CO Code § 18-1-802 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 1 - Provisions Applicable to Offenses Generally|Part 8 - Responsibility|§ 18-1-802. Insanity

     A person who is insane, as defined in section 16-8-101, C.R.S., is not responsible for his or her conduct defined as criminal. Insanity as a defense shall not be an issue in any prosecution unless it is raised by a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity as provided in section 16-8-103, C.R.S.    This subsection (1) applies to offenses committed before July 1, 1995.         A person who is insane, as defined in section 16-8-101.5, C.R.S., is not responsible for his or her conduct defined as criminal. Insanity as a defense shall not be an issue in any prosecution unless it is raised by a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity as provided in section 16-8-103, C.R.S.    This subsection (2) shall apply to offenses occurring on or after July 1, 1995.         History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 412, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-902 . L. 72: P. 268, § 7. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 5, § 4, effective January 31.    Cross references:    For pleading the defense of insanity, see Crim. P. 11(e).    For the legislative intent of the 1996 amendments to this section, see § 16-8-101.3.     ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “Mens Rea and the Colorado Criminal Code”, see 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 167 (1981). For article, “Trauma, Crime and the Affirmative Defense”, see 11 Colo. Law. 2401 (1982). For article, “Checklists to Evaluate Vietnam Vet Stress Disorders”, see 12 Colo. Law. 273 (1983).   Annotator's note. Since § 18-1-803 is similar to former § 40-1-5 , C.R.S. 1963, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.   By asserting insanity defense, defendant admits the act charged but denies criminal responsibility for the act. Leick v. People, 322 P.2d 674 (Colo.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 922, 78 S. Ct. 1363, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1366 (1958); People v. Gilliland, 769 P.2d 477 (Colo. 1989).   One insane when he commits act prohibited by law cannot be held guilty of a crime. A statute providing that insanity shall be no defense to a criminal charge would be unconstitutional. Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518 , 22 P.2d 1109 (1933).   No matter how brutal a homicide may be, a person who is insane at the time of committing it cannot lawfully be convicted of murder, but if found guilty of committing the act must be confined in a state institution under the laws governing that institution. Graham v. People, 95 Colo. 544 , 38 P.2d 87 (1934).   At commencement of the trial defendant is presumed to have been sane at the time of the alleged commission of the crime charged. Shank v. People, 79 Colo. 576 , 247 P. 559 (1926).   Accused must produce evidence raising reasonable doubt as to sanity. The killing being admitted or proven, an accused who relies upon the absence of sanity as a defense must produce evidence which will at least raise a reasonable doubt of its existence. Shank v. People, 79 Colo. 576 , 247 P. 559 (1926).   Burden is on the state to prove sanity. When the question of defendant's sanity is properly raised, the burden is upon the people to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time he committed the act charged. If the evidence raises in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the crime charged, they must find him not guilty. Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518 , 22 P.2d 1109 (1933).   The people are not required in the first instance to offer proof of sanity, sanity being presumed in the absence of evidence tending to show the contrary. But when evidence is introduced tending to show insanity, the people have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the sanity of the defendant. Graham v. People, 95 Colo. 544 , 38 P.2d 87 (1934).   Every criminal defendant is presumed sane, but once any evidence of insanity is introduced at trial, the burden of proof is on the people to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Wright, 648 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1982).   Question of reasonable doubt as to sanity is for jury. In a homicide case the question of reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity is for the jury, and its finding thereon, based on conflicting evidence, is not reviewable. Shank v. People, 79 Colo. 576 , 247 P. 559 (1926).   The question of sanity in a criminal case is an issue of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. People v. Wright, 648 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1982).   Accused is entitled to have jury pass on question of his sanity. One accused of a crime is entitled to raise and have a jury pass upon the question of whether he was sane or insane when he committed the act with which he is charged. Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518 , 22 P.2d 1109 (1933).   Upon the trial for murder, evidence of the insanity of a grandfather and of an aunt of the defendant is competent to show hereditary insanity in the family and proper for the jury to consider with the other evidence in the case as an aid in passing upon the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the homicide. When such evidence has been introduced, an instruction the effect of which is to deprive the defendant of its benefit is erroneous. Jones v. People, 23 Colo. 276 , 47 P. 275 (1896).   Where in the trial of an indictment there is evidence tending to show that the accused in committing the act was not mentally accountable, an instruction that withdraws this defense from the jury, or from which the jury may reasonably infer that in the opinion of the court this defense is not in the case, is error. Pribble v. People, 49 Colo. 210 , 112 P. 220 (1910).   Defendant's status as a ward of the state was not conclusive evidence of insanity. It does not follow from a commitment to such an institution that one necessarily is incapable of forming an intent to commit a crime. McConnell v. People, 157 Colo. 235 , 402 P.2d 75 (1965).   Defendant found sane in separate sanity hearing. The argument that the defendant was incapable of forming the requisite mens rea and, therefore, could not be criminally responsible for his acts, is unpersuasive where the defendant was found sane in a separate sanity hearing prior to trial, and no objection was raised as to the propriety of the proceedings. Johnson v. People, 174 Colo. 413 , 484 P.2d 110 (1971).   Insanity adjudication results in a presumptive continuation of a state of mental incapacity until it is shown that sanity has been restored. People v. Giles, 662 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1983).   Committed person not incapable of committing crime. An insanity adjudication represents a judicial determination that an accused is not legally responsible for a past criminal act by reason of a mental disease or defect which existed at the time the act was committed. It is simply not true, however, that an insanity adjudication renders a committed person legally incapable of committing future crimes during the period of commitment. People v. Giles, 662 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1983).   Insanity is an affirmative defense to a crime. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992); People v. Hill, 934 P.2d 821 (Colo. 1997).   The “deific-decree” delusion is recognized in Colorado; a defendant may be judged legally insane if the defendant's cognitive ability to distinguish right from wrong with respect to the act has been destroyed as a result of a psychotic delusion that God has decreed the act. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992).   Applied in Gould v. People, 167 Colo. 113 , 445 P.2d 580 (1968); People v. Gallegos, 628 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1981); People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981).