Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 340 of 1958. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated July 3	 1953	 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ Application No. 256 of 1952. Jwala Parshad Chopra and J. K. Hiranandani	 for the appellants. Nanak Chand	 R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen	 for respondents Nos. 1 to 3. 1961. April 21. DAYAL	 J. This appeal	 by special leave	 is against the order of the Punjab High Court 153 dismissing the petition of the appellants under article 226 of the Constitution praying for quashing the orders of the Custodian General	 dated June 17	 1952. The appellants and respondents Nos. 4 and 5 are	 residents of village Baland	 Tehsil and District Rohtak	 and are members of the body of proprietors of that village. The village Baland is divided between three estates. The plot in suit is in the estate known as 'Barsan '. One Fakira	 a mendicant and a non proprietor	 had his house on the plot in suit. In January	 1950	 the Custodian of Evacuee Property issued a notice under section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949	 stating that the appellants were in unauthorised possession of the house of Fakira	 a Muslim evacuee	 and that the should either vacate the house or show cause to the contrary. The appellants filed their objections to the notice. The Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property	 by his order dated September 3	 1950	 rejected the objections raised by the appellants and declared the house to be 'evacuee property '. The Deputy Custodian passed this order after he got an enquiry made through the Revenue Assistant (Rehabilitation). The appel lants went in appeal to the Additional Custodian	 Evacuee Property	 who got further enquiry made to ascertain whether Mumtaz	 son of Fakira	 evacuee	 had been in occupation of the house up to the date of the migration of the Muslims as a result of the partition. This enquiry revealed that Mumtaz had continued to reside in the village Baland and that a son was born to him in July	 1947. The Additional Custodian therefore agreed with the report and the order of the Deputy Custodian that the property in suit was evacuee property. The appellants then filed a revision before the Custodian General. It was dismissed on June 17	 1952. The Custodian General observed that there was more than sufficient evidence to establish that Mumtaz continued to be in possession of the house in dispute up to July	 1947. Thereafter	 the appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the legality of the order of the 20 154 Deputy Custodian on the grounds that the Deputy Custodian gave no notice or opportunity to them to meet the case and that the Custodian had no jurisdiction in the matter in view of the provisions of the wajibul arz according to which the house of a non proprietor	 on his leaving the village	 vested in the proprietory body. The learned Single Judge who heard the petition held that the provisions of the Administration of the Evacuee Property Act	 1950 (Act XXXI of 1950)	 had been complied with throughout and referred the question whether the site occupied by a non proprietor vested or not in the Custodian after the occupier had abandoned it	 to a larger Bench in view of his opinion that the decision of another Single Judge in Joti Parshad vs Bhawani Lal required re consideration. The Division Bench then decided this question and held the right of a non proprietor to occupy a village site was a right in property	 though it might not be an interest in property and that this right vested in the Custodian if the non proprietor left the country and became an evacuee. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed and it is against this order that this appeal has been filed. The sole question for determination in this case is whether Fakira had any such right in the property in suit which could vest in the Custodian on Fakira or his son Mumtaz becoming an evacuee. The case for the appellants is that Fakira had no such right which could vest in the Custodian both on account of the terms of the wajib ul arz and on account of his being a licensee. The respondents rely on section 18 of the to rebut this contention. It is necessary therefore to determine the scope of section IS of the Act. Section 18	 as originally enacted	 was substituted by section 8 of Act XI of 1953	 which provided that the substituted section shall be deemed always to have been substituted for the original section. Thus the present section must be deemed to be the section existing from the commencement of this Act. Sub section (1) of section 18 is: "(1) Where the rights of an evacuee in any land 155 or in any house or other building consist or consisted of occupancy rights	 nothing contained in any law for the time being in force or in any instrument having the force of law or in any decree or order of any court	 shall extinguish or be deemed to have extinguished any such rights either on the tenant becoming an evacuee within the meaning of this Act or at any time thereafter so as to prevent such rights from vesting in the Custodian under the provision of this Act or to prevent the Custodian from exercising all or any of the powers conferred on him by this Act in respect of any such rights	 and	 notwithstanding anything containd in any such law	 contract	 instrument	 decree	 or order	 neither the evacuee nor the Custodian	 whether as an occupancy tenant or as a tenant for a certain time	 monthly or otherwise	 of any land or house or other building shall be liable to be ejected or be deemed to have become so liable on any ground whatsoever for any default of (a) the evacuee committed after he became an evacuee or within a period of one year immediately preceding the date of his becoming an evacuee; or (b) the Custodian." The expression 'occupancy rights ' has not been defined in the Act. It is these occupancy rights which are not extinguished in spite of the provisions to the contrary in any other law or in any instrument having the force of law or in any decree or order of the Court. The occasion when they will not be extinguished would be when a tenant becomes an 'evacuee ' within the meaning of the Act	 or thereafter. It follows that sub section (1) of section 18 provided for the non extinguishment of those occupancy rights which would have been extinguished otherwise on the tenant 's becoming an evacuee and that therefore the person having such rights must be a tenant. If he is not a tenant	 then the occasion contemplated by sub section (1) of section 18	 for the application of its provisions	 does not arise. This is further clear from the latter part of this subsection which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law etc. 	 neither the evacuee nor the Custodian	 whether as an occupancy tenant or as a	 156 tenant for a certain time	 shall be liable to be ejected or be deemed to have become so liable on any ground whatsoever for any default. This latter part also makes it clear that the persons contemplated by the section are the tenants	 whether occupancy tenants or tenants for a certain time. We therefore hold that the provisions of section 18 apply to the occupancy rights of a tenant. The next question to determine is whether Fakira was a tenant of this house. It is clear that Fakira who resided in the house in suit	 was not a tenant of it. He occupied the site and probably built the house himself on getting the necessary permission from the proprietors. With respect to non proprietors	 the wajib ul arz of the village states: "No non proprietor can settle in the village or build a house without the consent of the owner of the estate. Whenever anybody settles	 he obtains land or house from the proprietor of the same and he can live there so long as he pleases. Whenever he abandons the village	 if the house belongs to the Shamlat ofit falls into the possession of that proprietorAbout the houses of non proprietors . there isno customary right to sell or mortgage residential houses	 remove the material or build burnt brick house without the consent of the proprietor If any person dies heirless his house reverts to the possession of the proprietor of the estate in which it is situate. " The mendicants are mentioned as one of the types of non proprietors settled in the Shamlat of the estate. It is clear from these provisions that Fakira	 a non proprietor	 had no such right in the site as would make him a tenant of it. He just had a right to occupy it and build a house which was	 however	 heritable and transferable only with the consent of the proprietor. It follows	 therefore	 that the provisions of sub section (1) of section 18	 do not apply to Fakira 's rights in the plot in suit and cannot therefore over ride the provisions of the wajib ul arz according to which his right to 157 reside in the house in suit came to an end when he abandoned the village on his migrating to Pakistan. Learned counsel for the respondent has further contended that apart from section 18 of the Act	 Fakira 's right to residence in the house in suit will vest in the Custodian as his migrating from the village to Pakistan on partition does not amount to abandonment contemplated by the provisions of the wajib ul arz. It is submitted that the wajib ul arz contemplates voluntary abandonment and not abandonment under force. We find it difficult to accept this contention. The abandonment is voluntary	 though the volition to abandon arises on account of circumstances over which Fakira bad no control. He left the village and migrated to Pakistan because he thought that to be the better thing to do. This point was also not taken before the High Court. Reliance is placed on the case reported as Associated Hotels of India vs R. N. Kapoor (1) for supporting the contention that Fakira was a lessee of the land in suit and not a licensee. We do not think this case supports the contention. The following propositions were laid down in that case for determining whether a document creates a licence or a lease: (1)To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or lease	 the substance of the document must be preferred to the form. (2)The real test is the intention of the parties whether they intended to create a lease or a licence. (3) If the document creates an interest in the property	 it is a lease	 but	 if it only permits another to make use of the property	 of which the legal possession continues with the owner	 it is a licence	 and (4) If under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property	 prima facie	 he is considered to be a tenant	 but circumstances may be established which negative that intention to create a lease. The terms of the wajib ul arz	 already mentioned	 make it clear that no interest in the site on which Fakira was settled was given to Fakira by the proprietors of the village. He was just granted a heritable (1) [1060] 1 S.C.R. 368	385	 158 right to occupy it for residence. The house reverted to the possession of the proprietors if he died heirless. Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to the observation in the above case to the effect: "The right of the respondent to transfer his interest under the document	 although with the consent of the appellants	 is destructive of any theory of licence. " This observation does not help the respondent 's case because no interest was created in Fakira and therefore no question of his transferring that interest arises. The wajib ul arz only expresses this much	 that there was no customary right to sell or mortgage residential houses	 remove the material or build burnt brick houses without the consent of the proprietors. It does not say that the non proprietor can transfer his residential right to any one with or without the consent of the proprietor. We therefore do not agree with this contention. It has also been contended for the respondent that the licensee 's rights which Fakira bad	 could vest in the Custodian	 as they come within the meaning of the expression 'property '. Even if they do	 those rights get extinguished in view of the provisions of the wajib ul arz and therefore there could be no vesting of those rights in the Custodian if the vesting of those rights is not prevented on account of the applicability of section 18 of the Act. We have already held that section 18 does not apply as Fakira was not a tenant. The expression 'evacuee property ' as it stood in the Act till its amendment in 1953	 meant any property in which an evacuee had any right or interest	 whether personal or as a trustee or as a beneficiary or in any other capacity and included any property etc. Fakira had no right in any capacity in the property in suit when the came into force in 1950	 and therefore the property in suit could not have been 'evacuee property '. Lastly	 we do not find any support in the provisions of the wajib ul arz or in any law for the observation in the judgment of the Court below: 159 "Were the evacuee to come back he could demand to take possession of the site	 and so it cannot be said that the right has ceased to exist. The right ceases only if the occupier leaves the village permanently with no intention of returning	. It was nobody 's case that Fakira and his son had left the village temporarily and were to return. It was said in paragraph 5 of the written statement of respondents 1 to 3 that Fakira abandoned the house only in 1947 at the time of partition. The entire case was that Fakira had migrated to Pakistan and had abandoned the village. We are therefore of opinion that Fakira did not possess any such right in the land in suit which could vest in the Custodian and that therefore the property in suit is not 'evacuee property '. We therefore allow the appeal with costs throughout and	 setting aside the order of the Court below	 allow the petition and quash the order of the Custodian General dated June 17	 1952	 declaring the property in suit to be evacuee property. Appeal allowed.

The wajib ul arz of village Buland	 teshil and district Rohtak	 provided as follows: "No non proprietor can settle in the village or build a house without the consent of the owner of the estate. Whenever anybody settles	 he obtains land or house from the proprietor of the same and he can live there so long as he pleases. Whenever he abandons the village	 if the house belongs to the Shamlat of it falls into the possession of the proprietor About the houses of non proprietors there is no customary right to sell or mortgage residential houses	 remove the material or build burnt brick house without the consent of the proprietor If any person dies heirless his house reverts 152 to the possession	 of the proprietor of the estate in which it is situate"	 and mentioned the mendicants as a type of non proprietors settled in the village. One F	 a Muslim belonging to that class	 migrated to Pakistan. The appellants	 who were proprietors	 took possession of his dwelling house. The Custo dian of Evacuee Property claimed it as evacuee property. The appellants ' objection was finally dismissed by the Custodian General who held that the house was evacuee property and vested in the Custodian. The High Court dismissed the appellants ' petition under article 226 of the Constitution holding that the right of a non proprietor to occupy a village site was a right in property and vested in the Custodian when the non proprietor became an evacuee. In this Court	 while the appellants relied on the wajib ul arz	 on behalf of the respondents reliance was placed on section 18 of the . Held	 that section 18(1) of the Administration of Evacuee Pro perty Act	 1950	 contemplated tenants	 whether occupancy tenants or tenants for a certain time and applied only to the occupancy rights of a tenant. Under the wajib ul arz	 however	 a non proprietor could have no such right in the site occupied by him as would make him a tenant of it. Section 18(1) of the Act	 therefore	 had no application and the house in question reverted to the proprietors under the provisions of the wajib ul arz when the non proprietor abandoned the village and migrated to Pakistan. It could not	 therefore	 vest in the Custodian. It was not correct to say that under the wajib ul arz that F 's interest in the house was that of a lessee. Associated Hotels of India vs R. N. Kapur	 [1960] 1 S.C.R. 368	 held inapplicable