Summarize the following court judgment. 1982 on the facts of the case	 in order to determine the computation of the ceiling area	 first exclude the built area which is 464 sq. metres and then exclude the deductions allowed under section 2(g) i.e.	 1000 sq. metres. Therefore	 the total deduction would be 1464 sq. metres which is within the ceiling limit of 2000 sq. metres but as actual area is 2530 sq. metres the excess would be 530 sq. metres which will be taken over by the State [914 C E] & CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2005/82	 995	 1021 27180	 2927 28/81	 2006 07	 2008 24	 2025	 2026 27	 2028	 2029	 2030 33	 2176	 2179	 2180 84	 2234	 2235	 2241	 2178	 3224 28 and 2832/82 and 6840	 6943	 6842	 6846	 6847 52	 6855 6860	 6861	 6863	 6870	 6871	 6873 80	 6882	 6889	 6890 92	 6881	 6845	 6872	 6883 6888	 6899 6915	 6918	 6919 22	 6923 6943	 6945 54	 6969 76	 7174 7200	 7342 7347	 7202 45	 7247 54	 7257 83	 7296	 7297 to 7311	 7313	 7314 7333	 7201	 7335 7340	 8211 8217	 8218 23	 8224	 8230	 8231	 8243	 8245 8256	 8261	 8260	 8262 8265	 8296 8329	 8337 59	 8375 76	 8377 8377C. 8378 8385 of 1983. Appeals by Special leave & by Certificate from the Judgments and orders dated the 30th October	 1978	 8th November	 1978	 12	 15	 16th January	 1979	 8th	 12th	 17th	 21st	 23rd February	 1979	 2nd	 5th	 12th	 26th	 30th March	 1979	 2nd	 4th	 17th	 23rd	 25th	 26th April	 1979	 2nd	 7th	 9th	 10th	 16th May	 1979	 4th	 5th	 6th	 10th	 13th	 16th	 23rd July	 1979	 11th	 14th	 18th	 26th September	 1979	 24th October	 1979	 5th	 8th and 21st November	 1979	 10th	 12th	 18th December	 1979 and 15th	 16th	 21st January	 1980	 14th	 17th	 18th	 20th	 21st	 26th	 27th and 28th March	 1980	 1st	 15th	 30th April	 1980	 5th May	 1980	 30th June	 1980	 4th	 5th	 14th	 19th	 20th and 28th August	 1980. 	 2nd	 5th	 15th September	 1980	 12th January	 1981	 10th 901 February	 1981	 9th	 11th	 13th March	 1981	 2nd	 8th	 11th	 18th	 21st May	 1981	 7th	 20th July	 1981	 7th August	 1981	 25th	 28th	 29th September	 1981	 12th	 15th	 16th	 19th	 21st	 23rd October	 1981	 2nd	 3rd 4th	 6th	 11th	 12th	 13th	 17th	 23rd	 24th. 27th November	 1981	 1st	 2nd	 23rd December	 1981	 11th	 18th	 26th February	 1982	 1st	 15th March	 1982	 5th April	 1982	 21st and 27th	 May	 1952 of The Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Nos. 3689/77	 7722/79	 6315	 6319	 6322	 6326	 6327	 6329	 5059	 5060	 of 1979	 7392/78	 6286/78	 8264	 8265	 8266	 8651	 8654	 8655	 8659	 8660	 8661	 8696	 8697	 8698	 8765	 8766	 8767	 8773	 8774	 8653	 8259	 8210	 8258	 6288	 6690	 8263	 7394 95	 6287	 4104	 6302	 7393	 7739	 7743	 7744. of 1978	 4902/79	 339/79	 1167/78	 1860/78	 4772 4776/79	 2976/76. 8647	 4106/78	 5217/77	 8257/78	 8268	 8652	 8656	 8658	 8699	 8769	 7399	 7400	 7401	 8261	 8270	 8274	 6283	 6693	 4248	 5828	 6695/78	 1387	 3262	 537	 1459/79	 5820	 4249	 1086	 5081	 3028	 4725 28/79	 6692	 6694	 5824/78	 3027	 3030	 3031. 3032	 3033	 3035/79	 1419/77	 5827/78	 4105/78	 5825/78	 5237	 6189	 6633	 6634/79	 7396/77	 6190	 7049	 5232	 5233	 5234 38	 4903/79	 8768/78	 1612	 2316	 2312	 2775	 2776 78/79	 8271 72178	 1385	 1390	 1392	 1446 51	 2513 15	 2520	 2521	 1388 89	 1391	 2530	 2869	 1467 75	 2529	 1123	 2779 81	 2868	 3263 3264	 3658	 3307	 345179	 10359	 10353 58	 10360/78	 2516 18	 2522 and 2532	 1451 1462. 1464 1466	 1455 60/7745/78	 344/79	 1184	 1586	 5823	 5833178	 694	 697 712	 841 842	 843	 and 893/79	 2060 67	 2068 2070	 8267	 442	 443	 446 52	 481	 538/79	 8829 32	 8862 8864	 8910	 8912/78	 340 42/79	 5192	 5225	 5822	 6282	 6284 85	 6303	 7731	 7742/78	 2953 56	 2519	 3654 55	 1548	 1705	 1708 09	 8833	 6314	 6318	 6321	 3402	 1706 07	 1710/79	 5831/78	 7993	 6339	 6331	 6333 36	 6338	 6340	 9432	 9431	 8345	 9430	 7989/79	 4247/78	 10558/79	 2883/80	 596	 2689	 2888	 1938	 2581	 2580	 5364/80	 10563	 5830/79	 3245/80	 7738/79	 447/80	 2755	 1712	 2895	 7173/80	 8510/79	 1939/801 7429	 7903	 3604	 6190	 7911	 3338	 1937	 3933/80	 8273/70	 5369/80	 7163/80	 356/81	 2803	 2804 06	 2125/81	 595/80	 2803/79	 2804	 3656/79	 10723/80	 9382	 8430	 8192	 9595	 8286	 8429	 9383/80	 6625/81	 6626	 6624	 5600/88	 7983/80	 11296/80	 8408/81	 5257/80	 10093/80	 1453/79	 1942/80	 1943	 1940	 2352	 7172	 5260/80	 9134/78	 4456/79	 9744/78	 4107/78	 2790	 517580/80	 646/819 6609/80	 5257/79	 650/81	 10406/80	 338	 8278	 5456/79	 8262/78	 6332/79	 3555	 250	 9629/81	 442/80	 648/81	 5258	 5253	 196/81	 3244/79	 5256	 6354	 2392/81	 8277/79	 8348/79	 6353	 7714	 7726	 6352	 6317/81	 8347	 3034/79	 1454/80	 10633/80	 8879/80	 14320/81	 1063/80	 6064/79	 3605/80	 14990/81	 75/82	 2853/82	 902 3933/80	 3758/82	 8681/81	 5258/80	 7598/80	 7234 35	 7237/80	 2978: 2974/80	 1956/82	 5256/80	 2831/82	 3430/82	 7594/80 and 2778 of 79 For The Appellants: Dr. L.M. Singhvi Prathvi Raj	 B.P. Maheshwari and B.P. Singh For The Respondents: S.N. Kacker	 R.K Jain Dr. Y.S. Chitale	 Dr. Meera Agarwal and R.C. Mishra in CAs. 994 & 1021 1027 of 1980. Pramod Swarup and Arun Madan in CA. 2026 2027 of 1982. A.K Srivastava in CA. 208 2024 of 1980. S.K. Bisaria	 Pradeep Misra and Sudhir Kulshreshtha in CA. 2176/82. R.N. Sharma and N.N. Sharma in CA. 7191/83 @ SLP. 2350/80. Probir Mitra in CA. 2178 of 1982. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI	 J. Wedded to the ideal of achieving a socialist pattern of State and building up an egalitarian society as mandated in the Preamble of the Constitution of India and incorporated in the directive principles contained in part IV	 which are indeed the heart and soul of the Constitution as held by this Court on several occasions	 the Central Government brought forth the present legislation called the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act	 1976 (Act No. 33 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act '). To avoid anomalies and controversies	 inequalities and inconsistencies	 the Central Government obtained the consent of the State Governments so as to pass a central law which would apply equally to all the States. The Act applies to the States and Union Territories and contains a schedule (Schedule I) in which the ceiling of urban 903 areas has been mentioned and which differs from area to area in ' various States and Union territories to which the Act applies. In the first phase at the hearing of the appeals	 the constitutional validity of the Act was challenged but the Constitution Bench upheld the validity of the Act in the case of Union of India	 etc. vs V.B. Chaudhry etc. etc.(1) It is therefore manifest that the challenge to the Act no longer survives. The Act was sought to be implemented by the States which empowered the competent authority to determine the ceiling area in accordance with the provisions of the Act and take over the excess land. In due fairness to the citizens	 the Act provides an appeal to a judicial authority (District Judge) to examine the correctness of the decision of the competent authority. In the instant case the matter has travelled right from the competent authority to the ' High Court and the case has been placed before us for judging the correctness of the grounds taken by the High Court in determining the excess area of lands which come within the ambit of the ceiling fixed by the Act. We propose to decide all the 200 and odd appeals and the special leave petitions by one common judgment as the question of law relating to the interpreta tion of the principles contained in the various sections of the Act to determine the ceiling area is more or less common to all the appeals. Before we proceed to detail the relevant provisions of the Act	 we would like to point out the aims and objects of the Act in the light of which the pivotal provisions have to interpreted. The aims and objects are contained in the Preamble of the Act	 the relevant portions of which may be extracted thus: "An Act to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations	 for the acquisitions	 for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit	 to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith	 with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering 904 therein and with a view to brining about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good. WHEREAS it is expedient to provide ' for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations	 for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit	 to regulate the construction of buildings 'on such land and for matters connected therewith	 with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good. " The opening words of the preamble	 viz.	 An Act to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations" clearly indicate that the pith and substance of the Act is that a ceiling should be imposed on vacant lands situated in urban areas which may or may not have building constructed thereon. Side by side the other dominant object to be achieved seems to be to prevent the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons so as to checkmate speculation and profiteering therein on the one hand and to bring about an equitable distribution of land amongst the urban population. The second clause of the preamble merely repeats and stresses what is contained in the opening part. Analysing	 therefore	 the real object which 'the Act seeks to achieve	 it seems to us that the provisions have to be construed against the background of two important considerations: (1) that the vacant land must be situated in an urban rather than a rural area	 and (2) that even in those portions of urban land which contain buildings	 substantial relief should be given to the owner for the beneficial enjoyment of the property left with him so that the Act may not be dubbed as being of a confiscatory nature. Moreover	 the Act governs only urban vacant lands or lands which contain building or dwelling units or outhouses and the areas 905 set apart in compliance with the respective byelaws have to be taken into account while computing the ceiling area applicable to the towns and territories concerned Before discusing the problem in L.J. Johnson 's case which has given rise to these appeals	 we would first like to give a birds eye view of the various provisions of the Act which are relevant to the decisions of these appeals. The relevant provisions in this case are sections 2(c)	 2(q)(ii)	 3 and 4(9). Section 2(c) states that the 'ceiling limit ' means the ceiling limit specified in section 4(1). This brings us to section 4(1) at once. The various clauses of section 4(1) (a) to (d) prescribe ceiling limits in urban agglomerations falling within different which may be extracted thus: "4(1) Subject to the other provisions of this section	 in the case of every person	 the ceiling limit shall be (a) where that vacant land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category A specified in Schedule I	 five hundred square metres; (b) where such land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category specified in Schedule I	 one thousand square metres; (c) where such land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category specified in Schedule I	 one thousand five hundred square metres; (d) where such land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category specified in Schedule I	 two thousand square metres. " In the instant case	 we are concerned with the land in the ' town of Dehradun situated in the State of Uttar Pradesh	 which was the subject matter of the writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. It is indisputable that the land in Johnson 's case (supra) falls under category where the ceiling limit is 2000 sq. metres. The only problem which is required to be resolved in these group of appeals by special leave by and large concerns the interpretation of section 4	 sub section (9) of the Act. All the appeals are from Uttar 906 Pradesh but the principles laid down by us would apply to all the States and Union Territories. In fact	 the substratum and the fate of the case depends on the outcome of the appeal arising out of State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. vs L.J. Johnson & Anr.(1) decided by the Allabhabad High Court and which has been taken as a sample case so that other appeals would merely follow the decision in Johnson 's case (c.A. No. 2005/82 in this Court). There are some other cases like A. No. 995/80 where the facts and principles may differ but we do not intend to decide or go into the intricacies of the other points involved therein and will leave the competent authority to determine the excess land in the context of other points and in the light of the law laid down by us. In these appeals	 we are mainly concerned with the interpretation of section 4 (9) and the allied construction of section 2(g) and 2(q) (iii) of the Act and their impact on section 4(9). It follows	 therefore	 that once the view taken in Johnson 's case in regard to this question is reversed all the matters will have to go back to the competent authority for a decision in the light of the view taken by this Court. This will be the ultimate outcome because in all the allied matters there is only a cryptic order disposing of the concerned matter in accordance with the view taken by the High Court in Johnsan 's case in regard to the interpretation of section 4 (9). The remaining questions raised by the land holders will have to be resolved and the actual computation of excess land	 if any	 would have to be undertaken by the competent authority on remand. Before going into the merits of Johnson 's case we may briefly narrate the admitted facts. It appears that the respondent (Johnson) had a parcel of land	 the total area of which was 2530 sq. metres on which there was a building. After the coming into force of the Act. he wanted to sell some portion of the open land in his possession to Maj. Gen. Prem Chandra	 a resident of Vasant Vihar	 New Delhi. The competent authority refused permission to sell on the ground that the total area in possession of Johnson being 2530 sq. metres	 it exceeded the ceiling limit and therefore no permission to sell could be given. Johnson thereafter filed an appeal before the District Judge assailing the decision of the competent authority as being based r on a wrong interpretation of the provisions of the Act. The District 907 Judge after considering the provisions of section 2 (g)	 2 (q) (ii) held that the owner was entitled to exclude 500 sq metres in view of the bye laws prevailing in Dehradun and another 500 sq. metres for the beneficial and convenient enjoyment of the building to satisfy the requirement of town planning and environmental purposes. This	 according to the District Judge	 flowed as a logical consequence of section 2 (g) of the Act. Ultimately	 the district judge held that after excluding the portions of areas indicated above	 there was no excess and the land was not covered by the Act and the refusal of permission by the competent authority was not legally valid. Against the decision of the District Judge	 the State filed a writ petition before the High Court contending that the interpretation placed by the District Judge was wrong and the competent authority was fully justified in computing the area. The High Court Strongly relied on the provisions of section 4 (9) read with section 2(q)(ii) and upheld the decision of the District Judge and accordingly dismissed the writ petition. After this decision	 a number of petitions were filed before the High Court which were decided by it in the light of the decision taken in Johnson 's case. Before proceeding to section 4 (9) of the Act	 we might mention as a prelude the nature	 character and the spirit of the Act. The Act applies only to urban areas and not to any other area. Secondly	 the statute fixes the ceiling limit in various urban areas of all the States where the Court has to determine the extent of the ceiling. It is clear that there can be only three categories of Urban lands (1) land which is entirely open in the sense that it does not contain any construction or building	 (2) where the entire land is covered by building or dwelling house	 and (3) land on a part of which there is a building with or without a dwelling unit thereon and the rest of the land is vacant	 So far as the first category is concerned	 no complexity is involved because any open area in excess of 2000 sq. metres in category States will be taken over by the Government. For instance	 if an open land without construction consists Of 6000 sq. meters	 the 908 computation of the ceiling area would present no difficulty because 4000 sq. metres will be taken over by the Government and 2000 sq. metres will be left to the landholder. Secondly	 if the entire land is covered by a building	 such an area would completely fall outside the ambit of the Act and no question of computation would arise. Thirdly	 a question arises as to what would happen if there is a land on a part of which there is a building with a dwelling unit and an area (open land) which is appurtenant thereto is vacant. This category of land would doubtless present some difficulty in making the computation and the principles on which such computation is to be made. Section 4 (9) is designedly and artistically drafted to meet such a contingency which may be extracted thus: "Where a person holds vacant land and also holds any other land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein	 the extent of such other land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto shall also be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land held by such person." (Emphasis supplied) In order to understand the import of section 4 (9) it may be necessary to extract clauses (i) and (ii) of section 2 (q) which run thus: "(q) 'Vacant land ' means land	 not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture	 in an urban agglomeration	 but does not include (i) land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated; (ii) in an area where there are building regulations the Gland occupied by any building which has been constructed before	 or is being constructed on	 the appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such building; and . " Clause (i) gives a blanket exemption to any land situated in an urban area where the entire area is covered by land on which it is not permissible to raise a building which will not be deemed to be 909 vacant land within the meaning of section 2 (q). This is because such land in an urban area cannot be used for building purposes but being vacant falls beyond the purview. Of the Act. Clause (ii) postulates that where a land is occupied by any building constructed before or on the appointed day ( 'appointed day ' has been defined in section 2 (a) of the Act) and there is some vacant land appurtenant to the said building	 land which is built upon and any area which is left out in accordance with the building regulations would not be included in the ceiling area. The term 'land appurtenant to such building ' would mean the contiguous land which remains after giving full allowance for the area left out under the municipal or building regulations subject to a maximum of 500 sq. metres and another 500 sq. metres which may be left for the beneficial use of the owner. The words 'land appurtenant ' used in section 4 (9) takes us to its connotation as defined in section (2) (g) (i) and (ii) which may be extracted thus: "(g) 'land appurtenant '	 in relation to any building	 means (i) in an area where there are building regulations	 the minimum extent of land required under such regulations to be kept as open space for the enjoyment of such building	 which in no case shall exceed five hundred square metres; or (ii) in an area where there are no building regulations an extent of five hundred square metres contiguous to the land occupied by such building	 and includes	 in the case of any building constructed before the appointed day with a dwelling unit therein	 an additional extent not exceeding five hundred square metres of land	 if any	 contiguous to the minimum extent referred to in sub clause (i) or the extent referred to in tub clause (ii?	 as the case may be;" It may	 however	 be necessary to explain the terms 'land appurtenant ' or 'other land ' as used in section 4 (9) and section 2(g) (ii) as a wrong interpretation of these terms by the High Court has made confusion worse confounded. To begin with	 the plain language in which sub section (9) of section 4 has been expressed clearly shows that when the legislature used the word 'appurtenant '	 it meant to qualify the 910 land which was occupied by the building. The words 'appurtenant thereto ' qualify the building which precedes the land. The expression 'appurtenant ' shows that the legislature intended that in taking into consideration the land	 it must be the land not contiguous or close to the building but the very land on which the building stands. Similarly	 the words 'other land occupied by the building ' also lead to the same conclusion	 viz.	 that the other land will not be land in some other plot but refers only to the very land a portion of which is occupied by the building. In Words and Phrases	 Legally Defined (Vol. I 2nd Edn.) at p. 105 it is clearly mentioned that 'land ' do not usually pass under the word 'appurtenances ' with reference to other land	 in its strict sense	 but they do pass if it appears that the word is used in a larger sense	 Land has been held to pass under this word where is a gift of a house with its appurtenances. There has been a distinction between a gift of a land with appurtenances and a gift with the land appertaining thereto. A chose in action does not ordinarily pass as appurtenant 'to other property '. The word 'appurtenance ' has been further defined thus: "Appurtenance	 in relation to a dwelling	 or to a school	 college or other educational establishment	 includes all land occupied therewith and used for the purposes thereof . The word 'appurtenances ' has a distinct and definite meaning	 and though it may be enlarged by the context. yet the burden of proof lies on those who so contend Prima facie	 it imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to the subject matter of the device or grant	 and which would. in truth	 pass without being specially mentioned." Similarly	 at page 220 in Words and Phrases	 Judicially Defined (vol. I) the word 'appurtenances ' has been defined thus: "The word 'appurtenances ' includes all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised such as rights of way	 of common	 or piscary	 and the like but it does not include lands in addition to that granted." (Emphasis supplied) Likewise	 in Words and Phrases	 Permanent Edition (Vol. 3A) at p. 546	 the word 'appurtenances ' has been explained thus 911 "The word 'appurtenances '	 which is ordinarily used in connection with real property	 while strictly confined to those incorporeal hereditaments that are commonly annexed to land and houses	 includes corporeal articles of personal property. 'Appurtenances ' as used in a deed of trust of certain real estate conveying all and singular the tenements	 hereditaments	 and 'appurtenances ' thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining	 means things belonging to another thing as principal	 and which pass as incident to the principal thing." (Emphasis supplied) In Stroud 's judicial Dictionary (Third edn.) at page 176	 the word 'appurtenances ' has been defined thus	 "By the grant of a messuage; or a messuage with the appurtenances	 doth pass no more than the dwelling house	 barn dove house	 and buildings adjoining	 orchard	 garden	 yard	 field	 or piece of void ground	 lying near and BELONGING to messuage	 and houses adjoining to the dwelling house	 and the close upon which the dwelling house is built	 at the most." Thus	 taking the legal and dictionary meaning of the word 'appurtenant ' or 'appurtenances ' the inescapable conclusion is that the words 'either other land or appurtenances ' are meant to indicate that the land in question should form an integral part of the main land containing the building in question. The Allahabad High Court	 therefore	 clearly misdirected itself in putting a wrong and loose interpretation on the words 'appurtenant or other land '. It is well settled that the language of a beneficial statute must be construed so as to suppress the mischief and advance its object. Bearing this in mind	 we can see no other interpretation of the words 'appurtenant or other land ' than the one we have indicated above which is that the land appurtenant means not a land contiguous to some other land but the very land which is a part of the same plot or area which contains the building or dwelling house. This also seems to be the avowed object of section 4 (9) of the Act. In the ultimate analysis the position is quite clear that s 4 (9) contemplates that if a person holds vacant land as also other portion of land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit	 the extent of 912 Land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto shall betaken into account in calculating the extent of the vacant land. This sub section has to be read in conjunction with section 2 (q) (ii) and (iii). A combined reading of these two statutory provisions would lead to the irresistible inference that in cases which fall within the third category mentioned above	 the (1) total area of the land of a landholder is first to be determined and if the total area	 built or unbuilt	 falls below 2000 sq. metres in category areas	 there would be no question of any excess land	 (2) where	 however	 there is a building and a dwelling unit then the area beneath the building and the dwelling unit would have to be excluded while computing the ceiling. Further	 if there are any byelaws requiring a portion of the land to be kept vacant	 the landholder would be allowed to set apart the said land to the maximum extent of 500 sq metres. He would also be allowed to retain an additional area of 500 sq. metres for the beneficial use af the building so that he may enjoy the use of a little compound also for various purposes. After excluding these items if the land falls below the ceiling limit there would be no question of excess but if there is excess that is beyond the ceiling limit	 the same would have to be taken over by the Government. For instance	 A has 4000 sq. metres of land out of which 2000 sq. metres is covered by building then in such a case the landholder will be entitled to keep the whole of the covered area	 i.e.	 2000 sq. metres plus 1000 sq. metres (500 under the municipal byelaws and another 500 for beneficial use) and the excess would only 1000 sq. metres. The scheme of the Act seems to be that if there is a constructed building with a dwelling unit	 the structure thereon cannot be treated as open land for the purpose of declaring it as an excess land beyond the ceiling limit. Similarly	 the Land kept open under the municipal regulations (upto 500 sq. metres) and an additional 500 sq. metres appurtenant to the land would not be available for being declared as excess land beyond the ceiling limit. The central idea governing this philosophy of putting a ceiling on urban land is that in an urban area none can hold land excess of the ceiling regardless of whether the land is entirely open or whether 913 there is a structure consisting of a dwelling unit thereon	 subject to the rider mentioned above. Indeed	 if the intention would have been to take over the entire open land without giving any benefit of appurtenant land to the landholder than the Act would perhaps be liable to be challenged on the ground of being of a confiscatory nature and would fall beyond the permissible limits of the directive principles enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution. Furthermore	 such an interpretation would discourage new building enterprises or factories or industrial units coming up in the urban areas which would be contrary to the very tenor and spirit of the Act. Coming now to Johnson 's case	 while the High Court of Allahabad was right in interpreting these provisions in so far as it held that the built area plus upto 500 sq. metres allowed under the municipal byelaws and another 500 sq. metres as additional area for beneficial enjoyment had to be excluded but it seems to have committed a grave error of law in applying this principle to concrete cases which had come up before it. Further	 the High Court was absolutely wrong in importing the concept of contiguity on the assumption that section 4(9) was attracted only if the person concerned held a distinct parcel of land which was vacant land. As discussed above	 these words do not envisage that there should be land other than the one which contains a building which is to be taken into consideration while computing the excess land but the section really refers to the very land which is a part of the plot which contains the building. The argument that once a plot contains a building	 the whole of the plot would be exempt from the ceiling area cannot be countenanced on a plain and simple interpretation of section 5(q)(ii) read with section 4(9). In fact section 4(9) itself puts the matter beyond controversy by qualifying the words 'other land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto '. The expression 'thereto ' manifestly shows that the intention of legislature was to the land on which building or the dwelling unit stands. In other words	 the vacant land which contains a building would include appurtenant land or any other land situated in that particular plot. We have gone through the judgments of the High Court	 the District Judge and that of the competent authority and we are not satisfied that all the details which are required for the purpose of determining the ceiling have been mentioned in any of the judgments. So far as Johanson 's case is concerned	 all that is mentioned is that the total area of urban land was 2530 sq. metres	 including the built 914 area. So far as the built area is concerned	 it is mentioned as 464 sq. metres but the details of the calculations have not been given which would have to be redetermined by the competent authority. Even on the facts mentioned in the judgments of the High Court and the courts below the position appears to be as follows . Total area of the land owned by the landholder	 is 2530 sq. metres. Prima facie 530 sq. metres is above the ceiling limit. In order however to calculate as to whether or not Johson had exceeded the permissible limit	 we have to compute in the following manner: First exclude the built area which is 464 sq. metres (it is not clear whether 464 includes the area of servant quarters also which are also mentioned to be existing there). Then exclude the deductions allowed under section 2(g). i.e	 1000 sq. metres. Therefore	 the total deduction would be 1464 sq. metres which is within the ceiling limit of 2000 sq. metres but as the actual area is 2530 sq. metres the excess would be 530 sq. metres which will be taken over by the State. The High Court seems to have made a wrong calculation by not relying on section 4(9) and in wrongly importing the concept of 'other land ' being a distinct plot. This however is not permissible. The landholder cannot have it both ways. He cannot take the benefit of the exclusion and then add that benefit to the total ceiling area in order to compute the excess. For these reasons	 therefore	 we p do not agree with the view taken by the High Court or the District Judge regarding the computation of the ceiling area. To sum up	 the effect of the view taken in Johnson 's case virtually comes to this. Section 4(9) would be attracted regardless of whether the landholder owned a distinct part of land on which there is no construction alongwith any other parcel of land where there is some construction alongwith any other parcel of land where there is some construction. In other words	 whether or not there is a surplus will not depend on whether the landholder holds a separate plot of land which is open land. To take the other view is to hold that if there is no separate plot but the construction is in the same plot then even if the entire plot comprises 10	000 sq. metres that would fall beyond the purview of section 4(9) if the 915 structure is built only on 1000 sq. metres of land. Such an interpretation of section 4(9) cannot be accepted by us as it goes against the very spirit and intent of the Act and allows the landholder to escape the ceiling area by merely putting a construction on a plot of land owned by him. On the other hand	 the Madhya Pradesh High Court in M/s. gr Eastern oxygen and Acetylene Ltd. vs State of Madhya Pradesh(1) seems to have taken a correct view in holding that nothing turns upon whether or not the landholder holds open land and a separate parcel of land with a dwelling unit thereon. The High Court in paragraph 5 rightly pointed out that it will necessitate reading the words "not contiguous to the vacant land" after the words "any other land" in sub section (9) of section 4 and such qualifying words cannot be read into the provision by implication. If this be the interpretation then it would mean that if there is a boundary wall which separates the construction from the open land	 the land would be within the purview of the ceiling and if there is no such wall it would fall outside the purview. Such an interpretation	 would lead to a most absurd and anomalous situation. The Madhya Pradesh High Court was	 therefore	 fully justified in expressing its dissent from judgment of the Allahabad High Court. We fully endorse the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Where	 however	 it is found that any person holds vacant land in two or more categories of urban agglomerations specified in Schedule I	 the computation and determination of ceiling area is to be done in accordance with the formula laid down in cl. (a) to (d) of section 4 (1) of the Act. In fine	 therefore	 the position in the instant case	 as already pointed out by us	 is that even taking into account the concessions and exemptions granted to Johnson	 the landholder	 the land in his possession exceeds the ceiling of 2000 sq. metres by 530 sq. metres which will have to be declared as surplus. Before concluding we might dwell on one more aspect of the matter which flows as a logical corollary of our interpretation of the various provisions of the Act; Where a person has several plots	 some completely vacant and some partly built and partly vacant	 a question may arise as to how 916 the computation of the ceiling area is to be made in such cases. This presents no difficulty in view of what we have fully discussed in our judgment because it is manifest that the legislature intended to leave with the landholder only the area of 2000 sq. metres in category area or the various ceiling areas mentioned in different categories of section 4 (1) of the Act. It is manifest that in such cases the competent authority will have to total the entire area of the lands in various ' places	 completely vacant or partly built and partly vacant and permit the landholder to retain 2000 sq. metres or less as provided in clauses (a) to (d) of section 4 (1) and give the landholder the option (as provided under section 6) to select the area which he desires to retain provided that does not exceed the ceiling limit. By way of postscript we might dwell on certain consequences of the legislation flowing from the interpretation which we have put on the various provisions of the Act. The Act being a social piece of legislation should have been implemented long ago but as its constitutional validity was challenged	 which was decided by this Court only in 1979 as indicated above	 the operation of the Act remained stayed. The second phase however began when the correctness of the manner in which computation was to be made as held by the Allahabad High Court was challenged by the State which also we have now decided in this judgment. We hope and trust that all the States will now go ahead with implementing the Act and take over the excess land in order to distribute them according to the tenor	 spirit and provisions of the Act. Any further delay is likely to defeat the very object for which the Act was passed. For the reasons given above	 we allow all these petitions and appeals	 set aside the judgments of the High Court and send back the cases to the competent authority to get fresh computations done in all the cases and then determine the ceiling area in the light of the principles enunciated and the law laid down by us. Civil appeal No. 995 of 1980 is also remanded to the competent authority for redetermination of the ceiling area as indicated above. In the circumstances of the case	 there will be no order as to costs. H.S.K. Appeals and petitions dismissed.

The first respondent in civil appeal No. 2005 of 1982 had a parcel of land measuring 2530 sq. metres with a building constructed on a small portion of it	 in an urban agglomeration falling within category specified in Schedule I of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act	 1976. As the aforesaid first respondent wanted to sell some portion of the open land	 he sought permission from the competent authority for that purpose. The competent authority refused to give permission on the ground that the total area of land in his possession exceeded the cieling limit of 2000 sq. metres prescribed by the Act for that area. In appeal the District Judge held that the first respondent was entitled to exclude 500 sq. metres in view of the bye laws prevailing in that area and another 500 sq. metres for the beneficial and convenient enjoyment of the building to satisfy the requirement of the town planning and environmental purposes and since after excluding these portions of the areas there was no excess and the land was not covered by the Act	 the refusal of permission by the competent authority was not legally valid. In a writ petition filed by the State the High Court strongly relied on the provisions of section 4(9) read with section 2. 2(q)(ii) of the Act and upheld the decision of the District Judge. The State challenged the High Court 's interpretation of the principles laid down in the Act for computing the ceiling area. The facts of other appeals and petitions were similar. Allowing the appeals and petitions; disapproving the view taken by the District Judge and the High Court; laying down the method of computing the ceiling area and sending back the cases to competent authority to get fresh computations done. ^ HELD: It is clear that there can be only three categories of Urban lands (1) land which is entirely open in the sense that it does not contain any construction of building	 898 (2) where the entire land is covered by building or dwelling house	 and (3) land on a part of which there is a building with or without a dwelling unit thereon ant the rest of the land is vacant. [907 F H] So far as the first category is concerned	 no complexity is because any open area in excess of 2000 sq. metres in category States will be taken over by the Government. For instance	 if an open land without construction consists of 6000 sq. metres	 the computation of the ceiling area would present no difficulty because 4000 sq. metres will be taken over by the Government and 2000 sq. metres will be left to the landholder. Secondly	 if the entire land is covered by a building	 such an area would completely fall outside tho ambit of the Act and no question of computation would arise. Thirdly	 a question arises as to what would happen if there is a land on a part of which there is a building with a dwelling unit and an area (open land) which is appurtenant thereto is vacant. Section 4(9) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act	 1976 provides for meeting such a contingency. [907 H	 908 A C] Section 4(9) contemplates that if a person holds vacant land as also other portion of land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit	 the extent of land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto shall be taken into account in calculating the extent of the vacant land. This sub section has to be read in conjunction with section 2 (q) (ii) and (iii)	 which defines 'vacant land '. [908 D G] The plain language in which sub section (9) of section 4 had been expressed clearly shows that when the legislature used the word 'appurtenant '	 it meant to qualify the land which was occupied by the building. The words 'appurtenant thereto ' qualify the building which precedes the land. The expression appurtenant ' shows that the legislature intended that in taking into consideration the land	 it must be the land not contiguous or close to the building but the very land on which the building stands. Similarly	 the words 'other land occupied by the building ' also lead to the same conclusion. [909 H	 910 A B] Taking the legal and dictionary meaning of the word 'appurtenant ' or 'appurtenances ' the inescapable conclusion is that the words 'either other land or appurtenances ' are meant to indicate that the land in question should form an integral part of the main land containing the building in question. [911 E P] Words & Phrases	 Legally Defined (Vol. 1 2nd Edn.) at p. 105; Words & Phrases	 Judicially Defined (Vol. I); Words Stroud 's Judicial Dictionary Third Edn.	 at p. 176 referred to. Bearing in mind the well settled rule of construction that the language of a beneficial statute must be construed so as to suppress the mischief and advance its object there could be no other interpretation of the words "appurtenant or other land" than that the land appurtenant means not a land contiguous 899 to some other land but the very land which is a part of the same plot or area which contains the building or dwelling house. This also seems to be the avowed object of section 4(9). [911 G H] The scheme of the Act seems to be that if there is a constructed building with a dwelling unit	 the structure thereon cannot be treated as open land for the purpose of declaring it as an excess land beyond the ceiling limit. Similarly	 the land kept open under the municipal regulations (upto 500 sq. metres) and an additional 500 sq. metres appurtenant to the land would not be available for being declared as excess land beyond the ceiling limit. [912 G H] The High Court was absolutely wrong in importing the concept of contiguity on the assumption that section 4(9) was attracted only if the person concerned held a distinct parcel of land which was vacant land. The argument that once a plot contains a building	 the whole of the plot would be exempt from the ceiling area cannot be countenanced on a plain and simple interpretation of section 2 (q) ii) read with section 4(9). Section 4(9) would be attracted regardless of whether the landholder owned a distinct part of land on which there is no construction along with any other parcel of land where there is some construction. [913 D F] A combined reading of section 4(9) and section 2 (q) (ii) and (iii) would lead to the irresistible inference that in cases which fall within the third category mentioned above for determining the ceiling area the (1) total area of the land of a landholder is first to be determined and if the total area	 built or unbuilt	 falls below 2000 sq. metres in category areas	 there would be no question of any excess land	 (2) where	 however	 there is a building and a dwelling unit then the area beneath the building and the dwelling unit would have to be excluded while computing the ceiling. Further if there are any bye laws requiring a portion of the land to be kept vacant	 the landholder would be allowed to set apart the said land to the maximum extent of 500 sq. metres. Ho would also be allowed to retain an additional area of 500 sq. metres for the beneficial use of the building so that he may enjoy the use of a little compound also for various purposes. [912 B E] After excluding these items if the land falls below the ceiling limit there would be no question of excess but if there is excess that is beyond the ceiling limit	 the same would have to be taken over by the Government. [912 E] Where	 however	 it is found that any person holds vacant land in two or more categories of urban agglomerations specified in Schedule I	 the computation and determination of ceiling area is to be done in accordance with the formula laid down in cl. (a) to (d) of g. 4(1) of tho Act. [915 E F] 900 Where a person has several plots	 some completely vacant and some partly built and partly vacant	 for computation of the ceiling area the competent authority will have to total the entire area of the lands in various places	 completely vacant or partly built and partly vacant and permit the landholder to retain 2000 sq. metres or less as provided in clauses (a) to (d) of section 4(1) and give the landholder the option (as provided under section 6) to select the area which he desires to retain provided that does not exceed the ceiling limit. [915 H	 916 A C] M/s. Eastern Oxygen & Acetylene Ltd. vs State of Madhya Pradesh	 A.I.R. 1981 MP 17	 approved. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. vs L. J. Johnson & Anr. (1979) All. LJ 1222	 overruled.