Summarize the following court judgment. : Criminal Appeals Nos. 211 to 217 of 1962. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated May	 5	 1962	 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench) at Indore	 in Criminal Appeals Nos. 216	 222 and 227 to 231 of 1961. C. B. Agarwala and Rameshwar Nath	 for the appellant. B. Sen and I. N. Shroff	 for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ayyangar J. These seven appeals are connected as they relate to the same appellant and the point involved in each is identical. They are before us by virtue of special leave granted by this Court and are directed against the common judgment of the Indore Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh convicting the appellant of a contravention of the Indian Iron & Steel (Scrap Control) Order	 1943. The accused	 the appellant before us	 was the President of the Scrap Dealers Association at Indore and he was prosecuted before the learned Additional City Magistrate	 Indore City in seven sets of criminal cases filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh alleging contravention of section 8(4) of the Iron & Steel (Scrap Control) Order	 1943 by selling or causing to be sold scrap iron to different customers on different dates at a rate higher than was authorised by notification dated September 30	 1952 issued by the Steel Controller under the said order. He was acquitted by the Additional City Magistrate but on appeals preferred by the State Government	 the learned Judges set aside the acquittal and convicted him of the offences and sentenced him to pay a fine of 325 Rs. 100 in each case with imprisonment in default of payment of fine. It is the correctness of this judgment of the High Court that is canvassed before us by the appellant in these appeals. To appreciate the points raised by the appellant it is necessary to narrate briefly the history of the legislation on the topic of control over the price at which scrap was permitted to be sold by dealers. The Defence of India Act	 1939 enabled the Central Government to frame rules	 among others	 "for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community (vides. " In pursuance thereof Rule 81 (2) of the Defence of India Rules empowered the Central Government "so far as appears to them to be necessary or expedient for . maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the com munity" to provide by order	 inter alia	 (a) for controlling the pi ices or rates at which articles or things of any description whatever may be sold. . and for relaxing any such prices or rates". By virtue of this power	 the Central Government promulgated the Iron & Steel (Scrap Control) Order	 1943 (hereinafter referred to as the Indian Scrap Order) on February 25. This Order to whose provisions we shall have to make some reference later would normally have lapsed on the expiry of six months after the revocation of the proclamation of emergency because of the provisions of section 102(3) (a) of the Government of India Act	 1935. In order to avoid this result	 the Emergency Provisions Continuance Ordinance	 1946 was promulgated on September 25	 1946 which continued several orders in relation to the control of production	 distribution etc. of essential commodities	 and Indian Scrap Order among them	 and this ordinance was replaced by a permanent legislation the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act	 1946 (Act 24 of 1946) which also contained a provision for the continuance of the Control Orders in force [vide section 17(2)]. Section 8(4) of the Indian Scrap Order prohibited the sale of scrap in excess of the prices fixed therefore by the Controller. It is not disputed that the sales in regard to which the appellant has been prosecuted were in excess of the maximum there specified. Several defences were raised but of these those which now survive are only two: (1) The legal effect of the parallel provisions on the same subject viz.	 control over the sale price of scrap which were in force in the Part B State of Madhya Bharat which comprised Indore	 and (2) Whether the appellant as the President of the Scrap Dealers Association which was an unincorporated body could be held liable for	 a sale in excess of the sup./64 8 326 authorised maximum price effected by a Munim or Munims of the Association. We shall now proceed to narrate in brief outline the history of the parallel provisions relative to control over the sale price of Scrap in the Part B State of Madhya Bharat. These provisions undoubtedly continued in force in the State till September 12	 1950 when the Indian Scrap Control Order	 1943 was in terms made applicable in that State and the principal point raised by Mr. Agarwala was whether a certain notification which had been issued under the State law and was in force on that date continued in force even thereafter. The State legislation on this topic started on October 9	 1948 with the promulgation of the Madhya Bharat Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance	 1948	 which was a reproduction of the Indian Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance	 1946. When this Ordinance was replaced in India by the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act	 1946	 the same process was repeated in Madhya Bharat by the enactment of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (Samvat 2005) (Madhya Bharat Act III of 1948). Among the "essential	 commodities" dealt with by the State enactment were iron and steel [vide section 2(3)(7)]. Section 4 of the Act read: "4. Powers to control production	 supply	 distribution etc.	 of essential commodities. (1) The Government so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodities	 or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices may by an Order notified in the Official Gazette provide for regulating or prohibiting the production	 supply	 distribution and movement thereof	 and trade and commerce therein. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub section (1)	 an order made thereunder may provide (c) For controlling the prices at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold; to quote only the material words. In exercise of the powers thus conferred the Director of Civil Supplies	 Madhya Bharat	 to whom the powers in that behalf were delegated by the State Government	 promulgated on June 4	 1949 the Madhya Bharat Iron	 Steel and Scrap (Production	 Procurement and Distribution) 327 Control Order	 1949. Clause 5 of this Order empowered the Director of Civil Supplies	 Madhya Bharat to specify from time to time the maximum prices wholesale and retail at which "iron and steel	 scrap or specified articles made thereof" may be sold (a) by a producer	 (b) by a controlled stockholder	 (c) by a registered stockholder (d) by a controlled dealer and (e) by a scrap merchant. The several categories of persons whose sales were thus regulated were defined in the Order. Acting under this provision	 the Director Civil Supplies issued a notification on the same date June 4	 1949 which read: "In exercise of the powers conferred on the Director under clause 5(1) of the Madhya Bharat Iron	 Steel and Scrap (Production	 Procurement and Distribution) Control Order	 1949	 I hereby specify that the Price Schedules as may be in force for the time being under . Iron and Steel Scrap Control Order in the Indian Union in respect of sales by producers	 controlled and Registered Stockholders and Scrap Merchants shall apply mutatis mutandis to sales by the aforesaid persons in Madhya Bharat; provided however	 that the Registered Stockholders shall sell to Controlled Dealers at II column rates of the Government of India Price Schedule for the time being in force	 that Iron and Steel which they receive at column I rate from the producers and at column III rate	 that Iron and Steel which they receive from the Controlled Stockholders at column II rates : provided also that controlled Dealers in Madhya Bharat shall sell to consumers at a profit margin of not exceeding Rs. 30 per ton; subject however	 in all cases to such local extra charges as may be fixed by me or the officers authorised by me in this behalf. " It is only necessary to add that there were similar Orders passed under the Indian Scrap Order	 1943 in which also the classification of dealers etc.	 proceeded on the same lines. The form of the notification by the Steel Controller to the Government of India	 referred to in this notification was on the following lines : There was a schedule to the notification fixing the maximum prices and it was divided into five columns. First was the number of the item	 the second was the description or classification of the material and the next three which were headed columns I	 II and III dealt with specified maximum basic prices per ton for sale at Calcutta	 Bombay and Madras. There were adjustments 328 indicated for arriving at the prices chargeable at other centres. Column I specified the prices for sales by Controlled Sources other than those mentioned in column 11. The second column was headed "specified prices fixed for sales by scrap merchants who have been declared controlled sources" and the 	last or third column specified the maximum for sales by all persons other than those mentioned in columns I and 11. Different maxima were fixed for sale by persons falling under the three columns	 the first column price being the lowest	 the second t little higher and the last which included sales by retail dealers to the consuming public being the highest. It is common ground that the Scrap Dealers Association	 Indore of which the appellant was the President had been declared "a Controlled Source" ' so that the maximum prices at which members of the Association which was an unincorporated body could sell	 were those specified in column II of the schedule. It is not necessary to set out the prices at which the actual sales which wore stated to be in violation of the law	 took place	 but it is sufficient to state that admittedly the servants of the Association sold scrap iron at prices higher than those fixed in column II and at prices fixed for column III. The first submission of Mr. Agarwala learned Counsel for the appellant was that the sale by the Association at the column ]II price was authorised and legal because of a notification issued by the Government of Madhya Bharat dated August 26	 1949. The principal point argued before us in respect of this notification is as to whether this notification was alive and in force on the date of the sales in 1956 which were the subject of the several prosecutions and whether it has survived subsequent Indian legislation extended to the State to which we shall advert presently. But before proceeding to do so	 it would be convenient to consider the nature of that notification. The Scrap Dealers Association of Madhya Bharat appear to have made a representation to the State Government that though the dealers in Scrap as constituent units of the Association were treated as a Controlled Source and secured advantages thereby and were bound to sell at prices fixed in column II	 still the Association should 'be accorded special privilege and be permitted to sell at prices fixed for the residuary class of dealers in column III. This representation was considered by an Advisory Committee appointed by the State Government and a direction was given that "a change be made to the extent that at present for the goods which is sold to consumers by the Scrap Association 329 at the regional headquarters they will be allowed to charge column III rates on the goods instead of column II rates. " It is stated that the Association has been selling at these rates ever since. There is no doubt that if this direction stood	 and we need only add that the validity of this direction was not challenged by the respondent as beyond the powers of the State Government	 the appellant could not have been guilty of the offence with which he was charged. But the question is whether this direction or this modification of the prices fixed under section 5(1) of the Madhya Bharat Scrap Control Order by incorporating the notification by the Steel Controller of the Government of India in its text	 subsisted in 1956 when the sales which are stated as being in contravention of the Indian Scrap Order	 took place. We have already seen that the notification dated June 4	 1949 which we have extracted earlier	 was issued under the Madhya Bharat Iron and Steel etc.	 Control Order	 1949 pro mulgated under the Madhya Bharat Essential Supplies (Tem porary Powers) Act	 1948. The Madhya Bharat Act	 however	 stood repealed by virtue of the provisions of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Amendment Act	 1950 (Act 52 of 1950) under which the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act	 1946 was extended to the Part B States as and from such dates as might be specified by the Central Government. By a notification issued by the Central Government the Essential Supplies Act	 1946 was made applicable to the Part B State of Madhya Bharat from August 17	 1950. The effect of this extension was provided for by section 10 of Act 52 of 1950 which enacted : "1O. Amendment of section 17	 Act XXIV of 1946. After sub section (3) of section 17 of the said Act	 the following sub section shall be inserted	 namely (4) If immediately before the day on which this Act comes into force in a Part B State	 there is in force in that State any law which corresponds to this Act	 such corresponding law shall on that day stand repealed in so far as it relates to any of the essential commodities governed by this Act: Provided that any Order made and in force immediately before that day in the said State shall continue in force and be deemed to be an Order made under this Act	 and all appointments made	 licences or permits granted	 and directions issued	 under any such Order and in force immediately before that day shall likewise continue in 330 force and be deemed to be made	 granted or issued in pursuance of this Act. " If the main part of sub section (4) stood alone without the proviso	 the effect would have been not merely a repeal of the Madhya Bharat Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act	 1948 which was "a corresponding law" which was in force in that State	 but with that repeal	 all the subordinate legislation enacted thereunder including the Control Orders as well as the Orders of the Director fixing prices would also have stood repealed. By virtue of the proviso	 however	 notwithstanding the repeal of the parent enactment	 the Orders made under it were continued and were to be deemed to have been made under the Indian Act. Mr. Agarwala laid considerable stress on the proviso and urged that by reason of its language it continued in force not merely the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order of June 4	 1949 and the price fixation by the Director under section 5 ( I) of that Order on the same date	 but also the variation in the prices to be charged by the Association effected by the Government Order dated August 26	 1949 which enabled that body	 notwithstanding its being a dealer specified in column II to sell at prices fixed for persons falling under column M. We need not pause to consider whether the direction or the notification dated August 26	 1949 is "a direction issued under any such order" within the proviso to section 17(4) but shall proceed on the basis that it is	 accepting the construction suggested by learned Counsel. But the replacement of the Madhya Bharat law on this topic by the law in force in India did not stop with that effected by Act 52 of 1950. By a notification of the Government of India dated September 12	 1950	 the Indian Scrap Order	 1943 was extended to Madhya Bharat. It is really the legal effect of this extension that calls for scrutiny in these appeals. The notification by which the Indian Scrap Order was extend ed to Madhya Bharat	 no doubt	 did not expressly provide for the repeal of the "Madhya Bharat Scrap Iron & Steel etc.	 Order	 1949"	 but if the two Control Orders cannot operate simultaneously	 it would be obvious that the Indian Scrap Order would have repealed and replaced the State law. In the first place	 even if the provisions contained in the two sets of Orders were in identical terms	 it might be proper to hold that the Indian Scrap Order replaced the State law in order to give some meaning and effect to the extension of the Indian Scrap Order to Madhya Bharat. But that is not the position here. There are 331 marked differences between the provisions of the two Orders such that it would not be possible for the two to stand together. For instance	 Rule 3 of the Indian Scrap Order prohibits producers from acquiring or agreeing to acquire scrap except and in accordance with a written order of the Controller etc. There is no rule corresponding to this in the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order. In line with this	 in Rule 6 of the Madhya Bharat Order which corresponds to Rule 8(4) of the Indian Scrap Order	 there is no prohibition against acquisition for a higher price than the maximum fixed	 such as is to be found in Indian Order. Again	 Rule 7 of the Madhya Bharat Order relating to the restrictions on the movement of scrap has no corresponding provisions in the Indian Scrap Order. Illustrations of this type of variation may be multiplied	 but this is unnecessary as it was conceded that the provisions contained in the two orders were not identical. What we desire to emphasise is that the two orders	 though achieving substantially the same object	 are not identical in their provisions. If that is so	 it is obvious that on the extension to Madhya Bharat of the Indian Scrap Order	 the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order would stand repealed and be replaced by the Indian law. Mr. Agarwala	 however	 submitted that this would not follow because according to him the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order had some sort of higher efficacy or stood on a footing superior to the Indian Scrap Order by reason of its having been continued by the proviso to section 17(4) to Act 24 of 1946	 the argument being that the notification etc.	 should be deemed to be one under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act itself. This argument	 even if sound	 does not really help the appellant	 for the Indian Scrap Order itself was preserved by a saving of the same type and couched in exactly the	 same language in the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance	 1946 and the Act of the same name of 1946 [vide section 17(2) & (3) of Act 24 of 1946]. Besides	 just as an order made or notification issued. under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act	 1946 could be amended	 modified or cancelled	 even if the Madhya Bharat Scrap Control Order and the notifications issued thereunder are deemed to have been passed under the Act of 1946 which is what learned Counsel contends	 they could surely be modified. amended or replaced by other subordinate legislation originating from the same parent Act. The Indian Scrap Order	 1943 was one such	 because it is deemed to have been made under that 332 Act. When the Indian Scrap Order was extended to Madhya Bharat	 the result was that it effectively replaced the Madhya Bharat Order on the same topic. Even granting that the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order of June 4	 1949 was repealed on the extension to that territory of the Indian Scrap Order	 Mr. Agarwala urged that the direction contained in the notification of the State Government dated August 26	 1949 was a special law which stood unaffected by the extension of the Indian Scrap Order to Madhya Bharat. That when the Indian Scrap Order was extended it carried with it the notifications issued by the Controller from time to time and that after the extension of the Scrap Order to Madhya Bharat	 all sales of scrap would have to be effected only in conformity with the prices fixed by the 'notifications issued under the Scrap Order was not contested. Nor was it disputed that on the terms of the notifications issued fixing the prices at which several classes of dealers might effect sales tinder the Indian Scrap Order	 the Association of which the appellant was the President would have fallen under column 11 and would have been bound to sell scrap only at the prices fixed in that column. But it was submitted that the fact that even before the extension of the Indian Scrap Order to Madhya Bharat in September	 1950 tinder the very provisions of the notification dated June 4	 1949 itself the maximum prices fixed in Madhya Bharat were only those prescribed by the Controller in India and that the deviation in regard to these prices permitted to the Association was thus in effect a local modification of the Indian Order and that consequently the direction issued by the State Government on August 26	 1949 and which was continued even after the repeal of the Madhya Bharat Temporary Powers Act	 1948 by reason of the proviso to section 17 (4) of the Act 24 of 1946 was not affected by the extension of the Indian Scrap Order to Madhya Bharat. We find ourselves unable to accept this argument. The concession allowed to the Association by the notification dated August 26	 1949 could be looked at from one of two alternative positions. The direction could be viewed as in effect a modification of the prices fixed under section 5 (1) of the Madhya Bharat Order by the Director so that in law it should be deemed to have been incorporated in that price fixation and became	 as it were	 the price fixed by the Controller. The effect of this would be that in Madhya Bharat before the extension of the Indian Scrap Order	 the maximum prices chargeable by the specified type of dealer falling under 333 column It would be those applicable to dealers in column III. If this were the true position	 the result would be that when the Indian Scrap Order was made applicable to Madhya Bharat without a saving or special provision as regards sales by the Association	 it would supersede that law and the special classification effected by the Madhya Bharat law would cease to be in force. In this respect the fact that the prices fixed in Madhya Bharat for sales by dealers etc.	 specified in the three column corresponded to those fixed by the Controller in India	 would be wholly irrelevant	 for the authority by which the fixation was effected would be traceable to Madhya Bharat and not the Indian law. The other alternative would be that the notification dated August 26	 1949 was an independent piece of subordinate law making under the Essential Commodities Act and the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order	 and it was this aspect that was stressed by Mr. Agarwala. Even if that be so	 the appellant would derive no advantage from this	 because there has been t repeal not merely of the Madhya Bharat Essential Supplies Act no doubt with a saving but of the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order without a saving and on the repeal of the Scrap Order under which the Subordinate rule or regulation was effected the latter would also stand repealed. As explained by Lord Reading C.J. in Watson vs Winch(1): "It has been long established that	 when an Act of Parliament is repealed	 it must be considered (except as to transactions passed and closed) as if it had never existed. . It would follow that any bye law made under a repealed statute ceases to have any validity unless the repealing Act contains some provision preserving the validity of the bye law notwithstanding the repeal. " Admittedly there is no saving clause either in the notification of the Central Government by which the Indian Scrap Order was extended to Madhya Bharat nor	 of course	 in the Scrap Order itself. As the parent order under which the notification was made his been repealed without a saving the effect must be that the notification dated August 26	 1949 must	 if it were held to be an independent subordinate legislation	 be held also to have been repealed. Mr. Agarwala next referred us to section 24 of the General Clauses Act No. X of 1897 and urged that the notifica (1) 	 690. 334 tion would be a bye law that would have continued notwithstanding the repeal of the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act runs thus: "24. Where any Central Act or Regulation	 is after the commencement of this Act	 repealed and re enacted with or without modification	 then	 unless it is otherwise expressly provided	 any appointment	 notification	 order	 scheme	 rule form or bye law	 made or issued under the repealed Act or Regulation	 shall	 so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re enacted	 continue in force and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re enacted	 unless and until it is superseded by any appointment	 notification	 order scheme	 rule form or by law	 made or issued under the provisions so re enacted and when any Central Act or Regulation	 which	 by a notification under section 5 or 5A of the Scheduled Districts Act	 1874	 or any like law	 has been extended to any local area	 has	 by a subsequent notification	 been withdrawn from and reextended to such area or any part thereof	 the provisions of such Act or Regulation shall be deemed to have been repealed and re enacted in such area or part within the meaning of this section. " We consider that this submission is entirely without force. Mr. Agarwala fairly conceded that the language of section 24 would not cover a repeal of the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order by the introduction into the Madhya Bharat territory of the Indian Scrap Order. 1943	 but he suggested that even though the section was in terms inapplicable	 he could invoke the principle underlying it. But this argument	 however	 proceeds on assuming that section 24 was declaratory of the common rule of interpretation and that even in the absence of section 24 the same principle of law would apply. The position apart from a statutory provision such as is found in section 24 of the General Clauses Act	 is thus summarised in Craies on Statute Lent	 6th Edn. 334: "If the statute under which bye laws are made is repealed	 those bye laws are impliedly repealed and cease to have any validity unless the repealing statute contains sonic provision preserving the validity of the bye law notwithstanding the repeal. This follows from the rule . when an Act of Parliament is repealed it must 335 be considered (except to transactions passed and closed) as if it had never existed." This submission has	 therefore	 no merit and must be rejected. The second of the points urged by Mr. Agarwala was that the Scrap Dealers Association was an unincorporated body consisting wholly of retail dealers and that as each of them individually was a dealer who could himself have sold at the column M rate	 the Association could not be penalised for selling at that rate. As an unincorporated body	 he submitted	 it was merely the aggregate of its members and so would have the rights of its constituent units. There is no force in this point either. Apart from the definition of "person" in the General Clauses Act as including an unincorporated body of persons	 what we are concerned with is not sales by individual dealers who composed the Association	 but sales by and through the Association. It was the Association that was given the facility of obtaining scrap at more favourable prices than dealers and it was that body which was subjected to control in the shape of having to sell what it had purchased from controlled sources at the prices specified in column II. Lastly	 it was faintly urged by Mr. Agarwala that the appel lant was merely the President of the Association and could not be held liable for the sales effected by its employees. There was no dispute that the sales were by the Association and at prices fixed by that body. It was also admitted that these prices were in excess of the prices specified for sales fixed for the Association. under section 8 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act	 1946	 "Any person who abets the contravention of any order. shall be deemed to have contravened that order." In the circumstances	 we do not see bow this affords any defence to the appellant. The result is that these appeals fail and are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.

The Indian Scrap Order	 1943	 passed under the Defence of India Rules	 was after the expiration of the said Rules	 preserved by the Essential Supplies Act	 1946. By (Central) Act 52 of 1950	 the said Act was extended	 inter alia to the Part B State of Madhya Bharat. That State already had its corresponding law on the subject	 namely	 the Madhya Bharat Essential Supplies Act	 1948	 under which the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order	 1949 had been issued. While extending the Cen tral legislation to the Part B States	 Act 52 of 1950 also laid down	 in section 17(4) that the "corresponding law" in the State would stand repealed	 with a proviso that the orders	 directions etc.	 issued under the repealed law would continue. The appellant who was President of the Scrap Dealers Association	 Indore	 was prosecuted under the allegation that the Association had sold scrap iron at rates higher than those fixed under the Indian Scrap Order. The defence taken was that the prices at which the sales had been effected were those fixed by a notification dated 26th August	 1949 under the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order which continued in force. The appellant was acquitted by the trial Court but was convicted by the High Court and appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave. The contentions of the appellant were : (1) The Madhya Bharat Scrap Order had not been expressly repealed by the Indian Scrap Order and therefore it continued by force of the proviso to section 17(4) of the Act 52 of 1950	 and	 in any case	 the notification dated 26th August	 1949	 continued in force as an independent piece of subordinate legislation. (2) The appellant as President of the Scrap Dealers Association which was an unincorporated body could not be held liable for a sale in excess of the authorised maximum price effected by a Munim or Munims of the Association. HELD : (i) The Central notification by which the Indian Scrap Order was extended to Madhya Bharat	 no doubt	 did not expressly provide for the repeal of the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order	 but the provisions of the two Orders were not identical and they could not	 therefore	 operate simultaneously. It was therefore obvious that on the extension to Madhya Bharat of the Indian Scrap Order	 the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order was repealed and replaced by the Indian law. [331D]. (ii) The notification in question could not survive even if it was treated as an independent piece of subordinate legislation under the State law. According to Craies	 if the statute under which by laws are made is repealed	 those bye laws are impliedly repealed and cease to have any validity unless the repealing statute contains some provision preserving the validity of the by laws	 notwithstanding the repeal. As the parent 324 order under which the notification dated August 26	 1949	 was made had been repealed without a saving	 the effect was that the said notification also stood repealed. (333D; 333G H; 334H]. (iii) The definition of 'person ' in the General Clauses Act includes within that term an unincorporated body of persons. In the present case it was the Association that was given the facility of obtaining scrap at more favourable prices than dealers	 and it was that body which was subjected to control in the shape of having to sell what it had purchased from controlled sources at specified prices. The argument could not be accepted that the Association as such could not be penalised for selling at unauthorised rates. The appellant as President of the Association was liable to be convicted by virtue of section 8 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act	 1946 which made the abetment of contravention of any order under the Act	 also an offence. [335C D	E F]. Watson vs Winch. and Craies on Statute Law. 6th Edn. 332	 referred to.