CO Code § 40-10.1-101 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 40 - Utilities|Article 10.1 - Motor Carriers|Part 1 - General Provisions|§ 40-10.1-101. Definitions

 As used in this article 10.1, unless the context otherwise requires:    “Advertise” means to advise, announce, give notice of, publish, or call attention to by use of any oral, written, or graphic statement made in a newspaper or other publication, on radio, television, or any electronic medium, or contained in any notice, handbill, sign, including signage on a vehicle, flyer, catalog, or letter, or printed on or contained in any tag or label attached to or accompanying any article of personal property.    “Certificate” means the certificate of public convenience and necessity issued to a common carrier under part 2 of this article.    “Commission” means the public utilities commission of the state of Colorado.    “Common carrier” means a common carrier as defined in section 40-1-102; except that the term does not include:   A contract carrier as defined in this section;    A motor carrier of passengers under part 3 of this article 10.1; or    A motor carrier of passengers providing large-market taxicab service under part 7 of this article 10.1.       “Compensation” means any money, property, service, or thing of value charged or received or to be charged or received, whether directly or indirectly.    “Contract carrier” means every person, other than a common carrier or a motor carrier of passengers under part 3 of this article, who, by special contract, directly or indirectly affords a means of passenger transportation over any public highway of this state; except that the term does not include a transportation network company, as defined in section 40-10.1-602 (3), or a transportation network company driver, as defined in section 40-10.1-602 (4).    “Fixed points” and “established route” mean points or a route between or over which any common carrier usually or ordinarily operates or holds out to operate any motor vehicle, even though there may be departures from such points or route, whether such departures are periodic or irregular.    “Household goods” means the personal effects and property used or to be used in a dwelling, when a part of the equipment or supply of such dwelling, and similar property if the transportation of such effects and property is:   Arranged and paid for by the householder; except that “household goods” does not include property moving from a factory or store, other than property that the householder has purchased with intent to use in his or her dwelling and that is transported at the request of, and the transportation charges are paid to the mover by, the householder; or    Arranged and paid for by another party.       “Intrastate commerce” means transportation for compensation by motor vehicles over the public highways between points in this state. (9.5) “Large-market taxicab service” means indiscriminate passenger transportation for compensation in a taxicab on a call-and-demand basis, within and between points in the counties of Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Broomfield, Denver, Douglas, El Paso, Jefferson, Larimer, and Weld, and between those points and all points within the state of Colorado, with the first passenger in the taxicab having exclusive use of the taxicab unless the passenger agrees to multiple loadings.    “Motor carrier” means any person owning, controlling, operating, or managing a motor vehicle that provides transportation in intrastate commerce pursuant to this article; except that the term does not include a transportation network company, as defined in section 40-10.1-602 (3), or a transportation network company driver, as defined in section 40-10.1-602 (4).    “Motor vehicle” means any automobile, truck, tractor, motor bus, or other self-propelled vehicle or any trailer drawn thereby.    “Mover” means a motor carrier that provides the transportation or shipment of household goods.    “Nonconsensual towing” or “nonconsensual tow” means the transportation of a motor vehicle by tow truck if such transportation is performed without the prior consent or authorization of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle.    “Permit” means the permit issued to a contract carrier under part 2 of this article 10.1 or to a motor carrier under part 3, 4, 5, or 7 of this article 10.1.    “Person” means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, joint stock association, or other legal entity and any person acting as or in the capacity of lessee, trustee, or receiver thereof, whether appointed by a court or otherwise.    “Public highway” means every street, road, or highway in this state over which the public generally has a right to travel.    “Shipper” means a person who uses the services of a mover to transport or ship household goods.    “Taxicab” means a motor vehicle with a seating capacity of eight or less, including the driver, operated in taxicab service.    “Taxicab service” means passenger transportation in a taxicab on a call-and-demand basis, with the first passenger therein having exclusive use of the taxicab unless such passenger agrees to multiple loadings.    “Towing carrier” means a motor carrier that:   Provides, as one of its primary functions, the towing of motor vehicles by use of a tow truck; and    May also provide storage of towed vehicles.       “Tow truck” means a motor vehicle specially designed or equipped for transporting another motor vehicle by means of winches, cables, pulleys, or other equipment for towing, pulling, or lifting such other motor vehicle from one place to another.    “Vehicle booting company” means a private corporation, partnership, or sole proprietor in the business of immobilizing a motor vehicle through use of a boot.     History. Source: L. 2011: Entire article added,(HB 11-1198), ch. 127, p. 395, § 1, effective August 10. L. 2014: (6) and (10) amended,(SB 14-125), ch. 323, p. 1409, § 3, effective June 5. L. 2018: IP, (4), and (14) amended and (9.5) added,(HB 18-1320), ch. 363, p. 2165, § 4, effective August 8. L. 2019: (22) added,(SB 19-236), ch. 359, p. 3312, § 19, effective May 30.    ANNOTATION   Law reviews. For article, “Control Over Motor Carriers by the Public Utilities Commission”, see 33 Dicta 138 (1956).   Annotator's note. Cases material to this section decided prior to its earliest source, L. 27, p. 499 , § 1, have been included in the annotations to this section. Since § 40-10.1-101 is similar to §§ 40-10-101 and 40-11-101 as they existed prior to the 2011 reorganization of the motor carrier statutes, relevant cases construing those sections have been included in the annotations to this section.   This article is constitutional. Bushnell v. People, 92 Colo. 174 , 19 P.2d 197 (1933); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. DeLue, 175 Colo. 317 , 486 P.2d 1050 (1971).   Legislative intent in establishing several types of motor vehicle transportation. The general assembly established several types of motor vehicle transportation, including common and contract carriage. By doing so, without question it intended to protect the public health, safety, and general welfare by providing a framework for the better transportation of persons and property. Denver Cleanup Serv. Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 192 Colo. 537 , 561 P.2d 1252 (1977).   This statute was enacted for the purpose of regulating any detrimental effect that contract carriers might have upon common carrier operation. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Stanton Transp. Co., 153 Colo. 372 , 386 P.2d 590 (1963); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. DeLue, 175 Colo. 317 , 486 P.2d 1050 (1971).   Contract carriers remain outside scope of regulation. This article was enacted for the regulation of motor vehicle carriers, but the act does not encompass private carriers. Private carriers remain outside the scope of regulation. Burbridge v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 91 Colo. 134 , 12 P.2d 1115 (1932); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Stanton Transp. Co., 153 Colo. 372 , 386 P.2d 590 (1963).   Neither the general assembly nor the commission has precisely defined contract carriage. Miller Bros. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 185 Colo. 414 , 525 P.2d 443 (1974).   One may look in vain in the statutes or in the rulings of the commission and of the supreme court for a clear definition of contract carriage or for an articulation of specific guidelines to be followed in the issuance of a contract carrier permit. Denver Cleanup Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 192 Colo. 537 , 561 P.2d 1252 (1977).   The fundamental distinction between a common and contract carrier is that the contract carrier enters into a contract with each of his customers and assumes no obligation to carry for any other, while the common carrier undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently. Ward Transp. Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 151 Colo. 76 , 376 P.2d 166 (1962).   The principal statutory distinction between the two is that a contract carrier is one which is not a common carrier. Denver Cleanup Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 192 Colo. 537 , 561 P.2d 1252 (1977).   One of the fundamental distinctions between a contract carrier and a common carrier is that a contract carrier has an obligation only to his contract-customers and has no obligation to others desiring carriage. In contrast, the common carrier must convey for all desiring its transportation. Denver Cleanup Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 192 Colo. 537 , 561 P.2d 1252 (1977).   A motor vehicle carrier cannot at the same time be both a contract carrier and a common carrier by utilizing one part of a truck for common-carrier service and another part of the same truck for contract-carrier service. Such a holding would make regulatory power ridiculous. McKay v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 104 Colo. 402 , 91 P.2d 965 (1939).   Situation in which carrier is neither common nor private or contract. A milk company that transports all the milk it produces to its processing plant, f.o.b. at the producers' stations is neither a common carrier nor a private or contract carrier for hire, because it then hauls only its own property. Colo. Milk Transp., Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 269 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1959).   Indiscriminately accepting freight is undoubtedly one of the important tests in ascertaining whether or not a certain operation has the elements of a common carrier. Greeley Transp. Co. v. People, 79 Colo. 307 , 245 P. 720 (1926); Burbridge v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 91 Colo. 134 , 12 P.2d 1115 (1932); Bushnell v. People, 92 Colo. 174 , 19 P.2d 197 (1933); McDill v. North E. Motor Freight, Inc., 92 Colo. 198 , 19 P.2d 204 (1933); McKay v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 104 Colo. 402 , 91 P.2d 965 (1939); Ward Transp., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 151 Colo. 76 , 376 P.2d 166 (1962).   Carrier who does not accept freight for hire indiscriminately is not a common carrier. A motor vehicle operator engaged in the transportation of freight for hire under contracts with various individuals is not a common carrier because he does not hold himself out as willing to, and does not in fact, accept freight for transportation for hire indiscriminately for all who might or did seek such service. Ward Transp., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 151 Colo. 76 , 376 P.2d 166 (1962).   By legislative mandate, contract carriers are public utilities. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Stanton Transp. Co., 153 Colo. 372 , 386 P.2d 590 (1963).   Authority as to contract carriers is solely statutory. The commission's authority over common carriers stems from both the constitution and the statutes, while its authority with respect to contract motor carriers is solely statutory. Miller Bros. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 185 Colo. 414 , 525 P.2d 443 (1974).   There is agreement as to certain characteristics. While the definition of contract carriage has never been clarified by legislation or the commission, there is general agreement as to certain contract carriage characteristics: (1) A contract carrier cannot serve the general public; (2) a contract carrier cannot participate in the formal rate-making process of the commission; and (3) a contract carrier cannot interline. Also, a contract carrier may not advertise in any newspaper, magazine, or other publication or otherwise hold itself out to serve the public indiscriminately. Miller Bros. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 185 Colo. 414 , 525 P.2d 443 (1974).   “Contract” means in the interest of the individual, as distinguished from enterprise or business operated by or on behalf of the public, or of any official function performed for public benefit. Colo. Contractors Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 128 Colo. 333 , 262 P.2d 266 (1953).   Contract carriage not declared public utility. The general assembly has declared that a “common carrier” is a “public utility”. However, contract carriage has not been so declared. Miller Bros. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 185 Colo. 414 , 525 P.2d 443 (1974).   A contract carrier provides service at its convenience and subject to the negotiation of a satisfactory agreement between the private carrier and its customer. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. DeLue, 175 Colo. 317 , 486 P.2d 1050 (1971).   Example of contract carrier. A motor vehicle operator engaged in the transportation of freight for hire under contracts with various individuals is not a common carrier because he does not hold himself out as willing to, and does not in fact, accept freight for transportation for hire indiscriminately for all who might or did seek such service. Ward Transp., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 151 Colo. 76 , 376 P.2d 166 (1962).   Test used in determining whether applicant is contract carrier held invalid. Denver Cleanup Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 192 Colo. 537 , 561 P.2d 1252 (1977).   A guideline of the public utilities commission (PUC) requiring that, to be considered a contract carrier, the proposed service must be beyond the capabilities of an authorized common carrier in effect grants a monopoly to common carriers, eliminating the need for contract carriage except under too limited circumstances. Denver Cleanup Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 192 Colo. 537 , 561 P.2d 1252 (1977).   The guidelines used by the commission in determining whether an applicant is to be considered a contract carrier promote too strongly the demise of contract carriers, and since the legislative purpose negates a result that either class be obliterated by the commission's fiat, it follows that the commission's test violates legislative intent and purpose. Denver Cleanup Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 192 Colo. 537 , 561 P.2d 1252 (1977).   Guidelines to be considered by commission. Denver Cleanup Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 192 Colo. 537 , 561 P.2d 1252 (1977).   The constitution and the statutes of this state have given to the business of trash hauling the status of a matter of statewide concern, subject to the jurisdiction of the PUC. Under such circumstances, a city has no power to pass an ordinance that is in conflict with the exercise by the commission of its statutory power. Givigliano v. Veltri, 180 Colo. 10 , 501 P.2d 1044 (1972).   “Property” embraces matter removed to dumps. The word “property” as applied to the act is intended to and does embrace the transportation for hire of matter and things that the parties remove from various households and establishments and haul to nearby dumps. Schlagel v. Hoelsken, 162 Colo. 142 , 425 P.2d 39, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827, 88 S. Ct. 81, 19 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1967).   Right of property exists in refuse material until it is destroyed. Although the owner of refuse materials may regard them as of no value, still the right to their possession and the need for their disposal are within the control of the individual owner. All of these materials have certain valuable uses under varied circumstances, and even though the owner desires to dispose of or destroy such materials, the right of property continues until disposed of or destroyed. In performing such disposal service, appellant was clearly engaged in the business of a common carrier. Schlagel v. Hoelsken, 162 Colo. 142 , 425 P.2d 39, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827, 88 S. Ct. 81, 19 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1967).   Vehicles engaged in transporting trash are within meaning of section. The amendment of § 40-10-101 expressly to include in the definition of “motor vehicle carrier”, as follows: “any motor vehicle used in serving the public in the business of transportation of ashes, trash, waste, rubbish, and garbage”, did not change the law; it merely clarified it. Schlagel v. Hoelsken, 162 Colo. 142 , 425 P.2d 39, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827, 88 S. Ct. 81, 19 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1967).   This section applies to common carriers, that is one whose business occupation or regular calling is to carry chattels for all persons who may choose to employ and remunerate him. Bushnell v. People, 92 Colo. 174 , 19 P.2d 197 (1933).   Those who merely secure passengers desiring to make trips as paying guests for private parties planning motor vehicle trips are not functioning as a public utility warranting regulation by the commission. Yellow Cab Coop. Ass'n v. Colo. Ground Transp. Center, Inc., 654 P.2d 1331 (Colo. App. 1982).   Section applies to all persons operating privately for hire. The statute does not attempt to include one class of motor vehicle operators for hire and exclude another class also transporting for hire; it includes all persons operating privately for hire. Bushnell v. People, 92 Colo. 174 , 19 P.2d 197 (1933).   This article does not include one who transports his or her own goods in his or her own vehicle from one place to another on the public highways and sells the same for a profit. People v. Montgomery, 92 Colo. 201 , 19 P.2d 205 (1933).   As to what “interlining” consists of, see Miller Bros. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 185 Colo. 414 , 525 P.2d 443 (1974).   Factors relevant in determining an applicant's fitness and ability to perform under a permit are discussed in Acme Delivery Serv. v. Cargo Freight Sys., 704 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1985).   Applied in Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Weicker Transp. Co., 102 Colo. 211 , 78 P.2d 633 (1938); Northwest Transp. Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 197 Colo. 437 , 593 P.2d 1366 (1979); Morey v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 629 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1981).