Summarize the following court judgment. Petition Nos. 1483	 1494 and 1544 of 1986 etc. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Dr: Y.S. Chitale	 Satish Chandra	 P.K. Banerjee	 S.N. Kacker	 K.C. Agarawal	 S.S. Rathore	 L.K. Garg	 M.K.D. Namboodiary	 P.M. Amin	 Ashok Grover	 Bulchandani	 M.N. Shroff	 P.H. Parekh and Sohail Dutt for the Petitioners. K. Parasaran	 Attorney Genera1	 G. Ramaswamy Additional Solicitor General	 G. Subramaniam	 A.S. Rao	 Ms. Relan and P.P. Parmeshwaran for the Respondents. R.S. Nariman	 (Indo Afghan Chamber of Commerce). Kapil Sibal	 (M/s Raj Prakash Chemicals) and Rajiv Dutta for the Interveners. The Judgment of the Court Was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI	 J. Writ Petition No. 1483 Of 1986 is directed. against 'the Show Cause Notices dated 21st August	 1986	 11th September	 1986 and 26th September	 1986 issued to the petitioners Messrs.D. Navinchandra & Company	 a partnership firm and Dilip Kumar Dalpatlal Mehta	 a part ner 'of the said firm. In order to 'appreCiate this chal lenge;	 it is necessary to refer to certain facts. This petition raises the question of the rights of the petition ers and 993 other diamond exporters who were entitled to export house certificates and additional licences under import policy of 1978 79 and who were granted the same pursuant to the judg ment and 'order of this Court dated 18th April	1985. As we shall explain later	 there is no conflict With this decision of a Bench which consisted of a bench of three judges and the subsequent decisions of this Court which We. Shall presently refer. It is necessary also that in order to make out. a case	 the petitioners have sought to emphasise on the point that the decision dated 18th April	 1985 was a deci sion of three learned Judges	 in Order to spin out a case of some sort of conflict with this decision and certain subse quent decisions of this Court consisting of benches of two ' learned judges. It appears that the import policy issued by the Government of India for the year 1978 79 by paragraph 176 provided for	 additional licences. On 29th April	 1979	 the first petitioner	 a diamond exporters	 was refused Export House Certificate. The said. petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay. being Misc. peti tion No. 1293/1979. By his order and judgment	 Pendse 	 J. made the rule absolute holding that canalised items were not banned items	 and there was no reason why the first peti tioner should not be compel " led to approach the canalising agency for import of the same. On 7th April	 1983	 the Delhi High Court delivered a judgment in Civil writ Petition No. 1501 of 1981 (which for the sake of convenience	 the party has chosen to describe as Rajnikant Bros. & Ors. case allow ing the diamond exporters the same and holding that merely Canalising an item could not be regarded as import of that item being absolutely banned. Against` these judgments special leave petitions were filed in this Court	 Appeal was also filed on 27th March. 1984 by the Import Control Authorities and Union of India against the judgment dated 11th November	 1983 mentioned hereinbefore passed by Pendse	 J. and the said appeal as dismissed on that date. Against the ' same	 the	 Export Control authorities and Union of India filed special leave petition No. 7190 Of 1984 in this Court. Similar special leave petitions were filed in this Court against similar judgments of the Bombay High Court. On 18th April	 1985	 by a common judgment	 the special leave. petitions were disposed of. As much has been made out 'of this judgment and order	 it is necessary to refer to the same. The matter was disposed of by the order in Civil Appeal No	 1423 of 1984 ' by a bench consisting Fazal Ali	 J.	 Varadarajan	 J. and one of us (Sabyasachi Mukharji	 J.). It was held by the said order that there was no requirement of diversification of exports as a condition for the grant of Export 994 House Certificate in the Import Policy for 1978 79. There fore	 while confirming the High Court 's judgment	 quashing the order impugned in the writ petitions in the High Court	 this Court directed the appellants namely Union of India and Import Control authorities to issue necessary Export House Certificates for the year 1978 79. It was further directed that Export House Certificates should be granted within three months from that date. The order stated that 'save and except items which are specifically banned under the preva lent import policy at the time of import	 the respondents shall be entitled to import all other items whether cana lised or otherwise in accordance with the relevant rules '. The appeals were disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. Pursuant to the aforesaid order	 on 29th July	 1985	 import licence was issued	 it is claimed	 to the first petitioner. of the c.i.f. value of Rs.71	15	900. Pursuant to the said import licence	 the first petitioner imported several consignments of items failing either under Appendix 3 (List of Limited Permissible Items)	 Appendix 2B (List of Restricted Items) or Appendix 5 (Canalised Items). According to the petitioner	 in the matter of clearance of such con signments different standards were applied by the Custom authorities. On 18th October	 1985	 in special leave petition No. 11843 of 1985 In the case of Raj Prakash Chemicals Ltd. vs Union of India this Court directed that Acrylic Ester Mono mors would not be permitted to be cleared until further orders unless they had already been cleared. Similarly	 on 31st January	 1986	 interim order was passed in the case of M/s Indo Afghan Chambers of Commerce vs Union of India (Writ Petition No. 199 of 1986) directing that Dry Fruits in respect of which Custom clearance had been obtained till 30th January	 1986 would be allowed to be cleared and no clearance of Dry fruits from 31st January	 1986 onwards would be made by the Custom authorities until further or ders. On 5th March	 1986	 judgment was delivered in the case of Raj Prakash Chemicals Ltd. and Another vs Union of India and Others	 by a bench consisting of three learned Judges Tulzapurkar	 J. and two of us (R.S. Pathak	 J. as the Chief Justice then was	 and Sabyasachi Mukharji	 J.). This Court held that additional licence holders were entitled to import items permissible to Export Houses under Import Policy 1978 79 excluding those items which fell in Appendix 3 (List of Banned Items) of the Import Policy 1985 88. This Court observed that diamond exporters who were granted Addi 995 tional Licences had formed a bona fide belief that they could import all the items accessible to them under Open General Licence under the Import Policy of 1978 79 except those placed in Appendix 2 Part A of the Banned List under the Import Policy 1985 88. This belief was formed on the basis of consistent orders of the High Courts and consistent manner in which Import Control authorities construed those orders. In view of such a belief	 it was further held by this Court	 in the interest of broad principles of justice	 equity and fair play and to avoid undeserved hardship	 without going to the legal technicalities that those diamond exporters who were granted Additional Licences under the Import Policy 1978 79 and had opened and established irrevo cable letters of credit before 18th October	 1985 i.e. the date on which the interim order was passed by this Court in Raj Prakash 's case as mentioned hereinbefore	 should be permitted	 notwithstanding the construction placed by this Court on the order dated 18th April	 1985 of this Court	 to clear the goods imported	 or to be imported by them pursuant to such irrevocable letters of credit. In other words	 all imports effected pursuant to such letters of credit should be deemed to have been legally and properly made	 and should entail no adverse consequences whatsoever. This Court fur ther reiterated that the Court must be presumed to have given effect to law That presumption can be rebutted only upon evidence showing a clear intention to the contrary	 either expressly or by necessary implication. This Court noted that the order dated 18th April	 1985 which we have set out hereinbefore used the expression "specifically banned" and the controversy before this Court in Raj Pra kash 's case was on the meaning of the expression 'specifi cally banned ' and the controversy between the parties cen tered round the meaning of the words 'specifically banned '. It was mentioned that Appendix 3 is the list of items which could not be imported by an Export House on additional licence	 it was a ban with reference to the category of importers. Appendix 4 is the list of items which could not be imported by anyone whosoever. This Court	 therefore	 was of the view that when regard is had to the Import Policy 1984 85	 reference must necessarily be made to the corre sponding Appendix 3	 formerly described as the List of Banned Items and now described as the List of Limited Per missible Items	 and Appendix 2 Part A which is now the list of Banned Items replacing Appendix 4 (List of Absolutely Banned Items). In other words	 said the Court	 the Addition al Licences to be issued to diamond exporters entitled them to import items permissible to Export Houses under such licence under the Import Policy 1978 79 excluding those items which fell within Appendices 3 and 4 of the Import Policy 1978 79 and also excluding items which fell in Appen dix 3 and Appendix 2 Part A of the Import This Court was of the view that this is the meaning which must be given to the terms of the order dated 18th April	 1985. This Court noted that when this Court made the previous order on 18th April	 1985 when the Import Policy of 1985 88 was in force. there were only two items which were absolutely banned. and these were animal tallow and animal cannot. That was also Substantially the position under the Import Policy 1984 85. This Court was of the view that in the Import Policies of 1984 85 and 1985 88 the items open to import under Open General Licence were then set forth	 when Raj Prakash 's judgment was delivered i.e. in Appendix 6. A perusal of Part I1 of List 8 in Appendix 6 indicated that it enumerated in fairly long detail the items allowed to be imported by the Export Houses holding Additional Licences for sale of those items to eligible Actual Users (Industrial) subject to Actual User conditions. That was the entitlement of the holder of an Additional Licence under paragraph 265(4) of the Import Policy 1985 88. It is necessary to set out in detail the aforesaid judgment and also to refer to the order of 18th April. 1985 to emphasise that whether non canalised items could be imported directly. and not through canalised agency	 was not in issue in either of these two cases. nor decided or adju dicated upon. In the judgment in Raj Prakash 's case (supra)	 it was held that Additional Licence holders were entitled to import items permissible to Export Houses under the Import Policy 1978 79 excluding those items which fell in Appendix 3 (list of banned items) of the Import Policy 1985 88. On 17th March	 1986	 letter was written by the Joint Chief Controller of Imports to Messrs. B. Vijay Kumar and Co. stating that against Additional Licences issued in terms of this Court 's Order dated 18th April	 1985	 import of items permissible against Additional Licences in terms of Policy for 1978 79 would be allowed even if such items were in the list of canalised items in Policy for 1978 79. On 3rd April	 1986	 there was a meeting with Member of C.B.E.C. and Principal Collector where the minutes recorded that items which were under O.G.L. during 1978 79 and subse quently canalised in Policy for 1985 88 would be allowed to be imported. On 23rd April	 1986	 a circular was issued from the Under Secretary to the Government of India to port authorities stating that canalised items 997 were not covered within the purview of this Court 's decision in Raj Prakash 's case and Additional Licence holders would be allowed to import canalised item. By a letter on 14/15th May	 1986 from Principal Collector to Chairman	 Western Region	 Federation of Indian Export Organisation	 the matter had been clarified and clearance of canalised items against Additional Licences was unconditionally allowed. This Court again dealt with the question in the case of M/s Indo Afghan Chambers of Commerce and Another etc. vs Union of India and Other etc.	 [1986] 3 SCC 352. In that decision two of us (R.S. Pathak	 J. as the learned Chief Justice then was and Sabyasachi Mukharji	 J.) were parties. It was held that under the import policy of 1978 79 dry fruits (exclud ing cashewnuts) could be imported by all persons under the Open General Licence. There was no need to obtain any Addi tional Licence for importing items in the year 1978 79 and therefore	 the wrongful denial of Additional Licences to diamond exporters in the year 1978 79	 could not justify any restitution subsequently in regard to the import of dry fruits (other than cashewnuts). It was further observed that under the Import Policy 1985 88	 dry fruits (excluding cashewnuts and dates) were no longer open to import under the Open General Licence. The sanction for importing them must be found under some other provision of the Import Policy. The diamond exporters	 it was held	 ' could not be regarded as dealers engaged in the trade of stocking and selling dry fruits (excluding cashewnuts and dates). They were	 therefore	 not entitled to the advantage of paragraph 181 (3) of the Import Policy 1985 88. Dry fruits	 it was further held	 must be regarded as consumer goods of agricul tural origin. The words "agricultural origin" in Item 121 of Appendix 2 Part B are used in the broadest sense. The words 'consumer goods ' in item 121 referred to dry fruits imported for supply to Actual Users (Industrial). It was further held that dry fruits do not appear in Appendix 3 Part A and 5 nor can be imported under the Open General Licence under the Import Policy 1985 88	 Inasmuch as they fail within Item 121 of Appendix 2 part B they are excluded from the scope of Item 1 of Appendix 6	 and cannot be imported as raw materi als and consumables for sale to Actual Users (Industrial). Appendix 2 Part B (List of Restricted Items) was also suc cessor of Appendix 4 (List of Absolutely Banned Items) under the Import Policy 1978 79. This Court reiterated	 and it was important to emphasise	 that On the reasoning which found favour with this Court in Raj Prakash 's case	 it must be held that diamond exporters holding Additional Licences were not entitled to import goods enumerated in Appendix 2 Part B of the Import Policy 1985 88. As held in that case	 holders of Additional Licences were 998 entitled to import only those goods which were included in Appendix 6 Part 2 List 8 of the Import Policy 1985 88. Dry fruits were not included in that list and therefore they could not be imported under Additional Licences. It is stated that on 20th May	 1986	 there was an order of adjudication in respect of one consignment of the first petitioner in this case i.e. Messrs. D. Navinchandra & Co. of items falling in Appendix 2B (List of Restricted Items) ( 10 Bills of Entry) imposing fine aggregating to Rs.45	000. Then on 21st August	 1986	 a show cause notice was issued to the first petitioner in this petition in respect of consign ment falling in Appendix 5 (Canalised Items) of the Policy for 1985 88. Reply was duly given on 9th September	 1986 and a show cause notice was issued on 11th September	 1986 to the first petitioner in respect of one consignment falling in Appendix 2B (List of Restricted Items) of Policy for 1985 88. In the meantime	 this Court had occasion to examine some passage of this decision. This question was examined and it is necessary to refer to the said two subsequent decisions of this Court. The first one is the decision in Union of India vs Godrej Soaps Pvt. Ltd. and Another	 ; and the second one is the decision in M/s Star Diamond Co. India vs Union of India and Others	 ; It is neces sary first to refer to Godrej Soaps ' case. It was held that a diamond exporter could import the items he was entitled to import under the Import Policy 1978 79 provided they were importable also under the Import Policy ruling at the time of import. These are items which are open to import by an Export House holding an Additional Licence for sale to eligible Actual Users (Industrial). These are items which could be directly imported	 for example	 the items enumerat ed in Part 2 of List 8 of Appendix VI of the Import Policy 1985 88. These are items which are not 'canalised '. 'Cana lised ' items are those items which are ordinarily open to import only through a public sector agency. There is	 howev er	 nothing to prevent an Import Policy from providing in the future that an Export House holding an Additional Li cence can directly import certain canalised items also. In that event	 an Export House holding an Additional Licence would be entitled to import items "whether canalised or otherwise"	 meaning thereby items open ordinarily to direct import (non canalised items) as well as items directly importable although on the canalised list. It is in that sense that the Court had intended to define the entitlement of a diamond exporter by using the words "whether canalised or otherwise" in its order dated 18th April	 1985. 999 In that case this Court found that in respect of Palm Kernel Fatty Acid which was a canalised item listed as Item 9(v) in Appendix V Part B of the Import Policy 1985 88	 there is no provision in that policy which permitted the import of such item by an Export House holding an Additional Licence. Therefore	 both on grounds of equity and construc tion the claim of the diamond exporters	 or	 as in that case	 a purchaser from the diamond exporter	 was held to be not maintainable. As importation of canalised items	 this Court reiterated	 directly by holders of additional licences was banned	 it should not be construed to have been permit ted by virtue of the order of this Court and the items sought to be imported do not come within List 8 of Part 2 of Appendix 6 of the Import Policy of 1985 88 against addition al licences. It was found that the goods were purchased by the respondents in that case after they were aware of the position of law as enunciated in Raj Prakash 's case as well as Indo Afghan Chambers of Commerce 's case. No question of any restitution of rights	 therefore	 arose. Goods in ques tion being specially banned goods	 these could not be im ported under Item I of Appendix 6 (Import of items under Open General Licence) of Import Policy	 1985 88	 more so the import being not by the Actual User (Industrial) but by somebody else from whom the respondent purchased the goods. This position was reiterated in the case of M/s Star Diamond Co. India vs Union of India and others (supra). This Court further reiterated that a decision of this Court is binding on all. To complete the narration of events	 reply was given by the first petitioner to the show cause notice dated 11th September	 1986 on 18th September	 1986. On 26th September	 1986	 another show cause notice was issued to the Petitioner in respect of another consignment falling in Appendix 2B (List of Restricted Items) of Policy for 1985 88. Personal hearing was given to the first peti tioner thereafter. The petitioner moved this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution	 for quashing the show cause notices dated 21st August	 1986	 11th September	 1986 and 26th September	 1986 and the order of adjudication dated 20th May	 1986 and for consequential relief. We are	 however	 unable to find any merit in this appli cation either in law or in equity. 1000 One of the points on which an argument was sought to be built up was that the Bench of two judges of this Court in the subsequent decisions had cut down the effect of the decision of this Court dated 18th April	 1985 in the case of Union of India vs Rajnikant Bros. It has been stated that in subsequent decisions referred to hereinbefore	 this Court had deviated and indeed differed from the view expressed in that case. It was urged that in Rajnikant Bros. case a bench of three judges categorically stated that the respondents would be entitled "to import all other items whether cana lised or otherwise" except those which were specifically banned under the prevalent import policy at the time of import	 with the relevant rules. In our opinion	 the subse quent decisions referred to hereinbefore do not take any different or contrary view. Indeed it gives effect to the letter and spirit of the said decision. It has to be borne in mind	 that the basic background under which the Rajni kant 's decision was rendered	 the Export Houses had been refused Export House Certificates because it was insisted that they should have diversified their export and that was a condition for the grant or entitlement of an export house certificate. It was found and it is common ground now that that was wrong. Therefore	 the wrong was undone. Those who had been denied Export House Certificates on that wrong ground were put back to the position as far as it could be if that wrong had not been done. To do so	 the Custom au thorities and Govt. authorities were directed to issue necessary Export House certificates for the year 1978 79 though the order was passed in April	 1985. This was a measure of restitution	 but tile Court	 while doing so	 ensured that nothing illegal was done. It is a presumption of law that the courts act lawfully and will not ask any authority to do anything which is illegal. Therefore	 the court directed that except those which were specifically banned under the prevalent import policy at the time of import	 the respondents shall be entitled to import all other items whether canalised or not canalised in accordance with the relevant rules. Analysing the said order	 it is apparent	 (1) that the importation that was permissible was of goods which were not specifically banned	 (2) such ban ning must be under the prevalent import policy at the time of import	 and (3) whether items which were canalised or un canalised would be imported in accordance _with the relevant rules. These conditions had to be fulfilled. The court never did and could not have said that canalised items could be imported in any manner not permitted nor it could have given a go bye to canalisation policy. It must be emphasised that in the case of Raj Prakash (supra)	 this position has been explained by saying that only such items could 1001 be imported by diamond exporters under the Additional Li cences granted to them as could have been imported under the Import Policy of 1978 79. the period during which the dia mond exporters had applied for Export House Certificates and had been wrongly refused and were also importable under the import policy prevailing at the time of import which in the present case would be during the import policy of 1985 88. These were the items which had not been 'specifically banned ' under the prevalent import policy. The items had to pass to two tests. firstly	 they should have been importable under the import policy 1978 79 and secondly they should also have been importable under the import policy 1985 88 in terms of the Order dated 18th April. 1985 and if one may add. in such terms in accordance with the import rules ' whether canalised or not canalised. It must be emphasised that in this case also. the CoUrt had no occasion to consid er the significance of the words 'whether canalised or otherwise ' mentioned in the Order dated 18th April. 1985 because that point did not arise in the case before it. What did the court then intend by these words used by the court? We have seen that diamond exporters could import the items which they were entitled to import under the Import Policy 1978 79 provided they were importable also under the import policy ruling at the time of import. These are items which were open to import by Export Houses holding Additional Licences for sale to the Actual Users (Industrial). These are items which were directly imported	 for example	 items in Part 2 List 8 of Appendix 6 of Import Policy 1985 88. These are items which are not canalised. Canalised items are those items which are ordinarily open to import only through a public sector agency. Although generally these are import able through public sector agencies	 it is permissible for any import policy to provide an exception to the rule and to declare that an importer might import a canalised item directly. It is in that sense and that sense only that the Court could have intended to define the entitlement of diamond exporters. They would be entitled to import items which were canalised or not if the import policy prevailing at the time of import permitted them to import items falling under such category. This was also viewed in that light in the case of Indo Afghan Chambers of Commerce (supra). It must be emphasised that in the Order dated 18th April	 1985	 this Court did not do away with canalisation. That was not the issue before this Court. The expression 'whether canalised or not canalised ' was to include both. This Court did not say that canalised items could be import ed directly by the importers ignoring the canalisation process. We are of the opinion that this Court did not say that canalisation 1002 could be ignored. That was not the issue. High public poli cy	 it must be emphasised	 is involved in the scheme of canalisation. This purpose of canalisation was examined by this Court in Daruka & Co. vs Union of India & Ors.	 ; where the Constitution Bench of this Court ob served that the policies of imports or exports were fash ioned not only with reference to internal or international trade	 but also on monetary policy	 the development of agriculture and industries and even on the political poli cies of the country and rival theories and views may be held on such policies. If the Government decided an economic policy that import or export should be by a selected channel or through selected agencies the court would proceed on the assumption that the decision was in the interest of the general public unless the contrary was shown. Therefore it could not be collaterally altered in the manner suggested. The policy of canalisation which is a matter of policy of the Government was not given a go bye by the observations referred to in the Order of 18th April	 1985. Indeed it is possible to read the Order in a manner consistent with canalisation scheme in the way we have indicated. If that is so	 then it should be so read. When this Court observed that the fact whether items were sought to be imported by diamond merchants were canalised	 would not be an impediment to the import directly by them	 the Court meant to say that this could be imported directly by them through the canalisation organisation. The need for canalisation stands on public policy and that need cannot be lightly or inferencially given a go bye. It should not be presumed that collaterally the court had done away with the system of canalisation based	 on sound public policy. We have found nothing in the different authorities on this subject	 which militate against the above views. Therefore	 the action taken by the Custom authorities in issuing adjudication notice and pro ceeding in the manner they did	 we are of the opinion that they have not acted illegally or without jurisdiction. This must proceed in accordance with law as laid down by this Court which	 in our opinion	 is clear enough. The fact that in subsequent decision	 the petitioner is not a party is not relevant. Generally legal positions laid down by the court would be binding on all concerned even though Some of them have not been made parties nor were served nor any notice of such proceedings given. As held in Star Diamond 's case (supra)	 the meaning of the expression "whether canalised or otherwise" used by this Court in Rajnikant Bros ' case as explained in Godrej Soaps Pvt. Ltd. case and reiterated and followed in the present case is applicable to the present petitioner. 1003 We see no substance in the submission made in the peti tion and reiterated before us in this Court for a reconsid eration of this question by a larger Bench. In the aforesaid view of the matter	 we are unable to sustain the grounds urged in support of this petition. We are	 therefore	 of the opinion that proceedings must go in accordance with law. The government 's understanding of the matter at one point of time is irrelevant. There are several applications for impleadment. These are allowed	 and they are impleaded. Their statements are taken on record. Before parting with this case	 certain factors must be noted. The diamond exporters and dry fruit exporters have their full round in this Court. Speaking entirely for my self	 my conscience protests to me that when thousands remediless wrongs await in the queue for this Court 's inter vention and solution for justice	 the petitions at the behest of diamond exporters and dry fruit exporters where large sums are involved should be admitted and disposed of by this Court at such a quick speed. Neither justice nor equity nor good conscience deserves these applications to be filed or entertained. There is no equity of restitution against the law declared categorically and repeatedly by this Court and no principle of estoppel involved in these applications. The Writ petition is dismissed and in the facts and circumstances of this case	 we direct that the petitioner must pay cost of this application. It has been prayed that clear cut date must be fixed where contracts had been entered into and in which letters of credit prior to 15th April	 1986 have been entered into	 there should be no prosecution. It has been further prayed that where however contracts have been entered into but no letters of credit have been opened	 such parties should not be penalised in the facts and circumstances of the case. No direction is necessary by this Court on this aspect. The authorities concerned will decide the same in taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances and taking into consideration the case of the petitioners and the alleged claim of bona fide on their part. A submission was made on the principle of promissory estoppel and reliance was placed on the several observations of several cases including the case in Union of India and Others etc. vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. etc. ; 	 It is true that the doctrine of 1004 promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government in the exercise of its government	 public or executive func tions and the doctrine of executive necessity or freedom of future executive action cannot be invoked to defeat the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. But in this case no such case of promissory estoppel has been made out. The intervention applications filed in this connection are allowed and the submissions contrary to what we had stated hereinbefore are rejected. As the points involved in Writ Petition No. 1494 of 1986 are same	 this is also dismissed with costs. Interim orders	 if any	 are vacated forthwith. The proceedings will proceed as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law. For the same reasons	 Writ Petition No. 1544 of 1986 is also dis missed with costs with the same observations. H.L.C. Petition dis missed.

By a common order dated April 18	 1985 in C.A. No. 1423 of 1984	 etc.	 Union of India vs Rajnikant Bros. the Court had directed issue of Export House Certificates and Addi tional Licences to the petitioners and other diamond export ers under the Import Policy 1978 79 stating: "Save and except items which are specifically banned under the preva lent Import Policy at the time of import	 the respondents shall be entitled to import all other items whether cana lised or otherwise in accordance with the relevant rules". The petitioners	 who were issued Additional Licences pursu ant to this order	 imported several consignments of items falling under Appendices 2B	 3 and 5 of Import Policy	 1985 88	 and	 while clearing them	 the Customs Authorities imposed a fine of Rs.45	000 in respect of certain items failing in Appendix 2B and issued show cause notices in respect of certain other items failing in Appendices 2B and 5. The petitioners challenge was directed not only against these orders	 but extended to certain subsequent decisions of the Court which	 according to them	 had cut down the effect of the Court 's earlier order dated April 18	 1985 in Union of India vs Rajnikant Bros. Dismissing the petitions	 HELD: The decisions rendered subsequent to the decision dated April 18	 1985 in Union of India vs Rajnikant Bros. do not take any different or contrary view. Indeed	 they give effect to the letter and spirit of that decision. The basic background in which the decision in Union of India vs Rajni kant Bros. was rendered was that Export Houses had been refused Export House Certificates on the ground that they had not diversified their exports. It was found that was wrong. The wrong was undone by directing issue of Export House Certificates for 990 the year 1978 79 though the order was passed in April	 1985. That was a measure of restitution	 but the Court	 while doing so	 ensured that nothing illegal was done. It is a presumption of law that the courts act lawfully and will not ask any authority to do anything which is illegal. It was directed that except those items which were specifically banned under the prevalent import policy at the time of import	 the respondents therein were entitled to import all other items whether canalised or not canalised in accordance with the relevant rules. Analysing the said order	 it is apparent: (1) that the importation that was permissible was of goods which were not specifically banned	 (2) that such banning must be under the prevalent import policy at the time of import. and (3) whether items which were canalised or uncanalised would be imported in accordance with the relevant rules. These conditions had to be fulfilled. The court never did and could not have said that canalised items could be imported in any manner not permitted nor it could have given a go bye to the canalisation policy. [1000C H] (ii). In Raj Prakash Chemicals vs Union of India		 it was explained that only such items could be imported by diamond exporters under the Additional Licences granted to them as could have been imported under the Import Policy 1978 79 and were also importable under the Import Policy prevailing at the time of import. These were the items which had not been 'specifically banned ' under the prevalent Import Policy. The items had to pass through two tests	 firstly	 they should have been importable under the Import Policy 1978 79 and	 secondly	 they should also have been importable under the Import Policy	 1985 88 in terms of the Order dated 18th April	 1985 and if one may add	 in such terms 'in accordance with the import rules ' whether cana lised or not canalised. The Court had no occasion to consid er in that case the significance of the words 'whether canalised or otherwise ' mentioned in the Order dated 18th April	 1985 in Union of India vs Rajnikant Bros.	 because that point did not arise there. [1000H; 1001A D] (iii) What did the court then intend by the words 'whet her canalised or otherwise ' used in the order dated 18th April	 1985 in Union of India vs Rajnikant Bros? The diamond exporters could import the items which they were entitled to import under the Import Policy 1978 79 provided they were importable also under the Import Policy ruling at the time of import. These are items which were open to import by Export Houses holding Additional Licences for Sale to the Actual Users (Industrial). These are items which were di rectly imported	 for example	 items in Part II List 8 of Appendix 6 of Import Policy 1985 88. These are items which are not canalised. Canalised items are those 991 items which are ordinarily open to import only through a public sector agency. Although generally these are import able through public sector agencies	 it is permissible for any Import Policy to provide an exception to the rule and to declare that an importer might import a canalised item directly. It is in that sense and that sense only that the Court could have intended to define the entitlement of diamond exporters. They would be entitled to import items which were canalised or not if the Import Policy prevailing at the time of import permitted them to import items failing under such category. [1001D G] (iv) In the Order dated 18th April	 1985 in Union of India vs Rajnikant Bros.	 this Court did not do away with canalisation. That was not the issue before this Court. This expression 'whether canalised or not canalised ' was to include both. This Court did not say that canalised items could be imported directly by the importers ignoring the canalisation process. High public policy	 it must be empha sised	 is involved in the scheme of canalisation. This purpose of canalisation was examined by.this Court in Daruka of this Court observed that the policies of imports or exports were fashioned not only with reference to internal or international trade	 but also on monetary policy	 the development of agriculture and industries and even on the political policies of the country and rival theories and views may be held on such policies. If the Government decid ed an economic policy that import or export should be by a selected channel or through selected agencies	 the court would proceed on the assumption that the decision was in the interest of the general public unless the contrary was shown. Therefore	 it could not be collaterally altered in the manner suggested. The policy of canalisation which is a matter of policy of the Government was not given a go bye by the observations referred to in the Order of 18th April	 1985. Indeed	 it is possible to read the Order in a manner consistent with canalisation scheme in the way we have indicated. If that is so	 then it should be so read. When this Court observed that the fact whether items were sought to be imported by diamond merchants were canalised	 would not be an impediment to the import directly by them	 the Court meant to say that this could be imported directly by them through the canalisation organisation. The need for canalisation stands on public policy and that need cannot be lightly or inferentially given a go bye. It should not be presumed that collaterally the court had done away with the system of canalisation based on sound public policy. We have found nothing in the different authorities on this subject	 which militate against the above views. Therefore	 the action taken by the Customs Authorities in issuing adjudica tion notice and proceeding in 992 the manner they did we are of the opinion that they have not acted illegally or without jurisdiction. This must proceed in accordance with law as laid down by this Court which	 in. our opinion is clear enough. The fact that in subsequent decision	 the petitioner is not a party is not relevant. Generally legal positions laid down by the court would be binding on all concerned even though some of them have not been made parties nor were served nor any notice of such proceedings given. [1001H; 1002A G] Union of India vs Rajnikant Bros.	 C.A. No. 1423 of 1984 decided on April 18	 1985; Raj Prakash Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. vs Union of India & Ors. 	 ; M/s. Indo Afghan Chambers of Commerce &Anr.	 etc. vs Union of India & Ors.	 etc.	 [1986] 3 S.C.C. 352; Union of India vs Godrej Soaps Pvt. Ltd. &Anr.	 ; ; and M/s. Star Diamond Co. India vs Union of India & Ors.	 [1986] 4 S.C.C. 246	 discussed	 explained and reiterated. Daruka & Co. vs Union of India & Ors.	 ; 	 referred to.