Summarize the following court judgment. Appeals Nos. 429 439	 591	 592	 597	 689	 694	 724	 725 and 727 of 1962 and 15	 139	 140	 159	 267 to 269	 331	 334	 337	 340	 342	 343	 347	 352	 389	 746 and 748 of 1963. Appeals from the judg ments and order dated December 19	 1958	 March 7	 1959	 March 11	 1959	 April 22	 1959	 April 24	 1959 in Writ Appeals Nos. 135	 122 of 1957 etc. T. V. R. Tatachari	 for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 429 to 434 and 694 of 1962 and C.A. No. 269/63). M. C. Setalvad	 P. Kodandaramayya	 E. V. Bhagarathi Rao and T. V. R. Tatachari	 for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 438 and 439/62). M. C. Setalvad	 and R. Ganapathi Iyer	 for the appellants (in C. A. Nos. 436	 437	 724	 725 and 727/62). 458 K. Srinivasamurthy and Naunit Lal	 for the appellants (in C. As. Nos. 591	 582	 597	 and 689/62 and 140	 267 and 268/63). K. Jayaram and R. Thiagarajan	 for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 139	 159	 330	 334	 337	 340	 342	 343	 347 and 352/63). K. R. Chaudhuri	 for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 15 and 389 of 63). A. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangam	 for the appellant (in C. As. 746	 and 748 of 63). D. Narsaraju	 T. Anantha Babu	 M. V. Goswami and B. R. G. K. Achar	 for the respondents (in C. As. 435437	 724	 725 and 727/62). D. Narsaraju	 T. Anantha Babu	 Yogeshwar Prasad and B. R. G. K. Achar	 for the respondents (in C. As. Nos. 429434	 438	 439 and 694/62 and 269 of 63). D. Narsaraju	 T. Anantha Babu	 M. section K. Sastri and B. R. G. K. Achar	 for the respondents (in C.A. Nos. 591	 597 and 689/62 and 140	 267 and 268/63) and respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 592/62). J.V.K. Sharma and T.Satyanarayana	 for respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 592/62). D. Narsaraju	 T. Anantha Babu	 R. Gopalakrishnan and BR. G. K. Achar	 for the respondents (in C. As. Nos. 15	 139	 331	 334	 337	 340	 342	 343	 347	 352	 159	 389 and 746 748 /63). March 25	 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR	 C. J. The principal question of law which arises in this group of 37 civil appeals relates to the construction of section 3 of the Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act	 1949 (No. 29 of 1949) (hereinafter called 'the Act '). The dispute which has given rise to these appeals centres round the validity of two notified orders issued by the respondent	 State of Andhra Pradesh on the 28th January	 1955	 and 30th January	 1955 respectively	 and it is the contention of the appellants that the said notified orders are outside the purview of section 3. The appellants in all these appeals are supplied electricity by the respondent for many years past	 and several individual agreements have been passed between them and the respondent during the period 1946 to 1952 prescribing the terms and conditions on which the said supply would be made to them. One of these terms stipulated the rate at which the supply of electricity had to be charged 459 against the consumers. The impugned orders have purported to increase this rate	 and the appellants contend that the respondent had no authority to change this important term of the contract to their prejudice by taking recourse to section 3(1) and issuing notified orders in that behalf. That	 in substance	 is the nature of the controversy between the parties before us. It appears that the Government of Madras	 and subsequently	 its successor	 the respondent	 had a single power grid system for the whole State comprising Tungabhadra and Machkund Hydro Electric System and the Thermal System of Nellore. The entire energy was integrated into one power system. The Government of Madras entered into agreements with several consumers in the State	 including the appellants	 for the supply of energy in bulk at the specified rates which were called tariffs	 for the years 1951 and 1952. These agreements were to be in operation for ten years. It is common ground that these agreements did not contain any provision authorising the Government to increase the rates during their operation. The charges fixed were calculated at graded regressive rates according to increasing slabs of consumption units	 and the overall unit rates including the demand charge were not to exceed 66 annas without prejudice to the monthly minimum payment and the guaranteed consumption. The Government of Andhra then issued the two impugned orders relating to Machkund and Nellore	 and Tungabhadra and Chittoore District areas respectively	 enhancing the agreed rates. These enhanced rates were specified in Schedules A and B attached to the said orders. According to these orders	 these increased tariffs were to take effect from the date on which meter readings were to be taken in the month of February	 1955 and were to operate for the future. The increase in the rates effected by these orders was thus to operate not retrospectively	 but prospectively. The impugned orders indicate that the main reason which inspired the said orders was the knowledge that the existing electricity tariffs which were formulated nearly 15 years before	 had become completely uneconomic; the charges of labour and the price level of all material had enormously increased; and that in evitably meant continuously growing loss to the Government. The Accountant General made queries in respect of this recurring loss and drew pointed attention of the State Government to the deficits in the working of the Power System. Accordingly	 the question of revision of tariffs was considered in the State of Madras	 but was not decided because reorganisation of the States was then in contemplation. After the respondent State wits born	 its Chief Engineer sumbitted proposals for 460 revisions of tariffs in all the areas covered by the relevant schemes. That is how the impugned notified orders came to be issued by the respondent. The appellants were naturally aggrieved by these orders	 because they added to their liability to pay the rates for the supply of electricity by the respondent to them. Accordingly	 a large number of consumers moved the Andhra Pradesh High Court under article 226 of the Constitution	 and challenged the validity of the two impugned orders. The learned single Judge who heard these writ petitions upheld the appellants ' plea and came to the conclusion that the impugned orders were not justified by the authority conferred on the respondent by section 3 of the Act	 and were unauthorised	 illegal and inoperative. In the result	 the writ petition filed by some of the appellants before us were allowed and an appropriate order was issued against the respondent restraining it from enforcing the revised tariff rates. These decisions were challenged by the respondent by preferring several Letters Patent Appeals. The Division Bench which heard these Letters Patent Appeals took a different view; it held that on its fair and reasonable con struction	 section 3 did confer authority on the respondent to issue the impugned orders	 and so	 the challenge made to the validity of the said orders could not be sustained. That is why the Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the respondent were allowed and the writ petitions filed by the appellants were dismissed. It is against these orders that the appel lants have come to this Court with a certificate issued by the said High Court. After the Division Bench had pronounced its decision on this point	 several other writ petitions were filed by other consumers	 and naturally the single Judge who heard them followed the decision of the Division Bench and dismissed the said writ petitions. The consumers who were aggrieved by the decision of the learned single Judge were then allow ed to come to this Court directly by special leave	 because the points which they wanted to raise were exactly the same as were raised by the other consumers who had come to this Court against the principal decision of the Division Bench. The present group of appeals thus consists of matters which have been decided by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court	 as well as those which have been decided by a learned single Judge	 and they all raise the same common question about the construction of section 3 of the Act	 and the validity of the impugned notified orders. Before addressing ourselves to the question of construing section 3	 it is necessary to recapitulate the legislative history of the Act. It will be recalled that during the Second World 461 War	 the Government of India passed the Defence of India Act (No. 35 of 1939) on the 29th of September	 1939. By virtue of the powers conferred on the Central Government by section 2 of the said Act	 several Rules came to be framed by Central Government known as the Defence of India Rules. Amongst these Rules was Rule 81(2) which clothed the Central Government with power to issue orders which may appear to the Central Government to be necessary or expedient for securing "the defence of British India	 or the efficient prosecution of the war	 or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community". These Rules were in operation during the continuance of the war. After the war came to an end	 it was realised that the eco nomic situation in the country continued to be serious	 and for the proper regulation of economic affairs	 it was thought necessary to continue the orders issued under the Defence of India Rule 81(2)	 because shortage of supply of essential articles was very much in evidence then. The purpose of continuing the orders was to ensure the supply of essential articles to the community at large at reasonable prices and to secure their equitable distribution. In due course	 the Defence of India Act came to an end in 1946	 but the Central Legislature thought it necessary to pass another Act to take its place and that was the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act	 1946 (No. 24 of 1946). On the same lines	 the Madras Legislature passed an Act in 1946 (No. 14 of 1946). Later	 it was replaced by Act No. 29 of 1949 with which we are concerned in the present appeals. After the respondent State was created under the Scheme of Reorganisation of States	 it passed Act No. 1 of 1955 and this Act received the assent of the President on the 21st of January	 1955. By this Act	 the Legislature of the respondent State virtually adopted the Madras Act. As a result	 the impugned orders are	 in substance	 referable to section 3 of the Madras Act. Before we part with this topic	 it may be mentioned that when the Madras Act was passed	 its Schedule gave a list of the essential articles as defined by section 2(a) and these articles were 12 in number. When the Andhra Legislature passed Act No. 1 of 1955 and adopted the Schedule of essen tial articles for its purpose	 the number of these articles was reduced to two; they are charcoal and electrical energy. The Andhra Act was originally intended to be in operation until the 25th January	 1956	 but it was later continued from time to time. It is common ground that when the impugned orders were passed	 section 3 of be Act was in operation and the present appeals have been argued on the basis that the said section is constitutionally valid	 so that the main point which calls for our decision is the construction of the said section. 462 Mr. Setalvad for the appellants contends that in construing section 3	 we ought not to concentrate on the words used in section 3 in isolation	 but must look at the said section along with the other provisions of the Act. The rule of harmonious construction	 he urges	 requires that we must so construe all the provisions of the Act as to avoid any conflict or repugnancy between them. So construed	 section 3	 according to him	 cannot be said to confer power on the respondent to enhance the tariff rate chargeable against the appellants in respect of the supply of energy made by the respondent to them. The whole scheme of the Act indicates clearly that the power to regulate the supply of an essential article which has been conferred on the State Government has to be applied in regard to transaction between citizens and citizens and cannot be applied to an essential article: which the State itself supplies. It would be odd	 he suggests	 if the State Government is given the power to issue a notified order regulating the rates at which it should supply energy which it itself produces. Therefore	 the dealings by the State Government in the matter of supply of energy to the consumers should be deemed to be outside the provisions of section 3	 and that would make the impugned orders invalid. The question as to whether the State Government would be bound by the provisions of legislative enactments passed by the State Legislature has sometimes led to difference in judicial opinion; but the decision of this Court in the Director of Rationing and Distribution vs The Corporation of Calcutta and Ors.(1) must be taken to have settled this question. The effect of the majority decision rendered in that case is to recognise the validity of the rule of interpretation of statutes enunciated by the Privy Council in Province of Bombay vs Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay (2) and that rule is that the State is not bound by a statute unless it is so provided in express terms or by necessary implication. In applying this rule	 it is obviously necessary that the Court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the Legislature by considernig all the relevant provisions of the statute together and not concentrating its attention on a particular provision which may be in dispute between the parties. If	 after reading all the relevant provisions of the statute	 the Court is satisfied that by necessary implication the obligation imposed by the statute should be enforced against the State	 that conclusion must be adopted. If there are express terms to that effect	 there is	 of course	 no difficulty. In dealing with this vexed question	 sometimes it is necessary also to enquire whether the conclusion that the State is not bound by the specific provision of a given statute	 (1) ; (2)73 I.A. 271. 463 would hamper the working of the statute	 or would lead to the anomalous position that the statute may lose its effi cacy	 and if the answer to either of these two questions indicates that the obligation imposed by the statute should be enforced against the State	 the Court would be inclined to infer by necessary implication that the State	 in fact	 is bound by the statute. Where	 however	 the question is not so much as to whether the State is bound by the statute	 but whether it can claim the benefit of the provision of a statute	 the same rule of construction may have to be applied. Where the statute may be for the public good	 and by claiming the benefit conferred on it by its provisions the State may allege that it is serving the public good	 it would still be necessary to ascertain whether the intention of the legislature was to make the relevant provisions applicable to the State. This position is also established by the decision of the Privy Council in Province of Bomboy(1) and it still continues to be a law in this Country. Incidentally	 we may add that where the Crown seeks to take advantage of a statute and urges that though it is not bound by the statute	 it is at liberty to take advantage of it	 English Law does not easily entertain such a plea	 though there are observations made in some judicial pronouncements to the contrary. As Halsbury points out	 "it has been said that	 unless it is expressly or impliedly prohibited from doing so	 the Crown may take advantage of a statute not withstanding that it is not bound thereby. " Having made this statement	 Halsbury has added a note of caution by 		saying that "there is only slender authority for this rule	 and since both the rule and such authority as does exist have also been doubted	 the rule cannot	 perhaps	 be regarded as settled law(2)". To the same effect is the comment made by Maxwell when be quotes with approval the view expressed by Sir John Simon that the decisions which recognise the right of the Crown to take advantage of a statutory provision "start with a passage in an unsuccessful argument of a law officer which was not even relevant to the case before the court	 but which has been taken out by a text writer and repeated for centuries until it was believed that it must have some foundation(3)". Therefore	 in construing section 3 of the Act	 we cannot permit the respondent to rely upon the artificial rule that since (1) 73 T.A. 271. (2)"	 Halsbury 's Laws of England	 Vol. 36	 p. 432	 para 654. (3) Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes	 11th Ed. p. 136 464 the respondent claims a benefit under section 3	 that construc tion should be adopted which supports such a claim. Thus	 the position is that when we construe section 3	 we must adopt the usual rule of construction; we must not read section 3 in isolation	 but must consider it in its proper setting and must have due regard for the other provisions of the Act	 and its general scheme and purpose. Reverting then to Mr. Setalvad 's main argument	 it may be conceded that when the Act was passed in 1949	 mainly and primarily the power conferred by section 3 on the State Government must have been intended to regulate the supply of essential articles made by one citizen to another. The State had not then entered commercial activities on a large scale and when section 3(1) contemplated notified orders issued for the purpose of securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of essential articles	 the legislature could not have in its mind supply of essential articles made by the State itself. That is one point in favour of Mr. Setalvad 's construction. If we examine the scheme of the Act	 it may also have to be conceded that some of the provisions may not be applicable to the State. Take	 for instance	 the provision of section 4 which relate to the powers of requisitioning and acquisition of properties	 and the subsequent two sections that deal with payment of compensation and release from requisition respectively; these provisions may not be applicable to the State. Take	 again	 the control of agriculture which is contemplated by section 7; it would not be applicable to the State. Section 12 which deals with penalties may also be inapplicable to the State	 and so	 would section 13 be inapplicable	 because it deals with abetment and assistance of contravention of the provisions of the Act. Therefore	 the general scheme of the Act and some of its provisions seem to suggest that the State may not have been within the contemplation of the Act. But it is obvious that the rule of harmonious construction on which Mr. Setalvad has solely rested his case	 can be invoked successfully by him only if the words used in section 3 are capable of the construction which he suggests. If the said words are capable of two constructions one of which supports the appellants ' case and the other that of the res pondent	 it would be legitimate to adopt the first construc tion	 because it has the merit of harmonising the provisions of section 3 with the general scheme and purpose of the Act. On the other hand	 if the words used in section 3(1) are not reason ably capable of the construction for which the appellants contend	 then it would be unreasonable and illegitimate for the Court to limit the scope of those words arbitrarily solely for the purpose of establishing harmony between the 465 assumed object and the scheme of the Act. Therefore	 it is necessary to examine the words used in section 3 very carefully. Let us first read section 3(1): "The State Government so far as it appears to them to be necessary or expedient for maintaining	 increasing or securing supplies of essential articles or for arranging for their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices may	 by notified order	 provide for regulating or prohibiting the supply	 distribution and transport of essential articles and trade and commerce therein". Sub section (2) provides that without prejudice to the gene rality of the powers conferred by sub section (1)	 an order made thereunder may provide for objects specified in clauses (a) to (k). The majority of these objects may not be appli cable to the State	 while	 conceivably	 some may be appli cable to it. Section 3(1) is obviously intended to secure supplies of essential articles and to arrange for their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. If electrical energy is one of the essential articles mentioned in the Schedule	 there can be no difficulty in holding that a notified order can be issued under section 3(1) for regulating the supply of the said energy and making it available at a fair price. Indeed	 it is not disputed and cannot be disputed that if electrical energy is produced by a private licensee and is then supplied to the consumers	 such a supply would fall within the mischief of section 3(1)	 and the terms on which it can and should be made to the consumers can be regulated by a notified order. There can also be no serious dispute that the terms of a contract entered into between a private supplier of electrical energy and the consumer could be modified by a notified order. Section 3(1) undoubtedly confers power on the State Government to vary and modify contractual terms in respect of the supply or distribution of essential articles. If that be so	 on a plain reading of section 3(1) it seems very difficult to accept the argument that the supply of electrical energy which is included in section 3(1) if it is made	 by a private producer should go outside the said section as soon as it is produced by the State Government. The emphasis is not on who pro duces and supplies	 but on the continuance of the equitable distribution and supply of essential articles at fair prices. If the object which section 3(1) has in mind is such equitable distribuiton and availability at fair prices of essential articles	 then that object would still continue to attract the provisions of section 3(1) even though the essential article may be produced by the State and may be supplied by it to the consumers. 466 The words used in section 3(1) are so clear	 unambiguous and wide that it would be unreasonable to limit their scope arti ficially on the ground that by giving effect to the wide language of the section	 we might reach a result which is not completely harmonious or consistent with the assumed object and purpose of the Act. Indeed	 as we have just indicated	 if the purpose of the Act is to secure the supply of essential articles at fair prices	 it would be irrelevant as to who makes the supply; what is relevant is to regulate the supply at a fair price. Therefore	 we are not prepared to accede to Mr. Setalvad 's argument that section 3(1) does not confer on the respondent the power to modify the terms of agreements between it and the appellants. Mr. Setalvad	 no doubt	 contended that in construing section 3(1)	 we may have regard to the fact that most of the clauses under section 3(2) would be inapplicable to the respondent State	 and so	 he virtually suggests that even though the words in section 3(1) may be wide	 their width should be controlled by the limited scope of the clauses prescribed by subsection (2). We are not prepared to accept this argument. After the decision of the Privy Council in King Emperor vs Sibnath Banerjee(1)	 it is well settled that the function of a clause like clause (2) of section 3 merely illustrative (vide also Santosh Kumar Jain vs The State(3)). In other words	 the proper approach to adopt in construing clauses (1) and (2) of section 3 is to assume that whatever is included in clause (2) is also included in clause (1). That is not to say that if the words of clause (1) are wide enough to include cases not included in clause (2)	 they must	 for that reason	 receive a narrower construction. Therefore	 we must ultimately go back to clause (1) to decide whether the supply of electrical energy made by the respondent to the appellants can be regulated by a notified order issued under it or not	 and the answer to that question must	 in our opinion	 be in the affirmative. In this connection	 it may be pertinent to refer to section 3(2)(b) which provides for controlling the prices at which any essential article may be bought or sold. It is not easy to see why this clause cannot take in articles which may be purchased or sold by the State. The clause is so worded that the transactions of sale and purchase of all essential articles would be included in it. It is true that where the State wants to sell its essential articles	 it may be able to regulate the prices and control them by means of an executive order; but that is not relevant and material in construing the effect (1) 72 I.A. 241 at p. 248. (2) ; 467 of the words; if the words take within their sweep essential articles sold by the State	 there is no reason why it should not be competent to the State to issue a notified order con trolling the prices in that behalf. In regard to the purchase of essential articles by the State	 the position is still clearer. If the State wants to purchase essential articles	 power to regulate the prices of such	 articles would seem to be clearly included in section 3(2)(b). In ' deed	 during the course of his arguments	 Mr. Setalvad did not seriously dispute this position. Therefore	 when the State wants to purchase essential articles	 it can regulate the price in that behalf by means of a notified order issued under section 3(1) and that shows that in the cases of both sale and purchase of essential articles by the State	 section 3(2)(b) read with section 3(1) would clothe the State with the power to issue the relevant notified order. Then	 it was faintly argued by Mr. Setalvad that the power to regulate conferred on the respondent by section 3(1) cannot include the power to increase the tariff rate; it would include the power to reduce the rates. This argument is en tirely misconceived. The word "regulate" is wide enough to confer power on the respondent to regulate either by in creasing the rate	 or decreasing the rate	 the test being what is it that is necessary or expedient to be done to maintain	 increase	 or secure supply of the essential articles in question and to arrange for its equitable distribution and its availability at fair prices. The concept of fair prices to which section 3(1) expressly refers does not mean that the price once fixed must either remain stationary	 or must be reduced in order to attract the power to regulate. The power to regulate can be exercised for ensuring the payment of a fair price	 and the fixation of a fair price would inevitably depend upon a consideration of all relevant and economic factors which contribute to the determination of such a fair price. If the fair price indicated on a dispassionate consideration of all relevant factors turns out to be higher than the price fixed and prevailing	 then the power to regulate the price must necessarily include the power to increase the price so as to make it fair. That is why we do not think Mr. Setalvad is right in contending that even though the respondent may have the power to regulate the prices at which electrical energy should be supplied by it to the appellants	 it had no power to enhance the said price. We must	 therefore	 hold that the challenge to the validity of the impugned notified orders on the ground that they are outside the purview of section 3(1) cannot be sustained. That takes us to the next question as to whether the im pugned notified orders are invalid	 because they contravene 468 the provisions of article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. The impugned orders have been notified by virtue of the fore	 be treated as law for the purpose of article 19. We may also assume in favour of the appellants that the right to receive the supply of electricity at the rates specified in the agreements is a right which falls within article 19(1)(f) or (g). Even so	 can it be said that the impugned notified orders are not reasonable and in the interests of the general public '? That is the question which calls for an answer in dealing with the present contention. It is true that by issuing the impugned notified orders	 the respondent has successfully altered the rates agreed between the parties for their respective contracts and that	 prima facie	 does appear to be unreasonable. But	 on the other hand	 the evidence shows that the tariff which was fixed several years ago had become completely out of date and he reports made by the Accountant General from time to time clearly indicate that the respondent was supplying electricity to the appellants at the agreed rates even though it was incurring loss from year to year. Therefore	 it cannot be said that the impugned notified orders were not justified on the merits. The prices of all commodities and labour charges having very much increased meanwhile	 a case had. certainly been made out for increasing the tariff for the supply of electrical energy. But it could not be possible to hold that the restriction imposed on the appellants ' right by the increase made in the rates is reasonable and in the interests of the general public solely because the impugned orders have saved the recurring loss incurred by the respondent under the contracts. If such a broad and general. argument were accepted	 it may lead to unreasonable and even anomalous consequences in some cases. This question	 however	 has to be considered from the point of view of the community at large; and thus considered	 the point which appears to support the validity of the impugned orders is that these orders were passed solely for the pur pose of assuring the supply of electrical energy and that would clearly be for the good of the community at large. Unless prices were increased	 there was risk that the supply of electrical energy may itself have come to an end. If the respondent thought that the agreements made with the appel lants were resulting in a heavy loss to the public treasury from year to year	 it may have had to consider whether the supply should not be cut down or completely stopped. It may well be that the respondent recognised its obligation to the public at large and thought that supplying electrical energy to the consumers who were using it for profit making purposes	 at a loss to the public exchequer would not be reasonable and legitimate	 and it apprehended that the legislature may well question the propriety or wisdom of such 469 a course; and so	 instead of terminating the contracts	 de cided to assure the supply of electrical energy at a fair price and that is why the impugned notified orders were issued. We ought to make it clear that there has been no suggestion before us that the prices fixed by the impugned notified orders are	 in any sense	 unreasonable or excessive	 and it is significant that even the revised tariff has to come into operation prospectively and not retrospectively. Therefore	( having regard to all the circumstances in this case	 we are disposed to hold that the change made in the tariff by the notified orders must be held to be reasonable and in the interests of the general public. Mr. Setalvad also attempted to challenge the validity of the impugned orders on the ground that they contravene article 14 of the Constitution. In support of this contention	 he invited our attention to the allegation made in Writ Petition No. 923 of 1956. In that writ petition	 one of the petitioners stated that the rate prescribed under the agree ments had not changed and had remained stationary as far as consumers under the State Government 's licensees were concerned. The affidavit appears to concede that certain 	other licensees had increased their rates	 but that increase	 it is claimed	 was negligible or nominal; and so	 the argument was that the rates which are widely divergent between consumer and consumer constitute a contravention of article 14. Mr. Setalvad fairly conceded that these allegations are vague and indefinite and no other material has been pro duced either by the petitioner who has made this affidavit	 or by any of the other petitioners who moved the High Court for challenging the validity of the impugned orders. In fact	 we do not know what the rates charged by other licensees are and have been	 and how they compare with the rates prescribed by the original contracts as well as the rates enhanced by the impugned notified orders. We ought to add that the Division Bench of the High Court appears to be in error when it assumed that the respondent was the sole supplier of electrical energy in the State of Andhra. It is true that the bulk of the energy is supplied by the respon dent; but there are some other private licensees which are licensed to supply electrical energy to the consumers and in that sense	 at the relevant time the respondent was not a monopolist in the matter of supply of electricity. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that when a citizen wants to challenge the validity of any statute on the ground that it contravenes article 14	 specific	 clear and unambiguous alle gations must be made in that behalf and it must be shown that the impugned statute is based on discrimination and that such discrimination is not referable to any classification 470 which is rational and which has nexus with the object in tended to be achieved by the said statute. Judged from that point of view	 there is absolulety no material on the record of any of the appeals forming the present group on which a plea under article 14 can even be raised. Therefore	 we do not think it is necessary to pursue this point any further. The result is the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fees. Appeals dismissed.

Electricity was supplied to the appellants by the respon dent state for many years past	 and several individual agreements were passed between them prescribing the terms and conditions for the supply. One of these terms stipulated the rate at which the supply had to be charged. These agreements did not contain any provision authorising the State to increase the rates during their operation. The respondent state issued two notified orders enhancing the agreed rates. The orders indicated that the main reason which inspired the increase was that the existing electricity tariffs which were formulated several years before	 had become completely uneconomic and meant continuously growing loss to the State. A large number of consumers challenged the validity of the two orders in the High Court under article 226. The writ petitions were allowed and the respondent was restrained from enforcing the revised rates. These decisions were challenged by the respondent by appeals in the High Court	 which took a different view and dismissed the writ petitions. On appeals to this Court	 it was contended	 inter alia that the respondent had no authority to increase the rate changing this important term of the contract by taking recourse to section 3(1) of the Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary) Powers Act	 that the power to regulate the supply of essential articles had to be applied in regard to transactions between citizens and citizens and could not be applied to an essential article which the State itself supplied; that the power to regulate conferred on the respondent by section 3(1) could not include the power to increase the tariff rate	 that the notified orders were invalid as they contravened the provisions of article 19(1)(f) and (g) and that of article 14 of the Constitution. Held: (i) The challenge to the validity of the notified orders on the ground that they were outside the purview of section 3(1) of the Act could not be sustained. The State is not bound by a statute unless it is so provided in express terms or by necessary implication. In applying this rule	 the court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the Legislature by considering all the relevant provisions of the statute together and not concentrating its attention on a particular provision which may be in dispute. Where the question is not so much as to whether the State is bound by the statute	 but whether it can claim the benefit of the provision of a statute	 the same rule of construction 457 may have to be applied ' Where the statute may be for the public good and by claiming the benefit conferred on it by its provisions the State may allege that it is serving the public good	 it would still be necessary to ascertain whether the intention of the legislature Was to make the relevant provisions applicable. Director of Rationing and Distribution vs Corporation of Calcutta	 ; and Province of Bombay vs Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay	 [1945 46] L.R. 73 I.A. 271	 applied. (ii) In construing section 3 of the Act of the usual rule of con struction must be adopted	 section 3 must not be read in isolation	 but must be considered in its proper setting and due regard must be had for the other provisions of the Act and its general scheme and purpose. (iii) The purpose of the Act is to secure the supply of essential articles at fair prices	 it would be irrelevant as to who makes the supply; what is relevant is to regulate the supply at a fair price. (iv) It is well settled that the function of a clause like cl. (2) of section 3 is merely illustrative. In other words the proper approach to adopt in construing cls. (1)	 and (2) of section 3 is to assume that whatever is included in cl. (2) is also included in cl. King Emperor vs Sibnath Banerjee	 72 I.A. 241 and Santosh Kumar Jain vs State	 ; 	 applied. (v) The word 'regulate ' is wide enough to confer power on the State to regulate either by increasing the rate or de creasing the rate	 the test being what is it that is necessary or expedient to be done to maintain	 increase or secure supply of the essential articles in question and to arrange for its equitable distribution and its availability at fair prices. (vi) Having regard to all the circumstances in this case	 the change made in the tariff were reasonable and in the in terests of the general public. (vii) There was absolute no material on the record of the appeals on which a plea under article 14 of the Constitution could even be raised.