Summarize the following court judgment. Special Leave Petition No.9148 of 1980. From the Judgment and Order dated the 3rd September	 1980 of the High Court of Delhi in C.M. (N). No. 49 of 1974. Prithvi Raj and Chaman Lal Itorora for the Petitioner. I.D. Garg and K.B. Rohtagi for the Respondents. But in view of the growing tendency of litigants of by passing the normal remedy of an appeal or revision by moving the High Court with petitions under article 227 of the Constitution	 we deem it necessary to give the reasons therefor. It appears that the property belonging to the surety Mohd. Salam comprised of a house situate at Katra Sheikh Chand	 Lal Kuan	 Delhi was sold by the Subordinate Judge	 Delhi in execution of an ex parte decree in favour of Mohd. Mustaqim due to the failure of the judgment debtor Hakim Mazhar ud Din to satisfy the decree on May 24	 1972. On June 9	 1972 the surety made an 213 application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure	 1908 without specifying whether it was under O.XXI	r. 90 The learned Subordinate Judge by his order dated June 10	 1972 treated the application to be under O.XXI	 r. 89 and the surety opted to elect it as such and prayed for time to deposit the solatium equal to 5% of the purchase money for payment to the auction purchaser Chuni Lal	 but failed to make such deposit the till death on July 22	 1972. At no stage of the proceedings did the surety assert that the decree had been satisfied out of Court	 nor did he make an application under O.XXI	 r. 2 for certification of adjustment. He died leaving behind him a son named Mohd. Karim and a daughter named Mst. Rabia Khatoon	 both of whom were apparently settled in Pakistan	 After his death	 on August 11	 1972	 the petitioner who is a total stranger to the estate of the deceased surety	 made an application stating that his name be substituted as he was the grandnephew of the surety and also his heir and successor in interest under an alleged will executed by the surety on July 20	 1972 i.e. two days before his death. On the same day	 there was an application moved by the decree holder stating that the surety had already made payment of the decretal amount and costs to him before the sale was held on May 24	 1972 and that full satisfaction of the decree may be recorded. The respondent	 who is the auction purchaser	 contested the claim of the petitioner and pleaded inter alia that the genuineness of the alleged will is open to question apart from its validity as it was affected by the doctrine of marz ul maut and that	 in any event	 the alleged adjustment could not affect his right or title to the property in dispute as an auction purchaser. The learned Subordinate Judge by his order dated November 23	 1972 held that there was no question of allowing the substitution of the name of the petitioner by the Court under its inherent powers. On December 15	 1972 the petitioner moved another application under s.151 of the Code for setting aside the sale on the ground that there was material irregularity in publishing and conducting the same and also to record satisfaction of the decree and set aside the sale. That application of his was disallowed by the learned Subordinate Judge by his order dated November 9	 1973 on the ground that his earlier order dated November 23	 1972 holding that the application made by the surety purporting to be under O.XXI	 r.89 stood disposed of as he did not comply with the requirements of r.89	 operated as res judicata	 and no question of invocation of the inherent powers of the Court arose and further that the 214 application made by the petitioner treated as an application under O.XXI	 r.89 was barred by limitation as it was filed beyond the period of 30 days prescribed by Art.127 of the First Schedule to the . Dissatisfied with the impugned orders passed by the learned Subordinate Judge	 the petitioner moved the High Court under article 227 of the Constitution. The contention before the High Court was that there was fraud perpetrated by the decree holder in bringing the property in dispute to sale although there was full satisfaction of the decree by the surety before his death. The High Court instead of dismissing in limine the petition under Art.227 of the Constitution as not maintainable	 declined to interfere with the impugned orders of the learned Subordinate Judge because it was satisfied that the application made by the petitioner construed as an application made under O.XXI	 r.89 to set aside the sale was barred both by the principle of constructive res judicata and also by limitation inasmuch as it was governed by Art.127 of the First Schedule to the 	 We fail to see the propriety of the petition moved by the petitioner in the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution. The rule is well established that there can be no certification of an adjustment between the decree holder and the judgment debtor under O.XXI	 r.2 after an auction sale is held in a case where a third party 's interest intervenes. In such a case	 the Court has no alternative but to confirm the sale under O.XXI	 r.92 of the Code. In Nanhelal & Anr. vs Umrao Singh	 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in dealing with o. XXI	 r.2 of the Code held that an adjustment between the decree holder and the judgment debtor come to at any time before the confirmation of an execution sale cannot nullify the decree by taking away the very foundation of the Court 's power to execute the decree viz. the existence of a decree capable of execution. In dealing with the question	 the Privy Council observed: "In the first place	 0.21	 R.2	 which provides for certification of an adjustment come to out of Court	 clearly contemplates a stage in the execution proceedings when the matter lies only between the judgment debtor 215 and the decree holder	 and when no other interests have come into being. When once a sale has been effected	 a third party 's interest intervenes	 and there is nothing in this rule to suggest that it is to be disregarded. The only means by which the judgment debtor can get rid of a sale	 which has been duly carried out	 are these embodied in R.89	 viz	 by depositing in Court the amount for the recovery of which the property was sold	 together with 5 per cent on the purchase money which goes to the purchaser as statutory compensation	 and this remedy can only be pursued within 30 days of the sale: see article 166	 Sch.1	 Lim. Act	 1908. " The Privy Council further observed: "That this is so is clear from tho wording of R.92	 which provides that in such a case (i.e. where the sale has been duly carried out)	 if no application is made under R.89	 the Court shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale shall become absolute." The petition under Art.227 of the Constitution was wholly misconceived. An appeal lay from an order under O.XXI	 r. 92 setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale	 under O.XLIII	 r. 1 (j) to the District Judge. That apart	 the application made by the petitioner claiming to be the legal representative of the surety	 the judgment debtor 's representative	 on the one hand and the auction purchaser	 the decree holder 's representative	 on the other alleging that there had been a fraud perpetrated by the decree holder in causing the sale to be held	 with a prayer for recording satisfaction of the decree under O	XXI	r.2	 raised a question relating to the execution	 discharge or satisfaction of the decree and therefore fell within the purview of section 47 which prior to February 1	1977 was appealable because then a decision under section 47 was deemed to be a decree under section 2(2) of the Code	 and therefore the petitioner had the remedy of an appeal to the District Judge. Even if no appeal lay against the impugned orders of the learned subordinate Judge	 the petitioner had the remedy of filing a revision before the High Court under s.115 of the Code. Upon any view of the matter	 the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the learned Subordinate Judge	 under article 227 of the Constitution. A mere wrong decision without anything 216 more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 227. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts udder article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority"	 and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record	 much less an error of law. In this case there was	 in our opinion	 no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Art.227	 the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or re weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. P.B.R. Petition dismissed.

On the failure of the judgment debtor to satisfy the decree passed against him the property in dispute was sold in execution of the decree. The surety made an application under section 151 Code of Civil Procedure	 without mentioning the order under which the application was made. The Subordinate Judge treated the application as one under order XXI	 r.89. The surety in that application prayed for time to deposit the amount but failed to make the deposit. In the meantime	 he died. A total stranger to his estate purporting to be his grand nephew made an application for substitution claiming that he was the surety 's successor in interest and that before his death the surety had executed a will in his favour. On the same day the decree holder made an application stating that the surety had made payment of the decretal amount before the sale was held and prayed that full satisfaction of the decree be recorded. The respondent who was the auction purchaser	 contested the genuineness of the will and stated that the alleged adjustment could not in any event affect his right or title to the property in dispute as auction purchaser. The Subordinate Judge refused substitution of the petitioner. Some time later	 the petitioner moved another application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure	 for setting aside the sale on the ground of material irregularity in conducting the sale but that application was rejected by the Subordinate Judge. The petitioner thereupon moved the High Court under article 227 of the Constitution contending that fraud was perpetrated by the decree holder in bringing the property in dispute to sale although there was full satisfaction of the decree by the surety before his death. The High Court declined to interfere with the impugned orders of the Subordinate Judge on various grounds. On the question whether it was proper for the petitioner to have moved a petition under article 227 of the Constitution. Dismissing the petition 212 HELD: The petition under article 227 was wholly misconceived. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority"	 and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record	 much less an error of law. In the instant case	 there was no error of law or error apparent on the face of record. From an order under O.XXI	 r.92 an appeal lay to the District Judge. That apart the petitioner 's application raised a question relating to execution which fell within the purview of section 47 Code of Civil Procedure which prior to February 1	 1977 was appealable because then a decision under section 47 was deemed to be a decree under section 2(2) of the Code. Therefore	 the petitioner had the remedy of appeal to the District Judge: Even if no appeal lay against the impugned orders of the Subordinate Judge	 the petitioner had the remedy of filing a revision before the High Court under section 115 of the Code. Upon any view of the matter the High Court under article 227 of the Constitution had no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the Subordinate Judge. A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227.[215 E: 216B C; 215F H;216 A]