Summarize the following court judgment. Civil Appeal No. 1998 of 1969. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated 3 10 1968 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No. 348/64. V. C. Mahajan	 Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for the Appellants. Hardev Singh for the Respondent. 465 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA	 J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment	 dated October 3	 1968	 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The facts leading to this appeal are that the appellants are partners of a firm	 Bharat Industries	 Chheharta. By a Notification	 dated May 15	 1946	 the Chheharta Municipal Committee levied a profession tax under Section 61(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act	 1911. Initially	 the tax was Rs. 15/ per annum and was levied on all the partners of the said firm. By a Notification	 dated July 4	 1958	 the annual tax for trade	 profession or calling for the owner of a factory registered under the Indian Factories Act	 was raised to Rs. 200/ per annum and each of the six partners of the said firm were assessed to annual tax of Rs. 200/ by the Municipal Committee. On October 30	 1960	 the appellants filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant Committee from realising the profession tax demanded by it per letters Nos. 15 to 20	 dated May 31	 1960	 amounting to Rs. 1	200/ . The appellants challenged the validity of the assessment contending that construed in the light of the definition given in section 2(40) of the Punjab General Clauses Act	 the term "person" occurring in section 6(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act	 1911	 includes a 'firm ' and since the trade carried on by the 'firm ' is one	 the tax could be levied only on the firm	 and not on the partners individually. On these premises	 it was pleaded that the Municipal Committee in levying the tax on the individual partners had exceeded its statutory powers under Section 61(1)(b) of the Municipal Act. The trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal by the plaintiffs	 the Additional District Judge	 Amritsar	 reversed the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit. The Municipal Committee carried a further appeal to the High Court. The learned Single Judge	 who heard the appeal	 affirmed the judgment and decree of the first appellate court	 on the reasoning which may be summed up as under: The term "person" in Section 61(1)(b) of the Municipal Act	 interpreted in the light of the definition given in Section 2(40) of the Punjab General Clauses Act	 includes a 'partnership '. Under clause (b) of Section 61(1) of the Municipal Act	 the basis on which the liability to pay tax arises	 is the trade	 profession or business; and if the 466 trade and business is one carried on by several persons collectively in partnership	 then the partnership alone	 and not the individual partners	 are liable to pay the tax; that the liability on the partners will fall twice which is not contemplated by the scheme and language of the Municipal Act	 even though all the partners are jointly and severally liable to any tax for the partnership business. In support of his conclusion that the tax was on trade and not on persons	 the learned Judge by way of analogy	 referred to clauses (a)	 (c)	 (d)	 (e) and (f) of sub Section (1). He also referred to two Madras decisions in The Municipal Commissioners of Nagapatam vs Sadaya Pillay(1) and Davies vs President of the Madras Municipal Commission(2): and found himself in entire agreement with the reasoning of the learned Judges in those cases. Aggrieved	 the Municipal Committee preferred a Letters Patent Appeal. The Appellate Bench of the High Court held that to import the definition of the term "person" occuring in Section 2(40) of the Punjab General Clauses Act into Section 61(1) (b) of the Municipal Act	 will be repugnant to the subject. In the opinion of the Bench	 under the scheme of the statute in question	 the tax cannot be levied on a firm or factory as such	 but only on the individual owners of the factory or of the firm. On this reasoning	 the Bench reached the conclusion "that under Section 61(1) (b) of the Act	 it is the individual who is to be assessed and is liable to pay the tax mentioned therein and so the assessment as well as the demand of the tax from each of the plaintiffs does not suffer from any legal infirmity. " The Bench further held that since the Committee in imposing the tax on the appellants herein	 has not acted outside the provisions of the statute	 "it would	 on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Firm Seth Radha Kishan (Deceased) represented by Hari Kishan & Ors. vs Administrator Municipal Committee	 Ludhiana	(3) which also dealt with the provisions of the Municipal Act	 follow that the impugned assessment could only be questioned under the provisions of Sections 84 and 86 of the Act	 and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of tax levied or the assessment made is excluded". In the result	 the appeal was allowed and the trial court 's decision dismissing the suit was restored. Before us	 Mr. V. K. Mahajan	 learned counsel for the plaintiffs appellants	 has adopted the reasons given by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. In support of his contentions	 he has relied upon the 467 aforesaid Madras decisions. His argument is that if the interpretation placed by the Appellate Bench of the High Court is allowed to stand	 it will lead to anamolous and unconstitutional results. Mr. Mahajan concedes that the individual partners are also 'persons ' within the meaning of clause (b) of Section 61(1). He	 however	 maintains that the firm	 also	 is a 'person ' within the contemplation of this provision and as such	 liable to be taxed; that if in respect of the one trade	 which is being carried on by the firm	 apart from each of the individual partners	 the firm	 also is separately assessed to Rs. 200/ per annum	 not only the incidence of the tax will fall twice	 the total liability therefor will far exceed the ceiling of Rs. 250/ per annum fixed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution. In these premises	 it is contended that an interpretation of Section 61(1) (b)	 which may lead to unconstitutional on irrational results should be eschewed. With regard to the question of jurisdiction it is contended that since the Municipal Committee had in the exercise of its powers clearly acted beyond its jurisdiction	 the suit was maintainable in the Civil Court. Section 61(1)(b) of the Municipal Act	 so far as material for this case	 reads as under: "Subject to any general or special orders which the State Government may make in this behalf	 and the rules	 any committee may	 from time to time for the purposes of this Act	 and in the manner directed by this Act	 impose in the whole or any part of the municipality any of the following taxes	 namely: (1) (a). . . . (i) to (iii) . . . . (b) a tax on persons practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in the municipality. Explanation. A person in the service or person holding an office under the State Government or the Central Government or a local or other public authority shall be deemed to be practising a profession within the meaning of this sub section. " From a plain reading of the extracted provision	 it is clear that a tax leviable under clause (b) is	 in terms	 a tax on "persons". The expression "persons" undoubtedly includes natural persons. The class of such taxable persons has been indicated by the Legislature with reference to their occupational activity. Thus	 in order to be authorised	 a tax under clause (b) of Section 61(1) must satisfy two conditions: 468 First	 it must be a tax on "persons". Second such persons must be practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in the municipality. There can be no dispute that the appellants are "persons" and	 as such	 satisfy the first condition. Even the learned counsel for the appellants has candidly conceded that the individual partners are also "persons" within the meaning of the said clause (b). Controversy thus becomes narrowed down into the issue; Whether persons collectively doing business in partnership	 in the municipality	 fulfil the second condition ? That is to say	 do such persons "carry of any trade or calling in the municipality" within the contemplation of clause (b) ? In our opinion	 for reasons that follow	 the answer to this question must be in the affimative. 'Partnership ' as defined in Section 4 of the 	 is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them for the benefit of all. The Section further makes it clear that a firm or partnership is not a legal entity separate and distinct from the partners. Firm is only a compendious description of the individuals who compose the firm. The crucial words in the definition of 'partnership ' are those that have been underlined. They hold the key to the question posed above. They show that the business is carried on by all or any of the partners. In the instant case	 admittedly	 all the plaintiff appellants are carrying on the business in partnership. All the six partners are sharing the profits and losses. All the partners are jointly and severally responsible for the liabilities incurred or obligations incurred in the course of the business. Each partner is considered an agent of the other. This being the position	 it is not possible to hold that each of the six partners is not carrying on a trade or calling within the purview of clause (b) of Section 61(1) of the Municipal Act. At the most	 it can be said that each of these six persons is severally as well as collectively carrying on a trade in the Municipality. There is nothing in the language of Section 61 or the scheme of the Municipal Act which warrants the construction that persons who are carrying on a trade in association or partnership with each other cannot be individually taxed under clause (b) of Section 61(1). On the contrary	 definite indication is available in the language and the scheme of this statute that such partners can be taxed as persons in their individual capacity. As noticed already	 clause (b) makes it clear in no uncertain terms that this is a tax on 'persons. ' Its incidence falls on individuals	 who belong to a class practising any profession or art; or carrying on a trade or calling in the municipality. 469 To hold that persons who are collectively carrying on a trade in the municipality cannot be taxed individually	 would be to read into the statute words which are not there. There are no words in clause (b) or elsewhere in the statute which	 expressly or by necessary implication	 exclude or exempt persons carrying on a trade collectively in the municipality from being taxed as individuals. To attract liability to a tax under this clause	 it is sufficient that the person concerned is carrying on a trade in the municipality	 irrespective of whether such trade is being carried on by him individually or in partnership with others. Thus	 both the conditions necessary for levying a tax under clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 61 of the Municipal Act existed in this case. The appellants are "persons" and they are carrying on a trade in Chheharata Municipality. In the view we take	 we do not think it necessary to go further into the question	 whether the definition of 'person ' given in Section 2(40) of the Punjab General Clauses Act	 can be imported into the statute under consideration	 so as to include a contractual firm	 also	 within the purview of the expression 'persons ' used in clause (b) of Section 61(1). Indeed	 the entire effort to import the definition of 'person ' given in the General Clauses Act	 into Section 61(1)(b) of the Municipal Act	 is directed to find a foundation for the argument	 that the construction adopted by the High Court could lead to double taxation and even unconstitutional results. But in the instant case	 nothing of this kind has happened. The firm has not been assessed. No question of double taxation or exceeding the Constitutional ceiling of Rs. 250/ fixed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution	 arises on the facts of the present case. The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants on this aspect of the matter are merely hypothetical	 and speculative. This takes us to the second question	 whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit. Section 84(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act provides that "an appeal against the assessment or levy of any. tax under this Act	 shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner or to such other officer as may be empowered by the State Government in this behalf". Then	 there is a proviso to this sub section which says that when the Deputy Commissioner or such other officer	 as aforesaid	 is or was	 when the tax was imposed	 a member of the Committee	 the appeal shall lie to the Commissioner of the Division. Sub section (2) is important. It provides: "84(2). If	 on the hearing of an appeal under the section	 any question as to the liability to	 or the principle of assessment of	 a tax arises	 on which the officer hearing the appeal entertains reasonable dobut	 he may	 either of his own 470 motion or on the application of any person interested	 draw up a statement of the facts of the case and the point on which doubt is entertained	 and refer the statement with his own opinion on the point for the decision of the High Court. " Section 86 mandates that "no objection shall be taken to any valuation or assessment	 nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned	 in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act. " From a conjoint reading of sections 84 and 86	 it is plain that the Municipal Act	 gives a special and particular remedy for the person aggrieved by an assessment of tax under this Act	 irrespective of whether the grievance relates to the rate or quantum of tax or the principle of assessment. The Act further provides a particular forum and a specific mode of having this remedy which analogous to that provided in Section 66 (2) of the Indian Income tax Act	 1922. Section 86 forbids in clear terms the person aggrieved by an assessment from seeking his remedy in any other forum or in any other manner than that provided in the Municipal Act. It is well recognised that where a Revenue Statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder	 a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum	 in a particular way	 it must be sought in that forum and in that manner	 and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded. Construed in the light of this principle	 it is clear that sections 84 and 86 of the Municipal Act bar	 by inevitable implication" the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessment under this Act. In the view we take	 we are fortified by the decision of this Court in Firm Seth Radha Kishan vs Administrator	 Municipal Committee	 Ludhiana	 (supra) wherein sections 84 and 86 of this very Punjab Municipal Act	 1911 came up for consideration. Therein	 the Municipal Committee	 Ludhiana	 imposed a terminal tax on Sambhar salt and assessed the appellant	 therein	 to a sum of Rs. 5	893/ towards that tax at the rate of Rs. 10/ per maund under item 69 of the Government Notification by which the terminal tax was imposed. The assessee filed a suit against the Municipal Committee in the Civil Court	 contending that Sambhar salt ought to have been assessed at the rate of 3 pies per maund under item 68	 that he had been illegally assessed under item 69 at the higher rate	 and claimed refund of the amount paid by him	 with interest. The Committee	 inter alia	 contended that Sambhar salt was not common salt	 and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The trial court held that Sambhar salt was common salt within the meaning of item 68 of the Schedule	 that 471 the imposition of tax on it under item 69 of the Schedule was illegal	 and	 therefore	 the Civil Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit by virtue of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On appeal	 the High Court held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction	 and dismissed the suit. The assessee came in appeal to this Court by certificate granted by the High Court	 and contended that since the impugned levy was not made under the Municipal Act but in derogation thereof	 the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and determine the suit. Delivering the judgment of the Court	 Subba Rao	 J. (as he then was) repelled this contention	 observing that the rate of the tax to be levied depended upon the character of the salt	 and it was not possible to say that in ascertaining this fact the authorities concerned travelled outside the provisions of the Municipal Act	 even if they wrongly applied item 69 of the schedule; that the mistake in applying the wrong item of the Schedule to the tax could be corrected only in the manner prescribed by the Act	 and the aggrieved person cannot file a suit in the Civil Court in that regard	 the Civil Court 's jurisdiction having been excluded by the provisions of Sections 84 and 86 of the Act. The Court distinguished that class of cases where the Municipal Committee in levying a tax or committing an Act	 clearly acts outside or in abuse of its powers under the Municipal Act	 and explained that it is only in such cases	 the bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would not apply. Can the case before us be said to belong to that class of cases where the Municipal Committee in levying a Tax acts beyond or in abuse of its powers under the Act ? The answer to this question must be in the negative. By no stretch of imagination	 can it be said in the facts and circumstances of the case	 that in assessing the appellants	 individually	 and not collectively	 to the tax in question	 the Municipal Committee abused its powers under the Act. We have already discussed and held that in levying this tax	 the Municipal Committee did not travel beyond or act contrary to the provisions of Section 61(1)(b) of the Act. In short	 the present case is one where the Municipal Committee acted "under the Act". It follows	 therefore	 that the Civil Court 's jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit was barred	 even if the dispute raised therein related to the principle of assessment to be followed. For the foregoing reasons	 the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.D.K. Appeal dismissed.

Under section 61(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act	 1911 the respondent by its Notification dated May 15	 1946 levied a profession tax of Rs. 15/ per annum on each of the partners of a firm. Bharat Industries Chheharta i.e. the appellants in the appeal. By the Notification dated July 4	 1958 the tax was raised to Rs. 200/ per annum. The validity of the demand made by the respondent at the rate of Rs. 200/ from each of the partners of the firm was challenged	 pleading that the Municipal Committee in levying the tax on the individual partners had exceeded its statutory powers under section 61(1)(b) of the Municipal Act in as much as the term 'person ' occurring in section 61(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act	 1911	 construed in the light of the definition given in section 2(40) of the Punjab General Clauses Act included a 'firm ' and since the trade carried on by the firm is one	 the tax could be levied only on the firm	 and not on the partners individually. The Trial Court dismissed the suit. First appellate court reversed the decree and the High Court in Second Appeal confirmed it. A Letters Patent Appeal	 preferred by the respondent was allowed and the Trial Court 's decision dismissing the suit was restored. Dismissing the appeal by special leave	 the Court ^ HELD: 1. It is clear	 from a plain reading of Section 61(1)(b) that a tax leviable under clause (b) is in terms	 a tax on 'persons '	 which expression includes natural persons. Its incidence falls on individuals	 who belong to a class practising any profession or art	 or carrying on a trade or calling in the municipality. To hold that persons who are collectively carrying on a trade in the municipality cannot be taxed individually	 would be to read into the statute words which are not there. There are no words in clause (b) or elsewhere in the statute which expressly or by necessary implication	 exclude or exempt persons carrying on a trade collectively in the municipality from being taxed as individuals. To attract liability to a tax under this clause it is sufficient that the person concerned is carrying on a trade in the municipality	 irrespective of whether such trade is being carried on by him individually or in partnership with others. [467G	 468H	 469A B] 2 'Partnership ' as defined in Section 4 of the 	 is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them for the benefit of all. A firm or partnership is not a legal entity separate and distinct from the partners. Firm 464 is only a compendious description of the individuals who compose the firm. The business being carried on by all or any of the partners	 all of them are jointly and severally responsible for the liabilities incurred in the course of the business as each one is considered as an agent of the other. Such partners can be taxed as persons	 in their individual. [468 D H] 3. In order to be authorised a tax under clause (b) of Section 61(1) must satisfy two conditions: First	 it must be a tax on persons. Second	 such persons must be practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in the municipality. Both the conditions necessary for levying a tax under clause (b) of sub section (1) of Section 61 of the Municipal Act existed in this case. The appellants are 'persons ' and they are carrying on a trade in Chheharata Municipality. [467H	 468A C] 4(i) Where a Revenue Statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder	 a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum	 in a particular way	 it must be sought in that forum and in that manner	 and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded. [470D E] (ii) From a conjoint reading of sections 84 and 86	 it is plain that the Municipal Act	 gives a special and particular remedy for the person aggrieved by an assessment of tax under this Act	 irrespective of whether the grievance relates to the rate or quantum of tax or the principle of assessment. The Act further provides a particular forum and a specific mode of having this remedy	 which is analogous to that provided in Section 66(2) of the Indian Income tax Act	 1922 Section 86 forbids in clear terms the person aggrieved by an assessment from seeking his remedy in any other forum or in any other manner than that provided in the Municipal Act. Therefore	 Sections 84 and 86 of the Municipal Act bar by inevitable implication	 the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessment under the Act. [470B D	 E F] (iii) In the facts and circumstances of the case	 it is clear (a) that in assessing the appellants individually	 and not collectively to the tax in question	 the Municipal Committee did not abuse its powers under the Act	 (b) in levying the profession tax it did not travel beyond or act contrary to the provisions of sections 61(1)(b) of the Act	 and (c) that the Committee acted under the Act. The Civil Courts jurisdiction	 therefor	 to entertain and decide the suit was barred. [471E G] Firm Seth Radhakishan vs Administrator	 Municipal Committee	 Ludhiana ; followed.