Summarize the following court judgment. Appeals Nos. 2483 and 2484 of 1969. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 11	 1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Sales Tax References Nos. 580 and 581 of 1966. J. P. Goyal and Sobhagmal Jain	 for the appellants (in both the appeals). C. B. Agarwala and 0. P. Rana	 for the respondent (in both the appeals). The Judgment of the	 Court was delivered by Shah	 J. The appellants who are dealers in food grains supplied to the Regional Food Controller diverse quantities of wheat in compliance with the provisions of the U.P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order	 1959. The Sales Tax Officer levied tax under the U.P. Sales Tax Act on the aggregate of the price of wheat by the appellants	 rejecting the contention raised	by the appellants that the wheat supplied was not sold by them to the Controller. In appeal the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) Sales Tax held that the turnover resulting from supplies of wheat was not taxable since there was no "sale" within the meaning of the U.P. Sales Tax Act	 1948. The order was confirmed by the Additional Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax. The Additional Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax referred the following questions to the High Court of Allahabad for opinion (1) Whether the sales made to the Regional Food Controller under the U.P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order	 1959	 are sales within the meaning of "sale" under section 2(h) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act ? (2) Whether in the circumstances of the case	 the assesses are liable to pay sales tax on the sales made to the Regional Food Controller under the provisions of the U.P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order	 1959 ?" The questions raised were defective in form. The word "sales" when it first occurs in Question No. (1 ) should be "supplies". The expression "sales made" in Question No. (2) should be "on the price for wheat supplied". We modify the questions accordingly. The High Court of Allahabad	 following their earlier judgment in Commissioner of Sales Tax		 U.P. Lucknow vs ) an Bilas 673 Ram Gopal(1) answered the two questions in the affirmative. The appellants have appealed to this Court with special leave. The expression "sale" is defined in section 2(h) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act	 1948 as meaning any transfer of property in goods for cash	 deferred payment or other valuable consideration	 but not including a mortgage	 hypothecation	 charge or pledge. Power of the Provincial Legislature by virtue of Entry 48 List 11 of the Government of India Act	 1935	 was restricted. The	 Legislature was competent to legislate for levy of tax only on transactions which were "sales" within the meaning of the Indian : State of Madras vs Gannon Dunkerley and Co. (Madras) Ltd.( ') M/s. New India Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner of Sales Tax	 Bihar( '). It was observed in M/s. New India Sugar Mills ' case( ') : "In popular parlance 'sale ' means transfer of property from one person to another in consideration of price paid or promised or other valuable consideration. But that is not the meaning of 'sale ' in the . Section 4 of the provides by its first sub section that a contract of sale of goods is a contract where the seller agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a price. "Price" by cl. (10) of section 2 means the money consideration for sale of goods	 	and "where under a contract of sale property in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer	 the contract is called a sale	 but where the transfer of the 'property in the goods is to take place at a future time or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled	 the contract is called an agreement to sell" [sub section (3) section 4]. It is manifest that under the a transaction is called sale only where for money consideration property in goods is transferred under a contract of sale. Section 4 of the was borrowed almost verbatim from section I of the English 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71. As observed by Benjamin in the 8th Edn. of his work on 'Sale '	 "to constitute a valid sale there must be a concurrence of the following elements viz. (1) parties competent to contract; (2) mutual assent; (3) a thing	 the absolute or general property in which is transferred from the seller to the buyer; and (4) a price in money paid or promised". It was also observed that the expression "sale of goods" in the Constitution must be understood in the same sense in which it is (1) (1969) All L.J. 424. (2) ; (3) [1963] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 459. 13Sup. C 1/70 14 674 used in the . The U.P. Legislature could therefore legislate for levy of sales tax on a transaction which amounted to a sale within the meaning of the 	 and not on any other transaction which was deemed by fiction to be a sale. It is necessary then to determine whether the stocks of wheat supplied by the appellants in compliance with the provisions of the U.P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order	 1959 to the Regional Food Controller were sold to that Officer within the meaning of the definition of the word 'sale ' in section 2(h) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act	 1948. The relevant provisions of the U.P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order	 1959	 may first be read. The preamble to the Order states : "Whereas the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary and expedient so to do for maintaining the supplies of wheat and for securing its equitable distribution and availability at fair prices Now	 THEREFORE	 in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (e)	 (f)	 (h)	 (i) and (j) of sub section (2) of section 3 of the (10 of 1955)	 the Governor of the State of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to make the following order Clause 3 provides "(1) Every Licensed dealer shall sell to the State Government at the controlled prices (a) Fifty (50%) per cent if wheat held in. stock by him at the commencement of this Order; and (b) Fifty (50%) per cent of wheat procured or purchased by him every day beginning with the date of commencement of this Order and until such time as the State Government otherwise directs. (2) The wheat required to be sold to the State Government under sub clause (1) shall be delivered by the licensed dealer to the Controller or to such other person as may be authorised by the Controller to take delivery on his behalf. " Clause 4 confers powers of entry	 search	 seizure upon Enforcement Officers : insofar as it is material it provides "(1) Any Enforcement Officer may	 with a view to securing compliance with this Order or to satisfying himself that this order has been complied with 675 (i) enter with such assistance as may be necessary any premises where he has reason to believe that wheat is procured	 purchased or stocked 	 (ii)ask of any person all necessary questions; (iii) examine any books or documents; (iv) search any premises	 vehicles	 'vessels and aircraft and seize wheat in respect of which he has reasons to believe that a contravention of the order has been	 is being	 or is about to be committed and thereafter take or authorise the taking of all measures necessary for securing the production of stocks so seized in a court and for their sale custody	 pending such production. By cl. 3 of the Order every licensed	 dealer is directed to "sell" to the State Government 50% of the wheat held in stock by him on the date of the commencement of the Order at the "controlled prices". Again out of the stock of wheat procured or purchased by him every day beginning with the date of commencement of the Order he is directed to "sell" 50% of that stock. The Order enjoins the licensed dealer to deliver the quantities specified in subcl. (1) of cl. 3 either to the Controller or to such other person as may be authorised by the Controller to take delivery on his behalf. To ensure that the licensed dealer carries out his obligation the Enforcement Officers may enter any premises where they have reason to believe that wheat is procured	 purchased or stocked	 and may make necessary enquiries	 examine any books or documents and search any premises	 vehicles	 vessels and aircraft and seize wheat in respect of which they have reason to believe that a contravention of the Order has been	 is being	 or is about to be	 committed. Obligation to deliver wheat of the quantity specified arises out of the statute. The Order takes no account of the volition of the licensed dealers and until the State Government directs otherwise	 of the Controller or the authorised officer. The Order imposes an obligation upon the licensed dealer who is defined in cl. 2(d) as meaning a person holding a valid licence under the U.P. Food grains Dealers Licensing Order	 1959	 to deliver the quantities of wheat specified in the Order. The State Government is directed by the Order to pay for the wheat supplied at the controlled rate. The source of the obligations to deliver the specified quantities of wheat and to pay for them is not in any contract	 but in the statutory order. In our judgment cl. 3 sets up a machinery for compul 676 sory	 acquisition by the State Government of stocks of wheat belonging to the licensed dealers. The Order	 it is true	 makes no provision in respect of the place and manner of supply of wheat and payment of the controlled price. It contains a bald injunction to supply wheat of the specified quantity day after day	 and enacts that in default of compliance the dealer is liable to be punished; it does not envisage any consensual arrangement. It does not require the State Government to enter into even an informal con tract. A sale predicates a contract of sale of goods between persons competent to contract for a price paid or promised : a transaction in which an obligation to supply goods is imposed	 and which does not involve an obligation to enter into a contract	 cannot be called a 'sale '	 even if the person supplying goods is declared entitled to the value of goods	 which is determined or determinable in the manner prescribed. Assuming that between the licensed dealer and the Controller	 there may be some arrangements about the place and manner of delivery of wheat	 and the payment of " controlled price"	 the operation of cl. 3 does not on that account become contractual. The High Court relied upon the following observations in Ram Bilas Ram Gopal 's case( ') "Analysing clause 3 of the Levy Order it is clear that a licensed dealer is obliged to sell to the State Government fifty	 per cent of the wheat held in stock by him at the commencement of the Order	 and thereafter fifty per cent of the wheat daily procured or purchased by him beginning with the date of commencement of the Order until such time as the State Government otherwise directs. The price at which the wheat is sold is the maxi mum price fixed in the Wheat (Uttar Pradesh) Price Control Order	 1959 as notified by the Government of India. Delivery of the wheat has to be given by the dealer to the Regional Food Controller or a person authorised by him in that behalf. The dealer has no option but to sell the specified percentage of wheat to the State Government. The State Government has also no option but to purchase fifty per cent of the wheat held in stock by the dealer at the commencement of the Levy Order. As regards the wheat procured or purchased daily by the dealer thereafter	 it is open to the State Government to say that from any particular date it will not purchase any or all of the specified percentage of wheat. Therefore	 as regards that wheat the Levy Order leaves it open to one of the parties	 namely the State Government to decide when it will stop purchasing wheat from the dealer. That in substance is clause 3 of (1961) All. L.J. 424 677 the Levy Order and it embodies the total sum of obligations imposed on the dealer and the State Government. All other details of the transaction are left open to negotiation. It leaves it open to the parties to negotiate in respect of the time and the mode of payment of the price	 the time and mode of delivery of wheat	 and other conditions of the contract. " Clause 3 of the Order compels the licensed dealer to deliver to the Controller or his authorised agent every day 50% of the wheat procured or purchased by him. There is no scope for negotiations there. Assuming that the Controller may designate the place of delivery and the place of payment of price at the controlled rate	 and the licensed dealer acquiesces therein	 or even when in respect of those two matters there is some consensual arrangement	 in our judgment	 supply of wheat pursuant to cl. 3 of the Order and acceptance thereof do not result in a contract of sale. The High Court observed that ". .whatever compulsive or coercive force is used to bring about a transaction under clause 3 of the Levy Order	 it must be traced to legislation. It cannot be attributed to the State Government as a party to the transaction. This	 then	 is clear. There is nothing in the Levy Order which can be accused of vitiating the free consent of the parties as defined under Sec. 14 of the Indian Contract Act	 when entering into the contract of sale. " But these observations assume a contract of sale which the Order does not contemplate. If there be a contract	 the restrictions imposed by statute may not vitiate the consent. But the contract cannot be assumed. We may refer to certain decisions of this Court on which reliance was placed at the Bar. In M/s. New India Sugar Mills ' case( ') under the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order	 1946	 a scheme was devised for equitable distribution of sugar. The consuming States intimated to the Sugar Controller of India their requirements of sugar and the factory owners sent statements of stocks of sugar held by them. The Controller made allotments to various States and addressed orders to the factory owners directing them to supply sugar to the States in question in accordance with the despatch instructions from the State Governments. Under the allotment orders	 M/s. New India Sugar Mills Ltd.	 in Bihar despatched stocks of sugar to the State of Madras. The State of Bihar treated the transaction as a sale and levied tax thereon under the (1) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 459. 678 Bihar Sales Tax Act	 1947. The tax payer contended that the supplies of sugar; pursuant to the directions of the Controller	 did not result in sales	 and that no tax was exigible on such transactions. A majority of the Court observed that despatches of sugar pursuant to the directions of the Controller were not made in pursuance of any contract of sale. There was no offer by the tax payer to the State of Madras	 and no acceptance by the latter; the tax payer was under the Control Order compelled to carry out the directions of the Controller and it had no volition in the matter. Intimation by the State of its requirements of sugar to the controller or communication of the allotment order to the assessee did not amount to an offer. Nor did the mere compliance with despatch instructions issued by the Controller	 which the assessee had not the option to refuse to comply with	 amount to acceptance of an offer Or to making of an offer. A contract of sale of goods postulates a voluntary arrangement regarding goods between the contracting parties. It was held that in the case before the Court there was no such voluntary arrangement. In two later decisions of this Court the true character of transactions in which supplies of commodities were made pursuant to Control Orders was examined. In Indian Steel & Wire Products Ltd. vs State of Madras( ') the tax payer supplied certain steel products to various persons in the State of Madras pursuant to the directions given by the Steel Controller exercising powers under the Iron and Steel (Control of Production and Distribution) Order	 1941. The authorities of the State of Madras assessed the turnover of the tax payer resulting from those transactions to sales tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. The tax payer contended that the transactions of supply did not result in sales and were on that account not exposed to sales tax	 because steel products were supplied pursuant to the directions of the Iron and Steel Controller made under cl. 10B of the Order there being no mutual assent between the parties to the transaction. This Court held that the supplies were made pursuant to the directions issued under cl. 5 of the Order and not pursuant to the directions issued under cl. 10B of the Order. It was observed that the Orders were in respect of goods not yet manufactured	 whereas under cl. 10B directions could be given only in respect of goods already in stock	 and since cl. 5 did not require the Controller to regulate or control every facet of a transaction between a producer and the person to whom the taxpayer supplied iron and steel products the transactions were consensual. Clause 5 of the Order read as follows "No producer or stock holder shall dispose of or agree to dispose of or export or agree to export from British India any iron or steel	 except in accordance with (1) ; 679 the conditions contained or incorporated in a general or special written order of the Controller. " Clause 10B provided "The Controller may	 by a written order require any person holding stock of iron and steel	 acquired by him otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of clause 4 to sell the whole or any part of the stock to such person or class of persons and on such terms and conditions as may be specified in the Order." Comparing the terms of cl. 5 with the terms of cl. 10	 the Court observed that liberty of contract in large measure was reserved to the producer or stockholder and to the purchaser in the matter of disposal of iron & steel. The obligation imposed by cl. 5 was	 it was said	 not to dispose of or agree to dispose of or export or agree to export any iron or steel except in accordance with the conditions contained or incorporated in the order of the Controller and that since there was liberty of contract between the parties but subject to restrictions	 the transaction could be regarded as a sale. It was observed at p. 489 : "But under clause 5 he can authorise a producer or a stockholder to dispose of any iron or steel whether the same is in stock or not in accordance with the conditions contained or incorporated in a sp ecial or general written order issued by him. In the instant case	 as can be gathered from the correspondence already referred to	 the order issued by the Controller could be complied with only after manufacturing the required material. Hence	 the order issued by the Controller could not have been issued under clause 10B." The Court then observed : ". . the area within which there can be bargaining between a prospective buyer and PA intending seller of steel products	 is greatly reduced. Both of them have to conform to the requirements of the order and to comply with the terms and conditions contained in the order of the Controller. Therefore they could negotiate only in respect of matters not controlled by the order or prescribed by the Controller. " The Court also observed : "It would be incorrect to contend that because law imposes some restrictions on freedom to contract	 there is no contract at all. So long as mutual assent is not completely excluded in any dealing	 in law it is a con tract. On the facts of this case for the reasons already 680 mentioned	 it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that nothing was left to be decided by mutual assent. " The Court in that case distinguished the case in M/s. New India Sugar Mills ' case( ') and expressly reserved their opinion on the question whether supplies of goods pursuant to the directions issued under cl. 10B of the Order may be regarded as sales. The decision in Indian Steel & Wire Products Ltd. 's case( ') does not justify the view that even if the liberty of contract in relation to the fundamentals of the transaction is completely excluded a transaction of supply of goods pursuant to directions issued under a Con trol Order may be regarded as a sale. In Andhra Sugars Ltd. & Anr. vs State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.(3) again	 in the view of the Court liberty of contract between parties to transactions relating to supply of sugarcane was not ruled out. Under the Andhra Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act	 1961	 the occupier of a sugar factory had to buy sugarcane from cane growers in conformity with the directions of the Cane Commissioner. Under section 21 of the Act the State Government had power to tax purchases of sugarcane for use	 consumption or sale in a sugar factory. Certain owners of sugar factories contended that "section 21 was invalid." They contended that they were compelled by law to buy cane from the cane growers	 and since purchases made by them were not under agreements	 the price paid for sugarcane could not be taxed under a statute enacted in exercise of the power in Entry 54 List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. This Court held that under Act 45 of 1961 and the rules framed thereunder	 the cane grower in the factory zone was free to make or not to make an offer of sale of cane to the occupier of the factory; if the cane grower made an offer	 the occupier of the factory was bound to accept it	 and the agreement resulting therefrom was recorded in writing and was signed by the parties. 		 The consent of the occupier of the factory was free as defined in section 14 of the Indian Contract Act. The compulsion of law is it was said not coercion as defined in section 15 of the Act. The agreements were enforceable by law and were regarded as contracts of sale as defined in section 4 of the Indian . In a later decision of this Court	 State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs M/s. Karam Chand `happar & Bros. Ltd.	 (4) the assessee who had acquired monopoly rights to supply coal in Rajasthan and sold coal to the State of Rajasthan. The Sales Tax Officer sought to (1) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 459. (3) ; 	 (2) ; (4) 	 681 tax the turnover from supplies of coal made to the State of Rajasthan. It was held by this Court that the colliery Control Order super imposed upon the agreement between the parties the rate fixed by the Control Order and by reason of such super imposition of the rate fixed by the Control Order the mutual assent of the parties and the voluntary character of the transactions were not affected. The decision of this Court ' in M/s. New India Sugar Mills ' case( ') was distinguished on the ground that there was in the case then in hand mutual assent between the parties	 to the transaction of supply of coal. The decision of the House of Lords in Kirkness (Inspector of Taxes) vs John Hudson & Co. Ltd.( ') is instructive. In that case liability to pay income tax on the difference between the compensation received for requisition of certain wagons by the Minister of Transport was in issue. A majority of the House held that there was no sale of the wagons and no income tax was payable. Viscount Simonds observed ". the taxpayers ' wagons were not sold	 and it would be a grave misuse of language to say that they were sold. To say of a man who has had his property taken from him against his will and been awarded compensation in the settlement of which he has had no voice	 to say of such a man that he has sold his property appears to me to be as far from the truth as to say of a man who has been deprived of his property without compensation that he has given it away. Alike in the ordinary use of language and in its legal concept	 a sale connotes the mutual assent of two parties. So far as the ordinary use of language is concerned	 it is difficult to avoid being dogmatic but	 for my part	 I can only echo what Singleton	 L.J.	 said in his admirably clear judgment (1954)1 All E.R. at page 32): "What would any one accustomed to the use of the words 'sale ' or 'sold ' answer ? It seems to me that every one must say 'the taxpayer did not sell '." " On the date of the commencement of the U.P. Wheat Procure ment (Levy) Order	 upon the licensed dealer was imposed a liability to deliver half the quantity of wheat on hand	 and he had also to supply to the State Government 50% of the quantity of wheat procured or purchased by him every day beginning with the date of commencement of the Order. If he failed to carry out the obligation he was liable to be penalized. To ensure that he carried out his obligation his premises were liable to be searched and (1) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 459. (2) 682 his property sequestered. The order ignored the volition of the dealer. We are unable to hold that there was any contract between the assessee and the State pursuant to which the goods were sold within the meaning of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The appeals are allowed. The order passed by the High Court is set aside. The answer to the two questions as reframed by us will be in the negative. The appellants will be entitled to their costs in this Court and in the High Court. One hearing fee. Y.P. Appeals allowed.

The	 assesses who were dealers in food grains supplied to the Regional Food Controller diverse quantities of wheat in compliance with the provisions of the U.P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order	 1959. The Sales tax Officer levied tax under the U.P. Sales tax Act on the aggregate of the price of wheat supplied by the assesses	 rejecting the assesses ' contention that the wheat supplied was not sold to the Controller. In appeal	 the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) Sales Tax held the supply was not taxable since there was no "sale" within the U.P. Sales tax Act. This order was confirmed by the Additional Judge (Revision) Sales Tax. On reference	 the High Court answered the question against the assesses. Allowing the assesses ' appeal by special leave	 this Court. HELD : The supply	 pursuant to cf. 3 of the U.P. Wheat Procurement (Levy) Order	 1959 and acceptance thereof	 does not result in a contract of sale. Clause 3 of the order sets up a machinery for compulsory acquisition by the State Government of stocks of wheat belonging to the licensed dealers. The Order contains a bald injunction to supply wheat of the specified quantity day after day	 and enacts that in default of compliance the dealer is liable to be punished; it does not envisage any consensual arrangement. To ensure	 that the dealer carries out his obligation his premises are liable to be searched and his property sequestered. The order does not require the State Government to enter into even an informal contract. Sale of goods predicates a contract of sale between persons competentto contract for a price paid or promised : a transaction. in which an obligation to supply goods is imposed	 and which does not involve an obligation to enter into a contract	 cannot be called a 'sale '	 even if the person supplying goods is declared entitled to the value of goods	 which is determined or determinable in the manner prescribed. Assuming that between the licensed dealer and the Controller	 there may be some arrangement about the place and manner of delivery of wheat	 and the payment of "controlled price	 the operation of cl. 3 does not on that account become contractual. [675 H 676 D] Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow vs Ram Bilas Ram Gopal, [1969] All. L.J. 424; State of Madras vs Gannon Dunkerlev and Co.,(Madras) Ltd; [1959]S.C.R. 379 M/s. New India Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, [1963] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 459; Indian Steel & Wire Products Ltd., vs State of Madras, ; ;Andhra Sugars Ltd. &Anr. vs State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. ; ; State ofRajasthan & Anr. vs M/s. Karan Chand Thappar & Bros. Ltd. [1969] IS.C.R. 861, Kirkness (inspector of Taxes) vs john Hudson & Co. Ltd., [1955] A.C. 696 referred to. 672 
2690	The appellant 's suit against the respondent for rendition of account and other reliefs was valued at Rs. 5,930/ for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction. The suit was decreed in part and the amount decreed was less. than the amount at which he stated his tentative valuation. He filed an appeal to the District Court stating the valuation for purposes of appeal at Rs. 4,880 '/ . The memorandum of appeal showed the valuation in the original suit and the court fee paid was the same amount as in the trial court. The District Court returned the memorandum of appeal for presentation to the proper court because, under section 39 '(1) of the Punjab Courts Act appeals above the value of Rs. 5,000/ had to filed before the High Court. The appeal was filed in the High Court the same day, but it was out of time. The appellant also filed a revision against the order of the District Court. His counsel placed reliance on r. 4 in Ch. 3 B of Vol. 1 of the Rules of the High Court which states that in a suit for the amount found due after taking accounts it is not the tentative valuation of the plaintiff but the amount found to be due and decreed by the court that determines the forum of appeal. " The High .Court held that there was no ground for extending time under section 5 of the Limitation Act and dismissed the appeal and also the revision. In appeal to this Court	 HELD: The High Court should have extended time under section 5 of the Limitation Act. [9 '4 A B] (i) The appellant did not have any underhand motive in filing the appeal before the District Court	 the filing had to be attributed entirely to the advice of his counsel. [93 A B] There is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground for condoning delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. [92 F G] In the present case the original valuation determined the court of lowest denomination before which the appeal from the suit had to go and that forum was the High Court. The counsel seems to have been misled by r. 4 in Ch. 3 B of Vol. 1 of the Rules and Orders of the High Court. This rule is applicable in a case where the amount decreed is larger than the amount for which the original suit was brought. It does not apply where the amount decreed is below the valuation in the original court. There is nothing in the case to show that the error committed by the counsel was tainted by any mala fide motive. [93 C F; 94 A]