Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal Nos. 3115 16 of 1980. From the Judgment and Order dated 15.6.1978 of the Bombay High Court in I.T. Ref. No. 458 of 1976. V.U. Eradi and Suman J. Khaitan for Khaitan & Co. for the Appellant. section Rajappa for Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B.P. JEEVAN REDDY	 J. Assessee is the appellant. He is aggrieved by the decision of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 458 of 1976 answering the following question	 which was referred to it at his instance	 against him: "whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the amount of tax paid by Ballarpur on behalf of the assessee in assessment years 1974 75 and 1975 76 is income tax ore under the heading 'other sources" '. The Ballarpur Paper and Straw Board Mills Limited (Ballarpur) is a public limited company engaged in the manufacture of paper and straw board. It undertook to set up a caustic soda/chlorine manufacturing plant at Ballarpur. For this purpose	 it entered into an agreement with Krebs	 a French concern	 for purchase of certain machinery and equipment. There was a second agreement between Ballarpur and Krebs whereunder Krebs undertook to provide services of certain personnel including engineers for setting up the plant at Ballarpur. Krebs	 in turn	 entered into an arrangement with a Swiss concern	 Escher Wyas Eurich	 for supply of certain machinery and also to make available services of certain personnel. The 30 assessee	 Emil Webler	 was one such person provided by the Swiss concern The assessee came to India and worked here in connection with the setting up of the plant. According to the agreement between Ballarpur and Krebs the former undertook to pay salaries and other emoluments to personnel provided by Krebs in accordance with the formula contained in the agreement. Inter alia	 it was provided that 'salaries are understood free of any Indian tax or duty '. For the assessment year 1974 75	 the assessee appellant was paid a sum of Rs. 3	82	481 and for the assessment year 1975 76	 a sum of Rs. 67	200 in addition to daily allowances and other facilities. The assessee contended before the Income Tax Officer that he was not liable to pay tax He also filed returns affirming the said stand. The stand taken by him was negatived	 whereupon Ballarpur paid the tax of Rs. 3	23	400 and Rs. 35	546 for the said two assessment years respectively. In his assessment orders	 the I.T.O. treated the said tax amount as a perquisite and added the same to the salary amount received by the assessee. The said addition was questioned by the assessee in appeal	 before the A.A.C. but without success. The matter was then carried to the Tribunal. The Tribunal too did not agree with the assessee 's contention and dismissed his appeal whereupon he obtained the aforesaid reference which	 as stated above	 has been answered against him by the Bombay High Court. For a proper appreciation of the question arising herein	 it is necessary to notice certain factual statements contained in the Statement of the Case. It is stated therein: "according to this agreement	 Ballarpur were under an obligation to pay by the device of delegation invoices opened with a bank in France certain amount of salaries at agreed rates to Krebs and Cis. Paris for setting up the plant at the town of Ballapur. . . The Tribunal clarified that there was no dispute between the parties that the amounts of Rs. 3	82	481 and Rs. 67	200 paid by Ballarpur through Krebs to the assessee for services rendered by it in the two respective years were taxable under the heading 'Salary '. It further clarified that there was no dispute between the parties	 that the relationship of the employer and employee did not exist between Ballarpur and the assessee. The Tribunal held as below: (1) Ballarpur was under a legal obligation to pay the tax if any	 levied on the assessee; (2) Ballarpur paid the tax by virtue of such a legal obligation . . . 31 The facts found by the Tribunal thus show that the assessee appellant was paid certain salary free of tax but that the tax payable in that behalf was to be and was in fact paid by Ballarpur. The assessment was made upon the assessee directly. The question is whether the said tax component paid by Ballarptir can be included within the income of the assessee. The first contention of ' the learned counsel for the assessee is that the amount paid by Ballarpur by way of tax cannot be treated as 'income ' of assessee at all. His second contention is that the assessee did not receive the said amount and	 therefore	 it cannot constitute his income. Indeed	 the learned counsel sought to argue that Ballarpur was under no obligation to pay the said tax amount relating to the salary amount received by the assessee. We find it difficult to agree with the learned counsel. The definition of 'income ' in clause (24) of Section 2 of the Act is an inclusive definition. It adds several artificial categories to the concept of income but on that account the expression 'income ' does not lose its natural connotation. Indeed	 it is repeatedly said that it is difficult to define the expression 'income ' in precise terms. Anything which can properly be described as income is taxable under the Act unless	 of course	 it is exempted under one or the other provision of the Act. It is from the said angle that we have to examine whether the amount paid by Ballarpur by way of tax on the salary amount received by the assessee can be treated as the income of the assessee. It cannot be overlooked that the said amount is nothing but a tax upon the salary received by the assessee. By virtue of the obligation undertaken by Ballarpur to pay tax on the salary received by the assessee among others	 it paid the said tax. The said payment is	 therefore	 for and on behalf of the assessee. It is not a gratuitous payment. But for the said agreement and but for the said payment	 the said tax amount would have been liable to be paid by the assessee himself He could not have received the salary which he did but for the said payment of tax. The obligation placed upon Ballarpur by virtue of Section 195 of the Income Tax Act cannot also be ignored in this context. It would be unrealistic to say that the said payment had no integral connection with the salary received by the assessee. We are	 therefore	 of the opinion that the High Court and the authorities under the Act were right in holding that the said tax amount is liable to be included in the income of the assessee during the said two assessment years. The question then arises under which head of income should the said 32 income be placed. Inasmuch as the assessee is not an employee of Ballarpur	 which made the payment	 it cannot be brought within the purview of Section 17 of the Act. It must necessarily be placed under sub section (1) of Section 56	 'income from other sources '. According to the said sub section	 income of every kind which is not to be included from the total income under the Act shall be chargeable to income tax under the head 'income from other sources '	 if it is not chargeable to income tax under any of the other heads specified in Section 14	 Items A to E. It is not the case of the assessee that any provision of the Act exempts the said income from the liability to tax The learned counsel for the assessee appellant relied upon certain decisions in support of his contention. The first is the decision of this court in N.A. Modi vs S.A.L. Narayana Rao	 SC. An advocate was appointed as a Judge. He received certain income after his appointment as a Judge in lieu of the professional service rendered by him before his appointment. The question was whether the said amount is taxable. It was held that it was not (in view of the provisions of the Act as it then stood). The basis for the said decision is that the assessee therein cannot be said to be carrying on the profession of an advocate at the time he received the said income. We are unable to see how the said decision helps the assessee herein. Indeed	 in the said decision this court emphasised that the question whether an income falls under one head or the other has to be decided according to the common notion of practical men	 inasmuch as the Act does not provide any guidance in the matter. It was observed that the heads of income must be decided on the nature of income by applying practical common notions and not by reference to the assessee 's treatment of income. The application of said test does not certainly help the assessee herein. The second decision cited is of the Bombay High Court in CLT. Bombay vs Smt. T.P. Sidhwa	 The question was whether the income from property received by an assessee of which he is not the owner can be taxed as 'income ' from other 'sources '. It was held that it cannot be so taxed. We do not see any anology between the facts and principle of that case and those of this case. Here the integral connection between the salary received by the assessee and the tax payable thereon	 paid by Ballarpur in pursuance of a legal obligation	 cannot be overlooked. The third case cited is in Mrs. Sheela Kaushish vs C.I.T	 Delhi	 131 I.T.R. 435 33 S.C. In this case	 it was held that determination of annual value under Section 23 of the Income Tax Act	 1961 should be done by taking the standard rent as the basis even where the assessee is receiving rent higher than the standard rent. Again we must say	 we see no relevance of the said principle of this case to the facts of this case. For the above reasons	 the appeals fail and are dismissed. No costs. V.P.R. Appeals dismissed.

Ballarpur	 a public limited company undertook to set up a caustic soda/chlorine manufacturing plant. It entered into an agreement with a French concern for purchase of certain machinery and equipment. In another agreement with Ballarpur	 the French concern agreed to provide services of certain personnel and Ballarpur agreed to pay salaries and other emoluments free of any Indian tax or duty to the personnel. The French concern entered into an arrangement with a Swiss concern for supply of certain machinery and to make available services of certain personnel. The assessee appellant was one such person. He came to India and started working in connection with the setting up of the plant. In addition to daily allowances and other facilities	 the assessee appellant was paid Rs. 3	82	 481 and Rs. 67	200 for the assessment years	 1974 75 and 1975 76	 respectively. Before the Income Tax Officer	 the assessee contended that he was not liable to pay tax. The I.T.O. did not agree. Ballarpur paid the tax amount of Rs. 3	23	400 and Rs. 35	546 for the assessment years respectively. The Income Tax Officer treated the tax amount paid by Ballarpur as a perquisite and added the same to the salary amount of the assessee. The assessee questioned the action of the I.T.O. in appeal before the A.A.C.	 which was dismissed. 28 The appeal flied before the Tribunal was also dismissed	 whereupon the assessee obtained a reference to be answered by the High Court. The High Court answered the reference	 "whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the amount of tax paid by Ballarpur on behalf of the assessee in assessment years 1974 75 and 1975 76 is income taxable under the heading 'other sources '	 against the assessee. Hence these appeals by the assessee contending that the amount paid by way of tax could not be treated as 'Income ' of assessee; that as the assessee did not receive the said amount from Ballarpur, it could not constitute his income. Dismissing the appeals, this Court, HELD: 1.01. The definition of 'Income ' in clause (24) of Section 2 of the Act is an inclusive definition. It adds several artificial categories to the concept of income but on that account the expression 'income ' does not lose its natural connotation. It is repeatedly said that it is difficult to define the expression 'income ' in precise terms. Anything which can properly be described as income is taxable under the Act unless, of course, it is exempted under one or the other provision of the Act. [31D] 1.02. The amount paid by Ballarpur by way of tax on the salary amount received by the assessee can be treated as the income of the assessee. The said amount is nothing but a tax upon the salary received by the assessee. By virtue of the obligation undertaken by Ballarpur to pay tax on the salary received by the assessee among others, it paid the said tax. The said payment is, therefore, for and on behalf of the assessee. It is not a gratuitous payment But for the said agreement and but for the said payment, the said tax amount would have been liable to be paid by the assessee himself. He could not have received the salary which he did but for the said payment of tax. The obligation placed upon Ballarpur by virtue of Section 195 of the Income Tax Act cannot also be ignored in this context. It would be unrealistic to say that the said payment had no integral connection with the salary received by the assessee. [31E G] 1.03. Inasmuch as the assessee is not an employee of Ballarpur, which made the payment, it cannot be brought within the purview of Section 17 of the Act. It must necessarily be placed under sub section (1) 29 of Section 56, 'income from other sources '. According to the said sub section, income of every kind which is not to be excluded from the total income under the Act shall be chargeable to income tax under the head 'income from other sources ', if it is not chargeable to income tax under any of the other heads specified in Section 14, Items A to E. [32A B] N 4. Modi vs S.A.L., Narayana Rao, SC; C.L T., Bombay vs Smt. T.P. Sidhwa, and Mrs. Sheela Kaushish vs C.I. T. Delhi 131 [TR 435 SC, distinguished. 
1474	A decree passed in favour of the respondent by a Subordinate judge of West Bengal was transferred for execution on August 28, 1950 to the Court of the Additional District judge of Morena in what was originally Gwalior State and subsequently became a part of the United States of Madhya Bharat and after the Constitution State of Madhya Bharat. On the date when the decree was transferred, the 620 Courts in Madhya Bharat were governed by the Indian Code of Civil Procedure as adapted by the Madhya Bharat Adapt action Order of 1948 but the power of transfer by the Court of Bankura was governed by sections 38 and 39 of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure. On the judgment debtor 's objection the application for execution was dismissed but the appeal against that order was allowed by the High Court. The appellant contended that the Court had no power to transfer the decree under section 38 to the Court in Morena. The question was with regard to the applicability of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure and whether the decree sought to be executed was a decree of a foreign Court or not. Held, that the Court at Morena not being a court, to which Indian Civil Procedure Code applied, the decree could not be transferred to it under the Indian Code of Procedure and sections 38 and 39 were inapplicable to justify such a transfer. The Indian Civil Procedure Code was not extended to Madhya Bharat till April 1, 1951, by the Act 2 of 1951. The decrees of foreign courts were under the Gwalior Court of which Morena was a part, not executable under section 233 which required a suit to be brought on the basis of foreign decree under not the Madhya Bharat Court of Civil Procedure. Held, further, that the Foreigners Act is not relevant for the purpose of finding out whether the decree was a foreign decree or not because the execution of decree is governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and not by Foreigners Act. A section of an enactment has to be interpreted as it is and a Court cannot read it as if its language was different from what it actually is. 
7005	The respondent accused was prosecuted for committing rape on a child of 8/9 years of age. The prosecution case was that: while the prosecutrix (P.W.4), her father (P.W.5) and elder sister (P.W.7) were in their fields, it suddenly started raining and all the three ran towards their house; P.W.4 got separated from the two kins and was following them when the accused, then aged about 16 years, took her under a mango tree and committed rape on her; P.W.5, who in the meantime returned to the fields in search of P.W.4, saw the accused lying on her, he raised an alarm whereupon P.W.7, rushed to the spot and the accused ran away leaving P.W.4 crying and bleeding per vagina. The victim was got medically examined the same day and the doctor (P.W.1), besides mentioning the injuries on the private part of the prosecutrix, reported that she had been subjected to sexual intercourse. At the trial P.W.5, P.W.7 and the doctor (P.W.1) who had medically examined the prosecutrix, supported the prosecution case in its totality. The trial court held that the accused had committed an offence of rape under s.376, I.P.C. on the prosecutrix, and sentenced him to suffer R.I. for a period of five years. 18 The accused riled an appeal before the High Court which acquitted him. The State filed the appeal by special leave to this Court. Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.I. Courts must be wary, circumspect and slow to interfere with reasonable and proper findings based on appreciation of evidence as recorded by the lower courts, before upsetting the same and acquiring an accused involved in the commission of heinous offence of rape of hapless girl child. [p.24B C] 1.2. The High Court without appreciating or properly discussing the evidence committed an error in setting aside the findings recorded by the trial court which were based on proper appreciation of evidence and were not unreasonable much less perverse. The judgment of the High Court is based on conjectural findings and cannot be sustained.[pp.22B C; 25A] 3. The statement of prosecutrix (PW4) is clear, cogent and specific. The Sessions Judge recorded her statement on being satisfied that she was capable of giving evidence. She narrated the occurrence in a simple and straight forward manner. The prosecution case was fully supported by her during her statement and nothing has been brought out in the cross examination from which any doubt could be caused about her veracity. Her statement receives ample corroboration from the testimony of her father (PW5) who is found to be a truthful and reliable witness. The medical evidence of PWl has supported the prosecutrix in all material particulars. The evidence of PW7 who had also seen the accused running away from the scene of crime further lands credence to the prosecution version. [pp.21E H; 22A] 2.1. There is no legal compulsion to look for corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. [p.22D] 2.2. In the instant case the evidence of the prosecutrix is found to be reliable and trustworthy. No corroboration was required to be looked for, though enough was available on the record. The medical evidence provided sufficient corroboration. [p.22E] 19 3.1. There is no inflexible axiom of law which lays down that the absence of injuries on the male organ of the accused would always be fatal to the prosecution case and would discredit the evidence of the prosecutrix, otherwise found to be reliable. Every case has to be approached with realistic diversity based on peculiar facts and circumstances of that case and inferences have to be drawn from the given set of facts and circumstances. [p.24D F] Rahim Beg & Anr. vs State of UP. , , distinguished. The doctor (PW3), who had examined the respondent, found him to be capable of sexual intercourse and according to him the absence of injury on the male organ of the accused was not suggestive of the fact that he had not indulged in sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, then of tender years of age. His evidence was not at all challenged on this aspect by the defence. [p.24F G] 4.1. The judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused is set aside. The accused is convicted under S.376 IPC for having committed rape on the prosecutrix and sentenced to suffer regorous imprisonment for a period of five years. [pp. 25H; 26A] 4.2. Though for such an offence a more severe sentence would have been desirable but neither the State sought enhancement of the sentence by filing an appropriate petition nor any notice in this regard had been issued to the accused, and without putting him on such a notice, the Court 'cannot enhance the sentence. 'Me provision prescribing more stringent minimum sentence under Section 376 was also incorporated in the Code by an amendment only with effect from December, 1982, after the offence in the instant case had been committed. [p.25D G] 
3263	In pursuance of an adevertisement dated 31 5 1971 by the University of Saugar calling for applications for the post of Professor of Zoology, five persons including the appellant and the respondent applied. The Selection Committee constituted in accordance with section 47 A of the Saugar University Act 1946 for considering these applications recommended on 4 12 1971 the name of the appellant to the Executive Council, which was competent to make the appointment. The Executive Council refused to accept the recommendations of the Selection Committee on the ground that it would lead to administrative and disciplinary complications. Thereupon the appellant filed a writ petition for quashing the resolution of the Executive Council and it was Quashed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Thereafter on 18 2 1973 the Executive Council appointed the appellant as Professor of Zoology. On 9 7 1973 the respondent filed a writ petition for quashing the appellants appointment. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh quashed the resolution dated 18 2 1973 appointing the appellant as Professor of Zoology and indicated that the University may advertise the post a fresh if they desire to fill in the vacancy. The ground on which the resolution was quashed was that the appointment was made more than a year after the recommendation of the Selection Committee was made and this was not permissible. The High Court relied upon the Statutes of the University made under section 31(aa) of the Act for this conclusion. Section 31 (aa) enables statutes to be made among other things, for the mode of appointment of teachers of the University paid by the University. The requirement of sub rule (2) of statute No. 21 AA is that the post should be readvertised before making an appointment if the appointment is not made within a year of the Section Committee 's recommendation. In this appeal by special leave it was contended for the appellant that (i) the statute is directory and not mandatory, and (ii) that, in any case, the statute is beyond the rule making power conferred by section 31(aa). Rejecting the contentions and dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD : The question whether a particular provision of a statute is directory or mandatory might arise in a case where merely a period is specified for performing a duty but the consequences of not performing the duty within that period are not mentioned. In this case, the statute clearly provides for the contingency of the duty not being performed within the period fixed by the statute and the consequence thereof. Unless the post is readvertised and an appointment is made from among those persons who apply in response to the readvertisement the appointment cannot be said to be valid. Though the reason for the delay in making the appointment was the wrongful refusal of the Executive Council to act in pursuance of the recommendation of the Selection Committee and the pendency of the writ petition filed by the appellant in the High Court that does not in any way minimise the effect of sub rule (2) of statute No. 21 AA. [150F H] (ii) Unless it could be said that the rule has no relation to the power conferred by the rule making power it cannot be said to be beyond the rule making power. The statute provides that the appointment should be made after the post 149 is advertised and the applications received considered by a committee of selection. It also provides that if no appointment is made to the post within one year from the date of nomination by the selection committee the post shall be readvertised. The rule therefore certainly relates to the mode of appointment. It cannot be said to be unrelated to the mode of appointment.[151A C] Dr. P. section Venkataswamy vs University of Mysore A.I.R. and S.B. Ray vs P.N. Banerjee, , referred to. 
5612	% The suit premises consisting of lands and buildings were originally owned by Dewan Bishen Dass a former Prime Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The appellants purchased the same from his successor in interest, Purnish Chandra by two sale deeds dated 12.7.1967 and 8.12.1967. The State Government tried to resume the land for setting up a tonga and lorry stand, and for the purpose of development of the city, and eviction of the appellants was ordered by the Estate Officer under the provision of the Jammu and Kashmir (Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1959 on January 5, 1968. The Municipality took forcible possession of the land and demolished the buildings thereon on January 11, 1968. The appellants filed a Writ Petition in the High Court assailing the action of the Municipality. The High Court on 19.7.1969 allowed the writ petition and held that the appellants were not unauthorised occupants, possession can be taken only on payment of compensation and that Section 5 of the Jammu and Kashmir (Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act was ultra vires. The State appealed to this Court and the judgment of the High Court was confirmed on the sole ground that as the Administrator of the Municipality had not complied with the provisions of section 238 and 239 of the Municipal Act the action taken by the Municipality in the matter of demolishing must be held to be entirely illegal and contrary to law, [State of Jammu and Kashmir vs 854 Haji Wali Mohammad & Ors., ; The Estate Officer thereafter issued a fresh notice under section 4(1) of the amended Jammu and Kashmir (Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1959 intimating that the appellants were in unauthorised occupation of the public premises mentioned in the Schedule to the notice. The appellants filed objections stating that they were not in unauthorised occupation of the said land nor have they encroached upon the same, and that the notice was wholly misconceived and illegal. It was further contended that the land was purchased by the appellants from the legal heirs of Dewan Bishen Dass, that they had been in continuous possession, made various improvements on the land and built houses, and that the Estate Officer could not declare the person in possession as an unauthorised occupants after lapse of more than 80 years. The Estate Officer rejected the objections and directed the appellants to handover possession of the premises including structures to the Administrator of the Minicipality. The appellants preferred an appeal to the District Judge but the same was dismissed. The order of the Estate Officer was also challenged in a writ petition by the appellants, but the same was dismissed by the High Court holding that the land being transferred by the legal heirs of Dewan Bishen Dass without obtaining prior permission of the Government or the competent authority in that behalf, the lease stood determined and that the notice under the Jammu and Kashmir (Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1959 was in accordance with law. In the appeal to this Court by Special Leave it was contended on behalf of the appellants: that the lands taken on lease by Dewan Bishen Dass cannot be deemed to have been taken under the provisions of Ailan No. 10 dated 7 Bhadon 1976 and as such section 12(A) and section 6 of the Land Grants Act 1960 are not applicable, that the lands could not be acquired without providing for adequate compensation to be paid to the Wasidar for the buildings, appurtenances and other improvements effected by him, that no compensation in fact was awarded and that the notice under section 4 of the Act was liable to be cancelled and quashed as being not in accordance with law. 855 The appeal was resisted by the State respondents, contending: that the appellants predecessor that is the original lessee was a Wasidar and that the lease was granted under Ailan No. 10 dated 7 Bhadon 1976, that section 12 A of the Jammu and Kashmir Lands Grants Act is applicable, that the transfer of the land had been made by the legal heirs of the original lessee Dewan Bishen Dass without the prior permission of the Government or any authority in that behalf, that the lease stood determined from the date of the transfer, the Government had the right of re entry on the land in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of the Land Grants Act, that the appellants are unauthorised occupants and consequently the notice under section 4(1) of the Jammu and Kashmir (Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1959 is not illegal but is in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. Allowing the Appeal, ^ HELD: 1. Dewan Bishen Dass predecessor of the appellants was a Wasidar and the lands were wasidari lands leased out to him for the purpose of constructing buildings. This lease was governed by Ailan No. 10 as well as by the Lands Grants Act, 1960. [860F] 2. The land was transferred by Purnish Chandra and others, legal representatives of the original lessee Dewan Bishen Dass, in favour of the appellants in contravention of the provisions of Section 12(A) of the Jammu and Kashmir Land Grants Act, 1960. [860G] 3. The notice under section 4(1) of the Jammu and Kashmir (Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act is in accordance with law and as such it is valid. Under the Act as well as the rule the appellants are entitled to get compensation for the buildings and structures as well as of the improvements made on the land even though they are not entitled to get compensation in respect of the value of the land. [860G H] 4. The compensation in the instant case, has not been determined nor the same has been paid. Appeal allowed. Judgment and Order of High Court, set aside. Matter remitted to the District Judge, who would expedite the determination of the compensation after determining the market value of the buildings, structures and all the improvements effected on the land. [861A B] 
5174	The ten accused persons forming themselves into an unlawful assembly in the house of A 1 and arming themselves with spears, sticks and crow bars attacked the deceased while he was returning from the canal carrying water in 'Kavadi '. As a result of the injuries sustained by the deceased he died. All the ten accused were charged under section 147 I.P.C. accused A 1, A4, A5 and A 6, who were armed with deadly weapons were also charged under section 148 I.P.C. and accused A 1 to A I0 were further charged under section 302 read with section 149 I.P.C. The trial Court acquitted A 4, A 9 and A I0 of all the charges levelled against them. Accused A 1 to A 3 and A 5 to A 8 were convicted section 147 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. Accused A I, A 5 and A 6 were convicted section 148 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. Accused A 1, A 2, A 5 and A 6 were convicted u/s 302 read with section 149 I.P.C. and sentenced to death. Accused A 3, A 7 and A 8 were also convicted section 302 read with section 149 I.P.C. but sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. The High Court allowed the appeals flied by the convict ed accused and acquitted all of them of the charges levelled against them and rejected the reference. Allowing the appeal of the State to this Court, HELD: 1. The judgment passed by the High Court acquit ting all the accused is not a proper judgment in accordance with the provisions of section 354 of the Code of Criminal Proce dure 1973. The learned Judge has not at all considered and marshalled the evidence of witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution particularly the evidence of PWs. 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 who were eye witnesses to the gruesome murder commit ted in the morning at about 7.30 a.m. 328 The names of all the seven accused appeared in the F.I.R. [330 C] 2. The learned Judge approached the case from wrong angle and without properly formulating the points for deci sions and without any proper appraisal of the evidences adduced by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused persons and also without adverting to the reasoning of the Sessions Judge, has perfunctorily come to the finding that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond doubt the case against the accused even though there are eye witnesses P.Ws. 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 to the occurrence. [330 E] 3. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the case is remitted back to the High Court for deciding it in accordance with law on a proper appraisal and marshalling of the evidence on record as early as possible. [330 F G] 
3505	Entries in record of rights Presumptive value of Presumption if applies to forged or fraudulent entries Effect of fraud or forgery on a document. Mahant Bharati of temple of Shankarji Maharaj gave lands belonging to the temple on Theka to one Sukai for a period of 10 years. The Mahant obtained a decree for eviction against Sukai but it could not be executed because of the objections raised by the respondents on the ground that they have been cultivating the lands for several years and they were entitled to continue in possession as Sirdars in spite of the decree against Sukai. The lessor, therefore, instituted two separate suits under order 21 Rule 103, C.P.C. Respondents contended inter alia, that they had become hereditary tenants and they must be deemed to have become Adhivasis of the land. The trial court dismissed the suit. The district court reversed the finding of the trial court in appeal and held that the appellant being the Bhumidar of the lands was entitled to recover possession thereof from the respondents. The district Judge held that the entries in the record of rights showing the occupation of the respondents were fraudulent. The High Court in second appeal upset the decree of the district court. Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: (1) The only question before the High Court was whether the entries on which the respondents relied were genuine or fraudulent. This is as question of fact and the High Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the finding on that question in second appeal. The High Court erroneously assumed that the district Court had not given any finding on the question of fraud. The district Court had given at least half a dozen reasons for holding that the entries were fictitious and were made surreptitiously and fraudulently. [521H; 522A H] (2) If the High Court thought that the district court had not recorded a clear finding on that issue and if the High Court were to determine under section 103 C.P.C. the issue under whether the entries were fraudulent or not it was necessary for it to discuss the evidence. But, the High Court instead placed blind and easy reliance on the entries which are utterly uninspiring. [523A B] (3) Entries in the revenue record ought generally to be accepted at their lace value and courts should not embark upon an appellate enquiry into the correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not formed or fraudulent entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim lo possessory title. [523B C] 
686	In exercise of the powers under section 3 Of the Essential Com modities Act, 1955, and under cl. 5 of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1955, the Government of India issued a notification dated July 30, 1958, fixing the ex factory price per maund of sugar produced in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar. The petitioners challenged the legality of the notification on the grounds (1) that it was beyond the ambit of authority conferred on the Central Government under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 955, and clause 5 Of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1955, and that, in any case, it was bad as it could not subserve the purposes of the Act ensuring equitable distribution of the commodity to the consumer at a fair price, (2) that the Act and the Order did not authorise the Central Government to fix ex factory prices, and,, in any case, the notification failed to fix prices for the ultimate consumer, (3) that it imposed an unreasonable restriction on the right to trade under article 10(1)(g), inasmuch as it fixed the price arbitrarily, and there was no reasonable safeguard against the abuse of power, and (4) that it was discriminatory because it fixed ex factory prices only for factories in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar and not for factories in other parts of India and there was no reasonable classification discernible on any intelligible differentia on the basis of which prices had been controlled in certain regions only. Held, (1) The notification dated July 30, 1958, is within the authority conferred on the Central Government by section 3 Of the , and cl. 5 of the Sugar (Control) Order,1955. (2) Section 3 of the Act which provides for control of price is very general in terms and authorises the Central Government to fix the ex factory price of sugar without fixing the wholesale or retail prices; and, since fair prices for the consumer are ensured by fixing the ex factory price, the notification in question subserves the purposes of the Act, and is valid. (3) Clause 5 of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1955, lays down the factors which have to be taken into consideration in fixing prices, and as the prices were fixed in accordance therewith, the 124 action taken by the Government in the interests of the general public could not be challenged on the ground that it was an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. (4) Though under the notification prices are fixed for fac tories only in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar, in effect, they are fixed for the whole of India, as the other States are deficit ; consequently, the notification brought about no discrimination between different regions. 
1312	The appellant was the President of a Municipal Committee. A written notice of the intention to move a motion of no confidence in the President signed by nine members of the Board was delivered to the District Magistrate under section 87 A sub section (2)of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The District Magistrate duly convened a meeting of the Board, but before the date of the meeting the appellant moved a writ petition in the High Court and questioned the validity of the notice. The writ petition was dismissed in limine inter alia as being premature. The Meeting of the Board. was held on the due date and all the members present, voted for the motion of no confidence and the Munsif of the area who had presided declared the motion to have been carried. The appellant by his second writ petition before the High Court desired that the 719 proceeding of the meeting be quashed and the resolution ex pressing no confidence in the appellant be not given effect to	 by the State and the District Magistrate	 for the reason that two of the members of the Board who had signed the notice and subsequently taken part in the proceedings of the meeting and voted	 had 'incurred disqualification under section 13 D (g) of the U.P. Municipalities Act	 1916	 inasmuch as they were in arrears in the payment of municipal tax and other dues to which section 166 of the Act applied. Held	 that an order	 dismissing a writ petition in limine not on merits but for the reason that it was premature. could not operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings. does not automatically come under suspension	 or lose his rights to take part in the proceeding of the Board	 or perform the duties of a member or cease to be a member of the Board merely on his incurring any of the disqualification mentioned in section 13 D of the U.P. Municipalities Act	 1916. A member of the Municipal Board	 merely	 by incurring the disqualification under cl. (g) of section 13 D of the U.P. Municipalities Act	 1916	 was not incompetent to exercise his rights as a member of the Board. Election Commission	 India vs Saka Venkata Subba Rao	 ; 	 referred to.