Summarize the following court judgment. iminal Appeal No. 20 of 1965. Appeal from the Judgment and order dated July 9	 1964 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision No. 166 of 1963. 241 B.Sen and 1. N. Shroff	 for the appellant. B.D. Sharma	 for the respondents. A.V. Rangam	 for Intervener No. 1. V.A. Seyid Muhammad	 Advocate General	 Kerala	 B. R. L. Iyengar	 A. G. Pudessery and M. R. K. K. Pillai for Intervener No. 2. B. R. G. K. Achar	 for intervener No. 3 The Judgment of SARKAR C.J. and MUDHOLKAR J. was delivered by SARKAR C.J. The Judgment of BACHAWAT and SHELAT JJ. was delivered by BACHAWAT J. HIDAYATULLAH J. delivered a dissenting Opinion. Sarkar	 C.J. On a complaint of trespass the police registered a case against the respondents under section 447 of the Penal Code. The respondents were later arrested by the police and released on the execution of surety bonds whereby the sureties undertook to produce them as required by the police. The case against the respondents was thereafter put up before the Nyaya Panchayat	 a court established under the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Act	 1949. In 	 'hat court	 fresh bonds were executed by sureties on behalf of the respondents to ensure their presence during the trial. The Nyaya Panchayat	 after trial	 convicted and sentenced the respondents to a fine of Rs. 75 each. The conviction was upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge	 Barwani. The respondents then moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in revision which set aside the conviction. Hence the present appeal. Section 63 of the Panchayat Act provides that no legal prac titioner shall appear on behalf of or shall plead for or defend any party in any dispute	 case or proceeding pending before the Nyaya Panchayat. The High Court observed that in view of the provisions of article 22(1) of the Constitution	 the section was void in respect of persons who were arrested. As the respondents had been arrested	 it set aside their conviction. The question in this appeal is	 whether the section violated article 22(1). That provision has to be considered along with article 21 of the Constitution and both are set out below: "article 21.No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. article 22(1).No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed	 as soon as may be	 of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult	 and to be defended by	 a legal practitioner of his choice. It seems to us fairly clear that a person arrested has the constitutional right to consult a legal practitioner concerning 242 his arrest. It is also clear that a person arrested has the constitutional right to be defended by a legal practitioner. But	 against what is he to be defended? We think that the right to be defended by a legal practitioner would include a right to take steps through a legal practitioner for release from the arrest. Now	 section 63 of the Act puts no ban on either of these rights. It cannot be said to be invalid as denying these rights. We may add that the Act is not concerned with arrest and gives no power to arrest. But	 is the right to be defended by a legal practitioner conferred only on a person arrested? We do not think so. In our opinion	 the right to be defended by a legal practitioner extends also to a case of defence in a trial which may result in the loss of personal liberty. On the other hand	 in our view	 where a person is subjected to a trial under a law which does not provide for an order resulting in the loss of his personal liberty	 he is not entitled to the constitutional right to defend himself at the trial by a legal practitioner. The reason is that articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution are concerned only with giving protection to personal liberty. That is strongly indicated by the language used in these Articles and by the context in which they occur in the Constitution. That also appears to be the view which has been taken by this Court. Thus in State of Bombay vs Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(1) Das	 J. (as he then was) observed: ". . . the implication of that article (article 2 1) was that a person could be deprived of his life or personal liberty provided such deprivation was brought about in accordance with procedure enacted by the appropriate Legislature. Having so provided in article 21	 the framers of our Constitution proceeded to Jay down certain procedural requirements which	 as a matter of constitutional necessity	 must be adopted and included in any procedure that may be enacted by the Legislature and in accordance with which a person may be deprived of his life or personal liberty. Those requirements are set forth in article 22 of the Constitution." It would follow that the requirement laid down in article 22(1) is not a constitutional necessity in any enactment which does not affect life or personal liberty. Now we find that the Act expressly provides that the Nyaya Panchayat cannot inflict a sentence of imprisonment	 not even one in default of payment of fine which it is authorised to impose. We also find that the Act does not give any power of arrest. The case against the respondents was one in which in the first instance a summons and not a war. ant could issue and therefore no arrest was inevitably necessary. The arrest	 if any that could (1). [1915]1 S.O.R. 167	204.243 be made if a warrant came to be issued	 would have been under the Code of Criminal Procedure and not the Panchayat Act. The Act	 does not lay down any procedure or law entailing or justifying an order depriving a person of his personal liberty. For such a law the procedural requirement in article 22(1) is not a constitutional necessity. The Act does not violate article 22(1) and cannot be held to be invalid on that ground. It is true that in this case the respondents had been arrested but they had been arrested not under the Act but under section 54(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 the offence being cognizable. A cognizable offence when tried by any of the courts created by the Code is punishable with imprisonment. But the Code by section 340 entitles an accused person to be defended by a lawyer. We are however not concerned in this case with a trial by a court created by the Code. The question in this appeal is	 whether the Panchayat Act is invalid. The Act does not deprive any arrested person of his constitutional right to take steps against the arrest or to defend himself in a trial which might occasion the loss of his personal liberty. It takes away no constitutional right at all. Can the fact that the respondents were arrested under an other law and thereafter tried under the Act give them the constitutional right to be defended at the trial by a legal practitioner? We do not think so. We think it clear that it cannot be said that the fact of arrest gives the arrested man the constitutional right to defend himself in all actions brought against him. Take the case of these respondents. Suppose that after the arrest an action was started against them for recovery of damages for wrongful trespass. Could they say that in view of article 22(1) they had a constitutional right to appear by a legal practitioner in that action? Could they say that if the law under which the trial was held denied the right to be represented by a legal practitioner. it was invalid as offending article 22(1)? We suppose the answer must plainly be in the negative. It would follow that it is not the fact of the arrest itself that gives the right to be defended by a lawyer in all matters. We may put the matter from a different point of view. Assume a case in which a law creating an offence provides that on conviction a person shall be sentenced to a certain term of imprisonment but states that it shall not be necessary to arrest the person accused of that offence before he is put up for his trial. We should suppose that in such a case the person would be entitled to the constitutional right of being defended at the trial by a legal practitioner and any provision that denies that right to him would be void as violating article 22(1). We think this would be in consonance with the decision of this Court in Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya 's case(1). We do not think that the Constitu (1) ; 244 tion could have intended that a person who ran the risk of loss of personal liberty as a result of a trial	 would not have the right to defend himself by a legal practitioner at the trial because he had not been arrested. There would be no principle to support such a view. Likewise	 we do not think that the Constitution makers intended that a person arrested would have the right to be defended by a legal practitioner at a trial which would not result in the deprivation of his personal liberty. He	 of course	 had the right to seek relief against the arrest through a legal practitioner. We would interpret the words "nor shall he" in article 22 as not being confined to a person who has been presently arrested but also as including a person who though not arrested runs the risk of loss of personal liberty. It seems to us that we would thereby be carrying out the spirit of the Constitution. The question before us is	 whether the Nyaya Panchayat Act is void as offending article 22(1) because it contains section 63. In our view	 it is not void because it does not give any power to deprive anyone of his personal liberty either by way of arrest before the trial or by way of a sentence of imprisonment as a result of the trial. It would appear that the High Court took the same view when it said that the section was void "in the case of persons arrested". In our opinion	 the High Court was in error. The validity of an Act cannot depend on the facts of a case but on its terms. The fact that the respondents were arrested under another statute	 cannot	 in our opinion make the Act void. A question was mooted at the Bar that since at the trial the respondents were not under arrest having been released on execution of bonds	 they were no longer entitled to the constitutional right conferred by article 22(1). As at present advised	 we are not inclined to accede to this view. We consider it unnecessary to pursue this matter further in the present case. For the reasons earlier stated	 in our view	 the Act is per fectly valid. No question therefore arises of the conviction being bad on the ground that the Act was invalid. In our view	 the High Court was in error in setting aside the conviction. We would	 therefore	 allow the appeal	 set aside the judg ment of the High Court and restore that of the courts below it. Hidayatullah	 J. In my opinion this appeal should fail. The short question in this appeal is whether section 63 of the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Act is inapplicable to criminal trials owing to its inconsistency with article 22(1) of the Constitution. The Panchayat Act was passed on June 17	 1949 and under its provisions the Nyaya Panchayats are empowered to try certain offences including the offence of criminal trespass punishable under section 447	 Indian Penal Code. The Act	 however	 places a limitation on the powers of these courts by enacting that they can impose a sentence 245 of fine but not imprisonment. The respondents were arrested by the Police without a warrant from a Magistrate	 for an alleged offence under section 447	 Indian Penal Code and were released on bail. After investigation the case was sent for trial before the Nyaya Panchayat	 Barwani. Fresh bail bonds were obtained from them by the Nyaya Panchayat. The respondents were fined Rs. 75 each but no sentence of imprisonment in lieu of fine was imposed on them. The respondents were not defended by a lawyer at the trial pre sumably because of section 63 of the Act which reads: "No legal practitioner shall appear on behalf of or shall plead for or defend any party in any dispute	 case or proceedings pending before the Nyaya Panchayat". The respondents filed an application for revision before the Additional Sessions Judge	 Barwani but were unsuccessful. They then filed a second application for revision in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and inter alia contended that the trial was vitiated because they were deprived of their right to be defended by counsel guaranteed under article 22(1) of the Constitution. They also submitted that section 63 of the Act was rendered void by reason of article 13 in view of its inconsistency with this guaranteed right. A learned single Judge of the High Court referred the second point for con sideration by a larger Bench but the Divisional Court declined to consider it because	 in its opinion	 the decision of this Court in the State of Punjab vs Ajaib Singh and Anr.(1) had distinctly laid down that article 22(1) was not applicable to persons held in custody or bail under an order of a court and	 therefore	 the point did not arise for decision. The case was remitted to the learned single Judge who	 by the order under appeal	 July 9	 1964 allowed the application for revision holding that the trial was vitiated as the respondents were deprived of their fundamental right to be defended by a counsel of their choice. He accordingly set aside their conviction but did not record an acquittal. The question thus arises whether section 63 of the Panchayat Act (in the setting of the powers of the Nyaya Panchayat) can be said to offend article 22(1) and for that reason to be void in so far as it takes away the right of a person who is arrested to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice in a trial before the Nyaya Panchayat. My brother Bachawat has held the section to be inapplicable to criminal trials before the Panchayat courts. He has	 however	 set aside the order of the High Court on the ground that the respondents did not seek to exercise their right at the trial and cannot	 therefore	 be said to have been deprived of it. I agree with him on the first point but in view of the importance of the question which affects some other statutes and involves a very valuable right	 I consider it necessary to express my views upon it. Article 22 is in Part III of the Constitution in a sub chapter headed "Right to Freedom". It is one of three articles immediately following article 19. Under article 19 certain fundamental rights are protected subject to restrictions which may be imposed on those Tights by law. Those restrictions are specified in relation to each of the guaranteed right in the article itself. We are not concerned with the rights or the restrictions because they do not touch the present matter. Article 20 which comes next consists of three clauses which are somewhat inadequately described by the marginal note "Protection in respect of conviction for offences". The first clause gives protection against retroactive penal laws. the second against double jeopardy and the third against testimonial compulsion. We are again not concerned with any of these rights. The next article is a general declaration relating to protection of life and personal liberty. It reads: "21.Protection of life and personal liberty.No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." It will be noticed that there is no mention here of any particular	nor of the articles that follow. Article 22	 with which we are concerned	 deals with several matters which are compendiously described in the marginal note as "Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases". It consists of seven clauses of which cls. (4) to (7) deal with preventive detention and the special requirements of such cases. They need not be considered here. Clause (3) excludes the operation of the first two clauses in respect of alien enemies and persons detained under any law providing for preventive detention. They do not touch our case. This leaves cls.(1) and	 (2) which may be quoted here: "22.Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed	 as soon as may be	 of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult	 and to be defended by	 a legal practitioner of his choice. Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. Articles 21 and 22 in a sense go together but	 in my opinion	 they cannot be treated as interrelated or interdependent. Article 21 prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life and personal liberty by laying down that these two possessions can only be taken away in accordance with procedure established by law. No authority ill India (legislative	 executive or judicial) can deprive a person of his life or personal liberty unless it can justify its action under a procedure established by law. Article 21 does not indicate what that law must be nor does article 22 say this. Article 22	 no doubt	 advances in a way the purpose of article 21	 when it specifies some guaranteed rights available to persons arrested or detained and lays down the manner in which persons detained preventively must 	be dealt with	 But the force of the declaration in article 21 is much greater than that because it makes law as the sole basis of State action to deprive a person of his life and personal liberty. We are not concerned in this case with arbitrary deprivation of life and personal liberty. The respondents were considered to have committed an offence of criminal trespass and were arrested and tried by procedure established by law. The only defect in that procedure was that they were unable to get assistance of counsel because of a provision of law which they claim to be void by reason of article 22(1). 1 proceed to examine the question. Article 22(1) is in two parts and it gives to persons arrested it two fold protection. The first is that an arrested person shall not be detained in custody without being told the grounds of such an arrest and the other is that he shall be entitled to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. article 22(2) gives a third protection and it is that every person arrested and detained in custody must be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the Magistrate. In Ajaib Singh 's case(1) it was held that by "arrest" in the article is meant physical restraint put on a person as a result of an allegation or accusation that he has committed a crime or an offence of a quasi criminal nature or that he has acted in a manner which is prejudicial to the State or public interest. It was further held that as arrests under warrants issued by courts almost always indicate the reasons for the arrest and require the person executing the warrant to produce the person arrested Wore the court	 such arrests are outside article 22(1) and (2). It was thus held that the article was designed to give protection against the act of the executive or other non judicial authority. That case arose under the (65 of 1949) under which persons abducted from Pakistan were rescued. Such persons were taken in custody and delivered to the custody of an officer in charge of a camp for the purpose of return to Pakistan. In deciding that this (1) ; 	 248 was not the kind of arrest contemplated by article 22 the court examined what meaning could be given to the word arrest. But the Bench guarded itself by observing as follows: ". . . it is not	 however	 our purpose	 nor do we consider it desirable	 to attempt a precise and meticulous enunciation of the scope and ambit of this fundamental right or to enumerate exhaustively the cases that come within its protection ". The case cannot be treated as having laid down the law finally or exhaustively. Similarly	 in State of Uttar Pradesh vs Abdul Sammad and Anr.(1) involving arrest and deportation of a person it was held by majority that it was not necessary to produce such a person before the Magistrate if he was produced before the High Court and the High Court remitted the person back to the same custody. Mr. Justice Subba Rao dissented with this view. Abdul Samad 's case(1) was also not exhaustive because the majority observed: "In view of the very limited question before us we do not feel called upon to deal with the scope of article 22(1) 22(2) or of the two clauses read together in relation to the taking into custody of a person for the purpose of executing a lawful order of deportation. . " I consider that there is room for further deliberation on the point. I do not see how we can differentiate between arrests of different kinds. Arrest is arrest	 whatever the reason. In so far as the first part of article 22(1) is concerned it enacts a very simple safeguard for persons arrested. It merely says that an arrested person must be told the grounds of his arrest. In other words	 a person 's personal liberty cannot be curtailed by arrest without in forming him	 as soon as is possible	 why he is arrested. Where the arrest is by warrant	 the warrant itself must tell him	 where it is by an order	 the order must tell him and where there is no warrant or order the person making the arrest must give that information. However the arrest is made	 this must be done and that is all that the first part of article 22(1) lays down. I find nothing in article 22(1) to limit this requirement to arrests of any particular kind. A warrant of a court and an order of any authority must show on their face the reason for arrest. Where there is no such warrant or order	 the person making the arrest must inform the person the reason of his arrest. In other words	 article 22(1) means what it says in its first part. I now come to the latter part of article 22(1). Here again	 the language is extremely clear. The words "nor shall be denied the right to consult	 and to be defended by	 a legal practitioner of his choice" refer to a person who is arrested. This is the sense of the (1)[162] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 915.249 matter and the grammatical construction of the words. It is contended by Mr. B. Sen that the article only affords a person to get released from arrest and the word 'defended ' means that the person who is arrested has a right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice and to take his aid to get out of the arrest. He contends that if a person has already been released on bail either by the authority making the arrest or by an order of the court	 the purpose of the article is served and occasion for the exercise of the guaranteed right is over. He argued	 therefore	 that in the present case the section cannot be characterized as unconstitutional because the respondents were not under arrest during their trial Lind they were not in danger of losing their personal liberty in any way since the Nyaya Panchayat had no power to impose a sentence of imprisonment. I do not agree. As I have stated already a person who is arrested gets three rights which are guaranteed. The first is that he must be told why he is arrested. This requirement cannot be dispensed with by taking bail from him. The need to tell him why he is arrested	 remains still. The next is that the person arrested must not be detained in custody more than 24 hours without being produced before a Magistrate. This requirement is dispensed with when the person arrested is admitted to bail. Otherwise it remains. The third is that he gets a right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. This is of course	 so while the arrest continues but there are no words to show that the right is lost no sooner than lie is released on bail. The word 'defended ' clearly includes the exercise of the right so long as the effect of the arrest continues. Before his release on bail the person defends himself against his arrest and the charge for which he is arrested and after his release on bail	 against the charge he is to answer and	 for answering which	 the bail requires him to remain present	 The narrow meaning of the word "defended" cannot be accepted. The framers of our Constitution must have been aware of the long struggle that took place in England before the right to be represented by counsel and to be told the grounds of arrest was established. No doubt the Crown was then concerned with traitors and other law breakers and in a desire to put them down denied them these privileges. The system then was inquisitorial as against the accusatorial which we have adopted. Although the trial was open (which was better than the continental trial behind doors)	 defence as late as 1640 meant in the words of Sir Thomas Smith(1)	 a mixture of formality and informality which consisted of an altercation between the accused and the prosecutor and his witness. The prisoner was not told what charge he had to meet because lie was not informed why he was arrested and no copy of the indictment was handed to him(1). He was closely questioned by the examining (1) De Repubica Anglorum Bk.11 c. 23 quoted by Holdsworth	 History of English Law Vol.IX	 p. 225.(2) Stephen: History of Criminal Law Vol.P.325	 330 31.250 Magistrate and then by the Judge at the trial and the prosecuting counsel. Thus it was that Throckmorton	 as an accused	 was first subjected to lengthy cross examination and had to argue even points of law in which at least he got the better of the Judge and the King 's counsel and secured a verdict of not guilty from the jury. It is	 of course	 a matter of history	 which is well known	 that the jury were themselves punished(1). Sir Walter Raleigh was also denied assistance of counsel and was cross examined by Popham C.J. without being warned or confronted with witnesses whose statements were used against him(1). College had legal advice but he fared no better because at the trial his papers containing instructions for his defence were taken away from him on the ground; that this would be tantamount to getting assistance from counsel(1). By an Act of 1695 only persons accused of high treason were given assistance of counsel and by 6 and 7 William IV	 c. 114 (in the year 1837) the Prisoners ' Counsel Act gave persons accused of felony the right to be defended by counsel. This history of English law makes it clear that the right to be defended by counsel and to be informed the reason for arrest is not an empty declaration coming to an end with release on bail. Nearer to our times we have the example of the United States of America. Right to counsel is considered so fundamental to a criminal trial that the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that there was a mistrial when Clarence Gideon could not afford a counsel and the State did not furnish one to him. Clarence Gideon was not charged with anything more serious than "the crime of breaking and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor	 to wit	 petty larceny". In the American Constitution there is no provision that an accused has a right to counsel but the Supreme Court stretched the due process clause to cover such a case. It is significant that at the retrial	 with counsel	 Gideon was acquitted of the charge on which he was first convicted. No doubt this was considered by the	 Supreme Court of America from the point of legal aid to persons accused of crime and our laws view legal aid differently. Under our jurisdiction providing counsel to an accused who cannot afford one (	except in capital cases) is not a right. Our law in respect of legal aid is similar to that declared by the Lord Chief Justice of England in Reg.vs Howes(1) who pointed out that the right to be defended by counsel is (in all save murder and treason cases) one ultimately for the discretion of the court to confer or deny. North C.J.after examining the papers said "forthat which contains the names of the witnesses	that you have again for other matters	 the instructions in point of law	 if they had been written in the first person	 in your own name	 that we might believe it was your writing	 it would have been something; but when it is written in the second person	 you should do so and so	 by which it appears to be written by another person	 it is an ill precedent permit such things; that were to give you counsel in an indirect way	 which the law gives you not directly". As we are not concerned with legal aid I need not say more but it is at least clear that when our Constitution lays down in absolute terms a right to be defended by one 's own counsel it cannot be taken away by ordinary law and it is not sufficient to say that the accused who was so deprived of this right	 did not stand in danger of losing his personal liberty. If he was exposed to penalty	 he had a right to be defended by counsel. If this were not so then instead of providing for punishment of imprisonment	 penal laws might provide for unlimited fines and it would be easy to leave the man free but a pauper	 and	 that too without a right to be defended by counsel(1). If this proposition were accepted as true we might be in the Middle Ages. The Criminal Procedure Code allows the right to be defended by counsel but that is not a guaranteed right. The framers of the Constitution have well thought of this right and by including the prescription in the Constitution have put it beyond the power of any authority to alter it without the Constitution being altered. A law which provides differently must necessarily be obnoxious to the guarantee of the Constitution. There is nothing in the words of the Constitution which permits any authority to alter this condition even on grounds of public interest as is the case with the guaranteed rights in article 19. Nor can we by a niggling argument lessen the force of the declaration so explicit in its terms or whittle down its meaning by a specious attempt at supposed harmony between rights which are not interdependent. There are three rights and each stands by itself. The first is the right to be told the reason of the arrest as soon as an arrest is made	 the second is the right to be produced before a Magistrate within twenty four hours and the third is the right to be defended by a lawyer of one 's choice. In addition there is the declaration that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except by procedure established by law. The declaration is general and insists on legality of the action. The rights given by article 22(1) and (2) are absolute in themselves and do not depend on other laws. There is no force in the submission that if there is only a punishment of fine and there is no danger to personal liberty the protection of article 22(1) is not available. Personal liberty is invaded by arrest and continues to be restrained during the period a person is on bail and it matters not whether there is or is not a possibility of imprisonment. A person arrested and put on his defence against a criminal charge	 which may result in penalty	 is entitled to the right to defend himself with the aid of counsel and any law that takes away this right offend s against the Constitution. In my judgment	 therefore	 section 63 of the Panchayat Act being inconsistent with article 22(1) 	came void on the inauguration of the Constitution in so far as it took away the right of an arrested person to be defended by a legal practitioner	of his choice. My brother Bachawat has reached the same conclusion but has reversed the order of the High Court and restored the conviction and penalty on the ground that no request was made at the trial for permission to be defended by counsel. I find it difficult to accept this result. It is true that the contention raised in the High Court has the appearance of an after thought because no complaint was made before the Sessions Judge. But it is nevertheless a question of a fundamental right. Since a request to bring in counsel would have been doomed to failure	 I feel I should not hold that the respondents go by default. As this objection is taken in the criminal case itself	 albeit at a late stage	 and not by a belated collateral proceeding	 I would allow the High Court order to stand. After all the prosecution will be free to start the case again	 if it is so desired	 and the accused will have the opportunity to defend themselves with the assistance of counsel if they so care. I would	 therefore	 dismiss the appeal. Bachawat	 J On or about November 15	 1962	 on receipt of a first information report charging the respondents with an offence under section 447 of the Indian Penal Code	 the Station Officer. Barwani registered the offence and arrested the respondents. The arrests were made without warrants issued by a magistrate. Subsequently	 the respondents were released by the Station Officer on execution of bail bonds with sureties for appearance in the Court of Nyaya Panchayat	 Barwani and other courts. On November 20	 1962	 the Station Officer submitted to the Nyaya Panchayat	 Bar wani a charge sheet against all the respondents. On the same day	 the respondents appeared before the Nyaya Panchayat	 and executed fresh bonds with sureties for appearance before the Nyaya Panchayat. The case was heard on several days	 and on January 31	 1963	 the Nyaya Panchayat convicted all the respondents under section 447 and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 75 / . On April 9	 1963	 the Additional Sessions Judge	 Barwani dismissed a revision application filed by the respondents. The respondents filed a revision petition before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh	 Indore Bench	 and contended for the first time that section 63 of the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Act	 1949 is violative of article 22(1) of the Constitution and their trials and convictions were illegal. The High Court accepted these contentions	 and by its order dated July 9 1964 declared that section 63 is void to the extent that it denied the res pondents the right to be defended by a legal practitioner of their choice in the trial before the Nyaya Panchayat	 quashed the convictions and sentences and directed that they be dealt with in accordance with law. The State of Madhya Pradesh now appeals to this Court on a certificate granted by the High Court. Mr. B. Sen appeared on behalf of the appellant. Mr. Sharma who was appointed as amicus curiae by an order of this Court	 argued the case of the respondents. In view of the constitutional 253 questions raised in this case	 notices were issued to the Advocates General of all the States. Mr. lengar appeared on behalf of the Advocate General of Kerala	 and he stated that there was no provision similar to section 63 of the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Act in the State of Kerala. Mr. Rangam appeared on behalf of the Advocate	 General of Madras	 and he drew our attention to section 76(5) of the Madras Village Courts Act (Act 1 of 1887). The Madhya Bharat Panchayat Act was passed on June 17	 1949. By section 75 of the Act	 the Nyaya Panchayat is empowered to try certain offences committed within its jurisdiction including offences under section 447. The Nyaya Panchayat has power to impose a fine not exceeding Rs. 100/ 	 but it has no power to inflict a substantive sentence of imprisonment nor a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine. Section 79 provides that if at any time it appears to the Nyaya Panchayat (a) that it has no jurisdiction to try any case before it or (b) that the offence is one for which it cannot award adequate punishment or (c) that the complaint is such or that it is so complicated that it should be tried by a Court of Justice	 the Nyaya Panchayat shall return the complaint to the complainant directing him to file it before a Sub Divisional Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case. section 89	 the decision of the Nyaya Panchayat in its criminal jurisdiction is final and not appealable except that it is subject to revision by the Sessions Judge. Section 87 provides that subject to the provisions of section 63 any party may appear before a Nyaya Panchayat by a duly authorised 1	 preventative. Section 63 provides: "No legal practitioner shall appear on behalf of or shall plead for or defend any party in any dispute	 case or proceedings pending before the Nyaya Panchayat. " The question is whether this section infringes article 22 of the Constitution. The second part of article 22(1) reads: nor shall he be denied the right to consult	 and to be defended by	 a legal practitioner of his choice." Mr. Sen submitted that "he" means a person who is arrested and detained	 and as the respondents were not detained at the time of the trial before the Nyaya Panchayat	 the constitutional guarantee is not available to them. Alternatively	 he submitted that "he" means "any parson". He argued that in the case of The State of Punjab vs Ajaib Singh and another(1)	 this Court has restricted the constitutional guarantee embodied in the first part of article 22(1) to persons arrested otherwise than under a warrant issued by a Court	 and he submitted that this restricted interpretation should not be given to the second part	 the two parts should be read independently of each other and the protection of the second part should be extended to all persons. But he also submitted that in the context of article 21 the right given by the second part of cl.(1) of article 22 (1)[1053] S.C.R. 254.254 should be limited to trials in which any person is deprived of his life or personal liberty or is in jeopardy of being so deprived. He pointed out that the Nyaya Panchayat has no power to inflict a sentence of imprisonment and be	 therefore	 submitted that the constitutional guarantee embodied in the second part of article 22(1) did not apply to a trial before a Nyaya Panchayat. It will thus appear that Mr. Sen asked us on the one hand to give a liberal interpretation to the second part of article 22(1) by applying it to all persons	 whether arrested or not and whether arrested under or without a warrant issued by a Court	 and	 on the other hand	 he asked us to give it a restricted interpretation by limiting its operation to a trial in which the accused is in jeopardy of being deprived of life or liberty. Mr. lengar submitted that "he" means "any person who is arrested". He argued that the second part of article 22(1) is an injunction on the arresting and detaining authority not to prevent consultation and defence by a legal practitioner	 and it gives no right to be defended at a trial. Mr. Rangam adopted the arguments of Mr. lengar. Mr. Sharma submitted that "he" means any person who is arrested and that any person who is arrested has the right to be defended at the trial for the offer for which he is arrested. Our duty is to listen to the clear words of the Constitution	 understand its message and then interpret it. Article 22(1) reads: "No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed	 as soon as may be	 of the grounds for such arrest. . . Every person is prima facie entitled to his personal liberty. If any person is arrested	 he is entitled to know forthwith why he is being deprived of his liberty	 so that he may take immediate steps to regain his freedom. Article 22(1) then continues: " nor shall he be denied the right to consult	 and to be defended by	 a legal practitioner of his choice. " Who is this "he" in the second part of article 22(1)? The pronoun "he" must refer to the last antecedent. "He" therefore means "any person who is arrested". He has the right to consult his lawyer and to be defended by him	 so that he may guard himself against the accusation for which he is arrested. Both parts of cl. (1) of article 22 thus come into play as soon as any person is arrested. Clause (2) of article 22 then goes on to give every person who is arrested and detained the right to be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours and the right to freedom from detention beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. Das	 J	 therefore	 observed in A. K. Gopalan vs The State(1): "Clauses (1) and (2) of article 22 lay down the procedure that has to be followed when a man is arrested. They ensure four things: (a) right to be informed regarding grounds of arrest	 (b) right to consult	 and to be defended by	 a legal practitioner of his choice	 (c) right to be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours and (d) freedom from detention beyond the said period except by order of the magistrate." Clauses (1) and (2) of article 22 safeguard the rights of the person arrested. The arrest of any person on a criminal charge is a step in an intended criminal proceeding against him. Save where the magistrate dispenses with his personal attendance and permits him to appear by a pleader	 the first step in a criminal proceeding is to bring the accused before the magistrate. The trial before the magistrate proceeds "when the accused appears or is brought before him. " The attendance of the accused before the magistrate is secured by summons or by arrest under or without a warrant. Upon arrest	 he may either be released on bail or be remanded into custody. If he is released on bail	 the bail bond ensures his attendance at the trial. Summonses	 warrants	 arrests without warrant and bail bonds are all machinery for securing the attendance of the accused before the Court. The arrest of the accused on a criminal charge has thus an intimate connection with his eventual trial on the charge. It is at the trial in the criminal Court that the accused defends or is defended by counsel. Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 therefore	 provides that any person accused of any offence before a criminal Court may	 of right	 be defended by a pleader. In this background	 the right of defence by a legal practitioner given by article 22(1) must extend to defence in a trial in a criminal Court. Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Article 22 guarantees the minimum rights which any person who is arrested shall enjoy. In support of his contention that the right of defence of the arrested person given by cl.(1) of article 22	 should be restricted to trial of offences in which the accused is in jeopardy of being deprived of his life or liberty	 Mr. Sen relied upon the observations of Das	 J. in State of Bombay vs Atma Ram Sr.dhar Vaidya(1) that article 22 sets forth certain procedural requirements which	 as a matter of constitutional necessity	 must be adopted and included in any procedure that may be enacted by the legislature and it accordance with which a person may be deprived of his life or personal liberty. He also relied upon the following ob servations of Das	 J. in A. K. Gopalan vs The State(1) at p. 325 "Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 lay down the procedure that has to be followed when a man is arrested. " For the purposes of this case	 let us give these observations their full effect. When any person is arrested	 he is deprived of his liberty	 the procedure third down in cl.(1) of article 22 must then be followed	 and he must be allowed the right to be defended by counsel of his choice. No law which permits deprivation of his personal liberty by arrest can deny him this right. Why should this right be limited to a trial in	 which he may be sentenced to death or to a term of imprisonment? Why should this right be denied to him in a trial in which he is in jeopardy of being convicted and sentenced to a heavy fine? The clear words of article 22 furnish no basis for this limitation. On this branch of his argument	 Mr. Sell submitted that "he" in the second part of cl.(1) should be read as "any person" in order that this part of cl.(1) may not suffer from the restricted interpretation of "arrest" given in Ajaib Singh 's case(1). It is impossible to accept this argument. The narrow interpretation of the expression "arrest" given in that case is not a ground for giving an unnatural meaning to the expression "he". The context of cl.(1) suggests that "he" refers to any person who is arrested. But let us assume that it is possible to give a more liberal interpretation to "he" and the operation of the second part of the clause should be extended to "any person". Even on this view	 we find no warrant for giving a restricted interpretation to the second part of the clause by reference to article 21 and for saying that the right to be defended by counsel is limited to a trial in which the arrested person is in jeopardy of being sentenced to death or to a term of imprisonment. It has been suggested that the right of defence by counsel given by article 22(1) does not extend to a trial of an offence before the Nyaya Panchayat because the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Act	 1949 does not authorise any arrest and	 as a matter of fact. the respondents were arrested by the police in the exercise of its powers under section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are unable to accept this suggestion. Suppose a statute sets tip a special criminal Court for the trial of certain offences	 and it gives no power to the police to arrest any person. Nevertheless	 the police has under its general powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure authority to arrest any person concerned in any cogniscible offence. If in the exercise of these powers the police arrests some person on the accusation of a crime for which he is liable to be tried before the special criminal Court	 the arrested person has the constitutional right to be defended by counsel at the trial before the special criminal Court in respect of the offence for which he was arrested. It has also been suggested that the trial of an offence before the Nyaya Panchayat is akin to an action for recovery of money and as an arrested person has no constitutional right to be defended by counsel in the action for recovery of money	 so	 also he has no such right in a trial of all offence before the Nyaya Panchayat We are unable to accept this line of reasoning. A person arrested on the accusation of a crime has the constitutional right to be defended by counsel at a subsequent trial of the crime for which he is arrested. He cannot	 therefore claim this right in a subsequent action against him for recovery of money	 but he can claim this right in a subsequent trial of the offence before the Nyaya Panchayat. As soon as the respondents were arrested without warrants issued by a Court	 they acquired the rights guaranteed by cl.(1) of article 22. It is true that they were subsequently released on bail and at the time of the trial before the Nyaya Panchayat they were not being detained. But the right attaching to them on their arrest continued though they were not under detention at the time of the trial. The right was not lost because they were released on bail. The respondents were arrested otherwise than under a warrant issued by a Court on the accusation that they had committed crimes. Their arrests	 therefore	 satisfy the test laid down in Ajaib Singh 's case(1)	 and are within the purview of cl.(1) of article 22. We express no opinion on the question whether the test of an arrest laid down in that case is exhaustive. We may now briefly notice a few decisions under other Pan chayat Acts. In Lal Bachan Singh vs Suraj.Bali(2)	 the Allababad High Court held that a provision of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act (26 of 1947) under which no counsel was permitted to appear in the Court of the Panchayati Adalat did not infringe any right of an accused who had not been arrested. In Gurdial Singh vs The State(1)	 the Punjab High Court held that a provision of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act (4 of 1953) under which the accused was not allowed to be defended by counsel of his choice did not infringe any right under article 22. In Digambar Aruk vs Nanda Aruk(4)	 the Orissa High Court held that no 'tight of the accused was infringed by section 94 of the Orissa Gram Panchayat Act (15 of 1948)	 which prohibited any legal practitioner from appearing before an Adalti Panchayat	 having power to award a sentence of imprisonment in lieu of fine. The reports of the two last cases do not set out full facts. Presumably	 in both cases the accused were not arrested at all	 and if so	 there could be no infringement of any right under article 22. We do not approve of these decisions if and so far as they might have held that the right of an arrested person to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice before the Panchayati Adalat was not infringed by the provisions precluding such defence. We	 therefore	 hold that section 63 of the Madhya Bharat Pan chayat Act	 1949 is violative of article 22(1) and is void to the extent it denies any person who is arrested the right to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice in any trial of the crime for which he is arrested. Most of the safeguards embodied in cls.(1) and (2) of article 22 are to be found in the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the Constitution makes the fundamental change that the rights guaranteed by cls.(1) and (2) of article 22 are no longer at the mercy of the legislature. No legislature can enact a law which is repugnant to the Constitution. A pre Constitution law which is inconsistent with the provisions of article 22 is	 to the extent of such inconsistency	 void. The next question is whether the trial and convictions were illegal. During the trial	 the respondents never claimed that they should be defended by counsel. Had they wanted the assistance of counsel	 the Nyaya Panchayat might have under section 79(c) returned the complaint for being filed before a magistrate. They were happy and content to be tried before the Nyaya Panchayat without the assistance of counsel. There was no occasion for enforcing the provisions of section 63 against them. Even if section 63 were repealed or struck down before the trial	 they would not have engaged any counsel for their defence. The existence of section 63 on the statute book did not cause them any prejudice. In the circumstances	 the High Court ought not to have quashed the trial and convictions. In the result	 we declare that section 63 of the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Act is violative of article 22(1) of the Constitution	 and is void to the extent that it denies any person who is arrested	 the right to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice in any trial of the crime for which he is arrested. Subject to this declaration	 the appeal is allowed	 the order of the High Court is set aside and the convictions and sentences passed by the Nyaya Panchayat	 Barwani are restored. ORDER In view of the majority	 the Appeal is allowed	 the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the Courts below is restored.

The respondents were arrested by the police for the offence of trespass and were released on bail. They were tried and sentenced to pay a fine by the Nyaya Panchayat	 a court established under the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Act	 1949	 with powers to impose only a sentence of fine. The conviction was set aside by the High Court on the ground that section 63 of the Act	 which provides that no legal practi tioner shall appear on behalf of any party in a proceeding before the Nyaya Panchayat	 violated article 22(1) of the Constitution and was therefore void. HELD:(Per Sarkar C.J.	 and Mudholkar	 J.): The High Court was in error in setting aside the conviction. Under article 22(1) a person arrested has the constitutional right to consult a legal practitioner concerning his arrest; and	 a person who has been arrested as well as one who though not arrested runs the risk of loss of personal liberty as a result of a trial	 have the constitutional right to be defended by an advocate of their choice. But in a trial under a law which does not provide for an order resulting in the loss of his personal liberty	 he is not entitled to the constitutional right	 because	 the Article is concerned only with giving protection to personal liberty. [241 H 242 C	 244 B C]. The Act does not give any power to deprive any one of his personal liberty either by way of arrest before the trial or by way of sentence of imprisonment as a result of the trial; nor does it deprive an arrested person of his constitutional right to take steps against the arrest or to defend himself at a trial which might occasion the loss of his personal liberty. The fact that the respondents were arrested under another statute	 namely	 the Criminal Procedure Code cannot make either the section or the Act void. [242 G H; 243 C D; 244 D E] State of Bombay vs Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya	 [1951] S.C.R. 167. 204	 followed. QUAERE:. Whether respondents were not entitled to the constitutional right because	 at the trial they were on bail. [244 E] Per Bachawat and Shelat JJ. : Section 63 of the Act is violative of article 22(1) and is void to the extent that it denies any person who is arrested the right to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice in any trial for the crime for which he is arrested. but	 the order of the High Court	 quashing the conviction	 should be set 240 aside	 because	 the respondents did not claim that they should be defended at the trial by counsel	 and the circumstances of the case	 the existence of section 63 on the statute book did not cause them any prejudice. [257 G; 258 B C] As soon as the respondents were arrested without warrants issued by a court	 they acquired the rights guaranteed by article 22(1)	 and they continued to have those rights though they were released on bail at the time of trial. The rights include the right to be defended even in a trial in which they were in jeopardy of only being sentenced to a fine. because	 the pronoun "he" in the second part of article 22(1) refers to "any person who is arrested ' . If in the exercise of the general powers under the Criminal Procedure Code	 the police arrest a person on the accusation of a crime for which he is liable to be tried before a Special Criminal Court	 the arrested person has the constitutional right to be defended by counsel at the trial before the Special Criminal Court in respect of the offence for which he was arrested. Even if the word "he" means "any person" there is no warrant for giving a restricted interpretation and limiting the right to be defended by counsel to a trial in which the arrested person is in jeopardy of being sentenced to death or to a term of imprisonment. [256 A D	 F G; 257 A B] State of Punjab vs Ajaib Singh	 ; 	 referred to. QUAERE:Whether the tests of an arrest" laid down in Ajaib Singh 's case are exhaustive. [257 C]. Per Hidayatullah J. (dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed. Under article 22	 a person who is arrested for whatever reason	 gets three independent rights. The first is the right to be told the reasons for the arrest as soon as an arrest is made	 the second is the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours and the third is the right to be defended by an advocate of his choice. When the Constitution lays down in absolute terms a right to be defended by one 's own counsel	 it cannot be taken away by ordinary law	 and. it is not sufficient to say that the accused who was so deprived	 of the right	 did not stand in danger of losing his personal liberty. The words "nor shall he be denied the right to consult	 and to be defended by	 a legal practitioner of his choice	 in article 22(1), refer to a person who is arrested. Personal liberty is invaded by arrest and continues to be restrained during the, period a person is on bail and, it is not sufficient to say that the accused who was so deprived prisonment. Before his release on bail he defends himself against his arrest and the charge for which he is arrested, and after his release on bail, against the charge he is to answer and for answering which, the bail requires him to be present. Therefore. section 63 of the Act, being inconsistent with the Article, is void. Though the contention was raised for the first time in the High Court, since it is a question of fundamental right it must be upheld. [248 H; 249 D F; 251 A B, F H; 252 B]. State of Punjab vs Aiaib Singh. ; and State of Uttar Pradesh vs Abdul Samad [1962]. S.C.R. 915. referred to. 
5676	% In this appeal, the appellant questioned the constitutional validity of sub section (4) of section 6 of the U.P. ( 'The Act ') and also the validity of the order passed by the Govt. remitting the award passed by the Labour Court for reconsideration by it. The appellant was an employee of respondent No. 5. M/s. Electric (India) Ltd., Meerut. The services of the appellant were terminated by the Management of the said respondent. The termination of services led to an industrial dispute. The State Government of Uttar Pradesh under section 4 K of the Act referred the said dispute for adjudication of the Labour Court, Meerut. The Labour Court passed an award and forwarded it to the State Government. Instead of publishing the award in the Official Gazette, as required by sub Section (3) of section 6 of the Act, the State Government passed an order under section 6(4) of the Act, remitting the award for reconsideration. The appellant submitted before the Labour Court that he did not want any re consideration of the award. On 7.2.1985, the Management filed an application saying that the case might be fixed for hearing after two months. The appellant opposed the application. The case was adjourned to 11.3.85 and on 11.3.85 to 26.3.85 at the further request of the management. In the meanwhile, the management moved the State Government to transfer the case from the Labour Court, Meerut, to another Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. The State Government passed an order transferring the case to the Industrial Tribunal Meerut. Aggrieved by the order, remitting the award to the Labour Court and the subsequent order, transferring the case to the Industrial Tribunal, the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court, challenging the above said two orders. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in respect of the order made under section 6(4) of the Act, but set aside the order of transfer. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, upholding the 470 order passed under section 6(4) of the Act, the appellant filed this appeal in this Court for relief by special leave. Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: By leave of the Court, the appellant raised an additional ground before the Court, questioning the constitutional validity of sub section (4) of section 6 of the Act itself, and the Court first took up for consideration the question relating to the constitutional validity of sub section (4) of section 6 of the Act. [476B C] The questions raised before the Labour Court were very simple ones. They had no effect on the national economy. They did not in any way interfere with the principles of social justice. No grave consequences would have ensued if the award had been published in the Official Gazette and the parties, allowed to question its validity before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The parties had not been given notice by the State Government to show cause why the award should not be remitted to the Labour Court for a fresh consideration. The order of the State Government also did not state why and on what points the State Government was not satisfied with the award and the questions on which the Labour Court was required to reconsider its award. [479G H; 480A B] When once a decision is given by a quasi judicial authority, it would not be safe to confer on any executive authority the power of review or remission in respect of the said decision without imposing any limitation on the exercise of such power, Even when a Court is conferred the power of review, such power can be exercised ordinarily under the well known limitations as are found in Order 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Similarly, under section 16 of the , the power to remit an award to the Arbitrator can be exercised by a Civil Court only under the circumstances specified in that connection. Sub section (4) of section 6 of the act imposes no such limitations. [482C D] The argument of the State Government that it was open to the State Government to seek necessary guidance from the object and contents of the Act, and that the State Government could remit the award to the Labour Court only for a reason which was germane to the statute in question, was not of any assistance to the State Government in this case because even though the reason for remitting the award may be a 471 reason connected with industry or labour, it can still be used arbitrarily to favour one party or the other. The ground for remitting the award should be one corresponding to a ground mentioned in section 16 of the ; otherwise the power is capable of serious mischief. The facts in this case themselves serve as a good illustration of the above proposition. There were only two main issues for consideration before the Labour Court: (1) whether the appellant was a workman, and (2) whether his services had been validly terminated. The Labour Court had recorded its findings on both the issues in favour of the appellant. From the prayers made before the Labour Court after the case had been remitted to it, it is seen that the Management wanted to adduce additional evidence before the Labour Court in support of its case. It was not the case of the Management that the Labour Court had unreasonably refused permission to the Management to adduce all its evidence before the award was passed. It was not even a case where industrial peace was likely to be disturbed if the award had been implemented as it was. The award would not have also affected prejudicially either national economy or social justice. In the above circumstances, it would not certainly be proper for the State Government to make an order remitting the award. The State Government in this case could do so because it had been entrusted with such unguided power under section 6(4) of the Act. [482E H; 483A C] It was urged by counsel for the State Government that sub section 4 of section 6 of the Act needed not to be struck down but the Court might direct that the State Government should give a hearing to the parties before an order was passed under section 6(4), remitting the award, and also require the State Government to give reasons in support of its order. The Court did not think that this was an appropriate case where the impugned provision could be upheld by reading into it the requirement of issuing notice to the parties and the requirement of giving reasons for its orders. The provisions could not be upheld in the absence of necessary statutory guidelines for the exercise of the power conferred by it, having regard to the fact that the proceeding before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal is in the nature of quasijudicial proceeding where parties have adequate opportunity to state their respective cases, to lead evidence and make all their submissions. It is significant that the corresponding Act which is in force in the other parts of India, i.e., the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (Central) Act XIV of 1947) does not contain any provision corresponding to section 6(4) of the Act, and the absence of such a provision in the Central Act has not led to any serious inconvenience to the general public. [483D F] 472 The Management could not derive much assistance from the decision of this Court in the Sirsilk Ltd. & Ors vs Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.[1964] 2 SCR 448 as in this case there was no settlement arrived at between the appellant and the Management, which made the publication of the award unnecessary. [484H; 485F] There was one other good reason for taking the view that without any guidelines it will not be appropriate to confer power on the State Government to nullify virtually the effect of an award by exercising its power under section 6(4) of the Act. applies not merely to disputes arising between private management and labour unions and the workmen employed by them but also to industries owned by the State Government and their workmen. In the cases where the Government is the owner of the industry, it would be inappropriate to confer uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government itself to remit the award passed on the industrial disputes arising in such industries for there is every chance of the power being exercised arbitrarily in such cases. The danger of entrusting unguided and uncontrolled power to remit an award for reconsideration of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal can very well be perceived, particularly where the award has gone against the State Government in a dispute arising out of an industry owned by it. The sub section (4) of section 6 of the Act, which is so widely worded is, therefore, likely to result in grave injustice to a party in whose favour an award is made as the said provisions can be used to reopen the whole case. The Court did not agree with the view expressed by the High Court of Allahabad in V.E. Thamas & Ors. vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. , , in which the validity of sub section (4) of section 6 of the Act had been upheld. [485F H; 486G H; 487C D] Taking into consideration all the aspects of the case, including the object with which the Act was enacted, the Court felt that sub section (4) of section 6 of the Act was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it conferred unguided and uncontrolled powers on the State Government. The Court declared sub section (4) of section 6 of the Act as unconstitutional and struck it down. It followed that the order passed by the State Government, remitting the case for reconsideration by the Labour Court was also liable to be set aside. The State Government was directed to publish the award under section 6(3) of the Act. On publication of the award, it was open to any of the parties aggrieved by the award to resort to such remedies as might be available to it in law. [487H; 488A C] 473 Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain vs The State of Uttar Pradesh and two others; , ; State of Bihar vs D.N. Ganguly & Ors., ; ; Sirsilk Ltd. 448; P. Sambamurthy & Ors. vs State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. , ; and Star Paper Mills Mazdoor Sangh & Ors. vs Star Paper Mills Ltd., Saharanpur & Ors., , referred to. V.E. Thamas & Ors. vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., , disapproved. 
3207	The trial court had convicted the respondents u/S. 302/34 I.P.C. and section 307/34 I.P.c. for the death of two persons G&Z. The occurrence took place during the night between 18th & 19th June, 1969. The victims used to cultivate jointly with others. The respondents and the two acquitted accused persons were brothers who lived in the same village. It is said that there was enmity between the deceased persons and the respondents. The prosecution case was that on the of 18th June 1969, the respondents with two others attacked G&Z and as result G died but Z survived. The trial court had convicted the respondents but the High Court acquitted them. I On appeal by the State, the main question was whether the three alleged eye witnesses, P.W.3, P.W.4 & P.W.5 who were related to each other and the victims could be relied upon, when corroborated by other facts and circumstances. Allowing the appeal, HELD : (1) It is a principle, common to all criminal appeals by special leave that this Court will refrain from substituting its own views about the appreciation of evidence if the judgment of the High Court is based on one of two alternative views each of which was reasonably open to the High Court to accept. If however, the High Courts approach is vitiated by some basically erroneous assumptions, or it adopts reasoning which, on the face of it is unsound, it may become the duty of this Court, to prevent a miscarriage of justice and to interfere with an order whether it be of conviction or of acquittal.[729F] (2) In the present case, the trial court had accepted the testimony of 3 eye witnesses, despite the fact that they are relations of the victims. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the mere fact that witness is related to the victim could not be a good enough ground for rejecting his testimony although it may be a ground for scrutinizing his evidence more critically and carefully where facts and circumstances disclose that only relations have been produced and others, presumably independent witness	 who were available	 were not produced. [729 H] The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath Is truthful unless and until he is shown to be unreliable or untruthful. In any particular respect	 witnesses solemnly deposing on oath in the witness box during a trial upon a grave charge of murder	 must be presumed to act with a full sense of responsibility of the consequences of what they state. it may be that what they say is so ' very unlikely or unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to disbelieve them. [730 F] In the present case	 the evidence of Z who became unconscious due to fatal blows by the assailants can be accepted when his evidence is strongly corroborated by medical and other evidence. 'Therefore	 the present case is a fit case where this court will interefere.