GA Code § 15-2-9 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 15 - Courts|Chapter 2 - Supreme Court|Article 1 - General Provisions|§ 15-2-9. Answers to Questions Certified by Federal Courts

  The Supreme Court of this state, by rule of court, may provide that when it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States, to any circuit court of appeals or district court of the United States, or to the Court of Appeals or the District Court of the District of Columbia that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of the laws of this state which are determinative of the case and there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of this state, such federal court may certify the questions of the laws of this state to the Supreme Court of this state for answers to the questions of state law, which certificate the Supreme Court of this state may answer by written opinion.   The Court of Appeals shall not have jurisdiction to consider any question certified under this Code section by transfer or otherwise.    (Code 1933, § 24-3902, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 577, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 337, § 1.)   Cross references.   - Certification of questions from federal courts as to Georgia law, Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia, Rule 37.   Law reviews.   - For article, "Federal Courts, State Law and Certification," see 23 Ga. St. B. J. 120 (1987). For essay on Georgia conflict of laws questions in contracts cases in the eleventh circuit and certification reform, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 531 (1995).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS    No federal rule requires use of certification. Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126, 249 S.E.2d 573 (1978).   No certification for moot questions.    - While federal district courts could certify open questions of law under the Georgia state constitution and relevant state statutes to the Supreme Court of Georgia under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. IV, O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9, and Ga. S. Ct. R. 46 - 48, because the direct actions by plaintiff insureds against defendant insurer were barred by O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 for failure to have first obtained a judgment against their uninsured motorists, the insureds' request for certification of a question of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia, to determine whether Georgia precedent prohibited the insurer from asserting set-offs in the payment of uninsured motorist personal injury claims, was not warranted. Harden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 339 Fed. Appx. 897 (11th Cir. 2009)(Unpublished).   Question certified as to state insurance law.    - Question was certified to the state supreme court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9 as to whether a notice of cancellation, properly given by an insurer after the premium was past due, was ineffective under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 because the notice provided the insured an opportunity to keep the policy in force by paying the past due premium within the 10-day statutory period. Infinity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 570 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2009).   Question certified.   - Because the question of whether bank directors and officers might be subject to claims for ordinary negligence was debatable under Georgia law, the issue was certified to the state supreme court. FDIC v. Skow, 741 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2013).   Because the appeal seemed to present questions of state law that had not yet been decided by the Georgia appellate courts, three questions were certified to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Piedmont Office Realty Trust v. Xl Speciality Ins. Co., 769 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2014).   Question not certified.   - Court's reasoning was not transformed from a principled decision to a conjectural conclusion simply because the court chose not to rely on legal theories that had either not been recognized in this state or that did not apply to the facts presented. As such, certification to the Georgia Supreme Court was inappropriate. Gold Cross EMS, Inc. v. Children's Hosp. of Ala., F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. June 1, 2015), aff'd, No. 15-14369, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7622 (11th Cir. Ga. 2016).    Cited in Szczepanski v. GMAC, 558 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1977); Miree v. United States, 565 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1978); Insurance Co. v. Meyer, 565 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1978); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 570 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1978); Szczepanski v. GMAC, 571 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1978); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 580 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1978); Miree v. United States, 588 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1979); Balboa Ins. Co. v. A.J. Kellos Constr. Co., 247 Ga. 393, 276 S.E.2d 599 (1981); United States v. Aretz, 248 Ga. 19, 280 S.E.2d 345 (1981); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 634 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1981); Aretz v. United States, 635 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1981); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Young, 638 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1981); Aretz v. United States, 660 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981); Continental Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 251 Ga. 412, 306 S.E.2d 285 (1983); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); Harlan v. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 699 F.2d 521 (11th Cir. 1983); General Tel. Co. v. Trimm, 706 F.2d 1117 (11th Cir. 1983); Lamb v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 712 F.2d 466 (11th Cir. 1983); Robinson v. Parrish, 720 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1983); Griffin v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 671 (11th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 732 F.2d 129 (11th Cir. 1984); Abney v. Cox Enters., 777 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1985); Jordan v. TG & Y Stores Co., 256 Ga. 16, 342 S.E.2d 665 (1986); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 256 Ga. 400, 349 S.E.2d 368 (1986); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 806 F.2d 225 (11th Cir. 1986); Southern Guar. Corp. v. Doyle, 256 Ga. 790, 353 S.E.2d 510 (1987); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Celotex Corp., 854 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1988); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 913 F.2d 907 (11th Cir. 1990); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 959 F.2d 219 (11th Cir. 1992); Granite State Ins. Co. v. Nord Bitumi U.S., Inc., 959 F.2d 911 (11th Cir. 1992); Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 965 F.2d 991 (11th Cir. 1992); Kitchen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 19 F.3d 601 (11th Cir. 1994); United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Park 'N Go of Ga., Inc., 66 F.3d 273 (11th. Cir. 1995); Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengel-Ellschaft, 81 F.3d 139 (11th Cir. 1996); Colonial Oil Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters, 106 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 1997); Boardman Petro., Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 119 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 1997); Waldrip v. Head, 272 Ga. 572, 532 S.E.2d 380 (2000), recons. denied; overruled on other grounds by Duke v. State, 829 S.E.2d 348, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 406 (Ga. 2019); Hallum v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2002); Baillie Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 391 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2004); Hardin v. NBC Universal, Inc., 283 Ga. 477, 660 S.E.2d 374 (2008); Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga. 583, 679 S.E.2d 10 (2009); Mooney v. Webster, 300 Ga. 283, 794 S.E.2d 31 (2016).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   ALR.    - Right of federal courts in passing upon the validity or construction of state statute or constitutional provision, or rights and obligations accruing thereunder, to exercise their own judgment independent of latest state court decisions thereon rendered subsequent to the accrual of the right in question, 97 A.L.R. 515.