Summarize the following court judgment. ivil Appeal No. 1842 of 1981. From the Judgment and Order dated30.4.1981 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 418 of 1978. Mrs. Shyamala Pappu	 H.K. Puri and S.D. Lal for the Appellant. Dr. Y.S. Chitale	 S.N. Kacker	 Mukul Mudgal and N.S. Das Bahl for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK	 CJ. This is a tenant 's appeal arising out of proceedings for her ejectment. The respondent	 as landlord of the premises let to the appellant	 filed a petition for her eviction on the ground set forth in section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act	 1958	 that is to say	 that the appellant had "acquired vacant possession of . . a residence" after the com mencement of the Act	 viz	 her own house D 196	 Defence Colony	 New Delhi and was therefore liable to hand over possession of the rented premises occupied by her to the respondent. It was alleged that the appellant had acquired vacant possession of her house on 20 November	 1973 after the premises in suit had been let out to her on April	 1971. The appellant denied that she was liable to ejectment. The Assistant Rent Controller	 Delhi	 and the Rent Control Tribunal concurrently held that the appellant was owner of house D 196	 Defence Colony	 New Delhi	 that on 20 November	 1973 the previous tenant had vacated the premises and handed over vacant possession and that thereafter she had sold it to one Smt. Leela Wati 750 on 24 November	 1973. It was observed that during the period 20 November	 1973 to 24 November	 1973 it must be taken that she was in possession of alternative accommodation. It was also held concurrently that even though on the date the petition for eviction was filed	 the house	 D 196	 Defence Colony	 New Delhi	 was no longer in the occupation of the appellant it was sufficient for the purpose of section 14(1)(h) that some time prior to the filing of the eviction petition the appellant had obtained possession of the house. The High Court endorsed the view taken by it earlier in Hem Chand Baid vs Smt. Prem Wati Parekh.	 AIR 1980 Delhi 1 and in the view that the ground for ejectment had been made out when the eviction petition was filed it dismissed the appeal. In this appeal it is urged on behalf of the appellant that before the earlier tenant of tile appellant had vacated the house the appellant had already entered into an agree ment to sell the house to another person	 and that therefore in the presence of that obligation it was not possible to say that when the house was vacated the appellant was enti tled to enter into and to continue in possession of the house. It is contended before us that before the original tenant vacated the house there was an oral agreement between the appellant and Smt. Leela Wati to sell the house to Smt. Leela Wati and that the agreement was only formalized in a written document on 24 November	 1973. It is urged that when the original tenant vacated the house on 20 November	 1973 the appellant was under a legal obligation to sell the house to Smt. Leela Wati	 and that in the circumstances	 the house cannot be said to constitute alternative accommodation for the purpose of section 14(1)(h) of the Act. The Rent Control Tribunal has found against the existence of any such oral agreement. Upon that it would seem that it was only after obtaining possession on 20 November	 1973 from the original tenant	 that is	 four days later	 that the appellant execut ed an agreement for sale with Smt. Leela Wati. It is appar ent that on 20 November	 1973 the appellant came into the house belonging to her and it was available to her for her occupation. The circumstances that she lost possession on the date when the eviction petition was filed does not protect the appellant against section 14(1)(h) of the Act. In the result	 the appeal fails .and is dismissed but there is no order as to costs. N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.

The respondent landlord filed a petition for eviction of the appellant tenant from the suit premises under section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act	 1958 on the ground that the appellant had acquired vacant possession of her house on November 20	 1973	 after the suit premises had been let out to her on April 1	 1971. The appellant contended that she was not liable to be ejected. The Assistant Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal concurrently held that even though the house owned by the appellant was not in her occupation on the date the petition was filed	 it was sufficient for the purpose ors. 14(1)(h) that sometime before the filing of the petition she had obtained vacant possession of the house	 and thus had alternative accommodation during November 20 24	 1973	 i.e.	 from the date she obtained vacant possession from her tenant till she sold it. The High Court also held that the ground for ejectment had been made out when the eviction petition was filed. In the appeal before this Court	 on behalf of the appel lant tenant it was contended that before the earlier tenant had vacated the house	 the appellant had already entered into an oral agreement to sell the house to another person	 which was formalized on a written document on November 24	 1973 and as the appellant was under legal obligation to sell the house she was not entitled to enter into and to continue in possession of the house when it was vacated	 and there fore	 the house could not be said to constitute alternative accommodation	 for the purpose ors. 14(1)(h) of the Act. Dismissing the appeal	 749 HELD: The Rent Control Tribunal has found against the existence of any oral agreement for the sale of the suit house. It was only after four days of obtaining possession on November 20	 1973 from the original tenant that the appellant executed an agreement for sale. Thus	 it is clear that the appellant came into the house belonging to her on November 20	 1973 and it was available to her for her occu pation. The circumstance that she lost possession on the date when the eviction petition was filed does not protect the appellant against section 14(1)(h) of the Act. [750F G]