Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 587 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 12	 1961	 of the Bombay High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 441 of 1961. 232 S.V. Gupte	 Additional Solicitor General of India and R.H. Dhebar	 for the appellant. S.G. Patwardhan and A.G. Ratnaparkhi	 for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL J. This appeal	 by special leave	 raises the question whether the amount of interest decreed for the period subsequent to the institution of a suit comes within the expression 'amount or value of the subject matter in dispute ' in article 1 of Schedule 1 of the Bombay Court fees Act	 1959	 hereinafter called the Act	 for purposes of court fee payable on the memorandum of appeal. The plaintiff respondent No. 1 instituted Special Suit No. 5 of 1957 in the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Ahmedabad to recover Rs.13	205 on account of the principal lent to defendant No. 7 and interest up to the date of the suit at the rate of 9 % per annum. On July 18	 1960	 his claim was decreed in a sum of Rs. 13	033 6 6 with future interest from the date of suit till realization at 40% per annum on a sum of Rs. 10	 120. Defendant No. 7 appealed to the High Court against the decree. In the memorandum of appeal	 defendant No. 7 valued the claim for purposes of jurisdiction and court fee at Rs. 13	033 6 6 and his grounds Nos. 1 and 48 of appeal were as follows: 1. That the lower Court erred in decreeing the plaintiff 's suit. That the decree is otherwise erroneous	 unjust and illegal and therefore deserves to be set aside. " The remaining 46 grounds related to the merits of the plaintiff 's claim and did not deal with the correctness of the trial Court awarding future pendente site interest on the rate at which it was to be calculated. The Taxing Officer was of opinion that the appeal was against the whole decree and that the amount of value of the subject matter in dispute for purposes 233 of court fee was Rs. 14	036. 80nP. as the amount of interest from the date of the suit till the date of the decree on Rs. 10	120 came to Rs. 1	033.40 nP. and it bad been conceded by the counsel for the defendant appellant that the subject matter of the appeal was the decree passed by the trial Court. He therefore directed the defendant appellant to pay the deficit court fee of Rs. 70 on the memorandum of appeal and to amend the claim accordingly. The defendant appellant then filed a revision to the High Court under section 5(2) of the Act. His objection was upheld by the learned Judge who expressed the view: "The subject matter in appeal is the real matter in dispute between the parties and not something which must stand or fall with the decision oil it. In other words	 it must mean the right which is in dispute between the parties. " He accordingly set aside the order of the Taxing Officer and held that the amount of court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal was the proper court fee. The State of Maharashtra has filed this appeal by special leave against this order. Mr. Gupta	 for the appellant State	 contends that the view expressed by the learned Judge is not correct and mainly relies on the construction put by Courts on the expression ' value or subject matter in dispute ' in the relevant provisions relating to the High Court 's giving leave to appeal to the Privy Council. In Gooroo persad Khoond vs Juggutchunder (1) the Judicial Committee said	 in connection with the requirements of the directions in the Order in Council of April 10	 1938	 with respect to the conditions for granting leave to appeal to the Privy Council	 that leave to appeal was to be given in cases where the value of the matter in dispute in the appeal amounted to the specified sum of Rs. 10	000 and that in (1) 8 M.I.A. 166. 234 determining such value	 the amount of interest decreed up to the date of the decree be included to the amount of the principal. Doorga Doss Chowdry vs Ramanauth Chowdry (1) is an authority for the proposition that the costs of a suit are no part of the subject matter in dispute. Their Lordships of the Privy Council said: sum claimed	 it would be in the power of every litigant	 by swelling the costs	 to bring any suit up to the appealable value. " It may also be said that a litigant 's conduct may lead to a protracted trial and consequently to the increase in the amount of pendente lite interest which may raise the value of the subject matter in dispute in appeal to the appealable value. We do not consider it correct that the expression in the Act be construed in the light of the construction placed on a similar expression for the purposes of considering whether the case had come within the rule allowing the High Courts to give leave for appeal to the Privy Council. The Act is a taxing statute and its provisions therefore have to be construed strictly	 in favour of the subject litigant. The other provisions are for the purpose of allowing the party feeling aggrieved against the decision of the High Court to take up his case to the next higher Court. the Privy Council and therefore the relevant provisions in that regard had to be given a liberal construction. In the present case we have to construe the expression 'value of the subject matter in dispute in appeal ' for the purposes of determining the amount of Court fee due on a memorandum of appeal and not for determining such valuation for preferring an appeal to this Court. The relevant provision governing the question of court fee to be paid on the memorandum of appeal filed in a Civil Court is contained in article 1 of Sche (1)8 M.I.A. 262. 235 dule 1 of the Act. it is to be paid ad valorem according to the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute. The rates applicable with respect to the various amounts are mentioned in the article. The maximum amount of court fee	 however	 is Rs. 15	000. The amount of court fee payable	 therefore	 depends on the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute in appeal. The defendant appellant valued his claim at Rs. 13	033 6 6 and paid the requisite court fee on that amount. It is obvious therefore that he disputes in appeal that part of the decree which awarded Rs. 13	033 6 6 against him on account of principal and interest due up to the date of the institution of the suit. He did not dispute	 according to the value of his claim	 the amount of interest which could be found on calculation for the period between the date of the suit and the date of the decree at 4% per annum on a sum of Rs. 10	120 as had been awarded under the decree. Whether his appeal is competent or not without his including this amount in his claim in appeal	 is a question different from that relating to the value of the subject matter in dispute in appeal. He does not dispute the decree for that amount and therefore the Court has not to decide about it and so this amount cannot be included in the amount of the subject matter in dispute in appeal covered by the relevant expression. None of his grounds of appeal refers specifically to this amount of interest between the date of the suit and the date of the decree. This makes it further plain that he does not question the propriety of awarding of future interest or the rate at which it was awarded or even the amount on which it could be awarded. It is not possible to say	 in these circumstances	 that the value of the subject matter in dispute in the appeal must include this amount of interest between the date of the suit and the date of the decree. Mr. Gupta has rightly conceded that it is well settled that the plaintiff has to value his appeal against the dismissal of his suit on the amount of the claim he had made in the plaint and has not to include 236 the interest due on the amount claimed up to the date of instituting the appeal	 that the defendant has not to include that amount of future interest subsequent to the date of the decree till the institution of the appeal in the valuation of the appeal for the purposes of court fee and that no court fee is to be paid on the amount of costs decreed in the suit when the party aggrieved appeals against the decree. On what principle are these amounts not treated as forming part of the value of the subject matter in dispute in appeal? Such value is to be determined on the substantial allegation in the plaint or from the pleas in the memorandum of appeal with respect to the points in dispute between the parties and sought to be determined by the Court. Such are necessarily the points affecting the rights of the parties sought to be adjudicated by the Court. Claims not based on any asserted right but dependent on the decision of the disputed right and reliefs in regard to which are in the discretion of the Court do not come within the purview of the expression 'subject matter in dispute in plaint or memo of appeal '. There appears no good reason to make a distinction between the decreed amount of costs and that of pendente lite interest for the purpose of determining the amount of the subject matter in dispute in appeal. It is true that costs of suit arise independently of the claim and are really those which are incurred by the plaintiff while the decree for the amount of pendente lite interest is directly related to the plaintiff 's claim though its award is within the discretion of the Court	 but this will not justify the distinction. The costs too	 and particularly the costs on account of court fee and counsel 's fee	 arise directly on account of the claim put forward in Court. The reason really is that it is the value of the right claimed in the suit or appeal which is covered by the expression 'amount or value of subject matter in dispute in article 1	 Schedule 1	 of the Act and that the plaintiff ' has no right to get any of these amounts from the defendant though the Court may	 in its discretion	 allow future interest 237 and costs according to the circumstances of the suit in view of sections 34 and 35 C.P.C. This principle equally applies to the non inclusion of the decreed amount ' of pendente lite interest in evaluating the subjectmatter in dispute in appeal as that too is awarded in the exercise of its discretion by the Court an the plaintiff has no right or claim for that amount against ' the defendant. It is obvious that if the defendant appellant succeeds in establishing to the satisfaction of the appellate Court that the decree for the principal and interest up to the date of the suit is bad in whole or in part	 that will itself lead the appellate Court to exercise its discretion with respect to the amount of costs and future interest in such a way that if the plaintiff 's claim is dismissed in too	 he will not be awarded any future interest or any costs of the suit or appeal and that in case his claim succeeds in part	 the amount of future interest and costs decreed in his favour would be appropriately modified by the appellate Court. The defendant appellant has therefore no reason to appeal against the decree for costs or the decree for future interest unless he disputes those amounts wholly or partially for certain reasons. If he disputes expressly the propriety or correctness of the decree with respect to the costs or pendente lite interest independently of the claim to the subject matter in the Trial Court he will have to pay court fee on the amounts challenged as in that case he does dispute those amounts in appeal and therefore those amounts do come within the expression 'value of the subjectmatter in dispute in appeal '. This has been the basis of the various decisions of the Courts in which court fee has been demanded on the amount of costs or future interest. In Mitthu Lal vs Chameli (1) it was held that no courtfee was to be paid on interest pendente lite granted by the lower Court unless the awarding of it was specifically challenged in appeal. It was said at p. 76: 57 All. 238 "Interest pendente lite is awarded under section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court may award it whether the plaintiff claims it or not. In this respect the court 's power stands on the same footing as its power to award costs to a successful party. It is well settled rule that no court fee is payable on the amount of costs awarded by a decree appealed from	 if no ground is specifically directed against the award of costs. . . . . The same principle is applicable to interest pendente lite which the Court may award in the exercise of its power under section 34. On a proper reading of the appellant 's grounds of appeal in the lower appellate court we are satisfied that the subjectmatter of his appeal to that court was the principal amount and interest up to the date of the suit." In Keolapati	 Mst. vs B.N. Varma "I it was held that unless the appellant expressly challenges the award of future interest	 no court fee is to be paid on the amount of interest accruing from the date of the suit till the date of the filing of the appeal. In Ashutosh vs Satindra Kumar (2) it was said at at p. 382: "Costs are not regarded as being any part of a subject matter in dispute either in the suit or in the appeal. In the appeal	 the appellant does not in such an event really dispute the order as to costs for it is the natural order that is ordinarily made following the decision as to the main subject matter in dispute and if he himself succeeds in the appeal in regard to the main subject matter	 automatically he will expect to succeed with regard to the costs. " We therefore hold that the amount of pendente lite interest decreed is not to be included in the 'amount or value of the subject matter in dispute in appeal ' for the purposes of article 1 of Schedule 1 of the Act unless the appellant specifically challenges the cor (1) I.L.R. 12 Luck. (2) 239 rectness of the decree for the amount of interest pendente lite independently of the claim to set aside that decree. The appellant here has not specifically challenged the decree in that respect and therefore the High Court is right in holding the memorandum of appeal to be	 sufficiently stamped. The appeal T. is therefore dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.

The plaintiff respondent No. 1 instituted a suit for recovery of the amount lent to the defendant with interest upto the date of the suit. His claim was decreed in a sum of Rs. 13	033 6 6 with future interest from the date of suit till realisation at 4 % per annum on a sum of Rs.10	120. Against this decree the defendant appealed to the High Court and valued the appeal at Rs. 13	033 6 6 and paid the requisite court fee on that amount. All his grounds of appeal related to the merits of the plaintiff 's claims and did not deal with the correctness of the trial court awarding future pendente lite interest on the rate at which it was to be calculated. The Taxing Officer directed the defendant to pay the deficit court fee of Rs. 70 on the memorandum of appeal as he was of the opinion that the appeal was against the whole decree and that the amount of value of the subject matter in dispute for purpose of court fee was Rs. 14	036.80nP. as the amount of interest from the date of the suit till the date of the decree on Rs. 10	120 came to Rs. 1	033.40nP. 231 The defendant challenged this order in revision before the High Court under section 5(2) of the Bombay Court fees Act	 1959. The High Court set aside the order of the Taxing Officer and the learned Judge expressed the view: "The subjectmatter in appeal is the real matter in dispute between the parties and not something which must stand or fall with the decision on it. In other words	 it must mean the right which is in dispute between the parties". In this Court the appellant State challenged the correctness of the said view of the High Court and relied mainly on the construction put by courts on expression " value or subject matter in dispute	 in the relevant provisions relating to the High Court 's giving leave to appeal to the Privy Council. Held:(i) That the expression 'amount or value of the subjectmatter in dispute ' in article 1 of Schedule 1 of the Bombay Court fees Act, cannot be construed in the light of the construction placed on a similar expression for the purposes of considering whether the case had come within the rule allowing the High Courts to give leave for appeal to the Privy Council. The Act is a taxing statute and its provisions have to be construed strictly, in favour of the subject litigant. Gooroopersad Khoond vs Juggutchunder, 8 M.I.A. 166 and Doorga Doss Chowdry vs Ramanauth Chowdry, 8 M.I.A. 262, held in applicable. (ii)Claims not based on any asserted right but dependent on the decision of the disputed right and reliefs in regard to which are in the discretion of the court do not come within the purview of the expression 'subject matter in dispute in plaint or memo of appeal '. (iii)The amount of pendente lite interest decreed is not to be included in the 'amount or value of the subject matter in dispute in appeal ' for the purposes of article 1 of Sch. 1 of the Act unless the appellant specifically challenges the correctness of the decree for the amount of interest pendente lite independently of the claim to set aside that decree. In the present case, the decree in that respect was not specifically challenged and therefore the view of the High Court must be held to be correct. Mitthu Lal vs Chameli, 57 All. 7 1, Keolapati Mst. vs B.N. Varma, I.L.R. 12 Luck. 466 and Ashutosh vs Satindra Kumar, 54 C.W.N.380, referred to. 
1664	The Appellant was the tenant of the respondent occupying of the latter premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 70. The appellant appealed to the Civil Judge for fixing standard rent under section 11(1) and for specifying interim rent under section 11(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and deposited a certain amount to the credit of the respondent. Subsequently the respondent filed a suit before the Civil Judge for evicting the appellant on the ground of non payment of rent. The Civil 158 Judge ordered the appellant to deposit the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 51 per month within 15 days. He substantially complied with his order. The two proceedings were amalgamated. The Civil Judge fixed the standard rent at the rate of Rs. 50 per month and dismissed the suit for eviction on the ground that the appellant was willing to pay the standard rent within the meaning of section 12 of the Act. In appeal the District Court fixed the standard rent Rs. 70 per mensem and found that since the appellant had complied with the order to deposit arrears and since he was ready and willing and ready to pay standard rent he confirmed order of the lower court order of dismissing of the suit. The respondent took the matter in revision before the High Court under section 115 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The High Court reversed the order of the District Court and directed eviction on the grounds that appellant was not ready and willing to pay the standard rent, that he had not deposited the standard rent at the rate enhanced by the District Court and that he had not paid the interim rent at the rate fixed by the trial Court. Held: (i) Section 12 (1) of the Act applies to a tenant who continues to remain in occupation even after the determination of the contractual tenancy. Such a tenant is entitled to claim protection from eviction against eviction so long as he is willing and ready to pay the standard rent and permitted increases and observe other conditions under the Act. This protection is subject to the provisions of section 13 and to the limitations contained in section 12(2) and section 12(3) (a). The expression may" in section 12(3) (a) has a mandatory content: if the conditions of this clause are fulfilled the court is bound to pass a decree in ejectment against the tenant. Bhaiya Punyalal Bhagwandin vs Bhagwat prasad; 	 (ii) The power to fix standard rent is exercisable under section 11(1) alone. To bring his claim within section 12(3) (b) the tenant must pay or tender the standard rent fixed by the court and permitted increases on or before the first day of hearing or on before such other date fixed by the court. The amount of costs has to be paid or deposited only if the court so directs. If in appeal the standard rent is enhanced the appeal court may fix a date for payment of the difference and if the tenant pays the difference on or before the day so fixed he will be entitled to get the protection of section 12(3) (h). (iii) Explanation to section 12 erects a rule of evidence. If the tenant pays or tenders regularly the interim rent specified by the court till the disposal of the suit the court is bound to presume that the tenant is at the date of the decree ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increase. The expression "standard rent" in section 12(3) (b) shall not however to be equated with "interim rent" in section 11 (3). There is nothing in section 12 to support the contention that the dispute concerning standard rent contemplated by cl. (b) of sub section (3) is one which must be raised before service of notice under section 12(3). 159 (iv) The District Court ought to have before disposing of the appeal fixed a date for payment of the difference between the standard rent due and the amount actually deposited in court. The error committed by the District Court was however only technical. Held	 further the High Court in exercise of its power under section 115 Code of Civil Procedure had no authority to set aside the order of the District Court merely because it was of opinion that the judgment of the District Court was assailable on the ground of error of fact or even of law. The High Court may exercise its power under that section only if the subordinate court has acted without jurisdiction or has failed to exercise its jurisdiction or has acted with material illegality or irregularity. Balakrishna Udayar vs Vasudeva Aiyar	 L.R. 44 I.A. 261	 Rajah Amir Hassan Khan vs Sheo Baksh Singh	 L.R. 11 I.A. 237	 Joy Chand Lal Babu vs Laksha Chaudhury	 L.R. 76 I.A. 131	 distinguished. Manindra Land and Building Corporation vs Bhutnath Bannerjee	 ;