CO Code § 15-2.5-306 (2021)
2021 Colorado Code|Title 15 - Probate, Trusts, and Fiduciaries|Article 2.5 - Uniform Powers of Appointment Act|Part 3 - Exercise of Power of Appointment|§ 15-2.5-306. Appointment to Deceased Appointee or Permissible Appointee's Descendant

  An appointment to a deceased appointee is ineffective.    Unless the terms of the instrument creating a power of appointment manifest a contrary intent, a powerholder of a nongeneral power may exercise the power in favor of, or create a new power of appointment in, a descendant of a deceased permissible appointee, which deceased appointee is a descendant of one or more of the grandparents of the donor, regardless of whether the descendant is described by the donor as a permissible appointee.     History. Source: L. 2014: Entire article added,(HB 14-1353), ch. 209, p. 777, § 1, effective July 1, 2015.    OFFICIAL COMMENT   Just as property cannot be transferred to an individual who is deceased (see Restatement Third of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 1.2), a power of appointment cannot be effectively exercised in favor of a deceased appointee.   However, an antilapse statute may apply to trigger the substitution of the deceased appointee's descendants (or other substitute takers), unless the terms of the instrument creating or exercising the power of appointment manifest a contrary intent. Antilapse statutes typically provide, as a default rule of construction, that devises to certain relatives who predecease the testator pass instead to specified substitute takers, usually the descendants of the predeceased devisee who survive the testator. See generally Restatement Third of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 5.5.   When an antilapse statute does not expressly address whether it applies to the exercise of a power of appointment, a court should construe it to apply to such an exercise. See Restatement Third of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 5.5, Comment . The rationale underlying antilapse statutes, that of presumptively attributing to the testator the intent to substitute the descendants of a predeceased devisee, applies equally to the exercise of a power of appointment.  l  The substitute takers provided by an antilapse statute (typically the descendants of the deceased appointee) are treated as permissible appointees even if the description of permissible appointees provided by the donor does not expressly cover them. This rule corresponds to the rule applying antilapse statutes to class gifts. Antilapse statutes substitute the descendants of deceased class members, even if the class member's descendants are not members of the class. See Restatement Third of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 19.12, Comment e.   The donor of a power, general or nongeneral, can prohibit the application of an antilapse statute to the powerholder's appointment and, in the case of a nongeneral power, can prohibit an appointment to the descendants of a deceased permissible appointee, but must manifest an intent to do so in the terms of the instrument creating the power of appointment. A traditional gift-in-default clause does not manifest a contrary intent in either case, unless the clause provides that it is to take effect instead of the descendants of a deceased permissible appointee.   Subsection (2) provides that the descendants of a deceased permissible appointee are treated as permissible appointees of a nongeneral power of appointment. This rule is a logical extension of the application of antilapse statutes to appointments. If an antilapse statute can substitute the descendants of a deceased appointee, the powerholder should be allowed to appoint in favor of, or to create a new power of appointment in, a descendant (meaning, one or more descendants; the Uniform Law Commission uses the singular to include the plural) of a deceased permissible appointee.   Who qualifies as a “descendant” is defined by state law. See, for example, Uniform Probate Code §§ 1-201(9), 2-103, 2-115 to 2-122, 2-705.   The rule of this section is consistent with, and this Comment draws on, Restatement Third of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 19.12 and the accompanying Commentary.