CO Code § 4-3-401 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 4 - Uniform Commercial Code|Article 3 - Negotiable Instruments|Part 4 - Liability of Parties|§ 4-3-401. Signature

  A person is not liable on an instrument unless (i) the person signed the instrument, or (ii) the person is represented by an agent or representative who signed the instrument and the signature is binding on the represented person under section 4-3-402.    A signature may be made (i) manually or by means of a device or machine, and (ii) by the use of any name, including a trade or assumed name, or by a word, mark, or symbol executed or adopted by a person with present intention to authenticate a writing.     History. Source: L. 94: Entire article R&RE, p. 862, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.    Cross references:   For offenses relating to this title, see part 5 of article 5 of title 18.   Official Comments   Copyright by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Reproduced with the permission of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. All rights reserved. —   Editor's note:   The Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code are available only in the printed book form of Colorado Revised Statutes. As noted above, the Official Comments are subject to copyright by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. At this time, Colorado has a license to reprint the Official Comments in the printed book form.   Editor's note:   This article was numbered as article 3 of chapter 155, C.R.S. 1963. The provisions of this article were repealed and reenacted in 1994, resulting in the addition, relocation, and elimination of sections as well as subject matter. For amendments to this article prior to 1994, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume. Former C.R.S. section numbers are shown in editor's notes following those sections that were relocated.   Editor's note:   This section is similar to former § 4-3-401 as it existed prior to 1994.   OFFICIAL COMMENT   1. Obligation on an instrument depends on a signature that is binding on the obligor. The signature may be made by the obligor personally or by an agent authorized to act for the obligor. Signature by agents is covered by Section 3-402. It is not necessary that the name of the obligor appear on the instrument, so long as there is a signature that binds the obligor. Signature includes an indorsement.   2. A signature may be handwritten, typed, printed or made in any other manner. It need not be subscribed, and may appear in the body of the instrument, as in the case of “I, John Doe, promise to pay * * *” without any other signature. It may be made by mark, or even by thumbprint. It may be made in any name, including any trade name or assumed name, however false and fictitious, which is adopted for the purpose. Parol evidence is admissible to identify the signer, and when the signer is identified the signature is effective. Indorsement in a name other than that of the indorser is governed by Section 3-204(d).   This section is not intended to affect any other law requiring a signature by mark to be witnessed, or any signature to be otherwise authenticated, or requiring any form of proof.   ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “Civil Liability for Check Forgeries in Colorado”, see 16 Colo. Law. 959 .   No person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon. Jett v. Phillips Associates, 439 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1971).   Even if a party does not sign an assumption agreement, the party may still be liable on the original obligation for which the instrument was given. Bigelow v. Nottingham, 833 P.2d 764 (Colo. App. 1991).   However, liability may arise apart from the instrument itself. A party who does not sign an assumption agreement may still be liable on the original obligation for which the instrument is given. Husband who executed promissory note and second deed of trust, but who consented by silence to subordination agreement that impaired his collateral, is still liable as a surety for the underlying obligation. Bigelow v. Nottingham, 833 P.2d 764 (Colo. App. 1992).