Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 182 of 1964. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 20	 1959	 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 325 of 1955. section V. Gupte	 Solicitor General	 W. section Barlingay	 section T. Khirwarkar and A. G. Ratnaparkhi	 for the appellants. M. section K. Sastri and M. section Narasimhan for I. N. Shroff	 for the	 respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah J. The appellants claiming to be the descen dants of former ruling chiefs in the Hoshangabad and Nimar Districts of Madhya Pradesh applied under the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act	 1948	 for grant of money or pension as suitable maintenance for themselves. By that Act	 every estate	 mahal	 village or land which was exempted from the payment of the whole or part of land revenue by special grant of	 or contract with the Crown	 or under the provision of any law or rule for the time being in force or in pursuance of any other instrument was after the appointed date made liable to land revenue from the year 1948 49	 notwithstanding anything contained in the grant	 contract	 law	 rule or instrument. The appellants held estates in the two districts on favourable terms as Jahgirdars Maufidars and Ubaridars	 and enjoyed an exemption from payment of land revenue amounting in the aggregate to Rs. 27	828 5 0 yearly. On the passing of the Act the exemption was lost and they claimed to be entitled to grant of money or pension under the provisions of the Act about to be set out. They applied to the Deputy Commissioner	 who forwarded their application to the State Government. The State Government by its order No. 993 /XVI 4	 dated April 26	 1955 rejected their petition. No reasons are contained in that order. The appellants thereupon filed a petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the State Government. In that LlSup./65 18 680 petition they contended that the	 rejection of their petition by the State Government without giving any reasons amounted to no decision at all and was an improper and illegal exercise of the power vested in the State Government by section 5 of the Act. The State Government resisted the petition by contending that the appellants were not descendants of any former ruling chief and further that the exercise of the power by the State Government was proper and legal. The petition in the High Court was heard and disposed of by a Full Bench. The learned Chief Justice	 who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Full Bench held that the State Government was not compelled to grant either money or pension because the exercise of the power under section 5 was discretionary and the petition	 therefore was incompetent. No other question was gone into by the High Court even though a suit is barred under the provisions of the Act and a petition under article 226 would appear to be the only remedy in case the State Government failed to comply with the terms of the Act	 or acted in an illegal manner. The Act consists of eight sections. The revocation of exemption from liability for land revenue is laid down by section 3	 the purport of which has already appeared in this judgment. It is not necessary to refer to that section in detail because in addition it speaks of lands in Berar governed by the Berar Land Revenue Code and of lands in Madhya Pradesh governed by the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act	 1917 and lays down the classes of such lands and the special rules applicable to them. In the present appeal we are not concerned with these details and they may	 therefore	 be put aside. Section 4 of the Act makes suitable amendments in the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act	 1917 and the Berar Land Revenue Code consequent upon the provisions of section 3 of the Act. We need not attempt to set out these amendments. Section 5 then provides as follows : "5. Awards of money grants or pension. (1) Any person adversely affected by the provisions of section 3 may apply to the Deputy Commissioner of the district for the award of a grant or money or pension. (2) The Deputy Commissioner shall forward the application to the Provincial Government	 which may pass such orders as it deems fit. (3) The Provincial Government may make a grant of money or pension 681. (i) for the maintenance or upkeep of any religious	 charitable or public institution or service of. & like nature; or (ii) for suitable maintenance of any family of at descendant from a former ruling chief. (4) Any amount sanctioned by way of grant of money or pension under this section shall be a charge on the revenues of the Province. " Section 6 bars the jurisdiction of civil courts. Section 8 enables the Provincial Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Section 7 grants power to the: State Government to grant exemptions from payment of land revenue under the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act	 1917 and the Berar Land Revenue Code in whole or in part	 as it may deem fit. The short question in this appeal is whether the provisions of section 5(3) make it obligatory upon the State Government to make a suitable grant of money or pension in case it is proved that the applicant has lost the exemption under the Act and is a descendant from a former ruling chief? The Full Bench of the High Court was of the view that there was no obligation on the State Government to make such a grant inasmuch as section 5 (3) was discretionary. The appellants contend that the view of the High Court of section 5 (3) is erroneous and the section is mandatory notwithstanding the use of language which appears to confer a discretion	 provided the other conditions of the sub section are fulfilled. Before we deal with this question we may also refer to the rules which have been framed under section 8 of the Act. These rules	 were made for dealing with applications received under section 5(1) of the Act. They are six in number. After defining the terms 'maufi '	 'inane	 'maufidar ' and 'inamdar	 rule 3 says that on receipt of the application the Deputy Commissioner may enquire into it personally or may transfer it to a Revenue Officer not below the rank of Extra Assistant Commissioner for enquiry and report. Rule 4 then provides what the enquiry should cover. Though the rule is divided into sub rules (a) to (g)	 under sub rules (a) to (e) the enquiry is directed to ascertain the lands held by the applicant	 his income	 class of maufi or inam and the details of the maufi and inam. There were many maufidars	 ubaridars	 who were holding lands under diverse titles and concessions. Sub rules (a) to (e) seem to apply to all the applicants. When	 however	 a maufi is held by any religious	 charitable or public institution or for any service as stated in section 5 (3) (i) quoted above or is held for maintenance Sup./65 19 682 by a descendant of a former ruling chief as mentioned in section 5 (3) (id)	 sub rules (f) and (g) apply in addition to sub rules (a) to (e). Under sub rule (f) some special enquiry is required to be made in respect of religious	 charitable or public institutions or service	 such as	 whether the institution should be continued to be maintained or service continued to be rendered and the minimum annual expenditure required for the maintenance of the institution or the service. Sub rule (g) then says "In the case of maufi or inam for the maintenance of a descendant of a former ruling chief the following further information should also be furnished This is followed by four sub rules the first lays down that the minimum amount required to ensure suitable maintenance of the family should be stated after enquiry; the second requires that any other source of income should be specified; the third requires the enquiring officer to state the extent to which such a person is dependent on maufi income and the fourth requires that his loyalty to Government should be ascertained. Rule 5 then enjoins that after completing the enquiry the Deputy Commissioner should make his report and his recommendation. Rule 6 provides that the Deputy Commissioner should also consider whether it would be desirable to exempt some land from liability to pay land revenue in whole or part under section 7 instead of making a money grant under section 5(3). It is contended on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh that the powers exercisable under the Act are in the discretion of the Government and there can be no remedy by way of a writ under article 226 of the Constitution. It is pointed out in support of the submission that sub section (2) of section 5 confers on the Government complete discretion because it says "that the Provincial (State) Government". . ." may pass such orders as it deems fit" in respect of every application forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner	 and that sub section (3) is also worded in language which is directory where it says "The Provincial (State) Government may make a grant of money or pension etc. " This view 	appears to have been accepted in the High Court. In our opinion	 this contention cannot be supported if the scheme of the fifth section is closely examined. No doubt	 the Deputy Commissioner is required to make enquiries and to forward all applications to Government and Government has been 683 given the power to pass such orders as it deems fit but the operation of sub section (2) and the discretion in it relates to applications in general while in respect of some of the applications the order has to be made under the third sub section where the discretion is to a considerable extent modified. The rules here help in the understanding of the third sub section. In all cases an enquiry has to be made which generally follows a pattern disclosed by rule 4	 sub rules (a) to (e). But in cases of maufi or inam held by religious	 charitable or public institutions or service or in case of a maufi or inam for the maintenance of a descendant of a former ruling chief additional enquiries have to be made. File rules highlight the distinction between revocation of exemption in the case of persons belonging to two special categories and the revocation of exemption in the case of others. It will be noticed presently that section 5 of the Act also follows the same scheme and the rules do no more than emphasise the special character of sub section (3) of section 5. Power has been conferred on Government to make some other lands free from land revenue so that sometimes a grant of money or pension and sometimes exemption from land revenue may be ordered. It could hardly have been intended that sub section (3) of section (5) was to be rendered nugatory in its purpose by the operation of the discretion conferred by sub section The two sub sections have to be read separately because though the word "may" appears in both of them that word in sub section (3) takes its meaning from an obligation which is laid upon Government in respect of certain institutions and persons if the stated conditions are fulfilled. It is impossible to think that in the case of a religious	 charitable or public institution which must be continued or in the case of descendants of former ruling chiefs	 Government possessed an absolute discretion to refuse to make a grant of money or pension for their maintenance or upkeep even though they satisfied all the conditions for such a grant and were deserving of a grant of money or pension. The word "may" in section 5(3) must be interpreted as mandatory when the conditions precedent	 namely	 the existence of a religious	 charitable or public institutions which ought to be continued or of the descendants of a ruling chief	 is established. The words "may pass such orders as it deems fit" in sub section (2) mean no more than that Government must make its orders to fit the occasion	 the kind of order to be made being determined by the necessity of the occasion. As stated in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes ( 11th edn. p. 23 1 "Statutes which authorise persons to do acts for the benefit of others	 or	 as it is sometimes said. for the 684 public good or the advancement of justice	 have often given rise to controversy when conferring the authority in terms simply enabling and not mandatory. In enacting that they "may"	 or "shall	 if they think fit	 or, shall have power	 or that it shall be lawful" for them to do such acts a statute appears to use the language of mere permission	 but it has been so often decided as to have become an axiom that in such cases such expressions may have to say the least compulsory force	 and so would seem to be modified by judicial exposition. " This is an instance where	 on the existence of the condition precedent	 the grant of money or pension becomes obligatory on the Government notwithstanding that in section 5(2) the Government has been given the power to pass such orders as it deems fit and in sub section (3) the word "may" is used. The word "may" is often read as "shall" or "must" when there is something in the nature of the thing to be done which makes it the duty of the person on whom the power is conferred to exercise the power. Section 5 (2) is discretionary because it takes into account all cases which may be brought before the Government of persons claiming to be adversely affected by the provisions of section 3 of the Act. Many such persons may have no claims at although they may in a general way be said to have been adversely affected by section 3. If the power was to be discretionary in every case there was no need to enact further than sub section The reason why two sub sections were enacted is not far to seek. That Government may have to select some for consideration under sub section (3) and some under section 7 and may have to dismiss the claims of some others requires the conferment of a discretion and sub section (2) does no more than to give that discretion to Government and the word "may" in that subsection bears its ordinary meaning. The word "may" in sub section (3) ha	 		 however	 a different purport. Under that sub section Government must	 if it is satisfied that an institution or service must be continued or that there is a descendant of a former ruling chief	 grant money or pension to the institution or service or to the descendant of the former ruling chief	 as the case may be. Of course	 it need not make a grant if the person claiming is not a. descendant of a former ruling chief or there is other reasonable ground not to grant money or pension. But	 except in those cases where there are good grounds for not granting the pension	 Government is bound to make a grant to those who fulfill the required condition and the word "may" in the third sub section though apparently discretionary has to be read as "must". File 685 High Court was in error in thinking that the third sub section also like the second conferred an absolute discretion. The next question is whether Government was justified in making the order of April 26	 1955 ? That order gives no reasons at all. The Act lays upon the Government a duty which obviously must be performed in a judicial manner. The appellants do not seem to have been heard at all. The Act bars a suit and there is all the more reason that Government must deal with such case in a quasi judicial manner giving an opportunity to the claimants to state their case in the light of the report of the Deputy Commissioner. The appellants were also entitled to know the reason why their claim for the grant of money or a pension was rejected by Government and how they were considered as not falling within the class of persons who it was clearly intended by the Act to be compensated in this manner. Even in those cases where the order of the Government is based upon confidential material this Court has insisted that reasons should appear when Government performs curial or quasi judicial functions (see Messrs Hari Nagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala & Others(1). The High Court did not go into any other question at all because it rejected the petition at the threshold on its interpretation of section 5(3). That interpretation has been found by us to be erroneous and the order of the High Court must be set aside. As the order of Government does not fulfil the elementary requirements of a quasi judicial process we do not consider it necessary to order a remit to the High Court. The order of the State Government must be set aside and the Government directed to dispose of the case in the light of our remarks and we order accordingly. The respondents shall pay the costs of the appellants in this Court and the High Court. Appeal allowed.

The appellants who were descendants of a former ruling chief and had lost their exemption from land revenue as a result of the operation of section 3 of the C.P. & Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act	 1948	 applied for a pension or money grant under the provisions of section 5 of the Act. their petition was rejected by the State Government without reasons being recorded. They filed a writ petition under article 226 but the High Court held that the granting of a pension was completely within the discretion of the Government and the petition was therefore incompetent. In appeal before the Supreme Court the appellants contended that rejection of their petition without any reasons being given amounted to no decision at all	 and that once the conditions for the grant of a pension were satisfied it was obligatory on the State Government to make a grant of money or pension. On behalf of the State Government reliance was placed on the words of section 5(2) that after enquiry in respect of the applications the Government 'may pass such orders as it deems fit ' and the directory word 'may ' used in section 5(3) itself. HELD: (i) Sub section (2) and (3) of section 5 must be considered separately. Under sub section (2) all the applications for grant of money or pensionhad to be considered and Government could deal with them in several ways. Notwithstanding its apparent discretion section 5(2) only enabled Government to pass orders as fit the occasion. [683 E H]. In sub section (3) special classes namely religious and charitable institutions etc. and descendants of ruling chiefs had to be dealt with and therefore the discretion stood modified. The rules highlighted the distinction between the two sub sections because they provided for special enquiries in cases falling under sub section (3) [683 A D]. Enabling provisions sometimes acquire a compulsory force and in the present instance on the existence of the condition precedent	 the grant of money or pension became obligatory on the Government notwithstanding that in sub section (2) the Government had power to pass such orders as it thought fit and in sub section (3) the word 'may ' was used. Except in those cases where there were good grounds for not granting the pension	 Government was bound to make a grant to those who fulfilled the desired conditions and the word 'may ' in the third sub section though apparently discretionary had to be read as 'must '. [684 B H]. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes	 referred to. (ii)In passing orders on the appellants ' application Government had to act in a quasi judicial manner. The appellants had to be given an 679 opportunity to state their case and were also entitled to know why their claim had been rejected. [685 B D]. M/s. Hari Nagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala and Others ; 	 referred to. Order of the State Government set aside.