Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 2313 of 1966. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 13	 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 853 of 1966. M.C. Setalvad. D. Narasaraju	 Anwar Ullah Pasha R. V. Pillai and M. M. Kashatriya	 for the appellant. Niren De	 Addl. Solicitor General	 P. Ram Reddy	 section Ramachandra Reddy and T. V.R. Tatachari	 for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidyalingam	 J. This appeal	 by special leave	 granted by this Court	 is directed against the order dated October	 13	 1966	 passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court	 dismissing Writ Petition No 853 of 1966	 filed by the appellant	 under article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant filed the said writ petition under the following circumstances. The appellant was the Vice Chancellor of the Osmania University	 having been appointed	 as such	 by order dated April 30. 1964	 passed by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh	 in 216 his capacity as Chancellor of the said University. The appointment of the appellant	 under the said order	 as Vice Chancellor	 there is no controversy	 was for a term of five years from the date of taking charge; and the appointment itself was made under sub section (1) of section 12 of the Osmania University Act	 1959 (Andhra Pradesh Act No. IX of 1959). There is	 again	 no controversy that the appellant took charge as Vice Chancellor	 in terms of the said order	 on April 30	 1964 and	 as such	 he became entitled to hold office for the full period of five years	 which will expire at the 	end of April 1969. The Osmania University was established in 1918 and the ad ministration of the University was then governed by a Charter of His Exalted Highness	 the Nizam of Hyderabad	 promulgated in 1947. With effect from November 1	 1956	 the State of Hyderabad ceased to exist	 and the Telengana region of that State became part of Andhra Pradesh. In 1959	 the Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed the Osmania University Act	 1959	 earlier referred to. That Act itself was one to amend and consolidate the law relating to the Osmania University. It is only necessary to note at this stage	 that under section 12(1) of the said Act	 it was provided that the Vice Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor from a panel of not less than three persons selected by a Committee	 as constituted under sub section (2); but	 if the Chancellor does not approve any of the persons so selected	 he may call for a fresh panel from the Committee. Section 13	 again	 provided for the term of office	 salary and allowances etc. 	 of the Vice Chancellor. Under sub section (1)	 the term of office of the Vice Chancellor was fixed for a term of five years and there was also a further provision to the effect that he shall be eligible for reappointment. By section 51 of the said Act	 the Osmania University Revised Charter	 of 1947 was repealed; but	 nevertheless	 it was provided that the person holding office immediately before the commencement of the Act as Vice Chancellor	 was to be the Vice Chancellor on such 	commencement of the Act	 and was to continue to hold the said office	 in circumstances mentioned therein. There is	 again	 no controversy that the appellant	 who was already the Vice Chancellor of the Osmania University from 1957	 was again appointed in 1959	 as Vice Chancellor for a period of five years under this Act; and he was similarly appointed for a further term of five years	 on April 30	 1964	 as Vice Chancellor	 as mentioned earlier. During the middle of 1965	 certain amendments were sought to be introduced in the Act by providing for removal of the Vice Chancellor	 by the Chancellor	 from office under certain circumstances. There was also a proposal to reduce the term of office of the Vice Chancellor from 5 years to 3 years	 from the date of his appointment	 and for provisions being made 217 enabling the Government to give directions to the University relating to matters of policy to be followed by it. The amendments sought to be introduced in the Act	 appear to have come in for considerable criticism from several quarters	 and these have been elaborately dealt with in the order	 under attack. According to the appellant	 he was one of those who very strenuously opposed the proposed amendments on the ground that the autonomy of the University was sought to be interfered with by the Government. According to the appellant	 again	 the various criticisms made by him and others	 were taken note of by the Inter University Board	 by the Education Minister of the Union and others. It is the further case of the appellant that it was felt by the Government of Andhra Pradesh that he was responsible for the agitation that was being made	 against the proposed amendments. But	 ultimately	 the Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed the Osmania University (Amendment) Act	 1966 (Act 11 of 1966)	 amending the Osmania University Act of 1959 in certain particulars. The said amendments are to the effect that the Vice Chancellor shall not be removed from office	 except as provided for in section 12(2) of the amended Act. The term of office was also fixed at 3 years under the amended section 13. Another provision relating to the power of Government to give instructions to the University	 was also introduced	 as section 7A; but the appellant continued as Vice Chancellor. The Osmania University Act	 was again amended by the Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act	 1966 (Act XI of 1966). Under this amendment	 section 13A was enacted. In brief	 that section was to the effect that the person holding the office of the ViceChancellor	 immediately before the commencement of the amending Act of 1966	 was to hold office only until a new Vice Chancellor was appointed under sub section (1) of section 12	 and it also provided that such appointment shall be made within 90 days after such commencement. There was a further provision that on the appointment of such new Vice Chancellor	 and on his entering upon his office	 the person holding the office of Vice Chancellor immediately before such appointment	 shall cease to hold that office. Section 7 A	 which had been introduced by Act II of 1966	 was deleted. Section 33 A was enacted	 making special provision as to the re constitution of the Senate	 Syndicate	 Academic Council and Finance Committee of the University. The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 853 of 1966	 in the High Court	 praying for the issue of a writ or order declaring section 5 of the Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act. 1966	 which introduced section 13A in the original Act	 as unconstitutional and void. In that writ petition	 he challenged the validity of the new Section	 section 13A on several grounds. In brief	 his plea was that by virtue 218 of his appointment as Vice Chancellor for 5 years on April 30	 1964	 he had acquired a vested right to hold that office for the full term and that such a vested right could not be taken away	 during the currency of the period	 by any legislative enactment. The legislature had no competence to enact the said provision inasmuch	 as section 13A could not be treated as legislation in respect of University education. The appellant had also pleaded that the provision virtually amounted to removal of the appellant from his office without giving him any opportunity to show cause against such removal. According to the appellant	 even assuming the Legislature was competent to enact the provision in question	 nevertheless	 section 13A is unconstitutional and void	 inasmuch as it offends article 14 of the Constitution. We do not think it necessary to advert	 elaborately	 to the various other grounds of attack levelled against the constitutional validity of the provision in question	 which have	 no doubt	 been dealt with by the High Court	 because	 for the purpose of disposing of this appeal	 in our opinion	 it is enough to refer to the grounds of attack	 taken by the appellant regarding the constitutionality of section 13A	 based upon article 14 of the Constitution. So far as this aspect is concerned	 according to the appellant	 section 9 of Act 11	 of 1966 amended the Act of 1959 by incorporating new sub sections (1) and (2) in section 12. Under sub section (1) of section 12	 the ViceChancellor is to be appointed by the Chancellor. Under sub section (2)	 the Vice Chancellor shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of mis behaviour or incapacity; and it also provided for such an order being passed only after due enquiry by a person who Is or has been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court	 as may be appointed by the Chancellor	 and the Vice Chancellor being given an opportunity of making his representation against the removal. Therefore	 in view of these provisions	 the Vice Chancellor could not be removed by the Chancellor without any cause	 without reason	 without enquiry and without an opportunity being given to him to show cause against removal. This provision applied to the appellant	 who was in office	 on the date of the passing of Act 11 of 1966	 as well as Act XI of 1966. Nevertheless	 section 5 of Act XI of 1966 incorporated s.13A in the principal Act. Under that section	 not only has power been	 conferred on the Chancellor	 but also a duty imposed	 so to say	 on him	 to remove the appellant	 who was the Vice Chancellor	 without any reason or justification or even giving an opportunity to him to show cause against such removal. No enquiry	 before ordering such removal	 is contemplated under this section. Further	 while a Vice Chancellor	 who is appointed after the passing of Act XI of 1966	 cannot be removed from office	 except in accordance with the provisions of sub section (2) of section 12	 the appellant	 who was already in office	 could be arbitrarily and 219 illegally removed under section 13A of the Act. There is no provi sion	 again	 similar to section 13A	 applicable to a Vice Chancellor	 appointed after the coming into force of the amending Act. Therefore	 according to the appellant	 the provisions contained in section 13A are clearly directed only against him	 as he was the person holding office	 prior to the amending Act	 and therefore it is a clear case of hostile discrimination. Further	 according to the appellant	 persons appointed as Vice Chancellors	 constitute a group and must be considered as persons similarly situated and they must be treated alike; whereas	 by virtue of section 13A	 a differentiation is made between the appellant	 who was a Vice Chancellor on the date of the commencement of the Amending Act and other persons who are to be appointed as Vice Chancellors thereafter. This differentiation	 according to the appellant	 is again without any basis; nor has such a classification	 any reasonable relation to the main object of the legislation. The appellant also relied on section 33A	 introduced by section 6 of Act XI of 1966 relating to the reconstitution of the Senate	 Syndicate	 Academic Council and the Finance Committee and pleaded that whereas those academic bodies or authorities were allowed to continue without any time limit and to function until they were reconstituted	 regarding the Vice Chancellor alone	 a period of 90 days had been fixed	 under the Amending Act	 within which the Chancellor was bound to appoint another Vice Chancellor. This	 again	 is a clear proof of discrimination against the appellant. The respondents controverted the stand taken on behalf of the appellant. Apart from supporting the competency of the Legislature to enact the measure	 in question	 they urge that article 14 of the Constitution has no application at all. According to the respondents	 inasmuch as the term of office of the Vice Chancellor had been reduced to three years	 as per Act 11 of 1966	 it was thought fit by the Legislature to provide for the termination of the office of the Vice Chancellor	 who was holding that post	 at the commencement of Act XI of 1966	 as also for the appointment of a new Vice Chancellor. It was	 under those circumstances	 that section 13A was incorporated in the Act of 1959	 by section 5 of Act	 XI of 1966. They also referred to similar provisions	 which were incorporated in the two enactments relating to the two other Universities in the State	 viz.	 the Andhra University and Sri Venkateswara University. The respondents further pleaded that Act 11 of 1966 placed the Vice Chancellor	 who was already appointed and who was functioning prior to that Act	 in the first category	 as a class apart	 from the Vice Chancellors who were to be subsequently appointed and who were to function	 after the passing of the said Amending Act	 in the second category	 both in the matter of the mode of appointment	 as well as the term of appointment. The Vice Chancellor 220 viz.	 the appellant	 who was in office	 on the date of the passing of Act XI of 1966	 according to the respondents	 therefore fell into a class all by himself and	 as such	 came under a third category; and the legislature thought fit to take into account the special features relating to him and	 therefore	 made separate provisions regarding the termination of his office. Therefore	 a suitable provision was made	 by enacting section 13A	 in respect of the existing Vice Chancellor	 who was treated as a class	 by himself. The respondents also claimed that the Legislature was entitled to treat the Vice Chancellor	 who was then in office	 as a class by himself and make suitable provisions with regard to the termination of his office	 and therefore a legislation made for that purpose	 and on that basis	 was constitutionally valid. The charge of hostility towards the appellant	 or any attempt to effect discrimination	 was stoutly denied by the respondents. The respondents	 there fore	 urged that the classification of the appellant	 as a separate class	 was proper and such a classification had a reasonable nexus	 with the object of the amending legislation. The respondents further pleaded that the curtailment of the term of office of an existing Vice Chancellor	 by a statute	 enacted by a competent Legislature	 does not amount to 'removal ' of the Vice Chancellor for sufficient and proved cause. The respondents also ` urged that academic bodies or authorities like the Senate	 Syndicate and the Academic Council are not similarly situated like the Vice Chancellor	 either in the matter of appointment or constitution	 or in exercising functions under the statute; and therefore	 the appellant	 according to them	 was not 'entitled to place any reliance. on section 33A	 introduced by section 7 of Act XI of 1966. For all these reasons	 they urged that article 14 of the Constitution was not violated by the Legislature in enacting section 13A. Before we refer to the findings recorded by the learned Judges of 'the High Court	 this will be a convenient stage to refer to the material provisions of the statutes	 concerned. We have already mentioned that the appellant was functioning as the Vice Chancellor of the Osmania University	 even from 1957	 i.e.	 even before the Osmania University Act	 1959	 was passed. We have also indicated that the administration of the University was then governed by a Charter promulgated in 1947. The Osmania University Act	 1959 (Act IX of 1959)	 (hereinafter called the Act)	 was passed in 1959 and published in the State Gazette on February 2	 1959. Section 3 of the Act provided that the University	 established by the Revised Charter promulgated by H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad	 on December 8	 1947	 and functioning at Hyderabad immediately before the commencement of the Act	 be reconstituted and declared to be a University by the name of 'Osmania University '. The said section also provided that the University would be a 221 residential	 teaching and affiliating University consisting of a Chancellor	 a Pro Chancellor	 a Vice Chancellor	 a Senate	 a Syndicate and an Academic Council. Section 12(1) provided for the appointment of the Vice Chancellor	 by the Chancellor	 from a panel of not less than three persons selected by a committee	 as constituted under sub section (2) thereof But	 if the Chancellor did not approve any of the persons so selected	 he could call for a fresh panel from the committee. Sub section (2) provided for the constitution of the committee. Section 13 provided for the term of office salary	 allowances etc. 	 of the Vice Chancellor. Under sub section (1)	 the Vice Chancellor was to hold office for a term of 5 years and he was eligible for reappointment. There was a proviso to the effect that the ViceChancellor shall continue to hold office after the expiry of his term of appointment	 for a period not exceeding six months	 or until Ms successor is appointed and enters upon his office	 whichever is earlier. Sub section (6) provided for the filling up of the vacancy	 in the post of the Vice Chancellor	 when it fell permanently vacant; and a Vice Chancellor so appointed as per sub sections (1) and (2) of section 12	 was to hold office for a full term of 5 years. Section 51 (I) repealed the Osmania University Revised Charter	 1947; but sub section (2) provided that notwithstanding such repeal	 the person holding office immediately before the commencement of the Act	 as Vice Chancellor	 shall	 on such commencement	 be the Vice Chancellor of the University	 and he was entitled to hold office until a Vice Chancellor is appointed in accordance with the Act. It will be noticed	 by the above reference to the material provisions of the Act	 that there was no provision for removal of a ViceChancellor; and that the appointment of a Vice Chancellor was to be by the Chancellor	 as provided for in section 12. The term of office of the Vice Chancellor was 5 years and he was eligible for reappointment. The appellant	 who was already a Vice Chancellor	 functioning under the Charter of 1947	 was entitled to continue	 and did continue	 as the Vice Chancellor	 by virtue of section 51 of the Act. He was also	 as already mentioned	 originally appointed as ViceChancellor for a period of 5 years under the Act	 in 1959. The Act was amended in certain particulars by the Osmania University (Amendment) Act	 1966 (Act II of 1966) (hereinafter called the First Amendment Act). The First Amendment Act received the assent of the Governor on January 29	 1966. Section 6 of the First Amendment Act	 introduced section 7A	 which we set out 222 "7A. Instructions by the Government. The Government may	 after consultation with the University	 give to the University	 instructions relating to matters of major educational policy such as pattern of University education	 medium of instruction and establishment of post graduate centres	 to be followed by it. (2) In the exercise of its powers and performance of its functions under this Act	 the University shall comply with the instructions issued under sub section (1). " Similarly	 section 9 incorporated new sub sections (1) and (2) in section 12 of the Act	 as follows 12. (1) The Vice Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor. (2) The Vice Chancellor shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity and after due inquiry by such person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court as may be appointed by the Chancellor	 in which the Vice Chancellor shall have an opportunity of making his representation against such removal. " Section 10	 while effecting certain other amendments to section 13. the Act	 incorporated a new sub section (1)	 as follows : "13. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub section (2) of section 12	 the Vice Chancellor shall hold office for a term of three years from the date of his appointment and shall be eligible for re appointment to that office for another term of three years only; Provided that the Vice Chancellor shall continue to hold office after the expiry of his term of appointment for a period not exceeding six months or until his successor is appointed and enters upon his office	 whichever is earlier. " It was this Amendment Act	 when it was in the Bill stage	 that appears to have been severely criticised by various authorities on the ground that the autonomy of the University was sought to be interfered with by the Government. In that connection	 the appellant also appears to have made several statements criticising the provisions sought to be incorporated in the Act. It is also on record that counter statements were made on behalf of the Government meeting these criticisms regarding the proposed amendments. They have been dealt with by the High Court rather elaborately; but	 we do not propose to go into those matters	 for the purpose of this appeal. 223 By virtue of the amendments effected and referred to above	 it will be seen that the term of office of the Vice Chancellor has been reduced from 5 years to 3 years. The manner of appointment of the Vice Chancellor has also been changed and a provision is contained for removal of the Vice Chancellor from his office	 but that can be done only in accordance with the provisions contained in section 12(2) of the Act. Section 7A gives power to the Government to give instructions to the University relating to matters of major educational policy; and it is made obligatory on the University to comply with such instructions issued by the Government. As we have already stated	 the appellant was again appointed as Vice Chancellor for a period of 5 years on April 30	 1964; and he was continuing in office when the First Amendment Act was passed. One of the claims that is made by the appellant	 in these proceedings	 is that he is entitled to the protection conferred by section 12(2) of the Act referred to above. There does not appear to be any controversy that any appointment of a Vice Chancellor was made	 after the passing of the First Amendment Act . The Act was further amended by the Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act	 1966 (Act XI of 1966) (to be referred to as the Second Amendment Act). It received the assent of the Governor on May 16	 1966. Section 2 of the Second Amendment Act	 omitted section 7A of the Act. Section 5 of the Second Amendment Act	 which introduced new section 13A in the Act	 and which provision is the subject of attack in these proceedings	 is as follows : "13A. Special provision as to the appointment of a new Vice Chancellor. Notwithstanding anything in this Act	 the person holding the office of the Vice Chancellor immediately before the commencement of the Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act	 1966	 shall continue to hold that office only until a new Vice Chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor under sub section (1) of section 12 and enters upon his office; and such appointment shall be made within ninety days after such commencement. On the appointment of such new Vice Chancellor	 and on his entering upon his office	 the person holding the office of the Vice Chancellor immediately before such appointment shall cease to hold that office." Again	 section 6 of the Second Amendment Act.	 incorporated section 33A in the Act	 which is as follows : "33A. Special provision as to the reconstitution of the Senate	 Syndicate	 .Academic Council and Finance Com mittee. Notwithstanding anything in this Act	 the members of the Senate	 the Syndicate	 the Academic Council and the Finance Committee constituted and functioning 224 before the commencement of the Osmania University (Amendment) Act	 1966	 shall continue to be such members and function only until a new Senate	 Syndicate	 Academic Council or Finance Committee	 as the case may be	 is reconstituted under this Act. On the reconstitution of such new Senate	 Syndicate	 Academic Council or Finance Committee	 the members of the Senate other than the life members thereof	 the members of the Syndicate	 Academic Council or Finance Committee	 as the case may be	 holding office immediately before such reconstitution	 shall cease to hold that office. " Even according to the respondents	 section 13A was incorporated for the purpose of terminating the services of the appellant as Vice Chancellor	 so as to enable the Chancellor to make a fresh appointment of a Vice Chancellor. We have referred to section 33A of the Act	 because the appellant 's case was also to the effect that with regard to the Senate	 Syndicate	 Academic Council etc. 	 there is no provision similar to section 13A of the Act	 though they are also similarly situated like him. The findings of the learned Judges of the. High Court may now be briefly summarised : 1. The Andhra Pradesh Legislature was competent to enact section 5 of the Second Amendment Act. The said section does not contravene article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The appellant was holding the office of the ViceChancellor when the Act came into force and continued under section 51(2) thereof as Vice Chancellor until the Chancellor passed an order	 in 1959 appointing him once again under the Act. Section 13(1)	 as introduced by the First Amendment Act	 is not retrospective and the right of the appellant to continue as Vice Chancellor for the full term of 5 years stood unaffected and the new section 13(1) does not apply to him. The new section 12(2)	 as introduced by the First Amendment Act	 is not applicable to the appellant. Sections 12(2) and 13A of the Act	 do not cover the same field. Section 12(2) provides for removal by way of punishment and its operation is on a different field from that of section 13A where the cessation of office is due to a curtailment of the term. Section 12(2) applies only to the future Vice Chancellors and section 13A is solely applicable to the existing Vice Chancellor	 the appellant. 225 .lm0 Regarding the attack on section 13A	 on the basis of article 14 of the Constitution that there is an unreasonable discrimination	 the learned Judges were of the view that the said section did not suffer from any such infirmity. The learned Judges held that the impugned legislation had resulted in classifying Vice Chancellors under two categories	 (a) the appellant	 as the existing Vice Chancellor	 falling under the first category; and (b) future Vice Chancellor	 to be appointed under the Act	 who falls under the second category. According to the High Court	 the object sought to be achieved by such classification	 as could be seen from the objects and reasons of the Second Amendment Act	 1966	 was to give effect to the reduced term of 3 years fixed under section 13(1) of the Act after the First Amendment. The Hi gh Court further held that the classification adopted by section 13A	 of putting the appellant	 as the existing ViceChancellor	 in a class by himself	 is founded on an intelligible differentia	 which distinguishes the appellant from future ViceChancellors	 and that this differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Second Amendment Act. In this connection	 the learned Judges also advert to the similar provisions enacted	 at about the same time	 in the Andhra University Act	 1925	 and the Sri Venkateswara University Act	 1954. The High Court is also of the view that the Legislature must have taken into account the fact that the appellant has already put in more than 6 years of service as Vice Chancellor	 for treating him as a class by himself	 as distinct from future Vice Chancellors	 who are to be appointed and	 as such	 have not put in any service at all. The learned Judges have	 no doubt	 adverted to the fact that the appellant has got an eventful record of efficient service	 full of recognition and appreciation	 but the appellant cannot plead those circumstances when a competent legislature has passed a valid legislative measure	 under which he has to lose his office. Ultimately	 on these findings	 the High Court came to the conclusion that section 5 of the Second Amendment Act	 introducing section 13A in the Act	 is not vitiated by any infirmity	 as alleged by the appellant	 and	 finally	 dismissed the appellant 's writ petition. The appellant has again raised	 no doubt	 most of the contentions that were taken before the High Court. But the main ground of attack that has been pressed before us	 by learned counsel for the appellant	 is the one based upon article 14 of the Constitution. The findings recorded	 and the views expressed	 by the High Court are sought to be sustained by the learned Additional Solicitor General	 appearing for the respondents. But	 we do not think it necessary to go into the larger controversy that has been raised by the appellant	 before the High Court	 in the view that we take	 that the appellant must succeed in respect of the attack levelled against the impugned 226 provision	 based upon article 14 of the Constitution. As to whether the criticism	 made by the appellant	 about the proposals to amend the Act	 was or was not responsible for the passing of the legislation in question	 does not assume much of an importance; because	 the simple question is whether the provision	 section 13A	 as it now stands n the Act	 is violative	 in any manner	 of article 14 of the Constitution. If the answer is 'yes '	 it is needless to state that the provision will have to be struck down. Therefore	 we are confining our attention only to the provisions of the Act and we will refer to any other circumstance that is brought to our notice only for the limited purpose of considering the grounds of attack based upon article 14 of the Constitution. According to Mr. Setalvad	 the appellant is entitled to take advantage of the provisions of section 12(2) of the Act. On the date of the passing of the First Amendment Act	 the appellant was	 admittedly	 a Vice Chancellor and he had been continuing as such. He cannot be removed from his office	 except in accordance with the provisions of section 12(2) of the Act. But	 in view of section 13A of the Act	 introduced by the Second Amendment Act	 the appellant is forced out of his office	 within 90 days of the passing of the Second Amend ment Act. The creation of two classes of Vice Chancellors	 viz.	 Of Vice Chancellors appointed under the Act and the Vice Chancellor who was in office at the commencement of the Second Amendment Act	 is not on any rational basis. Person is appointed as ViceChancellors	 constitute a group	 and the impugned provision makes a differentiation between the person who is a Vice Chancellor then and other persons who are to be appointed Vice Chancellors thereafter	 for which differentiation	 there is absolutely no basis. Further	 even if it can be stated that there is any basis for the said classification	 nevertheless there should be a nexus or connection between the basis of the classification and the object of the legislation	 which again	 is lacking in this case. Mr. Setalvad further urged that while the services of a ViceChancellor	 appointed under the Act	 could be terminated only in accordance with the provisions contained in section 12(2) of the Act	 the appellant 's services could be terminated under section 13A	 without adopting the procedure laid down in section 12(2) of the Act. There was also no provision in the Act	 Mr. Setalvad pointed out	 making section 13(2) applicable to Vice Chancellors to be appointed in future. Though the term of office for a Vice Chancellor has been fixed under the Act	 even after the amendments	 as three years	 and that may apply to all the Vice Chancellors	 so far as the appellant is concerned	 his term has been reduced or restricted to 90 days under section 13A of the Act. Mr. Setalvad again urges that even assuming that it is open to the Legislature	 in an appropriate case	 to make provisions applicable 227 to only one individual or a group of individuals	 nevertheless	 it is well established	 by this Court	 that the classification that is effected 	by the statute must be a classification founded on an intelligible differentia and that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. Applying these two tests	 learned counsel urges	 that the impugned legislation must be. considered to be violative of article 14 of the Constitution. The learned Additional Solicitor General has urged that the	 term of office of the Vice Chancellor has been reduced to three; years by the First Amendment Act. The Legislature	 in order to give effect to this provision and to enable fresh appointments to be made under the Act	 has enacted section 13A. That section has	 necessarily	 to apply only to persons like the appellant who are holding. office at the time when these provisions came into force. Such a provision	 in the nature of things	 cannot apply to Vice Chancellors who are to be appointed in future under the Act. Therefore it is wrong to state that all Vice Chancellors	. irrespective of the manner ' or mode under which they are appointed	 in present or in future	 fall under the same category. Further	 the appellant has been a Vice Chancellor for nearly 7 years. The legislature	 the learned Solicitor points out	 having regard to these circumstances	 has chosen to treat the appellant	 the Vice Chancellor holding office on the date of the Second Amendment Act	 as a class by himself and has differentiated him from persons to be appointed ViceChancellor for the first time. Such a classification	 is reasonable and it has got a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Second Amendment Act	 viz.	 bringing about uniformity in the tenure of three years of office for all Vice Chancellors. The learned Solicitor points out further that the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of section 12(2) of the Act. The Legislature was competent to enact the Measure in question and the object of the Legislature was to give effect to the amendment provisions as early as. possible. He pointed out that similar provisions were also made in two other enactments at about the same time	 viz.	 in the Andhra University Act	 1925	 and the Sri Venkateswara University Act	 1954. It may be that the Legislature could have adopted another method for replacing the present Vice Chancellor	 but that is a matter of policy	 which cannot be reviewed by the Courts	 so long as the Legislature had the competence to enact the measure and the provisions	 so enacted	 do not suffer from any other legal infirmities. We have given due consideration to the various contentions placed before us by Mr. Setalvad	 learned counsel	for the appellant	 and the learned Additional Solicitor General	 on behalf of the respondents; but we are not inclined to agree with the contentions of the learned Additional Solicitor General. 228 The principles to be borne in mind	 when a question arise under article 14 of the Constitution	 have been laid down in several 	decisions	 by this Court	on a number of occasions. In Budhan Choudhry vs The State of Bihar(1)	 Das J.	 speaking for the Court said : "It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class 'legislation	 it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order	 however	 to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled	 namely	 (i) that the	 classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. " Therefore	 it will be seen that in order to accept a classification as permissible and not hit by article 14	 the measure in question will have to pass the two tests laid down in the above decision. The observations	 extracted above	 have been quoted by Das C. J.	 in .Ram Krishna Dalmia vs Shri Justice section R. Tendolkar(2). It is no doubt true	 as pointed out by the learned Additional SolicitorGeneral	 that a statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing	 or against several individual persons or things. But	 before such a provision can be accepted as valid	 the Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis of classification which appears on the face of the statute itself	 or is deducible from the surrounding circumstances or matters of common knowledge. If no such reasonable basis of classification appears on the face of the statute	 or is deducible from the surrounding circumstances	 the law will have to be struck down as an instance of naked discrimination. It should also be borne in mind that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon the party who attacks the same as unconstitutional	 to 	Show that there is a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; but	 as observed by Das C.J.	 in Ram Krishna Dalmia 's case(2)	 at p. 297	 "while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed	 if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based	 the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried (1) ; 	1049. (2) ; 	 296. 229 to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. " Having due regard to the principles referred to above	 we now proceed to consider as to whether the appellant has been able to establish that section 5 of the Second Amendment Act	 introducing s.13A in the Act	 is discriminatory and	 as such	 violative of article 14 of the Constitution. We have already stated that the appellant was appointed	 under the Act	 for a further term of 5 years	 as Vice Chancellor	 on April 30	 1964	 and he was continuing in office	 as such	 at the time when the two Amending Acts were passed; and	 normally	. he	 would be entitled to continue in that post for the full term	 which will expire only at the end of April 1969. The First Amendment Act provided	 in section 12 of the Act	 that the Vice Chancellor is to be appointed by the Chancellor; but section 12(2) specifically provided that the Vice Chancellor shall not be removed from his office excep t by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity and	 after due inquiry by such person who is	 or has been	 a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court	 as may be appointed by the Chancellor. It was also provided that the ViceChancellor was to have an opportunity of making his representation against such removal. Prima facie; the provisions contained in sub section (2) of section 12	 must also apply to the appellant	 who did continue in office even after the passing of the First Amendment Act. No doubt the term of office of the Vice Chancellor was fixed at 3 years under section 13(1) of the Act. But no provisions	 were made in the First Amendment Act regarding the termination of the tenure of office of the Vice Chancellor who was then holding that post. There can be no controversy that section 13A	 introduced by section 5 of the Second Amendment Act	 deals only with the appellant. In fact	 the stand taken on behalf of the respondents in the counteraffidavit filed before the High Court	 was to the effect that the Legislature had chosen to treat the Vice Chancellor holding office at the time of the commencement of the Second Amendment Act	 as a class by himself and with a view to enable the Chancellor to make fresh appointments	 section 13A of the Act was enacted. Therefore	 it is clear that section 13A applies only to the appellant. Though	 no doubt	 it has been stated	 on behalf of the respondents				 that similar provisions were incorporated	 at about the same time	 in two other Acts	 relating to two other Universities	 viz.	 the Andhra University and the Sri Venkateswara University	 and though this circumstance has also been taken into account by the learned Judges of the High Court	 in our opinion	 those provisions 230 have no bearing in considering the attack levelled by the appellant on section 13A of the Act. This is a clear case where the statute itself directs its provisions by enacting section 13A	 against one individual	 viz.	 the appellant; and before it can be sustained as valid	 this Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for grouping the appellant as a class by himself and that such reasonable basis must appear either in the statute itself or must be deducible from other surrounding circumstances According to learned counsel for the appellant	 all Vice Chancellors of the Osmania University come under one group and can be classified only as one unit and there is absolutely no justification for grouping the appellant under one class and the Vice Chancellors to be appointed in future under a separate class. In any event	 it is also urged that the said classification has no relation or nexus to the object of the enactment. Our attention has been drawn to the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Second Amendment Bill	 the material part of which is as follows "The term of office of the Vice Chancellor has been reduced to three years under section 13(1) of the Osmania University Act as amended by section 10 of the Osmania University (Amendment) Act	 1966. Section 13 A	 proposed to be inserted by clause 5 of the Bill	 enjoins that notwithstanding anything in the Act	 the person holding the office of the Vice Chancellor immediately before the commencement of the Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act	 1966 shall continue to hold that office only until a new Vice Chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor under section 12(1) as amended and enters upon his office	 and such appointment shall be made within ninety days after such commencement. " We are inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Setalvad	 that there is no justification for the impugned legislation resulting in a classification of the Vice Chancellors into two categories	 viz.	 the appellant as the then existing Vice Chancellor and the future Vice. Chancellors to be appointed under the Act. In our view	 the Vice Chancellor	 who is appointed under the Act	 or the Vice Chancellor who was holding that post on the date 	of the commencement of the Second Amendment Act	 form one single group or class. Even assuming that the classification of these two types of persons as coming under two different groups can be made nevertheless	 it is essential that such a classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes the appel 231 lant from the Vice Chancellor appointed under the Act. We are not able to find any such intelligible differentia on the basis of which the classification can be justified. It is also essential that the classification or differentia effected by the statute must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. We have gone through the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Second Amendment Bill	 which became law later	 as well as the entire Act itself	 as it now stands. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Second Amendment Bill	 extracted above	 it is seen that except stating a fact that the term of office of the Vice Chancellor has been reduced to 3 years under section 13(1) and that s.13A was intended to be enacted	 no other policy his indicated which will justify the differentiation. The term of office fixing the period of three years for the Vice Chancellor	 has been already effected by the First Amendment Act and	 therefore	 the differential principle adopted for terminating the services of the appellant by enacting section 13A of the Act	 cannot be considered to be justified. In other words	 the differentia adopted in section 13A and directed as against the appellant and the appellant alone not be considered to have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Second Amendment Act. While a Vice Chancellor appointed under section 12 of the Act can be removed from office only by adopting the procedure under section 12(2)	 the services of the appellant	 who was also a Vice. Chancellor and similarly situated	 is sought to be terminated by enacting section 13A of the Act. We do not see any policy underlying the Act justifying this differential treatment accorded to the appellant. The term of office of the Vice Chancellors has been no doubt reduced under the First Amendment Act and fixed for 3 years for all the Vice Chancellors. But	 so far as the appellant is concerned	 by virtue of section 13A of the Act	 he can continue to hold that office only until a new Vice Chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor	 and that appointment is to be made within 90 days. While all other Vice Chancellors	 appointed under the Act	 can continue to be in office for a period of three years	 the appellant is literally forced out of his office on the expiry of 90 days from the date of commencement of the Second Amendment Act. There is also no provision in the statute providing for the termination of the services of the ViceChancellors	 who are appointed under the Act	 in the manner provided under section 13A of the Act. By section 13A	 the appellant is even denied the benefits which may be available under the proviso to sub section (1) of section 13 of the Act	 which benefit is available to all other ViceChancellors. The appointment of the appellant in 1959 and	 again in 1964	 under section 12(1) of the Act	 as it stood prior to the two amendments	 by the Chancellor	 must have been	 no doubt	 from a panel of 232 names submitted by a committee constituted under section 12(2). The appointment of a Vice Chancellor after the passing of the First Amendment Act	 is to be made exclusively by the Chancellor under section 12(1)	 as the section now stands. That is a circumstance	 relied on by the respondent	 for differentiating the appellant as an existing Vice Chancellor from a Vice Chancellor to be appointed under the Act	 as amended. Another circumstance relied on is that the appellant has been a Vice Chancellor for 7 years. In our opinion	 these are not such vital or crucial factors which will justify treating the appellant as a class by himself	 because the powers and duties of a Vice Chancellor	 either under 'the Act	 prior to the amendment	 or under the Act	 after amendment	 continue to be the same. To conclude	 the classification of the appellant	 as a class by himself	 is not founded on any intelligible differentia	 which distinguishes him from other Vice Chancellors and it has no rational relation to the object of the statute	 and so section 13A is hit by article 14. The appellant has attacked section 13A	 as discriminatory	 relying upon a different provision	 made under section 33A	 in respect of the Senate	 Syndicate	 Academic Council and the Finance Committee. We have	 however	 not considered the question as to whether the appellant can be treated as falling under the same class	 as the other authorities mentioned in section 33A	 as we have accepted the appellant 's contention	 based upon article 14	 on other grounds. For the above reasons	 we accept the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant	 and hold that section 5 of the Second Amendment Act (Act XI of 1966)	 introducing section 13A in the Act	 is discriminatory and violative of article 14 of the Constitution and	 as such	 has to be struck down as unconstitutional. The result is that the appeal is allowed	 and the appellant will be entitled to his costs in the appeal	 payable by the respondents	 here and in the High Court. R.K.P.S. Appeal allowed. M19Sup. C.I./66 2	500 18 7 67 GIPF.

As a result of the Osmania University (Amendment) Act 11 of 1966	 section 12(1) of the Osmania University Act	 1959	. was amended to provide for the appointment of the Vice Chancellor by the Chancellor alone; in section 12(2) a provision was introduced whereby he could only be removed from office by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of mis behaviour or incapacity after enquiry by a person who was or had been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court and after the Vice Chancellor had been given an opportunity of making his representation against such removal Section 13(1) of the 1959 Act was also amended so as to reduce the term of office of the Vice Chancellor from 5 to 3 years. The 1959 Act was again amended later in 1966 by the Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act XI of 1966. Section 5 of this amending Act introduced a new section 13A into the 1959 Act whereby it was provided that the person then holding the office of Vice Chancellor could only hold that office until a new Vice Chancellor was appointed; and that such new appointment must be made within 90 days of the commencement of the Act whereupon the old Vice Chancellor would cease to hold office. The appellant filed a writ petition claiming	 inter alia	 that section 5 of the second amending Act introducing the new section 13A was discriminatory as against him and therefore violative of article 14. The High Court dismissed the petition. In the appeal to the Supreme Court	 it was contended on behalf of the respondents that as the term of office had been reduced to 3 years by the first amending Act	 the legislature. 	 in order to give effect to this provision and to enable fresh appointments to be made under the Act	 had enacted section 13A which had	 necessarily	 to apply to a person like the appellant who was in office at the time when the provisions came into force. Such provisions could not	 in the nature of things	 apply to Vice Chancellors who were to be appointed in future; the appellant was appointed from a panel submitted by a committee constituted under the unamended section 12(2) whereas future Vice Chancellors were to be appointed by the Chancellor alone; furthermore	 the appellant had been the Vice Cancellor for 7 years. Having regard to these circumstances the legislature had chosen to treat the appellant as a class by himself and had differentiated him from persons to be appointed Vice Chancellors in the 215 future; that such classification was reasonable and had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the second amending Act i.e. bringing about uniformity in the tenure of 3 years. of office fee all Vice Chancellor; that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of section 12(2) and the legislature was competent to enact section 13A so as to give effect to the amended provisions as early as possible. HELD: Section 5 of the second amending Act (XI of 1966) introducing s 13A into the 1959 Act was discriminatory and therefore violative of article 14. [232 E] There was no intelligible differentia on the basis of which a classification of Vice Chancellors into two categories i.e. the appellant as the then existing Vice Chancellor and the future Vice Chancellors to be appointed under the Act		 could be justified. The term of office of three years for the Vice Chancellor had already been fixed by the first amending Act Therefore the differential principal adopted for terminating the appellant 's service under section 13A in introduced by the second amending Act and directed as against the appellant alone could not be considered to have a rational relation to object sought to be achieved by the second amending Act. Budhan Choudhary vs The State of Bihar	[1955] 1 S.C.R.1045	 1049; Ram Krishna Dalmia vs Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar ; 	 296; referred to. [231 B D] While a Vice Chancellor appointed under section 12 could be removed from office only by adopting the procedure under section 12(2)	 the services of the appellant	 who was also a Vice Chancellor and similarly situated were sought to terminated by enacting section 13A of the Act. There was no policy underelying the Act justifying this differential treatment. There was also no justification for the distinction whereby the appellant would appointed under the Act would continue in office for three years [231E G]