Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 216 of 1952. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 15	 1959 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 600 of 1955 from Original Decree. A.V. Viswanatha Sastri	 Rameshwar Nath	 S.N. Andley and P.k. Vohra	 for the appellant. S.N. Pershad	 M.H. Chhatrapati	 1. B. Dadachanji	 O.C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain	 for respondents Nos. 1 and 2. K.L. Hathi and R.H. Dhebar	 for respondent No. 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Raghubar Dayal	 J. There is a temple known as Shri Chandraprabhu Khandelwal Jain Temple at Dhulia. Gulabchand Hiralal	 father of appellant Hukumchand Gulabchand Jain	 a leading member of the Khandelwal Jain Community at Dhulia	 looked after the temple for over 40 years till his death sometime in 1950.The appellant looked after it after his father 's death. Two members of the community interested in the temple	 held to be a public temple	 instituted the suit against the appellant and the Charity Commissioner	 Bombay	 praying for the removal of the appellant from possession of the trust properties	 for the rendering of true and faithful accounts of all the assets and income of the trust property and for the framing of the scheme for the administration of the trust. It was alleged in the plaint that the appellant 's father was maintaining all accounts of income and expenditure concerning the temple and that the funds of the temple were many times advanced at interest and that the temple had come to hold large properties	 movable and immovable. It was further alleged that the temple had a large income from offerings	 house rent etc.	 but the appellant and his deceased father had not been maintaining the accounts properly and that the. funds of the temple were being advanced at interest	 though no such income was shown as received recently by the appellant. The appellant	 in his written statement	 denied that the amount was so advanced at interest as alleged by the plaintiffs and stated that his father had been keeping a ledger in the name of the temple in the accounts in which its income and expenditure had been duly entered since over 40 years and that the appellant himself had kept separate account books for the temple since October 30	 1951. He denied that any income recently received had not been shown in the accounts. The trial Court held that the appellant had committed minor irregularities in the maintenance of the accounts	 that he was liable to render accounts and that the Commissioner was to ascertain the 93 amount due from the appellant on taking the accounts. It definitely held it not established that income	 if any	 derived by way of interest on loans advanced out of the funds of the temple had not been credited to the account of the temple and that no instance of fraudulent or dishonest misappropriation of temple funds on the part of defendant No. 1 or his father had been established. It found that the meeting of the community had passed a resolution on August 22	 1958	 by an overwhelming majority	 sanctioning the accounts submitted by the appellant and that only two persons who opposed against the resolution were the two plaintiffs of the suit. The Commissioner found that on the date of the institution of the suit	 i.e. on February 17	 1954	 Rs. 10.088 10 3 were due for principal and Rs. 16	853 6 0 were due for interest	 from the appellant. The plaintiffs admitted the report to be correct but the appellant contended that under the rule of damdupat interest exceeding the amount of principal could not be allowed. The appellants contention was accepted and the trial Court passed a decree on April 23	 1955	 for Rs. 20	177 4 6 against the appellant	 with future interest at 6 per cent per annum. We are not now concerned with the other items of the decree and therefore we make no reference to them. The appellant deposited the amount due under the decree on July 18	 1955. The plaintiffs appealed and claimed a larger amount on various grounds	 including the one that the principle of damdupat should not have been applied and that interest on the balance of the trust fund should have been calculated and compound interest allowed in place of simple interest on the amount of the trust fund in the hands of the defendant or his father. The appellant filed a cross objection against the allowing of interest on the balance of the trust funds with his father and himself. The High Court agreed with the plaintiffs that the principle of damdupat could not be applied in the circumstances of the case and that compound interest should have been charged against the appellant. It therefore set aside the decree passed by the trial Court in so far as it determined the amount due to the temple and referred the case back to the trial Court for reassessment of the amount due to the temple having due regard to the observations made in its judgment. On an application by the appellant	 certificate under article 133(1) of the Constitution was granted. The appellant has then filed this appeal and questioned the correctness of the order of the High Court holding him liable to pay compound interest and holding that the principle of damdupat was not applicable in this case. The High Court said in its judgment that it was the contention of the plaintiffs that the appellant 's father and the appellant 3(D)2SCI 8 94 used the funds of the temple in their business and that they were therefore liable to account on that footing. There was no such allegation in the plaint or in the memorandum of appeal to the High Court. The High Court referred to the khulasa submitted to the Commissioner by the plaintiffs and stated that it was specifically alleged therein that the amount was being used by the defendant and his father in business. Support for such an allegation was found in the statement Exhibit 24 of the appellant 's father in 1931. Reference was also made to the fact that the appellant had nowhere denied the fact of the moneys of the temple being used for the purpose of the business and to the non production of certain books of account by the appellant. His statement that they were not available was not accepted. The High Court recorded the finding in this form (at p. 43 of the appeal record): "Under these circumstances it would not be an unreasonable inference to draw that the amounts belonging to the temple were being utilised by Defendant No. 1 (the appellant) and before him by his father in their business." Having come to this conclusion and to the view that the position of the appellant 's father and the appellant vis a vis the temple funds was that of a trustee	 the High Court considered whether the plaintiffs could claim interest on equitable grounds and held that they could claim compound interest with yearly rests	 as the money had been used in the business or had been so mixed up with their own funds that it was impossible to say that they had not so used it. The High Court did not apply the rule of damdupat as the liability of the appellant was not rounded on loans or on any contract. It is contended for the appellant that there was neither an allegation nor evidence to the effect that the trust funds had been used in his business by the appellant 's father or the appellant and that therefore the appellant was not liable to pay compound interest on the trust funds in his hands or in the hands of his father. It was further urged that if interest was payable by the appellant 's father or the appellant on the balance of trust funds	 it should be simple interest and the amount of interest could not be more than the amount of principal due on the date of the institution of the suit on the principle of damdupat. It has not been established in this case that the trust funds with the appellant or his father were used in their trade or business. We have already referred to the finding Of the High Court in this respect. It is a very halting finding. The High Court has not definitely held it proved that the funds were used in the business. We say so	 as the High Court has said (at p. 46 of the appeal record): "Since we are of the view that the defendant No. 1 and his father have used the monies of the temple in their business or have so mixed it up with their own funds that it is impossible to say that they have not so used it . " 95 This is not a clear cut definite finding that the funds had been used in business or trade. The earlier finding noted at p. 43 of the appeal record and quoted by us earlier	 loses its force in view of what has been said later. There is no evidence about such use of the money. There was no such allegation in the plaint. It was said in the khulasa dated December 22	 4954 and included in the Additional Report of the Commissioner of even date: "Because the amount that was received by the defendant in respect of the temple could be utilised by the defendant in his business he used to pay interest thereon at the rate of annas 8. " This too	 is not	 as stated by the High Court	 a specific allegation that the amount was being used in business. The plaint did not even say that the amount had been always advanced on loan. What it said in para l is that the funds of the temple were many times advanced at interest and that no income from interest recently received had been shown in the accounts. No evidence has been led about the regular advance of the trust funds as loans. On the other hand	 the accounts show only a few entries about the receipt of interest on the trust funds. The statement	 Exhibit 24	 made by the appellant 's father on October 26	 1931	 in Regular Suit No. 377 of 1931	 was in a suit instituted by the appellant 's father for the recovery of money advanced on a mortgage at compound rate of interest. Gulabchand	 father of the appellant	 stated in examination in chief	 that the funds lent were of the temple	 the transactions of the temple were in his name and that interest at compound rate had been agreed upon. In cross examination he stated that he had with him funds of the temple and that he paid for them compound interest at 8 annas. This statement does not necessarily mean that the appellant 's father had been crediting the temple accounts with compound interest	 at the rate of 8 annas	 on the temple funds in his hands. Gulabchand made another statement on January 12	 1950. It is exhibit 23. This statement was made in proceedings on Miscellaneous Application No. 110 of 1949. He stated: "Suit No. 377 of 1931 had been filed. In the same my deposition has been recorded. I have made a statement that the amount was of the temple. But I gave a statement to that effect as that amount has been set apart for the temple. I have given a statement that after the mortgage deed was executed and before the suit was filed	 I set apart this amount for the temple and that the transaction of the temple was in my name. That statement is correct	 96 If it is the amount of the Mandir	 I credit it to the Khata of the Mandir. I do not pay interest for the amount of the Mandir. As there was interest in the mortgage deed	 I have taken interest at eight annas from Mangilal. I have made a statement that I have with me the amount of the temple and that I pay interest for it at eight annas. " These statements	 taken together	 lead to the inference that Gulabchand was not crediting interest on the temple funds in the accounts except when he received interest on the amounts lent and that this statement made in 1931 was in connection with the amount lent on a mortgage deed. He charged compound interest from the mortgagor and therefore credited that interest in the accounts. It is significant to note that the four entries about interest were for the years 1927 to 1931 when Suit No. 377 of 1931 was filed. The fact that no interest appears to have been credited after 1931 bears out the inference we derive from the statements of Gulabchand. There is another matter which throws light on this question and tends to support our conclusion. The report submitted ' by the Commissioner on November 29	 1954 shows that the balance at the beginning of samvat year 1996	 corresponding to 1939 40	 was Rs. 7	649 14 3. The amount credited during the year was Rs. 573 12 0 and the amount debited was Rs. 769 3 6. If the opening balance be ignored	 there would be a deficit of Rs. 195 7 0 and the accounts for the samvat year 1997 opened with a debit balance of Rs. 195 7 0. This shows that the opening balance of samvat year 1996	 i.e. Rs. 7	649 14 3	 had been taken out of the accounts. It appears that this amount was taken over to some Bhandara account and was credited again in the temple accounts for samvat year 2009	 i.e.	 1952 53	 after being brought out from Bhandara account. Such dealing with this amount does not appear to be consistent with its being used in business. In view of the shaky finding of the High Court about the funds being used in business by the appellant 's father or the appellant and in view of what we have said above	 we hold that it has not been proved that these funds had been used in business and that therefore the appellant is not liable to pay compound interest on the balance of the trust funds with his father or himself. We may now consider whether the appellant is liable to pay simple interest on the balance of trust money with his father or himself. Two questions arise for consideration and they are whether the trustee is liable to pay simple interest on the trust capital in his hands and if he is so liable what rate of interest be charged from him in the present case. Interest can be allowed on equitable grounds only as no statutes in force during the period in suit and dealing with public charitable trusts made the trustee liable to pay 97 interest. The Indian Trusts Act does not apply to public or private religious or charitable endowments and therefore the provisions of section 23 thereof cannot be used for charging interest from the appellant trustee. The Charitable and Religious Trusts Act has no provision which provides for charging the trustee with interest. Reference may therefore be made in this connection to what is stated in para 1691 of Halsbury 's Laws of England	 III Edition. 38: "Subject to this	 or unless a trustee is expressly otherwise authorised or required under the terms of his trust. he must duly and promptly invest all capital trust money coming to his hands	 and all income which cannot be immediately applied for the purposes of the trust; and he is liable for any loss which may result from its being improperly invested or being left uninvested for an unreasonable length of time	 and for interest during the period of its being so left. " This is so because the trustee has to conduct the affairs of the trust in the same manner as an ordinary prudent man of business would conduct his own affairs. In para 1812 are set out the circumstances in which a trustee	 besides being required to account for the principal trust money	 can also be charged with interest on it and one of the circumstances is when the Court considers that the trustee ought to have received interest. Such could be the case when the trustee	 in breach of his duty	 retains the trust money in his own hands uninvested or mixes it with his own money or property. It appears from the Commissioner 's report that the trustee in this case had over Rs. 10	000 in his hands from samvat year 1988 commencing from November 10	 1931	 upto February 17	 1954	 when this suit was instituted. The trustee kept such a large sum uninvested for a long time extending over 22 years. The accounts show that reasonably he could not have expected to require this amount for any current purpose of the trust during these years. He should have invested the amount. His failure to do so makes him liable to pay interest. It appears from what is said in para 1814 of Halsbury 's Volume 38 that where a trustee simply fails to invest trust money which he ought to have invested or there are no other special circumstances in the case	 he is in general charged simple interest at the rate of 4 per cent per annum. We consider it reasonable to charge interest at 4 per cent per annum in this case. We have now therefore to decide what had been the amount of trust funds in the hands of the appellant 's father at different times and what would be the amount due from the appellant on the date of the institution of the suit	 both for principal amount of trust money and for accumulated interest with him. We do not 98 consider it desirable that the case be sent back to the trial Court for these calculations	 in the light of our finding	 as this litigation has been pending for over 10 years and as the accounting is to be done for a period commencing from November 10	 1931	 from which date the accounts are available to the Court. The Additional Report of the Commissioner	 dated December 22	 1954	 shows that the amount of principal on February 17	 1954	 the date on which the suit was filed	 was Rs. 10	088 10 3 and that the accumulated amount of interest due on that date was Rs. 16	853 6 0 at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. The plaintiffs respondents admitted this report to be correct. The defendant also admitted the correctness of the principal amount found due by the Commissioner. He	 in fact	 did not even dispute that the amount of interest at 6 per cent per annum would be what has been found by the Commissioner. What he contended was that he was not liable to pay interest in excess of the amount of principal found due	 in view of the rule of damdupat. In these circumstances	 these figures can be accepted as correct. When the Commissioner had submitted his first report on November 29	 1954. both the parties objected to the accounts prepared by him. The defendant had objected to the Commissioner 's including a sum of Rs. 7	648 14 3 twice over in his accounts. This sum represents the balance at the close of samvat year 1995 corresponding to 1938 39. It was not taken over in the accounts for the samvat year 1996. The Commissioner	 in preparing the account	 took this amount into consideration without making up the accounts for the samvat year 1996. He found and noted in his accounts that the amount credited to the temple during the samvat year 2009 corresponding to 1952 53 was Rs. 9	978 5 3 and that this amount included a sum of Rs. 7	648 14 3 which had been brought from the Bhandara account. He however did not consider this sum to be the sum which had been not included in the accounts of the temple from the samvat year 1996. The learned District Judge agreed with the objection of the defendant and held that this amount had been included twice in the Commissioner 's accounts. The respondents did not dispute the correctness of this finding in the High Court and therefore we do not consider it a sound contention that this sum of Rs. 7	648 14 3 be further added to the balance found due by the Commissioner. The appellant stated that the statement of the balance in hand submitted by him to the meeting on August 22	 1953 was arrived at by adding an amount of Rs. 7	000 to the balance shown in the accounts as he had found a sum of Rs. 7	000 in a bag marked 'Dharmadya ' inside a safe. The High Court has not considered the statement of the defendant about so finding a sum of Rs. 7	000 reliable. It was not urged before the High Court	 as has been urged 99 before us	 that this sum of Rs. 7	000 be included in the amount of trust money in the hands of the appellant on the date of the institution of the suit. The High Court merely dealt with the complaint for the respondents that the Commissioner had not taken this sum into account for the purpose of computation of interest on funds in possession of the defendant. The High Court considered this complaint to be justified. We therefore do not accept the respondent 's contention that Rs. 7	000 be added to the balance found due by the Commissioner and hold that the High Court was in error in ordering interest to be calculated on this amount as well. According to the report of the Commissioner	 the amount of interest on the principal amount of trust money in the hands of the trustee worked out to Rs. 16	853 6 0 up to February 17	 1954 at 6 per cent annum. We have held that the interest be calculated at 4 per cent per annum. If follows that at this rate the amount of interest found due by the Commissioner would be reduced to Rs. 1 I	235 9 4. The principal due on that date was Rs. 10	088 10 3. The question now arises whether the amount of interest be limited 10 the amount of principal	 on the basis of the principle of Damdupat	 or not. The High Court has held that the principle of Damdupat will not apply in this case. We agree with that opinion. The rule of Damdupat applies to cases where a loan is advanced. This is clear from Colebrooke 's Digest on Hindu Law. Part I	 Vol. I	 of the Digest deals with Contracts. Book I of this Part deals with Loans and Payment. Section I of Chapter I of Book I deals with Loans in General and describes what may or may not be loaned by whom	 to whom and in what form	 with the rules for delivery and receipt. These matters are comprised under the title 'loans delivered (rinadana) '	 which means the complete delivery of a loan or debt by whom	 where and to whom made. Chapter II deals with Interest and states at the commencement of Section I: "Such interest	 as may be taken without a breach of duty on the part of the creditor	 is a rule (dherma) for delivery by the creditor. Or . for it is the nature of a loan	 that it should produce to the lender the principal sum advanced	 and interest in addition thereto. " The various Articles in this Section use the expressions 'creditor '. 'render '. 'Joan '	 'principal '	 'lent '	 'borrowers ' and thus make it amply clear that it deals with interest on the amounts advanced by a creditor to a debtor. Section I deals with the rates of interest to be charged. Section 1I deals with Special Forms of Interest. Paragraph 53 thereof states: "Interest on money	 received at once	 not year by year	 month by month	 or day by day	 as it ought	 must never be more than enough to double the debt	 that is	 more than the amount of the principal paid at the same time. " 100 This is what is known by the rule of Damdupat and has been rightly construed	 as long ago as 1863	 by the Bombay High Court in Dhondu Jagannath vs Narayan Ramchandra(1). Section III deals with Interest Specially Authorized and Specially Prohibited. Article II of this Section deals with Limits of Interest. Paragraph 59 thereof states: "The principal can only be doubled by length of time	 after which interest ceases. " The limit of interest is different under other paragraphs for loans advanced in different circumstances. Paragraph 61 repeats what has been stated in paragraph 53 of Section II and adds a special rule to the effect: "On grain	 on fruit	 on wool or hair	 on beasts of burden	 lent to be paid in the same kind of equal value	 it must not be more than enough to make the debt quintuple. " It is therefore clear	 as stated earlier	 that the rule of Damdupat applies in respect of interest due on amounts lent by a creditor to the borrower	 the debtor. The question then is whether the funds in the hands of a trustee can be said to be such loans nationally advanced by the trustee to himself as an individual. If their character can be deemed to be such	 there may be a case for applying the rule of Damdupat to the interest on such funds and that if it is not so	 this rule of Damdupat will not apply to the interest ordered to be paid on such funds. It has been urged for the appellant that the trustee is a debtor with respect to the trust money in his hands. Reference has been made to Halsbury 's Laws of England	 III Edition	 Vol. 38	 1044 where it is stated at para 1801: "A breach of trust is	 in equity	 regarded as giving rise to a simple contract debt. " In the foot note is stated: "Strictly speaking	 the relation of debtor and creditor does not subsist between a trustee and his cestui que trust (per Lindley	 L.J. in Lewin on 'Trusts '	 15th Edition	 states at p. 745: "The debt constituted by a breach of trust is	 even after it has been established by a decree	 an equitable debt only	 and until the Bankruptcy Act	 1869	 would not have supported a petition in bankruptcy. " It was said by the Earl of Halsbury	 L.C.	 in Sharp vs Jackson(2): "It has been suggested that there was a proposition which could be maintained	 as to which I confess I entertain grave doubts whether any decision goes to that extent	 namely	 that the relation between a cestui que trust 101 and a trustee who has misappropriated the trust fund is not that of debtor and creditor. That it may be something more than that is true	 but that it is that of debtor and creditor. 1 can entertain no doubt. As that question has been mooted and brought before your Lordships ' House as one question for decision here	 I certainly have no hesitation in saying that in my opinion no such proposition can properly be maintained	 and that although there are other and peculiar elements in the relation between a cestui que trust and a trustee	 undoubtedly the relation of debtor and creditor can and does exist." No other Lord expressed an opinion on this point. The correctness of this expression of the Earl of Halsbury has been doubted in Lake	 in re. Dyer	 Ex Parte( ') by Rigby L.J.	 who remarked at the hearing: "How is a trustee a debtor '? Can he be sued at common law '? I do not see how he can be a 'debtor '	 for the money he is fraudulently dealing with is	 at law	 his own money. No doubt he can be called upon to replace the money	 but that must be by a suit in equity	 not at law. Notwithstanding the high authority of the statement that has been referred to	 I confess I do not understand it. " We are of opinion that though a trustee.	 who has custody of trust funds	 has a pecuniary liability to make good those funds if he has used them and may	 on the basis of such a liability	 be said to be a debtor of the trust	 yet he	 as an individual	 is not a borrower of the funds from the trust and cannot be said to have taken a loan from himself as a trustee in charge of the trust funds. His liability to pay interest	 when ordered by the Court on equitable grounds	 does not come within the provisions dealing with interest in Hindu Law	 as mentioned in Colebrooke 's Digest. There is no fixed rate of interest which a trustee be liable to pay as there is no contract between him as a trustee and as an individual to pay interest. He simply uses the money in his custody. It is only when the Court determines his liability to pay interest that interest is to be calculated on the principal amount due from him. It is not the case of a creditor letting interest accumulate and thus make the debtor pay interest much more than what he had borrowed as principal. The principle of Damdupat was evolved both as an inducement to the debtor to pay the entire principal and interest thereon at one and the same time in order to save interest in excess of the principal and as a warning to the creditor to take effective steps for realising the debt from the borrower within reasonable time so that there be not such accumulation of interest as would be in excess of the principal amount due	 as in that case he would have to forego the excess amount. There may be justification for the (1) 	715. 102 principle of Damdupat applying in the case of an ordinary creditor and a debtor	 but there seems no justification for extending that principle to the case of a trustee who has to pay interest on the funds in his hand with respect to which on certain grounds he is held liable to pay interest. We therefore hold that the rule of Damdupat will not apply with respect to the interest adjudged payable by a trustee on his committing breach of trust with respect to the trust funds in his hands . The result then is that the appellant is liable to pay Rs. 10	088 10 3 for principal and Rs. 11	235 9 4 as interest	 upto the date of the institution of the suit	 i.e. upto February 17	 1954. We therefore allow the appeal	 set aside the decree of the High Court and modify the decree of the trial Court accordingly. The result will be that the suit temple will be entitled to get from defendant No. 1 a sum of Rs. 21	324 3 7 upto the date of the suit	 together with future interest at 4 per cent per annum on Rs. 10	088 10 3 from the date of the suit till the date of payment. The appellant will bear his costs throughout. The costs of the respondents will come out of the estate. Appeal allowed.

The respondents who were interested in a public temple filed a suit against the appellant who was looking after the affairs of the temple. They prayed for his removal from possession of the trust properties	 for the rendering by him of true and faithful accounts and for the framing of a scheme. The trial court held that the appellant was liable to render accounts. Having ascertained the amount of principal	 it determined the interest payable at an amount equal to that of the principal on the basis of the rule of damdupat. The respondents appealed to the High Court and urged that the rule of damdupat should not have been applied and that compound interest should have been charged against the appellant. The High Court held that the appellant had used the trust moneys in his business and therefore agreed with the contention of the respondents and remanded the case to the trial court for ascertaining the amount due to the temple. In the appeal to the Supreme Court	 it was contended that	 (i) there were no grounds for making the appellant liable to pay compound interest	 and (ii) even if there was liability to pay any interest	 it was only for paying simple interest and that the rule of damdupat should be applied. HELD: (i) It had not been proved that the trust funds had been used in the appellant 's business and therefore the appellant was not liable to pay compound interest on the balance of the trust funds with him. [96 G] (ii) In the absence of statutes during the period of suit dealing with public charitable trusts making a trustee liable to pay interest	 interest could be charged only on equitable grounds. One such circumstance is	 when the Court considers that the trustee ought to have received interest	 as when he retains trust money in his hands uninvested. Since the accounts	 in the instant case	 show that the appellant had retained the principal amount uninvested for over twenty years he would be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of 4 per cent per annum. Even though the interest calculated at that rate exceeded the principal	 that entire interest would have to be paid	 because	 the rule of damdupat would not apply. The principle of damdupat was evolved both as an inducement to the debtors to pay the entire principal and interest at one and the same time in order to save interest in excess of the principal	 and as a warning to the creditor to take effective steps for realising the debt from the borrower within a reasonable time	 so that	 there may not be accumulation of interest in excess of the principal amount. But that rule applies only to cases where a loan is advanced. Though a trustee who had custody of trust funds	 has a pecuniary liability to make good those funds if he has used them and may	 on the basis of such a liability	 be said to be a debtor of the trust	 yet he	 as an individual	 is not a borrower of the funds from the trust and cannot be said to have taken a loan from himself as a trustee in charge of the trust funds. [96 H; 97 E H; 99 D; E; 101 E F	 H] 92 Sharp vs Jackson	 (1899) A.C.419 and Lake	 in re Dyer Ex Parte	 (1901)1 K.B. 710	 referred to.