CO Code § 16-19-104 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 16 - Criminal Proceedings|Article 19 - Fugitives and Extradition|§ 16-19-104. Form of Demand

 No demand for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another state shall be recognized by the governor unless in writing alleging, except in cases arising under section 16-19-107 , that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and that thereafter he fled from the state, and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon, or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution thereof, together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation, or parole. The indictment, information, or affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that state; and the copy of the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand.   History. Source: L. 53: P. 315, § 3. CSA: C. 72, § 48. CRS 53: § 60-1-3. L. 57: P. 379, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 60-1-3. History. Source: L. 53: P. 315, § 3. CSA: C. 72, § 48. CRS 53: § 60-1-3. L. 57: P. 379, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 60-1-3.    ANNOTATION   Purpose of extradition law. The extradition law is designed to prevent the successful escape of all persons accused of crime, whether convicted or not, and to secure their return to the state from which they fled for their due punishment. Gottfried v. Cronin, 192 Colo. 25 , 555 P.2d 969 (1976).   The purpose of extradition proceedings is to prevent an accused person from being wrongfully rendered to the demanding state for trial. Lovato v. Johnson, 617 P.2d 1203 (Colo. 1980).   Construction. The extradition statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to enable offenders against the laws of a state to find permanent asylum in another state. Gottfried v. Cronin, 192 Colo. 25 , 555 P.2d 969 (1976).   Demanding state may terminate proceedings. Nothing in the law of extradition prevents a demanding state from making a unilateral decision to terminate extradition proceedings. Massey v. Wilson, 199 Colo. 121 , 605 P.2d 469 (1980).   Demanding state has no duty to ensure that a pre-extradition hearing is held in the asylum state. Smith v. Lamm, 629 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Colo. 1986 ).   It is for the general assembly to say under what circumstances this state will grant asylum. Petition of Harwell, 180 Colo. 144 , 503 P.2d 618 (1972).   It is within the province of the general assembly to require that the demanding state must meet standards which are akin to probable cause. Bryan v. Conn, 187 Colo. 275 , 530 P.2d 1274 (1975).   The procedural safeguards in this article are adequate. Conrad v. McClearn, 166 Colo. 568 , 445 P.2d 222 (1968).   The form of demand and the requisites for extradition are defined by this section. Woolsey v. Nelson, 178 Colo. 144 , 496 P.2d 306 (1972).   All documents read together. In determining whether extradition documents sufficiently charge an accused with a crime in the demanding state, or that he was convicted of a crime and sentenced therefor, from which he escaped, or that the accused has broken the terms of his bail, probation, or parole, all of the requisition documents must be read and considered together. Martello v. Baker, 189 Colo. 195 , 539 P.2d 1280 (1975).   In evaluating the sufficiency of requisition papers, all of the documents must be read and considered together. Patrick v. Watson, 195 Colo. 156 , 576 P.2d 1014 (1978).   Extradition requisition may refer to, annex, and authenticate accompanying papers and, if together they meet statutory requirements, that is sufficient compliance with the requirements of this section. Hall v. Cronin, 196 Colo. 333 , 585 P.2d 286 (1978).   Statutory grounds required in demand for execution stated in alternative. It is fundamental that the statutory grounds in this section, which are required to be set forth in the form of demand for execution, are stated in the alternative. If any one ground is adequately set forth as required by this section, then the demand is sufficient in form to authorize the execution of the personal demand. Norrod v. Bower, 187 Colo. 421 , 532 P.2d 330 (1975).   Demand for extradition complied with this section although the requisition documents contained both a demand for extradition, pursuant to § 16-19-103 , and a request for extradition predicated on § 16-19-106 , which controls executive agreements, since the executive agreement, which accompanied the requisition documents, served only to ensure that the demanding state would return and surrender defendant to the Colorado authorities upon the completion of the trial in the demanding state. Buffalo v. Tanksley, 189 Colo. 45 , 536 P.2d 827 (1975).   The statutory requirement for supporting documents in a foreign state's form of demand is stated in the alternative. Johnson v. Kiefer, 624 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1981).   Any one basis for extradition sufficient to meet statutory test. If any one basis for extradition is adequately set forth as required by this statute, the form of the demand meets the statutory test. Johnson v. Kiefer, 624 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1981); Butcher v. Caldwell, 677 P.2d 342 (Colo. 1984).   Allegation of presence in demanding state in governor's warrant creates presumption. The requirement that the person sought to be extradited be shown to be in the state when the crime was committed is satisfied by an allegation to that effect in a governor's warrant, which creates a presumption that the accused was in the demanding state at the time the offense was committed. Graham v. Vanderhoof, 185 Colo. 334 , 524 P.2d 611 (1974); Johnson v. Cronin, 690 P.2d 1277 (Colo. 1984).   Court's habeas corpus review limited. Once the governor has granted extradition, a court considering habeas corpus relief is limited to deciding whether: (1) The extradition documents on their face are in order; (2) the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (3) the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (4) the petitioner is a fugitive. Gerard v. Ossola, 649 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1982); Rodriquez v. Sandoval, 680 P.2d 1278 (Colo. 1984).   Lawful demand required prior to extradition. The governor of Colorado must have a lawful demand or request before surrendering one who has committed a crime in another state. Massey v. Wilson, 199 Colo. 121 , 605 P.2d 469 (1980).   Requisition for extradition presents questions of law and fact. Upon receipt of a requisition for interstate rendition, the governor of the asylum state has two questions to pass upon: (1) Is the person demanded substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the demanding state by indictment or affidavit before a magistrate?; and (2) is the person a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state? The first of these questions is one of law, while the second is one of fact. Buhler v. People, 151 Colo. 345 , 377 P.2d 748 (1963); Capra v. Ballarby, 158 Colo. 91 , 405 P.2d 205 (1965).   The question as to whether a defendant is a fugitive from justice is one of fact. Harding v. People, 161 Colo. 571 , 423 P.2d 847 (1967).   It must allege presence in demanding state. The requirement of alleging presence in the demanding state is clearly imposed upon the requisition of the governor of the demanding state rather than upon the warrant of the governor of the asylum state. Harding v. People, 161 Colo. 571 , 423 P.2d 847 (1967); Luker v. Koch, 176 Colo. 75 , 489 P.2d 191 (1971).   And the accused must be substantially charged with a crime in the demanding state to be subject to extradition. This means that the charge standing against him must legally constitute a crime. Buhler v. People, 151 Colo. 345 , 377 P.2d 748 (1963).   This section of the uniform act requires that the indictment, information, or affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that state. Capra v. Ballarby, 158 Colo. 91 , 405 P.2d 205 (1965).   The requirement that the indictment, information, or affidavit made before the magistrate substantially charges the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that state is met where the crime is charged under the law of the demanding state, not under law of the asylum state. People v. Jackson, 180 Colo. 135 , 502 P.2d 1106 (1972).   The law of extradition in Colorado requires that the defendant be charged with a crime under the laws of the demanding state. White v. Leach, 188 Colo. 62 , 532 P.2d 740 (1975).   This is determined by asylum state. It is not only the right, but the duty of the proper authorities of the asylum state, executive and judicial, to determine whether the accused is charged with a crime in the demanding state. Buhler v. People, 151 Colo. 345 , 377 P.2d 748 (1963).   The sufficiency of the method of charging the crime in an extradition proceeding may be a matter for determination by the demanding state. Mote v. Koch, 173 Colo. 82 , 476 P.2d 255 (1970).   A criminal complaint or indictment from a state requesting extradition is presumed to charge a crime. Fox v. People, 161 Colo. 163 , 420 P.2d 412 (1966).   But one wholly failing to state offense does not support extradition. If the indictment or other charge of crime on which the requisition is founded wholly fails to state an offense created by the statute of the demanding state, it describes no crime thereunder and extradition should be refused. Buhler v. People, 151 Colo. 345 , 377 P.2d 748 (1963).   Charging document must be framed substantially in statutory language. To comply with the statutory requirement that an accused be substantially charged with an offense if he is to be extradited, the charging document must be framed substantially in the statutory language. White v. Leach, 188 Colo. 62 , 532 P.2d 740 (1975); Cates v. Sullivan, 696 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1985).   Burden not on asylum state to determine if defendant correctly charged. The law of extradition does not impose the burden on the courts of the asylum state to determine whether the defendant has been correctly charged with committing a particular offense. White v. Leach, 188 Colo. 62 , 532 P.2d 740 (1975); Pickinpaugh v. Lamm, 189 Colo. 143 , 538 P.2d 113 (1975); Cates v. Sullivan, 696 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1985).   Any question relating to the sufficiency of the information or the technical accuracy of the charge is left to the courts of the demanding state to resolve. White v. Leach, 188 Colo. 62 , 532 P.2d 740 (1975).   In an extradition proceeding and in its habeas corpus review, questions relating to the sufficiency of an information or the technical accuracy of a charge are left to the courts of the demanding state to resolve. Lovato v. Johnson, 617 P.2d 1203 (Colo. 1980).   Credibility of affiant may be attacked only in demanding state. At a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus, the state need not prove the credibility of the person who made the affidavit upon which extradition is based; an attack on the credibility of the affiant is possible only in the courts of the demanding state. People v. Schneckloth, 660 P.2d 1293 (Colo. 1983).   The asylum state need only determine whether accused is charged with an extraditable offense. White v. Leach, 188 Colo. 62 , 532 P.2d 740 (1975).   A person who seeks to invalidate an extradition has a burden of overcoming the presumption, by clear and convincing evidence, that the documents submitted by the demanding state substantially charge him with a crime. Nevard v. Conn, 187 Colo. 168 , 529 P.2d 305 (1974).   Extradition ordered if minimal requirements met. If in the course of a hearing which challenges extradition proceedings, Colorado courts are satisfied that certain minimal requirements are met, extradition should be ordered. Bryan v. Conn, 187 Colo. 275 , 530 P.2d 1274 (1975).   As long as the extradition demand and accompanying documents exhibit substantial compliance with the statutory requirements, extradition should be ordered. Griffith v. Nelson, 647 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1982); Cates v. Sullivan, 696 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1985).   The general rule is that the offense must be so described that the accused may know how to answer the charge, the court what judgment to pronounce, and conviction or acquittal thereon may be pleaded in bar to any subsequent prosecution. Capra v. Ballarby, 158 Colo. 91 , 405 P.2d 205 (1965).   If it may be fairly determined what the charges are for which the extradition of the accused is being sought, then the requisition documents satisfy the statutory requirements. Martello v. Baker, 189 Colo. 195 , 539 P.2d 1280 (1975).   Adequate statement as to parole violation. Demand reciting that the petitioner “is charged with the crime of parole violation having been convicted of the crime of possession of narcotics”, and certifying that the petitioner has fled from Michigan and may have taken refuge in Colorado, was held adequate statement. Wynsma v. Leach, 189 Colo. 59 , 536 P.2d 817 (1975).   The words “jumped bail” in a demand for extradition are substantially equivalent to a statement that a person has “broken the terms of his bail”. Protz v. Watson, 194 Colo. 223 , 571 P.2d 719 (1977).   The demanding state is not required to enumerate the grounds for probation revocation, only that the fugitive has violated the terms of his probation. Bernardo v. Cronin, 191 Colo. 36 , 550 P.2d 349 (1976).   Indictment need not allege elements of crime. Upon the trial of the issue of guilt, it would doubtless be necessary for the prosecution to prove an essential element of the crime. It is not necessary that the indictment should contain any such allegation. The indictment did “substantially charge” the petitioner with the crime of sodomy; being a crime known to the common law, further statutory definition of the word sodomy was unnecessary. Beliajus v. Phillips, 170 Colo. 212 , 460 P.2d 233 (1969).   Or prove criminal intent. The question of criminal intent is relevant only to the sufficiency of the demand for extradition. It is not an element to be proved in the responding state. Instead, it is a jurisdictional fact which must appear from the face of the supporting documents. Where the basis for extradition is that defendant has been charged in California in the manner provided in this section with committing an act in this state, or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in California, the trial court was under no duty to admit the evidence offered to prove that defendant was financially unable to make the support payments to negate the intent to commit a crime. Conrad v. McClearn, 166 Colo. 568 , 445 P.2d 222 (1968).   The asylum state has no authority to pass on the technical sufficiency of an indictment in an interstate rendition proceeding. If the subject of extradition desires to attack the technical insufficiency of an indictment, he must do so in the demanding state. Capra v. Ballarby, 158 Colo. 91 , 405 P.2d 205 (1965); Boyd v. Van Cleave, 180 Colo. 403 , 505 P.2d 1305 (1973).   Courts of the asylum state are without authority to pass upon the technical sufficiency of the indictment, which is left to the courts of the demanding state. Dressel v. Bianco, 168 Colo. 517 , 452 P.2d 756 (1969).   A court of an asylum state is without power to review the determination of probable cause by the demanding state. Gerard v. Ossola, 649 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1982).   The sufficiency of the evidence to support the charge is an issue to be resolved by the demanding state. Crosby v. Griswould, 650 P.2d 568 (Colo. 1982).   Matters of technical pleading will not be considered in an extradition hearing. Eathorne v. Nelson, 180 Colo. 288 , 505 P.2d 1 (1973).   It is fundamental that the technical sufficiency of the indictment is for the court of the demanding state to determine and not for the court of the asylum state. Samples v. Cronin, 189 Colo. 40 , 536 P.2d 306 (1975).   Likewise, asylum state not concerned with criminal procedure. Whether demanding state required preliminary examination before felony charge could be filed is a concern of the demanding state, not the asylum state. Boyd v. Van Cleave, 180 Colo. 403 , 505 P.2d 1305 (1973).   Nor on constitutional claims. However meritorious a defendant's constitutional claims may be, when the issue centers on extradition in a habeas corpus proceeding, the question must be resolved by the courts of the demanding state and not by the courts of Colorado. Buffalo v. Tanksley, 189 Colo. 45 , 536 P.2d 827 (1975).   Nor as to parole violation. Whether a person convicted of a crime has in fact violated his parole is of no concern in the courts of the asylum state. Tinsley v. Woods, 135 Colo. 590 , 313 P.2d 1006 (1957).   The relinquishing state will not look beyond the statement of the governor of the demanding state that the person sought has violated the terms of his parole. An inquiry into that subject is reserved for the demanding state upon the individual's return. Wynsma v. Leach, 189 Colo. 59 , 536 P.2d 817 (1975).   Or whether terms of probation violated. Whether the petitioner has, in fact, violated the terms of his probation is a matter for determination in the demanding, not the asylum, state. Bernardo v. Cronin, 191 Colo. 36 , 550 P.2d 349 (1976).   The issue of whether the demanding state properly revoked a fugitive's probation is a matter for determination in the demanding, not the asylum, state. Patrick v. Watson, 195 Colo. 156 , 576 P.2d 1014 (1978).   Hearing not required to show probable cause exists that defendant violated probation. Due process does not require that all extradition proceedings include a hearing to determine that probable cause exists to show that a defendant has violated the terms of his probation. Bryan v. Conn, 187 Colo. 275 , 530 P.2d 1274 (1975).   Due process of law does not require the courts of this state to extend an extradition proceeding beyond an examination of the sufficiency of the extradition documents into an exploration of whether there was probable cause to believe that the appellant had violated the terms of his probation. Byers v. Leach, 187 Colo. 312 , 530 P.2d 1276 (1975).   Demanding state has no duty to ensure that a pre-extradition hearing is held in the asylum state. Smith v. Lamm, 629 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Colo. 1986 ).   The requirement for ordering extradition is satisfied if the trial court finds either that probable cause exists or that the demanding state has made a finding of probable cause. Lopez v. Cronin, 193 Colo. 486 , 568 P.2d 43 (1977).   If the finding of probable cause was supported by evidence in the record, the constitutional and statutory requirements would be met. The requirement is also met if probable cause is in fact established by the extradition papers. Lopez v. Cronin, 193 Colo. 486 , 568 P.2d 43 (1977).   Effect of waiver of right to showing of probable cause in demanding state. Wyoming may extradite a defendant without an independent showing in Colorado of probable cause to hold him for trial in Wyoming, when he has already validly waived his right to such a showing in Wyoming. Smith v. Miller, 194 Colo. 218 , 571 P.2d 1084 (1977).   Extradition documents were sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the appellant had committed a crime in Minnesota. Simon v. Miller, 194 Colo. 27 , 568 P.2d 1167 (1977).   Where extradition is based on an information, there must be an accompanying affidavit which sets forth facts and circumstances which establish “something approaching probable cause”. Graham v. Vanderhoof, 185 Colo. 334 , 524 P.2d 611 (1974); Smith v. Miller, 194 Colo. 218 , 571 P.2d 1084 (1977).   Affidavit, accompanying extradition request, which incorporated police reports setting out facts of the investigation established sufficient cause. Graham v. Vanderhoof, 185 Colo. 334 , 524 P.2d 611 (1974).   Right to hearing does not turn on who demands transfer. A prisoner's right to a hearing should not turn on whether custody and transfer are sought by the demanding state under the extradition act or by the receiving state under the interstate compact. Moen v. Wilson, 189 Colo. 85 , 536 P.2d 1129 (1975).   Who may be extradited. Where the requisition papers show that the person has been charged and convicted in the demanding state, and that he has not completed his sentence, that person can be extradited to the demanding state under this article. Gottfried v. Cronin, 192 Colo. 25 , 555 P.2d 969 (1976).   In light of § 16-19-103 and the act's purposes, this section does not limit the extradition of an individual convicted of a crime to instances where he has “escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation, or parole”. Such language was only meant to be illustrative, but not exhaustive, of the occasions when a convicted person can be considered to have fled from the justice of another state. Gottfried v. Cronin, 192 Colo. 25 , 555 P.2d 969 (1976).   A person remains charged with crime while the judgment of conviction remains unsatisfied; hence, where a charge of crime has resulted in a conviction, the record of such conviction is sufficient evidence in extradition proceedings. Travis v. People, 135 Colo. 141 , 308 P.2d 997 (1957); Tinsley v. Woods, 135 Colo. 590 , 313 P.2d 1006 (1957).   A typewritten demand such as the judgment of conviction satisfies the language of the law. It alone is sufficient; hence, whose signature was on the order of commitment showing the sentence is unimportant, as long as all papers were authenticated by the governor who is the only one required by law to do so. Burnette v. McClearn, 162 Colo. 503 , 427 P.2d 331 (1967).   When extradition is for an offense that has resulted in conviction, all that is required is record of conviction and a statement by the governor that the accused has violated his parole. Wynsma v. Leach, 189 Colo. 59 , 536 P.2d 817 (1975).   Parolee subject to extradition. A crime that has resulted in conviction remains a charge under § 2, cl. (2) of art. IV, U.S. Const., which mandates the relinquishment of any person “charged” with a crime who has fled from justice and is in another state, so long as the sentence resulting from conviction is unsatisfied. Consequently, a parolee is subject to extradition as a fugitive because, as a convict with an unexpired sentence, he remains criminally “charged”. His extradition is for his original offense. Wynsma v. Leach, 189 Colo. 59 , 536 P.2d 817 (1975).   Parolee properly in asylum state extraditable for another offense. The fact that defendant was legally in the asylum state under probation does not prevent him from being a fugitive from the demanding state with respect to another offense. Mote v. Koch, 173 Colo. 82 , 476 P.2d 255 (1970).   Or for parole violation. A convicted individual may be extradited as a fugitive when he, prior to the revocation of parole, seeks asylum in the state from which he is sought to be extradited. The paroled prisoner is declared to be a fugitive from justice on the ground that he is a convict whose time has not expired and who, therefore, is charged with crime. Travis v. People, 135 Colo. 141 , 308 P.2d 997 (1957).   Probable cause finding by a neutral judicial officer in demanding state forecloses court in asylum state from reconsidering issue and when governor of asylum state grants extradition, prima facie evidence exists that all constitutional and statutory requirements have been met and the burden shifts to the petitioner to prove the extradition request is improper. Johnson v. Cronin, 690 P.2d 1277 (Colo. 1984).   A determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate of the demanding state is binding upon the courts of any asylum state, which are without power to review that determination. Allen v. Leach, 626 P.2d 1141 (Colo. 1981); Richardson v. Sullivan, 700 P.2d 534 (Colo. 1985).   Affidavits failing to set forth facts establishing probable cause not insufficient. Affidavits supporting an extradition demand are not insufficient because they fail to set forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause, because a determination of probable cause by a neutral judicial officer of the demanding state is binding upon the courts of the asylum state. Moore v. Miller, 198 Colo. 24 , 596 P.2d 64 (1979).   Presence of warrant in requisition documents establishes probable cause. When a state's law requires a judge to find probable cause before issuing a warrant, the presence of the warrant in the requisition documents establishes probable cause for the purposes of this section. Keefer v. Leach, 198 Colo. 101 , 597 P.2d 203 (1979); Parker v. Glazner, 645 P.2d 1319 (Colo. 1982); Vigil v. Martinez, 661 P.2d 1164 (Colo. 1983).   Minutes of earlier proceeding during which defendant was found guilty qualifies as copy of judgment of conviction or of a sentence. Miller v. Cronin, 197 Colo. 391 , 593 P.2d 706 (1979).   Certified copies of minute orders qualify as a copy of a judgment of conviction or sentence. Blackwell v. Johnson, 647 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1982); Butcher v. Caldwell, 677 P.2d 342 (Colo. 1984).   Record of conviction and probation violation sufficient to support extradition. Where the defendant violated the terms of his probation, all that is required is a record of the conviction and a statement by the governor of the requisition state that the person sought has violated the terms of his probation. Blackburn v. Johnson, 647 P.2d 238 (Colo. 1982).   And for parole violators record of conviction and parole violation is sufficient. Rodriquez v. Sandoval, 680 P.2d 1278 (Colo. 1984).   Where extradition based on substantive offense rather than probation violation. Where extradition is based not upon violation of the terms of probation, but upon the substantive criminal offense for which the defendant has not yet completed his sentence, all that is required is a record of the conviction and a statement by the governor of the requisition state that the person sought has violated the terms of his probation. Morgan v. Miller, 197 Colo. 341 , 593 P.2d 357 (1979).   Where indictment states two possible grounds for extradition but only one is basis for extradition. Where the indictment states two possible grounds for extradition, a charge of aggravated robbery and a burglary conviction, but the governor's requisition indicates that the charge of aggravated robbery is the actual basis for extradition, the statute requires only an accompanying indictment together with any warrants issued pursuant thereto and the allegation that petitioner was in the demanding state when the crime occurred and afterwards fled, and failure to include an authenticated copy of the prior conviction does not render the indictment ineffective. Anderson v. Cronin, 198 Colo. 103 , 596 P.2d 760 (1979).   No distinction between properly verified complaint and unverified information with affidavit. There is no meaningful distinction between a properly verified complaint which incorporates attached factual matter by reference and an unverified information with supporting affidavit. Coca v. Sheriff of City & County of Denver, 184 Colo. 11 , 517 P.2d 843 (1974).   Thus, the sufficiency of affidavits preliminary to the original criminal complaint or indictment is immaterial. Travis v. People, 135 Colo. 141 , 308 P.2d 997 (1957).   Where person sought to be extradited is charged with crime by grand jury indictment, an authenticated copy of which accompanies extradition papers, affidavit showing probable cause is not required. People v. Jackson, 180 Colo. 135 , 502 P.2d 1106 (1972).   A grand jury indictment is a finding of probable cause by the grand jury so extradition papers based upon an indictment need not have an additional showing of probable cause. Eathorne v. Nelson, 180 Colo. 288 , 505 P.2d 1 (1973).   When extradition is founded upon a criminal indictment, supporting affidavits are unnecessary and may be regarded as immaterial surplusage when considering the sufficiency of the form of demand required. McCoy v. Cronin, 187 Colo. 364 , 531 P.2d 379 (1975).   But affidavit alone must show probable cause for arrest. An affidavit used to charge a crime for the purpose of obtaining an arrest warrant must set forth facts sufficient to justify a finding of the existence of probable cause. It should report or summarize enough evidence to justify the issuance of an arrest warrant in the accusing state. People v. McFall, 175 Colo. 151 , 486 P.2d 6 (1971).   The affidavit in support of the extradition documents must also contain sufficient information to justify a fourth amendment finding of probable cause that the accused committed the crime with which he is charged. Allen v. Cronin, 189 Colo. 540 , 543 P.2d 707 (1975); Renton v. Cronin, 196 Colo. 109 , 582 P.2d 677 (1978).   The affidavit which accompanies the arrest warrant and the criminal complaint from the demanding state must set forth some of the underlying circumstances surrounding the crime charged, as well as an adequate identification of the source, or sources, of the information set forth in the affidavit. Allen v. Cronin, 189 Colo. 540 , 543 P.2d 707 (1975).   Probable cause established that defendant committed crime of escape. Where the complaint and affidavit was based upon the personal information and knowledge of the chief records officer of the Kentucky state reformatory, stating under oath that appellant had been confined in the Kentucky state reformatory under a sentence of 10 years for armed robbery, pursuant to a judgment of conviction from the Jefferson circuit court of Louisville, Kentucky; that affiant had been the chief records officer of the reformatory for 16 years and was in charge of the official custody and control records of the appellant at the reformatory; and that he knew, from these records and his own personal knowledge, that appellant did escape from the reformatory, leaving while on a hospital trip to Louisville, Kentucky, the complaint and affidavit is sufficient to establish probable cause that appellant had committed the substantive crime of escape under the Kentucky statute. Norrod v. Bower, 187 Colo. 421 , 532 P.2d 330 (1975).   Whether the affidavits establishing probable cause were executed before or after the charging document is immaterial, provided that the extradition documents, viewed in their entirety, establish probable cause that the person to be extradited committed the offense. Wood v. Leach, 189 Colo. 361 , 540 P.2d 1084 (1975); See Hill v. Miller, 195 Colo. 370 , 578 P.2d 655 (1978); Moore v. Miller, 198 Colo. 24 , 596 P.2d 64 (1979); Dietz v. Leach, 199 Colo. 293 , 607 P.2d 993 (1980).   Prima facie showing of identity. Where the name of the person in custody is identical to that appearing in the extradition documents, there is a prima facie showing of identity and the burden is on the petitioner to disprove the presumed identity. Samples v. Cronin, 189 Colo. 40 , 536 P.2d 306 (1975); Guy v. Nelson, 630 P.2d 610 (Colo. 1981).   Identity of name with the extradition documents is sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of identity; and, unless overcome by the appellant's evidence showing lack of identity, the prima facie showing is sufficient to establish identity. Cates v. Cronin, 194 Colo. 89 , 570 P.2d 524 (1977).   Once the prosecution has established a prima facie showing of identity, the person charged as a fugitive must show that he is not the person sought by the demanding state. Beam v. McKinster, 652 P.2d 618 (Colo. 1982).   Once a prima facie case for extradition has been established, the burden devolves upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence either that he is not a fugitive from the demanding state or that he is not substantially charged with a crime in that state. Lucero v. Martin, 660 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1983); Richardson v. Sullivan, 700 P.2d 534 (Colo. 1985); Council v. MacFarlane, 709 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1985).   However, the use of a “a/k/a” as a means of identifying a fugitive in a complaint, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of identity. Cates v. Sullivan, 696 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1985).   But the use of “a/k/a” documentation coupled with a description and photograph of the fugitive is sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of identity. Cates v. Sullivan, 696 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1985).   Clear and convincing evidence must be shown by accused that he is not the person sought in order to rebut the prima facie showing of identity. Guy v. Nelson, 630 P.2d 610 (Colo. 1981).   Where petitioner failed to introduce evidence that he was not the person described in the requisition documents and the cross-examination of the respondents' witnesses did not create such evidence, the petitioner failed to establish that he was not the person described in the documents. Council v. MacFarlane, 709 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1985).   Statutory citation not required to be included within indictment. Samples v. Cronin, 189 Colo. 40 , 536 P.2d 306 (1975).   An information not required with indictment. The trial court was in error to discharge a fugitive for lack of an information for no such information is required. It is sufficient that a certified copy of the indictment, charging the passing of a worthless check, and other papers relating thereto, including a requisition, were forwarded from the governor of Tennessee and that the governor of Colorado issued a warrant for petitioner's arrest on the basis of such papers. Capra v. Miller, 161 Colo. 448 , 422 P.2d 636 (1967).   The statement required by the extradition statute may be contained in the documents appended to the form of demand since the requisitioning governor certifies the accuracy of these documents. Wynsma v. Leach, 189 Colo. 59 , 536 P.2d 817 (1975).   Statements as to escape and copy of judgment are sufficient. In cases where persons are sought as escapees from state prison, all that is required for extradition is either a copy of the judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution thereof, together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confinement. Burnette v. McClearn, 162 Colo. 503 , 427 P.2d 331 (1967); Holmes v. People, 169 Colo. 371 , 456 P.2d 731 (1969).   Where a demand is for a person whose judgment of conviction remains unsatisfied, the demand shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment of conviction or of the sentence imposed in execution thereof, together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confinement or broken the terms of his bail, probation, or parole. Byers v. Leach, 187 Colo. 312 , 530 P.2d 1276 (1975).   Affidavit of sheriff in extraditing jurisdiction held sufficient. Weathers v. Sullivan, 184 Colo. 39 , 518 P.2d 842 (1974).   Fact that signature of South Carolina solicitor on indictment was made by his deputy did not preclude extradition of fugitive to South Carolina where procedure of having deputy sign solicitor's name to an indictment was proper and routine in South Carolina. Nevard v. Conn, 187 Colo. 168 , 529 P.2d 305 (1974).   Authentication of demanding governor is sufficient. In the absence of a showing that any of the documents authenticated by a governor are spurious the certificate of the governor is sufficient. Travis v. People, 135 Colo. 141 , 308 P.2d 997 (1957); Tinsley v. Woods, 135 Colo. 590 , 313 P.2d 1006 (1957).   The question of authenticity is one for the determination of the governor of the demanding state alone, and his certification of that fact is all that is required. Burnette v. McClearn, 162 Colo. 503 , 427 P.2d 331 (1967); Byers v. Leach, 187 Colo. 312 , 530 P.2d 1276 (1975).   Where governor of demanding state personally certifies to authenticity of extradition papers according to laws of demanding state, requirements of section in regard to authentication are met. People v. Jackson, 180 Colo. 135 , 502 P.2d 1106 (1972).   Where the requisition signed by the governor of Arizona clearly reflected that the indictment was authenticated, and in the absence of any showing by the accused that the authenticated documents are spurious, the requisition must be considered to be adequate and sufficient to support an extradition order. Rush v. Baker, 188 Colo. 136 , 533 P.2d 36 (1975).   Certification of extradition documents is not defective because there is no authorization included to show that the chief deputy clerk could sign for the clerk of the court when the demanding state's governor's authentication covers all the documents including the affidavits of probable cause and the arrest warrant. Absent some showing that the documents are spurious, the governor's general authentication establishes their validity. Keefer v. Leach, 198 Colo. 101 , 597 P.2d 203 (1979).   The only authentication required by § 16-19-104 is an authentication by the executive authority of the demanding state. Clark v. Leach, 200 Colo. 151 , 612 P.2d 1130 (1980); Butcher v. Caldwell, 677 P.2d 342 (Colo. 1984).   Governor's authentication covers all documents. A governor's general authentication, included in the requisition documents, covers all documents included in the requisition request. Blackwell v. Johnson, 647 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1982).   Requisition document signed by one other than governor. A requisition document, signed by one other than the governor of the demanding state, is valid so long as the capacity of the signator to act on behalf of the governor is duly authenticated. Hershberger v. Black, 645 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1982).   Petitioner's burden to overcome presumption that extradition papers properly signed. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to overcome the presumption that the person signing the extradition papers had the authority to do so. Hershberger v. Black, 645 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1982).   The copies necessary to accompany the demand need not be verified, certified, nor photocopied. Burnette v. McClearn, 162 Colo. 503 , 427 P.2d 331 (1967); Byers v. Leach, 187 Colo. 312 , 530 P.2d 1276 (1975).   Indictments need not specifically attest that their certification was authorized. The copy of the indictments accompanying the request for extradition need not specifically attest that the officer of the court who certified the copies of the indictments was authorized to do so. Furman v. Miller, 198 Colo. 282 , 598 P.2d 1042 (1979).   Charging documents accompanying demand for extradition must be verified by executive authority. The requirements of this statute are clear as to which of the documents accompanying the demand for extradition must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand. They are, “the copy of indictment, information, affidavit, judgment of conviction or sentence”. In other words, it is the charging document. People v. Lent, 187 Colo. 248 , 529 P.2d 1317 (1975).   Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies in the requisition documents do not render them invalid or prevent extradition. Martello v. Baker, 189 Colo. 195 , 539 P.2d 1280 (1975); Griffith v. Nelson, 647 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1982).   A minor discrepancy in the charge set forth in the requisition documents does not prevent extradition. Bryan v. Conn, 187 Colo. 275 , 530 P.2d 1274 (1975); Schumm v. Nelson, 659 P.2d 1389 (Colo. 1983).   As long as the requisition documents substantially comply with these statutory requirements, extradition should be ordered notwithstanding minor discrepancies or inconsistencies in the documents. Lucero v. Martin, 660 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1983); Cates v. Sullivan, 696 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1985).   Immaterial clerical inconsistencies do not affect the validity of the governor's warrant. Morris v. Nelson, 659 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1983).   Although a charging document must be phrased substantially in accordance with the statutory language, minor discrepancies will not prevent extradition if the substantive statutory standards are met. Furman v. Miller, 198 Colo. 282 , 598 P.2d 1042 (1979).   Where the documents substantially charge the defendant with having committed a crime under the laws of another state, clerical errors do not render the extradition documents invalid or prevent extradition. Wilson v. Johnson, 645 P.2d 21 (Colo. 1982).   Where the only difference between an authenticated copy and the original indictment relates to the manner in which those signatures are described on the copy, such difference does not impair the genuineness of the signatures on the original indictment nor the authenticity of the copy, and this authenticated copy satisfied the requirements of this section. Griffith v. Nelson, 647 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1982).   Demanding state is not required to allege every element of crime for which extradition is sought and charging documents are sufficient if framed substantially in the language contained in the statute. Johnson v. Cronin, 690 P.2d 1277 (Colo. 1984).   Technical discrepancy in middle name insufficient to defeat extradition. Under summary proceedings, sole reliance on a technical discrepancy in a middle name, when appellant does not allege or represent that he is not the fugitive, will not suffice to defeat extradition. Beverly v. Davis, 648 P.2d 621 (Colo. 1982); Beam v. McKinster, 652 P.2d 618 (Colo. 1982).   Where there is a discrepancy between the middle initial contained in the extradition documents and the governor's warrant and the initial claimed by the accused as being correct, a prima facie case of identity may be established by an appropriate affidavit and photograph. Miller v. Debekker, 668 P.2d 927 (Colo. 1983).   Discrepancy as to height insufficient to defeat extradition. A discrepancy between an extradition document from a demanding state and a governor's warrant issued pursuant thereto in this state, as to the height of the person in custody, is not clear and convincing evidence that the detainee is not the person named in the extradition document. Tackett v. Leach, 661 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1983).   Evidence of fugitive's own admissions relating to alleged offenses sufficient to overcome technical discrepancy in extradition documents and to establish identity for persons of extradition. Edmonds v. Andrews, 696 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1985).   Clerical defects did not require reversal. Clerical defects in extradition papers, such as the failure of the governor of North Dakota to insert in one the day and month on which he signed it, and in another, the day cannot be the basis for a reversal. Fox v. People, 161 Colo. 163 , 420 P.2d 412 (1966).   Extradition complaint was not defective because it incorporated by reference “6 pages”, and there were attached two duplicate sets of investigative reports, each set containing six pages. Coca v. Sheriff of City & County of Denver, 184 Colo. 11 , 517 P.2d 843 (1974).   Once a valid governor's warrant has been issued and served, questions relating to the illegality or irregularity of the arrest or initial detention become moot. Reese v. Warden & Keeper of County Jail, 193 Colo. 7 , 561 P.2d 339 (1977); Renton v. Cronin, 196 Colo. 109 , 582 P.2d 677 (1978); Whittington v. Bray, 200 Colo. 17 , 612 P.2d 72 (1980); Gerard v. Ossola, 649 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1982).   Once the governor's warrant is served, issues concerning the petitioner's previous detention are moot. Schumm v. Nelson, 659 P.2d 1389 (Colo. 1983).   Defects in the original Colorado arrest documents become moot once the petitioner is served with the governor's warrant. Morris v. Nelson, 659 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1983).   Subsequent extradition not barred by defective prior proceeding. Prior grant of writ of habeas corpus in extradition proceedings on ground that rendition papers allege that petitioner is fugitive when it is admitted that he is not a fugitive does not bar, under doctrine of res judicata, a subsequent attempt at extradition where facts and issues are different from those raised by the first petition. Boyd v. Van Cleave, 180 Colo. 403 , 505 P.2d 1305 (1973).   First hearing not res judicata. Where the only issue determined by a trial court on a first habeas corpus proceeding was that the petitioner was then unlawfully detained because the requesting state had not provided all the necessary documents required for extradition, the underlying basis or validity of the extradition demand was not adjudicated in the first habeas corpus proceeding and is not res judicata to second. Tucker v. Shoemaker, 190 Colo. 267 , 546 P.2d 951 (1976).   Judicial review under extradition act but not under detainer act. The extradition act and the uniform detainer compact, when applied to prisoners who are similarly situated, grant limited judicial review to contest transfer when the extradition act is used, but not under the provisions of the agreement on detainers. Moen v. Wilson, 189 Colo. 85 , 536 P.2d 1129 (1975).   Compliance with section established. Woolsey v. Nelson, 178 Colo. 144 , 496 P.2d 306 (1972); Reese v. Warden & Keeper of County Jail, 193 Colo. 7 , 561 P.2d 339 (1977).   Statute as basis for jurisdiction. See Lomax v. Cronin, 194 Colo. 523 , 575 P.2d 1285 (1978); Sollinger v. McNeel, 656 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1983).   Applied in Threadgill v. Capra, 161 Colo. 453 , 423 P.2d 318 (1967); Bartz v. Capra, 161 Colo. 503 , 423 P.2d 25 (1967); Davis v. People, 172 Colo. 486 , 474 P.2d 206 (1970); Buckmon v. Cronin, 183 Colo. 205 , 515 P.2d 1245 (1973); Teters v. Watson, 190 Colo. 355 , 547 P.2d 1277 (1976); People v. Pitcher, 192 Colo. 195 , 557 P.2d 395 (1976); Dulac v. Miller, 195 Colo. 275 , 577 P.2d 761 (1978); Jackson v. Cronin, 199 Colo. 428 , 610 P.2d 103 (1980); Schoengarth v. Bray, 200 Colo. 288 , 615 P.2d 655 (1980); Briddle v. Caldwell, 628 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1981); Martin v. Johnson, 708 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1985); Johnson v. Sullivan, 708 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1985).