CO Code § 16-13-303 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 16 - Criminal Proceedings|Article 13 - Special Proceedings|Part 3 - Abatement of Public Nuisance|§ 16-13-303. Class 1 Public Nuisance

  Every building or part of a building including the ground upon which it is situate and all fixtures and contents thereof, every vehicle, and any real property shall be deemed a class 1 public nuisance when:   Used as a public or private place of prostitution or used as a place where the commission of soliciting for prostitution, as defined in section 18-7-202, C.R.S.; pandering, as defined in section 18-7-203, C.R.S.; keeping a place of prostitution, as defined in section 18-7-204, C.R.S.; pimping, as defined in section 18-7-206, C.R.S.; or human trafficking, as described in section 18-3-503 or 18-3-504, C.R.S., occurs;      Used, or designed and intended to be used, as gambling premises, as defined in section 18-10-102 (5), C.R.S., or as a place where any gambling device or gambling record, as such terms are defined in section 18-10-102 (3) and (7), C.R.S., is kept; (b) (I) Used, or designed and intended to be used, as gambling premises, as defined in section 18-10-102 (5), C.R.S., or as a place where any gambling device or gambling record, as such terms are defined in section 18-10-102 (3) and (7), C.R.S., is kept;    Used for transporting gambling proceeds, records, or devices as defined in section 18-10-102 (3), (6), and (7), C.R.S.;         Used for unlawful manufacture, cultivation, growth, production, processing, sale, or distribution or for storage or possession for any unlawful manufacture, sale, or distribution of any controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5), C.R.S., or any other drug the possession of which is an offense under the laws of this state, or any imitation controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-420 (3), C.R.S.; (c) (I) Used for unlawful manufacture, cultivation, growth, production, processing, sale, or distribution or for storage or possession for any unlawful manufacture, sale, or distribution of any controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5), C.R.S., or any other drug the possession of which is an offense under the laws of this state, or any imitation controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-420 (3), C.R.S.;    Used for unlawful possession of any controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5), C.R.S., except for possession of less than sixteen ounces of marijuana;       Used for a purpose declared by a statute of this state to be a class 1 public nuisance;      Used as a place where the commission of theft, as specified in section 18-4-401, C.R.S., occurs; (e) (I) Used as a place where the commission of theft, as specified in section 18-4-401, C.R.S., occurs;    Used for transporting property which is the subject of theft, as specified in section 18-4-401, C.R.S.;       Used for the unlawful manufacture, sale, or distribution of drug paraphernalia, as defined in section 18-18-426, C.R.S.;    Used for prostitution of a child, as defined in section 18-7-401, C.R.S., or used as a place where the commission of soliciting for child prostitution, as defined in section 18-7-402, C.R.S., pandering of a child, as defined in section 18-7-403, C.R.S., keeping a place of child prostitution, as defined in section 18-7-404, C.R.S., pimping of a child, as defined in section 18-7-405, C.R.S., or inducement of child prostitution, as defined in section .5, C.R.S., occurs;    Used for the sexual exploitation of children pursuant to part 4 of article 6 of title 18, C.R.S.;  (h.5) Repealed.   (h.6) Used in violation of section 43-10-114 , C.R.S.;     Used in the commission of any felony not otherwise included in this section;    Used in the commission of felony vehicular eluding pursuant to section 18-9-116.5, C.R.S.;    Used in the commission of hit and run with serious bodily injury or death pursuant to section 42-4-1601 (1), (2)(b), and (2)(c), C.R.S.;    Used in committing a drive-by crime, as defined in section 16-13-301 (2.2);      Used, or designed and intended to be used, as gaming premises, or as a place where any gaming device, as the term is defined in section 44-30-103 (13), or gaming record is kept, in violation of article 30 of title 44, or in violation of article 20 of title 18; (m) (I) Used, or designed and intended to be used, as gaming premises, or as a place where any gaming device, as the term is defined in section 44-30-103 (13), or gaming record is kept, in violation of article 30 of title 44, or in violation of article 20 of title 18;    Used for transporting adjusted gross proceeds or gaming devices as the terms are defined in section 44-30-103 (1) and (13), or records in violation of the provisions of article 30 of title 44, or in violation of article 20 of title 18;    Used for the unlawful manufacture, production, sale, distribution, or for storage or possession for any unlawful manufacture, sale, or distribution of any gaming device, as defined in section 44-30-103 (13), or any other gaming device, equipment, key, electronic or mechanical device, slot machine, bogus chips, counterfeit chips, cards, coins, gaming billets, cheating device, thieving device, tools, drills, or wires used in violation of article 30 of title 44, or in violation of article 20 of title 18; or       Used in committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to commit against an elderly person any felony set forth in part 4 of article 4 of title 18, C.R.S., in part 1, 2, 3, or 5 of article 5 of title 18, C.R.S., article 5.5 of title 18, C.R.S., or section 11-51-603, C.R.S. For purposes of this paragraph (n), an “elderly person” means a person sixty years of age or older. (1.5) All equipment, mechanical systems, or machinery, or parts thereof, shall be deemed to be a class 1 public nuisance at the location of the automatic dialing system when used for soliciting with an automatic dialing system containing a prerecorded message in violation of section 18-9-311 (1) , C.R.S.         Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2)(b) of this section, all fixtures and contents of any building, structure, vehicle, or real property that is a class 1 public nuisance under subsection (1) of this section and all property that is a class 1 public nuisance under subsection (1.5) of this section are subject to seizure, confiscation, and forfeiture as provided in this part 3. In addition, the personal property of every kind and description, including currency and other negotiable instruments and vehicles, used in conducting, maintaining, aiding, or abetting any class 1 public nuisance is subject to seizure, confiscation, and forfeiture, as provided in this part 3.    Subsection (2)(a) of this section does not apply to an owner, operator, employee, or customer of a simulated gambling device, or of a business offering simulated gambling devices, who:   Ceased participating in such activity on or before July 1, 2018; and    Provides clear documentation to the district attorney that:   A lawful contract has been entered into for the sale or transfer of all simulated gambling devices connected with the activity to a person by whom, or into a jurisdiction where, the activity is lawful; and    Consummates the contract by actually selling or transferring the simulated gambling devices within one hundred eighty days after the contract was entered into or after any simulated gambling devices that were seized, confiscated, or forfeited by law enforcement authorities have been returned, whichever occurs later.             The following shall be deemed class 1 public nuisances and be subject to forfeiture and distributed as provided in section 16-13-311 (3), and no property rights shall exist in them:   All currency, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for any public nuisance act; or    All proceeds traceable to any public nuisance act; or    All currency, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any public nuisance act; or    All equipment of any kind, including but not limited to computers and any type of computer hardware, software, or other equipment, used in committing sexual exploitation of a child, as described in section 18-6-403, or cybercrime, as described in section 18-5.5-102.       Whenever it is established, in an action brought pursuant to this part 3, that a person has received proceeds derived from any public nuisance act, the court shall award to the plaintiff a money judgment of forfeiture for the amount of said proceeds shown to have been derived from any public nuisance act or for an amount shown to have been derived from a series of similar acts which fall within a pattern of public nuisance acts. The person subjected to such a money judgment may claim a setoff equal to the fair market value of the property forfeited if he shows that said property is traceable to the public nuisance act upon which the money judgment is predicated.      In any action seeking forfeiture of property pursuant to this part 3, any person contesting the forfeiture shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence such person's standing as a true owner of the property or a true owner with an interest in the property.    To establish standing, the person shall first prove that the person had a recorded or registered interest in the property, or a bona fide marital interest in the property, prior to title-vesting in the state, if the property is of the type for which interests can be, and customarily are, recorded or registered in a public office.    The person shall also prove that he or she is a true owner of the property or a true owner of an interest in the property. The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a person is a true owner shall include, but need not be limited to:   Whether the person had the primary use, benefit, possession, or control of the property;    How much of the consideration for the purchase or ownership of the property was furnished by the person, and whether the person furnished reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the property or interest;    Whether the transaction by which the person acquired the property or interest was secret, concealed, undisclosed, hurried, or not in the usual mode of doing business;    Whether the transaction by which the person acquired the property or interest was conducted through the use of a shell, alter ego, nominee, or fictitious party;    Whether the person is a relative, a co-conspirator, complicitor, or an accessory in the public nuisance act or acts or other criminal activity, a business associate in a legal or illegal business, one who maintains a special or close relationship with, or an insider with respect to the perpetrator of the alleged public nuisance act or acts;    Whether the person is silent or fails to call parties to testify or to produce available evidence explaining the acquisition of the property or factors which may be badges of fraud or deceit, or show lack of true ownership;    Whether the timing of the transaction by which the person acquired the property was during the pendency or threat of litigation, or during any time when the person knew, should have known, or had notice of the public nuisance act or acts or the threat of a forfeiture action;    Whether the placing of the title in the name of, or the putative ownership in, or transfer to, the person was done with intent to delay, hinder, or avoid a forfeiture, or for some purpose other than ownership of the property;    Whether the perpetrator of the alleged public nuisance act or acts has absconded or is a fugitive from justice and the conveyance occurred after the flight, or before the flight, in any of the circumstances set forth in subparagraph (III) of this paragraph (c);    Whether the subject matter property is of a kind in which property or ownership rights can legally exist;    Any other badge or indicia of fraud under article 8 of title 38, C.R.S., or the general law of fraudulent transfers or conveyances.       The court shall consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a person is a true owner. A person contesting the forfeiture does not necessarily have to show that all of the factors enumerated in paragraph (c) of this subsection (5) support the claim of true ownership, nor does the person necessarily establish true ownership by showing the absence of fraudulent intent or badges of fraud.    No private sale or conveyance of a used motor vehicle shall be deemed to make a party eligible to assert standing to contest the forfeiture thereof, unless the title to the motor vehicle, with transfer duly executed to the party, has been filed with the division of motor vehicles in the department of revenue prior to the physical seizure of the vehicle and the recording of a notice of seizure, or the party attempting to assert standing has exclusive possession of the vehicle at the time of seizure. A party eligible to assert standing under this paragraph (e) must nevertheless establish that the party is a true owner of the vehicle or has an interest therein pursuant to paragraph (c) of this subsection (5).    Unless the standing of a particular party is conceded in the complaint initiating the public nuisance action, a party must assert standing in the answer and fully describe the party's interest in the property which is the subject matter of the action, and submit a verified statement, supported by any available documentation, of the party's ownership of or interest in the property. (5.1)   In any action to forfeit property pursuant to this part 3, the plaintiff, in addition to any other matter which must be proven in the plaintiff's case in chief, shall prove by clear and convincing evidence that possession of the property is unlawful or that the owner of the property was a party to the creation of the public nuisance. The plaintiff shall also prove by clear and convincing evidence that the property was instrumental in the commission or facilitation of a crime creating a public nuisance or the property constitutes traceable proceeds of the crime or related criminal activity.    (a.5) (I) The defendant in an action brought pursuant to this part 3 may petition the court to determine whether a forfeiture was constitutionally excessive. Upon the conclusion of a trial resulting in a judgment of forfeiture in an action brought pursuant to this part 3, if the evidence presented raises an issue of proportionality under this paragraph (a.5), the defendant may petition the court to set a hearing, or the court may on its own motion set a hearing, to determine whether a forfeiture was constitutionally excessive. This determination shall be made prior to any sale or distribution of forfeited property.    In making this determination, the court shall compare the forfeiture to the gravity of the public nuisance act giving rise to the forfeiture and related criminal activity.    The defendant shall have the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the forfeiture is grossly disproportional.    If the court finds that the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the public nuisance act and related criminal activity, it shall reduce or eliminate the forfeiture as necessary to avoid a violation of the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment of the United States constitution or article II, section 20, of the Colorado constitution.    and (VI)(Deleted by amendment,L. 2003, p. 889, § 1, effective July 1, 2003.)       As used in paragraph (a) of this subsection (5.1), an owner was a “party to the creation of the public nuisance” if it is established that:   The owner was involved in the public nuisance act; or    (A) The owner knew of the public nuisance act or had notice of the acts creating the public nuisance or prior similar conduct. (5.2)   With respect to a partial or whole ownership interest in existence at the time the conduct constituting a public nuisance took place, “innocent owner” means any owner who:   Did not have actual knowledge of the conduct constituting a public nuisance, or notice of an act or circumstance creating the public nuisance or prior similar conduct, notice being satisfied by, but not limited to, sending notice of an act or circumstance creating the public nuisance by certified mail; or    Upon learning of the conduct constituting a public nuisance, took reasonable action to prohibit such use of the property. An owner may demonstrate that he or she took reasonable action to prohibit the conduct constituting a public nuisance if the owner:   Timely revoked or attempted to revoke permission for the persons engaging in such conduct to use the property; or    Took reasonable action to discourage or prevent the use of the property in conduct constituting a public nuisance.          With respect to a partial or whole ownership interest acquired after the conduct constituting a public nuisance has occurred, “innocent owner” means a person who, at the time he or she acquired the interest in the property, had no knowledge or notice that the illegal conduct subjecting the property to seizure had occurred or that the property had been seized for forfeiture, and:   Acquired an interest in the property in a bona fide transaction for value; or    Acquired an interest in the property through probate or inheritance; or    Acquired an interest in the property through dissolution of marriage or by operation of law.       An innocent owner's interest in property shall not be forfeited under any provision of state law. An innocent owner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has an ownership interest in the subject property. Otherwise, the burden of proof under this subsection (5.2) shall be as provided in subsection (5.1) of this section.    A person who is convicted of a criminal offense arising from the same activity giving rise to the forfeiture proceedings in accordance with section 16-13-307 (1.5) shall not be eligible to assert an innocent owner defense.                Whenever clear and convincing evidence adduced in an action pursuant to this part 3 shows a substantial connection between currency and the acts specified in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section, a rebuttable presumption shall arise that said currency is property subject to forfeiture. A substantial connection exists if:   Currency in the aggregate amount of one thousand dollars or more was seized at or close to the time that evidence of the acts specified in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section was developed or recovered; and      Said amount of currency was seized on the same premises or in the same vehicle where evidence of said acts was developed or recovered; or (b) (I) Said amount of currency was seized on the same premises or in the same vehicle where evidence of said acts was developed or recovered; or    Said amount of currency was seized from the possession or control of a person engaged in said acts; or    Traces of a controlled substance were discovered on the currency or an animal trained in the olfactory detection of controlled substances indicated the presence of the odor of a controlled substance on the currency as testified to by an expert witness. (6.5) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part 3 to the contrary, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, only the facts that give rise to the presumption that currency is property subject to forfeiture pursuant to subsection (6) of this section. However, when a preponderance of credible evidence is adduced to rebut a presumption that has arisen pursuant to subsection (6) of this section, the burden of proof shall revert to the plaintiff to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the elements of the plaintiff's case with respect to the currency.          Currency seized pursuant to this part 3 may be placed in an interest-bearing account during the proceedings pursuant to this part 3 if so ordered by the court upon the motion of any party. Photocopies of portions of the bills shall serve as evidence at all hearings. The account and all interest accrued shall be forfeited or returned to the prevailing party in lieu of the currency.    The provisions of subsection (6) of this section shall not be construed so as to limit the introduction of any other competent evidence offered to prove that seized currency is a public nuisance.     History. Source: L. 72: R&RE, p. 260, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-13-303 . L. 77: (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), and (2) amended and (1)(e) added, p. 889, § 1, effective July 1. L. 80: (1)(f) added, p. 472, § 2, effective July 1. L. 81: IP(1), (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), (1)(f), and (2) amended and (1)(g) to (1)(i) and (3) added, pp. 954, 956, §§ 2, 3, effective July 1; (1)(c) amended, p. 737, § 17, effective July 1. L. 83: IP(3) amended, p. 686, § 1, effective April 21; IP(1), (1)(c), and (2) amended, p. 683, § 2, effective July 1; (1)(c) amended, p. 704, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(e), (1)(h), (2), and (3)(a) to (3)(c) amended and (1)(j), (1)(k), and (4) to (8) added, p. 631, §§ 3, 4, effective July 1. L. 88: (1)(h.5) added, p. 1354, § 1, effective July 1; (1.5) added and (2) amended, p. 346, § 11, effective July 1; (1)(h.6) added, p. 1090, § 2, effective January 1, 1989. L. 89: (1)(h.5) repealed, p. 1645, § 18, effective June 5; (1)(l) added, p. 875, § 8, effective June 5. L. 91: (1)(m) added, p. 1581, § 5, effective June 4; (1)(h.6) amended, p. 1057, § 12, effective July 1. L. 92: (1)(m) amended, p. 2171, § 20, effective June 2; (1)(c)(I) and (1)(f) amended, p. 391, § 16, effective July 1; (5) amended and (5.1) and (5.2) added, p. 447, § 2, effective July 1. L. 94: (1)(k) amended, p. 2551, § 38, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (1)(m)(I) and (1)(m)(II) amended, p. 1110, § 62, effective May 31; (1)(c)(II) amended, p. 463, § 5, effective July 1. L. 99: (3)(d) added, p. 799, § 18, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(n) added, p. 1108, § 6, effective August 2. L. 2002: (5.1) and (5.2) amended, p. 917, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2003: (5), (5.1)(a), (5.1)(a.5), (5.1)(b)(II), (5.2)(a)(I), IP(5.2)(b), (5.2)(c), and IP(6) amended and (5.2)(d) and (6.5) added, pp. 898, 889, 902, 896, §§ 10, 1, 12, 6, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1)(c)(II) amended,(HB 10-1352), ch. 259, p. 1172, § 14, effective August 11. L. 2012: (1)(a) amended,(HB 12-1151), ch. 174, p. 621, § 3, effective August 8. L. 2013: (1)(e)(I) and (1)(e)(II) amended,(HB 13-1160), ch. 373, p. 2200, § 8, effective June 5. L. 2014: (1)(a) amended,(HB 14-1273), ch. 282, p. 1153, § 12, effective July 1. L. 2018: (2) amended,(HB 18-1234), ch. 381, p. 2298, § 2, effective June 6; (3)(d) amended,(HB 18-1200), ch. 379, p. 2292, § 4, effective August 8; (1)(m) amended,(SB 18-034), ch. 14, p. 238, § 11, October 1.    Editor's note:   Subsections (5.1)(b)(II)(A) and (5.1)(b)(II)(B) were numbered as (5.1)(b)(II) and (5.1)(b)(III), respectively, in HB 02-1404 but were renumbered on revision in 2010 to conform to statutory format.   ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “State and Federal Forfeiture of Property Used in Criminal Activity”, see 11 Colo. Law. 2597 (1982).   Two-pronged test to determine whether a statutory forfeiture proceeding is essentially criminal in character for purposes of double jeopardy clause: (1) Whether general assembly expressly or impliedly indicated a preference for criminal or civil categorization; and (2) in the event the general assembly did indicate an intent to treat a forfeiture proceeding as civil, whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the legislative intention. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987); People v. Ferrel, 929 P.2d 65 (Colo. App. 1996); People v. Coolidge, 953 P.2d 949 (Colo. App. 1997).   Forfeiture action pursuant to Colorado public nuisance statute is essentially civil in nature, does not violate double jeopardy provisions of the constitution, and is not subject to constitutional or statutory speedy trial provisions applicable to criminal prosecutions. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987).   Based upon the civil nature of civil forfeiture proceeding, defendant did not have a constitutional right to counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel is not a basis for overturning the judgment of forfeiture. People v. Cobb, 944 P.2d 574 (Colo. App. 1996).   Forfeiture action not dependent upon conviction in underlying criminal case. People ex rel. Sandstrom v. District Ct., 884 P.2d 707 (Colo. 1994).   Function of forfeiture action is separate from the punitive function of a criminal conviction. People ex rel. Sandstrom v. District Ct., 884 P.2d 707 (Colo. 1994).   The fact that statute defines a public nuisance to include every vehicle used in the commission of any felony not otherwise included in the section did not transform forfeiture action into a criminal proceeding subject to double jeopardy provisions. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987).   Forfeiture action initiated under this section did not violate the forfeiture of estate provision of section 9 of article II of the Colorado constitution.People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987).   Action for abatement of class 1 public nuisance is equitable in nature, and while the court in the exercise of its equity powers may not act contrary to the statutory mandate, it does retain a considerable degree of discretion and flexibility in fashioning a decree which achieves a fair result, so that in forfeiture situation, the court retains the authority to protect the interest of an innocent party to the extent practicable and within the statutory dispositional alternatives. People v. Garner, 732 P.2d 1194 (Colo. 1987).   The general assembly has declared that forfeiture proceedings of public nuisances are remedial and equitable in nature and the trial court properly determined that intervenor acquired an equitable interest in the vehicle based upon his payment of $500. People v. One 1968 Chevrolet 2-Door, 895 P.2d 1177 (Colo. App. 1995).   Trial court's determination that party contesting the forfeiture was true owner of automobile was supported by evidence because in its analysis of the totality of the circumstances, court considered intervenor's equitable interest, his good faith purchase for value without notice of the forfeiture, and the undue hardship laced on intervenor if the vehicle were forfeited. People v. One 1968 Chevrolet 2-Door, 895 P.2d 1177 (Colo. App. 1995).   Reasonable notice of conduct within section's scope. This section makes reasonably clear to those intended to be affected what conduct is within its scope. People v. Perez, 192 Colo. 562 , 561 P.2d 7 (1977).   Property seized pursuant to this section is forfeited at the time of seizure, not upon entry of a final order. United States v. Wilkinson, 686 P.2d 790 (Colo. 1984), aff'd, 628 F. Supp. 29 (D. Colo. 1985 ).   But only if there is a subsequent judgment of forfeiture. Eggleston v. Colo., 636 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Colo. 1986 ).   Subsection (1)(c) is not unconstitutionally vague. The language is specific, persons of common intelligence have no difficulty understanding the term “used” and in comprehending the definition of “controlled substance”, and the language is sufficiently plain to give defendant and others reasonable notice of the kind of conduct prohibited by its terms. People v. One 1967 Pontiac (GTO), 678 P.2d 1016 (Colo. 1984).   This section does not require any number of incidents of prostitution before a public nuisance may be found. People v. Perez, 192 Colo. 562 , 561 P.2d 7 (1977).   Subsection (3) permits classification of a vehicle as a class one public nuisance on the basis of a single sale of a controlled substance which transpires within a vehicle. People v. One 1967 Pontiac (GTO), 678 P.2d 1016 (Colo. 1984).   No requirement of “close proximity” standard for forfeiture of contents of building declared a public nuisance. Since forfeiture statute is a civil statute, once the people make a prima facie case that contents of a house were used in criminal activity, burden shifts to the owner of the property to show why it should not be seized. People v. Lot 23, 735 P.2d 184 (Colo. 1987).   The use of the term “traceable” in subsection (3)(b) reveals legislative intent to require that a direct connection be established between the alleged proceeds and the unlawful activity. People v. Cerrone, 780 P.2d 562 (Colo. App. 1989), cert. denied, 785 P.2d 917 (Colo. 1989).   The word “control” in subsection (6)(b)(II) encompasses any currency that is legally the property of the defendant, as well as any currency that the defendant has the authority or the power to manage or direct, even if such currency is not in the defendant's actual physical possession when it is seized. Thus, it is the general assembly's intention that any currency seized from the control of a defendant who engaged in a drug-related public nuisance is presumptively forfeitable. People v. Thirty-Three Thousand Two Hundred and Twelve Dollars ($33,212.00) in U.S. Currency, 83 P.3d 1206 (Colo. App. 2003).   The inclusion of subsection (1)(i) is a clear indication that the general assembly did not intend for the enumeration of specific felonies in the statute to be exhaustive. Legislative history indicates that the general assembly did not intend to override the residual effect of subsection (1)(i) and omit felony theft from the statute's coverage. People v. One 1988 Mazda 323, 857 P.2d 569 (Colo. App. 1993).   Storage for purposes of statute denotes that an item is left at a location for some period of time. It is not synonymous with possession. Generally the term indicates duration and not a transient situation. People v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 781 P.2d 186 (Colo. App. 1989).   Vehicle used in the commission of a robbery is a class 1 public nuisance and the entire vehicle is subject to forfeiture, not just the contents of the vehicle. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987).   Motor vehicle used to transport stolen items home was not subject to forfeiture. The stipulated facts and evidence presented were inadequate to prove that the motor vehicle was sufficiently connected to the thefts to allow forfeiture. People v. One 1988 Mazda 323, 857 P.2d 569 (Colo. App. 1993).   This section requires the forfeiture of a vehicle which has been determined to be a class 1 public nuisance when there is at least one owner of the vehicle who participated or acquiesced in the prohibited use which led to the vehicle being declared a public nuisance, notwithstanding the fact that a co-owner had no knowledge of or a role in the creation of the nuisance. People v. Garner, 732 P.2d 1194 (Colo. 1987).   Evidence showed only that defendant drove a vehicle to a location where marijuana was cultivated, which would not compel every reasonable person to draw the inference that the vehicle was used in the manufacture, cultivation, growth, production, or processing of marijuana. People v. Wilson, 826 P.2d 404 (Colo. App. 1992).   Forfeiture is proper even though the vehicle was not used as a place where illegal activities were conducted. This section requires only that the vehicle was used to aid the illegal activity. People v. 1979 Volkswagen, 773 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1989).   Summary judgment ordering forfeiture of real property, its contents, and currency was proper where motion was supported by affidavits describing a history of sales and use of crack cocaine on the property by the defendant and her tenants, where the defendant admitted to making sales of crack cocaine on one of the parcels of property, and where repeated illegal drug use and sales took place on the property. People v. Cobb, 944 P.2d 574 (Colo. App. 1996).   This section mitigates some of the harshness inherent in the principle of forfeiture by exempting property from forfeiture if the court finds that the possession of the property is not unlawful and the owner was not a party to the creation of a nuisance and would suffer undue hardship by the sale, confiscation, or destruction of the property. People v. Garner, 732 P.2d 1194 (Colo. 1987).   There was no undue hardship by the confiscation and sale of the fixtures and contents of the premises, which were being used for prostitution, where appellant knew of and profited from his deliberate illegal activity. People v. Perez, 192 Colo. 562 , 561 P.2d 7 (1977).   Burden of proof in forfeiture action under Colorado public nuisance statute rests on the state and must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987).   The defendant need not be charged under the precise section defining solicitation of prostitution in order for the provisions of the forfeiture section to apply. People v. 1979 Volkswagen, 773 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1989).   Ample evidence in record to support finding that business “was continuously being used as a place of prostitution”. People v. Perez, 192 Colo. 562 , 561 P.2d 7 (1977).   Former statute providing for abatement of houses of prostitution held valid. Mongone v. People, 84 Colo. 516 , 271 P. 617 (1928) (decided under repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C 1, § 1).   Statute as basis for jurisdiction. See People v. Wheatridge Poker Club, 194 Colo. 15 , 569 P.2d 324 (1977).   State claim to acquire currency used in a drug transaction may be pursued under either the Contraband Forfeiture Act or the Public Nuisance Act, each intended to create different procedures with different remedies. People v. $4338.00 in US Currency, 819 P.2d 1105 (Colo. App. 1991).   Any person contesting an action for forfeiture must establish his or her standing as a true owner of the property subject to forfeiture. The trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a person asserting the contest is a true owner. People v. Grell, 950 P.2d 660 (Colo. App. 1997).   Applied in Rueda v. District Court, 194 Colo. 327 , 575 P.2d 370 (1977); Barker v. District Court, 199 Colo. 416 , 609 P.2d 628 (1980); Wakabayashi v. Tooley, 648 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1982).