Summarize the following court judgment. ns Nos. 31	 50	 52	 54	 81 and 82 of 1964. Petitions under article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. R. Gopalakrishnan	 for the petitioners (in W.P. Nos. 31 and 52 of 1964). G. C. Kasliwal	 Advocate General	 State of Rajasthan	 K. K. Jain (for W. P. No. 31 of 1964 only) and R. N. Sachthey	 for the respondent (in W. P. Nos. 31 and 52 of 1964). C. K. Daphtary	 Attorney General and R. H. Dhebar	 for the Union of India. M. C. Setalvad	 J. B. Dadachanji	 O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain	 for intervener No. 1. G. section Pathak	 J. B. Dadachanji	 O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain	 for intervener No. 2. Dipak Dutta Chaudhuri and A. K. Nag	 for the petitioners (in W. P. No. 50 of 1964). B. K. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey	 for the respondent (in W. P. No. 50 1964). section K. Mehta	 K. L. Mehta	 for the petitioners (in W. P. No. 54 of 1964). B. K. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey	 for respondents Nos.1 to 3 (in W. P. No. 54 of 1964). R. V. section Mani	 for the petitioners (in W. P. Nos. 81 and 82 of 1964). 937 C. K. Daphtary	 Attorney General	 B. Sen and R. H. Dhebar	 for respondent No. 1 (W. P. No. 81 of 1964). C. K. Daphtary	 Attorney General	 R. K. P. Shankardass and R. H. Dhebar	 for respondent No. 1 (in W. P. No. 82 of 1964). N. Krishnaswamy Reddy	 Advocate General	 State of Madras	 A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam	 for respondent No. 2 (in W. P. Nos. 81 and 82 1964). K. section Chawla and R. V. section Mani	 for intervener No. 3. The Judgment of P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.	 K. 	 N. WANCHOO and RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ. was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J. M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ. delivered separate judgments. Gajendragadkar C.J. These six writ petitions which have been filed under article 32 of the Constitution	 seek to challenge the validity of the Constitution (17th Amendment) Act	 1964. The petitioners are affected by one or the other of the Acts added to the 9th Schedule by the impugned Act	 and their contention is that the impugned Act being constitutionally invalid	 the validity of the Acts by which they are affected cannot be saved. Some other parties who are similarly affected by other Acts added to the 9th Schedule by the impugned Act	 have intervened at the hearing of these writ petit ions	 and they have joined the petitioners in contending that the impugned Act is invalid. The points raised in the present proceedings have been elaborately argued before us by Mr. Setalvad and Mr. Pathak for the interveners and Mr. Mani for the petitioners. We have also heard the Attorney General in reply. The impugned Act consists of three sections. The first section gives its short title. Section 2(i) adds a proviso to cl. (1) of article 31A after the existing proviso. This proviso reads thus "Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation	 it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto	 unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land	 building or structure	 provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof". 938 Section 2 (ii) substitutes the following sub clause for sub cl. (a) of cl. (2) of article 31A: "(a) the expression "estate" shall	 in relation to any local area	 have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area and shall also include (i) any jagir	 inam or muafi or other similar grant and in the States of Madras and Kerala	 any janmam	 right; (ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement; (iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto	 including waste land	 forest land	 land for pasture or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land	 agricultural labourers and village artisans". Section 3 amends the 9th Schedule by adding 44 entries to it. That is the	 nature of the provisions contained in the impugned Amendment Act. In dealing with the question about the validity of the impugned Act	 it is necessary to consider the scope and effect of the provisions contained in article 368 of the Constitution	 because a large part of the controversy in the present writ petitions turns upon the decision of the question as to what the true scope and effect of article 368 is. Let us read article 368 : "368. An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament	 and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two thirds of the members of that House present and voting	 it shall be presented to the President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the Bill	 the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill : Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in (a) Article 54	 Article 55	 Article 73	 Article 162 or Article 241	 or (b) Chapter IV of Part V	 Chapter V of Part VI	 or Chapter 1 of Part XI	 or 939 (c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule	 or (d) the representation of States in Parliament	 or (e) the provisions of this Article	 the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than one half of the States by resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent". It would	 thus	 appear that the broad scheme of article 368 is that if Parliament proposes to amend any provision of the Constitution not enshrined in the proviso	 the procedure prescribed by the main part of the Article has to be followed. The Bill introduced for the purpose of making the amendment in question	 has to be passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two thirds of the members of that House present and voting. This requirement postulates that a bill seeking to amend the relevant provisions of the Constitution should receive substantial support from members of both the Houses. That is why a two fold requirement has been prescribed in that behalf. After the bill is passed as aforesaid	 it has to be presented to the President for his assent and when he gives his assent	 the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the bill. That is the position in regard to the amendment of the provisions of the Constitution to which the proviso does not apply. If Parliament intends to amend any of the provisions of the Constitution which are covered by clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso	 there is a further requirement which has to be satisfied before the bill car. be presented to the President for his assent. Such a bill is required to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than one half of the States by Resolutions to that effect passed by them. In other words	 in respect of the Articles covered by the proviso	 the further safeguard prescribed by the proviso is that the intended amendment should receive the approval of the Legislatures of not less than one half of the States. That means that at least half of the States constituting the Union of India should by a majority vote	 approve of the proposed amendment. It is obvious that the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III are not included in the proviso	 and so	 if Parliament intends to amend any of the provisions contained in Articles 12 to 35 which are included in Part III	 it is not necessary to take recourse to the proviso and to satisfy the additional requirements prescribed by it. 940 Thus far	 there is no difficulty. But in considering the scope of article 368	 it is necessary to remember that article 226	 which is included in Chapter V of Part VI of the Constitution	 is one of the constitutional provisions which fall under cl. (b) of the proviso; and so	 it is clear that if Parliament intends to amend the provisions of article 226	 the bill proposing to make such an amendment must satisfy	 the requirements of the proviso. The question which calls for our decision is : what would be the requirement about making an amendment in a constitutional provision contained in Part III	 if as a result of the said amendment	 the powers conferred on the High Courts under article 226 are likely to be affected ? The petitioners contend that since it appears that the powers prescribed by article 226 are likely to be affected by the intended amendment of the provisions contained in Part III the bill introduced for the purpose of making such an amendment	 must attract the proviso	 and as the impugned Act has admittedly not gone through the procedure prescribed by the proviso	 it is invalid; and that raises the question about the construction of the provisions contained in article 368 and the relation between the substantive part of article 368 with its proviso. In our opinion	 the two parts of article 368 must on a reasonable construction be harmonised with each other in the sense that the scope and effect of either of them should not be allowed to be unduly reduced or enlarged. It is urged that any amendment of the fundamental rights contained in Part III would inevitably affect the powers of the High Court	 prescribed by article 226	 and as such	 the bill proposing the said amendment cannot fall under the proviso; otherwise the very object of not including Part III under the proviso would be defeated. When the Constitution makers did not include Part III under the proviso	 it would be reasonable to assume that they took the view that the amendment of the provisions contained in Part III was a matter which should be dealt with by Parliament under the substantive provisions of article 368 and not under the proviso. It has no doubt been suggested that the Constitution makers perhaps did not anticipate that there would be many occasions to amend the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part M. However that may be	 as a matter of construction	 there is no escape from the conclusion that article 368 provides for the amendment of the provisions contained in Part III without imposing on Parliament an obligation to adopt the procedure prescribed by the proviso. It is true that as a result of the amendment of the fundamental rights	 the area over which the powers prescribed by article 226 would operate may be reduced	 but apparently	 the 	Constitution makers took the view that the diminution in the area 941 over which the High Courts ' powers under article 226 operate	 would not necessarily take the case under the proviso. On the other hand	 if the substantive part of article 368 is very liberally and generously construed and it is held that even substantial modification of the fundamental rights which may make a very serious and substantial inroad on the powers of the High Courts under article 226 can be made without invoking the proviso	 it may deprive cl. (b) of the proviso of its substance. In other words	 in construing both the parts of article 368	 the rule of harmonious construction requires that if the direct effect of the amendment of fundamental rights is to make a substantial inroad on the High Courts ' powers under article 226	 it would become neces sary to consider whether the proviso would cover such a case or not. If the effect of the amendment made in the fundamental rights on the powers of the High Courts prescribed by article 226	 is indirect	 incidental	 or is otherwise of an insignificant order	 it may be that the proviso will not apply. The proviso would apply where the amendment in question seeks to make any change	 inter alia	 in article 226. and the question in such a case would be : does the amendment seek to make a change in the provisions of article 226 ? The answer to this question would depend upon the effect of the amendment made in the fundamental rights. In dealing with constitutional questions of this character	 courts generally adopt a test which is described as the pith and substance test. In Attorney General for Ontario vs Reciprocal Insurers and others(1)	 the Privy Council was called upon to consider the validity of the Reciprocal Insurance Act	 1922 (12 & 13 Geo. 5	 Ont.	 c. 62) and section 508c which had been added to the Criminal Code of Canada by sections 7 & 8 Geo. 5	 c. 29 Dom. Mr. Justice Duff	 who spoke for the Privy Council	 observed that in an enquiry like the one with which the Privy Council was concerned in that case	 "it has been formally laid down in judgments of this Board	 that in such an inquiry the Courts must ascertain the 'true nature and character ' of the enactment : Citizens ' Insurance Co. vs Parsons(1); its 'pith and substance ' : Union Colliery Co. vs Bryden(3); and it is the result of this investigation	 not the form alone	 which the statute may have assumed under the hand of the draughtsman	 that will determine within which of the categories of subject matters mentioned in sections 91 and 92 the legislation falls; and for this purpose the legislation must be 'scrutinised in its entirety ' "Great West Saddlery Co. vs The King" (4). It is not (1) (2) [1881] 7 App. Cas 96. (3) (4) 	 117. 942 necessary to multiply authorities in support of the proposition that in considering the constitutional validity of the impugned Act	 it would be relevant to inquire what the pith and substance of the impugned Act is. This legal position can be taken to be established by the decisions of this Court which have consistently adopted the view expressed by Justice Duff	 to which we have just referred. What then is the pith and substance of the impugned Act ? For answering this question	 it would be necessary to recall very briefly the history of Articles 31A and 31B. Articles 31A and 3 1 B were added to the Constitution with retrospective effect by section 4 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act	 1951. It is a matter of general knowledge that it became necessary to add these two provisions in the Constitution	 because it was realised that legislative measures adopted by certain States for giving effect to the policy of agrarian reform which was accepted by the party in power	 had to face a serious challenge in the courts of law on the ground that they contravened the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens by Part III. These measures had been passed in Bihar	 Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh	 and their validity was impeached in the High Courts in the said three States. The High Court of Patna held that the relevant Bihar legislation was unconstitutional	 whilst the High Courts at Allahabad and Nagpur upheld the validity of the corresponding legislative measures passed in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively. [See Kameshwar vs State of Bihar(1) and Surya Pal vs U. P. Government(1). The parties aggrieved by these respective decisions had filed appeals by special leave before the Supreme Court. At the same time	 petitions had also been preferred before the Supreme Court under article 32 by certain other zamindars	 seeking the determination of the same issues. It was at this stage that Parliament thought it necessary to avoid the delay which would necessarily have been involved in the final decision of the disputes pending before the Supreme Court	 and introduced the relevant amendments in the Constitution by adding Articles 31A and 31B. 'Mat was the first step taken by Parliament to assist the process of legislation to bring about agrarian reform by introducing Articles 31A and 31B. The second step in the same direction was taken by Parlia ment in 1955 by amending article 31A by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act	 1955. The object of this amendment was to widen the scope of agrarian reform and to confer on the legislative measures adopted in that behalf immunity from a possible attack (1) A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 91. (2) A.I.R. 1951 AU. 674. 943 that they contravened the fundamental rights of citizens. In other words	 this amendment protected the legislative measures in respect of certain other items of agrarian and social welfare legislation	 which affected the proprietary rights of certain citizens. That is how the second amendment was made by Parliament. At the time when the first amendment was made	 article 31B expressly provided that none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the 9th Schedule	 nor any of the provisions thereof	 shall be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground that they were inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by Part III	 and it added that notwithstanding any judgment	 decree or order of any Court or tribunal to the contrary	 each of the said Acts and Regulations shall subject to the power of any competent legislature to repeal or amend	 continue in force. At this time	 19 Acts were listed in Schedule 9	 and they were thus effectively validated. One more Act was added to this list by the Amendment Act of 1955	 so that as a result of the second amendment	 the Schedule contained 20 Acts which were validated. It appears that notwithstanding these amendments	 certain other legislative measures adopted by different States for the purpose of giving effect to the agrarian policy of the party in power	 were effectively challenged. For instance	 in Karimbil Kunhikoman vs State of Kerala(1)	 the validity of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act (IV	 of 1961) was challenged by writ petitions filed under article 32	 and as a result of the majority decision of this Court	 the whole Act was struck down. This decision was pronounced on December 5	 1961. In A. P. Krishnaswami Naidu	 etc. vs The State of Madras (2 the constitutionality of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act (No. 58 of 1961) was put in issue	 and by the decision of this Court pronounced on March 9	 1964	 it was declared that the whole Act was invalid. It appears that the Rajasthan Tenancy Act HI of 1955 and the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling and Holdings) Act 27 of 1961 have been similarly declared invalid	 and in consequence	 Parliament thought it necessary to make a further amendment in article 31B so as to save the validity of these Acts which had been struck down and of other similar Acts which were likely to be struck down	 if challenged. With that object in view	 the impugned Act hasenpfeffer s.3 by which 44 Acts have been added to Schedule 9. If the impugned Act is held to be valid and the amendment made (1) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 829. (2) [1964]7 S.C.R. 82 944 in the Schedule is found to be effective	 these 44 Acts would have to be treated as valid. Thus	 it would be seen that the genesis of the amendments made by Parliament in 1951 by adding Articles 31A and 31B to the Constitution	 clearly is to assist the State Legislatures in this country to give effect to the economic policy in which the party in power passionately believes to bring about much needed agrarian reform. It is with the same object that the second amendment was made by Parliament in 1955	 and as we have just indicated	 the object underlying the amendment made by the impugned Act is also the same. Parliament desires that agrarian reform in a broad and comprehensive sense must be introduced in the interests of a very large section of Indian citizens who live in villages and whose financial prospects are integrally connected with the pursuit of progressive agrarian policy. Thus	 if the pith and substance test is applied to the amendment made by the impugned Act	 it would be clear that Parliament is seeking to amend fundamental rights solely with the object of removing any possible obstacle in the fulfilment of the socioeconomic policy in which the party in power believes. If that be so	 the effect of the amendment on the area over which the High Courts ' powers prescribed by article 226 operate	 is incidental and in the present case can be described as of an insignificant order. The impugned Act does not purport to change the provisions of article 226 and it cannot be said even to have that effect directly or in any appreciable measure. That is why we think that the argument that the impugned Act falls under the proviso	 cannot be sustained. It is an Act the object of which is to amend the relevant Articles in Part III which confer fundamental rights on citizens and as such it falls under the substantive part of article 368 and does not attract the provisions of cl. (b) of the proviso. If the effect of the amendment made in the fundamental rights on article 226 is direct and not incidental and is of a very significant order	 different considerations may perhaps arise. But in the present case	 there is no occasion to entertain or weigh the said considerations. Therefore the main contention raised by the petitioners and the interveners against the validity of the impugned Act must be rejected. Then	 it is urged that the true purpose and object of the impugned Act is to legislate	in respect of land	 and legislation in respect of land falls within the jurisdiction of the State Legislatures under Entry 18 of List II. The argument is that since the State Legislatures alone can make laws in respect of land	 Parliament had no right to pass the impugned Act. This argument is 945 based on the assumption that the impugned Act purports to be	 and in fact is	 a piece of land legislation. The same argument is placed before us in another form. It is urged that the scheme of Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution clearly shows that Parliament has no right to make a law in respect of land	 and since the impugned Act is a legislative measure in relation to land	 it is invalid. This argument	 in our opinion	 is misconceived. In dealing with this argument	 again	 the pith and substance test is relevant. What the impugned Act purports to do is not to make any land legislation but to protect and validate the legislative measures in respect of agrarian reforms passed by the different State Legislatures in the country by granting them immunity from attack based on the plea that they contravene fundamental rights. Parliament	 in enacting the impugned Act	 was not making any provisions of land legislation. It was merely validating land legislations already passed by the State Legislatures in that behalf. It is also urged that inasmuch as the impugned Act purports in substance to set aside the decisions of courts of competent jurisdiction by which some of the Acts added to the Ninth Schedule have been declared to be invalid	 it is unconstitutional. We see no substance in this argument. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that legislative power to make laws in respect of areas entrusted to the legislative jurisdiction of different legislative bodies	 can be exercised both prospectively and retrospectively. The constituent power conferred by article 368 on the Parliament can also be exercised both prospectively and retrospectively. On several occasions	 legislatures think it necessary to validate laws which have been declared to be invalid by Courts of competent jurisdiction and in so doing	 they have necessarily to provide for the intended validation to take effect notwithstanding any judgment	 decree or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction to the contrary. Therefore	 it would be idle to contend fiat by making the amendment retrospective	 the impugned Act has become constitutionally invalid. It has also been contended before us that in deciding the question as to whether the impugned Act falls under the proviso	 we should take into account the operative words in the proviso. The proviso takes in cases where the amendment sought to be made by the relevant bill seeks to make any change in any of the Articles specified in clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso	 and it is urged that on a fair reading of clauses (b) and (c)	 it would follow that the impugned Act purports to do nothing else but to seek to amend the provisions contained in article 226. It is not 946 easy to appreciate the strength or validity of this argument. This argument is really based on the assumption that the legislative mechanism adopted by the Parliament in passing the impugned Act introduces this infirmity. The argument obviously assumes that it would have been open to Parliament to make appropriate changes in the different Articles of Part III	 such as Articles 14 and 19	 and if such a course had been adopted	 the impugned Act would have been constitutionally valid. But inasmuch as the impugned Act purports to amend only articles 31A and 31B and seeks to add several Acts to the Ninth Schedule	 it does not amend any of the provisions in Part III	 but is making an independent provision	 and that	 it is said	 must take the case within the scope of the proviso. It is clear that what the impugned Act purports to do is to amend article 3 1 A	 and Article 3 1 A itself is included in Part III. If Parliament thought that instead of adopting the cumbersome process of amending each relevant Article in Part III	 it would be more appropriate to add Articles 3 1 A and 3 1 B	 and on that basis	 it passed the material provisions of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act	 it would not be reasonable to suggest that this method brings the amendment within the proviso. What the Parliament did in 1951	 has afforded a valid basis for further amendments made in 1955 and now in 1964. It would be clear that though the arguments which have been urged before us in the present proceedings have been put in different forms	 basically. they involve the consideration of the main question whether the ' impugned Act falls within the scope of the proviso or not; and the answer to this question	 in our opinion	 has to be against the petitioners by the application of the doctrine of pith and substance. Then	 it is urged that the power to amend	 which is conferred by article 368	 does not include the power to take away the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. The contention is that the result of the material provisions of the impugned Act is to take away a citizen 's right to challenge the validity of the Acts added to the Ninth Schedule	 and that means that in respect of the said Acts	 the relevant fundamental rights of the citizens are taken away. We do not think there is any substance in this argument. it is true that the dictionary meaning of the word "amend" is to 	correct a fault or reform; but in the context	 reliance on the dictionary meaning of the word is singularly inappropriate. because what article 368 authorises to be done is the amendment of the provisions of the Constitution. It is well known that the amendment of a law may in a proper case include the deletion of any one or more of the provisions of the law and substitution in their 947 place of new provisions. Similarly	 an amendment of the Constitution which is the subject matter of the power conferred by article 368	 may include modification or change of the provisions or even an amendment which makes the said provisions inapplicable in certain cases. The power to amend in the context is a very wide power and it cannot be controlled by the literal dictionary meaning of the word "amend". The question about the validity of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act has been considered by this Court in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo vs Union of India and State of Bihar(1). In that case	 the validity of the said Amendment Act was challenged on several grounds. One of the grounds was that the newly inserted Articles 31A and 31B sought to make changes in Articles 132 and 136 in Chapter IV of Part V and article 226 in Chapter V of Part VI 'and so	 they required ratification under cl. (b) of the proviso to article 368. This contention was rejected by this Court. Patanjali Sastri J.	 as he then was	 who spoke for the unanimous Court	 observed that the said Articles "did not either in terms or in effect seek to make any change in article 226 or in Articles 132 and 136"	 and he added that it was not correct to say that the powers of the High Courts under article 226 to issue writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part HI or of this Court under Articles 132 and 136 to entertain appeals from orders	 issuing or refusing to issue such writs were in any way affected. In the opinion of the Court	 the_ said powers remained just the same as they were before; only a certain class of cases had been excluded from the purview of Part Ill. The fact that the courts could not exercise their powers in respect of the said class of cases	 did not show that the powers of the courts were curtailed in any way or to any extent. It only meant that certain area of in which the said powers could have been exercised	 had been withdrawn. Similarly	 the argument that the amendments were invalid because they related to legislation in respect of land	 was also rejected on the ground that the impugned Articles 31A and 31B were essentially amendments of the Constitution which Parliament alone had the power to make. It would thus appear that in substance the points urged before us in the present proceedings are really concluded by the decision of this Court in Sankari Prasad 's case(1). It was	 however	 urged before us during the course of the hearing of these writ petitions that we should reconsider the matter and review our earlier decision in Sankari Prasad 's case. It is true that the Con (1) ; Supp.1/65 948 stitution does not place any restriction on our powers to review our earlier decisions or even to depart from them and there can be no doubt that in matters relating to the decision of constitutional points which have a significant impact on the fundamental rights of citizens	 we would be prepared to review our earlier decisions in the interest of public good. The doctrine of stare decisis may not strictly apply in this context and no one can dispute the position that the said doctrine should not be pemiitted to perpetuate erroneous decisions pronounced by this Court to the detri ment of general welfare. Even so	 the normal principle that judgments pronounced by this Court would be final	 cannot be ignored and unless considerations of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so	 we should be slow to doubt 		the correctness of previous decisions or to depart from them. It is universally recognised that in regard to a large number of constitutional problems which are brought before this Court for its decision	 complex and difficult questions arise and on many of such questions	 two views are possible. Therefore	 if one View has been taken by this Court after mature deliberation	 the fact that another Bench is inclined to take a different view may not justify the Court in reconsidering the earlier decision or in departing from it. The problem of construing constitutional provisions cannot be reasonably solved merely by adopting a literal construction of the words used in the relevant provisions. The Constitution is an organic document and it is intended to serve as a guide to the solution of changing problems which the Court may have to face from time to time. Naturally	 in a progressive and dynamic society the shape and appearance of these problems are bound to change with the inevitable consequence that the relevant words used in the Constitution may also chance their meaning and significance. That is what makes the task of dealing with constitutional problems dynamic rather than static. Even so	 the Court should be reluctant to accede to the suggestion that its earlier 	decisions should be lightheartedly reviewed and departed from. ' In such a case the test should be : is it absolutely necessary and essential that the question already decided should be re opened ? The answer to this question would depend on the nature of the infirmity alleged in the earlier decision	 its impact on public good	 and the validity and compelling character of the considerations urged in support of the contrary view. If the said decision has been followed in a large number of cases	 that again is a factor 	which must be taken into account. In the present case	 if the arguments urged by the petitioners 949 were to prevail	 it would lead to the inevitable consequence that the amendments made in the Constitution both in 1951 and 1955 would be rendered invalid and a large number of decisions dealing with the validity of the Acts included in the Ninth Schedule which have been pronounced by different High Courts ever since the decision of this Court in Sankari Prasad 's(1) case was declared	 would also be exposed to serious jeopardy. These are consideration	 which are both relevant and material in dealing with the plea urged by the petitioners before us in the present proceedings that Sankari Prasad 's case should be re considered. In view of the said plea	 however	 we have deliberately chosen to deal with the merits of the contentions before referring to the decision itself. In our opinion	 the plea made by the petitioners for reconsidering Sankari Prasad 's case is wholly unjustified and must be rejected. In this connection	 we would like to refer to another aspect of the matter. As we have already indicated	 the principal point which has been urged before us in these proceedings is	 that the impugned Act is invalid for the reason that before presenting it to the President for his assent	 the procedure prescribed by the proviso to article 368 has not been followed	 though the Act was one which fell within the scope of the proviso. In other words	 it was not disputed before us that article 368 empowers Parliament to amend any provision of the Constitution	 including the provisions in respect of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part M. The main contention was that in amending the relevant provisions of the Constitution	 the procedure prescribed by the proviso should have been followed. But it appears that in Sankari Prasad 's case	 another argument was urged before this Court in challenging the validity of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act	 and since we are expressing our concurrence with the said decisions	 we think it is necessary to refer to the said argument and deal with it	 even though this aspect of the matter has not been urged before us in the present proceedings. In Sankari Prasad 's case	 it was contended that though It may be open to Parliament to amend the provisions in respect of the fundamental rights contained in Part III	 the amendment	 if made In that behalf	 would have to be tested in the light of the provisions contained in article 13(2) of the Constitution. The argument was that the law to which article 13(2) applies	 would include a law passed by Parliament by virtue of its constituent power to amend ' the Constitution	 and so	 its validity will have to be tested by article 13(2) itself. It will be recalled that article 13(2) prohibits (1) ; 950 the State from making any law which	 takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III	 and provides that any law made in contravention of clause (2) shall	 to the extent of the contravention	 be void. In other words	 it was urged before this Court in Sankari Prasad 's(1) case that in considering the question as to the validity of the relevant provisions of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act	 it would be open to the party challenging the validity of the said Act to urge that in so far as the Amendment Act abridges or takes away the fundamental rights of the citizens	 it is void. This argument was	 however	 rejected by this Court on the ground that the word "law" used in article 13 "must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent power with the result. that article 13 (2) does not affect amendments made under article 368". It is significant that Patanjali Sastri J. as he then was	 who spoke for the Court	 described as attractive the argument about the applicability of article 13 (2) to Constitution Amendment Acts passed under article 368	 examined it closely	 and ultimately rejected it. It was noticed in the judgment that certain constitutions make certain rights "eternal and inviolate"	 and by way of illustration	 reference was made to article 11 of the Japanese Constitution and article 5 of the American. Federal Constitution. It was also noticed that the word "law" in its literal sense	 may include constitutional law	 but it was pointed out that "there is a clear demarcation between ordinary law	 which is made in exercise of legislative power	 and constitutional law which is made in exercise of constituent power". The scheme of the relevant provisions of the Constitution was then examined	 and ultimately	 the Court reached the conclusion that though both Articles 13 and 368 are widely phrased	 the harmonious rule of construction requires that the word "law" in article 13 should be taken to exclude law made in exercise of the constituent power. In our opinion	 this conclusion is right	 and as we are expressing our full concurrence with the decision in Sankari Prasad 's(1) case	 we think it is necessary to indicate our reasons for agreeing with the conclusion of the Court on this point	 even though the coffectness of this conclusion has not been questioned before us in the course of arguments. If we had felt a real difficulty in accepting this part of the conclusion	 we would have seriously considered the question as to whether the matter should not be referred to a larger Bench for a further examination of the problem. (1) ; 951 The first point which falls to be considered on this aspect of the matter is the construction of article 368 itself. Part XX which contains only article 368 is described as a Part dealing with the Amendment of the Constitution; and article 368 which prescribes the procedure for amendment of the Constitution	 begins by saying that an amendment of this Constitution may be initiated in the manner there indicated. In our opinion	 the expression "amendment of the Constitution plainly and unambiguously means amendment of all the provisions of the Constitution. It would	 we think	 be unreasonable to suggest that what article 368 provides is only the mechanics of the procedure to be followed in amending the Constitution without indicating which provisions of the Constitution can be amended and which cannot. Such a restrictive construction of the substantive part of article 368 would be clearly untenable. Besides	 the words used in the proviso unambiguously indicate that the substantive part of the article applies to all the provisions of the Constitution. It is on that basic assump tion that the proviso prescribes a specific procedure in respect of the amendment of the articles mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) thereof. Therefore	 we feel no hesitation in holding that when article 368 confers on Parliament the right to amend the Constitution the power in question can be exercised over all the provisions of the Constitution. How the power should be exercised	 has to be determined by reference to the question as to whether the proposed amendment falls under the substantive part of article 368	 or attracts the provisions of the proviso. It is true that article 13(2) refers to any law in general	 and literally construed	 the word "law" may take in a law made in exercise of the constituent power conferred on Parliament; but having regard to the fact that a specific	 unqualified and unambiguous power to amend the Constitution is conferred on Parliament	 it would be unreasonable to hold that the word "law" in article 13 (2) takes in Constitution Amendment Acts passed under article 368. If the Constitution makers had intended that any future amendment of the provisions in regard to fundamental rights should be subject to article 13 (2)	 they would have taken the precaution of making a clear provision in that behalf. Besides	 it seems to us	 very unlikely that while conferring the power on Parliament to amend the Constitution	 it was the intention of the Constitutionmakers to exclude from that comprehensive power fundamental rights altogether. There is no doubt that if the word "law" used in article 13(2) includes a law in relation to the amendment of the 952 Constitution	 fundamental rights can never be abridged or taken away	 because as soon as it is shown that the effect of the amendment is to take away or abridge fundamental rights	 that portion of the law would be void under article 13 (2). We have no doubt that such a position could not have been intended by the Constitution makers when they included article 368 in the Constitution. In construing the word "law" occurring in article 13(2)	 it may be relevant to bear in mind that	 in the words of Kania C.J. in A. K. Gopalan vs The State of Madras(1)	 "the inclusion of article 13 (1) and (2) in the Constitution appears to be a matter of abundant caution. Even in their absence	 if any of the fundamental rights was infringed by any legislative enactment	 the Court has always the power to declare the enactment	 to the extent it transgresses the limits	 invalid". The importance and significance of the fundamental rights must obviously be recognised and in that sense	 the guarantee to the citizens contained in the relevant provisions of Part III	 can justly be described as the very foundation and the comer stone of the democratic way of life ushered in this country by the Constitution. But can it be said that the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens are eternal and inviolate in the sense that they can never be abridged or amended? It is true that in the case of A. K. Gopalan(1) Patanjali Sastri	 as he then was	 expressed the view that "there can be no doubt that the people of India have	 in exercise of their sovereign will as expressed in the Preamble	 adopted the democratic ideal which assures to the citizen the dignity of the individual and other cherished human values as a means to the full evolution and expression of his personality	 and in delegating to the legislature	 the executive and the judiciary the irrespective powers in the Constitution. reserved to themselves certain fundamental rights	 so called	 I apprehend	 because they have been retained by the people and made paramount to the delegated powers	 as in the American model" (p. 198). This hypothesis may	 prima facie	 tend to show that the right to amend these fundamental rights vested not in Parliament	 but in the people of India themselves. But it is significant that when the same learned Judge had occasion to consider this question more elaborately in In re The 	 (1) etc. he has emphatically expressed the view that it is established beyond doubt that the Indian Legislature	 when acting within the limits circumscribing its legislative power	 has and was intended to have (1) ; 	 at p. 100. (2) ; 	 at pp. 883 84. 953 plenary of legislation as large and of the same nature as those of the British Parliament itself and no constitutional limitation on the delegation of legislative power to a subordinate unit is to be found in the Indian Councils Act	 1861	 or the Government of India Act	 1935	 or the Constitution of 1950. The suggestion that the legislatures	 including the Parliament	 are the delegate of the people of India in whom sovereignty vests	 was rejected by the learned Judge when he observed that "the maxim 'delegates ten protest delegate ' is not part of the Constitutional law of India and has no more force than a political precept to be acted upon by legislatures in the discharge of their function of making laws	 and the courts cannot strike down an Act of Parliament as unconstitutional merely because Parliament decides in a particular instance to entrust its legislative power to another in whom it has confidence or	 in other words	 to exercise such power through its appointed instrumentality	 however repugnant such entrustment may be to the democratic process. What may be regarded	 as politically undesirable is constitutionally competent". It would thus appear that so far as our Constitution is concerned	 it would not be possible to deal with the question about the powers of Parliament to amend the Constitution under article 368 on any theoretical concept of political science that sovereignty vests in the people and the be statures are merely the delegate of the people. Whether or not Parliament has the power to amend the Constitution must depend solely Upon the question as to whether the said power is included in article 368. The question about the reasonableness	 or expediency or desirability of the amendments in question from a political point of view would be irrelevant in construing the words of article 3 6 8. Incidentally	 we may also refer to the fact that the Constitutionmakers had taken the precaution to indicate that some amendments should not be treated as amendments of the Constitution for the purpose of article 368. Take	 for instance article 4(2) which deals with law made by virtue of article 4(1). article 4(2) provides that no such law shall be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of article 368. Similarly	 article 169(3) provides that any law in respect of the amendment of the existing legislative apparatus by the abolition or creation of Legislative Councils in State 	; shall not be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of article 368. In other words	 laws falling within the purview of Articles 4(2) and 169(3) need not be passed subject to the restrictions imposed by 'article 368	 even though. in effect they may amount to the amendment of the relevant provisions of the Constitution. If the Constitution makers took the 954 precaution of making this specific provision to exclude the applicability of article 368 to certain amendments	 it would be reasonable to assume that they would have made a specific provision if they had intended that the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part HI should be completely outside the scope of article 368. Apart from the fact that the words used in article 368 are clear and unambiguous in support of the view that we are taking	 on principle also it appears unreasonable to suggest that the Constitution makers wanted to provide that fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution should never be touched by way of amendment. It must not be forgotten that the fundamental rights guaranteed	 by article 19	 for instance	 are not absolute; the scheme of this article itself indicates that the fundamental rights guaranteed by subclauses (a) to (g) of clause (1)	 can be validly regulated in the light of the provisions contained in clauses (2) to (6) of article 19. In other words	 the broad scheme of article 19 is two fold; the fundamental rights of the citizens are of paramount importance	 but even the said fundamental rights can be regulated to serve the interests of the general public or other objects mentioned respec tively in clauses (2) to (6)	 and that means that for specified purposes indicated in these clauses	 even the paramountcy of fundamental rights has to yield to some regulation as contemplated by the said clauses. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the purposes for which fundamental rights can be regulated which are specified in clauses (2) to (6)	 could not have been assumed by the Constitution makers to be static and incapable of expansion. The Constitution makers must have anticipated that in dealing with socioeconomic problems which the legislatures may have to face from time to time	 the concepts of public interest and other important considerations which are the basis of clauses (2) to (6)	 may change and may even expand; and so	 it is legitimate to assume that the Constitution makers know that Parliament should be competent to make amendments in these rights so as to meet the challenge of the problems which may arise in the course of spcio economic progress and development of the country. That is why we think that even on principle	 it would not be reasonable to proceed on the basis that the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III were intended to be finally and immutably settled and determined once for all and were beyond the reach of any future amendment. Let us illustrate this point by reference to some of the provisions of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act	 1951 itself. By this Act	 Articles 15	 19 and 31 were amended. One has merely to 955 recall the purpose for which it became necessary to amend Articles 15 and 19 to be satisfied that the changing character of the problems posed by the words used in the respective articles could not have been effectively met unless amendment in the relevant provisions was effected; and yet	 if the argument that the fundamental rights are beyond the reach of article 368 were valid	 an these amendments would be constitutionally impermissible. That	 we think is not the true purport and effect of article 368. We are	 therefore	 satisfied that this Court was right in rejecting the said argument in the case of Sankari Prasad(1). This question can be considered from another point of view. The argument that the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part in are eternal	 inviolate	 and beyond the reach of article 368	 is based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that on a fair and reasonable construction of article 368	 the power to amend the fundamental rights cannot be held to be included within the constituent powers conferred on Parliament by the said Article. We have already held that a fair and reasonable construction of article 368 does not justify this assumption. The other assumption which this argument makes	 and must of necessity make	 is that if the power to amend the fundamental rights is not included in article 368 as it stands	 it cannot ever be included within its purview; because unless it is assumed that the relevant power can never be included in article 368	 it would be unrealistic to propound the theory that the fundamental rights are eternal	 inviolate	 and not within the reach of any subsequent constitutional amendment. It is clear that article 368 itself can be amended by Parliament	 though cl. (e) of the proviso requires that before amending article 368	 the safeguards prescribed by the proviso must be satisfied. In other words	 even if the powers to amend the fundamental rights were not included in article 368	 Parliament can	 by a suitable amendment of article 368	 take those powers. Thus	 the second assumption underlying the argument about the immutable character of the fundamental rights is also not well founded. There is one more point to which we would like to refer. In the case of Sankari Prasad(1) this Court has observed that the question whether the latter part of article 31B is too widely expressed	 was not argued before it	 and so	 it did not express any opinion upon it. This question has	 however	 been argued before us	 and so	 we would like to make it clear that the effect of the last clause in article 31B is to leave it open to the respective legislatures to repeal (1) ; 956 or amend the Acts which have been included in the Ninth Schedule. In other words	 the fact that the said Acts have been included in the Ninth Schedule with a view to make them valid	 does not mean that the legislatures in question which passed the said Acts have lost their competence to repeal them or to amend them. That is one consequence of the said provision. The other inevitable quince of the said provision is that if a legislature amends any of the provisions contained in any of the said Acts	 the amended provision would not receive the protection of article 31B and its validity may be liable to be examined on the merits. Before we part with this matter	 we would like to observe that Parliament may consider whether it would not be expedient and reasonable to include the provisions of Part III in the proviso to article 368. It is not easy to appreciate why the Constitution makers did not include the said provisions in the proviso when article 368 was adopted. In In re : the Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves(1)	 this Court had pointed out that amendment of article 1 of the Constitution consequent upon the cession of any part of the territory of India in favour of a foreign State	 does not attract the safeguard prescribed by the proviso to article 368	 because neither article 1 nor article 3 is included in the list of entrenched provisions of the Constitution enumerated in the proviso; and it was observed that it was not for this Court to enquire or consider whether it would not be appropriate to include the said two articles under the proviso	 and that it was a matter for Parliament to consider and decide. Similarly	 it seems somewhat anomalous that any amendment of the provisions contained in article 226 should fall under the proviso but	 not an amendment of article 32. Article 226 confers on High Courts the power to issue certain writs	 while article 32	 which itself is a guaranteed fundamental right	 enables a citizen to move this Court for similar writs. Parliament may consider whether the anomaly which is apparent in the different modes prescribed by article 368 for amending Articles 226 and 32 respectively	 should not be remedied by including Part HI itself in the proviso. If that is done	 difficult questions as to whether the amendment made in the provisions of Part III substantially	 directly and materially affects the jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts under article 226 may be easily avoided. In the result	 we hold that the impugned Act is constitutionality valid. The petitions	 accordingly	 fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. (1) 957 Hidayatullah J. I have had the privilege of reading the judgment just delivered by my lord the Chief Justice. I agree	 with him that there is no force in the contention that the 17th Amendment required for its valid enactment the special procedure	 laid down in the proviso to article	 368. It would	 of course	 have	 been necessary if the amendment had sought to make a change in article 226. This eventuality cannot be said to have arisen. Article 226 remains unchanged after the amendment. The proviso comes into play only when the article is directly changed or its ambit as such is sought to be changed. What the 17th amendment does is to enlarge the meaning of the word 'estate ' in article 31 A and ' to give protection to some Acts passed by the State Legislatures by including them in the Ninth Schedule under the shield of article 31 B. These Acts promoted agrarian reform and but for the inclusion in the Ninth Schedule they might be assailed by the provisions of Articles 14	 19 or 31 of the Constitution. Some of the Acts were in fact successfully assailed but the amendment makes them effective and invulnerable to the three articles notwithstanding article 13 of the Constitution. In Sri Sankari Prasad 's(1) case when the Constitution (First Amendment) Act was passed and Articles 3 I A and 31 B and Ninth Schedule were introduced	 the effect of that amendment on article 226 was considered and it was held that the Amendment had not the effect visualised by the proviso to article 368. The reasoning in that case on this point applies mutatis mutandis to the 17th Amendment. I find	 however	 some difficulty in accepting a part of the reasoning in Sankari Prasad 's case and my purpose in writing a separate judgment is to say that I decide the present cases without	 the assistance of that reasoning. I shall briefly indicate what that reasoning is and why I have doubts. In Sankari Prasad 's case it was contended that by article 13(2) the Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitution were put beyond the reach of article 368 and outside the power of amendment conferred on Parliament by article 368. This argument was considered "attractive '	 but was rejected because of certain "important considerations" which it was held pointed "to the opposite conclusion". Two reasons alone appear to have weighed with this Court. The first is that as constitutional law is distinguishable from other municipal laws and as there is no "clear indication" to be found that the Fundamental Rights are "immune from constitutional amendment"	 only the invasion of the Fundamental Rights by laws other than constitutional laws (1) ; 958 must be the subject of the prohibition in article 13 (2). article 13 may to be quoted at this stage : "13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights. (1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution	 in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part	 shall	 to the extent of such inconsistency	 be void. (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall	 to the extent of the contravention	 be void. (3) In this article	 unless the context otherwise requires	 (a) "law" includes any Ordinance	 order	 bye law	 rule	 regulation	 notification	 custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law; (b) It is true that there is no complete definition of the word "law" in the article but it is significant that the definition does not seek to exclude constitutional amendments which it would have been easy to indicate in the definition by adding "but shall not include an amendment of the Constitution". The meaning is also sought to be enlarged not curtailed. The meaning of article 13 thus depends on the sense in which the word "law" in article 13(2) is to be understood. If an amendment can be said to fall within the term "law"	 the Fundamental Rights become "eternal and inviolate" to borrow the language of the Japanese Constitution. Article 13 is then on par with article 5 of the American Federal Constitution in its immutable prohibition as long as it stands. But the restricted meaning given to the word "law" prevents this to be held. There is a priori reasoning without consideration of the text of the articles in Part M. The Articles use the language of permanency. I am of opinion that there are indications in the Constitution which needed to be considered and I shall mention some of them later as illustrations. The next reason was that article 368 was "perfectly general" and allowed amendment of "the Constitution	 without any exception whatsoever" and therefore article 13 (2) did not cover a constitutional ;amendment. It was observed in this connection that if it was con 959 sidered necessary to save Fundamental Rights a clear proviso in article 368 would have conveyed this intention without any doubt. To my mind the easiest and most obvious way was to say that the word "law" in article 13 did not include an amendment of the Constitution. It was finally concluded as follows : "In short	 we have here two articles each of which is widely phrased	 but conflicts in its operation with the other. Harmonious construction requires that one should be read as controlled and qualified by the other. Having regard to the considerations adverted to above	 we are of opinion that in the context of article 13 'law ' must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent power	 with the result that article 1. 3 (2) does not affect amendments made under article 368. " At the hearing reliance was not placed on article 13 (2) but emphasis was laid on the amendment of article 226. Mr. R. V. section Mani did	 however	 refer to the provision for the suspension of Fundamental Rights as showing that unless suspended in an emergency	 Part III must stand unchanged and he referred to article 32(4). For the disposal of these cases I indicate my view that on	 the arguments before us I must hold that as decided in Sankari Prasad 's(1) case article 226 is not sought to be changed by the 17th Amendment. But I make it clear that I must not be understood ' to have subscribed to the view that the word "law" in article 13(2) does not control constitutional amendments. I reserve my opinion on that case for I apprehend that it depends on how wide is the word "law" in that Article. The prohibition in that article may have to be read in the light of declarations in the various articles in Part III to find out the proper meaning. Though I do not express a final opinion I give a few examples. Take for instance article 32. It reads : "32. Remedies for enforcement of rights. (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs in the nature of habeas corpus	 mandamus	 prohibition	 quo warranto and certiorari	 whichever may be appropriate	 for the (1) ; 960 enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this	 Part. (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2)	 Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by the Constitution. " It is prima facie at least	 reasonable to think that if cls. (1) and (4) of this Article were included in Part XX (Amendment of the Constitution) that would have made the guarantee absolute against any amendment. It is a matter for consideration whether this guarantee is any the less because the article.is in another Part ? The first clause assures a guaranteed remedy. That guarantee is equally against legislative and executive actions. Part III is fun of declarations of what the legislature can do and what it cannot do. The guarantee covers all those actions which are not open to the legislature and the executive. If it be held that the guarantee is inviolable would not the guarantee of the remedy make the rights 'equally protected ? Another provision	 namely	 the Preamble of the Constitution is equally vital to our body politic. In In re : The Berubart Union and Exchange of Enclaves(1) it is held that although the preamble is the key to the mind of the Constitution makers	 it does not form part of the Constitution. Perhaps	 in one sense	 it does not but	 in another sense	 it does. Our preamble is more akin in nature to the American Declaration of Independence (July 4	 1776) than to the preamble to the Constitution of the United States. It does not make any grant of power but it gives a direction and purpose to the Constitution which is reflected in Parts III and IV. Is it to be imagined that a two thirds majority of the two Houses at any time is all that is necessary to alter it without even consulting the States ? It is not even included in the	 proviso to article 368 and it is difficult to think that as it has not the protection of the proviso it must be within the main part of article 368. Again	 article 13 (1) rendered void the laws in force in the territory of India which conflicted with Part III. Can it be said that article 13 may be repealed retrospectively and all those statutes (1) 961 brought back to life ? Because of successive amendments we have seen many faces of article 31 A. It is for consideration whether article 13 was not intended to streamline all existing and future laws to the basic requirements of Part 111. Or is the door left open for reversing the policy of our Constitution from time to time by legislating with a bigger majority at any given time not directly but by constitutional amendments ? It is possible to justify such amendments with the aid of the provisos in article 19 which permit the making of laws restricting the freedoms but not by ignoring article 13 and relying solely on article 368. I am aware that in A. K. Gopalan vs State of Madras(1) Kania C.J. said the inclusion of article 13(1) and (2) in the Constitution appears to be a matter of abun dant caution. Even in their absence	 if any of the fundamental rights was infringed by any legislative enactment	 the Court has always the power to declare the enactment	 to the extent it transgresses the limits invalid. " The observation is not clear in its meaning. There was un doubtedly a great purpose which this article achieves. It is probable that far from belittling the importance of article 13 the learned Chief Justice meant rather to emphasize the importance and the commanding position of Fundamental Rights in that even without article 13 they would have the same effect on other laws. To hold that article 13 is framed merely by way of abundant caution	 and serves no additional or intrinsic function of its own	 might	 by analogy persuade us to say the same of article 32 ( 1 ) because this Court would do its duty under article 32(2) even in the absence of the guarantee. I would require stronger reasons than those given in Sankari Prasad 's (2) case to make me accept the view that Fundamental Rights were not really fundamental but were intended to be within the powers of amendment in common with the other parts of the Constitution and without the concurrence of the States. No doubt article 19 by clauses numbered 2 to 6 allows a curtailment of rights in the public interest. This shows that Part III is not static. It as change and progress but at the same time it preserves the individual rights. There is hardly any measure of reform which cannot be introduced reasonably	 the guarantee of individual liberty notwithstanding. Even the agrarian reforms could have been partly carried out without Article 31 A and 31 B but they would have cost (1) ; at p. 100. (2) 962 more to the public exchequer. The rights of society are made paramount and they are placed above those of the individual. This is as it should be. But restricting the Fundamental Rights by resort to cls. 2 to 6 of article 19 is one thing and removing the rights from the Constitution or debilitating them by an amendment is quite another. This is the implication of Sankari Prasad 's case. It is true that such things would never be	 but one is concerned to know if such a doing would be possible. It may be said that the words of article 368 are quite explicit. article 368 does not give power to amend "any provision" of the Constitution. At least the article does not say so. Analysed by the accepted canons of interpretation it is found to lay down the manner of the amendment of "this Constitution" but by "this Constitution" it does not mean each individual article wherever found and whatever its language and spirit. The Constitution itself indicates in some places a contrary intention expressly (See Articles 4	 169 and the former article 240) and in some others by implication (See article 1 1). What article 368 does is to lay down the manner of amendment and the necessary conditions for the effectiveness of the amendment. The contrast between the opening part and the proviso does not show that what is outside the proviso is necessarily within the powers of amendment. The proviso merely puts outside the exclusive Power of Parliament to amend those provisions 'on which our federal structure rests. It makes it incumbent that a majority of the States should also agree. The proviso also preserves the structure of the higher judiciary so vital to a written Constitution and to a Democracy such as ours ' But the article no where says that the preamble and every single article of the Constitution can be amended by two thirds majority despite any permanency in the language and despite any historical fact or sentiment. The Constitution gives so many assurances in Part III that it would be difficult to think that they were the play things of a special majority. To hold this would mean prima facie that the most solemn parts of our Constitution stand on the same footing as any other provision and even on a less firm ground than one on which the articles mentioned in the proviso stand. The anamoly that article 226 should be somewhat protected but not article 32 must give us pause. Article 32 does not erect a shield against private conduct but against state conduct including the legislatures (See article 12). Can the legislature take away this shield ? Perhaps by adopting a literal construction of article 368 one can say that. But I am not inclined to play a grammarian 's role. As at present advised I can only say that the power to make amendments ought not 963 ordinarily to be a means of escape from absolute constitutional restrictions. For these reasons though I agree with the order proposed	 I would not like to be understood to have expressed a final opinion on the aspect of the case outlined above. Mudholkar J. I have seen the judgments of my Lord the Chief Justice and my brother Hidayatullah J. and I agree that the	 Writ Petitions should be dismissed. Of the various contentions raised in Sankari Prasad Singh De& vs Union of India and State of Bihar(1) in which the Constitution (First Amendment) Act	 1951 was challenged before this Court only two would be relevant in the context of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act	 1964. They are : (a) whether the Amendment Act in so far as it purports to take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution falls within the prohibition of article 13(2) and (b) whether articles 31A and 31B seek to make changes in articles 132	 136 or 226 or in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule and	 therefore	 the requirements of the proviso to article 368 had to be satisfied. Both these contentions were negatived by this Court. The first contention has not been raised in the arguments before us and the attack on the Seventeenth Amendment Act was based only on the second contention. Most of the grounds which learned counsel urged before us were the same as those urged in the earlier case. Some additional arguments were also urged before us but	 as my Lord the Chief Justice has pointed out	 they are unsubstantial. An attempt was made by Mr. Mani	 learned counsel for the petitioners	 to persuade us to reconsider the decision in the earlier case with regard to the second contention. As	 however	 no case was made out by him for reconsideration of that decision we intimated to him that we do not. propose to reconsider it. Since my Lord the Chief Justice in his judgment has dealt with the first contention also and expressed the view that the previous decision is right I think it necessary to say	 partly for the reasonsstated by my learned brother Hidayatullah J. and partly for some other reasons	 that I would reserve my opinion on this question and that I do not regard what this Court has held in that case as the last word. It seems to me that in taking the view that the word "law" occurring in article 13 (2) of the Constitution does not include an amend (1) ; L2Sup./65 18 964 ment to the Constitution this Court has not borne in mind some important considerations which would be relevant for the purpose. The language of article 368 is plain enough to show that the action of Parliament in amending the Constitution is a legislative act like one in exercise of its normal legislative power	 The only difference in respect of an amendment of the Constitution is that the Bill amending the Constitution has to be passed by a special majority (here I have in mind only those amendments which do not attract the proviso to article 368). The result of a legislative action of a legislature cannot be other than 'law ' and	 therefore	 it seems to me that the fact that the legislation deals with the amendment of a provision of the Constitution would not make its result 	any the less a 'law '. Article 3 6 8 does not say that when Parliament makes an amendment to the Constitution it assumes a different capacity	 that of a constituent body. As suggested by my learned brother Hidayatullah J. it is open to doubt whether this Article confers any such power upon Parliament. But even assuming that it does	 it can only be regarded as an additional legislative power. Then again while the Constitution as originally framed can only be interpreted by a court of law and the validity of no provision therein can be challenged the same cannot be said of an amendment to the Constitution. For an amendment to be treated as a part of the Constitution it must in fact and in law have become a part of the Constitution. Whether it has become a part of the Constitution is thus a question open to judicial review. It is obvious that an amendment must comply with the requirements of the Constitution and should not transgress any of its provisions. Where	 therefore	 a challenge is made before the Court on the ground that no amendment had in fact been made or on the ground that it was 'not a valid amendment it will be both the duty of the Court as well as be and within its power to examine the question and to pronounce upon it. This is precisely what a Court is competent to do in regard to any other law	 the validity of which is impugned 'before it. Neither of these matters appears to have been considered in Sankari Prasad 's case(") and I think that they do merit consideration. My Lord the Chief Justice has observed that though in A. K. Gopalan vs The State of Madras (2) Patanjali Sastri J.	 (as he then 'was) has said that fundamental rights are those rights which the people have reserved for themselves that learned Judge has emphati (1) ; (2) [1950] S.C.R. St. 965 cally stated in In re The Delhi Laws Act	 1912(1) that Parliament	 acting within the limits of its legislative power	 has plenary powers of legislation which are as large and which are of the same nature as those of the British Parliament and rejected the suggestion that	 Parliament is the. delegate of the people in whom the sovereignty rests. But does it follow that the learned Judge has departed from his earlier view ? No reference was made by him in. Sankari Prasad 's case (2) to his observations though they needed to be explained. In the case(1) he has undoubtedly said that Parliament enjoys plenary powers of legislation. That Parliament has plenary powers of legislation within the circumscribed limits of its legislative power and cannot be regarded as a delegate of the people c while exercising its legislative powers is a well accepted position. The fact	 however	 remains that unlike the British Parliament our Parliament	 like every other organ of the State	 can function only within the limits of the powers which the Constitution has conferred upon it. This would also be so when	 in the exercise of its legislative power	 it makes an amendment to the Constitution or to any of its provisions. It would	 therefore	 appear that the earlier observation of Patanjali Sastri J.	 cannot be regarded as inconsistent with what he has said in the case(1). At any rate	 this is an aspect of the matter which requires further consideration	 particularly because the same learned Judge has not adverted to those observations in Sankari Prasad 's case (2). It is true that by virtue of section 8 of the Indian Independence Act	 1947 it was upon the Constituent Assembly which framed the Constitution and not upon the people of India that sovereignty devolved after the withdrawal of the British power. But both the "Objectives Resolution" adopted by the Constituent Assembly on January 22	 1947 and the Preamble to the Constitution show that this sovereign body framed the Constitution in the name of the people of India and by virtue of the powers derived from them. In the circumstances it would have to be considered whether Patanjali Sastri J.	 was not right in saying that the fundamental rights are the minimum rights reserved by the people to themselves and they are	 therefore	 unalterable. It is true that the Constitution does not directly prohibit the amendment of Part III. But it would indeed be strange that rights which are considered to be fundamental and which include one which is guaranteed by the Constitution (vide article 32) should be more easily capable of being abridged or restricted than any of the matters referred to in the proviso to article 368 some of which (1) ; (2) ; 966 are perhaps less vital than fundamental rights. It is possible	 as suggested by my learned brother	 that article 368 merely lays down the procedure to be followed for amending the Constitution and does not confer a power to amend the Constitution which	 I think	 has to be ascertained from the provision sought to be amended or other relevant provisions or the preamble. The argument that if fundamental rights are regarded as unchangeable it will hamper legislation which the changing needs of a dynamic society may call for in future is weighty enough and merits consideration. It is possible that there may be an answer. The rights enumerated in article 19(1) can be subjected to reasonable restrictions under cls. (2) to (6) of article 19 and the other fundamental rights or at least many of them can perhaps be adapted to meet the needs of a changing society with the aid of the directive principles. For	 article 37	 the second Article in Part IV which deals with 'Directive Principles of States Policy '	 imposes a duty on the State to apply those directive principles in making laws. These principles are also fundamental in the governance of the country and the provisions of Part III of the Constitution must be interpreted harmoniously with those principles. This is also an aspect of the matter which requires consideration. We may also have to bear in mind the fact that ours is a written Constitution. The Constituent Assembly which was the repository of sovereignty could well have created a sovereign Parliament on the British model. But instead it enacted a written Constitution	 created three organs of State	 made the union executive responsible to Parliament and the State executives to the State legislatures; erected a federal structure and distributed legislative power between Parliament and the State legislatures; recognised certain rights as fundamental and provided for their enforcement; prescribed forms of oaths of office or affirmations which require those who subscribe to them to owe true allegiance to the Constitution and further require the members of the Union Judiciary and of the higher judiciary in the States	 to uphold the Constitution. Above all	 it formulated a solemn and dignified preamble which appears to be an epitome of the basic features of the Constitution. Can it not be said that these are indicate of the intention of the Constituent Assembly to give a permanency to the basic features of the Constitution ? It is also a matter for consideration whether making a change in a basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely as an amendment or would it be	 in effect	 rewriting a part of the 967 Constitution; and if the latter	 would it be within the purview of article 368 ? The Constitution has enjoined on every member of Parliament before entering upon his office to take an oath or make an affirmation to the effect that he will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution. On the other hand under article 368 a procedure is prescribed for amending the Constitution. If upon a literal interpretation of this provision an amendment even of the basic features of the Constitution would be possible it will be a question for consideration as to how to harmonise the duty of allegiance to the Constitution with the power to make an amendment to it. Could the two be harmonised by excluding from the procedure for amendment	 alteration of a basic feature of the Constitution ? It would be of interest to mention that the Supreme Court of Pakistan has	 in Mr. Fazlul Quader Chowdhry vs Mr. Mohd. Abdul Haque(1) held that franchise and form of government are fundamental features of a Constitution and the power conferred upon the President by the Constitution of Pakistan to remove difficulties does not extend to making an alteration in a fundamental feature of the Constitution. For striking down the action of the President under	 what he calls 'sub constitutional power ' Cornelius C.J.	 relied on the Judges ' oath of office. After quoting the following passage from Cooley 's Constitutional Limitations: "For the constitution of the State is higher in authority than any law	 direction	 or order made by anybody or any officer assuming to act under it	 since such body or officer must exercise a delegated authority	 and one that must necessarily be subservient to the instrument by which the delegation is made. In any case of conflict the fundamental law must govern	 and the act in conflict with it must be treated as of no legal validity. " the learned Chief Justice observed "To decide upon the question of constitutional validity in relation to an act of a statutory authority	 how highso ever	 is a duty devolving ordinarily upon the superior Courts by virtue of their office	 and in the absence of any bar either express or implied which stands in the way of that duty being performed in respect of the Order here in question it is a responsibility which cannot be avoided." (p. 506) (1) 968 The observations and the passage from Cooley	 quoted here for convenience support what I have said earlier regarding the power of the Courts to pronounce upon the validity of amendments to the Constitution. The Constitution indicates three modes of amendments and assuming that the provisions of article 368 confer power on Parliament to amend the Constitution	 it will still have to be considered whether as long as the preamble stands unmended	 that power can be exercised with respect to any of the basic features of the Constitution. To illustrate my point	 as long as the words 'sovereign democratic republic ' are there	 could the Constitution be amended so as to depart from the democratic form of Government or its republic character ? If that cannot be done	 then	 as long as the words "Justice	 social economic and political etc. 	 are there could any of the rights enumerated in articles 14, to 19, 21, 25, 31 and 32 be taken away ? If they cannot, it will be for consideration whether they can be modified. It has been said, no doubt, that the preamble is not a part of our Constitution. But, I think, that if upon a comparison of the preamble with the broad features of the Constitution it would appear that the preamble is an epitome of those features or, to put it differently if these features are an amplification or concretisation of the concepts set out in the preamble it may have to be considered whether the preamble is not a part of the Constitution. While considering this question it would be of relevance to bear in mind that the preamble is not of the common run such as is to be found in an Act of a legislature. It has the stamp of deep deliberation and is marked by precision. Would this not suggest that the framers of the Constitution attached special significance to it ? In view of these considerations and those mentioned by my learned brother Hidayatullah J. I feel reluctant to express a definite opinion on the question whether the word 'law ' in article 13 (2) of the Constitution excludes an Act of Parliament amending the Constitution and also whether it is competent to Parliament to make any amendment at all to Part III of the Constitution. In so far as the second contention is concerned I generally agree with what my Lord the Chief Justice has said but would only like to add this : Upon the assumption that Parliament can amend Part III of the Constitution and was, therefore, competent to enact therein Articles 31A and 31B as also to amend the definition of 'estate ', the question still remains whether it could validate a State 969 law dealing with land. I take it that only that legislature has power to validate a law which has the power to enact that law. Since the agrarian laws included in the Ninth Schedule and sought to be protected by article 31B could not have been enacted by Parliament, would it be right to say that Parliament could validate them ? If Parliament could amend Part III it could, indeed, remove the impediment in the way of the State. Legislatures by enacting article 3 1A and amending the definition of 'estate. But could it go to the extent it went when it enacted the First Amendment Act and the Ninth Schedule and has now added 44 more agrarian laws to it ? Or was it incompetent to it to go beyond enacting article 31A in 1950 and now beyond amending the definition of estate ? This, however, does not appear to have been considered in Sankari Prasad 's case(1) nor was such an argument advanced before us in this case. I am only mentioning this to make It clear that even in so far as the second contention is concerned I base my decision on the narrow ground that upon the arguments advanced before us no case has been made out for striking down the Seventeenth Amendment. As indicated in the judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice an amendment made by resort to the first part of article 368 could be struck down upon a ground such as taking away the jurisdiction of the High Courts under article 226 or of this Court under article 13 6 without complying with the requirements of the proviso. To this I would like to add that if the effect of an amendment is to curtail substantially, though indirectly, the jurisdiction of High Courts under AA. 226 or of this Court under article 136 and recourse has not been had to the proviso to article 368 the question whether the amendment was a colorable exercise of power by Parliament will be relevant for consideration. Before I part with this case I wish to make it clear that what I have said in this judgment is not an expression of my final opinion but only an expression of certain doubts which have assailed me regarding a question of paramount importance to the citizens of our country : to know whether the basic features of the Constitution under which we live and to which we owe allegiance are to endure for all time or at least for the foreseeable future or whether the yard no more enduring than the implemental and subordinate provisions of the Constitution. Petitions dismissed. 
338	ivil Appeal No. 26 of 1955. Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 28th February, 1953, of the Election Tribunal, Vellore, in Election Petition No. 84 of 1954. N.C. Chatterjee, (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him), for the appellant. Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 1. 1955. September, 15. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J. This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Election Tribunal, Vellore, declaring the election of the appellant to the Legislative Assembly void on the ground that there had been a violation of section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act No. XLIII of 1951. Under that section, it, is a major corrupt practice for a candidate or his agent to incur or authorise the incurring of expenditure in contravention of the Act or any rule made thereunder. Rule 117 provides that: No expense shall be incurred or authorised by a 471 candidate or his election agent on account of or in respect of the conduct and management of an election in any one constituency in a State in excess of the maximum amount specified in respect of that Constituency in Schedule V". Under Schedule V	 the maximum expense specified for election to the Madras State Legislature from a single member constituency	 such as Ranipet	 is Rs. 8	000. The return of the expenses lodged by the appellant showed that he had spent in all Rs. 7	063 for the election	 and that was within the limit allowed. The charge against him in the petition was that he had failed to disclose in his return two sums of Rs. 500 each	 spent for election purposes	 and that with the addition of those amounts	 the maximum speci fied had been exceeded. As regards the first amount	 the facts found are that on 12 9 1951 the appellant applied to the Tamil Nad Congress Committee for permission to contest the election as a Congress candidate	 and along with his application he paid Rs. 500 out of which Rs. 100 was subscription for membership and Rs. 400 deposit	 which was liable to be returned under the rules	 in case the applicant was not adopted as the candidate	 but not otherwise. In fact	 the appellant was adopted as the Congress candidate	 and it was on that ticket that he fought and won the election. The second payment of Rs. 500 was on 23 9 1951 to the North Arcot District Congress Committee	 which was in charge of the Ranipet Constituency. The Tribunal held that both these sums were paid for purposes of election and should have been included in the return made by the appellant	 that if they were so included	 the maximum prescribed was exceeded	 and that therefore section 123(7) had been contravened	 and accordingly declared the election void under section 100(2) (b) of the Act. The appellant disputes the correctness of this order. The Tribunal also recorded as part of the order a finding that the appellant had become subject to the disqualifications specified in section 140	 sub clauses (1) (a) and (2). The appellant attacks this finding on 60 472 the ground that it was given without notice to him	 as required by the proviso to section 99. The points that arise for decision in this appeal are (1) whether on the facts found	 there was a contravention of section 123(7) of Act No. XLIII of 1951and (2) whether the finding that the appellant had become disqualified under section 140 is bad for want of notice under the proviso to section 99 of the Act. (1) Taking first the sum of Rs. 500 paid by the appellant to the Tamil Nad Congress Committee on 12 9 1951	 the contention of the appellant is that section 123(7) and Rule 117 have reference only to expenses incurred by a candidate or his agent	 that the appellant was nominated as a candidate only on 16 11 1951	 and that as the payment in question was made long prior to the filing of the nomination paper	 the provisions aforesaid had no application. That raises the question as to when the appellant became a 'candidate ' for purposes of section 123(7). Section 79(b) of Act No. XLIII of 1951. defines a candidate thus: "Candidate" means a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election	 and any such person shall be deemed to have been a candidate as from the time when	 with the election in prospect	 he began to hold himself out as a prospective candidate". Under this definition which applies to section 123(7)	 all election expenses incurred by a candidate from the time when	 with the election in prospect	 he holds himself out as a prospective candidate and not merely from the date when he is nominated	 will have to enter into the reckoning 'under Rule 117 read with Schedule V. That the election was in prospect when the amount of Rs. 500 was paid is clear from the very application of the appellant dated 12 9 1951 wherein he states that he desires "to contest as a 'Congress candidate in the forthcoming election". That is not disputed by the appellant. What he contends is that though the election was in prospect	 he bad not become a prospective candidate at that time	 and that he became so only when the Congress 473 adopted him as its candidate on 13 11 1951. It was argued that it was open to the Congress Committee either to adopt him as its candidate or not	 that if it did not adopt him	 he could not	 under the rules to which he had subscribed	 stand for election at all	 that until he was actually adopted therefor	 his candidature was nebulous and uncertain	 and that the application was consequently nothing more than a preliminary step in aid of his becoming a prospective candidate. The question when a person becomes a candidate must be decided on the language of section 79(b). Under that section	 the candidature commences when the person begins to hold himself out as a prospective candidate. The determining factor therefore is the decision of the candidate himself	 not the act of other persons or bodies adopting him as their candidate. In The Lichfield	 case(1) at page 36	 Baron Pollock observed: "I think the proper mode of judging a question of this kind is to take it from the point of view of the candidate himself. Every man must judge when he will throw himself into the arena. But it is his own choice when he throws down the glove and commences his candidature". When	 therefore	 a question arises under section 79(b) whether a person had become a candidate at a given point of time	 what has to be seen is whether at that time he had clearly and unambiguously declared his intention to stand as a candidate	 so that it could be said of him that he held himself out as a prospective candidate. That he has merely formed an intention to stand for election is not sufficient to make him a prospective candidate	 because it is of the essence of the matter that he should bold himself out as a prospective candidate. That can only be if he communicates that intention to the outside world by declaration or conduct from which it could be inferred that he intends to stand as a candidate. Has that been established in this case? When the appellant made the payment of Rs. 500 to (1) 474 the Tamil Nad Congress Committee	 did he merely evince an intention to stand as a candidate	 or did he hold himself out as a prospective candidate? The application contains a clear declaration of his intention to contest the election	 and that declaration is backed by the solemn act of payment of Rs. 500. The appellant had thus clearly and unambiguously conveyed to the Committee his intention to stand as a candidate	 and he thereby became a prospective candidate within the meaning of section 79(b). The possi bility that the Congress might not adopt him as its 	candidate does not	 as already mentioned	 affect the position	 as the section has regard only to the volition and conduct of the candidate. It is true that if the Congress did not adopt him	 the appellant might not be able to stand for election. But such a result is implicit in the very notion of a prospective candidate	 and does not militate against his becoming one from the date of his application. It was also urged for the appellant that the declaration was made not to the constituency in the North Arcot District but to the Central Committee at Madras	 and that unless there was proof of holding out to the electorate	 the requirements of section 79(b) were not satisfied. It may be that the holding out which is contemplated by that section is to the Constituency; but if it is the Central Committee that has to decide who shall be adopted for election from the concerned constituency	 any declaration made to the Committee is	 in effect	 addressed to the constituency through its accredited representative. The question when a candidature commences is	 as has been held over and over again	 one of fact	 and a decision of the Tribunal on that question is not liable to be reviewed by this Court in special appeal. In the present case	 the Tribunal has	 in a well considered judgment	 formulated the correct principles to be applied in determining when a candidature commences	 examined the evidence in the light of those principles	 and recorded a finding that the appellant was a prospective candidate when he made the payment of 475 Rs. 500 on 12 9 1951	 and we do not find any ground for differing from it. Then	 there is the payment of Rs. 500 made to the North Arcot District Congress Committee on 23 9 1951. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee with reference to this payment is that unlike the payment dated 12 9 1951	 this was not spent for purposes of election but was donation made to the Committee out of philanthropic motives. It has been frequently pointed out that while it is meritorious to make a donation for charitable purposes	 if that is made at the time or on the eve of an election	 it is open to the charge that its real object was to induce the electors to vote in favour of the particular candidate	 and that it should therefore be treated as election expense. In The Wigan Case(1)	 Bowen	 J. observed: ". . I wish to answer the suggestion that this was merely charity. Charity at election times ought to be kept by politicians in the background. . In truth	 I think	 it will generally be found that the feeling which distributes relief to the poor at election time	 though those who are the distributors may not be aware of it	 is really not charity	 but party feeling following in the steps of charity	 wearing the dress of charity	 and mimicking her gait". In The Kingston Case(2)	 Ridley	 J. said: "Now assume for the moment that a man forms a design	 which at the time is in prospect	 for that is the point; yet if circumstances alter	 and an election becomes imminent	 he will go on with that design at his risk". It would again be a question of fact whether the payment of Rs. 500 by the appellant on 23 9 1951 was a pure act of charity or was an expense incurred for election purposes. It was admitted by the Secretary of the North Arcot District Congress Committee that it was usual for the Tamil Nad Congress Committee to consult the local Committee in the matter of adoption of candidates	 and that at the time the payment was made	 it was known that the appellant had ap plied to be adopted by the Congress. Exhibit A(7) (1) 	 (2) 	 476 which is a statement of receipts and payments of the North Arcot District Congress Committee for the period 24 9 1951 to 24 5 1952 shows that the Committee started with an opening balance of Rs. 7 12 2	 and that various amounts were collected including the sum of Rs. 500 paid by the appellant and utilised for election expenses. The Tribunal held on a consideration of these facts that the payment in question could not be regarded as innocent	 and "not motivated by the desire to obtain the recommendations of the North Arcot District Congress Committee for candidature of the first respondent". No ground has been shown for differing from this conclusion. It was finally contended for the appellant that the two payments dated 12 9 1951 and 23 9 1951 could not be said to be expenses incurred on account of the conduct and management of an election	 and reliance was placed on the decision in The Kennington Ca8e(1)	 where it was held that payments made for the running of a newspaper started for supporting a candidate were not expenses incurred in the conduct and management of an election. The facts of the present case have no resemblance to those found in that case	 and the following comment on that decision in Parker 's Election Agent and Returning Officer	 Fifth Edition	 page 241 is instructive: "But this decision could not be safely followed except where the facts are precisely similar". On the findings recorded above	 the expenses incurred by the appellant come to Rs. 8	063	 and the corrupt practice specified in section 123(7) has been committed. The election was therefore rightly set aside under section 100(2)(b) of Act No. XLIII of 1951. (2) It is next contended for the appellant that the Tribunal was in error in recording as part of the order a finding that by reason of the contravention of section 123(7)	 the appellant had become subject to the disqualification specified in section 140	 without giving notice to him as required by the proviso to section (1) 477 99. The question whether a party to an election petition is entitled to a notice under the proviso in respect of the very charges which were the subject matter of enquiry in the petition itself	 has been considered by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1955	 and it has been held therein that if the party had opportunity given to him in the hearing of the petition to meet the very charge in respect of which a finding is to be recorded under section 99 (1) (a)	 then he is not entitled to a further notice in respect of the same matter	 under the proviso. In the present case	 the finding under section 99(1) (a) relates to the very payments which were the subject matter of enquiry in the election petition	 and therefore no notice was required to be given to the appellant under the proviso. This objection also fails	 and the appeal must accordingly be dismissed. The respondent has stated through his counsel Shri Naunit Lal that he does not propose to contest the appeal. There will accordingly be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.

In 1951	 several State legislative measures passed for giving effect to a policy of agrarian reform faced a serious challenge in the Courts. In order to assist the State Legislatures to give effect to the policy	 articles 31A and 31B were added to the Constitution by the Constitution (First. Amendment) Act	 1951. Article 31B provided that none of the Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution shall be deemed to be void or ever to have become void. In 1.955	 by the Constitution (Fourth Amend ment) Act	 article 31A was amended. Notwithstanding those amendments some legislative measures adopted by different States for giving effect to the policy were effectively challenged. In order to save the validity of those Acts as well as of other Acts which were likely to be struck down	 Parliament enacted the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)	 Act 1964	 by which article 31A was again amended and 44 Acts	 were added to the Ninth Schedule. The petitioners in the Writ Petitions in Supreme Court	 and interveners	 were persons affected by one or other of those Acts. They contended that none of the Act by which they were affected could be saved because the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act was constitutionally invalid. It was urged that : (i) Since the powers prescribed by article 226	 which is in Chapter V	 Part VI of the Constitution	 were likely to be affected by Seventeenth Amendment	 the special procedure laid down in the proviso to article 368	 namely ' requiring the ratification by not less half the number of States	 should be followed; (ii) The decision in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo vs Union of India and State of Bihar	 ; 	 which negatived such a contention when dealing with the First Amendment	 should be reconsidered; (iii) The Seventeenth Amendment Act was a legislative measure in respect of land and since Parliament had no right to make a law in respect of land	 the Act was invalid and (iv) Since the Act purported to set aside decisions of Court of competent jurisdiction	 it was unconstitutional. HELD (by P. B. Gajendragadkar C. J.	 Wanchoo	 and Raghubar Dayal JJ.) : (i) The main part of article 368 and its proviso must on a reasonable construction be harmonised with each other in the sense that the scope and effect of either of them should not be allowed to be unduly reduced or enlarged. Such a construction requires that if amendment of the fundamental rights is to make a substantial inroad on the High Court 's powers under article 226	 it would become necessary to consider whether the proviso to article 368 would cover such a case. If the effect is indirect	 incidental or otherwise of an insignificant order the proviso may not apply. In dealing With such a question	 the test to be adopted is to find the pith and substance of the impugned Act. So tested it is clear that the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act amends the fundamental rights solely with the object of removing obstacles in the fulfilment of a socioeconomic policy. Its effect 934 on article 226 is incidental and insignificant. The Act therefore falls under the substantive part of article 368 and does not attract the proviso. [940 D E; 941 B E; 944 D F] (ii) On the contentions urged there was no justification for reconsidering Shankari Prasad case. [947 G H] Though the Constitution is an organic document intended to serve as a guide to the solution of changing problems the Court should be reluctant to accede to the suggestion that its earlier decisions should be lightheartedly reviewed and departed from. In such a case the test is : Is it absolutely and essential that the question already decided should be reopened. The answer to the question would depend on the nature of the infirmity alleged in the earlier decision	 its import on public good and the validity and compelling character of the considerations urged in support of the contrary view. It is therefore relevant and material to note that if the argument urged by the petitioners were to prevail	 it would lead to the inevitable consequence that the amendments of 1951 and 1955 and a large number of decisions dealing with the validity of the Acts in the Ninth Schedule would be exposed to serious jeopardy. [948 E H; 949 A B] (iii) Parliament in enacting the impugned Act was not making any provision of land Legislation but was merely validating land Legislation already passed by the State Legislatures in that behalf. [945 C] (iv) The power conferred by article 368 on Parliament can be exercised both prospectively and retrospectively. It is open to Parliament to validate laws which have been declared invalid by courts. [945 E F] (v) The power conferred by article 368	 includes the power to take away the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. In the context of the constitution it includes the power of modification	 or changing the provisions	 or even an amendment which makes the said provisions inapplicable in certain cases. The power to amend is a very wide power and cannot be controlled by the literal dictionary meaning of the word "amend". The expression "amendment of the Constitution" plainly and unambiguously means amendment of all the provisions of the Constitution. The words used in the proviso unambiguously indicate that the substantive part of the Article applies to all the provisions of the Constitution. A B; 951 B] The word "law" in article 13(2) does not include a law passed by Parliament by virtue of its constituent power to amend the Constitution. if the Constitution makers had intended that any future amendment of the provisions in regard to fundamental rights should be subject to article 13(2)	 they would have taken the precaution of making a clear provision in that behalf. It would not be reasonable to proceed on the basis that the fundamental rights in Part III were intended to be finally and immutably settled and determined once for all and were beyond the reach of any future amendment. The Constitution makers must have anticipated that in dealing With the socioeconomic problems which the legislatures may have to face from time to time	 the concepts of public interest and other important considerations may change and expand	 and so	 it is legitimate to assume that the Constitution makers knew that Parliament should be competent to make amendments in those rights so as to meet the challenge of the problems which may arise. The fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III could not have been intended to be eternal	 inviolate and beyond the reach of article 368 for	 even if the powers to amend the fundamental 'rights were not included in the Article	 Parliament ran by a suitable amendment of the Article take those powers. [951 F H; 954 F H; 955 E G] Article 226 which confers on High Court the power to issue writs falls under the proviso to article 368	 while article 32 which is itself a guaranteed fundamental right and enables a citizen to move the Supreme Court to 935 issue writs	 fall under the main part of the section. Parliament may consider whether the anamoly which is apparent in the different modes prescribed by article 368 for amending articles 226 and 32 respectively	 should not be remedied by including Part III itself in the proviso. [956 E G] Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo vs Union of India and State of Bihar	 ; 	 followed. A. K. Gopalan vs State of Madras	 ; and In re: The Delhi Laws Act; 	 	 referred to. (vi) It is not reasonable to suggest that	 since the impugned Act amends only articles 31A and 31B and adds several Acts to the Ninth Schedule it does not amend the provisions of Part III but makes an independent provision	 and so	 comes within the scope of the proviso to article 368. If Parliament thought that instead of adopting the cumbersome process of amending each relevant Article in Part III	 it would be more appropriate to add articles 31A and 31B	 then what Parliament did in 1951 has afforded a valid basis for further amendments in 1955 and in 1964. [946 B E] (vii) The fact that the Acts have been included in the Ninth Schedule with a view to making them valid	 does not mean that the Legislatures which passed the Acts have lost their competence to repeal or amend them. Also	 if a legislature amends any provision of any such Act	 the amended provision would not receive the protection of article 3 1B and its validity will be liable to be examined on the merits. [956 A C] Per Hidayatullah and Mudholkar JJ. Quaere (i) Whether the word "law" in article 13(2) of the Constitution excludes an Act of Parliament amending the Constitution. [959 E F; 968 G] (ii) Whether it is competent to Parliament to make any amendment at all to Part III of the Constitution. [961 F G; 968 G] Per Mudholkar J. An amendment made by resort to the first part of article 368 could be struck down upon a ground such as taking away the jurisdiction of High Courts under article 226 or of the Supreme Court under article 136 or that the effect of the amendment is to curtail substantially	 though indirectly	 the jurisdiction of the High Courts under article 226 or the Supreme Court under article 136	 and recourse had not been had to the proviso to article 368. The question whether the amendment was a colorable exercise of power by Parliament may be relevant for consideration in the latter kind of case. [969 D F] The attack on the Seventeenth Amendment Act was based on grounds most of which were the same as those urged and rejected in the earlier case of Sankari Prasad Singh Deo vs Union of India and State of Bihar	 ; 	 and on some grounds which are unsubstantial. No case has therefore been made out by the petitioners either for the reconsi deration of that decision or for striking down the Seventeenth Amendment. [963 FG] The following matters however were not considered in Sankari Prasad 's case and merit consideration : (i) Where Legislation deals with the amendment of a provision of the Constitution	 does it cease to be law within the meaning of article 13(2) merely because it has to be passed by a special majority ? [964 B C] (ii) Where a challenge is made before the Court on the ground that no amendment to the Constitution had in fact been made or on the ground that it was not a valid amendment	 would it not be the duty of the Court and within its power to examine the question and to pronounce upon it since this is precisely what a Court is competent to do in regard to any other law? (iii) Is the statement in A. K. Gopalan vs State of Madras	 ; that the fundamental rights are the minimum rights reserved by the people to themselves	 and therefore unalterable	 inconsistent with the statement in In re ; 	 that Parliament has plenary powers of legislation ? [965 D E] (iv) Whether making a change in the basic features of the Constitution can be regarded merely as an amendment or would it be	 in effect	 rewriting a part of the Constitution	 and if it is the latter	 would it be within the purview of article 368 ? [966 H	 967 A] (v) Upon the assumption that Parliament can amend Part III of the Constitution and was therefore competent to enact articles 31A and 31B	 as also to amend the definition of "estate"	 can Parliament validate a State law dealing with land ? [968 H	 969 A] (vi) Could Parliament go to the extent it went when it enacted the First Amendment and the Ninth Schedule and now when it added 44 more agrarian laws to it ? Or	 was Parliament incompetent to go	 beyond enacting article 31A in 1950	 and now	 beyond amending the definition of "Estate" ? [969 B C]