CT Gen Stat § 31-51q (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 31 - Labor|Chapter 557 - Employment Regulation|Section 31-51q - Liability of employer for discipline or discharge of employee on account of employee's exercise of certain constitutional rights.

 Any employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political subdivision thereof, who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state, provided such activity does not substantially or materially interfere with the employee's bona fide job performance or the working relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs of any such action for damages. If the court determines that such action for damages was brought without substantial justification, the court may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the employer.(P.A. 83-578.)Cited. 193 C. 558; 209 C. 807. Right to jury trial cannot be implied; must be affirmatively expressed. 211 C. 370. Cited. 214 C. 464; 222 C. 346; 224 C. 693; 226 C. 314; 239 C. 356. Whether subject matter addressed by a particular statement is of public concern involves a question of law for the court, and whether the statement addresses such a matter depends on its content, form and context which is a question of fact, and in this case, it was within court's discretion to submit the question to the jury; in an action under section, it is within province of trial court to determine as a matter of law which topics are considered to be of public concern, but whether employee's statements address such a topic is within the province of the jury to be determined by looking at content, form and context; jury instruction was permissible that for protection to apply, employee's statement must concern a broader issue of public concern and not merely employee's personal matters. 249 C. 766. Section extends protection of rights of free speech under federal and state constitutions to employees in a private workplace; managerial decision about placement of flags in the workplace does not involve employee's constitutional rights of free speech. 251 C. 1. Public employees who make statements pursuant to their official duties are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes under federal constitution and plaintiff failed to establish she was speaking in unofficial capacity. 304 C. 483. While constitutional protections grounded in first amendment of federal constitution are applicable to private employees, plaintiff's speech not protected under federal constitution because statements were made pursuant to his employment duties. Id., 585. Rule in 547 U.S. 410 (i.e., when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes, and the federal constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline) does not apply to claim that employer violated section by subjecting employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by Art. I, Sec. 3, 4 or 14 of the state constitution; section extends same protection to employee speech pursuant to official job duties in a private workplace as the protection afforded to employee speech in a public workplace for claims involving the state constitution. 319 C. 175.Section constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity. 15 CA 297. Cited. 20 CA 231; 33 CA 600; 40 CA 577; 45 CA 712. Statute applies to some activities and speech that occur at the workplace; plaintiff's failure to display an American flag at his workstation is not constitutionally protected speech to which the statute applies since plaintiff's expression did not involve a matter of public concern. 48 CA 618. Nothing in the legislative history indicates that legislature's use of term “costs” in either Sec. 31-51m or this section was intended to authorize court to award prevailing party the cost of an economist; because an economist is not a listed expert witness whose cost may be reimbursed under Sec. 52-260(f), testimonial fees of plaintiff's expert economist cannot be reimbursed. 79 CA 501. Plaintiff, an elected municipal sheriff, was an independent contractor and not an employee of defendant municipality for purposes of section. 135 CA 699. The term “employer” does not include a customer that exercised its right under a service contract to communicate concerns about vendor company's employee that resulted in disciplinary action against the employee. 158 CA 482.