Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 852 of 1964. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated August 24	 1962 of the Punjab High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 843 of 1956. Bishan Narain and A. G. Ratnaparkhi	 for the appellant. K. C. Nayyar and Mohana Behar Lal	 for respondent No. 1. 790 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava	 J. This appeal has come up as a result of a dis pute relating to succession to the property of one Sunder Singh. Sunder Singh	 on 4th November	 1950	 executed a will in respect of his property in favour of his niece	 Udham Kaur. Subsequently	 on 27th October	 1951	 one Tarlok Singh executed a document divorcing his wife	 Mst. Angrez Kaur	 respondent No. 1 in this appeal	 on the ground that she frequently went away from his house without his consent and whenever he made enquiries from her	 she became furious with him. In the document	 he recited that Mst. Angrez Kaur was no longer his wife and that she had gone to live with Sunder Singh. According to respondent No. 1 on this divorce being granted to her by her first husband	 Tarlok Singh	 she was married to Sunder Singh by a custom	 known as 'Chadar Andazi '. On 7th June	 1952	 Sunder Singh revoked his previous will and	 in that document	 acknowledged Mst. Ang rez Kaur as his wife and left the property to her. Sunder Singh died in 1953. Thereafter	 the appellant	 Gurdit Singh	 who was a collateral of Sunder Singh in the third degree	 applied for mutation. On 12th December	 1954	 mutation of the property left by Sunder Singh was sanctioned in favour of Gurdit Singh by the authorities. Thereupon	 Mst. Angrez Kaur filed a suit on 17th March	 1955	 claiming the property as widow of Sunder Singh. The trial Court decreed the suit	 holding that respondent No. I had married Sunder Singh by 'Chadar Andazi ' and the marriage was valid. On appeal	 the Additional District Judge set aside the decree of the trial Court and held that the marriage of Mst. Angrez Kaur with Sunder Singh during the life time of her first husband	 Tarlok Singh	 was invalid and was not justified by any custom and	 consequently	 she could not be treated as the widow of Sunder Singh. Respondent No. 1	 there on	 appeale to the High Court of Punjab and the learned Judge	 who heard the appeal	 felt that the question of custom had not properly tried by the trial Court and the first appellate Court. Consequently he framed the following issue : "Is there any custom amongst the tribes of the parties according to which the divorce given by Tarlok Singh 'to Mst. Angrez Kaur is recognised enabling her to enter into a valid marriage by Chadar Andazi with Sunder Singh?" This issue was remitted to the trial Court for recording a finding after giving the parties an opportunity to lead further evidence. Further evidence was led in the trial Court which answered this issue in the negative and against respondent No. 1. The District Judge	 in his report	 endorsed the view of the trial Court. The High Court	 however	 held that the 7 91 custom was proved under which Mst. Angrez Kaur could validly marry Sunder Singh	 even though her first husband	 Tarlok Singh	 was alive	 and	 consequently decreed the suit. Gurdit Singh appellant has now come up to this Court against this decree of the High Court by special leave. As is clear from the facts narrated above	 the	 only issue that arose in this case was whether respondent No. 1	 Mst. Angrez Kaur	 had succeeded in proving the existence of a custom in the community to which she belonged	 according to which Tarlok Singh	 her first husband	 could divorce her	 whereupon she was at liberty to enter into a valid marriage by Chadar Andazi with Sunder Singh	 whose property is now under dispute. The parties are residents of the District of Jullundur where	 according to Gurdit Singh appellant	 no such custom	 as claimed by respondent No. 1 exists amongst the Jats	 which is the caste to which the parties belong. To urge this point	 learned counsel for the appellant relied before us on 'The Digest of Customary Law ' by Sir W. H. Rattigan	 and on the 'Riwaj i am ' recorded at the time of the settlement in 1885 and 1914 15. It was argued that Rattigan 's Digest of Customary Law in the Punjab had always been treated as an authoritative exposition of the customs prevailing in the Punjab and had been accepted as such by the Privy Council as well as other Courts in India. Reliance was placed on para 72 at page 471 of the 14th Edition of Rattigan 's	 'Digest of Customary Law '	 where it is stated that "amongst Muhammadans of all classes a man may divorce a wife without assigning any reason; but this power	 in the absence of a special custom	 is not allowed to Hindus nor to females of any class". In paragraph 74	 he proceeds to lay down that "until the former marriage is validly set aside	 a woman cannot marry a second husband in the life time of her first husband;" and in paragraph 75	 it is stated that "A 'Karewa ' marriage with the brother or some other male relative of the deceased husband requires no religious ceremonies	 and confers all the rights of a valid marriage. " The marriage claimed by respondent No. 1 with Sunder Singh was described as a 'karewa ' marriage. On the basis of the principles laid down in the above paragraphs	 it was urged that it should be held that respondent No. I could not have entered into a valid marriage with Sunder Singh	 while her first husband	 Tarlok Singh	 was alive. It is	 however	 to be noted that in paragraph 72	 Rattigan himself makes an exception to the general rule	 and recognises the fact that	 if there be a special custom	 divorce can be resorted to even by Hindus. In earlier paragraphs of his book	 Rattigan has dealt with existence of special customs in the Punjab and	 in dealing with L Sup. CI/67 7 792 the Jats	 he expressed the view that	 as regards Jats	 and specially Sikh Jats who hold very liberal views on questions relating to marriage and whose notions of sexual morality are lax	 it will be difficult to enunciate any general principles as are opposed to public policy. Then	 he goes on to say that custom in the Punjab is primarily tribal and not local	 though the custom of a particular tribe may and often does differ in particular localities. Rattigon 's conclusion is expressed by saying that it seems to be clear that there is no uniform custom applicable to the whole of the Punjab. Custom varies from time to time and from place to place. It is in this background that we have to consider further remarks recorded by Rattigan in paragraph 72 mentioned above	 where he says that	 in one case	 it was doubted whether	 in Jullundur District	 a Hindu fat can divorce his wife. He also noticed a number of decisions relating to divorce in the surrounding districts in which it was held that the custom of divorce prevailed in almost identical terms in those districts. This custom according to him	 is that the husband is entitled to turn out his wife and	 if he does so	 she is entitled to remarry. It was on the basis of these observations of Rattigan that it was urged before us that the High Court committed an error in relying on the circumstance that	 in a number of surrounding districts	 it was found that the custom of divorce amongst the Hindu Jats so prevalent could lead to an inference that a similar custom prevailed in the district of Jullundur also. In Rattigan 's book	 by itself	 we are unable to find any proposition laying down that	 in the district of Jullundur	 there is any custom among Hindu fats permitting divorce as claimed by respondent No. 1. In fact	 Rattigan leaves the question open by saying that it has been doubted whether such a custom exists in the Jullundur District. He also mentions the Riwaj i am of Jullundur District	 but does not attach much importance to it on the ground of its being un reliable. Rattigan 's book on 'Customary Law '	 in these circumstances	 appears to us to be of little help in arriving at a conclusion about the existence of a custom on divorce amongst the Jats in Jullundur District. The only other document relating to Jullundur District available was the Riwaj i am of that district and learned counsel for the appellant placed great reliance on it. He drew our attention to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kunwar Basant Singh vs Kinwar Brij Rai Saran Singh(1) where their Lordships held "The value of the riwaj i am as evidence of customary law is well established before this Board; the most recent decision is (1) 62 I.A. 180. 79 3 Vaishno Ditti vs Rameshri(1)	 in which the judgment of the Board was delivered by Sir John Wallis	 who states : "It has been held by this Board that the riwaj i am is a public record prepared by a public officer in discharge of his duties and under Government rules; that it is clearly admissible in evidence to prove the facts entered thereon subject to rebuttal; and that the statements therein may be accepted even if unsupported by instances. " Reliance was also placed upon the principle laid down by this Court in Mahant Salig Ram vs Musammat Maya Devi(2)	 where this Court held : "There is no doubt or dispute as to the value of the entries in the Riwaj i am. It is well settled that though they are entitled to an initial presumption in favour of their correctness irrespective of the question whether or not the custom	 as recorded	 is in accord with the general custom	 the quantum of evidence necessary to rebut that presumption will	 however	 vary with the facts and circumstances of each case. " The Court also approved of the principle laid down by the Lahore High Court	 indicating the circumstances in which Riwaj i am can be held to prove a custom	 and in that connection said : "It has been held in Qamar ud Din vs Mt. Fateh Bano(3) that if the Riwaj i am	 oil which reliance is placed	 is a reliable and trustworthy document	 has been carefully prepared	 does not contain within its four corners contradictory statements of custom	 and in the opinion of the Settlement Officer is not a record of the wishes of the persons appearing before him as to what the custom should be in those circumstances the Riwaj i am would be a presumptive piece of evidence in proof of the special custom set up therein. If	 on the other hand	 the Riwaj i am is not a document of the kind indicated above	 then such a Riwaj i am would have no value at all as a presumptive piece of evidence. " It is in the light of these principles that we have to examine the value to be attached to the Riwaj i am in Jullundur District which has been relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant. The Riwaj i am of Jullundar District appears in the form of questions and answers and an extract of it has been placed before us. In answer to the questions about the grounds on which a wife may be divorced	 whether change of religion is a sufficient cause and whether	a husband may divorce his wife without (1) [1928] L. R. 55 I.A. 407	421	 (2) (3) Lah. 110. 7 94 assigning any cause	 the record states that among all Muhammadans except Rajputs the Muhammadan Law is followed; and a husband can divorce his wife without assigning any reason. Among the Muhammadan Rajputs and all Hindus no divorce is recognised. But an exception is mentioned that the Kambohs of the Nakodar Tahsil also divorce their wives. They are not required to assign any cause. In answer to the question as to what are the formalities which must be observed to constitute a revocable or an irrevocable divorce	 is was stated that among Hindus there is no divorce except among Kambohs of the Nakodar Tahsil who give 'talaq ' by executing a written deed. Reliance is placed on the entry in the Riwaj i am that the custom of divorce among Hindus does not exist in the Jullundur District to urge that the High Court wrongly held that respondent No. 1 could be divorced by her first husband	 Tarlok Singh	 and could validly marry Sunder Singh by Chadar Andazi. It	 however	 appears that the Riwaj i am of Jullundur District is unreliable	 and	 according to the principle laid down by this Court in the case of Mahant Salig Ram(1)	 such a Riwaj i am cannot be held to prove that there was no custom of divorce among Hindus in this district. It does not appear necessary to refer to the various decisions of the Lahore High Court on 'the question of unreliability of the Riwaj i am of Jullundur District. It is enough to quote the latest decision of the East Punjab High Court in Mohammad Khalil and Another vs Mohammad Bakhsh(2). In that case.	 Bhandari J.	 delivering the judgment of the Bench	 reproduced the principle laid down by the Lahore High Court in Qamar ud Din & Others(3)	 which was later approved by this Court in the case of Mahant Salig Ram(1). 	and then proceeded to hold : "Unfortunately	 the Riwaj i am of the Jullundur District cannot be regarded as a reliable or trustworthy document	 for	 it has been held in a number of decided cases	 such as Zakar Hussain vs Ghulam Fatima(1)	 Ghulam Mohammad vs Balli(5)	 and Mt. Fatima vs Sharaf Din(1)	 that it has not been prepared with care and attention. It seems to me	 therefore	 that it is impossible to accept the statements appearing therein at their face value." Learned counsel for the appellant	 however	 urged before us that all these cases	 in which the Riwaj i am of Jullundur District 	was held to be unreliable	 related either to the custom about the right of succession to property of a daughter against collaterals	 (1) (3) A. I. R. (36) 1949 E.Pb. (5) A. I. R. (1 4) 1927 Lab. (2) I. I. R. (4) A. 1. R. (18) (6) A. 1. R. (33) 79 5 or about the right to execute wills and gifts. None of these cases related to the custom of divorce and at least	 insofar as it records that there is no custom of divorce amongst Hindus in this district	 the Riwaj i am should be accepted. There are two reasons why we must reject this contention. The first is that the Riwaj i am having been found unreliable in respect of two customs	 the inference clearly follows that it was not drawn up carefully and correctly and	 consequently it would not be safe to rely even on other aspects of the Riwaj i am. The second	 and which is the more important reason	 is that	 in this particular case which is 'before us	 the evidence tendered by both the parties shows that this Riwaj i am has incorrectly recorded the custom about the right of a Hindu husband of this district to divorce his wife. Respondent No. 1	 in order to prove her case as to the existence of the custom	 has primarily relied on two pieces of evidence. The first piece of evidence consisted of the Riwaj i am of the neighbouring districts where there was a clear record that the custom of divorce among Hindu Jats existed. The existence of such a custom. in the neighbouring district	 which surround the Jullundur District all around	 is certainly a relevant consideration for an inference that such a custom may be prevalent in the Jul lundur District also	 particularly in view of Rattigan 's opinion that the custom is primarily tribal though also local. If the custom existed among the tribes of Hindu Jats in all the districts surrounding the district of Jullundur	 it is probable that a similar custom exists in the district of Jullundur also. The other piece of evidence relied upon was the statements of a number of witnesses examined to prove that not only such a custom existed	 but also that instances were available showing that there had been divorces in recent times. Respondent No. 1 has examined nine witnesses in this behalf. The learned District Judge	 in his report	 did not place full reliance on the testimony of these witnesses	 but their evidence has been accepted by the High Court. On behalf of the appellant also	 a number of witnesses were examined to prove the non existence of a custom of divorce. It	 however	 appears that the appellant 's own witnesses belied his case. Several of those witnesses clearly admitted that in this district a custom did exist permitting a husband to divorce his wife. Three of the witnesses	 Bhag Singh	 Karam Singh and Kartar Singh	 who were examined on behalf of the appellant	 in their examination in chief itself	 mentioned a custom under which a Zamindar could divorce his wife	 though they added that	 if the husband divorces his wife	 the wife cannot contract Chadar Andazi during the life time of her husband. Ujagar Singh	 another witness	 in his cross examination clearly admitted that the husband can divorce his wife	 but a wife cannot divorce her husband. He can divorce her both verbally as well as in writing. Similarly	 Niranjan Singh	 another 796 witness	 stated that a husband can divorce his wife	 but a wife cannot divorce her husband. Gurdit Singh	 in his examination in chief	 mentioned that a husband and wife could live separate from each other and	 in such a case	 the wife could not contract Chadar Andazi during the life time of her first husband	 and added that	 if she contracted Chadar Andazi	 she could not inherit the property of her second husband. In cross examination	 he stated that "there is no custom among us for divorcing the wives with mutual consent". All these witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant himself thus proved the existence of a custom under which a Hindu Jat in the district of Jullundur could divorce his wife	 though all of them added a qualification that	 in case a wife is divorced by a Hindu husband	 she is not entitled to a second marriage during the life time of her first husband. They all admit that a custom permitting	 a Hindu Jat to divorce his wife does actually exists in the district of Jullundur. Some of them	 at some stages of their evidence	 tried to distinguish the right of a husband by saying that he could desert his wife or that there 	could be separation between the husband and the wife	 but	 at 	other stages	 they admitted in clear words that the custom recognised included the right of the husband to divorce his wife. Thus	 the record in the Riwaj i am that there is no such custom of divorce among the Hindus of the Jullundur District	 is proved to be incorrect not only by the evidence of the witnesses examined 	on behalf of respondent No. 1	 but even from the evidence given by the witnesses of the appellant. In these circumstances	 we hold that there is no force at all in the submission of the learned counsel that this Riwaj i am could be held to be reliable insofar as it records the absence of the custom	 on the mere ground that in earlier cases the unreliability of this Riwaj i am was found in regard to record of customs relating to other matters. There is no doubt that the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant	 while admitting the existence of a custom permitting a Hindu husband to divorce his wife	 have added a qualification that	 if such a divorce is brought into effect by a husband	 the wife cannot legally contract a second marriage during his lifetime. This limited custom sought to be proved by these witnesses does not. find support from the Riwaj i am	 nor is it in line with the principles laid down by Rattigan in his book on 'Customary Law '. All that he stated in paragraph 74 of his book was that " until the former marriage is validly set aside	 a woman cannot marry a second husband in the life time of her first husband. " We have already held that	 even according to the witnesses exa mined by the appellant	 a custom exists which permits a valid divorce by a husband of his wife and that would dissolve the marriage. On the dissolution of such a marriage	 there seems to be no reason why the divorced wife cannot marry a second 797 husband in the life time of her first husband. It also appears to us incongruous to accept the proposition put forward on behalf of the appellant that	 though a wife can be divorced by her husband	 she is not at liberty to enter into a second marriage and thus secure for herself means for proper living. In these circumstances	 the High Court committee no error in accepting the evidence given by witnesses examined on behalf of respondent No. 1 who stated that the custom as prevailing in the Jullundur District not only permitted divorce	 but also recognised the validity of second marriage of the divorced wife even in the life time of her first husband. The High Court was further right in relying on the instances proved by the evidence of these witnesses of respondent No. 1 showing that a number of divorced wives had actually contracted second marriages in the life time of the in husbands and these	 marriages were recognised as valid marriages by the members of 'their community. The appeal	 consequently	 fails and is dismissed with costs. G.C. Appeal dismissed.

S married A after the latter had been divorced by her husband T. The parties were Jats of Jullundur District in the Punjab. After the death of S a collateral of his got the lands of S mutated in his favour. A then filed a suit claiming the land as widow of section Her marriage to S was challenged on the ground that there was no custom among the Jats of Jullundur District permitting a divorced woman to remar ry in the life time of her first husband	 The	 entries in the Rattilgan 's digest and the Riwaj i am of Jullundur District came up for consideration. HELD : Rattigan 's digest was not of help in arriving at a conclusion about the existence of such a custom of divorce among the Jats in Jullundur District. 'Me Riwaj i Am of Jullundur District was unreliable as it had been so held by courts. [792 F G; 795 A C] On the basis of the existence of a custom of divorce among the Jats of districts surrounding Jullundur District and on the basis of oral evidence adduced in the case	 the High Court rightly held that a custom of divorce existed among the Jats of Jullundur District	 and the custom permits the divorced women to marry in the life time of her first hus band. The divorce of A by T being valid her subsequent marriage to S was also valid	 and accordingly she was entitled to succeed to S 's property. L797 B C] Basant Singh vs Kunwar Brij Rai Saran Singh	 62 I.A. 180	 Vaishnoo Ditt vs Rameshri	 (1928) L.R. 55 I.A	 407	 Mahant Salig Ram vs Musammat maya Devi 	 Qamar ud din vs Mt. Fateh Bano	 Lab. 110	 Muhammad Khalil vs Mohammad Baksh. A.I.R. (36) 1949 E. Pb. 252	 Zakar Hussain vs Ghulam Faima	 A.I.R. (14) 1927 Lab. 261	 Ghulam Mohammad vs Ball	 A.I.R. (18) 1931 Lab. 641 and Mt. Fatima vs Sharaf Din	 A.I.R. (33) 1946 Lab. 426	 referred to.