NE Code § 25-1315 (2021)
2021 Nebraska Revised Statutes|Chapter 25 - Courts; Civil Procedure|25-1315 - Multiple claims or parties; effect.

25-1315.  Multiple claims or parties; effect.(1) When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.(2) When a court has ordered a final judgment under the conditions stated in subsection (1) of this section, the court may stay enforcement of that judgment until the entry of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is entered.Source Laws 2000, LB 921, § 10. Annotations  1. Multiple claims or parties 2. Final order or judgment 3. Procedure 4. Miscellaneous 1. Multiple claims or parties This section was implicated in a paternity action initiated for two children where (1) the presumptive father filed a cross-claim against the mother for custody and visitation as to one child and a counterclaim against the State for disestablishment of paternity as to the other child and (2) the district court granted disestablishment of paternity but did not determine the custody issues as to the other child. State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K. v. Ricky K., 300 Neb. 179, 912 N.W.2d 747 (2018). This section provides that when a case involves multiple claims or multiple parties, a party may generally only appeal when all claims and the rights of all parties have been resolved. If a court issues an order that is final as to some, but not all, of the claims or parties, such an order is appealable only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such an entry of judgment, orders adjudicating fewer than all claims or the rights of fewer than all the parties are not final and are subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Thus, absent an entry of judgment under this section, no appeal will lie unless all claims have been disposed as to all parties in the case. Boyd v. Cook, 298 Neb. 819, 906 N.W.2d 31 (2018). A “claim for relief” under subsection (1) of this section is equivalent to a separate cause of action. Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion, 286 Neb. 322, 836 N.W.2d 588 (2013). By its terms, subsection (1) of this section is implicated only where multiple causes of action are presented or multiple parties are involved, and a final judgment is entered as to one of the parties or causes of action. Connelly v. City of Omaha, 278 Neb. 311, 769 N.W.2d 394 (2009). Subsection (1) of this section requires, in cases with multiple claims or parties, an explicit adjudication with respect to all claims or parties or, failing such explicit adjudication of all claims or parties, an express determination that there is no just reason for delay of an appeal of an order disposing of less than all claims or parties and an express direction for the entry of judgment as to those adjudicated claims or parties. Malolepszy v. State, 270 Neb. 100, 699 N.W.2d 387 (2005). Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, only when more than one claim for relief or multiple parties are involved may the court direct entry of a final judgment as to fewer than all the claims or parties. Tri-Par Investments v. Sousa, 263 Neb. 209, 640 N.W.2d 371 (2002). Subsection (1) of this section is implicated only where multiple causes of action are presented or multiple parties are involved, and a final judgment is entered as to one of the parties or causes of action. Keef v. State, Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 262 Neb. 622, 634 N.W.2d 751 (2001). One may bring an appeal pursuant to subsection (1) of this section governing entry of a final judgment as to fewer than all of the claims or parties only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a "final order" as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Southwest Omaha Hospitality v. Werner-Robertson, 20 Neb. App. 930, 834 N.W.2d 617 (2013). Subsection (1) of this section is implicated only where multiple causes of action are presented or multiple parties are involved and a final judgment is entered as to one of the parties or causes of action. Parker v. Parker, 10 Neb. App. 658, 636 N.W.2d 385 (2001). 2. Final order or judgment A "final order" is a prerequisite to an appellate court's obtaining jurisdiction of an appeal initiated pursuant to subsection (1) of this section. Connelly v. City of Omaha, 278 Neb. 311, 769 N.W.2d 394 (2009). This section permits a judgment to become final only under the limited circumstances set forth in the statute. Connelly v. City of Omaha, 278 Neb. 311, 769 N.W.2d 394 (2009). The trial court's mere oral announcement of its judgment, without a written entry that is signed by the court, file stamped, and dated, is insufficient to render final judgment. Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 277 Neb. 456, 763 N.W.2d 77 (2009). Certification of a final judgment must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties. Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007). In deciding whether to grant certification under subsection (1) of this section, a trial court must address two distinct issues. A trial court must first determine that it is dealing with a "final judgment." It must be a "judgment" in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be "final" in the sense that it is an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action. Once having found finality, the trial court must go on to determine whether there is any just reason for delay. Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007). In a case involving two appellees, a lower court order sustaining one appellee's motion for summary judgment and entering judgment against the appellant was a final order, because it determined the action as related to those two parties, and no further action was necessary as between those two parties. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Dailey, 268 Neb. 733, 687 N.W.2d 689 (2004). An order granting an evidentiary hearing on some issues and denying a hearing on others is a final order because a postconviction proceeding is a special proceeding. The enactment of this section does not change that conclusion. State v. Harris, 267 Neb. 771, 677 N.W.2d 147 (2004). To be appealable in a case with multiple parties or causes of action, an order must satisfy the final order requirements of section 25-1902, as well as the requirements of subsection (1) of this section. Halac v. Girton, 17 Neb. App. 505, 766 N.W.2d 418 (2009). 3. Procedure With the enactment of subsection (1) of this section, one may bring an appeal pursuant to such section only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a "final order" within the meaning of section 25-1902 as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Therefore, to be appealable, an order must satisfy the final order requirements of section 25-1902 and, additionally, where implicated, subsection (1) of this section. Connelly v. City of Omaha, 278 Neb. 311, 769 N.W.2d 394 (2009). One may bring an appeal pursuant to this section only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a "final order" within the meaning of section 25-1902 as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007). With the enactment of subsection (1) of this section, one may bring an appeal pursuant to such section only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a final order within the meaning of section 25-1902 as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Bailey v. Lund-Ross Constructors Co., 265 Neb. 539, 657 N.W.2d 916 (2003). Without an express determination that there is no reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of final judgment from the trial court, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order that does not dispose of all of the claims against all of the parties. Abante, LLC v. Premier Fighter, 19 Neb. App. 730, 814 N.W.2d 109 (2012). When certifying a judgment as final under subsection (1) of this section, a court must make specific findings and explain the reasoning for its determination. Murphy v. Brown, 15 Neb. App. 914, 738 N.W.2d 466 (2007). In the absence of any express determination and express direction under subsection (1) of this section, an unresolved complaint in intervention caused the order sought to be appealed to be interlocutory. TierOne Bank v. Cup-O-Coa, Inc., 15 Neb. App. 648, 734 N.W.2d 763 (2007). Where multiple causes of action or multiple parties are involved, the trial court must both enter a final order pursuant to section 25-1902 and make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and expressly direct the entry of judgment to make appealable an order adjudicating fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all parties. Pioneer Chem. Co. v. City of North Platte, 12 Neb. App. 720, 685 N.W.2d 505 (2004). 4. Miscellaneous The trial court should not have certified as final its order resolving a claim against the trustee where the trustee's third-party claim for contribution was unresolved and nothing in the record suggested that a delay of a few months before the third-party complaint would be ready for trial would cause an unusual hardship for the parties. Rafert v. Meyer, 298 Neb. 461, 905 N.W.2d 30 (2017). This section does not modify final order jurisprudence as it regards orders denying intervention. Streck, Inc. v. Ryan Family, 297 Neb. 773, 901 N.W.2d 284 (2017). In enacting this section, the Legislature did not amend the partition statutes or attempt to change the effect of prior jurisprudence. Both before and after the adoption of this section, section 25-2179 characterized the settlement of all ownership rights as a "judgment" and Nebraska case law characterizes the order as a final order. Guardian Tax Partners v. Skrupa Invest. Co., 295 Neb. 639, 889 N.W.2d 825 (2017). An order granting a lender's motions for summary judgment to enforce a guaranty, but failing to adjudicate a cross-claim and not directing the entry of final judgment under this section, is not a judgment sufficient to support execution or garnishment in aid of execution. Cattle Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Watson, 293 Neb. 943, 880 N.W.2d 906 (2016). Where section 25-1315.03 and subsection (1) of this section are in conflict, section 25-1315.03 controls. R & D Properties v. Altech Constr. Co., 279 Neb. 74, 776 N.W.2d 493 (2009). A postconviction motion presents a single cause of action, and the various facts alleged as evidence that the defendant is entitled to postconviction relief are but multiple theories of recovery. State v. Poindexter, 277 Neb. 936, 766 N.W.2d 391 (2009). A trial court considering certification of a final judgment under this section should weigh factors such as (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the trial court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in setoff against the judgment sought to be made final; and (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007). The power this section confers upon the trial judge should only be used in the infrequent harsh case as an instrument for the improved administration of justice, based on the likelihood of injustice or hardship to the parties of a delay in entering a final judgment as to part of the case. Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007). When a trial court concludes that entry of judgment under this section is appropriate, it should ordinarily make specific findings setting forth the reasons for its order. Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007). The policy behind subsection (1) of this section was the avoidance of piecemeal appellate review in routine cases, not the facilitation thereof. Halac v. Girton, 17 Neb. App. 505, 766 N.W.2d 418 (2009). A trial court's decision to certify a final judgment pursuant to subsection (1) of this section is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, 17 Neb. App. 28, 756 N.W.2d 299 (2008). The power that subsection (1) of this section confers upon the trial judge should only be used in the infrequent harsh case as an instrument for the improved administration of justice, based on the likelihood of injustice or hardship to the parties of a delay in entering a final judgment as to part of the case. Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, 17 Neb. App. 28, 756 N.W.2d 299 (2008). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the certification under subsection (1) of this section, given that the length of time the litigation had been pending and the fact that a full jury trial had been brought to conclusion regarding the issues between certain parties, the case was the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket were outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties. Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, 17 Neb. App. 28, 756 N.W.2d 299 (2008). When a trial court concludes that entry of judgment under subsection (1) of this section is appropriate, it should ordinarily make specific findings setting forth the reasons for its order. Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, 17 Neb. App. 28, 756 N.W.2d 299 (2008).