CO Code § 16-3-102 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 16 - Criminal Proceedings|Article 3 - Arrest - Searches and Seizures|Part 1 - Authority of Peace Officer to Make an Arrest|§ 16-3-102. Arrest by Peace Officer

  A peace officer may arrest a person when:   He has a warrant commanding that such person be arrested; or    Any crime has been or is being committed by such person in his presence; or    He has probable cause to believe that an offense was committed and has probable cause to believe that the offense was committed by the person to be arrested.        History. Source: L. 72: R&RE, p. 198, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-3-102 . L. 77: (1)(c) amended, p. 850, § 1, effective May 20.    ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. ARREST PURSUANT TO WARRANT.    III. WARRANTLESS ARREST.   A. In General.    B. Commission of Crime.    C. Probable Cause.        I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Law reviews. For article, “Criminal Law”, see 32 Dicta 409 (1955). For article, “Highlights of the 1955 Legislative Session -- Criminal Law and Procedure”, see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 69 (1955). For article, “One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure”, see 39 Dicta 81 (1962). For comment, “Payton v. New York: The Supreme Court Reverses the Common Law Warrantless Arrest Requirements”, see 58 Den. L.J. 197 (1980). For article, “The Demise of the Aquilar-Spinelli Rule: A Case of Faulty Reception”, see 61 Den. L.J. 431 (1984). For comment, “People v. Thomas: Furtive Gestures as an Element of Reasonable Suspicion -- The Ongoing Struggle to Determine a Standard”, see 61 Den. L.J. 579 (1984). For article, “Criminal Procedure”, which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with stops and arrests, see 62 Den. U.L. Rev. 165 (1985). For article, “Using Local Police Powers to Protect the Environment”, see 24 Colo. Law. 1063 (1995).   Annotator's note. Since § 16-3-102 is similar to repealed § 39-2-20 , C.R.S. 1963, and CSA, C. 48, § 432, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.   Unlawful arrest is not official act. If an arrest is not a lawful one, if it is made under a void warrant or without a warrant in a case where a warrant is required, or if it is not made in such circumstances as justify the arrest without a warrant, the officer is not acting in his official capacity, either by virtue of, or under color of, office; and they are merely his private or personal acts for which his sureties are not liable. Johnson v. Enlow, 132 Colo. 101 , 286 P.2d 630 (1955).   And question is for jury. Where there is a dispute in the evidence as to whether there was in fact an unlawful arrest, the question is for the jury. McDaniel v. People, 179 Colo. 153 , 499 P.2d 613, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060, 93 S. Ct. 558, 34 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1972).   The probable cause requirement is applicable whether the arrest is made with or without a warrant. People v. Hoinville, 191 Colo. 357 , 553 P.2d 777 (1976).   An arrest with or without a warrant must stand on firmer ground than mere suspicion. People v. Weinert, 174 Colo. 71 , 482 P.2d 103 (1971).   Applied in People v. Apodaca, 38 Colo. App. 395, 561 P.2d 351 (1976), aff'd, 194 Colo. 1324 , 571 P.2d 1109 (1977); People v. Conner, 195 Colo. 525 , 579 P.2d 1160 (1978); People v. Lott, 197 Colo. 78 , 589 P.2d 945 (1979); People v. Rothe, 43 Colo. App. 274, 606 P.2d 79 (1979); People v. Smith, 620 P.2d 232 (Colo. 1980); People v. Eichelberger, 620 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1980); People v. Wolf, 635 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1981); People v. Bustam, 641 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1982); People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1982); People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1983); People v. Florez, 680 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1984).   II. ARREST PURSUANT TO WARRANT.   Even though an arrest warrant is invalid, the arrest may be upheld if the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed by the defendant apart from the complaint and the officer was confronted with exigent circumstances. People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488 , 491 P.2d 575 (1971).   III. WARRANTLESS ARREST.   A. In General.   Law reviews. For note, “The Evolution of the Police Officer's Right to Arrest Without a Warrant in Colorado”, see 43 Den. L.J. 366 (1966).   Annotator's note. For further annotations concerning warrantless arrests, see § 7 of art. II, Colo. Const.   Authority to arrest outside territorial jurisdictions. All Colorado police officers have the power to make arrests, even when outside of their territorial jurisdictions, when a crime has been committed in their presence. People v. Bloom, 195 Colo. 246 , 577 P.2d 288 (1978).   A peace officer has authority to make arrests without a warrant of persons committing or attempting to commit offenses in his presence, whether the offense be a felony or a misdemeanor, of persons who have committed felonies out of his presence, of persons he has reasonable cause to believe guilty of a felony that has been committed, and of persons charged, upon reasonable cause, with having committed a felony. Johnson v. Enlow, 132 Colo. 101 , 286 P.2d 630 (1955).   An officer may make an arrest for violation of a misdemeanor without a warrant if the officer has probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe that an offense has been committed and probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe that a certain individual committed that offense. Beyer v. Young, 32 Colo. App. 273, 513 P.2d 1086 (1973).   Only probable cause and exigent circumstances will excuse statutory warrant requirements. People v. Henry, 195 Colo. 309 , 578 P.2d 1041, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 961, 99 S. Ct. 445, 58 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1978).   Absent exigent circumstances, it is necessary to obtain arrest warrant in order to justify entry into private home to make an arrest. People v. Williams, 200 Colo. 187 , 613 P.2d 879 (1980).   Even where probable cause exists. Although police officers have probable cause to believe a suspect committed a crime, nevertheless they may not enter a private residence to effect an arrest in the absence of exigent circumstances. McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1981).   Exigent circumstances encompasses compelling need for immediate police action. The doctrine of exigent circumstances encompasses those situations where, due to an emergency, the compelling need for immediate police action militates against the strict adherence to the warrant requirement. McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1981).   People's burden to rebut presumption of unconstitutional arrest without warrant. An arrest without a warrant is presumed to have been unconstitutional, and the state has the burden of rebutting that presumption by showing both that the arrest was supported by probable cause and that it fell within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. People v. Burns, 200 Colo. 387 , 615 P.2d 686 (1980).   The lawfulness of an arrest without a warrant by state officers for a state offense must be determined by state law. People v. Navran, 174 Colo. 222 , 483 P.2d 228 (1971).   Remedy for violation of arrest warrant requirement is the exclusion of evidence seized which is tainted as “fruit of the poisonous tree”. People v. Henry, 195 Colo. 309 , 578 P.2d 1041, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 961, 99 S. Ct. 445, 58 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1978).   Officer not liable for false arrest and false imprisonment. Where police officer had both probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed and that the plaintiff was the person who had committed it, he was not civilly liable for false arrest and false imprisonment. Beyer v. Young, 32 Colo. App. 273, 513 P.2d 1086 (1973).   Failure of deputy to obtain arrest warrant was justified. People v. Fratus, 187 Colo. 52 , 528 P.2d 392 (1974).   Voluntary consent by occupant may constitute valid waiver of warrant requirement. A voluntary consent by an occupant of premises authorizing entry by the police for the purpose of effecting an arrest inside the home may constitute, under appropriate circumstances, a valid waiver of the warrant requirement. McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1981).   Entry into home by preconceived deception lacks consent. Where entry into the home is gained by a preconceived deception as to purpose, consent in the constitutional sense is lacking. McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1981).   Appearance in open doorway may excuse warrant. Where defendant was arrested while standing in the open doorway of his apartment, the warrant requirement was excused. People v. Burns, 200 Colo. 387 , 615 P.2d 686 (1980).   When detention by police permissible. The police may detain and require identification of a person if they have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the person is involved in criminal conduct. People v. Archuleta, 616 P.2d 977 (Colo. 1980).   Applied in Stubert v. County Court, 163 Colo. 535 , 433 P.2d 97 (1967).   B. Commission of Crime.   This section permits a police officer to arrest a person who has committed a crime in the officer's presence. Section 16-2-201 does not limit that authority. An officer may arrest when a crime occurs in his or her presence. When that crime is a class two petty offense, the arresting officer may, pursuant to § 16-2-201 , either take the arrested suspect before a judge or release the suspect after issuing a penalty assessment. Police compliance with both statutes is achieved because, even though they conduct a full custodial arrest and search, police “may” still release the offender without taking him before a judge. A custodial arrest and a discretionary release are not mutually exclusive under § 16-2-201. People v. Triantos, 55 P.3d 131 (Colo. 2002).   Arrest not limited to where crime has in fact been committed. The theory that under this section a lawful arrest without a warrant cannot be made unless a crime has in fact been committed and that the person arrested committed it is without merit. Van Camp v. Gray, 440 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1971).   However, a court must determine whether the facts available to a reasonably cautious officer at the moment of arrest would warrant his belief that an offense has been or is being committed. People v. Navran, 174 Colo. 222 , 483 P.2d 228 (1971).   Warrant is unnecessary where breach of peace witnessed. Schindelar v. Michaud, 411 F.2d 80 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 956, 90 S. Ct. 426, 24 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1969).   C. Probable Cause.   This section permits warrantless arrests by an officer when a criminal offense had in fact been committed and the officer had reasonable grounds for believing the person to be arrested had committed the offense. People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 (1971); People v. Pickett, 194 Colo. 178 , 571 P.2d 1078 (1977); People v. Saars, 196 Colo. 294 , 584 P.2d 622 (1978).   And such is “constitutional”. This section, which authorizes an officer to make an arrest without a warrant when a criminal offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it, is consonant with the case law of the United States supreme court and the supreme court of Colorado. People v. Nelson, 172 Colo. 456 , 474 P.2d 158 (1970).   The terms “probable cause” and “reasonable grounds” are substantially equivalent in meaning. Gonzales v. People, 156 Colo. 252 , 398 P.2d 236, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 945, 85 S. Ct. 1788, 14 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1965); People v. Bueno, 173 Colo. 69 , 475 P.2d 702 (1970); People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 (1971); Glass v. People, 177 Colo. 267 , 493 P.2d 1347 (1972).   And so this section authorizing an arrest without a warrant is satisfied if the arresting officer has probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested committed it. Van Camp v. Gray, 440 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1971).   For a warrantless arrest, officers must have probable cause to believe not only that an offense had been committed, but that the person to be arrested had committed it. People v. Boileau, 36 Colo. App. 157, 538 P.2d 484 (1975); People v. Hoinville, 191 Colo. 357 , 553 P.2d 777 (1976).   Probable cause is the touchstone for measuring the right to arrest without a warrant. People v. Fratus, 187 Colo. 52 , 528 P.2d 392 (1974).   And valid arrest by a peace officer must be supported by probable cause. People v. Severson, 39 Colo. App. 95, 561 P.2d 373 (1977).   Violation of municipal ordinance included. Since the violation of a municipal ordinance is a criminal offense, then as a matter of law, where the police have reasonable ground for believing that defendants have committed such offense, an attempted arrest is altogether lawful and the police would be derelict in the performance of their duty if they refuse to act. Boyer v. Elkins, 154 Colo. 294 , 390 P.2d 460, appeal dismissed, 379 U.S. 47, 85 S. Ct. 208, 13 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1964).   Flight does not solely justify warrantless arrest. Where the arresting officer knew that a burglary had been committed, his dispatcher had told him of the burglars' purported return, and when he arrived back at the scene he observed the hasty departure of a man who had been talking with the son-in-law, flight may legitimately give rise to suspicion, and evidence of flight may be admissible at trial to show consciousness of guilt, but defendant's running was not in and of itself sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. People v. Bates, 190 Colo. 291 , 546 P.2d 491 (1976).   Exigent circumstances. A police officer may make a warrantless arrest where he has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime and where the officer is confronted by exigent circumstances. People v. Boileau, 36 Colo. App. 157, 538 P.2d 484 (1975).   Exigent circumstances obviously exist when suspects are speeding from the scene of the crime. To require a warrant would impose an impracticable burden. People v. Cox, 190 Colo. 326 , 546 P.2d 956 (1976).   Exigent circumstances sufficient to justify warrantless arrest. People v. Litsey, 192 Colo. 19 , 555 P.2d 974 (1976).   Exigent circumstances sufficient to justify warrantless entry into home to make arrest. People v. Williams, 200 Colo. 187 , 613 P.2d 879 (1980).   Public security may outweigh warrant preference. When immediate police action is essential to protect the public safety, the warrant preference expressed by this section must, and does, give way to the public security. People v. Henry, 195 Colo. 309 , 578 P.2d 1041, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 961, 99 S. Ct. 445, 58 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1978).   Failure to obtain arrest warrant justified whenever circumstances require immediate action to protect the public safety; this includes the situation where the police are faced with the choice of arresting a suspect without a warrant or allowing him to escape. People v. Cardenas, 42 Colo. App. 61, 592 P.2d 1348 (1979).   Fact that officers may have probable cause to arrest someone else is of no consequence, for, where a defendant is arrested without a warrant, the burden of proving the existence of probable cause in defendant's case is on the prosecution. Mora v. People, 178 Colo. 279 , 496 P.2d 1045 (1972).   And physical presence with others, in and of itself, does not provide probable cause to arrest, for guilt by association has never been an acceptable rationale. Mora v. People, 178 Colo. 279 , 496 P.2d 1045 (1972).   The mere association with one who commits or has committed crimes, standing alone, does not amount to probable cause for arrest. People v. Crespin, 635 P.2d 918 (Colo. App. 1981).   Nor where one merely changes his direction upon seeing police. Where officers already had one suspect in their car and were questioning him when defendant approached, and at a distance of approximately one block from unmarked police car hesitated, then turned and walked the other way, disappearing around a corner, such circumstances did not show probable cause to arrest, especially where there was nothing in the testimony of the officer to indicate that he considered defendant a suspect in the crime in question or a suspect in any other known criminal act. People v. Bueno, 173 Colo. 69 , 475 P.2d 702 (1970).   Probable cause deals with the probability that a crime has been or is being committed. People v. Martinez, 173 Colo. 17 , 475 P.2d 340 (1970).   The burden of proving probable cause in justification of a warrantless arrest is upon the state. People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 (1971); People v. Vaughns, 175 Colo. 369 , 489 P.2d 591 (1971); People v. Chacon, 177 Colo. 368 , 494 P.2d 79 (1972).   But a belief beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. People v. Martinez, 173 Colo. 17 , 475 P.2d 340 (1970).   Rather, probable cause deals with probabilities which are not technical, but rather the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Gonzales v. People, 156 Colo. 252 , 398 P.2d 236, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 945, 85 S. Ct. 1788, 14 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1965); Lavato v. People, 159 Colo. 223 , 411 P.2d 328 (1966); People v. Bueno, 173 Colo. 69 , 475 P.2d 702 (1970); People v. Clark, 173 Colo. 129 , 476 P.2d 564 (1970); People v. Weinert, 174 Colo. 71 , 482 P.2d 103 (1971); People v. Saars, 196 Colo. 294 , 584 P.2d 622 (1978).   Consequently, probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Gonzales v. People, 156 Colo. 252 , 398 P.2d 236, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 945, 85 S. Ct. 1788, 14 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1965); Lavato v. People, 159 Colo. 223 , 411 P.2d 328 (1966); People v. Bueno, 173 Colo. 69 , 475 P.2d 702 (1970); People v. Weinert, 174 Colo. 71 , 482 P.2d 103 (1971); People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 (1971); Glass v. People, 177 Colo. 267 , 493 P.2d 1347 (1972); People v. Williams, 186 Colo. 72 , 525 P.2d 463 (1974); People v. Boileau, 36 Colo. App. 157, 538 P.2d 484 (1975).   Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe an offense has been or is being committed. People v. Rueda, 649 P.2d 1106 (Colo. 1982); People v. Martinez, 689 P.2d 653 (Colo. App. 1984).   Probable cause arises only where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge suffice to warrant a reasonably prudent person in the belief that the person to be arrested committed or is committing a criminal offense. People v. Severson, 39 Colo. App. 95, 561 P.2d 373 (1977).   Although precise point of officer's belief cannot be determined. If the circumstances at the time of an arrest are sufficient to justify a finding that probable cause existed, the court will so find even though the precise point at which the officer's hunch became suspicion and then progressed to reasonable belief is impossible to determine with certainty. Lanford v. People, 176 Colo. 109 , 489 P.2d 210 (1971).   This level of probability must exist at the actual moment of arrest, and must be based on known facts, not on mere rumor or conjecture. People v. Severson, 39 Colo. App. 95, 561 P.2d 373 (1977).   Suspicion and rumor alone would fall short of probable cause. Lucero v. People, 165 Colo. 315 , 438 P.2d 693, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 893, 89 S. Ct. 217, 21 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1968); People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 (1971).   It is basic that an arrest without a warrant must stand upon firmer ground than suspicion, though the arresting officer need not have in hand evidence which would suffice to convict. People v. Vaughns, 182 Colo. 328 , 513 P.2d 196 (1973); People v. Gonzales, 186 Colo. 48 , 525 P.2d 1139 (1974).   Mere suspicion does not constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest. People v. Montoya, 189 Colo. 106 , 538 P.2d 1332 (1975).   Information relied upon to satisfy a warrantless arrest is sufficient if it warrants a reasonably cautious and prudent police officer in believing, in light of his training and experience, that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested probably committed it. However, it need not be of that quality and quantity necessary to satisfy beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 (1971).   All evidence within knowledge of arresting officer may be considered. In assessing probable cause to arrest without a warrant, all evidence within the knowledge of the arresting officer may be considered even though it may not be competent evidence at trial. People v. Gonzales, 186 Colo. 48 , 525 P.2d 1139 (1974).   As well as officer's training and experience. Whether or not the arresting officer reasonably believed a crime had been or was being committed such as to make a warrantless arrest is to be considered in light of the officer's training and experience. People v. Boileau, 36 Colo. App. 157, 538 P.2d 484 (1975).   Same standards for determining probable cause for search or arrest. The same constitutional standards for determining probable cause apply whether a search or an arrest is being effected by police officers, and whether or not the officers have obtained a judicially authorized warrant to arrest or search. People v. Vaughns, 182 Colo. 328 , 513 P.2d 196 (1973).   Probable cause standards applicable with or without warrant. Probable cause standards for searches or arrests are applicable whether or not the police have obtained a warrant. People v. Burns, 200 Colo. 387 , 615 P.2d 686 (1980).   Probable cause is measured by facts of particular case. The quantum of information which constitutes probable cause for a warrantless arrest must be measured by the facts of the particular case. People v. Vaughns, 182 Colo. 328 , 513 P.2d 196 (1973).   The circumstances in each case of warrantless arrest must be considered to determine the reasonableness of police action and the existence of probable cause. People v. Fratus, 187 Colo. 52 , 528 P.2d 392 (1974).   Even if the information received by an officer from an informer is hearsay, such information from a reliable informer corroborated by the officers' own observations is sufficient to support a reasonable belief that a crime is being committed. Gonzales v. People, 156 Colo. 252 , 398 P.2d 236, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 945, 85 S. Ct. 1788, 14 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1965).   For the reasonably trustworthy information relied on may be based upon hearsay and need not be evidence sufficiently competent for admission at the guilt-finding process. People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 (1971).   In fact, either heavy or almost exclusive reliance on hearsay does not destroy the validity of an arrest without a warrant. Lucero v. People, 165 Colo. 315 , 438 P.2d 693, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 893, 89 S. Ct. 217, 21 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1968).   The “Aguilar” test for determining probable cause for arrest based upon information received from a police informer is as follows: First, the officer must know the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that a crime was being or had been committed by the accused; and second, there must be underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that information received was reliable. (Based upon Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964)). People v. Martinez, 173 Colo. 17 , 475 P.2d 340 (1970).   The test to measure probable cause to arrest, which is based upon information provided by a confidential informant, is met by setting forth the underlying circumstances which established that the informant had a basis in fact for his information and also provided facts which supported the reliability of the informant. People v. Fratus, 187 Colo. 52 , 528 P.2d 392 (1974).   First prong of “Aguilar” met. Where informer was not just relying on suspicion or rumor but stated with particularity details of stolen check, such as, amount, payee, maker, and endorsement, and also stated that defendant had talked with him, showed him the check, and told him of defendant's own attempt to cash it, these underlying circumstances were sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime had been or was being committed, as they met the first prong of the “Aguilar test” for determining probable cause for arrest. People v. Martinez, 173 Colo. 17 , 475 P.2d 340 (1970).   And the second prong of the test was met by virtue of the following evidence: (1) That the informant had previously given reliable information to police; (2) verification by the officer that the stolen check was missing by talking to the payee before defendant's arrest; (3) defendant was riding in the same car described by the informant; and (4) prior to arrest defendant was seen by the officer putting an envelope in a small paper sack. Hence, when such evidence was considered as a whole, it was sufficient for the officer to reasonably believe that informant's information was reliable. People v. Martinez, 173 Colo. 17 , 475 P.2d 340 (1970).   Totality of circumstances test. Since the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test for determining probable cause has been abandoned by the United States supreme court in Illinois v. Gates (462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)) in favor of the totality of the circumstances test, such test was used by the court to make the probable cause determination. People v. Gallegos, 680 P.2d 1294 (Colo. App. 1983); People v. Sullivan, 680 P.2d 851 (Colo. App. 1983).   No factor alone is conclusive in establishing exigent circumstances necessary for a warrantless arrest, as the totality of the circumstances must be examined. People v. Henry, 195 Colo. 309 , 578 P.2d 1041, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 961, 99 S. Ct. 445, 58 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1978).   Informant's information must be reliable. When a tip is received from a confidential informant, there must also be information supplied which establishes the credibility of the informant or indicates that the information was reliable. People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 225 , 519 P.2d 951 (1974).   Uncorroborated accusation by an informant whose identity and reliability remains untested cannot constitute probable cause. People v. Williams, 186 Colo. 72 , 525 P.2d 463 (1974).   When the source of the information is a citizen-informant who was an eyewitness to the crime and is identified, the information is presumed to be reliable, and the prosecution is not required to establish either the credibility of the informant or the reliability of his information. People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 225 , 519 P.2d 951 (1974); People v. Saars, 196 Colo. 294 , 584 P.2d 622 (1978).   Presumption as to trustworthiness of citizen-informant. Although one who qualifies as a “citizen-informant” is presumed trustworthy, this presumption only relates to the likelihood of truthfulness, not to the weight to be accorded the information provided. People v. Severson, 39 Colo. App. 95, 561 P.2d 373 (1977).   Report to authorities does not make uncorroborated speculation probable. Uncorroborated speculation and conjecture by an inexperienced citizen is not transformed into probability by a report to the authorities. Different standards govern observations by experienced peace officers. People v. Severson, 39 Colo. App. 45, 561 P.2d 373 (1977).   Where there is conflicting evidence as to several critical points regarding an informant's information, the prerogative for deciding whether or not probable cause for arrest without a warrant is established is within the domain of the trial judge and, absent a showing of abuse of this prerogative, a reviewing court will not overturn a trial court's ruling. People v. Trujillo, 179 Colo. 428 , 500 P.2d 1176 (1972).   Furthermore, details of the crime given to investigating officers by the victim of the crime can be relied upon by the officers and can furnish the basis for their conclusion that a crime had been committed and that certain described persons probably committed it. People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 (1971).   And where, after investigation, an officer, by his own knowledge, knows that an offense has been committed and corroboration of the suspect's name is obtained by identifying photographs, the officer has probable cause for arrest without a warrant. Lucero v. People, 165 Colo. 315 , 438 P.2d 693, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 893, 89 S. Ct. 217, 21 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1968).   But it is not necessary for the arresting officer to know of the reliability of the informer or to be himself in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause, if he acts upon the direction of, or as a result of, communication with a brother officer or that of another police department and provided the police as a whole are in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause to make the arrest. People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 (1971).   Thus, a police officer has the right to rely upon information relayed to him by his fellow law enforcement officers. People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 (1971).   As the fellow-officer rule permits a police officer to rely upon and accept information provided by another officer in determining whether there is probable cause for warrantless arrest. People v. Vaughns, 175 Colo. 369 , 489 P.2d 591 (1971).   So when police officers are informed by a telephone call from officers in another jurisdiction from which a package of contraband was sent, the officers have probable cause to arrest a person without a warrant when he claims the package. People v. Hankin, 179 Colo. 70 , 498 P.2d 1116 (1972).   All officers at arrest need not be informed. Where the officer who made the arrest had talked to the informant and had knowledge of all of the facts comprising probable cause, whether another officer who was present at the arrest was aware of the information given by the informant is immaterial. People v. Crespin, 635 P.2d 918 (Colo. App. 1981).   Illegal arrest cannot be justified. Neither the fellow-officer rule nor the validity of an exchange of information between police officers can justify an otherwise illegal arrest. People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 225 , 519 P.2d 951 (1974); People v. Saars, 196 Colo. 294 , 584 P.2d 622 (1978).   By claiming package, defendant becomes an active participant. Where officers had probable cause to believe that a course of criminal conduct involving packaged contraband had been initiated in another state in which defendant was likely to become involved and defendant appears to claim the package, then, under the circumstances, the defendant became an active participant in the criminal conduct for which his arrest could be lawfully effected without a warrant. People v. Hively, 173 Colo. 485 , 480 P.2d 558 (1971).   Moreover, evidence in plain view can be relied on. Where police officers are in a place where they have a right to be, they are not required to close their eyes to evidence in plain view, and the sight of such evidence can properly form the basis for a determination of probable cause to make an arrest. People v. McGahey, 179 Colo. 401 , 500 P.2d 977 (1972); Avalos v. People, 179 Colo. 88 , 498 P.2d 1141 (1972).   And in a situation involving an “arrangement” by the police to purchase drugs, where an officer, by prearranged signal, flashed his brake lights to indicate to other officers hiding nearby that the deal was completed, whereupon the officers approached a vehicle which had previously pulled up to the scene and ordered its driver to come out, and where, after arresting defendant as he stepped from the vehicle, the officer noticed that a package on the front seat was in plain view, which he seized and which later proved to contain additional quantities of illegal drugs, then, under the circumstances, the officer had probable cause to arrest the driver. People v. Clark, 173 Colo. 129 , 476 P.2d 564 (1970).   Also, probable cause existed where marijuana seen while validly checking registration in vehicle. Where an officer detained defendant for an admitted traffic violation and while performing his duties in this regard inquired for the auto registration, which by statute must be either in the possession of the operator or in the vehicle, then, upon the defendant's failure to produce the registration, the officer had the right to look in the vehicle for the registration to inspect it, and when at this time he observed a plastic bag containing what he suspected was, and which turned out to be, marijuana, the officer had probable cause to believe a crime was being committed in his presence and had the right and duty to make an arrest. Marquez v. People, 168 Colo. 219 , 450 P.2d 349 (1969).   However, facts must be available prior to arrest. The arrest of a defendant can only be justified by the information available to the officer immediately prior to the arrest, and the discovery of contraband on the person of one who is unlawfully arrested does not validate an arrest. People v. Nelson, 172 Colo. 456 , 474 P.2d 158 (1970).   Hence, where the mistaken suspicion of an informant on one matter triggered a police investigation which discovered other illegal matters during a search, the officer had no knowledge of any offense being committed in his presence which would have justified the arrest and he had had no report of any crime having been committed in the area by anyone resembling the defendant, and so, since the courts have a responsibility to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing in order to protect the constitutional rights of the individual, the arrest of the defendant was “unreasonable” when tested by the need to arrest under the exigencies of the situation against the invasion of privacy which the arrest entailed, and any evidence obtained was not admissible. People v. Nelson, 172 Colo. 456 , 474 P.2d 158 (1970).   Probable cause for arrest without warrant held to exist. Gonzales v. People, 156 Colo. 252 , 398 P.2d 236, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 945, 85 S. Ct. 1788, 14 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1965)(marijuana); People v. Bengston, 174 Colo. 131 , 482 P.2d 989 (1971)(marijuana); People v. Ramey, 174 Colo. 250 , 483 P.2d 374 (1971); People v. Vaughns, 175 Colo. 369 , 489 P.2d 591 (1971); People v. Vigil, 175 Colo. 421 , 489 P.2d 593 (1971)(marijuana); Lanford v. People, 176 Colo. 109 , 489 P.2d 210 (1971); Hafer v. People, 177 Colo. 52 , 492 P.2d 847 (1972); People v. Duncan, 179 Colo. 253 , 500 P.2d 137 (1972); People v. Lucero, 182 Colo. 39 , 511 P.2d 468 (1973); People v. Vaughns, 182 Colo. 328 , 513 P.2d 196 (1973); People v. Duleff, 183 Colo. 213 , 515 P.2d 1239 (1973)(marijuana); People v. Marquez, 183 Colo. 231 , 516 P.2d 1134 (1973); People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 225 , 519 P.2d 951 (1974); People v. Cruz, 186 Colo. 295 , 526 P.2d 1315 (1974); People v. Crespin, 635 P.2d 918 (Colo. App. 1981).   If probable cause for arrest does in fact exist, the officer is entitled to make a reasonable search incident to arrest. People v. Bueno, 173 Colo. 69 , 475 P.2d 702 (1970); People v. Hively, 173 Colo. 485 , 480 P.2d 558 (1971); People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 (1971); People v. Hankin, 179 Colo. 70 , 498 P.2d 1116 (1972).   And may seize evidence. In a search conducted incident to warrantless arrest, the arresting officers have authority to search for instrumentalities or evidence of the specific crime for which they had probable cause to arrest. People v. Valdez, 182 Colo. 80 , 511 P.2d 472 (1973).   If probable cause to arrest is present, evidence can be seized as incident to a lawful arrest. People v. Boileau, 36 Colo. App. 157, 538 P.2d 484 (1975).   An officer conducting a reasonable search, incident to a valid arrest, may seize contraband or articles, the possession of which gives the police officer reason to believe a crime has been committed, even though such articles do not relate to the crime for which the defendant was initially arrested. People v. Ortega, 181 Colo. 223 , 508 P.2d 784 (1973).   Following Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009), the search incident to arrest exception does not apply in this case, and the search of the passenger compartment of defendant's car was unconstitutional. Because statements defendant made following the discovery of drugs were the fruit of the unlawful search, the evidentiary use of the statements must also be suppressed. Perez v. People, 231 P.3d 957 (Colo. 2010).   Probable cause for arrest for burglary without warrant not shown. People v. Trujillo, 179 Colo. 428 , 500 P.2d 1176 (1972).   Where the court finds that probable cause for arrest without a warrant is not shown, the subsequent search and seizures are invalid. People v. Trujillo, 179 Colo. 428 , 500 P.2d 1176 (1972).   Evidence obtained subsequent to illegal arrest need not be suppressed, if the taint of the official misconduct has been purged. People v. Henry, 195 Colo. 309 , 578 P.2d 1041, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 961, 99 S. Ct. 445, 58 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1978).   When persons are arrested for minor traffic violations or minor municipal offenses, the instrumentalities or evidence of such crimes is minimal or nonexistent, and thus the scope of a search incident to such a warrantless arrest would be quite limited. People v. Valdez, 182 Colo. 80 , 511 P.2d 472 (1973).