GA Code § 15-11-280 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 15 - Courts|Chapter 11 - Juvenile Code|Article 4 - Termination of Parental Rights|Part 3 - Petition and Summons|§ 15-11-280. Petition; Style; Contents; Putative Fathers

  A petition to terminate parental rights and all subsequent court documents in such proceeding shall be entitled "In the interest of __________, a child.", except upon appeal, in which event the anonymity of a child shall be preserved by use of appropriate initials. The petition shall be in writing.   The petition to terminate parental rights shall be made, verified, and endorsed by the court as provided in Article 3 of this chapter for a petition alleging dependency.   A petition to terminate parental rights shall:   State clearly that an order for termination of parental rights is requested and that the effect of the order will conform to Code Section 15-11-261;   State the statutory ground, as provided in Code Section 15-11-310, on which the petition is based; and   Set forth plainly and with particularity:   The facts which bring a child within the jurisdiction of the court, with a statement that it is in the best interests of such child and the public that the proceeding be brought;   The name, age, date of birth, and residence address of the child named in the petition;   The name and residence address of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of such child; or, if the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child named in the petition to terminate parental rights does not reside or cannot be found within the state or if such place of residence address is unknown, the name of any known adult relative of such child residing within the county or, if there is none, the known adult relative of such child residing nearest to the location of the court;   Whether the child named in the petition is in protective custody and, if so, the place of his or her foster care and the time such child was taken into protective custody; and   Whether any of the information required by this paragraph is unknown.       When a petition to terminate parental rights seeks termination of the rights of a biological father who is not the legal father and who has not surrendered his rights to his child, the petition shall include a certificate from the putative father registry disclosing the name, address, and social security number of any registrant acknowledging paternity of the child named in the petition or indicating the possibility of paternity of a child of the child's mother for a period beginning no more than two years immediately preceding such child's date of birth. The certificate shall document a search of the registry on or before the date of the filing of the petition and shall include a statement that the registry is current as to filings of registrants as of the date of the petition.   A copy of a voluntary surrender or written consent, if any, previously executed by a parent of the child named in the petition to terminate parental rights shall be attached to the petition.     (Code 1981, §15-11-280, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-19/SB 364.)   Law reviews.   - For article discussing due process in juvenile court procedures in California and Georgia, in light of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 9 (1971). For article, "Child Custody - Jurisdiction and Procedure," see 35 Emory L. J. 291 (1986). For comment on grandparents' visitation rights in Georgia, see 29 Emory L. J. 1083 (1980).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Editor's notes.   - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-25, pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-38.1, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-82, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-95, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.   Juvenile petition must satisfy "due process."    - Although a juvenile petition does not have to be drafted with the exactitude of a criminal accusation, the petition must satisfy "due process." T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).    Since the state's petition failed to set forth in ordinary and concise language the facts demonstrating the nature of the parent's alleged failure to provide proper parental care or control, the parent lacked sufficient information to enable the parent to prepare a defense, and this amounted to a denial of due process. In re D.R.C., 191 Ga. App. 278, 381 S.E.2d 426 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-25).    To meet constitutional requirement of due process the language of a juvenile petition must pass two tests: (1) the petition must contain sufficient factual details to inform the juvenile of the nature of the offense; and (2) the petition must provide data adequate to enable the accused to prepare a defense. T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).   Allege with particularity.    - Due process requires that the petition alleging delinquency must set forth with specificity the alleged violation of law either in the language of the particular section, or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the child and the child's parents or guardian. D.P. v. State, 129 Ga. App. 680, 200 S.E.2d 499 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).    Petition filed alleging delinquency, deprivation, or unruliness must set forth alleged misconduct with particularity. A.C.G. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 156, 205 S.E.2d 435 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).   Insufficient notice to juvenile of alleged offense.    - If a juvenile is brought to trial on a petition alleging delinquency based on a violation of former Code 1933, § 26-1601 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1) but was adjudicated delinquent for violating former Code 1933, § 26-1806 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7), there was insufficient notice to the juvenile of the offense alleged to be the basis of the juvenile's delinquency and the trial court must be reversed. D.P. v. State, 129 Ga. App. 680, 200 S.E.2d 499 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).   Statement of custody irrelevant if jurisdiction otherwise exists.    - If jurisdiction otherwise existed, such as if the action was brought in the county of the residence of both mother and son, then the requirement in paragraph (4) of former Code 1933, § 24A-1603 had no relevancy to the right of the trial court to handle the case. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 138 Ga. App. 49, 225 S.E.2d 441, rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).   Assumption of jurisdiction linked to authorized petition.    - An order for detention clearly did not meet the requirements of a petition filed pursuant to former Code 1933, § 24A-1603 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-152,15-11-280,15-11-390,15-11-420,15-11-422, and15-11-522) to commence proceedings under former Code 1933, § 24A-1601 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-420), and the assumption of jurisdiction by the juvenile court is linked to the authorized petition. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).    In a hearing on parental custody in a divorce action, the trial court erred in awarding custody of the parties' minor children to the Department of Family and Children Services based upon findings that the children were deprived and the parents unfit because the mother had no notice that the superior court judge might award custody of the children to a third party based upon standards of deprivation. Watkins v. Watkins, 266 Ga. 269, 466 S.E.2d 860 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-25).   Preparation and verification.    - Because counsel for the Department of Children & Family Services stated to the court that counsel prepared the termination petition, that the petition was reviewed, verified, and then signed by counsel the next day, this was sufficient to comply with the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-25 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-152,15-11-280,15-11-390,15-11-422, and15-11-522). In re A.K.M., 235 Ga. App. 853, 510 S.E.2d 611 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-25).   Service by correctional officer upon incarcerated father.    - Personal service of a summons and a petition of deprivation by a correctional officer upon an incarcerated father was sufficient as the service procedures in the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et seq., were not adopted nor were binding on the juvenile court, and the correctional officer was acting under the direction of the court for the purposes of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39.1(c) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-161,15-11-282,15-11-400,15-11-424, and15-11-531). In the Interest of A.J.M., 277 Ga. App. 646, 627 S.E.2d 399 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-38.1)   Standing.    - Child's great aunt and uncle had standing to bring a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child's father and mother. In re J.J., 225 Ga. App. 682, 484 S.E.2d 681 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-82).   Compliance shown.    - Because orders entered by the juvenile court before the Department of Human Resources (DHR) filed its termination petition related to that petition, specifically declaring the child to be deprived and that the child had been in the temporary legal custody of the DHR for over 14 months with no indication that the conditions of deprivation will be alleviated in the future, the court either substantially complied with or satisfied by implication the endorsement requirements showing that the filing of the petition was in the best interest of the public and the child. In the Interest of V.D.S., 284 Ga. App. 582, 644 S.E.2d 422 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 635 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-95).   Parent notified of consequences of termination order.    - Terms which sufficiently apprised father of the consequences of an order terminating parental rights complied with subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-82 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-280). In re A.M.S., 208 Ga. App. 328, 430 S.E.2d 626 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1128, 114 S. Ct. 1095, 127 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-82).    State's petition failed to comply with subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-82 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-280) since the petition contained the first sentence of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-261) almost verbatim but did not provide any notice of the effects of the second sentence of that section. In re D.R.C., 191 Ga. App. 278, 381 S.E.2d 426 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-82).    Juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the mother and the subject matter of the termination of her parental rights because no original petition was filed and personally served. In re C.I.W., 229 Ga. App. 481, 494 S.E.2d 291 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-82).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 75 et seq.   C.J.S.   - 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 191 et seq.   U.L.A.   - Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 21.