**Εξτερναλισμός** είναι η άποψη ότι το περιεχόμενο μιας νοητικής κατάστασης δεν καθορίζεται μόνο από ότι βρίσκεται μέσα στο κεφάλι αυτού που τη σκέφτεται, αλλά από αυτό στο οποίο η νοητική κατάσταση αναφέρεται, δηλαδή εξαρτάται από (η και) εξωτερικούς παράγοντες. «Το νοητικό περιεχόμενο δεν είναι μόνο μέσα στο κεφάλι» (εξτερναλισμός).

Πηγές
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* Αμαλία Τσακίρη *Εξτερναλισμός και αντιληπτικό περιεχόμενο*. Ε.Κ.Π.Α - Αιτιολογημένη Πρόταση Διδακτορικών Σπουδών 2011.

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