Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 161 of 1954. Appeal from the judgment and order dated	 May 18	 1953	 of the Calcutta High Court in Income tax Reference No. 72 of 1951. N. A. Palkhivala	 P. D. Himatsingka	 J. B. Dadachanji	 section N. Andley Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra	 for the appellant. G. N. Joshi and R. H. Dhebar	 for the respondent. May 23. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR J. This appeal brought on a certificate of the High Court raises a point of far reaching consequence as to the interpretation of sections 8	 10 and 24(2) of the Indian Income tax Act (hereinafter termed the Act). The assessee (who is the appellant before us) claims that in the computation of its profits for the assessment year under review (1945 46)	 it is entitled to set off the carried over loss of the previous year against the profits of the year of assessment under section 24(2) of the Act. The assessee is a Bank carrying on banking business. For the assessment year its assessable income was computed by the Income Tax Officer at Rs. 14	95	826 "by splitting up" its income into 2 heads . . . . "interest on securities" and . . . . business income ". " Interest on securities" in the year of assessment was Rs. 23	62	815 and under the head " business income " there was a 81 loss of Rs. 8	86	972. After making the necessary adjust ments and deducting the business loss from " Interest on securities "	 the net income was determined at Rs. 14	95	826. In the previous year there was a loss of Rs. 3	21	929 which was computed by setting off the business loss against "interest on securities ". Before the Income tax Officer the assessee made its claim on the basis that it was a part of " the business of the Bank to deal in securities. . . . . . and " that no distinction should be made between income from securities and income from business for the purpose of set off under section 24 ". It also claimed that it carried on only one business	 namely banking as defined by section 277F of the Indian Companies Act in the ' course of which the " Bank has to receive money on deposits and invest such deposits in securities	 loans and advances " and therefore holdings of securities by it could not be treated as its separate business. The Income tax Officer was of the opinion that	 as there was a loss under the head " business " its claim could; not be sustained and hence it could not be set off under section 24(2) of the Act. On appeal to the Assistant Commissioner of Income tax it was again contended that the assessee was a dealer in securities and that the two heads of income	 " Interest on securities " and " profits and gains " in banking business could not be treated separately and were part of the same business of the assessee and therefore it could claim a set off under section 24(2) of the Act. But this contention was repelled. The matter was then taken to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal where again the contention was repeated that the business of the assessee could not be split up into two heads under " interest on securities " and banking business". The Tribunal	 however	 held: " Reading sections 6	 8 and 10 it appears to us that the legislature wanted to keep the income from the two sources as separate. We are therefore of the opinion that the Income tax Officer was right in splitting up the income of the appellant into two heads and in refusing the set off of the business loss brought forward 11 82 from last year against income from Govt. securities earned this year. " It therefore did not allow the loss of the previous year to be set off against the computed profits of the assessment year. The assessee thereupon asked for a case to be stated to the High Court and inter alia raised two questions; (1) Whether interest on securities was a part of Bank 's income from business carried on by it. (2) Whether the assessee was entitled to set off the carried over loss of the previous year against income during the assessment year. The assessee contended that it was carrying on banking business in various towns in India	 that " in the usual course of its business it invests moneys in Securities and receives interest thereon " and therefore it claimed that the loss of Rs. 3	21	929	 carried forward from the previous year could be set off under section 24(2) of the Act. The Tribunal stated the case and sought the opinion of the High Court on the following three questions; (1) " Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case	 the assessee was entitled to set off the business loss of Rs. 3	21	929 brought forward from the preceding year against this year 's income from interest on securities held by the assessee. (2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the assessee was entitled under section 8 to deduct any part of the administrative expenses out of the income from interest on securities. (3) Whether in the circumstances of this case	 the assessee was entitled under the first proviso to section 8 of the Income tax Act to deduct any interest on money borrowed and utilised for investment in tax free securities. " The High Court answered all the questions in the negative. The learned Chief Justice during the course of his judgment said: 83 " It appears to me	 therefore	 that because the several heads under section 6 in the Indian Act are mutually exclusive and because under any Income tax Law	 an item coming under an exclusive head cannot in any circumstances be charged under another head and also because the interest on securities in the hands of a banker cannot be treated as business income on the principles explained by Mr. Justice Rowlatt	 I must hold that the contention of the asesssee. . . . . . must be rejected. " We had the benefit of a full and able argument from counsel on both sides. Counsel for the appellant has raised three points: (1)That sections 8 and 10 of the Act should be so read that "interest on securities"	 in cases where the true nature and character of the securities in the hands of an assessee is one of trading assets	 would be excluded from the scope of section 8 and would fall under the head "business" within section 10 of the Act and alternatively even if sections 8 and 10 are read as specific heads then section 10	 being more appropriate	 should be applied to the facts of the present case ; (2)If sections 8 and 10 are equally applicable the assessee has the option to be taxed under that head which imposes a lighter burden on him; and (3)Lastly he contended that even if the heads of income were to be taken as mutually exclusive so that the "interest on securities" falls under section 8 and "business" under section 10 of the Act	 the assessee would be entitled to a set off under section 24 (2) because "interest on securities" and "profits and gains" from business result from different operations of the same business	 the two being different forms of the same business of the assessee. We may now turn to the scheme of the Act. Section 2(15) defines "total income" to mean "total amount of income	 profits and gains. . . .computed in the manner laid down in the Act. " Chapter I of the Act deals with "Charge of income tax". It consists of two sections 3 & 4. Section 3 provides that "income tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates in 84 accordance with and subject to the provisions of this Act. " Section 4 provides ' that "the total income of any previous year of any person includes all income	 profits and gains from whatever sources derived". Chapter 3 deals with "Taxable income". Section 6 enumerates the heads of income chargeable to incometax. It says as under : section 6 "Save as otherwise provided by this Act	 the following heads of income	 profits and gains	 shall be chargeable to income tax in the manner hereinafter appearing namely (i) Salaries. (ii) Interest on securities. (iii) Income from property. (iv) Profits and gains of business	 profession or vocation. (v) Income from other sources. (vi) Capital gains. " The two relevant heads for the purpose of this appeal are (ii) & (iv)	 i.e.	 " interest on securities " and " profits and gains of business" which are dealt with under sections 8 and 10 of the Act respectively. Section 8 provides that " the tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head " interest on securities " in respect of interest receivable by him on any security of the Central Government. . . . and in the provisos to this section are given the allowable deductions. The amendment made in the proviso by the Act of 1955 is very relevant for the purpose of this appeal and we &hall advert to it at a later stage. Section 10 provides: " The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head " profits and gains of business	 profession or vocation" in respect of the profits or gains of any business	 profession or vocation carried on by him ". The assessee contends that securities are a part of its trading assets and this position has throughout been accepted by the Department	 and any income which accrues in respect of these assets in the form of interest 85 has the same characteristics as profits or gains of " business " and therefore must be treated as income falling under the head " business " under section 10 of the Act. In other words the income of the assessee from its banking business which includes dealing insecurities is	really income from the same source and whatever accrues in the form of interest whether from securities or from any other source of investment would fall under section 10 and not section 8 because all the interest accrues from the business carried on by the assessee and this business is only one business. The argument thus is that sections 8 & 10 have to be so construed as to harmonise with each other and the only way they can be harmonised is that income accruing in the form of "interest on securities" should be taken to be accruing from the business of the assessee because securities form part of its trading assets and thus fall within section 10 and not section 8	 which must be restricted to capital investments only. It is further contended that if the object of the legislature was to give a separate and exclusive identity to the income from " interest on securities"	 it would have made the language of section 8 of the Act as specific as it has made in the case of income from dividends from shares	 which income by the addition of sub section (I A) to section 12 has come to have a specific place under the head "other sources" and is no longer within the head "business" under section 10 of the Act and thus by statute its nature and character have undergone a change. Reference is in this connection made to Commissioner of Income tax vs Ahmuty & co. Ltd. (1) where it was held by the High Court of Bombay that dividend income received by a dealer in shares is chargeable under section 10 and not under section 12 of the Act. It is thus contended that in order to preserve the unity and oneness of the business of the assessee and to maintain the unity of its business income the applicability of section 8 should be circumscribed to "interest on securities" when they are not trading assets of the assessee. According to the scheme of the Act discussed above income tax has to be charged in respect of the "total (1) (1955] 86 income" of the previous year of every assessee and "total income" is defined under section 2(15) to comprise all income	 profits and gains from whatever source derived subject to certain exemptions. Chapter 3 which is entitled "Taxable income" comprises sections 6 to 17 (both sections inclusive ). Section 6 enumerates the various heads of income	 profits and gains which are chargeable to income tax. Each of these heads of income	 profits and gains is dealt with under a separate section and these sections also give the details of allowances and exemptions in regard to each different head. The argument raised by counsel for the Revenue is that according to the decision of the Privy Council in Probhat Chandra Barua vs The King Emperor (1) section 6 is the charging section and that the words of sections 7 to 12 show that the various heads of income are mutually exclusive and items which specifically fall under these various heads have to be charged under only that head and would fall under one of these several but appropriately specific sections. It is true that the Privy Council in Probhat Chandra Barua vs The King Emperor (supra) did point out that section 6 was a charging section	 but this was because sections 3 and 4 were then differently worded as pointed out by Kania	 J.	 in B.M. Kamdar	 In re (2 ) at p. 43 and by Chagla	 J.	 in the	 same case at p. 57. The Federal Court in Chatturam and others vs Commissioner of Income tax	 Bihar(3) said: The liability to pay the tax is founded on sections 3 and 4 of the Income tax Act which are the charging sections". The judgment of the Privy Council in Wallace Brothers & Co. Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income tax (4) also shows section 3 to be the charging section. It is then argued that section 6 of the Act being mandatory all items of income	 from whatever source they arise	 would fall only under one of the heads enumerated under section 6 and therefore one of the sections 7 to 12 would specifically apply and section 8 which relates to " interest on securities" must be held to apply to income from that source. It is also contended by counsel for the (1) (1930) L.R. 57 I.A. 228	 238. (2) (3) 	 308. (4) 87 Revenue that even if there is any overlapping between sections 8 and 10 "interest on securities" whether accruing from securities held as a capital asset or trading assets falls under section 8 alone and section 10 should be so read as to altogether exclude the income from " interest on securities". Counsel for the Revenue has referred us to the form of the Return	 prescribed under section 22(1) of the Act at the relevant time of the assessment under review. The heads there shown are (1) Salary	 (2) Interest on securities	 (3) Property	 (4) Business	 profession or vocation	 (5) other sources	 and income from each source is to be shown in a separate column	 in each one of which reference is made to a particular note relevant to that head of income. In the column under the head "interest on securities" reference is made to note 9 which is in the following words: "Interest on securities" means interest on promissory notes or bonds issued by the Government of India or any other State Government or the interest on debentures or other securities issued by or on behalf of a local authority or company. The gross amount before deduction of income tax should be entered. Entries under this head should be accompanied by persons paying the interest under section 18(9) of the Act. Deductions are allowable in respect of (a) Commission charged by a banker for collecting the interest. (b) Interest payable on money borrowed for the purpose of investment in the securities except certain interest payable to persons abroad from which tax has not been deducted (see section 8 of the Act for details). Full particulars (in a separate statement if necessary) should be given of any deduction claimed. " This is a statutory form and it gives what is meant by " interest on securities "	 what documents are to accompany the Return in order to entitle an assessee to claim refund and what deductions are to be made. " The mandatory character of section 6 is indicated by the language employed in that section and the phraseology of all the sections following	 i.e.	 7 to 12	 employing the words " the tax shall be payable under 88 the head. . . . in respect of " the different and distinct heads of income	 profits and gains	 salaries " Interest on securities "	 and "property "	 business etc. is indicative of the intention of the legislature making the various heads of income	 profits and gains mutually exclusive. So every item of income	 whatever its source	 would fall under one particular head and for the purpose of computing the income for charging of income tax the particular section dealing with that head will have to be looked at. The various sources of income	 profits and gains have been so classified that the items falling under those heads become chargeable under sections 7 to 12 according as they are income of which the source is "salaries ') " interest on securities property business	 profession or vocation "	 " other sources or " capital gains ". Looked at thus the contention of counsel for the Revenue that under the scheme of the Act and on a true construction of these relevant sections" interest on securities " by whomsoever and for whatever purpose held has to be taxed under section 8 and under no other section is well founded and must be sustained. It being a specific head of chargeability of tax	 income from " interest on securities " whether held as a trading asset or capital asset would have to be taxed under section 8 and not under section 10 of the Act. The amendment made in the proviso to section 8 in the year 1955 allowing a deduction in respect of any remuneration paid to any person other than the banker for realising interest on behalf of the assessee	 supports this interpretation. Thus this proviso now provides that reasonable amount can be deducted by an assessee for commission paid to a Bank or remuneration paid to anybody else for realising interest on its behalf which clearly indicates the intention of the legislature that interest on securities specifically falls under section 8 and under no other section. This amendment shows that even a Bank	 if it buys securities as a part of its trading assets	 is entitled to make a deduction for remuneration paid by it to any person for realising interest which postulates that "interest on securities" would fall under s	 8 of the Act	 89 This interpretation receives further support from the language of section 18 which deals with payment after deduction at source. Section 18(3) requires a person responsible for paying " interest on securities " to deduct income tax on the amount of the interest payable at the maximum rate and the person so responsible is required	 after deduction of the income tax	 to pay to the account of the Central Government within 7 days of the deduction	 the sum so deducted and under section 18(5) the maximum rate is to be charged for the year in which the the amount is paid and not at the rate of the assessment year. A combined reading of sections 3	4	6	 8	10	18 and refund section	 section 48	 shows that income tax is to be charged at the rate or rates prescribed in the Finance Act on the total income of the assessee as defined in section 2(15) of the Act and computed in the manner given in as. 7 to 12 which are not charging sections but are provisions for the computation of " total income ". In the words of Viscount Dunedin in Salisbury House Estate vs Fry(1): " Now	 the cardinal consideration in my judgment is that the income tax is only one tax	 a tax on the income of the person whom it is sought to assess	 and that the different schedules are modes in which the Statute directs this to be levied ". As has been pointed out in that judgment there are no separate taxes under the various schedules but only one tax. But in order to arrive at the total income on which tax is to be charged " you have to consider the nature	 the constituent parts	 of his (assessee 's) income to see which schedule you are to apply. " If these words may be used with reference to the language of the Indian Act	 we have to look at the source of " income	 profits and gains" and then see under what head it appropriately and specifically falls and if it falls under one particular head then computation is to be made under the section which covers that particular head of income. We cannot treat any one of the sections from sections 7 to 10 to be general or specific for the purpose of any one particular source of income. The (1) (1930)15 T.C.266	306. 90 language shows that they are all specific and deal with the various heads in which the item of income	 profits and gains in the case of an assessee falls. Sir George Rankin in Commissioner of Income Tax vs Chunilal B. Mehta(l) said: " The effect of section 6 is to classify profits and gains	 under different heads for the purpose of providing for each appropriate rules for computing the amount; its language is " shall be chargeable in the manner hereinafter appearing. " One of the heads is " business "	 which as a head of income stands alongside salaries	 interest on securities	 professional earnings and other sources. True	 the classification of income is according to the character of the source But the list of " heads in section 6 is a list of sources not in the sense of attributing the income to one property rather than another	 one business rather than another	 but only in the sense of attributing it to property as distinct from employment	 or business as distinct from investment. . What is to be learnt from an examination of the language of sub section (1) of section 4 income	 profits and gains	 described or comprised in section 6 from whatever source derived is that section 6 is intended as describing different kinds of profits In that case the question for decision was whether a resident carrying on business in India and controlling transactions abroad in the course of such business was liable to income tax on such transactions	 it was held that the profits arising under such transactions do not arise or accrue in India merely because of control by the assessee in India. The judgment of the Privy Council shows what section 6 of the Act means each head refers to income	 profits and gains attributable to the source salary	 interest on securities	 property	 business	 profession etc. This supports the contention of each head being separate	 exclusive and specific. Decided cases all support the contention of counsel for the Revenue that the various heads of income enumerated in section 6 of the Act and more particularly (1) 	 529. 91 dealt with in sections 7 to 12 are exclusive heads and if an item of income falls under one of these heads then it has to be treated for the purpose of income tax under that head and no other. In Salisbury House Estate Ltd. vs Fry (1) the assessee was a limited company which was formed for the express purpose of acquiring Salisbury House and utilising it. In this building there were 800 rooms which were let to tenants. The company also maintained a staff of servants to render various kinds of services to the occupants of the rooms. The company was assessed to income tax under Sch. A upon gross valuation of the premises and as the actual rent received was higher	 the Revenue wanted to assess income again under Sch. The company contended that so far as the proceeds of the property were concerned they had already been taxed under Sch. A and could not again be brought "in computo" under Sch. D. Viscount Dunedin at p. 306 observed: " Now	 if the income of the assessee consists in part of real property you are	 under the Statute	 bound to apply Sch. Lord Atkin at p. 319 said: " the dominance of each Sch. A	 B	 C & E over its 'own subject matter is confirmed by reference to the Sections and Rules which respectively regulate them in the Act of 1842. They afford a complete code for each class of income	 dealing with allowances and exemptions	 with the mode of assessment	 and with the officials whose duty it is to make the assessments. . . . . . . I find no ground for assessing the taxpayer under Sch. D for any property or gains which are the subject matter of the other specific Schedules. " At p. 320	 he pointed out that Sch. D is a residuary Schedule and all Schedules are mutually exclusive. Referring to investments in securities he said: Income derived by a trading company from investments of its funds	 whether temporary or permanent	 in government securities must be taxed under (1) ; 92 Sch. C	 and cannot for the purposes of assessment under Sch. D be brought into account. " This shows that even though Sch. D is residual all Schedules are mutually exclusive and if income falls under one Schedule	 it must be assessed under that Schedule because the Schedules are a complete code for each class of income	 dealing with	 allowances and exemptions and with the mode of assessment. A significant passage in the judgment of Lord Atkin (at p. 321) is: " I find it difficult to say that companies which acquire and let houses for the purposes of their trade	 such as breweries in respect of their tied tenants	 and collieries and other large employers of labour in respect of their employees	 do not let the premises as part of their operation of trading. Personally I prefer to say that even if they do trade in letting houses their income so far as it is derived from that part of their trading must be taxed under Sch. A and not Sch. D." Thus even though the assessee was a company carrying on business or trade	 income from the head " property " was taxed under Sch. A and not Sch. This case supports the contention that different Schedules being distinctly applicable to each individual head of income would exclude the applicability of any other head. In Butler vs The Mortgage Company of Egypt Ltd. (1)	 a British company controlled in Egypt was carrying on business of lending money on mortgage of land in Egypt or on the security of debentures by mortgage of land. In case of default the bank could take action in the Egyptian Courts either to sell the property or to take possession with a view to future sale. The General Commissioners held that the acceptance of 	securities for money lent was only an incident of the company 's business and that income was not assessable under Case 4 of Sch. D. The company claimed that the assessment should be under Case 5 of Sch. D and not Case 4. It was held that the Crown had the right to tax under Case 4 but even if the assessee satisfies (1) 	 809	 810. 93 that Case 5 is also applicable it was still for the Crown to decide and tax under Case 4 provided both cases applied equally. Rowlatt J. said: "A banker could never ask to be repaid the tax which had been deducted from the Government securities which he held	 because he held them as a banker	 the point being that when you have once got a security (we will say) the interest on which is taxed by the Act	 you cannot get out of it because you say that you look a little further and see this is only embedded in a business." It means in terms of the Indian Statute that in the case of interest on securities if chargeable under a specific section	 the assessee even though he is a banker cannot claim that they be treated as "business income." in Thompson vs The Trust and Loan Company of Canada (1)	 the respondent company carried on business as a loan and finance company. During the material years the company bought treasury bonds cum coupons and on the same day sold bonds of the same nominal value retaining the coupons and received on encashment a half year 's interest under deduction of income tax. The Crown contended that in computing the Company 's profits for assessment to income tax under Case I of Sch. D there	 should be included	 as receipts	 the amounts realised by the sale of bonds ex coupons and the net proceeds of the coupons and	 as disbursements	 the amounts paid by the company for the bonds cum coupons. But it was held that the interest received by the company was income of the company taxed by deduction under Sch. C and that no part of the proceeds of the coupons should be included in the computation of the company 's liability under Sch. D. Rowlatt J. at p. 400 said: " The Crown cannot treat a transaction which has its own character for income tax purposes as if it were something of a different character. " and Lord Hanworth M.R. at p. 406 put the matter thus: (1) 94 Now in the present case it is plain that this subject matter of tax	 government bonds and coupons payable out of the government funds	 have got to be taxed under Sch. C; they cannot be taxed anywhere else. " In Volume I of Simon 's Income Tax (1948 Ed.) p. 54 the law is thus stated: " These Schedules are prima facie mutually exclusive and consequently if a particular kind of income is charged under one Schedule the Crown cannot elect to charge it under another. " This is in accord with the decisions discussed above. The Commercial Properties Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income tax	 Bengal(1) was a case of a registered company whose sole object was to acquire lands		 build houses and let them to tenants	 the sole business of the company being the management and collection of rents from the properties. The assessment was made under section 9 of the Act but the company claimed that they were carrying on a business assessable under section 10 and not under section 9. The Court held that the company was rightly assessed under section 9	 its income being derived from its ownership of buildings. Rankin C. J. said at p. 26: " In my judgment the words of section 6 and section 9 and section 10 must be read so as to give some effect to the contrast that is there made between income	 profits and gains from " property " and from " business " and I entirely refuse my assent to the proposition that because it happens that the owner of a property is a company which has been. incorporated for the purpose of owning such property	 therefore the income derived from " property must be regarded as income derived from business ". In my judgment	 income derived from " property is a more specific category applicable to the present case". The decision in this case shows that the ownership of the house property was not considered as "business" and that income derived from such source would more specifically and appropriately fall within the head "property". (1) 95 The applicability of section 8 directly arose and was discussed in H. C. Kothari v	 Commissioner of Income tax	 Madras(1). The assessees in that case had several sources of income	 one of which was interest on securities. The business of the assessees showed a loss but the assessees claimed earned income relief in respect of interest on securities on the ground that securities	 which they had purchased and sold as part of their business	 formed their stock in trade and the interest therefrom should be treated as "business" profits. But section 8 of the Act was held applicable to the facts of that case. Satyanarayana Rao	 J. said " of the Act which deals with interest on securities is a separate and distinct head	 and if an income is chargeable under that head	 it is not open either to the assessee or to the department to change the head and claim to tax it under a different head. It was also pointed out in this judgment following Commissioner of Income_tax vs Bosotto Bros. (2) that if income falls under more than one head the assessee has the option to choose the head which makes the burden on his shoulders lighter. The following two cases were relied upon by the assessee: (1) Mangalagiri Sri Umamaheshwara Gin and Rice Factory Ltd. vs Guntur Merchants Gin and Rice Factory Ltd. (3) where a limited company incorporated for the purpose of milling rice leased out the buildings	 plant	 machinery etc.	 to another company for a fixed annual rent. The lessees were to do the necessary repairs to keep the mill in good working condition and the lessors were to bear the loss of depreciation. The assessee company claimed the allowances for depreciation under section 10(2) (vi) of the Act. It was held that the company was carrying on the business of letting a rice mill and as such was entitled to a deduction for depreciation. The judgment of Krishnan	 J.	 shows that it was clear from the facts of the case that the company was carrying on business (1) 	 587. (3) (2) 96 of letting the mill for the purpose of being worked by lessees and it was under these circumstances that section 10 was held applicable. The other case is Sadhucharan Roy Chowdhry	 In re (1) the facts of which were similar to the facts of Mangalagiri Sri Umamaheshwara Gin and Rice Factory Ltd. vs Guntur Merchants Gin and Rice Factory Ltd. (supra). It was held that letting of a Jute Press at rent was as much a business as the letting of a ship to freight or letting of motor car or any other kind of machines or machinery for hire	 and therefore allowances for depreciation were allowed like in Mangalagiri 's case (supra). Neither of these cases throws any light on the question now before us. The appellant 's contention that looking at the real nature and character of the source of income arising from "interest on securities" in the case of the present assessee	 the Bank	 section 10 of the Act would apply and not section 8 can receive no support from the decision in Davies vs Braithwaite (2). That was a case where an actress earned her living by accepting and fulfilling professional engagements	 her activities being acting in stage plays in England and America	 performing for the films and on the wireless and performing for gramophone companies. These were held to fall under Sch. D and not E as whatever contracts she made were nothing but incidents in the conduct of her professional career. The use of the following words by Sir George Rankin in Commissioner of Income tax vs Chunilal B. Metha (3): But the list of "heads" in section 6 is a list of sources not in the sense of attributing the income to . . . one business rather than another but only in the sense of attributing it to business as distinct from investment. " is no surer foundation for saying that " interest on securities " is severable into income from securities held as a capital investment and income from those held as trading assets. The language of sections 6	 8 and 10 is destructive of any such contention. (1) (2) (3) [1938] 6I.T.R. 521	 529. 97 Thus on a true construction of the various sections of the Act the income of an assessee is one and the various sections 7 to 12 are modes in which the Statute directs that income tax is to be levied and these sections are mutually exclusive. The head of income of which the source is " interest on securities " has its ' characteristics for income tax purposes and falls under the specific head covered by section 8 of the Act	 and where an item falls specifically under one head it has to be charged under that head and no other. This interpretation follows from the words used in sections 6	 8 and 10 which must be read so as to give effect to the contrast between " income	 profits and gains " chargeable under the head " interest on securities " and income	 profits and gains " chargeable under the head business ". Thus on this construction the various heads of " income	 profits and gains " must be held to be mutually exclusive	 each head being specific to cover the item arising from a particular source. It cannot	 therefore	 be said that qua the assessee in the present case and for the purpose of securities held by it	 section 8 is more specific and section 10 general or vice versa	 and therefore no question of the applicability of the principle " generalia specialibus non derogant " arises. This finds support from the decided cases which have been discussed above. Thus both on precedent and on a proper construction	 the source of income " interest on securities " would fall under section 8 and not under section 10 as it is specifically made chargeable under the distinct head " interest on securities " falling under section 8 of the Act and cannot be brought under a different head even though the securities are held as a trading asset in the course of its business by a banker. In this view of the matter no question of exercise of option by the assessee or the Revenue arises. Consequently Lord Shaw 's observation in The Liverpool and Land Globe Insurance vs Bennett (1): " It appears to me that this selection is not only justified in law but is founded upon the soundest and most elementary principles of business	 (1) , 376. 98 will be inapplicable to the facts of the present case, and so also the rule as to choosing the head which imposes on the assessee 's shoulders burden which is highter as given in Commissioner of Income tax vs Bosotto Bros., (supra) and reiterated in H. C. Kothari vs Commissioner of Income tax, Madras (supra). To the third point raised by counsel for the assessee that even if interest on securities falls under section 8 of the Act and not under section 10 the assessee is entitled to 'Yet a set off under section 24(2) of the Act, counsel for the Revenue has taken the objection that this plea is not available to the appellant because it was not placed before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal for being referred to the High Court nor was it raised before the High Court. How the question was specifically raised before the Income Tax Officer and the Appellate Assist. ant Commissioner and also before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has already been mentioned. In its application to the Tribunal for stating the case to the High Court the assessee specifically raised in two suggested questions its right to set off the business loss of Rs. 3,21,929 brought forward from the previous year against the income of the assessee in the assessment year. It does not appear from the judgment of the High Court that the question was argued in the manner it has been debated in this court. The appellant seems to have rested his case on the applicability of section 10 to the profits under the head interest on securities" because of the securities being trading assets but this contention was repelled and the same question has been raised before us but the assessee now supports his case on an alternative argument that even if the securities fall under section 8 still the profits from that source are from an item of the assessee 's business and therefore the loss of the previous year from the banking business of the assessee can be set off against the profits of the assessment year whatever be the source of that profit. The case is similar to the one in Commissioner of Income tax vs Messrs. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. (1). The question framed by the Tribunal is a general one and what is to be determined is whether (1) 	 196	 198. 99 the loss of the previous year can be set off against the income of the assessment year within the provisions of section 24(2) of the Act. The question is wide enough to cover the point raised before us. In the circumstances of this case the third point	 raised by counsel for the assessee	 is open to be canvassed before us. Counsel for the Revenue contends that the words used in section 24(2) were " the same business " and therefore this set off would be allowable only against any profits or gains of the game business and no other business. He further contends that the scheme of section 24(1) and (2) shows that profits and gains must be arising under section 10 and not under any other section because the expression used is profits or gains which goes with " business " under section 10 and cannot have reference to income	 profits and gains arising from interest on securities " which are under section 8 of the Act. Counsel for the assessee on the other hand submits that the use of the word " same " signifies the identity of the business in which the loss has occurred and has no reference to the head under which the profits are chargeable. In other words interest does not cease to be profits and gains of the same business merely because for the purpose of chargeability it falls under a different head	 i.e.	 under section 8 and not under section 10. Section 24 of the Act deals with the set off of loss in computing the aggregate income. He also contends that the business which the assessee was carrying on was the business of dealing in money and credit and that banking and dealing in securities constitute one and the same business. He refers to section 277 F of the Indian Companies Act and relies on the Privy Council decision in Punjab Co operative Bank Ltd. vs The	 Commissioner of Income tax	 Punjab(1) in which it was pointed out that in the ordinary case 'of a bank the business consists in its essence of dealing with money and credit. The banker has always to keep enough cash or easily realisable securities to meet any probable demand by depositors	 and if some of the securities are realised to meet (1) 100 withdrawals by depositors	 this is clearly a normal step in carrying on the banking business. It is an act done in what is truly carrying on of the banking business. In view of the order we propose to make	 we do not find it necessary to express any opinion on the respective contentions raised by counsel for the parties. In Punjab Co operative Bank 's case (supra) a finding had been given that the purchase and sale of securities was as much the assessee 's business as receiving deposits from clients and withdrawals by them. In the case before us no such finding has been given and in the absence of such finding no opinion can be given as to whether the holding of securities out of which interest was derived formed part of the same business within section 24(2) or not. The appeal would therefore	 be allowed and the case remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision of the reference after getting from the Tribunal a fuller statement of facts about this part of the case	 whether the securities in question were a part of the trading assets held by the assessee in the course of its business as a banker. The costs of this appeal will be costs in the reference before the High Court. Appeal allowed. Case remitted.

For the assessment year (1945 46) the assessable income of the appellant bank was computed by the Income tax Officer by splitting up its income into two heads " interest on securities " and " business income "	 and deducting the business loss from interest on securities. In the previous year the assessment showed a loss which was computed by setting off the " business loss against " interest on securities The appellant claimed that in the computation of its profits for the assessment year in question it was entitled to set off the carried over loss of the previous year under section 24(2) Of the Indian Income tax Act	 1922. The Income tax Officer rejected the claim on the ground that the loss was under the head " business " and so could not be set off against income from securities under section 24(2) of the Act. Both the Income tax Appellate Tribunal and the High Court	 on reference	 held that in view of sections 6	 8 and 10 of the Act " interest on securities " could not be treated as business income and therefore the appellant could not claim a set off under section 24(2). On appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended for the appellant that (1) sections 8 and 10 should be so read that where the securities in the hands of an assessee are trading assets	 section 8 would be excluded	 being restricted to capital investments only	 and the matter would fall under the head " business " within section 10	 and (2) in any case	 even if the income from securities fell under section 8	 the appellant would be entitled to a set off under section 24(2) because it carried on only one business	 namely banking	 and the holding of securities by it was part of the said business. Held	 that the scheme of the Indian Income tax Act	 1922	 is that the various heads of income	 profits and gains enumerated in section 6 are mutually exclusive	 each head being specific to cover the item arising from a particular source and	 consequently	 " interest on securities " which is specifically made chargeable to tax under section 8 as a distinct head	 falls under that section and cannot be brought under section 10	 whether the securities are held as trading assets or capital asset	 80 Commissioner of Income Tax vs Chunnilal B. Mehta, Salisbury House Estate Ltd. vs Fry, (1930) 15 T. C. 266, Commercial Properties Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Bengal, and H. C. Kothari vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, , relied on. The question whether the holding of securities by the appellant formed part of the same business within section 24(2), could not be decided in the absence of a finding that the securities in question were a part of the trading assets held by the appellant in the course of its business as a banker, and the case was remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision on the reference after getting from the Tribunal a fuller statement of facts. 
6926	The appellant company was registered under the . It obtained the consent of the Government of India to 482 issue 7,20,00,000 equity shares of Rs. 10 each at par and 33, 90, 000 fourteen per cent secured redeemable non convertible debentures of Rs. 100 each at per. One of the conditions attached to the consent order was The company shall scrupulously adhere to the time limit of 10 weeks from the date of closure of the subscription list for allotment of all securities and despatch of allotment letters/certificates and refund orders." On 12.7.1990 the company issued prospectus for the issue of the shares and debentures	 stating therein that the company had sought the permission of the stock exchanges at Indore	 Ahmedabad	 Bombay	 Calcutta and Delhi for dealing in equity shares and debentures in terms of the prospects; that interest at the rate of 15 % per annum on the excess application money would be paid to the applicants as per the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance on July 21	 1983 and September 27	 1985; that the public issue would open on August 20	 1990 and close on August 23	 1990; and that it would not be extended beyond August 31	 1990. The issue opened on August 20	 1990. The company received 26	32	894 applications for equity shares together with an aggregate sum of Rs. 225	25	51	247 in respect of a public issue of Rs. 25 crores. The shares issue was close on 23rd August 1990. On October 15	1990 the Board of Directors of the company approved the allotment of shares. Prior to 1.11.1990	 it secured the requisite permissions of the stock exchanges at Indore	 Ahmedabad	 Bombay Calcutta and Delhi to deal in the shares offered in the prospects. The company had to despatch 25	50	604 refund order	 which were printed in Bombay and they were meant to be despatched from Delhi. The company despatched 8	55	226 refund orders from New Delhi at the rate of approx. 1	00	000 refund orders per day. On 26th October	 1990 a consignment of 6	69	999 refund orders were despatched from Bombay to Delhi. As a result of a fire that broke out on the way	 many refund orders were destroyed and about 50 % of the consignment was missing after the accident. In consultation with the Madhya Pradesh Stock Exchange and the Company 's Bank	 instructions were issued by the Company to 483 stop payment of all refund orders with a view to avoiding any possible fraud or misuse. As a result of the countermanding of all the refund orders and the printing of new refund orders	 delay occurred in the despatch of newly printed orders. For issuing the refund orders	 at the request of the company	 the Madhya Pradesh Stock Exchange granted extension of time till November 30	1990 and further extended till 19th December	 1990. The Bombay Stock Exchange refusing the grant extension of time informed the company that it was bound to pay interest by reason of the delay in the despatch of refund orders. The refund orders were not despatched until 12th November	 1990. The Government of India and the Securities and Exchanges Board of India Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 respectively	 insisted that the company should pay interest to the investors for the period of the delay in making the refund in accordance with the provisions of section 73 of the from 1st November (the expiry date of the period of 10 weeks from the date of the closure of the subscription lists) till the date of posting of the refund orders. The company filed a writ petition in the High Court apprehending that the Government might direct the stock exchanges to delist the shares of the company by reason of its failure to pay interest and also initiate actions against it. In the High Court	 the respondent No. 1 submitted that the liability to pay the excess amount arose on the expiry of 10 weeks from the date of closure of the subscription lists. The respondent No. 2 contended that the liability arose on the date of allotment. The company the appellant contended that on the facts of the case	 the liability arose on at the end of the period as extended by the Stock Exchanges at Indore in terms of the prospectus. The High Court dismissed the writ petition	 holding that the company was liable to pay interest at the prescribed rates for the period of delay and the liability for same arose on the expiry of 8 days from the date of allotment of the shares	 and not from the date of expiry of 10 weeks	 where allotment was made earlier to that date. 484 This appeal was filed by the Company against the High Court 's judgment by special leave	 on the question	 whether the High Court was right in discarding	 for computation of interest	 the time limit of 10 weeks running from the date of closure of the subscription lists	 notwithstanding that the allotment had been made prior to the date of expiry of 10 weeks. The appellant contended that the company was entitled to retain the excess amount for the period mentioned in the prospectus and consequently no liability to pay interest could arise until the expiry of that period; that as the Madhya Pradesh Stock Exchange had extended time for refund till 19th December	 1990	 the liability of the company to repay the excess amount did not arise until then; that the interest became payable only after 8 days from the expiry of the period as extended by the Madhya Pradesh Stock Exchange; and that the interest was payable as a penalty and therefore a reasonable and rational construction of the statute to be made in regard to the commencement of the liability of the company to repay the excess amount by taking into account of the relevant circumstances which caused the delay. The respondents submitted that the liability to repay the excess amount arose on the date of allotment of the shares	 that the liability arose forthwith and any delay beyond the period of 8 days from the day on which the liability arose attracted interest that the expression `forwith ' had to be understood as an immediate liability ascertainable with reference to the date of allotment	 but subject to a period of grace of 8 days. Allowing the appeal	 this Court	 HELD : 1.01 As per Dr. Justice T.K. Thommen : A public limited company has no obligation to have its shares listed on a recognised stock exchange. But if the company intend to offer its shares or debentures to the public for subscription by the issue of a prospectus	 it must	 before issuing such prospectus	 apply to one or more recognised stock exchanges for permission to have the shares or debentures intended to be so offered to the public to be dealt with in each such stock exchange in terms of section 73. [496 G] 1.02 Sub section (1) of section 73	 as amended by the 485 Companies (Amendment) Act	 1988 has application only to a company intending to offer shares or debentures to the public for subscription by the issue of a prospectus. Until this sub section was inserted	 listing of public issues was not compulsory. [497 B C] 1.03. Sub section (1A) of Section 73 as amended by the Companies (Amendment) Act	 1988 makes it necessary for the company to state in its prospectus the name of each of the recognised stock exchanges whose permission for listing has been sought by the company. [497 G] 1.04. Any allotment of shares will become void if permission is not granted by the stock exchange or each such stock exchange	 as the case may be	 before the expiry of 10 weeks from the date of the closing of the subscription lists. The validity of the allotment is made dependent on securing the requisite permission of each stock exchanges whose permission has been sought. [497 G 498 A] 1.05. The liability to repay the application money arises only upon refusal of the stock exchange to grant the permission sought by the company before the expiry of 10 weeks from the date of closing of the subscription lists. [498 A] 1.06 There is a deemed refusal if permission is not granted by the stock exchange before the expiry of 10 weeks from the date of closing of the subscription lists	 and upon the expiry of that date	 any allotment of shares made by the company becomes void. [498B] 1.07. Sub section (1A) postulates that any allotment made becomes void at the end of 10 weeks from the date of the closing of the subscription lists if by that time the requisite permission of the stock exchange has not been obtained. But this consequence is postponed till the dismissal of any appeal preferred under section 22 of the . Nevertheless	 the permission	 if not obtained with 10 weeks	 is deemed not to have been granted. [504 F G] 1.08. It is the legislative intent to delay the result postulated under sub section (1A) i.e.	 rendering the allotment void	 until the period of 10 weeks has expired or until the dismissal of the appeal. The liability to repay the excess money in the present case arose on 1.11.1990 which was admittedly the date of expiry of 10 weeks from the date of the closing of the subscription lists	 and consequently the liability to pay interest at the rate specified in sub 486 section (2A) arose on the expiry of 8 days from 1.11.1990. [498 C D] 2.01. From the decision of the stock exchange refusing permission	 an appeal will lie under section 22 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation)Act	 1956. [498 C] 2.02. Pending the decision in appeal	 the allotment made would not be void	 and the decision of the concerned stock exchange is made dependent on the result of the appeal. [498 C] 2.03. The fact that an appeal is pending does not postpone the result contemplated in sub section (2) in regard to the liability to repay the amounts and the interest accruing thereon if the amounts are not repaid within 8 days after the liability arose. [505 A] 3.01 Sub section (1A) of Section 73 postulates two circumstances in which interest becomes payable	 namely	 where the permission has not been applied for before issuing the prospects and the company has thus acted in violation of the law or where permission	 though applied for	 has not been granted. In the former case	 apart from the other consequences which may flow from the company 's disobedience of the law	 the liability to pay interest arises as from the date of receipt of the amounts	 for the company ought not to have received any such amount in response to the prospectus issued by the company in disobedience of the requirements of subsection (1). In the latter case	 the liability to pay interest does not arise until the expiry of 8 days after the company became liable to repay the amounts received by reason of its failure to obtain the necessary permission as referred to in sub section (1A). [499 C D] 3.02. Section 73	 as it stood prior to 1975	 contained no specific provision compelling the company or its directors to repay the amounts received in excess of the aggregate of the application money relating to the shares or debentures in respect of which allotments have been made. Sub section (2A) was inserted by the Companies (Amendment)Act	 1974 inserted to cover cases where permission of the stock exchange has been obtained	 but the shares or debentures have been over subscribed and the company is consequently in possession of excess amounts. The amended sub section made the company liable to repay the excess amounts forthwith	 but did not made the company liable to pay interest on such excess amounts. But a liability was cast on the directors. If the excess amount was not repaid within 8 days from the day the company became liable to 487 repay it	 the directors were made jointly and severally liable to repay such amount with interest. The proviso to sub section (2A)	 which like the proviso to sub section (2)	 as they stood prior to 1988	 provided that a director was not liable to repay the money with interest if he proved that the default in payment of the money was not on account of any misconduct or negligence on his part. [500 C E] 3.03. Owing to the absence of a specific provision imposing liability on the company to pay interest on the over subscribed amounts	 and also owing to the absence of any provision to exempt directors who were not directly in charge of the administration of the company and the need to make listing of public issues compulsory	 further amendments to the section became necessary. Accordingly the Amendment Act of 1988 introduced several amendments to section 73	 one of them being the substitution of a part of sub section (2A) making the company and every director of the company who is `an officer in default ' jointly and severally liable to repay the excess money with interest. [500 F H] 3.04. A `director of a company who is an officer in default ' appearing in sub section (2A) must be understood with reference to the definition of `an officer who is in default ' contained in section 2 (31) read with section 5. This definition includes the managing director or the whole time director of a company. [500 H 501 A] 3.05. The liability imposed under sub section (2A) on a director of the company falls only upon a director who is `an officer in default '	 as defined under section 2 (31) read with section 5(a) (b)	 and not upon any other director. The nominees of the Government of financial institutions on the board of directors of the company	 but not directly in charge of its administration as full time directors	 are exempted from personal liability. [501 A B] 3.06. Sub section (2A) provides for the accrual of interest and the rates thereof. Unlike sub section (2B) providing for punishment by imposition of fine or imprisonment	 sub section (2A) speaks only of interest which is in contra distinction to punishment and is not penal in character. It merely provides a mode of calculation of the amounts payable. Any consideration with reference to a penal provision is of no relevance to the liability of the company of its directors to pay interest in terms of sub section (2A). [503 E] 488 3.07. Sub section (2B) concerns solely with default of compliance with the requirement of sub section (2A) namely	 repayment of excess money. Failure to repay the excess money as required by sub section (2A) visits the company and every officer of the company who is in default (as defined under section 5) with the stipulated punishment. This is	 of course	 in addition to the payment of interest prescribed under sub section (2A). [503 H 504 A] 3.08. The interest provided under sub section (2) is payable to the applicants in terms of that sub section unless the money is returned to them within the specified time	 notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal mentioned in the proviso to sub section (1A). Subsection (3) has to be so understood to be in harmony with the other provisions of section 73. [506 C] 3.09. If the permission for listing sought under sub section (1) is not granted	 the interest payable under sub section (2) is attracted. Sub section (2) says that the liability to repay the money received from applicants arises forthwith either where the permission has not been sought or	 having been sought	 it has not been granted. [504 H 505 A] 3.10. The accrual of interest under sub section (2) is not dependent or consequent on the nullity postulated insub section (1A). [505B] 4.01. The expression `forthwith ' does not necessarily and always mean instantaneous. The expression has to be understood in the context of the statue. Where	 however	 the statute prescribes the payment of money and the accrual of interest thereon at certain points of time	 the expression `forthwith ' must necessarily be understood to be immediate or instantaneous	 so as to avoid any ambiguity or uncertainty. The right accrues or liability arises exactly as prescribed by the statute. [502 H 503 A] 4.02. When `forthwith ' is used for determining the time and mode of payment of the principal and interest	 a liberal or reasonable construction not to be adopted. The legislature intended the expression `forthwith ' to refer to a particular day on which the liability to repay the principal amount arose and that is the day from which the period of 8 days has to be computed	 and on the expiry of that period	 interest begins to accrue. [503 B C] 489 Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar vs The Commissioner of Police	 Greater Bombay	 ; and Salim vs State of West Bengal	 ; 	 distinguished. The right or obligation of the company to keep the money in the bank is only for the period preceding the decision of the stock exchange on the company 's request for permission to list. Once the permission is expressly or impliedly refused	 the money has to be returned to the applicants	 notwithstanding the pendency of the company 's appeal. The earlier part of the sub section about depositing the money in the bank is controlled by the latter provision in the sub section for return of the money as required by sub section (2). This is particularly so by reason of the penalty specially provided in sub section (3) in the event of default of compliance with the requirement of that sub section. [505 H 506 B] 5.02. The money credited to the separate bank account can be utilised for only two purposes: (1) for adjustment against allotment of shares where listing is permitted; or (2) for repayment where listing is not permitted or the company is otherwise unable to allot shares. The company has no right to deal with the money in any other manner or keep it longer than permitted by the section. [506 G H] Palmer 's Company Law	 24th ed. para 24.31; 1955(1) WLR 1080	 referred to. Interest does not begin to run under sub section (2) until 8 days have elapsed from the date of expiry of the period of 10 weeks commencing on the date of closure of the subscription lists. The fact that the legislature has so provided in cases where permission has been refused expressly or by reason of the deeming provision is sufficient indication of the legislative intent to give the company reasonable time to repay the money. [507 B C] 6.02. Companies generally make allotments as soon as practicable after the necessary application has been made to the recognised stock exchange for permission for listing. Upon the issue of the prospectus after making such application	 amounts are received from the public in consideration of which allotments are made in anticipation of the requisite permission. Greater the reputation of the company	 larger are the amounts likely to be received. If permission is not granted	 the entire amounts received from the public 490 have to be forthwith repaid. On the other hand	 if permission is obtained	 but the amounts received from the public are in excess of the aggregate of the application money relating to the allotted shares or debentures. Such excess amounts are forthwith repayable. Whether or not permission will be obtained cannot be ascertained until the period prescribed for the purpose has expired	 namely	 10 weeks from the date of closing of the subscription lists. Until the expiry of those 10 weeks	 neither the subscribing public nor the company will be in a position to decide whether or not the allotments made are valid. This is a period of uncertainty and it is for that reason that the legislature has	 been is a case of refusal to grant permission	 provided that the liability to repay the application money arises upon the expiry of 10 weeks. [507 D G] 6.03. The possibility of an appeal being allowed is	 not a ground to delay repayment. It should make no difference whether it is as a result of the permission having been refused	 or permission having been granted and excess amounts are received by reason of over subscription	 that repayment of money has to be made by the company. It either event	 the liability to repay the amounts arises forth with on the expiry of 10 weeks from the date of closure of the subscription lists	 and the interest will begin to accrue thereon on the expiry of 8 days therefrom. This construction is	 just and reasonable from the point of view of both the investor and the company	 and has the advantage of certainty	 uniformity and easy application. [507 G 508 A] 7. The section 73 is not free from ambiguities and doubts. Having been amended in several respects	 it has not finally emerged with the clarity that admits of easy construction. But the contemporaneous construction placed upon an ambiguous section by the administrators entrusted with the task of executing the statute is extremely significant. This construction is	 perfectly consistent with the language and the object of the statute. It is a practical and reasonable construction	 particularly because it affords the company reasonably sufficient time to complete the formalities for despatch of the refund orders. And the investor who has responded to the invitation contained in the prospectus is not unduly kept waiting for the return of the excess amounts due to him. [508 E G] Desh Bandu Gupta & Co. & ors. vs Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd.; 	 and K.P. Varghese vs Income Tax Officer	 Ernakulam & Anr.	 ; 	 referred to. 491 Crawford 's Interpretation of Laws	 1989 Ed. referred to. As per Mr. Justics section Mohan (Concurring) 1.01. Sub section (2A) of Section 73 of the comes into operation only where permission has been granted by the recognised stock exchange or exchanges. The words	 "where permission has been granted" are of great significance. Therefore	 the contention that on the date of allotment the liability to pay interest arises may not be correct. Nor again	 it would be correct to contend that the mechanics of refund liability to pay arises on the date of allotment since there is a failure of consideration in respect of shares not allotted. [519 B C] 1.02. The liability of the company to repay the excess amount under Section 73 (2A) will arise only on the expiry of 10 weeks from the date of the closure of subscription lists. The interest begins to accrue thereupon at the end of 8 days. [526 A] 2.01. The word "due" in the section 73 has been substituted for the word "payable" in order to make it clear that a mortgagor cannot redeem within the term of the mortgage. The right of redemption arises when the principal money secured by the mortgage has become due and may be exercised at any time thereafter	 subject of course to the law of limitation. [520 C D] 2.02. "Due"	 means payable immediately or a debt contracted but payable at a future time. "A debt is said to be `due 'the instant that it has existence as a debt; it may be payable at a future time" it cannot be contended on the strength of Section 530 `due ' and `payable ' is one and the same even under section 732 (a). [522 E F] Black 's Legal Dictionary	 (5th Edition 488)	 Venkataramiah 's Law Lexicon and Legal Maxims Vol. I	 713 714; Wharton 's Law Lexicon	 14th Edition; Buckley on the Companies Acts	 14th Edition	 Volume I	 referred to. Bhaktawar Begum vs Husaini Khanam	 (1914)36 All. 195; 41 I.A. 84; ; Bir Mohammad V. Nagoor	 ; (which over ruled Rose Ammal vs Rajarathnam	 ; Baroda Board & Paper Mills Ltd. vs Income Tax Officer	 Circle I	 Ward E	 Ahmedabad and others	 1976 (46) company cases 492 25; Union of India vs Air Foam Industries (P) Ltd.	 ; & 1271 (Para 7) referred to. "Forthwith ' is not susceptible of a fixed time definition	 and the surrounding facts and circumstances must be taken into consideration in determining the question	 and forthwith may be minutes	 hours	 days or even weeks. It cannot be said that "forthwith" means E.O. instanti. [526 E F] Dickerman vs Trust Co.	 ; 176 U.S. 193	 	 	 4 Tyrwh. 837; Edwards vs Ins. Co.	 ; Seammon vs Ins. Co.	 101	 III 621; ; ; Bennect vs Ins ; Pennsylvanis R.Co. vs Reichert	 58 Md. 261; Meriden Silver Plate Co. vs Flory 	 193	 Soutern Reporter	 339 and 16 Soutern Reporter 33 @ 35 Col. I.	 Laws 1035	 Ex Secs C. 10	 referred to. Bouvier 's Law Dictionary Referred to. 4. It cannot but be held that the payment of interest is only compensatory and not penal. Merely because clause 10 uses the word "penal" it cannot be amount to penalty. [526 F] Mahalaxmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd vs Commissioner of Income Tax	 Delhi	 New Delhi	 ; 	 referred to. In view of the clear terms of the statute the administrative inconvenience cannot be pleaded. [528 B C] Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co vs Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. & Another	 ; 1029	 referred to.