Summarize the following court judgment. Writ Petition (Crimi nal) No. 184 of 1989. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India). Kapil Sibbal	 K.K. Lahiri	 K.R. Nagaraja and R.S. Hegde for the Petitioner. V.C. Mahanjan	 T.V.S.N. Chari and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents. 344 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT	 J. In this writ petition the petitioner has chal lenged the validity of the detention order dated January 19	 1989 passed under the 	 hereinaf ter referred to as 'the Act '	 by virtue of which the peti tioner has been under detention since the said date. The allegations made in the grounds of detention need not be stated	 for only legal submissions have been made on behalf of the petitioner in challenging the order of detention. The order of detention dated January 19	 1989 reads as follows: "WHEREAS	 I	 Vijay Karan	 Commissioner of Police	 Delhi	 am satisfied that with a view to prevent Sh. Jitender Tyagi s/o Sh. Ram Nath Tyagi	 R/o VIII. Khajuri	 Police Station. Kila	 Distt. Meerut (Uttar Pradesh) aged at about 25/26 from acting in a manner prejudi cial to the maintenance of public order	 it is necessary to make an order directing that the said Sh. Jitender Tyagi may be detained. Now	 therefore	 in exercise of the powers conferred vide sub section (2) of section 3 of the as delegated to me vide Delhi Administration	 Delhi 's order No. F2/1/88 H.P. II	 dated 11.1.89. I hereby direct that the said Sh. Jitender Tyagi be detained and kept in Central Jail	 Tihar	 Delhi. " It	 thus	 appears from the order of detention that it was passed by the Commissioner of Police	 Delhi	 in exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (2) of section 3 of the Act as delegated to him by the Delhi Administration. The order of detention was approved by the Administrator of Delhi by his order dated January 31	 1989. Paragraph 3 of the said order is in the following terms: "3. Now	 therefore	 in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by sub section (4) of section 3 of the 	 the Administrator hereby approves the order of the Police Commissioner dated 19.1.1989 de taining Sh. Jitender Tyagi and further directs that Sh. Jitender Tyagi be kept in custody in Central Jail	 Tihar	 New Delhi. The first point that has been strenuously urged by Mr. Kapil Sibal	 learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner	 is that the order of detention not having been approved within a period of 345 twelve days	 as provided in sub section (4) of section 3 of the Act	 it had spent its force on the expiry of the said period and	 accordingly	 the detention of the petitioner is illegal. Section 3 of the Act provides for the power to make orders of detention under certain circumstances. Sub section (4) of section 3 reads as follows: "(4). When any order is made under this sec tion by an officer mentioned in sub section (3)	 he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as	 in his opinion	 have a bearing on the matter	 and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless	 in the meantime	 it has been approved by the State Government: Provided that where under section 8 the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detention	 this sub section shall apply sub ject to the modification that	 for the words "twelve days"	 the words "fifteen days" shall be substituted. " Under sub section (4) of section 3	 "no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless	 in the meantime	 it has been approved by the State Government". The question that arises for our consid eration relates to the computation of the period of twelve days. To be more explicit	 the question is whether in com puting the period of twelve days	 the day on which the order of detention is passed should be included or not. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the day on which the order of detention was passed should be included and the order approving the detention having been passed on January 31	 1989	 that is	 on the thirteenth day after the expiry of twelve days	 it had ceased to be in force. On the other hand	 it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the day on which the detention order was passed should be excluded and	 accordingly	 the detention of the petitioner having been approved on January 31	 1989	 it was quite within the period of twelve days. Further	 it is the case of the respondents that the order of detention was	 as a matter of fact	 approved on January 26	 1989 and by the order dated January 31	 1989	 the order of approval was communicated to the authorities concerned. 346 We may first consider the contention of the respondents that the order of detention was duly approved on January 26	 1989. A statement in that regard has been made in the coun ter affidavit of the respondents. We are	 however	 unable to accept the same. We have already extracted above paragraph 3 of the order of detention dated January 31	 1989 in which it has been categorically stated "the Administrator hereby approves the order of the Police Commissioner dated 19.1.1989 detaining Sh. Jitender Tyagi. " After the said categorical statement in paragraph 3	 it is difficult to accept the contention of the respondents that the said order dated January 31	 1989 was made for the purpose of communi cating the approval of the order of detention. In our view	 there can be no doubt	 whatsoever	 that the order of deten tion was approved by the said order dated January 31	 1989. Now	 we may consider the question as to the computation of twelve days as referred to in sub section (4) of section 3. Sub section (4)	 inter alia	 provides that when an order is made by an officer mentioned in sub section (3)	 he shall forthwith report the facts to the State Government. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that under sub section (4)	 the officer has to act forthwith after the making of the order in reporting the fact to the State Government and this is sufficient indication that the day on which the order of detention is made should be included in computing the period of twelve days. In our opinion	 sub section (4) has given a clear indi cation as to the computation of twelve days. The period of twelve days has to be calculated 'after ' the making of the order of detention. Thus	 it is apparent that the period of twelve days comes after the making of the order of deten tion. It is true that in sub section (4)	 the officer making the order of detention shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government	 but the word 'forthwith ' will not be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the period of twelve days inasmuch as there is a clear indica tion that the said period shall be computed after the order is made. In other words	 sub section (4) itself excludes the day on which the order is made. Computation of twelve days including the day on which the detention order is made will be ignoring the direction of the legislature	 as given in sub section (4) itself	 that the said period of twelve days will commence after the making of the detention order. It is	 however	 submitted that when two interpretations are possible	 that which enures to the benefit of the detenu should be accepted. In our opinion	 sub section (4) admits of only one interpretation regarding the computation of twelve days and	 accord 347 ingly	 the question as to the adoption of the interpretation which enures to the benefit of the detenu does not arise. The view which we take	 is in accordance with the well established canons of interpretations. It has been stated in Stroud 's Judicial Dictionary	 Third Edition	 Volume I	 page 86	 as follows: "Where an act has to be done within so many days "after" a given event	 the day of such event is not to be reckoned In Smt. Manjuli vs Civil Judge	 AIR 1970 Bom. 1	 the provision of section 15(1) of the Village Panchayats Act	 1958 came up for interpretation before the Nagput Bench of the Bombay High Court. Section 15(1)	 inter alia	 provides that any person who is qualified to vote is entitled to challenge the validity of the election "within 15 days after the date of the declaration of the result of the election". The High Court in interpreting the provision rightly laid stress on the word "after" and held that the day of which the result was declared must be excluded. This Court had also occasion to construe rule 119 of the Election Rules framed under the Representation of the People Act in T.C. Basappa vs T. Nagappa	 ; Rule 119 provides	 inter alia	 that an election petition against a returned candidate is to be presented at any time after the publica tion of the name of such candidate under section 67 of the Act	 but not later than 14 days from the date of publication of the notice in the official gazette under rule 113. Mukh erjea	 J. (as he than was) speaking for the Bench observed as follows: The High court seems to think that in comput ing period of 14 days the date of publication is to be included. This seems to us to be an unwarranted view to take which is opposed to the ordinary canons of construction. Dr. Tek Chand appearing for the respondent No. 1	 plainly confessed his inability to support this view and we must hold therefore that there is no question of the Tribunal 's enter taining election petition after the prescribed period in the present case. " In re: V.S. Mehta	 AIR 1970 A.P. 234 which is a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court	 relating to the computa tion of the period of three months in section 106 of the Factories Act Section 106 provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable 348 under the Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector. The question before the High Court was whether in computing the said period of three months	 the day on which the offence was alleged to be committed should be excluded or not. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the view that the term "within three months of the date" in section 106 of the Factories Act means 'within three calendar months after the commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an In spector ' and	 consequently	 the date of the knowledge	 that is	 the date of inspection should be excluded in computing the period of three months. That interpretation resulting in the exclusion of the date of knowledge should be made as the High Court considered the expression "within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector" as "within three months after the date on which etc . . ". Thus	 what is significant to be noticed is the word "after" which the High Court has substituted for the word 'of ' in the expression "of the date" in section 106. In Haru Das Gupta vs State of West Bengal	 ; 	 the question was whether under section 12 of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act	 1970	 the order or decision of the State Government confirming the detention order was made within three months from the date of detention. In holding that in computing the said period of three months	 the date of detention shall be excluded	 this Court has laid down that the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. This Court has agreed to the view expressed by Wills	 J. in Ratcliff vs Bartholomew	 that a complaint under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act filed on June 30 in respect of an act alleged to have been committed on May 30 was "within one calendar month after the cause of such complaint shall arise". The principle on the basis of which that view was expressed by Wills	 J. is that the day on which the cause for the complaint arose had to be excluded while computing the period within which under the Act	 the complaint had to be filed. Thus	 it is apparent from the above decision that the day on which the cause of action arises has to be excluded in computing a particular period of time and	 in the instant case	 such an exclusion has to be made in view of the word "after" in sub section (4) of section 3 of the Act. 349 The petitioner has	 however	 placed reliance on a few decisions which will be stated presently. In Prabhu Narain Singh vs Superintendent	 Central Jail	 Varanasi	 ILR (1961) 1 All. 427 the Allahabad High Court has	 on an interpreta tion of sub section (3) of section 3 of the 	 which is verbatim the same as subsec tion (4) of section 3 of the Act	 with which we are con cerned	 held that in computing the period of twelve days	 the day on which the order of detention is passed should be included. One of the reasons for the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court	 which is strongly relied on by the learned Counsel for the detenu	 is that if the day on which the order is passed is to be excluded . from twelve days prescribed for the approval of the said order	 then the consequence of the acceptance of this interpretation would be that it would not be possible for the State Government to approve of the order until after the day on which it was passed had expired. It has been observed that such an unrea sonable consequence was not contemplated by the legislature. When the language of a statute is plain and simple	 the question of ascertaining the intention of the legislature does not arise. In our opinion	 the word 'after ' in sub section (4) of section 3 of the Act is very significant and clearly excludes any contention that in computing the period of twelve days the day on which the order of detention is passed should be included. The Allahabad High Court has omitted to consider the word "after" in the section. We are unable to subscribe to the view of the High Court that if the day on which the order of detention was made is excluded from the calculation of the period of twelve days	 in that case	 the position would be that it would not be possible for the State Government to approve of the order of deten tion until after the day on which it was passed had expired. The expression "in the meantime" in sub section (4) of section 3 of the Act clearly indicates that the State Gov ernment can approve of the order of detention even on the day it is passed. The language of sub section (4) of section 3 is plain and simple and the question whether the order of detention can be approved on the day it is passed or not does not at all arise. In our opinion	 Prabhu Narain Singh 's case (supra) has not correctly interpreted the provision of section 3(3) of the in regard to the computation of the period of twelve days. The learned Counsel for the detenu has placed reliance upon two other decisions	 namely	 Nillapareddi Chandrasekhra Reddy vs The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Another	 and C. Krishna Reddy and Another vs Commissioner of Police	 Hyderabad 350 and Others	 	 both are of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. These two decisions relate to the commu nication to the detenu of the grounds of detention not later than five days from the date of detention as provided in section 8(1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act	 1951. We do not think that we should be justified in ex pressing any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of the computation of the said period of five days as made in these two decisions	 for the language that is used in sub section (4) of section 3 of the Act	 with which we are concerned	 is different from that used in section 8(1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act	 1951. Similarly	 the decision of the Patna High Court in Gulam Sarwar vs State of Bihar and Others	 relied on by the respondents also related to the computation of the period of five days	 as contained in section 8(1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act	 1951. In this case	 a contrary view has been expressed. In our view all these decisions are of no help to us having regard to the differ ence in language of the provision with which we are con cerned. Be that as it may	 we have no hesitation in holding that in computing the period of twelve days referred to in sub section (4) of section 3 of the Act	 the day on which the order of detention was passed should be excluded and	 upon such computation	 it must be held that the approval of the order of detention was made within twelve days after the making of the order of detention. The next point that has been urged on behalf of the detenu is that the order dated January 11	 1989 of the Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi	 directing that during the period from 19.1.1989 to 18.4. 1989 the Commissioner of Police	 Delhi	 may also exercise the powers of detaining authority under sub section (2) of section 3 of the Act	 is ultra vires section 3(3) of the Act. Section3(3) provides that if	 having regard to the circumstances pre vailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police	 the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do	 it may	 by order in writing	 direct that during such period	 as may be specified in the order	 such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also	 if satisfied as provided in subsection (2)	 exer cise the powers conferred by the said sub section. It is contended that as no circumstances	 as mentioned in section 3(3) in respect of which satisfaction has to be made by the Administrator of Delhi	 have been stated in the order	 nor in the grounds of detention	 the said order dated January 11	 1989 is illegal and invalid. This point has not been taken in the writ petition and	 accordingly	 the Delhi Administration did not get an opportunity to controvert the allega 351 tions made for the first time in the argument. The point is not one involving only a question of law	 but it also in volves question of fact. In the circumstances	 we do not think we shall be justified in allowing the petitioner to take the point for the first time in the argument. The next point that has been urged by the learned Coun sel for the petitioner is that the detaining authority	 that is	 the Commissioner of Police	 Delhi	 not having supplied to the detenu a copy of the said order dated January 11	 1989 of the Administrator of Delhi directing him to exercise the powers of the detaining authority under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act	 a serious prejudice has been caused to the detenu in that	 if the copy of the said order had been supplied	 the detenu might have contended that no such circumstances	 as contemplated by sub section (3) of section 3 of the Act	 were prevailing and that the delegation of the powers on the Commissioner of Police of Delhi was illegal and invalid and	 consequently	 the order of detention was inoperative and void. The Act does not provide for supplying a copy of an order under section 3(3) of the Act. The said order has not been relied upon by the Commissioner of Police in passing the impugned order of detention. It may be that by virtue of the said order dated January 11	 1989 passed under section 3(3) of the Act	 the Commissioner of Police could exercise the powers of the detaining authority under section 3(2) of the Act. But	 that has nothing to do as to the subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner of Police in making the impugned order of detention. We do not think there is any substance in the contention made on behalf of the detenu and it is	 accordingly	 rejected. In the grounds of detention it is	 inter alia	 stated as follows: "Though Sh. Jitender Tyagi is in judicial custody	 it is reported that applica tion for his bail has been filed in the court in case FIR No. 6 dated 7.1.89 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act	 P.S. Yamuna Vihar	 Delhi. It is likely that he may be released in these cases on bail and again indulge in nefarious activi ties of extortion and intimidation. Keeping in view his activities	 I have issued order for his detention under section 3(2) of the Na tional Security Act	 1980	 so that his crimi nal activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order	 could be stopped. " It is urged on behalf of the detenu that only in one case the detenu has made an application for bail	 but in the said statement of 352 the Commissioner of Police in the grounds of detention	 he was proceeding on the assumption that in all the cases the detenu had made applications for bail. Accordingly	 it is submitted that this shows complete non application of mind by the detaining authority. We are unable to accept the contention. Mr. Mahajan	 learned Counsel for the respond ents	 has produced before us the records of the detaining authority from which it appears that a copy of the applica tion for bail was with the detaining authority before he made the order of detention. So	 the contention that the detaining authority proceeded on the basis that the detenu had made applications for bail in all the cases pending against him is not correct. There is	 therefore	 no sub stance in this contention. Equally non meritorious is the contention that a copy of the application for bail has not been supplied to the de taining authority for his consideration. It is submitted that if such a copy had been supplied to the detaining authority	 he would have considered the statement of the detenu that he was falsely implicated in these cases. The contention is based on erroneous assumption that a copy of the bail application was not supplied to the detaining authority. Indeed	 as noticed already	 a copy of the bail 'application was with the detaining authority before he had passed the order of detention. This contention is also rejected. No other point has been urged in this writ petition. For the reasons aforesaid	 the writ petition is dismissed. T.N.A. Petition dismissed.

Sub section (4) of section 3 of the provides that no order passed by an officer men tioned in sub section (3) shah remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless	 in the mean time	 it has been approved by the State Government. The Commissioner of Police	 Delhi	 in exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (2) of section 3 of the Act	 as delegated to him by the Delhi Administration	 passed an order on 19.1.1989 detaining the petitioner The order of detention was approved by the Administrator on 31.1.1989. The petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the validity of the detention order contending that (i) the day on which the order of detention was passed should he included in the period of computation of twelve days and since the order of detention was approved on 31.1.1989	 that is	 on the thirteenth day after the expiry of twelve days	 it had ceased to be in force; (ii) the non supply of the copy of order delegating the power of deten tion on the Commissioner of Police has seriously prejudiced the detenu; and (iii) there was serious non application of mind by the detaining authority. 342 Dismissing the petition	 this Court	 HELD: 1. In computing the period of twelve days referred to in sub section (4) of section 3 of the Act	 the day on which the order of detention was passed should be excluded. Therefore the approval of the order of detention was made within twelve days after the making of the order of deten tion. [350D] 1.1 Sub section (4) of section 3 has given a clear indication as to the computation of twelve days. It excludes the day on which the order is made. The word 'after ' in sub section (4) of section 3 of the Act is very significant and clearly excludes any contention that in computing the period of twelve days the day on which the order of deten tion is passed should be included. The period of twelve days has to be calculated 'after ' the making of the order of detention	 i.e. the day on which the cause of action arises has to be excluded in computing the period of time. [346E F; 349D; 348H] 1.2 It is true that in sub section (4) the officer making the order of detention shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government	 but the word 'forthwith ' will not be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the period of twelve days inasmuch as there is clear indica tion that the said period shah be computed after the order is made. Computation of twelve days including the day on which the detention order is made will be ignoring the direction of the legislature	 as given in sub section (4) itself	 that the said period of twelve days will commence after the making of the detention order. [346F G] 2. When the language of a statute is plain and simple	 the question of ascertaining the intention of the legisla ture does not arise. [349D] 2.1 Sub section (4) of section 3 admits of only one interpretation regarding the computation of twelve days and	 accordingly	 the question as to the adoption of the inter pretation which ensures to the benefit of the detenu does not arise. [346H; 347A] T.C. Basappa vs T. Nagappa	 ; ; Haru Das Gupta vs State of West Bengal	 ; and Ratcliff vs Bartholomew	 	 followed. Nillapareddi Chandrasekhara Reddy vs The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.	 ; C. Krishna Reddy and Anr. vs Commissioner of Police Hyderabad & Ors.	 343 and Gulam Sarwar vs State of Bihar & Ors. 	 	 distinguished. Manjuli vs Civil Judge	 AIR 1970 Bom. 1 and In re: V.S. Mehta	 AIR 1970 AP 234	 approved. The expression "in the meantime" in sub section (4) of section 3 of the Act clearly indicates that the State Government can approve of the order of detention even on the day it is passed. The language of sub section (4) of section 3 is plain and simple and the question whether the order of detention can be approved on the day it is passed or not does not at all arise. [349F] Prabhu Narain Singh vs Superintendent	 Central Jail	 Varanasi	 ILR 1961 1 All. 427	 disapproved. The Act does not provide for supplying a copy of an order under Section 3(3) of the Act. In the instant case	 the said order has not been relied upon by the Commissioner of Police in passing the impugned order of detention. It may be that by virtue of the said order under section 3(3) of the Act	 the Commissioner of Police could exercise the powers of the detaining authority under section 3(2) of the Act. But	 that has nothing to do as to the subjective satis faction of the Commissioner of Police in making the impugned order of detention. [351D E] 5. In the instant case	 a copy of the application for bail was with the detaining authority before he made the order of detention. So	 it is not correct to say that the detaining authority proceeded on the basis that the detenu had made applications for bail in all the cases pending against him. Accordingly there was no non application of mind by the detaining authority. [352A B & C]