Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 128 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 21	 1961 of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 32 of 1959. N.D. Karkhanis	 R.N. Sachthey and B.R.G.K. Achar	 for the appellant. R.J. Kolah	 J.B. Dadachanji	 O.C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain	 for the respondent. December 2	 1963. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH	 J. Henry Gannon who was a registered holder of 2674 shares of Gannon Dunkerley & Company a private Limited Company with its registered office in Bombay died on May 13	 1945	 having made and published a will disposing of his extensive estate in the United Kingdom and in British India. The National Bank of India Ltd. obtained probate of Gannon 's will in the United Kingdom and appointed the respondent James Anderson its attorney to administer the estate in British India. Anderson applied for and obtained in India on August 14	 1946	 Letters of Administration "durante absentia" to the estate of Gannon in British India. 450 out of the shares were specifically bequeathed by Gannon to certain legatees	 and in the course of administration	 share certificates with transfer forms duly executed were delivered to the legatees in respect of those shares and no question arises in this appeal in regard to those shares. By agreement dated August 14	 1946	 between the executor to the estate	 the Company and one Morarka	 the executor agreed to sell the remaining 2224 shares of the Company to Morarka and pursuant thereto the relevant share certificates with transfer deeds were handed over to Morarka on October 12	 1946	 against payment of the price at the rate of Rs. 140 per share. Morarka	 for some reason which is not clear from the record	 failed to present the transfer deeds and the share certificates for registration at 593 the office of the Company and the name of Gannon remained at all material times on the register of shareholders in respect of those 2224 shares. In the assessment of the Company for the assessment years 1946 47 and 1947 48 the Income tax Officer	 Bombay	 made an order on March 26	 1953	 under section 23A of the Income tax Act	 1922 (as it then stood) that certain undistributed parts of the assessable income of the Company shall be deemed to have been distributed as dividends amongst the shareholders as at the dates	 viz.	 May 26	 1947	 and December 22	 1947	 of the General Meetings of the Company. The net dividends so deemed to be distributed in respect of the shares were Rs. 61	051 and Rs. 3	73	099. The Income tax Officer then issued on March 28	 1953	 a notice under section 34(1)(b) of the Income tax Act addressed to "James Anderson	 Administrator to the Estate of late Mr. Henry Gannon" reciting that he had reason to believe that Anderson 's "income assessable to income tax for the year ending 31st of March 1949" had escaped assessment and that he proposed to re assess the escaped income and for that purpose called upon Anderson to make a return of his total income and the total world income assessable for the year ending March 31	 1949. In compli ance with the requisition Anderson submitted a return	 but did not include therein the dividend deemed to have been distributed under the order dated March 26	 1953. The Income tax Officer in his order of assessment included dividends deemed to be distributed and after processing the amount under section 18(5) included it in the total income of Anderson and levied tax thereon at the appropriate rate. Anderson 's appeals against the order of the Income tax Officer to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal	 Bombay	 were unsuccessful. At the instance of Anderson the following questions were referred by the Tribunal to the High Court of Bombay under section 66(1) of the Income tax Act: 1/SCI/64 38 594 "(1)Whether in the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessment made on Mr. James Anderson	 Administrator to the estate in India of Mr. Henry Gannon (deceased) is valid in law? If the above question is answered in the affirmative (2 ) whether in the facts and in the circumstances of the case the dividends of Rs. 61	051 and "Rs. 3	73	099 deemed to have been distributed on 26th May 1947 and 22nd December 1947 respectively under section 23A of the Income tax Act were assessable in the hands of the applicant?" The High Court answered the first question in the negative and declined to answer the second question. With special leave	 the Commissioner of Income tax	 Bombay	 has appealed to this Court. The estate of Gannon to which the Letters of Administration relate	 vested by virtue of section 211 of the Indian Succession Act	 in Anderson	 but he did not take steps to get his name entered in the register of shareholders maintained by the Company	 and the Income tax Officer sought to tax the dividends deemed to have been distributed in the hands of Anderson as administrator of the estate of Gannon. The order made by the Income tax Officer under section 23A gives rise to a notional income: it merely creates a fiction about distribution and consequential receipt of dividend. The order by its own force however does not charge the income to tax: it has to be followed by an order of assessment to make tax on such income eligible. The sole question in this appeal is whether the Act contains machinery for assessing dividends deemed to have been distributed by virtue of an order under section 23A in respect of the shares held by a shareholder	 when before the date on which the fiction of distribution becomes effective viz. 	 the date of the relevant General Meeting of the Company the registered shareholder has died and his representatives have not been substituted in the register of the Company. 595 It was held by this Court in Commissioner of Income tax	 Bombay City II vs Shakumtala and others(1) following Howrah Trading Company Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income tax	 Central Calcutta(2) that the expression "shareholder" in section 23A of the Indian Income tax Act	 1922	 means a shareholder registered in the books of the company	 and such shareholder alone is liable to be taxed in respect of the dividend deemed to be distributed. Counsel for the Commissioner submits that the principle of those cases applies only when the registered share holder is alive and the beneficial ownership in the shares is vested as a result of some transaction inter vivos in a person in whose name the shares do not stand in the Company 's register	 but not where by the grant of representation to the estate of a registered shareholder who has died	 the representative is invested	 without his name being entered in the register	 with the rights of the shareholder. Whether on the death of a shareholder his executor or administrator may enforce the rights of the shareholder or incur liability in respect of the shares to the Company	 depends upon the nature of the right and the obligation	 and terms of the statute and the articles of the Company which create those rights and obligations. The legal representative of a deceased person cannot vote on behalf of the shareholder and may not become a director of the Company on the strength of the representation alone. Again by the express provision contained in section 35 of the Indian Companies Act	 1913	 a transfer of the share or other interest of a deceased member by his legal representative although he is himself not a member is as valid as if he were a member at the time of the execution of the transfer. This implies that the legal representative does not acquire in all cases the rights of a shareholder of a company in respect of shares of which the name of the deceased was registered as holder. But if the estate of a shareholder of a com (1) (2) 596 pany is by virtue of the Articles of the Company liable in respect of calls upon shares whether made during the life time of the holder or after his death	 the legal representative is obliged to satisfy the calls in his representative character. This obligation arises not because the legal representative becomes	 by virtue of probate or Letters of Administration	 a shareholder in place of the person whose estate is vested in him	 but because as a representative it is his duty to discharge the obligations enforceable against the estate. Under an order made by the Income tax Officer under section 23A of the Indian Income tax	 1922	 dividend is deemed to be distributed among the shareholders and by the express provision contained in the statute the proportionate share of the dividend of each shareholder has to be included in the total income of such shareholder for the purpose of assessing his total income. The statute therefore in terms applies to the shareholder and makes the dividend taxable as his income. The obligation to pay the tax on the dividend so deemed to be distributed is of the shareholder	 and may be enforced against him or his legal representative in the manner and to the extent the statute permits. There is no special machinery devised by the Income tax Act enabling assessment and levy of tax in respect of such deemed income from the estate of the shareholder in the hands of his legal representative when the order of the Income tax Officer pursuant to which the income was to be deemed to be distributed becomes effective was made after the death of the shareholder	 and the general provision in section 24B for enforcement of liability against the legal representative of a deceased person to pay tax which would have been payable if such person had not died	 has a limited application. In Commissioner of Income tax Bombay vs Ellis C. Reid(" it was observed by the Bombay High Court in rejecting the claim made by the Income tax Department to assess a deceased person 's estate (1) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 312: 597 in the hands of his legal representative to tax	 that the definition of "assessee" in section 2(2) of the Indian Income tax Act	 1922 (as it stood at the material date) in terms only applied to a living person	 the words being "a person by whom income tax is payable" and not "a person by whom or by whose estate Income tax is payable"	 and in the absence of appropriate provisions	 for collecting tax from the estate of a deceased person in the Act	 the claim of the Income tax Officer to make an assessment under section 23(4) must fail. The Court also observed that throughout the Income tax Act there is no reference to the decease of a person on whom the tax had been originally charged	 and it was difficult to suppose that the omission was unintentional. In Reid 's case(" the tax payer had died after the commencement of the financial year but before the income of the previous year was assessed	 and it was held that the executors under the will of the tax payer were not liable to pay tax on receipt of income due to the deceased	 notwithstanding that he died while assessment proceedings were pending	 because the proceedings could not be continued and the assessment could not be made after the tax payer 's death. To rectify the lacuna in the machinery of assessment the Legislature enacted section 24B	 by the Indian Income tax (Second Amendment) Act	 18 of 1933. The first sub section of section 24B provided: "Where a person dies	 his executor	 administrator or other legal representative shall be liable to pay out of the estate of the deceased person to the extent to which the estate is capable of meeting the charge the tax assessed as payable by such person	 or any tax which would have been payable by him under this Act if he had not died." In interpreting that enactment this Court held in a recent case: Commissioner of Income tax	 Bombay City 1 vs Amarchand Shroff (2) that by the incorporation of section 24B the Legislature has extended the legal personality of a deceased person for the duration (1) I.L.R. (2) 598 of the entire previous year in the course of which he died	 and therefore the income either received by him before his death or by his heirs and representatives after his death in that previous year becomes assessable to tax in the relevant assessment year	 but not the income received in the year subsequent to the previous or account year. In Amarchand Shroff 's case(1)	 'A ' who was a partner in a firm of solicitors which maintained accounts "on cash basis" died on July 7	 1949. Outstandings of the firm in respect of professional services rendered prior to the death of 'A ' were realized during five years subsequent to 'A 's death and were divided between the partners of the firm and certain sums were paid to the heirs and legal representatives of 'A ' as his share. The Income tax Department sought to assess the amounts received by the legal representative of 'A ' as his share to tax under section 34 (1)(b) read with section 24B. It was held that section 24B did not authorise the levy of tax on receipts by the legal representative of a deceased person in the years of assessment succeeding the year of account in which such person died and accordingly the income received by him before his death and that received by his heirs and legal representatives after his death in that previous year became assessable to income tax in the relevant assessment year	 but not receipts by the legal representatives after the expiry of the account year in which 'A ' died. In the case before us Gannon died in May 1945	 and the dividend in respect of which orders under section 23A were passed was deemed to be distributed in the year of account ending March 31	 1949. The legal personality of Gannon as held in Amarchand Shroff 's case(1) came to an end for the purpose of section 24B at the end of the account year in which Gannon died and no tax could be levied under section 24B on the dividends deemed to have been received by him or his legal representatives after the end of that year. Counsel for the Commissioner sought to rely on the following observations made by Kapur	 J	 who spoke for the Court in Amarchand Shroff 's case(1) (at p. 67): (1)48 I.T.R. 59. 599 "In the present case the amounts which are sought to be taxed and which have been held not to be liable to tax are those which were not received in the previous year and are there fore not liable to tax in the several years of assessment. It cannot be said that they were income which may be deemed by fiction to have beer received by the dead person and therefore they are not liable to be taxed as income of the deceased	 Amarchand	 and are not liable to be taxed in the hands of the heirs and legal representatives who cannot be deemed to be assessees for the purpose of assessment in regard to those years"	 and on the latter part of the opinion sought to raise two arguments (1) that even if after the expiry of the year of account receipts which if the person earning had not died would have been treated as his income	 ceased to be liable to assessment as income of the deceased	 they could still be taxed as his income in the hands of the legal representatives and (2) that where the income was notional as under section 23A the legal personality of the deceased must be regarded as extended to the end of the year in which such notional income must be deemed to have been received by the legal representatives of the deceased. The first argument is plainly inconsistent with what was decided in Amarchand Shroff 's case(1). In that case the Court held that the receipts by the heir or legal representative for professional services rendered by the deceased solicitor were liable to be brought to tax in the hands of the legal representatives only to the limited extent permitted by section 24B. The second argument involves the importation into the expression "deemed by fiction to have been received" a concept which was wholly alien to what was decided by the Court	 for in Amarchand Shroffs case(1) the Court was dealing not with a fiction of distribution by an order under section 23A of dividends which never reached the shareholder or his legal representative	 but to a fiction of receipt by a deceased person of income by extending (1) 600 his legal personality. Section 24B does not warrant the application of two different interpretations in the matter of extension of the legal personality of the deceased according as the income is actual or notional. Section 24B in terms refers to the liability of the legal representative to pay tax assessed as payable by such deceased person	 or any tax which would have been payable by him under the Act if he had not died	 and if the expression "tax which would have been payable under this Act	 if he had not died" is intended to impose liability for tax on income received in the year of account in the course of which the tax payer died	 a different interpretation of the same expression in the context of notional income would be impermissible. The Legislature not having made any provision generally for assessment of income receivable by the estate of the deceased person	 the expression "any tax which would have been payable by him under this Act if he had not died" cannot be deemed to have supplied the machinery for taxation of income received by a legal representative to the estate after the expiry of the year in the course of which such person died. It was then urged that apart from section 24B	 the legal representatives of a deceased person also represent his estate in the matter of taxation of income and it is competent to the taxing authorities to assess them on income received on behalf of the estate. Counsel did not rely upon any specific provision of the Act in support of the contention	 and merely asserted that the Act seeks to tax all assessable incomes	 and income received by a legal representative of the estate of a deceased person should not be permitted to escape tax to the detriment of public revenue. But if the Legislature has failed to set up the procedure to assess such income	 the Courts cannot supply it. The expression "assessee" in section 2(2) as substituted by the Indian Income tax (Amendment) Act	 25 of 1953	 with effect from April 1	 1952	 means a person by whom income tax or any other 601 every person in respect of whom any proceeding and this Act has been taken for the assessment of his income or of the loss sustained by him or of the amount of refund due to him. By section 3 where income tax is chargeable for any year at any rate or rates prescribed by the Act of the Central Legislature	 tax at that rate shall be charged for that year in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual	 Hindu undivided family	 company and local authority	 and of every firm and other association of persons or the partners of the firm or the members of the association individually. The charge to income tax has therefore to be in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Act	 and the Legislature has not provided that the income received by a legal representative which would	 but for the death of the deceased	 have been received by such deceased person	 is to be regarded for the purpose of assessment as the personal income of the legal representative To assess tax on such receipts on the footing that it is the personal income of the legal representative is to charge tax not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. We therefore agree with the High Court	 though for somewhat different reasons. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.

G	 a holder of certain shares of a private limited company made a will disposing of his estate and died on May 13	 1945. The respondent obtained Letters of Administration "durante absentia" to the estate	 and in pursuance of an agreement between himself	 the company and one M to sell the shares to M	 handed over the share certificates to M against payment of the price. M failed to present the share certificates for registration and the name 591 of G remained on the register of shareholders of the Company. The Income tax Officer made an order under section 23A of the Income tax Act (as it then stood) that certain undistributed part of the assessable income of the company shall be deemed to have been distributed as dividend amongst the shareholders as at the dates of the general meetings	 viz.	 May 26	 1947 and December 22	 1947. The Income tax Officer then issued a notice under section 34(1) (b) to the respondent proposing to re assess his income and calling upon him to file a return for the relevant year. The respondent submitted a return	 but did not include the dividend deemed to have been distributed by the order passed under section 23A The Income tax Officer included the dividends in the total income of the respondent and levied tax. The respondent 's appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income tax Appellate Tribunal were unsuccessful. On reference	 the High Court held that the assessment made on the respondent Administrator to the estate of G (deceased) was not valid in law. In appeal by special leave: Held (i) The legal representative does not acquire in all cases	 the right of a share holder in respect of shares of which the deceased was registered as holder. But if the estate of a share holder of a company is by virtue of the Articles of the Company liable in respect of calls whether made during the life time of the holder or after his death	 the legal representative is obliged to satisfy the calls in his representative character. (ii) There is no special machinery devised by the Income tax Act enabling assessment and levy of tax in respect of such deemed income from the estate of the share holder	 in the hands of his legal representative when the order of the Income tax Officer pursuant to which the income was to be deemed to be distributed becomes effective was made after the death of the share holder. The provision in section 24B for enforcement of liability against the legal representative of a deceased person to pay tax which would have been payable if such person had not died	 has a limited application. The expression "tax which would have been payable under this Act	 if he had not died	 in section 24B is intended to impose liability for tax on income actually received or deemed fictionally to be received in the year of account in the course of which the taxpayer died. This expression does not supply machinery for taxation of income received by a legal representative after the expiry of the year in the course of which such person died. Commissioner of Income tax Bombay vs Amarchand Shroff, [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 699 and Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay vs Ellis C. Reid. I.L.R. , referred to. (iii) To assess tax on such receipts after the expiry of the year in the course of which the original owner died on the footing that it is the personal income of the legal representative is to charge tax not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 
473	The respondent Municipality passed a resolution under s.67(1) of the C.P. & Berar Municipal Act, 1922, for the purpose of levying an octroi duty which was published in the State Gazette along with the rules for assessment. Objections were invited to the said proposed tax, and only one objection was filed within time which was also rejected. The Government gave its sanction to the imposition of the tax and draft Rules by two Notifications. The appellants filed a petition challenging the legality of the imposition of the tax inter alia on the ground that the notifications were ultra vires. They contended that all steps necessary for the imposition of tax had not been taken and that objections raised within time by the respondent No. 1 were not considered on their merits and were rejected merely on the ground that there was only one objector; as this was one of the essential steps for the validity: of the imposition of tax it could not be said that section 67 of the Act had been complied with, therefore the imposition was invalid. Held, that where the Government Notification clearly was one which directed imposition of Octroi Tax it fell within subs. ( 7) of section 67 of the Act and having been once notified in the Gazette sub section (8) of section 67 of the Act came into operation and the issue of the notification was conclusive evidence of the Tax having been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and it could not be challenged on the ground that all necessary steps had Rot been taken. 
6688	The original occupant of the suit godowns had on 1.10.1963 granted to the appellant a licence in respect of the premises and subsequently by a deed of assignment dated 13.8.1966 assigned all its rights, title and interest in the premises in favour of the appellant. The appellant had in the meantime by agreement dated 27.3.1964 permitted the second respondent to store goods in the premises. The appellant thereafter requested the Corporation to recognise it as the principal occupant of the premises by means of a formal agreement. This request was at first rejected by the Corporation on the ground that the second respondent, had been already in occupation of the premises. Subsequently the Corporation examined the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 27.3.1964 and after satisfying itself the Corporation transferred the occupancy right to the appellant on the appellant executing a formal agreement dated 17.6.1967. A notice dated 25.7.1969 terminating tenancy in terms of the agreement dated 17.6.1969 was served on the appellant. This was followed by an enquiry under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 which resulted in the order of eviction dated 6.1.1971, the appellant being the principal tenant and the second respondent as a sub tenant. The enquiry officer, acting as a delegate in terms of section 68 and exercising the power of Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, the first respondent under section 195B, ordered eviction of the appellant on the ground of sub letting the premises. The enquiry officer, on inspection, found that the second respondent was in occupation of the premises as a sub lessee that the appellant 830 had sub let the premises contrary to the terms of the conditions of occupation and had thus become an unauthorised occupant liable to be evicted from the premises in terms of section 105B, and passed an order of eviction against the appellant. This order was, on appeal, set aside by the appellate officer, on appreciation of the evidence and the terms of the agreements, the appellate officer held that the agreement dated 27.3.1964, approved and recorded the assignment and transfer of the right, title and interest of the original occupant to the appellant, and recognised the appellant as the principal occupant, and that the Corporation was at all material times aware of the appellant 's relationship with the second respondent and the occupation of the premises by the second respondent under the appellant. The eviction of the appellant solely on the ground of sub letting was therefore unwarranted. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution held that the appellate officer was wrong in saying that the circumstances had not altered so as to warrant an order of eviction on the ground of sub lease, and that the lease in favour of the appellant had been duly determined by the Corporation in terms of the contract, and the appellant having thus become an unauthorised" occupant was as such liable to be evicted under clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 105B. The High Court accordingly set aside the order made by the appellate officer under section 105B and restored the order of eviction made under section 105B by the Enquiry Officer. In the appeal to this Court it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that persons in occupation of premises under authority are not liable to be evicted otherwise than on any one of the statutorily specified grounds	 and that the application of clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 105B	 is confined to persons in unauthorised occupation	 and that the appellate officer having found that the Corporation when it entered into an agreement of occupation with the appellant on 17.6.1967 fully aware of the terms and conditions under which the second respondent was in occupation of the premises under the appellant	 the High Court was not justified in upholding the eviction of the appellant on the very same ground. On behalf of the respondent No. 1 Corporation it was submitted that in view of the finding that the sub lease granted or renewed by the appellant was contrary to clauses (6) and (2) of the agreement dated 17.6.1967 the appellant has	 after the expiry of the period stipulated in 831 the notice dated 25.7.1969	 become an unauthorised occupant	 and is liable to be evicted in terms of clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 105B. On the question: whether it is open to the Corporation to have recourse to clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 105B to order eviction of the appellant as an unauthorised occupant	 and whether clause (b) is attracted where eviction is sought to be made by determination of authority otherwise than in terms of the statute. Allowing the appeal	 the Court	 HELD: 1. Section 105A to section 105H of Chapter VA were inserted in the Act in 1961 to provide for speedy eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of Corporation premises. (839C) Section 105A(d) defines 'unauthorised occupation '. This definition shows that occupation of Corporation premises without authority for such occupation is an unauthorised occupation. Such occupation includes continuance in occupation by a person after the authority under which he occupied the premises has "expired" or it has been "duly determined". the definition thus includes not only a trespasser whose initial and continued occupation has never been under any valid authority	 but it also includes in equal measure a person whose occupation at its commencement was under authority	 but such authority has since expired	 or	 has been duly determined Which means validly determined. The expiry of authority to occupy occurs by reason of the terms or conditions of occupation. On the other hand	 the determination of authority to occupy to be due or valid must be founded on one of the grounds specified by the statute. Any order of eviction on the ground of either "expiry" or due determination" has to be made in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the statute. [839D H] 3. Clause (a) of sub section (1) of section 105B contains various grounds upon which a person is liable to be evicted. Clause (b) says that unauthorised occupation itself is a ground for eviction. Sub section (2) speaks of show cause notice before an order of eviction by notice is made under sub section (1). Sub section (3) has conferred sufficient power on the Commissioner to enforce an order of eviction made by him under sub section (1). For the purpose of holding an enquiry under the Act	 the Commissioner is invested with all the powers of a Civil Court (Section 105E) An appeal lies from every order of the Commissioner 832 under section 105B or section 105C to the appellate officer	 namely the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court of Bombay (section 105F)	 whose orders are final and not liable to be "called in question in any original suit	 application or execution proceeding" (Section 105G). [841E G] 4. The satisfaction of the Commissioner	 which is the condition precedent to the exercise of power of eviction by the summary procedure prescribed by the Act	 may be in respect of any of the circumstances falling under clauses (a)	 (b) or (c) of sub section (1) of section 105B. Clause (a) contemplates eviction of any person on any one of the grounds mentioned in sub clauses (i) to (iv) thereof. These grounds relate only to a person in authorised occupation of Corporation premises. They have no application to a trespasser. [841H 842B] 5. Likewise	 clause (c) presumably applies to authorised occupation of Corporation premises	 which the Commissioner is empowered to terminate by ordering eviction of the occupant otherwise than on any of the grounds specified under clause (a)	 provided the Commissioner is satisfied that the premises in question are required by the Corporation in the public interest. All that the Commissioner has to satisfy himself in a case falling under clause (c) is as regards the public interest requiring eviction. Construction of parks	 playgrounds	 hospitals	 colleges	 markets	 destitute homes and the like will indeed qualify for invoking the Commissioner 's power under clause (c). [842C] 6. Clause (b) is a powerful weapon for eviction of an unauthorised occupant. This clause is applicable equally to a trespasser as it is to a person whose occupation has ceased to be an authorised occupation by reason of expiry of authority in terms thereof or due determination of authority under clause (a) or clause (c) of sub section (1) of section 105B. [842D] 7. If a person is in occupation without authority	 as in the case of a trespasser	 or if the authority under which a person has been in occupation has expired in terms thereof and he continues to remain in occupation of the premises	 he will be liable to be evicted on the ground mentioned in clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 105B	 but in accordance with the procedure laid down in that section and on the satisfaction of the Commissioner	 expressed by an order	 as to the lack or expiry of authority. [842E F] 8. Sub letting as such	 without more	 is not a ground for eviction 833 under clause (a) (ii). What attracts eviction in terms of that provision is sub letting which is contrary to the terms or conditions of occupation. [843C] In the instant case	 the appellate officer has found that the occupation of the premises by the second respondent under the appellant was well known to the Corporation; the terms and conditions of that occupation were closely scrutinised by the Corporation before recognising the transfer of rights and interest from the previous principal occupant to the appellant; and	 it was on that basis and with that knowledge that the Corporation authorised the occupation of the premises by the appellant in terms of the agreement dated 17.6.1967. In such circumstances	 whatever right of occupation which the second respondent enjoyed under the appellant must be deemed to have been incorporated as a term of the authority granted by the Corporation in favour of the appellant. The appellate officer has categorically found that there was no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the circumstances in which the premises had been occupied by the second respondent had in any manner	 or at any time	 altered so as to affect the terms or conditions under which the appellant was recognised as the principal occupant. The Corporation is	 accordingly on the facts found	 estopped from having recourse to the ground falling under clause (a) (ii) of sub section (1) of section 105B. [843D G] 9. In proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution	 the high Court was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact rendered against the Corporation by the appellate officer. [843H 844A]