GA Code § 36-66-3 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 36 - Local Government|Chapter 66 - Zoning Procedures|§ 36-66-3. Definitions

 As used in this chapter, the term:    "Local government" means any county or municipality which exercises zoning power within its territorial boundaries.   "Territorial boundaries" means, in the case of counties, the unincorporated areas thereof and any area defined in paragraph (5.1) of Code Section 36-70-2, and, in the case of municipalities, the area lying within the corporate limits thereof except any area defined in paragraph (5.1) of Code Section 36-70-2.   "Zoning" means the power of local governments to provide within their respective territorial boundaries for the zoning or districting of property for various uses and the prohibition of other or different uses within such zones or districts and for the regulation of development and the improvement of real estate within such zones or districts in accordance with the uses of property for which such zones or districts were established.   "Zoning decision" means final legislative action by a local government which results in:   The adoption of a zoning ordinance;   The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance which changes the text of the zoning ordinance;   The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance which rezones property from one zoning classification to another;   The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance by a municipal local government which zones property to be annexed into the municipality; or   The grant of a permit relating to a special use of property.     "Zoning ordinance" means an ordinance or resolution of a local government establishing procedures and zones or districts within its respective territorial boundaries which regulate the uses and development standards of property within such zones or districts. The term also includes the zoning map adopted in conjunction with a zoning ordinance which shows the zones and districts and zoning classifications of property therein.     (Code 1981, §36-66-3, enacted by Ga. L. 1985, p. 1139, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 806, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1009, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1567, § 2; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1391, § 1.)   Code Commission notes.   - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1985, the definitions were alphabetized.   Law reviews.   - For review of 1998 legislation relating to local government, see 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 194 (1998). For survey article on real property law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 193 (2015). For annual survey on zoning and land use law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 301 (2018).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   "Zoning decision" construed.    - Both passage and rescission of a text amendment change the text of the zoning ordinance. Both actions fit squarely within the statutory definition of a "zoning decision." Atlanta Bio-Med, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 261 Ga. 594, 408 S.E.2d 100 (1991).    Clause in a lease agreement between a city and the city's solid waste treatment provider which might require a future amendment to a zoning ordinance did not constitute a zoning decision. Grove v. Sugar Hill Inv. Assocs., 219 Ga. App. 781, 466 S.E.2d 901 (1995).    Since a real estate developer had neither concluded the purchase of property or made substantial expenditures in reliance upon the probable issuance of a building permit until after the county amended its zoning ordinance to the detriment of the developer, the developer did not acquire a vested right to develop the property in question in conformity with the old ordinance; the county board of commissioner's letter to the developer amounted to an agreement to amend the ordinance and, thus, invoked the notice and hearing requirements under Georgia's Zoning Procedures Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq. Buckner v. Douglas County, 273 Ga. App. 765, 615 S.E.2d 850 (2005).    Letter from a county to a developer advising that proposals would be considered under an amended ordinance limiting the development of private sewer systems was not a "decision" of the county for purposes of triggering the 30-day period to appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-3-20; therefore, the developer's claim of inverse condemnation never ripened. Mortgage Alliance Corp. v. Pickens County, 294 Ga. 212, 751 S.E.2d 51 (2013).   "Zoning ordinance".    - Commonly understood definition of "zoning ordinance" would encompass all those legislative acts that the Georgia's Zoning Procedures Law (ZPL), O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq., defines as "zoning decisions" under O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4); thus, the DeKalb County Organizational Act and the ZPL are consistent with one another because both distinguish between comprehensive zoning ordinances and all other zoning ordinances. Jester v. Red Alligator, LLC, 344 Ga. App. 15, 806 S.E.2d 920 (2017), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 479 (Ga. 2018).   Zoning map properly incorporated by reference.    - County zoning ordinance properly incorporated by reference an official zoning map as the board of commissioners had a zoning map before the commissioners when the commissioners considered the ordinance, the zoning map was in existence when a limited liability limited partnership (LLLP) bought the property and that map was kept in the zoning administrator's office, the new zoning administrator's uncertainty about which of two maps was the official map did not render the entire zoning ordinance invalid, and it was clear that the LLLP's land was not zoned for a landfill. Mid-Georgia Envtl. Mgmt. Group, L.L.L.P. v. Meriwether County, 277 Ga. 670, 594 S.E.2d 344 (2004).    Sign ordinances were subject to the Zoning Procedures Law (ZPL), O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq., when the ordinances were drafted in such a manner as to regulate the uses and development standards of property, i.e., signs, by means of zones or districts; if the city's sign ordinance was read as a whole, it was clear that the ordinance divided the city into districts and regulated the uses of signs relative to the districts in which the signs were located and, accordingly, was subject to the ZPL. City of Walnut Grove v. Questco, Ltd., 275 Ga. 266, 564 S.E.2d 445 (2002).   Failure to establish standing.    - Dismissal of the appellants' petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the grant of a special use permit to the appellees was upheld because the appellants only alleged generally that the art farm would create noise, light, and traffic, and that it would decrease property values, without alleging how those effects would harm the appellants differently than other property owners in the area. Davis v. Rockdale Art Farm, Inc., 354 Ga. App. 82, 840 S.E.2d 160 (2020).    Adult ordinance was not a "zoning ordinance" even though the ordinance placed certain limitations on locations available to an adult business and established certain minimum lot sizes and road frontages; rather than regulating general uses of land, the adult ordinance regulated a particular type of activity - adult entertainment; as such, it was not a zoning ordinance and was not subject to the hearing requirements established under the Zoning Procedures Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq. Artistic Entm't, Inc. v. City of Warner Robins, 331 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988, 124 S. Ct. 2017, 158 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2004).    Flood ordinances in question did not classify property into separate districts, instead, the ordinances applied to all property in the county subject to a specified physical phenomenon, specifically, periodic flooding; thus, the ordinances were not zoning ordinances subject to the notice requirements of the Zoning Procedures Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq., and were not invalid for failure to comply with that law. Union County v. CGP, Inc., 277 Ga. 349, 589 S.E.2d 240 (2003).   Overlay zoning ordinances.    - With regard to the landowners' action against a town and the town's officials alleging the unconstitutionality and invalidity of an overlay zoning district, the trial court erred by denying the landowners' motion for partial summary judgment with regard to the landowners' claim that the town did not have any legal authority to impose the requirements of the overlay zoning ordinance for right-of-way improvements on the state route abutting the property since the property at issue was outside the territorial boundaries of the town. Therefore, the requirements of the overlay zoning ordinance were invalid as to the property since the town had no zoning authority over the property. Century Ctr. at Braselton, LLC v. Town of Braselton, 285 Ga. 380, 677 S.E.2d 106 (2009).   Establishment of copy of zoning law.    - Application of former O.C.G.A. § 24-8-1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-11-2) in a county's action to establish a copy of a zoning ordinance that had been lost did not violate the Zoning Procedures Law (ZPL), O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq., because the trial court's decree did not have the effect of either adopting or amending any zoning ordinance; because it did not constitute final legislative action by a local government resulting in such adoption or amendment, the decree was not a "zoning decision" to which the ZPL applied, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4). East Georgia Land & Dev. Co. v. Baker, 286 Ga. 551, 690 S.E.2d 145 (2010).   Not a zoning ordinance.    - Trial court did not err in determining that the Zoning Procedures Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq., did not apply to City of Forest Park, Ga., Ordinance § 9-8-45 because the ordinance regulated businesses selling merchandise in a certain manner, and that the ordinance regulated businesses and included a distance restriction in its regulation of merchandise display did not render it a "zoning ordinance;" the passage of the ordinance was not a "zoning decision" as defined by O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4), and the ordinance was not a "zoning ordinance" as defined by § 36-66-3(5). Braley v. City of Forest Park, 286 Ga. 760, 692 S.E.2d 595 (2010).   Notice requirement in seeking conditional use permit.    - As a county's notice of the public hearing on a neighbor's request for a conditional use permit failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a) because the notice was published 46, not 45, days before the hearing, the county's approval of the neighbor's request was invalid. C & H Dev., LLC v. Franklin County, 294 Ga. App. 792, 670 S.E.2d 491 (2008).   Reference to "legislative" action not determinative.    - Because a decision denying a conditional use permit required the zoning board to determine the facts and apply the ordinance's legal standards to them, which was a decision-making process akin to a judicial act, the decision was reviewable by certiorari under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a); the owner's failure to file a certiorari petition barred the owner's claims. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)(E)'s reference to "legislative" action was not determinative. Riverdale Land Group, LLC v. Clayton County, 354 Ga. App. 1, 840 S.E.2d 132 (2020).   Decision on special use permit as quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.    - Decision by a county board to grant a special use permit was a quasi-judicial decision because the process involved determining the facts and applying the county ordinance's legal standards to the permits, which was akin to a judicial act; the applicant therefore waived the applicant's challenge to two property owners' standing by failing to object before the board. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)(E) did not apply or compel the conclusion that the board of commissioner's decision was legislative. York v. Athens College of Ministry, Inc., 348 Ga. App. 58, 821 S.E.2d 120 (2018).    Cited in Fairfax MK, Inc. v. City of Clarkston, 274 Ga. 520, 555 S.E.2d 722 (2001); Kingsley v. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc., 259 Ga. App. 207, 575 S.E.2d 921 (2002).