Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 2418 of 1966. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 19	 1963 of the Punjab High Court	 Circuit Bench	 at Delhi in F.A.0. Appeal No. 123 D of 1961. R. L. Agarwal	 K. L. Mehta	 section K. Mehta	 P. N. Chadda. M. G.	 Gupta and K. R. Nagaraja	 for the appellant. L. M. Singhvi	 Badri Dass Sharma and section P. Nayar	 for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court has delivered by Shelat	 J. By this appeal	 under special leave	 the appellantcompany challenges the correctness of the judgment of the High Court of Punjab	 dated February 19	 1963 refusing to set aside an umpire 's award	 dated March 22	 1958. The award was in respect of certain disputes between the company and the Union of India in the matter of disposals of the United States surplus war materials left by the Government of the U.S.A. at the end of the last World War. These surplus materials	 called the U.S. Surplus Stores	 consisted of vehicles and other stores. It was said that these were sold to the company by the Director General	 Disposals through correspondence and sale notes. These contracts of sale were subject to the General Conditions of Contract (Form Con. 117). Cl. 13 of these General Condi tions provided that "In the event of any question or dispute arising under these conditions or any special conditions of contract or in connection with this contract the same shall be referred to the award of an arbitrator to be nominated by the Director General and an arbitrator to be nominated by the contractor	 or in the case of the said arbitrators not agreeing then to the award of an Umpire to be appointed by the arbitrators in writing before proceeding on the reference . Upon every and any such reference	 the assessment of the costs incidental to the reference and award respectively shall be in the discretion of the arbitrators	 or in the event of their not agreeing	 of the Umpire appointed by them. " 285 Disputes having arisen between the parties both as regards the contents and the quantity of the vehicles delivered under the contracts	 they were referred	 in the first instance	 to two arbitrators nominated by the parties	 and ultimately to an umpire. The disputes were crystallized into nine claims by the appellant company totalling Ks. 6	73	34	500/ 	 and several counterclaims by the Government of India. At the end of the arbitration	 the umpire	 by his said award	 disallowed all the claims made by the company	 except one for which he awarded RS. 6	94	000/ and held	 in respect of the counter claims filed by the Government of India	 that the appellant company was liable to pay to the Government in all Rs. 36	23	682.50 P. and costs amounting to Rs. 5	40	544/ . In the result	 after deducting the claim allowed to the appellant company	 the company was held liable to pay to the Government Rs. 34	70	226.50 P. The award having been filed by the umpire in the Court of the	 District Judge	 Delhi and the Government of India having thereupon applied for a decree in term of the award	 the company applied to the Court for setting aside the award urging several grounds for so doing. The District Judge by an elaborate judgment declined to set aside the award. He	 however	 held that the award suffered from an error apparent on the face of the award in respect of the appellant 's claim No. 111(a)	 and further held that the counter claims 11	 IV	 V and VI made by the Government were not covered by the reference	 and consequently	 the umpire had no jurisdiction to go into them. Declining	 however	 to set aside the award	 he remitted it for reconsideration of the aforesaid items and also for readjustment of the amount of costs in the evert of enhanced compensation being awarded to the company in respect of its claim No. 111(a). Dissatisfied with the judgment of the court the company filed an appeal before the High Court. The Union of India also filed certain coss objections. The High Court heard the appeal and the cross objections together and by its aforesaid juggment dismissed both the anneal and the cross objections and upheld the judgment of the District Judge. In support of the claim that the award was liable to be set aside	 counsel for the company submitted the following six propositions for our acceptance : 1. that the contracts of sale entered into by the company were misconstrued by the umpire and such misconstruction appears on the face of the award: 2. that the umpire. as also the High Court	 failed to take into consideration several documents while deciding the scope of the sales; 286 3. that in respect of claim No. VI and counter claim No. VI of the Government	 the umpire acted beyond his jurisdiction as those question		; did not fall within the scope of the reference; 4. that the umpire did not act according to law but acted as a conciliator and based his award on mere conjectures and surmises; 5. that his conclusion on ground rent awarded to the Government was based on no evidence; and 6. that the costs awarded to the Government were altogether disproportionate. Before we proceed to consider these propositions	 it is necessary to ascertain the scope of	 section 30 of the and the principles underlying that section. The general rule in matters of arbitration awards is that where parties have agreed upon an arbitrator	 thereby displacing a court of law for a domestic forum	 they must accept the award as final for good or ill. In such cases the discretion of the court either for remission or for setting aside the award will not be readily exercised and will be strictly confined to the specific grounds set out in sections 16 and 30 of the Act. In Hodgkinson vs Fernie	(1) Williams	 J. stated the principle as follows : "where a cause or matters in difference are referred to an arbitrator	 whether a lawyer or a layman	 he is constituted the sole and final judge of all questions both of law and fact . The only exceptions to that rule are	 cases where the award is the result of corruption or fraud	 and one other	 which though it is to be regretted	 is now	 I think	 firmly established	 viz.	 where the question of law necessarily arises on the face of the award	 or upon some paper accompanying and forming part of	 the award. " This observation was recently cited with approval in Union of India vs Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. (2) The principle is that the Court	 while examining an award 	 will look at documents accompanying and forming part of the award. Thus	 if an arbitrator were to refer to the pleadings of the parties so as to incorporate them into the award	 the Court can look at them. In some cases	 however	 courts extended the principle and set aside the award on a finding that the contract	 though only referred to but not incorporated into the award as part of it	 had been misconstrued and such misconstruction had (1) (1857)(3)C.B.(N.S.)189	 202. (2) [1967] 1 S.C.R.324. 287 been the basis of the award. Thus	 in Landauer vs Asser(1) the dispute between buyers and sellers of goods was as to who was entitled to certain sums paid upon a policy of insurance upon the goods. This was referred to arbitration and the umpire made his award basing it on the construction he placed on the contract	 namely	 that as the parties to the contract were "by the terms thereof" principals	 their interest and liability in insurance was defined to be the value of the invoice plus 5 per cent. On an application to set aside the award	 the Court of Appeal held that inasmuch as the umpire had referred to the contract and the terms thereof	 it was justified in looking at the contract	 and having done so	 found that he had based his decision entirely upon the terms of the contract. It also found that since the contract	 if properly construed	 did not justify the decision	 the award was bad on the face of it and was liable to be set aside. A similar view appears also to have been taken in F.R. Absalom Ltd. vs Great Western (London) Garden Village Society Ltd . (2 ) where the award set out the relevant words and cl. 30 of the contract and also the conclusion of law on the meaning of those words. Lord Russel said that since the award recited the contract and referred in terms to the provisions of cl. 30	 thereby incorporating it into the award	 and then stated the construction which the arbitrator placed upon that clause	 the Court was entitled to look at that clause to ascertain if the construction placed by the arbitrator was erroneous. The correctness of the decision in Landauer vs Asser(1) was challenged before the Privy Council in Chempsey Bhara & Co. vs Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.(2) Lord Dune din		 however	 did not expressly overrule it but rested content by observing that that decision was not binding on the Board. But he formulated the principle thus : .LM15 " An error in law on the face of the award means	 that you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto	 as for instance	 a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment	 some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous. It does not mean that if in a narrative a reference is made to a contention of one party that opens the door to seeing first what that contention is	 and then going to the contract on which the parties ' rights depend to see if that contention is sound. " (1) [1905](2) K.B. 184. (2) (3) [1923] A.C.480. 288 The Privy Council upheld the award. stating that it was impossible to say what was the mistake on the face of the award which the arbitrators had made as they had not tied themselves down to any legal principle which was unsound. The mere fact that the court would have construed a document differently than the arbitrator would not induce the court to interfere unless the construction given by the arbitrator is such that it is against the well established principles of construction. see Kelanton vs Duff Development Co.(1) I In an illuminating analysis of a large number of earlier decisions	 including Landauer(2) and F. R. Absalom Ltd.(3) Diplock	 L.J.	 in Giacomo Costa Fu Andrea vs British Italian Trading Co. Ltd. (4 ) recorded his conclusion thus "It seems to me	 therefore	 that	 on the cases	 there is none which compels us to hold that a mere reference to the contract in the award entitles us to look at the contract. It may be that in particular cases a specific reference to a particular clause of a contract may incorporate the contract	 or that clause of it	 in the award. I think that we are driven back to first principles in this matter	 namely	 that an award can only be set aside for error which is on its face. It is true that an award can incorporate another document so as to entitle one to read that document as part of the award and	 by reading them together	 find an error on the face of the award. " The question whether a contract or a clause of it is incorporated in the award is a question of construction of the award. The test is	 does the arbitrator come to a finding on the wording of the contract. If he does	 he can be said to have impliedly incorporated the contract or a clause in it whichever be the case. But a mere general reference to the contract in the award is not to be held as incorporating it. The principle of reading contracts or other documents into the award is not to be encouraged or extender. (see Babu Ram vs Nanhemal & The rule thus is that as the parties choose their own arbitrator to be the judge in the dispute between them	 they cannot	 when the award is good on the face of it	 object to the decision either upon the law or the facts. Therefore. even when an arbitrator commits a mistanke either in law or in fact in determining the matters referred to him	 but such mistake does not appear on the face of the (1) [1] 1923 A.C.395 (2) [1905] 2 K.B.184 (3) (4) [1962]2 All E.R. 53	 62 (5) C. A. NO. 1 07 of 1966	 Decided on 5 12 1968. 289 award or in a document appended to or incorporated in it so as to form part of it	 the award will neither be remitted nor set aside notwithstanding the mistake. In the light of the principle above stated	 the first question calling for determination is	 is there an error apparent on the award	 in the sense that the umpire misconstrued the contracts of sale inasmuch as though those contracts were contained 'in sale notes as well as in several letters	 he considered the sale notes only as containing the contracts of sale disregarding the corres pondence which had taken place between the company and the Director General	 Disposals and his officers ? Such a question would undoubtedly be one of law. But the disputes referred to the umpire contained disputes both of fact and law. Ordinarily the decision of the umpire	 even though it be on a question of law	 would be binding on the parties. The court would only interfere if the case falls within the exceptions mentioned by Williams	 J. in Hodgkinson vs Fernie(1) and reaffirmed by Diplock L. J.	 in Giacomo Costa Fu Andrea ' vs British Italian Trading Co. Ltd.(2). There were in all three separate sales to the appellant company		 which according to the respondents were incorporated in sale notes Nos. 160	. 161 and 197. Before the sale note 160 was issued on July 11	 1946	 it is a fact that the company had written a letter dated July 10	 1946 which was also endorsed by two officers of the Director General	 Disposals. The letter contained three clauses	 the first of which stated that "M/s. Allen Berry will buy the Moran Vehicles Depot 'as is where is for Rs. 1	80	00	000/". The two other clauses provided the manner and time of payment of the sale price. But the letter commenced. with the following words: "Pending detailed record of terms tomorrow the following are the broad heads of agreement	 which will form the basis of sale of surplus vehicles. " The next day	 i.e.	 July 11	 1946	 the Department issued sale note 160	 which in clear terms stated that what was purchased were "all vehicles and trailers lying in Moran Depot"	 which meant that the vehicles sold were only those that were actually lying in that depot on July 11	 1946	 and not those outside it or those borne on the records of that depot	 as contended by the company. It	 however	 appears from the judgment of the Trial Court (para 206) that on receipt of sale note 160	 the company wrote a letter on July 11	 1946 in which it contended that "We have purchased the entire vehicle depot of Moran". (1) ; 	202. 57) (2) [1962] 2 All ER 53	 68. 7SupCI/71 290 It appears that in view of this difference of opinion	 a meeting 	of representatives of the parties	 was held on July 23	 1946	 the minutes of which	 as recorded by the Assam Controller	 U.S.A.S.S.	 read as follows: (2) (a) The vehicles and trailers sold to Messrs. Allen Berry and Co. Ltd.	 are deemed to	 include all vehicles which were or should have been held in Moran Depot on the 10th July	 also those which have 'been issued on a Memorandum Receipt as follows : (i) To the Americans	 left behind by them in various camps and depots and not yet turned in by us. (ii) Vehicles issued on Memorandum Receipt to military units assisting the U.S.A.S.S. Organisation. (iii) Any surplus vehicles originally allotted to U.S.A.S.S. Units for operational purposes and now no longer required by them. " On September 17	 1946	 a secraphone message was sent from New Delhi to Calcutta which stated "We have sold U.S. Army surplus vehicles presumed to be borne on Moran list	 that is those actually in Moran Vehicle Depot or those that were intended to be moved to that depot	 which was meant to be parking depot for surplus U.S. vehicles in Assam area. " On September 26 1946	 the Director General	 'Disposals	 wrote to the company that "The vehicles sold to you in Assam are those U.S. Army surplus. vehicles actually in Moran Vehicle Depot or those that were intended to be moved to Moran Vehicle Depot. Any mobile engineering equipment	 such as mobile cranes	 tracked tractors are	 excluded from the sale to you. " On December 10	 1946	 the Controller issued a release order in respect of 1. All vehicles and trailers lying in Moran Depot on 10th July 1946 including all United States Army Surplus Stores	 excluding land and buildings lying within Moran Depot and transferred to the Government of India from the Government of the United States. Vehicles in operational use in Calcutta and Assam as and when no longer required by the U.S.A.S.S. Organisation. " 291 The question raised by counsel is that the umpire failed to consider all these documents while considering the scope and content of the contract of sale and relied on only sale note No. 160	 dated July 11	 1946	 that the contract was not contained in the said note 160 alone	 and that therefore	 he misconstrued the contract	 and that that misconstruction	 which is a point of law	 is apparent on the face of the award	 as it was made the very basis of the award. The first three issues raised by the umpire were (1) whether the appellant was entitled to prove that any vehicles	 stores etc. other than those mentioned in the sale notes were sold to it; (2) whether the Government was bound by the clarifications	 representation	 explanations or assurances made or given by any officer or officers of the Department regarding the subjectmatter of the contracts of sale except those necessarily implicit in the sale notes; and (3) whether the Government sold any vehicles except those lying in Moran Depot on July 11	 1946	 or those intended to be moved thereto. The dispute between the parties	 thus	 clearly was that whereas the company claimed that the	 sale was of all vehicles borne on the records of Moran Depot	 irrespective of whether they were actually lying there on July 11.	 1946 or not	 the Government claimed that the company was entitled to those actually lying in the Depot. According to the respondents	 the contract of sale was to be found in the sale note	 and therefore	 any subsequent explanations or assurances given by any officer or officers of the Department could not vary or alter the terms of the contract. These expanations and assurances were given	 only to remove the misunderstanding of the company over the question of the scope and extent of the sale made to it. The umpire set out part of the sale notes 160 and 197 in the award and then observed "the language used in these sale letters is to my mind perfectly clear	 explicit and unambiguous and excludes the possibility of any vehicles	 trailers or stores lying on the dates in question outside the locations specified in the sale letters having been included in the two sales. The contention that they in fact include all vehicular stores in Assam in one case and in Bengal area in the other has been made in all seriousness and a good deal 292 of evidence both oral and documentary has been produced in support of or against such contention. The point has also been argued at great length by learned counsel for the parties. I have given the whole matter my most serious and earnest consideration and my view is that apart from the language of the two saledeeds ' being against such a contention	 the evidence too considered as a whole does not support it. Accordingly	 I hold that the stores sold to the claimants in the case of Assam were those actually located in Moran Depot on July 10	1946 and in the case of Bengal those actually located in Jodhpur and other depots specified in the sale letter on July 31	 1946." He next held : "The alleged clarifications or representations made or explantions or assurances given by any officer or officers of the Disposals Department either verbally or in writing have been very carefully examined by me and I am of opinion that neither are they	 considered as whole	 capable of the interpretation sought to be put upon them by the claimants nor are the respondents bound by them. They are not in accordance with law and do not amount to legal contracts binding the respondents. " These passages clearly show that the umpire had considered	 besides the sale notes	 the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties as also the contentions urged on and as regards them by counsel for the company. It is impossible	 therefore	 to uphold the contention that the various documents	 i.e.	 the letter of the company dated July 10	 1946	 'the subsequent correspondence	 minutes of the meetings which too place after the salenote 160 was issued etc. were not taken into consideration by the umpire while coming to his conclusion as to what actually was sold to the company. The dispute	 amongst other disputes	 referred to the umpire and crystallized by him in the form of issues on the pleadings of the parties involved	 as already stated	 the question first as to what was sold	 and secondly	 arising out of that	 the question whether besides the said sale notes 160 and 197	 the subsequent clarifications or explanations were binding on the Government. These were	 no doubt	 questions partly of fact and partly of law. But questions both of fact and law were referred to the umpire and prima facie his findings on them would bind the parties unless	 as explained earlier	 the umpire has laid down any legal proposition	 such as a construction which is made the basis of the award and is on the face of the award an error. 293 The point is	 is this such a case ? True it is that this is not 	a case where a question of law is specifically referred to. It is clearly a case falling in the category of cases	 like Kalanton vs Du# Development Co. Ltd. (1) wherein deciding the questions referred to him the umpire has to decide a point of law. In doing so	 the umpire no doubt	 laid down the legal propsition that the clarifications or assurances given subsequent to the dates of the said sale notes by an officer or officers of the department were not binding on the respondents nor could they affect the scope of the sales. That answer the umpire	 was entitled to give. But the fact that he answered a legal point does not mean that he has incorporated into the award or made part of the award a document or documents	 the construction of which	 right or wrong	 is the basis of the award. The error	 if any	 in such a case cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the award entitling the court to consider the various documents placed in evidence before the umpire but not incorporated in the award so as to form part of it and then to make a search if they have been misconstrued by him. This	 in our understanding	 is the correct principle emerging from the decisions which counsel placed before us. In any event	 this is not a case where the umpire	 in the words of Lord Dunedin	 "tied himself down to a legal proposition" which on the face of the award was unsound. The award 	makes it clear in so many words that he took into. account the entire evidence	 including the documents relied on by counsel and then only came to the conclusion that it did not assist the company in its contention as to the scope of the sales. Contentions 1 and 2 raised by Mr. Agarwal	 therefore	 cannot be upheld. Contention No. 3 relates to 547 vehicles said ' to have been sold to the company under sale: note 197	 dated August 2	/6	 1946. There is no dispute that out of these vehicles the company removed 291 vehicles alleging that the delivery of the balance of 256 vehicles was withheld. The company made a claim being claim No. VI for the price of these 256 undelivered vehicles. The respondents contention was that the sale to the company was confined only to the U.S.A. Surplus Stores	 that these vehicles did not fall within that category	 but were Reverse Land Lease vehicles belonging to the Government of India under an agreement between the U.S.A. and India. On these allegations the respondents laid counter claim No. VI claiming the price of the 291 vehicles admittedly removed by the company when they were lying in Jodhpur Depot	 Calcutta. The umpire found that the expression "Reverse Land Lease" related to the reciprocal aid articles referred to in the said agreement. A reciprocal aid article	 according to that agreement	 (1) 294 meant an article transferred by the India Government to the U.S. Government under reciprocal aid under para 4 C of that agreement '. The U.S.A. Government was deemed to have acquired as on September 2	 1945 full title over such articles except that such reciprocal aid articles incorporated into installations in India were deemed to have been returned to India Government from the date when the U.S.A. forces relinquished possession of such installations. From the inventories produced before him	 the umpire held that these 547 vehicles were incorporated into installations in India	 and therefore	 ownership in them vested in India Government on and after the U.S.A. forces relinquished possession of those installations. They could not	 therefore	 be regarded 	is U.S. Surplus Stores which alone were and could be the subject matter of sale note 197. Consequently	 the company was not entitled to remove the said 291 vehicles which it did	 much less could the company claim compensation for 256 vehicles which it alleged were not delivered to it. In the result	 the umpire allowed the Government 's counter claim No. VI	 which was for the price of 291 vehicles unauthorisedly removed by the company from Jodhpur Depot. The argument in connection with this part of the award was	 firstly	 that the findings of the umpire were vitiated as there was total lack of evidence on which they could be based	 and secondly that in any event	 the umpire had no jurisdiction to award compensation to the Government in respect of counterclaim No. VI. The first part of the argument need not detain us as the finding that these vehicles formed part of reciprocal aid articles	 the ownership in which vested in the Government of India and were therefore not U.S.A.S.S. was based on the agreement between the two Governments and the inventories produced before the umpire from which he could hold that they belonged to the Government of India from the date when the installations in which they were incorporated were relinquished by the U.S. forces	 and that therefore	 they could not form the subject matter of sale note 197 which related only to the U.S. Surplus St ores. The second part of the argument	 however	 requires conside ration. The question is whether the arbitration clause included. a dispute relating to compensation in respect of the said 291 vehicles unauthorisedly removed by the company. Cl. 13 of the General Conditions of Contract	 quoted earlier	 provides for reference to arbitration of all questions or disputes "arising under these conditions" or "in connection with this	 contract". Dr. Singhvi referred us to cl. 10 of these Conditions also but it is clear that it can in no sense apply to the dispute relating to	 compensation. But the words "arising under these conditions" ' 295 and "in connection. with this contract" are undoubtedly wide and comprehensive. it is	 nonetheless	 a question whether the dispute as to compensation on the ground of unauthorised appropriation of these vehicles by the company falls within cl. 13. In Vidya Sagar Joshi vs Surinder Nath Gautam(1) the words "expenditure	 in connection with election" used in section 77 of the Representation of the People Act	 1951 were construed to mean "having to do	 with". An arbitration clause wherein the words "in relation to or in connection with the contract" were construed not to contemplate a dispute raised by a contractor that he could avoid the contract on the ground that it was obtained by a fradulent misrepresentation. (see Monro vs Bognor Urban District Coun cil(2). But a claim for damages on the ground of negligence on. the part of the defendant in re moving the plaintiff 's furniture against a clause for due diligence in removing it was held to fall	 within the arbitration clause. Woolf vs Collis Remo val Service (3) Counsel conceded that a dispute as to the interpretation of sale note 197 would fall under the arbitration clause. If that is so	 it must follow that the umpire was competent to decide whether the said 547 vehicles fell within the purview of the sale note or not. If in determining that question he came to the conclusion that they did not	 the obvious conclusion would be that the company was not entitled to take away 291 vehicles admittedly removed by it from the Depot. If the company did that	 would the question as to the return or of compensation in lieu of such vehicles	 to which it was not entitled under the sale	 be a question which arises out of or in connection with the contract ? Counsel went as far as to say that the umpire in deciding the company 's claim No. VI and the Government 's counter claim No. VI could decide that the company was not entitled to those vehicles	 but could not take the next step either to direct the return of them or payment of compensation in lieu of those vehicles. In our view	 such an argument cannot be accepted. The reason is that once it is found that he was competent to decide the dispute as to whether the said 547 vehicles were not the subject matter of the sale and 291 of them were removed unauthorisedly	 he must	 to do justice between the parties in respect of disputes referred to him	 order the company either to return them or to pay compensation for them. Since the first course was not possible after all these years	 the second was the only and the obvious course. The dispute raised by the respondents that 291 vehicles were not included in the sale was: co extensive with and connected with the dispute that the com (1) ; (3) [1947]2AllE.R.260. (2) [1915] (3) K.B.167. 296 pany was bound to return them if it was found that they were not covered by the sale. On this reasoning it is not possible to say that the umpire went beyond his jurisdiction either in rejecting the company 's claim No. VI or in accepting the corresponding counter claim No. VI of the respondents. Contention 4 relates to 600 vehicles which had been taken out of Moran Depot for operational purposes	 but which the company claimed were part of the sale under sale note 160. The umpire held (I that those vehicles having been taken out of the Depot for operational purposes did not fall within the sale	 and (2) in the alternative	 that the evidence disclosed that a substantial number of vehicles in operational use were delivered to the company even though strictly speaking it was not entitled to them as they were not lying in the	 Depot on. July 10	 1946. The umpire further held that if some of them per chance were not handed over	 the respondents had sufficiently compensated the company by handing over several non operational vehicles from outside the depot to which the company was not entitled. Counsel argued that this part of the award was vague and without any evidence to support it	 and therefore	 the umpire behaved in this respect more like aconcilliator than as an arbitrator. Having held that sale note 160 covered only those vehicles which were actually lying in Moran Depot on July 10	 1946	 it was not incumbent on the umpire to decide the number of operational vehicles outside the depot. Consequently	 if he was satisfied that even though the company was not entitled to the said 600 vehicles claimed by it	 yet the authorities had delivered a substantial number of them	 and for any deficiency	 had also delivered non operational vehicles	 there would be no purpose in going into the details of vehicles delivered to the company. Even though	 as the judgment of the Trial Court discloses (para 223)	 there was evidence	 both oral and documentary	 that the company had collected a number of vehicles lying at places outside the Depot	 and the vehicles so collected were recorded by the company	 yet the company had withheld the production of those records. In view of these facts it is impossible to say that the umpire had acted without evidence	 or that he behaved in the manner of a conciliator	 or gave findings on conjectures and surmises. Our interference was invited next on the question of ground rent on the ground that the amount of such rent was fixed by the umpire without any evidence. There is hardly any substance in this contention. The sites	 on which the various depots were situated	 were requisitioned by the Government under the 297 Defence of India Rules. The Government had a statutory obligation	 therefore	 to pay to the owners of those sites compensation as provided by those Rules. Under the contracts of sale the company was	 bound to pay to the Government ground rent and other charges which the Government in its turn was liable to pay. It is	 therefore	 not correct to say that the umpire could award only that amount which the Government had actually paid and that the umpire should	 therefore	 have taken an account from the Government. It was never the case of the company that the Government had claimed ground rent higher than the compensation it was liable to pay. The last objection was that the amount of costs awarded by the umpire to the respondents was disproportionate. It appears from the award that the umpire fixed the amount of costs after considering the statements of expenses incurred by the parties for the hearing before him tendered by the respective counsel for the parties. Considering the huge amounts claimed by the parties	 the volume of evidence	 both oral and documentary	 adduced by them	 the number of days occupied in recording that evidence and in arguing the case	 we are not prepared to say that the discretion which the umpire. exercised in the matter of costs was exercised in breach of any legal provision or unreasonably which can justify the Court 's intervention. In our view	 none of the six contentions urged by counsel can be upheld. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.

The Director General of Disposals	 through correspondence and sale notes	 sold to the appellant company	 United States surplus was materials consisting of vehicles and other stores. Disputes having arisen between the parties	 both as regards the contents of and the quantity of the vehicles deliverable under the contracts	 they were referred to arbitration as per cl. 13 of the general conditions of the contract between the parties. The disputes consisted of claims and counter claims and the umpire after deducting the amount of one claim allowed to the appellant	 held that the appellant was liable to pay to the respondent Rs. 34	70	226.50 and costs amounting to Rs. 5	40	544	00. The award was filed in the District Judge 's Court and the appellant applied for having it set aside on various grounds. The Court held that with respect to certain matters claimed by the respondent the umpire had no jurisdiction and remitted the award for reconsideration of those items and also for readjustment of the amount of costs. The High Court confirmed the judgment of the District Judge. In appeal to this Court	 it was contended that the award was liable to be set aside	 because : (1) the contracts of sale were misconstrued and the error appeared on the face of the award; (2) several documents bearing on the scope of the sales were not considered; (3) the umpire went beyond his jurisdiction when he awarded compensation to the respondent because the appellant removed certain vehicles; (4) that the umpire acted as a conciliator deciding matters on conjecture; (5) that the umpire fixed ground rent payable by the appellants without any evidence; and (6) that the costs awarded were totally disproportionate. HELD : (1) When parties choose their own arbitrator to be the judge in the dispute between them	 they cannot	 when the award is good on the face of it	 object to the decision either upon the law or the facts. Therefore	 even when an arbitrator commits a mistake either in law or in fact in determining the matters referred to him. but such mistake does not appear on the face of the award or in a document appended to or incorporated in it so as to form part of it	 the award will neither be remitted nor set aside. Whether the contract or a clause of it is incorporated in award is a question of construction of the award. The test is	 did the arbitrator corn	 ' to a finding on the wording of the contract. If be did	 he can be said to have impliedly incorporated the contract or the relevant clause but a mere general reference to the contract in the award is not to be held as incorporating it. [288 F H; 289 A] Union of India vs Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. ; 	 followed. 283 Champsey Bhara & Co. vs Jivraj Balloo Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. 	 applied. Kelanton vs Duff Development Co. [1923] A.% ' . 395 and Giacomo Costa Fu Andrea vs British Italian Trading Co. Ltd. 	 62. referred to. 2(a) The dispute in the present case being as to what was sold and as to whether besides the sale notes	 the subsequent clarifications or. explanations given by various officers of the respondent formed part of the contract and were binding on the respondent	 and both the questions having been referred to arbitration	 the umpires findings on them would bind the parties unless he laid down any legal proposition such as a construction which is made the basis of the award and is on the face of the award erroneous. The award showed that the umpire had considered besides the sale notes the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties as also the contentions urged by counsel. It could not	 therefore	 be contended that the several documents were not taken into consideration by the umpire. [291 E F; 292 E H] (b) The umpire laid down the legal proposition that the clarifications or assurances given subsequent to the dates of the sale notes were not binding on the respondent and could not affect the scope of the sales; but the fact that he answered a legal point	 which he had to decide while deciding the questions referred to him	 did not mean that he incorporated into the award or made part of it a document or documents	 the construction of which was the basis of the award. If there was an error in such a case it could not be said to an error appearent on the face of the award entitling the court to consider the various documents placed before the umpire but not incorporated in the award so as to form part of it	 and then to make a search if they had been misconstrued by him. [293 B E] (3) Once it was found that it was competent for the umpire to decide that the appellant company was not entitled to keep certain vehicles which it had removed	 he must	 to do justice between the parties	 order the appellant either to return them or to pay compensation for them. Since the first course was not possible because of lapse of time the second was the only obvious course. Clause 13 of the general conditions provides for reference to arbitration of all questions or disputes arising	 under these conditions or in connection with this co tract	 and these words are wide and comprehensive. Therefore	 the umpire did not go beyond his jurisdiction in accepting the respondent 's counter claim for compensation. [295 D E] (4) Merely because the umpire held that even though the appellant was not entitled to some vehicles claimed by it	 yet the authorities had delivered a substantial number of them. without going into details	 it could not be said that he bad acted without evidence or that he behaved in the matter as a conciliator	 or gave findings on conjuncture and surmises	 especially when the appellant withheld relevant evidence which was in its possession. [296 E F] (5) Under the contracts of the sale. the appellant was bound to pay to the respondent ground rent and other charges which the respondent in its turn was liable to pay the owners; and since it was not the appellant 's case that the respondent had claimed a higher amount there was no sub stance in the contention that the arbitrator fixed the ground rent without any evidence. [297 A C] 284 (6) Considering the huge amounts claimed by the parties	 the volume of evidence	 adduced and the number of days occupied in recording that evidence and in arguing the case	 it could not be said that the discretion of the umpire exercised in the matter of costs was exercised in breach of any legal provision or unreasonably. [297 C D]