Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 2034 of 1969. Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 7	 1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 850 of 1969. K. L. Gosain N. N. Goswamy	 section K. Mehta	 K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja	 for the appellant. Harbans Singh and R. N. Sachthey	 for respondents Nos. 1 and 2. section V. Gupte and section K. Gambhir	 for respondent No. 18. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde	 J. This appeal by certificate arises from the decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a writ petition wherein the appellants challenged the validity of proceedings under sections 4	 6	 9 and 17 (2) (c) of the Land Acquisition Act	 1894 as amended by the Punjab Legislature. For convenience sake we shall refer to that amended Act as 'the Act '. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. It appears that several contentions were sought to be advan ced before the High Court but in this Court only three con tentions have been pressed for our consideration i.e. (1) the acquisition in question being one for a company proceedings should have been taken under sections 38 to 44(B) of the Act	 the same having not been taken	 the Proceedings taken are void; (2) there was no urgency and hence recourse should not have been had to section 17 of the Act and (3) Section 17(2) (c) is inapplicable to the facts of the case. Now we may state the facts	relevant for the purpose of deciding the questions in dispute. 873 On 14/17 March	 1969	 Government of Haryana issued a notification under section 4 of the Act notifying for acquisition the land concerned in this case. The notification further directed that action under section 17 (2) (c) of the Act shall be taken on the ground of urgency and the provisions of section 5 A shall not apply in regard to the said acquisition. The preamble to the said notification says that "whereas it appears to the Governor of Haryana that land is likely to be required to be taken by Government	 at public expenses	 for a public purpose	 namely for the setting up a factory for the manufacture of Chine ware and Porcelain ware including Wall Glazed Tiles etc. at village Kasser. Tehsil Jhajjar	 District Rohtak	 it is here by notified that the land in the locality described in the specification below is likely to be required for the above purpose". On March 18	 1969 the Government isued a notification under section 6 of the Act acquiring the land for a public purpose On March 28	 1969 notices under section 9 of the Act were served on the appellants. On April 8	 1969	 the appellants filed the writ petition giving rise to this appeal. The allegations in the writ petition include the assertion that there was no urgency in the matter of acquiring the land in question and therefore there was no justification for having recourse to section 17 and thus deprive the appellants of the benefit of	 section 5 A of the Act. It was further alleged therein that the acquisition in question was made for the benefit of a company and hence proceedings should have been taken under sections 38 to 44(B) of the Act and that there was no public purpose involved in the case. It was further pleaded that the land acquired was not waste and parable land and that section 2 (c) of the Act did not confer power on the Government to dispense with the proceedings under section 5 A. In the counter affidavit filed by the Deputy Director of Industries (Administration)	 Government of Haryana On behalf of the State of Haryana	 the above allegations were all denied. Therein it is stated that at the instance of the State of Haryana	 Government of India had issued a letter of intent to a company for setting up a factory for the manufacture of Glazed Tiles etc. in village Kasser. That project was to be started with the collaboration of a foreign company	 known as Pilkington Tiles Ltd. The scheme for setting up the project had been finalised and approved by the concerned authorities. on November 26	 1968	 the Government wrote to one of the pro moters of the project	 Shri H. L. Somany asking him to com plete the "arrangements for the import of capital equipment and acquisition of land in Haryana State for setting up of the proPosed factory". It was further stated in that communication the Government was pleased to extend the time for compleing the Project upto April 30	 1969. Under those circumstances it 8 74 had become necessary for the State of Haryana to take imme diate steps to acquire the required land. It was under those circumstances the Government was constrained to have recourse to section 17 of the Act. The Government denied the allegation that the facts of this case did not come within the scope of section 17 (2) (c). It was also denied that the acquisition in question was not made for a public purpose. We have earlier seen that in the notification issued under section 4	 it had been stated that the acquisition was made "at public expenses	 for a public purpose" namely for the setting up a factory for the manufacture of China ware and Porcelain ware including Wall Glazed Tiles etc. In the writ petition it was not denied that the acquisition in question was made at "public expenses". All that was challenged in the writ petition was that the purpose for which the acquisition was made not a public purpose. There is no denying the fact that starting of a new industry is in public interest. It is stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government that the now State of Haryana was lacking in industries and consequently it was become difficult to tackle the problem of unemployment. There is also no denying the fact that the industrialization of an area is in public interest. That apart	 the question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by the Government. That is a socioeconomic question. This Court is not in a position to go into that question. So long as it is not established that the acquisition is sought to be made for some collateral purpose	 the declaration of the Govern. men+ it is made for a public purpose is 'not open to challenge	 Section 6(3) says that the declaration of the Government that the acquisition made is for public purpose shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Unless it is shown that there was a colorable exercise of power	 it is not open to this Court to go behind that declaration and find out whether in a particular case the purpose for which the land was needed was a public purpose or not see Smt. Somavanti and ors. vs The State of Punjab(1) and Raja Anand Brahma Shah vs State of U.p.(2). On the facts of this case there can be hardly any doubt that the purpose for which the land was acquired is a public purpose. In view of the pleadings referred to earlier it is not open to the appellant to contend that the State Government had not contributed any Amount towards the cost of acquisition	 We were informed at the bar that the State Government had contributed (1) (2) ; 875 a sum of Rs. 100/ towards the cost of the land which fact is also mentioned in the award of Land Acquisition Officer. That being so it was not necessary for the Government to proceed with the acquisition under Part VII of the Act see Somavanti 's case(1). Now coming to the question of urgency	 it is clear from the facts set out earlier that there was urgency	 The Government of India was pleased to extend time for the completion of the of project upto April 30	 1969. Therefore urgent steps had to be taken for pushing through the project. The fact that the St ate Government or the party concerned was lethargic at an earlier stage is not very relevant for deciding the question whether on the date on which the notification was issued	 there was urgency or not the conclusion of the Government in a given case that there was urgency entitled to weight	 if not conclusive. This takes us to the question of applicability of section 17 (2) (c) to the facts of the case. The appellant had denied in the affidavit that the entire land acquired is either waste or arable Iand That contention of his has not been examined by the High Court. Therefore we have to proceed on the basis that the case does not come within the scope of section 17(1). The State has also not purported to act under section 17 (1). It has purported to act under section 17 (2) (c). Therefore we have to see whether the State could have proceeded on the facts of this case under section 17 (1) (c). Section 17 as amended by the Punjab Act 2 of 1954	 Punjab Act 17 of 1956 and Punjab Act 47 of 1956 to the extent necessary for our present purpose reads thus : "17 (1) In cases of urgency whenever	 the appropriate Government so directs	 the Collector	 though no such award has been made	 may	 on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9	 sub section (1) take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a Company. Such land shall there upon	vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Explanation (2) In the following cases	 that is to say (a) Whenever owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency	 it becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to acquire the 'immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river side or ghat	 station or of (1) 876 providing convenient connection with or access to any such station; (b) Whenever in the opinion of the Collector it becomes necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the purpose of any library or educational institution or for the construction	 extension or improvement of any building or other structure in any village for the common use of the inhabitants of such village	 or any godown for	 any society registered under the (Act 11 of 1912)	 or any dwelling house for the poor	 or the construction of labour colonies or houses for any other class of people under a Govermnent sponsored 'Housing Scheme or any irrigation tank	 irrigation or drainage channel	 or any well	 or any public road; (c) Whenever land is required for a public purpose which in the opinion of the appropriate Government is of urgent importance	 the Collector may	 immediately after the	 publication of the notice mentioned in sub section (1) and with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government enter upon and take possession of such land	 which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a build ing under this sub section Without giving to the occupier thereof at least ' forty eight hour 's notice of his intention so to do . (3) In every case under either of the preceding subsections the Collector shall at the time of taking possession offer to the persons interested compensation for the standing crop and three (if any) on such land and for any other damage sustained by them caused by sudden dispossession . (4) In the case of any land to which in the	 opinion of the appropriate Government	 the provisions of subsection (1) or sub section (2) are applicable	 the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of section 5 A shall not apply. 877 Herein we are only concerned with the scope of section 17 (2) (c) as the vires of section 17(2) is not challenged. Section 17(2)(c) if read by itself is plain. It seems to permit the appropriate Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5 A shall not apply whenever land is required for public purpose which in the opinion of the appropriate Government is of urgent importance. The conditions precedent for the application of section 17 (2) (c) are ( 1 ) that the land must be required for a public purpose and (2) the appropriate Government must be of the 	opinion that the purpose in question is of urgent importance. But it was urged on behalf of the appellants that we should apply ejusdem generie rule in interpreting section 17 (2) (c). The contention on behalf of the appellants was that though section 17 (2) (c) read by itself covers a very large field	 that provision should be given a narrower meaning because of the provisions in section 17(2) (a) and (b). It was urged that as the general words contained in section 17 (2) (c) follow the specific words of the same nature	 in section 17 (2) (a) and (b)	 those general words must be understood as applying to cases similar to those mentioned in section 17 (2) (a) and (b). The ejusdem generis rule is not a rule of law but is merely a rule of construction to aid the courts to find out the true intention of the legislature. If a given I provision is plain and unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear	 there is no occasion to call into aid that rule ejusdem generis rule is explained in Halsbury 's Laws of England (3rd Edn.). 36 p. 397 paragraph 599 thus "As a rule	 Where in a statute there are general words following particular and specific words		 the general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified	 although this	 ' as a rule of construction	 must be applied with caution	 subject to the primary rule that statutes are to be construed in accordance with the intention of Parliament. For the ejusdem rule to apply	 the specific words must constitute a category	 class or genus; if they do constitute such a category	 class or genus	 then only things which belongs to that category	 class or genus fall within the general words. It is observed in Craies on Statute Law (6th Edn.) p. 181 that : "The ejusdem generis rule is one to be applied With caution and not pushed too far	 as in the case of many decisions	 which treat it as automatically appli 878 cable	 and not as being	 what it is	 a mere presumption in the absence of other indications of the intention of the legislature. The modem tendency of the law	 it was said	 is "to attenuate the application of the rule of ejusdem generis". To invoke the application of the ejusdem generis rule there must be a distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to different objects of a widely differing character but to something which can be	 called a class or kind of objects. According to Sutherland Statutory Construction (3rd Edn.) Vol. II p. 395	 for the application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis	 the following conditions must exist. (i) The statute contains an enumeration by specific words; (ii) The members of the enumeration constitute a class; (iii) The class is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) A general term follows the enumeration and (v) There is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires. The scope of the ejusdem generis rule has been considered by this Court in several decisions. In State of Bombay vs Ali Gulshan(1); it was observed: "Apart from the fact that the rule must be confined within narrow limits	 and general or comprehensive words should recive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment	 it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus	 which must comprise more than one species	 before the rule can be applied.". In Lilavati Bai vs The State of Bombay	(2) it was observed "The rule of ejusdem generis is intended to be applied where general words have been used following particular and specific words of the same nature on the established rule of construction that the legislature presumed to use the general words in a restricted sense	; that is to say	 as belonging to the same genus ' as the particular and specific words. Such a restricted mean (1) ; (2) ; 879 ing has to be given to words of general import only where the context of the whole scheme of legislation requires it. But where the content and the object and mischief of the enactment do not require such restricted meaning to be attached to words of general import	 it becomes the duty of the courts to give those words their plain and ordinary meaning	 The same view was reiterated by this Court in K. K. Kochini vs State of Madras and Kerala(1). Bearing in mind the principles set out earlier, we shall now consider whether the general import of the words, in section 17 (2) (e) should be cut down in view of section 17 (2) (a) and (b). Under cl. (a) of section 17(2), the acquisition is to be made by the Railway Administration when owing to any sudden change 'in the, channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency it becomes necessary for the administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of the traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river side or ghat station or for providing convenient connection with or access to any such station. We would like to emphasize that under this provision, the acquisition can only be made by the Railway Administration and that when it considers that immediate possession (of any land is necessary for the purposes mentioned therein, Under el. (b) of sub section (2) of section 17, before an acquisition can be made, the Collector must form an opinion that it has become necessary to acquire the immiediate possession of the land concerned for the ' purposes mentioned therein. Under cl. (c) of section 17(2), the acquisition can be made only when the appropriate Government forms the opinion that because of urgent importance, the concerned land has to be acquired for the purposes mentioned in that provision. Under el. (a) the derision to acquire has to be made by the Railway Administration. Under el. (b), the acquisition can be made only on the formation of the required opinion by the Collector. Under el. (c) the acquisition can be made only when the requisite opinion is formed by the appropriate Government. Further under el. (a) the acquisition has to be made to meet certain unforeseen emergency as a result of which the immediate possession of the land is necessary. Under el. (b) the Collector must form an opinion that it has become necessary to acquire the immediate possession of land but under el. (c) the requirement is that the appropriate Government must form the opinion that the acquisition is of urgent importance. Under cls. (a), (b) and (c) of sub section (2) of section 17, the decision to acquire land has, not to be made by the (1) A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 105.0. (1) A.I.R. 1960 s.c. 1050 880 same authority but by different authorities. Further the conditions under which the acquisition has to be, made differ from clause to clause. Therefore there is no basis to say that the general words in cl. (c) follow the particular and specific words in cls. (b) and (c). Nor can it be said that the specific words contained in cls. (a) and (b) constitute a category, 'class or genus. Hence we are unable to accept the contention that in interpreting cl. (c) of section 17(2), we should apply the rule of ejusdem generis. As none of the contentions taken by the appellants are ac ceptable, thise appeal fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. K.B.N. Appeal dismissed. 
6587	vil Appeal No. 2211 (NT) of 1988 etc. From the Judgment and Order dated 7.10.1986 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in M.P. No. 1861 of 1983. 594 Prithvi Raj, R.B. Mishra, Uma Nath Singh, S.K. Gambhir, Vivek Gambhir, Satish K. Agnihotri, Ashok Singh and Mrs. V.D. Khanna for the Appellants. Harish N. Salve, Ms. Lira Goswami and D.N. Misra for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN, J. The Civil Appeal and S.L.P. 12054/87 are by the State of Madhya Pradesh (M.P.). The respondents in these two matters and the petitioners in the other five Special Leave Petitions are certain concerns in M.P. assess able to sales tax (hereinafter compendiously referred to as the assesses '). All these matters can be conveniently dis posed of by a common judgment as they raise a common issue. The assesses ' claim for exemption from sales tax for certain periods in question was accepted by the High Court in the case of G.S. Dhall & Flour Mills and, following it, in the case of Mohd. Ismail (a case where the exemption sought for was originally granted but subsequently revoked). However, subsequently, a Full Bench of the High Court, in the case of Jagadamba Industries, disapproved the view taken by the Division Bench in the G.S. Dhall & Flour Mills case and, following the Full Bench, the writ petitions filed by certain other assesses were dismissed by the High Court. The State is aggrieved by the judgment in the first two cases and the assesses by the High Court 's decision in the other cases. Hence these appeals and special leave petitions. Before dealing with the appeals on merits, an important circumstance needs to be referred to, which is this: The judgment of the Full Bench in the case of Jagadamba Indus tries was itself the subject matter of Special Leave Peti tions in this Court but those petitions (S.L.P. Nos. 15688 90/87) were dismissed, at the stage of admission, on 9.2. 1988, with the observations: We are in agreement with the views expressed by the High Court. The Special Leave Peti tions are dismissed". In view of this	 the State submits that C.A. 22 11/87 should be allowed and that the assesses ' S.L.Ps. should be dismissed in limine. On the other hand	 counsel for the assesses seek to distinguish the Jagadamba case by contending that this Court had refused leave against the Full Bench judgment on account of certain special facts which were considered sufficient to disentwine the assesses in those 595 cases from claiming the exemption. They contend that	 in view of this and the fact that the G.S. Dhall & Flour Mills case is in appeal before we may grant leave in the S.L.Ps. and dispose of all the appeals on merits. We accept this plea and grant leave in the S.L.Ps. condoning a delay in the filing of S.L.P. 12054/87. We shall	 however	 touch upon the above aspect of the matter in the course of our judgment. The issue raised is	 at first blush	 a simple one. section 12 of the M.P. Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as `the Act ') enables the State Government to grant exemption from the levy of sales tax in certain circumstances. It says: 12. Saving: (1) The State Government may	 by notification	 and subject to such restrictions and condi tions as may be specified therein	 exempt	 whether prospec tively or retrospectively	 in whole or in part (i) any class of dealers or any goods or class of goods from the payment of tax under this Act for such period as may be specified in the notification; (ii) any dealer or class of dealers from any provision of the Act for such period as may be specified in the notifica tion. (2) Any notification issued under this section may be re scinded before the expiry of the period for which it was to have remained in force and on such rescission such notifica tion shall cease to be in force. A notification rescinding an earlier notification shall have prospective effect. " In exercise of this power	 the State Government issued the following notification on 23/26.10.1981 which it is neces sary to extract in full here along with its Annexure. It reads: "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act	 1958 (No. 2 of 1959) the State Government hereby exempts the class of dealers specified in column (1) of the Schedule below who have set up industry in any of the districts of Madhya Pradesh specified in the annexure to this notification and have commenced production after 1st April	 1981	 from pay ment of tax under the said Act for the period specified in column (2)	 subject to the restrictions and conditions specified in column (3) of the said schedule: 596 Class of dealers Period Restrictions and conditions subject to which exemption has been granted 1 2 3 1. dealers who Two years The dealer specified in (a) hold a certifi from the column (1) shall continue cate of regis date of to furnish the pres tration under The commence cribed returns under the M.P. General Sales ment of M.P. General Sales Tax Tax Act	 1958: production Act	 1958 and shall pro duce before the assessing (b) are registered authority at the time of small scale indus his assessment a certifi trial units with cate issued by the Direc the Industries Dep tor of Industries	 Madhya artment of Govt. of Pradesh or any officer au M.P.	 and thorised by him for the purpose	 certifying that (c) have set up ind such dealer is eligible to ustry in any of the claim the exemption and districts specified that he has not opted for in part I of the the scheme of deferring Annexure the payment of tax under the rules framed for this purposes. Dealer who do (a) hold certifi (a) 3 years cate of registra in case of an tion under the industry loca M.P. General Sales ted in a district Tax Act	 1958 specified in `A ' (No.2 of 1959); of part II of the Annexure. (b) are registered (b) 4 years	 in the as Small scale Ind case of an industry ustrial units with located in category the Industries De `B ' of Part II of partment of Govt. of of the Annexure; M.P. or are regis and tered with the Di rector General of Technical Develop ment as an indus trial unit or are registered 597 as industrial units by any authority duly empowered to do so by the State Govt. or Cen tral Govt. or hold a licence under the In dustries (Development & Regulation) Act 1951 (No.65 of 1951); and (c) have set up indus (c) 5 years	 in do try in any of the dis the case of an tricts specified in industry located part II of the Anne in a district spe xure. cified in category `C ' of part II of the Annexure; from the date of commen cement of production. Dealers who (a) hold certificate (a) 3 years in The dealer speci of registration under the case of an fied in column (1) the M.P.General Sales Industry loca shall produce be Tax 1958 (No.2 of ted in any of fore the assessing 1959); the tehsils of authority at the a district spe time of his assess fied in part I ment a certificate of the Annexure; issued by the Direc tor of Industries	 Madhya Pradesh or any (b) are registered (b) 5 years in officer authorised by as industrial units the case of an him for the purpose with the Director industry located of certifying that General of Technical in any of the the dealer is eligi Development or by any tehsils of a ble to claim such authority duly em a district spe exemption under the powered to do so by cified in cate scheme of the Indus State or Central gory `A ' of Part tries. Department Government or hold II of the Anne being a first dealer licence under the xure; to have commenced Industries (Develop production in the ment and Regula industry set up by him in the tehsils referred to in col umn (2) and that such dealer has not opted for the scheme of deferring the pay ment of tax under the rules framed for this purpose. 598 tion) Act	 1951 (No.65 of 1951) have fixed a capital in vestment between Rs.1 crore and Rs.10 crores and; (c) are the first to (c) 7 years in set up the industry the case of an in any tehsil of the industry loca district of Madhya ted in any of Pradesh specified in the tehsils of the Annexure. a district spe cified in cate gory `B ' of Part II of the Anne xure; (d) 3 years in the case of an industry located in any of the tehsils to a district specified in category `C ' of Part II of the Annexure; from the date of commencement of production. ANNEXURE Part I 1. Indore 2. Ujjain 3. Bhopal 4. Jabalpur 5. Gwalior 6. Durg Part II Category `A ' 1. Bilaspur 2. Raipur 3. Dewas 4. Handsaur 5. Morena 6. Vidisha 7. Hoshangabad 8. Ratlam 9. Khandwa 10. Satna 11. Shahdol 599 Category `B ' 1. Geoni 2. Balaghat 3. Betul 4. Raigharh 5. Guna 6. Chindwara 7. Damoh 8. Sagar 9. Narsimhpur 10. Senor 11. Rajmandgoo Category `C ' 1. Panna 2. Sidhi 3. Rewa 4. Chhatarpur 5. Tikamgarh 6. Khargone 7. Surguja 8.Mandla 9. Bhind 10. Shivpuri 11. Datia 12. Raisen 13. Shajapur 14. Dhar 15. Rajgarh 16. Jhooua 17. Bastar It is not in dispute that the assessees before us fulfil the qualifications mentioned in the notification. However	 when they approached the Director of Industries for the certificate of exemption envisaged under column (3) of the notification	 it was denied to them on the ground that the industries run by them are "traditional industries" which were not eligible for exemption. The assessees went to Court contending that this was totally unjustified. They said	 the concept of "traditional industries" was one unspecified in the notification. The authorities had no jurisdiction to travel outside the terms of the notification and import extraneous considerations to deny the assessees an exemption they were entitled to under the notification. It is this contention that was accepted in the G.S. Dhall and Flour Mills case. The State had relied on the provisions of the M.P. (Deferment of Payment of Tax) Rules	 1983	 notified on 1.9.83 (in particular	 rule 13 thereof) and on certain instructions that had been issued by the Government on 12.1.1983 pertaining to the "grant of certificate of eligi bility to new industrial units claiming exemption from/deferment of payment of sales tax". The High Court took the view that these rules and instructions had no relevance to the claim for exemption put forward under the notifica tion of 23.10.1981 and that	 in any event	 the executive instructions could not override the provisions of the statu tory notification. This judgment was delivered on 7.10.1986 by Sohani	 C.J. and Faizanuddin	 J. The Full Bench	 in its judgment of 2.11.1987 took a different view. It has	 in effect	 attached importance to the rules and instructions referred to above and relied considerably on the history of the 600 sales tax levy in the State as furnishing a proper and necessary background in which the terms of the notification of 23.10.1981 have to be read and interpreted. This history has	 therefore	 to be set out now in order to appreciate the validity of the conclusions of the Full Bench. Before doing this	 it may be mentioned that the Full Bench comprised of Ojha C.J.	 Faizanuddin	 J. and Adhikari	 J. In fact	 the judgment was written by Faizanuddin	 J. who has explained in detail the reasons for his change in view. It may also be mentioned	 as a matter of record	 that	 subsequent to the decision of the Division Bench in G.S. Dhall and Flour Mills	 the State Government appears to have issued a notifi cation on 3.7. 1987	 intended obviously to overcome the effect of the said decision. We shall refer to this later in this judgment. Now	 to turn to the history relied on by the Full Bench	 we start with a "scheme for the grant of subsidy/interest free loan to new industries set up in Madhya Pradesh". The scheme was to be effective from 15.9.69 and till the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan period (1970) "or such further period as may be extended by the State Government from time to time". It would appear that the scheme was being adminis tered informally under executive instructions even beyond 1970. Though certain "rules" appear to have been framed for the first time on 30.8.73	 these rules	 it would seem	 were not statutory but were only in the nature of executive instructions. We shall	 however	 refer to them as "rules". Rule 3 was clear as to the persons eligible to avail of it. It read: "Rule 3 "It shall be applicable to all new industrial units except traditional industries like oil mill	 flour mill	 dall mill	 rice mill	 ginning and printing factories	 who set up in Madhya Pradesh	 provided further that such appli cants register themselves with the department after 15.9.69 but before 31.3.74 and in case of SSI units go into produc tion within a period of one year and in case of Large and Medium Industries go into production within 3 years of their date of registration provided further that in case of delay in going into production the period of availability of subsidy or concession will be reduced by the period of delay in going into production. This will come into force from 1.4.74. Note: Small Scale Industries who are already registered with the department need not register separately for this concession. " 601 It would also appear that the districts of the State were divided into two categories advanced and backward and the latter into three categories `A '	 `B '	 `C '. The amount and period of the subsidy/loan depended upon this classification and was elaborately set out in para 8 which need not be extracted here. A note added to para 8 had this to say: Note: (1) Unit who is otherwise entitled to subsidy may on his request be considered for grant of interest free loan to the extent of entitlement of the subsidy. (2) No unit available concession under the scheme will be allowed to change the location of the whole or any part of the industrial unit or effect any substantial part of its total fixed capital investment within a period of five year after its going in to production. (3) In case the ownership of a new unit changed during the period of availability of this concession	 the new owner would be entitled to this concession for the balance period. (4) A closed unit	 which is re started by an entrepre neur will not be considered to be a new unit for the purpose of this concession. " Another set of "rules" came into force with effect from 1.4.1977 and superseded the earlier rules. These were on more or less the same lines as the earlier ones and were to apply to "new industrial units"	 and "existing industrial units"	 as defined in rules 2(a) and (b)	 on fulfillment of certain terms and conditions but industries enumerated in rule 3 were specifically excluded from the purview of the definition. Rule 3 made it clear that the rules shall not be applicable to "the following traditional industries". The list of such industries	 in addition to those mentioned in the earlier set of rules (excluding roller flour mills and solvent extraction plants in oil mills)	 took in also saw mills	 ice factories and "such other industries as may be notified by the Government from time to time". The period and extent of the subsidy/ loan here again depended upon the district advanced or backward	 and in the latter category `A ' or `B ' or `C ' in which the industry was set up Rule 7 is of some relevance and may be set out: "7. An industrial unit eligible for this concession will apply 602 to the Asst. Director of Industries of the district con cerned for verification of the date of going into commercial production and other particulars of new industrial unit or substantial expansion in respect of which the concession is sought. The Asst. Director of Industries will make verifica tion in accordance with rules 5(1) and send within 15 days of the receipt of the application his report to the sanc tioning authorities	 Dy. Director of Industries or Director of Industries indicating the date of going into commercial production of the unit. A copy will be furnished to the applicant. " The form of the certificate to be issued by the office of the Director of Industries read thus: "No. Date The particulars furnished by M/s . . . . . . have been checked and verified from records including those of consumption of power and raw materials and output of finished products. The date of commencement of commercial production by the industrial unit is The date from which the unit has exceeded	 on a sustained basis production over the licensed or installed capacity of the unit is . . . Asst. Director of Industries" It appears that the Government had announced "conces sions" regarding the payment of sales tax by new industrial units including pioneer units going into production after 1 4 1981 not only under the notification dated 23/10/81 but also under other notifications dated 1 5 82 and 29 6 82. Two of these notifications are on record before us. It is	 however	 unnecessary to extract them here. It is sufficient to set out their purport	 quoting from the "instructions" of 12 1 83	 referred to a little later: "According to the first notification	 the new industrial units are exempted from the payment of sales tax. This notification covered sales tax payable by them on the products manufactured by them. It entitled them to exemption 603 from payment of purchase tax on purchase made by them from unregistered dealers. According to the second notification an industrial unit making purchases of its raw material from a registered dealer is exempted from payment of sales tax on the raw materials so purchased by him from the registered dealer. In other words	 registered dealers selling raw materials to a new industrial unit are not required to charge any sales tax from the new industrial unit on sales made by them to such unit. The third notification exempts the goods manufactured by the new industrial units from the levy of sales tax even when these goods are sold by the dealers who have purchased these goods from the new indus trial units. In other words	 by issue of this notification	 the goods manufactured by the new industrial units are fully exempted from the payment of sales tax right upto the stage they reach the consumer. These three notifications only deal with the grant of exemption from payment of sales tax under the M.P. General Sales Tax Act. that is to say from the payment of the State Sales Tax. The fourth notification exempts the new industrial units from payment of the Central Sales Tax on the sale of goods manufactured by them in the course of interstate trade or commerce. This notification has exempted the new units from payment of sales tax w.e.f. 1 7 82. " In view of these notifications	 the Government considered it necessary to issue certain instructions "for the grant of certificate of eligibility to new industrial units claiming exemption from/deferment of payment of sales tax" on 12 1 1983. These instructions also proceed on the same lines as the earlier ones. "Traditional" industries	 as listed in para 5. are said to be outside the purview of the scheme. Para 5 enumerated the following as "traditional industries": flour mills (excluding roller flour mills)	 oil mills (excluding solvent extraction plants	 dall mills. saw mills	 rice mills	 printing presses of all types	 cotton ginning and pressing factories	 in factories and such other indus tries as may be notified from time to time. It also stated (a) that "industrial units undertaking expansion/modifica tion or diversification will not be eligible for these concessions	 (b) that a closed unit revived by the entrepre neur will not be considered as a new unit for the purpose of availing of these concession and (c) that units claiming interest free loans as an existing unit will not be eligible for these concessions. A certificate of eligibility had to be obtained in the prescribed manner 604 and this procedure was made more elaborate. District Level Committees and a State Level Committee were constituted for this purpose and they took a decision on the application of the unit read with the comments thereon by the Director of Industries	 though the certificate was actually issued by the Director of Industries or the General Manager of the District Industries Centre in a prescribed form. The Full Bench	 after considering the scheme and in structions of the Government discussed above	 came to the conclusion that the scope of the exemption notification of 1981 was not intended to be wider than that of the conces sions granted earlier. The 1981 notification was intended to bring about only a change in the mode of relief to the same categories of industries as were covered by the earlier schemes. The Court observed: "It appears that the mode of concessions granted by the aforesaid instructions involved some inconvenience to the industrial units and duplication of procedure inasmuch as the industrial unit had to first collect the sales tax and the tax so collected and paid along with the returns were later on refunded to the industrial unit in the shape of subsidy. To avoid the duplication of procedure the State Government thought it fit to altogether exempt the industri al units from payment of sales tax or defer the payment of sales tax. " The Court observed. vis a vis the various instructions referred to above: "12 . . These instructions also contain a complete procedure for application and grant of eligibility certifi cate by the Industries Department. Thus it is clear from these instructions that the question of grant of eligibility certificate by the Industries Department is not an empty formality but before granting the certificate the Industries Department has to see whether all the requirements as con tained in the instructions are fulfilled and complied with or not. All the Government Instructions discussed above	 issued from time to time right from 1973 onwards till 1983 (Annex ure R I	 II and III) clearly indicate not only the consist ent Government policy in the matter of grant of 605 Sales Tax concessions to the New Industrial Units but also the consistent practice that has been followed throughout whereby these concessions were not at any time made avail able to the Traditional Industries like Flour Mills and Dall Mills etc. Not a single instance is available to show that any of these concessions were ever made available to any Traditional Industries. It may be pointed out that all these facts and the Government policy as also all the aforesaid Government Instructions on the subject were not placed before the Division Bench which heard and decided Misc. Petition No. 1861 of 1983 (G. section Dall Mills vs State of M.P.). However	 after the decision of M.P. No. 1861/83 the State Government while issuing a Notification No. 351 dated 21st October	 1986 under section 12 of the Act	 a photostat copy of which has been filed on record of M.P. No. 2710/87 (See at page 94 of the paper book) exempting the Industrial Units specified therein from payment of tax under section 6 and 7 AA of the Act again specifically provided in clause (xiii) of the said Notification that the said exemption shall not be available to the Industrial Units enumerated therein including Flour Mills and Dall Mills etc. " It was true	 the Court agreed	 that a notification has generally to be construed on its plain language. But	 here: "as pointed out earlier	 column 3 of the 1981 Notification (Annexure B) does not contain any guidelines or a procedure in the matter of grant of eligibility certificate or refusal thereof by the Industries Department and as the grant or refusal of such certificate cannot be an empty formality and	 therefore	 in order to avoid the possibility of arbi trariness and injustice to any one the State Government was justified in issuing executive instructions laying down the guidelines and procedure for the same. " The Full Bench	 therefore	 observed: "16. From what has been stated and discussed above it is clear that at no point of time any concession or exemption from. payment of sales tax was ever given to the Traditional Industries and not a single example to that effect is avail able. The State Government while issuing instruction from 606 time to time have been specifically excluding the Tradition al Industries. Thus the executive authorities and the high est agency and its officers charged with the duty for the administration and enforcement of the said Notification are not only conversant with the underlying policy of the Gov ernment but they are also intimately acquainted with the economic significance of the tax in question and exemption thereof. The interpretation of the Government regarding the construction of 1981 Notification read with the instructions (Annexure R. I	 II and III) excluding the Traditional Indus tries	 which has been consistently followed and acted upon accordingly for a period over a decade cannot be given a go by but has to be accepted. In view of the above discussion the impugned Notifica tion dated 4 7 1987 (Annexure G) is hardly of any conse quence. More or less it is a clarification of 1981 Notifica tion and not rescission of any grant. " The contention that "instructions" could not override the effect of the statutory notification was repelled by the Court on the ground that the validity and effectiveness of the instructions can be supported by reference to Article 162 of the Constitution as filling up a lack of guidelines in the notification. An argument based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel was also rejected as "the petitioners were well aware of the fact that the exemption was not available to their new units and they had not established their units because of the exemption". The Court explained the position thus: "20. In this behalf firstly it may be pointed out that all the petitioners had established their Industrial Units after the Government issued the executive instructions (Annexure R. III) dated 12 1 1983	 of which clause 5(b) specifically speaks that the concessions will not be available to Tradi tional Industries like Flour Mills and Dall Mills etc. To say that the petitioners were not aware of these executive instructions would be incorrect because clause 6 of these instructions contemplates that New Industrial Units desirous of availing the said concessions shall have to apply in Form I accompanied with a declaration in Form II appended to the said Instructions and the petitioners applied in Form I with declaration in Form II (See Annexure D	 D/I and D/2 in M.P. No. 2710/87). Further these 607 applications for exemption were made by the petitioners only after the order dated 7 10 1986 was passed in G.S. Flour Mills vs State (M.P.) No. 1861 of 1983) which shows that the petitioners were aware of the fact that they were not entitled to exemption and it was only after the aforesaid decisions that they considered to apply for exemption. This fact is further fortified from the conduct of the petition ers themselves as they continued to submit returns right from 1983 onwards and continued to pay the tax as assessed against them without taking any steps to claim exemption. In this behalf paragraphs 8 and 9 of the petitions are self explanatory. Thus having regard to all these facts	 the. question of application of principle of promissory estoppel in the present case does not arise and the petitions deserve to be dismissed. " Sri Harish Salve	 appearing for the G.S. Dhall & Flour Mills	 apart from pleading that the view taken in this case is the correct one and not that enunciated by the Full Bench	 also raised an alternative contention on the footing that	 at best	 the notification of 1981 was ambiguous and lent itself to two plausible interpretations. Assuming that there was initially some ambiguity regarding the applicabil ity of the Notification of 23.10.81 to traditional indus tries	 it had been dispelled by the instructions of 12	 1.83. Once these instructions were published	 any assessee setting up a traditional industry took a calculated risk on the issue as to whether the Notification should be confined	 on proper interpretation	 only to non traditional industries and could not rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Pointing out that the assesses in the Full Bench case were persons who had set up their industry after 12.1.83	 Sri Salve argued that the dismissal of the Special Leave Peti tion against the Full Bench judgment will not affect his case as this assessee had set up its industry	 admittedly	 before 12.1. The position is similar in the case of Mohan. Ismail. Learned counsel	 therefore	 submitted that	 even if the 1983 instructions were rightly held by the High Court to have validly supplemented the terms of the 1981 Notification	 they can have no application to the two earli er cases which had to be decided solely on the terms of the 1981 Notification. To answer these contentions	 one has to look first at the statutory instruments in this case viz. section 12 of the Act and the notification thereunder. section 12(1)(i)	 with which we are concerned	 lays down four requirements for the grant of exemption from the provisions of the Act: 608 (i) that any exemption to be granted under the section has to be by a notification; (ii) that the notification may exempt any class of dealers or any goods or class of goods from the payment of tax under the Act in whole or in part but only for a definite period to be specified in the notification; (iii) that the exemption will be subject to such restric tions and conditions as may be specified in the notifica tion; (iv) that such exemption could be prospective or retrospec tive. We are concerned here with the scope of the second and third requirements mentioned above. So far as the class of dealers entitled to the exemption are concerned	 the notifi cation spells out the following requisites: (i) they must belong to one of the classes Of dealers speci fied in column No. (1) of the schedule; (ii) they must have set up industry in any of the districts of Madhya Pradesh specified in the annexure; (iii) they must have commenced production after 1.4. The period of exemption is also specified in the notifica tion. So far as the "restrictions and conditions" subject to which the exemption has been granted	 they are	 as per column No. (3) of the Schedule: (a) that the dealer should continue to furnish the pre scribed returns under the Sales Tax Act; and (b) that they should produce	 at the time of their assessment	 a certifi cate from the Director of Industries certifying that such dealer is eligible to claim exemption and has not opted for the "scheme of deferring the payment of tax under the rules framed for the purpose". It is not anybody 's case that the assesses before us did not fall within the class of dealers specified in column (1) or that they did not comply with (a) above or that they had opted for the scheme of deferment of tax. This being so	 the assesses claim that they are eligible for the exemption under the notification and that the Director of Industries should have granted them a certificate to this effect. It is the denial of 609 this certificate which has brought the assesses to Court. The question for consideration is whether the Director of Industries can refuse the exemption certificate on a consid eration not specified in the notification. Prima facie	 No. All the conditions for exemption have to be. and are	 set out in the notification itself and all that the Director of Industries has to do is to satisfy himself that those condi tions are fulfilled; he cannot travel beyond the terms of the notification. He can see whether the dealer falls under the description in column (1)	 whether he has set up a new industry in M.P. State	 whether he has commenced production after 1.4.1981 and whether has opted for the deferment scheme. The condition about the dealer filing returns regu larly would seem to be one under the purview of the sales Tax Officer rather than one under that of the Director of industries. If these conditions are fulfilled	 the exemption certificate will have to be granted. That seems the straight and simple interpretation of the notification. But	 it is said for the State	 this is not the intend ment or effect of the notification. It is said that the argument overlooks the reference in column (3) to the grant of an eligibility certificate by the Director of Industries. This is one of the important conditions for the grant of this exemption. It is pointed out	 in this context	 that there had been in force in the State	 for several years past	 a scheme of subsidy/loan. That scheme was also depend ant on a certificate of the Director of Industries but that certificate could be denied to "traditional industries". It is argued that	 since the notification does not set out the conditions on which	 and the procedure in accordance with which the Director of Industries is to issue the eligibility certificate	 that earlier scheme and procedure should be read into the notification. Sri Salve objected to this reading of the notification	 infer alia	 on the ground that the earlier scheme and the exemption now proposed are total ly different in their object and scope and that	 while the former scheme was intended as an incentive to any one who set up a new industry in the State so that "traditional" industries did not get any benefit	 the notification presently under consideration was issued with the object of industrialising the backward areas of the State and so it was immaterial what type of industry went in there and whether the industry proposed to be set up was a "tradition al" one or not. This contention does not appear to be quite correct. It has been pointed earlier that even the earlier schemes provided for graded incentives for industrialisation effective for varying periods depending upon the backward ness or otherwise of the district in which the industry was proposed to be set up. But	 even granting that the 1981 policy was to replace the earlier subsidy/loan by an exemp tion	 it does not necessarily follows that the 610 units intended to be covered by the new scheme were only those that were covered by the earlier scheme and that no wider exemption was contemplated. Indeed	 there were four new concessions introduced in 1981 82 and there is no mate rial which would justify these being tied down to the param eters of the earlier schemes. No factual foundation has been laid to establish the hypothesis that the exemption con ferred in 1981 was to be a mere extension or substitution of the benefits conferred earlier. There are other difficulties in reading the provisions of the earlier schemes into the notification. In the first place	 the earlier schemes spe cifically provided that "traditional industries" were out side their purview. The language of the notification	 which is a piece of subsequent legislation	 is silent about this. This is itself indicative of a legislative intent to widen the scope of relief and grant exemption to traditional industries as well: vide	 G.P. Singh: Interpretation of Statutes	 4th Edition	 pp. 767 8. The omission to specifi cally exclude "traditional industries" as was done in the earlier schemes the notification gains added significance in view of section 12 which specifically requires that all condi tions and restrictions governing an exemption should be specified in the notification. Secondly	 the attempt of the State to read a further condition into the notification excluding "traditional industries" from the exemption is based on the words which require that the Director of Indus tries should grant a certificate (a) that the dealer is entitled to claim the exemption and (b) that he has not opted for the scheme of deferring the payment of tax under the rules framed for the purpose. But these words do not carry the State 's case further	 for what the Director of Industries has to do is to certify that the applicant is entitled to the exemption on the terms and conditions set out in the notification and not on the basis of any further requirements not so set out. The notification does not authorise him to say that	 though the applicant fulfills the terms of the notification	 he will not grant the eligibility certificate because	 under the previously prevalent schemes	 he could not issue an eligibility certificate to "tradition al industries". He could not grant an eligibility certifi cate under the earlier schemes because the instructions which outlined the scheme specifically excluded traditional industries. Actually	 even under the earlier schemes	 nei ther the application form nor the form of certificate	 which have been extracted earlier	 make any reference to the assessee concerned not being a `traditional industry '. Be that as it may	 for granting a certificate that the appli cant is eligible for exemption under the notification	 the director has to look to the conditions set out in the noti fication and nowhere else. To say that	 when the notifica tion requires an eligibility certificate from the Director it means a certificate on the terms prescribed under the earlier scheme is to read into 611 the notification something which is not there. Thirdly	 the interpretation advocate by the State really narrows down the class of dealers entitled to the exemption as set down in column (1) of the notification. It amounts to substituting	 for the word "dealers" in column 1 of the notification the words "dealers other than those carrying on traditional industries". Such an interpretation also virtually amounts to allowing certain executive instructions issued in a different context to cut down the scope of a statutory notification. This cannot clearly be done. Lastly	 a perusal of the earlier schemes would show that the concept of "traditional industries" is a vague one. The nomenclature of these industries has varied from time to time. The note in the 1977	 and the definition in the 1983	 instructions show the eligibility under the earlier schemes was denied not only to "traditional industries" but also certain other industries such as revived or reconstructed industries. We may also mention in this context a notification of 21.10.1986 referred to by the High Court outlining exemp tions under Ss. 6 and 7AA. It excludes	 from exemption	 in addition to saw mills	 flour mills etc. (which the State calls traditional industries) various other industries (total numbering 26) specified in cl. (xiii) thereof. This changing definition of eligibility for exemption also shows that there was no common or identical group of beneficiaries intended under the various instructions or notifications and that each set of instructions or notification issued from time to time defined only the categories exempted from its purview and nothing else. The exemption list under one was not meant to be carried over into another. We are	 there fore	 of opinion that it is not permissible to restrict the scope of the notification in the manner suggested. We may point out that	 in construing the notification thus	 we are only giving effect to a well settled rule that may be illustrated by a reference to the decision in Hansraj Gordhandas vs H.H. Dave	 In that case notifications had been issued under section 8 of the granting exemption to (a) "cotton fabrics produced by any cooperative society formed of owners of cotton powerlooms . ." and (b) "cotton fabrics pro duced on powerlooms owned by any cooperative society or owned by or allotted to the members of the society . . ". The appellant had sought exemption from excise duty under these notifications in respect of cotton fabrics which had been got manufactured by him on the powerlooms belonging to a cooperative society in pursuance of an agreement entered into with it. The excise authorities rejected the claim on the ground that the exemption under the notifications could be claimed only when the cotton fabrics were manufactured by a cooperative so 612 ciety for itself. Upholding the assessee 's claim	 this Court observed: "It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the object of granting exemption was to encourage the forma tion of co operative societies which not only produced cotton fabrics but which also consisted of members. not only owning but having actually operated not more than four power looms during the three years immediately preceding their having joined the society. The policy was that instead of each such member operating his looms on his own. he should combine with others by forming a society which. through the cooperative effort should produce cloth. The intention was that the goods produced for which exemption could be claimed must be goods produced on its own behalf by the society. We are unable to accept the contention put forward on behalf of the respondents as correct. On a true construction of the language of the notifications. dated July 31	 1959 and April 30. 1960 it is clear that all that is required for claiming exemption is that the cotton fab rics must be produced on power looms owned by the coopera tive society. There is no further requirement under the two notifications that the cotton fabrics must be produced by the Cooperative Society on the power looms "for itself". It is well established that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words. The entire matter is governed wholly by the language of the notification. If the tax payer is within the plain terms of the exemption it cannot be denied its benefit by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority. If such intention can be gathered from the construction of the words of the notification or by necessary implication therefrom. the matter is different	 but that is not the case here. In this connection we may refer to the observations of Lord Watson in Salomon vs Salomon & Co.	 ; 	 38: "Intention of the legislature is a common but very slippery phrase	 which	 popularly understood may signi fy anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant although there has been an omission to enact it. In a Court of Law or Equity	 what the Legislature intended to be 613 done or "not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact	 either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication. " It is an application of this principle that a statutory notification may not be extended so as to meet a casus omissus. As appears in the judgment of the Privy Council in Crawford vs Spooner	 " . We cannot aid the legislature 's defective phrasing of the Act	 we cannot add	 and mend	 and	 by construction	 make up deficiencies which are left there. " Learned Counsel for the respondents is possibly right in his submission that the object behind the two notifications is to encourage the actual manufacturers of handloom cloth to switch over to power looms by constituting themselves into Cooperative Societies. But the operation of the notifica tions has to be judged not by the object which the rulemak ing authority had in mind but by the words which it has employed to effectuate the legislative intent. " In our view	 this principle applies here squarely. Indeed	 even granting that the notification may be inter preted having regard to the past history and the possible intention of the Government while issuing the notification	 the position of the assesses here is much stronger for	 while in the reported case the State was trying only to effectuate the clear object of the notification	 here it is not at all clear	 for the reasons discussed above	 that the State intended the exemption to be confined only to the cases covered by the subsidy/loan schemes prevalent earlier. The 1981 notification does not expressly	 or (for the rea sons discussed above) even by necessary implication	 exclude "traditional" industries from its scope. Sri Salve contends that	 even if a lenient view is taken and a more liberal construction is sought to be placed on the notification	 the best that could be said for the State would be that the notification was ambiguous. One could either say that the previous procedure and requirements prevalent for obtaining an exemption certificate were in tended to be incorporated by the words requiring such a certificate (as suggested for the appellant or one could say	 with equal plausibi 614 lity	 that the exemption certificate is to be based only on the conditions and requirements mentioned in the notifica tion (as contended for by the assesses). In such a state of law	 he contends	 one can have regard to the conduct of the parties and how they understood the notification. His argu ment is that the State	 by its conduct	 had held out to the assessee that it would also be eligible for the exemption. In this context	 he drew our attention to the following circumstance: (1) The M.P. Audhyogik Vikas Nigam	 a State instrumen tality	 which was administering the notification issued	 in November 1981	 a pamphlet setting out the various incentives the State was offering for new industries proposed to be set up in the State. As to "exemption from sales tax"	 the pamphlet stated that "new industrial units coming into production after 1.4.81" will be entitled to an exemption for a period depending upon the district where it is set up or could alternatively exercise an option to defer payment of sales tax by a period of 10 years. It did not mention anywhere that the industry should not be a traditional industry. (2) The Nigam allotted a plot of land of the extent of 1 acre to enable the assessee to establish its unit in the Industrial Area. Mandideep	 Dt. Raisen. (3) Other incentives as to power	 interest and capital subsidy were extended to the assessee. Thus	 says counsel	 the State "lured" the assessee to set up a unit in the record time of ten months and with a substantial capital outlay of over Rs. 10 lakhs in a backward area. These incen tives were meant to be coextensive with the concession regarding sales tax. He contends that these representations and acts are sufficient to found a claim of "equitable estoppe" against the State. We are unable to accept this argument. The respondents have stated in their counter affidavit that the Nigam had acted in error and misconstrued the notification and was not acting under the authority of the Government in issuing the pamphlet. The other conces sions extended to the assessee pertained to the setting up of a small scale industry in the State and were unrelated to the exemption from sales tax. In our opinion	 there is force in these submissions. The circumstances and material relied on by the assessee do not spell out any clear promise of exemption from sales tax even for traditional industries. The notifications or guidelines under which the other facil ities were granted have not been 615 placed before us and no material is available on record to correlate them to the sales tax exemption or to show that all these were inextricably connected so as to form part of a single "relief packet". We	 therefore	 reject this conten tion of Sri Salve. However	 on the interpretation of the notification. we accept the contention of the assesses that the notification does not warrant denial of exemption solely on the ground that the applicant is having a "traditional industry". We have indicated earlier that the assesses whose writ petitions were disposed of by the Full Bench had set up their industries after 12.1. 1983 by which time elaborate instructions had been issued to explain the State 's point of view	 The question is whether this makes a difference. We think not. Even the 1983 document is not a statutory instru ment neither a notification nor a rule framed under the statute. The Full Bench has considered those instructions to be conclusive on two grounds on the doctrine of contempora nea exposition and on the principle that executive instruc tions can always be issued to supplement statutory instru ments so as to fill up areas on which the latter are silent. In our opinion	 neither of these grounds is tenable. It is true that the principle of contemporanea exposition is in voked where a statute is ambiguous but is shown to have been clearly and consistently understood and explained by the administrators of the law in a particular manner. This doctrine has been explained and applied in a numbers of cases of this Court (e.g. See Varghese vs L.T.O.	 ; 	 in addition to the cases referred to by the Full Bench). As pointed out by Sri Salve	 its applicability in the construction of recent statutes. and that too in the first few years of their enforcement	 has been doubted. vide: Doypack Systems P. Ltd. vs Union of India. ; 	 para 61. But	 this apart	 the principle will not be applicable here for two reasons. In the first place	 the instructions of 1983 do not anywhere "expound" the terms of the notification. They do not give any indication that the state had applied its mind to the precise terms of the notification or their interpretation. They do not explain or clarify that	 though the notification is silent	 it has been intended that the limitations of the previous schemes should be read into it. Secondly	 the cases referred to will show that the doctrine applies in cases where the plea is that	 though the language of the statute may appear to be wide enough to seem applicable against the subject in particular situations	 the State itself which was the progenitor of the statute had not understood it in that way. But	 to apply the doctrine to widen the are bit of the statutory language would	 however	 virtually mean that the State can determine the interpretation of a statute by its 616 ipsi dixit. That	 certainly	 is not	 and cannot be	 the scope of the doctrine. The doctrine can be applied to limit the State to its own narrower interpretation in favour of the subject but not to claim its interpretation in its own favour as conclusive. The second ground on which the Full Bench has sought to invoke the instructions is also not correct. Executive instructions can supplement a statute or cover areas to which the statute does not extend. But they cannot run contrary to statutory provisions or whittle down their effect. The Full Bench seems to think that	 unless the instructions are brought in	 the notifications would have been in danger of abuse for want of proper guidelines as to the grant of exemption certificates. It is suggested that the notification contemplates rules to be issued for the purpose and that	 since no rules had been issued	 Directors of Industries were left with no parameters for the issue of exemption certificates and might act capriciously or arbi trarily in granting or refusing certificates. The instruc tions	 it is said	 have been issued to fill in this lacuna and are hence valid. There are two misconceptions in this line of reasoning. The first is that. though the last few words in column (3) of the notification are capable of a wider meaning	 it would appear that these words govern only the immediately preceding words; rules envisaged are not in relation to the grant of exemption certificates and condi tions therefore but in respect of the circumstances in which the assesses can exercise the option between exemption and deferment of sales tax. This view derives support from the instructions of 1983. As pointed out earlier	 the instruc tions first set out the scope of the various notifications as granting exemption from sales tax; the instructions thereafter proceed to say: "The grant of exemption from the payment of sales tax is contingent upon the issue of a certificate of eligi bility to the new industrial units. This certificate of eligibility is required to be issued by the Director of Industries or an officer authorised by him for this purpose. In so Jar as the grant of concessions relating to the exemption from payment of sales tax is concerned	 no further notifications are required to be issued. For ena bling the new industrial units to avail of the second con cession viz.	 that of deferment of payment of sales tax	 a scheme is being issued separately. For availing of the benefit of the deferment of concession too	 a certificate of eligibility is required to be obtained by the industrial unit. However. 617 pending the issue of the scheme	 the grant of certificate of eligibility should not be held up." (underlining ours) Incidentally	 we may point out	 the first part of the para does not clarify that the eligibility certificate is not to be granted to "traditional industries". But	 so far as the present point is concerned	 it is categorically stated that no further notifications are required to be issued and that they are needed only to define the scheme for deferment of tax. Indeed	 rules were framed in order to implement the deferment scheme which came into force with effect from 1 4 1983. We shall refer a little later to these rules. Secondly	 there is no warrant for assuming that the notifi cation envisages conditions for the issue of the eligibility certificate other than those specified by itself. There is nothing in the language of the notification to suggest that anything further is needed to enable the Director of Indus tries to grant the exemption. Without the guidelines	 the requirement for an exemption certificate would not become an "empty formality" as suggested by the Full Bench. The Direc tor of Industries has to issue the same after satisfying himself that the applicant industry falls within the terms of the notification in the following respects (a) that the assessee is one of the class of dealers set out in column ( 1); (b) that he has set up an industry in the State; (c) that it has been set up in one of the districts set out in the annexure and the category to which it belongs; (d) that the industry has commenced production after 1 4 81; (e) that the assessee has not opted for the deferment scheme. These conditions are many and detailed and do not leave anything to the discretion of the Director of Industries. We fail to understand what need there was to lay down any elaborate procedure therefore. Even if there was	 and the earlier procedure by way of application form	 declaration form and form of certificate were to be adapted	 that proce dure	 by itself	 did not	 as pointed out earlier	 contain any reference to the assessee being a traditional industry or otherwise. To assume first that the conditions specified in the notification are not exhaustive or suffi 618 cient and may lead to abuse of power by executive authori ties unless canalised by procedural guidelines and then to say that such a conclusion is borne out by the mere refer ence to a certificate being granted by the Director of Industries because	 under some earlier schemes	 such certif icate was being granted on a restricted basis	 does not appear to be sound logic. We are	 therefore	 of opinion that the notification is quite clear and leaves no area of vacuum which needs to be supplemented by guidelines. Thirdly	 if we read the last part of the entry in column (3) of the notifi cation as envisaging rules to be framed for the grant of the eligibility certificate	 no such rules were flamed. Only instructions were issued. These instructions say that even an assessee	 who fulfills all the requirements of the noti fication	 will not be eligible for exemption unless he fulfills one more condition outside the notification. They travel beyond and counter to the notification. They restrict the scope of exemption under the notification. They deny exemption to a person who qualifies for it under the statu tory notification. Indeed	 there is force in the contention that if the statutory notification is construed as permit ting the State by rules or executive instructions to pre scribe other conditions for exemption	 whether new or based on past practice	 it is liable to be struck down on the ground of impermissible delegation of legislative power to the executive. This	 certainly	 they cannot do. A further development which has been relied on by the State but does not really seem to help its case may now be referred to. State Act 25 of 1982 inserted section 22 D in the Act in the following terms: "22 D. Special provisions relating to deferred payment of tax by Industrial Units Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act	 a registered dealer	 who is (a) registered as a small scale industrial unit with Indus trial Department of the Government of Madhya Pradesh;or (b) registered with the Director General of Technical Devel opment as an industrial unit; or (c) registered as an industrial unit by any authority duly empowered to do so by the Government of Madhya Pradesh or the Central Government; or (d) holding a licence under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act	 1951 (No. 65 of 1951). 619 and who in each case has or may set up a new industrial unit in any district of Madhya PradeSh if eligible for grant of the facility of deferred payment of tax under the scheme providing for grant of incentive to enterpreneurs for set ting up new industrial units in the state as the State Government may make in this behalf may make deferred payment subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be speci fied in such scheme. " Thereafter	 the State Government framed the M.P. Deferment of Payment of Tax Rules	 1983 which were gazetted of 1.9.83 but with retrospective effect from 1.4. 1981 (that is	 even anterior to the date of the notification). Rules 3	 4 and 14 are relevant and may be set out here. "3. Eligibility for grant of Facility of Deferred payment of tax (1) A new industrial unit other than a unit specified in rule 14 which is covered by any of the categories speci fied in section 22D and of the Act and which is engaged in the manufacture and sale of any goods shall qualify for deferred payment of the tax payable by it provided it is eligible for grant of the concession of exemption from payment of tax in terms of notification No. A 3 41 81 (35) ST V	 dated the 23rd October	 1981 and No. A 3 41 81(31) ST V	 dated the 29th June	 1982 as amended from time to time subject to the provisions of the act. The period pertaining to which the tax which the new industrial unit can defer will be the same for which it could have obtained the con cession of the exemption from payment of tax	 i.e.	 the period pertaining to which the tax can be deferred will be the period shown in column (2) of the said notification. (2) The new industrial unit shall be eligible to defer only the payment of tax which is due from it under the Act. Application for Scheme of deferred payment and grant of certificate of eligibility (1) A new industrial unit opting for the scheme of deferred payment of tax shall apply for and obtain a certificate of eligibility in accordance with the instructions issued by State Government in the Commerce and Industries Department for the said purpose. An applica tion in writing shall be submitted within forty five days of the publication of these rules or of commencement of the production whichever is later. In the application form the 620 new industrial unit shall indicate that it has opted for scheme of deferred payment of tax. The option once exercised shall be irrevocable. The form of the application as well as the certificate of eligibility shall be as specified in the said instructions. The application shall be made to the General Manager	 District Industries Centre of the district where the new industrial unit is or is proposed to be locat ed and shall be processed further in accordance with the said instructions. The certificate of eligibility in respect of large and medium scale units shall issued by the Director of Industries (Government of Madhya Pradesh) and in respect of small scale units by the said General Manager	 and shall carry a specific and district number given by the said officer. (2) A copy of the certificate of eligibility shall be for warded by the officer issuing the certificate to the appro priate Sales Tax Officer	 i.e. the Sales Tax Officer in whose circle the industrial unit is registered as a dealer. The Sales Tax Officer receiving the copy of the certificate of eligibility shall maintain a record of the same in such form as may be directed by the Commissioner and shall not enforce recovery of the tax payment whereof has been shown to have been deferred in the certificate of eligibility. (3) The new industrial unit shall be entitled to defer the payment of the tax for a period of ten years. This entitle ment shall be available only on receipt of the certificate of eligibility to it under sub rule (1). The certificate of eligibility shall show the duration for which the payment of the tax has been deferred. The year in which the tax per taining to any accounting year of the industrial unit is required to be paid consequent upon deferment of tax shall also be shown in the certificate of eligibility. The entire tax assessed pertaining to any accounting year shall be payable by the industrial unit in lump sum on the expiration of duration of deferment and payment of such tax shall be made within thirty days of the date on which the period of ten years from the end of the relevant accounting year expires. Non availability of facility of deferred payments The result of the scheme of deferred payment of tax shall not be available to the following new industrial units	 namely: 621 (A) (1) flour mills (Excluding Roller Flour Mills); (2) Oil mills (excluding Solvent Extraction Plants); (3) dall mills; (4) saw mills; rice mills; (6) printing presses of all types; (7) cotton ginning and pressing factories; (8) ice factories; (9) such other industries as may be notified by Government from time to time. (B) industrial units undertaking expansion	 modernisation or diversification; (C) a closed unit revived by an entrepreneur; (D) units claiming interest free loans as an existing unit establishing a new unit; (E) an industrial unit set up by transferring or shifting or dismenting an existing industry. A note was also published in the Gazette explaining the background of the rules. It reads thus: "NOTE EXPLAINING THE BACKGROUND OF THE SCHEME OF DEFERRED PAYMENTS TAX The Government of Madhya Pradesh	 with a view to accelerat ing the pace of industrialisation have announced concessions regarding the payment of tax under the Madhya Pradesh Gener al Sales Tax Act	 1958 and the by new industrial units going into production after 1st April	 1981 which contemplate (a) total exemption from payment of tax whether State or Central by new industrial units going into production after 1st April	 1981 for varying periods depending upon the district in which the new industrial unit is set up; 622 (b) deferment of the payment of tax in lieu of the above said exemption for a period of ten years. To give effect to the concession of exemption from payment of tax	 the Government in the Separate Revenue Department have already issued the following notifications: (i) F. No. A3 41 81(35) ST V	 dated 23rd October	 1981. (ii)F. No. A3 41 81 (25) ST V	 dated 1st May	 1982. (iii) F. No A3 41 81(24) ST. V	 1st May	 1982. (iv) F. No. A3 41 81 (31) ST V	 dated 29th June	 1982. With a view to enabling those new industrial units who opt for the alternative concession of deferment of payment of tax	 a special provision in the shape of section 22 D has been inserted in the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act	 1958 with effect from 1st April	 1981	 according to which the facility of deferring the payment of tax which become available subject to the provisions of the scheme providing for the grant of incentives for setting up the new industri al Units; The aforesaid rules have therefore been framed to formulate the scheme of deferred payment of tax. " It might appear	 at first sight	 that since the relief by way of deferment of tax is only in the nature of an alterna tive to the provision for exemption and the former is not available to traditional industries because of rule 14 above	 the same should be the position in regard to the exemption provision also. There are	 however	 several diffi culties in accepting this suggestion. In the first place	 the rules relate to tax deferment and not tax exemption. It is open to the State Government	 particularly in view of section 22D	 to frame such scheme for the purpose as it may deem fit. The provision for exemption	 however	 needs to be spelt out	 under section 12	 in a statutory notification. Secondly if	 as is being urged on behalf of the State	 it is explicit even on the terms of the notification that traditional industries are excluded	 it is not necessary for the rules of deferment to specifically provide that they will not be available to the industries listed in rule 14 particularly when rule 4 has incorporated the requirement of an eligibil ity certificate in accordance with 623 the previous instructions for the said purpose. Thirdly rule 14 excludes from the scheme not merely "traditional indus tries" covered by para (A) but also industrial units (which may not be `traditional industries ') falling under paras (B) to (E). Fourthly	 the rules are not inconsistent with the interpretation that	 while all industries fulfilling the terms of the notification can claim exemption under it	 only some of those units	 which do not fall under rule 14	 can opt for the alternative of determent. We are	 therefore	 of opinion that even the retrospective promulgation of these rules provide no assistance in the interpretation of the notification. A reference has now to be made to the notification of 3/7/87 amending the 1981 notification with retrospective effect so as to exclude what may be described in brief as `traditional industries ' though	 like rule 14 of the defer ment rules	 the exclusion extends even to certain other non traditional units operating in certain situations. Though this notification purports to be retrospective	 it cannot be given such effect for a simple reason. We have held that the 1981 notification clearly envisages no exclu sion of any industry which fulfills the terms of the notifi cation from availing of the exemption granted under it. In view of this interpretation	 the 1987 amendment has the effect of rescinding the exemption granted by the 1981 notification in respect of the industries mentioned by it. section 12 is clear that	 while a notification under it can be prospective or retrospective	 only prospective operation can be given to a notification rescinding an exemption granted earlier. In the interpretation we have placed on the notifi cation	 the 3/7/87 notification cannot be treated as one merely clarifying an ambiguity in the earlier one and hence capable of being retrospective: it enacts the rescission of the earlier exemption and	 hence	 can operate only prospec tively. It cannot take away the exemption conferred by the earlier notification. We would like to add that we agree with the view of the Full Bench that	 if the notification is interpreted as done by it or even hold it to be ambiguous	 there is no scope for the assessee to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel. We have already dealt with this aspect in regard to the cases in which the State has appealed. In the other cases covered by the Full Bench decision	 the mere fact that an exemption was initially granted and then revoked would be insufficient to found the claim of estoppel particularly when it has been found that the assesses started production after 12.1. 1983 and claimed exemption very much later. But since	 in our view	 the terms of the notification are clear and envisage no denial of exemption to traditional indus tries	 this question does not survive. 624 Before we conclude	 we have to refer to one aspect which we have touched upon at the very beginning of the judgment and that is the dismissal	 in limine	 of the Special Leave Petition filed in this Court by the petitioners before the Full Bench. It has been pointed out that the above petition was dismissed notwithstanding that the Special Leave Peti tion in the case of G.S. Dhall & Flour Mills was also then pending for admission. It would perhaps have been better if both the S.L.Ps. had been taken up and dealt with together. However	 the S.L.P. against the Full Bench was dismissed and	 two of us having been members of the Bench that dis missed it	 we may observe that Sri Salve is perhaps right in saying that it was the content of paras 20 and 21 of the Full Bench judgment that persuaded this Court to dismiss the S.L.P. there against. The Full Bench has there pointed out that even if it could be said that two interpretations of the notification were equally plausible. the assesses in those cases had set up the industries after the explicit instructions of 12.1. 1983 were made public and thus took a deliberate risk and had only themselves to thank. Neverthe less	 the fact is that the view taken by us on the scope of the notification runs counter to the Full Bench decision which must be treated as overruled. For the above reasons	 we have come to the conclusion that the G.S. Dhall and Flour Mills case laid down the correct law and not the Full Bench. We would like to add that we are not quite happy to arrive at this decision. It does seem likely that the State Government had not intended the exemption to be availed of by certain categories of industries. But it has failed to achieve this purpose on account of the wide language in which it couched the exemp tion notification. We find ourselves unable	 for the reasons discussed above	 to discover any valid legal basis on which the exemption clearly granted can be withheld from the assesses here. We	 therefore	 dismiss the appeals of the State and allow the appeals preferred by the assesses and hold them entitled to the exemption under the 1981 notifica tion. We	 however	 make no order regarding costs. R.S.S. Appeals filed by State dismissed and other appeals allowed.

In March 1969	 the respondent State issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act	 1894	 as amended by the Punjab Legislature	 for acquisition of the appellants ' land. The notification stated that the land was likely to be required to be taken by Government	 at public expense	 for a public purpose	 namely	. the setting up of a factory for the starting of an industry and	 further that action under section 17(2)(c) would be taken on the	 ground of urgency and provisions of section 5A will not apply in regard to the said acquisition. The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court questioning the validity of the acquisition on the ground	 inter alia	 that there was no urgency in the mattelr	 of requiring the land '	 therefore recourse to section 17 was not justified. The state government pleaded that since the Government of India had extended the time for completion of the project till April 30	 1969	 it	 had become necessary to take immediate steps to acquire the land. The High Court dismissed the petition. In the appeal to this Court it was contended that (i) the acquisition in question being one for the benefit of a Company	 proceedings should have been taken under sections 38 to 44B of the Act		 and that there was no public purpose involved in the case; (ii) there was no urgency and hence recourse could not be had to section 17 of the Act; and (iii) section 17(2) (c) was inapplicable to the facts of the case	 because	 though section 17(2)(c) read by itself covered a very large field	 applying the ejusdem generis Rule that provision had to be given a narrower meaning because of the provisions of section 17(2)(a) and (b). Dismissing the appeal	 HELD : (i) On the facts of the case the purpose for which land was acquired was a public purpose. The question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by the Government. So long as it is not established that the acquisition is sought to be made for some collateral purpose or that there is a colourable exercise of power the declaration of the government that it is made for a public purpose is not open to challenge. [874 E G] Smt; Somavanti and Ors vs State of Punjab	 [1963] 2 S.C.R. 774 and Raja Anand Brahma Shah vs State of U.P.	 ; 	 referred to. In view of the fact that the State Government had contributed towards the cost of acquisition it was not necessary to proceed with the acquisition under Part VII of the Act. [875 A] 8 7 2 (ii) On the facts of the case there was urgency. The conclusion of the Government in a given case that there was urgency is entitled to weight	 if not conclusive. (iii) In interpreting cl. (c) of section 17(2) the rule of ejusdem generis	 	cannot be applied. If a given provision is plain and unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear there is no occasion to call into aid that rule. Under cls. (a)	 (b) and (c) of sub section (2) of section 17 the decision to acquire	 land has not to be made by the same authority but by different authorities. Further	 the conditions under which the acquisition has to be made differ from clause to clause. Therefore	 there is no basis to say that the general words in cl. (c) follow the particular and specific words in cls. (b) and (c). [877 E; 879 H] State of Bomby vs Ali Gulshan	 	 Lilavati Bai vs Stat of Bombay	 ; 	 K	 K. Kochuni vs State of Madras	 A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1050	 referred to.