Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 637 of 1967. Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 27	 1966 of the Bombay High Court in Misc. Application No. 112 of 1963. section T. Desai	 G. L. Sanghi	 B. Datta and O. C. Mathur	 for the appellant. R. M. Hazarnavis	 section P. Nayar	 and R. H. Dhebar	 for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava	 J. The Swastik Oil Mills Ltd.	 appellant	 carries on business of manufacturing vegetable oils	 soaps and other products and selling them in India as well as exporting them outside India. It was registered as a dealer under the various Sales Tax Acts in force in Bombay. The first of these Acts was the Bombay Sales Tax Act 5 of 1946	 which was replaced by th Bombay Sales Tax Act 3 of 1953. The third and the latest Act now in force in Bombay is the Bombay Sales Tax Act 51 of 1959. 	 'The appellant was assessed to sales tax on its turnover for the periods from 1st April	 1948 to 31st March	 1950	 and from 1st April	 1950 to 31st March	 1951 on the basis of Returns of turnover submitted by it. In these Returns	 the appellant claimed exemption from tax in respect of the turnover representing the despatches or transfer of goods from its Head Office Bombay	 to its various Depots or Branches in other States in India	 and also exemption in respect of sales which were alleged to have taken place in the course of inter State trade after 26th January	 1950. The Sales Tax Officer in his order of assessment dated 2nd January	 1954 rejected both these claims. The appellant went up in appeal before the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax	 who	 in his appellate order dated 29th October	 1956	 accepted the claim of the appellant in respect of the despatches to its various Depots or Branches in other States in India	 but disallowed the claim in respect of the alleged inter State sales. As a result of partially allowing the claim of the appellant	 the Assistant Collector reduced the tax imposed by a sum of Rs. 19	240 15 6 for the period between 1st April	 1948 to 31st March	 1950	 and Rs. 97	208/for the second period between 1st April	 1950 to 31st March	 1951	 and directed refund of these amounts to the appellant. The revisions filed by the appellant against the rejection of its claim in respect of inter State sales were still pending	 when	 on 7th January	 1963	 a notice was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax	 Bombay City Division	 in Form XXIV under 495 section 31 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act	 1953	 intimating the appellant that he proposed to revise suo motu the appellate orders passed by the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax insofar as he had allowed deduction	 in respect of the entire goods despatched to its Branches in other States outside Maharashtra	 because	 in so doing	 he had overlooked the provisions contained in proviso (b) to sub clause (ii) of Rule 1 under sub section (3) of section 6 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act	 1946 as amended by the Bombay Sales Tax Amendment Act 48 of 1949. On receipt of this notice	 the appellant put in appearance before the Deputy Commissioner	 who is the respondent in this appeal	 and raised several objections against the proposed revisional proceedings	 making a request that the proceedings be dropped. Since the respondent did not accept this request	 the appellant filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Bombay challenging the notice dated 7th January	 1963	 with the prayer that the notice be quashed and the respondent be restrained from taking any action against the appellant in pursuance thereof. The petition was dismissed by the High Court and	 now	 on certificate granted by that Court	 the appellant has come up in this appeal to this Court. In this appeal	 Mr. section T. Desai	 appearing on behalf of the appellant	 urged the same objections against the notice which were the basis of the prayer for writ in the High Court	 and we proceed to deal with them in the order in which he has put them forward before us in his submissions. The first point urged by learned counsel was that	 in exercise of the revisional powers	 the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax	 whether acting under the Sales Tax Act of 1946	 or of 1953	 or of 1959	 could only proceed to take action on the basis of the material already present on the record and was not entitled to act on conjecture or to institute any enquiry so as to include additional material in order to judge the correctness of the order sought to be revised. In support of this proposition	 learned counsel referred us to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs T. G. Lakshmaiah Setty & Sons.(1). In that case	 the Deputy Commissioner	 in exercising the revisional jurisdiction	 was found by the High Court to have based his assessment on guess work	 and the Court held that "this conjecture could not be a _justification for seeking to revise the order of the assessing authority. If the Deputy Commissioner could	 on the material before him	 find data for revising the assessment	 it was open to him to do so. It must be made clear that he has no jurisdiction to travel beyond the record that is available to the assessing authority and the basis should be found on the record already in existence. " We are unable to accept this principle laid down	 by that High Court as (1) 12 S.T.C. 663. 496 correct. Whenever a power is conferred on an authority to revise an order	 the authority is entitled to examine the correctness	 legality and propriety of the order and to pass such suitable orders as the authority may think fit in the circumstances of the particular case before it. When exercising such powers	 there is no reason why the authority should not be entitled to hold an enquiry or direct an enquiry to be held and	 for that purpose	 admit additional material. The proceedings for revision	 if started suo motu	 must not	 of course	 be based on a mere conjecture and there should be some ground for invoking the revisional powers. Once those powers are invoked	 the actual interference must be based on sufficient grounds and	 if it is considered necessary that some additional enquiry should be made to arrive at a proper and just decision	 there can be no bar to the revising authority holding a further enquiry or directing such an enquiry to be held by some other appropriate authority. This principle has been clearly recognised by this Court in The State of Kerala vs K. M. Cheria Abdulla and Company(1). In that case	 sub section (2) of section 12 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act	 1939	 which came up for interpretation	 empowered the Deputy Commissioner	 suo motu or under certain circumstances on an application	 to call for and examine the record of any order passed or proceeding recorded under the provisions of that Act by any officer subordinate to him	 for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such order	 or as to the regularity of such proceeding	 and to pass such order with respect thereto as he thought fit. This Court held : "There is no doubt that the revising authority may only call for the record of the order or the proceeding	 and the record alone may be scrutinised for ascertaining the legality or propriety of an order or regularity of the proceeding. But there is nothing in the Act that for passing an order in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction	 if the revising authority is satisfied that the subordinate officer has committed an illegality or impropriety in the order or irregularity in the proceeding	 be cannot make or direct any further enquiry. " It was further held "It is	 therefore	 not right baldly to propound that	 in passing an order in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction	 the ' Deputy Commissioner must	 in all cases	 be restricted to the record maintained by the officer subordinate to him	 and can never make enquiry outside that record." (1) ; 497 While thus explaining the scope of the revisional power	 the Court also indicated the limitations within which such power can be exercised	 holding : " It would not invest the revising authority with power to launch upon enquiries at large so as either to trench upon the powers which are expressly reserved by the Act or by the Rules to other authorities or to ignore the limitations inherent in the exercise of those powers. For instance	 the power to reassess escaped turnover is primarily vested by rule 17 in the assessing officer and is to be exercised subject to certain limitations	 and the revising authority will not be competent to make an enquiry for reassessing a taxpayer. Similarly	 the power to make a best judgment assessment is vested by section 9 (2) (b) in the assessing authority and has to be exercised in the manner provided. It would not be open to the revising authority to assume that power." (p. 887). In the present case	 the notice issued by the Deputy Commis sioner of Sales Tax	 on the face of it	 discloses the reasons which led him to take proceedings for exercising his revisional powers suo motu	 and it cannot be said on those facts that he was acting merely on conjecture. The Deputy Commissioner has not yet proceeded further under the notice to make the assessment. We have no doubt that	 when the Deputy Commissioner does make an enquiry	 if any	 for the purpose of exercising his revisional powers	 he will keep within the limitations indicated by this Court in the case cited above. The notice cannot be quashed or the proceedings restrained merely on the ground that the Deputy Commissioner may have to hold some enquiries in order to properly exercise his revisional jurisdiction. Mr. Desai on behalf of the appellant emphasised the circumstance that in section 12(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act	 which was considered by this Court	 the Deputy Commissioner 's power was expressed by stating that he may pass such order as he	 thinks fit	 while no such words occur in the corresponding provisions in the Bombay Sales Tax Acts with which we are concerned	 but we do not think that this circumstance makes any difference. A revising authority necessarily has the power to make such order as	 in the opinion of that authority	 the case calls for when the authority is satisfied that it is an appropriate case for interference in exercise of revisional powers. In fact	 in section 12(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act	 the Deputy Commissioner	 when exercising his powers	 was to call for the record of the order or proceeding before passing any order which he thought fit	 so that there was an expression used which could have been interpreted as limiting his powers to the examination of the record only without holding any further 498 enquiry	 and	 yet	 this Court held that the	 Deputy Commissioner could not be restricted to the record and was empowered to make an enquiry outside that record. In the provisions relating to revisions in the three Bombay Sales Tax Acts	 there are no such words indicating any limitation; and that would be an additional reason for holding that there can be no bar to an appropriate enquiry being held by the Deputy Commissioner when seeking to exercise his revisional powers suo motu. The next point urged by learned counsel was that the notice in question was issued on the 7th January	 1963	 when the Act of 1959 had already come into force and the Act of 1953 had been repealed	 so that if any revisional jurisdiction could be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner	 it could only be under the Act of 1959 and not under the Act of 1953. On this basis	 advantage was sought to be taken of the circumstance that	 under the Act of 1959	 the revisional powers conferred by section 57 can be exercised within five years from the date of the order sought to be revised and	 at the relevant time in 1963	 could only be exercised within two years from the date of that order. The order sought to be revised was passed on 29th October	 1956	 so that the notice to exercise revisional powers was being issued more than 6 years after that order had been passed. It appears to us that this submission is adequately met by the provisions contained in section 77 of the Act of 1959. The Act of 1953 was repealed by section 76 of the Act of 1959 and then section 77 lays down : "(1) Notwithstanding the repeal by section 76 of any of the laws referred to therein	 (a) those laws (including any earlier law continued in force under any provisions thereof)	 and all rules	 regulations	 orders	 notifications	 forms and notices issued under those laws and in force immediately before the appointed day shall	 subject to the provisions of section 42 continue to have effect for the purposes of the levy	 assessment	 reassessment	 collection	 refund or set off of any tax	 or the granting of a draw back in respect thereof	 or the imposition of any penalty	 which levy	 assessment	 reassessment	 collection	 refund	 setoff	 draw back or penalty relates to any period before the appointed day	 or for any other purpose whatsoever connected with or incidental to any of the purposes aforesaid; 499 (3) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in the foregoing sub sections and section thereto	 section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act	 1904	 shall apply in relation to the repeal of any of the laws referred to in section 76 as if the law so repealed had been an enactment within the meaning of section 7 of that Act." (We have only quoted the portions of section 77 with which we are concerned). The effect of section 77 (1)(a) is to continue in force the Bombay Sales Tax Act of 1953 as well as the Bombay Sales Tax Act of 1946 to the extent to which they were in force when this Act of 1959 came into force for the purposes mentioned in that clause. These purposes included levy	 assessment	 reassessment and collection of sales tax	 so that the proceedings against the appellant	 which had been initiated under the Act of 1946	 continued to be governed by the provisions of that Act. Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1 of 1904	 which was made applicable 'by section 77(3) to the repeal of the Act of 1953	 includes the following provisions : " Where this Act	 or any Bombay Act	 or Maha rashtra Act	 made after the commencement of this Act	 repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made	 then	 unless a different intention appears	 the repeal shall not (c) affect any right	 privilege	 obligation or liability acquired	 accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation	 legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right	 privilege	 obligation	 liability	 penalty	 forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid	 and any such investigation	 legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted	 continued or enforced	 and any such penalty	 forfeiture or punishment may be imposed	 as if the repealing Act had not been passed. " Very clearly	 the repeal of the Act of 1953 by the Act of 1959 did not affect the rights and liabilities of the assessee to tax under the Act of 1953 or the Act of 1946 in respect of the turnover which became liable to sales tax under the Act of 1946. The effect of clause (e) of section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 500 further is that any legal proceeding in respect of levy	 imposition or recovery of that tax is to continue and any fresh investigation	 legal proceeding or remedy could be instituted as if there had been no repeal by the Act of 1959. Consequently	 the repeal of the Act of 1953 did not in any way affect the power of the Deputy Commissioner to institute proceedings for revision suo motu against the appellate order of the Assistant Collector which had been passed in exercise of his powers under the Act of 1946. It is true	 as urged by Mr. Desai in the alternative	 that	 in fact	 the proceedings should have been taken not under section 31 of the Act of 1953	 but under section 22 of the Act of 1946. This is so	 because when the Act of 1946 was repealed by the Act of 1953	 similar provisions were made in the Act of 1953 to continue in force the provisions of the Act of 1946 in respect of rights and liabilities which may have accrued or have been incurred under the Act of 1946. Section 48(2) and section 49(1) clearly contained provisions indicating that	 in respect of a liability to tax under the Act of 1946	 the rights and liabilities of the assessee had to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1946 and all legal proceedings or remedies in respect thereof had also to be taken under the same Act. Consequently	 the Deputy Commissioner	 in seeking to exercise revisional powers against the order of the Assistant Collector passed under the Act of 1946	 had to proceed under section 22 of the Act of 1946. That	 however	 is not at all material	 because the provisions of section 22 of the Act of 1946 are quite similar to those of section 31 of the Act of 1953. The mere incorrect mention of section 31 of the Act of 1953 in the notice is immaterial. The Deputy Commissioner has the jurisdiction and power to revise the order under section 22 of the Act of 1946 and	 consequently the proceedings initiated by him are not without jurisdiction. The last submission made by Mr. Desai was that	 if it be held that the revisional powers are sought to be exercised under the Act of 1946	 it should be held that the proceedings sought to be instituted are barred by time	 because limitation of a reasonable time	 within which the revisional powers are to be exercised	 must be implied in the statute itself. Section 22 of the Act of 1946 and section 31 of the Act of 1953 do not lay down any limitation for exercise of the power of revision by a Deputy Commissioner sue motu	 and we are not prepared to accept that any such limitation must be necessarily read in the two Acts. In support of his proposition that such a limitation must be read by us	 Mr. Desai referred to the decision of this Court in the State of Orissa vs Debaki Debi and Others(1). That case	 however	 has no relevance at all	 because	 in the Orissa Sales Tax Act	 there was a proviso in general terms laying down that no order "assessing the (1) 15 S.T.C. 153. 501 amount of tax shall be passed after the lapse of 36 months from the expiry of the period"	 and it was held that this provision was	 in substance	 not a real proviso to the section in which it was placed	 but was	 in fact	 a period of limitation prescribed for all orders of assessment made under any other provision of the Act. In the Bombay Sales Tax Acts of 1946 and 1953	 there is no such general provision prescribing a period of limitation for making an assessment and	 even though the effect of the order of the Dy. Commissioner passed in revision may be to bring about an assessment to tax of turnover which was set aside by the Assistant Collector in appeal. 	 such an assessment does not come under any provision relating to limitation. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income tax	 Bombay City 1 vs Narsee Nagsee & Co. (1) is also similarly inapplicable. In that case	 section 11 of the Business Profits Tax Act	 1947	 which had no limitation prescribed for an order of assessment	 was held to be governed by the 4 years ' period of limitation which was prescribed under section 14 for issue of a notice for reassessment. The decision in that case turned on the fact that	 if proceeding for reassessment could not be started after the expiry of four years from the end of the chargeable accounting period concerned	 it would be totally unreasonable to hold that the first assessment of tax can be made after the expiry of that period. The case before us relates to exercise of revisional powers and does not deal with the question of the first assessment to be made when the Return is initially filed by an assessee. In fact	 when a revisional power is to be exercised	 we think that the only limitations	 to which that power is subject	 are those indicated by this Court in K. M. Cheria Abdulla & Co 's(2) case. These limitations are that the revising authority should not trench upon the powers which are expressly reserved by the Acts or by the Rules to other authority and should not ignore the limitations inherent in the exercise of those powers. In the present case	 the Deputy Commissioner	 when seeking to exercise his revisional powers	 is clearly not encroaching upon the powers reserved to other authorities. Under the Act of 1946	 the first assessment is made by the Sales Tax Officer under section 11. If information comes into his possession that any turnover in respect of sales or supplies of any goods chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in any year or has been under assessed or assessed at a lower rate or any deductions have been wrongly made therefrom	 proceedings can be taken afresh under section 11A. On the face of it	 if a first assessment order is made under section 11 and any turnover escapes assessment	 the appropriate provision	 under which action is to be taken for assessing that turnover to tax	 is section 11A. There is	 however	 no provision under which the power now sought to be exercised by (1) (2) ; 502 the Deputy Commissioner in the case before us could have been exercised by any other authority. In this case	 as we have indicated earlier	 the first assessment of tax was made by the Sales Tax Officer	 and the turnover now in question was assessed to tax by him. Having once assessed that turnover to tax	 he could .not initiate a fresh proceeding in respect of it under section 11A. The 	assessment made by him was set aside in appeal by the Assistant Collector and it is this order of the Assistant Collector which is sought to be revised by the Deputy Commissioner. This is	 therefore	 not a case where the powers are being exercised for the purpose of assessing or reassessing an escaped turnover. The case is one where the revisional powers are sought to be exercised to correct what appears to be an incorrect order passed in appeal by the Assistant Collector	 and	 for such a purpose	 proceedings could not possibly have been taken under section 11A. In exercising his revisional powers	 therefore	 the Deputy Commissioner is not encroaching upon the jurisdiction of any other authority specially entrusted with taking such proceedings. In this connection	 Mr. Desai relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Manordas Kalidas vs V. V. Tatke(1). The decision in that case also related to this very Act of 1946	 but the point to be kept in view is that in that case	 the revisional power was sought to be exercised in respect of the original assessment order passed by the Sales Tax Officer under section 11 of the Act. It was in these circumstances that the Bombay High Court	 after referring to its two decisions in Bisesar House vs State of Bombay (2 and Commr. of Income tax vs Narsee Nagsee & Co. held : 		In neither of those two cases	 revisional powers were sought to be exercised	 but the principle of those cases must	 in our judgment	 apply for the same reasons to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction	 and that jurisdiction must be exercised w ithin a reasonable period	 and the yard stick of reasonableness will be the period prescribed for re assessment." It appears that in view of the fact that proceedings for re assessment could have been taken under section 11A in that case and	 instead	 revisional powers were sought to be exercised	 that Court held that the exercise of such revisional powers must be	 governed by the same limitation which applied to the exercise of power of reassessment. In fact	 the correct principle that should have been applied in that case is the principle mentioned by us earlier laid down in K. M. Cheria Abdulla & Co.(4). The revision should have been held to be incompetent on the ground that the power (1) 11 S.T.C. 87. (2) 9 S.T.C. 654. (3) (4) ; 503 was sought to be exercised for assessment of escaped turnover which had not 'been assessed at all at the initial stage of assessment under section 11 and proceedings under section 11A could have been competently initiated for bringing that turnover to tax. Instead	 the Court equated the proceeding in revision with the proceeding for reassessment and applied the 4 year period of limitation which was prescribed only for reassessment and not for exercise of revisional power. In our opinion	 the ultimate decision in that case was perfectly correct	 but we are unable to affirm the vie	%	 that the revisional power is governed by any period of limitation laid down in section 11A for proceedings for reassessment of escaped turn over. Reference	 in this connection	 was also made to a decision of this Court in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh vs Commissioner of Income tax	 Bihar and Orissa(1)	 in which the Court dealt with a case of an assessee whose income to the extent of Rs. 93	604/representing interest on arrears of rent was omitted to be brought to assessment by the Income tax Officer. Subsequently	 in another case	 the Privy Council held that interest on arrears of rent payable in respect of agricultural land was not agricultural income and	 consequently	 the Income tax Officer initiated reassessment proceedings under section 34(1) (b) of the Income tax Act. The circumstance relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant was that the omission by the Income tax Officer to bring to assessment that interest was part of an order made by him after his initial assessment order had been set aside by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who directed a fresh assessment	 allowing the appeal against that order. In that case	 it was held that the escaped income could be brought to tax under section 34 of the Income Tax Act; and	 on the basis of this decision	 it was urged that	 similarly	 in the present case	 the turnover now sought to be brought to tax in exercise of revisional powers could be re assessed under section 11A. This argument ignores the circumstance that	 in that case	 the last order	 under which the income from interest had been exempted from tax	 was an order made by the Income Tax Officer himself	 though after the assessment proceedings had been remanded to him by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Since the income had escaped assessment under an order passed by the Income tax Officer himself	 he could competently take proceedings under section 34. In the case before us	 the turnover of the assessee now sought to be taxed in the revisional proceedings did not escape liability to tax under the orders of the Sales tax Officer and	 on the other hand	 was actually taxed by him	 which imposition of tax was set aside in appeal. Consequently	 the Sales Tax Officer could not possibly take proceedings under section II A in respect of that turnover. (1) 504 For these reasons	 we hold that the proceedings initiated by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax against the appellant are not incompetent and the High Court was right in refusing the writ sought by the appellant. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.

The appellant was registered as a dealer under the various Sales Tax Acts in force in Bombay from time to time i.e. Bombay Acts 5 of 1946	 3 of 1953 and 51 of 1959. In the course of its assessments to sales tax for the periods from 1st April	 1948 to 31st March	 1950	 and from 1st April 1950 to 31st March	 1951	 the appellant claimed exemption from tax	 inter alia	 in respect of certain despatches of goods from its head office in Bombay to its branches in other States. The Sales Tax Officer rejected these claims but	 in appeal	 the Assistant Collector accepted the claim in respect of the despatches to various branches though he rejected all other claims for exemption. He also directed a refund of the excess 'tax collected from the appellants. While revision petitions filed by the appellant against these orders were pending	 a notice was issued to him on January 7	 1963 by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax in Form XXIV under section 31 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act	 1953	 intimating the appellant that he proposed to revise suo motu the orders passed by the Assistant Collector in so far as he had allowed deduction in respect of the entire goods despatched to the appellants ' branches outside Maharashtra because	 in so doing	 he had overlooked certain provisions of law which were specified in the notice. Tile appellant filed a petition under article 226 of the Institution seeking to quash the notice dated 7th January	 1963 but his petition was dismissed by the High Court. In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant	 inter alia (i) that in exercise of the revisional powers	 the Deputy Commissioner	 whether acting under the Sales Tax Act of 1946	 or of 1953	 or of 1959	 could only proceed to take action on the basis of the material already present on the record and was not entitled to act on conjecture or to institute any enquiry so as to include additional material nor to judge the correctness of the order sought to be revised; (ii) that the notice in question was issued on 7th January	 1963	 when the Act of 1959 had already come into force and the Act of 1953 had been repealed; so that any revisional jurisdiction could only be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner under the Act of 1959 and not under the Act of 1953 	 as the power under section 57 of the Act of 1959 could only be exercised within five years from the date of the order sought to be revised; the notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner was time barred; and (iii) that the proceedings to be instituted were barred by time	 because limitation of a reasonable time; within which the revisional Powers are to be exercised must be implied in the statute itself. 493 HELD : The proceedings initiated by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax against the appellant were not incompetent and the High Court was right in refusing the writ sought by the appellant. (i) Whenever a power is conferred on an authority to revise an order	 it is entitled to examine the correctness	 legality and propriety of the order and to pass such suitable orders as it may think fit in the circumstances of the particular case. The proceedings for revision	 if started suo motu	 must not be based on a mere conjecture and there should be some ground for invoking the revisional powers. Once these powers are invoked	 the actual interference must be based on sufficient grounds and	 if it is considered necessary that some additional enquiry should be made to arrive at a proper and just decision	 there can be no bar to the revising authority holding or directing a further enquiry and thereafter admitting additional material. [496 A C] The State of Kerala vs K. M. Cheria Ahdulla and Company	 ; 	 explained and followed. State of Andhra Pradesh vs T. G. Lakshmnaiah Setty & Sons	 12 S.T.C. 663; disapproves. In the present case	. the notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner	 on the face of it	 disclosed the reasons which led him to take proceedings for exercising his revisional powers suo motu	 and it could not be said on those facts that he was acting merely on conjecture. There was no reason to think that	 when proceeding with his inquiry	 he would not keep within the limitations indicated by this Court in K. M. Cheria Abdullas case. (ii) The effect of section 77(1) (a) of the Act of 1959 is to continue in force the Act of 1953 as well as: the Act of 1946 to the extent to which they were in force when the Act of 1959 came into force for the purposes of levy	 assessment	 reassessment and collection of sales tax. Fur thermore	 by virtue of section 7(e) of the Bombay General Clauses Act	 1904	 which was made applicable to the repeal of the Act of 1953 by section 77(3) of the 1959 Act	 any legal proceeding in respect of levy	 imposition or recovery of tax is to continue and any fresh investigation	 legal proceeding or remedy could be instituted as if there had been no repeal by the Act of 1959. Consequently	 the repeal of the Act of 1953 did not in any way affect the power of the Deputy Commissioner to institute proceedings for revision suo motu against the appellate order of the Assistant Collector which had been Passed in exercise of his power under the Act of 1946. [499 C 500 B] Although the Deputy Commissioner	 in seeking to exercise revisional powers should have proceeded under section 22 of the Act of 1946 and not under section 31 of the 1953 Act	 this fact was immaterial as the provisions of the two Sections were similar. [500 D E] (iii) Section 22 of the Act of 1946 and section 31 of the Act of 1953 do not lay down any period of limitation for the exercise of the power of revision by a Deputy Commissioner suo motu and no such limitation could be read in the two Acts. [500 G] The State of Orissa vs Debaki Debi and Others	 15 S.T.C. 153. Commissioner of Income tax	 Bombay City 1 vs Narsee Nagsee & Co.	 	 Manordas Kalidas vs V. V. Tatke	 11 S.T.C	 87. Disesar House vs State of Bombay	 9 S.T.C. 654	 distinguished. 494 Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh vs C.I.T.	 Bihar and Orissa	 	 referred to.