GA Code § 40-5-60 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 40 - Motor Vehicles and Traffic|Chapter 5 - Drivers' Licenses|Article 3 - Cancellation, Suspension, and Revocation of Licenses|§ 40-5-60. When Revocation or Suspension Effective; Notice

  All revocations and suspensions provided for in this chapter shall be effective on the day the driver receives actual knowledge or legal notice thereof, whichever occurs first. Notice of suspension by operation of law shall be considered legal notice. Any license suspension or revocation mandated in this chapter following a person's conviction for any offense, including suspensions due to the accumulation of points pursuant to Code Section 40-5-57, shall be by operation of law.   Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, for any suspension or revocation for which the department is required to send notice to the driver, the department shall be authorized to direct such notice to the driver's new address as reflected in the records of the United States Postal Service in lieu of or in addition to sending such notice to the address reflected in his or her driving record.    (Ga. L. 1976, p. 1668, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 4; Ga. L. 2008, p. 171, § 6/HB 1111; Ga. L. 2011, p. 355, § 6/HB 269.)   Law reviews.   - For article on the effect on receiving government-issued licenses after a conviction based on a nolo contendere plea, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 723 (1979).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Necessity of actual or constructive notice.    - Since one element of the offense of driving while one's license is in a mandatory state of suspension is notice to the defendant of the action, absent proof by the state of actual or legal notice, a conviction for the offense of driving while one's license is suspended cannot be sustained. State v. Orr, 246 Ga. 644, 272 S.E.2d 346 (1980).    Conviction for driving while one's license is in a mandatory state of suspension may be sustained when one is charged with constructive notice of suspension by operation of law. Hale v. State, 188 Ga. App. 524, 373 S.E.2d 250, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 911, 373 S.E.2d 250 (1988).    Notice contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 40-5-60 applies to all suspensions provided for in O.C.G.A. Ch. 5, T. 40, and suspensions under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57 fall within this class and are not excepted from the general rule. Thus, without proof by the state of actual or legal notice to a defendant of the defendant's license suspension, a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-121 cannot be sustained. State v. Fuller, 289 Ga. App. 283, 656 S.E.2d 902 (2008).    Because there was no evidence that a defendant had received notice of the defendant's license suspension for excessive violation points under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57, a conviction of driving with a suspended license in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-121 was properly reversed. Under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-60, notice of a suspension was required for a conviction, and § 40-5-57 did not provide for notice by operation of law. State v. Fuller, 289 Ga. App. 283, 656 S.E.2d 902 (2008).   Notice sufficient.    - Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 after a jury found the defendant guilty of driving on a suspended license in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-121(a) because there was some evidence that the defendant was served with a notice of suspension pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-5-60; the state introduced the defendant's driver's license history report, which showed that the defendant had been served with the notice of the license suspension by a police officer, and the officer testified that the officer served the defendant with the notice. Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 717 S.E.2d 682 (2011).   Officer's knowledge of driver's knowledge of suspension status.    - Though central dispatch advised an officer that the defendant had not been served with notice of suspension of the defendant's license, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under suspension (O.C.G.A. § 40-5-121) as the officer had no way of knowing whether the defendant had obtained actual or constructive notice of the suspension by other means. Thus, drugs found in a search of the defendant's car incident to the arrest were admissible; the trial court's ultimate conclusion that the defendant did not have notice of the suspension did not "retroactively vitiate" the probable cause supporting the arrest. Johnson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 254, 676 S.E.2d 884 (2009).   Calculating beginning of revocation period when delay of notification.    - Trial court erred in ruling that the revocation of a licensee's driver's license as a habitual violator was effective in May 2006 when the Georgia Department of Driver Services (DDS) received official notice of the licensee's December 2004 conviction for a third driving under the influence charge; the habitual violator revocation was effective on December 16, 2004, the date on which the licensee received legal notice of the licensee's status as a habitual violator and that the licensee's driver's license was being revoked. Lokey v. Ga. Dep't of Driver Servs., 291 Ga. App. 856, 663 S.E.2d 283 (2008).    Cited in Kimbrell v. State, 164 Ga. App. 344, 296 S.E.2d 206 (1982).