Summarize the following court judgment. tition Nos. 232 & 233 of 1983. (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India) M.S. Joshi	 N.D. Garg and Rajiv Kumar Garg for the Petitioners. D.D. Sharma for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD	 CJ. An important question arises for consideration in these two writ petitions. That question is whether a delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death must be considered sufficient for setting aside that sentence. Learned counsel who appears on behalf of the petitioners relies upon a decision of this Court in T.V. Vatheeswaran vs The State of Tamil Nadu(1) and contends that since more than two years have passed since the petitioners were sentenced to death by the Trial Court	 they are entitled to demand that the said sentence should be quashed and substituted by the sentence of life imprisonment. The petitioners	 Sher Singh and Surjit Singh	 and one Kuldip Singh were convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the 586 Penal Code and were sentenced to death by the learned Sessions Judge	 Sangrur	 on November 26	 1977. By a judgment dated July 18	 1978 the High Court of Punjab and Haryana reduced the sentence imposed upon Kuldip Singh to life imprisonment but upheld the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioners. The High Court also imposed a sentence of fine of Rs. 5000 on Kuldip Singh and a fine of Rs. 5000 on each of the petitioners. Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1711 of 1978 which was filed by the petitioners against the judgment of the High Court was dismissed by this Court on March 5	 1979. The petitioners then filed a Writ Petition in this Court challenging the validity of section 302 of the Penal Code. That petition was dismissed on January 20	 1981. Review Petition No. 99 of 1981 filed by the petitioners against the dismissal of their S.L.P. was dismissed by this Court on March 27	 1981. The petitioners filed yet another petition under article 32 of the Constitution	 this time challenging the validity of section 34 of the Penal Code. That petition was dismissed on August 24	 1981. After failing in these seemingly inexhaustible series of proceedings	 the petitioners filed these two writ petitions on March 2	 1983	 basing themselves on the decision rendered by Justice Chinnappa Reddy and Justice R.B. Misra on February 16	 1983 in Vatheeswaran. The question which arose for consideration in Vatheeswaran is formulated by Chinnappa Reddy	 J.	 who spoke for the Court	 in these terms: "But the question is whether in a case where after the sentence of death is given	 the accused person is made to undergo inhuman and degrading punishment or where the execution of the sentence is endlessly delayed and the accused is made to suffer the most excruciating agony and anguish	 is it not open to a court of appeal or a court exercising writ jurisdiction	 in an appropriate proceeding to take note of the circumstance when it is brought to its notice and give relief where necessary ?" This question arose on the following facts as stated in the judgment of Brother Chinnappa Reddy: (1) The prisoner was rightly sentenced to death. (2) He was the 'arch villain of a villainous piece ' and the brain behind a cruel conspiracy to impersonate Customs officers	 pretend to question unsuspecting visi 587 tors to the city of Madras	 abduct them on the pretext of interrogating them	 administer sleeping pills to the unsuspecting victims	 steal their cash and jewels and finally murder them. The plan was ingeniously fiendish and the appellant was its architect. (3) Since January 19	 1975 when the Sessions Judge pronounced the sentence of death	 the prisoner was kept in solitary confinement contrary to the decision of this Court in Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration. (1) Before that	 he was a 'prisoner under remand ' for two years. On these facts	 the argument advanced in this Court on behalf of the prisoner was that taking away his life after keeping him in jail for ten years	 eight of which were spent in illegal solitary confinement	 is a gross violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. In Vatheeswaran	 our learned Brethren have drawn sustenance to their conclusion from one judgment of the Federal Court of India	 five judgments of this Court	 one of the Privy Council and one of the U.S. Supreme Court. As to the meaning and implications of Article 21 of the Constitution	 they have relied upon the decisions of this Court in Sunil Batra	(1) Maneka Gandhi	(2) Bachan Singh	 (3) Hussainara Khatoon (4) and Hoskot.(5) The judgment in Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik (6) and Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri (7) have been relied upon to show that prisoners who are under a sentence of death and detenus are entitled to certain fundamental rights. In Piare Dusadh	 (8) the Federal Court was considering appeals against the judgments of the High Courts of Allahabad	 Madras	 Nagpur and Patna	 under the special Criminal Courts Ordinance II of 1942. In Case Nos. XLI and XLII	 the High Court of Patna had 588 confirmed the sentence of death passed on the appellants by the Special Judge. It was urged before the Federal Court that the death sentence imposed in those cases should be reduced to transportation for life on account of the time that had elapsed since the sentences were first pronounced. The Court observed: "It is true that death sentences were imposed in these cases several months ago	 that the appellants have been lying ever since under threat of execution	 and that the long delay has been caused very largely by the time taken in proceedings over legal points in respect of the constitution of the courts before which they were tried and of the validity of the sentences themselves. We do not doubt that this court has power	 where there has been inordinate delay in executing death sentence in cases which come before it	 to allow the appeal in so far as the death sentence is concerned and substitute a sentence of transportation for life on account of the time factor alone	 however right the death sentence was at the time when it was originally imposed. But this is a jurisdiction which very closely entrenches on the powers and duties of the executive in regard to sentences imposed by courts. It is a jurisdiction which any court should be slow to exercise. We do not propose ourselves to exercise it in these cases. Except in Case No. XLVII (in which we are commuting the sentence largely for other reasons as hereafter appears)	 the circumstances of the crimes were such that if the death sentence which was the only sentence that could have been properly imposed originally	 is to be commuted	 we feel that it is for the executive to do so. " It was urged before the Federal Court that in England	 when cases in which death sentence has been imposed are allowed to be taken to the House of Lords on account of some important legal point	 the consequential delay in finally disposing of the case was treated as a ground for the commutation of the death sentence and that a similar course might well be adopted in India in cases in which substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution Act had to be considered by the Federal Court. This argument was rejected on the ground that these were matters primarily for the consideration of the executive. 589 In Case No. XLVII	 which was one of the cases before the Federal Court	 the appellant was convicted by a special Judge of the offence of murder and was sentenced to death on September 30	 1942. The Allahabad High Court confirmed the sentence of death but the Federal Court commuted that sentence to transportation of life. As is evident from the parenthetical portion of the passage extracted above	 this was done "largely for other reasons"	 that is to say	 for reasons other than that a long delay had intervened after the death sentence was imposed. The Federal Court commuted the death sentence on the ground that the sentence of transportation for life was more appropriate in the circumstances of the case. They added that the appellant was awaiting the execution of his death sentence for over a year. It is thus clear that Piare Dusadh is not an authority for the proposition that if a certain number of years have passed since the imposition of a death sentence	 that sentence must necessarily be commuted to life imprisonment. In Ediga Anamma(1) this Court was hearing an appeal against the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant. Finding that the appellant was a young woman of 24 who was flogged out of her husband 's house by the father in law	 this Court reduced her sentence to life imprisonment for a variety of factual reasons peculiar to the case	 like her entanglement into a sex net	 that she had a young boy to look after and so on. Speaking for the Court	 Krishna Iyer	 J. added: "What may perhaps be an extrinsic factor but recognised by the Court as of humane significance in the sentencing context is the brooding horror of 'hanging ' which has been haunting the prisoner in her condemned cell for over two years. The Sessions Judge pronounced the death penalty on December 31	 1971	 and we are now in February 1974. This prolonged agony has ameliorative impact according to the rulings of this Court." Piare Dusadh was regarded by the Court as a leading case on this point. We have already adverted to the circumstances in which the death sentence was commuted to transportation for life in that case. 590 In the other cases referred to in Vatheeswaran	 (supra) this Court was hearing appeals against the judgments of High Courts confirming the sentence of death. In those cases	 the sentence of death was commuted into life imprisonment by this Court by reason of the long interval which had elapsed either since the imposition of the death sentence or since the date of the occurrence. But we must hasten to add that this Court has not taken the narrow view that the jurisdiction to interfere with a death sentence can be exercised only in an appeal against the judgment of conviction and sentence. The question which arises in such appeals is whether the extreme penalty provided by law is called for in the circumstances of the case. The question which arises in proceedings such as those before us is whether	 even if the death sentence was the only appropriate sentence to impose in the case and was therefore imposed	 it will be harsh and unjust to execute that sentence by reason of supervening events. In very recent times	 the sentence of death has been commuted to life imprisonment by this Court in quite a few cases for the reason	 inter alia	 that the prisoner was under the spectre of the sentence of death for an unduly long time after the final confirmation of that sentence	 consequent upon the dismissal of the prisoner 's Special Leave Petition or Appeal by this Court. Traditionally	 subsequent events are taken into account in the area of civil law. There is no reason why they should not receive due consideration in other jurisdictions	 particularly when their relevance on the implementation or execution of judicial verdicts is undeniable. Undoubtedly	 principles analogous to Res judicata govern all judicial proceedings but when new situations emerge	 particularly factual	 after a verdict has assumed finality in the course of the hierarchical process	 advertence to those situations is not barred on the ground that a final decision has been rendered already. That final decision is not a decision on new facts. Courts are never powerless to do justice	 that is to say	 to ensure that the processes of law do not result in undue misery	 suffering or hardship. That is why	 even after the final seal of approval is placed upon a sentence of death	 this Court has exercised its power to direct	 ex debito justiciae	 that though the sentence was justified when passed	 its execution	 in the circumstances of the case	 is not justified by reason of the unduly long time which has elapsed since the confirmation of that sentence by this Court. Some of us dealing with this case have been parties to decisions directing	 in appropriate cases	 that the death sentence shall not be executed by reason of supervening circumstances. 591 In Vatheeswaran	 the prisoner was under the sentence of death for over eight years and was in the jail for two years before that. After the death sentence was pronounced upon him	 he was kept in solitary confinement	 contrary to this Court 's ruling in Sunil Batra. These supervening considerations	 inter alia	 were unquestionably germane to the decision whether the death sentence should be allowed to be executed. The Court took them into account and commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. Like our learned Brethren	 we too consider that the view expressed in this behalf by Lord Scarman and Lord Brightman in the Privy Council decision of Neol Riley (1) is	 with respect	 correct. The majority in that case did not pronounce upon this matter. The minority expressed the opinion that the jurisprudence of the civilized world has recognized and acknowledged that prolonged delay in executing a sentence of death can make the punishment when it comes inhuman and degrading: Sentence of death is one thing; sentence of death followed by lengthy imprisonment prior to execution is another. The prolonged anguish of alternating hope and despair	 the agony of uncertainty	 the consequences of such suffering on the mental	 emotional	 and physical integrity and health of the individual can render the decision to execute the sentence of death an inhuman and degrading punishment in circumstances of a given case. Death sentence is constitutionally valid and permissible within the constraints of the rule in Bachan Singh. This has to be accepted as the law of the land. We do not	 all of us	 share the views of every one of us. And that is natural because	 every one of us has his own philosophy of law and life	 moulded and conditioned by his own assessment of the performance and potentials of law and the garnered experiences of life. But the decisions rendered by this Court after a full debate have to be accepted without mental reservations until they are set aside. The fact that it is permissible to impose the death sentence in appropriate cases does not	 however	 lead to the conclusion that the sentence must be executed in every case in which it is upheld	 regardless of the events which have happened since the imposition or the upholding of that sentence. The inordinate delay in the execution of the sentence is one circumstance which has to be taken into account 592 while deciding whether the death sentence ought to be allowed to be executed in a given case. In his sociological study called 'Condemned to Die	 Life Under Sentence of Death '	 Robert Johnson says: "Death row is barren and uninviting. The death row inmate must contend with a segregated environment marked by immobility	 reduced stimulation	 and the prospect of harassment by staff. There is also the risk that visits from loved ones will become increasingly rare	 for the man who is "civilly dead" is often abandoned by the living. The condemned prisoner 's ordeal is usually a lonely one and must be met largely through his own resources. The uncertainties of his case pending appeals	 unanswered bids for commutation	 possible changes in the law may aggravate adjustment problems. A continuing and pressing concern is whether one will join the substantial minority who obtain a reprieve or will be counted among the to be dead. Uncertainty may make the dilemma of the death row inmate more complicated than simply choosing between maintaining hope or surrendering to despair. The condemned can afford neither alternative	 but must nurture both a desire to live and an acceptance of imminent death. As revealed in the suffering of terminally ill patients	 this is an extremely difficult task	 one in which resources afforded by family or those within the institutional context may prove critical to the person 's adjustment. The death row inmate must achieve equilibrium with few coping supports. In the process	 he must somehow maintain his dignity and integrity" (page 4) "Death row is a prison within a prison	 physically and socially isolated from the prison community and the outside world. Condemned prisoners live twenty three and one half hours alone in their cells. " (page 47) The author proceeds to say: "Some death row inmates	 attuned to the bitter irony of their predicament	 characterize their existence as a living death and themselves as the living dead. They are speaking symbolically	 of course	 but their imagery is an appropriate description of the human experience in a world where life is so obviously ruled by death. It takes 593 into account the condemned prisoners ' massive deprivation of personal autonomy and command over resources critical to psychological survival; tomblike setting	 marked by indifference to basic human needs and desires; and their enforced isolation from the living	 with the resulting emotional emptiness and death." (page 110) A prisoner who has experienced living death for years on end is therefore entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court for examining the question whether	 after all the agony and torment he has been subjected to	 it is just and fair to allow the sentence of death to be executed. That is the true implication of Article 21 of the Constitution and to that extent	 we express our broad and respectful agreement with our learned Brethren in their visualisation of the meaning of that article. The horizons of Article 21 are ever widening and the final word on its conspectus shall never have been said. So long as life lasts	 so long shall it be the duty and endeavour of this Court to give to the provisions of our Constitution a meaning which will prevent human suffering and degradation. Therefore	 Article 21 is as much relevant at the stage of execution of the death sentence as it is in the interregnum between the imposition of that sentence and its execution. The essence of the matter is that all procedure	 no matter what the stage	 must be fair	 just and reasonable. It is well established that a prisoner cannot be tortured or subjected to unfair or inhuman treatment. (See Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri	 Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik and Sunil Batra). It is a logical extension of the self same principle that the death sentence	 even if justifiably imposed	 cannot be executed if supervening events make its execution harsh	 unjust or unfair	 Article 21 stands like a sentinel over human misery	 degradation and oppression. Its voice is the voice of justice and fairplay. That voice can never be silenced on the ground that the time to heed to its imperatives is long since past in the story of a trial. It reverberates through all stages the trial	 the sentence	 the incarceration and finally	 the execution of the sentence. In cases too numerous to mention	 this Court has released undertrial prisoners who were held in jail for periods longer than the period to which they could be sentenced	 if found guilty: this jurisdiction relates to pre trial procedure. In Hussainara Khatoon (supra) and Champalal(1)	 speedy trial was held to be an integral part of the 594 right conferred by Article 21: this jurisdiction relates to procedure during the trial. In Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri	 the Court upheld the right of a detenu	 while in detention	 to publish a book of scientific interest called 'Inside the Atom '; in Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik	 it was held that prisoners had to be afforded reasonable human conveniences and that the live wire mechanism fixed on prison walls in pursuance of administrative instructions could not be justified as reasonable if it violated the fundamental rights of the prisoners; in Sunil Batra	 solitary confinement and bar fetters were disapproved as normal modes of securing prisoners. These three cases are illustrative of the Court 's jurisdiction to review prison regulations and to regulate the treatment of prisoners while in jail. And	 last but not the least	 as we have stated already	 death sentences have been commuted to life imprisonment by this Court either while disposing of Special Leave Petitions and Appeals or while dealing with Writ Petitions filed after the unsuccessful termination of the normal processes of litigation: this jurisdiction relates to the execution of the sentence. This then is the vast sweep of Article 21. What we have said above delineates the broad area of agreement between ourselves and our learned Brethren who decided Vatheeswaran. We must now indicate with precision the narrow area wherein we feel constrained to differ from them and the reasons why. Prolonged delay in the execution of a death sentence is unquestionably an important consideration for determining whether the sentence should be allowed to be executed. But	 according to us	 no hard and fast rule can be laid down as our learned Brethren have done that "delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Article 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death". This period of two years purports to have been fixed in Vatheeswaran after making "all reasonable allowance for the time necessary for appeal and consideration of reprieve". With great respect	 we find it impossible to agree with this part of the judgment. One has only to turn to the statistics of the disposal of cases in High Court and the Supreme Court to appreciate that a period far exceeding two years is generally taken by those Courts together for the disposal of matters involving even the death sentence. Very often	 four or five years elapse between the imposition of death sentence by the Sessions Court and the disposal of the Special Leave Petition or an Appeal by the Supreme Court in that matter. This is apart from the time which the President or the Governor	 as the case may be	 takes to consider petitions filed 595 under Article 72 or article 161 of the Constitution or the time which the Government takes to dispose of applications filed under sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has been the sad experience of this Court that no priority whatsoever is given by the Government of India to the disposal of petitions filed to the President under Article 72 of the Constitution. Frequent reminders are issued by this Court for an expeditious disposal of such petitions but even then the petitions remain undisposed of for a long time. Seeing that the petition for reprieve or commutation is not being attended to and no reason is forthcoming as to why the delay is caused	 this Court is driven to commute the death sentence into life imprisonment out of a sheer sense of helplessness and frustration. Therefore	 with respect	 the fixation of the time limit of two years does not seem to us to accord with the common experience of the time normally consumed by the litigative process and the proceedings before the executive. Apart from the fact that the rule of two years runs in the teeth of common experience as regards the time generally occupied by proceedings in the High Court	 the Supreme Court and before the executive authorities	 we are of the opinion that no absolute or unqualified rule can be laid down that in every case in which there is a long delay in the execution of a death sentence	 the sentence must be substituted by the sentence of life imprisonment. There are several other factors which must be taken into account while considering the question as to whether the death sentence should be vacated. A convict is undoubtedly entitled to pursue all remedies lawfully open to him to get rid of the sentence of death imposed upon him and indeed	 there is no one	 be he blind	 lame	 starving or suffering from a terminal illness	 who does not want to live. The Vinoba Bhaves	 who undertake the "Prayopaveshana" do not belong to the world of ordinary mortals. Therefore	 it is understandable that a convict sentenced to death will take recourse to every remedy which is available to him under the law	 to ask for the commutation of his sentence	 even after the death sentence is finally confirmed by this Court by dismissing his Special Leave Petition or Appeal. But	 it is	 at least relevant to consider whether the delay in the execution of the death sentence is attributable to the fact that he has resorted to a series of untenable proceedings which have the effect of defeating the ends of justice. It is not uncommon that a series of review petitions and writ petitions are filed in this Court to challenge judgments and orders which have assumed finality	 without any seeming justification. Stay orders are obtained in those proceedings and then	 at the end 596 of it all	 comes the argument that there has been prolonged delay in implementing the judgment or order. We believe that the Court called upon to vacate a death sentence on the ground of delay caused in executing that sentence must find why the delay was caused and who is responsible for it. If this is not done	 the law laid down by this Court will become an object of ridicule by permitting a person to defeat it by resorting to frivolous proceedings in order to delay its implementation And then	 the rule of two years will become a handy tool for defeating justice. The death sentence should not	 as far as possible	 be imposed. But	 in that rare and exceptional class of cases wherein that sentence is upheld by this Court	 the judgment or order of this Court ought not to be allowed to be defeated by applying any rule of thumb. Finally	 and that is no less important	 the nature of the offence	 the diverse circumstances attendant upon it	 its impact upon the contemporary society and the question whether the motivation and pattern of the crime are such as are likely to lead to its repetition	 if the death sentence is vacated	 are matters which must enter into the verdict as to whether the sentence should be vacated for the reason that its execution is delayed. The substitution of the death sentence by a sentence of life imprisonment cannot follow by the application of the two years ' formula as a matter of "quod erat demonstrandum". In the case before us	 the sentence of death was imposed upon the petitioners by the learned Sessions Judge	 Sangrur	 on November 26	 1977. It was upheld by the High Court on July 18	 1978. This Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed by the petitioners on March 5	 1979. The matter is pending in this Court since then in one form or another	 by reason of some proceeding or the other. The last of the writ Petitions filed by the petitioners was dismissed by this Court on August 24	 1981. We do not know why the sentence imposed upon the petitioners has not been executed for more than a year and half. The Government of Punjab must explain that delay. We are of the opinion that	 in the instant case	 the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioners by the Sessions Court and which was upheld by the High Court	 and this Court	 cannot be vacated merely for the reason that there has been a long delay in the execution of that sentence. On the date when these Writ Petitions came before us	 we asked the learned counsel for the petitioners to argue upon the 597 reasons why	 apart from the dealy caused in executing the death sentence	 it would be unjust and unfair to execute that sentence at this point of time. Every case has to be decided upon its own facts and we propose to decide this case on its facts. After hearing the petitioners ' counsel	 we will consider the question whether the interests of justice require that the death sentence imposed upon the petitioners should not be executed and whether	 in the circumstances of the case	 it would be unjust and unfair to execute that sentence now We must take this opportunity to impress upon the Government of India and the State Governments that petitions filed under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution or under sections 432 and 433 of the Criminal Procedure Code must be disposed of expeditiously. A self imposed rule should be followed by the executive authorities rigorously	 that every such petition shall be disposed of within a period of three months from the date on which it is received. Long and interminable delays in the disposal of these petitions are a serious hurdle in the dispensation of justice and indeed	 such delays tend to shake the confidence of the people in the very system of justice. Several instances can be cited	 to which the record of this Court will bear testimony in which petitions are pending before the State Governments and the Government of India for an inexplicably long period. The latest instance is to be found in Cri. Writ Petition Nos.345 348 of 1983	 from which it would appear that petitions filed under article 161 of the Constitution are pending before the Governor of Jammu & Kashmir for anything between 5 to 8 years. A pernicious impression seems to be growing that whatever the courts may decide	 one can always turn to the executive for defeating the verdict of the Court by resorting to delaying tactics. Undoubtedly	 the executive has the power	 in appropriate cases	 to act under the aforesaid provisions but	 if we may remind	 all exercise of power is preconditioned by the duty to be fair and quick. Delay defeats justice. On the question as to whether the death sentence should not be allowed to be executed in this case	 we shall pronounce later after hearing the parties. In the meanwhile	 notice will go to the Government of Punjab. Order accordingly.

The petitioners were convicted under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C. and were sentenced to death on November 26	 1977. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence on July 18	 1978. The petitioners ' Special Leave Petition against the judgment of the High Court was dismissed on March 5	 1979 and the Review Petition against the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition was also dismissed on March 27	 1981. The petitioners ' successive writ petitions challenging the validity of sections 302 and 34 I.P.C. were dismissed on January 20	 1981 and August 24	 1981 respectively. The present writ petitions were filed on March 2	 1983 on the basis of the decision in T.V. Vatheeswaran vs State of Tamil Nadu which was rendered on February 16	 1983. The contention on behalf of the petitioners was that more than two years had elapsed since they were sentenced to death by the trial court and therefore they were entitled in terms of the ruling in vatheeswaran to demand that the said sentence should be quashed and substituted by the sentence of life imprisonment. ^ HELD : Prolonged delay in the execution of a death sentence is unquestionably an important consideration for determining whether the sentence should be allowed to be executed. But no hard and fast rule that "delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke article 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death" can be laid down as has been done in Vatheeswaran. [594 E F] (i) No absolute or unqualified rule can be laid down that in every case in which there is a long delay in the execution of a death sentence	 the 583 sentence must be substituted by the sentence of life imprisonment. There are several other factors which must be taken into account while considering the question as to whether the death sentence should be vacated. A convict is entitled to pursue all remedies lawfully open to him and get rid of the sentence of death imposed upon him and his taking recourse to them to ask for the commutation of his sentence even after it is finally confirmed by this Court is understandable. But	 it is	 at least	 relevant to consider whether the delay in the execution of the death sentence is attributable to the fact that he has resorted to a series of untenable proceedings which have the effect of defeating the ends of justice. It is not uncommon that a series of review petitions and writ petitions are filed in this Court to challenge judgments and orders which have assumed finality	 without any seeming justification. Stay orders are obtained in those proceedings and then	 at the end of it all	 comes the argument that there has been prolonged delay in implementing the judgment or order. The Court called upon to vacate a death sentence on the ground of delay caused in executing that sentence must find why the delay was caused and who is responsible for it. If this is not done	 the law laid down by this Court will become an object of ridicule by permitting a person to defeat it by resorting to frivolous proceedings in order to delay its implementation. Further	 the nature of the offence	 the diverse circumstances attendant upon it	 its impact upon the contemporary society and the question whether the motivation and pattern of the crime are such as are likely to lead to its repetition if the death sentence is vacated	 re matters which must enter into the verdict as to whether the sentence should be vacated for the reason that its execution is delayed. The substitution of the death sentence by a sentence of life imprisonment cannot follow by the application of the two years ' formula as a matter of "quod erat demonstrandum." [595 D H; 596 AE] T.V. Vatheeswaran vs State of Tamil Nadu. overruled. (ii) The period of two years purports to have been fixed in Vatheeswaran after making "all reasonable allowance for the time necessary for appeal and consideration of reprieve. " It is not possible to agree with this part of the judgment in that case. The fixation of the time limit of two years does not accord with the common experience of the time normally consumed by the litigative process and the proceedings before the executive. A period far exceeding two years is generally taken by the High Court and this Court together for the disposal of matters involving even the death sentence. Very often four or five years elapse between the imposition of death sentence by the Sessions Court and the disposal of the Special Leave Petition or an Appeal by this Court in that matter. This is apart from the time which the President or the Governor	 as the case may be	 takes to consider petitions filed under article 72 or article 161 of the Constitution or the time which the Government takes to dispose of application filed under sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [594 F H; 595 AC] (iii) Piare Dusadh is not an authority for the proposition that if a certain number of years have passed since the imposition of a death sentence	 584 that sentence must necessarily be commuted to life imprisonment. In that case the Federal Court commuted the sentence of death to sentence of transportation for life for reasons other than that a long delay had intervened after the death sentence was imposed. In Ediga Anamma	 Piare Dusadh was regarded as a leading case on the point. In the other judgments of this Court referred to in Vatheeswaran	 this Court was hearing appeals against judgments of High Courts confirming the sentence of death. However	 the Court has not taken the narrow view that the jurisdiction to interfere with a death sentence can be exercised only in an appeal against the judgment of conviction and sentence. In very recent times	 the sentence of death has been commuted to life imprisonment by this Court in quite a few cases for the reason	 inter alia	 that the prisoner was under the spectre of the sentence of death for an unduly long time after the final confirmation of that sentence. [589 B D H; 590 A D] Piare Dusadh	 [1944] F.C.R. Vol.6 61; Ediga Anamma; 	 ; Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration	 ; ; Maneka Gandhi [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Bachan Singh	 	 Hussainara Khatoon; 	 ; Hoskot; 	 ; Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik; 	 ; and Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri; 	 referred to. (iv) Article 21 is as much relevant at the stage of execution of the death sentence as it is in the interregnum between the imposition of that sentence and its execution. The essence of the matter is that all procedure	 no matter what the stage	 must be fair	 just and reasonable. It is well established that a prisoner cannot be tortured or subjected to unfair or inhuman treatment. It is a logical extension of the self same principle that the death sentence	 even if justifiably imposed	 cannot be executed if supervening events make its execution harsh	 unjust or unfair. A prisoner who has experienced living death for years on end is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court for examining the question whether	 after all the agony and torment he has been subjected to	 it is just and fair to allow the sentence of death to be executed. That is the true implication of article 21 of the Constitution. [593 B G] Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik; 	 ; Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri; 	 ; and Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration; 	 referred to. (v) Traditionally	 subsequent events are taken into account in the area of civil law. There is no reason why they should not receive due consideration in other jurisdictions	 particularly when their relevance on the implementation or execution of judicial verdicts is undeniable. Principles analogous to res judicata govern all judicial proceedings but when new situations emerge	 particularly factual	 after a verdict has assumed finality in the course of the hierarchical process	 advertence to those situations is not barred on the ground that a final decision has been rendered already. That final decision is not a decision on new facts. Courts are never powerless to do justice	 that 585 is to say	 to ensure that the processes of law do not result in undue misery	 suffering or hardship. That is why	 even after the final seal of approval is placed upon a sentence of death	 this Court has exercised its power to direct	 ex debito justiciae	 that though the sentence was justified when passed	 its execution	 in the circumstances of the case	 is not justified by reason of the unduly long time which has elapsed since the confirmation of that sentence by this Court. [590 E H] In the instant case	 the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioners by the Sessions Court and which was upheld by the High Court and this Court cannot be vacated merely for the reason that there has been a long delay in the execution of that sentence. Counsel for the petitioners have been asked to argue upon the reasons why	 apart from the delay caused in executing the death sentence	 it would be unjust and unfair to execute that sentence at this point of time. The question will be decided after hearing the parties. [596 G H; 597 A B] 2. Petitions filed under articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution and under sections 432 and 433	 Cr. P.C. must be disposed of expeditiously. A self imposed rule should be followed by the executive authorities that every such petition shall be disposed of within a period of three months from the date on which it is received. [597 C]