CO Code § 4-2-202 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 4 - Uniform Commercial Code|Article 2 - Sales|Part 2 - Form, Formation, and Readjustment of Contract|§ 4-2-202. Final Written Expression - Parol or Extrinsic Evidence

 Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein, may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented:    By course of dealing, usage of trade, or by course of performance (section 4-1-303); and    By evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.     History. Source: L. 65: P. 1303, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 155-2-202. L. 2006: (a) amended, p. 490, § 5, effective September 1. History. Source: L. 65: P. 1303, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 155-2-202. L. 2006: (a) amended, p. 490, § 5, effective September 1.    Cross references:   For the course of performance or practical construction, see § 4-2-208 .   OFFICIAL COMMENT   1. This section definitely rejects:    Any assumption that because a writing has been worked out which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as including all the matters agreed upon;    The premise that the language used has the meaning attributable to such language by rules of construction existing in the law rather than the meaning which arises out of the commercial context in which it was used; and    The requirement that a condition precedent to the admissibility of the type of evidence specified in paragraph (a) is an original determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous.     2. Paragraph (a) makes admissible evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade and course of performance to explain or supplement the terms of any writing stating the agreement of the parties in order that the true understanding of the parties as to the agreement may be reached. Such writings are to be read on the assumption that the course of prior dealings between the parties and the usages of trade were taken for granted when the document was phrased. Unless carefully negated they have become an element of the meaning of the words used. Similarly, the course of actual performance by the parties is considered the best indication of what they intended the writing to mean.   3. Under paragraph (b) consistent additional terms, not reduced to writing, may be proved unless the court finds that the writing was intended by both parties as a complete and exclusive statement of all the terms. If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the document in the view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact.   Cross References:   Point 3: Sections 4-1-205 , 4-2-207 , 4-2-302 and 4-2-316 .   Definitional Cross References:   “Agreed” and “agreement”. Section 4-1-201 .   “Course of dealing”. Section 4-1-205 .   “Parties”. Section 4-1-201 .   “Term”. Section 4-1-201 .   “Usage of trade”. Section 4-1-205 .   “Written” and “writing”. Section 4-1-201 .   ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “Exclusion and Modification of Warranty under the U.C.C. — How to Succeed in Business Without Being Liable for Not Really Trying”, see 46 Den. L.J. 579 . For article, "Buyer-Secured Party Conflicts Under Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code", see 46 U. Colo. L. Rev. 333 (1974-75).   Parol evidence is to be excluded if the writing was intended as a final, complete, and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. MacGregor v. McReki, Inc., 30 Colo. App. 196, 494 P.2d 1297 (1971).   If the written expression is not “complete and exclusive”, parol evidence is admissible if it relates to additional terms which are not inconsistent with a term of the written agreement. MacGregor v. McReki, Inc., 30 Colo. App. 196, 494 P.2d 1297 (1971).   There is no longer the assumption that the parties intended a writing to be the complete expression of their agreement. The assumption is to the contrary, unless the court expressly finds that the parties intended the contract to be completely integrated. Amoco Prod. Co. v. W. Slope Gas Co., 745 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985); Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. JER P'ship, 943 F.2d 1219 (10th Cir. 1991).   Parol evidence admissible to vary or contradict terms of ambiguous agreement. Montoya v. Cherry Creek Dodge, Inc., 708 P.2d 491 (Colo. App. 1985); Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. JER P'ship, 943 F.2d 1219 (10th Cir. 1991).   General integration clause does not effect a waiver of a claim of negligent misrepresentation not specifically prohibited by the terms of the agreement. Parol evidence as to such misrepresentation allowed. Keller v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., 819 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1991).   Parol evidence rule applicable to contract disputes had no force in a tort action alleging fraudulent misrepresentation in the inducement to execute an agreement. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Shultz, 168 Colo. 59 , 450 P.2d 70 (1969); Keller v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., 819 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1991).   To be inconsistent, the offered evidence must contradict or negate the written terms. MacGregor v. McReki, Inc., 30 Colo. App. 196, 494 P.2d 1297 (1971).   Where a buyer alleges the existence of oral warranties prior to execution of a written contract and there is conduct following the sale which tends to show that warranties were in fact made, there is a material issue of fact for resolution, namely, whether the parties intended the written contract to be a final expression of their agreement, and, if not, what the terms actually agreed upon by the parties consisted of. Evidence of both oral warranties and the conduct of the parties subsequent to signing the contract is admissible for purpose of resolving this issue. O'Neil v. Int'l Harvester Co., 40 Colo. App. 369, 575 P.2d 862 (1978).   Previous course of dealing considered in determining meaning of contract provisions. It is the policy of the uniform commercial code to consider previous course of dealing in determining the meaning of contract provisions. Amerine Nat'l Corp. v. Denver Feed Co., 493 F.2d 1275 (10th Cir. 1974); KN Energy, Inc. v. Great W. Sugar Co., 698 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1022, 105 S. Ct. 3489, 87 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1985).   The lack of facial ambiguity in the contract language is basically irrelevant to whether extrinsic evidence ought to be considered by the court as an initial matter. Amoco Prod. Co. v. W. Slope Gas Co., 754 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985).   If a contract's construction depends upon extrinsic facts, then its terms become questions of fact, and the district court's construction will be overturned only if clearly erroneous. Amoco Prod. Co. v. W. Slope Gas Co., 745 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985); Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. JER P'ship, 943 F.2d 1219 (10th Cir. 1991).   Applied in Lease Fin., Inc. v. Burger, 40 Colo. App. 107, 575 P.2d 857 (1977); Universal Drilling Co. v. Camay Drilling Co., 737 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1984).