Summarize the following court judgment. eal No. II of 1949. Appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Allaha bad High Court (Harish Chandra J.) dated 11th November	 1949	 in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 960 of 1949. The facts of the case and the arguments of counsel are set out fully in the judgment. Alladi Krishnaswami Iyer (Alladi Kuppuswami with him) for the appellant. M.C. Setalvad	 Attorney General for India (V. N. Sethi	 with him) for the respondent. May 5. The judgment of Kania C.J. and Patanjali Sastri J. was delivered by PATANJALI SASTRI J. This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court at Allahabad dismiss ing an application under sections 491 and 561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for release of the appellant who was arrested in pursuance of an extradition warrant issued by the Regional Commissioner of the United State of Rajasthan who is the principal officer representing the Crown in the territory of that State. The appellant who is a member of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service was appointed in 1948 to serve what was then known as the Tonk State in various capacities	 and during such service he is alleged to have helped the Nawab in obtaining the sanction of the Government of India to the payment of Rs. 14 lakhs to the Nawab out of the State Treasury for the discharge of his debts	 and to have induced the Nawab by threats and deception to pay the appellant	 in return for such help	 sums totalling Rs. 3 lakhs on various dates. On these allegations the appellant is charged with having committed offences under section 383 (Extortion) and 575 section 420 (Cheating) of the Indian Penal Code which are extraditable offences under the (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The warrant was issued under section 7 of the Act to the District Magis trate	 Nainital	 where the appellant was residing after reverting to the service of the Uttar Pradesh Government	 to arrest and deliver him up to the District Magistrate of Tonk. The appellant 's case is that the sum of Rs. 3 lakhs was paid to him by the Nawab to be kept in safe deposit in a bank for the Nawab 's use in Delhi	 that no offence was committed and that the amount was returned when demanded by the authorities of the Tonk State. The warrant was issued mala fide on account of enmity. Various technical objections were also raised to the validity of the warrant and to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Nainital to take cogni sance of the matter and arrest the appellant. The High Court overruled all the objections and dismissed the application for the release of the appellant. On behalf of the appellant Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar contended that section 7 of the Act under which the warrant purports to have been issued had no application to the case and that the entire proceedings before the Magistrate were illegal and without jurisdiction and should be quashed. Learned counsel	 relying on section 18 of the Act which provides that nothing in Chapter III (which contains section 7) shall "derogate from the provisions of any treaty for the extradition of offenders	 submitted that the treaty entered into between the British Government and the Tonk State on the 28th January, 1869, although declared by section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, to have lapsed as from the 15th August, 1947, was continued in force by the Stand still Agreement" entered into on the 8th August	 1947	 that that treaty exclusively governed all matters relating to extradition between the two States	 and that	 inasmuch as it did not cover the offences now charged against the appel lant	 no extradition of the appellant could be demanded or ordered. 576 The Attorney General appearing for the Government ad vanced three lines of argument in answer to that contention. In the first place	 the standstill agreement entered into with the various Indian States were purely temporary ar rangements designed to maintain the status quo ante in respect of certain administrative matters of common concern pending the accession of those States to the Dominion of India	 and they were superseded by the Instruments of Acces sion executed by the Rulers of those States. Tonk having acceded to the Dominion on the 16th August	 1947	 the stand still agreement relied on by the appellant must be taken to have lapsed as from that date. Secondly	 the treaty was no longer subsisting and its execution became impossible	 as the Tonk State ceased to exist politically and such sover eignty as it possessed was extinguished	 when it covenanted with certain other States	 with the concurrence of the Indian Government "to unite and integrate their territories in one State	 with a common executive	 legislature and judiciary	 by the name of the United State of Rajasthan	 the last of such covenants, which superseded the earlier ones, having been entered into on the 30th March, 1949. Lastly, even assuming that the treaty was still in operation as a binding executory contract, its provisions were in no way derogated from by the application of section 7 of the Act to the present case, and the extradition warrant issued under that section and the arrest made in pursuance thereof were legal and valid and could not be called in question under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As we are clearly of opinion that the appellant 's contention must fail on this last ground, we consider it unnecessary to pronounce on the other points raised by the AttorneyGeneral especially as the issues involved are not purely legal but partake also of a political character, and we have not had the views of the Governments concerned on those points. It was not disputed before us that the present case would fall within section 7 of the Act, all the requirements thereof being satisfied, if only the applicability of 577 the section was not excluded, under section 18, by reason of the Extradition Treaty of 1869, assuming that it still subsists. The question accordingly arises whether extradi tion under section 7 for an offence which is not extradita ble under the treaty is, in any sense, a derogation from the provisions of the treaty, which provides for the extradition of offenders for certain specified offences therein called heinous offences	 committed in the respective territories of the high contracting parties. Under article 1 the Gov ernment of the Tonk State undertakes to extradite any per son, whether a British or a foreign subject, who commits a heinous offence in British territory. A reciprocal obliga tion is cast by article 2 on the British Government to extradite a subject of Tonk committing such an offence within the limits of that State. Article 3 provides, inter alia, that any person other than a Tonk subject committing a heinous offence within the limits of the Tonk State and seeking asylum in British territory shall be apprehended and the case investigated by such Court as the British Govern ment may direct. Article 4 prescribes the procedure to be adopted and the conditions to be fulfilled before extradi tion could be had, and article 5 enumerates the offences which are to be deemed as coming within the category of heinous offences" which	 however	 do not include the of fences charged against the appellant. The argument on behalf of appellant was put thus: The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is applicable	 as pointed out by McNair on The Law of Treaties	 (1938 pp. 203	 204)	 to the interpretation of treaties. According to that rule the treaty in question should be read as allowing extradition only for the specified offences and for no others	 that is to say	 as implying a prohibition of extra dition by either State for any other offence than those enumerated in article 5. Further	 while the treaty entitled each of the high contracting parties to demand extradition on a reciprocal basis	 an unilateral undertaking by the Indian Government to grant extradition for an offence for which it could not claim extradition under the treaty 578 violates the principle of reciprocity which is the recog nised basis of all international compacts for extradition. Such an arrangement places the State of Tonk in a more advantageous position which was not contemplated by the framers of the treaty. And where	 as here	 the person whose surrender is demanded is an Indian subject who is not liable to be extradited under the treaty	 his surrender under section 7 trenches upon the liberty of the subject. In so far	 therefore	 as that section authorises extradition of a person	 especially when he is an Indian subject	 for an offence which is not extraditable under the treaty	 it derogates from the provisions of the treaty within the meaning of section 18	 and its application to the present case is thereby excluded. The argument proceeds on a miscon ception and cannot be accepted. No doubt the enumeration of "heinous offences" in arti cle 5 of the treaty is exhaustive in the sense that the high contracting parties are not entitled	 under the treaty	 to claim extradition of criminals in respect of other offences. But we cannot agree that such of enumeration implies a prohibition against either those parties providing by its own municipal laws for the surrender of criminals for other offences not covered by the treaty. It is difficult to imagine why the contracting States should place such a fetter on their respective legislatures in advance not only in regard to their subjects but also in regard to alien offenders	 for	 if such prohibition is at all to be implied	 it should cover both. As pointed out in Wheaton 's Interna tional Law	 there is no universally recognised practice that there can be no extradition except under a treaty	 for some countries grant extradition without a. treaty: (Fourth Edition	 sections 116 (a) to (d)	 pp. 186 189). No doubt the constitutional doctrine in England is that the Crown makes treaties with foreign States for extradition of criminals but those treaties can only be carried into effect by Act of Parliament: (Ibid section 116 (b)	 p. 187). Accordingly	 the extradition Acts are made applicable by an Order in Council in the case of each State which enters into an extradition treaty 579 with the Crown	 and they are made applicable only so far as they can be applied consistently with the terms and condi tions contained in the treaty. Under such a system where the high contracting parties expressly provide that their own subjects shall not be delivered up	 as in the case of the treaty between England and Switzerland	 the power to arrest and surrender does not exist: Regina vs Wilson(1). This	 it was observed by Cockburn C.J. in that case	 was a "serious blot" on the British system of extradition	 and the Royal Commission on Extradition	 of which he was the chairman	 recommended in their report that "reciprocity in this matter should no longer be insisted upon whether the criminal be a British subject or not. If he has broken the laws of a foreign country his liability to be tried by them ought not to depend upon his nationality . The convenience of trying crimes in the country where they were committed is obvious. It is very much easier to transport the criminal to the place of his offence than to carry all the witnesses and proofs to some other country where the trial is to be held:" (Wheaton	 section 120 (a)	 pp. 197	 198). Evidently	 similar considerations led to the passing of the Act by the Indian Legislature providing for the surrender of criminals	 including Indian subjects	 for a wide variety of offences	 with power to the Governor General in Council to add to the list by notification in the Gazette generally for all States or specially for any one or more States. This statutory authority to surrender cannot of course enlarge the obliga tion of the other party where an extradition treaty has been entered into	 and this is made clear by section 18. But it is equally clear that the Act does not derogate from any such treaty when it authorises the Indian Government to grant extradition for some additional offences	 thereby enlarging	 not curtailing	 the power of the other party to claim surrender of criminals. Nor does the Act derogate	 in the true sense of the term	 from the position of an Indian subject under the treaty of 1869. That treaty created no right in the subjects of either (1) 580 State any more than in fugitive aliens not to be extradited for other than "heinous offences. " It is noteworthy that even in Wilson 's case	 (ubi supra) where there was an excep tion in the treaty in favour of the subjects of the con tracting States	 the decision was based not on the ground that the treaty by itself conferred any right or privilege on English subjects not to be surrendered but on the ground that the Order in Council applying the Extradition Act	 1870	 to Switzerland limited its operation	 consistently with the terms of the treaty	 to persons other than English subjects. It is	 therefore	 not correct to say that	 by providing for extradition for additional offences	 the Act derogates from the rights of Indian citizens under the treaty or from the provisions of the treaty. We are accord ingly of opinion that the arrest and surrender of the appel lant under section 7 of the Act is not rendered unlawful by anything contained in the treaty of 1869	 assuming that it still subsists. The appeal fails and is dismissed. FAZL ALI J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgments prepared by my brothers Sastri and Mukherjea	 who have given different reasons for arriving at the same con clusion. As I am inclined to agree with the line of reason ing in both the judgments	 I concur in the order that this appeal should be dismissed. MAHAJAN J. I agree with the judgment going to be deliv ered by my brother Mukherjea. For the reasons given therein this appeal should be dismissed. MUKERJEA J. This appeal	 which has come up before us on special leave granted by this Court	 is directed against a judgment of Harish Chandra J. of the Allahabad High Court dated 11th of November	 1949	 by which the learned Judge dismissed an application of the appellant under sections 491 and 561 A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The facts which are material for purposes of this appeal are not in controversy and may be shortly stated as follows: The appellant Dr. Ram Babu 581 Saksena	 who is a resident of the United Provinces	 was a member of the Executive Civil Service in that province	 and during his official career	 extending over SO years	 held various important posts	 both in and outside that province. In January	 1948	 he was appointed Administrator of the Tonk State	 where a dispute was going on at that time regarding succession to the rulership of the State between two rival claimants. On 11th of February	 1948	 the dispute was set tled and Ismail Ali Khan was recognised as the Nawab or the Ruling Prince of the State and appellant was then appointed Dewan and Vice President of the State Council	 of which the Nawab was the President. In April	 1948	 the Tonk State	 together with several other States in Rajputana	 integrated and formed together the United State of Rajasthan and the appellant thereupon became the Chief Executive Officer of the Rajasthan Government. Towards the end of July	 1948	 he got another special post under the Rajasthan Government	 but soon afterwards	 he took leave and proceeded to Naini Tal	 where he has been residing since then. On 23rd May	 1949	 he was arrested at Naini Tal on the strength of a warrant issued under section 7 of the 	 by Shri V.K.B. Pillai	 Regional Commissioner and Political Agent of the United State of Rajasthan. The warrant	 which is dated the 8th of May	 1949	 was addressed to the District Magistrate of Naini Tal and directed the arrest of Dr. Saksena and his removal to Rajasthan	 to be delivered to the District Magistrate of Tonk for enquiry into certain of fences against the laws of that State which he was alleged to have committed. After his arrest	 the appellant was released on bail in terms of the warrant itself and was directed to be present before the District Magistrate of Tonk on the 7th of June	 1949. The allegations against the appellant in substance are	 that while he was 'the Dewan of the Tonk State and Vice President of the State Council	 the Nawab	 being in urgent need of money to meet his personal demands	 requested Dr. Saksena to help him in obtaining for his own use 582 a sum of Rs. 14 lakhs from the State Treasury. Dr. Saksena promised his assistance on condition that the Nawab would give him a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs out of this amount as his share. By dint of his efforts	 the appellant succeeded in inducing the State Ministry to pay the full amount of Rs. 14 lakhs to the Nawab in different instalments. The first instalment	 amounting to over Rs. 21/2 lakhs was paid on 31st March	 1948	 and a further sum of Rs. 5 lakhs was paid on 21st of April following. On that date	 it is said	 the Nawab paid to Dr. Saksena a sum of Rs. 1	50	000 which was only half of the promised amount. A few days later	 Dr. Saksena pressed for payment of the balance and held out threats to the Nawab that in case the money was not paid	 the latter would find himself in serious difficulties as his position as a Ruling Prince of the State was not at all secure and there were grave charges against him. As a result of these threats and misrepresentations	 the Nawab was induced to pay to the appellant the balance of Rs. 1	50	000 in two instalments. The matter became known to the Regional Commissioner some time in November 1948 and he called Dr. Saksena for an interview and succeeded in getting back from him the entire sum of Rs. 3 lakhs which the Nawab had paid. On the basis of these facts	 Dr. Saksena has been accused of having committed offences under sections 383 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. On 3rd June	 1949	 Dr. Saksena filed an application in the High Court of Allahabad under sections 491 and 561 A of the Criminal Procedure Code	 complaining of illegal and unauthorised detention under the warrant of the Regional Commissioner of Rajputana dated the 8th of May	 1949. The legality of the warrant and of arrest thereunder was at tacked on a number of grounds. It was contended	 first of all	 that the applicant was falsely implicated by the Nawab on account of enmity which grew up between them for various reasons and the allegations made were totally false. It was next said that the District Magistrate of Naini Tal could not take cognizance of the matter without the previous 583 sanction of the U.P. Government under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that the sanction of the Rajpra mukh of the United State of Rajasthan was also necessary before any proceeding could be initiated. The third and the main contention was that the alleged offences being said to have been committed in the State of Tonk	 the case would be governed by the provisions of the Extradition Treaty entered into between the British Government and the Tonk State on 28th of January	 1869	 and as neither "extortion" nor "cheating" was mentioned in the list of offences for which extradition was permissible under that Treaty	 the warrant of arrest issued under section 7 of the Extradition Act was wholly illegal and unauthorised. It is admitted that these offences are specified in the Schedule to the Indian Extra dition Act of 1903	 but it was said that section 18 of the Extradition Act expressly made the Act inapplicable when its provisions "derogated" from those of a Treaty. Lastly	 it was urged that the extradition warrant was a mala fide step taken by the Nawab of Tonk with the help of his friend the Regional Commissioner of Rajasthan for ulterior purposes and that it constituted a fraud upon the Statute and an abuse of the processes of law. The application was heard by Harish Chandra	 J. sitting singly	 and by a judgment dated 11th of November	 1949	 which fully and elaborately dis cussed the different points raised in the case	 the learned Judge rejected the application of the petitioner. No cer tificate was given by the High Court under section 205 (1) of the Government of India Act	 1935	 and the present appeal has been brought to this Court on the strength of special leave granted by it. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar	 who appeared in support of the appeal	 has very properly not pressed before us all the points that were canvassed on behalf of his client in the Court below. His contention	 in substance	 is that the rights of extradition in the present case should be regulat ed exclusively by the provisions of the Extradition Treaty that was entered into between the Tonk State and the British Government 584 on 28th of January	. 1869	 and was subsequently modified by a supplementary 	Treaty in the year 1887. This Treaty	 it is argued	 has not been abrogated or rendered ineffective in any way by reason of the merger of the Tonk State in the United State of Rajasthan	 and the decision of the High Court on this point is erroneous. According to the provi sions of this Treaty	 no extradition is permissible in respect to offences of "extortion" and "cheating" with which the appellant is charged and the warrant of arrest issued by the Political Agent is consequently illegal and ultra vires. It is conceded by Sir Alladi that if section 7 of the 	 is held to be applica ble to the facts of the present case	 the warrant of arrest issued by the Political Agent of Rajasthan could not be assailed as invalid or inoperative; but his contention is that section 18 of the Extradition Act makes an express reservation in cases where Treaty rights exist and to the extent that the provisions of Chapter III of the Extradition Act derogate from those of any Treaty relating to extradi tion of offenders	 the Treaty is entitled to prevail. To appreciate the merits of this contention	 it may be convenient to refer at this stage to a few sections of the of 1903 as well as to the material provisions of the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk State and the British Government which have a bearing upon the present question. Chapter 111 of the deals with surrender of fugitive criminals in case of States other than foreign States and section 7	 with which this chapter opens	 provides as follows: "(1) Where an extradition offence has been committed or is supposed to have been committed by a person	 not being a European British subject	 in the territories of any State not being a foreign State	 and such person escapes into or is in British India	 and the Political Agent in or 1or such State issues a warrant	 addressed to the District Magis trate of any district in which such person is believed to be	 (or if such person is believed to be in any Presidency town 585 to the Chief Presidency Magistrate of such town)	 for his arrest and delivery at a place and to a person or authority indicated in the warrant such Magistrate shall act in pursu ance of such warrant and may give directions accordingly. " * * * * The expression "extradition offence" has been defined in section 2 (b) and means "any such offence as is described in the First Schedule to the Act. " The First Schedule gives a catalogue of offences described with reference to specific sections of the Indian Penal Code and it includes offences punishable under sections 383 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code prima facie	 it seems therefore that all the conditions laid down in section 7 of the Extradition Act are fulfilled in the present case. the warrant has been issued by the Political Agent of a State which is not a "foreign State" as defined by the Act and the offences with which the appellant is charged are "extradition offences" as specified in Sched ule i. Sir Alladi 's contention	 as stated above	 is that section 7	 which is in Chapter III of the Extradition Act	 is controlled by section 18 which lays down that "nothing in this chapter shall derogate from the provisions of any treaty for the extradition of offenders	 and the procedure provided by any such treaty shall be followed in any case to which it applies	 and the provisions of this Act shall be modified accordingly. " Turning now to the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk State and the British Government	 it will be seen that the First Article of the Treaty provides for extradition	 where a British subject or a foreign subject commits a "heinous" offence in British territory and seeks shelter within the limits of the Tonk State. The Second Article deals with an offender who is a subject of the Tonk State and having committed a "heinous" offence within the State seeks asylum in British territory; while the Third Article relates to a person other than a Tonk subject who commits a "heinous" offence within the limits of the Tonk State and seeks asylum in British territory. The conditions 586 under which extradition could be had in all such cases and the procedure to be followed are laid down in article 4. Article 5 then gives a list of offences which would be deemed as coming within the category of "heinous" offences. It is not disputed that neither "cheating" nor "extortion" are mentioned in this list. The whole controversy	 there fore	 centers round the point as to whether in view of the provisions of the Extradition Treaty mentioned above	 extra dition could legally be made or demanded in respect of offences coming under sections 383 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code which are mentioned in the list of offences specified in Schedule I to the Extradition Act but do not find a place in article 5 of the Treaty. Could it be said that the provisions of the Extradition Act	 derogate in this respect from the Treaty between the Tonk State and the British Government and consequently	 the terms of the Treaty would override the statute as indicated in section 18 of the Extradition Act ? The learned Attorney General	 who appeared for the Government of India	 put forward a two fold argument in reply to the contention of Sir Alladi. He argued in the first place	 that section 18 of the has no application to the present case inasmuch as the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk State and the British Government	 upon which the appellant relies	 does not subsist and cannot be enforced	 at the present day. The other contention is that even if the Treaty still subsists	 there is nothing in its terms which prohibits extradition for offences other than those described as heinous offences in article 5. It is argued that "to derogate" means "to detract" or "to take away" and the Schedule to the Extradi tion Act by mentioning certain offences	 which do not occur in the list of "heinous offences" as given in the Treaty	 cannot be said to have derogated from the terms of the Treaty. Both these points were fully argued on both sides and it is clear that if on either of these points a decision is reached adverse to the appellant	 the appeal is bound to fail. 587 So far as the first point is concerned	 Mr. Setalvad has drawn our attention to various political changes that have come over the Tonk State since the conclusion of the Extra dition Treaty in 1869. In 1869 Tonk was one of the Native States in India with a "separate" political existence of its own and the Treaty that was entered into in that year was meant to regulate exclusively the rights and obligations in matters of extradition of offenders as between the Tonk State on the one hand and the British Government on the other. In 1887 there was a modification of the Treaty but it is not disputed that the modification made certain alter ations in the procedure which are not material for our present purpose. The major political change with regard to all Indian States which vitally affected their existing Treaties with the British Government occurred on the 15th of August	 1947	 when India became an Independent Dominion. Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act provided inter alia that: "(1) As from the appointed day (b) The suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses	 and with it	 all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States . . As a result of this provision	 the Extradition Treaty between Tonk and the British Government must be deemed to have lapsed with effect from the 15th of August	 1947. If matters stood there	 obviously there would be nothing left upon which section 18 of the could possibly operate. There was	 however	 a Standstill Agreement entered into by the Indian Dominion with the Indian States	 the first article of which runs as follows: "1. (1) Until new agreements in this behalf are made	 all agreements and administrative arrangements as to matters of common concern now existing between the Crown and any Indian State shall	 in so far as may be appropriate	 contin ue as between the Dominion of 588 India or	 as the case may be	 the part thereof	 and the State. (2) In particular	 and without derogation from the generality of sub clause (1) of this clause the matters referred to above shall include the matters specified in the Schedule to this agreement. " The Schedule does mention "extradition" as one of the matters to which the Standstill Agreement is applicable. This was certainly intended to be a temporary arrangement and Mr. Setalvad argues that as there was no Treaty in the proper sense of the term but only a substitute for it in the shape of a temporary arrangement	 section 18 of the Extradition Act which expressly mentions a Treaty cannot be applicable. While conceding that prima facie there is force in the conten tion	 I think that this would be taking a too narrow view of the matter and I should assume for the purposes of this case that under the Standstill Agreement the provisions of the Treaty of 1869 still continued to regulate matters of extradition of criminals as between the Tonk State on the one hand and the Indian Dominion on the other till any new agreement was arrived at between them. Though the Standstill Agreement was to take effect after the establishment of the Indian Dominion	 the In strument was actually signed on 8th of August	 1947. On the 16th of August	 1947	 Tonk acceded to the Dominion of India and one of the terms in the Instrument of Acces sion is that the "Ruler accepts the position that with regard to matters specified in the Schedule to the Instrument	 the Dominion Legislature would be entitled to make laws for the State." "Extradition including the surrender of criminals and accused persons to parts of His Majesty 's Dominion outside India" is one of the matters specified in the Schedule. Thus the State gave up and surrendered in favour of the Dominion Legislature its right	 to legislate in respect to extradition after the date of accession. Whether the existing Extradition Treaty was ipso facto abrogated by this Instrument of Accession is not so clear. Obviously	 the Indian Dominion 589 could pass any legislation it liked regarding matters of extradition between the Tonk State	 and any other State	 either Indian or Foreign. No such law was	 however	 passed by the Indian Legislature except that very recently under an Adaptation Order the Extradition Act of 1903 has been made applicable to States under Group B in the Indian Constitution in which Rajasthan is included. It is to be noted that the Extradition Act itself	 which is made applicable to the United State of Rajasthan	 contains an express provision in section 18 which safeguards exist ing treaty rights. It is somewhat unusual that an Extradi tion Treaty would be subsisting even after the State had acceded to India but we have no materials before us upon which we could definitely hold that the Treaty has been expressly superseded or abrogated by the Indian Legislature. The next important thing is that in April	 1948	 there was a Covenant entered into by the Rulers of nine States including Tonk	 by which it was agreed by and between the covenanting parties that the territories of these nine States should be integrated into one State by the name of the United State of Rajasthan. This was done with the concurrence of the Dominion of India. Later on	 on 12th of May	 1949	 Mewar also became a party to this Covenant and the United State of Rajasthan was reconstituted by the integration of the territories of all the ten States. By the Covenant of Merger	 the Covenanting States agreed to unite and integrate their territories in one State known as the United State of Rajasthan and to have a common executive	 legislature and judiciary. The Rulers of all the States became members of the Council of Rulers and the President was designated as the Raj Pramukh of the United State. Article VI of the Covenant of Merger runs as follows: "(1) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall	 as soon as practicable and in any event not later than the first day of May	 1948	 make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh; and thereupon 590 (a) all rights	 authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain or are incidental to the Govern ment of the Covenanting State shall vest in the United State and shall hereafter be exercisable only as provided by this Covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder; (b) all duties and obligations of the Ruler pertain ing or incidental to the Government of the Covenanting State shall devolve on the United State and shall be discharged by it; and (c) all the assets and liabilities of the Covenanting State shall be the assets and liabilities of the United State. " The question now is how far was the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk State and the British Government affected by reason of the merger of the State into the United State of Rajasthan. When a State relinquishes its life as such through incorporation into or absorption by another State either voluntarily or as a result of conquest or annexation	 the general opinion of International Jurists is that the treaties of the former are automatically termi nated. The result is said to be produced by reason of com plete loss of personality consequent on extinction of State life(1). The cases discussed in this connection are gener ally cases where independent States have ceased to be such through constrained or voluntary absorption by another with attendant extinction of the former 's treaties with other States. Thus the forceable incorporation of Hanover into the Prussian Kingdom destroyed the previous treaties of Hanover. The admission of Texas into the United States of America by joint resolution extinguished the Treaties of the Independent Republic of Texas(2). The position is the same when Korea merged into Japan. According to Oppenheim	 whose opinion has been relied upon	 by Sir Alladi	 no succession of rights and duties ordinarily takes place in such cases	 and as political and personal treaties presuppose the exist ence of a contracting State	 (1) Vide Hyde on International Law	 Vol. III	 p. 1529. (2) Vide Hyde on International Law	 Vol. II1	 p. 1531	 591 they are altogether extinguished. It is a debatable point whether succession takes place in cases of treaties relating to commerce or extradition but here again the majority of writers are of opinion that they do not survive merger or annexation(1). The remarks quoted above do not	 however	 seem quite appropriate to a case of the present description. Here there was no absorption of one State by another which would put an end to the State life of the former and extinguish its personality. What happened here was that several States voluntarily united together and integrated their territories so as to form a larger and composite State of which every one of the covenanting parties was a component part. There was to be one common executive	 legislature and judiciary and the Council of Rulers would consist of the Rulers of all the Covenanting States. It may not be said	 therefore	 that the Covenanting States lost their personality altogether and it is to be noted that for purposes of succession of Ruler ship and for counting votes on the strength of population and other purposes the Covenant of Merger recognises a quasi separation between the territories of the different States. But although such separation exists for some pur poses between one State territory and another	 it is clear that the inhabitants of all the different States became	 from the date of merger	 the subjects of the United State of Rajasthan and they could not be described as subjects of any particular State. There is no such thing as subject of the Tonk State existing at the present day and the Ruler of Tonk cannot independently and in his own right exercise any form of sovereignty or control over the Tonk territory. The Government	 which exercises sovereign powers	 is only one	 even though the different Rulers may have a voice in it. It seems to us that in those altered circumstances the Extradi tion Treaty of 1869 has become entirely incapable of execution. It is not possible for the Tonk State	 which is one of the contracting parties to act in accordance with the terms of the treaty	 for it has no longer any independent (1) Oppenheim on International Law	 Vol. I	 p. 152	 592 authority or sovereign rights over the Tonk territory and can neither make nor demand extradition. When as a result of amalgamation or merger	 a State loses its full and inde pendent power of action over the subject matter of a treaty previously concluded	 the treaty must necessarily lapse(1). It cannot be said that the sovereignty of the Tonk State in this respect is now vested in the United State of Rajasthan. The authority	 so far as extradition was concerned	 was already surrendered by the Tonk State in favour of the Dominion Government by the Instrument of Accession. But even assuming that these treaty rights could devolve upon the United State of Rajasthan by reason of article 6 of the Covenant of Merger	 the latter	 it seems to me	 could be totally incapable of giving effect to the terms of the treaty. As has been said already	 there could be no such thing as a subject of the Tonk State at the present moment and article 2 of the Treaty which provides for extra dition of Tonk subjects accused of having committed heinous offences within Tonk territory and seeking asylum elsewhere would be wholly infructuous. The United State of Rajasthan could not possibly demand extradition on the basis of this article	 and if reciprocity	 which is the essence of an Extradition Agreement	 is gone	 the Treaty must be deemed to be void and inoperative. The decision in Terlinden vs Ames (2) which was relied upon by Sir Alladi in course of his arguments	 rather forti fies the view that I have taken. The question there was whether an Extradition Treaty between Prussia and the United States of America	 which was entered into in 1852	 could be given effect to after the incorporation of Prussia into the German Empire. The question was answered in the affirmative. It was pointed out inter alia that the Constitution of the German Empire left sufficient independent power and sover eignty to the States composing the confederation to enable them to act upon these treaties and it was observed by Chief Justice Fuller	 who delivered the opinion of the Court	 that where sovereignty in respect (1) Vide Hyde on International Law	 Vol. p. 1535. (2) ; 593 to the execution of treaties is not extinguished and the power to execute remains unimpaired	 outstanding treaties cannot be regarded as void. This is the real criterion and as obviously the power of the Tonk State to execute the treaty is altogether gone after the Covenant of Merger	 the treaty cannot but be regarded as void. The other case cited by Sir Alladi	 viz.	 that of Lazard Brothers vs Midland Bank Ltd.(1) has absolutely no bearing on this point. It laid down the well accepted proposition of International Law that a change in the form of government of a contracting State does not put an end to its treaties. The treaty entered into by the Czarist Russia could be given effect to after the Revolution	 once the new government was recognised as a person in International Law. My conclusion	 therefore	 is that the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk State and the British Government in 1869 is not capable of being given effect to in the present day in view of the merger of the Tonk State in the United State of Rajasthan. As no treaty rights exist	 section 18 of the has no application and section 7 of the Act has been complied with	 there is no ground upon which we can interfere. In view of my decision on the first point	 the second point does not require determination and I refrain from expressing any opinion upon it. In the result	 the appeal fails and is dismissed. DAS J I substantially agree with the reasonings given in the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Mukher jea and concur in dismissing this application. Appeal dismissed.

In 1869 the British Government and the State of Tonk entered into a treaty which provided for the extradition of offenders in respect of certain offences specified therein called "heinous offences	 which did not include the of fences of cheating and extortion. In 1903 the Indian Extradition Act was passed which provided for extradition in respect of cheating and extortion also, but section 18 of the Act provided that nothing contained in the Act shall derogate from the provisions of any treaty for the extradition of offenders. " Under the Independence of India Act	 1947	 the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapsed and with it all treaties and agreements in force; but under a "standstill agreement	 between the Indian Dominion and the States (including Tonk) all agreements between His Majesty and the States were continued, including agreements in respect of extradition. Tonk acceded to the Dominion of India in 1947 and became a member State of the United State of Rajasthan. The appellant was a member of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service and his services were lent to the State of Tonk in 1948. After he had reverted to the Uttar Pradesh he was charged with the offences of cheating and extortion alleged to have been committed while he was in Tonk and was arrested under an extradition warrant issued under section 7 of the Extradition Act, 1903. He applied under es. 4=91 and 561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for his release, contending that in view of the provisions of section 18 of the Extradition Act and the Treaty of Extradition of 1869, his arrest was illegal: Held per KANIA O. J. and PATANJALI SASTRI J. (FAZL, ALI. J. concurring), Even assuming that the Extradition Treaty of 1869 subsisted after the merger of the Tonk State, by providing for extradition for additional offences the Extradition Act of 1903 did not derogate from the provisions of the Treaty of 5869 or the rights of Indian citizens thereunder, and the arrest and surrender of the appellant under section 7 of the Act was not, therefore, rendered unlawful by anything contained in the said Treaty. 574 Per MUKHERJEA J. (FAZL ALI, MAHAJAN and DAS JJ. concur ring). The Extradition Treaty of 1869 was not capable of being given effect to in view of the merger of the Tonk State in the United State of Rajasthan, and, as no enforce able treaty right existed, section 18 of the Extradition Act of 1903 had no application; and inasmuch as the conditions of section 7 of the said Act had been complied with, the warrant of arrest issued under section 7 of the Act was not illegal. 
1417	K, H and M filed four suits each against four sets of defendants in respect of different sets of plots under section 175 U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939. Since similar points were involved the twelve suits were tried together and were disposed of by a common judgment decreeing them. Twelve decrees were prepared and the defendants preferred twelve appeals to the Additional Commissioner. Three appeals by one set of the defendants B were dismissed for default and the remaining nine were dismissed on merits. Against the dismissal of the nine appeals on merits the three sets of defendants preferred nine second appeals before the Board of Revenue but they were dismissed as barred by res judicata on May 7, 1954. In November, 1954, the appellants filed petitions for special leave before the Supreme Court and on April 18, 1955, special leave was granted. In July 1954, the villages in Which the lands in suit were situate came under consolidation operations under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, and the operations were completed by the publication of a notification 218 under section 52 of the Act on October 17, 1953. The appellants did not file any objections before the consolidation authorities. The respondent contended that in view of the consolidation operations the appeals before the Supreme Court had become infructuous. Held, that the appeals had not become infructuous. There was nothing in the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, as it stood during the period the village in suit was under consolidation operations which could have in any way affected these appeals, during or after the consolidation operations. The subsequent Amending Acts did not affect the appeals as they were prospective in operation and applied only to cases where the consolidation operations were started after the Amending Acts had come into force. Held, further that the appeals before the Board of Revenue were not barred by resjudicata. It was essential for the bar of res judicata that the previous and judication must have been between the same parties. The three suits in which judgments had become final were against one B and not against any of the appellants . The matter in issue in those three suits was different from that in the other nine suits as each of the suits related to different plots. The common judgment was really twelve judgments in the twelve suits. Badri Narayan Singh vs Kamdeo Prasad Singh, (1962) 3. section C. R. 759 referred to. 
7066	The respondent was defendant in a suit. He engaged the appellant as an Advocate. The suit was compromised on 14.6.77 ordering that out of the amount lying with the Court receiver, plaintiff was to be paid a sum of Rs. 64,000 and the balance to be paid to the defendant respondent and possession of suit property to be handed over to the respondent. During the tendency of the suit the Court Receiver inducted a tenant in a suit property. The tenant filed a suit praying for an interim injunction restraining the court receiver from handing over possession to the respondent. Tenant 's suit was continued. After the compromise decree was passed on 14.6.77, the appellant withdrew a total amount of Rs. 50,379 from the Court receiver. Out of the amount, appellant paid only Rs. 18,000 to the respondent. On 9.1.81 the respondent filed a complaint against the appellant before the Bar Council of India. On receiving a notice, the appellant submitted reply. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council rejected certain receipts produced to evidence payment to the respondent and also the plea of the appellant that the account books were lost. The Committee suspended the appellant for a period of two years and further directed to pay a sum of Rs. 500 to the respondent. Before this Court the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India was challenged contending that the Committee did not properly appreciate the evidence and that it was incorrect to hold that the 1007 receipt dated 8.8.77 was a suspicious document merely because the account books were not produced. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD : 1.01. Advocacy is not a craft but a calling , a profession wherein devotion to duty constitutes the hall mark. Sincerity of performance and the earnestness of endeavor are the two wings that will bare aloft the advocate to the tower of success. Given these virtues other qualifications will follow of their own account. This is the reason why legal profession is regarded to be a noble one. But it cannot be allowed to become a sorriest of trades. Therefore. an exacting standard is what is expected of an advocate. [1010 C D, 1011 C] 1.02. The members of the noble profession must set an example of conduct worthy of emulation. If any of them falls from the high expectations, the punishment has to be commensurate with the degree and gravity of the misconduct. [1012 E] Sharasawood on legal profession, Harry R. Blythe cited if? , referred to. M. Veerabhadra Rao vs Tek Chand, [1984] Supp. SCC 571, referred to.[1011 C] 2.01. The appellant had withdrawn the money from the Court Receiver. None of the correspondence addressed to the respondent mentioned about the receipt dated 8th of August, 1977. The plea taken by the appellant based on the receipt is clearly false. The statement of the appellant that the account books had been lost in transit cannot be believed. Under these circumstances this is a clear case wherein the misappropriation by the appellant has been fully established. [1012 F] 2.02. The appellant has been withdrawing the money over 14 years and lit has illegally retained the amount. Out of a sum of Rs. 50,379 which was admittedly withdrawn from the court receiver only Rs. 18,000 was paid on different occasions. Still a sum of Rs. 22,379 is due. [1012 H, 1013 A] 2.03. In view of the established finding of misappropriation the proper punishment will be the name of the Advocate must be struck off the rolls. [1013 B] 1008 2.04. When Section 38 of the Advocates Act says, 'deems fit	 it must be construed as to meet the ends of justice. The respondent should not be driven to a civil court for recovery of this amount even when the appellant has been found guilty. Therefore	 it is directed that there shall be a decree in favour of the respondent (complainant) for a sum of Rs. 22	379 together with interest at 9% per annum from the date of the complaint till the date of payment 11013 F G]