CO Code § 18-5-113 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 18 - Criminal Code|Article 5 - Offenses Involving Fraud|Part 1 - Forgery, Simulation, Impersonation, and Related Offenses|§ 18-5-113. Criminal Impersonation

  A person commits criminal impersonation if he or she knowingly:   Assumes a false or fictitious identity or legal capacity, and in such identity or capacity he or she:   Marries, or pretends to marry, or to sustain the marriage relation toward another without the connivance of the latter;    Becomes bail or surety for a party in an action or proceeding, civil or criminal, before a court or officer authorized to take the bail or surety; or    Confesses a judgment, or subscribes, verifies, publishes, acknowledges, or proves a written instrument which by law may be recorded, with the intent that the same may be delivered as true; or       [ ] Assumes a false or fictitious identity or capacity, legal or other, and in such identity or capacity he or she:   Performs an act that, if done by the person falsely impersonated, might subject such person to an action or special proceeding, civil or criminal, or to liability, charge, forfeiture, or penalty; or    Performs any other act with intent to unlawfully gain a benefit for himself, herself, or another or to injure or defraud another.    Performs an act that, if done by the person falsely impersonated, subjects such person to an action or special proceeding, civil or criminal, or to liability, charge, forfeiture, or penalty;    Performs an act that, if done by the person falsely impersonated, might subject the person to an action or special proceeding, civil or criminal, or to liability, charge, forfeiture, or penalty; or    Performs any other act with intent to unlawfully gain a benefit for himself, herself, or another or to injure or defraud another.          [ ] Criminal impersonation is a class 6 felony.   [ ] Criminal impersonation in violation of subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b)(I) of this section is a class 6 felony.    Criminal impersonation in violation of subseciton (1)(b)(II) of this section is a class 1 misdemeanor.    Criminal impersonation in violation of subsection (1)(b)(III) of this section is a class 2 misdemeanor.       For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, using false or fictitious personal identifying information, as defined in section 18-5-901 (13), shall constitute the assumption of a false or fictitious identity or capacity.    Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(b) is effective until March 1, 2022.  [ ] Assumes a false or fictitious identity or capacity, legal or other, and in such identity or capacity he or she:  Editor's note: This version of subsection (1)(b) is effective March 1, 2022. Editor's note: This version of subsection (2) is effective until March 1, 2022. Editor's note: This version of subsection (2) is effective March 1, 2022.  History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 436, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-5-113 . L. 77: IP(1) amended, p. 964, § 30, effective July 1. L. 89: (2) amended, p. 834, § 54, effective July 1. L. 2011: (1) amended and (3) added,(SB 11-201), ch. 217, p. 947, § 1, effective May 27. L. 2021: (1)(b) and (2) amended,(SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3182, § 233, effective March 1, 2022.    Editor's note:   Section 803(2) of chapter 462 (SB 21-271), Session Laws of Colorado 2021, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after March 1, 2022.   ANNOTATION   Annotator's note. Since § 18-5-113 is similar to former CSA, C. 48, § 338, a relevant case construing that provision has been included in the annotations to this section.   Subsection (1)(e) is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. People v. Lambert, 194 Colo. 421 , 572 P.2d 839 (1978).   Criminal impersonation defined. This section defines criminal impersonation as (now knowingly) assuming a false or fictitious identity or capacity, and in that identity or capacity, doing any act with intent to unlawfully gain a benefit or injure or defraud another. People v. Brown, 193 Colo. 120 , 562 P.2d 754 (1977); People v. Borrego, 738 P.2d 59 (Colo. App. 1987).   To falsely impersonate means to pretend to be a particular person without lawful authority. People v. Horkans, 109 Colo. 177 , 123 P.2d 824 (1942).   And to perform act in assumed character for benefit. It is an offense under this section to falsely impersonate another, and in such assumed character to do any act whereby any benefit might accrue to the offender or to another person. People v. Horkans, 109 Colo. 177 , 123 P.2d 824 (1942).   Even though such person is dead. The offense of impersonation may be committed although the person who is impersonated is dead. People v. Horkans, 109 Colo. 177 , 123 P.2d 824 (1942).   Continuing offense. The offense of criminal impersonation can be continuing or can occur at a specific time. People v. Perez, 129 P.3d 1090 (Colo. App. 2005).   Criminal impersonation is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Veloz-Luvevano v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1308 (10th Cir. 2015) (decided under law in effect prior to 2011 amendment).   Venue is not an element of the crime of criminal impersonation. People v. Perez, 129 P.3d 1090 (Colo. App. 2005).   Section does not require two overt acts to be committed. Section requires assuming a false identity and doing an act with the intent to gain a benefit. Giving a fictitious name to police because the defendant was on parole from another state satisfies both requirements. People v. Johnson, 30 P.3d 718 (Colo. App. 2000).   Paragraphs (d) and (e) of subsection (1) may be construed independently of the first three paragraphs, and any construction need not relate back to them. People v. Horkans, 109 Colo. 177 , 123 P.2d 824 (1942).   Subsection (1)(e) criminalizes knowingly using a false or fictitious identity or capacity with the intent to unlawfully gain a benefit for himself or another person or to injure or defraud another person. Subsection (1)(e) requires the prosecution to prove one act and two culpable mental states. In this case, the defendant used a fictitious name to avoid arrest on an outstanding warrant to commit criminal impersonation. Alvarado v. People, 132 P.3d 1205 (Colo. 2006).   The requisite intent to gain a benefit may be inferred from the accused's knowing use of a false identity and the acknowledged intent to secure some advantage from the impersonation. People v. Borrego, 738 P.2d 59 (Colo. App. 1987).   The common meaning of “assumes a false or fictitious identity” is not to hold oneself out as someone that he or she is not; it requires the assumption of the identity of another person, whether that other person is real or fictitious. People v. Jones, 841 P.2d 372 (Colo. App. 1992).   Criminal impersonation is not a specific instance of attempt to influence a public servant. People v. Van De Weghe, 2012 COA 204 , 312 P.3d 231.   Attorney with suspended license guilty of criminal impersonation for practicing law. The court held that “continuing to represent himself as an attorney and performing legal work when he was aware that he had no valid license to do so amounts to the assumption of a false or fictitious capacity for purposes of the criminal impersonation statute.” People v. Bauer, 80 P.3d 896 (Colo. App. 2003).   Failure to provide an accurate social security number was not equivalent to the assumption of another persona where such information was not the sole, identifying fact. People v. Jones, 841 P.2d 312 (Colo. App. 1992); Montes-Rodriguez v. People, 241 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2010).   Use of a false social security number did not constitute the assumption of a false capacity. A lender's requirements to obtain a loan are different from the legal requirements to obtain a loan. Montes-Rodriguez v. People, 241 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2010).   Even though he supplied a false social security number, defendant did not assume a false identity since he provided his correct name, address, birth date, and place of employment. Montes-Rodriguez v. People, 241 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2010).   Defendant's giving of a false birth date did not satisfy the “any other act” element of criminal impersonation under subsection (1)(e). People v. Peay, 5 P.3d 398 (Colo. App. 2000).   Passing falsified gift certificates. The second element of criminal impersonation, i.e., an act with intent unlawfully to gain a benefit or to defraud another, was met by the defendant's passing in exchange for property gift certificates falsified when a false name was written to facilitate the passing. The defendant knew the certificates, as signed, were false, and from this, intent to defraud could be inferred. Further, writing the false name demonstrated that the defendant knew he was not entitled to exchange the certificates for merchandise. People v. Brown, 193 Colo. 120 , 562 P.2d 754 (1977).   Indictment under this section should allege that the injury or benefit mentioned in the section would accrue. People v. Horkans, 109 Colo. 177 , 123 P.2d 824 (1942).   Indictment sufficient. An indictment alleging that accused at a certain time and place did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and falsely impersonate another, and in such assumed character did agree to take, and did take a civil service examination given on a certain day, and by reason thereof did receive a certain sum of money from the person falsely impersonated, is sufficient and states a complete offense under this section. People v. Horkans, 109 Colo. 177 , 123 P.2d 824 (1942).   Where no evidence that false name resulted in benefit, no guilty verdict. Where the prosecution failed to present evidence to the jury that the use of a false name would result in a benefit to the defendant, the evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict of criminal impersonation. People v. Shaw, 44 Colo. App. 533, 616 P.2d 185 (1980).   Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding character witness testimony because defendant admitted to using a false social security number he knew was not his own, and any evidence pertaining to his character for truthfulness was irrelevant in that respect. People v. Montes-Rodriguez, 219 P.3d 340 (Colo. App. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 241 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2010).   Similarly, trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence regarding whether or not defendant knew whose social security number he used. Because defendant admitted to using a social security number that was not his own, the evidence was irrelevant. People v. Montes-Rodriguez, 219 P.3d 340 (Colo. App. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 241 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2010).   Defendant was not entitled to jury instruction that offense of false reporting to authorities was a lesser included offense of criminal impersonation because false reporting has the additional element of making or transmission of a report to law enforcement authorities. People v. Vasallo-Hernandez, 939 P.2d 440 (Colo. App. 1995).   Nor did evidence support jury instruction on offense of false reporting to authorities as a lesser non-included offense of criminal impersonation absent the initiation of affirmative action intended to communicate information. People v. Vasallo-Hernandez, 939 P.2d 440 (Colo. App. 1995).   Applied in People v. Stinson, 632 P.2d 631 (Colo. App. 1981).