"Free trade and free markets have proven their ability to lift whole societies out of poverty" I'm not a socio-political/history buff - does anybody have some clear examples? ----- Original Message ----- From: "Rohit Khare" To: Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 5:10 PM Subject: sed /s/United States/Roman Empire/g > > A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human > > race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable. > > Absolutely correct. Perhaps the most fundamental thing to realize about > life on Earth today. > > The following is a fascinating document of official Government policy > that bears close reading. It is the aspirations of a wonderful nation in > an imperfect world. > > > The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations. It does, > > however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the > > future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideas and this is an > > area where America must excel. > > I was recently at a lecture about the surprising success of Radio Sawa, > our new music-and-news channel for 15-30 year old Arabs. It's #1 in > practically every market it's entered, nearing 90% listenership in > Amman. And it's even beginning to be trusted for news, well past BBC and > taking share from every other government broadcaster. > > It is as hard to imagine America losing a war of ideas in the long-term > as it is to imagine America making any headway at all in the short term. > > Many of you may disagree, but I found the document below surprisingly > centrist. If you know the code, you can hear clearly partisan tones, re: > ICC, Taiwan Relations Act, etc. But, still, this is as much a Democratic > platform as not. Africa and AIDS take up more mindshare than I feared > they might. > > As you read, replace "United States" with "Roman Empire" and it may make > as much sense, in the long view of history. I don't know how proud to be > about that, but it is telling. Sometime I daydream that the President > might sit down with the nation with Perotista flip charts and explain to > our citizens the sheer vastness of our 700+ military installations > overseas and what they do for us. It would be a powerful education on > how engaged we are in the world around us. > > Heck, I'd love to see a real-time map of Federal expenditures around the > globe, a softly glowing necklace of embassies, carriers, arctic research > stations, hotels, golf courses, warehouses, libraries, clinics and all > the rest of the influence a trillion dollars here or there can buy. > > Of course, this still doesn't leave me any more comfortable with the > real news in this document: the Bush Doctrine for pre-emptive strikes. > I'd sooner repeal the Church amendments on covert action than permit > such a principle to be loosed upon the world. > > Rohit > > ----------------------------------------------------- > September 20, 2002 > > Full Text: Bush's National Security Strategy > > Following is the full text of President Bush's new national security > strategy. The document, entitled "The National Security Strategy of the > United States," will soon be transmitted to Congress as a declaration of > the Administration's policy. > > INTRODUCTION > > THE great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and > totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of > freedom -- and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, > democracy, and free enterprise. In the twenty-first century, only > nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and > guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the > potential of their people and assure their future prosperity. People > everywhere want to say what they think; choose who will govern them; > worship as they please; educate their children -- male and female; own > property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom > are right and true for every person, in every society -- and the duty of > protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of > freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages. > > Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military > strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our > heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for > unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that > favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies > can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and > economic liberty. By making the world safer, we allow the people of the > world to make their own lives better. We will defend this just peace > against threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace > by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the > peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent. > > Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental > commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed > dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great > industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of > individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less > than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to > penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies > against us. > > To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal -- > from better homeland defenses and law enforcement to intelligence and > cutting off terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global > reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help > nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will > hold to account nations that are compromised by terror -- because the > allies of terror are the enemies of civilization. The United States and > countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop > new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every > turn. > > The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism > and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking > weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing > so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to > succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other > means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, > contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous > technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America > will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We > cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must > be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, using the best intelligence > and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who > saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have > entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. > > As we defend the peace, we will also take advantage of an historic > opportunity to preserve the peace. Today, the international community > has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the > seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace > instead of continually prepare for war. Today, the world's great powers > find ourselves on the same side -- united by common dangers of terrorist > violence and chaos. The United States will build on these common > interests to promote global security. We are also increasingly united by > common values. Russia is in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching > for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror. Chinese > leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only source of > national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political > freedom is the only source of national greatness. America will encourage > the advancement of democracy and economic openness in both nations, > because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and > international order. We will strongly resist aggression from other great > powers -- even as we welcome their peaceful pursuit of prosperity, > trade, and cultural advancement. > > Finally, the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend > the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring > the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to > every corner of the world. The events of September 11, 2001, taught us > that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our > national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people > into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and > corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and > drug cartels within their borders. > > The United States will stand beside any nation determined to build a > better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people. Free > trade and free markets have proven their ability to lift whole societies > out of poverty -- so the United States will work with individual > nations, entire regions, and the entire global trading community to > build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity. > The United States will deliver greater development assistance through > the New Millennium Challenge Account to nations that govern justly, > invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom. We will also > continue to lead the world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of > AIDS and other infectious diseases. > > In building a balance of power that favors freedom, the United States is > guided by the conviction that all nations have important > responsibilities. Nations that enjoy freedom must actively fight terror. > Nations that depend on international stability must help prevent the > spread of weapons of mass destruction. Nations that seek international > aid must govern themselves wisely, so that aid is well spent. For > freedom to thrive, accountability must be expected and required. > > We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, > better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply > the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed > to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade > Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as > other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment > these permanent institutions. In all cases, international obligations > are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to > rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment. > > Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of > every person -- in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has > been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the > clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and > it has been tested by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity > holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom's triumph over all > these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in > this great mission. > > I. Overview of America's International Strategy > > > "Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We > fight, as we always fight, for a just peace -- a peace that favors > liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists > and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among > the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and > open societies on every continent." > > > > > > > President Bush > West Point, New York > June 1, 2002 > > > > The United States possesses unprecedented -- and unequaled -- strength > and influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of > liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with > unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great > strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that > favors freedom. > > For most of the twentieth century, the world was divided by a great > struggle over ideas: destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and > equality. > > That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and > race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and > discredited. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we > are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by > catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must > defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends. > > This is also a time of opportunity for America. We will work to > translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, > and liberty. The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a > distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our > values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help > make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to > progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations > with other states, and respect for human dignity. > > And this path is not America's alone. It is open to all. > > To achieve these goals, the United States will: > > * champion aspirations for human dignity; > > * strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent > attacks against us and our friends; > > * work with others to defuse regional conflicts; > > * prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our > friends, with weapons of mass destruction; > > * ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and > free trade; > > * expand the circle of development by opening societies and building > the infrastructure of democracy; > > * develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of > global power; and > > * transform America's national security institutions to meet the > challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century. > > > II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity > > > "Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the > language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require > different methods, but not different moralities." > > > > > > President Bush > West Point, New York > June 1, 2002 > > > > In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we > stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because > these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation > owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. Fathers and > mothers in all societies want their children to be educated and to live > free from poverty and violence. No people on earth yearn to be > oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of > the secret police. > > America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human > dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; > free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; > religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property. > > These demands can be met in many ways. America's constitution has served > us well. Many other nations, with different histories and cultures, > facing different circumstances, have successfully incorporated these > core principles into their own systems of governance. History has not > been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and > aspirations of their people. > > Our own history is a long struggle to live up to our ideals. But even in > our worst moments, the principles enshrined in the Declaration of > Independence were there to guide us. As a result, America is not just a > stronger, but is a freer and more just society. > > Today, these ideals are a lifeline to lonely defenders of liberty. And > when openings arrive, we can encourage change -- as we did in central > and eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991, or in Belgrade in 2000. When > we see democratic processes take hold among our friends in Taiwan or in > the Republic of Korea, and see elected leaders replace generals in Latin > America and Africa, we see examples of how authoritarian systems can > evolve, marrying local history and traditions with the principles we all > cherish. > > Embodying lessons from our past and using the opportunity we have today, > the national security strategy of the United States must start from > these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty. > > Our principles will guide our government's decisions about international > cooperation, the character of our foreign assistance, and the allocation > of resources. They will guide our actions and our words in international > bodies. > > We will: > > * speak out honestly about violations of the nonnegotiable demands of > human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions to > advance freedom; > > * use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who > struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward > democracy are rewarded for the steps they take; > > * make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key > themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation > from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights > to move toward a better future; and > > * take special efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience > and defend it from encroachment by repressive governments. > > > We will champion the cause of human dignity and oppose those who resist > it. > > III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent > Attacks Against Us and Our Friends > > > "Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have > the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already > clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been > waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is > peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on > the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of > our choosing." > > > > > > President Bush > Washington, D.C. (The National Cathedral) > September 14, 2001 > > > > The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of > global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or > religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism -- premeditated, > politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents. > > In many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of a > lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed > within a political process. But no cause justifies terror. The United > States will make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals > with them. We make no distinction between terrorists and those who > knowingly harbor or provide aid to them. > > The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in > our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly > elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress will come > through the persistent accumulation of successes -- some seen, some > unseen. > > Today our enemies have seen the results of what civilized nations can, > and will, do against regimes that harbor, support, and use terrorism to > achieve their political goals. Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition > forces continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But it is not > only this battlefield on which we will engage terrorists. Thousands of > trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South > America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia. > > Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist > organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, > control, and communications; material support; and finances. This will > have a disabling effect upon the terrorists' ability to plan and operate. > > We will continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a > coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists. Once the regional > campaign localizes the threat to a particular state, we will help ensure > the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial > tools necessary to finish the task. > > The United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the > financing of terrorism. We will identify and block the sources of > funding for terrorism, freeze the assets of terrorists and those who > support them, deny terrorists access to the international financial > system, protect legitimate charities from being abused by terrorists, > and prevent the movement of terrorists' assets through alternative > financial networks. > > However, this campaign need not be sequential to be effective, the > cumulative effect across all regions will help achieve the results we > seek. > > We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by: > > * direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and > international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist > organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of > terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction > (WMD) or their precursors; > > * defending the United States, the American people, and our interests > at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it > reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to > enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate > to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by > acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing > harm against our people and our country; and > > * denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists > by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign > responsibilities. > > > We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international > terrorism. This includes: > > * using the full influence of the United States, and working closely > with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of terrorism are > illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as > slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government > can condone or support and all must oppose; > > * supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim > world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote > terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation; > > * diminishing the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism by > enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources > on areas most at risk; and > > * using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of > information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of > those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism. > > > While we recognize that our best defense is a good offense we are also > strengthening America's homeland security to protect against and deter > attack. > > This Administration has proposed the largest government reorganization > since the Truman Administration created the National Security Council > and the Department of Defense. Centered on a new Department of Homeland > Security and including a new unified military command and a fundamental > reordering of the FBI, our comprehensive plan to secure the homeland > encompasses every level of government and the cooperation of the public > and the private sector. > > This strategy will turn adversity into opportunity. For example, > emergency management systems will be better able to cope not just with > terrorism but with all hazards. Our medical system will be strengthened > to manage not just bioterror, but all infectious diseases and > mass-casualty dangers. Our border controls will not just stop > terrorists, but improve the efficient movement of legitimate traffic. > > While our focus is protecting America, we know that to defeat terrorism > in today's globalized world we need support from our allies and friends. > Wherever possible, the United States will rely on regional organizations > and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism. Where > governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their capacities, we > will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and > our allies can provide. > > As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work > with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as > non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the > humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to > rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, > threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists > > In the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are > ultimately fighting for our democratic values and way of life. Freedom > and fear are at war, and there will be no quick or easy end to this > conflict. In leading the campaign against terrorism, we are forging new, > productive international relationships and redefining existing ones in > ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. > > IV. Work with Others To Defuse Regional Conflicts > > > "We build a world of justice, or we will live in a world of coercion. > The magnitude of our shared responsibilities makes our disagreements > look so small." > > > > > > President Bush > Berlin, Germany > May 23, 2002 > > > > Concerned nations must remain actively engaged in critical regional > disputes to avoid explosive escalation and minimize human suffering. In > an increasingly interconnected world, regional crisis can strain our > alliances, rekindle rivalries among the major powers, and create > horrifying affronts to human dignity. When violence erupts and states > falter, the United States will work with friends and partners to > alleviate suffering and restore stability. > > No doctrine can anticipate every circumstance in which U.S. action -- > direct or indirect -- is warranted. We have finite political, economic, > and military resources to meet our global priorities. The United States > will approach each case with these strategic principles in mind: > > * The United States should invest time and resources into building > international relationships and institutions that can help manage local > crises when they emerge. > > * The United States should be realistic about its ability to help > those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when > people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively. > > > Policies in several key regions offer some illustrations of how we will > apply these principles: > > The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical because of the toll of > human suffering, because of America's close relationship with the state > of Israel and key Arab states, and because of that region's importance > to other global priorities of the United States. There can be no peace > for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed > to an independent and democratic Palestine, living beside Israel in > peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a > government that serves their interests, and listens to their voices, and > counts their votes. The United States will continue to encourage all > parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and > comprehensive settlement to the conflict. > > The United States, the international donor community, and the World Bank > stand ready to work with a reformed Palestinian government on economic > development, increased humanitarian assistance and a program to > establish, finance, and monitor a truly independent judiciary. If > Palestinians embrace democracy, and the rule of law, confront > corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support > for the creation of a Palestinian state. > > Israel also has a large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine. > Permanent occupation threatens Israel's identity and democracy. So the > United States continues to challenge Israeli leaders to take concrete > steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state. > As there is progress towards security, Israel forces need to withdraw > fully to positions they held prior to September 28, 2000. And consistent > with the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee, Israeli settlement > activity in the occupied territories must stop. As violence subsides, > freedom of movement should be restored, permitting innocent Palestinians > to resume work and normal life. The United States can play a crucial > role but, ultimately, lasting peace can only come when Israelis and > Palestinians resolve the issues and end the conflict between them. > > In South Asia, the United States has also emphasized the need for India > and Pakistan to resolve their disputes. This administration invested > time and resources building strong bilateral relations with India and > Pakistan. These strong relations then gave us leverage to play a > constructive role when tensions in the region became acute. With > Pakistan, our bilateral relations have been bolstered by Pakistan's > choice to join the war against terror and move toward building a more > open and tolerant society. The Administration sees India's potential to > become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century > and has worked hard to transform our relationship accordingly. Our > involvement in this regional dispute, building on earlier investments in > bilateral relations, looks first to concrete steps by India and Pakistan > that can help defuse military confrontation. > > Indonesia took courageous steps to create a working democracy and > respect for the rule of law. By tolerating ethnic minorities, respecting > the rule of law, and accepting open markets, Indonesia may be able to > employ the engine of opportunity that has helped lift some of its > neighbors out of poverty and desperation. It is the initiative by > Indonesia that allows U.S. assistance to make a difference. > > In the Western Hemisphere we have formed flexible coalitions with > countries that share our priorities, particularly Mexico, Brazil, > Canada, Chile, and Colombia. Together we will promote a truly democratic > hemisphere where our integration advances security, prosperity, > opportunity, and hope. We will work with regional institutions, such as > the Summit of the Americas process, the Organization of American States > (OAS), and the Defense Ministerial of the Americas for the benefit of > the entire hemisphere. > > Parts of Latin America confront regional conflict, especially arising > from the violence of drug cartels and their accomplices. This conflict > and unrestrained narcotics trafficking could imperil the health and > security of the United States. Therefore we have developed an active > strategy to help the Andean nations adjust their economies, enforce > their laws, defeat terrorist organizations, and cut off the supply of > drugs, while -- as important -- we work to reduce the demand for drugs > in our own country. > > In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist > groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking > activities that help finance the operations of such groups. We are > working to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions and defeat > illegal armed groups of both the left and right by extending effective > sovereignty over the entire national territory and provide basic > security to the Colombian people. > > In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, > and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United > States -- preserving human dignity -- and our strategic priority -- > combating global terror. American interests and American principles, > therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an > African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity. > Together with our European allies, we must help strengthen Africa's > fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous > borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence > infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists. > > An ever more lethal environment exists in Africa as local civil wars > spread beyond borders to create regional war zones. Forming coalitions > of the willing and cooperative security arrangements are key to > confronting these emerging transnational threats. > > Africa's great size and diversity requires a security strategy that > focuses bilateral engagement, and builds coalitions of the willing. This > administration will focus on three interlocking strategies for the > region: > > * countries with major impact on their neighborhood such as South > Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia are anchors for regional engagement > and require focused attention; > > * coordination with European allies and international institutions is > essential for constructive conflict mediation and successful peace > operations; and > > * Africa's capable reforming states and sub-regional organizations > must be strengthened as the primary means to address transnational > threats on a sustained basis. > > > Ultimately the path of political and economic freedom presents the > surest route to progress in sub-Saharan Africa, where most wars are > conflicts over material resources and political access often tragically > waged on the basis of ethnic and religious difference. The transition to > the African Union with its stated commitment to good governance and a > common responsibility for democratic political systems offers > opportunities to strengthen democracy on the continent. > > V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends > with Weapons of Mass Destruction > > > "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and > technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear > weapons, along with ballistic missile technology -- when that occurs, > even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to > strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and > have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the > capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends -- and > we will oppose them with all our power." > > > > > > President Bush > West Point, New York > June 1, 2002 > > > > The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States -- with our > allies and friends -- to emphasize deterrence of the enemy's use of > force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the > collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security > environment has undergone profound transformation. > > Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our > relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the > balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear > arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as > counterterrorism and missile defense that until recently were > inconceivable. > > But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. > None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power > that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and > motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain > destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest > states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass > destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex > and dangerous. > > In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue > states that, while different in important ways, share a number of > attributes. These states: > > * brutalize their own people and squander their national resources > for the personal gain of the rulers; > > * display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, > and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; > > * are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with > other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively > to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; > > * sponsor terrorism around the globe; and > > * reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything > for which it stands. > > > At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq's > designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against > Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear > weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become > the world's principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested > increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. > Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as > well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has > become a looming threat to all nations. > > We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients > before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction > against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must > take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new > partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military > forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective > missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence > collection and analysis. > > Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes: > > * Proactive counterproliferation efforts. We must deter and defend > against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key > capabilities -- detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce > capabilities -- are integrated into our defense transformation and our > homeland security systems. Counterproliferation must also be integrated > into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of > our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed > adversaries. > > * Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and > terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies and expertise > necessary for weapons of mass destruction. We will enhance diplomacy, > arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction > assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD, and when > necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. We will > continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their > increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and > threat reduction programs. The recent G-8 agreement to commit up to $20 > billion to a global partnership against proliferation marks a major step > forward. > > * Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD > use, whether by terrorists or hostile states. Minimizing the effects of > WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such > weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading > enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. The United States > must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our > forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked. > > > It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of > this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the > United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have > in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy > of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be > caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. > We cannot let our enemies strike first. > > * In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we > faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an > effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of > retaliation is far less likely to work against leaders of rogue states > more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and > the wealth of their nations. > > * In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered > weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who > used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons > of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and > military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also > allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our > allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior > of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means > of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States. > > * Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a > terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the > targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death > and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between > states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to > action. > > > For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer > an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves > against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars > and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption > on the existence of an imminent threat -- most often a visible > mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. > > We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and > objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not > seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would > fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terrorism and, potentially, the use > of weapons of mass destruction -- weapons that can be easily concealed > and delivered covertly and without warning. > > The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian > population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law > of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, > mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and > these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired > and used weapons of mass destruction. > > The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions > to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the > threat, the greater is the risk of inaction -- and the more compelling > the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if > uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To > forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United > States will, if necessary, act preemptively. > > The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging > threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. > Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek > the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot > remain idle while dangers gather. > > We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our > actions. To support preemptive options, we will: > > * build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide > timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge; > > * coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the > most dangerous threats; and > > * continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to > conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results. > > > The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat > to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our > actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just. > > VI. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and > Free Trade. > > > "When nations close their markets and opportunity is hoarded by a > privileged few, no amount -- no amount -- of development aid is ever > enough. When nations respect their people, open markets, invest in > better health and education, every dollar of aid, every dollar of trade > revenue and domestic capital is used more effectively." > > > > > > President Bush > Monterrey, Mexico > March 22, 2002 > > > > A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing > prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth > supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher > incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs > economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it > reinforces the habits of liberty. > > We will promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond America's > shores. All governments are responsible for creating their own economic > policies and responding to their own economic challenge. We will use our > economic engagement with other countries to underscore the benefits of > policies that generate higher productivity and sustained economic > growth, including: > > * pro-growth legal and regulatory policies to encourage business > investment, innovation, and entrepreneurial activity; > > * tax policies -- particularly lower marginal tax rates -- that > improve incentives for work and investment; > > * rule of law and intolerance of corruption so that people are > confident that they will be able to enjoy the fruits of their economic > endeavors; > > * strong financial systems that allow capital to be put to its most > efficient use; > > * sound fiscal policies to support business activity; > > * investments in health and education that improve the well-being and > skills of the labor force and population as a whole; and > > * free trade that provides new avenues for growth and fosters the > diffusion of technologies and ideas that increase productivity and > opportunity. > > > The lessons of history are clear: market economies, not > command-and-control economies with the heavy hand of government, are the > best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty. Policies that further > strengthen market incentives and market institutions are relevant for > all economies -- industrialized countries, emerging markets, and the > developing world. > > A return to strong economic growth in Europe and Japan is vital to U.S. > national security interests. We want our allies to have strong economies > for their own sake, for the sake of the global economy, and for the sake > of global security. European efforts to remove structural barriers in > their economies are particularly important in this regard, as are > Japan's efforts to end deflation and address the problems of > non-performing loans in the Japanese banking system. We will continue to > use our regular consultations with Japan and our European partners -- > including through the Group of Seven (G-7) -- to discuss policies they > are adopting to promote growth in their economies and support higher > global economic growth. > > Improving stability in emerging markets is also key to global economic > growth. International flows of investment capital are needed to expand > the productive potential of these economies. These flows allow emerging > markets and developing countries to make the investments that raise > living standards and reduce poverty. Our long-term objective should be a > world in which all countries have investment-grade credit ratings that > allow them access to international capital markets and to invest in > their future. > > We are committed to policies that will help emerging markets achieve > access to larger capital flows at lower cost. To this end, we will > continue to pursue reforms aimed at reducing uncertainty in financial > markets. We will work actively with other countries, the International > Monetary Fund (IMF), and the private sector to implement the G-7 Action > Plan negotiated earlier this year for preventing financial crises and > more effectively resolving them when they occur. > > The best way to deal with financial crises is to prevent them from > occurring, and we have encouraged the IMF to improve its efforts doing > so. We will continue to work with the IMF to streamline the policy > conditions for its lending and to focus its lending strategy on > achieving economic growth through sound fiscal and monetary policy, > exchange rate policy, and financial sector policy. > > The concept of "free trade" arose as a moral principle even before it > became a pillar of economics. If you can make something that others > value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something > that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the > freedom for a person -- or a nation -- to make a living. To promote free > trade, the Unites States has developed a comprehensive strategy: > > * Seize the global initiative. The new global trade negotiations we > helped launch at Doha in November 2001 will have an ambitious agenda, > especially in agriculture, manufacturing, and services, targeted for > completion in 2005. The United States has led the way in completing the > accession of China and a democratic Taiwan to the World Trade > Organization. We will assist Russia's preparations to join the WTO. > > * Press regional initiatives. The United States and other democracies > in the Western Hemisphere have agreed to create the Free Trade Area of > the Americas, targeted for completion in 2005. This year the United > States will advocate market-access negotiations with its partners, > targeted on agriculture, industrial goods, services, investment, and > government procurement. We will also offer more opportunity to the > poorest continent, Africa, starting with full use of the preferences > allowed in the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and leading to free > trade. > > * Move ahead with bilateral free trade agreements. Building on the > free trade agreement with Jordan enacted in 2001, the Administration > will work this year to complete free trade agreements with Chile and > Singapore. Our aim is to achieve free trade agreements with a mix of > developed and developing countries in all regions of the world. > Initially, Central America, Southern Africa, Morocco, and Australia will > be our principal focal points. > > * Renew the executive-congressional partnership. Every > administration's trade strategy depends on a productive partnership with > Congress. After a gap of 8 years, the Administration reestablished > majority support in the Congress for trade liberalization by passing > Trade Promotion Authority and the other market opening measures for > developing countries in the Trade Act of 2002. This Administration will > work with Congress to enact new bilateral, regional, and global trade > agreements that will be concluded under the recently passed Trade > Promotion Authority. > > * Promote the connection between trade and development. Trade > policies can help developing countries strengthen property rights, > competition, the rule of law, investment, the spread of knowledge, open > societies, the efficient allocation of resources, and regional > integration -- all leading to growth, opportunity, and confidence in > developing countries. The United States is implementing The Africa > Growth and Opportunity Act to provide market-access for nearly all goods > produced in the 35 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. We will make more > use of this act and its equivalent for the Caribbean Basin and continue > to work with multilateral and regional institutions to help poorer > countries take advantage of these opportunities. Beyond market access, > the most important area where trade intersects with poverty is in public > health. We will ensure that the WTO intellectual property rules are > flexible enough to allow developing nations to gain access to critical > medicines for extraordinary dangers like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and > malaria. > > * Enforce trade agreements and laws against unfair practices. > Commerce depends on the rule of law; international trade depends on > enforceable agreements. Our top priorities are to resolve ongoing > disputes with the European Union, Canada, and Mexico and to make a > global effort to address new technology, science, and health regulations > that needlessly impede farm exports and improved agriculture. Laws > against unfair trade practices are often abused, but the international > community must be able to address genuine concerns about government > subsidies and dumping. International industrial espionage which > undermines fair competition must be detected and deterred. > > * Help domestic industries and workers adjust. There is a sound > statutory framework for these transitional safeguards which we have used > in the agricultural sector and which we are using this year to help the > American steel industry. The benefits of free trade depend upon the > enforcement of fair trading practices. These safeguards help ensure that > the benefits of free trade do not come at the expense of American > workers. Trade adjustment assistance will help workers adapt to the > change and dynamism of open markets. > > * Protect the environment and workers. The United States must foster > economic growth in ways that will provide a better life along with > widening prosperity. We will incorporate labor and environmental > concerns into U.S. trade negotiations, creating a healthy "network" > between multilateral environmental agreements with the WTO, and use the > International Labor Organization, trade preference programs, and trade > talks to improve working conditions in conjunction with freer trade. > > * Enhance energy security. We will strengthen our own energy security > and the shared prosperity of the global economy by working with our > allies, trading partners, and energy producers to expand the sources and > types of global energy supplied, especially in the Western Hemisphere, > Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. We will also continue to > work with our partners to develop cleaner and more energy efficient > technologies. > > > Economic growth should be accompanied by global efforts to stabilize > greenhouse gas concentrations associated with this growth, containing > them at a level that prevents dangerous human interference with the > global climate. Our overall objective is to reduce America's greenhouse > gas emissions relative to the size of our economy, cutting such > emissions per unit of economic activity by 18 percent over the next 10 > years, by the year 2012. Our strategies for attaining this goal will be > to: > > * remain committed to the basic U.N. Framework Convention for > international cooperation; > > * obtain agreements with key industries to cut emissions of some of > the most potent greenhouse gases and give transferable credits to > companies that can show real cuts; > > * develop improved standards for measuring and registering emission > reductions; > > * promote renewable energy production and clean coal technology, as > well as nuclear power -- which produces no greenhouse gas emissions, > while also improving fuel economy for U.S. cars and trucks; > > * increase spending on research and new conservation technologies, to > a total of $4.5 billion -- the largest sum being spent on climate change > by any country in the world and a $700 million increase over last year's > budget; and > > * assist developing countries, especially the major greenhouse gas > emitters such as China and India, so that they will have the tools and > resources to join this effort and be able to grow along a cleaner and > better path. > > > VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building > the Infrastructure of Democracy > > > "In World War II we fought to make the world safer, then worked to > rebuild it. As we wage war today to keep the world safe from terror, we > must also work to make the world a better place for all its citizens." > > > > > > President Bush > Washington, D.C. (Inter-American > Development Bank) > March 14, 2002 > > > > A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human > race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable. Including > all of the world's poor in an expanding circle of development -- and > opportunity -- is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities of > U.S. international policy. > > Decades of massive development assistance have failed to spur economic > growth in the poorest countries. Worse, development aid has often served > to prop up failed policies, relieving the pressure for reform and > perpetuating misery. Results of aid are typically measured in dollars > spent by donors, not in the rates of growth and poverty reduction > achieved by recipients. These are the indicators of a failed strategy. > > Working with other nations, the United States is confronting this > failure. We forged a new consensus at the U.N. Conference on Financing > for Development in Monterrey that the objectives of assistance -- and > the strategies to achieve those objectives -- must change. > > This Administration's goal is to help unleash the productive potential > of individuals in all nations. Sustained growth and poverty reduction is > impossible without the right national policies. Where governments have > implemented real policy changes we will provide significant new levels > of assistance. The United States and other developed countries should > set an ambitious and specific target: to double the size of the world's > poorest economies within a decade. > > The United States Government will pursue these major strategies to > achieve this goal: > > * Provide resources to aid countries that have met the challenge of > national reform. We propose a 50 percent increase in the core > development assistance given by the United States. While continuing our > present programs, including humanitarian assistance based on need alone, > these billions of new dollars will form a new Millennium Challenge > Account for projects in countries whose governments rule justly, invest > in their people, and encourage economic freedom. Governments must fight > corruption, respect basic human rights, embrace the rule of law, invest > in health care and education, follow responsible economic policies, and > enable entrepreneurship. The Millennium Challenge Account will reward > countries that have demonstrated real policy change and challenge those > that have not to implement reforms. > > * Improve the effectiveness of the World Bank and other development > banks in raising living standards. The United States is committed to a > comprehensive reform agenda for making the World Bank and the other > multilateral development banks more effective in improving the lives of > the world's poor. We have reversed the downward trend in U.S. > contributions and proposed an 18 percent increase in the U.S. > contributions to the International Development Association (IDA) -- the > World Bank's fund for the poorest countries -- and the African > Development Fund. The key to raising living standards and reducing > poverty around the world is increasing productivity growth, especially > in the poorest countries. We will continue to press the multilateral > development banks to focus on activities that increase economic > productivity, such as improvements in education, health, rule of law, > and private sector development. Every project, every loan, every grant > must be judged by how much it will increase productivity growth in > developing countries. > > * Insist upon measurable results to ensure that development > assistance is actually making a difference in the lives of the world's > poor. When it comes to economic development, what really matters is that > more children are getting a better education, more people have access to > health care and clean water, or more workers can find jobs to make a > better future for their families. We have a moral obligation to measure > the success of our development assistance by whether it is delivering > results. For this reason, we will continue to demand that our own > development assistance as well as assistance from the multilateral > development banks has measurable goals and concrete benchmarks for > achieving those goals. Thanks to U.S. leadership, the recent IDA > replenishment agreement will establish a monitoring and evaluation > system that measures recipient countries' progress. For the first time, > donors can link a portion of their contributions to IDA to the > achievement of actual development results, and part of the U.S. > contribution is linked in this way. We will strive to make sure that the > World Bank and other multilateral development banks build on this > progress so that a focus on results is an integral part of everything > that these institutions do. > > * Increase the amount of development assistance that is provided in > the form of grants instead of loans. Greater use of results-based grants > is the best way to help poor countries make productive investments, > particularly in the social sectors, without saddling them with > ever-larger debt burdens. As a result of U.S. leadership, the recent IDA > agreement provided for significant increases in grant funding for the > poorest countries for education, HIV/AIDS, health, nutrition, water, > sanitation, and other human needs. Our goal is to build on that progress > by increasing the use of grants at the other multilateral development > banks. We will also challenge universities, nonprofits, and the private > sector to match government efforts by using grants to support > development projects that show results. > > * Open societies to commerce and investment. Trade and investment are > the real engines of economic growth. Even if government aid increases, > most money for development must come from trade, domestic capital, and > foreign investment. An effective strategy must try to expand these flows > as well. Free markets and free trade are key priorities of our national > security strategy. > > * Secure public health. The scale of the public health crisis in poor > countries is enormous. In countries afflicted by epidemics and pandemics > like HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, growth and development will be > threatened until these scourges can be contained. Resources from the > developed world are necessary but will be effective only with honest > governance, which supports prevention programs and provides effective > local infrastructure. The United States has strongly backed the new > global fund for HIV/AIDS organized by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan > and its focus on combining prevention with a broad strategy for > treatment and care. The United States already contributes more than > twice as much money to such efforts as the next largest donor. If the > global fund demonstrates its promise, we will be ready to give even more. > > * Emphasize education. Literacy and learning are the foundation of > democracy and development. Only about 7 percent of World Bank resources > are devoted to education. This proportion should grow. The United States > will increase its own funding for education assistance by at least 20 > percent with an emphasis on improving basic education and teacher > training in Africa. The United States can also bring information > technology to these societies, many of whose education systems have been > devastated by AIDS. > > * Continue to aid agricultural development. New technologies, > including biotechnology, have enormous potential to improve crop yields > in developing countries while using fewer pesticides and less water. > Using sound science, the United States should help bring these benefits > to the 800 million people, including 300 million children, who still > suffer from hunger and malnutrition. > > > VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers > of Global Power > > > "We have our best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th > century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead > of prepare for war." > > > > > > President Bush > West Point, New York > June 1, 2002 > > > > America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions -- as > broad as practicable -- of states able and willing to promote a balance > of power that favors freedom. Effective coalition leadership requires > clear priorities, an appreciation of others' interests, and consistent > consultations among partners with a spirit of humility. > > There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can > accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies > and friends in Canada and Europe. Europe is also the seat of two of the > strongest and most able international institutions in the world: the > North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has, since its > inception, been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European > security, and the European Union (EU), our partner in opening world > trade. > > The attacks of September 11 were also an attack on NATO, as NATO itself > recognized when it invoked its Article V self-defense clause for the > first time. NATO's core mission -- collective defense of the > transatlantic alliance of democracies -- remains, but NATO must develop > new structures and capabilities to carry out that mission under new > circumstances. NATO must build a capability to field, at short notice, > highly mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are needed to > respond to a threat against any member of the alliance. > > The alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, > creating coalitions under NATO's own mandate, as well as contributing to > mission-based coalitions. To achieve this, we must: > > * expand NATO's membership to those democratic nations willing and > able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests; > > * ensure that the military forces of NATO nations have appropriate > combat contributions to make in coalition warfare; > > * develop planning processes to enable those contributions to become > effective multinational fighting forces; > > * take advantage of the technological opportunities and economies of > scale in our defense spending to transform NATO military forces so that > they dominate potential aggressors and diminish our vulnerabilities; > > * streamline and increase the flexibility of command structures to > meet new operational demands and the associated requirements of > training, integrating, and experimenting with new force configurations; > and > > * maintain the ability to work and fight together as allies even as > we take the necessary steps to transform and modernize our forces. > > > If NATO succeeds in enacting these changes, the rewards will be a > partnership as central to the security and interests of its member > states as was the case during the Cold War. We will sustain a common > perspective on the threats to our societies and improve our ability to > take common action in defense of our nations and their interests. At the > same time, we welcome our European allies' efforts to forge a greater > foreign policy and defense identity with the EU, and commit ourselves to > close consultations to ensure that these developments work with NATO. We > cannot afford to lose this opportunity to better prepare the family of > transatlantic democracies for the challenges to come. > > The attacks of September 11 energized America's Asian alliances. > Australia invoked the ANZUS Treaty to declare the September 11 was an > attack on Australia itself, following that historic decision with the > dispatch of some of the world's finest combat forces for Operation > Enduring Freedom. Japan and the Republic of Korea provided unprecedented > levels of military logistical support within weeks of the terrorist > attack. We have deepened cooperation on counter-terrorism with our > alliance partners in Thailand and the Philippines and received > invaluable assistance from close friends like Singapore and New Zealand. > > The war against terrorism has proven that America's alliances in Asia > not only underpin regional peace and stability, but are flexible and > ready to deal with new challenges. To enhance our Asian alliances and > friendships, we will: > > > * look to Japan to continue forging a leading role in regional and > global affairs based on our common interests, our common values, and our > close defense and diplomatic cooperation; > > * work with South Korea to maintain vigilance towards the North while > preparing our alliance to make contributions to the broader stability of > the region over the longer-term; > > * build on 50 years of U.S.-Australian alliance cooperation as we > continue working together to resolve regional and global problems -- as > we have so many times from the Battle of Leyte Gulf to Tora Bora; > > * maintain forces in the region that reflect our commitments to our > allies, our requirements, our technological advances, and the strategic > environment; and > > * build on stability provided by these alliances, as well as with > institutions such as ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation > forum, to develop a mix of regional and bilateral strategies to manage > change in this dynamic region. > > > We are attentive to the possible renewal of old patterns of great power > competition. Several potential great powers are now in the midst of > internal transition -- most importantly Russia, India, and China. In all > three cases, recent developments have encouraged our hope that a truly > global consensus about basic principles is slowly taking shape. > > With Russia, we are already building a new strategic relationship based > on a central reality of the twenty-first century: the United States and > Russia are no longer strategic adversaries. The Moscow Treaty on > Strategic Reductions is emblematic of this new reality and reflects a > critical change in Russian thinking that promises to lead to productive, > long-term relations with the Euro-Atlantic community and the United > States. Russia's top leaders have a realistic assessment of their > country's current weakness and the policies -- internal and external -- > needed to reverse those weaknesses. They understand, increasingly, that > Cold War approaches do not serve their national interests and that > Russian and American strategic interests overlap in many areas. > > United States policy seeks to use this turn in Russian thinking to > refocus our relationship on emerging and potential common interests and > challenges. We are broadening our already extensive cooperation in the > global war on terrorism. We are facilitating Russia's entry into the > World Trade Organization, without lowering standards for accession, to > promote beneficial bilateral trade and investment relations. We have > created the NATO-Russia Council with the goal of deepening security > cooperation among Russia, our European allies, and ourselves. We will > continue to bolster the independence and stability of the states of the > former Soviet Union in the belief that a prosperous and stable > neighborhood will reinforce Russia's growing commitment to integration > into the Euro-Atlantic community. > > At the same time, we are realistic about the differences that still > divide us from Russia and about the time and effort it will take to > build an enduring strategic partnership. Lingering distrust of our > motives and policies by key Russian elites slows improvement in our > relations. Russia's uneven commitment to the basic values of free-market > democracy and dubious record in combating the proliferation of weapons > of mass destruction remain matters of great concern. Russia's very > weakness limits the opportunities for cooperation. Nevertheless, those > opportunities are vastly greater now than in recent years -- or even > decades. > > The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral > relationship with India based on a conviction that U.S. interests > require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest > democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative > government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We > have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through > the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest > in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia. > > Differences remain, including over the development of India's nuclear > and missile programs, and the pace of India's economic reforms. But > while in the past these concerns may have dominated our thinking about > India, today we start with a view of India as a growing world power with > which we have common strategic interests. Through a strong partnership > with India, we can best address any differences and shape a dynamic > future. > > The United States relationship with China is an important part of our > strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific > region. We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous > China. The democratic development of China is crucial to that future. > Yet, a quarter century after beginning the process of shedding the worst > features of the Communist legacy, China's leaders have not yet made the > next series of fundamental choices about the character of their state. > In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its > neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated > path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national > greatness. In time, China will find that social and political freedom is > the only source of that greatness. > > The United States seeks a constructive relationship with a changing > China. We already cooperate well where our interests overlap, including > the current war on terrorism and in promoting stability on the Korean > peninsula. Likewise, we have coordinated on the future of Afghanistan > and have initiated a comprehensive dialogue on counter-terrorism and > similar transitional concerns. Shared health and environmental threats, > such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, challenge us to promote jointly the > welfare of our citizens. > > Addressing these transnational threats will challenge China to become > more open with information, promote the development of civil society, > and enhance individual human rights. China has begun to take the road to > political openness, permitting many personal freedoms and conducting > village-level elections, yet remains strongly committed to national > one-party rule by the Communist Party. To make that nation truly > accountable to its citizen's needs and aspirations, however, much work > remains to be done. Only by allowing the Chinese people to think, > assemble, and worship freely can China reach its full potential. > > Our important trade relationship will benefit from China's entry into > the World Trade Organization, which will create more export > opportunities and ultimately more jobs for American farmers, workers, > and companies. China is our fourth largest trading partner, with over > $100 billion in annual two-way trade. The power of market principles and > the WTO's requirements for transparency and accountability will advance > openness and the rule of law in China to help establish basic > protections for commerce and for citizens. There are, however, other > areas in which we have profound disagreements. Our commitment to the > self-defense of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act is one. Human > rights is another. We expect China to adhere to its nonproliferation > commitments. We will work to narrow differences where they exist, but > not allow them to preclude cooperation where we agree. > > The events of September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the context for > relations between the United States and other main centers of global > power, and opened vast, new opportunities. With our long-standing allies > in Europe and Asia, and with leaders in Russia, India, and China, we > must develop active agendas of cooperation lest these relationships > become routine and unproductive. > > Every agency of the United States Government shares the challenge. We > can build fruitful habits of consultation, quiet argument, sober > analysis, and common action. In the long-term, these are the practices > that will sustain the supremacy of our common principles and keep open > the path of progress. > > IX. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the > Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century > > > "Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not touch > its source. America is successful because of the hard work, creativity, > and enterprise of our people." > > > > > > President Bush > Washington, D.C. (Joint Session of Congress) > September 20, 2001 > > > > The major institutions of American national security were designed in a > different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be > transformed. > > It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. > We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our military's > highest priority is to defend the United States. To do so effectively, > our military must: > > * assure our allies and friends; > > * dissuade future military competition; > > * deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and > > * decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. > > > The unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and their > forward presence, have maintained the peace in some of the world's most > strategically vital regions. However, the threats and enemies we must > confront have changed, and so must our forces. A military structured to > deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on > how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might > occur. We will channel our energies to overcome a host of operational > challenges. > > The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound > symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends. Through our > willingness to use force in our own defense and in defense of others, > the United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of > power that favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the > many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases > and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as > well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment > of U.S. forces. > > Before the war in Afghanistan, that area was low on the list of major > planning contingencies. Yet, in a very short time, we had to operate > across the length and breadth of that remote nation, using every branch > of the armed forces. We must prepare for more such deployments by > developing assets such as advanced remote sensing, long-range precision > strike capabilities, and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces. > This broad portfolio of military capabilities must also include the > ability to defend the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure > U.S. access to distant theaters, and protect critical U.S. > infrastructure and assets in outer space. > > Innovation within the armed forces will rest on experimentation with new > approaches to warfare, strengthening joint operations, exploiting U.S. > intelligence advantages, and taking full advantage of science and > technology. We must also transform the way the Department of Defense is > run, especially in financial management and recruitment and retention. > Finally, while maintaining near-term readiness and the ability to fight > the war on terrorism, the goal must be to provide the President with a > wider range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of > coercion against the United States, our allies, and our friends. > > We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from > experience that some enemies cannot be deterred. The United States must > and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy -- > whether a state or non-state actor -- to impose its will on the United > States, our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces > sufficient to support our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces > will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a > military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the > United States. > > Intelligence -- and how we use it -- is our first line of defense > against terrorists and the threat posed by hostile states. Designed > around the priority of gathering enormous information about a massive, > fixed object -- the Soviet bloc -- the intelligence community is coping > with the challenge of following a far more complex and elusive set of > targets. > > We must transform our intelligence capabilities and build new ones to > keep pace with the nature of these threats. Intelligence must be > appropriately integrated with our defense and law enforcement systems > and coordinated with our allies and friends. We need to protect the > capabilities we have so that we do not arm our enemies with the > knowledge of how best to surprise us. Those who would harm us also seek > the benefit of surprise to limit our prevention and response options and > to maximize injury. > > We must strengthen intelligence warning and analysis to provide > integrated threat assessments for national and homeland security. Since > the threats inspired by foreign governments and groups may be conducted > inside the United States, we must also ensure the proper fusion of > information between intelligence and law enforcement. > > Initiatives in this area will include: > > * strengthening the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence > to lead the development and actions of the Nation's foreign intelligence > capabilities; > > * establishing a new framework for intelligence warning that provides > seamless and integrated warning across the spectrum of threats facing > the nation and our allies; > > * continuing to develop new methods of collecting information to > sustain our intelligence advantage; > > * investing in future capabilities while working to protect them > through a more vigorous effort to prevent the compromise of intelligence > capabilities; and > > * collecting intelligence against the terrorist danger across the > government with all-source analysis. > > > As the United States Government relies on the armed forces to defend > America's interests, it must rely on diplomacy to interact with other > nations. We will ensure that the Department of State receives funding > sufficient to ensure the success of American diplomacy. The State > Department takes the lead in managing our bilateral relationships with > other governments. And in this new era, its people and institutions must > be able to interact equally adroitly with non-governmental organizations > and international institutions. Officials trained mainly in > international politics must also extend their reach to understand > complex issues of domestic governance around the world, including public > health, education, law enforcement, the judiciary, and public diplomacy. > > Our diplomats serve at the front line of complex negotiations, civil > wars, and other humanitarian catastrophes. As humanitarian relief > requirements are better understood, we must also be able to help build > police forces, court systems, and legal codes, local and provincial > government institutions, and electoral systems. Effective international > cooperation is needed to accomplish these goals, backed by American > readiness to play our part. > > Just as our diplomatic institutions must adapt so that we can reach out > to others, we also need a different and more comprehensive approach to > public information efforts that can help people around the world learn > about and understand America. The war on terrorism is not a clash of > civilizations. It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, > a battle for the future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideas > and this is an area where America must excel. > > We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet > our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired > by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the > International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend > to Americans and which we do not accept. We will work together with > other nations to avoid complications in our military operations and > cooperation, through such mechanisms as multilateral and bilateral > agreements that will protect U.S. nationals from the ICC. We will > implement fully the American Servicemembers Protection Act, whose > provisions are intended to ensure and enhance the protection of U.S. > personnel and officials. > > We will make hard choices in the coming year and beyond to ensure the > right level and allocation of government spending on national security. > The United States Government must strengthen its defenses to win this > war. At home, our most important priority is to protect the homeland for > the American people. > > Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is > diminishing. In a globalized world, events beyond America's borders have > a greater impact inside them. Our society must be open to people, ideas, > and goods from across the globe. The characteristics we most cherish -- > our freedom, our cities, our systems of movement, and modern life -- are > vulnerable to terrorism. This vulnerability will persist long after we > bring to justice those responsible for the September eleventh attacks. > As time passes, individuals may gain access to means of destruction that > until now could be wielded only by armies, fleets, and squadrons. This > is a new condition of life. We will adjust to it and thrive -- in spite > of it. > > In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment, and > interests of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act > apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require. When we > disagree on particulars, we will explain forthrightly the grounds for > our concerns and strive to forge viable alternatives. We will not allow > such disagreements to obscure our determination to secure together, with > our allies and our friends, our shared fundamental interests and values. > > Ultimately, the foundation of American strength is at home. It is in the > skills of our people, the dynamism of our economy, and the resilience of > our institutions. A diverse, modern society has inherent, ambitious, > entrepreneurial energy. Our strength comes from what we do with that > energy. That is where our national security begins. >


On Tue, Oct 08, 2002 at 11:51:54AM -0700, Elias wrote: > So, given the apparent commonality of these occurances, companies appear > to be losing a large amount of money by mailing these tiny checks out. > Why can't they simply credit the account in question on the next bill? > Granted, if an account has been closed there is no such option... I've been waiting for Hettinga to regale us with one of his well-tuned micro-cash-bearer-settlement-geodesic-finance rants. Bob, you are SO disappointing me. -- njl


Checking with New Day, though we could do both on Wednesday. Or should I pitch DWS on Bartiromo for Thurs/Fri? On Apr 25, 2016, at 11:23 AM, Miranda, Luis > wrote: Do we have any option of having her on CNN New Day on Wednesday? I would prioritize that. Luis Miranda, Communications Director Democratic National Committee 202-863-8148 – MirandaL@dnc.org - @MiraLuisDC From: Manriquez, Pablo Sent: Monday, April 25, 2016 11:22 AM To: Miranda, Luis; Paustenbach, Mark; Walker, Eric Subject: Request - DWS//BARTIROMO//WEDS Morning WHO: DWS and Maria Bartiromo WHAT: One on one live interview to recap Super Tuesday for "Mornings with Maria" on Fox Business. WHEN: 8 o'clock hour AM EST on Wednesday, 27 April WHERE: At our convenience. Pablo Manriquez Democratic National Committee Phone: 202.572.5488 Email: pablo@dnc.org web: democrats.org Twitter: @Pablo_DNC Pablo Manriquez Democratic National Committee Phone: 202.572.5488 Email: pablo@dnc.org web: democrats.org Twitter: @Pablo_DNC


Hi Phil I am sure you know that this is not about the science. It is an attack to undermine the science in some way. In that regard I don't think you can ignore it all, as Mike suggests as one option, but the response should try to somehow label these guys and lazy and incompetent and unable to do the huge amount of work it takes to construct such a database. Indeed technology and data handling capabilities have evolved and not everything was saved. So my feeble suggestion is to indeed cast aspersions on their motives and throw in some counter rhetoric. Labeling them as lazy with nothng better to do seems like a good thing to do. How about "I tried to get some data from McIntyre from his 1990 paper, but I was unable because he doesn't have such a paper because he has not done any constructive work!" There is no basis for retracting a paper given in Keenan's message. One may have to offer a correction that a particular sentence was not correct if it claimed something that indeed was not so. But some old instrumental data are like paleo data, and can only be used with caution as the metadata do not exist. It doesn't mean they are worthless and can not be used. Offering to make a correction to a few words in a paper in a trivial manner will undermine his case. Kevin > Hi Phil, > > This is all too predictable. This crowd of charlatans is always looking > for one thing they can harp on, where people w/ little knowledge of the > facts might be able to be convinced that there is a controversy. They > can't take on the whole of the science, so they look for one little > thing they can say is wrong, and thus generalize that the science is > entirely compromised. Of course, as nicely shown in the SPM, every > landmass is independently warming, and much as the models predict. So > they can harp all they want on one Chinese data set, it couldn't > possibly change the big picture (let alone even the trends for China). The > > So they are simply hoping to blow this up to something that looks like a > legitimate controversy. The last thing you want to do is help them by > feeding the fire. Best thing is to ignore them completely. They no > longer have their friends in power here in the U.S., and the media has > become entirely unsympathetic to the rants of the contrarians at least > in the U.S.--the Wall Street Journal editorial page are about the only > place they can broadcast their disinformation. So in other words, for > contrarians the environment appears to have become very unfavorable for > development. I would advise Wang the same way. Keenan may or may not be > bluffing, but if he tries this I believe that British law would make it > easy for Wang to win a defamation suit against him (the burden is much > tougher in the states), > > mike > > Phil Jones wrote: >> >> Kevin, >> Have a look at this web site. I see you're away. >> The websites can wait, but scroll down to the letter below >> from Keenan - the last sentence. >> >> #comments >> >> and >> >> #more-1479 >> >> One is about data from a paper 17 years ago (Jones et al. 1990) >> >> Also there is this email (below) sent to Wei-Chyung Wang, who was >> one of the co-authors on the 1990 paper. Wei-Chyung is in >> China, and may not yet have seen this. When he's back in >> Albany, I've suggested he talks to someone there. It is >> all malicious. I've cc'd this to Ben and Mike as well, to get >> any thoughts from their experiences. >> >> If it gets worse I will bring Susan in as well, but I'm talking >> to some people at UEA first. Susan has enough to do >> with getting the AR4 WG1 volume out. >> >> On the 1990 paper, I have put the locations and the data for >> the rural stations used in the paper on the CRU website. All >> the language is about me not being able to send them the >> station data used for the grids (as used in 1990!). I don't >> have this information, as we have much more data now >> (much more in Australia and China than then) and probably >> more stations in western USSR are as well. >> >> As for the other request, I don't have the information on >> the sources of all the sites used in the CRUTEM3 database. >> We are adding in new datasets regularly (all of NZ from >> Jim Renwick recently) , but we don't keep a source code >> for each station. Almost all sites have multiple sources and >> only a few sites have single sources. I know things roughly >> by country and could reconstruct it, but it would take a while. >> >> GHCN and NCAR don't have source codes either. It does >> all come from the NMSs - well mostly, but some from >> scientists. >> >> A lot of the issues are in various papers, but they never >> read these. Also certainly no use talking to them. >> >> In Geneva all week. David Parker and Tom Peterson will >> be there. I can live with the web site abuse, but the Keenan >> letter knocked me back a bit. >> >> I seem to be the marked man now ! >> >> Cheers >> Phil >> >> >> >> >> From: "D.J. Keenan" >> To: "Wei-Chyung Wang" >> Cc: "Phil Jones" >> Subject: retraction request >> Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2007 13:31:15 +0100 >> X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.3028 >> X-UEA-Spam-Score: 0.0 >> X-UEA-Spam-Level: / >> X-UEA-Spam-Flag: NO >> >> Dear Dr. Wang, >> Regarding the Chinese meteorological data analyzed by Wang et al. >> [GRL, 1990] and Jones et al. [Nature, 1990], it now seems clear that >> there are severe problems. In particular, the data was obtained from >> 84 meteorological stations that can be classified as follows. >> 49 have no histories 08 have inconsistent histories 18 have >> substantial relocations 02 have single-year relocations 07 have >> no relocations Furthermore, some of the relocations are very >> distant--over 20 km. >> Others are to greatly different environments, as illustrated here: >> #comment-102970 >> >> The above contradicts the published claim to have considered the >> histories of the stations, especially for the 49 stations that have no >> histories. Yet the claim is crucial for the research conclusions. >> >> I e-mailed you about this on April 11th. I also phoned you on April >> 13th: you said that you were in a meeting and would get back to me. I >> have received no response. >> >> I ask you to retract your GRL paper, in full, and to retract the >> claims made in Nature about the Chinese data. If you do not do so, I >> intend to publicly submit an allegation of research misconduct to your >> university at Albany. >> >> >> Douglas J. Keenan >>  >> phone + 44 20 7537 4122 >> The Limehouse Cut, London E14 6N, UK >> >> >> >> >> Prof. Phil Jones >> Climatic Research Unit Telephone +44 (0) 1603 592090 >> School of Environmental Sciences Fax +44 (0) 1603 507784 >> University of East Anglia >> Norwich Email p.jones@uea.ac.uk >> NR4 7TJ >> UK >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > > > -- > Michael E. Mann > Associate Professor > Director, Earth System Science Center (ESSC) > > Department of Meteorology Phone: (814) 863-4075 > 503 Walker Building FAX: (814) 865-3663 > The Pennsylvania State University email: mann@psu.edu > University Park, PA 16802-5013 > >  > > ___________________ Kevin Trenberth Climate Analysis Section, NCAR PO Box 3000 Boulder CO 80307 ph 303 497 1318


Credit Union is constantly working to ensure security by regularly screening the accounts in our system. We recently reviewed your account, and we need more information to help us provide you with secure service. Until we can collect this information, your access to sensitive account features will be limited. We would like to restore your access as soon as possible, and we apologize for the inconvenience. Why is my account access limited? Your account access has been limited for the following reason(s): * We would like to ensure that your account was not accessed by an unauthorized third party. Because protecting the security of your account is our primary concern, we have limited access to sensitive Credit Union account features. We understand that this may be an inconvenience but please understand that this temporary limitation is for your protection. (Your case ID for this reason is FCU1-878-274-267906.) At Credit Union, one of our most important responsibilities to you, our customer, is the safekeeping of the nonpublic personal ("confidential") information you have entrusted to us and using this information in a responsible manner. Appropriate use of the confidential information you provide us is also at the heart of our ability to provide you with exceptional personal service whenever you contact us. How can I restore my account access? Please confirm your identity here: Restore My Online Banking and complete the "Steps to Remove Limitations." Completing all of the checklist items will automatically restore your account access.


eBay Unpaid Item Dispute #25000521881 - response required Dear eBay Member, eBay member clintonmomo (533) already paid for item #25000521881 and never receive it. Please respond. Review the submitted details regarding the payment. Regards,eBay International


Grazie! -- Alessandro Scarafile Field Application Engineer Sent from my mobile.   From : Antonella Capaldo Sent : Friday, August 29, 2014 11:58 AM To : Alessandro Scarafile Subject : pacco x te       Antonella Capaldo Administrative Support   Hacking Team Milan Singapore Washington DC www.hackingteam.com email:  a.capaldo@hackingteam.com mobile:+39 3667216471 phone: +39 0229060603   --


Untitled Document Re-activate your Online Security Access by Clicking on sign in, in your Online Banking page for quick and easy process. Access Online Banking Here Thanks for taking the time to learn about our upcoming plan for Enhanced Online Security - it's one more way that Barclays Building Society online banking can make your online banking experience better. Endeavour to fill in your Memorable word correctly.