NE Code § 25-1902 (2021)
2021 Nebraska Revised Statutes|Chapter 25 - Courts; Civil Procedure|25-1902 - Final order, defined; appeal.

25-1902.  Final order, defined; appeal.(1) The following are final orders which may be vacated, modified, or reversed:(a) An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;(b) An order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding;(c) An order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is entered; and(d) An order denying a motion for summary judgment when such motion is based on the assertion of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a government official.(2) An order under subdivision (1)(d) of this section may be appealed pursuant to section 25-1912 within thirty days after the entry of such order or within thirty days after the entry of judgment.Source   R.S.1867, Code § 581, p. 496;   R.S.1913, § 8176;   C.S.1922, § 9128;   C.S.1929, § 20-1902;   R.S.1943, § 25-1902;  Laws 2019, LB179, § 1.  Annotations  1. Final order 2. Not final order 3. Special proceeding 4. Substantial right 5. Miscellaneous 1. Final order A trial court's order denying a judgment debtor's motion to quash and vacate a foreign judgment affected a substantial right, and thus, the order was a final, appealable order; once the court ordered garnishment of the debtor's bank account, forcing him to postpone his appeal from such an order would have significantly undermined his right to the use and enjoyment of his property. Gem City Bone & Joint v. Meister, 306 Neb. 710, 947 N.W.2d 302 (2020). An order denying a motion to modify or eliminate a probation condition is a final, appealable order. State v. Paulsen, 304 Neb. 21, 932 N.W.2d 849 (2019). Under this section, the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is a final, appealable order, because it affects a substantial right and is made in a special proceeding. Cullinane v. Beverly Enters. - Neb., 300 Neb. 210, 912 N.W.2d 774 (2018). Final orders and judgments issued by a county court may be appealed to district court. A district court order affirming, reversing, or remanding an order or judgment of the county court is itself a final order that an appellate court has jurisdiction to review. State v. Coble, 299 Neb. 434, 908 N.W.2d 646 (2018). An order issuing a stay within an action is generally not appealable. But a stay that is tantamount to a dismissal of an action or has the effect of a permanent denial of the requested relief is a final order. Boyd v. Cook, 298 Neb. 819, 906 N.W.2d 31 (2018). Generally, an order of dismissal is a final, appealable order. Boyd v. Cook, 298 Neb. 819, 906 N.W.2d 31 (2018). The only three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal are (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after judgment is rendered. Boyd v. Cook, 298 Neb. 819, 906 N.W.2d 31 (2018). Under this section, an order is final for purposes of appeal if it affects a substantial right and (1) determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) is made during a special proceeding, or (3) is made on summary application in an action after judgment is rendered. State v. McColery, 297 Neb. 53, 898 N.W.2d 349 (2017). An order overruling a motion to terminate parental rights is a final, appealable order. In re Interest of Isabel P. et al., 293 Neb. 62, 875 N.W.2d 848 (2016). A motion to compel arbitration invokes a special proceeding. An order that compels arbitration or stays court proceedings pending arbitration divests the court of jurisdiction to hear the parties' dispute and determines arbitrability. Accordingly, it is a final, appealable order. Shasta Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, 290 Neb. 640, 861 N.W.2d 425 (2015). The compensation court’s award which granted the worker vocational rehabilitation of formal training was a final order because it was made in a special proceeding and affected a substantial right by eliminating the employer’s claim that the worker was not entitled to vocational rehabilitation. Becerra v. United Parcel Service, 284 Neb. 414, 822 N.W.2d 327 (2012). In a request for partition brought within a probate proceeding, a county court’s order directing a referee to sell the real estate was a final, appealable order. Probate proceedings are special proceedings, and the right to receive the real estate in kind is a substantial right that was affected by the order to sell the property. In re Estate of McKillip, 284 Neb. 367, 820 N.W.2d 868 (2012). Where a child is adjudicated and placed in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services, and the department is the child's guardian, a juvenile court order permanently changing the child's placement is a final, appealable order. In re Interest of Karlie D., 283 Neb. 581, 811 N.W.2d 214 (2012). An order resolving all the issues raised in an independent special proceeding is a final, appealable order. Big John's Billiards v. State, 283 Neb. 496, 811 N.W.2d 205 (2012). If a plaintiff's other claims in an action are rendered moot by the court's ruling that a statute is unconstitutional, the trial court's order completely disposes of the subject matter of the litigation. Such an order both is final and affects a substantial right. Big John's Billiards v. State, 283 Neb. 496, 811 N.W.2d 205 (2012). A probate court's denial of an application for the appointment of a special administrator, brought pursuant to section 30-2457(2), is a final, appealable order within the meaning of this section. In re Estate of Muncillo, 280 Neb. 669, 789 N.W.2d 37 (2010). A stay in an independent special proceeding that is tantamount to a dismissal of an action or has the effect of a permanent denial of the requested relief is appealable as a final order. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010). An order compelling arbitration or staying judicial proceedings pending arbitration is a final order under the second category of this section. It affects a substantial right in an independent special proceeding because it disposes of all the issues presented. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010). An order of contempt in a postjudgment proceeding to enforce a previous final judgment is a final order for appeal purposes; the contempt order affects a substantial right, made upon a summary application in an action after judgment. Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 279 Neb. 661, 782 N.W.2d 848 (2010). An order denying a motion to vacate or modify a final order affects a substantial right upon a summary application in an action after judgment, and is itself a final, appealable order. Capitol Construction v. Skinner, 279 Neb. 419, 778 N.W.2d 721 (2010). An order granting an evidentiary hearing on some issues presented in a postconviction motion but denying a hearing on others is a final order. State v. Poindexter, 277 Neb. 936, 766 N.W.2d 391 (2009). The three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal are (1) an order which affects a substantial right in an action and which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered. Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 277 Neb. 456, 763 N.W.2d 77 (2009); State v. Bjorklund, 258 Neb. 432, 604 N.W.2d 169 (2000); State v. Silvers, 255 Neb. 702, 587 N.W.2d 325 (1998); In re Interest of Anthony G., 255 Neb. 442, 586 N.W.2d 427 (1998); State v. Kula, 254 Neb. 962, 579 N.W.2d 541 (1998); Hull v. Aetna Ins. Co., 247 Neb. 713, 529 N.W.2d 783 (1995); Rohde v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Neb. 863, 509 N.W.2d 618 (1994); Jarrett v. Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 506 N.W.2d 682 (1993); In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1991); Moyers v. International Paper Co., 25 Neb. App. 282, 905 N.W.2d 87 (2017); Abante, LLC v. Premier Fighter, 19 Neb. App. 730, 814 N.W.2d 109 (2012); Michael B. v. Donna M., 11 Neb. App. 346, 652 N.W.2d 618 (2002); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 10 Neb. App. 622, 635 N.W.2d 272 (2001); O'Connor v. Kaufman, 6 Neb. App. 382, 574 N.W.2d 513 (1998). A judgment is a court's final consideration and determination of the respective rights and obligations of the parties to an action as those rights and obligations presently exist. An order entered by a court may affect a substantial right and be subject to review as a final order although it could not or need not be properly denominated a judgment. State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762, 696 N.W.2d 860 (2005). In a case involving two appellees, a lower court order sustaining one appellee's motion for summary judgment and entering judgment against the appellant was a final order because it determined the action as related to those two parties, and no further action was necessary as between those two parties. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Dailey, 268 Neb. 733, 687 N.W.2d 689 (2004). A denial of a motion to compel based on the Federal Arbitration Act is a final, appealable order because it affects a substantial right and is made in a special proceeding. Webb v. American Employers Group, 268 Neb. 473, 684 N.W.2d 33 (2004). A trial court's order which ordered the clerk of the court to issue an amended commitment for a defendant who had previously been convicted and sentenced is a final, appealable order. State v. Perry, 268 Neb. 179, 681 N.W.2d 729 (2004). The denial of a motion to vacate and set aside the judgment under subsection (2) of section 29-4123 affects a substantial right in a special proceeding and is therefore an appealable order under this section. State v. Bronson, 267 Neb. 103, 672 N.W.2d 244 (2003). An order denying a request for reimbursement pursuant to the in forma pauperis statutes entered after the judgment is an order affecting a substantial right made upon a summary application in an action after judgment and is therefore a final, appealable order under this section. Heathman v. Kenney, 263 Neb. 966, 644 N.W.2d 558 (2002). A proceeding to determine the competency of an accused to stand trial is a special proceeding within the meaning of this section, and an order finding the accused incompetent to stand trial and ordering the accused confined until such time as he or she is competent is a final order from which an appeal may be taken under section 25-1911. State v. Lassek, 272 Neb. 523, 723 N.W.2d 320 (2006); State v. Jones, 258 Neb. 695, 605 N.W.2d 434 (2000); State v. Guatney, 207 Neb. 501, 299 N.W.2d 538 (1980). A ruling on a plea in bar is a final order as defined in this section. State v. Marshall, 253 Neb. 676, 573 N.W.2d 406 (1998). Per this section, a motion to discharge for lack of speedy trial, pursuant to section 29-1208, is an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding. State v. Jacques, 253 Neb. 247, 570 N.W.2d 331 (1997). A ruling on a motion for absolute discharge based upon an accused criminal's nonfrivolous claim that his or her statutory speedy trial rights were violated is final and appealable. State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 570 N.W.2d 326 (1997). The denial of a plea in bar is a final order as defined by this section. State v. Sinsel, 249 Neb. 369, 543 N.W.2d 457 (1996); State v. Lynch, 248 Neb. 234, 533 N.W.2d 905 (1995); State v. Milenkovich, 236 Neb. 42, 458 N.W.2d 747 (1990). In order for a decree to qualify as "final", it must dispose of the whole merits of the case and leave nothing for further consideration of the court. In re Adoption of Krystal P. & Kile P., 248 Neb. 907, 540 N.W.2d 312 (1995). The denial of a plea in bar raising a double jeopardy claim is a final order as defined in this section. State v. Woodfork, 239 Neb. 720, 478 N.W.2d 248 (1991). An ex parte temporary detention order keeping a juvenile's custody from his or her parent for a short period of time pending a hearing as to whether the detention should be continued is not final; however, a detention order entered after a hearing continuing to keep a juvenile's custody from his or her parent pending an adjudication hearing to determine whether the juvenile is neglected, and thus within the purview of section 43-247(3)(a), is final and thus appealable. In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1991). An order which directs the Department of Social Services to pay for the costs of treatment is a final order for purposes of this section. In re Interest of J.M.N., 237 Neb. 116, 464 N.W.2d 811 (1991). Order by separate juvenile court requiring parent to participate in psychological therapy and requiring Department of Social Services to pay for that therapy was a final order. In re Interest of B.M.H., 233 Neb. 524, 446 N.W.2d 222 (1989). Order of county court dismissing motion to remove personal representative was appealable. In re Estate of Snover, 233 Neb. 198, 443 N.W.2d 894 (1989). An order is final and appealable when the substantial rights of the parties to the action are determined even though the cause is retained for the determination of matters incidental thereto. In re 1983-84 County Tax Levy, 220 Neb. 897, 374 N.W.2d 235 (1985); Dorshorst v. Dorshorst, 174 Neb. 886, 120 N.W.2d 32 (1963). On appeal from the county court sitting as a juvenile court, an order of the district court remanding the case to the county court for a further dispositional hearing is a final order appealable to this court. In re Interest of Roman, 212 Neb. 919, 327 N.W.2d 36 (1982). Only final orders may be properly appealed to the Supreme Court. An order in a case is final if no further action by a court is necessary to dispose of the cause pending. Lake v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 212 Neb. 570, 324 N.W.2d 660 (1982). An order fixing fees in a partition action is a final, appealable order. Evans v. Evans, 199 Neb. 480, 259 N.W.2d 925 (1977). An order of the Court of Industrial Relations establishing bargaining units is a final order under this section, and becomes immediately appealable. American Assn. of University Professors v. Board of Regents, 198 Neb. 243, 253 N.W.2d 1 (1977). An order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding is a final order which may be appealed. State v. Loomis, 195 Neb. 552, 239 N.W.2d 266 (1976). Order of county superintendent denying petition for school district reorganization was a final order. Frankforter v. Turner, 175 Neb. 252, 121 N.W.2d 377 (1963). Order vacating a default judgment is an appealable order. Jones v. Nebraska Blue Cross Hospital Service Assn., 175 Neb. 101, 120 N.W.2d 557 (1963). A denial of a motion to file a petition on appeal from municipal court out of time is a final order. Pep Sinton, Inc. v. Thomas, 174 Neb. 508, 118 N.W.2d 621 (1962). Public officer has an appealable interest where proper administration of the duties of a public office is involved. State ex rel. Coulter v. McFarland, 166 Neb. 242, 88 N.W.2d 892 (1958). Order of dismissal without prejudice was a final order. Akins v. Chamberlain, 164 Neb. 428, 82 N.W.2d 632 (1957). Order of Superintendent of Public Instruction dissolving school district was final order. Schutte v. Schmitt, 162 Neb. 162, 75 N.W.2d 656 (1956). Order affecting substantial right in condemnation proceeding is appealable. Higgins v. Loup River P. P. & I. Dist., 159 Neb. 549, 68 N.W.2d 170 (1955). Order granting interpleader is final order as between stakeholder and claimants. Strasser v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 157 Neb. 570, 60 N.W.2d 672 (1953). Granting of continuance under federal Civil Relief Act was final order. Sullivan v. Storz, 156 Neb. 177, 55 N.W.2d 499 (1952). Denial by district court of request to issue special execution by successful plaintiff in a replevin action is a final order from which an appeal can be taken. Barstow v. Wolff, 148 Neb. 14, 26 N.W.2d 390 (1947). An order affecting a substantial right in an action upon a summary application after judgment is a final order from which an appeal may be taken. De Lair v. De Lair, 146 Neb. 771, 21 N.W.2d 498 (1946). An order of the court confirming or refusing to confirm a sale constitutes a final and appealable order. Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation v. Ganser, 145 Neb. 589, 17 N.W.2d 613 (1945). The denial of an application for a writ of habeas corpus by the district court is a final order. Williams v. Olson, 145 Neb. 282, 16 N.W.2d 178 (1944). Final orders in habeas corpus proceedings may be reviewed on appeal. The test of finality of order for purpose of appeal is whether particular proceeding or action is terminated by judgment. Tail v. Olson, 144 Neb. 820, 14 N.W.2d 840 (1944). Judgment by district court awarding weekly sum "until further order" in compensation case was final order. Schlesselman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 Neb. 65, 195 N.W. 466 (1923). Alimony decree was final order. Wharton v. Jackson, 107 Neb. 288, 185 N.W. 428 (1921). Absolute order of revivor of action against defendant's executor was final order. Levin v. Muser, 107 Neb. 230, 185 N.W. 431 (1921). Order vacating judgment on petition filed after the term was final order. Wunrath v. Peoples Furniture & Carpet Co., 98 Neb. 342, 152 N.W. 736 (1915). An order granting or refusing license to sell realty to pay debts of deceased person was final order. In re Estate of Broehl, 93 Neb. 166, 139 N.W. 1020 (1913). To appeal from order, it must be formally entered upon journal. Fauber v. Keim, 84 Neb. 167, 120 N.W. 1019 (1909). Action of State Board of Equalization on railroad assessment was final order. State ex rel. U.P.R.R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 81 Neb. 139, 115 N.W. 789 (1908). Quashing summons and dismissing action without prejudice was final order. Davis v. Jennings, 78 Neb. 462, 111 N.W. 128 (1907). If no further action is necessary to dispose of case, order is final. Huffman v. Rhodes, 72 Neb. 57, 100 N.W. 159 (1904). Order of county court denying right to file claim against estate was final order. Ribble v. Furmin, 71 Neb. 108, 98 N.W. 420 (1904). Judgment of district court reversing judgment or order of inferior court, though case retained for trial, was final order. Ribble v. Furmin, 69 Neb. 38, 94 N.W. 967 (1903). Order vacating judgment rendered at former term was final order. Bannard v. Duncan, 65 Neb. 179, 90 N.W. 947 (1902). Appointment of receiver was final order. Seeds Dry-Plate Co. v. Heyn Photo-Supply Co., 57 Neb. 214, 77 N.W. 660 (1898). Quashing writ of replevin and dismissing action was final order. Swain v. Savage, 55 Neb. 687, 77 N.W. 362 (1898). Decree in foreclosure annulling mortgage though proceedings on note continued, was final order. France v. Bell, 52 Neb. 57, 71 N.W. 984 (1897). Order setting aside sale was final order. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Creighton Theatre Bldg. Co., 51 Neb. 659, 71 N.W. 279 (1897). Ex parte order, in aid of execution against defendant, was final order. Clarke v. Nebraska Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 800, 69 N.W. 104 (1896). Decision refusing to order clerk to approve supersedeas was final order. State ex rel. Lions Ins. Co. v. Baker, 45 Neb. 39, 63 N.W. 139 (1895). Order recalling order of sale in foreclosure was final order. State ex rel. Harris v. Laflin, 40 Neb. 441, 58 N.W. 936 (1894). Discharge of attachment was final order. Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Co. v. Curtis, 38 Neb. 520, 57 N.W. 161 (1893); Adams County Bank v. Morgan, 26 Neb. 148, 41 N.W. 993 (1889). Denying petition to intervene was final order. Herman v. Barhydt, 20 Neb. 625, 31 N.W. 488 (1886). Overruling application to set aside default and permit answer was final order. Steele v. Haynes, 20 Neb. 316, 30 N.W. 63 (1886). Order on application to modify decree affecting substantial right though it does not determine action was final order. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 19 Neb. 584, 27 N.W. 640 (1886). Order requiring attorney to pay money into court was final order. Baldwin v. Foss, 14 Neb. 455, 16 N.W. 480 (1883). Decree enjoining sale of real estate was final order. Rickards v. Coon, 13 Neb. 419, 14 N.W. 162 (1882). Judgment of dismissal and costs to defendant was final order. Rogers v. Russell, 11 Neb. 361, 9 N.W. 547 (1881). Order confirming sale, made at chambers, was final order. State Bank of Nebraska v. Green, 8 Neb. 297, 1 N.W. 210 (1879). Decision of county board of equalization in assessing and levying taxes was final order. Sioux City & P. R. R. v. Washington County, 3 Neb. 30 (1873). A juvenile court order ceasing reasonable efforts and rejecting the permanency plan of reunification affected a substantial right of the parent, and thus was a final, appealable order that had to be appealed within 30 days; it did not matter that the court's order did not also simultaneously specify a new permanency plan, but instead returned the case to the Department of Health and Human Services for alternative permanency planning recommendations. In re Interest of LeAntonaé D. et al., 28 Neb. App. 144, 942 N.W.2d 784 (2020). A final, appealable order must affect a substantial right. In re Guardianship of Aimee S., 24 Neb. App. 230, 885 N.W.2d 330 (2016). The three types of final orders that an appellate court may review are (1) an order that affects a substantial right and that determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order that affects a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order that affects a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered. In re Guardianship of Aimee S., 24 Neb. App. 230, 885 N.W.2d 330 (2016). Under this section, the three types of final orders that an appellate court may review are (1) an order that affects a substantial right and that determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order that affects a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order that affects a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered. Furstenfeld v. Pepin, 23 Neb. App. 673, 875 N.W.2d 468 (2016). Under this section, the three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal are (1) an order which affects a substantial right in an action and which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered. Belitz v. Belitz, 21 Neb. App. 716, 842 N.W.2d 613 (2014). The granting of a summary judgment is a final order where it concludes all issues between the two parties on either side of the motion. Abante, LLC v. Premier Fighter, 19 Neb. App. 730, 814 N.W.2d 109 (2012). Sentencing orders in which a defendant is sentenced to probation with one term of probation's being a jail term that may or may not ultimately be waived by the court are final, appealable orders. State v. Volcek, 15 Neb. App. 416, 729 N.W.2d 90 (2007). An order denying a petition to invalidate pursuant to section 43-1507 and motion to dismiss is a final order for purposes of this section. In re Interest of Enrique P. et al., 14 Neb. App. 453, 709 N.W.2d 676 (2006). An order adjudicating an individual as a mentally ill dangerous person pursuant to section 71‑908 and ordering that person retained for an indeterminate amount of time is an order affecting a substantial right in a special proceeding from which an appeal may be taken. In re Interest of Saville, 10 Neb. App. 194, 626 N.W.2d 644 (2001). A denial of a plea in bar is a final, appealable order. State v. Noll, 3 Neb. App. 410, 527 N.W.2d 644 (1995). A ruling on a motion to set aside the forfeiture of an appeal bond is an appealable order. State v. Hernandez, 1 Neb. App. 830, 511 N.W.2d 535 (1993). 2. Not final order The order granting an application to proceed in forma pauperis is not a final, appealable order because it does not affect a substantial right. State v. Fredrickson, 306 Neb. 81, 943 N.W.2d 701 (2020). An order overruling a plea in bar was not a final, appealable order, where the defendant's plea in bar did not present a colorable double jeopardy claim. State v. Kelley, 305 Neb. 409, 940 N.W.2d 568 (2020). Even if, in the face of a defendant's insistence, a court refuses to rule on the merits of a motion to quash an information on limitations grounds, the court's refusal to rule would be no more final, for purposes of an appeal, than a ruling on the motion would have been. State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852, 901 N.W.2d 679 (2017). An order that merely holds bond funds in the court and does not state who is entitled to the funds is not a final, appealable order. State v. McColery, 297 Neb. 53, 898 N.W.2d 349 (2017). An order disqualifying counsel in a civil case is not a final, appealable order, overruling Richardson v. Griffiths, 251 Neb. 825, 560 N.W.2d 430 (1997), and cases relying upon it. Heckman v. Marchio, 296 Neb. 458, 894 N.W.2d 296 (2017). An order imposing a discovery sanction was not a final order; it did not dispose of the whole merits of the case, was not made during a special proceeding, and was not made after a judgment was rendered. Ginger Cove Common Area Co. v. Wiekhorst, 296 Neb. 416, 893 N.W.2d 467 (2017). An order refusing to vacate a discovery sanction order was not a final order, because it did not affect a substantial right. Ginger Cove Common Area Co. v. Wiekhorst, 296 Neb. 416, 893 N.W.2d 467 (2017). The denial of a motion to transfer a criminal case from district court to juvenile court is not final and appealable under this section. State v. Bluett, 295 Neb. 369, 889 N.W.2d 83 (2016). A finding of abandonment under section 43-104(2)(b) in an ongoing adoption proceeding is not a final, appealable order; such a finding does not terminate parental rights or standing in the proceedings, but merely eliminates the need for the abandoning parent's consent and authorizes the execution of substitute consent, and such finding has no real and immediate effect on parental obligations, visitation, custody, or other matters pertaining to the parent's contact with the child during the pendency of the final judgment granting or denying the petition for adoption. In re Adoption of Madysen S. et al., 293 Neb. 646, 879 N.W.2d 34 (2016). An order of the trial court issuing a warrant for a defendant's arrest and commitment upon finding that the Department of Correctional Services had erroneously released the defendant before his mandatory discharge date was an order on summary application relating to a final judgment (the defendant's sentence). But the order did not affect a substantial right necessary to qualify for immediate appeal. The trial court was not deciding any important right or issue affecting the subject matter of the underlying criminal action or of any rights allegedly derived from the mistaken release, and the trial court did not diminish any claim or defense that was available to the defendant prior to the order for an arrest and commitment warrant. State v. Jackson, 291 Neb. 908, 870 N.W.2d 133 (2015). An order dismissing a case "subject to being reinstated" upon the filing of a motion for reinstatement within 14 days is conditional and, thus, not a final order. State v. Meints, 291 Neb. 869, 869 N.W.2d 343 (2015). An order in a juvenile proceeding merely finding the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act applicable, without further adjudicative or dispositive action, is not a final order within the meaning of this section. In re Interest of Jassenia H., 291 Neb. 107, 864 N.W.2d 242 (2015). A court's temporary injunction or stay that merely preserves the status quo pending a further order is not an order that amounts to a dismissal of the action or that permanently denies relief to a party. So it is not a final, appealable order. Shasta Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, 290 Neb. 640, 861 N.W.2d 425 (2015). A truly temporary order entered pursuant to section 43-2929.01(4)(a) is not a “final order” under this section. Huskey v. Huskey, 289 Neb. 439, 855 N.W.2d 377 (2014). An order denying a motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity was not a final order for purposes of appeal. Carney v. Miller, 287 Neb. 400, 842 N.W.2d 782 (2014). A Workers’ Compensation Court’s finding of a compensable injury or its rejection of an employer’s affirmative defense without a determination of benefits is not an order that affects an employer’s substantial right in a special proceeding, and thus, is not appealable. Jacobitz v. Aurora Co-op, 287 Neb. 97, 841 N.W.2d 377 (2013). An order granting ancillary discovery of allegedly privileged information is not a final order under this section. Schropp Indus. v. Washington Cty. Atty.'s Ofc., 281 Neb. 152, 794 N.W.2d 685 (2011). An order reviving an action is not a final order from which an appeal may immediately be taken; the order may be reviewed after final judgment in the case. Platte Valley Nat. Bank v. Lasen, 273 Neb. 602, 732 N.W.2d 347 (2007). The overruling of a pretrial motion raising a statute of limitations defense neither affects a substantial right nor occurs in the context of a special proceeding. State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762, 696 N.W.2d 860 (2005). An order denying or dissolving a temporary injunction or restraining order is not a final order as defined in this section. Dissolution of a temporary restraining order is not a final order within the meaning of this section. Waite v. City of Omaha, 263 Neb. 589, 641 N.W.2d 351 (2002). An order sustaining a motion for partial summary judgment, which grants a permanent injunction but reserves the issue of monetary damages for later disposition, is not a final, appealable order. O'Connor v. Kaufman, 255 Neb. 120, 582 N.W.2d 350 (1998). A motion to disqualify a criminal defendant's court-appointed attorney is not a final, appealable order. State v. Schlund, 249 Neb. 173, 542 N.W.2d 421 (1996). A trial court order is not a final decision for the purposes of appeal or res judicata if a motion for new trial of the matter is pending before the court. Smith v. Smith, 246 Neb. 193, 517 N.W.2d 394 (1994). Where the Nebraska Motor Vehicle Industry Licensing Board's order is clearly conditional, operating only in the event that the franchisor finds another franchisee and notifies the board of the fact that it has done so, it is not a final order and is therefore not appealable. Garber v. State, 241 Neb. 523, 489 N.W.2d 550 (1992). Where all of plaintiff's theories are based on the same operative facts and involve the same parties, summary judgment with regard to only some of the theories does not constitute a final, appealable order which this court may consider. Lewis v. Craig, 236 Neb. 602, 463 N.W.2d 318 (1990). An order dismissing one cause of action while a second cause of action arising out of the same factual circumstances and involving the same parties but asserting a different legal theory of recovery remains pending for trial does not constitute a final appealable order. P. R. Halligan Post 163 v. Schultz, 212 Neb. 329, 322 N.W.2d 657 (1982). Decision of trial court temporarily suspending father's right of visitation and temporarily suspending his obligation to pay child support pending an appeal in a related guardianship case was not a final order, and was not appealable. Sain v. Sain, 211 Neb. 519, 319 N.W.2d 107 (1982). Dissolution of a restraining order is not a final order within the meaning of this section. Abramson v. Bemis, 201 Neb. 97, 266 N.W.2d 226 (1978). District court order remanding a cause to county court for new trial not an appealable, final order. Martin v. Zweygardt, 199 Neb. 770, 261 N.W.2d 379 (1978). Order sustaining objections to personal jurisdiction not final within meaning of this section. Ranch & Farm Lines, Inc. v. Dressman, 185 Neb. 328, 175 N.W.2d 299 (1970). An order sustaining a general demurrer to a petition, not followed by a judgment of dismissal or other final disposition of the case, is not a final order or judgment, and is not reviewable in the Supreme Court. Root v. School Dist. No. 25 of Custer County, 183 Neb. 22, 157 N.W.2d 877 (1968). Summary judgment on issue of liability alone was not a final order. Hart v. Ronspies, 181 Neb. 38, 146 N.W.2d 795 (1966). An order sustaining an objection to personal jurisdiction is not a final order. Busboom v. Gregory, 179 Neb. 254, 137 N.W.2d 825 (1965). An order sustaining special appearance is not a final order. Erdman v. National Indemnity Co., 178 Neb. 312, 133 N.W.2d 472 (1965). Order overruling a motion for summary judgment is not a final order. Pressey v. State, 173 Neb. 652, 114 N.W.2d 518 (1962); Rehn v. Bingaman, 157 Neb. 467, 59 N.W.2d 614 (1953). Order of city council holding action on claim in abeyance is interlocutory and not final. Belitz v. City of Omaha, 172 Neb. 36, 108 N.W.2d 421 (1961). Order denying motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order. Otteman v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 171 Neb. 148, 105 N.W.2d 583 (1960). Order to bring in an additional party is not final or appealable. Lund v. Holbrook, 157 Neb. 854, 62 N.W.2d 112 (1954). Sustaining motion to strike withdrawal from petition for probate of will was not a final order. Hill v. Humlicek, 156 Neb. 61, 54 N.W.2d 366 (1952). Overruling of motion to dismiss appeal from county court to district court is not a final order. Egan v. Bunner, 155 Neb. 611, 52 N.W.2d 820 (1952). An order sustaining a demurrer is not a final order. Shipley v. Shipley, 154 Neb. 872, 50 N.W.2d 103 (1951). Pendency of motion for new trial prevents judgment from being final. Harkness v. Central Nebraska P. P. & I. Dist., 154 Neb. 463, 48 N.W.2d 385 (1951). Order sustaining a demurrer, in absence of further proceedings, is not a final order reviewable on appeal. Koehn v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 151 Neb. 859, 39 N.W.2d 808 (1949). An order is not final when the substantial rights of the parties remained undetermined and when the cause is retained for further action. Barry v. Wolf, 148 Neb. 27, 26 N.W.2d 303 (1947). Order overruling a demurrer to a petition is not a final order reviewable on appeal. Anson v. Kruse, 147 Neb. 989, 25 N.W.2d 896 (1947). An appeal from Department of Roads and Irrigation to Supreme Court will be dismissed where record does not disclose rendition of final order or judgment from which such appeal is prosecuted. Cozad Ditch Co. v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 132 Neb. 547, 272 N.W. 560 (1937). Sustaining motion to strike certain parts of answer without further judicial action does not constitute a final, appealable order. State ex rel. Sorensen v. State Bank of Omaha, 131 Neb. 223, 267 N.W. 532 (1936). Order approving executor's account, requiring further report, and continuing proceedings was not a final order. In re Hansen's Estate, 117 Neb. 551, 221 N.W. 694 (1928). Ruling on interlocutory matter was not a final order. Gainsforth v. Peterson, 113 Neb. 1, 201 N.W. 645 (1924). County court's order appointing guardian ad litem was not a final order. In re Estate of Isaac, 108 Neb. 662, 189 N.W. 297 (1922). Temporary injunction against Secretary of State from submitting referendum was not a final order. Barkley v. Pool, 102 Neb. 799, 169 N.W. 730 (1918). Order to bring in additional defendant, another wrong-doer alleged to be indemnitor, in personal injury action, was not a final order. Kaplan v. City of Omaha, 100 Neb. 567, 160 N.W. 960 (1916). In partition suit, where partition ordered, order is not appealable until effected and confirmed. Peterson v. Damoude, 95 Neb. 469, 145 N.W. 847 (1914). Order dissolving temporary injunction, not disposing of case, was not final order. Young v. City of Albion, 77 Neb. 678, 110 N.W. 706 (1906). Sustaining demurrer to petition without dismissal was not final order. Larson v. Sloan, 77 Neb. 438, 109 N.W. 752 (1906). Refusal of peremptory writ of mandamus, in case not dismissed, was not a final order. State ex rel. Yeiser v. Higby, 60 Neb. 765, 84 N.W. 261 (1900). Order fixing amount of supersedeas bond, delaying writ of assistance, was not a final order. Green v. Morse, 57 Neb. 798, 78 N.W. 395 (1899). Overruling plea in abatement was not a final order. Bartels v. Sonnenschein, 54 Neb. 68, 74 N.W. 417 (1898). Order opening judgment and permitting answer was not a final order. Merle & Heaney Mfg. Co. v. Wallace, 48 Neb. 886, 67 N.W. 883 (1896). Judgment for costs is not reviewable before final adjudication disposing of case. Reynolds v. City of Tecumseh, 48 Neb. 785, 67 N.W. 792 (1896). Judgment for costs in favor of defendant on verdict in his favor was not a final order. Little v. Gamble, 47 Neb. 827, 66 N.W. 849 (1896). Dissolution of restraining order and denial of temporary injunction was not a final order. Manning v. Connell, 47 Neb. 83, 66 N.W. 17 (1896). Order dissolving or modifying temporary injunction incident to cause was not a final order. Bartram v. Sherman, 46 Neb. 713, 65 N.W. 789 (1896). Quashing summons without order of dismissal was not a final order. Lewis v. Barker, 46 Neb. 662, 65 N.W. 778 (1896). Order setting aside verdict at term and granting new trial, before judgment, was not a final order. Johnson v. Parrotte, 46 Neb. 51, 64 N.W. 363 (1895). Order determining that appeal to district court was taken in time was not a final order. Edgar v. Keller, 43 Neb. 263, 61 N.W. 587 (1895). Overruling plaintiff's application for special master to conduct foreclosure sale was not final order. American Inv. Co. v. Nye, 40 Neb. 720, 59 N.W. 355 (1894). Sustaining demurrer to counterclaim was not final order. Yager v. Lemp, 39 Neb. 93, 58 N.W. 285 (1894). Sustaining of motion to quash service of summons is not a final order. Persinger v. Tinkle, 34 Neb. 5, 51 N.W. 299 (1892). Overruling motion to discharge attachment was not a final order. Root v. State Bank of Nebraska, 30 Neb. 772, 47 N.W. 82 (1890). Refusing to dismiss on motion of defendant was not a final order. Grimes v. Chamberlain, 27 Neb. 605, 43 N.W. 395 (1889). Setting aside decree to permit defendant to answer cross-petition of which he had no notice was not a final order. Cockle Separator Mfg. Co. v. Clark, 23 Neb. 702, 37 N.W. 628 (1888). Sustaining motion to strike amended pleading was not final order. Welch v. Calhoun, 22 Neb. 166, 34 N.W. 348 (1887). Overruling motion for default judgment was not a final order. Shedenhelm v. Shedenhelm, 21 Neb. 387, 32 N.W. 170 (1887). Order for temporary alimony was not a final order. Aspinwall v. Aspinwall, 18 Neb. 463, 25 N.W. 623 (1885). Finding that petition was confessed where defendant was in default was not a final order. Daniels v. Tibbets, 16 Neb. 666, 21 N.W. 454 (1884). Allowance or refusal of attachment on claim not due was not final order. Seidentopf v. Annabil, 6 Neb. 524 (1877). Judgment that partition is impracticable, and directing sale, was not a final order. Mills v. Miller, 2 Neb. 299 (1873). Quashing service by publication or summons was not final order. Goldie v. Stewart, 5 Neb. Unof. 523, 99 N.W. 255 (1904). Dissolution of temporary injunction was not a final order. Stansbury v. Storer, 3 Neb. Unof. 100, 91 N.W. 197 (1902). Judgment for costs on special findings was not a final order. Welch v. Tippery, 1 Neb. Unof. 163, 95 N.W. 491 (1901). Where the issue of guardian ad litem fees has been raised and reserved for later determination, an order permanently modifying child custody but not resolving the issue of guardian ad litem fees is not a final, appealable order. McCaul v. McCaul, 17 Neb. App. 801, 771 N.W.2d 222 (2009). A court's decision to deny waiver of a 45-day jail term as a condition of probation was not a final, appealable order. State v. Volcek, 15 Neb. App. 416, 729 N.W.2d 90 (2007). An order overruling a pretrial motion to dismiss pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. section 6-1112(b)(1), (2), and (6) is not a final order. Qwest Bus. Resources v. Headliners—1299 Farnam, 15 Neb. App. 405, 727 N.W.2d 724 (2007). An appeal based solely on an alleged violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial can be effectively vindicated in an appeal after judgment. State v. Wilson, 15 Neb. App. 212, 724 N.W.2d 99 (2006). The denial of a motion for discharge, based upon a constitutional right to a speedy trial and in the absence of a nonfrivolous statutory claim, is interlocutory. State v. Wilson, 15 Neb. App. 212, 724 N.W.2d 99 (2006). In cases where section 29-1819.02 does not apply, an order overruling a motion to withdraw a plea does not affect a substantial right in a special proceeding and therefore does not constitute a final, appealable order. State v. Cisneros, 14 Neb. App. 112, 704 N.W.2d 550 (2005). 3. Special proceeding Juvenile court proceedings are "special proceedings" for purposes of this section. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016). A summary judgment motion does not invoke a special proceeding. It is a step in the overall action and cannot be a summary application made in an action after a judgment is rendered. Partial summary judgments are usually considered interlocutory. They are not appealable unless the order affects a substantial right and, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment. To be a final order under the first category of this section, the order must dispose of the whole merits of the case and leave nothing for the court's further consideration. Big John's Billiards v. State, 283 Neb. 496, 811 N.W.2d 205 (2012). A proceeding's characterization does not hinge upon the remedy granted, because it cannot be both a special proceeding and a step within an action. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010). Special proceedings include civil statutory remedies that are not encompassed in Chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes and sometimes statutory remedies within the civil procedure statutes. But regardless of a statutory remedy's location within Nebraska's statutes, actions and special proceedings are mutually exclusive. Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010). Proceedings regarding modification of a marital dissolution, which are controlled by section 42-364, are special proceedings as defined by this section. Steven S. v. Mary S., 277 Neb. 124, 760 N.W.2d 28 (2009). Under this section, custody determinations are considered special proceedings. Steven S. v. Mary S., 277 Neb. 124, 760 N.W.2d 28 (2009). A proceeding under section 30-2454 to remove a personal representative for cause is a special proceeding within the meaning of this section. In re Estate of Nemetz, 273 Neb. 918, 735 N.W.2d 363 (2007). None of the many steps or proceedings necessary or permitted to be taken in an action to commence it, to join issues in it, and conduct it to a final hearing and judgment can be a special proceeding within the terms of this section. State v. Vela, 272 Neb. 287, 721 N.W.2d 631 (2006). A proceeding initiated under sections 30-3814 and 30-3862 to remove a trustee is a special proceeding within the meaning of this section. In re Trust of Rosenberg, 269 Neb. 310, 693 N.W.2d 500 (2005). Approval of class certification neither affects a substantial right nor is a special proceeding. A special proceeding within the meaning of this section must be one that is not an action and is not and cannot be legally a step in an action as part of it. None of the many steps or proceedings necessary or permitted to be taken in an action to commence it, to join issues in it, and conduct it to a final hearing and judgment can be a special proceeding within the terms of this section. Keef v. State, 262 Neb. 622, 634 N.W.2d 751 (2001). An order denying an application for appointment of a receiver is not made in a special proceeding and therefore cannot be a final order. Nebraska Nutrients, Inc. v. Shepherd, 261 Neb. 723, 626 N.W.2d 472 (2001). Postconviction proceedings are special proceedings under this section. State v. Silvers, 255 Neb. 702, 587 N.W.2d 325 (1998). An order to vacate a dismissal constitutes a special proceeding within the meaning of this section. Jarrett v. Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 506 N.W.2d 682 (1993). An order vacating a dismissal after the limitations period has run constitutes an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and is therefore a final appealable order. Jarrett v. Eichler, 244 Neb. 310, 506 N.W.2d 682 (1993). A proceeding under section 30-2454 to remove a personal representative for cause is a special proceeding within the meaning of this section and therefore is a final order and is appealable even though it may not terminate the action or constitute a final disposition of the case. In re Estate of Seidler, 241 Neb. 402, 490 N.W.2d 453 (1992). Proceedings before the Department of Water Resources brought pursuant to section 46-209 also are special proceedings for the purposes of this section. In re Applications A-14137, A-14138A, A-14138B, and A-14139, 240 Neb. 117, 480 N.W.2d 709 (1992). Order entered under Juvenile Court Act was made in special proceeding. Ripley v. Godden, 158 Neb. 246, 63 N.W.2d 151 (1954). Condemnation is a special statutory proceeding under this section. Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 155 Neb. 48, 50 N.W.2d 533 (1951). Suit under workmen's compensation law is a special proceeding hereunder and order of trial court is final and appealable within meaning of this section. G. A. Steinheimer Co. v. Podkovich, 122 Neb. 710, 241 N.W. 287 (1932). Because a motion to modify a dissolution decree is brought pursuant to Chapter 42 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, it is not encompassed in Chapter 25 and is therefore a special proceeding as that term is used in this section. Templeton v. Templeton, 9 Neb. App. 937, 622 N.W.2d 424 (2001). 4. Substantial right An order finding a defendant to be indigent and appointing appellate counsel at the county's expense did not affect a substantial right of the parties and was not a final order for purposes of appeal, where the order did not obligate the county to pay any specific amount or set a deadline for payment, such determinations were to be the subject of future proceedings addressing the question of reasonable attorney fees, and the State had the ability to challenge the findings of indigency and recoup any subsequently expended funds from the defendant. State v. Fredrickson, 305 Neb. 165, 939 N.W.2d 385 (2020). An order reinstating a case does not affect a substantial right merely because reinstatement would affect a defense in a future hypothetical action. Fidler v. Life Care Centers of America, 301 Neb. 724, 919 N.W.2d 903 (2018). An order on a motion seeking to remove the record of a criminal citation from the public record under section 29-3523 affects a substantial right for purposes of this section. State v. Coble, 299 Neb. 434, 908 N.W.2d 646 (2018). The illegality of an arrest gives rise only to "collateral" rights and remedies in the underlying criminal action, which are effectively vindicated on appeal from the judgment. Dugan v. State, 297 Neb. 444, 900 N.W.2d 528 (2017). An order changing a permanency plan in a juvenile case adjudicated under section 43-247(3)(a) does not necessarily affect a substantial right of the parent for purposes of this section when the order continues prior orders directed at family preservation and reunification or remedying the reasons that led to the adjudication. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016). Subsequent review orders in a juvenile case adjudicated under section 43-247(3)(a) do not typically affect a substantial right for purposes of appeal under this section, because the parent has been given the full and fair opportunity to respond to the allegations at the adjudication stage. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016). Under this section, an order in a juvenile case adjudicated under section 43-247(3)(a), which order continues prior dispositional orders but changes the permanency objective from family reunification to another objective, is a final, appealable order only if the parent's ability to achieve rehabilitation and family reunification has been clearly eliminated, because such an order affects a substantial right. In re Interest of LeVanta S., 295 Neb. 151, 887 N.W.2d 502 (2016). Orders overruling a guarantor's and a coguarantor's objections to writs of execution and garnishment were orders made on summary application after judgment was rendered and affected the guarantor's and coguarantor's substantial rights and, thus, were final and appealable. Cattle Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Watson, 293 Neb. 943, 880 N.W.2d 906 (2016). Juvenile court orders which changed the permanency objective from reunification to adoption, with concurrent plans that did not include reunification with the mother, were appealable even though they contained many of the same goals and strategies as previous orders, because an oral statement by the juvenile court from the bench had the effect of ending any services aimed at reunification with the mother and, thus, affected the mother's substantial rights. In re Interest of Octavio B. et al., 290 Neb. 589, 861 N.W.2d 415 (2015). The order awarding a personal representative fee affected a substantial right where it was dispositive of the personal representative’s claim for reasonable compensation and awarded the entire amount of compensation to which the court found the personal representative was entitled. In re Estate of Gsantner, 288 Neb. 222, 846 N.W.2d 646 (2014). A juvenile court order that adopts a case plan with a material change in the conditions for reunification with a parent’s child is a crucial step in child protection proceedings that could possibly lead to the termination of parental rights, and thus, such orders affect a parent’s substantial right in a special proceeding and are appealable. In re Interest of Mya C. & Sunday C., 286 Neb. 1008, 840 N.W.2d 493 (2013). Substantial rights under this section include those legal rights that a party is entitled to enforce or defend. Therefore, an order that completely disposes of the subject matter of the litigation in an action or proceeding both is final and affects a substantial right because it conclusively determines a claim or defense. Big John's Billiards v. State, 283 Neb. 496, 811 N.W.2d 205 (2012). A substantial right under this section is not affected when that right can be effectively vindicated in an appeal from the final judgment. In re Adoption of Amea R., 282 Neb. 751, 807 N.W.2d 736 (2011). In determining whether a party can appeal from an order clarifying an injunction, the critical question is whether the order merely interprets the decree or modifies the decree in a way that affects a party's substantial right. A court's order clarifying a permanent injunction is a final order only if it changes the parties' legal relationship by expanding or relaxing the terms, dissolving the injunction, or granting additional injunctive relief. Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 279 Neb. 661, 782 N.W.2d 848 (2010). The resolution of a motion to amend a postconviction motion to assert additional claims does not affect a substantial right and is not a final order under this section. State v. Hudson, 273 Neb. 42, 727 N.W.2d 219 (2007). A substantial right can be affected by an order if the right is irrevocably lost by operation of the order, while a substantial right is not affected when that right can be effectively vindicated in an appeal from the final judgment. State v. Vela, 272 Neb. 287, 721 N.W.2d 631 (2006). When an order affects the subject matter of the litigation, by diminishing a claim or defense available to a defendant, this affects a substantial right. Also, if an order significantly impinges on a constitutional right, for example, parents' liberty interest in raising their children or a criminal defendant's right not to be subjected to double jeopardy, this affects a substantial right. Hernandez v. Blankenship, 257 Neb. 235, 596 N.W.2d 292 (1999). A substantial right is an essential legal right as distinguished from a mere technical one. Western Smelting & Refining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 150 Neb. 477, 35 N.W.2d 116 (1948). A substantial right under this section is an essential legal right. Furstenfeld v. Pepin, 23 Neb. App. 673, 875 N.W.2d 468 (2016). Substantial rights under this section include those legal rights that a party is entitled to enforce or defend. Moyers v. International Paper Co., 25 Neb. App. 282, 905 N.W.2d 87 (2017); Furstenfeld v. Pepin, 23 Neb. App. 673, 875 N.W.2d 468 (2016). An order denying a motion for in-chambers testimony in an adjudication proceeding is not a final order that is reviewable on appeal because a child does not have a substantial right to testify outside the presence of the parent. In re Interest of Marcella B. & Juan S., 18 Neb. App. 153, 775 N.W.2d 470 (2009). An order imposing a money judgment for attorney fees and expenses for discovery violations pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Disc. section 6-337(a)(4) does not affect a "substantial right" as required by this section. Frederick v. Seeba, 16 Neb. App. 373, 745 N.W.2d 342 (2008). 5. Miscellaneous When there has been an amendment to the final order statute to make a previously interlocutory order a final order, it is a procedural change and not a substantive change and is therefore binding upon a tribunal upon the effective date of the amendment; this allows a party to file an appeal if the amendment took place within 30 days of the interlocutory order. Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Transit Auth. of Omaha, 305 Neb. 609, 941 N.W.2d 497 (2020). Not every order vacating a dismissal and reinstating a case is final and appealable; rather, the statutory criteria of this section must be applied to determine whether the order appealed from is final. Fidler v. Life Care Centers of America, 301 Neb. 724, 919 N.W.2d 903 (2018). An order affecting a substantial right that is issued upon a summary application in an action after judgment is an order ruling on a postjudgment motion in an action. State v. Coble, 299 Neb. 434, 908 N.W.2d 646 (2018). A determination of the statute of limitations governing the prosecution of a criminal charge has no bearing on the correctness of a speedy trial determination. State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852, 901 N.W.2d 679 (2017). The language in Peterson v. Damoude, 95 Neb. 469, 145 N.W. 847 (1914), concerning the appealability of orders in a partition action, harmonizes the final order language of this section with the partition procedure mandated by section 25-2179. Guardian Tax Partners v. Skrupa Invest. Co., 295 Neb. 639, 889 N.W.2d 825 (2017). When an appeal presents two jurisdictional issues—whether a party has appealed from a final order or judgment and whether the lower court had jurisdiction over the parties' dispute—the first step in determining appellate jurisdiction is to determine whether the lower court's order was final and appealable. Shasta Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, 290 Neb. 640, 861 N.W.2d 425 (2015); Big John's Billiards v. State, 283 Neb. 496, 811 N.W.2d 205 (2012). An appellate court considers the finality of an order entered in probate proceedings under the rubric of this section. In re Estate of Gsantner, 288 Neb. 222, 846 N.W.2d 646 (2014). Under the collateral order doctrine, the denial of a claim of qualified immunity is appealable, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment, if the denial of immunity turns on a question of law. Carney v. Miller, 287 Neb. 400, 842 N.W.2d 782 (2014). For appeal purposes, the distinction between criminal and civil contempt sanctions has no relevance to whether a party may appeal from a final order in a supplemental postjudgment contempt proceeding. Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 279 Neb. 661, 782 N.W.2d 848 (2010). With the enactment of section 25-1315(1), one may bring an appeal pursuant to such section only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a "final order" within the meaning of this section as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Therefore, to be appealable, an order must satisfy the final order requirements of this section and, additionally, where implicated, section 25-1315(1). Connelly v. City of Omaha, 278 Neb. 311, 769 N.W.2d 394 (2009). With the enactment of subsection (1) of section 25-1315, one may bring an appeal pursuant to such section only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a final order within the meaning of this section as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Bailey v. Lund-Ross Constructors Co., 265 Neb. 539, 657 N.W.2d 916 (2003). Under the collateral order doctrine, the denial of a claim for qualified immunity is appealable, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment, if the denial of immunity turns on a question of law. D.M. v. State, 25 Neb. App. 596, 911 N.W.2d 621 (2018). An order on "summary application in an action after judgment" under this section is an order ruling on a postjudgment motion in an action. Heathman v. Kenney, 263 Neb. 966, 644 N.W.2d 558 (2002); Furstenfeld v. Pepin, 23 Neb. App. 673, 875 N.W.2d 468 (2016). Unless the context is shown to intend otherwise, action includes any proceeding in a court and only final orders therein are bases for appeals. Grantham v. General Telephone Co., 187 Neb. 647, 193 N.W.2d 449 (1972). An order denying a motion for in-chambers testimony in an adjudication proceeding is reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. In re Interest of Marcella B. & Juan S., 18 Neb. App. 153, 775 N.W.2d 470 (2009). To be appealable in a case with multiple parties or causes of action, an order must satisfy the final order requirements of this section, as well as the requirements of section 25-1315(1). Halac v. Girton, 17 Neb. App. 505, 766 N.W.2d 418 (2009). Where multiple causes of action or multiple parties are involved, the trial court must both enter a final order pursuant to this section and make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and expressly direct the entry of judgment to make appealable an order adjudicating fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all parties. Pioneer Chem. Co. v. City of North Platte, 12 Neb. App. 720, 685 N.W.2d 505 (2004). Orders which fall into the second category of this section must meet two requirements: A substantial right must be affected, and the court's order must be made in a special proceeding. Michael B. v. Donna M., 11 Neb. App. 346, 652 N.W.2d 618 (2002). An appeal from a special assessment by a metropolitan-class city taken as specified in section 14-813 means that proceedings from a district court shall be the same as an appeal from a county board, and under this section, that means appeal is taken by petition in error and the review is solely of the record made before the tribunal whose action is being reviewed. Jackson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 10 Neb. App. 330, 630 N.W.2d 680 (2001). An appellate court has jurisdiction over the appeal of an order by the workers' compensation court affecting a substantial right after a special proceeding, even where part of the order complained of involves a remand for clarification. Underwood v. Eilers Machine & Welding, Inc., 6 Neb. App. 631, 575 N.W.2d 878 (1998).