CO Code § 14-13-202 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 14 - Domestic Matters|Article 13 - Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act|Part 2 - Jurisdiction|§ 14-13-202. Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction

  Except as otherwise provided in section 14-13-204, a court of this state that has made a child-custody determination consistent with section 14-13-201 or 14-13-203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:   A court of this state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or    A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.       A court of this state that has made a child-custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under section 14-13-201.     History. Source: L. 2000: Entire article R&RE, p. 1525, § 1, effective July 1.    OFFICIAL COMMENT   This is a new section addressing continuing jurisdiction. Continuing jurisdiction was not specifically addressed in the UCCJA. Its absence caused considerable confusion, particularly because the PKPA, § 1738(d), requires other States to give Full Faith and Credit to custody determinations made by the original decree State pursuant to the decree State's continuing jurisdiction so long as that State has jurisdiction under its own law and remains the residence of the child or any contestant.   This section provides the rules of continuing jurisdiction and borrows from UIFSA as well as recent UCCJA case law. The continuing jurisdiction of the original decree State is exclusive. It continues until one of two events occurs:   1. If a parent or a person acting as a parent remains in the original decree State, continuing jurisdiction is lost when neither the child, the child and a parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent continue to have a significant connection with the original decree State and there is no longer substantial evidence concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relations in that State. In other words, even if the child has acquired a new home State, the original decree State retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, so long as the general requisites of the “substantial connection” jurisdiction provisions of Section 14-13-201 are met. If the relationship between the child and the person remaining in the State with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction becomes so attenuated that the court could no longer find significant connections and substantial evidence, jurisdiction would no longer exist.   The use of the phrase “a court of this State” under subsection (1)(a) makes it clear that the original decree State is the sole determinant of whether jurisdiction continues. A party seeking to modify a custody determination must obtain an order from the original decree State stating that it no longer has jurisdiction.   2. Continuing jurisdiction is lost when the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent no longer reside in the original decree State. The exact language of subparagraph (1)(b) was the subject of considerable debate. Ultimately the Conference settled on the phrase that “a court of this State or a court of another State determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this State” to determine when the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of a State ended. The phrase is meant to be identical in meaning to the language of the PKPA which provides that full faith and credit is to be given to custody determinations made by a State in the exercise of its continuing jurisdiction when that “State remains the residence of ... .” The phrase is also the equivalent of the language “continues to reside” which occurs in UIFSA § 205(a)(1) to determine the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of the State that made a support order. The phrase “remains the residence of” in the PKPA has been the subject of conflicting case law. It is the intention of this Act that paragraph (1)(b) of this section means that the named persons no longer continue to actually live within the State. Thus, unless a modification proceeding has been commenced, when the child, the parents, and all persons acting as parents physically leave the State to live elsewhere, the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction ceases.   The phrase “do not presently reside” is not used in the sense of a technical domicile. The fact that the original determination State still considers one parent a domiciliary does not prevent it from losing exclusive, continuing jurisdiction after the child, the parents, and all persons acting as parents have moved from the State.   If the child, the parents, and all persons acting as parents have all left the State which made the custody determination prior to the commencement of the modification proceeding, considerations of waste of resources dictate that a court in State B, as well as a court in State A, can decide that State A has lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.   The continuing jurisdiction provisions of this section are narrower than the comparable provisions of the PKPA. That statute authorizes continuing jurisdiction so long as any “contestant” remains in the original decree State and that State continues to have jurisdiction under its own law. This Act eliminates the contestant classification. The Conference decided that a remaining grandparent or other third party who claims a right to visitation, should not suffice to confer exclusive, continuing jurisdiction on the State that made the original custody determination after the departure of the child, the parents and any person acting as a parent. The significant connection to the original decree State must relate to the child, the child and a parent, or the child and a person acting as a parent. This revision does not present a conflict with the PKPA. The PKPA's reference in § 1738(d) to § 1738 (c)(1) recognizes that States may narrow the class of cases that would be subject to exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. However, during the transition from the UCCJA to this Act, some States may continue to base continuing jurisdiction on the continued presence of a contestant, such as a grandparent. The PKPA will require that such decisions be enforced. The problem will disappear as States adopt this Act to replace the UCCJA.   Jurisdiction attaches at the commencement of a proceeding. If State A had jurisdiction under this section at the time a modification proceeding was commenced there, it would not be lost by all parties moving out of the State prior to the conclusion of proceeding. State B would not have jurisdiction to hear a modification unless State A decided that State B was more appropriate under Section 14-13-207 .   Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction is not reestablished if, after the child, the parents, and all persons acting as parents leave the State, the non-custodial parent returns. As subsection (2) provides, once a State has lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, it can modify its own determination only if it has jurisdiction under the standards of Section 14-13-201 . If another State acquires exclusive continuing jurisdiction under this section, then its orders cannot be modified even if this State has once again become the home State of the child.   In accordance with the majority of UCCJA case law, the State with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction may relinquish jurisdiction when it determines that another State would be a more convenient forum under the principles of Section 14-13-207 .   ANNOTATION   In a continuing custody dispute where none of the parties still live in Colorado, the fact that any proceedings related to custody inherently arise from an initial custody order, which was made by Colorado courts, does not necessarily give Colorado continuing jurisdictional authority. In re Pritchett, 80 P.3d 918 (Colo. App. 2003).   “Presently reside” is not equivalent to “currently reside” or “physical presence”. “Presently reside” is not confined only to a party's physical presence within the borders of a state, but necessitates an inquiry broader than technical domicile into the totality of the circumstances that make up domicile--that is, a person's permanent home to which he or she intends to return to and remain. In re Brandt, 2012 CO 3, 268 P.3d 406.   Totality of the circumstance test to determine if a party “presently resides” is a mixed question of fact and law and includes, but is not limited to, the length and reasons for the parents' and the child's absence from the state of initial jurisdiction; their intent in departing from the state and returning to it; reserve and active military assignments affecting one or both parents; where they maintain a home, car, driver's license, job, professional licensure, and voting registration; where they pay state taxes; the initial state's determination of residency based on the facts and that state's law; and any other circumstances demonstrated by evidence in the case. In re Brandt, 2012 CO 3, 268 P.3d 406.