Summarize the following court judgment. l Appeals Nos. 280 and 281 of 1960. Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 20	 1956	 of the Madras High Court	 in T. R. C. Nos. 101 and 102 of 1956. B. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishnan	 for the appellant. M. M. Ismail and T. M. Sen	 for the respondent. 572 D. V. Sastri and T. M. Sen	 for Intervener No. 1. Naunit Lal	 for Intervener No. 2. section M. Sikri	 Advocate General	 Punjab and D. Gupta	 for Intervener No. 3. section M. Sikri	 Advocate General	 Punjab	 N. section Bindra and D. Gupta	 for Intervener No. 4. G. C. Kasliwal	 Advocate General	 Rajasthan	 section K. Kapur and D. Gupta	 for Intervener No. 5. 1961. April 28. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by section K. DAS	 J. These are two appeals on certificates granted by the High Court of Madras and consolidated by its orders dated March 22	 1957. They are from the judgment and orders of the said High Court dated April 20	 1956 and July 30	 1956 in two Tax Revision Cases	 by which the High Court dismissed two petitions filed by the appellants under section 12 B of the Madras General Sales Tax Act (Madras Act IX of 1939)	 hereinafter called the principal Act	 in the fol lowing circumstances. Messrs. George Oakes (Private) Limited	 appellants herein	 are dealers in Ford motor cars	 spare parts and accessories. For the two years 1951 52 and 1952 53 the appellants submitted their returns under the relevant provisions of the principal Act and claimed exemption from tax with regard to certain amount realised on transactions of sales which the appellants contended were inter State sales and hence exempt from tax under article 286 of the Constitution as it stood at the relevant time. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer	 Madras	 not only rejected the claim of exemption	 but added to the turnover certain amounts which the appellants had collected by way of tax. The amounts so added for 1951 52 were (a) Rs. 8	000 to the net turnover assessable at 3 pies per rupee	 and (b) Rs. 4	30	000 to the turnover assessable at 9 pies per rupee. For 1952 53 the amounts so added were (a) Rs. 30	132 odd and (b) Rs. 2	92	257 odd res pectively. Aggrieved by the orders of the Deputy Commercial 573 Tax Officer	 the appellants preferred two appeals to the Special Commercial Tax Officer	 Appeals	 Madras City. These appeals were dismissed. The matter was then taken to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal by means of two appeals. By this time the Madras Legislature had passed the Madras General Sales (Definition of Turnover and Validation of Assessments) Act	 1954	 being Madras Act No. XVII of 1954. This Act we shall refer to as the impugned Act in this judgment	 because its constitutional validity is now the only question for decision in these appeals. The Tribunal negatived the claim of the appellants arising out of the contention that some of the sale transactions in the relevant years were in effect interState sales and therefore exempt from tax; the tribunal declined to go into the second question of the constitutional validity of the impugned Act. We may state here	 though nothing now turns upon this	 that the Tribunal held that when sales tax was included in the turnover	 it was proper to tax the amounts so included at the minimum rate only	 viz.	 3 pies in the rupee under section 3(1) of the principal Act. Thereafter the appellants filed two revision petitions to the High Court under section 12 B of the principal Act. These were dismissed in limine. By the orders dated April 20	 1956 the High Court held that the contention as to some of the transactions being inter State sales was concluded by one of its earlier decisions	 which came before us in Ashok Leyland Ltd. vs The State of Madras	 Civil Appeal No. 446 of 1958. In that appeal we delivered judgment on March 28	 1961 and held that the Sales Tax Laws (Validation) Act	 1956 applied and it was unnecessary to consider the true nature of the transactions which the appellants contended were inter State sales. Learned Counsel for the appellants has conceded before us that decision governs the present appeals	 and the first question no longer survives. As to the second question	 the High Court by oversight did not deal with it in its orders dated April 20	 1956. When the matter was brought to the notice of 73 574 the High Court	 it said in its orders dated July 30	 1956 that the second question was also concluded by its decision in Sri Sundararajan and Co.	 Ltd. vs The State of Madras( ') where the validity of the impugned Act was upheld. When we heard these appeals along with Ashok Leyland Ltd. vs The State of Madras	 Civil Appeal No. 446 of 1958	 we expressed the view that there was some divergence of opinion in the High Courts on the second question and the substantial point for consideration before us was whether the impugned Act was validly made under entry 54 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution: thus the question raised was one of legislative competence and affected all the States. The State of Madras was already a party respondent to these appeals. Accordingly	 we directed the issue of notices to the Advocates General of all other States also. In pursuance of the said notices the Advocates General of Andhra Pradesh	 Assam	 West Bengal	 Gujarat	 Maharashtra	 Punjab and Rajasthan have appeared before us. They have unanimously supported the State of Madras in its submission that the impugned Act is valid; some of them have added supplementary arguments in support of that submission. For convenience and brevity we shall refer in this judgment to the main arguments as representing two differing points of view; firstly	 there is the argument on behalf of the appellants that the several provisions of the principal Act as also section 2 of the impugned Act make a distinction between the sale price of goods sold and the amount collected by way of tax and in view of that distinction made	 What the impugned Act seeks to impose is a 'tax on Sales tax ' a subject which does not come within the ambit of entry 54 of List II which at the relevant time read as "Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers. " On the other side	 the argument is that what the impugned Act seeks to do is to enlarge the scope of the definition of 'turnover ' so as to include the amount collected by way of tax in the turnover by a deeming (1) (1956) 7 S.T.C. 105. 575 provision	 and this the State Legislature was competent to enact under entry 54 of the State List. These are the main arguments on two sides; but there are several subsidiary points in support of the main argument on each side	 and it would be an over simplification to ignore these altogether. We shall	 therefore	 consider them also when dealing with the main argument on each side. We shall first refer to the relevant provisions of the principal Act and of the impugned Act	 in so far as they bear on the points debated before us. Under section 3 of the principal Act which is the charging section	 every dealer is liable to pay	 subject to the provisions of the Act	 for each year a tax on his total turnover for that year calculated at a particular percentage of such turnover. What is 'turnover ' is defined in section 2(i). The definition substantially states " 'turnover ' means the aggregate amount for which goods are either bought or sold by a dealer whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration. . 'Sale ' is defined in section 2(h) and means (we are reading so much of the definition only as is material for our purpose) "every transfer of property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration. " It is worthy of note here that the tax imposed by the principal Act is a tax on total turnover	 and turnover means the aggregate amount for which goods are either bought or sold by a dealer. Therefore	 one of the questions which fall for consideration is whether the State Legislature went beyond its legislative competence in enacting by the impugned Act that the amounts collected by the dealer by way of tax shall be deemed to have formed part of his turnover. This brings us to section 8B of the principal Act	 which provides in sub section (1) that no person who is not a registered dealer shall collect any amount by way of tax; nor shall a registered dealer make any such collection except in accordance with such conditions and restrictions	 if any	 as may be prescribed; sub section (2) provides inter alia that every person who has collected or collects by way of tax any amounts shall pay 576 over the same to the State Government. Section 15 provides for penalties for a	 contravention of some of the provisions of the principal Act including the provisions of section 8B. In The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes	 Coimbatore Division vs M. Krighnaswami Mudaliar & Sons (1) the Madras High Court held that the amount collected by a registered dealer from the consumer by way of sales tax and paid over to Government should not be included in the turnover of the registered dealer as part of the sale price of the goods sold and it was not liable to be taxed again. This decision was given on January 7	 1954. In July 1954 was enacted the impugned Act sections 2 and 3 whereof need only be set out here. "section 2. Sales Tax Collections by dealers to be deemed part of turnover. In the case of sales made by a dealer before the 1st April 1954	 amounts collected by him by way of tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act	 1939 (Madras Act IX of 1939) (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act)	 shall be deemed to have formed part of his turnover. Validation of certain assessment and collections. (1) All assessments	 and collections made	 all orders passed	 all actions taken by any officer in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction or power conferred by the principal Act	 and all judgments	 decrees or orders pronounced by any Tribunal or Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction or powers with respect to matters in the principal Act	 on the basis that amounts collected by a dealer by way of tax under the principal Act before the 1st April 1954	 formed part of the turnover of the dealer are hereby declared to have been validly made	 passed	 taken or pronounced	 as the case may be; and any finding recorded by any officer	 Tribunal or Court to a contrary effect and any order	 judgment or decree in so far as such order	 judgment or decree embodied or is based on any such finding and does not relate merely to the costs of the proceeding which result in the judgment	 decree or order shall be void and of no effect: (2) [1954] 5 S.T.C. 88. 577 Provided that no act or omission on the part of any person shall be punishable as an offence which would not have been so punishable if this Act had not been passed. (2) Nothing in sub section (1) shall be construed as authorising any officer	 in assessing any dealer in s the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction or powers conferred by the principal Act	 to include in the turnover of the dealer amounts collected by him after the 1st April 1954 by way of tax under the principal Act. " The validity of the impugned Act was then questioned in the Madras High Court and in Sri Sundararajan and Co.	 Ltd. vs The State of Madras (1) it was held that the impugned Act was valid. The High Court pointed out that the earlier decision in Krishnaswami Mudaliar 's case (2) was not that the State Legislature could not make the amounts collected by a registered dealer by way of tax under section 8B part of the assessable turnover	 but that the principal Act as it stood at the relevant time did not make such amounts part of the assessable turnover. It held that in pith and substance the impugned Act validated the assessments already made before April 1	 1954 and that even where the registered dealer collected any amount by way of tax under the authority of section 8B	 the payment by the purchaser was on the occasion of the sale by the dealer and vis a vis the latter it was in reality part of the price the purchaser paid the seller for purchasing the goods. The same view was also expressed by the Patna High Court in Ashoka Marketing Company Ltd. vs The State of Bihar (3) with regard to the Bihar Sales Tax (Definition of Turnover and Validation of Assessments) Act	 1958. The question before us is whether the aforesaid view is correct. The relevant legislative entry	 as we have said earlier	 is entry 54 of List II "Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers. " A similar entry (No. 48) in List 11 of Schedule VII to the Government of India Act	 1935 read as "Taxes on the (1) [1956] 7 S.T.C. 105. (2) [1954] 5 S.T.C. 88. (3) [1959] 10 S.T.C. 110	 578 sale of goods." The true scope and effect of that entry was considered by this Court in the State of Madras vs Gannon Dunkerley and Co. (Madras) Ltd. (1) and on a review of several decisions bearing on the subject it held that the expression "sale of goods" was a term of well recognised legal import in the general law relating to sale of goods and in the	 legislative practice relating to that topic and must be interpreted as having the same meaning as in the ; in other words	 it was held that sales contemplated by entry 48 of the Government of India Act	 1935 were transactions in which title to the goods passed from the seller to the buyer	 and in The Sales Tax Officer	 Pilibhit vs Messrs. Budh Prakash Jai Prakash (2) it was held that a mere executory agreement was not a sale within the meaning of that entry. We think that the same meaning must be given to entry 54 of List 11 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The question before us is that giving that meaning to the entry	 is the impugned Act a valid piece of legislation by a competent Legislature? Now	 learned Counsel for the appellants has not raised before us the extreme contention that in no case could the State Legislature validly make a law which would include the amount collected by way of tax as part of the turnover of the dealer. He has submitted that it is unnecessary for him in this case to press into service any such wide proposition. His argument is that the principal Act by sections 8B and 15 and the impugned Act by section 2 thereof having made a distinction between what he calls the sale price and what is collected by way of tax by the dealer	 the question of the validity of the impugned Act must be determined on the basis of that distinction and so determined	 what the impugned Act does is to impose what learned Counsel calls "a tax on tax" and therefore not covered by the relevant legislative entry. His submission further is that what is collected by way of tax being distinct from sale price and therefore from turnover	 it must be necessarily held that the amount collected by way of tax is not essentially (1) ; (2) ; 579 connected with the transaction of sale and therefore the imposition of "a tax on tax" has no necessary connexion with the transaction of sale as understood in the general law relating to sale of goods. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. First of all	 we do not think that either the principal Act or the impugned Act proceeds	on any immutable distinction between sale price and tax such as learned Counsel for the appellants has suggested. The principal Act does not contain any separate definition of sale price. We have already referred to the definitions of 'sale ' and 'turnover '; those definitions do not show any such distinction. On the contrary	 the expression 'turnover ' means the aggregate amount for which goods are bought or sold	 whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration	 and when a sale attracts purchase tax and the tax is passed on to the consumer	 what the buyer has to pay for the goods includes the tax as well and the aggregate amount so paid would fall within the definition of turnover. In Paprika Ltd. and Another vs Board of Trade (1) Lawrence	 J. said "Whenever a sale attracts purchase tax	 that tax presumably affects the price which the seller who is liable to pay the tax demands but it does not cease to be the price which the buyer has to pay even if the price is expressed as x plus purchase tax." The same view was again expressed in Love vs Norman Wright (Builders)	 Ltd. (2) when Goddard	 L. J. said: "Where an article is taxed	 whether by purchase tax	 customs duty	 or excise duty	 the tax becomes part of the price which ordinarily the buyer will have to pay. The price of an ounce of tobacco is what it is because of the rate of tax	 but on a sale there is only one consideration though made up of cost plus profit plus tax. So	 if a seller offers goods for sale	 it is for him to quote a price which includes the tax if he desires to pass it on to the buyer. If the buyer agrees to the price	 it is not for him to consider how it is made up or whether the seller has included tax or not. " (1) (2) 580 We think that these observations are apposite even in the context of the provisions of the Acts we are considering now	 and there is nothing in those provisions which would indicate that when the dealer Collects any amount by way of tax	 that cannot be part of the sale price. So far as the purchaser is concerned	 he pays for the goods what the seller demands	 viz.	 price even though it may include tax. That is the whole consideration for the sale and there is no reason why the whole amount paid to the seller by the purchaser should not be treated as the consideration for the sale and included in the turnover. But	 argues learned Counsel for the appellants	 section 8 B of the principal Act and Turnover and Assessment Rules made under section 19 show that under the scheme of the principal Act a distinction is drawn between the amount collected by way of tax and the amount of purchase price. It is indeed true that in section 8 B the amount collected by way of tax is separa tely mentioned	 and while sub section (1) thereof is merely enabling in the sense that a registered dealer may pass on the tax	 sub section (2) imposes an obligation on the registered dealer to pay over the amount of tax collected by him to Government. The position under the Turnover and Assessment Rules is correctly summarised in the following extract from the judgment in Krishnaswamy Mudaliar 's case (1): "Rule 4 provides that the gross turnover of a dealer for the purposes of the rules is the amount for which goods are sold by the dealer. Provision is made in rule 5 for certain deductions	 and the mode or manner in which the tax to be levied has to be arrived at. The object of these rules is to assess. 	 the net turnover on which the tax is to be levied under the charging section. It is therefore clear that under the charging section	 tax is to be paid on the turnover which is assessed according to the rules. Rule 11 requires that every dealer should submit a return under rule 6 every year to the assessing authority in Form A in which he has to show the actual gross and net turnover for the preceding (1) [1954] 5 S.T.C. 88. 581 year and the amounts by way of tax or taxes actually collected during that year. In Form A columns 1 to 10 relate to the gross turnover and the deductions to be made from the gross turnover; column 10 requires the net turnover liable to tax to be shown. In column 11 the amount actually collected by way of tax or taxes under section 8 B has to be shown. " The question however still remains do the aforesaid provisions show such a distinction under the scheme of the two Acts that the amount collected by way of tax cannot be part of the turnover of the dealer and if the impugned Act makes it a part of the turnover by a deeming provision	 it must be struck down as being outside the legislative competence of the State Legislature? It is necessary to emphasise here that no question of legislative competence arose in Krishnaswamy Mudaliar 's case( ') the decision being based on a construction of section 8 B and the Turnover and Assessment Rules only. We do not think that the distinction drawn in Krishnaswamy Mudaliar 's case( ') whether right or wrong on a question of construction only	 is material to the question of legislative competence. In The Tata Iron & Steel Co.	 Ltd. vs The State of Bihar (2) this Court dealt with a provision in the Bihar Sales Tax Act	 1947 similar to section 8 B of the principal Act. Das	 C. J.	 delivering the majority opinion said: "The circumstance that the 1947 Act	 after the amendment	 permitted the seller who was a registered dealer to collect the sales tax as a tax from the purchaser does not do away with the primary liability of the seller to pay the sales tax. This is further made clear by the fact that the registered dealer need not	 if he so pleases or chooses	 collect the tax from the purchaser and sometimes by reason of competition with other registered dealers he may find it profitable to sell his goods and to retain his old customers even at the sacrifice of the sales tax. This also makes it clear that the sales tax need not (1) [1954] 5 S.T.C. 88. (2) ; 74 582 be passed on to the purchasers and this fact does not alter the real nature of the tax which	 by the express provisions of the law	 is cast upon the seller. The buyer is under no liability to pay sales tax in addition to the agreed sale price unless the contract specifically provides otherwise. See Love	 vs Norman Wright (Builders)	 Ltd. L. R. These observations show that when the seller passes on the tax and the buyer agrees to pay sales tax in addition to the price	 the tax is really part of the entire consideration and the distinction between the two amounts tax and price loses all significance from the point of view of legislative competence. The matter is not in any way different under the Turnover and Assessment Rules. It is true that in column 11 of Form A the amount collected by way of tax under section 8 B has to be shown; that does not	 however	 mean that an immutable distinction such as will go to the root of legislative competence has been drawn and must be always maintained. It appears to us that the true effect of section 8 B and the Turnover and Assessment Rules is that (a) a registered dealer is enabled to pass on the tax	 (b) an unregistered dealer cannot do so	 and (c) the amount collected by way of tax is to be shown separately	 for it has to be paid over to Government. This does not mean that it is incompetent to the legislature enacting legislation pursuant to entry 54 in List 11 by suitable provision to make the tax paid by the purchaser to the dealer together with the sale price in consideration of the goods sold	 a part of the turnover of the dealer; nor does it mean that in law the tax as imposed by Government is a tax on the buyer making the dealer a mere collecting agency so that the tax must always remain outside the sale price. There is another aspect from which the question may be considered. We shall assume that under the 	scheme of the principal Act a distinction is drawn between the amount collected by way tax and the sale price other than the tax. Is such a distinction continued and maintained by the impugned Act? Learned Counsel for the appellants has referred us to 583 section 2 of the impugned Act where the expression "collected by him by way of tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act	 1939" occurs. It is argued that the aforesaid expression in the impugned Act has to be read with the provisions of the principal Act and so read	 B. 2 maintains and continues the distinction made under the principal Act. Again	 we are unable to agree. The expression "collected by him by way of tax etc." is merely descriptive of the "amounts" so collected; the essential and operative part of section 2 says that the amounts so collected shall be deemed to have formed part of the turnover of the dealer. Therefore	 in express terms section 2 states that the tax shall be deemed to have formed part of the turnover and obliterates the distinction	 if any	 between 'tax ' and 'turnover ' for the limited period during which the impugned Act operates. To hold that the distinction is maintained and continued under the impugned Act is to go against the express terms of section 2. This aspect of the question was adverted to in The Government of Andhra vs East India Commercial Co. Ltd. (1) where the Andhra High Court had occasion to consider the question from a somewhat different point of view	 namely	 an amendment made by the Andhra Pradesh Legislature in the definition of the expression 'turnover ' in the principal Act. Section 2 of the amending Act substituted the following definition of 'turn over ': Turnover means the total amount set out in the bill of sale (or if there is no bill of sale	 the total amount charged) as the consideration for the sale or purchase of goods . including any sums charged by the dealer for anything done in respect of the goods sold at the time of or before the delivery of the goods and any other sums charged by the dealer	 whatever be the description	 name or object thereof. " Section 4 of the amending Act repeated sections 8 B and 8 C of the principal Act. Dealing with the effect of these amendments	 the High Court of Andhra Pradesh said	 (1) [1957] 8 S.T.C. 114. 584 "The ultimate economic incidence of the sales tax is on the consumer or the last purchaser and whatever he pays for the goods is paid only as price	 that is to say	 as consideration for the purchase. The statutory liability	 however	 for payment of sales tax is laid on the dealer on his total 'turnover ' whether or not he realises the tax from the purchasers. Generally speaking	 the price charged by the dealer would be inclusive of sales tax	 for	 it is to his interest to pass the burden of the tax to the purchaser. So far as the dealer is concerned	 the payment of a sum covering the tax made by a purebaser on the occasion of sale	 is really part of the price which the purchasers pay for the goods. " Later	 it referred with approval to the decision in Sri Sundararajan and Co.	 Ltd. vs The State of Madras (1). In this latter decision the validity of the impugned Act was questioned and dealing with section 2 of the impugned Act	 the High Court said: "Section 2 only enacted that such amount shall be deemed ' to be part of the turnover and for a limited period. It may not be necessary to set out authorities for the well settled principle of what the effect is of the use of the expression 'deemed ' in a statute. Was the legislature competent to enact section 2 including the deeming provision	 is the real question. If the validity of section 2 of the impugned Act is established there should be little difficulty in upholding the validity of section 3	 which gave effect to the legal fiction enacted by section 2. Obviously	 it is not the name the legislature accords to a payment by a purchaser to a seller	 who is a dealer as defined by the Act	 that determines the question of the legislative competence. No doubt section 8B called the payment as amount (collected) by way of tax. It is equally true that the statutory liability to pay the sales tax is laid on the dealer. What is taxable is not each transaction of sale but the total turnover of the dealer	 computed in accordance with the provisions of the (1) (1956) 7 S.T.C. 105. 585 Act and the Rules. But it is well recognised that whatever be the form of the statutory provisions	 the ultimate economic incidence of the tax is on the consumer	 the purchaser. It was that well settled principle that was re stated in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. vs State	 of Bihar (1). Even if the registered dealer collects the amount by way of tax under the authority of section 8B of the Act	 the payment is by the purchaser on the occasion of the sale by the dealer. Vis a vis the dealer it is in reality part of the price the purchaser has to pay the seller for purchasing the goods. A tax on such a payment	 in our opinion	 is well within the ambit of Entry 54 of List 11	 Schedule VII	 read with Article 246(3) of the Constitution. " We are of the view that the aforesaid observations correctly give the true effect of section 2 of the impugned Act	 and section 3 of the impugned Act is merely consequential. Mr. Sikri appearing on behalf of. the States of Maharashtra and Punjab has drawn our attention to certain American decisions which show that treating tax as part of the sale price in cases where the tax is passed on to the buyer	 is well recognised and is not unknown to law (see Lash 's Products Company vs United States	 73 L. Edn. 251; Pure Oil Company vs State Of Alabama	 148 American Law Reports 260). We consider it unnecessary to examine these decisions	 because the validity of the impugned Act must be determined on its own terms in the context of the provisions of the principal Act. Reading the impugned Act in the light of the provisions of the principal Act	 it seems clear to us that the impugned Act cannot be held to be bad on the ground of legislative incompetence. Under the definition of turnover the aggregate amount for which goods are bought or sold is taxable. This aggregate amount includes the tax as part of the price paid by the buyer. The amount goes into the common till of the dealer till he pays the tax. It is money which he keeps using for his business till he pays it over to Government. Indeed	 (1) 586 he may turn it over again and again till he finally hands it to Government. There is thus nothing anomalous in the law treating it as part of the amount on which tax must be paid by him. This conception of a turnover is not new. It is found in England and America and there is no reason to think that when the legislatures in India defined 'turnover ' to include tax also	 they were striking out into something quite unknown and unheard of before. The only question which has been raised in these appeals is regarding the validity of the impugned Act. That question having been decided against the appellants	 the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.

Certain amounts collected by the appellants as sales tax were included in their turnover by the sales tax authorities. They contested the constitutional validity of the Madras General Sales (Definition of Turnover and Validation of Assessments) Act	 1954	 on the ground inter alia that the Sate Legislature went beyond its legislative competence under entry 54 of List If of the Constitution in enacting by the impugned Act that the amounts collected by the dealer by way of tax shall be deemed to have formed part of his turnover. Held	 that entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution is similar to entry 48 of List 11 of Sch. Vil of the Government of India Act	 1935 sales under which have been held to be transactions passing title to the Goods from the seller to the buyer and that a mere executory agreement was not a sale within the meaning of that entry. The same meaning must be given to entry 54. 571 State of Madras vs Gannon Dunkerly & Co.	 Ltd.	 ; and Sales Tax Officer vs M/s. Budh Prakash jai Prakash; 	 	 referred to. Under sections 2(i) and 2(h) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act	 1939	 the expression "turnover" means the aggregate amount for which goods are sold either for cash or deferred payment or other Valuable consideration	 and when a sale attracts purchase tax which is passed on to the consumer what the buyer has to pay includes the tax and the aggregate amount to be paid would fall under the definition of turnover. When the seller passes on the tax and the buyer agrees to pay sales tax in addition to the price	 the tax is really part of the entitle considerations. Papreka Ltd. vs Board of Trade	 	 Love vs Norman Wright (Builders) Ltd.	 	 followed. Asoka Marketing Co. Ltd. vs The State of Bihar	 [1959] IO S.T.C. 110 and Tata Iron and Steel Co. vs The State of Bihar	 ; 	 referred to. Although section 8B of the Madras General Sales Tax Act	 1939 and the Turnover and Assessment Rules separately mentioned the amounts collected as tax for the purpose of paying such amounts to the Government	 no immutable distinction was drawn between the sale price and the tax nor was any such distinction maintained under section 2 of the impugned Act. Assuming that such a distinction did exist the Legislature was competent to enact under entry 54 in List II of the Constitution that the tax shall be deemed to have formed part of the turnover and obliterate the distinction for the limited period during which the impugned Act operated. The impugned Act was therefore valid. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes vs M. Kyishna swami Mudaliar	 [1954] 5 S.T.C. 88	 held not applicable. Sri Sundararajan & Co. vs The State of Madras	 [1956] 7 S.T.C. 105	 approved. The Government of Andhya vs East India Commercial Co.	 Ltd.	 [1957] 8 S.T.C. 114 and Bengal Immunity Co.	 Ltd. vs State Of Bihar	[1955] 2 S.C.R. 603	 referred to.