Summarize the following court judgment. Civil Appeal No. 2534 of 1969. (Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 19 8 1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in C.R.P. No. 2190 of 1968.) P. P. Juneja	 for the appellant. G. N. Rao	 for the respondent. 552 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG J. The defendant appellant had taken a house on rent under a registered lease dated 10th February	 1958	 on a monthly rent of rent Rs. 250/ for a period of five years for running a lodging house. It J is admitted by both sides that in February	 1963	 the lease had expired. According to the landlord respondent	 the defendant appellant had continued to hold over as a tenant "on the same terms" by which he	 presumably	 meant that it was a month to month tenancy. The Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease	 Rent and Eviction) Control Act	 1960	 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') came into opera ton before the lease expired. The appellant seemed to be constantly making defaults in payments of rent. The landlord responden had	 therefore	 to file a suit for arrears of rent in the Court of District Munsif	 Visakhapatnam	 which was decreed on 4th April	 1962. The landlord respondent had to file a petition on 21st April	 1962	 under Section 10 of the Act before the Rent Controller	 Visakhapatnam for the eviction of the appellant as no rent was paid from 1st December	 1961 to 31st March	 1962. There was a compromise on 12th October	 1962. The appellant agreed to clear arrears and to pay rents regularly. The appellant	 however	 wailfully defaulted again in payments of rent from September	 1963 to April	 1964. A notice dated 8th April	 1964	 was sent by registered post by the landlord respondent to the appellant terminating his tenancy and calling upon him to pay up the arrears of rent and vacate the house by the end of April	 1964. This came back with the endorsement that the appellant was refusing to accept it. On 9th `` April	 1964	 the respondent filed another petition under Section 10 of the Act before the Rent Controller of Visakhapatnam who ordered the eviction of the appellant after holding all the flimsy defenses of the t appellant to be unsubstantiated. The Subordinate Judge of Visakhapatnam dismissed the tenant 's appeal on 23rd October	 1968. The appellant 's revision application to the High Court was also rejected on 19th August	 1969. The only question raised by the appellant before us	 in this appeal by special leave	 is that no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been served upon the appellant according to the finding of the Andhra Pradesh High Court itself. It was	 therefore	 urged 	 that the petition under Section 10 of the Act could not succeed. The Andhra Pradesh High Court had	 however	 relied upon Ulligamma Ors. V. section Mohan Rao & ors. (1)	 where a Division Bench of that High Court had held that the Act	 with which we are now concerned	 provided a procedure for eviction of tenants which was self contained so that no recourse to the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary. We may also refer here to the observations of this Court. in Raval & Co. vs K. C. Ramachandran & ors.(2). There	 this Court noticed (1) (1969) 1 An. P.R. Law Jolurnal 351. (2) [197412 S.C.R. 629 @ 634 553 Shri Hem Chand vs Shrmati Sham Devi(1)	 and pointed out "that it was held there that the Act under consideration in that case provided the whole procedure for obtaining the relief of ejectment	 and	 that being so	 provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had no relevance". No doubt the decision mentioned with approval by this Court related to another enactment. But	 the principle indicated by this Court was the same as that applied by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. It is true that	 in Mangilal vs Sugan. Chand Rathi (Deceased) etc.(2)	 this Court has held that the provisions of Section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act of 1955 do not dispense with the requirement to comply with the provisions of Section 16 of the Transfer of Property Act. In that case	 however	 Section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Act merely operated as a bar to an ordinary civil suit so that service of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act became relevant in considering whether an ordinary civil suit filed on a ground which constituted an exception to the bar contained in Section 4 had to be preceded by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the context of the remedy of ejectment by an ordinary civil suit	 it was held that the usual notice of termination of tenancy under Section long of the Transfer of Pro party Act was necessary to terminate a tenancy as a condition precedent to the maintainability of such a suit. In the case before us	 the respondent landlord relied upon a provision for special summary proceedings for eviction of tenants under an Act which contains all the requirements for those proceedings. We	 therefore think that the learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had correctly applied the principle laid down by a Division Bench decision of that Court. He rightly distinguished such a case from Mangilal 's case (supra)	 where an entirely different kind of provision of another Act in another State was being considered by this Court. The Division Bench decision of the High Court	 applied by the learned Judge	 had	 we think	 enunciated the correct principle. A question raised before us by learned Counsel for the respondent is whether the notice sent by the respondent landlord could be held not to have been served at all simply because the postman	 who had made the endorsement of refusal	 had not been produced. The Andhra Pradesh High Court had relied upon Meghji Kanji Patel vs Kundanmal Chamanlal (a)	 to hold that the notice was not served. There	 a writ of summons	 sought to be served by registered post	 had been returned with the endorsement "refused". The Bombay High Court held G that the presumption of service had been repelled by the defendant 's statement on oath that he had not refused it as it was never brought to him. In this state of evidence	 it was held that	 unless the postman was produced	 the statement of the defendant on oath must prevail. An (1) I.L.R. [1955] Punj. (2) A.I.R. 1965 SC 101. (3) A.I.R. 1968 Bombay 387. 3 608SCI/76 554 ex paste decree	 passed on the basis of such an alleged service was	 therefore	 set aside. On facts found	 the view expressed could not be held to be incorrect. In Nirmalabala Debi vs Provat Kumar Basa(1)	 it was held by the Calcutta High Court	 that a letter sent by registered post	 with the endorsement "refused" on the cover	 could be presumed to have been duly served upon the addressee without examining the postman who had tried to effect service. What was held there was that the mere fact that the latter had come back with the endorsement "refused" could not raise a presumption of failure to serve. On the other hand	 the presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act would be that	 in the ordinary course of business	 it was received by the addressee and actually refused by him. This is also a correct statement of the law. The two decisions are reconcilable. The Calcutta High Court applied a rebuttable presumption which had not been repelled by any evidence. In the Bombay case	 the presumption had been held to have been rebutted by the evidence of the defendant on oath so that it meant that the plaintiff could not succeed without further evidence. The Andhra Pradesh High Court had applied the ratio disdained of the Bombay case because the defendant appellant before us had deposed that he had not received the notice. It may be that	 on a closer examination of evidence on record	 the Court could have reached the conclusion that the defendant had full knowledge of the notice and had actually refused it knowingly. It is not always necessary	 in such cases	 to produce the postman who tried to effect service. The denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admissions or conduct. We do not think it necessary to go into this question any further as we agree with the High Court on the first point argued before us. Consequently	 this appeal is dismissed with costs. P.B.R. Appear dismissed.

The respondent landlord filed a petition under section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease	 Rent and Eviction) Control Act	 1960	 for the eviction of the appellant tenant. There was a compromise. Since the tenant defaulted in payment of the rent thereafter	 a registered notice terminating the tenancy issued by the landlord	 came back with an endorsement that the appellant had refused to accept it. Later. the tenant was ordered to be evicted. 'The tenant 's appeal to the appellate court and then his revision application to the High Court were rejected. Relying upon an earlier Division Bench decision of that Court	 the High Court held that the Act provided a self contained procedure for eviction of tenants	 and therefore	 compliance with the provisions of section 106	 Transfer of Property Act was unnecessary. Dismissing the tenant 's appeal	 ^ HELD: The High Court has correctly applied the principle laid down by a Division Bench of that court in Mohan & ors. vs section Mohan Rao & Ors. [1969] An. P.R. Law Journal 351. [553 E] Raval & Co. vs K. C. Ramacharndran & ors. [19741 2 SCR 629 @ 634 and Shri Hern Chand vs Shrimali Sham Devi. ILR 1955 Puni. 36	 referred to. In Mangilal vs Sugan Chand Rathi [AIR 1955 SC 101] this Court was considering an entirely different kind of provision of another Act in another State	 and this case is distinguishable. In the context of the remedy of ejectment by an ordinary civil suit it was held in that case that the usual notice of termination _ of tenancy under section 106. Transfer of Property Act was necesary. [553F & D] boiler [In cases where a party denies receipt of registered notice it is not always necessary to produce the postman who tried to effect service. Denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admissions or conduct. The decision of the Bombay High Court in M. K. Patel vs Kundan Mal Chamanlal and that of the Calcutta High Court in Nirmal Bala Devi. vs Provar Kumar Basu are reconcilable. The Calcutta High Court applied a rebuttable presumption under section 114	 Evidence Act	 that the letter was received by the addressee in the ordinary course of blazons was refused by him because the presumption from the endorsement made upon it had not been repelled by any 	 evidence. In the Bombay case	 the presumption had been held to have been `J rebutted by the evidence of the defendant on oath so that it meant that the plaintiff could not succeed without further evidence.] [554C E]