abatement-refund action differing from first only in that taxpayer sought a further valuation reduction is barred under principles of res judicata or claim preclusion. Red Junction, LLC v. Mesa County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 174 P.3d 841 (Colo. App. 2007).   For neglect of taxpayer barring relief, see Miller v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 92 Colo. 425 , 21 P.2d 714, appeal dismissed, 290 U.S. 586, 54 S. Ct. 78, 78 L. Ed. 518 (1933); E. A. Stephens & Co. v. Bd. of Equaliz., 104 Colo. 556 , 92 P.2d 732 (1939).   III. EQUITY JURISDICTION.   Remedy afforded by this section is suit at law and is available in the federal courts the same as in state courts. Union P. R. R. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 222 F. 651 (8th Cir. 1915), rev'd on other grounds, 247 U.S. 282, 38 S. Ct. 510, 62 L. Ed. 1110 (1918).   This section affords an adequate remedy at law in case of an illegal or erroneous levy. Denver & R. G. R. R. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 69 Colo. 212 , 193 P. 555 (1920); Union Nat'l Bank v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 75 Colo. 298 , 225 P. 851 (1924).   Equity will not entertain jurisdiction unless there exists some recognized equitable ground for the granting of relief. Denver & R. G. R. R. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 69 Colo. 212 , 193 P. 555 (1920).   Exceptional circumstances required. Upon a full consideration of public interest, of judicial pronouncement in general upon the subject involved, and of this section, which affords a complete remedy in a proper case, it is rarely possible, and then under most exceptional and unusual circumstances, that a cause of action to restrain the collection of taxes can be stated of which equity will or ought to take cognizance. Grater v. Logan High Sch. Dist., 64 Colo. 600 , 173 P. 714 (1918).   Injunctive interference in collection of public revenues opposed. Public interest, judicial announcement, and statutory enactment are opposed to injunctive interference in the collection of the public revenues. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 52 Colo. 609 , 125 P. 528 (1912); Tallon v. Vindicator Consol. Gold Mining Co., 59 Colo. 316 , 149 P. 108 (1915); Nile Irrigation Dist. v. English, 60 Colo. 406 , 153 P. 760 (1915); Kendrick v. A. Y. & Minnie Mining & Milling Co., 63 Colo. 214 , 164 P. 1161 (1917).   Tax must be prima facie void before equity will interfere. It is a prerequisite, before a court of equity will interfere to restrain the collection of taxes, as a general rule, though there may be some exceptions, that the tax must be prima facie void. Tallon v. Vindicator Consol. Gold Mining Co., 59 Colo. 316 , 149 P. 108 (1915).   Principles of equity did not prohibit application of two-year statute of repose where homeowners' association failed to allege that assessor concealed facts or otherwise prevented it from filing a timely petition, was aware of its status as a nonprofit association, received yearly tax assessments, and failed to file a petition for abatement until eight months after due date. Woodmoor Imp. v. Prop. Tax Adm'r, 895 P.2d 1087 (Colo. App. 1994).