NV Rev Stat § 692C.256 (2021)
2021 Nevada Revised Statutes|Chapter 692C - Holding Companies|NRS 692C.256 - Order of Commissioner relating to acquisition: Issuance; competitive standard.

  1. The Commissioner may issue an order pursuant to NRS 692C.258 relating to an acquisition if:  (a) The effect of the acquisition may substantially lessen competition in any line of insurance in this state or tend to create a monopoly; or  (b) The acquiring person fails to file sufficient materials or information pursuant to NRS 692C.254.  2. In determining whether a proposed acquisition would violate the competitive standard, the Commissioner shall consider the following:  (a) Any acquisition to which the provisions of NRS 692C.252 apply involving two or more insurers competing in the same market is prima facie evidence of a violation of the competitive standard if:  (1) The market is highly concentrated and the involved insurers possess the following shares of the market: Insurer A Insurer B 4 percent 4 percent or more 10 percent 2 percent or more 15 percent 1 percent or more  (2) The market is not highly concentrated and the involved insurers possess the following shares of the market: Insurer A Insurer B 5 percent 5 percent or more 10 percent 4 percent or more 15 percent 3 percent or more 19 percent 1 percent or more  (b) There is a significant trend toward increased concentration when the aggregate market share of any grouping of the largest insurers in the market, from the two largest to the eight largest, has increased by 7 percent or more of the total market over a period of time extending from any base year 5 to 10 years before the acquisition up to the time of the acquisition. Any acquisition to which the provisions of NRS 692C.252 apply, involving two or more insurers competing in the same market is prima facie evidence of a violation of the competitive standard if:  (1) There is a significant trend toward increased concentration in the market;  (2) One of the insurers involved is one of the insurers in a grouping of large insurers showing the requisite increase in the market share; and  (3) Another involved insurer’s market share is 2 percent or more.  3. Percentages not shown in the tables in paragraph (a) of subsection 2 must be interpolated proportionately to the percentages that are shown.  4. If more than two insurers are involved in an acquisition, exceeding the total of the two columns in the relevant table of paragraph (a) of subsection 2 is prima facie evidence of a violation of the competitive standard. For the purposes of this subsection, the insurer with the largest market share shall be deemed to be Insurer A.  5. Irrespective of whether an acquisition constitutes a prima facie violation of the competitive standard set forth in this section, the Commissioner, or a party to the acquisition, may establish the presence or absence of the requisite anticompetitive effect based upon other substantial evidence, including, without limitation, market shares, volatility of ranking market leaders, the number of competitors, concentrations, trend concentration in the industry and ease of entry and exit in the market.  6. The Commissioner shall, before issuing an order specified in subsection 1, consider:  (a) If:  (1) The acquisition creates substantial economies of scale or economies in the use of resources that may not be created in any other manner; and  (2) The public benefit received from those economies exceeds the public benefit received from not lessening competition; or  (b) If:  (1) The acquisition substantially increases the availability of insurance; and  (2) The public benefit received by that increase exceeds the public benefit received from not lessening competition.  7. The public benefits set forth in subparagraph 2 of paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 6 may be considered together, as applicable, in assessing whether the public benefits received from the acquisition exceed any benefit to competition that would arise from disapproving the acquisition.  8. The Commissioner has the burden of establishing that the acquisition will result in a violation of the competitive standard set forth in subsection 1.  9. An order may not be entered in accordance with NRS 692C.258 if:  (a) The acquisition will yield substantial economies of scale or economies in resource utilization that cannot be feasibly achieved in any other way, and the public benefits which would arise from such economies exceed the public benefits which would not arise from lessening competition; or  (b) The acquisition will substantially increase the availability of insurance, and the public benefits of the increase exceed the public benefits which would arise from not lessening competition.  10. As used in this section:  (a) "Highly concentrated market" means a market in which the combined market share of the four largest insurers totals 75 percent or more of the total market.  (b) "Insurer" includes any company or group of companies under common management, ownership or control.  (c) "Market" means the relevant product and geographical markets. In the absence of sufficient information to the contrary, the relevant product market is assumed to be the direct written insurance premium for a line of business, such line being that used in the annual statement required to be filed by an insurer doing business in this State and the relevant geographical market is assumed to be this State.  (Added to NRS by 2003, 3319; A 2009, 1496; 2013, 3365; 2015, 3497)