Summarize the following court judgment. il Appeal No	. 1084 of 1976. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 6th September	 1976 of the Delhi High Court in C.R. No. 390/76 S.L. Bhatia and H.K. Puri for the Appellants. Pogeshwar Prasad and (Miss) Rani Arora and Meera Bali for Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD	 J. This appeal by special leave raises a question of some interest and importance for decision. The question is whether the provisions of the Slum Areas (Im provement and Clearance) Act	 96 of 1956	 override those of the Delhi Rent Control Act	 59 of 1958. If they do	 no person can institute any suit or proceeding for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area without the previous permission in writing of the competent authori ty. For the sake of brevity we will refer to these two enactments as the "Slum Clearance Act" and the "Delhi Rent Act" respectively. The respondent is a government servant employed in the Railway Ministry (Railway Board) and was in that capacity occupying quarters allotted to him by the Government at Nanakpura	 New Delhi. By a letter dated December 24	 1975 the Assistant Director of Estates called upon the respondent to vacate the quarters on or before December 31	 1975 on the ground that he owned a residential house and was	 therefore	 liable to vacate the premises allotted to. him by the Gov ernment. The respondent was paying to the Government a monthly rent of Rs. 65.05 but since he did not vacate the premises as required	 the Government started charging him after January 1	 1976 a monthly rent of Rs. 509.50 at the market rate. The respondent owns a house bearing No. 5014	 Ward No. XII	 at Roshanara Road	 New Delhi. A part of that house is in the occupation of the appellants at a monthly rent of Rs. 6.25. On being asked to vacate the official quarters	 the respondent gave to the appellants a notice to quit and followed it up by filing an application for eviction against them under section 14A of the Delhi Rent Act. On March 12	 1976 the appellants filed before the Rent Controllor 11 1546 SC1/76 424 an affidavit under section 25B(4) of the Delhi Rent Act	 setting out the grounds on which they sought to contest the applica tion for eviction and asking for leave to contest it. One of such grounds was that the application was not maintain able since the respondent had not obtained permission of the competent authority under section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act	 the house being situated in a slum area. By his order dated April 28	 1976 the Rent Controller rejected the application of the appellants for leave to contest the ejectment appli cation filed by the respondent. As a sequiter	 the Rent Controller passed an order on the same date stating that since the appellants ' application for leave to contest the ejectment application was rejected	 respondent was enti tled to a decree for eviction. The appellants were asked to hand over vacant possession of the premises to the respond ent within two months of the order. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision	 the appellants filed Civil Revision Application No. 390 of 1976 in the Delhi High Court	 under the proviso to section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Act. By reason of section 25B(8)	 no appeal or second appeal lies against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Rent Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in section 25B. The proviso confers power on the High Court	 for the purposes of satisfying itself that an order made by the Rent Controller under section 25B is according to law	 to call for the record of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. The revision application was heard by a learned single Judge of the High Court who	 following his own earlier judgment in Civil Revision Application No. 280 of 1976	 dismissed it	 giving rise to this appeal. A question was raised before the High Court as to wheth er at the relevant time the respondent was in occupation of the premises allotted to him by the Government	 but it was not disputed before us that he was in occupation of the premises allotted to him by the Government when he filed the present proceedings for eviction of the appellants. Thus	 the only question which arises before us is whether	 the premises being situated in the slum area	 the application for eviction filed by the respondent is not maintainable for the reason that before filing it he had not obtained permis sion of the competent authority as required by section 19(1) of the Slum Clearance Act. The landlord tenant relationship in Delhi was governed formerly by the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act	 38 of 1952. That Act	 in so far as it applied to the Union terri tory of Delhi	 was repealed by section 57 of the Delhi Rent Control Act	 59 of 1958. This latter Act was passed in order to provide a suitable machinery for expeditious adjudication of proceedings between landlords and tenants; to provide for the determination of standard rent payable by tenants; and to give to the tenants a large measure of protection against eviction. Section 14 of the Act of 1958 affords to tenants substantially the same measure of protec tion which was available to them under section 13 of the Act of 1952. 425 While the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act of 1952 was in force	 the Parliament enacted the 	 96 of 1956	 in order "to provide for the improvement and clearance of slum areas in certain Union territories" including Delhi	 and "for the protection of tenants in such areas from ' eviction". Section 19(1) of that Act	 as originally enacted	 made all decrees and orders for eviction of tenants in. slum areas unexecutable	 except with the previous permission in writing of the compe tent authority. The vires of section 19 was challanged in Jyoti Pershad vs The Administrator for the Union territory of Delhi(1) on the ground that it violated articles 14 and 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. The challenge was repelled by this Court on the ground that section 19 did not offend against the equal protection of laws guaranteed by article 14	 that section 19(1) gave enough guidance to the competent authority in the use of his discretion and that the restrictions imposed by section 19 could not be said to be unreasonable. Adverting to the non obstante clauses in secs. 19 (1) and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act and in sec. 38 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952	 the Court observed that the provisions of the former Act must	 in respect of buildings in slum areas	 operate in addition to the provisions of the latter Act. Section 19(1) of the Slum Clearance Act was amended by Act 43 of 1964 which came into force on February 28	 1965. Whereas under the unamended provision no person could exe cute any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a slum area without the previous permission in writing of the competent authority	 under the amended provision no person can	 except with such permission	 insti tute after the amendment any suit or proceeding for obtain ing any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area. If such a decree or order was obtained before the amendment it cannot be execut ed without the requisite permission. For a proper appreciation of the question involved in this appeal	 it is necessary to notice the relevant provi sions of the two Acts under consideration. We will refer first to the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act and then to those of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The former Act being of the year 1956 is anterior in point of time to the latter which was passed in 1958 but the more decisive provisions of the latter Act with which we are directly concerned in this appeal were incorporated in that Act in 1976. The relevant provisions of the Slum Clearance Act are these: "section 19. Proceedings for eviction of tenants not to be taken without permission of the competent authority. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force	 no person shall	 except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority	 (a) institute	 after the commencement of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clear ance) Amendment Act	 (1) ; 426 1964	 any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area; or (b) Where any decree or order is ob tained in any suit or proceeding instituted before such commencement for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in such area	 execute such decree or order. (2) Every person desiring to obtain the permission referred to in sub section (1) shall make an application in writing to the competent authority in such form and contain ing such particulars as may be prescribed. (3) On receipt of such application	 the competent authority	 after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard and after making such summary inquiry into the .circumstances of the case as it thinks fit	 shall by order in writing	 either grant or refuse to grant such permission. (4) In granting or refusing to grant the permission under sub section (3)	 the competent authority shall take into account the following factors	 namely : (a) whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted; (b) whether the eviction is in the inter est of improvement and clearance of the slum areas; (c) such other factors	 if any	 as may be prescribed. (5) where the competent authority re fuses to grant the	 permission	 it shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish a copy thereof to the applicant." "section 39. Act to override other laws. The provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shah have. effect not withstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. " Having noticed the relevant provisions of the Slum Clearance Act we must refer to the following provisions of the Delhi Rent Act: "section 14(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract	 no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant: Provided that the Controller may	 on an application made to him in the prescribed manner	 make an order for 427 the recovery of possession off the premises on one or more of the following grounds only	 namely : (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the land lord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him	 if he is the owner thereof	 or for any person for whose benefit the prem ises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; (6) Where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer	 no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under sub section (1) on the ground speci fied in clause (e) of the proviso thereto	 unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition. (7) Where an order for the recovery of possession of any premises is made on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub section (1) the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession there of before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order. " "section 14A. Right to recover immediate posses sion of premises to accrue to certain persons. (1) Where a landlord who	 being a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Gov ernment or any local authority is required by	 or in pursuance of	 any general or special order made by that Government or authority	 to vacate such residential accommodation	 or in default	 to incur certain obligations	 on the ground that he owns	 in the Union terri tory of Delhi	 a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent Child	 there shall accrue	 on and from the date of such order	 to such landlord	 notwithstanding anything con tained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether express or implied)	 custom or usage to the contrary	 a right to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him: . " "S.25A. Provisions of this Chapter to have overriding effect. The provisions of this Chapter or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law	 for the time being in force." "25B. Special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction. (1 ) Every application by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub section (1) of section 428 14	 or under section 14A	 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. (4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served (whether in the ordinary way or by registered post) in the form specified in the Third Schedule shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller as hereinafter provided; and in default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave	 the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affi davit filed by the tenant discloses. such facts ' as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of posses sion of the premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub section (1) of section 14	 or under section 14A. (6) Where leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application	 the Controller shall commence the hearing of the application as early as practicable . " "25C. Act to have effect in a modified form in relation to certain persons. (1) Nothing contained in sub section (6) of section 14 shall apply to a landlord who	 being a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority is required by	 or in pursuance of	 an order made by that Govern ment or authority to vacate such residential accommodation	 or	 in default	 to incur certain obligations	 on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or depend ent child in the Union territory of Delhi. (2) In the case of a landlord who	 being a person of the category specified in sub sec tion (1)	 has obtained	 on the ground speci fied in clause (e) of the proviso to sub section (1) of section 14	 or under section 14A	 an order for the eviction of a tenant from any premises	 the provisions of subsec tion (7) of section 14 shall have effect as if for the words "six months" occurring therein	 the words "two months" were substituted". "section 54. Nothing in this Act shah affect the provisions of the Administration of Evacu ee Property Act	 1950	 or the 	 429 1956	 or the Delhi Tenants ' (Temporary Protec tion) Act	 1956. " Sections 14A	 25A	 25B	 and 25C were introduced into the Delhi Rent Act by Ordi nance 24 of 1975 which came into force on December 1	 1975. The Ordinance was later replaced by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment)Act	 18 of 1976	 which was given effect from the date of the ordinance. Sec tions 25A	 25B and 25C are contained in a newly introduced chapter	 IIIA	 called "Sum mary Trial of Certain Applications". Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has raised the following points: (1) Section 14A of the Delhi Rent Act does nothing more than to. confer a right on a class of landlords to sue for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement	 which right was not available to that class under clause (e) of the proviso to section 14 of that Act. A person occupying premises allotted to him by the Government could not before the enactment of section 14A evict his own tenant because	 so long as he was in possession of the accom modation allotted to him by the Government he could not satisfy the requirement of clause (e) that he should have no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; (2) Since section 14A merely furnishes one more cause of action in addition to the existing ones for which a landlord can obtain possession of	 the premises let out by him	 there is no reason why the application of the Slum Clear ance Act should be excluded in regard to proceedings arising out of the right conferred by section 14A	 particularly when the right con ferred by the various clauses of the proviso to section 14(1) is plainly subject to the provi sions of the Slum Clearance Act; (3) Section 54 of the Delhi Rent Act expressly saves. the operation of the Slum Clearance Act and since section 14A is incorporated into the Delhi Rent Act	 the Slum Clearance Act would prevail over it; (4) In view of the non obstante clauses contained in sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clear ance Act and section 54 of the Delhi Rent Act	 every proceeding for eviction of a tenant under the Delhi Rent Act is subject to the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act; (5) The Slum Clearance Act being a special act	 the object of which is to afford an additional protection to tenants residing in slum areas	 its provisions must have precedence over the provisions of the Delhi Rent Act which is in the nature of a general enactment governing the landlord tenant relationship. The Slum Clearance Act applies only to notified locali ties in Delhi while the Delhi Rent Act is of general application to the entire territory of Delhi; (6) If it were intended that despite the provisions of section 54 of the Delhi Rent Act	 proceedings arising out of a right conferred by section 14A should not be subordinated to the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act	 nothing would have been easier for the legislature than to provide in section 14A itself or in the newly introduced Chapter IIIA that to such proceedings the provisions of the Slum Clear ance Act would have no application; and (7) To .deny precedence to the Slum Clearance Act over the Delhi Rent Act in matters arising out of section 14A or Chapter IIIA is to repeal the former Act by implication	 pro tanto. Law disfavours the doctrine of implied repeal. 430 Having considered these submissions carefully we are unable to accept any one of them. It would not be condu cive to an adequate exposition or a proper understanding of the issues involved in the case to consider the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants seriatim. The points raised by the appellants ' counsel are interdependent and since they depend for their validity on the thesis that the Slum Clearance Act must in any event have precedence over the Delhi Rent Act in all matters arising under the latter Act	 it would be helpful to deal straight away with that contention. Section 14A	 and Chapter IlI A containing sections 25A	 25B and 25C	 were introduced into the Delhi Rent Act by Ordi nance 24 of 1975 which was later replaced by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act	 18 of 1976. The amending Act was given effect from the date on which the ordinance was pub lished	 namely	 from December 1	 1975. By section 25B every application by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) or under section 14A has be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in the section. Section 25A	 which is the first of the collocation of sec tions appearing in Chapter IIIA	 provides that the provi sions of that Chapter or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law for the time being in force. The marginal note to section 25A reads: "provisions of this Chapter to have overriding effect." Section 25A may for convenience be split up into two parts	 ignoring for the present purpose the reference to rules made under Chapter IIIA. In the first place	 that section provides that. the provisions of Chapter IIIA con taining sections 25A	 25B and 25C shall have an overriding effect over every other provision of the Delhi Rent Act which is inconsistent with anything contained in Chapter IIIA. Secondly	 section 25A provides that the provisions of Chapter IIIA shall also have overriding effect over anything incon sistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. It is patent that by virtue of the first part of section 25A	 the provisions of Chapter IIIA must prevail over the provisions of section 54 of the Delhi Rent Act. The reason is that to the extent to which section 54 saves the opera tion of the Slum Clearance Act	 it is inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter IIIA which prescribes a special proce dure for dealing with applications for eviction filed under clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) or under section 14A of the Delhi Rent Act. It is equally clear that by reason of the second part of section 25A also	 the provisions of Chapter IIIA would prevail over those of the Slum Clearance Act. The reason is that the relevant provisions of that Act devise an over riding procedure by reason of which no suit or proceeding can be instituted without the previous permission in writing of the competent authority. Sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act are to that extent inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Act and have to be subordinated to it. The object of section 14A	 as shown by its marginal note	 is to confer a right on certain landlords to recover "immediate possession of premises" belonging to them and which are in the possession of their 431 tenants. In the significant language of the. marginal note	 such a right is "to accrue" to a class of persons. The same concept is pursued and clarified in the body of section 14A by providing that in the contingencies mentioned in the section	 a right will accrue to the landlord "to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him". The argument which was presented to us on the use of the word "immediately" in the body of section 14A has thus no substance. The right conferred by section 14A has to be enforced in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Chapter IIIA. That is the prescription of section 25B(1). In order expressly to exclude the operation of all provisions inconsistent with Chapter IIIA whether such provisions are contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law like the Slum Clearance Act	 section 25A was put on the statute book. That section gives an over riding effect to the provisions of Chapter IIIA. But the legislature did not rest content by providing merely that the procedural provisions contained in Chapter IIIA would have such over riding effect. It took the precaution of making an additional provision in section 14A itself that on and from the date of the order passed by the Central Government or any local authority calling upon a per son to vacate the residential accommodation allotted to him	 there shall accrue to such person a right to recover immediately the possession of any premises let out by him	 "notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether express or implied)	 custom or usage to the contrary . "The provisions of section 14A must	 there fore	 prevail over anything contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in the Slum Clearance Act. In December 1975 when Ordinance 24 of 1975 was promul gated and later when the ordinance was replaced by Act 18 of 1976 the legislature was cognisant that by reason of the provisions contained in section 54 Of the Delhi Rent Act and further by reason of those contained in sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act	 this latter Act would prevail over all other laws. As a result	 no proceeding could be insti tuted for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area nor could any decree or order be executed against the tenant of any such building or land	 without the previous permission in writing of the competent authority. The object of the legis lature in incorporating the non obstante clause both in sections 14A and 25A of the Delhi Rent Act was to free the proceed ings arising out of the right newly conferred by section 14A and falling within Chapter IIIA	 from the restraint imposed by section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act and from the operation of section 39 thereof. The reason for releasing such proceedings from the pre condition imposed by the Slum Clearance Act is that if the Government or the local authority asks a person to vacate the premises allotted to him by it on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child	 a provision ought to be made to enable such a person to obtain immedi ately the possession of his own house if it be in the occupation of a tenant. To subject this facility to the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act	 under which 432 the competent authority can grant the requisite permission only by applying the tests prescribed in section 19(4)	 would be to make illusory the right conferred by section 14A on the allot tee to obtain "immediate possession" of the premises let out by him to his tenant. It is with a view to making that right truly effective that the legislature gave it prece dence over anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Delhi Rent Act itself or in any other Act like the Slum Clearance Act. It is noteworthy that whereas section 25A gives an overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter IIIA over anything "inconsistent therewith" contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law for the time being in force	 section 14A does not qualify the overriding effect of what is contained therein	 that is in section 14A	 in reference to anything "inconsistent" therewith contained either in the Delhi Rent Act itself or in any other law. Section 14A provides that there shall accrue a right to the lanlord to recover immediately possession of any premises. let out by him notwithstanding "anything" contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law for the time being in force. In the context	 the word "anything" would ordinarily mean "anything to the contrary"	 but the point of the matter is that the legislature. has expressed its intention clearly and unequivocally in more than one way	 that the provisions of section 14A and Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Act would have precedence over anything else contained in that Act itself or in any other law. Section 25C contained in Chapter IIIA points in the same direction. Section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Act provides that where a landlord has acquired any premises by trans fer	 no application for the recovery of possession thereof shall lie under sub section (1) on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso thereto unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition. A person who acquires by allotment any premises from the Central Government or a local authority would	 by reason of section 14(6)	 be disabled .from asking for possession of his own house from his tenant under section 14A	 before the expiry of five years from the date of allotment. In order that the object of section 14A may not be frustrated	 section 25C provides that nothing contained in section 14(6) shall apply to a landlord who is in possession of premises allotted to him by the Central Government or a local authority and who is required to vacate that residential accommodation. Section 14(7) of the Delhi Rent Act provides that where an order for the recovery of possession is made on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub sec. (1)	 the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order. Sub section (2) of section 25C reduces the period of six months to 'two months	 which again emphasises that the object of the legislature is to confer a real	 effective and immediate right on a class of landlords to obtain possession of premises let out by them to their tenants. Whatever be the merits of that philosophy	 the theory is that an allottee from the Central Government or a local authority should not be at the mercy of law 's delays while being faced with instant eviction by his landlord save on payment of what in practice is penal rent. Faced with a Hobson 's choice	 to quit the official residence or pay the market rent for it	 the allottee had in turn to be afforded 433 a quick and expeditious remedy against his own tenant. With that end in view it was provided that nothing	 not even the Slum Clearance Act	 shall stand in the way of the allottee from evicting his tenant by resorting to. the summary proce dure prescribed by Chapter IIIA.The tenant is even de prived of the elementary right of a defendant to defend a proceeding brought against him	 save on obtaining leave of the Rent Controller. If the leave is refused	 by section 25B(4) the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord is entitled to an order for eviction. No appeal or second appeal lies against that order. Section 25B(8) denies that right and provides instead for a revision to the High Court whose jurisdiction is limited to finding out whether the order complained of is according to law. Speaking generally	 the object and purpose of a legisla tion assume greater relevance if the language of the law is obscure and ambiguous. But	 it must be stated that we have referred to the object of the provisions newly introduced into the Delhi Rent Act in 1975 nor for seeking light from it for resolving an ambiguity	 for there is none	 but for a different purpose altogether. When two or more laws oper ate in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause stating that its provisions will over ride those of any other law	 stimulating and incisive problems of inter pretation arise. Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol	 cases of such conflict have to be decided in reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration. A piquant situation	 like the one before us	 arose in Shri Ram Narain vs The Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd.	 (1) the competing statutes being the Banking Companies Act	 1949 as amended by Act 52 of 1953	and the Displaced persons (Debts Adjustment) Act	 1951. Sec tion 45A of the Banking Companies Act	 which was introduced by the amending Act of 1953	 and section 3 of the Displaced Persons Act 1951 contained each a non obstante clause	 providing that certain provisions would have effect "not withstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force . " This Court resolved the conflict by considering the object and purpose of the two laws and giving precedence to the Banking Companies Act by observing: "It is	 therefore	 desirable to determine the overriding effect of one or the other of the relevant provisions in these two Acts	 in a given case	 on much broader considerations of the purpose and policy under lying the two Acts and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein. "(p. 615). Asc indicated by us the special and specific purpose which motivated the enactment of section 14A and Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Act would be wholly frustrated if the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act requiring permission of the compe tent authority were to prevail over them. Therefore	 the newly introduced provisions of the Delhi Rent Act must hold the field and be given full effect despite anything to the contrary contained in the Slum Clearance Act. For resolving such inter se conflicts	 one other test may also be applied through the persuasive force of such a test is but one of the (1) ; 434 factors which combine to give a fair meaning to the language of the law. That test is that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one. Section 14A and Chapter IIIA having been enacted with effect from December 1	 1975 are later enactments in reference to section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act which	 in its present form	 was placed on the statute book with effect from February 28	 1965 and in reference to section 39 of the same Act	 which came into force in 1956 when the Act itself was passed. The legislature gave over riding effect to section 14A and Chapter IIIA with the knowledge that sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act contained non obstante clauses of equal efficacy. Therefore the later enactment must prevail over the former. The same test was mentioned with approval by this Court in Shri Ram Narain 's case (Supra) at page 615. Relying strongly on the finding at p. 151 in Jyoti Prasad 's case (supra) that "the provisions of the special enactment	 as the Act is	 will in respect of the buildings in areas declared slum areas operate in addition to the Rent Control Act	 counsel for the appellants argues that the question of precedence as between the two Acts is concluded by that decision and we must therefore hold that the con flicting provisions of the two Acts must operate together with equal efficacy, with the result that the previous permission of the competent authority under the Slum Clear ance Act must be obtained before instituting any proceeding under Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Act. This submission overlooks that in Jyoti Prasad 's case (supra) which was decided in 1961, the Court did not have before it the amendments introduced into the Delhi Rent Act by the amend ing Act of 1976, and therefore no question arose as to the effect of the non obstante clauses contained in sections 14A and 25A of the Delhi Rent Act. The decision is therefore not an authority for the proposition for which the appellants contend and the question arising before us cannot be held to be concluded by that decision. The argument of implied repeal has also no substance in it because our reason for according priority to the provi sions of the Delhi Rent Act is not that the Slum Clearance Act stands impliedly repealed protanto. Bearing in mind the language of the two laws, their object and purpose, and the fact that one of them is later in point of time and was enacted with the knowledge of the non obstante clauses in the earlier law, we have come to the conclusion that the provisions of section 14A and Chapter IIIA of the Rent Control Act must prevail over these contained in sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act We understand that the view which we are taking has been consistently taken by the learned Judges of the Delhi High Court in various cases. They are right in their conclusion and accordingly, we uphold the judgment of the High Court and dismiss this appeal. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. P.B.R. Appeal dismissed. 
2588	l Appeals Nos. 1477 to 1479 of 1968. Appeals from the judgment and order dated November 30, 1964 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Case Referred No. 49 of 1962. S.T. Desai and K. Jayaram, for the appellant (in all the appeals). D.Narsaraju, G. C. Sharma, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent (in all the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought by certificate from the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, dated 30th November, 1964 in Reference Case No. 49 of 1962. N. V. Rangarao, the father of the appellant, was the holder of an impartible estate called the Munagala Estate" in the Krishna District in the State of Andhra Pradesh. This estate was abolished under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act	 1948	 and compensation under ' section 45 of the Act was paid severally to the appellant	 his father and his brothers. Other properties belonging to the joint family of the appellant	 his father and brothers were also partitioned between them from time to time. The assets forming the subject of reference to the High Court consisted of investments made from the compensation amount received by the appellant in securities	 shares etc. and also other assets such as deposits in Banks. The appellant filed returns for the assessment years 1957 58	 1958 59 and 1959 60 in the status of a Hindu Undivided Family. The appellant 's family during the material time consisted of himself	 his wife and his two minor daughters and there was no other male member. The appellant claimed to be assessed in the status of a Hindu Undivided Family inasmuch as the wealth returned consisted of ancestral property received or deemed to have been received by him on partition with his father and brothers. The Wealth Tax Officer did not accept the contention of the appellant and assessed him as an individual for the assessment years 1957 58	 1958 59 and 1959 60. On appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax the finding that he must be assessed as an individual was confirmed. L 11 Sup. CI/69 7 884 The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal however on appeal by the appellant held that he should be assessed in the status of a Hindu Undivided Family. Thereupon	 the Commissioner of Wealth Tax applied to the Tribunal to state a case to the High Court under section 27(1) of the Wealth Tax Act (Act No. 27 of 1957) (hereinafter called the Act). The Tribunal accordingly referred the following question of law for the opinion of the High Court : "Whether the status of the assessee was rightly determined as Hindu Undivided Family ?" The High Court disagreed with the view of the Appellate Tri bunal and hold that as the appellant 's family did not have any other male coparcener all the assets forming the subject matter of the returns filed by the appellant belonged to him as an individual and not to a Hindu Undivided Family. The High Court answered the question in favour of the appellant and against the Commissioner of Wealth Tax. It is necessary at this stage to set out the relevant provisions of the Act as they stood at the material time : "Section 2 : In this Act	 unless the context otherwise requires (e)"assets" includes property of every description	 movable or immovable	 but does not include (i) agricultural land and growing crops	 grass or standing trees on such land; (ii) any building owned or occupied by a cultivator or receiver of rent or revenue out of agricultural land (iii)animals; (ix)a right to any annuity in any case of where the terms and conditions relating thereto preclude the commutation of any portion thereof into a lump sum grant; (v)any interest in property where the interest is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years; (m)"net wealth" means the amount by which the aggregate value computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act of all the assets	 wherever located	 885 belonging to the assesses on the valuation date	 including assets required to be included in his net wealth as on that date under this Act	 is in excess of the aggregate value of all the debts owed by the assesses on the valuation date other than	 (i)debts which under section 6 are not to be taken into account; and (ii)debts which are secured on	 or which have been incurred in relation to	 any asset in respect of which wealth tax is not payable under this Act. Section 3 Charge of Wealth tax Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act	 there shall be charged for every financial year commencing on and from the first day of April	 1957	 a tax (hereinafter referred to as wealth tax) in respect of every individual	 Hindu Undivided Family and company at the rate or rates specified in the Schedule. Section 5 : Exemption in respect of certain assets: (i)Wealth tax shall not be payable by an assesses in respect of the following assets and such assets shall not be included in the net wealth of the assessee (ii)the interest of the assessee in the coparcenary property of any Hindu Undivided Family of which he is a member". Under section 3 of the Wealth Tax Act not a Hindu coparcenary but a Hindu Undivided Family is one of the assessable legal en tities. A Hindu joint family consists of all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor	 and includes their wives and unmarried daughters. A Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body than the Hindu joint family; it includes only those persons who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property	 these being the sons	 grand sons and great grand sons of the holder of the joint property for the time being. In Kalyanji Vithaldas vs Commissioner of Income Tax	(1) Sir George Rankin observed : "The phrase "Hindu Undivided Family" is used in the statute with reference	 not to one school only of (1) 886 Hindu law	 but to all schools; and their Lordships think it a mistake in method to begin by pasting over the wider phrase of the Act the words "Hindu co parcenary"	 all the more that it is not possible to say on the face of the Act that no female can be a member". The first question involved in this case is whether the status of the appellant was that of a Hindu undivided family consisting of himself	 his wife and his daughters. In our opinion	 there is no warrant for the contention of the respondent that there must be at least two male members to form a Hindu Undivided Family as a taxable unit. The expression "Hindu Undivided Family" in the Wealth Tax Act is used in the sense in which a Hindu joint family is understood in the personal law of Hindus. Under the Hindu system of law a joint family may consist of a single male member and his wife and daughters and there is nothing in the scheme of the Wealth Tax Act to suggest that a Hindu Undivided Family as an assessable unit must consist of at least two male members. The next question is whether the assets which came to the share of the appellant on partition ceased to bear the character of joint family properties and became the individual property in his hands. In this connection	 a distinction must be drawn between two classes of cases where an assesses	 is sought to be assessed in respect of ancestral property held by him : (1) where property not originally joint is received by the assessee and the question has to be asked whether it has acquired the character of a joint family property in the hands of the assessee and (2) where the property already impressed with the character of joint family property comes into the hands of the assessee as a single coparcener and the question required to be considered is whether it has retained the character of joint family property in the hands of the assessee or is converted into absolute property of the assessee. In Kalyanjis(1) case there were six appeals presented before the Judicial Committee by six partners of the firm of M/s. Moolji Sicka and Co.	 viz.	 Moolji	 Purshottam	 Kalyanji	 Chaturbhuj	 Kanji and Sewdas. Moolji	 Purshottam and Kalyanji each had a son or sons from whom he was not divided. It was found by the appellate tribunal that the capital supplied by them to the partnership business belonged to them in their individual capacities and was their self acquired property. Hence the income of the firm which had to be assessed to super tax was the separate income of each of these partners. Chaturbhuj had a wife and daughter but no son. Kanji and Sewdas	 sons	 of Moolji	 were married men but neither had a son. It was found by the appellate tribunal that Chaturbhuj Kanji and Sewdas had (1) 887 received by gift from Moolji their respective share capital in the firm	 that the	 share capital belonged to them in their individual capacities and was self acquired. The question at issue was whether the existence of a son and a wife or a wife and a daughter made the income of the partners the income of the Hindu Undivided Family rather than the income of the individual partner. The Judicial Committee held that though the income was from an ancestral source	 the fact that each partner had a wife or daughter did not make that income from ancestral source income of the Hindu Undivided Family of the partner	 his wife and daughter. Different considerations would be applicable	 where property already impressed with the character of joint family property comes into the hands of a single coparcener. The question to be asked in such a case is whether the property retains the character of joint family property or whether it sheds the character of joint family property and becomes the absolute property of the single coparcener. In Commissioner of Income Tax vs Gomedalli Lakshminarayan	(1) the property was ancestral in the hands of the father and the son had acquired an interest in it by birth. There was a subsisting Hindu Undivided Family during 'the life time of the father and that family did not come to an end on his death. On these facts	 the Bombay High Court held that the income received from the property was liable to super tax as the income of the Hindu Undivided Family in the hands of the son who was the sole surviving male member of the Hindu Undivided Family in the year of assessment. The reasoning was that the property from which income accrued originally belonged to a Hindu Undivided Family and on the death of the father it did not cease to be property of that Hindu Undivided Family but continued to belong to that Hindu Undivided Family and its income in the hands of the son was	 therefore	 assessable as income of the Hindu Undivided Family. There was a vital distinction between the facts of this case and the facts in Kalyanjis case(1). This distinction was not noticed by the Judicial Committee in Kalyanji 's case(2) when it observed that the Bombay High Court "arrived too readily at the conclusion that the income was the income of the family". When Gomedalli 's case(1) was carried on appeal the Judicial Committee once again failed to notice the distinction and wrongly reversed the decision of the Bombay High Court holding that the facts of the case were not materially different from the facts in Kalyanji 's case(2) [See the decision of the Judicial Committee in Commissioner of Income Tax vs A. P. Swamy Gomedalli(3)]. (1)(1935) (2) (3) 888 The recent decision of the Judicial Committee in Attorney General of Ceylon vs AR. Arunachalam Chettiar(1) is important	. One Arunachalam Nattukottai Chettiar and his son constituted a joint family governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. The father and son were domiciled in India and had trading and other interests in India	 Ceylon and Far Eastern countries. The undivided son died in 1934 and Arunachalam became the sole surviving coparcener in the Hindu Undivided Family to which a number of female members belonged. Arunachalam died in 1938 shortly after the Estate Ordinance No. 1 of 1938 came into operation in Ceylon. By section 73 of the Ordinance it was provided that property passing on the death of a member of the Hindu Undivided Family was exempt from payment of estate duty. On a claim to estate duty in respect of Arunachalam 's estate in Ceylon	 the Judicial Committee held that Arunachalam was at his death a member of the Hindu Undivided Family	 the same undivided family of which his son	 when alive	 was a member and of which the continuity was preserved after Aruna chalam 's death by adoptions made by the widows of the family and since the undivided Hindu family continued to persist	 the property in the hands of Arunachalam as a single coparcener was the property of the Hindu Undivided Family. The Judicial Committee observed at page 543 of the Report ". . .though it may be correct to speak of him as the owner '	 yet it is still correct to describe that which he owns as the joint family property. For his ownership is such that upon the adoption of a son it assumes a different quality; it is such	 too	 that female members of the family (whose members may increase) have a right to maintenance out of it and in some circumstances to a charge for maintenance upon it. And these are incidents which arise	 notwithstanding his so called ownership	 just because the property has been and has not ceased to be joint family property. Once again their Lordships quote from the judgment of Gratiaen	 J. (2) "To my mind it would make a mockery of the undivided family system if this temporary reduction of the coparcenary unit to a single individual were to convert what was previously joint property belonging to an undivided family into the separate property of the surviving coparcener". To this it may be added that it would not appear reasonable to impart to the legislature the intention to discriminate	 so long as the family itself subsists	 between property in the hands of a single copar (1) (2) (1953) 55 C.N.L.R. 496 501. 889 cener and that in the hands of two or more coparceners". The Judicial Committee rejected the contention of the appellant that since a single coparcener had full power over the property 	held by him	 he must be held to be the absolute owner and observed that fact that he possesses a large power of alienation ". . . appears to their Lordships to be an irrelevant consideration. Let it be assumed that his power of alienation is unassailable : that means no more than that he has in the circumstances the power to alienate joint family property. That is what it is until he alienates it and	 if he does not alienate it	 that is what it remains. It is only by analysing the nature of the rights of the members of the undivided family	 both those in being and those yet to be born	 that it can be determined whether the family property can properly be described as joint property ' of the undivided family. "(1) The basis of the decision was that the property which was the joint family property of the Hindu Undivided Family did not cease to be so because of the "temporary reduction of the coparcenary unit to a single individual". The character of the property	 viz.	 that it was the joint property of a Hindu Undivided Family	 remained the same. The same principle was applied by this Court in Gowali Bud danna 's (2 ) case. In that case	 one Buddappa	 his wife	 his two unmarried daughters and his unmarried son	 Budanna	 were members of a Hindu Undivided Family. Buddappa died and after his death the question arose whether the income of the properties held by Buddanna as the sole surviving coparcener was assessable as the individual income of Buddanna or as the income of the Hindu Undivided Family. It was held by this Court that since the property which came into the hands of Buddanna as the. sole surviving coparcener was originally joint family property	 it did not cease to belong to the joint family and income from it was assessable in the hands of Buddanna as income of the Hindu Undivided Family. In the course of the judgment Shah	 J. speaking for the Court examined the decision of the Judicial Committee in Kalyanji 's case(") and Gomedalli 's (4 ) and pointed out that there was a clear distinction between the two classes of cases : "It may however be recalled that in Kalyanji Vithaldas 's case(3) the income assessed to tax belonged separately to four out of six partners; of the remaining two (1) (2) (3) (4) 890 it was from an ancestral source	 but the fact that each such partner had a wife or daughter did not make that income from an ancestral source income of the undivided family of the partner	 his wife and daughter. In Gomedalli Lakshminarayan 's case(1)	 the property from which income accrued belonged to a Hindu Undivided Family and the effect of the death of the father	 who was a manager	 was merely to invest the rights of a manager upon the son. The income from the property was and continued to remain the income of the undivided family. This distinction	 which had a vital bearing on the issue falling to be determined	 was not given effect to by the Judicial Committee in A. P. Swami Gomedalli 's case(1). At page 302 Shah	 J. referred to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Arunachalam 's (2) case and concluded as follows: "Property of a joint family	 therefore	 does not cease to belong to the family merely because the family is represented by a single coparcener who possesses rights which an owner of property may posesss. In the case in hand the property which yielded the income originally belonged to a Hindu Undivided Family. On the death of Budappa	 the family which included. a widow and females	 born in the family was represented by Buddanna alone	 but the property still continued to belong to that undivided family and income received therefrom was taxable as income of the Hindu undivided family". In the present case the property which is sought to be taxed in the hands of the appellant originally belonged to the Hindu Undivided Family belonging to the appellant	 his father and his brothers. There were joint family properties of that Hindu Undivided Family when the partition took place between the appellant	 his father and his brothers and these properties came to the share of the appellant and the question presented for determination is whether they ceased to bear the character of joint family properties and became the absolute properties of the appellant. As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Arunachalam 's case(2) "it is only by analysing the nature of the rights of the members of the undivided family	 both those in being and those yet to be born	 that it can be determined whether the family property can properly be described as "joint property of the undivided family". Applying this test it is clear that	 though in the absence of male issue the dividing coparcener may be properly described in a sense as the owner of the properties	 that upon the adoption of a son or birth of a son to him	 it would assume a different quality. It con (1) (2) 891 tinues to be ancestral property in his hands as regards his male issue for their rights hid already attached upon it I and the partition only cuts off the claims of the dividing coparceners. The father and his male issue still remain joint. The same rule would apply even when a partition had been made before the birth of the male issue or before a son is adopted	 for the share which is taken at a partition by one of the coparceners is taken by him as representing his branch. Again the ownership of the dividing coparcener is such "that female members of the family may have a right to maintenance out of it and in some circumstances to a charge for maintenance upon it". (See Arunachalam 's(1) case). It is evident that these are the incidents which arise because the properties have been and have not been ceased to be joint family properties. It is no doubt true that there was a partition between the assessee	 his wife and minor daughters on the one hand and his father and brothers on the other hand. But the effect of partition did not affect the character of these properties which did not cease to be joint family properties in the hands of the appellant	 Our conclusion is that when a coparcener having a wife and two minor daughters and no son receives his share of the joint family properties on partition	 such property in the hands of the coparcener belongs to the Hindu Undivided Family of himself	 his wife and minor daughters and cannot be assessed as his individual property. It is clear that the present case falls within the ratio of the decision of this Court in Gowali Buddanna 's case (2) and the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the status of the respondent was that of a Hindu Undivided Family and not that of an individual. On behalf of the respondent reference was made to the decision of this Court in T. section Srinivasan vs Commissioner of 'Income Tax(3)	 and it was contended that the decision proceeded on the basis that property received by the coparcener on partition cannot be regarded as property of a Hindu Undivided Family if he has merely a wife or daughter and no son. It is therefore necessary to examine the material facts and find out what is the ratio decidendi of that case. The appellant was a member of the Hindu Undivided Family with his father and brothers. As a result of partial partition of properties belonging to the Hindu Undivided Family the appellant received certain shares and with tsese shares as nucleus he acquired house properties	 shares and deposits. His first son was born on 11 th December	 1952 and it was common ground that the conception of the child must have taken place some time in March	 1952. For the assessment year 1953 54 the relevant accounting year being the financial year 1st April 1952 to 31st March	 1953	 the (1) (2) (3) 8 92 appellant claimed that the income from the assets should be assessed in the hands of the Hindu Undivided Family consisting of himself and his son which	 according to him	 had come into existence in or about March	 1952 when the son was conceived. The Income Tax Officer recognised the Hindu Undivided Family only from the date of the birth of the son	 viz. 11th December	 1952 and assessed the income till 11th December	 1952 in the hands of the appellant as an individual. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal upheld this view on appeal. Before the High Court the question debated was whether the Hindu Undivided Family came into existence in or about March 1952 when the son was conceived and whether the assesses could be assessed in the status of an individual for any part of the relevant accounting year. 	 The question was answered against the assessee by the High Court. The assessee appealed to this Court and the contention of the appellant was that according to the doctrine of Hindu law a son conceived is in the same position as a son actually in existence. The argument was rejected by this Court which held that the Hindu Undivided Family did not come into existence on the conception of the son as claimed by the appellant	 but came into being when the son was actually born. It was suggested on behalf of the respondent that the decision of this case must be taken to be implicitly	 if not explicitly that there was no Hindu Undivided Family prior to the date of the birth of the son. But we do not think that any such implication can be raised. The case of the appellant throughout the course of the proceedings was that the Hindu Undivided Family came into existence for the first time in or about March	 1952 when the son was conceived and it was not his case at any time that a Hindu Undivided Family was in existence prior to the conception of the son. Indeed	 it was common ground between the parties that there was no Hindu Undivided Family in existence prior to the conception of the son. The only dispute was whether the Hindu Undivided Family came into existence for the first time when the son was conceived as claimed by the assessee or whether it came into existence when the son was born as claimed by the Income Tax Department. The appellant relied on the doctrine of Hindu law that the son conceived is in the same position as the son born and the respondent contended that this doctrine was inapplicable. That was the only question raised before this Court which it was called upon to decide and which in fact it decided. The question whether there was in any event even without a son conceived or born	 a Hindu Undivided Family consisting of the appellant and his wife and whether the properties received on partition belonged to that Hindu Undivided Family was neither raised nor argued before this Court which had no occasion to consider it. The decision of T. section Srini 893 vasan 's case(1) has therefore no bearing on the question now presented for determination in the present case. For the reasons already.expressed we hold that the status of the appellant was rightly determined as that of a Hindu Un divided Family by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the question of law referred to the High Court must be answered ill the affirmative and against the Commissioner of Wealth Tax. These appeals are accordingly allowed with costs. One hearing fee.

Section 19 of the Slum Areas (improvement and Clear ance) Act 1956 provides that notwithstanding anything con tained in any other law for the time being in force	 no person shall	 except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority	 institute any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a slum area. Section 39 enacts that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwith standing anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. Section 14A and Chapter IIIA called "Summary Trial of certain applications" containing sections 25A	 25B and 25C were introduced into the Delhi Rent Control Act with effect from December 1	 1975. Section 14A provides that where the landlord who	 being in occupation of residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government	 was required to vacate such residential accommodation on the ground that he Owns residential accommodation within the Union Territory	 there shall accrue to such landlord	 not withstanding anything contained in the Act or any other law for the time being in force	 a right to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him. Section 25A provides (i) that the provisions of Chapter IlIA shall have an over riding effect over every other provision of the Delhi Rent Act which is inconsistent with anything con tained in Chapter IIIA and (ii) that the provisions of Chapter IIIA shall have over riding effect over anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. Section 25 B prescribes special procedure for the disposal of appli cations for eviction. Section 54 provides that nothing in the Act shall affect the provisions of the . The respondent who was allotted government quarters in New Delhi was called upon by the Government to vacate the quarters on the ground that he owned a residential house in Delhi. Since he did not vacate the quarters before the time given he was asked to pay a high penal rent. His application under section 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act for eviction of the appellants	 who were the tenants of the premises	 was contested by them on the ground that since the house had been situated in a slum area	 the respondent was not entitled to possession because he had not obtained permission of the competent authority under section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act. This plea was rejected. Their revision application was rejected by the High Court. In appeal it was contended that the Slum Clearance Act being a special Act	 its provisions must have precedence over the provisions of the Delhi Rent Act and to deny prece dence to the former Act In matters arising out of section 14A and Chapter IIIA was to repeal that Act by implication. Dismissing the appeal	 HELD: The provisions of section 14A and Chapter IlIA of the Rent Control Act must prevail over those contained in sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act. [434 G] 1 (a) By virtue of the first part of section 25A	 the provi sions of Chapter IIIA must prevail over the provisions of section 54 of the Delhi Rent Act. To the extent 422 to which section 54 saves the operation of the Slum Clearance Act	 it is inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter IlIA which prescribes a special procedure for dealing with appli cations for eviction filed under cl. (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) or under section 14A of the Delhi Rent Act [430 F] (b) By virtue of the second part of section 25A also the provisions of Chapter IlIA would prevail over those of the Slum Clearance Act. Sections 19 and 391 of the Slum Clear ance Act are to that extent inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by Chapter IlIA of the Delhi Rent Act and have to be subordinated to it. [430 G] 2(a) The object of section 14A is to confer a right on certain landlords to recover "immediate possession of premises" belonging to them and which are in the possession of their tenents. such a right is "to accrue" to a class of persons. The same concept is clarified by providing that in the contingencies mentioned in the section	 a right will accure to the landlord "to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him." [430 H] (b) The provisions of section 14A must prevail over anything contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in the Slum Clearance Act. Section 25B(1) prescribes that the right conferred by section 14A has to be enforced in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Chapter ILIA. Section 25A gives an overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter ILIA. [431 E] 3(a) The Legislature has expressed its intention clearly and unequivocally that the provisions of section 14A and Chapter IIIA would have precedence over anything else contained in that Act or in any other law. The object of the Legisla ture in incorporating the non obstante clause both in section 14A and section 25A of the Delhi Rent Act was to free the proceedings arising out of the right newly conferred by section 14A and falling within Chapter IlIA from the restraint imposed by section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act and from the operation of section 39 thereof. To subject that facility to the provision of the Slum Clearance Act would be to make illusory the right conferred by section 14A on the allottee to obtain "immediate possession" of the premises let out by him to his tenant. [432D & 431F] (b) While section 25A gives an overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter IlIA over anything "inconsistent therewith" contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law	 section 14A does not qualify the over riding effect of what is contained therein i.e. in section 14A in refer ence to anything inconsistent therewith contained either in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law. The word 'anything ' occuring in "now withstanding anything contained" elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act would ordinarily mean "anything to the contrary". [432B C] (c) In order that the object of section 14A may not be frustrat ed	 section 25C provides that nothing contained in section 14(6) shall apply to a landlord who is in possession of the premises allotted to him by the Central Government and who is re quired to vacate that residential accommodation. Section 25C(2) reduces the period of six months prescribed under section 14(7) for recovery of possession of the premises to two months which emphasises that the object of the Legislature is to confer real	 effective and immediate right on a class of landlords to obtain possession of premises let out by them to their tenents.[432F H] (4) To afford a quick and expeditious remedy against the tenant the Act provided that nothing	 not even the Slum Clearance Act	 shall stand in the way of an allottee of Government accommodation from evicting his tenant by resort ing to the summary procedure prescribed by Chapter IIIA. The tenant is deprived of the right to defend a proceeding against him and to appeal or second appeal lies against the order of the Rent Controller. The jurisdiction of the High Court m revision is limited to finding out whether the order complained of is according to law. [433A B] (5(a) When two or more laws oVerate in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause	 cases of conflict have to be decided in. reference to the object and purpose of the law under consideration In the instant case	 the 423 special and specific purpose which motivated the enactment of section 14A and Chapter IIIA would be frustrated if the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act were to prevail over them. Therefore	 the newly introduced provisions of the Delhi Rent Act must hold the field and be given full effect despite anything to the country contained in the Slum Clear ance Act. [433 D & G] Sri Ram Narain vs The Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd. [1956] S.C.R. followed. (b) Yet another test is that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one. Section 14A and Chapter IlIA having been enacted with effect from December 1	 1975 are later enactments in reference to section 19 of the Slum Clear ance Act which was placed on the statute book with effect from February 28	 1965 and i.n reference to section 39 of the same Act which came into force in 1956 when the Act was passed. The Legislature gave overriding effect to section 14 A and Chapter IlIA with the knowledge that sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act contained non obstante clauses of equal efficacy. [434A B]