Summarize the following court judgment. Appeals Nos. 721 723 of 1962. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 1	 1961	 of the Patna High Court in Misc. Judicial Cases Nos. 1167	 1122 and 1235 of 1960. N. C. Chatterjee	 Rai Behari Singh and Udai Pratap Singh	for the appellants (in all the appeals). B. P. Singh	 N. P. Singh and I. N. Shroff	 for the respondent No. 1 (in all the appeals). C. K. Daphtary	 Attorney General	 N. section Bindra	 V. D.Mahajan and B. R. G. K. Achar	 for respondents Nos. 2 and 3. February 26	 1964. The short question which arises in these appeals by special leave is whether section 1(3) of the (No. 34 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act) is invalid. By their writ petitions filed before the Patna High Court	 the appellants who are the workmen of the three respondent concerns	 the Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd.	 the Kumardhubi Engineering Works Ltd.	 and Kumardhubi Fire Clay and Silica Works Ltd.	 respectively	 alleged that the impugned section has contravened article 14 of the Constitution	 and suffers from the vice of excessive delegation	 and as such is invalid. These employers were impleaded as respondent No. 1 respectively in the three writ petitions. The High Court has rejected the plea and the writ petitions filed by 915 the appellants have accordingly been dismissed. It is against this decision of the High Court that the appellants have come to this Court and have impleaded the three employers respectively. The three appeals proceed on similar facts and raise an identical question of law and have	 therefore	 been heard together. It appears that respondents No. 1 in all the three appeals are under the management of M/s. Bird.& Co. Ltd.	 through a General Manager	 and the appellants are their workmen. As such workmen	 the appellants were getting satisfactory medical benefits of a very high order free of any charge. Respondent No. 1 in each appeal maintained a wellfurnished hospital with provision for 60 permanent beds for the workmen	 their families and their dependents. The main grievance made by the appellants is that as a result of section 1(3) of the Act	 the appellants have now to be content with medical benefits of a less satisfactory nature. That is why they challenged the validity of the impugned section and contest the propriety and legality of the notification issued under it. To these writ petitions as well as to the appeals	 the Employees ' State Insurance Corporation and the Union of India have been impleaded as respondents 2 and 3 respectively. On the 22nd August	 1960	 respondent No. 3 issued a notification under section 1	 sub section (3) appointing the 28th August	 1960 as the date on which some provisions of the Act should come into force in certain areas of the State of Bihar. By this notification	 the area in which the appellants are working came within the scope of the Act. In pursuance of the said notification	 the Chief Executive Officer of respondent No. 1 informed the appellants on the 25th August	 1960 that the medical benefits including indoor and outdoor treatment upto the extent admissible under the Act will cease to be provided to insurable person 	 from the appointed day. A notice in that behalf was duly issued and published by the said Officer. Similar notices were issued indicating to the appellants that medical benefits would thereafter be governed by the relevant provisions of the Act and not by the arrangements which had been made 916 earlier by respondent No. 1 in that behalf. That	 in brief	 is the genesis of the present writ petitions and the nature of the dispute between the parties. The first point which Mr. Chatterjee has raised before us is that section 1(3) of the Act suffers from excessive	 delega tion and is	 therefore	 invalid. In order to consider the validity _of this argument	 it is necessary to read section 1	 sub section (3): "The Act shall come into force on such date or dates as the Central Government may	 by notification in the Official Gazette	 appoint	 and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act and for different States or for different parts thereof '. The argument is that the power given to the Central Government to apply the provisions of the Act by notifica tion	 confers on the Central Government absolute discretion	 the exercise of which is not guided by any legislative provision and is	 therefore	 invalid. The Act does not prescribe any considerations in the light of which the Central Government can proceed to act under section 1(3) and such uncanalised power conferred on	 the Central Government must be treated as invalid. We are not impressed by this argument. Section 1(3) is really not an illustration of delegated legislation at all; it is what can be properly described as conditional legislation. The Act has prescribed a self contained code in regard to the insurance of the	 employees covered by it; several remedial measures which the Legislature thought it necessary to enforce in regard to such workmen have been specifically dealt with and appropriate provisions have been made to carry out the policy of the Act as laid down in its relevant sections. Section 3(1) of the Act purports to authorise the Central Government to establish a Corporation for the administration of the scheme of Employees ' State Insurance by a notification. In other words	 when the notification should be issued and in respect of what factories 'it should be issued	 has been left to the discretion of the Central Government and that is precisely what is usually done	 by conditional legislation. 917 What Lord Selborne said about the powers conferred on the Lieutenant Governor by virtue of the relevant provisions of Act 22 of 1869 in Queen vs Burah(1)	 can be said with equal justification about the powers conferred on the Central Government by section 1(3). Said Lord Selborne in that case: "Their Lordships think that it is a fallacy to speak of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant Governor (large as they undoubtedly are) as" if	 when they were exercised	 the efficacy of the acts done under them would be due to arty other legislative authority than that of the Governor General in Council. Their whole operation is directly and immediately under and by virtue of this Act (XXII of 1869) itself. The proper Legislature has exercised its judgment as	 to place	 person	 laws	 powers; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things. The Conditions having been fulfilled	 the legislation	 is now absolute". That is the first answer to the plea raised by Mr. Chatterjee. Assuming that there is an element of delegation	 the plea is equally unsustainable	 because there is enough guidance given by the relevant provisions of the Act and the very scheme of the Act itself. The preamble to the Act shows that it was passed because the legislature thought it expedient to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness	 maternity and employment injury and. to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto. So	 the policy of the Act is unambiguous and clear. The material ' definitions of "benefit period"	 "employee"	 "factory"	injured person 	 "sickness"	 "wages" and other terms contained in section 2 give a clear 'idea as to the nature of the factories to which the Act is intended to be applied	 the class of persons for whose benefit it has ' been passed and the nature of the benefit which is intended to be conferred on them. Chapter II of the Act deals with the (1) 5 I.A. 178 at p. 195. 918 Corporation	 Standing Committee and Medical Benefit Council and their constitution; Chapter III deals with the problem of finance and audit; Chapter IV makes provisions for contribution both by the employees and the employer	 and Chapter V prescribes the benefits which have to be conferred on the workmen; it also gives general provisions in respect of those benefits. Chapter V A deals with transitory provisions; Chapter VI deals with the adjudication of disputes and claims; and Chapter VII prescribes penalties. Chapter VIII which is the last Chapter	 deals with mis cellaneous matters. In the very nature of things	 it would have been impossible for the legislature to decide in what areas and in respect of which factories the Employees ' State Insurance Corporation should be established. It is obvious that a scheme of this kind	 though very beneficient	 could not be introduced in the whole of the country all at once. Such beneficial measures which need careful experimentation have sometimes to be adopted by stages and in different phases	 and so	 inevitably	 the question of extending the statutory benefits contemplated by the Act has to be left to the discretion of the appropriate Government. "Appropriate Government" under section 2(1) means in respect of establishments under the control of the Central Government or a railway administration or a major port or a mine or oilfield	 the Central Government	 and in all other cases	 the State Government. Thus	 it is clear that when extending the Act to different establishments	 the relevant Government is given the power to constitute a Corporation for the administration of the scheme of Employees ' State Insurance. The course adopted by modern legislatures in dealing with welfare schemes has uniformly conformed to the same pattern. The legislature evolves a scheme of socioeconomic welfare	 makes elaborate provisions in respect of it and leaves it to the Government concerned to decide when	 how and in what manner the scheme should be introduced. That	 in our opinion	 cannot amount to excessive delegation. The question of excessive delegation has been frequently considered by this Court and the approach to be adopted in dealing with it is no longer in doubt. In the Edward Mills Co. Ltd.	 Beawar and Others vs The State of Ajmer 919 and Another(1)	 this Court repelled the challenge to the validity of section 27 of the (No. XI of 1948)	 whereby power had been given to the appropriate Government to add to either part of the schedule any employment in respect of which it was of opinion that minimum wages shall be fixed by giving notification in a particular manner	 and it was provided that on the issue of the notification	 the scheme shall	 in its application to the State	 be deemed to be amended accordingly. In dealing with this problem	 this Court observed that there was an element of delegation implied in the provisions of section 27	 for the legislature	 in a sense	 authorised another body specified by it to do something which it might do itself; but it was held that such delegation was not unwarranted and unconstitutional and it did not exceed the limits of permissible delegation. To the same effect are the recent decisions of this Court in M/s. Bhikusa Yamasa Kshatriya and Another vs Sangamner Akola Taluka Bidi Kamgar Union and Others(2)	 and Bhikusa Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. vs Union of India and Another(3). Therefore	 we must hold that the impugned section 1 (3) of the Act is not shown to be constitutionally invalid. Before we part with these appeals	 there is one more point to which reference must be made. We have already mentioned that after the notification was issued under section 1(3) by respondent No. 3 appointing August 28	 1960 as the date on which some of the provisions of the Act should come into force in certain areas of the State of Bihar	 the Chief Executive Officer of respondent No. 1 issued notices giving effect to the State Government 's notification and intimating to the appellants that by reason of the said notification	 the medical benefits which were being given to them in the past would be received by then under the relevant provisions of the Act. It was urged by the appellants before the High Court that these notices were invalid and should be struck down. The argument which was urged in support of this contention was that respondent (1)[1955] 1 S.C.R. 735. (2) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 524. (3) ; 920 No. 1 in all the three appeals were not entitled to curtail the benefits provided to the appellants by them and that the said benefits were not similar either qualitatively or quan titatively to the benefits under the Scheme which had been brought into force under the Act. The High Court has held that the question as to whether the notices and circulars issued by respondent No. 1 were invalid	 could not be considered under article 226 of the Constitution; that is a matter which can be appropriately raised in the form of a dispute by the appellants under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is true that the powers conferred on the High Courts under article 226 are very wide	 but it is not suggested by Mr. Chatterjee that even these powers can take in within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which this contention seeks to raise. Therefore	 without expressing any opinion on the merits of the contention	 we would confirm the finding of the High Court that the proper remedy which is available to the appellants to ventilate their grievances in respect of the said notices and circulars is to take recourse to section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act	 or seek relief	 if possible	 under sections 74 and 75 of the Act. The result is	 the appeals fail and are dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.

The appellants as workmen of respondent No. 1 in all the three respondent concerns were getting free medical benefits of a very high order in a well furnished hospital maintained by respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 3. the Union of India issued a notification under section 1(3) of the Employees State Insurance Act appointing 28th August	 1960 as the date on which some provisions of the Act should come into force in certain areas of the State of Bihar and the area in which the appellants were working came within the scope of the Act. In pursuance of the said notification	 the Chief Executive Officer of Respondent No. 1 issued notices to the appellants that the medical benefits upto the extent admissible under the Act will cease to be provided to insurable persons from the appointed day and the medical benefits would thereafter be governed by the relevant provisions of the Act. The appellants in a writ petition to the High Court challenged the validity of section 1(3) of the Act and legality of the notifications issued under it	 inter alia	 on the ground that it contravened article 14 of the Constitution and suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. The High Court rejected the plea and dismissed the writ petitions. On appeal by special leave the appellants contended that section 1(3) of the Act suffers from excessive delegation and is	 therefore	 invalid. Held: (i) section 1(3) of the Act is not an illustration of delegated legislation at all	 it can be described as conditional legislation. It purports to authorise the Central Government to establish a corporation for the administration of the scheme of Employees ' State Insurance by a notification. As to when the notification should be issued and in respect of what factories it should be issued	 has been left to the discretion of the Central Government and that is precisely what is usually done by conditional legislation. Queen vs Burah	 5. I.A. 178	 relied on. (ii) Assuming there is an element of delegation	 the plea is equally unsustainable	 because there is enough guidance given by the relevant provisions of the Act and the very scheme of the Act itself. In the very nature of things	 it would have been impossible for the legislature to decide in what areas and in respect of which factories the Employees ' State Insurance Corporation should be established. It is obvious that a scheme of this kind	 though very beneficent	 could not be introduced 34 159 S.C. 58 914 in the whole of the country all at once. Such beneficial measures which need careful experimentation have sometimes to be adopted by stages and in different phases	 and so	 inevitably	 the question of extending the statutory benefits contemplated by the Act has to be left to the discretion of the appropriate Government. That cannot amount to excessive delegation. Edward Mills Co. Ltd. Beawar vs The State of Ajmer	 ; 	 M/s Bhikusa Yamasa Kshatriya vs Sangamner Akola Taluka Bidi Kamgar Union	 [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 524 and Bhikusa Yamasa Kahtriva vs Union of India	 ; followed: