Summarize the following court judgment. Appeals Nos. 926 and 927 of 1965. Appeals from the judgment and decree dated November 25	 1962 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench) at Indore	 in First Appeals Nos. 19 and 23 of 1957 respectively. 166 section V. Gupte	 Solicitor General	 Rameshwar Nath	 section N. Andley	 P. L. Vohra and Mahinder Narain	 for the appellant. section P. Sinha	 Ganapat Rai	 E. C. Agarwala and P. C. Agarwala	 for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami	 J. These appeals are brought by certificate on behalf of the defendant from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh	 Indore Bench	 dated November 20	 1962 in First Appeals Nos. 19 and 23 of 1957. The plaintiffs	 Rup Chand and Hukam Chand instituted Civil Suit No. 8 of section 1999 in the Court of District Judge	 Ujjain	 against the defendant Vithal Das and three others	 for partition of houses and for rendition of accounts. Two of the defendants	 Bheronlal and Indermal died in the course of the suit and the suit was continued against Vithal Das. The plaintiffs alleged that the immovable property constituting Blocks Nos. 206 and 207 in Freeganj	 Ujjain was purchased with the capital of the partnership firm in which the plaintiffs and the defendant were	 at one time	 partners and by two documents dated July 2	 1937 and July 16	 1937	 the properties continued to remain in the ownership of the partnership firm	 though the firm had been dissolved in the year 1937. The plaintiffs claimed that the properties were managed by the defendant on behalf of the plaintiffs and the defendant realised rents from the tenants on their behalf and plaintiffs were	 therefore entitled to receive half the amount realised as rent and the defendant was liable to render accounts thereof. The plaintiffs also claimed parti tion of the joint properties	 or in the alternative	 the sale of the property by auction and after deducting the cost of auction	 half of the sale proceeds. The defendant contested the suit on the ground that at the time of the execution of the document dated July 2	 1937 there were only three blocks in partnership which were at that time open land. The defendant claimed that Block 'No. 206 and the building constructed thereon was not a partnership property. It was further alleged that the defendant had invested Rs. 10.000 in the three blocks of land which were held in partnership for constructing a building. The trial court accepted the plaintiffs ' case and granted a decree for partition of the blocks and for an account of income realised in respect of the property situated on block No. 207. As regards block No. 206 and the property standing thereon the trial court directed the defendant either to remove the construction or accept his share of money spent by the defendant over it and created a charge over the property in respect of the amount so held payable. Both the parties preferred appeals in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh against the judgment of the trial court which partially allowed the appeals and remanded the case to the trial Court. The High Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to claim half share in both the properties built on blocks Nos	 206 and 207 and the defendant was liable to account 167 for the income of the properties on block No. 207 from the date of dissolution i.e.	 from July 2	 1937 and of block No. 206 from the year 1939. The High Court also held that the plaintiffs were liable to pay half the costs spent by the defendant in constructing the building on block No. 206. After the order of remand the trial Court appointed a Commissioner for examining accounts of rent realised by the defendant. After considering the report of the Commissioner	 the trial Court determined the total amount of rent of both the blocks Nos. 206 and 207 at Rs. 41	829/3/7 and the half share of the plaintiffs was determined at Rs. 20	914/4/9. The trial Court also awarded interest to the plaintiffs on the half share of the income to the extent of Rs. 6	676/7/3 calculated upto April 11	 1957. The total amount thus due to the plaintiffs was determined at Rs. 27	591 /1/ . Out of this amount the trial court allowed sum of Rs. 9	755/7/3 on account of the half costs of ' construction and interest thereon and expenses incurred for house tax	 water tax	 legal expenses and repairs. The net amount thus awarded to the plaintiffs was Rs. 17	670/9/9. As regards the partition of blocks Nos. 206 and 207	 the trial court held that in view of the method of construction of the blocks it was not possible to make partition in equal shares and therefore the trial court directed that the two blocks should be auctioned in separate lots and the parties should be at liberty to bid at the auction and the parties would have equal rights to the amount of the auction. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court both the parties preferred appeals to the High Court of Madhya pradesh	 namely	 First Appeals Nors. 19 and 23 of 1957. The defendant 's appeal was registered as Civil First Appeal No. 19 of 1957 and the plaintiffs ' appeal was registered as Civil First Appeal No. 23 of 1957. Both	 the appeals were heard and disposed of by a common judgment by the High Court which modified the trial court 's finding	 as to the income of blocks 206 and 207 to the extent of Rs. 803/ '5/3 by reducing the income of the two blocks by that figure. 'The total income was thus reduced from Rs. 41	829/3/7 to Rs. 41 015	/14/4 with the corresponding	reduction in the amount of interest. The High Court affirm the finding of the trial court that tile defendant was liable to pity interest on the half share of the rental income on the ground that the relationship between the parties was in the nature of a truest under section 90 of the Trusts Act (Act 11 of 1882). The plaintiffs ' appeal No. 23 of 1957 was allowed to the extent of Rs. 4	942/9/after adjustment	 the plaintiffs ' claim was decreed for Rs. 22	103/ . The first question for consideration in these appeals is whether the High Court was right in granted interest to the plaintiffs on their share of rental income to the extent of Rs. 6	676 / 7 / 3 for the period prior to the institution of the suit. It was argued by the Solicitor Geiieral on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was in error in appellant that the relationship between the prince was governed by section 90 of the Trusts Act and the plaintiffs were therefore entitled to interest on their share of rent under the provi LIS5SCI 13 168 sions of section 23 of that Act. In our opinion	 the contention put forward by the Solicitor General is well founded and must be accepted as correct. It is well established that interest may be awarded for the period prior to the date of the institution of the suit if there is an agreement for the payment of interest at fixed rate or if interest is payable by the usage of trade having the force of law	 or under the provisions of any substantive law as for instance section 80 of Negotiable Instruments Act or section 23 of the Trusts Act. It is admitted in the present case that the two agreements between the parties dated July 2	 1937 and July 16	 1937 did not provide for payment of interest on the rental realised by the defendant on the joint properties. Nor is interest payable by virtue of any provision of the law governing the case. Under the Interest Act	 1839	 the Court may allow interest to the plaintiff if the amount claimed is a sum certain which is payable at a certain time by virtue of a written instrument. But it is conceded that the position in the present case is different. It was suggested by Mr. section P. Sinha on behalf of the respondents that interest may be awarded under the Interest Act which contains a provision that "interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law". But this provision only applies to cases in which the Court of Equity exercises jurisdiction to allow interest. The legal position has been explained by the Judicial Committee in Bengal Nagpur Rly. Co. Ltd. vs Ruttanji Ramji(1) at p. 72 as follows: "As observed by Lord Tomlin in Maine and New Brunswick Electrical Power Co. vs Hart	 	 at p. 640; (AIR 1939 PC 185 at p. 188)	 'In order to invoke a rule of equity It is necessary in the first instance to establish the existence of a state of circumstances which attracts the equitable jurisdiction	 as	 for example	 the non performance of a contract of which equity can give specific performance '. " The decision of the Judicial Committee in Bengal Nagpur Rly. Co. Ltd. vs Ruttanji Ramji(1) was relied upon by this Court in Thawardas Pherumal vs Union of India(1) in rejecting a claim for interest. In that case	 a contractor entered into a contract with the Dominion of India for the supply of bricks. A clause in the contract required all disputes arising out of or relating to the contract to be referred to arbitration. The dispute having arisen	 the matter was referred to arbitration and the arbitrator gave an award in the contractor 's favour. The Union of India which has succeeded to the rights and obligations of the Dominion	 contested the award on various grounds one of which was the liability to pay interest on the amount awarded. It was held by this Court that the interest awarded to the contractor could not	 in law	 be awarded and the arbitrator is not a Court within the meaning of the Interest Act	 1839 and. in any event	 interest could only be awarded if there was (1) 65 I.A. 66. (2) 169 a debt or a sum certain payable at a certain time or otherwise by virtue of some written contract and there must have been a demand in writing stating that interest will be demanded from the date of the demand. The same view has been expressed by this Court in two later cases Union of India vs Rallia Ram(1) and Union of India vs Watkins Mayor and Co.(2). It was	 however	 pointed out for the respondents that the defendant was in possession of the entire properties as co owner after the dissolution of the partnership by the document dated July 16	 1937. It was argued that the defendant was realising rents of all the properties and he was in the position of a constructive trustee under section 95 of the Trust Act and was liable therefore to pay interest on the plaintiffs ' share of rent under section 23 read with section 95 of the Act. We do not consider there is any justification for this argument. Section 90 of the Act states: "Where a tenant for life	 co owner	 mortgagee or other qualified owner of any property	 by availing himself of his position as such	 gains an advantage in derogation of the rights of the other persons interested in the property	 or where any such owner	 as representing all persons interested in such property	 gains any advantage	 he must hold	 for the benefit of all persons so interested	 the advantage so gained	 but subject to payment by such persons of their due shares of the expenses properly incurred	 and to an indemnity by the same persons against liabilities properly contracted	 in gaining such advantage." Section 95 provides as follows: " The person holding property in accordance with any of the preceding sections of this Chapter must	 so far as may be	 perform the same duties and is subject	 so far as may be	 to the same liabilities and disabilities	 as if he were a trustee of the property for the person for whose benefit he holds it: Provided that (a) where he rightfully cultivates the property or employs it in trade or business	 he is entitled to reasonable remuneration for his trouble	 skill and loss of time in such cultivation or employment 	 and (b) where he holds the property by virtue of a contract with a person for whose benefit he holds it	 or with any one through whom such person claims	 he may	 without the permission of the Court	 buy or become lessee or mortgagee of the property or any part there of. " Section 23 reads as follows: "Where the trustee commits a breach of trust	 he is liable to make good the loss which the trust property or the beneficiary has thereby sustained	 unless the beneficiary has by (1) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1636. (2) A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 275. 170 fraud induced the trustee to commit the breach	 or the beneficiary	 being competent to contract	 has himself	 without coercion or undue influence having been brought to bear on him	 concurred in the breach	 or subsequently acquiesced therein	 with full knowledge of the facts of the case and of his rights as against the trustee. A trustee committing a breach of trust is not liable to pay interest except in the following cases: (a) where he has actually received interest; (b) where the breach consists in unreasonable delay in paying trust money to the beneficiary; (c) where the trustee ought to have received interest	 but has not done so; (d) where he may be fairly presumed to have received interest. He is liable	 in case (a)	 to account for the interest actually received	 and	 in cases (b)	 (c) and (d) to account for simple interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum	 unless the Court otherwise directs. . . " We do not agree with the contention of the respondents that section 90 of the Trusts Act applies to this case. A co owner in possession of all the joint properties does not become a trustee by the mere fact of his collection of the full amount of rent from the tenants. If the co owner is to be clothed with the status of a trustee it must be shown that he has gained some advantage in derogation of the other co owners interested in the property and that he gained such an advantage by availing himself of his position as co owner. In the present case	 there is no allegation made by the plaintiffs that the defendant has gained any advantage in derogation of the rights of the plaintiffs	 nor is there any finding of the lower courts that the defendant gained any advantage by availing himself of his position as co owner. We shall	 however	 assume in favour of the respondents that the defendant is in the position of a constructive trustee in view of the provisions of section 90 of the Trusts Act. Even upon that assumption we are of opinion that the defendant is not liable to pay interest to the plaintiffs for their share of the rent of the properties. The reason is that the trustee is liable to pay interest only if he commits a breach of trust under section 23 of the Trusts Act. There is also the restriction contained in section 23 of the Trusts Act	 namely	 that a trustee committing a breach of trust is not liable to. pay interest except in the cases mentioned in that section. It was argued by Mr. section P. Sinha for the respondents that the defendant was liable to pay interest under section 23(b) of the Trusts Act because there was unreasonable delay in paying the trust money to the beneficiary. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. In 171 our opinion	 section 23(b) contemplates cases where there is an obligation on the part of the trustee to pay the trust money to the beneficiary at fixed intervals or on demand. In our opinion	 there is no question of breach of trust on the part of the	 defendant in the present case and the provisions of section 23(b) of the Trusts Act are not attracted. The view that we have expressed is borne out by several authorities. In Blogg vs Johnson(1)	 Lord Chelmsford	 L.C. stated that "the Court will not charge an executor who has been guilty of delay in accounting	 with interest on arrears of income unpaid by him". In that	 case	 X was entitled to a life income from the estate of her husband	 and died in 1861. A bill was filed by her executor	 in 1862	 against the executor of her husband 's will	 who had been his partner in business	 for an account of income due to her estate; in 1863 accounts were directed. In 1866 a certificate was made	 finding that a large sum was due from the husband 's executor. It was held by Lord Chelmsford	 L.C. that he was not chargeable with interest before the date of the certificate. Again	 in Silkstone and Haigh Moor Coal Co. vs Edey(2)	 it was held by the Chancery Court that upon the setting aside of a sale by a trustee of trust property to himself	 and the reconveyable of the property to the beneficiaries	 it is not the practice of the Court to charge the trustee with interest on the rents and profits received by him since the date of the sale. Interest was	 however	 charged on arrears in some cases as in Malland vs Gray(1) and Guildrey vs Stevens(1)	 but these cases fall within the range of another principle of equity that where an executor or a trustee unnecessarily detains money in his hand which he ought either to have invested or to have paid over to the person entitled to it	 he will have to pay interest for it. As Lord Chelmsford	 L.C. observed in Blogg vs Johnson(1) at p. 228: "Where money is thus improperly retained	 it appears to me to be immaterial how the sum has arisen	 whether from a legacy	 or a distributive share	 or a residue	 or the arrears of income. In the latter case	 the claim for interest is not made on account of the arrears	 but for the improper keeping back or a sum of money	 from whatever source derived	 which the executor or trustee ought to have paid over. " We have already given reasons for holding that the provisions of section 23(b) of the Trusts Act do not apply to the present case and the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any interest on arrears of rent and the High Court has fallen into an error in granting such interest. The next contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the Commissioner examined the accounts and submitted his report from July 2	 1937 to December 31	 1954 and the High Court was not justified in granting a decree to the plaintiffs for the subsequent (1) 1867 2 Ch. A. 225. (3) E.R. 744. (2) (4) 172 period from January 1	 1955 to April 11	 1957 on the basis of the figures found from the Commissioner 's report. It was argued that the High Court had no basis for assuming that the same rental income was received by the defendant for the period from January 1	 1955 to April 11	 1957 as for the prior period. In our opinion	 there is great force in this argument and we should	 in the normal course	 remand the case to the High Court for a finding as to the accounts of the subsequent period. Mr. Sinha	 however	 pointed out that the litigation commenced in 1942 and has already been pro tracted too ]on . We do not	 therefore	 wish to remand the case to the High Court for further inquiry. Having examined the evidence on the record of this case	 we consider that	 in the circumstances	 a sum of Rs. 2	400/ (instead of Rs. 3	100/ ) for the period from January 1	 1955 to April 11	 1957 should be granted to the plaintiffs as their share of profits. We direct that the interest may be granted to the plaintiffs at the rate of 6 per cent p.a. from November 20	 1962 which is the date of the final decree on the amount found due to the plaintiffs. Two other points were raised by the Solicitor General in the course of argument. It was pointed out	 in the first place	 that First Appeal No. 23 of 1957 filed by the plaintiffs in the High Court was barred by limitation and the High Court should have dismissed the appeal on that ground. It was argued that the trial courts judgment was delivered on April 11	 1957 and the appeal to the High Court was filed on July 22	 1957. A certified copy of the judgment was delivered to the plaintiffs on May 4	 1957 but the endorsement on the certified copy with regard to the date was fraudulently made. An application was made by the defendant to the High Court on November 20	 1961 drawing the attention of the High Court with regard to the endorsement on the certified copy of the judgment. There is	 however	 no reference in the judgment of the High Court on the question of limitation and it should	 therefore	 be taken that the point was not pressed on behalf of the defendant at the time of the hearing of the appeal by the High Court. It is	 therefore	 not possible for us to entertain the argument of the appellant at the present stage	 in the absence of any finding of the High Court. The other objection put forward by the Solidtor General is that the High Court has not taken into account vacancies in the computation of the rental income due to the plaintiffs. It was said that the High Court was wrong in holding that the defendant was liable as a trustee for the rents he ought to have realised even though there was no letting of the building. The Solicitor General may be right in his argument that the defendant cannot be held liable as a constructive trustee for the rent he has not realised from the tenants and for the premises which were not let out to tenants and which had been lying vacant	 but the ground upon which the High Court has made the defendant liable is different. The High Court has taken the view that the defendant has 173 not kept proper accounts of the income of the rents realised from the shops. In the absence of proper accounts it is not possible to accept the case of the defendant regarding the vacancies. In our opinion	 the finding of the High Court on this point is not vitiated by any error of law and the argument of the Solicitor General must be rejected on this aspect of the case. For the reasons already expressed	 we hold that these appeals should be partly allowed with proportionate costs and the decree of the High Court dated November 20	 1962 should be modified to the extent indicated in this judgment. Appeals allowed in part.

The plaintiffs instituted a suit for partition of immovable property constituting two blocks and for rendition of accounts. They claimed that the property was purchased with the capital of the partnership firm in which the plaintiffs and the defendant were Partners and that by two documents dated July 2	 1937 and July 16	 1937	 the properties continued to remain in the ownership of the partnership firm	 though the firm was dissolved in 1937. The defendant contested the suit on various grounds and also alleged that he had invested Rs. 10	000/ for constructing a building on the land in one of the blocks. The trial Court granted the plaintiffs a decree for most of the reliefs sought. The High Court	 in appeal	 held that the plaintiffs were entitled to claim half share in the properties and that the defendant was liable to account for the income from the date of dissolution i.e. July 2	 1937 in the case of one block and from 1939 in the case of the other block and furthermore that the plaintiffs were liable to pay half the amount spent by the defendant in constructing the building on one of the blocks. Upon a remand of the case to the trial Court a Commissioner was appointed to examine the accounts of rent realized by the defendant and on the basis of his report	 the trial court granted the plaintiffs a decree for the amount payable to them as their half share	 together with interest upto April 1957 and after deducting the plaintiffs ' share of the expenditure incurred by the defendant on the building. In further appeals to the High Court by both the parties the decision of the trial court was substantially confirmed. In the appeal to this Court by the defendant	 it was contended	 inter alia	 on his behalf that the trial court and the High Court had erroneously decided that the defendant was liable to pay interest for the period prior to the institution of the suit on the half share of the rental income on the ground that the relationship between the par ties was in the nature of a trust under Section 90 of the Trusts Act	 1882. On the other hand the contentions for the respondents were that interest prior to the date of institution of the suit could be paid to them under the Interest Act	 1839: that the defendant was in possession of the entire properties as as Owner after the dissolution of the partnership by the document dated July 16	 1937 and that as he 165 was realizing rents of the properties	 he was in the position. of a constructive trustee under section 95 of the Trusts Act and was liable therefore to pay interest on the plaintiffs ' share of rent under section 23 read with section 95 of the Act; and that he was in any event liable to pay interest under section 23(b) of the Trusts Act because there was unreason able delay in paying the trust money to the beneficiary. HELD: Interest was only payable to the plaintiffs at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the final decree on the amount found due to the plaintiffs. It is well established that interest may be awarded for the period prior to the date of the institution of the suit if there is an agreement for the payment of interest at fixed rate or if interest is payable by the usage of trade having the force of law	 or under the provisions of any substantive law as for instance under section 80 of Negotiable Instruments Act or section 23 of the Trusts Act. It was admitted in the present case that the two agreements between the parties dated July 2	1937 and July 16	1937 did not provide for payment of interest on the rental reilised by the	 defendant on the joint properties. Nor was interest payable under any provision of law governing the case. Under the Interest Act	 1839	 the court may allow interest if the amount claimed is a sum certain which is payable at a certain time by virtue of a written instrument but it was conceded that was not the position in the present case. The provision in section 1 of the Interest Act that "interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law	 applied only to cases in which the Court of Equity exercised jurisdiction to allow interest. [168 B D]. Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. vs Ruttanji Ramji 65 I.A. 66, Thawardas Pharumal vs Union of India, Union of India vs Rallia Ram, ; and Union of India vs Watkins Mayor & Co. A.I.R. 1966 section C. 275, referred to. There was no force in the contention that section 90 of the Trusts Act applied to this case. A co owner in possession of all the joint properties does not become a trustee by the mere fact of his collection of the full amount of rent from the tenants. If the co owner is to be clothed with the status of a trustee, itmust be shown that he has gained some advance in derogation ofthe other co owners interested in the property and that he gained such advantage by availing himself of his position as co owner. In the present case, there was no allegation or finding by the trial court that the defendant had gained any such advantage. [17O E] Even assuming that the defendant was in the position of a constructive trustee, he would be liable to pay interest under section 23 only if he committed a breach of trust and in the present case there was no question of any such breach on his part. Furthermore, he was not liable to pay interest under section 23(b) as that provision contemplates cases where there is an obligation on the part of the trustee to pay the trust money to the beneficiary at fixed intervals or on demand. [170 F]. Blogg vs Johnson., [1867] 2 Ch. A 225, Silkstone and Haigh Moor Coal Co. vs Edey, ; Malland V. Gray and Guildrey vs Stevens , referred to. 
4575	The respondent State in the public Works Department has engaged a large number of workers for the construction of Madanganj Harmara Road, close to Tilonia village with a view to providing relief to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions. The workers employed in this construction work are divided into gangs of 20 persons or multiple thereof and for each gang one muster roll is maintained. The work done by each gang is measured every fortnight and payment is made by the Public Works Department to the Mate who is the leader of the gang according to the work turned out by such gang during each fortnight. The Public Works Department has fixed a certain norm of work to be turned out by each gang before the workmen belonging to such gang can claim the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day with the result that if any particular gang turns out work according to the norm fixed by the Public Works Department, the Mate would be paid such amount as would be on distribution give a wage of Rs. 7 per day to the workmen constituting such gang, but if less work is turned out by such gang, payment to be made to the mate of such gang would be proportionately reduced and in that event, the wage earned by each member of such gang would fall short of the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day. Further, this system of proportionate distribution of the wages adopted without any visible principle or norm enabled a workman who has put in less work to get more payment than the person who has really put in more work. Hence the public interest writ petition filed by the Director of the Social Work and Research Centre, complaining violation of the provisions of the , Articles 14 and 23 of the Constitution, and the vires of section 3 of the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exemption from Labour Laws) Act, 1964. Allowing the Petition, the Court ^ HELD: 1. Where a person provides labour or service to another for remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, the labour or service provided by him clearly falls within the meaning of the words 'forced labour ' and attracts the condemnation of Article 23. Every person who provides labour or service to another is entitled at the least to the minimum wage and if anything less than the minimum wage is paid to him, he can complain of violation of his 272 fundamental right under Article 23 and ask the court to direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the breach of Article 23 may be abated. [280 D F] 2: 1. The constitutional validity of the Exemption Act in so far as it excludes the applicability of the providing that minimum wage may not be paid to a workman employed in any famine relief work, cannot be sustained in the face of Article 23. Article 23 mandates that no person shall be required or permitted to provide labour or service to another on payment of anything less than the minimum wage. Whenever any labour or service is taken by the State from any person, whether he be affected by drought and scarcity conditions or not, the State must pay, at the least, minimum wage to such person on pain of violation of Article 23. [280 F G, 282 B C] 2: 2. When the State undertakes famine relief work, it is no doubt true, that it does so in order to provide relief to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions but, none the less it is work which enures for the benefit of the State representing the society and if labour or service is provided by the affected persons for carrying out such work, the State cannot pay anything less than the minimum wages to the affected persons. It is not as if dole or bounty is given by the State to the affected persons in order to provide relief to them against drought and scarcity conditions nor is the work to be carried out by the affected persons worthless or useless to the society so that under the guise of providing work what the State in effect and substance seeks to do is to give dole or bounty to the affected persons. The State cannot be permitted to take advantage of the helpless condition of the affected persons and extract labour or service from them on payment of less than the minimum wage. No work of utility and value can be allowed to be constructed on the blood and sweat of persons who are reduced to a state of helplessness on account of drought and scarcity conditions. [281 B E, H, 282 A] 2: 3. In the instant case, the Notification issued under the makes it clear that the minimum wage of Rs. 7 is fixed per day and not with reference to any particular quantity of work turned out by the workmen during the day. The Notification does not empower the employer to fix any particular norm of work to be carried out by the workman with reference to which the minimum wage shall be paid by the employer. The minimum wage is not fixed on piece rate basis, so that a particular minimum wage would be payable only if a certain amount of work is turned out by the workman and if he turns out less work, then the minimum wage payable would be proportionately reduced. Here the minimum wage is fixed at Rs. 7 per day and that is the minimum wage which must be paid by the employer to the workman so long as the workman works throughout the working hours of the day for which he can lawfully be required to work. The employer may fix any norm he thinks fit specifying the quantity of work which must be turned out by the workman during the day, but if the workman does not turn out work in conformity with such norm, the employer cannot pay him anything less than the minimum wage. If the norm fixed by the employer is reasonable and the workman does not turn out work according to such norm, disciplinary action may be taken against the workman and in a given case he must even be liable to be thrown out of employment, but he cannot be paid less than the minimum 273 wage, unless, of course, the minimum wage fixed by the Notification under the is correlated with the quantity of work to be turned out by the workman. Otherwise, it would be the easiest thing for the employer to fix an unreasonably high norm which a workman working diligently and efficiently during the day cannot possibly reach and thereby deprive the workman of the minimum wage payable to him. [283 B G] Peoples Union for Democratic Rights & Other vs Union of India &. Others [1983]1 S.C.R. 456 followed. PER PATHAK, J. 1. The workers employed in the construction of the Madanganj Harmara Road as a measure of relief is a famine stricken area are entitled to a minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day, and that wage cannot be reduced by reference to the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exemption and Labour Laws) Act 1964, because in so far as the provisions of section 3 of that Act countenance a lesser wage they operate against Article 14 of the Constitution and are, therefore, void.[286 D E] 2:1. By prescribing the criterion which it has, the Public Works Department has effected an invidious discrimination bearing no reasonable nexus to the object behind the employment. [286 C D] 2:2 The circumstance that employment has been given to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions provides only the reason for extending such employment. In other words, the granting of relief to persons in distress by giving them employment constitutes merely the motive for giving them work. It cannot affect their right to what is due to every worker in the course of such employment. The rights of all the workers will be the same, whether they are drawn from area affected by drought and scarcity conditions or come from elsehwere. The mere circumstance that a worker belongs to an area affected by drought and scarcity conditions can in no way influence the scope and sum of those rights. In comparison with a worker belonging to some other more fortunate area and doing the same kind of work, he is not less entitled than the other to the totality of those rights nor liable to be distinguished from the other by the badge of his misfortune. [285 E G] 2: 3. When the State employs workers for doing work needed on its development projects, it must find funds for such projects. And the fund must be sufficient to ensure the prescribed minimum wage to each worker and this is particularly so having regard to the concept of a minimum wage". Therefore	 the argument that the wages are drawn from a fund too limited to provide for payment of a minimum wage to all is not justified. [286 B C]