Summarize the following court judgment. ivil Appeal No. 1552 of 1966. 735 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 8	 1966 of the Mysore High Court in C.R.P. No. 1118 of 1964. M. C. Chagla and R. Gopalakrishnan	 for the appellant. M. R. Ramamurthi	 section section Javali and M. Veerappa	 for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidailyngam J. this appeal	 by special leave	 is against the judgment of the Mysore High Court	 dated June 8	 1966 in Civil Revision Petition No. 1118 of 1964. The respondent land lord filed an application	 dated July 6	 1962 under section 21 (1) (j) of the Mysore Rent Control Act	 1961 (Mysore Act XXII of 1961) (hereinafter called the Act) before the Rent Controller for eviction of the tenants (the appellants herein) on the ground that the premises were reasonably and bonafide required by him for the immediate purpose of demolishing and erecting of a new building. According to the respondent the premises were old and were (not suitable for continued occupation. The respondent had also stated in his application that he had obtained the necessary licence for erecting a new building after demolition of the existing building and that he had made all preparations for demolition and erection of new buildings on the site. The appellant tenant contested the claim of the landlord on several grounds. He pleaded that the premises were not old and that it was quite suitable for occupation and it does not require any re construction or remodelling. The allegations that the building was old and required to be reconstructed were not bona fide and had been made by the landlord only as a pretext for evicting the tenant. The tenant further pleaded that the requirement of the landlord was neither reasonable nor bona fide. In any event	 the tenant claimed that he should be entitled to be paid the value of the improvements that had been effected by him. The Rent Controller	 by his order dated January 22	 1964 accepted the claim of the respondent and ordered eviction of the appellant granting the tenant one month 's time for delivering vacant possession. Though the Consulting Engineer who gave evidence as P.W. 2 on behalf of the respondent had stated that the building was over 60 years old but nevertheless it could go co for about 15 years more	 the Rent Controller actually found that the building was more than 50 years old and that it was an old fashioned one. He further found that when the landlord desired to pull it down and put up a modern building thereon	 it could not under the circumstances	 be said that his claim was not bona fide or reasonable 736 and that the intention of the landlord in pulling down the building and erecting a new one to get a better return was certainly understandable. The Rent Controller further found that the landlord had proved that he had sufficient means to construct the building and that he had also obtained the necessary sanction from the Municipality concerned for reconstruction of the building. In view of all these circumstances	 the Rent Controller found that the requirement of the landlord was quite reasonable and bona fide. Regarding the claim of the tenant for payment of improvements before eviction is ordered	 the Rent Controller found that such a claim	 even if established	 could not stand in the way of the landlord getting possession of the premises. Ultimately the application filed by the landlord was allowed. The findings recorded by the Rent Controller were confirmed by the learned District Judge	 by his judgment dated October 19	 1964 in A.S. No. 43 of 1964 taken before him by the tenant. The revision filed by the appellant before the High Court was rejected by order dated June 8	 1966. Mr. Chagla	 learned counsel appearing for the appellant	 contended that the interpretation placed by all the Courts on section 21 (j) of the Act was erroneous. According to the learned counsel	 unless the landlord was able to establish that the condition of the building was such that it required immediate demolition and re construction	 no eviction of the tenant could be ordered under section 21 (1) (j) of the Act. On the findings of the Courts	 based upon the evidence of the Engineer	 that though the building was old it could continue to exist for another 15 years	 it should have been held that the conditions mentioned in section 21 (I) (j) were not attracted to justify an order of eviction of the tenant. Mr. Ramamurthi	 learned counsel for the respondent	 pointed out that in order to attract section 21 (I) (j) it was not necessary that the landlord should establish that the condition of the building was such that it required to be demolished immediately. On the other hand	 the sub section made it clear that the requirement contemplated was that of the landlord and once his requirement had been held by all the Courts to be reasonable and bona fide	 the order passed for eviction of the tenant was fully justified. Having due regard to the scheme of the Act	 we are satisfied that the interpretation placed upon section 21(1)(j) by the High Court is correct. Section 21 (1)	 while placing a general embargo against a landlord from evicting a tenant	 recognises	 in its. proviso the circumstances under which a landlord could seek recovery of 737 possession of a premises. The ground upon which the landlord asked for eviction	 in the present case	 was based on section 21 (1) (j). The material provision is as follows : "21. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant: Provided that the court may on an application made to it	 make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds only	 namely: . . . . . (j) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building in place of the premises sought to be demolished; . . . . . . According to Mr. Chagla	 the words 'reasonably and bona fide required '	 occurring in this clause	 must be interpreted to have reference to the condition of the building	 the demolition of which is sought to be made and those words have no reference to any intention entertained by the landlord. The mere fact that a landlord may bona fide and reasonably entertain an idea of demolishing the building and reconstructing the same with a view to putting the property to a more profitable use after construction	 will not satisfy the requirements of the said clause. That is	 according to the learned counsel	 the condition of the building must be such that it is immediately necessary to demolish it	 in which case alone eviction under cl. (j) could be ordered. We are not inclined to accept this construction sought to be placed by the appellant on the clause in question. The proviso to section 21 (1) enumerates the various circumstances under which a landlord may seek to recover possession of the property from his tenant. The requirement contemplated under clause (j) of the proviso to sub section ( 1 ) is that of the landlord and it does not have any reference to the condition of the building as such. What is necessary under that clause is that the landlord must satisfy the Court that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and the demolition is for the purpose of erecting a new building in the place of the old one. No doubt	 as to whether the landlord 's requirement is reason 738 able and bona fide has to be judged by the surrounding circumstances	 which will include his means for reconstruction of the. building	 and other steps taken by him in that regard. In considering the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord under this clause	 the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use after demolition and reconstruction is also a factor that may be taken into account in favour of the landlord. In our opinion	 it is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish under this clause that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. That the condition of the property may be such which requires immediate demolition is emphasized in cl. (k) of the proviso. When such a specific provision has been made in cl. (k)	 the condition of the building cannot come into the picture nor could it have been dealt with again in cl. So the requirement under cl. (j) is that of the landlord and cannot have any reference to the building. This Court	 in Neta Ram vs Jiwan Lal (1) in interpreting no doubt a slightly differently worded provision in section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance	 2006 B.K. (8 of 2006 BK) held that one of the circumstances which could be taken into account in considering the requirements of the landlord with reference to the existing building is 'the possibility of its being put to a more profitable use after construction '. In the case 'before us all the Courts have concurrently held that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide and that he had obtained the necessary sanction from the municipality concerned and that the landlord had also the means for reconstruction of the building. If the landlord does not commence demolition of the premises within the period specified in the order of the Court	 the tenant is given a right under section 26(1) to issue a notice to the landlord of his intention to occupy the pre mises from which he had been evicted and also to apply to the Court for relief if the landlord does not comply with his request. Again under section 27	 the tenant has got a right to occupy the new building on its completion provided he satisfies the requirements contained in that section. Under section 2 8 (I)	 the landlord is bound to intimate the tenant from whom he had received a notice under section 27 the date on which the erection of the new building will be completed from which date the tenant will be entitled to occupy the same. Mr. Chagla has referred us to a decision of the Madras High Court in Mehsin Bhai vs Hate & Company (2). The section which came up for consideration before the Madras High Court was section 14(3) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act	 1960 (Act XVIII of 1960) which was as follows: (1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 623. (2) 739 14(1)(b) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished	 pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date. " That clause is substantially similar to section 21(1)(j) of the Act. In the Madras case it is seen that the building from which the tenant was sought to be evicted was in good condition and there was no danger of its failing for another 20 years though the building was old. Under those circumstances when the landlord applied under section 14(1) (h) of the Madras Act for eviction on the ground that he wished to demolish the building for the purpose of erecting a new building thereon	 the High Court affirmed the decision of the Subordinate Court declining relief to the landlord	 Though the learned Judge states that landlords May bona fide require such buildings	 particularly old buildings in their own interest for demolition and reconstruction	 he holds that it is equally possible that the mere fact that a building is old may be taken advantage of by a landlord to put forth such pretext	 his real object being ulterior and not bona fide 	for the purpose of reconstruction. We have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned Judge 's observation that the landlord must prove the reasonableness and bona fide nature of his requirement. But	 if the learned Judge intended to Iay down a proposition of law that under section 14 ( I ) (b) of the Madras Act	 similar to section 21 ( 1) (j) of the Act a landlord cannot recover possession of the property for the purpose of re construction so as to put the property to a more profitable use	 we are of the view that the decision of the Madras High Court must be considered to be erroneous. There is absolutely no justification for putting such a narrow interpretation on the clause in question. Mr. Chagla further urged that before his client is evicted his	 claim for compensation should have been considered by the Rent Controller. It is enough to say that	 as pointed out by the High Court	 that claim does not arise for consideration in these proceedings. We may also state that a further contention regarding them validity of the notice to quit issued by the landlord which was taken before the High Court and held against the appellant	 has not been canvassed before us. In the result	 the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The petitioner/appellant undertaken to vacate the premises within a month from today. Y.P. Appeal dismissed.

Under section 21 (1) (j) of the Mysore Rent Control Act	 1961 the court may on an application order the recovery of possession of any premises in favour of the landlord	 if "the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of enacting a new building in place of the premises sought to be demolished	. The respondent landlord applied under section 21(1)(j) for eviction of the tenants appellants, claiming that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required by him for the immediate purpose of demolishing and erecting of a new building, that the premises were old and were not suitable for continued occupation. The respondent claimed to have obtained the necessary licence and to have made all preparations for demolishing the existing., building and erecting new building. The appellants tenants contested the claim. The Rent Controller accepted the respondent landlord 's claim and ordered eviction, which in appeal, and further revision to the High Court was upheld. In appeal to this Court for the appellant tenant, it was contended that unless the landlord was able to establish that the condition of the building was such that it required immediate demolition and reconstruction, no eviction of the tenant could be ordered under section 21 (1) (j). Rejecting this contention and dismissing the appeal, HELD : The requirement contemplated under clause (j) of the proviso to sub section (1) is that of the landlord and it does not have any reference to the condition of the building as such. What is necessary under that clause is that the landlord must satisfy the Court that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is for the purpose of erecting a new building in the place of the old one. No doubt, whether the landlord 's requirement is reasonable and bona fide has to be judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances, which will include his means for reconstruction of the building, and other steps taken by him in that regard. [737 G, H] In considering the reasonable and bona fide requirements of the landlord under this clause, the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use after demolition and reconstruction is also a factor that may be taken into account in favour of the landlord. It is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish under this clause that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. [738 D] Neta Ram vs Jiwan Lal, [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 623, referred to. Mehsin Bhai vs Hale & Company, (1964) II M.L.J. 147, contra observation disapproved. 
722	Respondent I filed an election petition challenging the election of the appellant. The security required to be deposited under section 117 Of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, was made in the following terms:  Security deposits for Election Petition of Bargi Assembly Constituency No. 97	 Distt. Jabalpur	 Madhya Pradesh. Refundable by order of the Election Commission of India	 New Delhi. " Before the Election Tribunal the appellant made an applica tion alleging that there was non compliance with the provisions section 117 inasmuch as (i) the deposit was not in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission	 and (ii) the amount was only refundable to the depositor and would not be payable to appellant in case the petition was dismissed under section 90(3). The Tribunal upheld the objections and dismissed the petition under section 00(3). Respondent I preferred an appeal under section 116 A of the Act to the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal	 set aside 	the order of the Tribunal and sent back the petition for trial. The appellant contended that no appeal lay to the High Court and that there was non compliance with the provisions of s.117. Held	 that	 an appeal lay to the High Court under section 116 A of the Act against the dismissal of the election petition under section 90(3) by the Tribunal. The order passed by the Tribunal under section 90(3) was an order passed at the	 conclusion of the trial of the petition and was in substance and in law one under section 98. Once an election petition was entrusted to the Tribunal the trial started and any order passed by the Tribunal which concluded the trial was an order at the conclusion of the trial. Harish Chandra Bajpai vs Tirloki Singh	 ; 	 referred to. Gulsher Ahmad vs Election Tribunal	 A.I.R. 1958 Madh. Pra. 224	 approved. Held	 further that	 there had been substantial compliance with the provisions of section 117 of the Act. Section 117 was not to be strictly or technically construed and a substantial compliance with its requirements was sufficient. The security in this case 528 had been made in respect of the election petition in question and it had been credited towards the accounts of the Election Commission. The use of the words " refundable " would not prevent the Election Commission from making an order of payment of the amount to the successful party. Kamraj Naday vs Kunju Thevar	 A.I.R. 	 applied.