Summarize the following court judgment. Appeals Nos. 1186 1188 of 1972. Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order (fated 12/ 13/15th October	 1971 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 555	 556 of 1967 and 72 of 1968. K. section Cooper	 M. K. Shah	 P. H. Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare	 for the appellants. B. N. Lokur	 Rameshwar Nath	 for respondent No. 1. Subodh Markendeya	 for Respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA	 J. Whether the principle of apportionment is applicable to the fixation of standard rent of a premises under the Bombay Rents	 Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act	 1947 (for short	 the Act); if so whether on the facts of the case	 the principle has been rightly invoked is the two fold question that falls for decision in these three appeals by special leave directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The material facts are as under A big compound	 measuring 11	150 sq. yards	 at 156 Tardeo Road	 Bombay	 belonged to Raja Bahadur Moti Lal Mills	 Ltd.	 Bombay	 appellant No.1. The Mills were shifted from these premises in the year 1930. In 1932	 the whole of this estate including the structures standing on. a part of it	 was let out to Sound Studios Ltd. Between the years 1932 and 1940	 some part of it was sub let by Sound Studios to Sheraj Ali	 who was the proprietor of M/s. Famous 579 Cine Laboratory and another part to Neon Signs (India) Ltd.	 and the rest of the estate continued to be with Sound Studios. Thereafter	 Sound Studios went out of the picture and the whole estate was let out to National Studios Ltd. on October 23	 1940 at a monthly rent of Rs. 1700/ for a period of two years. In July 1941	 National Studios surrendered their lease and Sheraj Ali became a direct tenant under appellant 1 in respect of the premises in his possession	 called for the sake of identification	 983/1 (whole) and 983/2 (Ground floor). On December 1	 1941 and again in November 1942	 Sheraj Ali took on rent additional portions of this estate so that his original rent	 which was Rs. 400/ 	 was first increased to Rs. 600/and then to Rs. 700/ and thereafter in November 1942 to Rs. 875/ . By November 1947	 Sheraj Ali was paying Rs. 1200/ per month as rent for the premises demised to him including some new structures which had been built. Sheraj Ali had taken a loan from M/s. Govind Ram Bros. Ltd.	 Respondent 1 on the security of his Film Studio Equipments. He failed to repay the loan. Thereupon	 Respondent 1 instituted a suit for recovery of the amount and obtained a decree from the High Court	. on February 27	1948. As a result of the High Court 's decree	 the right	 title and interest of Sheraj Ali in the mortgaged property were assigned to Respondent 1. Respondent 1	 in consequence	 took a fresh lease on March 19	1948 from appellant No. 1 of the	 properties (called for identification) 983/1 to 983/12	 which were in the tenancy of Sheraj Ali '	 at a contractual rent of Rs. 1228/ p.m. On the same date	 Respondent 1 executed another lease in respect of three rooms in the same premises (marked for identification as) 984	 in favour of appellant 1	 on a monthly rent of Rs. 750/ Respondent 1 failed to pay the contractual rent	 regularly	 which fell into arrears which were not cleared despite the pressing demands made by the Receiver. On March 13	 1954 the Receiver wrote to Respondent 1 threatening to take legal proceedings for the recovery of the rent. This Receiver	 who is now appellant No. 2	 had been appointed by the High Court in Suit No. 454 of 1949 instituted by appellant 1 against the Insurance Company On April 14	 1954	 two applications were filed in the Court of Small Causes by Respondent 1 for fixation of standard rent in respect of the premises comprised in the said two leases one application	 R.A.N. 983/54	 relates to properties 983/1 to 983/12	 and the other (R.A.N. 984) to premises 984. It was alleged in the applications that since on September	 1	 1940	 the entire estate	 including the properties in question. had been let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 1700/ 	 standard rent of the premises it question should be fixed on the basis of apportionment In particular	 it was pleaded that fair rent of Rs. 983/1 to 983/12 should be 1/8th of Rs. 1200/ which was later corrected as 1700/ . On the same basis it was alleged in the second application	 that fair rent of premises 984 should be Rs. 75/ p. m. 580 The appellants resisted these applications and averred in R. A. N. 983/54	 that several entirely new structures had been built and substantial alterations made in most of these structures between the years 1940 and 1948	 as a result whereof the property had lost its identity	 and consequently	 fair rent could not be fixed on apportionment basis. On June 11	 1958	 Respondent 1 made an application for amendment of the Standard Rent Application (R.A. N. 983154) for adding an alternative ground based on the value of the land and cost of construction so that in the event of the court holding on the preliminary issue in favour of the appellants	 the standard rent could be fixed on the basis of the valuation of the land and the construction. This application was disallowed. On July 30	1958 Respondent 1 made an application for amendment of his R. A. N. 984 of 1954 on lines similar to that in R. A. N. 983/54. It was also dismissed by an order	 dated July 31	 1958. At the stage of arguments on December 4	 1958	 Respondent 1 moved another application for amendment and addition of the plea that they were the owners of the structures in premises 983/10	 983/1] and 983/12. The second amendment was not sought to be made in the other application R. A. N. 98411954 relating to property 984. This prayer was also declined. The trial court (Samson J.) by its judgment dated April 2	 1959	 found that the premises in question on account of structural alterations had undergone such a change that they could no longer be identified with the property that existed in September 1940 and that the mode of 	determining rent by apportionment was not available to the tenants. In the result he dismissed the applications	 adding "there is no sufficient 	material to ascertain the standard rent in any other way '. Against those orders	 Respondent 1 filed a revision petition under section 129 (3) of the Act before the Revisional Court of Small Causes	 Bombay	 which accepted	 the same set aside the order of the trial judge	 allowed the amendment and remanded both the applications for fixation of fair rent to the trial court. Against this remand order	 dated August 8	 1960	 of the Revisional Court	 the appellants preferred two Civil Revisions to the High Court of Bombay. During the pendency of those Revisions	 the trial court allowed the amendment and proceeded to decide the entire matter afresh. These facts were brought to the notice of the High Court	 which	 however	 	dismissed the revision petitions by a judgment dated February 3	 1961 holding that the first Revisional Court had	 in fact	 remanded the entire matter for trial de novo	 after rightly allowing both the amendments. After the remand	 the trial court by its judgment	 dated April 25	 1961 held that except 983/10	 983/11 and 983/12	 which were new structures there was no change of identity in the rest of the properties 581 i. e. 983/1 to 983/9; that new structures 983/10	 983/11 and 983/12 belonged to Respondent 1 who was consequently	 liable to pay rent only for the land underneath; that the cost of repairs of the properties	 983/8 and 983/9 after they had been destroyed by fire	 was mainly borne by Respondent 1	 the landlord 's contribution being Rs. 8	500/ only. Applying the principle of apportionment	 it fixed the standard rent of the properties 983/1 to 983/12 at Rs. 400/ p.m. subject to permitted increases after 1954. Regarding the premises 984(in R.A.N.984/54)	 the trial court gave are turn on the investment of Rs.40	000/ made by the landlord inclusive of the cost of structure and the value of land underneath at Rs. 30/ per sq. yard (as that of 1940) and fixed the standard rent at Rs. 386/ p. m. subject to permitted increases after 1946. Aggrieved by these orders of the trial court	 appellants and Respondent 2 filed two revision applications under section 129 (3) to the Revisional Court of Small Causes which by its judgment	 dated September 30	 1964	 substantially upheld the findings of the trial court	 inter alia with the exceptions : (i) that the ownership of the new structures 983/10	 983/11 and 983/12 vested in Appellant 1	 who was entitled to get a fair return on that investment; (ii) that the value of the land "married" to the new structures 983/10	 983/11 and 983/12	 and 984/54	 should be taken at Rs. 50/ per sq. yd.	 i. e. as of 1948 and not as of 1940 as had been done by the trial court on remand. In the result	 the standard rent in R.A.N. 983 was raised to Rs. 981 / and in R.A.N. 984 to Rs.411/ p.m. To impugn the decision	 dated September	 30	 1964	 of the Revisional Court	 the parties preferred six Special Civil Applications under article 226/227 of the Constitution to the High Court. By a common order	 a learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed these applications except that he corrected some arithmetical errors and	 in consequence	 fixed the standard rent of properties 983/1 to 983/12 at Rs. 841.07 and that of premises 984/54 at Rs. 462/11 p. m. It is against this decision dated 12/13th October 1971 of the High Court that these appeals have been filed by special leave. The first contention of Mr. Cooper	 learned Counsel for the appellants is that there is no provision in the Act which requires standard rent to be fixed on apportionment basis; rather	 the definition of "premises" in section 5(8) (b) which speaks of "part of a building let separately	 read with clause (i) of section 5(10) and clause (c) of section 11 (1) with due emphasis on the article 'the ' immediately preceding the, word 'premises ' in the said clauses, indicates that the standard rent would be the rent for which the suit premises were first let separately on or, after the basic date i.e. September 1, 1940. If on the basic date proceeds the argument the premises in question did not form the subject of a separate, single ,demise but had been let out together with other portions of larger premises, its standard rent could not be determined on the footing of the rent payable for those different portions. Reliance 582 has been placed on Dhanrajgirji Naraingirji vs W. G. Ward;(1) and Bata Shoe Co ' Ltd. vs Narayan Das Mullick and Ors.(2) Counsel had further tried to distinguish Capital and Provincial Property Trust Ltd. vs Rice(3) and Bhikaji Ramchandra Paranjpe vs Vishnu Ramchandra Paranjpe(4), referred to in the judgment of the High Court. On the other hand, Mr. Lokur, learned Counsel for Respondent maintains that the principle of apportionment has always been accepted by the Bombay High Court as an appropriate guide in fixing standard rent under the Act of premises which on the basic date had been let out as part of a larger entity. It is pointed out that in Narayanlal Bansilal vs Venkatrao Anant Rai(5); a Bench of the High Court while considering the question of standard rent in respect of another portion of the very property of the appellant Mills, had invoked this principle. Before we deal with the contentions canvassed, it will be proper to make a brief survey of the relevant provisions of the Act: The material part of the definition of premises" in s.5(8) reads: "Premises" means: (a) any land not being used for agricultural purposes; (b) any building or part of a building let separately. " (emphasis supplied) Sub section (10) of the same Section defines "standard rent"	 in relation to any premises	 to mean (a) where the standard rent fixed by the court and the Controller respectively under the Bombay ]tent Restrictions Act	 1939 or the Bombay Rents	 Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act	 1944	 such standard rent; or (b) Where the standard rent is not so fixed/subject to the provisions of section 11	 (i) the rent at which the premises were let on the first day of September 1940	 or (ii) where they were not let on the first day of September 1940	 the rent at which they were last let before that day	 or (iii) where they were first let after the first day of September 1940	 the rent at which they were first let	 or (iv) in any of the cases specified in section 11	 the rent fixed by the Court; (1) (2) A.I.R. 1953 Cal. (3) [1952] Appeal Cases 142. (4) (5) 583 Section 1 1 empowers the Rent Court to fix the standard rent at such amount	 as having regard to the provisions of this Act and the circumstances of the case	 the court deems just (a) where any premises are first let after the first day of September 1940	 and the rent at which they are so let is in the opinion of the Court excessive; or (b) where the Court is satisfied that there is no sufficient evidence to ascertain the rent at which the premises were let in anyone of the cases mentioned in sub clause (i) to (iii) of clause (4) of sub section (10) of section 5; or (c) Where by reason of the premises having been let at one time as a whole or in part and another time in parts or a whole	 or for any other reasons	 any difficulty arises in giving effect to this part; or (d) Where any premises have been or are let rent free or at a nominal rent or for some consideration in addition to rent; or (e) Where there is any dispute between the land lord and the tenant regarding the amount of standard rent. " Clause (c) read with the opening part of section 11(1) is crucial for our purpose. One of the primary objects of the Act is to curb exaction of extortionate rents and to stabilise the same at prewar level. In achieving that object	 however	 it avoids a Procrustean or mechanical approach. While pegging the basic line to September 1	 1940	 it significantly subordinates "standard rent" by its very definition in section 5 (10) (b) to the benignant jurisdiction of the Court under s.11. And the key words of the latter provision	 into which the conscience of this anti rack renting statute is compressed	 are "the circumstances of the case	 the Court deems just". These words inhibit a rigid and ossified determination of "standard rent". They leave sufficient "play at the joints"	 investing the court with a wide discretion in the matter. According to the scheme of the Act	 while "rent" recoverable by the landlord	 may owing to permitted increases	 fluctuate	 the 'standard rent ' always remains fixed or stationary. If on the basic date	 the suit premises were not let out separately but were a part of the subject matter of a larger demise as in the instant case difficulty arises in giving effect to the statute. Clause (c) of section II (1) then comes into operation. To resolve the difficulty this clause and the related provisions are not to be construed in a narrow technical sense which would stultify or defeat their object. It is to be interpreted liberally in a manner which would 'advance the remedy '	 'suppress the 584 mischief	 and foil 'subtle inventions and evasions ' of the Act. Construed in accordance with this socially relevant rule in Hayden 's case the meaning of 'the premises ' having been let at one time as a whole	 spoken of in this clause	 can legitimately be deemed to cover ' the larger premises which	 on the basic date	 had been let as a: whole and of which the suit premises was a part let out subsequently. In any event	 the amplitude of the phrase "or any other reason" in the latter part of the clause	 is wide enough to embrace cases of this kind and confers a plenary curative power on the Court. True	 that unlike the English Rent Control Act of 1920 or the later English Acts	 the (Bombay) Act does not expressly speak of apportionment. But the language of its relevant provisions construed consistently with the scheme and in built policy of the Act	 is elastic enough to permit the fixation of standard rent on apportionment basis. As noticed already	 section II (1) gives a discretion to the Court to fix such amount as standard rent as it "deems just". However	 in exercising this discretion the Court has to pay due regard to (i) the provisions of the. Act and (ii) the circumstances of the case. Apportionment or equal distribution of the burden of rent on every portion is a rule of justice and good sense. If the standard rent of a whole was a specific amount	 it stands to reason that the standard rent of a part or sub division of that whole should not ordinarily exceed that amount. Therefore	 if in the circumstances of a given case the Court feels that for securing the ends of justice and giving effect to the provisions and policy of the Act	 it is reasonably necessary and feasible to work out the standard rent by apportionment	 it can legitimately do so. This principle	 however	 is applicable where on the basic date	 that portion of which the standard rent is to be determined	 had not been let separately as on unit	 but the whole	 of which it is a part	 had been let on that date. Apportionment postulates that on account of its having been let on the basic date	 the whole had acquired a standard rent which has to be allocated to smaller units subsequently carved out of it. It is thus clear that the principle of apportionment is not alien to the spirit of the Act	 and has indeed been often invoked by the courts in fixing standard rent under this Act. In Narayanlal Bansilal 's case (supra)	 a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court determined standard rent of another part of this very estate of the Mills in accordance with that principle. However	 while conceding that apportionment is not foreign to the scheme	 purpose and policy of the Act	 we will like to emphasise the need for caution and circumspection in invoking it. It is not to be rigidly and indiscriminately applied as a cast iron rule of law regardless of time and circumstances or the equities of the case. A doctrinaire approach	 not consistent with a just and fair determination	 stultifies the whole salutary purpose of justice to both	 the landlord and the tenant. If necessary	 it can be adjusted	 adapted and attuned in the light of the particular circumstances of the case	 to satisfy the statutory requirement of 585 fixing the standard rent as at a "just amount. Thus if after the material date	 the landlord has made investments and improvements in the promises	 it will be just and reasonable to take that factor also into account and to give him a fair return on such investments. Further	 in appor tioning the rant	 the Court must consider other relevant circumstances	 such as "size	 accessibility	 aspect	 and other 'Physical advantage enjoyed by the tenant of the premises of which the standard rent is in question	 as compared with those of the rent of the property in which it is comprised [see Bainbridge vs Contdon(1)]. Where after the basic date	 the premises completely change their identity	 apportionment as a method of determining just standard rent	 loses its efficacy and may be abandoned altogether. We have only illustrated	 not exhaustively enumerated the relevant circumstances and their implications. At this stage	 we may notice the decisions in Danrajgirji vs W.C. Ward (supra) and Bata Shoe and Co. vs Narayan Dass (supra) relied upon by Mr. Cooper. In the first	 a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court was considering sections 2(1)(a) and 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent (War Restriction Act II of 1918)	 which were	 to an extent	 similar to sections 5(8)(b) and (10) and 11(1)(c) of the 1947 Act. There	 the Port Trust had in March 24	1915	 leased the building known as Watson 's Annexe to one Dr. Billimoria at a rental of Rs. 2	850	 besides ground rent and taxes. Dr. Billimoria sublet the premises in different flats to different tenants. The premises in the occupation of the defendant were sublet to him at a rental of Rs. 75/ in September	 1915	 i.e. before September 1	 1916 which was the basic date under the 1918 Act. The tenancy of Dr. Billimoria was terminated by a consent decree on July 31	 1923 and thereafter	 the defendant held directly under the plaintiff. The question arose as to whether standard rental of the flat should be calculated on the basis of the actual rent of Rs. 75/ 	 on the basis of the subletting or whether it should be determined by apportionment of the rent which Dr. Billimoria was paying to the Port Trust on the basis of the first letting. Pratt J answered this question thus: "The Rent Act itself in the definition of the premises refers to a part of the building separately let as premises of which the standard rent has to be determined and such standard rent must be determined with reference to those premises in the manner spe cified by s 2(1)(a) of the Act. The standard rent	 therefore	 must be ascertained on the admitted basic rent of Rs. 75./. . Again	 if the head lease instead of being as here the lease of one building consisting of flats had been a lease of a large number of buildings constituting a large estate	 it would be almost impossible to make a correct apportionment of the rent. I do not think it was the intention of the Rent Act that landlords and tenants should be driven to do a difficult and expensive process of valuation. and calculation before their rent could be ascertained. " (1) M45Sup. CI/75 586 We see force in the argument as also textual and pragmatic support. But these considerations do not preclude the Court from importing the flexible factors of fairness suggested by the circumstances of the case. Indeed	 section 11	 as explained earlier	 obliges the Court to do it. Moreover	 the interpretation of "premises" adopted by the learned judge was a little too literal	 narrow and divorced from the purpose and content of the provisions relating to fixation of standard rent. Nor was it in accord with the scheme and object of the 1918 Act. The court 's jurisdiction to consider	 as a strong circumstance	 proper apportionment of rent is not taken away	 in our view. It may be noted that just like the opening clause of section 5 of the 1947Act	 which defines "premises" "standard rent" etc.	 the corresponding section 2(1) of the 1918 Act	 also	 started with the qualifying words "In this Act	 unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context". While applying these definitions to particular cases and provisions of the Acts	 these words should not be lost sight of. The argument in favour of adopting the restricted interpretation	 ignores this rider to the definitions	 provided by the Legislature in these statutes. We do not intend to over burden this judgment with a discussion the decision in Bata Shoe & Co 's case (supra). Suffice it to say that is a decision under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act (17 of 1950) which stands on its own facts. It cannot be accepted as laying down a rule of universal application. It is vulnerable	 more or less on the same grounds	 on which the decision in Dhanrajgirji 's case can be assailed. We reject the narrow interpretation of the relevant provisions of Ss. 2 and II	 canvassed for by the appellants	 for two reasons: Firstly	 it will leave the door wide open for evasion of this statute by what Abbot C. J. in Fox vs Bishop of Chester(1) called "shift or contrivance" All that a greedy landlord	 need do to squeeze out more rent would be to divide his premises into several parts and let them out separately on exorbitant rents. Such an evasion may amount to a fraud upon the statute. Secondly	 such a construction so manifestly subversive of one of the primary objects of the Act would be wholly beyond the intendment of the Legislature. For reasons aforesaid we would negative the first contention of Mr. Cooper	 as an inflexible proposition and answer the first part of the question posed in the affirmative to the extent indicated. it takes us to the second part of that question namely whether the principle of apportionment was correctly applied to the fact	 of the case ? Mr. Cooper contends that the first trial court (Samson J.) had rightly found that the premises in question on account of extensive alterations and constructions undergone a complete change after the basic date	 and therefore standard rent could not be determined by apporoining the rent of the whole among the parts. It is maintained that (1) (824) ; at 655. 587 this finding of Samson J. was wrongly set aside by the High Court and must be deemed to be still holding the field. Objection is also taken to the amendments allowed by the trial court on remand. In the alternative	 it is argued that even the courts below found that properties 983/10	 983/11	 983/12 and 984/54 were admittedly new structures and extensive repairs and replacements had been made in the remaining suit premises which had been destroyed or severely damaged by fire in 1948 49. On account of these substantial alterations and reconstructions the premises in question had lost their identity and consequently	 the principle of appointment was not applicable. The first part of the contention based on the judgment of Samson J. is groundless. The judgment of the first trial court was set aside in toto by the Revisional Court	 and further by the High Court and the case was remanded for de novo trial to the trial court which thereafter	 decided the case afresh after allowing the applicant to amend his R.A. N.S. It is too late in the day any way to argue on the assumption that the findings still survive. The question whether a certain property has changed its identity after the basic date is largely one of fact. The courts below have found that excepting properties 983/10	 983/11	983/12 and 984/54 which were admittedly new structures contracted near about 1948	 the rest of the properties	 namely 983/1 to 983/9 had not lost their identity. The courts therefore	 worked out the economic rent of these new structures by capitalising their value and gave the landlord a fair return on Ms investments and fixed their standard rent mainly on that basis. It was with regard to the unchanged old properties 983/1 to 983/9 that the High Court and the Revisional Court mainly adopted the method of appointment. Even so	 it allowed the landlord fair return over Rs. 14	448/ being the cost of flooring	 ceiling and other fixtures fixed to property 983/6. Now it is not disputed that on the basic date (September 1	 1940)	 these properties in question were parts of a larger entity comprised in a single lease or tenancy in favour of Sound Studios at a monthly rent of Rs. 1700/ . The courts below have therefore taken into account this basic circumstance along with the other relevant facts of the case. We do not find anything so wrong or unfair or untenable in the method adopted by them which would warrant an interference by this Court in the exercise of its special jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution. Not that apportionment must be applied in all cases as a rule of law but that	 if applied along with other considerations dictated by a sense of justice and fairplay	 cannot be condemned by this Court as	 illegal. We therefore	 overrule this contention	 also. Lastly	 it is contended that the courts below have seriously erred in evaluating the land under the suit properties at Rs. 30/ per sq. on the basis of an instance (exhibit R 6) of the year 1942	 while they should have taken into account the value of the land as in the year 1948. it is added that some photostat co pies of sale deeds pertaining to the rele vant year were produced by Mr. Deweja	 architect examined by the Landlord	 and the Revisional Court wrongly rejected them As unproved. it is maintained that in 1948	 the market value of the site underneath the 288 structures was Rs. 120/ per sq. in support of his contention that the value of the land at the date of the letting is the appropriate value to be taken into account	 Counsel has cited Bukmanibai Khunji Cooverji vs Shivnarayan Ram Ashre. We are unable to accept this contention also. The courts below in capitalising the structures	 983/10 to 983/12 and 984/54 did take into account the value of the land married to those properties at the rate of Rs. 50/ per sq. yd; which	 according to their estimate	 after adding Rs. 30/ per sq. yd for escalation	 would be the market value of that land in the year 1948. Since the rent of the old unchanged properties 983/1 to 983/9 was fixed mainly on apportionment basis	 the courts did not think it necessary to take the value of their sites separately into computation in fixing the standard rent. Moreover	 there was no evidence on the record to show that the value of the land in question	 in the year 1948 was Rs. 120/ per sq. We	 therefore	 do not think it necessary to examine Cooverji 's case cited by the Counsel. We however	 do not rule out the propriety of paying regard to escalations in land value as put forward by Mr. Cooper	 but do hold that this Court will be loath to re investigate factual conclusions not shown to be perverse or manifestly unjust. Such is not the case here. For all the foregoing reasons	 we would answer the question posed for decision.in the affirmative and dismiss these appeals with one set of costs. V.P.S. Appeals dismissed (1)(1966)67 Bom. L.R. 692.

On September 1	 1940	 the basic date under the Bombay Rents	 Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act	 1947	 the properties in dispute were parts of a larger entity comprised in a single lease. In March 1948	 the respondent took a fresh lease of the properties in dispute	 Thereafter	 the respondent filed applications in the court of Small Causes for fixation of standard rent on the basis of apportionment. The trial court dismissed the applications holding that the premises	 on account of structural alterations	 had undergone such a change that they could no longer be identified with the property that existed in September 1940; that the mode of determining the rent by apportionment was not available to the tenant; and that there was no sufficient material for ascertaining the standard ' rent in any other way. This order was set aside in revision and the case was remanded to the trial court. After remand	 the trial court held that except with respect to three items of the premises in dispute	 which were new Structures	 there was no change of identity in the rest of the properties; that the new structures belonged to the respondent who was consequently liable to pay rent only for the land underneath; and on that basis	 applying the principle of apportionment	 fixed the standard rent. With respect to one item the trial court took into consideration the investment made by the landlord inclusive of the	 cost of structures	 estimated the value of the land underneath as in 1940	 and fixed the standard rent on that basis. In revision it was held that the ownership of the three new structures also vested in the appellant	 that he was entitled to get a fair return on that investment also and that the value of the land should be taken as in 1948 and not in 1940	 and the standard rent was fixed on that basis. Further revisions to the High Court were dismissed with some arithmetical corrections. In appeal to this Court	 HELD : The principle of apportionment is applicable to the fixation of standard rent of the premises in dispute and the principle had been rightly invoked and applied. [584 F G] (a) One of the primary objects of the Act is to curb exaction of extortionate rent. Section II (1) empowers the Court to fix the standard rent at such amount	 as having regard to the provisions of the Act and the circumstances of the case	 the Court deems just	 If on the basic date the premises were not let out separately but were a part of the subject matter of a larger demise then section 11(1)(c) comes into operation. If the standard rent of a whole was a specific amount it stands to reason that the standard rent of a part or sub division of the whole should not ordinarily exceed that amount. Therefore	 if in the circumstances of a given case the court feels that for securing the ends of justice and giving effect to the provisions and policy of the Act it is reasonably necessary and feasible to work out the standard rent by apportionment	 it can legitimately do so. The language of the Act consistently with its scheme and in built policy is elastic enough to permit the fixation of standard rent on apportionment basis. At the same time	 caution and circumspection are necessary in applying the principle to the particular circumstances of a case. For example	 if after the material date	 the landlord has made investments and improvements in the premises it will be just and reasonable to take that factor also into account and give him a fair return on such investment. Similarly	 in apportioning the rent	 the Court must also consider other relevant circumstances and advantages enjoyed by the tenant of the premises of which the standard rent is in question as compared with the rest 578 of the Property in which it is comprised. Further	where after the basic date the premises completely changed their identity	 apportionment as a method of determining just standard rent loses its efficacy and may be abandoned altogether.[583E 585C] Narayanlal Bansilal vs Venkatrao Anant Rai 67 Bom. L.R. 352	 Bainbridge vs Congdon and Fox vs Bishop of Chester ; at 655 referred to. Dhanrajgirji Naraingirji vs W. G. Ward (1925) 27	 Bom. L.R. 877 and Bata Shoe & Co. Ltd. vs Narayan Das Mullick and Ors. not approved. (b)(1) The findings of the trial court before remand had been set aside in the order of remand	 and there is nothing wrong or unfair or untenable in the method adopted by the lower courts after remand which would warrant interference by this Court in exercise of special jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution. [587D G] (ii) The question whether certain property has changed its identity after the basic date is largely one of fact. The factual conclusions arrived at by the revisional court and High Court are not shown to be perverse or manifestly unjust" It was with regard to the unchanged old properties that the High Court and the Revisional Court mainly adopted the method of apportionment. Even so	 they allowed the landlord a fair return over the amount invested by him towards the cost of flooring	 ceiling and other fixtures. since the rent of the old unchanged premises was fixed mainly on apportionment basis	 the courts rightly did not think it necessary to take the value of their sites separately into computation in fixing the standard rent. [588 B D] (iii) As regards the new structures the courts below	 in capitalising their value did take into account the value of the land and took the market value of the land as in the year 1948. [588B]