Summarize the following court judgment. Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 1961. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 20	 1961 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1274 of 1960. A.S.R. Chari	 M.K. Ramamurthi	 R.K. Garg	 S.C. Agarwala and D.P. Singh	 for the appellant. D.Goburdhan	 for the respondent. April 4. The judgment of Subba Rao and Mudholkar J. was delivercd by Mudholkar J. Dayal J. delivered a separate judgment. MUDHOLEAR J. In this appeal by special leave from the judgment of the ]Patna High Court affirming the conviction of the appellant under section 47 (a) of the Excise Act and the sentences of rigorous imprisonment for one year and of fine amounting to Rs. 2	000 awarded by the Judicial Magistrate First Class	 Patna	 the substantial question which falls for decision is whether a confession made by the appellant and recorded by the Excise Inspector who was investigating the case is inadmissible by reason of the provisions of section 25 of the . It is not disputed before us by Mr. Chari that on August 3	 1957	 a motor car bearing No. WBC 562 757 was stopped by the Excise Inspector	 R.R.P. Sinha (P.W.1) on the Bayley Road	 near the New Secretariat	 Patna	 at 10.00 p.m. The car belongs to the appellant 's brother Radhey Shyam; but he was not at that moment in the car. The car was then being driven by Jagdish Sah and the appellant was sitting by his side. Four other persons were sitting on the back seat. The Excise Inspector searched the car in the presence of three witnesses Debendra Prasad Singh (P.W. 2)	 Paresh Nath Prasad Singh (P.W. 3) and Rabindra Prasad Singh (P.W. 4) and recovered from the car five bundles of non duty paid Nepali Ganja. According to the prosecution four of them were recovered from the luggage boot of the. car while one was recovered from the leg space in front of the front seat of the car. According to the appellant	 however	 no ganja was carried in the car and therefore	 none was seized from the car; Further	 according to the prosecution	 the appellant produced the keys with which the luggage boot was opened. The Excise Inspector made a seizure memo exhibit 2 and recorded the statements of all the persons who were in the car	 including the appellant. Exhibit 3 is the statement of the appellant. After the investigation was completed all the persons who were in the car at that time including the appellant and Radhey Shyam	 the brother of the appellant	 were put up for trial before the Judicial Magistrate. He convicted all of them but in appeal the Sessions judge	 Patna	 acquitted all except the appellant. It is	 therefore	 not necessary to refer to the defence taken by the acquitted persons. The appellant 's defence was that he was not traveling in the car at the relevant moment and that he was at that time in the house of Kanhai Singh (D. W. 1) which is situate in Subjibagh Mohalla of Patna where he was arrested by the Excise Inspector at 6.00 on the morning of August 4. His defence 758 further is that after his arrest R. R. P. Sinha	 P. W. I and other officers of the Excise Department took him in a jeep	 subjected him to threats and abuses	 assaulted him and eventually took his signature on a blank paper. Thus his defence is that he was falsely implicated by the Excise Inspector. In view	 however	 of the fact that all the courts have accepted the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which establishes the fact that the appellant was actually in the car when it was stopped by the Excise Inspector	 Mr. Chari has rightly not challenged that finding. He has also not contended that the appellant 's signature was taken on a blank paper by the Excise Officers. The argument he advanced	 however	 is that there is no legally admissible evidence on the basis of which the appellant 's conviction can be sustained. The confessional statement ]exhibit 3 upon which reliance has been placed by the High Court as supporting the evidence of P. W. 2 Debendra Prasad Singh	 P. W. 3 Paresh Nath Prasad Singh and P. W. 4 Rabindra Prasad Singh is attacked as being inadmissible in evidence and it is said that if this statement is put aside the evidence of the three prosecution witnesses on whom reliance has been placed by the High Court is insufficient in law to sustain the conviction of the appellant under section 47 (a) of the Excise Act. The relevant portion of section 47 runs thus : "Penalty for unlawful import	 export	 trans port	 manufacture	 possession	 sale	 etc. If any person	 in contravention of this Act	 or of any rule	 notification or order made	 issued 'or given	 or license	 permit or pass granted	 under this Act. 	 (a) imports	 exports	 transports	 manufactures	 possesses or sells any intoxicant ; or. . he shall be liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or to 759 fine which may extend to two thousand rupees	 or to both. " The evidence of P. Ws. 2	 3 and 4 taken along with the evidence of the Excise Inspector establishes the following facts : (1) that the appellant was sitting by the side of the driver when the car was stopped by the Excise Inspector ; (2) that five bundles of non duty paid Nepali Ganja were recovered from the car (3) that four bundles were recovered from. the luggage boot of the car and one from the leg space in front of the front seat ; (4) that a bunch of keys marked exhibit 2 series was recovered from the pocket of the appellant and another bunch of keys marked exhibit I series was recovered from the possession of 'the driver Jagdish Sah (5) that every key of exhibit I series could open the lock of the luggage boot and two keys of exhibit 2 series could also open the lock. In order to establish this	 the prosecution has relied on the seizure memo exhibit F and the evidence of the Excise Inspector and P. W. 2 Debendra Prasad Singh. P. W. 3 Paresh Nath Prasad Singh and P. W. 4 Rabindra Prasad Singh. A perusal of exhibit F would	 however	 show that material Alterations and erasures appear to have been made in that document by reason of which no reliance can be placed upon it. The High Court has wholly ignored this Pact and we are	 therefore	 entitled to take it into consideration. It would appear that originally it was 760 shown in col. 5 and 6 taken together that a bundle containing 35 seers of ganja was found in the leg space in front of the rear seat but what was written originally in col. 6 has been over written by inserting words describing meaningless facts on top of the words originally written and in continuation of them. In Col. 5 the weight of the bundle is given as 35 seers and below it weights of four other bundles are mentioned. They are 35 seers	 26 seers	 18 seers and 6 seers. The weight of the first bundle was excluded from the bracket in which the weights of the first three bundles were included. Then by introducing another bracket	 the first bundle was included within it. Against the bracket it is stated in col. 6 that the bundles were found in the luggage boot. The bundle weighing 6 seers is not included in the bracket. Against it	there was some other remark in col. 6 which has been clumsily erased and in its place it isstated "In the leg space in front of front seat. " Again	 in col. 8 wherever the appellant 's name appears there appears to have been something else originally which was erased and his name written there subsequently. A bare look at the document shows that it has been materially altered and is	 therefore	 not a kind of material on which reliance can be placed. It is only with the aid of the confession that it can be accepted as incriminating the appellant. For	 even the direct evidence of witnesses was not regarded by the High Court as worthy of credence	 unaided by the confession. It is indeed the prosecution case that one bundle of ganja was found in the leg space in front of the front seat. Bearing in mind the fact that there were six persons in the car at the time and that the luggage boot in which the bundles were kept could be opened not merely with the keys which were recovered from the appellant but also with the keys which were recovered from the driver it is not possible to say	 761 though the driver has been acquitted	 that the appellant was in exclusive possession of the ganja which was found in the car except with the aid of the confessional statement	 exhibit 3. It follows	 therefore	 that the appellant 's conviction could be maintained only if	 we hold that the confessional statement is admissible in evidence. Mr. Chari besides objecting to the admissibility of the confessional statement relying on section 25 of the Evidence Act also contends that statement is rendered inadmissible by the provisions of section 162	 Code of Criminal Procedure inasmuch as it was recorded by R. R. P. Sinha	 Inspector of Excise while .he was investigating into an excise offence. under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 25 of the Evidence Act reads thus: "No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. " Undoubtedly the Inspector R. R. P. Sinha is an Excise Officer and not a police officer in the sense that he does not belong to the police force or the police establishment. It has	 however	 been held in a large number of cases	 including the one decided by this court	 The State of Punjab vs Barkat Ram (1)	 that the words "Police ' Officer" to be found in section 25 of the Evidence Act are not to be construed in a narrow way but have to be construed in a wide and popular sense. Those words	 according to this Court	 are however not to be construed in so wide a sense as to include persons on whom only some of the powers exercised by the police are conferred. This Court was there concerned with the question whether a Customs Officer can be regarded as a Police Officer and consequently whether a confession made to such an officer is hit by the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act. In the (1) ; 762 majority judgment Raghubar Dayal J.	 has observed : "The Customs Officer	 therefore	 is not primarily concerned with the detection and punishment of crime committed by a person	 but is mainly interested in the detection and prevention of smuggling of goods and safe guarding the recovery of customs duties. He is more concerned with the goods and customs duty	 than with the offender." (p. 279). After pointing out that Customs Officers	 when they act under the Sea Customs Act for the prevention of smuggling of goods	 also act judicially inasmuch as they are entitled to confiscate the goods and levy penalties on the person found smuggling	 he said that the mere fact that similar powers in regard to detection of infractions of Customs laws have been conferred on Officers of the Customs Department as are conferred on Officers of the Police is not sufficient for holding them to be police officers within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act because the powers of search etc.	 conferred on the former are of a limited character and have a limited object of safeguarding the revenues of the State. The majority	 however expressed no opinion on the question whether officers of departments other than the police on whom the powers of an officer incharge of a police station under ch. 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are conferred are police officers or not for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act. The question whether an Excise Officer is a Police Officer was thus left open by them. It is precisely this question which falls for consideration in the present appeal. For	 under s.78(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act	 1915 (2 of 1915) an Excise Officer empowered under s	 77	 sub section (2) of that Act shall	 for the purpose of 763 s.156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station with respect to the area to which his appointment as an Excise Officer extends. Sub section (1) of section 77 empowers the Collector of Excise to investigate without the order of a Magistrate any offence punishable under the Excise Act committed within the limits of his jurisdiction. Sub section (2) of that section provides that any other Excise Officer specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government I in respect of all or any specified class of offenses punishable under the Excise Act may	 without the order of a Magistrate	 investigate any such offence which a court having jurisdiction within the local area to which such officer is appointed would have power to inquire into or try under the aforesaid provisions. By virtue of these provisions the Lieutenant Governor of Bihar and Orissa by Notification No. 470 F dated January 15	 1919 has specially empowered Ins pectors of Excise and Sub Inspectors of Excise to investigate any offence punishable under the Act. It is not disputed before us that this notification is still in force. By virtue of the provisions of section 92 of the Act it shall have effect as if enacted in the Act. It would thus follow that an Excise Inspector or SubInspector in the State of Bihar shall be deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station with respect to the area to which he is appointed and is in that capacity entitled to investigate any offence under the Excise Act within that area without the order of a Magistrate. Thus he can exercise all the powers which an officer in charge of a police station can exercise under Ch. XIV 'of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 He can investigate into offenses	 record statements of the persons questioned by him	 make searches	 seize any articles connected with an offence under the Excise Act	 arrest an accused person	 grant him bail	 send him up for trial before a Magistrate	 file a charge sheet and so on. Thus his position in so far as offenses under the Excise Act 764 committed within the area to which his appointment extends are concerned is no different from that of an officer in charge of a police station. As regards these offenses not only is he charged with the duty of preventing their commission but also with their detection and is for these purposes empowered to act in all respects as an officer in charge of a police station. No doubt unlike an officer in charge of a police station he is not charged with the duty of the maintenance of law and order nor can he exercise the powers of such officer with respect to offenses under the general law or under any other special laws. But all the same	 in so far as offenses under the Excise Act are concerned	 there is no distinction whatsoever in the nature of the powers he exercises and those which a police officer exercises in relation to offenses which it is his duty to prevent and bring to light. It would be logical	 therefore	 to hold that a confession recorded by him during an investigation into an excise offence cannot reasonably be regarded as anything different from a confession to a police officer. For	 in conducting the investigation he exercises the powers of a police officer and the act itself deems him to be a police officer	 even though he does not belong to the police force constituted under the Police Act. It has been held by this court that the expression " 'Police Officer" in section 25 of the Evidence Act is not confined to persons who are members of the regularly constituted police force. The position of an Excise Officer empowered under section 77(2) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act is not analogous to that of a Customs Officer for two reasons. One is that the Excise Officer does not exercise any judicial powers just as the Customs Officer does under the . Secondly	 the Customs Officer is not deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station and therefore can exercise no powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure and certainly not those of an officer in charge of a police station. No doubt	 he too has the 765 power to make a search	 to seize articles suspected to have been smuggled and arrest persons suspected of having committed an offence under the . But that is all. Though he can make an enquiry	 he has no power to investigate into an offence under section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Whatever powers he exercises are expressly set out in the . Though some of those set out in ch. XVII may be analogous to those of a Police Officer under the Code of Criminal Procedure they are not identical with those of a police officer and are not derived from or by reference to the Code. In regard to certain matters	 he does not possess powers even analogous to those of a Police Officer. Thus he is not entitled to submit a report to a Magistrate under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with a view that cognizance of the offence be taken by the Magistrate. Section 187(A) of the specially provides that cognizance of an offence under the can be taken only upon a complaint in writing made by the Customs Officer or other officer of the customs not below the rank of an Assistant Collector of Customs authorized in this behalf by the Chief Customs Officer. It may well be that a statute confers powers and imposed duties on a public servant	 some of which are analogous to those of a police officer. But by reason of the nature of other duties which he is required to perform be may be exercising various other powers also. It is argued on behalf of the State that where such is the case the mere conferral of some only of the powers of a police officer on such a person would not make him a police officer and	 therefore	 what must be borne in mind is the sum total of the powers which he enjoys by virtue of his office as also the dominant purpose for which he is appointed. The contention thus is that when an officer has to perform a wide range of duties and 766 exercise correspondingly a wide range of powers	 the mere fact that some of the powers which the statute confers upon him are analogous to or even identical with those of a police officer would not make him a police officer and	 therefore	 if such an officer records a confession it would not be hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act	 In our judgment what is pertinent to bear in mind for the purpose of determining as to who can be regarded a "police officer" for the purpose of this provision is not the totality of the powers which an officer enjoys but the kind of powers which the law enables him to exercise. The test for determining whether such a person is a "police officer" for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act would	 in our judgment	 be whether the powers of a police officer which are conferred on him or which are exercisable by him because he is deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station establish a direct or substantial relationship with the prohibition enacted by section 25	 that is	 the recording of a confession. In our words	 the test would be whether the powers are such as would tend to facilitate the obtaining by him of a confe ssion from a suspect or a delinquent. If they do	 then it is unnecessary to consider the dominant purpose for which he is appointed or the question as to what other powers he enjoys. These questions may perhaps be relevant for consideration where the powers of a police officer conferred upon him are of a very limited character and are not by themselves sufficient to facilitate the obtaining by him of a confession. As an instance of a law which confers on an officer powers of a limited character which are analogous to those conferred upon police officers	 we may refer to the itself. This Act confers a wide range of powers on Customs Officers. But powers analogous to those of a police officer are to be found only in ch. XVII which deals 767 with " 'procedure relating to offenses	 appeals etc. " Under section 169 a Customs officer is	 empowered to search on reasonable suspicion any vessel in any port in India or any person who has landed from any vessel. This power	 however	 is subject to the right given by section 170 to that person to require the Customs officer to take him before his search to a Magistrate or Customs Collector. Where such person exercises that right the question. as to whether he should be searched or not would depend upon the Magistrate or the Customs Collector being satisfied about the existence of reasonable grounds for the search. No such restriction is imposed upon a police officer making a search under section 102	 sub section (3) of the Code. Again	 whereas an officer in charge of a police station can search any place in connection with a cognizable offence under investigation after recording in writing his reasons. a Customs Officer cannot search any place on land .where a dutiable or prohibited goods or documents relating to such goods are secreted without first obtaining a search warrant from a Magistrate. Under section 173 of the Act a Customs Officer has the power to arrest a person against whom reasonable suspicion exists that he has been guilty of an offence under the Act. But he is required to produce that person forthwith before the nearest Magistrate and it will be for the Magistrate either to commit that person to jail custody or release him on bail at his discretion. An officer in charge of a police station has	 however	 the power	 to release an arrested person on his furnishing bail and is not required for the purpose to obtain an order of a Magistrate. It is only where he does not release him on bail that he must produce him before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. We may add that the existence of the power to grant bail in an officer in charge of a police station itself enables him to exercise authority over the arrested person and influence his conduct if he so wishes. Finally	 a 768 Customs Officer has power to seize anything liable to confiscation under the Act. But where he has seized anything he is liable	 on demand of the person in charge of the thing so seized	 to give him a statement in writing of the reasons for such seizure. Similarly where he	 has arrested a person	 he is bound to give to that person	 if that person so demands	 a statement ' in writing disclosing the reasons for the arrest. No such duty is cast upon a police officer seizing an article or arresting a person. Chapter XVII deals with no other powers which could be said to be analogous to those of a police officer. The whole of that chapter shows that the other powers conferred upon a Customs Officer are such	 as are necessary 'for preventing the commission of offenses under the and matters incidental thereto. It is worthy of note that the powers of investigation into offenses which a police officer enjoys are not conferred upon a Customs Officer. It is the possession of these powers which enables police officers and those who are deemed to be police officers to exercise a kind of authority over the per sons arrested which facilitate the obtaining from them statements which may be incriminating to the persons making them. The law allows the police officer to obtain such statements with a view to facilitate the investigation of the offenses. But it renders them inadmissible in evidence for the obvious reason that a suspicion about voluntariness would attach to them . It is the power of investigation which establishes a direct relationship with the prohibition enacted in section 25. Therefore	 where such a power is conferred upon an officer	 the mere fact that he possesses some other powers under another law would not make him any the less A police officer for the purposes of section 25. In this connection it would be pertinent to bear in mind the object with which the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act were enacted. For this 769 purpose we can do not better than quote the following passage from the judgment of Mahmood J. in Queen Empress vs Babulal (1). malpractices of police officers in extorting confessions from accused persons in order to gain credit by securing convictions	 and that those malpractices went to the length of positive torture; nor do I doubt that the Legislature	 in laying down such stringent rules	 regarded the evidence of police officers as untrustworthy	 and the object of the rules was to put a stop to the extortion of confession	 by taking away from the police officers the advantage of proving such extorted confessions during the trial of accused persons. " This provision was thus enacted to eliminate from consideration confessions made to an officer who	 by virtue of his position	 could extort by force	 torture or inducement a confession. An Excise Officer acting under section 78 (3) would be in the same position as Officer in charge of a police station making an investigation under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He would likewise have the same opportunity of extorting a confession from a suspect. It is	 therefore	 difficult to draw a rational distinction between a confession recorded by a Police Officer strictly so called and one recorded by an Excise Officer who is deemed to be a Police Officer. A large number of decisions were cited at the bar bearing on the question as to whether the expression "Police Officer" used in section 25 of the Evidence Act is restricted to the members of the force or has a wider meaning. It is unnecessary to refer to those decisions because in Barkat Ram 's case (2)	 it has clearly been held that the expression (1) All. 509	 523. (2) ; 770 is not to be construed in a narrow way. We may	 however	 refer to certain decisions ' in which the question whether an Excise Officer is a Police officer within the meaning of that section has been specifically considered. There is	 however	 no unanimity in those decisions. Thus in Ah Foong vs Emperor ' (1)	 Harbhanjan Sao vs Emperor (2)	 Matilall Kalwar vs Emperor (3)	 it was held that an Excise Officer is not a Police Officer. A contrary view was	 however	 taken in .Ibrahim Ahmed vs King Emperor (4). The view taken in that case was affirmed by a Full Bench in Ameen Sharif vs Emperor (5). The view taken in the Full Bench case as well as in Ibrahim Ahmed 's case (4)	 follows that of the Bombay High Court in Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed vs Emperor (6). A similar view was also taken in Public Prosecutor vs C. Paramasivam (7)	 Ibrahim vs Emperor (8). In Radha Kishun Marwari vs King Emperor (9)	 it was	 however	 held that an Excise Officer functioning under the Bihar Excise Act is not a Police Officer and that a statement made to him is not within section 25 of the Evidence Act. We need not	 however	 consider the last mentioned decision because there the learned judges have construed the expression "Police Officer" in section 25 of the Evidence Act to mean only an officer of the police force. That	 however	 is not in accord with what this Court has held in Barkat Ram 's case We will briefly examine the other decisions. In Ah Foong 's case (1)	 all that Sanderson C.J.	 who delivered the leading judgment has said was that he did not think that Excise Officers in the case before the court could be said to be Police Officers and that the statements made by the accused to them were not admissible by reason of the fact that they were made to Police Officers. There is thus no discussion of the question at all. Apart from that the offence concerned in that case was one under the Opium Actand an Excise Officer (1) Cal. 41 1.(2) Cal. (3) Cal. (5) Cal 607.(6) Bom. 78 (7) A.I.R. 1953. Mad 917.(8) A.T.R. (9) Pat 46 F.B.(10) [1962] 3 S.C. R. 338. 771 acting under that Act was not conferred with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Harbhanjan Sao 's case (1)	 merely followed this case as also did Matilal 's case (2). Ibrahim Ahmed 's case (3)	 was a case which arose after the amendment of the Opium Act and it followed the view taken in Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed 's case (4). In Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed 's Case (4)	 a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court examined a large number of decisions commencing from The Queen vs Hurribole Chunder Ghose (5). Marten C. J. quoted with approval the following two passages from that case : "Its humane object is to prevent confessions obtained from accused persons through any undue influence	 being received as evidence against them . I consider that the term "police officer ' should be read not in any strict technical sense	 but according to its more comprehensive and popular meaning." (p. 215). " and I think it better in construing a section such as the 25th which was intended as a wholesome protection to the accused to construe it in its widest and most popular signification." (p. 216). The Full Bench pointed out that in Ah Foong 's case (6)	 there was hardly any discussion of the question and further pointed out that Excise Officers had limited power in Bengal under the Opium Act of 1878 whereas in Bombay they exercised the powers of investigation and so on. The learned Chief Justice then observed : ' in my judgment	 we should hold that as the Bombay Legislature has deliberately (1) Cal 601. is) Cal 1260. (5) Cal. (2) A T.R. (4) Bom. (6) Cal. 41 1. 772 conferred upon these Abkari officers substan tially all the powers of a Police Officer	 they have thereby in effect made them Police Officers within the meaning of section 25	 and that	 accordingly	 any confession made to such an officer in the course of his investigation under the Abkari Act or the Criminal Procedure Code is inadmissible in evidence." (p. 94) According to Shah J. section 25 of the embodies an important rule	 which is to be given effect to as a matter of substance and not as a mere matter of form and that it is a perfectly fair interpretation of section 25 to say that 'the Police Officer within the meaning of that section is an officer	 who exercises the powers of police conferred upon him by law	 whether he is called a Police Officer or he is called by any other name and exercises other functions also under other provisions of law	 if for the investigation of offenses under a particular Act he is empowered to exercise the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of a cognizable offence. Fawcett J. pointed out that since the Legislature did not amend the Act even after the decision in Hurribole 's case (1)	 where the expression police officer" was given a wide meaning the courts would be justified in adhering to it. Kemp J. was of the opinion that though the term "police Officer" should not be construed strictly it was not safe to lay down generally that the term should not be construed in its popular and most comprehensive sense. All the same he held that an Excise Officer acting under the Abkari Act of Bombay must be deemed to be a Police Officer inasmuch as he had the power of investigating into excise offenses	 Mirza J. concurred with this view but did not state any reasons. In Ameen Sharif 's case (2) the following question was referred to a Full Bench : "Is an excise (1) Cal. (2) Cal 607. 773 officer who	 in the conduct of investigation of an offence against the excise	 exercises the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure upon an officer in charge of a police station for the investigation of a cogenizable offence	 a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the ?" That case arose under the Bengal Excise Act and Mukerji J. who delivered the leading judgment	 after pointing out that the powers .of an Excise Officer acting under the Opium Act (I of 1878) prior to its amendment by Opium (Bengal Amendment) Act	 (Bengel Act V of 1933) are not quite the same as those of an Excise Officer acting under the Bengal Excise Act (Bengal Act V of 1909) observed that during arguments a much broader question had been submitted for the decision of the Full Bench as arising upon the order of reference taken along with the facts of the cases in which the reference was made. The learned judge then said that to answer this question one has nece ssarily to consider the meaning of the term "Police Officer" as used in section 25 of the Evidence Act which	 though it may not rank with 'ancient statutes ' in the sense in which that expression is used in forensic language	 great regard ought to be paid	 in construing a statute enacted long ago to the construction which was put upon it by those who lived about the time or soon after it was made	 because the meaning which a particular word or expression bore in those days may have got mixed up or blurred during the interval that has elapsed. From that point of view he regarded the decision in the case of Queen vs Hurribole Chunder Ghose (1)	 one of very great importance. We have already referred to that decision but we have not proceeded upon the view that while construing the relevant provision we should apply the principle followed in construing an ancient statute. The Evidence Act is of the year 1872 and in Senior Electric Inspector vs Laxminarayan Chopra (2)	 this court while considering the question (1) (2) ; 	 774 as to the meaning to be given to the expression "Telegraph line" occurring in section 3	 sub section (4) of the Telegraph Act	 1885	 pointed out that the maxim contemporanea expositio as laid down by Coke was applied in construing ancient statutes but not in interpreting Acts which are comparatively modern. Indeed	 the rule of construction which ought to be applied to a statute either ancient or modern is the same and that is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature. We	 however	 agree that it would be inappropriate to attach wide meaning to the words used by the legislature in a law made in remote ages when society was static and that the position would be different with respect to words used in a law made in a modern progressive society in which the frontiers of knowledge are fast expanding. The Evidence Act was 'enacted at a time when already a revolution in men 's ideas had set in and considerable scientific advances had already been made. The maxim laid down by Coke cannot therefore properly be applied for construing the language used by the Legislature in section 25 of the Evidence Act. The learned judge did not	 however	 rest his judgment solely upon this ground. Upon a consideration of a large number of decisions of the Indian High Courts	 he came to the conclusion that an Excise Officer exercising the powers of an officer in charge of a police station within the area to which he is apointed would fall within the expression "police officer" occurring in section 25 of the Evidence Act. The learned judge	 there referred to section 6 of the Police Act and some other provisions thereof and pointed out: "The police	 therefore	 were instruments for the prevention and detection of crimes with the concomitant powers of apprehension and detention of offenders in order to their being brought to justice	 such powers varying accor ding to the position or status of the particular 775 member of the body. In other words	 "police officers" were officers whose duty was to prevent and detect crimes. Apart from any technical meaning which the term "police officer	 occurring under any particular Act, might bear, the more comprehensive and popular meaning of the term was what has just been stated. In the Oxford Dictionary, two of the senses in which the word police" is used are said to be the following 'The department of government which is concerned with the maintenance of public order and safety	 and the enforcement of the law; the extent of its functions varying greatly in different countries and at different periods. The civil force to which is entrusted the duty of maintains public order	 enforcing regula tions for the prevention and punishment of breaches of the law	 and detecting crime; con strued as plural	 the members of a police force; the constabulary of a locality. ' All these duties which police officers discharge are but different phases of and means for carrying out the two more comprehensive duties	 namely	 of prevention of crimes and detection of crimes. It is true that it has nowhere been defined what minimum aggregation of functions will constitute a person a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Act	 but the more comprehensive and popular signification of the term 'police officer"	 such as it was in 1861	 is not difficult to appreciate from what was said by the legislature in the Police Act (V of 1861). Powers and duties of police officers under Act V of 1861 or under Act XXV of 1861 or under any other statute	 or the different powers which different grades of police officers leave under any particular enactment	 are mere matters of details worked out in order to enable the entire 776 body	 taken as a whole	 to carry out the two essential duties entrusted to them	 namely	 the prevention and detection of crimes. These	 two features of the duties which the police have to discharge and especially that of detection of offenders	 which involves the duty of holding investigations have always been regarded as marking them out for special treatment in so far as confessions made to them are concerned." (pp. 623 4). We agree with the learned judge that by and large it is the duty of detection of offenses and of bringing offenders to justice	 which requires an investigation to be made	 that differentiates police officers from private individuals or from other agencies of State. Being concerned with the in vestigation	 there is naturally a desire on the part of a police officer to collect as much evidence as possible against a suspected offender apprehended by him and in his zeal to do so he is apt to take recourse to an easy means	 that is	 of obtaining a confession by using his position and his power over the person apprehended by him. We	 there fore	 agree with the observations of the learned judge at p. 629 which are to the following effect "I can find no reason why in 1872 in respect of an offence under the then Opium Act (XIII of 1857) the legislature could have thought of excluding a confession made to a member of the regular police force but not a confession made to an abkari or excise officer	 if such officer was	 in fact	 holding an investigation into an offence and was exercising such powers as a police officer is competent to exercise. The fact is that	 in those days	 he had no such powers and so could not exercise them. When	 in course of time	 he came to have those powers and was able to exercise them in respect of offenses which 777 were not known to law in those day	% and only subsequently came to be regarded as such	 such an officer	 when so acting	 is an officer for whom the term "police officer" used in section 25 of the Evidence Act was meant. " The learned judge then considered two points which were raised before the Full Bench as militating against the view expressed by him one being that there is a distinction between " 'police officers" and "revenue officers" and the other that in section 25 of the Evidence Act in respect of an officer of the police there is a personal disability implied irrespective of the question whether he is holding an investigation or not	 while no such disability can be said to have been intended in the case of an Excise Officer. So far as the first of these points was concerned the learned judge agreed with the answer given by Marten C. J. in the case of Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed (1)	 at p. 95 of the report to	 meet a similar point. As regards the second point he said that	 whereas police officers	 by reason of section 22 of Act V of 1961	 are to be always considered: on duty for the purposes of the Act	 all revenue officers	 on the other hand	 are not police officers and it is only such of them as may be exercising the powers of police officers and only when exercising such powers that they may be regarded as police officers. We are in complete agreement with this view Mallik and Ghose JJ agreed with Mukherji J. But Jack J. did not accept Hurribole 's case as an authority for holding that an Excise Officer is a Police Officer merely because he has certain powers of a police officer. His conclusion	 however	 was that the application of section 25 of the Evidence Act	 in the case of an excise officer should be limited to a confession made to him in the course of an investigation of an offence by virtue of section 74(3) (1) Bom. Cal	 207	 778 of the Excise Act	 which gives him the status of a police officer for the purposes of the investigation. In other words	 what he means is that though an Excise Officer cannot be regarded as a Police officer	 still	 when he exercises certain functions under section 74(3) of the Excise Act he will be acting as a Police Officer and	 therefore	 a confession made to him would be hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. Costello J. however	 differed from the other learned judges and based himself largely upon the decision in Radha Kishan Marwari 's case (1) and in conclusion he observed : "In my opinion	 endless difficulties inevitably arise when judges endeavor to extend the plain provisions of any statutory enactment. Where the language of an enactment is unambiguous it should be interpreted strictly and	 in a case such as the present	 it is	 to my mind	 in the highest degree unsound	 and indeed dangerous for the court	 by subtlety of argument or by resorting to other statutes to extend provisions such as that contained in section 25. I am clearly and definitely of opinion that when the legislature used the expression 'police officer ' they meant a police officer in the sense in which that expression is generally understood by the populace at large and in no other sense at all." (p. 648). The learned judge apparently overlooked the fact that in the popular sense Excise Officers are also regarded as Police Officers	 being referred to as "the Excise Police. " Thus a consideration of the decisions of the High Courts in India shows that the preponderance of judicial opinion is in consonance with the view which we have already expressed. There is one more reason also why the confession made to an Excise Sub Inspector must be (1) Pat	 46. F.B. 779 excluded	 that is	 it is a statement made during the course of investigation to a person who exercises the powers of an officer in charge of a police station. Such statement is excluded from evidence by section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure except for the purpose of contradiction. Therefore	 both by section 25 of the Evidence Act as well as by section 162	 Cr.p.c. the confession of the appellant is inadmissible in evidence. If the confession goes	 then obviously the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. Accordingly we allow the appeal ' and set aside the conviction and sentences passed on the appellant. RAGHUBAR DAYAL J. I agree that the appeal be allowed and the conviction and the sentences passed on the appellant be set aside	 but for different reasons which I proceed to state : I do not consider the confession to be inadmissible in evidence as being made to a police officer. The admissibility of the alleged confession of the appellant depends on the question whether the Excise Inspector comes within the expression 'police officer ' in section 25 of the . I am of opinion that he does not. In State of Punjab vs Barkat Ram (1)	 this Court held that a customs officer is not a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act. The view was based on the following considerations : (1) The powers which a police officer enjoys are Rowers for the effective prevention and detection of crime in order to maintain law and order while a customs officer is not primarily concerned with the detection and punishment of crime committed by a person but is mainly interested in the detection and prevention of smuggling of goods and safeguarding the recovery of customs duties. (1) ; 780 (2) The mere fact that customs officers possess certain powers similar to those of police officers in regard to detection of infractions of customs laws	 is not a sufficient ground for holding them to be police officers within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act	 even though the words "police officer ' are not to be construed in a narrow way but have to be construed in a wide and popular sense	 as remarked in Queen vs Hurribole (1). The expression 'police officer ' is not of such wide meaning as to include persons en whom certain police powers arc incidentally conferred. (3) A confession made to any police officer	 whatever be his rank and whatever be the occasion for making it	 is inadmissible in evidence	 but a confession made to a customs officer when. he be not discharging any such duty which corresponds to the duty of a police officer	 will be inadmissible even if the other view be correct that he was a police officer when exercising such powers. (4) The itself refers to (police officer ' in contra distinction to 'customs officer '. (5) Customs Officers act judicially when they act under the to prevent smuggling of goods and imposing confiscation and penalties	 and proceedings before them are judicial proccedings for the purpose of sections 193 and 228 I. P. C. A scrutiny of the various provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act		 1915 (Act II of 1915)	 hereinafter called the Act	 leads to a similar conclusion with respect	 to Excise Officers on whom powers of investigating offenses under the Act have been conferred. It will be useful to quote the relevant provisions of the Act and Government Orders which lead to such a conclusion. (1) Cal. 207	 781 .lm15 The preamble of the Act reads "Whereas it is expedient to amend and reenact the law in the Province of Bihar (and Orissa) relating to the import	 export	 transport	 manufacture	 possession	 and sale of certain kinds of liquor and intoxicating drugs; According to cl. (8) of section 2	 'Excise Officer ' means the Collector or any officer or other person appointed or invested with powers under section 7. The relevant portion of section 7 reads : "(1) The administration of the Excise Department and the collection of the excise revenue within a district shall ordinarily be under the charge of the Collector. (2) The State Government may by notification a pplicable to the whole of the State or to any specified local area	 (a) appoint an officer who shall	 subject to such control as the State Government may direct	 have the control of the administration of the Excise Department and the collection of the excise revenue; x x x x X" Excise Commissioners arc appointed under section 7(2)(a). Among the other officers appointed under the other clauses of sub s (2) of section 7 of the Act arc Superintendents of Excise	 Inspectors of Excise and SubInspectors of Excise. The Superintendent of Excise exercises certain specified powers of the Collector to whom be is subordinate. 782 Chapter VIII deals with offenses and penalties. Section 63 provides for penalty for contempt of Court and reads : " 'Every proceeding under this Act before a Collector	 or before any officer	 of such rank as the	 State Government may	 by notification prescribe	 who is exercising powers of a Collector	 shall be deemed to be a 'judicial proceeding ' within the meaning of s: 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). " Officers who may exercise the powers of a Collector are Superintendents of Excise	 Sub Divisional Officers and Deputy Collectors. Section 68 provides that the Collector or any Excise Officer specially empowered by the State Government in that behalf	 not below the rank of Depury Collector or Superintendent of Excise	 may compound offenses and release property liable to confiscation in certain circumstances on payment to the Col lector or such Excise Officer of asum of money not exceeding Rs. 500/ Section 69 empowers the Excise Commissioner	 Collector or any Excise Officer not below such rank as the State Government may	 by notification	 prescribe and subje ct to any restrictions prescribed by the state Government by rule made under section 89	 to enter and inspect any pl ace of manufacture or storage or sale of any toxicant by a licensed manufacturer and to test and seize measures and to examine accounts and registers or a place where an intoxic ant is kept for sale by such licensed person and to seize them if he had reasons to believe them to be false. Exc ise Officers not below the rank of a Sub Inspector have be en empowered under s 69	 under Notification No. 470 F dated January 15	 1919	 of the Financial Department of the 783 Government of Bihar and Orissa	 and we understand that this Notification is still in force. Section 70 authorizes any officer of the Excise	 Police	 Salt	 Customs or Land Revenue Department or any person empowered by the State Government in that behalf by notification	 to arrest without warrant any person found committing offenses punishable under ss.47	 49	 55 or 56 of the Act and to seize and detain any article which he has reason to believe to be liable for confiscation under the Act or any other law for the time being in force relating to the excise revenue and to detain and search any person upon whom	 and any vessel	 raft	 vehicle etc.	 upon which	 he may have reasonable cause to suspect any such article to be. Sections 71 and 72 provide for the Collector or any Magistrate empowered to try offenses punishable under the Act to issue warrant for the arrest of any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed or abetted any offence punishable under ss.47	 49	 55 or 56 and to issue a warrant for the search of any intoxicant	 material	 still	 utensil etc. in respect of which the alleged offence has been or is likely to be committed. Section 73 empowers the Collector or any SubDivisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class to arrest or direct the arrest in his presence or to search or direct a search to be made in his presence when he be competent to issue a warrant of arrest or a search warrant. Section 74 empowers an Excise Officer not below such rank as the State Government may	 by notification	 prescribe	 to arrest certain offenders when such Officer has reason to believe that an offence had been committed or was being committed and when the obtaining of a search warrant might afford the offender an opportunity to escape or conceal evidence of the offence. The State Government has prescribed that Excise Officers not below the rank of a Sub Inspector can exercise the power under this section. 784 Section 77 is important for our purpose and is set out in full below: " '(1) A Collector may	 without the order of a Magistrate	 investigate any offence punishable under this Act which a Court having juris diction over the local area within th e limits of the Collector 's jurisdiction would have power to enquire into or try under the provi sions of Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 1898	 relating to the place of in quiry or trial. (2) Any other Excise Officer specially empo wered in this behalf by the State Government in respect of all or any specified class of offenses punishable under this Act may	 without the order of a Magistrate	 investigate any such offence which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area to which such officer is appointed would have power to inquire into or try under the aforesaid pro visions. " Under sub section (2) of section 77	 the State Government has specially empowered Inspectors of Excise and SubInspectors of Excise to investigate any offence punishable under the Act. Section 78 reads : "(1) Any Collector	 or any Excise Officer empowered under section 77	 sub section (2)	 may after recording in writing his reason for suspecting the commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate	 exer cise (a) any of the powers conferred upon a Police Officer making an investigation	 or upon an officer in charge of a policc station	 785 by sections 160 to 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 1898 (5 of 1898)	 and ' (b) as regards offenses punishable under section 47	 section 49	 section 55	 or section 56 of this Act any of the powers conferred upon Police Officers in respect of cognizable offenses by clause first of sub section (1) of section 54 and by section 56 of the said Code; and the said portions of the said Code shall apply accordingly	 subject to any restrictions or modifications prescribed by the State Government by rule made under section 89	 clause (o). (2) Subject to any restrictions prescribed by the State Government a Collector or an Excise Officer empowered under section 77	 sub section (2)	 may	 without reference to a Magistrate	 and for reasons to be recorded by him in writing	 stop further proceedings against any person concerned	 or supposed to be concerned	 in any offence which he or any Excise Officer subordinate to him has investigated. (3) For the purposes of section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 1898 (5 of 1898) the area to which an Excise Officer empowered under section 77	 sub section (2)	 is appointed shall be deemed to be a police station	 and such officer shall be deemed to be the officer in charge of such station. (4) As soon as an investigation by a Collector or by an Excise Officer empowered under section 77	 sub section (2)	 has been completed	 if it appears that there is sufficient evidence to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate	 the investigating officer	 unless he 786 proceeds under sub section (2) of this section or under section 68 of this Act	 shall submit a report [which shall	 for the purposes of section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 1898 (5 of 1898) be deemed to be a Police report] to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into or try the case and empowered to take cognizance of offenses on Police reports. " Section 79 deals with security and bail and empowers any Excise Officer not below such rank as the State Government may	 by notification	 prescribe	 to release persons on bail or on their own bond. The State Government has prescribed that any Excise Officer not below the rank of SubInspector can exercise this power. Section. 80 provides that articles seized and persons arrested under the warrant of the Collector shall be produced before the Collector and that articles seized and persons arrested under the Act by persons or officers not having authority to release arrested persons on bail on their own bond	 shall be produced before or forwarded to the Collector or an Excise Officer empowered under section 77 (2) to investigate the offence	 or to the nearest Excise Officer who has authority to release arrested persons on bail or on their own bond	 or the officer in charge of the nearest police station	 whoever be nearer. Section 82 reads : "When any Excise Officer below the rank of Collector	 or any officer in charge of a police station	 makes	 or receives information of	 any arrest	 seizure	 or search under this Act	 he shall	 within twenty four hours thereafter	 make a full report of all the particulars of the arrest	 seizure	 or search	 or of the information received to the Collector	 and to the Excise Officer (if any) empowered under section 77	 787 sub section (2)	 within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the arrest	 seizure	 or search was made. " Section 84 directs that any person arrested for an offence under the Act shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds for such arrest and shall be produced before the nearest Magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest	 excluding the time necessary for the journeys from the place of arrest to the Court of the Magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond such period without the authority of the Magistrate. Its sub section (2) reads : "(2) A Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 1898 (5 of 1898)	 by a Collector or an Excise Officer empowered under section 77	 sub section (2)	 may exercise the powers conferred upon a Magistrate by the said section 167." Section 85 reads : "(1) Save as in this Act otherwise expressly provided	 the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 1898 (5 of 1898)	 relating to arrests	 detentions in custody	 searches	 summonses	 warrants of arrest	 search warrants and the production of persons arrested shall apply so far as may be	 to arrests	 detentions and searches made	 summonses and warrants issued	 and the production of persons arrested under this Act. (2) For the purposes of the said provisions of the said Code	 a Collector shall be deemed to be a Court. (3) Officers to whom a Collector 's warrant is directed or endorsed and officers (other than 788 Collectors) making arrests	 searches or seizures under this Act	 shall	 for the purposes of the said provisions of the said Code	 be deemed to be Police Officers. " Section 89 empowers the State Government to make rules to carry out the objects of the Act or any other law for the time being in force relating to the excise revenue. Section 95 provides that no suit shall lie in any Civil Court against the Government or any Excise Officer for any act in good faith done or ordered to be done in pursuance of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force relating to the excise revenue. Section 96 provides for limitations of suits and prosecutions and reads "	No Civil Court shall try any suit against the Government in respect of anything done	 or alleged to have been done	 in pursuance of this Act	 and	 except with the previous sanction of the State Government	 no Magistrate shall take cognizance of any charge made aga inst any Excise Officer under this Act or any other law relating to the excise revenue or made against any other person under this Act	 unless the suit or prosecution is instituted within six months after the date of the act complained of. " The provisions of sections 7	 89	 95 and 96 are sufficient to indicate that the action of Excise Officers under the Act and under any other law relating to exciserevenue is treated alike. The Act is	 therefore	 like 789 the 	 primarily concerned with the collection of the excise revenue. The object of the Act according to the preamble	 is not to provide for the prevention and detection of crime but is to provide for conditions on which liquor and intoxicating drugs can be imported	 exported	 transported	 manufactured and possessed and sold. Offenses created under the Act are for contravening provisions in that regard and the power of Excise Officers to make arrests	 searches or seizure or to investigate offenses under the Act is incidental to the general power to see that the provisions of the Act are observed. The first consideration for holding Customs Officers not to be police officers would equally apply to the case of Excise Officers empowered to investigate offenses. An Excise Officer too cannot be a police officer for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act at all times. He can be a police officer only when he is discharging the duties of an investigating officer. In view of consideration No. 2	 subject to what is said in section 85 (2)	 the expression 'Police officer ' in section 25 of the Evidence Act cannot embrace Excise Officers on whom certain powers corresponding to the powers of the police officers are conferred. Section 82 draws a distinction between an officer in charge of a police station and an Excise Officer who is empowered under section 77 (2) of the Act	 as the former had to give information of any arrest	 seizure or search under the Act which he makes	 or about which he receives information to the Collector and to the Excise Officer empowered under section 77 (2) exercising jurisdiction in the area where any of these acts are done	 and so consideration No. 4 is equally applicable in this case. Excise Officers not below the rank of Superintendent of Excise and Deputy Collector can 790 compound offenses and release property liable to confiscation in the exercise of powers conferred under section 68. Such a power implies that the culprit accepts his guilt and is prepared to compound the offence. Ordinarily the culprit will express such a desire to an Excise Inspector or Sub Inspector in the first instance. It appears to me to be incongruous that a confession to such an Excise Officer be considered to be inadmissible on trial of a suspect in Court by considering these Excise Officers to be police officers	 while the Act itself allows the superior Excise Officer to compound the offence with the culprit and discharge him in view of section 68 and the Government Notification. Further all proceedings before the Collector or Superintendent of Excise	 section D. 0. and Deputy Collector exercising the powers of the Collector are judicial proceedings within the meaning of section 228 1. P. C. Section 85 (3) provides about the officers who and the circumstances in which they can be deemed to be police officers for the purposes of the Criminal Procedure Code. All Officers other than Collectors .who make arrests. 	 searches or seizures under the Act are to be deemed 'police officers ' for the purpose of the provisions relating to arrests	 searches or seizures in the Criminal Procedure Code. It is therefore clear that the Legislature had in mind the police 	officers who perform the duties of making arrests	 searches	 and seizures	 under the Criminal Procedure Code and provided that Excise officers or other persons authorized under the Act to perform these acts be deemed to be police officers for these purposes. It is therefore clear that the Legislature did not contemplate that Excise Officers performing other duties corresponding to the duties of the regular police officers be deemed police officers merely on account of their performing those duties. It follows that Excise Officers when investigating offences under the Act are not to be deemed police officers for the 791 purposes of the provisions about investigation in the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the Legislature had intended that officers who investigate offences under the Act be also deemed to be officers for the purposes of provisions regarding investigation in the Code of Criminal Procedure or section 25 of the Evidence Act or for any other purpose under any other law	 it could have made an express provision in that regard. It is not suggested for the appellant that a Collector who is an Excise Officer and on whom the power of investigating offences under the Act is conferred under section 77 of the Act is a police officer within section 25 of the Evidence Act. Sub section (3) of section 85 does not even provide that he be deemed to be a police officer when he makes arrests	 searches or seizures under the Act. The Act itself therefore contemplates that the possession of a power to investigate offences under section 77 and the right under section 78 of the Act to exercise any of the powers conferred upon a police officer making an investigation or upon the officer in charge of a police station by sections 160 to 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not make the officer so empowered a 'police officer '. Great reliance however is placed on the provision of sub section (3) of section 78 of the Act for the contention that Inspectors and Sub lnspectors of Excise are police officers for the purposes of section 25 of the Evidence Act. Sub section (3) of section 78 reads: " 'For the purposes of section 156 of the Code of Criminal 'Procedure	 1898 (5 of 1898) the area to which an Excise Officer empowe red under section 17	 sub section (2)	 is appointed shall be deemed to be a police station	 and such officer shall be deemed to be the officer in charge of such station. " 792 It is argued that these provisions definitely provide that the area to which the Excise Officer empowered under section 77 (2) is appointed is to be deemed a police station and he be deemed to be an officer in charge of the said police station	 and that therefore such an Excise Officer is a police officer within the meaning of that expression in section 25 of the Evidence Act. I do not agree. The area is deemed to be a police station and he himself is deemed to be a police officer in charge of that police station for a very limited purpose. He is to be so considered for the purposes of section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not for any other purpose. Now	 section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads : "(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may	 without the order of a Magistrate investigate	 any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XV relating to the place of enquiry or trial. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned. " What sub section (1) of section 156 of the Code provides is already provided under sub section (2) of section 77 of the Act which empowers such officers to investigate	 without the order of a Magistrate	 any such offence which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area 793 to which such officer is appointed would have the power to enquire into or try under the aforesaid provisions. Sub section (1) of section 156 of the Code does nothing more than authorize an officer in charge of a police station	 without the order of a Magistrate	 to investigate any cognizable offence which the Court having jurisdiction over the local area or within the limits of the police station would have the power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XV relating to the place of enquiry or trial. The effect of sub section (3) of section 78 can only be that in view of the provisions of sub SS. (2) & (3) of section 156 of the Code	 no proceeding by the Excise Officer so empowered under section 77 (2) shall	 at any stage	 be called in question on the ground that he was not empowered to investigate that offence and that any Magistrate empowered under section 190 Cr. P. C. can order such an ]Excise Officer to investigate an offence under the Act. In this view	 the provisions of section 78 (3) are of no help in concluding that the Excise Officer empowered under section 77 (2) is a police officer for all the purposes of the investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure	 or for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act. Further	 the limited nature of the effect of sub. section (3) of section 78 is also apparent when it is considered that sub section (1) of section 78 provides that an Excise Officer empowered under section 77 (2) can exercise any of the powers conferred upon a police officer making an investigation or by an officer in charge of a police station by Ss. 160 to 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the provisions of sub section (3) make an Excise Officer empowered under section 77 (2) a police officer in charge of a police station for the purposes of the entire investigation	 there was no necessity to provide in sub section (1) that he could exercise the powers under certain sections specified therein. The powers which the Excise Officer as an Investigating Officer exercises under section 78 (1) are 794 also limited in scope	 Under section 160 Cr. P. C. he can summon persons for the purpose of investigation. He may examine such persons orally about the facts and circumstances of the case	 just as a police officer can do under sub section (1) of section 161. But the person so examined does not appear to be bound to answer all questions relating to such case put to him by the Excise Officers though he is bound to answer the questions put by the police officer in view of sub section (2) of section 161 Or. P. C.	 and by the Customs Officer under section 171 A of the . Section 162 of the Code does not confer any power on a police officer. It only provides that any statement made by a person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code could be used for no purpose except for the purpose provided in that sub section	 at any enquiry in respect of that offence under investigation at the time when that statement was made. An investigation by the Excise Officer is not an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He may take similar steps during investigation which a police officer has to take	 but that does not make his investigation an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code. Again	 section 163 has no application so far as the question of conferring power is concerned. It rather enjoins upon a police officer not to offer or make or cause to be offered or made	 any such inducement	 threat or promise as is mentioned in the 	 section 24	 and not to prevent any person from making a voluntary statement in the course of an investigation. Section 164	 again	 deals with the recording of statements and confessions by Magistrates during the investigation under that Chapter	 and can at best be said to empower by implication that these Excise Officers can send a confessing accused for the recording of confession to a Magistrate. In exercise of the powers under section 165	 795 Cr. P. C.	 the Excise Officer can search in certain circumstances a place for a thing which may be found useful for the investigation and	 in view of section 166 Cr. P. C. he can require any other Excise Officer or police officer to a cause search to be made. Section 168 of the Code is of no use as it requires any subordinate police officer making investigation to report the result to the Station Officer as all Inspectors and Sub Inspectors of Excise are required by section 78 (4) of the Act to report to the Magistrate for trying the accused if he has not stopped further proceedings in exercise of the powers under section 78 (2) and which he would do when there be not sufficient evidence to send the accused to the Magistrate for Trial. For similar reason	 section 169 Cr. P.C.	 is of no use to the Excise Officer empowered under section 77 (2). Section 170 empowers the officer in charge of a police station to send up the accused to a Magistrate if there be sufficient evidence. Under section 171	 he can send up a witness on complaint	 in certain circumstances	 in custody to a Magistrate. I may now consider certain cases in which a view has been expressed that when an officer	 who is not an officer of the regular police force	 is invested with powers of the Station Officer in charge of a police station for the purposes of the investigation of offences he is competent to investigate	 that officer will be a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act during the course of the investigation he be making. The considerations which led to that view were mainly two. One was that neither the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 which originally enacted a provision identical with the one in section 25 of the Evidence Act	 nor the Evidence Act of 1872 itself defined a police officer	 that the definition of the word 'Police ' in the Police .Act of 1861 was not a definite definition but only an inclusive one and that the expression 'police officer ' 796 being not precise in defining the class of officers covered by it was to be interpreted according to what the original intention and object of the Legislature must have been in their enacting section 25 of the Evidence Act. The second was that the expression 'police officer ' in section 25 of the Evidence Act should be construed according to the meaning that expression carried at or about the time that enactment was made and for that purpose	 the view expressed in Hurribole 's Case (1)	 was not only accepted but was interpreted to mean that anyone whom the people at large looked upon as a police officer would be included in that definition. I would first consider Hurribole 's Case (1)	 to which reference had been made in Barkat Ram 's Case (2). In Hurribole 's Case (1)	 Mr. Lambert who was a member of the regular police force and was so regarded outside Calcutta to which city the police Act of 1861 did not apply	 was posted at Calcutta as Deputy Commissioner of Police. He was also invested with the powers of a Magistrate. The accused in that case made a confession originally to two policemen. It was taken down in writing. He was then brought before Mr. Lambert	 the Deputy Commissioner of Police	 at the police office. He affirmed the truth of his former statement to Mr. Lambert	 who	 in his capacity of a Magistrate	 received and attested the statement. The question was whether this confession was hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act or not. The decision of this question depended on the view whether Mr. Lambert was a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act. Garth C. J.	 repelled the contention that the expression 'police officer ' comprised only that class of persons who were called in the Bengal Police Act members of the police force and observed; at p. 215: ". that the term 'Police officer ' should be read not in any strict technical sense	 but (1) (1876) I.L.R. I Cal	 207. (2) ; 797 according to its more comprehensive and popular meaning. In common parlance and amongst the generality of people	 the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police are understood to be officers of police	 or in other words 'police officers ' quite as much as the more ordinary members of the force; . I think it better in construing a section such as the 25th which was intended as a wholesome protection to the accused	 to construe it in its widest and most popular signification. " These observations simply mean that Mr. Lambert who was a regular member of the police force did not cease to be a police officer when posted as Deputy Commissioner of Police at Calcutta with Magisterial powers	 that he would still be considered to be a police officer by the people in general and that therefore he should be held to be a police officer. The use of the comparative words 'narrow ' and 'wider ' with respect to the meaning to be given to the term 'police officer ' have a particular reference in the context to the effect that a person	 even though strictly not a police officer during the period of his tenure of office as Deputy Commissioner of Police	 Calcutta	 but a police officer in view of his regular service conditions	 must be held to be a police officer as the people at large cannot make any distinction between the temporary character of his status when he was posted at Calcutta as Deputy Commissioner of Police	 who according to the definition	 probably did not come within either the Bengal Police Act or the Police Act of 1861	 I cannot take it that Garth C. J.	 meant	 that in construing the term 'police officer ' in section 25 of the Evidence Act Courts should resort to their notions as to whether the people at large considered the particular officer to be a police officer or not. Any such basis for construing this expression in section 25 would be very slippery as there 798 would be no real basic standard to form the foundation for such an interpretation. Another question raised in that case was that the confession was admissible in view of section 26 of the Evidence Act which provided that no confession made by a person in police custody would be admissible in evidence unless it was made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate	 that Mr. Lambert was a Magistrate and that therefore the confession made to him was admissible in evidence. This contention was repelled on the ground that section 25 of the Evidence Act was imperative and a confession made to a police officer under any circumstances was not admissible in evidence against the maker thereof. This means that Mr. Lambert 's status as a Magistrate was completely ignored. The confession was not deemed to be taken by a Magistrate. It was taken to be made to a police officer as Mr. Lambert was a police officer on account of the service to which he belonged. It was merely as a Deputy Commissioner of Police that he enjoyed certain powers of a Magistrate. This view	 therefore	 can also be used in support of the contention that the mere conferment of certain powers of an officer of one class did not make that officer an officer of the class whose powers had been conferred on him. If conferment of powers of another officer could make the officer an officer of the other type during the period he be exercising the functions of the other officer	 Mr. Lambert could have been treated a Magistrate when he purported to act as a Magistrate in receiving the confession of the accused. In my opinion	 the case does not support the opposite view in any way. The only effect of the observations of the learned Chief justice to the effect that section 25 of the Evidence Act be construed in its widest and most popular signification is that the expression 'police officer ' is not restricted to only those police officers who come within the definition of police officer ' 799 within a certain Act dealing with police	 but can include officers who belong to the police in general. Its effect is not to widen the scope of 'police officer ' in section 25 to such an extent as to make the Court embark on a general enquiry about popular concept in a certain area	 about one being a police officer in the mind of the people at large. It is true that the Criminal Procedure Code of 1861 or of later years does not define the expression 'police officer ' while its various sections refer to police officers. For the purpose of this case	 we may refer to section 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 1861 (Act XXV of 1861). Section 148 was : " 'No confession or admission of guilt made to a Police Officer shall be used as evidence against a person accused of any offence." Which Officers were contemplated to be 'police officers ' by the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 ? I am of opinion that the Code of Criminal Procedure could not have but referred to the regular police officers for the purpose of its various enactments. It must have fixed upon a particular class of officers on whom the various powers of a police officer were being conferred by the Code and on whom the Code imposed certain important duties. Surely these powers were not conferred and duties were not imposed on a vague class of persons whose powers or liability would be subject to determination by Courts in accordance with the popular impression. The only definite class of people would be then members of the police according to the various enactments in force and not necessarily under the general Police Act of 1861 or any special Police Act applicable to the Presidency towns	 or those who	 under certain statutory provisions be deemed to be 800 police officers as	 in that case	 it would be the Legislature which itself would lay down the class of persons who would be treated to be police officers. I may say that it was not foreign to the Legislature in 1861 to make provisions with respect to certain persons being deemed to be officers of a certain class. Historically	 I do not find the expression 'Police officer ' or 'Police ' to be a vague one. In 1793	 a number of Regulations were made by the Governor General in Council. They dealt with many a subject connected with the administration of the territory under the control of the East India Company. The preamble of Regulation XXII of 1793 indicates that the object of that Regulation was to establish an efficient police throughout the country whereby offenders may be deprived of all hope of eluding the pursuit of officers of justice as the clause in the engagements of the landholders and farmers of land by which they were bound to keep the peace	 and in the event of any robbery being committed in their respective estates or farms	 to produce both the robbers and the property plundered	 was found nugatory. Section 11 of this Regulation reads : " 'The police of the country is	 in future	 to be considered under the exclusive charge of the officers who may be appointed to the superintendence of it on the part of Government. The landholders and farmers of land who were bound to keep up establishments of tannahdars and police officers for the preservation of the peace are accordingly required to discharge them	 and all landholders and farmers of land are prohibited from entertaining such establishments in future." Section III specifically provided that in future landholders and farmers would not be considered 801 responsible for robberies committed in their respective estates or farms unless certain facts mentioned therein existed. This seems to be the first Regular Code for the establishment of the efficient police in the country under the control of the British. Formerly	 it was the landholder and the farmer of land who discharged the functions of the police for the maintenance of peace and for preventing the commission and detection of crimes	 especially crimes against property	 robbery	 theft	 etc. It is to be noticed that according to the preamble and the provisions of section II of this Regulation	 the entire police was to be in the exclusive charge of the officers appointed by the Government. The Government had to appoint the police officers as such. Subsequent Regulations and Acts developed the law about the police on the foundations laid by this Regulation. The object of the Police Act of 1861 is also to cover the entire police in the country. Its title is : 'An Act for the Regulation of Police '; and its preamble reads : "Whereas it is expedient to reorganize the Police and to make it a more efficient instru ment for the prevention and detection of crime. . . The expression 'general police district ' according to section 1	 embraces any Presidency	 State or place	 in which the Act shall be ordered to take effect. Section 2 provides that the entire police establishment under a State Government shall	 for the purposes of the Act	 be deemed to be one police force and shall be formally enrolled; persons of this establishment	 therefore	 formed a class by themselves. Section 3	 however	 provides that the superintendence of the police throughout a general police district shall vest in and shall be exercised by the State Government to which such district is subordinate. This does not speak of the superintendence 802 of the police force or the police establishment	 but puts the entire police within the State under the control of the Government. The administration of such entire police is vested in the Inspector General of Police by section 4 and within a district 'is vested in the District Superintendent. These officers exercise no administrative control over the Excise Officers. Section 47 makes it lawful for the State Government to declare. that any authority which is being exercised by a Magistrate of the District over any village watchman or other village police officer for the purpose of police shall be exercised	 subject to the general control of the Magistrate of the district	 by the District Superintendant of Police. This is a clear indication that the Act purported to bring the entire police whether controlled under the Act or not	 within its purview in the area where the Act be in force. It was on account of the various persons under several Acts or otherwise discharging the functions of the police that the Police Act of 1861 provided that the word "Police ' in the Act meant to include all persons who would be enrolled under that Act	 indicating thereby that the expression could cover persons other than those enrolled under that Act. Section 21 of the Police Act refers to some of them	 viz.	 hereditary or other police officer or police officers appointed under Act XX of 1856	 the Bengal Chowkeydari Act. The inclusive definition of 'police ' does not appear to me to be so wide as to include any one to whom powers similar to those of a police officer are conferred by any Act. The history of the Excise Law also shows that Excise Officers have been considered different from police officers and that clear provisions were enacted for certain. officers of the Revenue and Police Departments to be deemed Excise Officers. 803 Regulation XXXIV of 1793 re enacted with modifications the rules passed on April 16	 1790	 and subsequent dates	 for levying a tax upon intoxicating liquors and drugs and for preventing illicit manufacture and vend of them. This was repealed by Regulation X of 1813. Section I of Regulation X of 1813 states with respect to the purpose of the Regulation : ". and whereas it will tend to the public convenience to reduce the whole of the Regu lations at present in force with respect to that branch of the public revenue	 and respecting likewise the duties on intoxicating drugs	 taury	 and putchwye	 to one Regulation	 with alterations and amendments	 the following rules have been passed". and thus emphasized that the Regulatian related to the branch of public revenue. Section XVIII provided that for the more convenient collection of the duties on spirituous liquors etc. 	 officers would be appointed by the collectors to be denominated abkarry darogahs for the collection of the said duties. These darogahs were to apprehend and send to the Collector any individual having an unlicensed still in his possession or engaged in the illicit sale of spirituous liquors etc. Section XXII provided that .all investigations which it may be necessary to institute respecting the illicit manufacture or sale of spirituous liquors etc.	 shall be conducted by the collectors of land revenue or other public officers entrusted with the charge of the abkarry mohaul. Section XXII further empowered the Collector or other officers entrusted with the charge of akbarry mohaul to cause the persons charged with or suspect ed of offences under the Regulation to be apprehended so that a regular enquiry might be made into the merits of the case. Officers in charge of the abkarry 804 mohaul were given power under section XXIII to issue search warrants. Section XXXI made the collectors of land revenue entitled to a commission on the net amount of the abkarry revenue realised by them. Act XXI of 1856 repealed Regulation X of 1813. Its title is 'An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the Abkaree Revenue in the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal ' and the preamble states : "Whereas it is expedient that the laws relating to the manufacture of spirits and the sale of spirituous and fermented liquors and intoxicating drugs	 and the collection of the revenue derived therefrom	 should be consolidated and amended : It is enacted as follows. " Section II says that the Collectors of land revenue will be in charge of the collection of the revenue arising from the manufacture of spirits and the sale of spirits	 liquors and intoxicating drugs. Section IV empowered the Collectors to appoint darogahs	 jemadars	 peons	 surveyors	 gaugers and other officers for the collection of the abkaree revenue and for the prevention of smuggling. The office of abkaree darogah could be combined with that of any tuhseeldar	 naib tuhseeldar or peshkar. In such cases section IV provided that those officers and officers subordinate to them would be held and deemed to be Abkaree officers within the meaning of the Act. The Abkaree officers were empowered under section LV to enter and inspect shops or premises of licensed Manu facturers or retail vendors. Section LVI empowered them to stop and detain any person carrying articles liable to confiscation under the Act and to seize such articles and also to arrest the person in possession of them. Powers of arrest under certain circumstances were also conferred on them by section LVII. Section LXV further provided that all police officers were required to aid the Abkaree officers in 805 the due execution of the Act upon notice given or request made by such officers. The expression 'police officers ' and 'abkarec officers ' in these sections refer to officers of the regular police and officers of Abkaree respectively. The Act makes a distinction between the two	 and rightly. Section LVIII empowered an Abkaree officer above the rank of a jemadar of peons to enter and search certain places in the presence of the darogah or other officer of police in circumstances specified in that section. Section LIX provided for the vesting of certain powers in the officers of the Police	 Customs and Revenue Departments and authorised the Government to invest those officers with powers with respect to the seizure of and search for spirituous and fermented liquors and intoxicating drugs and the arrest of persons found in possession of them. It further provided that all such officers when so empowered	 as well as all police	 Customs and Revenue officers	 when acting under the authority conferred by that section	 for the suppression of illicit dealings in opium	 would be held and deemed to be Abkaree officers within the meaning of the Act. It is clear	 therefore	 from the provisions of sections IV and LIX that the Legislature specifically provided	 whenever it considered necessary	 for certain officers to be deemed to be Abkaree officers when	 by virtue of their regular service	 they were not Abkaree officers. It was in 1861	 as already stated	 that the 'Criminal Procedure Code	 by section 148	 provided that no confession made to a Police officer would be used in evidence against an accused person. In view of the provisions of the first Regulation XXII of 1793 dealing with the creation of the Police under the direct control of the Government and of the Abkaree Department 806 governed by Regulation XXXIV of 1793 up to 1856	 it is not possible to say in my opinion	 that the Legislature when using the expression 'police officer ' in section 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861	 intended that expression to include the Abkaree officers who had powers of investigation	 though without any reference to the procedure to be followed in carrying out the investigation necessary for the purpose of establishing the offences under the Abkaree Act against the alleged culprits. It is also clear from certain provisions referred to above that the Legislature did state in clear terms that certain officers of the other departments would be deemed to be Abkaree officers in certain circumstances. It follows therefore that if the Legislature had intended to use the expression 'police officers ' in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 or in section 25 of the Evidence Act of 1872 in such a sense as to include such officers of departments other than the Police on whom powers of investigation were conferred	 it could have very easily said that a confession to a police officer or such other officers would be inadmissible in evidence or it could have explained the expression (police officer ' for the purposes of that section	 that is	 section 148 of the Criminal ' Procedure Code of 1861 or section 25 of the Evidence Act of 1872. Its omission to do so	 to my mind		 is a clear indication of the fact that the Legislature had no intention to use the expression 'police officer ' in section 25 of the Evidence Act in such a general sense in which it is construed in Nanoo vs Emperor (1)	 Ameen Sharif vs Emperor (1)	 Public Prosecutor vs Paramasivam (3). I may refer to the case cited as Radha Kishun Marwari vs King Emperor (4)	 where it was held that an Excise officer was not a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the evidence Act. of the three judges	 Courtney Terrel	 C. J.	 expressed his disagreement with the (1) Bom	 78. (2) Cal. 607	 (3) A.I	P		 	 (4) (1932) 1	L	R	 12 Pat. 46. 807 view of the Bombay High Court in Nanoo vs Emperor (1)	 and	 after stating that the decision in Hurribole 's case (2)	 had been much misunderstood	 said "The fact is that the term "police officer ' is sufficiently well understood to allow of its use without any precise definition. Thus it is well recognised that different countries and states confer upon their respective police officers different powers. Nevertheless it is not difficult to decide whether any particular individual is	 or is not	 a police officer in any particular country and it has been held that a confession made to a police officer of a foreign force in the country where he is in fact a police officer is not admissible in an Indian I trial." He also expressed the opinion that the Courts of justice were not primarily concerned with the objects with which the legislature enacted any particular law and that the legislature might not have finally enacted a provision to carry out the entire object with which it tended to enact it	 and that in cases where the legislature had not thought fit to express its intention otherwise than by the use of the words of the section; those words	 must be followed. Fazl Ali	 J. agreed with his views and stated at p. 56: "It appears to me that the distinction between a person who is nothing but a police officer and one who is primarily not a police officer but merely invested with the powers of a police officer is material and cannot be ignored for the purpose of construing section 25 of the Evidence Act."" He pertinently remarked at p.57: "To take this view would	 in my opinion	 be to ignore the popular meaning of the term (1) Bom	 78. (2) (1871) I.L.R. I Cal. 207. 808 'police officer ' and enlarge unduly the scope of the section. There was nothing to prevent the framers of the Evidence Act from saying expressly that confessions made to a police officer as well as those persons who are for the time being and for certain limited purposes invested with the powers of a police officer arc inadmissible in evidence. " Agarwala J.	 expressed the opinion that the expression 'police officer ' in section 25 of the Evidence Act referred to the police officers enrolled in or appointed as members of the police force. I agree with respect with the wider view taken by the learned Chief Justice and Fazl Ali	 J. I therefore hold that the Excise Inspector and Sub Inspector empowered by the State Government under section 77(2) of the Act are not police officers within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act and that the aforesaid officers cannot be treated to be police officers for the purposes of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 162 does not confer any power on a police officer. It deals with the use which can be made of the statements recorded by a police officer carrying out investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code. The investigation which the aforesaid Excise officer conducts is not under Chapter XIV of the Code	 but is under the provisions of the Act and therefore this is a further reason for non applicablity of section 162 Cr. P. C. to any statements made by a person to an Excise officer during the course of his investigating an offence under the Act. In this case	 the evidence on record about the appellant 's being found in possession of Nepali Ganja is not such on which reliance could be placed for maintaining his conviction. The High Court relied on it in view of the confession of the appellant	 809 The conduct of the Excise Inspector in tampering with the seizure memo is such as to affect his bona fides and therefore there is a lot of doubt about the alleged confession by the appellant being voluntary. I am not satisfied about the confession being voluntary and would therefore not use it in support of the unsatisfactory statements of the prosecution witnesses about the recovery of the ganja from his possession and would not sustain the conviction even though the High Court has recorded a finding of fact that Ganja was recovered from the appellant 's possession. The High Court did not consider the tampering of the seizure memo in all its aspects or its effect on the alleged voluntariness of the confession and	 consequently	 on the case. Appeal allowed.

The appellant along with five other. people	 one of whom was driving the car	 were traveling in a car belonging to the appellant 's brother. The car was stopped by the Excise Inspector who conducted a search of the car and recovered five bundles of Ganja	 four from the luggage boot and one from the leg space in front of the seat of the car. The boot could be opened with the keys in the possession of the appellant as well as one of the keys in the possession of the driver. The appellant made a confession to the Excise Inspector admitting his guilt. At the trial of the appellant alongwith the other persons he pleaded an alibi and pleaded innocence. The 753 trial court acquitted all the other accused but convicted the appellant under section 47 (a) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act. 1915	 and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 2	000. On appeal the High Court affirmed this conviction and sentence. The appellant thereupon appealed to this Court with special leave. In the appeal before this Court it was contended that the confessional statement exhibit 3 upon which reliance was placed by the High Court as supporting the evidence of P. W. 2	 P. W. 3 and P. W. 4 was inadmissible and if this statement was put aside the evidence of these prosecution witnesses was insufficient in law to sustain the conviction of the appellant. In objecting to the admissibility of the statement reliance was placed on section 25 of the and section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in as much as it was recorded by the Inspector of Excise while he was investigating into an excise offence under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Held (per Subba Rao and; Mudholkar JJ.) the words	 "Police Officer" in section 25 of the Evidence Act are not to be construed in a narrow way but have to be construed in a wide and popular sense. Those words are however not to be construed in so wide a sense as to include persons on whom only some of the powers exercised by the police are conferred. State of Punjab vs Barkat Ram ; referred to. By virtue of section 77 (2) read with section 78 (3) of the Bihar & Orissa Excise Act	 1915	 an Excise Inspector or Sub Inspector in the State of Bihar shall be deemed to be an of charge of a police station and is entitled to investigate any offence under the Excise Act. He can exercise all the powers which an officer in charge of a police station can exercise under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore a confession recorded by him during an investigation into an excise offence cannot reasonably be regarded as anything 'different from a confession to a police officer. The test for determining whether a person is a "police officer" for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act would be whether the powers of a police officer which are conferred on him or which arc exercisable by him because he is deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station establish a direct or 754 substantial relationship with the prohibition enacted by section 25 of the Evidence Act that is the recording of a confession. in other words the test would be whether the powers are such as would tend to facilitate the obtaining by him of a confession from a suspect delinquent. It is the power of investigation which establishes a direct relationship with the prohibitions under section 25 of the Evidence Act. Therefore where such power is conferred upon an officer	 the mere fact that he possesses some other powers under another law would not make him any the less a police officer for the purpose of section 25. The object of enacting section 25 of the Evidence Act was to eliminate from consideration confession made to an officer who by virtue of his position	 could extract by force	 torture or inducement a confession. An Excise Officer acting under section 78 (3) of the Bihar & Orissa Excise Act	 1915	 would be in the same position as an officer in charge of a police station making an investigation under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He would likewise have the same opportunity of extracting confession from a suspect. It is therefore difficult to draw a rational distinction between a 	confession recorded by a Police Officer strictly so called and recorded by an Excise Officer who is deemed to be a police officer. Case law reviewed. Harbhanian Sao vs Emperor	 (1927) 1. L. R. 	 Matilal Kalwar vs Emperor	 A. I. R. 	 Ameen Sharief vs Emperor	 (1934) 1. L. R. 	 Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed vs Emperor	 Bom. 78	 Public Prosecutor vs O. Paramasivam	 A. I. R. 	 Ibrahim vs Emperor	 A. 1. R. 	 Radha Kishun Maruwari V. King Emperor	 Pat. 46 and Queen vs Hurribole Chunder Ghose	 (1876) 1. L. R. referred to. There is one more reason also why the confession made to an Excise Sub Inspector must be excluded	 that is	 it is a statement made during the course of investigation to a person who exercises the power of an officer in charge of a police station. Such a statement is excluded from evidence by section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure except for the purposes of contradiction. Therefore both by section 25 of the Evidence Act as well as section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code the confession of the appellant is inadmissible in evidence. 755 Per Raghubar Dayal	 J. The appeal should be allowed but for different reasons. A scrutiny of the various provisions of the Bihar & Orissa Excise Act	 1915	 leads to the conclusion that the legal position of an Excise Officer is similar to that of the Customs Officer whom this Court has held to be not a "Police officer" in the case of State of Punjab vs Barkat Ram	 A. 1. The provisions of sections 7	 89	 95 and 96 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act	 1915	 are sufficient to indicate that the action of Excise Officers under the Act and under any other law relating to excise revenue is treated alike. The Act is like Sea Customs Act primarily concerned with the collection of the Excise revenue. An Excise Officer cannot be a police officer for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act at all times. He cannot be a police officer only when he is discharging the duties of an investigating officer. The mere fact that the Excise Officer possesses certain powers similar to those of police officers in regard to infraction of excise laws is not a sufficient ground for holding them to be police officers within the meaning of section 25 Evidence Act. Under section 85(3) of the Bihar & Orissa Excise Act	 1915 all officers other than collectors who make arrests	 searches or seizures under the Act are deemed to be police officers for the purpose of the provisions relating to arrests	 searches and seizures in the Criminal Procedure Code. It is therefore clear that the Legislature did not contemplate that Excise Officers performing other duties corresponding to the duties of the regular police officers be deemed to be police officers merely on account of their performing those duties. It follows that Excise Officers when investigating offenses under the Act are not to be deemed police officers for the purpose of the provisions about investigation in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The effect of section 78(3) can only be that in view of the provisions of sub 3s. (2) and (3) of section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure no proceedings by the Excise Officer so empowered shall be called into question on the ground that he was not empowered to investigate an offence. The history of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as the Excise law shows that Excise Officers have been considered 756 different from police officers and that clear provisions were created for certain officers of the Revenue and Police departments to be deemed Excise Officers. The Excise Inspector and Sub Inspector empowered by the State Government under section 77(2) of the Act are not police officers within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act and that the aforesaid officers cannot be treated to be police officers for the purpose of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.