Summarize the following court judgment. are the persons inti mately	 vitally and adversely affected by any action of the BDA and the Government which is destructive of the environ ment and which deprives them of facilities reserved for the enjoyment and protection of the health of the public at large. Being residents of the locality	 the petitioners are naturally aggrieved by the orders in question	 and they have	 therefore	 the necessary locus standi. [131H	 132A B] & CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2750 of 1991. From the Judgment and Order dated 13.9.89 of the Karna taka High Court in W.A. No. 162 of 1989. B.R.L. lyengar	 S.S. Javali	 R.V. Narasimhamurthi	 E.C. Vidyasagar	 G.V. Shantharaju	 D.N.N. Reddy	 Raju Ramachan dran	 K. Jagan Mohan Rao	 M. Veerappa and R.P. Wadhwani for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THOMMEN	 J. Leave granted. I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judg ment of my learned Brother Sahai	 J. and I am in complete agreement with what he has stated. It is in support of his reasoning and conclusion that I add the following words. A site near the Sankey 's Tank in Rajmahal Vilas Exten sion in the City of Bangalore was reserved as an open space in an improvement scheme adopted under the City of Bangalore Improvement Act	 1945. This Act was repealed by section 76 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act	 1976 (Karnataka Act No. 12 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") which received the assent of the Governor on 2.3. 1976 and is deemed to have come into force on 20.12. By a notification issued under section 3 of the Act	 the Govern ment constituted the Bangalore Development Authority (the "BDA") thereby attracting section 76 which	 so far as it is material	 reads: "section 76. REPEAL AND SAVINGS (1) On the issue of the 117 notification under sub section (1) of section 3 constituting the Bangalore Development Authority	 the City of Bangalore Improvement Act	 1945 (Mysore Act 5 of 1945) shah stand repealed. (2). . . . (3). . . . Provided further that anything done or any action taken (including any appointment notification rule	 regulation	 order	 scheme or bye law made or issued	 any permission granted) under the said Act shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the correspond ing provisions of this Act and shall continue to be in force accordingly unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under this Act: Provided also that any reference in any enactment or in any instrument to any provision of the repealed Act shall unless a different intention appears be construed as a reference to the corresponding provision of this Act. (emphasis supplied) Accordingly	 the scheme prepared under the repealed enact ment is deemed to have been prepared and duly sanctioned by the Government in terms of the Act for the development of Rajmahal Vilas Extension. In the scheme so sanctioned the open space in question has been reserved for a public park. However	 pursuant to the orders of the State Government dated 27.5.1976 and 11.6.1976 and by its resolution dated 14.7.1976	 the BDA allotted the open space in favour of the appellant	 a medical trust	 for the purpose of constructing a hospital. This site is stated to be the only available space reserved in the scheme for a public park or play ground. This allotment has been challenged by the writ petitioners (respondents in this appeal) 'who are residents of the locality on the ground that it is contrary to the provisions of the Act and the scheme sanctioned thereunder	 and the legislative intent to protect and preserve the environment by reserving open space for 'ventilation '	 recreation and play grounds and parks for the general pub lic. 118 The writ petitioners	 being aggrieved as members of the general public and residents of the locality	 have chal lenged the diversion of the user and allotment of the site to private persons for construction of a hospital. The learned Single Judge who heard the writ petition in the first instance found no merit in it and dismissed the same. He held that	 a hospital being a civic amenity	 the allotment of the site by the BDA in favour of the present appellant for the purpose of constructing a hospital was valid and in accordance with law. On appeal by the respond ents (the residents of the locality) the learned Judges of the Division Bench held that	 the area having been reserved in the sanctioned scheme for a public park	 its diversion from that object and allotment in favour of a private body was not permissble under the Act	 even if the object of the allotment was the construction of a hospital. The learned Judges were not impressed by the argument that the proposed hospital being a civic amenity	 the Act did not prohibit the abandonment of a public park for a private hospital. Accord ingly	 allowing the respondents ' appeal and without preju dice to a fresh allotment by the BDA of any alternative site in favour of the present appellant	 according to law	 the writ petition was allowed and the allotment of the site in question was set aside. The appellant 's counsel submits that the learned Judges of the Division Bench exceeded their jurisdiction in setting aside an allotment which was purely an administrative action taken by the BDA pursuant to a valid direction issued by the Government in that behalf. He submits that in the absence of any evidence of mala fide the impugned decision of the BDA was impeccable and not liable to be interfered with in writ jurisdiction He says that the decision to allot a site for a hospital rather than a park is a matter within the discre tion of the BDA. The hospital	 he says	 is not only an amenity	 but also a civic amenity under the Act	 as it now stands	 and the diversion of the user of the land for that purpose is justified under the Act. The respondents	 on the other hand	 contend that it was improper to confer a largesse on a private party at the expense of the general public. The special consideration extended to the appellant	 they say	 was not permissible under the Act. To have allotted in favour of the appellant an area reserved for a public park	 even if it be for the purpose of constructing a hospital	 was to sacrifice the public interest in preserving open spaces for 'ventilation '	 recreation and protection of the environment 119 The scheme is undoubtedly statutory in character. In view of the repealing provisions contained in section 76 of the Act	 which we have in part set out above the impugned actions affecting the scheme will be examined with reference to the Act. The validity of neither the Act nor the scheme is doubted. The complaint of the writ petitioners (respond ents) is that the scheme has been violated by reason of the impugned orders. The scheme	 they point out	 is a legitimate exercise of statutory power for the protection of the resi dents of the locality from the ill effects of urbanisation	 and the impugned orders sacrificing open space reserved for a public park is an invalid and colourable exercise of power to suit private interest at the expense of the general public. The Act	 as enacted in 1976	 has undergone several changes	 but the definition of 'amenity ' in clause (b) of section 2 remains unchanged. 'Amenity ' includes various 'conveniences ' such as road	 drainage	 lighting etc. and such other conveniences as are notified as such by the Government. Section 2 was amended in 1984 by Karnataka Act No. 17 of 1984 to add clause (bb)	 after clause (b)	 which distin guished a 'civic amenity ' from an 'amenity '. Certain ameni ties were specified as civic amenities	 such as dispen saries	 maternity homes etc. and those amenities which are notified as civic amenities by the Government. By Act 11 of 1988	 clause (bb) of section 2 was	 w.e.f. 21.4. 1984	 substituted by the present clause which defines a civic amenity as	 amongst others	 a dispensary	 a hospi tal	 a pathological laboratory	 a maternity home and such other amenity as the Government may by notification	 speci fy. Clauses (b) and (bb) of section 2 read together show that all those conveniences which are enumerated	 or	 noti fied by the Government under clause (b)	 are `amenities '; and	 all those amenities which are enumerated	 or	 notified by the Government under clause (bb)	 are 'civic amenities '. Significantly	 a hospital is specifically stated to be a 'civic amenity '. The concept of 'amenity ' under clause (b)	 however	 remains unchanged. it is not clear from sub clause (i) of clause (bb) whether a hospital which is not run by the Government or a civic 'Corporation ' but	 as in the present case	 by a private body	 would qualify as 'civic amenity '. Nor is it clear whether a hospital was either an `amenity ' or a 'civic amenity ' until it was specifically stated to be the latter by the Amendment Act 11 of 1988. The respondents (residents) 120 contend that a hospital did not have the status of an 'amen ity ' and much less a 'civic amenity ' until Act 11 of 1988 so stated. But perhaps the appellant rightly contends that Act 11 of 1988 was merely clarificatory of what was always the position	 and the hospital has always been regarded as an 'amenity '	 if not a 'civic amenity '. However	 on the facts of this case	 it is unnecessary to pursue this point fur ther. Nor is it necessary to consider whether a privately owned and managed hospital	 as in the present case	 is an 'amenity ' for the purpose of the Act. The question really is whether an open space reserved for a park or play ground for the general public	 in accord ance with a formally approved and published development scheme in terms of the Act	 can be allotted to a private person or a body of persons for the purpose of constructing a hospital? Do the members of the public	 being residents of the locality	 have a right to object to such diversion of the user of the space and deprivation of a park meant for the general public and for the protection of the environ ment? Are they in law aggrieved by such diversion and allot ment? To ascertain these points	 we must first took at the relevant provisions of the Act. Chapter III of the Act deals with 'development schemes '. The BDA is empowered to draw up detailed schemes for the development of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area. It may	 with the previous approval of the Government	 undertake from time to time any work for such development and incur expenditure therefor. The Government is also empowered to require the BDA to take up any development scheme or work and execute the same	 subject to such terms and conditions as may be specified by the Government (See section 15). Section 16 provides that such development schemes must provide for various matters	 such as acquisition of land	 laying and re laying of land	 construction and reconstruc tion of buildings	 formation and alteration of streets	 drainage	 water supply and electricity. In 1984 this section was amended by Act 17 of 1984 by inserting clause (d) so as to provide for compulsory reservation of portions of the layout for public parks and play grounds and also for civic amenities. Section 16(1)(d) provides: "section 46. PARTICULARS TO BE PROVIDED FOR IN A DEVELOPMENT SCHEME Every development scheme under section 15: (1) shall	 within the limits of the area com prised in the scheme	 provide for: 121 (d) the reservation of not less than fifteen per cent of the total area of the layout for public parks and play grounds and an addition al area of not less than ten percent of the total area of the layout for civic amenities. " This provision thus treats 'public parks and play grounds ' as a different and separate amenity or convenience from a 'civic amenity '. 15% and 10% of the total area of the layout must respectively be reserved for (1) public parks and play grounds	 and	 (2) for civic amenities. The extent of the areas reserved for these two objects are thus separately and distinctly stated by the statute. The implication of this conceptual distinction is that land reserved for a public park and play ground cannot be utilised for any 'civic amenity ' including a hospital. 16(2) says: "section 16(2) may	 within the limits aforesaid	 provide for (b) forming open spaces for the better venti lation of the area comprised in the scheme or any adjoining area; The need for open space for 'better ventilation ' of the area is thus emphasised by this provision. One of the main ob jects of public parks or play grounds is the promotion of the health of the community by means of `ventilation ' and recreation	 It is the preservation of the quality of life of the community that is sought to be protected by means of these regulations. Section 17 lays down the procedure to be followed on completion of a development scheme. It deals with	 amongst other things	 the method of service of notice on affected parties. Section 18 deals with the procedure for sanctioning the scheme. The BDA must submit to the Government the scheme together with the particulars such as plans	 estimates	 details of land to be acquired etc. and also representa tions	 if any	 received from persons affected by the scheme. On consideration of the proposed scheme	 the Government is empowered under sub section (3) of section 18 to accord its sanction for the scheme. 122 Section 19 says that when necessary sanction is accorded by the Government	 it should publish in the Official Gazette a declaration as the sanction accorded and the land proposed to be acquired for the scheme. Sub section (4) of section 19 says: "19(4) If at any time it appears to the authority that an improvement can be made in any part of the scheme	 the Authority may alter the scheme for the said purpose and shall subject to the provisions of sub sections (5) and (6)	 forthwith proceed to execute the scheme as altered. " This means that the BDA may	 subject to certain restrictions contained in sub sections (5) and (6)	 alter the scheme	 but such alteration has to be carried out pursuant to a formal decision duly recorded in the manner generally followed by a body corporate. The scheme is a statutory instrument which is administrative legislation involving a great deal of general law making of universal application	 and it is not	 therefore	 addressed to individual cases of persons and places. Alteration of the scheme must be for the purpose of improvement and better development of the City of Bangalore and adjoining areas and for general application for the benefit of the public at large. Any alteration of the scheme with a view to conferring a benefit on a particular person	 and without regard to the general good of the public at large	 is not an improvement contemplated by the section. See the principle stated in Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited & Anr. etc. vs Union of India & Ors.	 [1990] 1 SCR 909	937	 et. Section 30 has not been amended	 and	 so far as it is material	 reads: "30. STREETS ON COMPLETION TO VEST IN AND BE MAINTAINED BY CORPORATION (2) Any open space including such parks and play grounds as may be notified by the Govern ment reserved for ventilalion in any part of the area under the jurisdiction of the Author ity as part of any development scheme sanc tioned by the Government shall be transferred on completion to the Corporation for mainte nance at the expense of the Corporation and shall thereupon vest in the Corporation. . . . . . . . . (emphasis supplied) 123 Sub section (2) of this section thus refers to open space	 including parks and play grounds	 notified by the Government as reserved for `ventilation '. Section 31 prohibits transfer by sale or otherwise of sites for the purpose of construc tion of buildings until all the improvements specified in section 30	 including parks and play grounds	 have been provided for in the estimates. Section 32 prohibits any person from forming any extension or layout for the purpose of construction of buildings without specific sanction of the BDA. Section 33 has empowered the Commissioner of the BDA to order alteration or demolition of buildings con structed otherwise than in conformity with the sanction of the BDA. These provisions have not undergone any material change. Chapter V of the Act deals with property and finance of the BDA. Section 38 reads: "38. POWER OF AUTHORITY TO LEASE	 SELL OR TRANSFER PROPERTY Subject to such restric tions	 conditions and limitations as may be prescribed	 the Authority shall have power to lease	 sell or otherwise transfer any movable or immovable property which belongs to it	 and to appropriate or apply any land vested in or acquired by it for the formation of open spaces or for building purposes or in any other manner for the purpose of any develop ment scheme." (emphasis supplied) This section also has not undergone any material change. It says that	 subject to such restrictions	 conditions etc.	 as may be prescribed	 the BDA has the power to lease	 sell or otherwise transfer any movable or immovable property which belongs	 to it	 and to appropriate or apply any land vested in it or acquired by it for the formation of 'open spaces ' or for building purposes or in any other manner for the purpose of any development scheme. This implies that land once appropriated or applied or earmarked by formation of 'open spaces ' or for building purposes or other development in accordance with a duly sanctioned scheme should not be used for any other purpose unless the scheme itself	 which is statutory in character	 is formally altered in the manner that the BDA as a body corporate is competent to alter. This section	 of course	 empowers the BDA to lease or sell or otherwise transfer any property. But that power has to be exercised consistently with the appropriation or application of land for formation of 'open spaces ' or for building purposes or any other development scheme sanctioned by 124 the Government. Property reserved for open space in a duly sanctioned scheme cannot be leased or sold away unless the scheme itself is duly altered. Any unauthorised deviation from the duly sanctioned scheme by sacrificing the public interest in the preservation and protection of the environ ment by means of open space for parks and play grounds and 'ventilation ' will be contrary to the legislative intent	 and an abuse of the statutory power vested in the authori ties. That this is the true legislative intent is left in no doubt by the subsequent amendment by Act 17 'Of 1984	 insert ing section 38A	 which reads: "38A. PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF AREA RESERVED FOR PARKS	 PLAY GROUNDS AND CIVIC AMENITIES FOR OTHER PURPOSES The authority shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any area reserved for public parks and play grounds and civic amenities	 for any other purpose and any disposition so made shall be null and void." (emphasis supplied) This amendment of 1984	 which came into force on 17.4.84	 is merely clarificatory of what has always been the legislative intent. The new provision clarifies that it shall not be open to the BDA to dispose of any area reserved for public parks and play grounds and civic amenities. Any such site cannot be diverted to any other purpose. Any action in violation of this provision is null and void. The legislative intent to prevent the diversion of the user of an area reserved for a public park or play ground or civic amenity is reaffirmed by the Bangalore Development Authority (Amendment) Act	 1991 (Karnataka Act No. 18 of 1991) which came into force w.e.f. 16.1.1991	 and which substituted a new section 38A in the place of the earlier provision inserted by Act 17 of the 1984. Section 2 of the Karnataka Act 18 of 1991 reads: "section 2. Substitution of section 38A For sec tion 38A of the Bangalore Development Authori ty Act	 1976 (Karnataka Act 12 of 1976 (here inafter referred to as the principal Act)	 the following shall be deemed to have been substi tuted with effect from the twenty first day of April	 1984	 namely: `38A. Grant of area reserved for civic amenities etc: (1) The Authority shall have the power to lease	 sell or 125 otherwise transfer any area reserved for civic amenities for the purpose for which such area is reserved. (2) The Authority shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any area reserved for public parks and playgrounds and civic ameni ties	 for any other purpose and any disposi tion so made shall be null and void Provided that where the allottee commits breach of any of the conditions of allotment	 the Authority shall have right to resume such site after affording an opportuni ty of being heard to such allottee. " This new section 38A	 as clarified in the Statement of Objects and Reasons and in the Explanatory Statement at tached to L.A. Bill No. 6 of 1991	 removed the prohibition against lease or sale or any other transfer of any area reserved for a civic amenity	 provided the transfer is for the same purpose for which the area has been reserved. This means that once an area has been stamped with the character of a particular civic amenity by reservation of that area for such purpose	 it cannot be diverted to any other use even when it is transferred to another party. The rationale of this restriction is that the scheme once sanctioned by the Government must operate universally and the areas allo cated for particular objects must not be diverted to other objects. This means that a site for a school or hospital or any other civic amenity must remain reserved for that pur pose	 although the site itself may change hands. This is the purpose of sub section (1) of section 38A	 as now substitut ed. Sub section (2) of section 38A	 on the other hand	 emphasises the conceptual distinction between 'public parks and play grounds ' forming one category or ' 'space ' and 'civic amenities ' forming another category of sites. While public parks and play grounds cannot be parted with by the BDA for transfer to private hands by reason of their statu tory dedication to the general public	 other areas reserved for. civic amenities may be transferred to private parties for the specific purposes for which those areas are re served. There is no prohibition	 as such	 against transfer of open spaces reserved for public parks or play grounds	 whether or not for consideration	 but the transfer is limit ed to public authorities and their user is limited to the purposes for which they are reserved under the scheme. The distinction is that while public parks and play grounds are dedicated to the public at large for common use	 and must therefore remain with the State or its instrumentalities	 such as the BDA or a Municipal Corporation or any other authority	 the civic amenities are not so dedicated	 126 but only reserved for particular or special purposes. This restriction against allotment of public parks and play grounds is further emphasised by section 3 of the Karnataka Act 18 of 1991 which reads: "S.3. Validation of allotment of civic amenity sites Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or judg ment	 decree or order of any court or other authority	 any allotment of civic amenity site by way of sale	 lease or otherwise made by the authority after the twenty first day of April	 1984	 and before the Seventh day of May	 1988 for the purposes specified in clause (bb) of Section 2 of the principal Act	 shall	 if such site has been made use of for the purpose for which it is allotted	 be deemed to have been validly made and shall	 have effect for all purposes as if it had been made under the principal Act	 as amended by this Act and accordingly: (i) all acts or proceedings	 or things done or allotment made or action taken by the Authority shall	 for all purposes be deemed to be and to have always been done or taken in accordance with law; and (ii) no suit or other proceedings shall be instituted	 maintained or continued in any court or before any authority for cancellation of such allotment or demolition of buildings constructed on the sites so allotted after obtaining building licences from the Authority or the (local authority concerned or for questioning the validity of any action or) things taken or done under section 38A of the principal Act	 as amended by this Act and no court shall enforce or recognise any decree or order 'declaring any such allotment made	 action taken or things done under the principal Act	 as invalid." The evil that was sought to be remedied by the validation provision is in regard to allotment of "civic amenity sites"	 and not public parks or play grounds (see also the Explanatory Statement attached to the Bill). All these provisions unmistakably point to the legislative intent to preserve 'a public park or public play ground in the hands of the general public	 as represented by the BDA or any other public authority	 and thus prevent private hands from grab bing them for private ends. it must also be stated here that the validation clause relates to the period between 21.4. 1984 and 7.5. 1988 which was long after the impugned allot ment. 127 Section 65 empowers the Government to give such direc tions to the BDA as are	 in its opinion	 necessary or expe dient for carrying out the purposes of the Act. It is the duty of the BDA to comply with such directions. It is con tended that the BDA is bound by all directions of the Gov ernment	 irrespective of the nature or purpose of the direc tions. We do not agree that the power of the Government under section 65 is unrestricted. The object of the direc tions must be to carry out the object of the Act and not contrary to it. Only such directions as arc reasonably necessary or expedient for carrying out the object of the enactment are contemplated by section 65. If a direction were to be issued by the Government to lease out to private parties areas reserved in the scheme for public parks and play grounds	 such a direction would not have the sanctity of section 65. Any such diversion of the user of the land would be opposed to the statute as well as the object in constituting the BDA to promote the healthy development of the city and improve the quality of life. Any repository of power be it the Government or the BDA must act reasonably and rationally and in accordance with law and with due regard to the legislative intent. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that section 38A prohibiting sale or any other disposal of land reserved for 'public parks or play grounds '	 and section 16(1)(d) requiring that 15 per cent of the total area of the layout be reserved for public parks and play grounds	 and an addi tional area of not less than ten per cent of the total area of the layout for civic amenities	 were enacted subsequent to the relevant orders of the Government dated 27.5.1976 and 11.6.1976 and the resolution of the BDA dated 14.7.76 re sulting in the allotment of the site in favour of the appel lant. Counsel says that at the material time when the Gov ernment made these orders and the BDA acted upon them there was no restriction on the diversion of the user of land reserved for a public park or play ground to any other purpose. Significantly	 the original scheme	 duly sanctioned under the Act	 includes a public park and the land in ques tion has been reserved exclusively for that purpose. Al though it is open to the BDA to alter the scheme	 no altera tion has been made in the manner contemplated by section 19(4). It is	 however	 true that certain steps had been taken by the Government and the BDA to allot the open space in question to the appellant. My learned brother Sahai	 J. has referred to the letter dated 21st April	 1976 addressed by the Chairman of the BDA to the Chief Minister and the endorsement made by the Chief Minister on that letter as well as the Orders of the Government dated 27th May	 1976 and 11th June	 1976 sanctioning conversion of the low level park 128 into a civic amenity site and allotting the same to the appellant. These orders were followed by a resolution adopt ed by the BDA on 14th July	 1976 reading as follows: "393. Allotment of C.A. Site to Bangalore Medical Trust for construction of Hospital in Rajmahal viias Extension. It was resolved `The Government Order No. HMA 249 MNG 76 Bangalore dt. 17.6.1976 regarding allotment of C.A. site situated next to the land allotted to H.K.E. Society in Rajmahal viias Extension	 Bangalore	 in favour of Banglore Medical Trust for construction of Hospital to read and recorded with confirma tion for further action in the matter". These documents leave no doubt that the action of the Gov ernment and the BDA resulting in the resolution dated 14th July	 1976 have been inspired by individual interests at the costs and to the disadvantage of the general public. Public interest does not appear to have guided the minds of the persons responsible for diverting the user of the open space for allotment to the appellant. Conversion of the open space reserved for a park for the general good of the public into a site for the construction of a privately owned and managed hospital for private gains is not an alteration for improve ment of the scheme as contemplated by section 19	 and the impugned orders in that behalf are a flagrant violation of the legislative intent and a colourable exercise of power. In the circumstances	 it has to be concluded that no valid decision has been taken to alter the scheme. The scheme provides for a public park and the land in question remains dedicated to the public and reserved for that purpose. It is not disputed that the only available space which can be utilised as a public park or play ground and which has been reserved for that purpose is the space under consideration. The scheme is meant for the reasonable accomplishment of the statutory object which is to promote the orderly devel opment of the City of Bangalore and adjoining areas and to preserve open spaces by reserving public parks and play grounds with a view to protecting the residents from the iII effects of urbanisation. It is meant for the development of the city in a way that maximum space is provided for the benefit of the public at large for recreation	 enjoyment	 'ventilation ' 129 and fresh air. This is clear from the Act itself as it originally stood. The amendments inserting sections 16(1)(d)	 38A and other provisions are clarificatory of this object. The very purpose of the BDA	 as a statutory authori ty	 is to promote the healthy growth and development of the City of Bangalore and the area adjacent thereto. The legis lative intent has always been the promotion and enhancement of the quality of life by preservation of the character and desirable aesthetic features of the city. The subsequent amendments are not a deviation from or alteration of the original legislative intent	 but only an elucidation or affirmation of the same. Protection of the environment	 open spaces for recrea tion and fresh air	 play grounds for children	 promenade for the residents	 and other conveniences or amenities are matters of great public concern and of vital interest to be taken care of in a development scheme. It is that public interest which is sought to be promoted by the Act by estab lishing the BDA. The public interest in the reservation and preservation of open spaces for parks and play grounds cannot be sacrificed by leasing or selling such sites to private persons for conversion to some other user. Any such act would be contrary to the legislative intent and incon sistent with the statutory requirements. Furthermore	 it would be in direct conflict with the constitutional mandate to ensure that any State action is inspired by the basic values of individual freedom and dignity and addressed to the attainment of a quality of life which makes the guaran teed rights a reality for all the citizens. See Kharak Singh vs The State of U.P. & Others	 [1964] 1 SCR 332; Municipal Council	 Ratlam vs Shri Vardhichand & Ors.	 ; ; Francis Coralie Mullin vs The Administrator	 Union Territory of Delhi & Ors.	 ; ; Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors.	 ; ; State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. vs Umed Ram Sharma & Ors.	 ; and Vikram Deo Singh Tomar vs State of Bihar	 ; Reservation of open spaces for parks and play grounds is universally recognised as a legitimate exercise of statutory power rationally related to the protection of the residents of the locality from the illeffects of urbanisation. See for e.g: Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act	 1961; Maha rashtra Regional and Town Planning Act	 1966; Bombay Town Planning Act	 1954; The Travancore Town and Country Planning Act	 1120; The Madras Town Planning Act	 1920; and the Rules framed under these Statutes; Town & Country Planning Act	 1971 (England & Wales); Encyclopaedia Americana	 Volume 22	 page 240; Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences	 Volume XII at page 130 161; Town Imporvement Trusts ' in lndia	 1945 by Rai Sahib Om Prakash Aggarawala	 p. 35; et. 	 ' Halsburys Statutes	 Fourth Edition	 p. 17 et. and Journal of Planning & Environment Law	 1973	 p. 130 et. See also: Penn Cen tral Transportation Company vs City of New York	 ; (1978)]; Village of Belle Terre vs Bruce Bora as; 	 (1974)]; Village of Euclid vs Ambler Realty Company	 (1926) and Halsey vs Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd.	 In Agins vs City of Tiburon	 ; (1980)	 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a zoning ordinance which provided `. it is in the public interest to avoid unnecessary conversion of open space land to strictly urban uses	 thereby protecting against the resultant impacts	 such as . pollution	 . destruction of scenic beauty. disturbance of the ecology and the environment	 hazards related geology	 fire and flood	 and other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl '. Upholding the ordinance	 the Court said: ". The State of California has determined that the development of local open space plans will discourage the "premature and unnecessary conversion of open space land to urban uses". The specific zoning regulations at issue are exercises of the city 's police power to pro tect the residents of Tiburon from the iII effects of urbanization. Such governmental purposes long have been recognized as legiti mate. The zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well public by serving the city 's interest in assuring careful and order ly development of residential property with provision for open space areas. See com ments on this decision by Thomas J. Schoen baum	 Environmental Policy Law	 1985 p. 438 et. See also Summary and Comments	 [1980] 10E.L.R. 10125 et. " The statutes in force in India and abroad reserving open spaces for parks and play grounds are the legislative at tempt to eliminate the misery of disreputable housing condi tion caused by urbanisation. Crowded urban areas tend to spread disease	 crime and immorality. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Samuel Berman vs Andrew Parker	 99 1. Ed. 27 ; ". They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the 131 people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insuf ferable burden. They may also be an ugly sore	 a blight on the community which robs it of charm	 which makes it a place from which men turn. The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a river. The concept of the public wel fare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical	 aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to deter mine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy	 spacious as well as clean	 well balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case	 the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. . ". (Per Douglas	 J.). Any reasonable legislative attempt bearing a rational relationship to a permissible state objective in economic and social planning will be respected by the courts. A duly approved scheme prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Act is a legitimate attempt on the part of the Gov ernment and the statutory authorities to ensure a quiet place free of dust and din where children can run about and the aged and the infirm can rest	 breath fresh air and enjoy the beauty of nature. These provisions are meant to guaran tee a quiet and healthy atmosphere to suit family needs of persons of all stations. Any action which tends to defeat that object is invalid. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre vs Bruce Boraas	 1: ". The police power is not confined to elimination of filth	 stench	 and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values	 youth values	 and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people". See also Village of Euclid vs Ambler Realty Company	 1926. See the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Damodhar Rao & Ors. vs The Special Officer	 Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad & Ors.	 AIR 1987 AP 17 1. The residents of the locality are the persons ' intimately	 vitally 132 and adversely affected by any action of the BDA and the Government which is destructive of the environment and which deprives them of facilities reserved for the enjoyment and protection of the health of the public at large. The resi dents of the locality	 such as the writ petitioners	 are naturally aggrieved by the impugned orders and they have	 therefore	 the necessary locus standi. In the circumstances	 we are of the view that	 apart from the fact that the scheme has not been validly altered by the BDA	 it was not open to the Government in terms of section 65 to give a direction to the BDA to defy the very object of the Act. The impugned orders of the Government dated 27.5. 1976 and 11.6.1976 and the consequent decision of the BDA dated 14.7. 1976 are inconsistent with	 and contrary to	 the legislative intent to safeguard the health	 safety and general welfare of the people of the locality. These orders evidence a colourable exercise of power	 and are opposed to the statutory scheme. The impugned orders and the consequent action of the BDA in allotting to private persons areas reserved for public parks and play grounds and permitting construction of build ings for hospital thereon are in the circumstances	 declared to be null and void and of no effect. R.M. SAHAI	 J. Public park or private nursing home which serves public interest	 better	 is itself an interesting issue in this appeal directed against order of the Karnataka High Court	 apart	 from if the conversion of the site from park to hospital was in accordance with law and whether a private hospital was an amenity or civic amenity under the Bangalore Development Authority Act (Act 12 of 1976) (in brief the Act) and in any case could it be considered as an improvement	 under Section 19(4) of the Act	 if so whether the authorities while doing so acted within the constraints of law. Factual martix is quite simple and plain. But before narrating it or entering into merits of various issues it is imperative to sort out at the threshold if a private nursing home with modern facilities and sophisticated instruments is more conducive to the public interest than a park as it was stressed that even if the conversion of the site suffered from any infirmity procedural or substantive the High Court should have refrained from exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction and that also in favour of those residents many of whom did not have their houses around the park and thus could not be placed in the category of 133 persons aggrieved. It was also emphasised that the hospital with research centre and even free service being more impor tant from social angle the inhabitants of the locality could not be said to suffer any injury much less substantial injury. Locus standi to approach by way of writ petition and refusal to grant relief in equity jurisdiction are two different aspects	 may be with same result. One relates to maintainability of the petition and other to exercise of discretion. Law on the former has marched much ahead. Many milestones have been covered. The restricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of specific injury has yielded in favour of broad and wide construction in wake of public interest litigation. Even in private challenge to executive or administrative action having extensive fall out the dividing line between personal injury or loss and injury of a public nature is fast vanishing. Law has veered round from genuine grievance against order affecting prejudicially to sufficient interest in the matter. The rise in exercise of power by the executive and comparative decline in proper and effective administrative guidance is forcing citizens to espouse challenges with public interest flavour. It is too late in the day	 therefore	 to claim that petition filed by inhabitants of a locality whose park was converted into a nursing home had no cause to invoke equity jurisdiction of the High Court. In fact public spirited citizens having faith in rule of law are rendering great social and legal service by espousing cause of public nature. They cannot be ignored or overlooked on technical or conservative yardstick of the rule of locus standi or absence of personal loss or injury. Present day development of this branch of jurispru dence is towards freer movement both in nature of litigation and approach of the courts. Residents of locality seeking protection and maintenance of environment of their locality cannot be said to be busy bodies or interlopers S.P. Gupta vs Union of India	 ; Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Kararnchari Sangh vs U.O.I.	 and Fertilizer Corporation Karngar Union vs U.O.I.	 AIR 1981 SC 364. Even otherwise physical or personal or economic injury may give rise to civil or crimi nal action but violation of rule of law either by ignoring or affronting individual or action of the executive in disregard of the provisions of law raises substantial issue of accountability of those entrusted with responsibility of the administration. It furnishes enough cause of action either for individual or community in general to approach by way of writ petition and the authorities cannot be permitted to seek shelter under cover of technicalities of locus standi nor they can be heard to plead for restraint in exercise of discretion as grave issues of 134 public concern outweigh such considerations. Public park as a place reserved for beauty and recrea tion was developed in 19th and 20th Century and is associat ed with growth of the concept of equality and recognition of importance of common m.n. Earlier it was a prerogative of the aristocracy and the affluent either as a result of royal grant or as a place reserved for private pleasure. Free and healthy air in beautiful surroundings was privilege of few. But now it is a	 `gift from people to themselves '. Its importance has multiplied with emphasis on environment and pollution. In modern planning and development it occupies an important place in social ecology. A private nursing home on the other hand is essentiality a commercial venture	 a profit oriented industry. Service may be its morn but earn ing is the objective. Its utility may not be undermined but a park is a necessity not a mere amenity. A private nursing home cannot be a substitute for a public park. No town planner would prepare a blue print without reserving space for it. Emphasis on open air and greenery has multiplied and the city or town planning or development acts of different States require even private house owners to leave open space in front and back for lawn and fresh air. In 1984 the BD Act itself provided for reservation of not less than fifteen per cent of the total area of the lay out in a development scheme for public parks and playgrounds the sale and dispo sition of which is prohibited under Section 38A of the Act. Absence of open space and public park	 in present day when urbanisation is on increase	 rural exodus is on large scale and congested areas are coming up rapidly	 may given rise to health hazard. May be that it may be taken care of by a nursing home. But it is axiomatic that prevention is better than cure. What is lost by removal of a park cannot be gained by establishment of a nursing home. To say	 there fore	 that by conversion of a site reserved for low lying into a private nursing home social welfare was being promot ed was being oblivious of true character of the two and their utility. Merits	 too	 raise issues of far reaching importance. One of them being the efficacy of exercise of individualised discretion where law or the rules contemplate participatory objective decision or conclusion. Another is the requirement of substantive fairness in dealings by government or local bodies or public institutions with people of any strata of society uniformly and equally. To begin with the factual setting in which the controversy arose it is undisputed that the City Improvement Board constituted under City of Banga lore Improvement Act	 1945	 prepared the development scheme for bringing into 135 existence an extension of the City of Bangalore which came to be known as the Palace Upper Orchards/Sadashiv Nagar	 later came to be known as Raj Mahal Viias Extension. In this an area facing	 the Sankey tank	 was earmarked for being developed as a low level park. In 1976 the Improvement Act was repealed and replaced by Act 12 of 1976 which came into force with effect from December	 1975. Section 76 of the Act while repealing Improvement Act by Section 76 saved the scheme by proviso Second to Sub Section (3) of the Section and provided that it shall be deemed to have been done under corresponding provisions of the Act. The Act received the assent in March 1976. And in the same month the Chairman of the Bangalore Development Authority received a communication from the Chief Minister of the State that the Bangalore Medical Trust	 the appellant (referred as BMT) was keen to have the plot reserved for park as nursing home. On it the Chairman	 without any meeting of any Committee or the Devel opment Authority	 wrote a letter to the Chief Minister on 21st April	 1976	 the contents of which are extracted below: "No. PS. 56/76 77 Encl. One Blue Print. Respected sir	 Re: Grant of land to Bangalore Medical Trust for construction of a nursing home. The Bangalore Medical Trust have applied to your goodself on 30.3. 1976 for grant of vacant land situated next to that given to H.K.E. Society	 Rajmahal Viias Exten sion	 on which you have passed orders "Chair man	 BDA A suitable site for the proposed hospital building may be given. I herewith enclose a blue print showing the location of the said plot	 which they have requested. In the blue print ap proved by the erstwhile City Improvement Trust Board	 Bangalore	 this site is marked as a Low Level Park	 which measures approximately 13	485 sq. This is a low level area when compared to the surrounding ground level. The sponsors of Bangalore Medical Trust are very keen to secure this land for their use to construct a nursing home 136 with eminent specialists to cater medical relief to the needy public. In the first instance	 it has to be approved by the Government to convert this low level park as a civic amenity site. Secondly Government has to approve the allotment of the said land to the Bangalore Medical Trust as a Civic Amenity Site. Therefore	 I seek your kind orders in the matter	 how I should act. With warm regards	 Yours sincerely. On it the Chief Minister made an endorsement is his own hand which reads as under: "This area which was allowed to be kept for laying a park may be converted into C.A. Site. Another similar bit kept for the same purpose has been given away for Education Society some years back. And this remaining area is said to be not suitable for park. " In consequence of the direction by the Chief Minister the Government on 27th May	 1976 converted the site from public park to a civic amenity. Copy of the order is ex tracted below: "Subject: Grant of land to Bangalore Medical Trust for construction of a Nursing Home. ORDER NO. HMA 249 MNG 76 DATED BANGA LORE THE 27TH MAY 1976. READ; Letter No. PS 56/7 6 77 dated 21.4.1976 from the Chairman	 Bangalore Development Authority	 Bangalore. PREAMBLE; The Chairman	 Bangalore Development Authority 137 has requested for sanction of Government to the conversion of the low level park	 next to the land allotted to the HKE Society	 in Rajmahal Viias Extension as a C.A. Site and to the allotment of the said site to the Banga lore Medical Trust for the construction of a Nursing Home. 'ORDER Sanction is accorded to the conver sion of the Low Level Park	 situated next to the land allotted to the H.K.E. Society in Rajmahal Vilas Extension	 Bangalore as a civic amenity site. By order and in the name of the Governor of Karna taka sd/ (S.R. Shankaranarayana Rao I/c. Under Secretary to Government Health & Municipal Admn. Deptt. " It was followed by another order dated 17th June	 1976	 sanctioning the lease to the BMT. The order reads as under: "Subject: Allotment of a C.A. site to Banga lore Medical Trust for Construction of a hospital. ORDER NO. HMA 249 MNG 76	 BANGALORE DATED THE 17TH JUNE	 1976. READ; (1)Govt. Order No. PLM 18 MNG 64 dated 17th March	 1964. 2) Govt. Order No. HMA 249 MNG 76 dated 27th May	 1976. 3) Letter No. PS 132/76 77 dated 1st June	 1976 from the Chairman	 Bangalore Development Authority	 Bangalore. PREAMBLE; 138 Sanction was accorded to convert a low level park situated next to the land allotted to H.K.E. Society in Rajmahal Viias Extension	 Bangalore vide Govt. Order read at (ii) above. Now the Chairman	 Bangalore Development Authority requests for lease of the aforesaid Civic Amenity Site to the Banga lore Medical Trust	 Bangalore. ORDER Sanction is accorded to the lease of Civic Amenity Site situated next to the land allotted to HKE Society in Rajmahal Viias Extension Bangalore to the Bangalore Medical Trust for construction of hospital with condi tions of lease as detailed in the Govt. Order No. PLM 18 MNG 64	 dated 17th March	 1964. The trust should strictly adhere to the condition No. 7 of the lease and should complete the building well within 3 years. By Order and in the name of Governor of Karnataka sd (K.G. Rajanna) Under Secretary to Government Health & Munici pal Admn. Deptt. " On 14th July the Bangalore Development Authority. (hereinafter referred as BDA) completed the formality by passing the resolution and allotting the site to the BMT. The resolution reads as under: "The Government Order No. HMA 249 MNG 76 Bangalore dated the 17th June	 1976 regarding allotment of C.A. Site situated next to the land allotted to H.K.E. Society in Rajmahal Vilas Extension	 Bangalore in favour of Banga lore Medical Trust for construction of hospi tal be read and recorded with confirmation for further action in the matter. On coming to know of the allotment in 1981	 when some construction activity was noticed by the residents	 they approached the 139 High Court by way of writ petition on which the learned single Judge framed two issues: "(1) Whether the land had become the property of the Corporation and therefore the allotment of land by the BDA in favour of the fourth respondent was illegal and invalid? (2) Even assuming that the ownership of the land had not been transferred to the Corpora tion	 whether the action of the BDA in allot ting the land	 originally earmarked for a park	 for construction of a nursing home and a hospital	 to the fourth respondent is illegal and invalid? Both the issues were answered in the negative. On the first it was held that even though building and street etc. were transferred to the Corporation by the State Govt. by a notification issued under Section 23(I) of the Act no such notification under Sub Section (2) of Section 23 was issued in respect of open space etc. therefore the site reserved for public park did not vest in the Corporation and it continued with the BDA which could deal with it. The finding was affirmed by the Division Bench as well. Its correctness was not assailed by the respondents	 in this Court. As regards the second question the learned Judge while agreeing with the Division Bench in Holy Saint Education Society vs Venkataamana	 ILR 1982 1 Karnataka P. 1. that a site re served for children 's playground under the scheme prepared under the City Improvement Act when came to be vested in the Corporation	 it was under a duty to retain it as such and it had no authority to divert it for any other use or grant it to a private person or organisation ' held that the ratio was not helpful as	 `both under the provisions of the City Improvement Act and the BDA Act	 the CIT or the BDA	 as the case may be	 had the authority to improve the scheme by making alteration in the scheme and in exercise of the said power	 the purpose for which any space was reserved	 could be changed and after such change is effected the land could be disposed of for the purpose for which it is earmarked after such change. The Judge held that since the site re served for public park was converted under order of the Government it was not possible to hold that the land in question was reserved for a park. It was further held	 that	 since only notification allotting the site was challenged and not the conversion of site from public park to private nursing home and once the scheme was altered and the area reserved for park was converted to be an area reserved for civic amenity the contention of the petitioners that the BDA had allotted 140 the site for a purpose other than to which the land was reserved	 had no basis at all for the fact that after alter ation brought about by Government under order dated 27th March	 1976	 the site in question was only reserved for a civic amenity generally and not for a part specially. ' Two other subsidiary submissions which in fact are now the principal issues	 that the BDA had no power to alter the scheme '	 and in any event a site reserved for a civic ameni ty could not have been allotted for construction of a hospi tal" also did not find favour as the scheme could be altered under Section 19(4) of the Act and it was done with approval of State Govt. In appeal the Division Bench after examining inclusive definition of civic amenity in Section 2(bb)	 ad ed in 1984	 amended with retrospective effect in 1983 held that a hospital could not be considered to be an amenity in 1976 as	 "public amenity civic or otherwise to be a public convenience for purposes of the BDA Act	 the Govern ment has to notify. If it does not specify whatever may otherwise be a public convenience will not be a civic ameni ty or. amenity under clauses (bb) and (b) of Section 2 respectively for purposes of the BD Act. "The Bench further held that in allowing the site to the BMT largess was con ferred on it in utter violation of law and rules. Did the Division Bench commit any error of law? Was the conversion of site in accordance with law? Were any of the authorities aware or apprised of the provisions under which they could convert a site reserved for public park into a nursing home? Did the authorities care to ascertain the provisions of law or rules under which they could act? Was any precaution taken by the Chief Executive of the State to adhere to legislative requirement of altering any scheme. Not in the least. The direction of the Chief Minister	 the apex public functionary of the State	 was in breach of public trust	 more like a person dealing with his private property than discharging his obligation as head of the State administration in accordance with law and rule The Govt. record depicted even more distressing picture. The role of the administration was highly disappointing. In their noting even a show of awareness of law and fact was missing. This culture of public functionary	 adorning high est office in the State of being law to himself and the administration acting on dictate	 for whatever reason dis turbs the balance of rule of law. What is more shocking is that this happened in 1976 and not even one out of various departments from which the papers were routed through raised any objection. And the statutory body like BDA with impres sive members too succumbed under the pressure without	 even	 a murmur. 141 Financial gain by a local authority at the cost of public welfare has never been considered as legitimate purpose even if the objective is laudable. Sadly the law was thrown to winds for a private purpose. The extract of the Chief Minister 's order quoted in the letter of Chairman of the BDA leaves no doubt that the end result having been decided by the highest executive in the State the lower in order of hierarchy only followed with `ifs ' and `buts ' ending finally with resolution of BDA which was more or less a formality. Between 21st April and 14th July	 1976	 that is less than ninety days	 the machinery in BDA and Government moved so swiftly that the initiation of the proposal	 by the appellant a rich trust with 90	000 dollars in foreign depos its	 query on it by the Chief Minister of the State	 guid ance of way	out by the Chairman	 direction on it by the Chief Minister	 orders of Govt. resolution by the BDA and allotment were all completed and site for public park stood converted into site for private nursing home without any intimation direct or indirect to those who were being deprived of it. Speedy or quick action in public institu tions call for appreciation but our democratic system shuns exercise of individualised discretion in public matters requiring participatory decision by rules and regulations. No one howsoever high can arrogate to himself or assume without any authorisation express or implied in law a dis cretion to ignore the rules and deviate from rationality by adopting a strained or distorted interpretation as it ren ders the action ultra vires and bad in law. When the law requires an authority to act or decide	 'if it appears to it necessary" or if he is 'of opinion that a particular act should be done ' then it is implicit that it should be done objectively	 fairly and reasonably. Decisions affecting public interest or the necessity of doing it in the light of guidance provided by the Act and rules may not require intimation to person affected yet the exercise of discretion is vitiated if the action is bereft of rationality lacks objective and purposive approach. The action or decision must not only be reached reasonably and intelligibly but it must be related to the purpose for which power is exercised. The purpose for which the Act was enacted is spelt out from the Preamble itself which provides for establishment of the Authority for development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto. To carry out this purpose the development scheme framed by the Improvement Trust was adopted by the Development Authority. Any alteration in this scheme could have been made as provided in Sub Section (4) of Section 19 only if it resulted in improvement in any part of the scheme. As stated earlier a private Nursing Home could neither be considered to be an amenity nor it could be considered improvement over necessity like a public park. The exercise of power	 therefore	 was contrary to the pur pose 142 for which it is conferred under the statute. Was the exercise of discretion under Sub Section (4) of Section 19 in violation or in accordance with the norm provided in law. For proper appreciation the Sub Section is extracted below: "(4) If at any time it appears to the Authori ty that an improvement can be made in any part of the scheme	 the Authority may alter the scheme for the said purpose and shall subject to the provisions of sub section (5) and (6) forthwith proceed to execute the scheme as altered. " This legislative mandate enables the Authority to alter any scheme. Existence of power is thus clearly provided for. What is the nature of this power and the manner of its exercise? It is obviously statutory character. The legisla ture took care to control the exercise of this power by linking it with improvement in the scheme. What is an im provement or when any change in the scheme can be said to be improvement is a matter of discretion by the authority empowered to exercise the power. In modern State activity discretion with executive and administrative agency is a must for efficient and smooth functioning. But the extent of discretion or constraints on its exercise depends on the rules and regulations under which it is exercised. Sub Section (4) of Section 19 not only defines the scope and lays down the ambit within which the discretion could be exercised but it envisages further. the manner in which it could be exercised. Therefore	 any action or exercise of discretion to alter the scheme must have been backed by substantive rationality flowing from the Section. Public interest or general good or social betterment have no doubt priority over private or individual interest but it must not be a pretext to justify the arbitrary or illegal exercise of power. It must withstand scrutiny of the legislative stand ard provided by the Statute itself. The authority exercising discretion must not appear to be	 impervious to	legislative directions. From the extracts of correspondence between the Chairman and the Chief Minister it is apparent that neither of them cared to look in	 the provisions of law. It was left to the learned Advocate General to defend it	 as a matter of law	 in the High Court. There is no whisper anywhere if it was ever considered	 objectively	 by any authority that the nursing home would amount to an improvement. Whether the decision would have been correct or not would have given rise to different consideration. But here it was total absence of any effect to do so. Even in the reply filed on behalf of BDA in the High Court which appears more a legal jugglery than statement of facts bristling 143 with factual inaccuracies there is no mention of it. The extent of misleading averments for purpose of creating erroneous impressions on the Court shall be clear from the statement contained in paragraph 1 of the affidavit relevant portion of which is extracted below: "The fourth respondent had made an application for grant of land for purpose of constructing a Nursing Home. This application was made also to this Respondent. Considering the fact that the medical facilities available in Bangalore were meagre and were required to be supple mented by charitable medical institutions	 this authority was required to ascertain whether a suitable site could be given for the hospital building of the fourth respondent. Upon scrutiny of the Rajmahal Viias Extension	 as early as in 1976	 the area in question which had been marked as a low level park measuring 13485 sq. yards was found suitable to cater to the medical relief to the needy public. However	 since the said area had been marked as a low level park	 it was necessary to convert the said low level park as civic amenity site. Furthermore	 it is essential that the Government had to approve allotment of the site to the fourth respondent as a civic amenity site. There are proceedings before the first respondent in relation to allotment of site to public institutions. Under the recommendations which has been made	 it was decided that plots could be allotted to public institutions subject to certain condi tions. " It was this statement which resulted in erroneous finding by the learned single Judge to the effect. "Therefore	 it is clear that though at the time of preparation of the scheme	 formation of a park was considered in the interest of the general public	 nothing prevents the BDA from taking the view that the construction of a hospital to provide medical facilities to the general public is necessary and therefore	 the area earmarked for park should be converted into a civic amenity site is in exercise of this power	 the BDA decided to convert the area reserved for park into a civic amenity site so as to enable its disposal in favour of the fourth respondent for construction of a hospital. Though Section 19(4) does not expressly require the taking of the approval of the Government for such alteration	 the approval was necessary as the original scheme in which the area was reserved for a park had been approved by the Government. Therefore	 the BDA considered appropriate	 and in my opinion rightly	 to seek the approval of the Government for making such conversion The State Government 144 accorded sanction for the conversion. Therefore	 the conver sion was in accordance with law". The averment in the affi davit of the BDA that an application was made before it could not be substantiated. Nor it could be established that the BDA or any of its committee ever took into consideration that medical facilities were meagre in the city of Banga lore. Such misleading statements call for serious condemna tion. No further comment is needed except that the public institutions should be cautious and must not give impression of taking sides. It is destructive of fairness. The then Chairman 's letter in 1976 extracted above was forthright whereas the stand of BDA in 1983 appears to be crude effort to support the executive action. No record was produced to substantiate ' the averments. It was necessary as it was not m harmony with the correspondence extracted earlier. The statement by the counsel for the BDA that the records were not traceable was not satisfactory. The executive or the administrative authority must not be oblivious that in a democratic set up the people or community being sovereign the exercise of disceretion must be guided by the inherent philosophy that the exercisor of discretion is accountable for his action. It is to be tested on anvil of rule of law and fairness or justice particularly if competing interest of members of society is involved. Was this adhered to by any of the authority? Unfortunately not. Much was attempted to be made out of exercise of discre tion in converting a site reserved for amenity as a civic amenity. Discretion is an effective tool in administration. But wrong notions about it results in iII conceived conse quences. In law it provides an option to the authority concerned to adopt one or the other alternative. But a bet ter	 proper and legal exercise of discretion is one where the authority examines the fact	 is aware of law and then decides objectively and rationally what serves the interest better. When a Statute either provides guidance or rules or regulations are framed for exercise of discretion then the action should be in accordance with it. Even where Statutes are silent and only power is conferred to act in one or the other manner	 the Authority cannot act whimsically or arbi trarily. It should be guided by reasonableness and fairness. The legislature never intends its authorities to abuse the law or use it unfairly. When legislature enacted Sub section (4) it unequivocally declared its intention of making any alteration in the scheme by the Authority	 that is	 BDA and not the State Government. It further permitted interference with the scheme sanctioned by it only if appeared to be improvement. The facts	 therefore	 that were to be found by the Authority were that the conversion of public park into private nursing home would be an improvement in the scheme. Neither the Authority nor the State 145 Government undertook any such exercise. Power of conversion or alteration in scheme was taken for granted. Amenity was defined in Section 2(b) of the Act to include road	 street	 lighting	 drainage	 public works and such other conveniences as the Government may	 by notification	 specify to be an amenity for the purposes of this Act. The Division Bench found that before any other facility could be considered amenity it was necessary for State Government to issue a notification. And since no notification was issued including private nursing home as amenity it could not be deemed to be included in it. That apart the definition indicates that the convenience or facility should have had public characteris tic. Even if it is assumed that the definition of amenity being inclusive it should be given a wider meaning so as to include hospital added in clause 2(bb) as a civic amenity with effect from 1984 a private nursing home unlike a hospi tal run by Govt. or local authority did not satisfy that characteristic which was necessary in the absence of which it could not be held to be amenity or civic amenity. In any case a private nursing home could not be considered to be an improvement in the scheme and	 therefore	 the power under Section 19(4) could not have been exercised. Manner in which power was exercised fell below even the minimum requirement of taking action on relevant considera tions. A scheme could be altered by the Authority as defined under Section 3 of the Act. It is a body corporate under Section 3 consisting of the Chairman and experts on various aspects	 namely	 a finance member	 an engineer	 a town planner	 an architect	 the ex officio members such as Com missioner of Corporation of the City of Bangalore	 officer of the Secretariat and elected members for instance	 two persons of the State Legislature	 one a woman and other a Scheduled caste and Scheduled tribe member	 representative of labour	 representative of water supply	 sewerage board	 electricity board	 State Road Transport Corporation	 two elected counsillors etc. and the Commissioner. This authori ty functions through committees and meetings as provided 'ruder Sections 8 and 9. There is no Section either in the Act nor any rule was placed to demonstrate that the Chairman alone	 as such	 could exercise the power of the Authority. There is no whisper nor there is any record to establish that any meeting of the Authority was held regarding altera tion of the scheme. In any case the power does not vest in the State Government or the Chief Minister of the State. The exercise of power is further hedged by use of the expres sion	 if `it appears to the Authority '. In legal terminology it visualises prior consideration and objective decision. And all this must have resulted in conclusion that the alteration would have been improvement. Not 146 even one was followed. The Chairman could not have acted on his own. Yet without calling any meeting of the authority or any committee he sent the letter for converting the site. How did it appear to him that it was necessary	 is mentioned in the letter dated 21st April	 because the Chief Minister desired so. The purpose of the Authority taking such a decision is their knowledge of local conditions and what was better for them. That is why participatory exercise is contemlated. If any alteration in Scheme could be done by the Chairman and the Chief Minister then Sub Section (4) of Section 19 is rendered otiose. There is no provision in the Act for alteration in a scheme by converting one site to another	 except	 of course if it appeared to be improvement. But even that power vested in the Authority not the Govern ment. What should have happened was that the Authority should have applied its mind and must have come to the conclusion that conversion. of the site reserved for public park into a private nursing home amounted to an improvement then only it could have exercised the power. But what hap pened in fact was that the application for allotment of the site was accepted first and the procedural requirements were attempted to be gone through later and that too by the State Govt. which was not authorised to do so. Not only that the Authority did not apply its mind and take any decision if there was any necessity to alter the Scheme but even if it is assumed that the State Govt. could have any role to play	 the entire exercise instead of proceeding from below	 that is	 from the BDA to State Government proceeded in reverse direction	 that	 from the State Government to the BDA. Every order	 namely	 converting the site from public park to private nursing home and even allotment to BMT was passed by State Government and the BDA acting like a true subservient body obeyed faithfully by adopting and confirming the direc tions. It was complete abdication of power by the BDA. The Legislature entrusted the responsibility to alter and ap prove the Scheme to the BDA but the BDA in complete breach of faith reposed in it	 preferred to take directions issued on command of the Chief Executive of the State. This result ed not only in error or law but much beyond it. In fact the only role which the State Government could play in a scheme altered by the BDA is specified in Sub Section (5) and (6) of Section 19 of the Act. The former requires previous sanction of the Govt. if the estimated cost of executing the altered scheme exceeds by a greater sum than five per cent of the cost of executing the scheme as sanctioned. And later if the 'scheme as altered involved the acquisition otherwise than by agreement. In other words the State Government could be concerned or involved with an altered scheme either because of financial considerations or when additional land was to be acquired	 an exercise which could not 147 be undertaken by the BDA. A development scheme	 therefore	 sanc ; tioned and published in the Gazette could not be altered by the Government. Effort was made to justify the exercise of power under SubSection (3) of Section 15 which reads as under: "(3) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force	 the Government may	 whenever it deems it necessary require the Authority to take up any development scheme or work and execute it subject to such terms and conditions as may be specified by the Government. " In Sub Section (1) the Authority is empowered to draw up development scheme with approval of government whereas under Sub Section (2) it is entitled to proceed on its own provid ed it has funds and resources. Sub Section (3) is the power of State Government to direct it to take up any scheme. The main thrust of the Sub Section is to keep a vigil on the local body. But it cannot be stretched to entitle the Gov ernment to alter any scheme or convert any site or power specifically reserved in the Statute in the Authority. The general power of direction to take up development scheme cannot be construed as superseding specific power conferred and provided for under Section 19(4). The Authority under Section 3 functions as a body. The Act does not contemplate individual action. That is participatory exercise of powers by different persons representing different interest. And rightly as it is the local persons who can properly assess the need and necessity for altering a scheme and if any proposal to convert from one use to another was an improve ment for residents of locality such as exercise could not be undertaken by the Government. Absence of power apart	 such exercise is fraught with danger of being activated by extra neous considerations. Section 65 the overall power reserved in Government to give such directions to the Authority as it considers expe dient for carrying out any purpose of the Act was another provision relied to support an order which is otherwise unsupportable. An exercise of power which is ultra vires the provisions in the Statute cannot be attempted to be resusci tated on general powers reserved in a Statute for its proper and effective implementation. The Section authorises the Government to issue directions to ensure that the provisions of law are obeyed and not to empower it itself to proceed contrary to law. What is not permitted 148 by the Act to be done by the Authority cannot be assumed to be done by State Government to render it legal. An illegali ty cannot be cured only because it was undertaken by the Government. The Section authorises the Government to issue directions to carry out purposes of the Act. That is the legislative mandate should be carried out. And not that the provision of law can be disregarded and ignored because what was done was being done by State Government and not the Authority. An illegality or any action contrary to law does not become in accordance with law because it is done at the behest of the Chief Executive of the State. No one is above law. In a democracy what prevails is law and rule and not the height of the person exercising the power. For these reasons the entire proceedings before the State Government suffered from absence of jurisdiction. Even the exercise of power was vitiated and ultra vires. There fore the orders of the Government to convert the site re served for public park to civic amenity and to allot it for private nursing home to Bangalore Medical Trust and the resolution of the Bangalore Development Authority in compli ance of it were null	 void and without jurisdiction. Leave granted. ORDER In the result this appeal fails	 for the reasons stated by us in our separate but concurring judgments	 and is accordingly dismissed. We further direct that the respond ents shall be entitled to their cost throughout. N.P.V. Appeal dis missed.

A site in the city of Bangalore was reserved as an open space in an improvement scheme adopted under the City of Bangalore Improvement Act. This Act was replaced by the Bangalore Development Authority Act	 1976 and the scheme prepared under the repealed enactment was deemed to have been prepared and duly sanctioned by the Government in terms of the new Act. In the scheme	 the open space in question had been reserved for a public park. However	 pursuant to the orders of the State Government	 and by a Resolution	 the Bangalore Development Authority allotted the open space in favour of the appellant	 a private medical Trust	 for the purpose of constructing a hospital. This allotment and diversion of the user of the site was challenged before the High Court by the respondents	 as residents of the locality and as general public	 contending that it was contrary to the provisions of the Act and the scheme sanctioned thereun der	 and the legislative intent to protect and preserve the environment by reserving open space 103 for ventilation	 recreation and play grounds and parks for the general public. A Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition holding that a hospital being a civic amenity	 the allotment of the site by the BDA in favour of the appellant for the purpose of constructing a hospital was valid and in accordance with law	 and	 rejected the claim of the peti tioners that the BDA had no power to alter the scheme	 and in any event	 a site reserved for a civic amenity could not have been allotted for construction of a hospital	 on the ground that the scheme could be altered under Section 19(4) of the Act	 and it was done with approval of State Govt. On appeal	 the Division Bench held that though the BDA had the authority to deal with the plot in question	 the area	 having been reserved in the sanctioned scheme for a public park	 its diversion from that object and allotment in favour of a private body was not permissible under the Act	 even if the object of the allotment was the construction of a hospital	 since a hospital could not be considered to be an amenity in 1976	 and that in alloting the site to the appellant Trust	 largesse was conferred on it in utter violation of law and rules	 and set aside the allotment of the site in question to the appellant with liberty to the BDA to make a fresh allotment of any alternative site in favour of the appellant. In appeal before this Court	 on behalf of the appellant trust	 it was contended that the Division Bench exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside an allotment which was purely an administrative action by the BDA pursu ant to a valid direction by the Government in that behalf	 that in the absence of any evidence of mala fide the deci sion of the BDA was not liable to be interfered with	 that the decision to allot a site for a hospital rather than a park was a matter within the discretion of the BDA and that the hospital being not only an amenity but also a civic amenity under the Act	 as amended from time to time	 the diversion of the user of the land for that purpose was justified	 that under Section 65 the BDA was bound by all directions of the Government	 irrespective of the nature or purpose of the directions	 and that Section 38A prohibiting sale or any other disposal of land reserved for 'public parks or playgrounds and Section 16(1)(d) requiring that 15% of the total area of the lay out be reserved for public parks and playgrounds and an additional area of not less than 10% of the total area for civic amenities were enacted subsequent to the relevant orders of the Government dated 27.5.76 and 11.6.76 and the resolution of the BDA 104 dated 14.7.76 resulting in the allotment of the site in favour of the appellant and at the material time when the Government made these orders and the BDA acted upon them	 there was no restriction on the diversion of the user of the land reserved for the public park or a playground to any other purpose. On behalf of the respondents	 it was contended that it was improper to confer a largesse on a private party at the expense of the general public and the special consideration extended to the appellant was not permissible under the Act	 and that to allot in favour of the appellant an area re served for public park even if it be for the purpose of constructing a hospital was to sacrifice the public interest in preserving the open spaces for ventilation	 recreation and protection of the environment. Dismissing the appeal	 this Court	 HELD: Per Sahai	 J. 1. The entire proceedings before the State Government suffered from absence of jurisdiction. Even the exercise of power was vitiated and ultra vires. Therefore	the orders of the Government to convert the site reserved for public park to civic amenity and to allot it for private nursing home to the appellant Trust and the resolution of the Development Authority in compliance of it were null	 void and without jurisdiction. [148C D] 2.1 The purpose for which the Bangalore Development Authority Act	 1976 was enacted is spelt out from the pream ble itself which provides for establishment of the Authority for development of the city and areas adjacent thereto. To carry out this purpose	 the development scheme framed by the Improvement Trust was adopted by the Development Authority. Any alteration in this scheme could have been made as pro vided in Sub Section (4) of Section 19 only if it resulted in improvement in any part of the scheme. A private Nursing Home could neither be considered to be an amenity nor it could be considered improvement over necessity like a public park. The exercise of power	 therefore	 was contrary to the purpose for which it is conferred under the statute. [141G H] 2.2 The legislative mandate under Sec. 19(4) enables the Authority to alter any scheme. Thus	 existence of power is clearly provided for. But the legislature took care to control the exercise of this power by linking it with im provement in the scheme. What is an improve 105 ment or when any change in the scheme can be said to be improvement is a matter of discretion by the authority empowered to exercise the power. [142C D] 2.3 Sub Section (4) of Section 19 not only defines the scope and lays down the ambit within which discretion could be exercised but it envisages further the manner in which it could be exercised. Therefore	 any action or exercise of discretion to alter the scheme must have been backed by the substantive rationality flowing from the Section. [142E] 2.4 The exercise of power is further hedged by use of the expression if it appears to the Authority. In legal terminology it visualises prior consideration and objective decision. And all this must have resulted in conclusion that the alteration would have been improvement. [145G H] 3.1 When legislature enacted Sub Section (4)	 it une quivocally declared its intention of making any alteration in the scheme by the Authority	 that is	 BDA and not the State Government. It further permitted interference with the scheme sanctioned by it only if it appeared to be improve ment. Therefore	 the facts that were to be found by the Authority were that the conversion of public park into private Nursing Home would be an improvement in the scheme. Neither the Authority nor the State Government undertook any such exercise. Power of conversion or alteration in scheme was taken for granted. There is no whisper anywhere if it was ever considered	 objectively	 by any authority that the nursing home would amount to an improvement. Whether the decision would have been correct or not would have given rise to different consideration. But it was a total absence of any effort to do so. [144G H	 145A	 G] 3.2 The manner in which power was exercised fell below even the minimum requirement of taking action on relevant considerations. A scheme could be altered by the Authority	 as defined under Section 3 of the Act. It is a body corpo rate consisting of the Chairman and experts on various aspects. This Authority functions through committees and meetings as provided under Sections 8 & 9. The purpose of the Authority taking such a decision is their knowledge of local conditions and what was better for them. That is why participatory exercise is contemplated. Yet	 without calling any meeting of the authority or any committee the Chairman sent the letter for converting the site. If any alteration could be done by the Chariman or the Chief Minister	 then subsection (4) of Section 19 is rendered otoise. 106 3.3 Financial gain by a local authority at the cost of public welfare has never been considered as legitimate purpose even if the objective is laudable. Sadly the law was thrown to winds for a private purpose. The extract of the Chief Minister 's order quoted in the letter of Chairman of the BDA leaves no doubt that the end result having been decided by the highest executive in the State	 the lower in order of hierarchy only followed with 'ifs ' and 'buts ' ending finally with resolution of BDA which was more or less a formality. In less than ninety days	 the machinery in BDA and Government moved so swiftly that the initiation of the proposal	 by the appellant	 a rich trust with foreign depos its	 query on it by the Chief Minister of the State	 guid ance of way out by the Chairman	 direction on it by the Chief Minister	 orders of Govt.	 resolution by the BDA and allotment were all completed and the site for public park stood converted into site for private nursing home without any intimation direct or indirect to those who were being deprived of it. [141A C] 3.4 Speedy or quick action in public institutions call for appreciation but our democratic system shuns exercise of individualised discretion in public matters requiring par ticipatory decision by rules and regulations. No one howso ever high can arrogate to himself or assume without any authorisation express or implied in law a discretion to ignore the rules and deviate from rationality by adopting a strained or distorted interpretation as it renders the action ultra vires and bad in law. [141C D] 3.5 There is no provision in the Act for alteration in a scheme by converting one site to another	 except	 of course if it appeared to be improvement But even that power vested in the Authority	 not the Government. The Authority should have applied its mind and must have come to the conclusion that conversion of the site reserved for public park into a private nursing home amounted to an improvement; then only it could have exercised the power. Instead	 the application for allotment of the site was accepted first and the proce dural requirements were attempted to be gone through later	 and that too	 by the State Government	 which was not autho rised to do so. The only role which the State Government could play in a scheme altered by the BDA is specified in Sub Sections (5) and (6) of Section 19 of the Act	 viz	 the State Government could be concerned or involved with an altered scheme either because of the financial considera tions or when additional land was to be acquired	 an exer cise which could not be undertaken by the BDA. A development scheme	 therefore	 sanctioned and published in the Gazette could not he altered by the Government. [146B	 G H	 147A] 107 3.6 Not only that the Authority did not apply its mind and take any decision if there was any necessity to alter the Scheme	 but even if it is assumed that the State Govt. could have any role to play	 the entire exercise	 instead of proceeding from below	 that is	 from the BDA to State GOv ernment	 proceeded in reverse direction	 that is	 from the State Government to the BDA. Every order	 namely	 converting the site from public park to private nursing home and even allotment to the applicant was passed by State Government and the BDA	 acting like a true subservient body	 obeyed faithfully by adopting and confirming the directions. It was complete abdication of power by the BDA. [146D E] 3.7 The Legislature entrusted the responsibility to alter and approve the Scheme to the BDA	 but the BDA in complete breach of faith reposed in it	 preferred to take directions issued on command of the Chief Executive of the State. This resulted not only in error of law	 but much beyond it. [146F] 3.8 Under Sub Section (3) of Section 15	 the State Government has power to direct the Authority to take up any scheme. The main thrust of the Sub Section is to keep a vigil on the local body. But it cannot be stretched to entitle the Government to alter any scheme or convert any site or power specifically reserved in the Statute in the Authority which functions as a body. The general power of direction to take up development scheme cannot be construed as superseding specific power conferred and provided for under Section 19(4). Absence of power apart	 such exercise is fraught with danger of being activated by extraneous considerations. [147D E] 3.9 An exercise of power which is ultra vires the provi sions in the Statute cannot be attempted to be resuscitated on general powers reserved in a Statute for its proper and effective implementation. Section 65 authorises the Govern ment to issue directions to carry out purposes of the Act and to ensure that the provisions of law are obeyed	 and not to empower itself to proceed contrary to law. What is not permitted by the Act to be done by the Authority cannot be assumed to be done by State Government to render it legal. An illegality cannot be cured only because it was undertaken by the Government	 or because it is done at the behest of the Chief Executive of the State. No one is above law. In a democracy what prevails is law and rule and not the height of the person exercising the power. [147G H	 148A B] 3.10 Amenity was defined in Section 2(b) of the Act to include road	 street	 lighting	 drainage	 public works and such other con 108 veniences as the Government may	 by notification	 specify to be an amenity for the purpose of this Act and before any other facility could be considered amenity	 it was necessary for State Government to issue a notification. And since no notification was issued including private nursing home as amenity	 it could not be deemed to be included in it. That apart	 the definition indicates that the convenience or facility should have had public characteristic. Even if it is assumed that the definition of amenity	 being inclusive	 it should be given a wider meaning so as to include hospital added in clause 2(bb)	 as a civic amenity with effect from 1984	 a private nursing home	 unlike a hospital run by Govt. or local authority	 did not satisfy that characteristic which was necessary	 in the absence of which it could not be held to be amenity on civic amenity. In any case	 a private nursing home could not be considered to be an improvement in the scheme and	 therefore	 the power under Section 19(4) could not have been exercised. [145A D] 4.1 Discretion is an effective tool in administration. But wrong notions about it result in ill conceived conse quences. In law it provides an option to the authority concerned to adopt one or the other alternative. But a better	 proper and legal exercise of discretion is one where the authority examines the fact	 is aware of law and then decides objectively and rationally what serves the interest better. When a Statute either provides guidance or rules or regulations are framed for exercise of discretion then the action should be in accordance with it. Even where Statutes are silent and only power is conferred to act in one or the other manner	 the Authority cannot act whimsically or arbi trarily. It should be guided by reasonableness and fairness. The legislature never intends its authorities to abuse the law or use it unfairly. [144E G] 4.2 The executive or the administrative authority must not be oblivious that in a democratic set up the people or community being sovereign	 the exercise of discretion must be guided by the inherent philosophy that the exerciser of discretion is accountable for his action	 It is to be tested on anvil of rule of law and fairness or justice particularly if competing interests of members of society are involved. [144C D] 4.3 When the law requires an authority to act or decide	 if it appears to it necessary ' or if he is 'of opinion that a particular act should be done '	 then it is implicit that it should be done objectively	 fairly and reasonably. Deci sions affecting public interest or the necessity of doing it in the light of guidance provided by the Act and rules may not require intimation to person affected yet the exercise of discretion is vitiated if the action is bereft of ration ality	 lacks objective and 109 purposive approach. The action or decision must not only be reached reasonably and intelligibly but it must be related to the purpose for Which power is exercised. Public interest or general good or social betterment have no doubt priority over private or individual interest but it must not be a pretext to justify the arbitrary or illegal exercise of power. It must withstand scrutiny of the legislative stand ard provided by the Statute itself. The authority exercising discretion must not appear to be	 impervious to legislative directions. No doubt	 in modern State activity	 discretion with executive and administrative agency is a must for efficient and smooth functioning. But the extent of discre tion or constraints on its exercise depends on the rules and regulations under which it is exercised. [141E F	 142F	 D] Public park as a place reserved for beauty and recrea tion is associated with growth of the concept of equality and recognition of importance of common man. Earlier free and healthy air in beautiful surroundings was privilege of few. But now it is a 'gift from people to themselves '. Its importance has multiplied with emphasis on environment and pollution. In modern planning and development it occupies an important place in social ecology. A private nursing home	 on the other hand	 is essentially a commercial venture	 a profit oriented industry. Service may be its moto but earn ing is the objective. Its utility may not be undermined but a park is a necessity not a mere amenity. A private nursing home cannot be a substitute for a public park. [134A C] 5.2 In 1984	 the BD Act itself provided for reservation of not less than fifteen per cent of the total area of the lay out in a development scheme for public parks and play grounds	 the sale and disposition of which is prohibited under Sec. 38A of the Act. Absence of open space and public park	 in present day when urbanisation is on increase	 rural exodus is on large scale and congested areas are coming up rapidly	 may give rise to health hazard. May be that it may be taken care of by a nursing home. But it is axiomatic that prevention is better than cure. What is lost by removal of a park cannot be gained by establishment of a nursing home. To say	 therefore	 that by conversion of a site reserved for low lying park into a private nursing home	 social welfare was being promoted was being oblivious of true character of the two and their utility. [134D F] 6.1 Locus standi to approach by way of writ petition and refusal to grant relief in equity jurisdiction are two different aspects	 may be with the same result. One relates to maintainability of the petition and other to exercise of discretion. Law on the former has marched much ahead. 110 Many milestones have been covered. The restricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of specific injury has yielded in favour of broad and wide construction in the wake of public interest litigation. Even in private chal lenge to executive or administrative action having extensive fall out the dividing line between personal injury or loss and injury of a public nature is fast vanishing. [133B C] 6.2 Law has veered round from genuine grievance against order affecting prejudicially to sufficient interest in the matter. The rise in exercise of power by the executive and comparative decline in power and effective administrative guidance is forcing citizens to expose challenges with public interest flavour. Therefore	 it is too late in the day to claim that petition filed by inhabitants of a locali ty whose park was converted into a nursing home had no cause to invoke equity juris diction of the High Court. In fact	 public spirited citizens having faith in rule of law are rendering great social and legal service by espousing cause of public nature. They cannot be ignored or overlooked on technical or conservative yard stick of the rule of locus standi or absence of personal loss or injury. Present day development of this branch of jurisprudence is towards free movement both in nature of litigation and approach of the courts. Residents of locality seeking protection and mainte nance of environment of their locality cannot be said to be busy bodies or interlopers. Even otherwise physical or personal or economic injury may give rise to civil or crimi nal action but violation of rule of law either by ignoring or affronting individual or action of the ' executive in disregard of the provisions of law raises substantial issue of accountability of those entrusted with responsibility of the administration. It furnishes enough cause of action either for individual or community in general to approach by way of writ petition and the authorities cannot be permitted to seek shelter under cover of technicalities of locus standi nor they can be heard to plead for restraint in exercise of discretion as grave issues of public concern outweigh such considerations. [133C H] S.P. Gupta vs Union of India	 [1982] 2 S.C.R. Akhil Bhartiya Sashit Karamchari Sangh vs U.O.I.	 AIR 1981 SC 293 and Fertilizer	 Corporation Kamgar Union vs U.O.I.	 AIR 1981 SC 364	 referred to. Per Thommen J. (Concurring) 1.1 Apart from the fact that the scheme has not been validly altered by the Bangalore Development Authority	 it was not open to the Government in terms of section 65 of the Bangalore Development Act	 1976 to give a direction to the BDA to defy the very object of the Act. The orders of the Government dated 27.5. 1976 and 11.6.1976 and the consequent decision of the BDA dated 111 14.7.1976 are inconsistent with	 and contrary to	 the legis lative intent to safeguard the health	 safety and general welfare of the people of the locality. These orders evidence a colourable exercise of power	 and are opposed to the statutory scheme. [132B D] 1.2 The orders in question and the consequent action of the BDA in allotting to private persons areas reserved for public parks and play grounds and permitting construction of buildings for hospital thereon are	 in the circumstances	 declared to be null and void and of no effect. [132D E] 2.1 Under Sub Section (4) of Section 19 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act	 1976 the BDA may	 subject to certain restrictions contained in sub sections (5) and (6)	 alter the scheme	 but such alteration has to be carried out pursuant to a formal decision duly recorded in the manner generally followed by a body corporate. The scheme is a statutory instrument which is administrative legislation involving a great deal of general law making of universal application	 and it is not	 therefore	 addressed to individ ual cases of persons and places	 Alteration of the scheme must be for the purpose of improvement and better develop ment of the City and adjoining areas and for general appli cation for the benefit of the public at large. Any altera tion of the scheme with a view to conferring a benefit on a particular person	 and without regard to the general good of the public at large	 is not an improvement contemplated by the Section. [122C E] Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited & Anr. etc. vs Union of India & Ors.	 [1990] 1 SCR 909	937 et. relied on. 2.2 Under Section 38	 the BDA has the power	 subject to such restrictions	 conditions etc.	 as may be prescribed	 to lease	 sell or otherwise transfer any movable or immovable property which belongs to it	 and to appropriate or apply any land vested in it or acquired by it for the formation of 'open spaces ' or for building purposes or in any other manner for the purpose of any development scheme. This implies that land once appropriated or applied or earmarked by formation of 'open spaces ' or for building purposes or other development in accordance with a duly sanctioned scheme should not be used for any other purpose unless the scheme itself	 which is statutory in character	 is formally altered in the manner that the BDA as a body corporate is competent to alter. But that power has to be exercised consistently with the appropriation or application of land for formation of 'open spaces ' or for building purposes or any other development scheme sanctioned by the 112 Government. Any unauthorised deviation from the duly sanc tioned scheme by sacrificing the public interest in the preservation and protection of the environment by means of open space for parks and play grounds and 'ventilation ' will be contrary to the legislative intent	 and an abuse of the statutory power vested in the authorities. Section 38A inserted by Amendment Act 17 of 1984 clarifies that it shall not be open to the BDA to dispose of any area reserved for public parks and play grounds and civic amenities. Any such site cannot be diverted to any other purpose. Any action in violation of this provision is null and void. [123F H	 124A	 D E] 2.3 Section 16 treats 'public parks and play grounds ' as a different and separate amenity or convenience from a 'civic amenity '	 and reserves 15% and 10% respectively for these two purposes. The extent of the areas reserved for these two objects are thus separately and distinctly stated by the Statute. The implication of the conceptual distinc tion is that land reserved for a public park and play ground cannot be utilised for any 'civic amenity ' including a hospital. [121B C] 2.4 One of the main objects of public parks or play grounds is the promotion of the health of the community by means of ventilation and recreation. It is the preservation of the quality of life of the community that is sought to be protected by means of these regulations. [121E F] 2.5 The legislative intent is to preserve a public park or public playground in the hands of the general public as represented by the BDA or any other public authority and prevent private hands from grabbing them for private ends. [126G] 3.1 The scheme provides for a public park and the land in question remains dedicated to the public and reserved for that purpose. It is meant for the reasonable accomplishment of the statutory object which is to promote the orderly development of the city and adjoining areas and to preserve open space by reserving public parks and play grounds with a view to protecting the residents from the ill effects of urbanisation of the city in a way that maximum space is provided for the benefit of the public at large for recrea tion	 enjoyment	 'ventilation ' and fresh air. This is clear from the Act itself as it originally stood. The amendments inserting sections 16(1)(d)	 38A and other provisions are clarificatory of this object. The legislative intent has always been the promotion and enhancement of the quality of life ' by preservation of the character and desirable aes thetic features of the city. 	 [128F H	 129A B] 113 3.2 The original scheme	 duly sanctioned under the Act	 includes a public park and the land in question has been reserved exclusively for that purpose. Although it is open to the BDA to alter the scheme	 no alteration has been made in the manner contemplated by section 19(4). [127F] 3.3 The letters addressed by the Chairman of the BDA to the Chief Minister and the endorsement made by the Chief Minister on that letter as well as the orders of the Govern ment sanctioning conversion of the low level park into a civic amenity site and alloting the same to the appellant and the resolution adopted by the BDA leave no doubt that the action of the Government and the BDA resulting in the resolution have been inspired by individual interests at the costs and to the disadvantage of the general public. Public interest does not appear to have guided the minds of the persons responsible for diverting the user of the open space for allotment to the appellant. Conversion of the open space reserved for a park for the general good of the public into a site for the construction of a privately owned and managed hospital for private gains is not an alteration for improve ment of the scheme as contemplated by Section 19	 and the orders in question in that behalf are a flagrant violation of the legislative intent and a colourable exercise of power. In the circumstances	 no valid decision has been taken to alter the scheme. [127G H	 128A	 D F] 3.4 The power of the Government to give directions to the Authority under section 65 is not unrestricted. The object of the directions must be to carry out the object of the Act and not contrary to it. Only such directions as are reasonably necessary or expedient for carrying out the object of the enactment are contemplated by section 65. If a direction were to be issued by the Government to lease out to private parties areas reserved in the scheme for public parks and play grounds	 such a direction would not have the sanctity of section 65. Any such diversion of the user of the land would be opposed to the statute as well as the object in constituting the BDA to promote the healthy devel opment of the city and improve the quality of 'life. Any repository of power be it the Government or the BDA must act reasonably and rationally and in accordance with law and with due regard to the legislative intent. [127B D] 3.5 The BD Act as enacted in 1976 has undergone several changes but the definition of 'amenity ' in Clause (b) or Sec. 2 remains unchanged. Amenity includes various conven iences such as "road	 drainage	 lighting etc. and such other conveniences" as are notified as 114 such by the Government. The section was amended in 1984	 and to add clause (bb) after clause (b) which distinguished a civic amenity from amenity	and specified as civic amenities	 such as dispensaries	 maternity homes	 etc. and those ameni ties which are notified as civic amenities by the Govern ment. Clause (bb) which was substituted by Act 11 of 1988 defines a civic amenity as	 amongst others	 a dispensary	 a hospital	 a pathological laboratory	 a maternity home and such other amenity as the Government may by Notification specify. Thus	 Clauses (b) and (bb) of Sec. 2 read together show that all those conveniences which are enumerated or notified by the Government under Clause (b) amenities and those amenities which are enumerated or notified by the Government under clause (bb) are civic amenities. Signifi cantly	 a hospital is specifically stated to be a civic amenity. However	 the concept of amenity under clause (b) remains uncchanged	 though	 it is not clear from sub clause (i) of clause (bb) whether a hospital	 when is not run by the Government or a civic 'Corporation '	 but by a private body as in the instant case	 would qualify as 'civic ameni ty '. But the Act of 1988 was merely clarificatory of what was always the position and the hospital has always regarded as an 'amenity '	 if not a `civic amenity '. [119C G	 120A] 4.1 Protection of the environment	 open spaces for recreation and fresh air	 play grounds for children prome nade for the residents	 and other conveniences or amenities are matters of great public concern and of vital interest to be taken care of in a development scheme. It is that public interest which is sought to be promoted by the Act by estab lishing the BDA. [129C] 4.2 The public interest in the reservation and preserva tion of open spaces for parks and play grounds cannot be sacrificed by leasing or selling such sites to private persons for conversion to some other user. Any such act would be contrary to the legislative intent and inconsistent with the statutory requirements. Furthermore	 it would be in direct conflict with the constitutional mandate to ensure that any State action is inspired by the basic values of individual freedom and dignity and addressed to the attain ment of a quality of life which makes the guaranteed rights a reality for all the citizens. [129D E] Kharak Singh vs The State of U.P. & Others	 [1964] 1 SCR 332; Municipal Council Ratlam vs Shri Vardhichand & Ors.	 ; ; Francis Coralie Muffin vs The Administrator Union Territory of Delhi & Ors.	 ; ; Olga Tellis & Ors. vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors.	 ; ; State of Himachal Pradesh 115 Deo Singh Tomar vs State of Bihar. 	 ; 	 re ferred to. 4.3 Reservation of open spaces for parks and play grounds is universally recognised as a legitimate exercise of statutory power rationally related to the protection of the residents of the locality from the iII effects of urban isation. Crowded urban areas tend to spread disease	 crime and immorality. [129G	 130G] Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act	 1961; Maharash tra Regional and Town Planning Act	 1966; Bombay Town Plan ning Act	 1954; The Travancore Town and Country Planning Act	 1120; The Madras Town Planning Act 1920; and the Rules framed under these Statutes; Town & Country Planning Act	 1971 (England & Wales); Encyclopaedia Americana	 Volume 22	 page 240; Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences	 Volume XII at page 161; Town Improvement Trusts in India	 1945 by Rai Sahib Om Prakash Aggarawala	 p. 35; et. ; Halsbury 's Statutes	 Fourth Edition	 p. 17; el. seq. and Journal of Planning & Environment Law	 1973	 p. 130 et. Penn Central Transportation Company vs City of New York	 57 L. Ed. 2d/631 ; 1978; Village of Belle Terre vs Bruce Boraas	 ; 1974 Village of Euclid vs Ambler Realty Company	 1926 Halsey vs Esso Petro leum Co. Ltd.	 [1961] 1 WLR; Thomas J. Schoenbaum	 Environ mental Policy Law 1985 p. 438; et. Summary and Comments ; et. and Agins vs City of Tribu ron; 	 1980	 referred to. Samuel Berman vs Andrew Parker	 ; 	 referred to. 4.4 Any reasonable legislative attempt bearing a ration al relationship to a permissible state objective in economic and social planning will be respected by the courts. A duly approved scheme prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Act is a legitimate attempt on the part of the Gov ernment and the statutory authorities to ensure a quiet place free of dust and din where children can run about and the aged and the infirm can rest	 breath fresh air and enjoy the beauty of nature. These provisions are meant to guaran tee a quiet and healthy atmosphere to suit family needs of persons of all stations. Any action which tends to defeat that object is invalid. [131D F] Village of Belle Terre vs Bruce Boraas	 ; ; Village of Euclid vs Ambler Realty Company	 1926	 and 116 T. Damodhar Rao & Ors. vs The Special Officer	 Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad & Ors.	 	 referred to.