GA Code § 9-11-58 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 9 - Civil Practice|Chapter 11 - Civil Practice Act|Article 7 - Judgment|§ 9-11-58. Entry of Judgment; Judge's Name to Be Typed, Printed, or Stamped After Signature; Filing of Civil Case Disposition Form

  Cross references.   - Authority of Superior Court clerks, § 15-6-60.   Code Commission notes.   - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2006, "Code Sections 44-7-50 through 44-7-59" was substituted for "OCGA Sections 44-7-50 - 44-7-59" at the end of the last sentence of subsection (b).   Editor's notes.   - Ga. L. 2000, p. 850, § 10, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to subsections (a) and (b) are applicable to civil actions commenced in superior or state court on or after July 1, 2000.   Ga. L. 2006, p. 648, § 3/HB 1195, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section shall apply to actions and judgments filed on or after July 1, 2006.   U.S. Code.   - For provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58, and annotations pertaining thereto, see 28 U.S.C.   Law reviews.   - For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 405 (2006). For annual survey on appellate practice and procedure, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (2009).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Construction with O.C.G.A.    §§ 9-2-60(b) and9-11-41(e). - Trial court erroneously dismissed a litigant's petition for a writ of mandamus, and erroneously relied on dicta, in finding that orders setting a pre-trial conference in the underlying medical malpractice action were merely "housekeeping or administrative orders" that did not suspend the running of the five-year period under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-60(b) and9-11-41(e). Instead, such orders tolled the running of the five-year rule if the orders were in writing, signed by the trial judge, and properly entered in the records of the trial court. Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 658 S.E.2d 567 (2008).    Trial court did not err in dismissing the action under the five-year rule, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-60(b) and9-11-41(e), because no written order had been taken in the case for a period of five years and an order authorizing an attorney to withdraw during the five-year period did not toll the time because the order was void since the order was entered in violation of a bankruptcy stay. Miller v. Lomax, 333 Ga. App. 402, 773 S.E.2d 475 (2015).    Construction with Title 5. - What additional requirements are imposed by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b) of the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, for entry of a judgment are not relevant for purposes of the Appellate Practice Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-31 and5-6-38(a), which has its own definition of when a judgment is entered. GMC Group, Inc. v. Harsco Corp., 293 Ga. App. 707, 667 S.E.2d 916 (2008).   Prerequisites for effective judgment.    - Two requirements must be met before an adjudication becomes an effective judgment: (1) judgment must be set forth in writing and signed by the judge; and (2) judgment so set forth must be entered in the civil docket by the clerk of court; before then, such judgment is inchoate and is of no effect for any purpose. Bloodworth v. Thompson, 230 Ga. 628, 198 S.E.2d 293 (1973).    In courts of record, all judgments must be in writing, signed by the judge, and entered by filing with the clerk. Maroska v. Williams, 146 Ga. App. 130, 245 S.E.2d 470 (1978).   Judgment inchoate until entered.    - What judge orally declares is no judgment until it has been put in writing and entered as such. Dunagan v. Sims, 119 Ga. App. 765, 168 S.E.2d 914 (1969).    Order granting or refusing motion must be in writing. Addis v. First Kingston Corp., 225 Ga. 231, 167 S.E.2d 656 (1969).    Until an order is signed by the judge, the order is ineffective for any purpose. Majors v. Lewis, 135 Ga. App. 420, 218 S.E.2d 130 (1975).    Until entered in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58, a judgment is inchoate and of no effect for any purpose. Zeitman v. McBrayer, 201 Ga. App. 767, 412 S.E.2d 287 (1991).    Because a superior court's contempt finding was based upon a violation of a verbal order that had not been reduced to writing, signed by the issuing judge, and filed with the clerk, the finding was ineffective pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b) and, thus, had to be reversed. Shirley v. Abshire, 288 Ga. App. 819, 655 S.E.2d 694 (2007).   Parent could not be held in contempt of verbal ruling to pay child support.    - Trial court erred in holding the parent in contempt for failing to pay child support and non-covered health care expenses as there was no court order for the parent to pay child support and part of the non-covered healthcare expenses for the child because, at the time the trial court issued the court's final order, the trial court had not ordered the parent to pay child support; and, even if the parties had reached an agreement about child support, they failed to submit it to the trial court and obtain a consent order, and, thus, the trial court was not authorized to hold the parent in contempt of a verbal ruling that had not been reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the court clerk. Tate v. Tate, 340 Ga. App. 361, 797 S.E.2d 227 (2017).   Denial of motion not precluded by oral announcement that motion would be granted.    - Order denying motion for new trial and order denying motion to set that order aside are not illegal when the judge had orally announced that the judge would grant the motion for a new trial. Waller v. Waller, 226 Ga. 279, 174 S.E.2d 433 (1970).   Filing of signed judgment constitutes entry.    - Under both Ga. L. 1965, p. 18, § 23 and Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 5 and Ch. 11, T. 9), a judgment is effective only upon entry and filing of a judgment signed by the judge with the clerk constitutes entry. Minnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 154 Ga. App. 439, 268 S.E.2d 688 (1980).    Dismissal of an owner's appeal of a summary judgment on a fraud and breach of contract complaint was improper when the complaint was amended to include a negligence count hours before the summary judgment on the fraud and breach of contract claims was filed, and therefore entered pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b) (although the summary judgment order had been signed the previous day); the negligence claim was pending at the time that the summary judgment was entered, and although the order granting summary judgment was subject to a direct appeal by the owner, the owner was not required to file an appeal at that time under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(h). Liberty v. Storage Trust Props., L.P., 267 Ga. App. 905, 600 S.E.2d 841 (2004).    As a child advocate did not establish that the juvenile court directed that the court's oral order was effective on the day the order was made, the advocate's motion to reconsider was premature under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b) because the order was filed before the juvenile court filed a written order. In the Interest of N. W., 309 Ga. App. 617, 710 S.E.2d 832 (2011).   Entry on docket not required.    - Nothing in subsection (b) of this section requires entry of a judgment or order on the court docket; filing of a judgment, after the judgment has been signed by the judge, with the clerk is all that is required to complete the judgment's entry. Thomas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 133 Ga. App. 193, 210 S.E.2d 361 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 242 Ga. 242, 248 S.E.2d 641 (1978); Fastenberg v. Associated Distribs., Inc., 134 Ga. App. 213, 213 S.E.2d 898 (1975).    It is not essential to the validity of a judgment that the judgment be entered on the docket sheet. Krasner v. Verner Auto Supply, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 892, 204 S.E.2d 770 (1974).   Entry dates from filing rather than signing.    - Date of filing of judgment with the clerk of the court, not the date the judgment was signed by the trial judge, constitutes "entry" of the judgment. Blanton v. Moseley, 133 Ga. App. 144, 210 S.E.2d 368 (1974).    Because a custody transfer order had not been filed with the court clerk, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b), when an administrative employee allegedly failed to comply with the order, the trial court erred by finding the employee in contempt under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5(a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-31). In the Interest of K.D., 272 Ga. App. 803, 613 S.E.2d 239 (2005).   No time limit given for signing and filing.    - All judgments are signed by the judge and filed with the clerk; no time limit is given for such signing and filing. Hiscock v. Hiscock, 227 Ga. 329, 180 S.E.2d 730 (1971); Moore v. Moore, 229 Ga. 600, 193 S.E.2d 608 (1972); Maloy v. Planter's Whse. & Lumber Co., 142 Ga. App. 69, 234 S.E.2d 807 (1977).    No time limit is given for the signing and filing of judgments. Jefferson v. Ross, 250 Ga. 817, 301 S.E.2d 268 (1983).   Entry of dismissal on court calendar or docket not entry of judgment.    - Entry of "DWOP" (dismissed for want of prosecution) on the court's calendar or docket, without the judge's signature and without filing with the clerk, does not amount to entry of a judgment. Rothstein v. Brooks, 133 Ga. App. 52, 209 S.E.2d 674 (1974).   Order to comply with settlement agreement.    - State court order declaring that the defendants had not defaulted with respect to a settlement agreement and ordering the parties to comply with the terms of the agreement did not constitute a final judgment when the order did not expressly provide either that the action was dismissed or that the plaintiffs receive judgment in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Zeitman v. McBrayer, 201 Ga. App. 767, 412 S.E.2d 287 (1991).   Entry of judgment required for disposition of case or appeal.    - There must be an entry of judgment to finally dispose of a case or for the purpose of using the judgment to support an appeal. Dunagan v. Sims, 119 Ga. App. 765, 168 S.E.2d 914 (1969).    In the absence of a judgment in writing, no question for decision is presented to the appellate court. Dunagan v. Sims, 119 Ga. App. 765, 168 S.E.2d 914 (1969).    Oral order is not final nor appealable until and unless the order is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk. This constitutes "entry"; and it is only an "entered" decision or judgment which is appealable. Sharp v. State, 183 Ga. App. 641, 360 S.E.2d 50 (1987).    Judgment should be certain and definite, or should be capable of being made so by proper construction, which sometimes requires reference to the complaint. Pico, Inc. v. Mickel, 138 Ga. App. 856, 230 S.E.2d 488 (1976), aff'd, 238 Ga. 218, 232 S.E.2d 841 (1977).   Judgment must be specific enough for outsider to understand.    - Judgment must be specific enough for an individual without inside knowledge to understand the judgment, especially when a judgment is to be a muniment of title. Sease v. Singleton, 246 Ga. 278, 271 S.E.2d 187 (1980).   Power of judge over judgment during term of entry.    - Unless a judgment is based upon the verdict of a jury, it remains in the breast of the court until the end of the term during which the judgment was entered, and the judge has the power on the judge's own motion to vacate the judgment, with or without notice to the parties. Rothstein v. Brooks, 133 Ga. App. 52, 209 S.E.2d 674 (1974).   Continuing jurisdiction to enter judgment on jury verdict.    - Court of record has continuing jurisdiction to enter judgment on a jury verdict at any time. Jefferson v. Ross, 250 Ga. 817, 301 S.E.2d 268 (1983).   Intent to record previously unrecorded action actually taken or judgment actually rendered.    - Juvenile court had jurisdiction to award custody of a child to the Department of Human Resources and properly entered the court's order of disposition awarding permanent custody to the Department because the mother and father had no rights to surrender to the great-grandparents when the termination order reflected the juvenile court's intent to record a previously unrecorded action actually taken or judgment actually rendered; the juvenile court rendered judgment terminating the child's parental rights at the conclusion of the hearing on September 3, 2008, and although the court's oral ruling was not memorialized in a written order until September 9, 2008 and not filed until September 17, 2008, such order clearly stated that it was nunc pro tunc to September 3, 2008, the date of the termination hearing. In re D.C.H., 300 Ga. App. 827, 686 S.E.2d 434 (2009).   Renewal of dormant judgment.    - Except for determining whether or not a judgment has been dormant, provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58 are immaterial in an action for renewal of a dormant judgment. Watkins v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 163 Ga. App. 468, 294 S.E.2d 703 (1982), aff'd, 250 Ga. 29, 301 S.E.2d 892 (1983).   Proof of entry of order.    - Finding that order was entered was supported by independent evidence of record in the form of testimony of the clerk of the probate court that the clerk entered the order by entering the notation "granted" in the docket book and an extract of a "granted" entry appearing in the probate court docket. Jabaley v. Jabaley, 208 Ga. App. 179, 430 S.E.2d 119 (1993).   Mandamus to compel written order.    - When a juvenile court failed to enter a written order, the court failed to carry out an administrative act; therefore, mandamus was appropriate not to review the propriety of the court's denial of the filing, but to compel the judge to enter a written order from which an appeal could be taken under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(a) and Ga. Unif. Juv. Ct. R. 17.1. Titelman v. Stedman, 277 Ga. 460, 591 S.E.2d 774 (2003).   Contempt based on oral judgment improper.    - To the extent that a later contempt finding was based on the trial court's oral pronouncement, the finding was a nullity. In re Tidwell, 279 Ga. App. 734, 632 S.E.2d 690 (2006).   Debtor failed to show rights were violated by order confirming sale.    - Debtor sought to nullify the confirmation of the foreclosure sale by invoking the rule that a judgment must be in writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58 to be effective, irrespective of any oral announcement by the trial court. The superior court at the second confirmation hearing correctly determined that, while a final order should be entered "to close [the first] case out," the confirmation proceedings in connection with the foreclosure sale nevertheless comprised "a new action", and with respect to such proceedings, the superior court signed a final order and duly filed the order with the clerk; thus, the debtor's rights were not violated. Friedman v. Regions Bank, 288 Ga. App. 57, 653 S.E.2d 507 (2007).    When an appellant filed a bankruptcy petition after a temporary restraining order was issued verbally but before the order was reduced to writing, signed, and filed, it was error to hold the appellant in civil contempt as under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58 the order was not effective until the order was written, signed, and filed. Huffman v. Armenia, 284 Ga. App. 822, 645 S.E.2d 23 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 554 (Ga. 2007).   Time for filing motion for attorney fees not impacted by civil disposition form filing.    - As real property contestants failed to file a request for attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 within 45 days following a trial court's final disposition in a real property proceeding, the trial court erred in granting the contestants' request because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion; the time for filing the motion began to run when judgment was entered under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-31, and the time when a civil disposition form was filed under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b) had no effect on the timing for purposes of the motion. Horesh v. DeKinder, 295 Ga. App. 826, 673 S.E.2d 311 (2009).   Failure to object to order of contempt waived appeal.    - In an appeal challenging an order of contempt arising as a discovery sanction entered against the appellants, the court held that because the appellants failed to object below about the order to compel and for sanctions, the appellants did not give the trial court opportunity to correct the alleged error, therefore, there was nothing for the appellate court to review. Roberts v. First Ga. Cmty. Bank, 335 Ga. App. 228, 779 S.E.2d 113 (2015).    Cited in Bragg v. Bragg, 225 Ga. 494, 170 S.E.2d 29 (1969); Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775, 186 S.E.2d 154 (1971); Reese v. Ideal Realty Co., 128 Ga. App. 684, 197 S.E.2d 829 (1973); Bell v. Stocks, 128 Ga. App. 799, 198 S.E.2d 209 (1973); Perry v. Thomas, 129 Ga. App. 325, 199 S.E.2d 634 (1973); G.M.J. v. State, 130 Ga. App. 420, 203 S.E.2d 608 (1973); Townsend v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 131 Ga. App. 824, 207 S.E.2d 230 (1974); Philips Broadcast Equip. Corp. v. Production 70's, Inc., 13 Ga. App. 765, 213 S.E.2d 35 (1975); Milam v. Mojonnier Bros. Co., 135 Ga. App. 208, 217 S.E.2d 355 (1975); Pilgrim v. Brookfield West, Inc., 136 Ga. App. 619, 222 S.E.2d 137 (1975); Lawson v. Alvers, 136 Ga. App. 801, 222 S.E.2d 203 (1975); Barnett v. Mobley, 236 Ga. 565, 224 S.E.2d 406 (1976); Bowen v. State, 239 Ga. 517, 238 S.E.2d 62 (1977); Stegar v. Northeast Foreign Car Serv., Inc., 143 Ga. App. 760, 240 S.E.2d 95 (1977); Hilliard v. Hilliard, 243 Ga. 424, 254 S.E.2d 372 (1979); Sheehan v. Sheehan, 244 Ga. 367, 260 S.E.2d 77 (1979); McCauley v. Board of Tax Assessors, 245 Ga. 510, 265 S.E.2d 787 (1980); Gates Rental, Inc. v. Perry, 164 Ga. App. 297, 297 S.E.2d 79 (1982); Boatright v. Sunshine Toyota, Inc., 177 Ga. App. 332, 339 S.E.2d 275 (1985); Storch v. Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc., 181 Ga. App. 627, 353 S.E.2d 350 (1987); West v. Mache of Cochran, Inc., 187 Ga. App. 365, 370 S.E.2d 169 (1988); MacKenzie v. Sav-A-Lot Food Store, 226 Ga. App. 32, 485 S.E.2d 559 (1997); Fulton County Tax Comm'r v. GMC, 234 Ga. App. 459, 507 S.E.2d 772 (1998); Taylor v. Young, 253 Ga. App. 585, 560 S.E.2d 40 (2002); Boggs Rural Life Ctr., Inc. v. IOS Capital, Inc., 255 Ga. App. 847, 567 S.E.2d 94 (2002); W. Ray Camp, Inc. v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, 308 Ga. App. 597, 708 S.E.2d 560 (2011).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, §§ 55 et seq., 67, 68.   C.J.S.   - 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 143 et seq.   ALR.    - Impersonation or false statement by juror as to his identity as ground for new trial, 127 A.L.R. 717.   Modern status of state court rules governing entry of judgment on multiple claims, 80 A.L.R.4th 707.