CO Code § 19-2.5-203 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 19 - Children's Code|Article 2.5 - The Colorado Juvenile Justice System|Part 2 - Investigations and Law Enforcement|§ 19-2.5-203. Statements - Definitions

  A statement or admission of a juvenile made as a result of the custodial interrogation of the juvenile by a law enforcement official concerning delinquent acts alleged to have been committed by the juvenile are not admissible in evidence against the juvenile unless a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian of the juvenile was present at such interrogation and the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian were advised of the juvenile's right to remain silent and that any statements made may be used against the juvenile in a court of law, of the juvenile's right to the presence of an attorney during such interrogation, and of the juvenile's right to have counsel appointed if the juvenile so requests at the time of the interrogation; except that, if a public defender or counsel representing the juvenile is present at such interrogation, such statements or admissions may be admissible in evidence even though the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian was not present.      Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, statements or admissions of a juvenile may be admissible in evidence, notwithstanding the absence of a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian, if the court finds that, under the totality of the circumstances, the juvenile made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights and:   The juvenile is eighteen years of age or older at the time of the interrogation or the juvenile misrepresents his or her age as being eighteen years of age or older and the law enforcement official acts in good-faith reliance on such misrepresentation in conducting the interrogation;    The juvenile is emancipated from the parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian; or    The juvenile is a runaway from a state other than Colorado and is of sufficient age and understanding.       For the purposes of this subsection (2), “emancipated juvenile” means a juvenile over fifteen years of age and under eighteen years of age who has, with the real or apparent assent of the juvenile's parents, demonstrated independence from the juvenile's parents in matters of care, custody, and earnings. The term may include, but is not limited to, any such juvenile who has the sole responsibility for the juvenile's own support, who is married, or who is in the military.       Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, statements or admissions of a juvenile are not inadmissible in evidence by reason of the absence of a parent, guardian, or legal custodian if the juvenile was accompanied by a responsible adult who was a custodian of the juvenile or assuming the role of a parent at the time.    For the purposes of this section, “physical custodian” is defined in section 19-2.5-102.    Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian may expressly waive the requirement that the parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian be present during the juvenile's interrogation. This express waiver must be in writing and must be obtained only after full advisement of the juvenile and the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian of the juvenile's rights prior to the taking of the custodial statement by a law enforcement official. If said requirement is expressly waived, statements or admissions of the juvenile are not inadmissible in evidence by reason of the absence of the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian during interrogation. Notwithstanding the requirements of this subsection (5), a county department of human or social services and the state department of human services, as legal or physical custodian, may not waive said requirement.    Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, statements or admissions of a juvenile are not inadmissible into evidence by reason of the absence of a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian, if the juvenile makes any deliberate misrepresentations affecting the applicability or requirements of this section and a law enforcement official, acting in good faith and in reasonable reliance on such deliberate misrepresentation, conducts a custodial interrogation of the juvenile that does not comply with the requirements of subsection (1) of this section.      Notwithstanding any provisions of this section to the contrary, if the juvenile asserts that statements made during the custodial interrogation are inadmissible because a responsible adult had an interest adverse to the juvenile, the prosecution, as part of its burden of proof at a hearing on a motion to suppress the statements, must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the person interrogating the juvenile reasonably believed that the responsible adult did not have any interests adverse to those of the juvenile and that the responsible adult was able to provide protective counseling to the juvenile concerning the juvenile's rights during the interrogation.    For purposes of this subsection (7):   “Protective counseling” means an ongoing opportunity to offer guidance and advice concerning the juvenile's right to remain silent and to obtain retained or appointed counsel associated with the custodial interrogation; and    “Responsible adult” means a parent, guardian, legal or physical custodian, or other responsible adult who was a custodian of the juvenile or who assumed the role of a parent at the time of the interrogation.           History. Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations,(SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 567, § 2, effective October 1.    Editor's note:   This section is similar to former § 19-2-511 as it existed prior to 2021.   ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “Confessions and the Juvenile Offender”, see 11 Colo. Law. 96 (1982). For comment, “Fourth Amendment Protection in the School Environment: The Colorado Supreme Court's Application of the Reasonable Suspicion Standard in State v. P.E.A.”, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 153 (1990). For article, “Family Law and Juvenile Delinquency”, see 37 Colo. Law. 61 (Oct. 2008).   Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.   Constitutional source of rights. Rights set out in this section of the Colorado Children's Code find genesis in the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and in the sixth amendment right to counsel. People v. Knapp, 180 Colo. 280 , 505 P.2d 7 (1973).   Section does not diminish fifth amendment protections but instead provides for additional protection. People v. Blankenship, 119 P.3d 552 (Colo. App. 2005).   Section provides for due process. The specific procedures in this section grant to juveniles all that is required under the due process clauses of the United States and the Colorado constitutions. J.T. v. O'Rourke ex rel. Tenth Judicial Dist., 651 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1982).   Subsection (2)(a)(III) does not confer a fundamental right to a runaway from another state when he or she is of sufficient age and understanding and has waived his or her right to remain silent or to have an attorney present. People v. Blankenship, 119 P.3d 552 (Colo. App. 2005).   The clear purpose in enacting former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) is to afford a special protection to a juvenile who is in police custody because of alleged criminal acts. People v. Maes, 194 Colo. 235 , 571 P.2d 305 (1977); People in Interest of R.L.N., 43 Colo. App. 542, 605 P.2d 491 (1980).   Former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) of this section provides an additional and necessary assurance that the juvenile's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and his sixth amendment right to counsel will be fully afforded to him. People v. Maes, 194 Colo. 235 , 571 P.2d 305 (1977); People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583 (Colo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162, 102 S. Ct. 1036, 71 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1982).   Former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) was enacted to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination, the same privilege protected by Miranda, and the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine on the inadmissibility of evidence obtained by unconstitutional police action applies to its violation. People v. Saiz, 620 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1980).   The purpose of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) is to provide a child with parental guidance during police interrogation and to ensure that any waiver of the child's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and sixth amendment right to counsel will be made knowingly and intelligently. People in Interest of G.L., 631 P.2d 1118 (Colo. 1981).   Legislative purpose of subsection (1), barring admission of statements made during police interrogation of minor unless minor's parents, guardian, legal custodian, or attorney are present, is to provide minor with an opportunity to consult with such person before deciding whether to assert or waive fifth amendment rights. People v. Raibon, 843 P.2d 46 (Colo. App. 1992).   Subsection (1) does not condition the admissibility of a juvenile's statements to law enforcement on more than his or her parent's presence during a Miranda advisement and interrogation. The plain language of subsection (1) requires only that a parent be present during the advisement and interrogation. It is unnecessary for a trial court to examine a parent's motivation. People in the Interest of A.L.-C., 2016 CO 71, 382 P.3d 842.   Factual findings as to “custody” and “interrogation” are necessary predicates to any application of this section. Where magistrate failed to make findings on question of whether juvenile was in custody and being interrogated, matter was remanded to the district court for development of further evidence. People in Interest of R.A., 937 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1997).   Protection afforded statements and admissions of child applies to searches. The same test is applicable to the validity of the search whether the consenting party is an adult or a juvenile with the one exception noted in former subsection (3) (now subsection (1)) of this section. That is, a parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child must be present and freely and intelligently give his consent. Although this subsection (3) refers specifically to “statements and admissions”, and requires that the interrogating officer afford both the juvenile and his parent, guardian, or legal custodian full fifth amendment protection, the juvenile is entitled to comparable protection in connection with the waiver of his fourth amendment rights. People v. Reyes, 174 Colo. 377 , 483 P.2d 1342 (1971).   Search properly conducted in accordance with safeguards arising out of fourth amendment to constitution of United States is not inconsistent with this section. In re People in Interest of B.M.C., 32 Colo. App. 79, 506 P.2d 409 (1973).   Defendant's consent to search was voluntary and not the result of coercion. Defendant's parents provided guidance and advice before, during, and after the interrogation. The parents' position that they approved of DNA testing was consistent throughout. There is no requirement that the defendant's parents be present during the sample collection. People v. Lehmkuhl, 117 P.3d 98 (Colo. App. 2004).   The language, “acts which if committed by an adult”, which appears almost verbatim in former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)), was intended to define, by analogy, a general type of conduct for which a child might be taken into custody and for which he might be adjudicated a delinquent. People v. Maynes, 39 Colo. 158 , 562 P.2d 756 (1977).   The words “at the time of the interrogation” refer to the request for appointment of counsel and do not refer to all the rights listed. People v. Hayhurst, 194 Colo. 292 , 571 P.2d 721 (1977).   Department of institutions not “legal custodian”. The department of institutions, into whose control an adjudicated delinquent has been placed, is not a “legal custodian” for the purposes of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)). People v. McAnally, 192 Colo. 12 , 554 P.2d 1100 (1976).   This section is to be strictly construed. People in Interest of M.M., 43 Colo. App. 65, 599 P.2d 968 (1979).   Former subsection (1) (now § 19-2-507 ) dovetails with requirement of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)). Former subsection (1) (now § 19-2-507 ), requiring prompt notification to the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of a child taken into temporary custody, dovetails with the requirement of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) that a parent, guardian, or legal custodian be present during interrogation. People v. Maynes, 39 Colo. 158 , 562 P.2d 756 (1977).   The warnings incorporated in a Miranda advisement have been codified in the juvenile context by this section, together with the requirement that the juvenile be accompanied by a parent, guardian, or custodian during the advisement and interrogation. People v. T.C., 898 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1995).   The standard of review for determining custody for this section's purpose is the same standard for determining custody in Miranda cases. People v. Howard, 92 P.3d 445 (Colo. 2004).   In determining whether a juvenile is in custody for purposes of this section, a court must consider whether a reasonable person in the juvenile's position would consider himself or herself significantly deprived of his or her liberty. In deciding whether a reasonable person would believe himself or herself to be deprived of his or her freedom of action, the court must consider the totality of circumstances. The factors the court should consider are: The time, place, and purpose of the encounter; the persons present during the interrogation; the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; the officer's tone of voice and general demeanor; the length and mood of the interrogation; whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; the officer's response to any questions asked by the defendant; whether directions were given to the defendant during the interrogation; and the defendant's verbal or nonverbal response to such directions. People v. Howard, 92 P.3d 445 (Colo. 2004).   Additional factor required when determining whether a juvenile is in custody. When considering the totality of the circumstances, the court must also consider the age of the juvenile. People v. N.A.S., 2014 CO 65, 329 P.3d 285.   A police officer's subjective view that the individual under question is a suspect, if undisclosed, has no bearing on whether the suspect is in custody. People v. Howard, 92 P.3d 445 (Colo. 2004).   Not in custody for Miranda purposes. People v. Howard, 92 P.3d 445 (Colo. 2004).   This section does not require, in every case, a repetitive advisement of rights immediately before any statement is taken. People v. Hayhurst, 194 Colo. 292 , 571 P.2d 721 (1977).   Parent not required to be present when juvenile makes voluntary statements to police after police ended interrogation with parent because of request for counsel. People v. Rivas, 13 P.3d 315 (Colo. 2000).   Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress statements made during a phone conversation with a victim who was a minor. First, the standards for determining whether a party's consent is voluntary for purposes of the eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes are less stringent than the standards applicable to questions of voluntariness arising in the context of alleged violations of constitutional rights. Second, the victim was not in custody when he agreed to the recording of the conversation but rather his consent was given in an effort to assist in the apprehension and prosecution of defendant. People v. Richardson, 2014 COA 50 , 350 P.3d 905.   Limitations of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)). Former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) does not require that a juvenile be warned that his statements “will” be used against him or that a juvenile be advised that he has the right to terminate the questioning at any time. People in Interest of M.R.J., 633 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1981).   Factors in determining voluntariness of confession. In determining whether a juvenile's confession is voluntary, the primary factors to be considered are the juvenile's age, experience, background, and intelligence, his capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his fifth amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. People in Interest of M.R.J., 633 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1981).   And prosecution to prove voluntariness by preponderance. Once the issue of voluntariness has been raised, the prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements were made voluntarily. People in Interest of M.R.J., 633 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1981).   Confession obtained during custodial interrogation properly determined voluntary despite fact that waiver of parental attendance was not in writing. The juvenile and his parents waived their right to consult with an attorney and orally waived their right to parental attendance at the interrogation, and the interviewing detective's “soft technique”, if any, did not constitute improper coercion. People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd, 48 P.3d 543 (Colo. 2002).   The remedy for a violation of this section is suppression of the statements obtained. However, that remedy applies only to statements made as a result of custodial interrogation. People v. T.C., 898 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1995).   Section is applicable even when a juvenile lies to police about his age. Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1999).   General assembly did not provide for an exception for juveniles who lie about their age to the police and claim to be adults. Nor is there a “good faith” exception for cases in which the police reasonably but mistakenly believe that their suspect is an adult. Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1999).   This interpretation is consistent with the way civil law protects juveniles from being bound by legal decisions they make even if they lie about their age. Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1999).   Admissibility governed by circumstances surrounding interrogation. Whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible depends upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. People in Interest of M.R.J., 633 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1981).   Interrogation conducted via telephone not custodial since police officer could not exercise immediate control over juvenile. Juvenile not entitled to protection of subsection (1). People in Interest of J.C., 844 P.2d 1185 (Colo. 1993).   Statements inadmissible unless special protection provided. Statements and admissions made to the police by a juvenile in the course of a criminal investigation are not admissible in evidence against a juvenile unless the special protection contemplated by former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) of this section is provided. People v. Maes, 194 Colo. 235 , 571 P.2d 305 (1977).   And simply reciting required warnings does not sever illegal connection. Simply reciting the warnings required by this section does not sever the connection between illegal questioning and subsequently incriminating statements. People v. Saiz, 620 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1980).   If the adult appearing with the juvenile has interests that are objectively hostile to those of the juvenile and cannot aid the juvenile in making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her constitutional rights, the juvenile is deprived of the protections of this section. People v. Legler, 969 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1998).   Child's confession, obtained without compliance with this section, was inadmissible, and the court should have granted the child's motion to suppress the confession. People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1, 513 P.2d 1069 (1973).   Minor's statements suppressed when gained through police urgings following his expressed desire to stop interrogation. Where a minor defendant responded to one of the officer's questions by stating, “I ain't going to say nothing no more”, but the officers continued to urge defendant to tell the truth, a statement gained by those urgings was suppressed. People v. Saiz, 42 Colo. App. 469, 600 P.2d 97 (1979).   Where the police were actively involved in the continued urging of minor defendant “to tell the truth”, the fact that the defendant's parents made similar requests did not absolve the police of any wrongdoing, or allow them to disregard defendant's exercise of his right to cut off questioning. People v. Saiz, 42 Colo. App. 469, 600 P.2d 97 (1979).   Tainted fruit doctrine does not require the automatic suppression of later statements made by the defendant or by witnesses whose identity was derived from the defendant's initial, unwarned statement. Although the lack of a Miranda warning creates a presumption of compulsion, the presumption can be rebutted and the initial statement shown to be voluntary in light of the totality of the circumstances. People v. T.C., 898 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1995).   Thus, fruits doctrine does not require suppression of properly obtained second confession where, although first confession was suppressed for lack of the written parental attendance waiver required under subsection (5), first confession nevertheless was voluntary. People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 48 P.3d 543 (Colo. 2002).   Physical evidence which is fruit of statement improperly obtained from juvenile is inadmissible. People v. Saiz, 42 Colo. App. 469, 600 P.2d 97 (1979).   It is implicit that a child involved in the commission of an offense should be afforded protective counseling concerning his legal rights from one whose interests are not adverse to those of the child, to the end that any statements made by the child be given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. People v. McAnally, 192 Colo. 12 , 554 P.2d 1100 (1976); People v. Legler, 969 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1998).   Counselors of a school for boys cannot be considered the neutral counselors contemplated by former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)). People v. McAnally, 192 Colo. 12 , 554 P.2d 1100 (1976).   Purpose of parental presence at interrogation. The statutory requirement of the presence of a parent or guardian at the interrogation of a child by law enforcement officers is designed to provide parental guidance and assistance to the child and thereby to provide at least some minimal assurance that a child's waiver of his right against self-incrimination is knowingly and intelligently made. People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1, 513 P.2d 1069 (1973).   Subsection (5) requires police to advise a juvenile of the right to have a parent present during custodial interrogation and acquire an express waiver of that right from the juvenile prior to conducting an interrogation of the juvenile without the presence of a parent. People v. Barrow, 139 P.3d 636 (Colo. 2006).   The “full advisement” requirement of subsection (5) is not satisfied by merely showing the minor defendant a form signed by his parent indicating that she granted permission for the interview to proceed outside her presence. People v. Barrow, 139 P.3d 636 (Colo. 2006).   Subsection (5) requires that a waiver of the right to parental attendance must be express, in writing, and obtained after a Miranda advisement; however, it does not require that the writing be signed. People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd, 48 P.3d 543 (Colo. 2002).   Although subsection (5) does not require a signature on the written waiver of parental attendance, the written waiver must in some manner be attributable to the person against whom it is to be enforced. A signature on the document obviously is the most direct means to demonstrate this, but it is not the only way for one to acknowledge or ratify the document. People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd, 48 P.3d 543 (Colo. 2002).   Detective complied with this section by informing both the juvenile and his guardian verbally that the juvenile had the right to have his guardian present during police questioning. The signed waiver form also indicated the right to have the guardian present. People v. Barrios, 2019 CO 10, 433 P.3d 1218.   Even though the detective minimized the potential offenses and there was a lack of actual consultation between the juvenile and his guardian, the juvenile legally waived his right to have his guardian present during the interrogation. Under the totality of the circumstances, those concerns did not undermine the reliability of the waiver. People v. Barrios, 2019 CO 10, 433 P.3d 1218.   Where parent is himself incarcerated, his ability to guide and advise the child is hobbled and restrained by his own circumstances to such an extent that his mere physical presence does not satisfy the requirements of this section concerning confessions of a child. People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1, 513 P.2d 1069 (1973).   A child's confession is inadmissible where the child receives inadequate guidance because the parent is present but also incarcerated, or where a counselor or caseworker is substituted for the parent. People in Interest of M.M., 43 Colo. App. 65, 599 P.2d 968 (1979).   Because parent must be in position to freely advise. To effectively provide the guidance and advice contemplated by this section, the parent must be in a position to give advice freely, and a parent who is himself incarcerated is in no such position. People in Interest of L.B., 33 Colo. App. 1, 513 P.2d 1069 (1973).   Where interest of parents is obviously adverse to interests of minor, they are disqualified to act under the provisions of this section. People in Interest of P.L.V., 176 Colo. 342 , 490 P.2d 685 (1971); People v. Hayhurst, 194 Colo. 292 , 571 P.2d 721 (1977).   The fact that the father was upset with his son's possible involvement in a crime does not mean that their interests were necessarily adverse. People v. Hayhurst, 194 Colo. 292 , 571 P.2d 721 (1977).   A pending investigation against a parent does not create a per se rule that the parent's interests are hostile or adverse to those of a child who comes under police investigation. People v. White, 64 P.3d 864 (Colo. App. 2002).   Out-of-state runaways are not afforded the protections of this section. Statements from a juvenile who is a runaway from another state are admissible if the juvenile is of sufficient age and understanding. Sufficient age and understanding refers to the juvenile's ability to understand his or her constitutional rights and to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. People v. Blankenship, 30 P.3d 698 (Colo. App. 2000).   There is a rational basis under subsection (2) for distinguishing between out-of-state runaways and in-state runaways. Parents of in-state runaways presumably live in state and can be contacted more easily and be present for an interrogation with less difficulty. People v. Blankenship, 119 P.3d 552 (Colo. App. 2005).   Runaway is defined as an unmarried person under the age of 18 and who ran away from home or is otherwise beyond parental control. People v. Blankenship, 30 P.3d 698 (Colo. App. 2000).   Counsel appointed if person appearing with juvenile is neutral or hostile. The only effective means of implementing the purposes of this statute in situations where person appearing with juvenile is neutral or hostile to the juvenile's interests is to appoint counsel. People v. Maes, 194 Colo. 235 , 571 P.2d 305 (1977).   Former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) provides for the presence of an attorney, or the public defender, at the interrogation. People v. McAnally, 192 Colo. 12 , 554 P.2d 1100 (1976).   Appointed counsel must be present at confession. Appointment of counsel does not alleviate the necessity for compliance with this section where counsel was not present at the time of the confession. People in Interest of M.M., 43 Colo. App. 65, 599 P.2d 968 (1979).   But right to counsel held waived. Child's execution of financial eligibility form and interview by member of public defender's office did not constitute an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. Under totality of the circumstances, statement by juvenile's mother to police concerning public defender representation simply indicated mother's concern over legal representation in light of financial circumstances, and was not a clear assertion of right to counsel. People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 48 P.3d 543 (Colo. 2002).   Guardian ad litem appointed for custody purposes may be representative for juvenile's interests in criminal interrogation. Attorney guardian ad litem who was familiar with the juvenile and his familial and criminal background was qualified to appropriately serve the interests of the juvenile. Fact that the guardian was originally appointed to represent juvenile in custodial proceeding was not dispositive of whether guardian could also adequately represent juvenile defendant during custodial interrogation. People v. S.M.D., 864 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1994).   Trial court properly found that juvenile was emancipated, therefore absence of the juvenile's parent at custodial interrogation did not require the court to suppress the juvenile's statement. The trial court appropriately found that the juvenile was emancipated where the juvenile had been on his own for three months and had not been receiving financial support from his mother. People v. Lucas, 992 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1999).   Trial court properly held that juvenile was emancipated even though legal and physical custody of the juvenile had been placed with the department of human services. The language of this section implicitly recognizes that a juvenile may be emancipated from the custody of someone other than the parent, including the state. People v. Lucas, 992 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1999).   Application of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)). Read in context, the limitations of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) apply only when a child is in temporary custody or under detention, as those terms are used in the Colorado Children's Code. People v. Maynes, 39 Colo. 158 , 562 P.2d 756 (1977); People v. L.A., 199 Colo. 390 , 609 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1980); People in Interest of G.L., 631 P.2d 1118 (Colo. 1981).   Although not expressly so limited, it is clear that former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) concerns questioning of a child while in temporary custody or under detention. People v. Maynes, 39 Colo. 158 , 562 P.2d 756 (1977).   The requirements of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) do not apply to interrogation of a child by a law enforcement official concerning traffic offenses which could not result in the child's being adjudicated a delinquent. People v. Maynes, 39 Colo. 158 , 562 P.2d 756 (1977).   The exclusionary rule of former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)) does not apply to a child's statement made to a treating physician when that statement is not the result of an interrogation by a law enforcement official. People in Interest of R.G., 630 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1981).   Under Miranda and former subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)), the decisive stage for the warnings is custodial interrogation, i.e., questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583 (Colo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162, 102 S. Ct. 1036, 71 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1982).   Subsection (1) applies only to consent searches and not to searches incident to a lawful arrest. People in Interest of S.J.F., 736 P.2d 29 (Colo. 1987).   Subsection (1) is inapplicable to a search consented to by a minor in a noncustodial setting. People in Interest of S.J., 778 P.2d 1384 (Colo. 1989).   Subsection (1) does not require that parents, irrespective of the rules of evidence, be permitted to testify concerning all statements made by their child during an interrogation at which they were present. People v. Raibon, 843 P.2d 46 (Colo. App. 1992).   Physical custodians under subsection (1) must be limited to the adult or adults with whom the child resided immediately prior to the arrest and custodial interrogation. If an adult is functioning as a current physical custodian for the child at the time of the interrogation, a protective relationship sufficient to satisfy the legislative purposes presumptively exists. People v. Legler, 969 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1998).   Principal and security officer did not act as agents of the police. Whether or not an individual conducting a search is an agent of the police and thus “a law enforcement official” under subsection (1) is determined by the totality of the circumstances. The fact that the police officer supplied information to the school principal with the intent of initiating a search and that he was present on school premises during the investigation do not support a finding that the principal and security officer acted as agent of “a law enforcement official”. People in Interest of P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1988); People in Interest of F.M., 754 P.2d 390 (Colo. 1988).   This section does not apply to admission of paternity by minor. People in Interest of R.L.N., 43 Colo. App. 542, 605 P.2d 491 (1980).   Applied in People v. Salazar, 189 Colo. 429 , 541 P.2d 676 (1975); D.W. v. Dist. Court, 193 Colo. 194 , 564 P.2d 949 (1976); People v. Cunningham, 194 Colo. 228 , 570 P.2d 1086 (1977); People v. L.A., 199 Colo. 390 , 609 P.2d 116 (1980); People v. Trujillo, 624 P.2d 924 (Colo. App. 1980).