Summarize the following court judgment. minal Appeal No. 127 of 1960. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 4	 1958	 of the former High Court at Bombay in Criminal Revision Application No. 728 of 1958. B. P. Maheshwari	 for the appellant. 452 Vir Sen Sawhney	 R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen	 for the respondent. March 17. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL	 J. This appeal	 by special leave	 is directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court. The appellant was a ' Third Class Magistrate at Sanand in 1951. He received Rs. 200 in cash from Amar Singh Madhav Singh as deposit for security to be released on bail. This amount was not credited in the Criminal Deposit Rojmal and the appellant thereby committed criminal breach of trust with respect to the amount. The appellant was dismissed from service on April 4	 1953	 as a result of a departmental enquiry. On June 9	 1954	 a complaint was filed on behalf of the State against the appellant. He was convicted of the offence under section 409	 Indian Penal Code	 by the Trial Magistrate. The conviction was confirmed by the Extra Additional Sessions Judge	 Ahmedabad. His revision was dismissed by the High Court. The only point urged in this appeal is that the learned Magistrate should not have taken cognizance of this offence without the previous sanction of the State Government in view of the provisions of section 197	 Code of Criminal Procedure. It is not disputed that a Court could not have taken cognizance of this offence against the appellant if he had been a Magistrate on June 9	 1954. The appellant was not a Magistrate on June 9	 1954	 when the complaint was filed. The question then is whether the provisions of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibit a Court from taking cognizance of an offence committed by a Magistrate while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty even when he is no longer a Magistrate on the date the Court takes cognizance. Sub section (1) of section 197	 Code of Criminal Procedure	 reads: "(1) When any person who is a Judge within the meaning of section 19 of the Indian Penal Code	 or 453 when any Magistrate	 or when any public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of a State Government or the Central Government	 is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty	 no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction (a) in the case of a person employed in connection with the affairs of the Union	 of the Central Government; and (b) in the case of a person employed in connection with the affairs of a State	 of the State Government. " There cannot be much scope for the contention that a Court is prohibited from taking cognizance of an offence committed by a Judge while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty only when that person is a Judge at the time cognizance is taken	 as otherwise full effect will not be given to the expression 'any person who is a Judge '	 in the subsection. Similar expression is not used in describing a Magistrate or a public servant. But it is clear that those two persons should also be 'Magistrate or a public servant ' at the time cognizance is taken of an offence committed by them while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. In connection with 'public servant ' the expression who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of a State Government or the Central Government indicates that. It is only when the public servant concerned is in service that the question of his removal from office can arise. If the public servant has ceased to be a public servant	 no such question arises. Therefore it seems proper to construe the expression 'when any Magistrate ' in the sub section to mean 'when a person who is a Magistrate '. Even if the expression be not construed in this form	 the section says: 'when any Magistrate. is accused of any offence '. This indicates that it is only when the accusation is against a Magistrate that the Court will not take cognizance of an offence committed by 454 him while acting in the discharge of his official duty	 without previous sanction. If a person is not a Magistrate at the time the accusation is made	 the Court can take cognizance without previous sanction. It has been strenuously urged on behalf of the appellant that the expression 'when any Magistrate is accused of any offence ' refers to the stage when the accusation is first made against the Magistrate	 that is to say	 when it is alleged for the first time that the Magistrate has committed such an offence. There seems to be no justification to add the word 'first ' and read this expression as 'when any Magistrate is first accused of any offence '. The occasion when such an allegation is made for the first time against a Magistrate is not in connection with the Court 's taking cognizance of the offence but will always be either when a complaint is made to a superior officer in the department or to the police. Both these authorities are free to inquire into the accusation. It is only when the departmental enquiry or the police investigation leads to the conclusion that the matter is fit for going to Court that a complaint would be made or a police report would be submitted Io the proper Court for taking action against the Magistrate. It is at this stage that the Magistrate would be accused of the offence for the purposes of the Court and therefore it would be then that the Court will see whether the person proceeded against is a Magistrate or not. This view finds further support from the language of the clauses (a) and (b). The previous sanction	 according to these clauses	 will be of the Central Government if the Magistrate is employed in connection with the affairs of the Un ion and of the State Government if he is employed in connection with the affairs of a State. If the person is not employed	 no sanction is necessary. Whether the person is so employed or not	 is to be seen shortly before the submission of the complaint or police report to the Court. The sanction can be given by the proper authority on a consideration of the allegations and evidence available to establish them and therefore only after the investigation is complete. The submission of the 455 complaint or police report is expected to follow the grant of sanction within a reasonable time. A similar question arose in section A. Venkataraman vs The State (1) in connection with the interpretation of the provisions of section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act	 1947 (Act II of 1947). Sub section (1) of that section reads: "(1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under subsection (2) of section 5 of this Act	 alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government	 of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government	 of the State Government; (c) in the case of any other person	 of the authority competent to remove him from his office." This Court said at p. 1046: "The words in section 6(1) of the Act are clear enough and they must be given effect to. There is nothing in the words used in section 6(1) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein in the case of a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time the court was asked to take cognizance	 although he had been such a person at the time the offence was committed. . A public servant who has ceased to be a public servant is not a person removable from any office by a competent authority. " The same can be said with respect to the provisions of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We therefore hold that no previous sanction is necessary for a Court to take cognizance of an offence committed (1) [1958] S.G.R. 1037 456 by a Magistrate while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his _official duty if he had ceased to be a Magistrate at the time the complaint is made or police report is submitted to the Court	 i.e.	 at the time of the taking of cognizance of the offence committed. We accordingly dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.

The appellant	 a Magistrate	 was dismissed from service as a result of a departmental enquiry. On a complaint filed by the State Government he was convicted under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The point urged was that the trial Magistrate should not have taken cognizance of the offence without the previous sanction in view of the provisions of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Held	 that no previous sanction was necessary for a Court to take cognizance of an offence committed by a Magistrate while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty if he had ceased to be a Magistrate at the time the complaint was made or police report was submitted to the Court	 i.e.	 at the time of the taking of cognizance of the offence committed. section A. Venkataraman vs The State	 	 applied.