Summarize the following court judgment. : Special Leave Petition (Crl.) 2599 of 1979. From the Judgment and Order dated 9 7 1979 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl. A. 1228/1976. section K Sabharwal and R.C. Kohli for the petitioner. The order of the Court was delivered by	 KRISHNA IYER	 J	 A rapist if the concurrent findings of the courts below were correct has chosen to seek special leave to challenge his crime and punishment	 and his counsel has attacked the verdict of culpability as wholly unfounded. Indeed	 it is redundant	 and absent exceptional circumstances	 out of bounds	 for this Court	 exercising its jurisdiction under article 136	 to launch upon an exploration and re appreciation of the evidence	 its strengths and weaknesses with a view to sit in judgment over the holdings of the High Court in affirmance of those of the trial Court. Briefly	 we will touch upon one or two circumstances without claiming to be exhaustive in any manner. One Shashi Bala of Ambala was sleeping	 with her mother and other children	 outside her house in hot July (1975). The petitioner	 in the company of another (acquitted accused)	 carried her away under intimidation to a neighbouring godown belonging to one Tilak Raj (another acquitted accused) and in that secluded venue committed rape on the young women. After subjecting her to these beasteal acts of lust	 Shashi Bala	 who by then was nearly unconscious	 was put back in her cot from where she had been removed. In the morning	 the mother of the victim found blood on the daughter 's salwar and thereupon she complainingly narrated the criminal assault of the previous night. On the return of the father	 P.W. 7	 who had been away	 the victim went	 in his company	 to the police station	 lodged a report which was followed by investigation and charge sheet. The Court	 after a trial	 convicted the present petitioner but	 on grounds of benefit of doubt	 acquitted the rest. Medical evidence showed that the raped girl was below 16 years of age. We are not too happy about the acquittal but since the State has not chosen to come up in appeal against the acquittal	 we do not probe the matter further. Counsel for the petitioner persistently urged that the evidence of the prosecutrix	 without substantial corroboration	 was inadequate to rest a conviction under section 376 I.P.C. He relied on observations of this Court in Gurucharan Singh vs State of Haryana for the pro 307 position that although a prosecutrix is not an accomplice	 her evidence	 as a rule of prudence	 is viewed by courts unfavourably unless reinforced by corroboration "so as to satisfy its conscience that she is telling the truth and that the present accused of rape on her has not been falsely implicated". It is true that old English cases	 followed in British Indian courts	 had led to a tendency on the part of judge made law that the advisability of corroboration should be present to the mind of the Judge "except where the circumstance make it safe to dispense with it". Case law	 even in those days	 had clearly spelt out the following propositions: "The tender years of the child	 coupled with other circumstances appearing in the case	 such	 for example as its demeanour	 unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth	 may render corroboration unnecessary but that is a question of fact in every case. The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must	 in every case	 be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed	 to stand." "It would be impossible	 indeed it would be dangerous to formulate the kind of evidence which should	 or would	 be regarded as corroboration. Its nature and extent must necessarily vary with circumstances of each case and also according to the particular circumstances of the offence charged. " Observations on probative force of circumstances are not universal laws of nature but guidelines and good counsel. We must bear in mind human psychology and behavioural probability when assessing the testimonial potency of the victim 's version. What girl would foist a rape charge on a stranger unless a remarkable set of facts or clearest motives were made out? The inherent bashfulness	 the innocent naivete and the feminine tendency to conceal the outrage of masculine sexual aggression are factors which are relevant to improbabilise the hypothesis of false implication. The injury on the person of the victim	 especially her private parts	 has corroborative value. Her complaint to her parents and the presence of blood on her clothes are also testimony which warrants credence. More than all	 it baffles belief in human nature that a girl sleeping with her mother and other children in the open will come by blood on her garments and injury in her private parts unless she has been subjected to the torture of rape. And if rape has been committed	 308 as counsel more or less conceded	 why	 of all persons in the world	 should the victim hunt up the petitioner and point at him the accusing finger? To forsake these vital considerations and go by obsolescent demands for substantial corroboration is to sacrifice commonsense in favour of an artificial concoction called 'Judicial ' probability. Indeed	 the court loses its credibility if it rebels against realism. The law court is not an unnatural world. We are not satisfied that merely because the trial court has ultra cautiously acquitted someone	 the higher court must	 for that reason	 acquit everyone	 Reflecting on this case we feel convinced that a socially sensitised judge is a better statutory armour against gender outrage than long clauses of a complex section with all the protections writ into it. N.V.K. Petition dismissed.

The prosecution alleged that a girl below 16 years of age was sleeping outside her house with her family and that the petitioner in the company of another (acquitted accused) carried her away under intimidation to a neighbouring godown belonging to another acquitted accused and in that secluded venue committed rape on the young woman and afterwards put her back on her cot. The trial court convicted the petitioner but on grounds of benefit of doubt acquitted the other accused. The High Court affirmed this order. In the special leave petition to this Court	 it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the evidence of the prosecutrix without substantial corroboration	 was inadequate to rest a conviction under section 376 IPC. Dismissing the special leave petition	 ^ HELD 1. To forsake vital consideration and go by obsolete demands for substantial corroboration is to sacrifice commonsense in favour of an artificial concoction called 'judicial ' probability. [308A] 2. Human psychology and behavioural probability must be borne in mind when assessing the testimonial potency of the victim 's version. What girl would foster rape charges on a stranger unless a remarkable set of facts or cleanest motives are made out? The inherent bashfulness	 the innocent naivete and the feminine tendency to conceal the outrage of masculine sexual aggression are factors which are relevant to improbabilise the hypothesis of false implication. The injury on the person of the victim has corroborative value. [307G] 3. The court loses its credibility if it rebels against realism. The law court is not an unnatural world. [308 B] 4. Merely because the trial court has ultra cautiously acquitted someone	 the higher court must	 for that reason	 cannot acquit everyone. [308C] 5. A socially sensitized judge is a better statutory armour against gender outrage than long clauses of a complex section with all the protections writ into it. [308C] 6. Observation on probative force of circumstances are not universal laws of nature but guidelines and good counsel. [307 F] Gurcharan Singh vs State of Haryana ; referred to. 306