Summarize the following court judgment. ON: Criminal Appeal No. 147 of 1955. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 10th May 1955 of the Pepsu High Court at Patiala in Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 1954 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 21st June	 1954 of the Court of Sessions Judge at Barnala in Sessions Case No. 18 of 1954. J.N. Kaushal and Naunit Lal	 for the appellant. Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale	 for the respondent. April 17. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J. The appellant Basdev of the village of Harigarh is a retired military Jamadar. He is charged with the murder of a young boy named Maghar Singh	 aged about 15 or 16. Both of them and others of the same village went to attend a wedding in another village. All of them went to the house of the bride to take the midday meal on the 12th March	 1954. Some had settled down in their seats and some bad not. The appellant asked Maghar Singh	 the young boy to step aside a little so that he 365 may occupy a convenient seat. But Maghar Singh did not move. The appellant whipped out a pistol and shot the boy in the abdomen. The injury proved fatal. The party that had assembled for the marriage at the bride 's house seems to have made itself very merry and much drinking was indulged in. The appellant Jamadar boozed quite a lot and he became very drunk and intoxicated. The learned Sessions Judge says "he was excessively drunk '? and that "according to the evidence of one witness Wazir Singh Lambardar he was almost in an unconscious condition". This circumstance and the total absence of any motive or premeditation to kill were taken by the Sessions Judge into account and the appellant was awarded the lesser penalty of transportation for life. An appeal to the PEPSU High Court at Patiala proved unsuccessful. Special leave was granted by this Court limited to the question whether the offence committed by the petitioner fell under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code or section 304 of the Indian Penal Code having regard to the provisions of section 86 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 86 which was elaborately considered by the High Court runs in these terms: "In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent	 a person who doe& the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he bad the same knowledge as he would have had if he bad not been intoxicated	 unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will". It is no doubt true that while the first part of the section speaks of intent or knowledge	 the latter part deals only with knowledge and a certain element of doubt in interpretation may possibly be felt by reason of this omission. If in voluntary drunkenness knowledge is to be presumed in the same manner as if there was no drunkenness	 what about those cases where mens rea is required. Are we at liberty to place in 48 366 tent on the same footing	 and if so	 why has the section omitted intent in its latter part? This is not the first time that the question comes up for consideration. It has been discussed at length in many decisions and the result may be briefly summarised as follows: So far as knowledge is Concerned	 we must attribute to the intoxicated man the same knowledge as if he was quite sober. But so far as intent or intention is concerned	 we must gather it from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due regard to the degree of intoxication. Was the man beside his mind altogether for the time being? If so it would not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. But if he had not gone so deep in drinking	 and from the facts it could be found that he knew what he was about	 we can apply the rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act or acts. Of course	 we have to distinguish between motive	 intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions	 the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion. In the old English case	 Rex vs Meakin(1) Baron Alderson referred to the nature of the instrument as an element to be taken in presuming the intention in these words: "However	 with regard to the intention	 drunkenness may perhaps be adverted to according to the nature of the instrument used. If a man uses a stick	 you would not infer a malicious intent so strongly against him	 if drunk	 when he made an intemperate use of it	 as he would if be bad used a different kind (1) ; ; 7 Car. & P. 295. 367 of weapon; but where a dangerous instrument is used	 which	 if used	 must produce grievous bodily harm	 drunkenness can have no effect on the consideration of the malicious intent of the party. " In a charge of murdering a child levelled against a husband and wife who were both drunk at the time	 Patteson J.	 observed in Regina vs Cruse and Mary his wife (1) "It appears that both these persons were drunk	 and although drunkenness is no excuse for any crime whatever	 yet it is often of very great importance in cases where it is a question of intention. A person may be so drunk as to be utterly unable to form any intention at all	 and yet he may be guilty of very great violence. " Slightly different words but somewhat more illuminating were used by Coleridge J.	 in Reg. vs Monkhouse(2) "The inquiry as to intent is far less simple than that as to whether an act has been committed	 because you cannot look into a man 's mind to see what was passing there at any given time. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does or says	 and if he says nothing	 then his act alone must guide you to your decision. It is a general rule in criminal law	 and one founded on common sense	 that juries are to presume a man to do what is the natural con sequence of his act. The consequence is sometimes so apparent as to leave no doubt of the intention. A man could not put a pistol which he knew to be loaded to another 's bead	 and fire it off	 without intending to kill him; but even there the state of mind of the party is most material to be considered. For instance	 if such an act were done by a born idiot	 the intent to kill could not be inferred from the act. Sol if the defendant is proved to have been intoxicated	 the question becomes a more subtle one; but it is of the same kind	 namely	 was he rendered by intoxication entirely incapable of forming the intent charged?" (1) ; ; (2) 368 "Drunkenness is ordinarily neither a defence nor excuse for crime	 and where it is available as a partial answer to a charge	 it rests on the prisoner to prove it	 and it is not enough that he was excited or rendered more irritable	 unless the intoxication was such as to prevent his restraining himself from committing the act in question	 or to take away from him the power of forming any specific intention. Such a state of drunkenness may no doubt exist". A great authority on criminal law Stephen J.	 postulated the proposition in this manner in Beg. vs Doherty(1) ". although you cannot take drunkenness as any excuse for crime	 yet when the crime is such that the intention of the party committing it is one of its constituent elements	 you may look at the fact that a man was in drink in considering whether he formed the intention necessary to constitute the crime". We may next notice Rex vs Meade(2) where the question was whether there was any misdirection in his summing	 up by Lord Coleridge	 J. The summing up was in these words: "In the first place	 every one is presumed to know the consequences of his acts. If he be insane	 that knowledge is not presumed. Insanity is not pleaded here	 but where it is part of the essence of a crime that a motive	 a particular motive	 shall exist in the mind of the man who does the act	 the law declares this that if the mind at that time is so obscured by drink	 if the reason is dethroned and the man is incapable therefore of forming that intent	 it justifies the reduction of the charge from murder to man slaughter". Darling	 J.	 delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed the correctness of the summing up but stated the rule in his own words as follows: "A man is taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts. This presumption may be rebutted (1) in the case of a sober man	 in many ways: (1) (2) 	 369 (2)it may also be rebutted in the case of a man who is drunk	 by shewing his mind to have been so affected by the drink he had taken that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was dangerous	 i.e.	 likely to inflict serious injury. If this be proved	 the presumption that he intended to do grievous bodily harm is rebutted". Finally	 we have to notice the House of Lord 's decision in Director of Public Prosecutions vs Beard(1). In this case a prisoner ravished a girl of 13 years of age	 and in aid of the act of rape he placed his hand upon her mouth to stop her from screaming	 at the same time pressing his thumb upon her throat with the result that she died of suffocation. Drunkenness was pleaded as a defence. Bailhache J. directed the jury that the defence of drunkenness could only prevail if the accused by reason of it did not know what he was doing or did not know that he was doing wrong. The jury brought in a verdict of murder and the man was sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeal (Earl of Reading C.J.	 Lord Coleridge J.	 and Sankey	 J.) quashed this conviction on the ground of misdirection following Rex vs Meade(2) which established that the presumption that a man intended the natural consequences of his acts might be rebutted in the case of drunkenness by showing that his mind was so affected by the drink that he bad taken that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was dangerous. The conviction was	 therefore	 reduced to manslaughter. The Crown preferred the appeal to the House of Lords and it was heard by a strong Bench consisting of Lord Chancellor	 Lord Birkenhead	 Earl of Reading	 C.J.	 Viscount Haldane	 Lord Denedin	 Lord Atkinson	 Lord Sumner	 Lord Buckmaster	 and Lord Phillimore. The Lord Chancellor delivered the judgment of the court. He examined the earlier authorities in a lengthy judgment and reached the conclusion that Rex vs Meade(2) stated the law rather too broadly	 though on the facts there proved the decision was right. The position "that a person charged with a crime of violence (1) [1920] A.C. 479. (2) 370 may show	 in order to rebut the presumption that he intended the natural consequences of his acts	 that he was so drunk that he was incapable of knowing what he was doing was dangerous. . . . . . which is what is said in Meade 's case	 was not correct as a general proposition of law and their Lordships laid down three rules: (1)That insanity	 whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise	 is a defence to the crime charged; (2) That evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent; (3)That evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved incapacity in the accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime	 and merely establishing that his mind was affected by drink so that he more readily gave way to some violent passion	 does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts. The result of the authorities is summarised neatly and compendiously at page 63 of Russel on Crime	 tenth edition	 in the following words: "There is a distinction	 however	 between the defence of insanity in the true sense caused by excessive drunkenness and the defence of drunkenness which produces a condition such that the drunken man 's mind becomes incapable of forming a specific intention. If actual insanity in fact supervenes as the result of alcoholic excess it furnishes as complete an answer to a criminal charge as insanity induced by any other cause. But in cases falling short of insanity evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent	 but evidence of drunkenness which falls short of proving such incapacity and merely establishes that the mind of the accused was so affected by drink that he more readily gave way to some violent passion does not 371 rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his act". In the present case the learned Judges have found that although the accused was under the influence of drink	 he was not so much under its influence that his mind was so obscured by the drink that there was incapacity in him to form the required intention as stated. They go on to observe: "All that the evidence shows at the most is that at times he staggered and was incoherent in his talk	 but the same evidence shows that he was also capable of moving himself independently and talking coherently as well. At the same time it is proved that be came to the darwaza of Natha Singh P.W. 12 by himself	 that he made a choice for his own seat and that is why he asked the deceased to move away from his place	 that after shooting at the deceased be did attempt to get away and was secured at some short distance from the darwaza	 and that when secured be realised what he had done and thus requested the witnesses to be forgiven saying that it bad happened from him. There is no evidence that when taken to the police station Barnala	 he did not talk or go there just as the witnesses and had to be specially supported. All these facts	 in my opinion	 go to prove that there was not proved incapacity in the accused to form the intention to cause bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The accused had	 therefore	 failed to prove such incapacity as would have been available to him as a defence	 and so the law presumes that he intended the natural and probable consequences of his act	 in other words	 that he intended to inflict bodily injury to the deceased and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death". On this finding the offence is not reduced from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the second part of section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction and sentence are right and the appeal is dismissed.

So far as knowledge is concerned the court must attribute to the intoxicated man the same knowledge as if he was quite sober but so far as intent or intention is concerned	 the court must gather it from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due regard to the degree of intoxication. If the man was beside his mind altogether for the time being	 it would not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. But if he had not gone so deep in drinking and from the facts it could be found that he knew what he was about the court will apply the rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act or acts	 That rule of law is well settled: 1.That insanity	 whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise	 is a defence to the crime charged; 364 2.The evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent; 3.That evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved incapacity in the accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime	 and merely establishing that his mind was affected by drink so that he more readily gave way to some violent passion	 does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts. Director of Public Prosecutions vs Board	 ([1920] A.C. 479)	 referred to. On the finding in the present case that although the accused was under the influence of drink	 he was not so much under its influence that his mind was obscured to such an extent that there was incapacity in him to form the required intention the offence was not reduced from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the second part of section 304 of the Indian Penal Code.