CO Code § 39-11-136 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 39 - Taxation|Article 11 - Sale of Tax Liens|§ 39-11-136. Treasurer to Execute Deed - Effect

  The deed shall be signed by the treasurer in his official capacity and when so signed shall vest in the purchaser all the right, title, interest, and estate of the former owner in and to the land conveyed and also all right, title, interest, and claim of the state and county thereto. Such deed may be acknowledged in the same manner as other deeds to real estate and, if so acknowledged and recorded in the proper county, shall be prima facie evidence of the following facts:   That the real property conveyed was subject to taxation for the year or years stated in the deed;    That the taxes were not paid at any time before the sale;    That the real property conveyed had not been redeemed from the sale at the date of the deed;    That the property had been listed and assessed at the time and in the manner required by law;    That the taxes were levied according to law;    That the tax lien on said property was advertised for sale in the manner and for the length of time required by law;    That the tax lien on said property was sold for delinquent taxes as stated in the deed;    That the grantee named in the deed was the purchaser, or the heir at law, or the assignee of such purchaser;    That the sale was conducted in the manner required by law;    That the deed was properly signed, acknowledged, and delivered by the treasurer.       All the right, title, interest, and estate conveyed by any such deed executed before August 1, 1964, by the treasurer shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser at the time such deed was signed by the treasurer in his official capacity.    Execution of a deed pursuant to this section shall not affect the existence of any public or private roads, rights-of-way, conservation easements, other easements, or equitable servitudes that run with land and have both benefits and burdens, all as claimed or existing prior to the execution of such deed.     History. Source: L. 64: R&RE, p. 736, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 137-11-36. L. 85: (1)(f) and (1)(g) amended, p. 1243, § 24, effective July 1. L. 93: (3) added, p. 305, § 4, effective April 7. L. 2001: (3) amended, p. 10, § 1, effective August 8; (3) amended, p. 308, § 1, effective August 8. History. Source: L. 64: R&RE, p. 736, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 137-11-36. L. 85: (1)(f) and (1)(g) amended, p. 1243, § 24, effective July 1. L. 93: (3) added, p. 305, § 4, effective April 7. L. 2001: (3) amended, p. 10, § 1, effective August 8; (3) amended, p. 308, § 1, effective August 8.    Editor's note:   Amendments to subsection (3) by House Bill 01-1082 and House Bill 01-1321 were harmonized.   ANNOTATION   Analysis     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.    II. DEED AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE.    III. BURDEN OF PROVINGTAX DEED INVALID.     I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.   Law reviews. For note, “The Effect of a General Tax Sale on the Special Assessment Lien”, see 20 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 288 (1948). For note, “The Effect of Tax Titles Upon Easements and Restrictions Upon the Use of Land in Colorado”, see 33 Dicta 228 (1956). For article, “The Tax Deed -- Modern Movement Towards Respectability”, see 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 181 (1962).   Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.   Valid tax deed extinguishes all previous encumbrances. Sherman v. Greeley Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 66 Colo. 288 , 181 P. 975 (1919); Sanderford v. Walker Inv. Co., 84 Colo. 203 , 269 P. 14 (1928); Benedict v. Coriolanus Corp., 30 Colo. App. 306, 491 P.2d 985 (1971).   Title by adverse possession vanishes when treasurer issues deed for unpaid taxes. Linville v. Russell, 168 Colo. 459 , 452 P.2d 18 (1969).   Unless claim of adverse possession asserted prior to issuance of treasurer's deed. Where claims to ownership of real property based upon adverse possession are asserted in a judicial proceeding to quiet title prior to the issuance of the treasurer's deed and payment of taxes has been tendered, the policy considerations compelling application of the absolute rule that title by adverse possession vanishes upon issuance of a treasurer's deed do not apply. First Nat'l Bank v. Fitzpatrick, 624 P.2d 927 (Colo. App. 1981).   Omission of inked scroll around word “seal” of no import. Where there appears next to the county treasurer's signature, the printed word “seal”, encircled by a printed scroll, the omission of an inked scroll on the deed has no legal import. Linville v. Russell, 168 Colo. 459 , 452 P.2d 18 (1969).   Tax deed cannot pass title to previously severed mineral rights. A tax deed does not pass title to oil and mineral rights which have previously been severed from the surface and on which no proper assessment has been made. Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo. 267 , 243 P.2d 412 (1952).   Purchaser with general tax deed entitled to maintain action. A purchaser of lands at a tax sale, having obtained the treasurer's deed, may maintain a bill against one holding a certificate of the sale of the same premises for the nonpayment of a special tax, which was invalidated by the sale for the general tax. City & County of Denver v. Keller, 48 Colo. 54 , 108 P. 998 (1910).   Showing of substantial compliance required. A party asserting a claim to lands under tax proceedings must show at least substantial compliance with this article. McPherrin v. Paul, 21 Colo. App. 154, 120 P. 1051 (1912).   Defects in tax deed must be alleged in pleadings. Defects in a tax deed good on its face cannot be shown in the trial unless they have been pointed out in the pleadings; but it is not necessary that this be done in any particular manner or exclusively by the party relying on the defects. It is sufficient if it clearly appears from the pleadings that certain defects are relied upon and an issue is made as to their existence. Scott v. Watkins, 61 Colo. 244 , 157 P. 3 (1916).   Sale without proper notice invalid although deed executed and recorded. Among other prerequisites to a valid sale of land for taxes is the giving of notice thereof, and, when it is shown that such notice has not been given in substantial conformity with this article, the sale will be adjudged invalid notwithstanding a tax deed in proper form may have been duly executed and recorded. Morris v. St. Louis Nat'l Bank, 17 Colo. 231 , 29 P. 802 (1892); Paine v. Palmborg, 20 Colo. App. 432, 79 P. 330 (1905).   Claimant under invalid tax deed may assert right of reimbursement. One claiming title under an invalid tax deed may assert the right to reimbursement for taxes paid as against the holder of the regular title from the government, but a subsequent valid tax deed cuts off the right. Young v. Rohan, 77 Colo. 70 , 234 P. 694 (1925).   Only when a deed issues does a tax lien purchaser acquire all right, title, interest, and estate of the former owner in the land conveyed. Hughey v. Jefferson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 921 P.2d 76 (Colo. App. 1996).   Applied in United States Sec. & Bond Co. v. Wolfe, 27 Colo. 218 , 60 P. 637 (1900); Lovelace v. Tabor Mines & Mills Co., 29 Colo. 62 , 66 P. 892 (1901); Richard v. Beggs, 31 Colo. 186 , 72 P. 1077 (1903); Imperial Sec. Co. v. Morris, 57 Colo. 194 , 141 P. 1160 (1914); Hamer v. Glenn Inv. Co., 75 Colo. 423 , 226 P. 299 (1924); Pyles v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 76 Colo. 598 , 233 P. 618 (1925); City & County of Denver v. Bach, 92 Colo. 594 , 22 P.2d 1114 (1933).   II. DEED AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE.   Deed prima facie evidence of facts occurring before or at time of sale. The things of which the tax deed is made prima facie evidence relate to facts which occurred before or at the time of the sale and not to acts which the cash purchaser is required to perform subsequent to the sale and as a further condition precedent to his right to a deed. Carnahan v. Sieber Cattle Co., 34 Colo. 257 , 82 P. 592 (1905); Sternberger v. Moffat, 44 Colo. 520 , 99 P. 560 (1908); Pelton v. Muntzing, 24 Colo. App. 1, 131 P. 281 (1913).   Tax deed is evidence only of matters declared so by this section. The party relying upon a tax deed as evidence must still show the assessed value of the land, that the notice required by § 39-11-131 was given, whether the land was vacant or occupied, and, if occupied, that notice was given to the occupant as well as to all other persons specified in the statute. Mitchell v. Trowbridge, 47 Colo. 6 , 105 P. 878 (1909).   Deed prima facie evidence of title conveyed. It is apparent that it was the intention of the general assembly to provide that, when a duly executed and recorded tax deed shows that the statutory requirements for the assessment and collection of taxes have been substantially complied with, the deed shall be prima facie evidence of title to the property, thereby conveyed in favor of the purchaser, his heirs, and assigns, as against the former owner. Dyke v. Whyte, 17 Colo. 296 , 29 P. 128 (1892); Bennett v. Shotwell, 118 Colo. 206 , 194 P.2d 335 (1948); Rock v. Fastenau, 122 Colo. 41 , 219 P.2d 781 (1950); Bald Eagle Mining & Ref. Co. v. Brunton, 165 Colo. 28 , 437 P.2d 59 (1968).   Evidence that property subject to taxation. A tax deed is prima facie evidence, as provided in subsection (1)(a), that the property described therein was subject to taxation, and the introduction into evidence of a tax deed establishes a prima facie title in the grantee. Mitchell v. City of Denver, 33 Colo. 37 , 78 P. 686 (1904).   Deed not prima facie evidence that subsequent taxes paid. The form of the deed prescribed by § 39-11-135 contains a recital that subsequent taxes were paid. Subsection (1) of this section does not make the deed prima facie evidence of that fact, but clearly the statutory recital must be given that effect. Richardson v. Halbekann, 97 Colo. 175 , 48 P.2d 1014 (1935).   Unexecuted deed not evidence of anything. A tax deed not executed as required by this section is not prima facie evidence of anything. Eaches v. Johnston, 46 Colo. 457 , 104 P. 940 (1909).   Officials' inability to remember procedure followed insufficient to overcome recitals. Evidence that officials are unable to remember the precise procedure they followed is insufficient to overcome the effect of their own recitals in the affidavits and the deed itself. Bald Eagle Mining & Ref. Co. v. Brunton, 165 Colo. 28 , 437 P.2d 59 (1968).   Executing and recording of deeds as provided by this section. Morris v. St. Louis Nat'l Bank, 17 Colo. 231 , 29 P. 802 (1892).   III. BURDEN OF PROVING TAX DEED INVALID.    Presumption of regularity rebuttable. The treasurer's deed is prima facie evidence of the regularity of the proceedings, but the presumption of regularity raised is a rebuttable one; when evidence is presented which shows that the proceedings did not follow the statutory requirements, the deed must be set aside. Bald Eagle Mining & Ref. Co. v. Brunton, 165 Colo. 28 , 437 P.2d 59 (1968); Arabasz v. Schwartzberg, 943 P.2d 463 (Colo. App. 1996).   Claimant under title must prove preliminary steps to sale. A party claiming under a tax title has the burden of proving the preliminary steps leading up to the sale. Scott v. Watkins, 61 Colo. 244 , 157 P. 3 (1916).   Burden of overthrowing deed upon adverse claimant. The burden of overthrowing a tax deed, regular in form, is upon the party claiming adversely thereto. Waddingham v. Dickson, 17 Colo. 223 , 29 P. 177 (1892); Knight v. Boring, 38 Colo. 153 , 87 P. 1078 (1906); Grusing v. Parke, 120 Colo. 555 , 212 P.2d 102 (1949).