CO Code § 38-8-104 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 38 - Property - Real and Personal|Article 8 - Fraudulent Transfers|§ 38-8-104. Value

  Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise made otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support to the debtor or another person.    For the purposes of sections 38-8-105 and 38-8-106, a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive sale, foreclosing on assets subject to a lien, or pursuant to the execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.    A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous.     History. Source: L. 91: Entire article added, p. 1684, § 1, effective July 1.    Editor's note - Colorado legislative change: This section was numbered as section 3 in the uniform act. In subsection (2), after “conducted,”, the phrase “noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution” has been changed to “noncollusive sale, foreclosing on assets subject to a lien, or pursuant to the execution”.   OFFICIAL COMMENT    This section defines “value” as used in various contexts in this Act, frequently with a qualifying adjective. The word appears in the following sections:    Section 3(a) (numbered as section 38-8-104 (1) in C.R.S.) is adapted from § 548(d)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. See also § 3(a) of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. The definition in Section 3 is not exclusive. “Value” is to be determined in light of the purpose of the Act to protect a debtor's estate from being depleted to the prejudice of the debtor's unsecured creditors. Consideration having no utility from a creditor's viewpoint does not satisfy the statutory definition. The definition does not specify all the kinds of consideration that do not constitute value for the purposes of this Act--e.g., love and affection. See, e.g., United States v. West, 299 F.Supp. 661, 666 (D.Del. 1969).    Section 3(a) does not indicate what is “reasonably equivalent value” for a transfer or obligation. Under this Act, as under § 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, a transfer for security is ordinarily for a reasonably equivalent value notwithstanding a discrepancy between the value of the asset transferred and the debt secured, since the amount of the debt is the measure of the value of the interest in the asset that is transferred. See, e.g., Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Holy Family Polish Nat'l Catholic Church, Carnegie, Pa., 341 Pa. 390, 19 A.2d 360 (1941). If, however, a transfer purports to secure more than the debt actually incurred or to be incurred, it may be found to be for less than a reasonably equivalent value. See e.g., In re Peoria Braumeister Co., 138 F.2d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1943) (chattel mortgage securing a $3,000 note held to be fraudulent when the debt secured was only $2,500); Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Jirasek, 254 Mich. 131, 140, 235 N.W. 836, 839 (1931) (quitclaim deed given as mortgage held to be fraudulent to the extent the value of the property transferred exceeded the indebtedness secured). If the debt is a fraudulent obligation under this Act, a transfer to secure it as well as the obligation would be vulnerable to attack as fraudulent. A transfer to satisfy or secure an antecedent debt owed an insider is also subject to avoidance under the conditions specified in Section 5(b) (numbered as section 38-8-106 (2) in C.R.S.).    Section 3(a) of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act has been thought not to recognize that an unperformed promise could constitute fair consideration. See McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 404, 414 (1933). Courts construing these provisions of the prior law nevertheless have held unperformed promises to constitute value in a variety of circumstances. See, e.g., Harper v. Lloyd's Factors, Inc., 214 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1954) (transfer of money for promise of factor to discount transferor's purchase-money notes given to fur dealer); Schlecht v. Schlecht, 168 Minn. 168, 176-77, 209 N.W. 883, 886-87 (1926) (transfer for promise to make repairs and improvements on transferor's homestead); Farmer's Exchange Bank v. Oneida Motor Truck Co., 202 Wis. 266, 232 N.W. 536 (1930) transfer in consideration of assumption of certain of transferor's liabilities; see also Hummel v. Cernocky, 161 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1947) (transfer in consideration of cash, assumption of a mortgage, payment of certain debts, and agreement to pay other debts). Likewise a transfer in consideration of a negotiable note discountable at a commercial bank, or the purchase from an established, solvent institution of an insurance policy, annuity, or contract to provide care and accommodations clearly appears to be for value. On the other hand, a transfer for an unperformed promise by an individual to support a parent or other transferor has generally been held voidable as a fraud on creditors of the transferor. See, e.g., Springfield Ins. Co. v. Fry, 267 F.Supp. 693 (N.D.Okla. 1967); Sandler v. Parlapiano, 236 App.Div. 70, 258 N.Y.Supp. 88 (1st Dep't 1932); Warwick Municipal Employees Credit Union v. Higham, 106 R.E. 363, 259 A.2d 852 (1969); Hulsether v. Sanders, 54 S.D. 412, 223 N.W. 335 (1929); Cooper v. Cooper, 22 Tenn.App. 473, 477, 124 S.W.2d 264, 267 (1939); Note, Rights of Creditors in Property Conveyed in Consideration of Future Support, 45 Iowa L.Rev. 546, 550-62 (1960). This Act adopts the view taken in the cases cited in determining whether an unperformed promise is value.    Subsection (b) (numbered as subsection (2) in C.R.S.) rejects the rule of such cases as Durrett v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (nonjudicial foreclosure of a mortgage avoided as a fraudulent transfer when the property of an insolvent mortgagor was sold for less than 70% of its fair value); and Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982) (nonjudicial foreclosure held to be fraudulent transfer if made without fair consideration). Subsection (b) adopts the view taken in Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on another ground, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), that the price bid at a public foreclosure sale determines the fair value of the property sold. Subsection (b) prescribes the effect of a sale meeting its requirements, whether the asset sold is personal or real property. The rule of this subsection applies to a foreclosure by sale of the interest of a vendee under an installment land contract in accordance with applicable law that requires or permits the foreclosure to be effected by a sale in the same manner as the foreclosure of a mortgage. See G.Osborne, G.Nelson, & D.Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law 83-84, 95-97 (1979). The premise of the subsection is that “a sale of the collateral by the secured party as the normal consequence of default . . . [is] the safest way of establishing the fair value of the collateral . . ..” 2 G.Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, 1227 (1965).    Subsection (c) (numbered as subsection (3) in C.R.S.) is an adaptation of § 547(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. A transfer to an insider for an antecedent debt may be voidable under § 5(b) infra (numbered as section 38-8-106 (2) in C.R.S.).     4(a)(2) (numbered as section 38-8-105 (1)(b) in C.R.S.) (“reasonably equivalent value”);   4(b)(8) (numbered as section 38-8-105 (2)(h) in C.R.S.) (“value ... reasonably equivalent);   5(a) (numbered as section 38-8-106 (1) in C.R.S.) (“reasonably equivalent value”);   5(b) (numbered as section 38-8-106 (2) in C.R.S.) (“present, reasonably equivalent value”);   8(a) (numbered as section 38-8-109 (1) in C.R.S.) (“reasonably equivalent value”);   8(b), (c), (d), and (e) (numbered as section 38-8-109 (2) , (3), (4), and (5) in C.R.S.) (“value”);   8(f)(1) (numbered as section 38-8-109 (6)(a) in C.R.S.) (“new value”); and   8(f)(3) (numbered as section 38-8-109 (6)(c) in C.R.S.) (“present value”).   If a lien given an insider for a present consideration is not perfected as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser or is so perfected after a delay following an extension of credit secured by the lien, foreclosure of the lien may result in a transfer for an antecedent debt that is voidable under Section 5(b) infra (numbered as section 38-8-106 (2) in C.R.S.). Subsection (b) does not apply to an action under Section 4(a)(1) (numbered as section 38-8-105 (1)(a) in C.R.S.) to avoid a transfer or obligation because made or incurred with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor.