CO Code § 18-8-306 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 8 - Offenses - Governmental Operations|Part 3 - Bribery and Corrupt Influences|§ 18-8-306. Attempt to Influence a Public Servant

 [ ] Any person who attempts to influence any public servant by means of deceit or by threat of violence or economic reprisal against any person or property, with the intent thereby to alter or affect the public servant's decision, vote, opinion, or action concerning any matter which is to be considered or performed by him or the agency or body of which he is a member, commits a class 4 felony.  Editor's note: This version of this section is effective until March 1, 2022.  History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 460, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-8-306 . L. 2021: Entire section amended,(SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3200, § 295, effective March 1, 2022.    Editor's note:   Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.   Cross references:   For interference with the legislative process, see part 4 of article 2 of title 2; for legislative witnesses, see § 8-2.5-101 .   ANNOTATION   This statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face where it was narrowly tailored to enable citizens to proscribe the type of conduct that rose to a level of criminal culpability and where defendant's letter to a district court judge went beyond a mere expression of criticism and did not lie within the area of protected speech. People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1994).   This statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to defendant where the tone and language of a letter to a district court judge evinced a threatening manner and the language suggested conduct that was squarely within the statute's proscriptions and was therefore unprotected under the first amendment. People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1994).   The words “deceit” and “economic reprisal” contained in this section were not unconstitutionally vague where the statute clearly portrayed the type of conduct that subjected a person to criminal prosecution, it defined the offense with particular words to limit the scope of the offense, and the language was plain and unambiguous. People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1994).   First amendment does not require the people to prove that defendant subjectively intended to threaten public official. People v. Stanley, 170 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2007).   Criminal defendant has no first amendment privilege to threaten violence against a judge even if he does so in the context of a court proceeding. People v. Stanley, 170 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2007).   Requisite intent can exist in case where defendant used a false written instrument prepared by another. Prosecution is not obligated to prove defendant either mailed the false instrument or explicitly directed another to do so on defendant's behalf. People v. Taylor, 159 P.3d 730 (Colo. App. 2006).   Defendant could not have intended to influence a public servant if defendant did not know of servant's involvement. Defendant filed a false report at a kiosk. There is no evidence that defendant knew that anyone would screen the information input at the kiosk and then approve the report. People v. Tee, 2018 COA 84 , 446 P.3d 875.   This statute requires only an attempt to influence a public official, not that the public servant actually be influenced. A physician fraudulently making false representations on a physician certification for medical marijuana may constitute an attempt to influence, even though the certification was never submitted to the department of public health and environment. People v. Montante, 2015 COA 40 , 351 P.3d 530.   A police officer is a public servant pursuant to this section. People v. Sena, 2016 COA 161 , 395 P.3d 1148; People v. Knox, 2019 COA 152 , 467 P.3d 1218.   A community corrections employee working for a private entity can be a public servant pursuant to this section. A community corrections employee performing a governmental function fits under the definition of public servant. People v. Barnett, 2020 COA 167 , __ P.3d __.   Evidence supported a charge under statute where defendant gave a false name to a police officer during a traffic stop with intent to alter officer's official actions toward defendant. People v. Beck, 187 P.3d 1125 (Colo. App. 2008).   False reporting to authorities is not a specific instance of attempt to influence a public servant. The crime of false reporting penalizes those who provide untruthful information to public officials, regardless of an attempt to influence public officials. The attempted influence offense can occur without any false reporting at all. Thus, the attempted influence charge and the false reporting charge do not differ solely by prohibiting general and specific conduct. People v. Blue, 253 P.3d 1273 (Colo. App. 2011).   Criminal impersonation is not a specific instance of attempt to influence a public servant. People v. Van De Weghe, 2012 COA 204 , 312 P.3d 231.   Nothing in this section requires incorporation of the definition of criminal attempt contained in § 18-2-101 . Moreover, such a requirement would be illogical because this section does not proscribe influencing a public servant; it proscribes attempting to influence a public servant. People v. Riley, 2015 COA 152 , 380 P.3d 157.   A person may be charged with multiple offenses of attempting to influence a public servant arising from a single criminal episode when the discrete offenses were separated in time and location and comprised separate volitional departures. Defendant's report to the dispatcher, account to one police officer at the scene, and statement to another police officer during the ambulance ride constituted three discrete offenses. People v. Knox, 2019 COA 152 , 467 P.3d 1218.   Applied in People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1985).