GA Code § 23-3-60 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 23 - Equity|Chapter 3 - Equitable Remedies and Proceedings Generally|Article 3 - Quia Timet|Part 2 - Quia Timet Against All the World|§ 23-3-60. Purpose of Part

 The purpose of this part is to create a procedure for removing any cloud upon the title to land, including the equity of redemption by owners of land sold at tax sales, and for readily and conclusively establishing that certain named persons are the owners of all the interests in land defined by a decree entered in such proceeding, so that there shall be no occasion for land in this state to be unmarketable because of any uncertainty as to the owner of every interest therein.   (Ga. L. 1966, p. 443, § 11.)   Law reviews.   - For annual survey of law on real property, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 283 (2010). For annual survey on real property, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 233 (2013). For annual survey on local government law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 199 (2016). For annual survey on real property, see 71 Mercer L. Rev. 241 (2019).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Prerequisites not met.    - Plaintiff could not succeed on a claim pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 because the plaintiff had not alleged many of the statutory prerequisites to this claim, such as including a particular description of the land involved in the proceeding, including a plat survey of the land, including a copy of the instrument upon which the plaintiff's interest was based, and providing the name and address of possible adverse claimants. Bowman v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2013).   Sovereign immunity not applicable to in rem quiet title action.    - Sovereign immunity was not applicable to an in rem quiet title action against all the world under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 as such an action was against the underlying property itself. TDGA, LLC v. CBIRA, LLC, 298 Ga. 510, 783 S.E.2d 107 (2016).   Attorney fees and expenses.    - Plaintiff who brought an action to quiet title and for partitioning of property was not entitled to an award of attorney fees and expenses since the statutes providing for such actions do not provide for attorney fees and expenses and such an award was not authorized if the case was considered one at law. Walker v. Walker, 266 Ga. 414, 467 S.E.2d 583 (1996).    Trial court erred by denying the defendant's motions for a directed verdict or JNOV on the issue of attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 because the jury found no bad faith in the underlying quiet title action between the parties and the mere fact that the defendant's action had caused an issue which later required litigation to correct did not in and of itself provide a basis for an award; plus, any conduct during litigation could not support an award under § 13-6-11. Bowen v. Laird, 348 Ga. App. 1, 821 S.E.2d 105 (2018).   Unbroken chain of title not established.    - In order to show an unbroken chain of title, it was necessary for the plaintiff to show that persons who deeded the land were the heirs-at-law of the prior owner who had died intestate; because the plaintiff failed to establish this fact, the court was not required to find in the plaintiff's favor, and involuntary dismissal of the action was not in error. Smith v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 269 Ga. 475, 498 S.E.2d 266 (1998).   Landowner's right to property established.    - Findings entered by a Special Master, which determined that the disputed portion of an alley belonged to a landowner, and not the neighbors, by operation of the landowner's prior recorded deed, was not clearly erroneous, as: (1) the landowner received the property via a valid deed; (2) the neighbors failed to put the landowner on notice of their claim; and (3) the neighbors' claim of possession and use was insufficient. Cernonok v. Kane, 280 Ga. 272, 627 S.E.2d 14 (2006).    In a dispute over an easement in an action to quiet title filed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., the trial court granted summary judgment to plaintiff landowners, finding that they had title to the easement as delineated in the parties' plats, and permanently enjoined defendant adjacent landowners from interfering with use of that easement. Thus, a special master properly concluded that there was not clear and unequivocal evidence of an intention to abandon the easement, which had been acquired by grant, and that the mere nonuse of the easement for a period of time was insufficient to establish its abandonment. Whipple v. Hatcher, 283 Ga. 309, 658 S.E.2d 585 (2008).   Landowner's right to property not established.    - Judgment of the trial court that a landowner did not have title to property by virtue of a deed was not error because by its express description, the deed upon which the landowner relied did not convey an interest in the subject property; the deed set forth a metes and bounds description that corresponded to the landowner's house and surrounding lot only, and the description did not include the subject property. Bailey v. Moten, 289 Ga. 897, 717 S.E.2d 205 (2011).   Neighbor's right to property established.    - Because the neighbors' actual adverse possession was inconsistent with and prevailed over the owners' mere constructive possession under O.C.G.A. § 44-5-166(a), the trial court did not err in entering the court's judgment and decree in favor of the neighbors under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60. Sacks v. Martin, 284 Ga. 712, 670 S.E.2d 417 (2008).    It was not error for the trial court to adopt the special master's conclusion that title to certain property was vested in a landowner's neighbor because the neighbor's quitclaim deed was the only deed placed before the special master that described an interest in the subject property. Bailey v. Moten, 289 Ga. 897, 717 S.E.2d 205 (2011).   Tender required.   - In cases involving mortgages, Georgia law required that a party first tender the amount due under the note and security deed before seeking the equitable remedy of quiet title; the complaint did not allege that the plaintiff attempted to tender the amount due and defendants refused it, or that the defendants were likely to refuse such an offer. Moreover, the allegations in the complaint did not plausibly support the notion that the plaintiff owned the subject property free and clear, so the plaintiff's quiet title action failed. Warthen v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2012).   Used to remove any cloud of title.    - Special master erred in concluding that the property purchaser's action to quiet title was a conventional quia timet employed to quiet title, as that action was used to quiet title as to a deed or other writing which casts a cloud over a title, whereas the property purchaser's action was a quia timet action against all the world; however, no error occurred in denying the property claimant's motion for a jury trial even though an action against the entire world allowed for one, as the evidence did not present a question of fact that required a jury. Gurley v. E. Atlanta Land Co., 276 Ga. 749, 583 S.E.2d 866 (2003).   Implied easement not shown.    - In submitting a quiet title case to a special master, a trial court did not cede jurisdiction to render a final decision, and was not obligated to accept a special master's erroneous legal conclusion; a trial court properly rejected a special master's finding that an implied easement was established because access to an owner's home across a neighbors' property was unnecessary, but merely convenient, and because the owner's deed made no mention of a plat allegedly relied on by the owner or a right of way bordering the property, and the plat itself was not recorded. Eardley v. McGreevy, 279 Ga. 562, 615 S.E.2d 744 (2005).   Adverse possession.    - In a quiet title action under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., appellee alleged property owner established adverse possession of a disputed tract because both appellee and a prior lessee used the tract in connection with their business on contiguous property leased from an estate from 1971-1999; appellee acquired title to a lot containing the tract from the estate in 1999. Steinichen v. Stancil, 284 Ga. 580, 669 S.E.2d 109 (2008).   Dismissal of quiet title claim improper.    - Trial court erred in dismissing the property owner's quiet title claim because, although the bank tried to reform the deed and void the foreclosure that listed 2253 Dawnville as the property foreclosed upon, and the bank's counsel filed an affidavit of title that the bank intended the deed to encumber 2215 Dawnville, the allegations of the property owner's counterclaim disclosed that the property owner would be entitled to relief if it was determined that the property owner did in fact hold unencumbered legal title to 2215 Dawnville, and that the bank through the filing of the affidavits of title and the foreclosure and resulting deed under power, cast a cloud upon that title. Cronan v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 336 Ga. App. 201, 784 S.E.2d 57 (2016).   Special master report properly adopted.    - In a quiet title action, the trial court did not err by adopting a special master report because the report was not tainted by a conflict of interest since the special master was appointed by a stipulated conflict waiver agreed upon by the parties and there was sufficient evidence to support that only two tracts of land were conveyed to the purchaser, not four. DeCay v. Houston, 295 Ga. 223, 758 S.E.2d 286 (2014).   Jury trial available.    - While a special master erred in concluding the property purchaser's action to quiet title was a conventional quia timet action, and, thus, no jury trial was available to the property claimant, the claimant was not harmed by the error; although a jury trial was available regarding the property purchaser's action in quia timet as against all the world, the property claimant did not show that the evidence presented a question of fact, and, thus, the intervention of a jury was not required. Gurley v. E. Atlanta Land Co., 276 Ga. 749, 583 S.E.2d 866 (2003).    When one seeks conventional quia timet, one is not entitled to trial by jury under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-43; when one seeks quia timet against all the world, however, one is entitled by the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 23-3-66 to a jury trial, but there is no right to a jury trial when a suit at law is converted by amendment into an equitable proceeding. Vatacs Group, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 292 Ga. 483, 738 S.E.2d 83 (2013).   Planned street parcel conveyed in deed to property owners.    - In a quiet title action brought by property owners, a trial court properly found that since the grantor who conveyed to the owners' predecessors-in-title land abutting a planned street parcel that the grantor also owned, but the street was never dedicated, the deed conveyed to the owners the interest that the grantor held in the road since there was no clear expression of a contrary intent. 1845 La Dawn Lane, LLC v. Bowman, 277 Ga. 741, 594 S.E.2d 373 (2004).    In an action to invalidate an allegedly forged quitclaim deed filed by a husband, which transferred an interest in certain property to the husband's wife, summary judgment was erroneously granted to the husband, as a bankruptcy trustee presented sufficient evidence of disputed issues of material fact concerning the husband's equitable claim; hence, the matter was remanded for further proceedings under the Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq. Hurst v. Evans, 284 Ga. App. 274, 643 S.E.2d 824 (2007).   Title did not ripen under tax deed.    - In a quiet title action under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60, although a corporation with a 1984 tax deed to the property in dispute claimed that ripening of title had occurred under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48 as the corporation held the tax deed for the required seven-year period under a former version of the statute, a 1989 amendment that applied expressly to tax deeds executed prior to July 1, 1989, required adverse possession by the tax deed grantee in order for title to ripen. BX Corp. v. Hickory Hill 1185, LLC, 285 Ga. 5, 673 S.E.2d 205 (2009).   Consent judgment inappropriate over waterfront property.    - As both parties did not actually consent to all of the terms of a consent judgment which purported to resolve the parties' ongoing dispute over title to waterfront property in an action under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60, a trial court erred in issuing the consent judgment; the trial court's consent judgment impermissibly modified a condition precedent to the parties' agreement. Allen v. Sea Gardens Seafood, Inc., 290 Ga. 715, 723 S.E.2d 669 (2012).   Action must be brought in county where land lies.    - Trial court erred by dismissing a credit union's quiet title action because the two causes of action at issue were neither identical nor did they resolve the same issues as the quiet title action sought to establish the credit union as the legal title holder of the Lee County, Georgia, properties, while the Dougherty County lawsuit sought to hold the credit union monetarily responsible for the allegedly unlawful acquiring of the titles to those and other properties. DOCO Credit Union v. Chambers, 330 Ga. App. 633, 768 S.E.2d 808 (2015).   Res judicata.    - Trial court did not err in ruling that a church's prior quia timet action under the Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., barred an heir's action against the church seeking title to the property because the prior action settled the church's ownership interest in the property. Cartwright v. First Baptist Church of Keysville, Inc., 316 Ga. App. 299, 728 S.E.2d 893 (2012).   Dismissal of homeowner's claim based on assignment of security deed.    - Homeowner's action to quiet title against an assignee of the security deed to the homeowner's property failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the homeowner's security deed had been granted to the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) and then to the assignee and was never held by the lender that had since become defunct. Bank of America, N.A. v. Johnson, 299 Ga. 861, 792 S.E.2d 704 (2016).    Cited in Capers v. Camp, 244 Ga. 7, 257 S.E.2d 517 (1979); In re Rivermist Homeowners Ass'n, 244 Ga. 515, 260 S.E.2d 897 (1979); Henson v. Tucker, 278 Ga. App. 859, 630 S.E.2d 64 (2006); Thompson v. Cent. of Ga. R.R., 282 Ga. 264, 646 S.E.2d 669 (2007); Donald Azar, Inc. v. Muche, 326 Ga. App. 726, 755 S.E.2d 266 (2014).   RESEARCH REFERENCES   ALR.    - Tax deed and recitals therein as evidence of regularity of tax proceedings as to advertising and notice of sale, and as to time, manner, and place of sale, 30 A.L.R. 8; 88 A.L.R. 264.