Summarize the following court judgment. minal Appeal No. 49 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 13	 1954	 of the Madras High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 267 and 1954 154 1212 (Criminal Revision Petition No. 249 of 1954) arising out of the judgment and order dated January 12	 1954	 of the Court of the District and Sessions Judge as Tiruchirapalli in Criminal Revision Petition No. 17 of 1953. R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishnan	 for the appellant. No one appeared for the respondents. August 25. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J. The only question for determination in this appeal by special leave	 is whether the petition of complaint	 disclosed a prima facie offence under section 295 of the Indian Penal Code. The courts below have taken the view that it did not	 and on that ground	 it stood summarily dismissed	 before evidence pro and con had been recorded. It appears that the appellant filed a petition of complaint in the court of the Additional First Class Magistrate	 Tiruchirappalli	 against the respondents	 three in number. The petition of complaint alleged inter alia that the first accused is the leader of Dravida Kazakam (a community of persons who profess to be religious reformers	 one of whose creeds is to carry on propaganda against idol worship)	 and as such	 be was out to " vilify a certain section of the Hindu community and do propaganda by holding meetings and writing articles. " It is further alleged in the petition of complaint that " recently	 the first accused announced his intention of breaking the image of God Ganesa	 the God sacred to the Saiva Section of the Hindu Community on 27th May	 1953	 in a public meeting at Town Hall. This caused terror commotion in the mind of the Saivite Section of the Hindu Community. " The complainant claims to be a Saivite. The complainant further alleged in his petition that on May 27	 1953	 at about 5 30 p.m.	 the accused broke an idol of God Ganesa in public at the Town Hall Maidan	 and before breaking the idol	 lie made a speech	 and expressly stated that he intended to insult the feelings of the Hindu community by breaking the idol of God 1213 Ganesa. The said act of breaking the idol was alleged to have been actively abetted by instigation and aid by the other two accused persons	 who also made speeches. The petition of complaint also alleged that the said act of breaking the image of God Ganesa was done with the intention of insulting the religious feelings of certain sections of the Hindu community	 who hold God Ganesa in veneration	 and that the acts complained of	 amounted to offences under sections 295 and 295A of the Indian Penal Code. On those allegations	 the petition of complaint (dated June 5	 1953) prayed that processes might issue against the three accused persons. In the list of witnesses appended to the petition	 figured the Additional District Magistrate	 the Sub Divisional Magistrate	 the Town Sub Inspector of police	 Tiruchi Fort	 and Sub Magistrate	 Tiruchy Town. On the same date	 the learned magistrate examined the complainant on oath. The complainant made statements in support of his allegations in the petition of complaint. Thereupon	 the learned magistrate directed that the petition of complaint be sent to the Circle Inspector of police	 Trichy	 for inquiry and report under section 202	 Criminal Procedure Code. On June 26	 1953	 on receipt of the police report which " showed that though the occurrence as alleged had taken place it was a point of law if the act of the accused would amount to any offence "	 the learned magistrate passed his order	 dismissing the complaint under section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the course of his order	 the learned magistrate observed as follows: "The mud figure of Ganesa alleged to have been broken by accused is not an object held sacred or worshipped by any class of persons. Simply because it resembled the God Ganesa held in veneration by a section it cannot become an object hold sacred. Even Ganesa idol abandoned by the people as unworthy of worship loses its sanctity and it is no longer an object held sacred by anybody	 since such given up idols are found in several places of defilement. It is not an offence if a person treads union any such abandoned idol. Therefore the breaking of mud figure of Ganesa 1214 does not amount to an offence under Section 295	 Indian Penal Code. " "The speeches delivered by the accused with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging religious feelings of a community	 no doubt amount to an offence under Section 295 A	 Indian Penal Code. But for laying a complaint under this section the sanction of the Government is necessary. This section has been clearly mentioned in the complaint and it cannot be said it was included by oversight. Without a proper sanction an offence under this section is unsustainable. I therefore see no sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint and I dismiss the same under section 203	 Criminal Procedure Code. " The complainant moved the learned Sessions Judge of Tiruchirappalli	 by his petition in revision	 filed on July 9	 1953	 under sections 435 and 436 of the Criminal Procedure Code	 for setting aside the order of dismissal of the complaint. In the petition filed in the Court of Session	 the complainant stated that the petition was confined to the complaint in respect of the alleged offence under section 295	 Indian Penal Code	 and that it did not seek to revise the order of dismissal of the complaint in respect of an offence tinder section 295 A of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge dismissed the petition by an order dated January 12	 1954	 holding	 in agreement with the learned magistrate	 that the acts complained of did not amount to an offence under section 295	 Indian Penal Code. In the course of his order	 the learned Sessions Judge made the following observations: " I agree with the learned Magistrate that the acts complained of do not amount to an offence. The accused	 who profess to be religious reformers in a campaign against idolatory organized a public meeting at which they broke an earthern image of the God Ganesa. The particular image broken was the private property of the accused and was not in itself an object held sacred by any class of persons; nor do I think that idol breaking by a non believer can reasonably be regarded by a believer as an insult to his religion ; and the ingredients of Section 295	 Indian Penal Code	 are therefore not made out. " 1215 The complainant then moved the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The matter was heard by a learned single Judge of that Court. The learned single Judge also agreed with the courts below in the reasons given by them for dismissing the petition of complaint	 and refused to order further inquiry. In the course of his judgment	 he discussed the question whether a mud image of God Ganesa	 came within the scope of the words " any object held. sacred by any class of persons " in section 295	 and he answered the question in the negative. In this connection	 he referred to the judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Queen Empress vs Imam Ali (1)	 which is directly an authority for this proposition only that the word 'object ' in section 295 of the Indian Penal Code	 does not include animate objects. That case dealt with the complaint of killing a cow. Edge C. J. in the course of his judgment	 made an observation that the word ' object ' should be interpreted ejusdem generis with the words 'place of worship '	 and by way of an example of such an inanimate object	 he mentioned an idol. That observation	 if anything	 is not against the complainant. The learned single Judge also referred to the case of Romesh Chunder Sannyal vs Hiru Mondal (2)	 which also is not in point inasmuch as it dealt with the case of a dedicated bull. But the learned Judge seemed to draw from those cases the inference which may be stated in his own words	 as follows: " Interpreted like that	 it would mean that the section would apply only to cases where an idol in a temple is sought to be destroyed	 damaged	 or defiled. The words 'any object held sacred by any class of persons ' even otherwise will apply only to idols in a temple or when they are carried out in processions on festival occasions. The object held sacred ' will mean only the idols inside the temple and when they are taken out in processions on festival occasions. In such circumstances as in the present case the breaking is nothing more than a doll taken from the shop. (1) All. 150. (2) Cal. 1216 Though the intention of the respondents may be to decry the feelings and wound the susceptibilities of a large section of the people	 still the intention alone is not sufficient unless it is carried out by an act which must fall within the scope of this section. The dolls in the shop	 though they may resemble several of the deities in the temple	 cannot be held to be objects held sacred by any class of persons. In modern society there are several images of the deities in the drawing rooms of several houses. It cannot for a moment be suggested that these images are objects held sacred. These have got to be distinguished from the objects held sacred	 which can only be when they are duly installed in a temple and from which they are subsequently taken out in procession on festival occasions. What was broken therefore by the respondents is nothing more than a doll taken either from a shop or made for the occasion	 and it cannot by any means be called ail object held sacred. The offence is not made out and the dismissal is therefore justified. " The petitioner moved the High Court for the necessary certificate of fitness for making an appeal to this Court. The learned Judge	 who had heard the case on merits	 also dealt with this application	 and refused to certify that this was a fit case for appeal to this Court under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The petitioner moved this Court and obtained the necessary special leave to appeal. It is regrettable that the respondents have remained ex parts in this Court. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the courts below had unduly restricted the meaning of the words of section 295	 particularly	 the words " any object held sacred by any class of persons "	 and that the words have been used in their fullest amplitude by the Legislature	 in order to include any object consecrated or otherwise	 which is held sacred by any class of persons	 not necessarily belonging to a different religion or creed. In the first place	 whether any object is held sacred by any class of persons	 must depend upon the evidence in the case	 so also the effect of the words " with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class 1217 of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction	 damage or defilement as an insult to their religion. " In this case	 the facts alleged in the petition	 do not appear to have been controverted	 but the learned magistrate	 as also the learned Sessions Judge and the learned Judge in the High Court	 have thrown out the petition of complaint solely on the ground that the image of God Ganesa	 treated by the respondents as alleged by the complainant	 could not be said to be held sacred by any class of persons. In the instant case	 the insult alleged was by destruction of the image of God Ganesa. Apart from the question of evidence	 which had yet to be adduced	 it is a well knonwn fact that the image of Lord Ganesa or any objective representation of a similar kind	 is held sacred by certain classes of Hindus	 even though the image may not have been consecrated. The learned Judge in the Court below	 has given much too restricted a meaning to the words any object held sacred by any class of persons "	 by holding that only idols in temples or idols carried in processions on festival occasions	 are meant to be included within those words. There are no such express words of limitation in section 295 of the Indian Penal code	 and in our opinion	 the learned Judge has clearly misdirected himself in importing those words of limitation. Idols are only illustrative of those words. A sacred book	 like the Bible	 or the Koran	 or the Granth Saheb	 is clearly within the ambit of those general words. If the courts below were right in their interpretation of the crucial words in section 295	 the burning or otherwise destroying or defiling such sacred books	 will not come within the 'Purview of the penal statute. In our opinion	 placing such a restricted interpretation on the words of such general import	 is against all established canons of construction. Any object however trivial or destitute of real value in itself	 if regarded as sacred by any class of persons would come within the meaning of the penal section. Nor is it absolutely necessary that the object	 in order 1218 to be held sacred	 should have been actually worshipped. An object may be held sacred by a class of persons without being worshipped by them. It is clear	 therefore	 that the courts below were rather cynical in so lightly brushing aside the religious susceptibilities of that class of persons to which the complainant claims to belong. The section has been intended to respect the religious susceptibilities of persons of different religious persuasions or creeds. Courts have got to be very circumspect in such matters	 and to pay due regard to the feelings and religious emotions of different classes of persons with different beliefs	 irrespective of the consideration whether or not they share those beliefs	 or whether they are rational or otherwise	 in the opinion of the court. As a result of ' these considerations	 it must be held that the courts below have erred in their interpretation of the crucial words of section 295 of the Indian Penal Code. But the question still remains whether	 even after expressing our strong disagreement with the interpretation of the section by the courts below	 this Court should direct a further inquiry into the complaint	 which has stood dismissed for the last about 5 )	ears. The action complained of against the accused persons	 if true	 was foolish	 to put it mildly	 but as the case has become stale	 we do not direct further inquiry into this complaint. If there is a recurrence of such a foolish behaviour on the part of any section of the community	 we have no doubt that those charged with the duty of maintaining law and order	 will apply the law in the sense in which we have interpreted the law. The appeal is	 therefore	 dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

The words " any object held sacred by any class of persons" occurring in section 295 Of the Indian Penal Code are of general import and cannot be limited to idols in temples or idols carried on festival occasions. Not merely idols or sacred books	 but any other object which is regarded as sacred by any class of persons	 whether actually worshipped or not	 fall within the description. Queen Empress vs Imam Ali	 All. 150 and Romesh Chunder Sannyal vs Hiru Mondal	 Cal. 852	 considered. Consequently	 in a case where the allegation in the petition of complaint was that one of the accused broke the idol of God Ganesa in public and the two others actually aided and abetted him with the intention of insulting the religious feeling of the complainant and his community who held the deity in veneration and the trial Magistrate	 on receipt of the Police report that the alleged occurrence was true	 dismissed the complaint under section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure holding that the breaking of a mud image of Ganesa was not an offence under section 295 of the Indian Penal Code and the Sessions judge and the High Court in revision	 agreeing with the view of the trial Court	 refused to direct further enquiry : Held	 that the courts below were clearly in error in inter preting section 295 of the Indian Penal Code in the way they (lid	 but since the complaint stood long dismissed	 no further enquiry need be directed into the matter. Held	 further	 that the Courts must be circumspect in such matters and pay due regard to the religious susceptibilities of different classes of persons with different beliefs	 whether they shared those beliefs or not or whether those beliefs in the opinion of the Court were rational or not.