reglab/housing_qa huggingface dataset:
CT Gen Stat § 53a-11 (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability|Section 53a-11 - Criminal liability of individual for conduct in name of or on behalf of corporation or limited liability company.

 A person shall be criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which such person performs or causes to be performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation or limited liability company to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in such person's own name or on such person's behalf.(1969, P.A. 828, S. 11; P.A. 00-11; P.A. 10-32, S. 151.)History: P.A. 00-11 included conduct performed in the name of or in behalf of a limited liability company and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 10-32 made technical changes, effective May 10, 2010.Cited. 209 C. 75; 242 C. 345.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-12 (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability|Section 53a-12 - Defenses; burden of proof.

 (a) When a defense other than an affirmative defense, is raised at a trial, the state shall have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.(b) When a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.(1969, P.A. 828, S. 12.)Cited. 186 C. 414; 191 C. 659; 196 C. 519. Instructing jury that it was the state's burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt did not adequately inform jury that it was the state's burden to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt. 199 C. 273. Cited. 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; Id., 733; 218 C. 349; 219 C. 314; 225 C. 450; 227 C. 456; 228 C. 281; 230 C. 183; 236 C. 342.Cited. 6 CA 701; 8 CA 667; 10 CA 697; 11 CA 665; 14 CA 511; 17 CA 200; Id., 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579.Cited. 34 CS 612. Statute does not become constitutionally vulnerable by reason of imposing on defendants the burden of establishing affirmative defenses. 35 CS 555.Subsec. (a):Cited. 186 C. 654; 188 C. 237; Id., 653; 194 C. 376; 203 C. 212; 209 C. 322; 210 C. 110; 220 C. 602; 228 C. 335; 231 C. 484; 232 C. 537; 233 C. 1; 234 C. 381.Cited. 3 CA 289; 5 CA 338; 10 CA 643, 647; 11 CA 102; 17 CA 97; 20 CA 75; 24 CA 556; Id., 624; 29 CA 262; 31 CA 140; 33 CA 782; 34 CA 368, see also 233 C. 517; 46 CA 216.Cited. 38 CS 619.Subsec. (b):Cited. 182 C. 388; 193 C. 695; 207 C. 374; 209 C. 733; 214 C. 540; 217 C. 648; 227 C. 456; 228 C. 281; 229 C. 328; 230 C. 351; 233 C. 403; 236 C. 189; Id., 342; 242 C. 93. Legislature not required to expressly declare an exception to culpability to be an affirmative defense for it to operate as an affirmative defense; statute does not prohibit judicially recognized affirmative defenses. 254 C. 107.Cited. 12 CA 32; 14 CA 511; 20 CA 342; 24 CA 678; Id., 670; 28 CA 91.Held unconstitutional insofar as it places a burden of proof on the defense. 33 CS 28.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-14 (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability|Section 53a-14 - Duress as defense.

 In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced by the use or threatened imminent use of physical force upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. The defense of duress as defined in this section shall not be available to a person who intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.(1969, P.A. 828, S. 14.)Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Duress as defense discussed. 184 C. 157. Instruction to jury that it was the state's burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt did not adequately inform jury that it was the state's burden to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt. 199 C. 273. Cited. 201 C. 211; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75. Trial court did not err in refusing to provide a jury instruction that would have allowed jury to factor defendant's age into his defense of duress, independent and regardless of how defendant's age relates to age of his coercers, so as to account for the differences in how adolescents evaluate risk; duress defense has both subjective and objective components; subjective component is that defendant actually must have been coerced into the criminal action; objective component requires that defendant have been coerced in circumstances under which a reasonable person in his situation would have been likewise unable to resist. 282 C. 281.Cited. 15 CA 34; 26 CA 367; 46 CA 486. Court did not err in charging jury re statutory exception to defense of duress by failing to define the term “situation”; because “situation” is not defined in section, it is taken that the jury, as a matter of common knowledge, comprehends the term and, therefore, the trial court was not obligated to define it. 125 CA 125.Cited. 34 CS 612.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-15 (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability|Section 53a-15 - Entrapment as defense.

 In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced to do so by a public servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, for the purpose of institution of criminal prosecution against the defendant, and that the defendant did not contemplate and would not otherwise have engaged in such conduct.(1969, P.A. 828, S. 15.)Cited. 173 C. 197; Id., 431. Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 195 C. 70; 201 C. 211; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 229 C. 60. Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on defense of entrapment because there was no evidence presented that defendant was initially unwilling to commit a crime or that the actions of the officers actually implanted a criminal design in defendant's mind. 305 C. 330.Cited. 8 CA 158; 20 CA 395; 21 CA 326; 23 CA 392; 30 CA 470; 42 CA 751; 46 CA 486.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-16 (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability|Section 53a-16 - Justification as defense.

 In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 53a-17 to 53a-23, inclusive, shall be a defense. Justification as a defense does not include provocation that resulted solely from the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, nonforcible, romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic relationship. As used in this section, “gender identity or expression” means gender identity or expression, as defined in section 53a-181i.(1969, P.A. 828, S. 16; P.A. 19-27, S. 2.)History: P.A. 19-27 added provisions re discovery, knowledge or potential disclosure of victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-16a (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability|Section 53a-16a - Affirmative defense in certain situations involving firearms; exceptions.

 In any prosecution for an offense under section 53a-55a, 53a-56a, 53a-60a, 53a-92a, 53a-94a, 53a-102a or 53a-103a, it shall be an affirmative defense that the pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not a weapon from which a shot could be discharged, but it shall not be an affirmative defense to any prosecution under section 53a-55, 53a-56, 53a-60, 53a-92, 53a-94, 53a-102 or 53a-103.(P.A. 75-380, S. 2; P.A. 81-27, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 1.)History: P.A. 81-27 removed references to prosecutions under repealed sections 53a-72, 53a-75 and 53a-78; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 198 C. 190; 209 C. 75.Cited. 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-16b (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability|Section 53a-16b - Affirmative defense of coparticipant to offense with firearm.

 In any prosecution for an offense under section 53a-55a, 53a-56a, 53a-60a, 53a-92a, 53a-94a, 53a-102a or 53a-103a in which the defendant was not the only participant, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant: (1) Was not armed with a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm, and (2) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon.(P.A. 75-380, S. 13; P.A. 92-260, S. 2.)History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law where evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 209 C. 75.Cited. 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-17 (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability|Section 53a-17 - Conduct required or authorized by law or judicial decree.

 Unless inconsistent with any provision of this chapter defining justifiable use of physical force, or with any other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable when such conduct is required or authorized by a provision of law or by a judicial decree, including but not limited to (1) laws defining duties and functions of public servants, (2) laws defining duties of private citizens to assist public servants in the performance of certain of their functions, (3) laws governing the execution of legal process, (4) laws governing the military services and the conduct of war, and (5) judgments and orders of courts.(1969, P.A. 828, S. 17.)Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 197 C. 588; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; Id., 322. Evidence that defendant sought to introduce concerning a dispute over tribal leadership and defendant's alleged responsibilities as a tribal official was relevant to defendant's defense of justification under section and, therefore, was improperly excluded. 263 C. 602.Cited. 8 CA 667; 18 CA 303; 21 CA 138; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-20 (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability|Section 53a-20 - Use of physical force in defense of premises.

 A person in possession or control of premises, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be in or upon such premises, is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises; but he may use deadly physical force under such circumstances only (1) in defense of a person as prescribed in section 53a-19, or (2) when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent an attempt by the trespasser to commit arson or any crime of violence, or (3) to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry by force into his dwelling as defined in section 53a-100, or place of work, and for the sole purpose of such prevention or termination.(1969, P.A. 828, S. 20; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 6; P.A. 73-639, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 5.)History: 1971 act specified use of “reasonable” physical force; P.A. 73-639 allowed use of deadly physical force when necessary to prevent crime of violence and deleted language allowing use of deadly physical force “not earlier in time” than necessary to prevent or terminate unlawful entry in dwelling or workplace by force; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing “believes it is necessary” and “believes it necessary” with “believes such to be necessary”.Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 199 C. 383; 203 C. 466; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 242 C. 211. Defendant's due process right to fair trial was violated when trial court failed to explicitly instruct jury that state bore burden of disproving defendant's defense of premises theory. 294 C. 399. The term “crime of violence” includes only those offenses that fall within the traditional common law definition of the term, such as arson and burglary, and do not necessarily involve the use of deadly force or infliction of great bodily harm. 314 C. 618.Cited. 2 CA 617; 8 CA 667; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390.Common-law right referred to; unnecessary to decide whether Sec. 53a-23 creates an exception. 34 CS 531. Cited. 43 CS 46.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-21 (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability|Section 53a-21 - Use of physical force in defense of property.

 A person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent an attempt by such other person to commit larceny or criminal mischief involving property, or when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to regain property which he reasonably believes to have been acquired by larceny within a reasonable time prior to the use of such force; but he may use deadly physical force under such circumstances only in defense of person as prescribed in section 53a-19.(1969, P.A. 828, S. 21; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 7; P.A. 92-260, S. 6.)History: 1971 act specified use of “reasonable” physical force; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing “believes it necessary” with “believes such to be necessary”.Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. An act injurious to the physical well-being of a child is prohibited; statute is not unconstitutionally vague. 192 C. 37. Cited. 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 226 C. 601. Section does not bar defendant from claiming that he did not commit a larceny in order to defend against a robbery charge where larceny is an element of the robbery offense. 317 C. 338.Cited. 2 CA 617; judgment overruled in part, see 317 C. 338; 8 CA 667; judgment overruled in part, see 317 C. 338; 16 CA 455; 19 CA 445; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 29 CA 283; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795; 31 CA 58; 32 CA 687; 34 CA 368, see also 233 C. 517; 45 CA 390. Privilege to enter another's home to retrieve goods does not exist when defendant voluntarily gave his property to the victim. 116 CA 112. Section mandates that a defendant must use reasonable physical force upon another person to invoke defense of property; section is inapplicable to crimes involving the use of force against property. 187 CA 813.Cited. 34 CS 612.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-23 (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 951 - Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability|Section 53a-23 - Use of physical force to resist arrest not justified.

 A person is not justified in using physical force to resist an arrest by a reasonably identifiable peace officer or special policeman appointed under section 29-18b, whether such arrest is legal or illegal.(1969, P.A. 828, S. 22; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 9; P.A. 05-180, S. 3; P.A. 08-150, S. 51; P.A. 10-36, S. 17; P.A. 19-108, S. 5.)History: 1971 act deleted definition of peace officer; P.A. 05-180 included a special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b within purview of section; P.A. 08-150 included Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed under Sec. 14-8 and certified pursuant to Sec. 7-294d within purview of section; P.A. 10-36 replaced “Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed” with “motor vehicle inspector designated” and made technical changes, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 19-108 deleted reference to motor vehicle inspectors, and made a technical change.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-32a (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses|Section 53a-32a - Violation of probation by certain sexual offenders.

 If a defendant who entered a plea of nolo contendere or a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine to a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000, section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, and was ordered to undergo sexual offender treatment as a condition of probation, becomes ineligible for such treatment because of such defendant's refusal to acknowledge that such defendant committed the act or acts charged, such defendant shall be deemed to be in violation of the conditions of such defendant's probation and be returned to court for proceedings in accordance with section 53a-32.(P.A. 97-151, S. 2; P.A. 01-84, S. 16, 26; P.A. 19-189, S. 16.)History: P.A. 01-84 replaced reference to “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21” with “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000,” included a violation of “subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21” and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 19-189 replaced “53a-70b,” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or”.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-33 (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses|Section 53a-33 - Termination of probation or conditional discharge.

 The court or sentencing judge may at any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, after hearing and for good cause shown, terminate a sentence of probation or conditional discharge before the completion thereof, except a sentence of probation imposed for conviction of a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000, section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.(1969, P.A. 828, S. 33; P.A. 92-260, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 11; P.A. 01-84, S. 17, 26; P.A. 19-189, S. 17.)History: P.A. 92-260 added “a sentence of”; P.A. 95-142 specified that a sentence of probation or conditional discharge may be terminated “before the completion thereof” and precluded termination of a sentence of probation imposed for conviction of a violation of Sec. 53-21(2) or Sec. 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b; P.A. 01-84 replaced reference to “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21” with “a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000,” and included a violation of “subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21”, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 19-189 replaced “53a-70b,” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or”.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-60a (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses|Section 53a-60a - Assault in the second degree with a firearm: Class D or C felony: One year not suspendable.

 (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a firearm when he commits assault in the second degree as provided in section 53a-60, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree and assault in the second degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.(b) Assault in the second degree with a firearm is (1) a class D felony, or (2) if the offense resulted in serious physical injury, a class C felony, for which, in either case under subdivision (1) or subdivision (2) of this subsection, one year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.(P.A. 75-380, S. 5; P.A. 19-132, S. 4.)History: P.A. 19-132 amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provision re class D felony penalty as Subdiv. (1), adding Subdiv. (2) re class C felony penalty, and making a conforming change.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-67 (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses|Section 53a-67 - Affirmative defenses.

 (a) In any prosecution for an offense under this part based on the victim's being mentally incapacitated, physically helpless or impaired because of mental disability or disease, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of such condition of the victim.(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this part, except an offense under section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged offense, living together by mutual consent in a relationship of cohabitation, regardless of the legal status of their relationship.(1969, P.A. 828, S. 68; P.A. 75-619, S. 2; P.A. 81-27, S. 3; P.A. 90-162; P.A. 13-47, S. 4; P.A. 19-189, S. 22.)History: P.A. 75-619 deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed as affirmative defense the actor's belief that alleged victim was above the specified age in cases where age is an element of offense unless victim is under 14, relettering Subsec. (c) accordingly; P.A. 81-27 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under Sec. 53a-70b; P.A. 90-162 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under Sec. 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b; P.A. 13-47 amended Subsec. (a) to substitute “impaired because of mental disability or disease” for “mentally defective”; P.A. 19-189 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “53a-70b,” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or”.
CT Gen Stat § 53a-70b (2020)
2020 Connecticut General Statutes|Title 53a - Penal Code|Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses|Section 53a-70b - Sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting relationship: Class B felony.

 Section 53a-70b is repealed, effective October 1, 2019.(P.A. 81-27, S. 1; P.A. 14-234, S. 9; P.A. 19-189, S. 44.)