NM Stat § 34-6-2 (2021)
2021 New Mexico Statutes|Chapter 34 - Court Structure and Administration|Article 6 - District Courts|Section 34-6-2 - District court terms.

The district court shall always be in session. At least two regular terms for each county within a judicial district shall be established by court rule. When for any reason a district judge is prevented from attending a regular term of the district court on the first day, he may, at any time during that term, enter an order fixing another return day for all process, bonds and recognizances returnable at that term. The order fixing the return day shall be filed with the district court clerk, who shall post a copy at the courthouse for at least ten days before the return day. Juries shall be empanelled [empaneled], cases shall be set and tried and all other business of the district court shall be conducted in any county at any time as directed by the district judge. History: 1953 Comp., § 16-3-2, enacted by Laws 1968, ch. 69, § 5. ANNOTATIONSBracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not part of the law. Cross references. — For terms of district courts, see N.M. Const., art. VI, § 13. Repeals and reenactments. — Laws 1961, ch. 188, § 5, repealed former 16-3-2, 1953 Comp., relating to number of judges in first judicial district divisions, and enacted another 16-3-2, 1953 Comp., dealing with the same subject matter. Laws 1968, ch. 69, § 69, repeals 16-3-2, 1953 Comp., and the above section was enacted by Laws 1968, ch. 69, § 5. "Sessions" of court include only that time during which a court actually conducts business. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-04. Determination at arraignment is determination of court. — The determination by the judge at arraignment that defendant was not entitled to court-appointed counsel was a determination of the court. In this case, it was the court of the first judicial district. The trial judge who presided carried out judicial duties as the court of the district. There is only one court. It was the court that inquired into defendant's indigency. If defendant wished the court to reconsider the matter, he should have brought it to the attention of the court. State v. Anaya, 1966-NMSC-144, 76 N.M. 572, 417 P.2d 58. Trial cannot be conducted between terms. — Terms of courts for the several counties having been provided by statute for the trial of causes, the trial court, in the intervals between those terms, was, for the purpose of conducting trials, no longer a court. Staab v. Atl. & Pac. R.R. Co., 1886-NMSC-015, 3 N.M. (Gild.) 606, 9 P. 381. Arranging nonjury trials. — Under former statute, no fixed terms were set for nonjury trials but they were arranged through court order and proper notice in adversary proceedings. Peisker v. Chavez, 1942-NMSC-004, 46 N.M. 159, 123 P.2d 726. Authorizing vacation hearings on motions does not authorize final judgment. — Terms of statute permitting judge to hear and determine motions in vacation could not be extended so as to authorize a decision in vacation in actions at law which amounts to final judgment in the case, or any branch of it, from which, if rendered in term, an appeal would lie, even though the parties should consent thereto. Colter v. Marriage, 1886-NMSC-014, 3 N.M. (Gild.) 604, 9 P. 383. Vacation decrees proper where court is always in session. — Since Comp. Laws 1884, § 1829, declared that the district courts should be in session at all times, with authority to render final decrees in equity, no action of the court at a regular term was required to give validity to decrees rendered in vacation. United States v. Gwyn, 1888-NMSC-012, 4 N.M. (Gild.) 635, 42 P. 167. Proceedings at unauthorized term void. — Where proceedings were tried at term not authorized by statute, they were coram non judice and void. Bumpers v. Wallace, 1952-NMSC-056, 56 N.M. 462, 245 P.2d 383. Under former statute, if a term of court had failed for any cause, a special term might be called, but where a criminal conviction was had at a term not authorized by law, the proceedings were coram non judice and the judgment was void. State v. Montiel, 1952-NMSC-028, 56 N.M. 181, 241 P.2d 844. If term authorized, conviction not subject to attack. — Under former statute, court rightly refused to sustain motion in arrest of judgment on asserted ground that term of court in which defendant was tried and convicted was a special term, that the special term was unauthorized by law and that the proceedings of the term were coram non judice. Territory v. Hicks, 1892-NMSC-024, 6 N.M. 596, 30 P. 872, overruled on other grounds by Haynes v. United States, 1899-NMSC-003, 9 N.M. 519, 56 P. 282. Sentencing may be postponed to later term. — Under former statute relating to special terms, postponement of a sentence from a special term at which a verdict of guilty was rendered to a regular term two weeks later, at defendant's request, did not render the proceedings void for want of jurisdiction. Gonzales v. Cunningham, 164 U.S. 612, 17 S. Ct. 182, 41 L. Ed. 572 (1896). Duration of term. — A term of a district court, begun and held by any judge, continues its existence until the legal day for beginning another term, unless sooner adjourned, although another term of the same court for another county has been held, as required by law, in the meantime, by the same judge. Territory v. Barela, 1910-NMSC-042, 15 N.M. 520, 110 P. 845; Territory ex rel. Hubbell v. Armijo, 1907-NMSC-013, 14 N.M. 205, 89 P. 267. Discretion to continue term. — Compiled Laws 1884, § 543, which directed courts to be held in the different counties at the times fixed by law and authorized their continuance until adjourned by order of court, imposed a duty and conferred a discretion which should prevail if exercise of discretion rendered the discharge of the duty impracticable. Borrego v. Territory, 1896-NMSC-011, 8 N.M. 446, 46 P. 349. Former section, providing that special terms should not conflict with regular terms, merely declared against a conflict and did not declare the cessation or illegality of the proceedings of the seemingly conflicting special term; under the statute, length of special term was as absolutely in the control of the presiding judge as regular terms are without any condition or restrictions as to duration in furtherance of justice. Borrego v. Territory, 1896-NMSC-011, 8 N.M. 446, 46 P. 349. The discretion of the trial judge in continuing a special term to conclude a pending case, even if prolonged beyond the day fixed for the regular term, was not controlled by former statute. Gonzales v. Cunningham, 164 U.S. 612, 17 S. Ct. 182, 41 L. Ed. 572 (1896). Order held to adjourn court, not term. — An order of adjournment, "It is ordered that the court do now adjourn until court in course," adjourns the court and not the term. Henry v. Lincoln Lucky & Lee Mining Co., 1906-NMSC-012, 13 N.M. 384, 85 P. 1043. Effect of elimination of term. — Fact that Laws 1905, ch. 89, § 1, eliminated a March term of court did not disqualify the jury commissioners who would have served that term from serving for the new April term. Territory v. Emilio, 1907-NMSC-020, 14 N.M. 147, 89 P. 239. Procuring the docketing of an appeal. — On appeal from justice of the peace (now magistrate) the clerk of the district court must docket the case on or prior to the second day of the next ensuing term, and the justice may do so (where the transcript is received and the docket fees are paid) before the first day of the term. Reece v. Montano, 1943-NMSC-054, 48 N.M. 1, 144 P.2d 461. Failure to move for disqualification at term may lose right. — Because the plaintiff failed to file an affidavit of disqualification after the first term had passed for hearing on motion by defendant for dismissing action on contention that over two years had transpired since anything had happened to bring the case to final judgment, defendant's right to do so had been lost. Heron v. Gaylor, 1948-NMSC-073, 53 N.M. 50, 201 P.2d 370; Heron v. Gaylor, 1948-NMSC-072, 53 N.M. 44, 201 P.2d 366 (decided under prior law) (see 38-3-10 NMSA 1978). Commitment hearings held at commitment facility not precluded. — Absent a showing by a "developmentally disabled" person that his substantive rights would in any way be abridged if his involuntary commitment hearing is not held at the county seat, the district court is not precluded from adopting the practice of holding such hearings at the commitment facility when, in its discretion, such practice would better serve the public convenience. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No.79-20. Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 21 et seq. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 111 et seq.