GA Code § 15-11-422 (2021)
2021 Georgia Code|Title 15 - Courts|Chapter 11 - Juvenile Code|Article 5 - Child in Need of Services|Part 5 - Petition and Summons|§ 15-11-422. Content of Petitions

  A petition seeking an adjudication that a child is a child in need of services shall be verified and may be on information and belief. It shall set forth plainly and with particularity:   The facts which bring a child within the jurisdiction of the court, with a statement that it is in the best interests of the child and the public that the proceeding be brought;   The name, date of birth, and residence address of the child alleged to be a child in need of services;   The name and residence address of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child named in the petition; or, if such child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian does not reside or cannot be found within the state or if such place of residence address is unknown, the name of any known adult relative of such child residing within the county or, if there is none, the known adult relative of such child residing nearest to the location of the court;   The name and age of any other family member of such child living within such child's home;   Whether all available and appropriate attempts to encourage voluntary use of community services by such child's family have been exhausted; and   Whether any of the information required by this subsection is unknown.     If a petition seeking an adjudication that a child is a child in need of services is based on a complaint filed by a school official, such petition shall be dismissed unless it includes information which shows that:   The legally liable school district has sought to resolve the expressed problem through available educational approaches; and   The school district has sought to engage such child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian in solving the problem but any such individual has been unwilling or unable to do so; that the problem remains; and that court intervention is needed.     If a petition seeking an adjudication that a child is a child in need of services is based on a complaint filed by a school official involving a child who is eligible or suspected to be eligible for services under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act or Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, such petition shall be dismissed unless it includes information which demonstrates that the legally liable school district:   Has determined that such child is eligible or suspected to be eligible under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act or Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and   Has reviewed for appropriateness such child's current Individualized Education Program (IEP) and placement and has made modifications where appropriate.       (Code 1981, §15-11-422, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)   Law reviews.   - For article discussing due process in juvenile court procedures in California and Georgia, in light of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 9 (1971). For article, "Child Custody - Jurisdiction and Procedure," see 35 Emory L. J. 291 (1986). For comment on grandparents' visitation rights in Georgia, see 29 Emory L. J. 1083 (1980).   JUDICIAL DECISIONS   Editor's notes.   - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-25 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-38.1, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.   Juvenile petition must satisfy "due process."    - Although a juvenile petition does not have to be drafted with the exactitude of a criminal accusation, the petition must satisfy "due process." T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).    Since the state's petition failed to set forth in ordinary and concise language the facts demonstrating the nature of the parent's alleged failure to provide proper parental care or control, the parent lacked sufficient information to enable the parent to prepare a defense, and this amounted to a denial of due process. In re D.R.C., 191 Ga. App. 278, 381 S.E.2d 426 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-25).    To meet constitutional requirement of due process the language of a juvenile petition must pass two tests: (1) the petition must contain sufficient factual details to inform the juvenile of the nature of the offense; and (2) the petition must provide data adequate to enable the accused to prepare a defense. T.L.T. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 895, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).   Allege with particularity.    - Due process requires that the petition alleging delinquency must set forth with specificity the alleged violation of law either in the language of the particular section, or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the child and the child's parents or guardian. D.P. v. State, 129 Ga. App. 680, 200 S.E.2d 499 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).    Petition filed alleging delinquency, deprivation, or unruliness must set forth alleged misconduct with particularity. A.C.G. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 156, 205 S.E.2d 435 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).   Insufficient notice to juvenile of alleged offense.    - If a juvenile is brought to trial on a petition alleging delinquency based on a violation of former Code 1933, § 26-1601 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1) but was adjudicated delinquent for violating former Code 1933, § 26-1806 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7), there was insufficient notice to the juvenile of the offense alleged to be the basis of the juvenile's delinquency and the trial court must be reversed. D.P. v. State, 129 Ga. App. 680, 200 S.E.2d 499 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).   Statement of custody irrelevant if jurisdiction otherwise exists.    - If jurisdiction otherwise existed, such as if the action was brought in the county of the residence of both mother and son, then the requirement in paragraph (4) of former Code 1933, § 24A-1603 had no relevancy to the right of the trial court to handle the case. Sanchez v. Walker County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 138 Ga. App. 49, 225 S.E.2d 441, rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).   Assumption of jurisdiction linked to authorized petition.    - An order for detention clearly did not meet the requirements of a petition filed pursuant to former Code 1933, § 24A-1603 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-152,15-11-280,15-11-390,15-11-420,15-11-422, and15-11-522) to commence proceedings under former Code 1933, § 24A-1601 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-420), and the assumption of jurisdiction by the juvenile court is linked to the authorized petition. Hartley v. Clack, 239 Ga. 113, 236 S.E.2d 63 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1603).    In a hearing on parental custody in a divorce action, the trial court erred in awarding custody of the parties' minor children to the Department of Family and Children Services based upon findings that the children were deprived and the parents unfit because the mother had no notice that the superior court judge might award custody of the children to a third party based upon standards of deprivation. Watkins v. Watkins, 266 Ga. 269, 466 S.E.2d 860 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-25).   Preparation and verification.    - Because counsel for the Department of Children & Family Services stated to the court that counsel prepared the termination petition, that the petition was reviewed, verified, and then signed by counsel the next day, this was sufficient to comply with the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-25 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-152,15-11-280,15-11-390,15-11-422, and15-11-522). In re A.K.M., 235 Ga. App. 853, 510 S.E.2d 611 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-25).   Service by correctional officer upon incarcerated father.    - Personal service of a summons and a petition of deprivation by a correctional officer upon an incarcerated father was sufficient as the service procedures in the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et seq., were not adopted nor were binding on the juvenile court, and the correctional officer was acting under the direction of the court for the purposes of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39.1(c) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-161,15-11-282,15-11-400,15-11-424, and15-11-531). In the Interest of A.J.M., 277 Ga. App. 646, 627 S.E.2d 399 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-38.1)   RESEARCH REFERENCES   Am. Jur. 2d.   - 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 75 et seq.   C.J.S.   - 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 191 et seq.   U.L.A.   - Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 21.