reglab/housing_qa huggingface dataset:
WI Stat § 939.645 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions.|939.645 - Penalty; crimes committed against certain people or property.

939.645  Penalty; crimes committed against certain people or property. (1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crime are increased as provided in sub. (2):(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is committed or selects the property that is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime under par. (a) in whole or in part because of the actor's belief or perception regarding the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property, whether or not the actor's belief or perception was correct. (2) (a) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a misdemeanor other than a Class A misdemeanor, the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum term of imprisonment is one year in the county jail.(b) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor, the penalty increase under this section changes the status of the crime to a felony and the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum term of imprisonment is 2 years.(c) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is a felony, the maximum fine prescribed by law for the crime may be increased by not more than $5,000 and the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for the crime may be increased by not more than 5 years. (3) This section provides for the enhancement of the penalties applicable for the underlying crime. The court shall direct that the trier of fact find a special verdict as to all of the issues specified in sub. (1). (4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry or proof of any person's perception or belief regarding another's race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry is required for a conviction for that crime.History:  1987 a. 348; 1991 a. 291; 2001 a. 109.When two penalty enhancers are applicable to the same crime, the length of the second penalty enhancer is based on the maximum term for the base crime as extended by the first penalty enhancer. State v. Quiroz, 2002 WI App 52, 251 Wis. 2d 245, 641 N.W.2d 715, 01-1549.The “hate crimes" law, s. 939.645, does not unconstitutionally infringe upon free speech. State v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 124 L. Ed. 2d 436 (1993); 178 Wis. 2d 597, 504 N.W.2d 610 (1993).Hate Crimes: New Limits on the Scope of the 1st Amendment. Resler. 77 MLR 415 (1993).Put to the Proof: Evidentiary Considerations in Wisconsin Hate Crime Prosecutions. Read. 89 MLR 453 (2005).Talking about Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of American and Canadian Regulation of Hate Speech. Moran. 1994 WLR 1425.Hate Crimes. Kassel. Wis. Law. Oct. 1992.
WI Stat § 939.65 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions.|939.65 - Prosecution under more than one section permitted.

939.65  Prosecution under more than one section permitted. Except as provided in s. 948.025 (3), if an act forms the basis for a crime punishable under more than one statutory provision, prosecution may proceed under any or all such provisions.History:  1993 a. 227.Due process does not require that a person know with certainty which crime, among several, the person is committing, at least until the prosecution exercises its charging discretion. Harris v. State, 78 Wis. 2d 357, 254 N.W.2d 291 (1977).The district attorney had the discretion to charge the defendant with a Class A misdemeanor offense of sexual intercourse with a child age 16 or older under s. 948.09, a Class I felony offense of exposing intimate parts under s. 948.10 (1), and a Class D felony offense of child enticement with intent to expose intimate parts under s. 948.07 (3). It was not absurd to penalize the defendant for the felony crime of exposing intimate parts, which would be practically necessary for the misdemeanor intercourse to occur. State v. Matthews, 2019 WI App 44, 388 Wis. 2d 335, 933 N.W.2d 152, 18-0845.
WI Stat § 939.70 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions.|939.70 - Presumption of innocence and burden of proof.

939.70  Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. No provision of chs. 939 to 951 shall be construed as changing the existing law with respect to presumption of innocence or burden of proof.History:  1979 c. 89; 1987 a. 332 s. 64.
WI Stat § 939.71 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions.|939.71 - Limitation on the number of convictions.

939.71  Limitation on the number of convictions. If an act forms the basis for a crime punishable under more than one statutory provision of this state or under a statutory provision of this state and the laws of another jurisdiction, a conviction or acquittal on the merits under one provision bars a subsequent prosecution under the other provision unless each provision requires proof of a fact for conviction which the other does not require.Misdemeanor battery is an included crime of felony battery, but they are not the same offense. Acquittal on felony battery charges does not prevent subsequent prosecution for misdemeanor battery. State v. Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 330, 579 N.W.2d 35 (1998), 97-0938.This section does not bar a subsequent prosecution for an offense arising from the same acts that could not have been charged at the time of the first prosecution and thus did not bar prosecuting a defendant for 1st-degree intentional homicide for the same act which led to battery convictions when the victim died after having been in a coma for 4 years. State v. McKee, 2002 WI App 148, 256 Wis. 2d 547, 648 N.W.2d 34, 01-1966.Under this section, a subsequent prosecution is not prohibited if each provision requires proof of a fact for conviction that the other does not require, even if the same conduct was involved in the two prosecutions. In contrast, s. 961.45 provides that if a violation of ch. 961 is a violation of a federal law or the law of another state, a conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. The difference in the 2 statutes does not violate equal protection. State v. Swinson, 2003 WI App 45, 261 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 12, 02-0395.
WI Stat § 939.72 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions.|939.72 - No conviction of both inchoate and completed crime.

939.72  No conviction of both inchoate and completed crime. A person shall not be convicted under both: (1) Section 939.30 for solicitation and s. 939.05 as a party to a crime which is the objective of the solicitation; or (2) Section 939.31 for conspiracy and s. 939.05 as a party to a crime which is the objective of the conspiracy; or (3) Section 939.32 for attempt and the section defining the completed crime.History:  1991 a. 153; 2001 a. 109.Sub. (3) does not bar convicting the defendant who shot at one person but killed another of both murder and attempted murder. Austin v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 213, 271 N.W.2d 668 (1978).Sub. (3) does not bar convictions for possession of burglarious tools and burglary arising out of a single transaction. Dumas v. State, 90 Wis. 2d 518, 280 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979).This section refers to convictions, not charges. The state may properly charge a defendant with both being a party to an attempt to commit a crime and conspiracy to commit the crime. State v. Moffett, 2000 WI 130, 239 Wis. 2d 629, 619 N.W.2d 918, 99-1768.
WI Stat § 939.73 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 939 - Crimes — general provisions.|939.73 - Criminal penalty permitted only on conviction.

939.73  Criminal penalty permitted only on conviction. A penalty for the commission of a crime may be imposed only after the actor has been duly convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction.
WI Stat § 940.06 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security.|940.06 - Second-degree reckless homicide.

940.06  Second-degree reckless homicide. (1) Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human being is guilty of a Class D felony. (2) Whoever recklessly causes the death of an unborn child is guilty of a Class D felony.History:  1987 a. 399; 1997 a. 295; 2001 a. 109.Judicial Council Note, 1988: Second-degree reckless homicide is analogous to the prior offense of homicide by reckless conduct. The revised statute clearly requires proof of a subjective mental state, i.e., criminal recklessness. See s. 939.24 and the NOTE thereto. [Bill 191-S]Second-degree reckless homicide is not a lesser included offense of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998), 96-2830.The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.The second-degree reckless homicide statute requires both the creation of an objectively unreasonable and substantial risk of human death or great bodily harm and the actor's subjective awareness of that risk. The circuit court's refusal to instruct the jury about the effect of a parent's sincere belief in prayer treatment for their child on the subjective awareness element of second-degree reckless homicide, did not undermine the parents' ability to defend themselves. The second-degree reckless homicide statute does not require that the actor be subjectively aware that his or her conduct is a cause of the death of his or her child. The statute and the jury instructions require only that the actor be subjectively aware that his or her conduct created the unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560, 11-1044.Importance of clarity in law of homicide: The Wisconsin revision. Dickey, Schultz & Fullin. 1989 WLR 1323 (1989).
WI Stat § 940.07 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security.|940.07 - Homicide resulting from negligent control of vicious animal.

940.07  Homicide resulting from negligent control of vicious animal. Whoever knowing the vicious propensities of any animal intentionally allows it to go at large or keeps it without ordinary care, if such animal, while so at large or not confined, kills any human being who has taken all the precautions which the circumstances may permit to avoid such animal, is guilty of a Class G felony.History:  1977 c. 173; 2001 a. 109.The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.
WI Stat § 940.08 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security.|940.08 - Homicide by negligent handling of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire.

940.08  Homicide by negligent handling of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire. (1) Except as provided in sub. (3), whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class G felony. (2) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class G felony. (3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a health care provider acting within the scope of his or her practice or employment. History:  1977 c. 173; 1985 a. 293; 1987 a. 399; 1997 a. 295; 2001 a. 109; 2011 a. 2.Judicial Council Note, 1988: The definition of the offense is broadened to include highly negligent handling of fire, explosives and dangerous weapons in addition to firearm, airgun, knife or bow and arrow. See s. 939.22 (10). [Bill 191-S]The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.In order to establish that the defendant was guilty of the crime of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon under sub. (1), the state had to prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the defendant operated or handled a dangerous weapon; 2) the defendant operated or handled a dangerous weapon in a manner constituting criminal negligence; and 3) the defendant's operation or handling of a dangerous weapon in a manner constituting criminal negligence caused the death of another human being. State v. Langlois, 2018 WI 73, 382 Wis. 2d 414, 913 N.W.2d 812, 16-1409.
WI Stat § 940.10 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security.|940.10 - Homicide by negligent operation of vehicle.

940.10  Homicide by negligent operation of vehicle. (1) Whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class G felony. (2) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child by the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class G felony.History:  1987 a. 399; 1997 a. 295; 2001 a. 109.Judicial Council Note, 1988 Homicide by negligent operation of vehicle is analogous to prior s. 940.08. The mental element is criminal negligence as defined in s. 939.25. [Bill 191-S]A motorist was properly convicted under this section for running a red light at 50 m.p.h., even though the speed limit was 55 m.p.h. State v. Cooper, 117 Wis. 2d 30, 344 N.W.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1983).The definition of criminal negligence as applied to homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Barman, 183 Wis. 2d 180, 515 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1994).A corporation may be subject to criminal liability under this section. State v. Knutson, Inc. 196 Wis. 2d 86, 537 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1995), 93-1898. See also State v. Steenberg Homes, Inc. 223 Wis. 2d 511, 589 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1998), 98-0104.It is not a requirement for finding criminal negligence that the actor be specifically warned that his or her conduct may result in harm. State v. Johannes, 229 Wis. 2d 215, 598 N.W.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2239.The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.
WI Stat § 940.11 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security.|940.11 - Mutilating or hiding a corpse.

940.11  Mutilating or hiding a corpse. (1) Whoever mutilates, disfigures or dismembers a corpse, with intent to conceal a crime or avoid apprehension, prosecution or conviction for a crime, is guilty of a Class F felony. (2) Whoever hides or buries a corpse, with intent to conceal a crime or avoid apprehension, prosecution, or conviction for a crime or notwithstanding s. 946.90 (2) or (3), 946.91 (2), 946.92, or 946.93 (2) or (3) with intent to collect benefits under the assistance program for families with dependent children administered under ss. 49.141 to 49.161, the Medical Assistance program administered under subch. IV of ch. 49, or the food stamp program, as defined in s. 49.79 (1) (c), is guilty of a Class F felony. (3) A person may not be subject to prosecution under both this section and s. 946.47 or under both this section and s. 948.23 (2) for his or her acts regarding the same corpse. History:  1991 a. 205; 2001 a. 109; 2011 a. 268; 2013 a. 226; 2015 a. 147.Evidence that the defendant dragged a corpse behind a locked gate into a restricted, secluded wildlife area, then rolled the corpse into water at the bottom of a ditch was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant hid a corpse in violation of this section. State v. Badker, 2001 WI App 27, 240 Wis. 2d 460, 623 N.W.2d 142, 99-2943.
WI Stat § 940.12 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security.|940.12 - Assisting suicide.

940.12  Assisting suicide. Whoever with intent that another take his or her own life assists such person to commit suicide is guilty of a Class H felony.History:  1977 c. 173; 2001 a. 109.
WI Stat § 940.13 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security.|940.13 - Abortion exception.

940.13  Abortion exception. No fine or imprisonment may be imposed or enforced against and no prosecution may be brought against a woman who obtains an abortion or otherwise violates any provision of any abortion statute with respect to her unborn child or fetus, and s. 939.05, 939.30 or 939.31 does not apply to a woman who obtains an abortion or otherwise violates any provision of any abortion statute with respect to her unborn child or fetus.History:  1985 a. 56.
WI Stat § 940.15 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security.|940.15 - Abortion.

940.15  Abortion. (1) In this section, “viability" means that stage of fetal development when, in the medical judgment of the attending physician based on the particular facts of the case before him or her, there is a reasonable likelihood of sustained survival of the fetus outside the womb, with or without artificial support. (2) Whoever intentionally performs an abortion after the fetus or unborn child reaches viability, as determined by reasonable medical judgment of the woman's attending physician, is guilty of a Class I felony. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman, as determined by reasonable medical judgment of the woman's attending physician. (4) Any abortion performed under sub. (3) after viability of the fetus or unborn child, as determined by reasonable medical judgment of the woman's attending physician, shall be performed in a hospital on an inpatient basis. (5) Whoever intentionally performs an abortion and who is not a physician is guilty of a Class I felony. (6) Any physician who intentionally performs an abortion under sub. (3) shall use that method of abortion which, of those he or she knows to be available, is in his or her medical judgment most likely to preserve the life and health of the fetus or unborn child. Nothing in this subsection requires a physician performing an abortion to employ a method of abortion which, in his or her medical judgment based on the particular facts of the case before him or her, would increase the risk to the woman. Any physician violating this subsection is guilty of a Class I felony. (7) Subsections (2) to (6) and s. 939.05, 939.30 or 939.31 do not apply to a woman who obtains an abortion that is in violation of this section or otherwise violates this section with respect to her unborn child or fetus.History:  1985 a. 56; 2001 a. 109.The essential holding of Roe v. Wade allowing abortion is upheld, but various state restrictions on abortion are permissible. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992).
WI Stat § 940.16 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security.|940.16 - Partial-birth abortion.

940.16  Partial-birth abortion. (1) In this section:(a) “Child" means a human being from the time of fertilization until it is completely delivered from a pregnant woman.(b) “Partial-birth abortion" means an abortion in which a person partially vaginally delivers a living child, causes the death of the partially delivered child with the intent to kill the child, and then completes the delivery of the child. (2) Except as provided in sub. (3), whoever intentionally performs a partial-birth abortion is guilty of a Class A felony. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the partial-birth abortion is necessary to save the life of a woman whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical disorder, physical illness or physical injury caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself, and if no other medical procedure would suffice for that purpose.History:  1997 a. 219.A Nebraska statute that provided that no partial birth abortion can be performed unless it is necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury is unconstitutional. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 949, 147 L. Ed. 2d 743 (2000).Enforcement of this section is enjoined under Carhart. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603 (2001).
WI Stat § 940.19 (2021)
2021 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations|Chapter 940 - Crimes against life and bodily security.|940.19 - Battery; substantial battery; aggravated battery.

940.19  Battery; substantial battery; aggravated battery. (1) Whoever causes bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another without the consent of the person so harmed is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. (2) Whoever causes substantial bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a Class I felony. (4) Whoever causes great bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a Class H felony. (5) Whoever causes great bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause great bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a Class E felony. (6) Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to another by conduct that creates a substantial risk of great bodily harm is guilty of a Class H felony. A rebuttable presumption of conduct creating a substantial risk of great bodily harm arises if the person harmed has a physical disability, whether congenital or acquired by accident, injury or disease, that is discernible by an ordinary person viewing the physically disabled person, or that is actually known by the actor.History:  1977 c. 173; 1979 c. 111, 113; 1987 a. 399; 1993 a. 441, 483; 2001 a. 109; 2021 a. 76.Under the “elements only" test, offenses under subsections that require proof of nonconsent are not lesser included offenses of offenses under subsections for which proof of nonconsent is not required. State v. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d 1, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985).“Physical disability" is discussed. State v. Crowley, 143 Wis. 2d 324, 422 N.W.2d 847 (1988).First-degree reckless injury, s. 940.23 (1), is not a lesser included offense of aggravated battery. State v. Eastman, 185 Wis. 2d 405, 518 N.W.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1994).The act of throwing urine that strikes another and causes pain constitutes a battery. State v. Higgs, 230 Wis. 2d 1, 601 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1811.Section 941.20 (1), 1st-degree recklessly endangering safety, is not a lesser included offense of sub. (5), aggravated battery. State v. Dibble, 2002 WI App 219, 257 Wis. 2d. 274, 650 N.W.2d 908, 02-0538.