CO Code § 34-43-104 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 34 - Mineral Resources|Article 43 - Claims - How Located|§ 34-43-104. Location Certificate Void - When

 Any location certificate of a lode claim which does not contain the name of the lode, the name of the locator, the date of location, the number of lineal feet claimed on each side of the discovery shaft, the general course of the lode, and such description as identifies the claim with reasonable certainty shall be void.   History. Source: L. 1874: P. 186, § 4. G.L. § 1814. G.S. § 2400. R.S. 08: § 4195. C.L. § 3281. CSA: C. 110, § 171. CRS 53: § 92-22-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 92-22-4. History. Source: L. 1874: P. 186, § 4. G.L. § 1814. G.S. § 2400. R.S. 08: § 4195. C.L. § 3281. CSA: C. 110, § 171. CRS 53: § 92-22-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 92-22-4.    ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. NECESSARY DESCRIPTION.    III. DEFECTIVE CERTIFICATE.     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Construction of section not to be unduly technical. The provisions of this section are mandatory and necessary, but they are not to be given a construction so technical as will result in imposing on locators an unnecessary burden, or requirements with which, in many instances, they would be unable to comply. Londonderry Mining Co. v. United Gold Mines Co., 38 Colo. 480 , 88 P. 455 (1906).   Intention of this section is to impart notice to third parties. Londonderry Mining Co. v. United Gold Mines Co., 38 Colo. 480 , 88 P. 455 (1906).   Certificate to help locate claim. The purpose of the certificate is to give one seeking the locus of a recorded claim something in the nature of an initial point from which to start, and, following the course or distance given, find with reasonable certainty the claim located. Drummond v. Long, 9 Colo. 538 , 13 P. 543 (1886).   Two insufficient certificates may combine to satisfy section. A miner may change the location of his claim so as to include abandoned overlapping claims, or other territory which has not been located, and for this purpose he may file an additional location certificate, and both certificates are admissible in evidence in a traverse suit to show that he has complied with the law, and though neither one as a whole may be absolutely correct and in perfect conformity to this section, yet if from both considered together there may be found all that the law requires, this section being otherwise complied with, the miner's record is complete and his title is perfect. Duncan v. Fulton, 15 Colo. App. 140, 61 P. 244 (1900).   Inadmissibility of parol evidence to contradict monument called for by deed. Resurrection Gold Mining Co. v. Fortune Gold Mining Co., 129 F. 668 (8th Cir. 1904).   II. NECESSARY DESCRIPTION.   Federal law and this section are substantially same in requiring that recorded certificate contain proper description as shall identify the claim with reasonable certainty. Drummond v. Long, 9 Colo. 538 , 13 P. 543 (1886); Londonderry Mining Co. v. United Gold Mines Co., 38 Colo. 480 , 88 P. 455 (1906).   Object of requiring reference to natural object or permanent monument is to furnish means by which to identify claim, and whatever reference will accomplish this object satisfies the law. Londonderry Mining Co. v. United Gold Mines Co., 38 Colo. 480 , 88 P. 455 (1906).   Whether or not such reference sufficient deemed question of fact. Whether or not there is a reference to a natural object or permanent monument as to satisfy the provisions of the law must necessarily be a question of fact, unless, in the certificate, there is no reference to such an object or monument, or unless, although there is such a reference, it is so indefinite that it can be told from an inspection of the certificate that the claim cannot be identified thereby. Londonderry Mining Co. v. United Gold Mines Co., 38 Colo. 480 , 88 P. 455 (1906).   Satisfactory monuments or markers. Stone monuments, blazed trees, the confluence of streams, the point of intersection of well-known gulches, ravines or roads, prominent buttes, hills, mining shafts, etc., are enumerated as satisfying the requirements of this section, as are the permanent monuments of a neighboring mining claim. Quimby v. Boyd, 8 Colo. 194 , 6 P. 462 (1884), appeal dismissed, 128 U.S. 488, 9 S. Ct. 147, 32 L. Ed. 502 (1888); Gilpin County Mining Co. v. Drake, 8 Colo. 586 , 9 P. 787 (1885); Drummond v. Long, 9 Colo. 538 , 13 P. 543 (1886).   Sufficient description. A location certificate of a mining claim which gave the government section in which it was located, and gave the course from which the highest point of a well-known mountain bore from the discovery shaft, the shaft, being 18 feet deep, and then located the surface boundaries on the ground, setting posts at the corners and center of the side lines, the surface boundaries being tied by course and distance to the discovery shaft, contained a sufficient description of the claim to conform to the requirements of this section. Duncan v. Fulton, 15 Colo. App. 140, 61 P. 244 (1900).   Patented claim will be presumed to be well-known natural object or permanent monument until the contrary appears. Duncan v. Fulton, 15 Colo. App. 140, 61 P. 244 (1900); Carlin v. Freeman, 19 Colo. App. 334, 75 P. 26 (1904).   And there is no difference between references to a patented claim and to one not patented; the presumption must be the same in each case. Londonderry Mining Co. v. United Gold Mines Co., 38 Colo. 480 , 88 P. 455 (1906).   Reference to another claim is prima facie compliance with section. Where the description in a location certificate is by metes and bounds beginning at corner No. 1, describing a parallelogram by courses and distances, and concluding by stating, “Corner No. 1 of Wichita lode joining corner No. 4 of Wichita Eagle lode”, the reference to the Wichita Eagle lode is a prima facie compliance with this section. Londonderry Mining Co. v. United Gold Mines Co., 38 Colo. 480 , 88 P. 455 (1906).   III. DEFECTIVE CERTIFICATE.   Section 34-43-115 qualifies provisions of this section. Section 34-43-115 , providing that a defective or erroneous certificate may be amended, must be understood as qualifying the declaration in this section that such a certificate is void. Frisholm v. Fitzgerald, 25 Colo. 290 , 53 P. 1109 (1898); Nylund v. Ward, 67 Colo. 108 , 187 P. 514 (1919).   Thus, defective certificates lack force but are not wholly void. When this section is read in connection with § 34-43-115 and qualified by it, it will be understood as saying the defective certificates are lacking in force and sufficiency until amended as provided in § 34-43-115 , but are not wholly void. McElvoy v. Hyman, 25 F. 596 (D. Colo. 1885 ).   Recorder's error held not to void location certificate. Weise v. Barker, 7 Colo. 178 , 2 P. 919 (1884).