CO Code § 24-60-501 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 24 - Government - State|Article 60 - Interstate Compacts and Agreements|Part 5 - Agreement on Detainers|§ 24-60-501. Disposal of Detainers Against Prisoner Based on Untried Charges

 The agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:   The Agreement on Detainers   The contracting states solemnly agree that:   Article I   The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.   Article II   As used in this agreement:    "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of America; a territory or possession of the United States; the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.    "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final disposition pursuant to article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to article IV hereof.    "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to article III or article IV hereof.    Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations, or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.    Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.    Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the request.   Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.    A duly certified copy of the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.       For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law.    From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments, informations, or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies, and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.     Article III   (a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.   (b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.   (c) The warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint on which the detainer is based.   Article IV   (a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he had lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information, or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded, and transmitted the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of thirty days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.   (b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.   (c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.   (d) Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.   (e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V (e) hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.   Article V   (a) In response to a request made under article III or article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such indictment, information, or complaint is pending against such person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in article III of this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the custodian.   (b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:   (c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in article III or article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information, or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.   (d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations, or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.   (e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.   (f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.   Article VI   (a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.   (b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.   Article VII   Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.   Article VIII   This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom by enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.   Article IX   This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provisions of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.   Source: L. 69: p. 292, § 9. C.R.S. 1963: § 74-17-1 .   ANNOTATION   Analysis    I. General Consideration.    II. Purpose.    III. Applicability.    IV. Prisoner's Rights.    V. Time Limitations.    VI. Compliance.     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Agreement on detainers is constitutional. Moen v. Wilson, 189Colo. 85, 536 P.2d 1129 (1975).   Federal law governs interpretation of the agreement on detainers. People v. Hines, 817 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1991).   Agreement on detainers is not the exclusive method by which one state may obtain a defendant incarcerated in another state. People v. Quackenbush, 687 P.2d 448 (Colo. 1984).   Judicial review limited. Judicial review of extradition requests is conducted to determine whether there has been procedural compliance with the statute and whether there has been a showing that the person against whom extradition is sought is the person charged with a crime in the demanding state. The district court is not required to hear claims that the extradition would affect criminal proceedings in another judicial forum. Moore v. Wilson, 662 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1983).   Applied in People v. Bielecki, 41 Colo. App. 256, 588 P.2d 377 (1978); People v. District Court, 638 P.2d 65 (Colo. 1981); People v. Bean, 650 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1982); Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1982); People v. Watson, 666 P.2d 1114 (Colo. App. 1983); Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986).   II. PURPOSE.   The primary purpose of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is to provide a mechanism for prisoners to insist upon speedy and final disposition of untried charges that are the subjects of detainers so that a prisoner's speedy trial rights and any prison rehabilitation programs initiated for the prisoners' benefit will not be disrupted or precluded by the existence of these untried charges. People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1986); People v. Thornton, 890 P.2d 158 (Colo. App. 1994); People v. Helmstetter, 914 P.2d 474 (Colo. App. 1995).   Policies of this part and Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act are similar. People v. Bean, 44 Colo. App. 373, 619 P.2d 72 (1980); People v. Morgan, 712 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1986).   Generally, the principles of one may be applied to the other. People v. Morgan, 712 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1986).   Purpose of agreement on detainers. The agreement on detainers is intended to serve the purpose of forcing a recalcitrant defendant who is no longer within the state where charges are pending to stand trial. Moen v. Wilson, 189Colo. 85, 536 P.2d 1129 (1975); Abad v. Ricketts, 645 P.2d 848 (Colo. 1982).   The obvious purpose of the agreement on detainers is to avoid the difficulties often encountered in interstate proceedings by providing an expeditious, simplified method of disposing of outstanding criminal charges. As such, the section is generally designed to benefit the states, not the prisoners. Brown v. District Court, 194Colo. 225, 571 P.2d 1091 (1977).   The agreement on detainers is a special statutory provision designed to promote the orderly and expeditious disposition of outstanding charges against persons incarcerated in other states. Simakis v. District Court, 194Colo. 436, 577 P.2d 3 (1978).   The agreement on detainers provides a mechanism for the expeditious disposal of detainers, based on untried charges, which are lodged against a prisoner. Hughes v. District Court, 197Colo. 396, 593 P.2d 702 (1979).   The agreement on detainers was designed to foster more effective prisoner treatment and rehabilitation by eliminating, as expeditiously as possible, the uncertainties surrounding outstanding criminal charges. People v. Swazo, 199Colo. 486, 610 P.2d 1072 (1980); People v. Sevigny, 679 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1984).   III. APPLICABILITY.   Agreement activated when detainer lodged. It is not until the receiving state lodges with the sending state a detainer based on a pending indictment, information, or complaint that the provisions of the agreement are activated. People v. Lincoln, 42 Colo. App. 512, 601 P.2d 641 (1979).   The agreement is inapplicable where there is no untried indictment, information, or complaint outstanding in the receiving state. Beals v. Wilson, 631 P.2d 1181 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Quintana, 682 P.2d 1226 (Colo. App. 1984).   Anti-shuttling provision in article IV (e) of agreement does not apply among judicial districts within same state. Purpose of agreement is to provide for orderly disposition of charges pending in one state against person imprisoned in another. Issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum by state district court for appearance of defendant imprisoned in federal facility in same state was not issuance of a "detainer" triggering application of the agreement. People v. Hines, 817 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1991).   The procedural requirements of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) and the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act do not apply to a sentencing detainer placing a hold on a prisoner based on an unresolved sentencing determination in another jurisdiction where the defendant has already been convicted on the charges. Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1993).   Agreement concerns pending charges in another state and is not applicable to an unserved sentence. Reed v. People, 745 P.2d 235 (Colo. 1987).   Detainer limited to prisoners. Although both the extradition and the detainer provisions were enacted to effect interstate transfer of persons for trial, the agreement on detainers was limited to prisoners. Moen v. Wilson, 189Colo. 85, 536 P.2d 1129 (1975).   A withdrawal of detainer does not change the fact that a detainer has been lodged. A defendant has the right to demand disposition of charges if detained. The statute does not require that the detainer remain pending, or that it continue to be lodged, only that it "has been lodged." People v. Robertson, 56 P.3d 121 (Colo. App. 2002).   Presentence confinement is not a term of imprisonment for purposes of article III (a). Romans v. District Court, 633 P.2d 477 (Colo. 1981).   Generally, probation violators are not entitled to the benefits of agreement on detainers. As probation revocation proceeding does not involve "untried" matters. The term "untried" refers to matters which can be brought to full trial. In a probation revocation proceeding, the trial has already been held, and the defendant convicted. In such a hearing, the defendant comes before the court in a completely different posture than he does at his trial before conviction. People v. Jackson, 626 P.2d 723 (Colo. App. 1981); Garcia v. Cooper, 711 P.2d 1255 (Colo. 1986).   Trial court erred in determining defendant, who was in federal custody pending resolution of parole revocation proceedings, had "entered upon a term of imprisonment" within the meaning of article III (a), thereby triggering the prompt notice and speedy trial provisions of the IAD. Until defendant arrived at federal prison to serve his sentence following revocation of his federal parole violation, he had not "entered upon a term of imprisonment" and the provisions of the IAD were inapplicable until that time. People v. Brown, 854 P.2d 1332 (Colo. App. 1992).   The IAD is to apply at the time the defendant is sentenced, regardless of the institution at which the defendant is incarcerated subsequent to sentencing. People v. Helmstetter, 914 P.2d 474 (Colo. App. 1995).   IV. PRISONER'S RIGHTS.   The benefits and protections of the IAD are statutory and not of constitutional dimension. People v. Evans, 971 P.2d 229 (Colo. App. 1998).   Failure of trial court to appoint counsel to assist defendant in perfecting his speedy disposition rights under the IAD was not erroneous as defendant does not have a substantial right to court-appointed counsel to assist in perfecting statutory rights accorded by the IAD. People v. Evans, 971 P.2d 229 (Colo. App. 1998).   Duty to inform prisoner under article III (c) is necessary concomitant to the effective operation of the agreement. People v. Lincoln, 42 Colo. App. 512, 601 P.2d 641 (1979).   The mere statement of fact that a detainer has been lodged is insufficient to satisfy the express requirements of article III (c). People v. Greenwald, 704 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1985).   Awareness of pending charges not sufficient to supply information to comply with duty to inform prisoner. Mere awareness of pending charges does not supply the superintendent of the department of corrections with sufficient information to fulfill the duty to inform the prisoner of the source or nature of pending charges. Awareness of pending charges in another jurisdiction is not the equivalent of having an actual detainer filed from that jurisdiction. Russell v. Cooper, 724 P.2d 1302 (Colo. 1986).   Due process applicable. Because the detainer in article IV (a) constitutes a deprivation of liberty, a defendant serving a prison sentence is entitled to some protection under the due process clause, in addition to a motion to the governor. Moen v. Wilson, 189Colo. 85, 536 P.2d 1129 (1975).   Agreement on detainers contains the right to a hearing which is also afforded a prisoner in testing the legality of transfer under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. Moen v. Wilson, 189Colo. 85, 536 P.2d 1129 (1975).   The right to judicial review is left to receiving state. Recognizing the limited right to judicial review when the agreement on detainers provides the means for a transfer is properly left to the receiving state. Moen v. Wilson, 189Colo. 85, 536 P.2d 1129 (1975).   Request for final disposition pursuant to agreement on detainers must be made by a prisoner personally and cannot be effectively made by his attorney. Gardner v. Gaubatz, 719 P.2d 329 (Colo. App. 1985).   Prisoner subject to detainer prospectively entitled to challenge procedures. Prospectively, and not retroactively, a prisoner subject to a detainer under the agreement on detainers will have the right to challenge the procedures to determine whether the compact and the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act have been complied with. Moen v. Wilson, 189Colo. 85, 536 P.2d 1129 (1975).   Prisoner cannot assert substantive rights. A prisoner does have the right when the agreement on detainers is the basis for a transfer for the purpose of trial: (1) To contest his presence in the receiving state at the time the alleged crime was committed; (2) to question whether he is a fugitive from justice or whether the detainer documents are supported by either an indictment or an information supported by an affidavit establishing probable cause; and (3) to determine whether he is substantially charged with a crime under the laws of the receiving state. Moen v. Wilson, 189Colo. 85, 536 P.2d 1129 (1975); Abad v. Ricketts, 645 P.2d 848 (Colo. 1982).   Denial of injunction found improper. Where the petitioner, who had previously challenged the extradition proceeding by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, sought an injunction against his removal under the agreement of detainers, alleging in his complaint that he wished to contest the sufficiency of the detainer documents and be given an opportunity to have a hearing to question the authority to remove him from the state, the injunction should not have been denied for the reason that the matter was res judicata as a result of the habeas corpus proceeding, since the documents under the agreement on detainers were prepared after the petition for habeas corpus was denied and, in any event, any insufficiency in these documents was not before the court in the habeas corpus proceeding. Allen v. Evans, 193Colo. 61, 562 P.2d 752 (1977).   "Flagging device" on file permitted. Another state may request that Colorado authorities notify it 60 days prior to the petitioner's release so that his consecutive sentence could be served there. The request for notification is no more than a "flagging device", which allows the requesting state to take whatever action it deems appropriate. Moore v. Ricketts, 654 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1982).   No undue delay of notice of speedy trial right where defendant was unable to stand trial during period of absence from prison and defendant was promptly notified of such right following his return. People v. Quintana, 682 P.2d 1226 (Colo. App. 1984).   Defendant's speedy trial time was tolled by his voluntary request for speedy disposition of detainer filed against him by authorities in another state, and by his subsequent removal to that state, where defendant's actions precluded Colorado authorities from objecting to his removal. People v. Yellen, 739 P.2d 1384 (Colo. 1987).   Time spent out-of-state counted against original sentence. Time spent in another state pursuant to the agreement on detainers should be counted against petitioner's original sentence to the Pueblo county jail. Pleasant v. Tihonovich, 647 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1982).   Voluntary guilty plea can waive defendant's rights under IAD. The waiver is not precluded by the fact that defendant moved to dismiss prior to entering his guilty plea. People v. Carroll, 939 P.2d 452 (Colo. App. 1996).   Prosecution's failure to assert before trial court that defendant waived any IAD claim did not preclude prosecution from raising the issue on appeal. Issue was before the court when defendant, in his motion to vacate judgment, asserted that his conviction by guilty plea did not waive his argument that the speedy trial provision of the IAD was violated. People v. Carroll, 939 P.2d 452 (Colo. App. 1996).   Upon completion and discharge of federal sentence, defendant is no longer eligible for the speedy disposition provisions accorded by the IAD. People v. Evans, 971 P.2d 229 (Colo. App. 1998).   The IAD's anti-shuttling provision of article IV is not triggered where the United States transferred prisoner from a state to federal prison and then allowed state officials to escort him to state proceedings on new state charges while he was in federal custody. The mere temporary transfer of a prisoner to a different jurisdiction to answer pending charges while in the custody of a receiving state does not implicate the concern of having treatment programs and rehabilitation obstructed by numerous absences so long as the transfer does not impermissibly lengthen a prisoner's stay in the receiving state. United States v. Pursley, 474 F.3d 757 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 829, 128 S. Ct. 47, 169 L. Ed. 2d 42 (2007).   V. TIME LIMITATIONS.   Waiver of speedy trial rights must be voluntary. While a waiver of statutory speedy trial rights need not comport with the standards applicable to a waiver of basic constitutional rights, a waiver of statutory rights must still be voluntary. People v. Sevigny, 679 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1984).   Mere silence does not prove a waiver. Failure to object to a trial setting beyond the speedy trial term is one factor to consider on the issue of waiver, but mere silence, by itself, does not prove a waiver. To prove a voluntary waiver, in this context, there must be a showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial period. People v. Sevigny, 679 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1984); People v. Allen, 744 P.2d 73 (Colo. 1987).   Burden of satisfying speedy trial requirements of agreement on detainers is on prosecutor whose request for temporary custody of defendant in Article IV proceeding triggers speedy trial period. People v. Allen, 744 P.2d 73 (Colo. 1987).   Speedy trial provisions of this section do not apply to charges that do not underlie the detainer placed against a prisoner. People v. Greenwald, 704 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1985); People v. Newton, 764 P.2d 1182 (Colo. 1988).   Article IV (e) allows the receiving state only one rendition. Hughes v. District Court, 197Colo. 396, 593 P.2d 702 (1979); Romans v. District Court, 633 P.2d 477 (Colo. 1981).   Speedy trial provisions not applicable in absence of filing of detainer. The dismissal remedy for violations of the speedy trial provisions apply only to those charges that underlie the detainer filed against the prisoner. Charges as to which no detainer has been filed are not subject to the speedy trial provisions. People v. Bost, 770 P.2d 1209 (Colo. 1989).   Premature return to federal custody deemed a violation. Where a defendant is returned to the custody of the federal authorities after charges against him are set for trial in a state court, but before he is tried, there is a violation of article IV (e). Hughes v. District Court, 197Colo. 396, 593 P.2d 702 (1979).   <b> Special time limitations of this section prevail over more general criminal procedure provisions </b> of <cite class="occo"><a href="gov.co.crs.title.18.html#t18-ar01-s18-1-405" target="_blank">§ 18-1-405</a></cite> and Crim. P. 48. Simakis v. District Court, 194Colo. 436, 577 P.2d 3 (1978).   Speedy trial provision almost identical to that of uniform detainers act. The provisions in the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act mandating that prison authorities "forthwith" furnish the certified statement and request, and directing that failure to comply with the specified time requirements for commencing trial will result in dismissal, are almost identical to the analogous provision in the agreement on detainers. People v. Bean, 619 P.2d 72 (Colo. App. 1980).   The Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act is a special statute designed to foster more effective prisoner treatment and rehabilitation; thus, when there is a conflict with the general speedy trial provisions, the provisions of the uniform act control. People v. Swazo, 199Colo. 486, 610 P.2d 1072 (1980).   The request for speedy disposition must meet the certification and documentation mandates of this section to trigger the running of the 180-day period. Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1997).   One-hundred-eighty-day period to bring defendant to trial after he or she provides written notice of place of imprisonment applies to jail as well as prison sentences, even when jail term is part of probation. Construing "penal or correctional institutions" to include jails as well as prisons is consistent with the purpose of the IAD, which is to encourage the expeditious disposition of untried charges because such charges obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. People v. Walton, 167 P.3d 163 (Colo. App. 2007).   Article III (a) contemplates an expressed prosecutorial motion for a continuance and supported by facts amounting to "good cause". Trial setting beyond the speedy trial term resulting from docket congestion may be a constructive continuance for good cause, but is not sufficient without a prosecutorial motion for a continuance. People v. Sevigny, 679 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1984).   Amended waiver provision in non-detainer statute, which requires that a defendant or his defense counsel expressly object to a trial setting beyond the speedy trial period, applies to this section but only with respect to acts committed on or after July 1, 1985, and not to acts that commence before such date but continue thereafter. People v. Newton, 764 P.2d 1182 (Colo. 1988).   "Good cause" interpreted. Docket congestion may arguably constitute good cause for continuance. However, where defendant, due to prosecutorial delay, was not brought before the court until shortly before the expiration of the speedy trial term, the unavailability of any trial dates within the remaining term does not constitute the type of docket congestion that might justify a continuance under the "good cause" standard. People v. Sevigny, 679 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1984).   Postponement of a trial due to illness of the trial judge is a continuance for good cause. People v. Watson, 650 P.2d 1340 (Colo. App. 1982).   Inability of replacement defense counsel to prepare for trial in the time remaining before expiration of the 120-day period constitutes good cause for granting a continuance. People v. Watson, 650 P.2d 1340 (Colo. App. 1982).   Time granted to allow accused to prepare and file motions constitutes a continuance. Simakis v. District Court, 194Colo. 436, 577 P.2d 3 (1978).   Defendant's delays not included in calculation of time. Delays incurred with the defendant's acquiescence or as an accommodation to him are not to be included as a factor in calculating the period of limitation under this section. People v. Grubbs, 39 Colo. App. 436, 570 P.2d 1299 (1977); People v. Hampton, 728 P.2d 345 (Colo. App. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987).   Prisoner's inability to stand trial is not the only circumstance tolling running of time under this section. People v. Grubbs, 39 Colo. App. 436, 570 P.2d 1299 (1977).   Appellate review procedures for habeas corpus petitions contesting transfers of temporary custody under this section shall be by petition for certiorari and not an appeal of right. Semendinger v. Brittain, 770 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1989).   The agreement has no application in case in which defendant, while held in Colorado after return to Colorado under the agreement, is charged with additional crimes. The new and unrelated charges filed after transfer from sending state do not qualify as untried indictments, informations, or complaints pending in Colorado prior to the time of transfer under article V (d). Selph v. Buckallew, 805 P.2d 1106 (Colo. 1991).   Defendant is not entitled to an automatic dismissal of charges underlying a detainer as a sanction for violation of the prompt notification requirement of this section. Rather, a hearing is required to provide the prosecution an opportunity to demonstrate a lack of prejudice resulting to defendant from such violation. People v. Johnson, 819 P.2d 1114 (Colo. App. 1991).   Defendant waived the IAD's protections when defendant did not raise the IAD issue to the trial court at the time the trial date was set. People v. Walton, 167 P.3d 163 (Colo. App. 2007).   VI. COMPLIANCE.   Determination of probable cause is binding. A determination of probable cause by a neutral judicial officer of the demanding state is binding on the courts of the asylum state. Breault v. Wilson, 645 P.2d 276 (Colo. 1982).   Agreement on detainers act violations cannot be asserted as defense to extradition, and state having custody of defendant has no authority to dismiss or invalidate charge underlying a detainer. Dodson v. Cooper, 705 P.2d 500 (Colo. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1084, 106 S. Ct. 857, 88 L. Ed. 2d 896 (1986); Russell v. Cooper, 724 P.2d 1302 (Colo. 1986); Morris v. McGoff, 728 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1986).   Prison authorities, and not prisoners, are responsible for forwarding a prisoner's request for prompt disposition to another jurisdiction and for seeing that the information in inmate status accompanies the request. People v. Thornton, 890 P.2d 158 (Colo. App. 1994).   Compliance by prison officials not discretionary. However difficult it may be for the prosecutors in the receiving state to compel official compliance with this section in the sending jurisdiction, the agreement does not accord the prison officials discretion to comply or not to comply with its terms. People v. Lincoln, 42 Colo. App. 512, 601 P.2d 641 (1979).   Compliance by one county with detainer requirements relieves additional counties of requirements. Where one county complies with the detainer requirements in order to prosecute a defendant incarcerated in another state, additional counties seeking to prosecute the same individual do not have to comply separately with the detainer requirements. Brown v. District Court, 194Colo. 225, 571 P.2d 1091 (1977).   Burden is on prosecution to establish noncompliance with detainers agreement by sending state. People v. Lincoln, 42 Colo. App. 512, 601 P.2d 641 (1979); People v. Gonzales, 42 Colo. App. 517, 601 P.2d 644 (1979).   No presumption of valid and regular performance of duties by sending state. There is no presumption that the officials of a sending state under the agreement have performed their duties thereunder in a valid and regular manner. People v. Lincoln, 42 Colo. App. 512, 601 P.2d 641 (1979); People v. Gonzales, 42 Colo. App. 517, 601 P.2d 644 (1979).   There is no presumption that the officials of an imprisoning state have performed their duties under the agreement with regularity. Romans v. District Court, 633 P.2d 477 (Colo. 1981).   Absent some demonstration of irregularity by the alleged fugitive, it is presumed that certified requisition documents are authentic and duly certified pursuant to article IV of the Agreement. Morris v. McGoff, 728 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1986).   Substantial compliance with terms of the statute are required for a prisoner to invoke his or her rights; however, by failing to identify himself properly to a district attorney when it became clear that there was confusion over this issue, prisoner failed to substantially comply. Allowing a prisoner to use an alias in his IAD request without revealing the name by which he is known in the state where the charge is pending would create unnecessary confusion and frustrate efficient administration of prisoner movement. People v. Thornton, 890 P.2d 158 (Colo. App. 1994).   Under the agreement on detainers, a defendant can assert a violation of the prompt notification requirement only in the receiving state. Sweaney v. District Court, 713 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1986).   Effect of violation of prompt notification requirement in article III (c) of the agreement on detainers. A defendant is entitled to the dismissal of charges against him underlying a detainer as a sanction for a violation of the prompt notification requirement, unless the prosecution can demonstrate a lack of prejudice to the defendant resulting from that violation. Sweaney v. District Court, 713 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1986); Yellen v. Cooper, 713 P.2d 925 (Colo. 1986); People v. Reyes, 179 P.3d 170 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd, 195 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2008).   Defendant must first assert some claim of prejudice to frame the issue to be determined, as the alternative would require the prosecution to prove an unlimited negative. People v. Reyes, 179 P.3d 170 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd, 195 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2008).   Failure to claim prejudice with respect to two detainers in response to a prosecution request that defendant state "any claims of prejudice based on the failure of federal authorities to notify him of Colorado detainers" constituted waiver of any claims as to those detainers. People v. Reyes, 179 P.3d 170 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd, 195 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2008).   Agreement on detainers does not apply to detainers lodged against a defendant in pretrial or presentence confinement because such confinement is not a "term of imprisonment" within the meaning of the agreement. People v. Reyes, 179 P.3d 170 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd, 195 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2008).   Failure to promptly provide formal notification to defendant of a detainer did not prejudice him when informal notification and various legal proceedings provided defendant with a speedy disposition of the detainer without defendant having to request it. People v. Reyes, 179 P.3d 170 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd, 195 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2008).   Failure of state to comply with agreement requires dismissal of charges. The failure on the part of the state to comply with the mandates of the agreement on detainers requires the dismissal of the charges against the defendant with prejudice. People v. Jacobs, 198Colo. 75, 596 P.2d 1187 (1979); People v. Lincoln, 42 Colo. App. 512, 601 P.2d 641 (1979); Romans v. District Court, 633 P.2d 477 (Colo. 1981); People v. Sevigny, 679 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1984); People v. Allen, 744 P.2d 73 (Colo. 1987).   Even if the detainer was withdrawn in good faith and the defendant was not prejudiced thereby, the IAD still requires dismissal regardless of whether defendant has suffered prejudice. People v. Robertson, 56 P.3d 121 (Colo. App. 2002).   However, defendant must bear the risk of uncooperative or inept prison officials, and the speedy trial provisions of the IAD are not triggered until the court and the prosecuting attorney receive from prison officials the prisoner's demand for final disposition. People v. Evans, 971 P.2d 229 (Colo. App. 1998) (disagreeing with Romans v. District Court cited above) (decided prior to U.S. Supreme Court decision in Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 113 S. Ct. 1085, 122 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1993)).   A showing of prejudice not necessary. There is no requirement in the agreement on detainers that a prisoner demonstrate that prejudice resulted from a violation of its provisions before he may gain relief. Hughes v. District Court, 197Colo. 396, 593 P.2d 702 (1979); Romans v. District Court, 633 P.2d 477 (Colo. 1981); People v. Sevigny, 679 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1984).   Noncompliance raisable for first time on appeal. Since compliance with the interstate agreement on detainers is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the state's ability to try a defendant on the charges against him, noncompliance may be raised for the first time on appeal. People v. Jacobs, 198Colo. 75, 596 P.2d 1187 (1979), implicitly overruled in People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1984).   Rights under this act are not constitutionally based, are nonjurisdictional, and can be waived. Waiver, however, must be voluntary, but need not be knowing and intelligent, and must be asserted prior to or during trial. People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1984); People v. Reyes, 179 P.3d 170 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd, 195 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2008).   Since waiver is shown by proof that the prisoner has affirmatively requested treatment in a manner contrary to the protections of the agreement on detainers, defendant waived the anti-shuttling provision of the agreement by requesting numerous and lengthy continuances during which he requested or acquiesced in being returned to a federal penitentiary. People v. Reyes, 179 P.3d 170 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd, 195 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2008).   Waiver of the protections of the anti-shuttling provision applied not only to the requested or acquiesced in shuttling related to the continuance requests but also retroactively to any earlier unobjected-to violations of the anti-shuttling provision. Reyes v. People, 195 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2008).   This section mandates four procedural steps that must be followed by the prisoner, the custodial officials, and the state filing the detainer. Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1997).   A uniform standard of compliance and interpretation by the compact states reinforces the Interstate Agreement of Detainers' public policy intent. Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1997).   Accordingly, federal appellate decisions hold that prisoners must strictly comply with the procedures set forth in the IAD. Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1997).   The provisions of this section, govern interstate detainers, filed by a compact state that has charges pending against a person imprisoned in another compact state and the provisions of article 14 of title 16, C.R.S. govern intrastate detainers, which involve prisoners in the custody of the department of corrections in Colorado who have Colorado charges pending against them. Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1997).   Therefore, Colorado adopts the holding of federal appellate courts and of other state courts that a standard of strict compliance is applicable. Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1997); People v. Evans, 971 P.2d 229 (Colo. App. 1998).   In cases involving interstate detainers, strict compliance with the IAD is required. Thus, a defendant's letter requesting the hold on the defendant be released so he could pursue rehabilitative programs to aid in obtaining an earlier release date was insufficient as it did not mention the IAD or speedy trial rights. People v. Johnson, 926 P.2d 126 (Colo. App. 1996), aff'd, 939 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1997).   Defendant's motion to dismiss was not in strict compliance with the IAD, and therefore it did not trigger the provisions of the act. People v. Johnson, 926 P.2d 126 (Colo. App. 1996), aff'd, 939 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1997).   Where prisoner files motion for speedy trial or dismissal of charges directly in county court rather than delivering written notice and request for final disposition of outstanding charges to custodial official, prisoner has failed to strictly comply with the procedures of the IAD, and dismissal of charges against prisoner is improper. People v. Evans, 971 P.2d 229 (Colo. App. 1998).   Defendant's initiation of a habeas corpus action, with full awareness of the possible consequences, both beneficial and adverse, constituted a waiver of article III (d) where the facts indicate the people objected to defendant's habeas corpus request on the basis that the anti-shuttling provisions of article III (d) might apply, thereby adversely affecting the People's opportunity to prosecute defendant. Defendant testified at the evidentiary hearing on the request that he had been offered a return to federal custody only if he waived his rights under the IAD, and he indicated he was unwilling to waive any rights. People v. Brown, 854 P.2d 1332 (Colo. App. 1992).   Provisions of IAD do not require that prosecuting attorney seek custody of an incarcerated defendant in order to prosecute defendant. People v. Evans, 971 P.2d 229 (Colo. App. 1998).   Defendant does not have to be sent back to his sending state before trial on charges that arose out of the same transaction as the IAD charge. The aggravated robbery charge was part of the transaction of the escape charge. People v. Garcia, 17 P.3d 820 (Colo. App. 2000).   Applied in People v. Harter, 216 P.3d 606 (Colo. App. 2009).