Summarize the following court judgment. Appeals Nos. 651 to. 655 of 1967. Appeals from the judgment and order dated March 2	 1966 of the Bombay High Court in Income tax Reference No	. 73 of 1962. S.T. Desai	 D. Dwarkadas and S.S. Javali	 for the appellant. C.K. Daphtary	 Attorney General	 R. Gopalakrishnan	 R.N. Sachthey and B.D. Sharma for the respondent in all the appeals. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami	 J. These appeals are brought by certificate from the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated March 2	 1966 in Income Tax Reference No. 73 of 1962. The appellant company	 hereinafter called the assessee company	 was incorporated on July 29	 1924	 as an investment company	 the objects of which are set out in el. III of the memorandum of association and more particularly in sub cls. 1	 2	 15 and 16 of that clause. The assessment years in question are 1943 44 to 1948 49	 excepting the year 1947 48. According to its petition made in the High Court	 the assessee company dealt with its assets as follows: "The petitioner company purchased during the period 1st July	 1925 to 30th June	 1928	 shares of the value of Rs. 1	86	47	789 major portion of which was comprised of shares in the Sassoon Group of Mills. During the year ended 30th June	 1929	 the petitioner company promoted two companies known as Loyal Mills Ltd.	 and Hamilton Studios Ltd. and took over all their shares of the value of Rs. 101/2 lacs. In the year 1930	 the petitioner company purchased shares of Rs. 1	33	930. During the period of 9 years from Ist July	 1930	 to 30th July	 1939	 no purchases. were made with the exception of a few shares of Loyal Mills Ltd. taken over from the staff of E.D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd.	 who retired from service. In the year ended 30th June	 1940	 reconstruction scheme of the Appollo Mills Ltd. 48 took place under which debentures held by the petitioner company in the Appollo. Mills Ltd.	 were redeemed and the proceeds were .reinvested in the new issue of shares made by the Appollo Mills Ltd. Out of the purchases of the value of Rs. 2	794 made by the petitioner company during the year ended 30th June	 1941	 Rs. 2	000 was the value of shares of the Loyal Mills. Ltd.	 taken over from the retiring staff. In the year ended 30th June	 1943	 the petitioner company took over from the David Mills Co. Ltd.	 shares of the Associated Building Co.	 of the value of Rs. 56	700. After this there were no purchases at all to this date excepting purchases. of the value of Rs. 34	954 during the year ended 30th June	 1946. " The sales are contained in paragraph 3(b) which states: "In relation to the purchases made by the petitioner company as stated above no appreciable sales of shares were made during the period 29th July	 1924 to 30th June	 1942	 the sales made in the year ended 30th June	 1929	 of the value of Rs. 1	29	333 included shares of the value of Rs. 45	000 in the Loyal Mills Ltd.	 sold to the members of the staff and shares of the value of Rs. 83	833 representing sterling investments handed over to the creditors of the petitioner company in part repayment of the loan taken from them in the year ended 30th June	 1931	 shares of the value of Rs. 7	48	356 were handed over to the creditors in payment of the loan granted ' by them. From the year ended 30th June	 1943	 E.D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd.	 started relinquishing the managing agencies of the various mills under their agency and the shares held by the petitioner company in the Sassoon Group of Mills were handed over to the respective purchasers. of the mills agencies. " Prior to 1940 the assessee company made a claim every year being treated as a dealer in investments and properties but this contention was repelled by the Income Tax authorities and upto the assessment year 1939 40 the assessee company was assessed on the basis of being an investor but it appears that for the assessment years 1940 41	 1941 42 and 1942 43 the Income Tax department accepted the plea of the assessee company and treated it as a dealer in shares	 securities and immovable properties and assessed it on that basis. For these years and for the assessment year 1943 44 the assessee company made its return in that basis. But after the return had been filed for the year 1943 44	 the assessee company withdrew its return and filed a revised return on March 7	 1944	 contending that it was not a 49 dealer but merely an investor. Along with the return it filed a letter dated March 6	 1944 in which it stated: "The return of Total Income which was submitted with the Company 's letter of 25th May 1943 was prepared in conformity with the ruling of the Income tax Officer in the 1940 41 assessment that the company was to be assessed as a dealer in Investments. Since that return was submitted the Central Board of Revenue has decided that the Company is an Investment Holding Company	 and accordingly an amended Return of Total Income under Section 22( 1 ) of the Indian Income tax Act is submitted herewith on which the assessment for 1943 44 may be based	 as on this particular question the company obviously cannot have one status for Excess Profits Tax and another for Income taX." It was contended by the assessee company that it never carried on any business in the purchase or sale of shares	 securities or properties In support of this contention the assessee company relied on the order of the Central Board of Revenue dated August 18	 1943 passed under section 26(1) of the Excess Profits Tax Act. The Income. Tax Officer rejected the plea and held that the investments were held by the assessee company as the stock intrade of its business which it carried on during the previous year and also in the preceding years. The assessee company took the matter in appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the Income Tax Officer. The assessee thereafter appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the same contentions were urged on behalf of the assessee company. The Appellate Tribunal rejected the assessee 's claim that it was showing itself as a dealer in shares	 securities and immovable properties under a misapprehension and without appreciation of the correct facts. The Appellate Tribunal held that in the case of the assessee company not only the Memorandum of Association gave the power to the company to deal in investments but the case of the company all along in the past was that it was a dealer in investments and properties. Consequently	 the Tribunal held that the assessee company was a dealer in shares	 securities and properties and dismissed the appeals. Thus the grounds on which the case was decided against the assessee company were (1) that the assessee claimed to. be a dealer or an investor according as it incurred losses or made profits and (2) that because of the objects contained in the memorandum of association and because of its assertion made in the past as being a dealer the assessee company could not be held to be an investor. The assessee company then applied to the Appellate Tribunal under section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act	 1922	 50 hereinafter called the 'Act ' for a reference of the following questions of law for the opinion of the High Court: "(i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessee company can rightly be treated as a dealer in investments and properties; and (ii) Whether the profits and losses arising from the sale of shares	 securities and immovable properties of the assessee company can be taxed as business profits. " The application was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that no question of law arose out of its order. The assessee company then made an application under section 66(2) of the Act to the Bombay High Court which dismissed the application by its order dated June 15	 1952. The assessee company thereupon obtained special leave to appeal to this Court. The appeal was allowed by this Court by its judgment dated May 22	 1957 and the order of the Bombay High Court dated June 15	 1952 was set aside. It was pointed out by this Court that the Appellate Tribunal in arriving at its finding that the assessee was a dealer and not an investor	 had relied on two basic facts	 viz.	 the objects set out in the Memorandum of Association and the previous assertion made by the assessee company that it was a dealer in investments and properties and not merely an investor. It was observed that merely because the company had within its objects the dealings. in investments	 shares and properties the circumstance did not give it the characteristics of a dealer in shares. The circumstance	 though relevant	 was not conclusive. It was pointed out in the judgment of this Court that the question as to. what were the characteristics of the business of dealing in shares or that of an investor was a mixed question of fact and law and what was the legal effect of the facts found by the Appellate Tribunal. and whether as a result thereof the assessee could be termed a dealer or an investor was itself a question of law. Accordingly the Court formulated the following two .questions of law as arising out of the order of the Tribunal: "( 1 ) Whether there are any materials on the record to support the finding of the Income Tax Officer that the assessee company was a dealer in shares	 securities and immovable property during the assessment year in question? (2) Whether the profits and losses arising from the sale of shares	 securities and immovable properties of the assessee company can be taxed as business profits. ?" The case was therefore remanded to the High Court for directing the Appellate Tribunal to state a case on the aforesaid questions of law under section 66(2) of the Act. In accordance with the direc 51 tion of this Court the Appellate Tribunal made a statement of the case on June 12/13	 1962. The reference being Income tax Reference No. 73 of 1962 was heard by the High Court which by its judgment dated March 2	 1966 answered both the questions. against the assessee company and in favour of the Commissioner of Income Tax. On behalf of the assessee company Mr. S.T. Desai argued that the question whether the assessee company was a dealer dealing in investments and properties or whether it was a mere investor will have to be judged on a proper scrutiny of the transactions themselves considered in the light of the Circumstances in which the transactions 'both of purchase and sale had .been brought about. If it is found on an examination of the transactions themselves that the essential characteristics of the business of the assessee were of dealing in shares and investments	 the assessee will undoubtedly be taken as a dealer. If	 on the other hand	 the characteristics revealed by the transactions are those ' peculiar to mere investments in shares	 securities and properties	 the finding of the Court must be that the assessee is an investor and the profits made by it are only excess obtained on realisations of the investments and not liable to be taxed. According to Mr. S.T. Desai	 neither the Memorandum of Association nor the previous assertions made by the assessee company either under a misconception or even deliberately will not have the effect of changing the legal nature of the transactions as revealed by the transactions themselves and the circumstances in which the transactions have taken place. In support of this argument reference was made on behalf of the appellant to the statements of the transactions	 Annexures 'E ' and 'F ' of the statement of the case and detailed explanations	 statements M 1 and M 2. The substance of the argument of the appellant was that (1 ) most of the shares	 securities and properties acquired by the assessee company were the properties of E.D. Sassoon & Co. and the family of Sassoons; (2) a large block of shares held by the company consisted of the shares of the Sassoon Group of Mills and the ' block was held all along since its acquisition before the year 1930 until E.D. Sassoon and Co. and the Sassoons continued to be interested in the said Group of Mills and they were realised by sale only when E.D. Sassoon & Co. and the Sassoons decided to relinquish their interest in the said Group of Mills	 and (3) neither the mode of acquisition of these shares. and properties nor the mode and manner of their disposal have any of the distinctive characteristics of business dealings. On the questions actually formulated by this Court upon which the Appellate Tribunal has made a statement of the case it is not possible for us to entertain the argument advanced by Mr. S.T. Desai. It was contended on the contrary by the Attorney General 52 that upon the questions actually referred	 the answers must be against the asses.see company. It was said that there were at least two materials on record to support the finding of the Appellate Tribunal that the assessee company was a dealer in shares	 securities and immovable properties during the assessment year in question. The first is that in its own memorandum dated October 2	 1942	 the assessee company contended ' that it was a dealer in shares and investments and set out various reasons in support of its contention. The second circumstance is that el. 3 of the Memorandum of Association gave the power to the assessee company to deal with investments. The contention of the Attorney General was that there was material on the record to support the finding of the Appellate Tribunal that the assessee company was a dealer in shares	 securities and immovable properties and the questions	 as already framed	 were rightly answered by the High Court in the affirmative and against the assessee company. In answer to this contention Mr. S.T. Desai submitted that the real controversy in this case is not reflected in the two questions framed by this Court in its judgment dated May 22	 1957. It was argued that the two questions up.on which the assessee company applied for a reference under section 66(1) of the Act were properly framed and were questions arising out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal. Mr. S.T. Desai urged that we should modify the questions in a manner suggested by the assessee company in the application under section 66(1) of the Act and ask the Appellate Tribunal to make a fresh statement of the case. In our opinion	 the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant is well rounded and as we shall presently point out	 it is necessary in the interest of justice that we should modify the questions framed by this Court on the last occasion and call upon the Appellate Tribunal to make a fresh statement of the case. There is no doubt that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by section 66(1) of the Act is limited to entertain references involving questions of law. If	 fo.r instance	 the point raised on reference relates to the construction of a document of title or interpretation of relevant provisions of a statute	 it is a pure question of law. In dealing with it	 the High Court may have due regard for the view taken by the Tribunal	 but its decision would not be lettered by that view. In some cases	 the point sought to be raised in a reference may turn out to be a pure question of fact and if that be so	 the finding of fact recorded by the Appellate 'Tribunal must be regarded as conclusive in a proceeding under 'section 66(1). But it would be open to challenge the conclusion of fact drawn by the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that it is not supported by any legal evidence or material or that the conclusion of fact drawn by the Appellate Tribunal 'is perverse and is not ration	ally possible. It is within these narrow limits that the 53 conclusions of fact by the Appellate Tribunal can be challenged under section 66(1). Such conclusions can never be challenged on the ground that they are based on misappreciation of evidence. There is	 however	 a third class of cases in which the assessee or the department may seek to challenge the correctness of the conclusion reached by the Tribunal on the ground that it is a conclusion on a question of mixed ' law and fact. Such a conclusion is no doubt based upon the primary evidentiary facts	 but its ultimate form is determined by the application of relevant legal principles. To put it differently	 the proper construction of statutory language is always a matter of law and therefore the claim of the assessee that the profits and losses arising from the sale of shares	 securities etc. cannot be taxed as profits of a business involves the application of law to the facts found in the setting of the particular case. In dealing with findings on such questions of mixed law and fact the High Court must no doubt accept the findings of the Tribunal on the primary questions of fact; but it is open to the High Court to examine whether the Tribunal had applied the relevant legal principles correctly or not in reaching	 its final conclusion; and in that sense	 the scope of enquiry and the extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with such points is the same as in dealing with pure points of law. (See the decision of this Court in G. Venkataswami Naidu & Co. v.C.I.T.(1)). On the last occasion it was pointed out by this Court that the question as to what are the characteristics of the business in shares or that of an investor is a mixed question of fact and law. To put it differently	 the question as to what is the legal effect of the facts found by the Tribunal and whether as a result the assessee can be treated as a dealer or an investor is itself a question of law. The final conclusion of the Tribunal can	 therefore	 be challenged on the ground that the relevant legal principles have been mis applied by the Tribunal in reaching its decision on the point; and such a challenge is open under section 66( 1 ) because it is a challenge on a ground of law. It is because the question involved in this case was not a question of pure fact but was a mixed question of fact and law that this Court allowed the appeal on the last occasion and set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated June 15	 1952 and directed the Appellate Tribunal to state a case	 but owing possibly to some mistake or inadvertence the actual questions framed by this Court (quoted at page 676 of 32 I.T.R.) and the form in which the questions were framed by this Court seem to assume that the questions involved are questions of fact. The reason is that it is only in regard to a finding of fact that the question can be properly framed "as to whether there was material to support the said finding". We are accordingly of the opinion that the questions actually framed by this Court on the last occasion are not appropriate and (1) 54 do not reflect the real controversy between the parties. It is therefore	 expedient in the interest of justice that the questions should be modified as suggested by the assessee company in its .petition under section 66( 1 ) of the Act to the High Court and the Appellate Tribunal should be asked to make a fresh statement of the case. For these reasons we allow these appeals and set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated March 2	 1966 and direct the Appellate Tribunal to make a fresh statement of the case on the following questions of law: "( 1 ) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessee company can rightly be treated as a dealer in investments and properties; and (2) whether the profits and losses arising from the sale of shares	 securities and immovable properties of the assessee company can be taxed as business profits." After the Appellate Tribunal has made a statement of the case the High Court will dispose of the reference in accordance with law. The appellant must pay the costs of this appeal in this Court to the respondent. We should like to add that we have not considered whether the High Court has in its judgment reached the correct conclusion on what the High Court assumed were 'the questions to be decided by it. We are setting aside the judgment of the High Court only on the ground that the enquiry made by the High Court was	 .on the view taken by us	 not competent on the questions as framed at present. We therefore express no opinion on the merits of the dispute. We trust that the Tribunal will make the fresh reference with the least practicable delay. G.C. Appeals allowed.

For the assessment years 1940 41 to 1943 44 the assessee company claimed to be an investor in shares and properties and not a dealer. The contention was rejected by the Income tax Officer	 the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal. The company then applied to the Tribunal under section 66(1) of the Income tax Act	 1922 for a reference of the following questions of law for the opinion of the High Court: (i) whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessee company can rightly be treated as a dealer in investments and properties ? (ii) whether the profits and losses arising from the sale of shares	 securities and immovable properties of the assessee company can be taxed as business profits. The Tribunal refused to make the reference and the High Court dismissed the application under section 66(2). On appeal by special leave this Court held that the question as to what were the characteristics of the business of dealing in shares or that of an investor was a mixed question of law and fact. It remanded the case to the High Court for directing the Tribunal to state a case under section 66(2) on the following questions: (i) whether there are any materials on the record to support the finding of the Income tax Officer that the assessee company was a dealer in shares. 	 securities and immovable property during the assessment year in question (ii) whether the profits and losses arising from the sale of shares	 securities and immovable properties of the assessee company can be treated as business property ? On these questions being referred to the High Court by the Tribunal	 the High Court decided them against the assessee company. The company again appealed to this Court. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the questions as framed by this. Court did not reflect the real controversy 'and therefore the questions as originally framed in the company 's application under section 66(1) should be referred to the High Court in a fresh statement of case to be made by the Tribunal. HELD: (i) The questions framed by this Court and the form in which they were framed seemed to assume that the questions involved were questions of fact for it is only in regard to a question of fact that the question can properly be framed "as to whether there was material to support the said finding". This Court had itself held that the questions involved in the present case were mixed questions of law and fact. Therefore the questions framed by this Court were not appropriate and did not reflect the real controversy between the parties. It was therefore appropriate that the questions should be modified as suggested by the appellant in its petition under section 66(1) to the High Court. [53 G 54 B] (ii) The proper construction of statutory language is always a matter of law and therefore the claim of the assessee that the profits and losses arising from the sale of shares securities etc. cannot be treated as profits 47 of a business involves the application of law to the facts found in the setting of the particular case. In dealing with findings on such questions of law and fact the High Court must No. doubt accept the findings of the. Tribunal on the primary questions of fact; but it is open to the High Court to examine whether the Tribunal had 'applied the relevant legal principles correctly or not in reaching its final conclusion; and in that sense	 the scope of enquiry and the extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with such points is the same as in dealing with pure questions of law. [53 B D] G. Venkataswami Naidu & Co. vs C.I.T.	 	 relied on.