Summarize the following court judgment. n No. 378 of 1969. Petition under article 32 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. D. P. Singh	 for the petitioner. G. section Chatterjee for Sukumar Basu	 for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde	 J. In this petition under article 32 of the Constitution submitted from jail	 the petitioner seeks a writ of habeas .corpus directing his release from detention. We have already directed the release of the petitioner on 15 12 1969. Now we proceed to give our reasons in support of that order. The petitioner was ordered to be detained by the Commis sioner of Police	 Calcutta under section 3(2) of the (Act IV of 1950) by his order dated July 15	 361 1969. It is stated in that order that the petitioner was ordered to be detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order". That order was confirmed by the State Government after the same was approved by the Advisory Board. From the grounds served on the petitioner	 it appears that his detention was ordered because of the three instances mentioned therein. It is said therein that on 28 2 1968 between 9 50 p.m. and 10 30 p.m. the	 petitioner armed with a knife along with some others	 also armed	 created disturbance on the Northern Avenue in the course of which he attacked the local people with knife as a result of which one Ajit Kumar Biswas sustained stab injuries. It is further alleged that during that incident	 the petitioner and his associates hurled sodawater bottles and brickbats towards the local people endangering their lives and safety and thereby they created. fear and frightfulness amongst the people of the locality and thus affected public peace 	and tranquillity of the locality. The second incident mentioned therein is that on 29 10 1968 at about 9 10 p.m. the petitioner being armed with bombs and accompanied by	 some other created disturbance on Raja Manindra Road	 in the course of which he and his associates hurled bombs	 used swords	 iron rods ' and lathis against the local people endangering their lives and safety and thereby they created fear and frightfulness in the locality resulting in the disturbance of public peace and tranquillity of that locality. The last incident mentioned is that on 28 6 1969 at about 11 15 p.m.	 the petitioner and his associates armed with bombs created disturbance on Raja Manindra Road in the course of which they indiscriminately hurled bombs towards the local ;people endangering their lives and safety and thereby they affected _public peace and tranquillity of that locality. From the record it does not appear that the petitioner was prosecuted for any of the offences mentioned earlier. It is not known why he was not prosecuted. In the ordinary course	 if there is truth in the allegations made	 he should have been prosecuted and given an opportunity to defend himself. The allegations made against the petitioner do not amount to anything more	 than that he committed certain breaches of law. The freedom of the individual is of utmost importance in any civilized society. It is a human right. Under our Consti tution it is a guaranteed right. It can be deprived of only by due process of law. The power to detain is an exceptional power to be used under exceptional circumstances. It is wrong to 362 consider the same	 as the executive appears to have done in the present case	 that it is a convenient substitute for the ordinary process of law. The detention of the petitioner under the circumstances of this case appears to be a gross misuse of the power conferred under the . The three incidents mentioned in the grounds are stray incidents spread over a period of one year and four months. These incidents cannot be said to be inter linked. They could not	 have prejudiced the maintenance of 'public order ' nor can they be held to be subversive of 'public order '. They were at best prejudicial to " 'law and order". The distinction between the maintenance of 'public order ' and maintenance of "law and order ' was brought out by this Court in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v State of Bihar( '). Therein this Court pointed out that main tenance of "law and order" is a conception much wider than the conception of maintenance 'public order '. The latter is the prevention of a disorder of grave nature. 	 Every act that affects "law and order" need not affect 'public order '. If it is otherwise every one who disturbs "law and order"	 however petty the offence committed by him may be	 can be detained under the Prevention Detention Act. This would be a total repudiation of of the rule of law and an affront to our Constitution. The lega position relating to the point in issue was again recently considered by this Court in Arun Ghosh vs State of West Bengal( ')	 Therein it was observed that 'public order ' is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or ever a specified locality. Disturbance of "public order" is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do no disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and it	 effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of "law and order". We are of the opinion that the grounds stated in support of the detention cannot amount to a disturbance of the	 maintenance of 'public order '. V.P.S. (1) ; (2) [19701 3 S.C.R. 288.

The petitioner along with others	 committed various offences on three occasions. On the first occasion he attacked the people of a locality with a knife and by hurling bottles at them. On the other two occasions he attacked the people of another locality	 by hurling bombs at them. He was detained under section 3(2) of the 	 with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In a petition under article 32 for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus	 HELD : The incidents were not interlinked and could not have prejudiced the maintenance of public order. They were stray incidents spread over a period of one year and four months	 directed against individuals	 and did not disturb society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity; and hence	. the petitioner was entitled to be released. The power to detain is an exceptional power to be used in exceptional circumstances and cannot be used as a convenient substitute for the ordinary process of law. The acts complained of against the petitioner can at best be considered as prejudicial to "law and order" and not "public order" as required by the law relating to preventive detention. [361 H; 362 A C	 E F] Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of Bihar	 ; and Arun Ghosh vs State of West Bengal	.[1970] 3 S.C.R. 288	 followed.