Summarize the following court judgment. l Appeal No.5 of 1958. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 26	 1956	 of the former Nagpur High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 66 of 1956	 arising out of the judgment and order dated April 14	 1956	 of the said High Court in Misc. Petition No. 6 of 1956. M. C. Setalvad	 Attorney General of India	 B. Sen	 D. B. Padhya and I. N. Shroff	 for the appellants. R. V. section Mani	 for the respondent. April II. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.K. DAS J. This is an appeal by special leave. The appellants before us are the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company)	 a public limited company having its registered office at Nagpur in Madhya Pradesh	 its Manager	 and Assistant Manager. The respondent	 Shreepathi Rao	 joined the service of the Company as a typist on a salary of Rs. 30 per month in July	 1936. He rose in rank from time to time and was appointed Deputy Head Clerk in 1947 in the grade of Rs. 120 10 225. Since 1952 he has been receiving a basic salary of Rs. 245 per month. On November 28	 1955	 an explanation was called for from him with regard to the issue of certain bills to consumers of electricity called ".high tension consumers "	 without having certain " notes for the information of consumers " printed at the back of the bills. The respondent submitted his explanation on the next day	 marking a copy thereof to one of the directors of the Company. On December 2	1955	 he was again asked to explain why he marked a copy of his explanation to one of the directors. The respondent submitted an explanation in respect of this matter also. On the same date	 he was again asked to explain as to how and why certain " double adjustments " had been made in the accounts of 1954 relating to the consumers ' department of the Company	 the allegation being that a sum of Rs. 1	05	894 7 7 which represented the amount of bills of the Central Railway had been deducted twice in the accounts. The respondent submitted an explanation on December 3	 1955	 in which he said that the charge was vague and that	 after 1949	 he was not in any way concerned with the preparation of summaries and annual statements of accounts of the consumers department. On December 5	 1955	 an order of suspension was made against the respondent which stated that the order was to take immediate effect and to remain in force until further orders	 pending some investigation against the respondent. Two days later	 on December 7	 1955	 a memorandum was served on the respondent terminating his services with effect from January 31	1956. The memorandum	 so far as it is relevant for our purpose	 read We hereby give you notice under Standing Order 16(1) that your services will stand terminated as from 31st January	 1956. The Company 's Managing Director is satisfied that it is not in the interests of the business of the Company to disclose reasons ' for terminating your services. " On December 19	 1955	 a notice was served on the Company on behalf of the respondent wherein it was stated that the order of suspension dated December 5	 1955	 and the order of termination dated December 7	 1955	 were illegal and ultra vires and a request was made to withdraw the said orders and reinstate the respondent within 24 hours	 failing which the respondent said that he would take legal action in the matter. On December 26	 1955	 the Company sent a reply to the notice denying the allegations	 and the company further stated that it had no desire to enter into a discussion with the respondent as to the propriety of the orders passed. On January 2	 1956	 the respondent filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court 466 at Nagpur in which he prayed for the issue of appropriate writs or directions quashing the orders of suspension and termination dated December 5	 1955	 and December 7	 1955	 respectively and asking for certain other reliefs. This petition was heard by a learned single Judge on certain preliminary objections raised by the present appellants	 and	 by an order dated April 14	 1956	 he upheld the preliminary objections and dismissed the petition. The preliminary objections taken were these: it was urged that the service of the respondent was terminated in accordance with the Standing Orders of the Company	 approved by the relevant authorities under the provisions of the (XX of 1946)	 hereinafter referred to as the central Act	 and also under the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act	 1947 (C. P. and Berar Act XXlll of 1947)	 hereinafter called the local Act; and if the respondent had any grievance against the said Standing Orders	 his only remedy was to get the Standing Orders amended as provided for in the relevant Act	 but he had no right to move the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the orders passed against him or for reinstatement	 etc. Alternatively	 it was urged that if the Standing Orders did not apply in the case of the respondent as was the respondent 's case	 then the Ordinary law of master and servant applied	 and the only remedy of the respondent was to sue the Company in damages for wrongful dismissal. On these preliminary objections the learned Judge held (1) that the respondent was not an employee within the meaning of the Standing Orders and therefore his case was not governed by the Standing Orders; (2) that the relationship between the appellants and the respondent was contractual and not statutory and the remedy of the respondent was to sue the Company in damages for wrongful dismissal; and (3) as for amendment of the Standing Orders so as to include the respondent and persons in his category	 the only remedy open to the respondent was to take action under the relevant Act by approaching a recognised union to move in the matter. 467 On the dismissal of his petition	 the respondent preferred an appeal under el. 10 of the Letters Patent. This appeal was heard and allowed by a Division Bench on September 26	 1956	 on the findings that (1) the Standing Orders did not apply to the respondent	 though he was an employee within the meaning of that expression in section 2 (1) of the local Act ; (2) the conditions of the respondent 's service were governed by the provisions of the local Act and on a breach thereof	 the respondent had a right to move the High Court for appropriate orders under article 226 of the Constitution; and (3) as the termination of the service of the respondent was without statutory authority	 it must be vacated. The Division Bench accordingly allowed the appeal	 quashed the orders of suspension and termination of service and declared that the respondent continued to bean employee of the Company on terms which were applicable to him on the date of his suspension	 namely	 December 5	 1955. There was also a direction to the Company to pay back wages to the respondent. The appellants herein then moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal from the order of the Division Bench	 dated September 26	 1956. The present appeal has been brought in pursuance of the order granting special leave to the appellants. The first and foremost question which arises for decision in this appeal is whether the Standing Orders of the Company apply to the respondent. We have already stated and it is not in dispute that the Standing Orders were approved by the certifying officer under the provisions of the central Act and by the Labour Commissioner under section 30 of the local Act. It is necessary to explain here the general scheme of the provisions of the two Acts under which the Standing Orders were approved. Under the central Act	 the expression " Standing Orders " means rules relating to matters set out in the Schedule	 and section 3 requires that within six months from the date on which the central Act becomes applicable to an industrial establishment the employer shall submit to the certifying officer five copies of the draft Standing Orders proposed by him 468 for adoption in his industrial establishment. Sub section (2) of section 3 lays down that provision shall be made in such draft for every matter set out in the Schedule which may be applicable to the industrial establishment and where model Standing Orders have been prescribed	 the draft shall so far as practicable	 in conformity with such model. The Schedule refers to the matters which are to he provided by Standing Orders	 and item 8 of the Schedule relates to " termination of employment	 and the notice thereof to be given by employer and workman We may state here that the central Act contains a definition of " workman " which	 at the material time in this case	 meant any person employed in any industrial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled	 manual or clerical	 labour for hire or reward	 but did not include any member of the armed forces. Sections 4 to 10 of the central Act deal with (a) conditions for certification of Standing Orders	 (b) certification of Standing Orders	 (e) appeals	 (d) date of operation of Standing Orders	 (e) register of Standing Orders	 (f) posting of Standing Orders and (g) duration and modification of Standing Orders. There are similar provisions in the local Act	Chapter IV of which deals with Standing Orders. Sub section (1) of section 30 of the local Act lays down Every employer	 in respect of any industry to which this Act has been made applicable under subsection (3) of section 1	 shall	 within two months of the (late of such notification	 submit to the Labour Commissioner for approval	 in such manner as may be prescribed	 a copy of the Standing Orders concerning the relations between him and his employees with regard to all industrial matters mentioned in Schedule 1. " Item 8 of Schedule I of the local Act is again " termination of employment	 notice to be given by employer and employee ". The other sub sections of section 30 lay down the procedure to be followed for the approval of Standing Orders by the Labour Commissioner	 appeal by an aggrieved person	 etc. Sections 31 and 32 lay down the procedure for an amendment of the Standing Orders either at the instance of the employer or at the 469 instance of a representative of employees. It is worthy of note that sub section (1) of section 30 requires every employer to submit to the Labour Commissioner a copy of the Standing Orders concerning the relations between him and his employees with regard to all industrial matters mentioned in Schedule 1. The local Act defines the expression " employee " and	 at the relevant time	 it meant any person employed by an employer to do any skilled or unskilled	 manual or clerical work for contract or hire or reward in any industry. It is worthy of note that the definition of " employee " in the local Act corresponds more or less to the definition of " workman " under the central Act. There are some minor differences in the definition of the two expres sions in the two Acts	 but with those differences we are not concerned in the present case. The Standing Orders with which we are concerned in the present case came into force on November 14	 1951	 and it is convenient at this stage to refer to the relevant Standing Orders. Standing Order No. 2 defines certain expressions used in the Standing Orders. It states In these Orders	 unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context (a) " employees " means all persons	 male or female	 employed in the Office or Mains Department or Stores or Power House or Receiving Station of the Company	 either at Nagpur or at Wardha whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters. (b) " The Manager " means the person appointed as such and includes the Assistant Manager and in relation to Wardha establishment " the Resident Engineer ". (c) " Ticket " includes a Card	 pass or token. (d) " Workman " means such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared to be " Workman " by the Management ". Standing Order No. 3 classifies employees into certain categories and Standing Order No. 4 deals with tickets. In substance	 it says that every workman	 permanent 6 470 or temporary	 shall have a ticket or card	 and an apprentice shall have an apprentice card; the tickets or cards issued shall be surrendered when the workman is discharged or ceases to belong to the class of employment for which the card or ticket is issued. It is to be noticed that under the definition clause " workman " means such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared	 to be workmen by the management and Standing Order No. 4 makes it clear that every workman	 permanent or temporary	 will have a ticket. Standing Order No. 16 deals with termination of employment	 and cl. (1) thereof	 relevant for our purpose	 must be quoted in full " For terminating the employment of a permanent employee	 a notice in writing shall be given either by the employer or the employee	 giving one calendar month 's notice. The reasons for the termination of the services will be communicated to the employee in writing	 if he so desires at the time of discharge	 unless such a communication	 in the opinion of the Management	 may directly or indirectly lay the company and the Management or the person signing the communication open to criminal or civil proceedings at the instance of the employee	 or the Company 's Managing Director is satisfied that it is not in the interests of the business of the Company to disclose the reasons and so orders in writing. " Now	 it is not in dispute that the respondent is a 'workman ' within the meaning of the Central Act and an 'employee ' as defined in the local Act. controversy before us is as to whether he is an employee ' within the meaning of the Standing Orders. Admittedly	 no ticket has been issued to the respondent by the Company; his ticket number cannot	 therefore	 be included in the departmental muster. The learned Judges of the High Court held that the inclusion of the name and ticket number in the departmental muster was an essential characteristic of an ' employee ' as defined for the purpose of the Standing Orders	 and the mere fact of employment in the Office	 Mains Department	 Stores	 Power House or Receiving Station of the Company was not enough to make a	 471 person so employed an 'employee ' within the meaning of the Standing Orders	 and as the respondent did not fulfil the necessary condition of having his name and ticket number included in the departmental ' muster	 he was not an 'employee ' as defined for the Standing Orders	 which did not therefore apply to him. On behalf of the appellants	 it is contended that regard being had to the context and the entire body of the Standing Orders	 the aforesaid view of the High Court is not correct	 and on a proper construction	 inclusion of the name and ticket number in the departmental muster is not an essential characteristic of an 'employee ' as defined for the Standing Orders. It is rightly pointed out that if the possession of a ticket and a ticket number is taken as an essential characteristic of an ' employee '	 then there is hardly any difference between an 'employee ' and a 'workman ' as defined in the Standing Orders; because a 'workmen ' means such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared to be workmen	 and under Standing Order No. 4 all workmen must have tickets. If a person em ployed by the company must have a ticket before he can be an employee	 and if workmen are such categories of employees as have tickets	 the distinction between the two disappears and. it is difficult to understand why two definitions were necessary. On a consideration	 however	 of ' the subject or context of the Standing Orders	 read in their entirety and in harmony with one another	 it becomes at once clear why two definitions are necessary and what is the distinction between the two classes 	 employees ' and ' workmen ' in the landing Orders. The expression ' employee ' denotes a larger group namely	 all persons	 male or females who are employed in the Office	 Mains Department	 Stores	 Power House	 or Receiving Station of the Company	 either at Nagpur or Wardha. 'Workmen ' denotes a smaller group	 viz.	 such categories of employees as have been declared to be workmen	 and who must have a ticket. Such a distinction is clearly intelligible in an industrial establishment	 where for security and other reasons a system of tickets or passes is necessary for those who 472 work in the Power House or Mains Department or other places where essential machinery is installed while others	 such as the clerical staff	 may work in an office building where security demands are either nonexistent or much less insistent. This distinction means that all 'workmen ' are 'employees '	 but all ` employees ' are not 'workmen ' for the purpose of the Standing Orders	 and the inclusion of ticket numbers in the departmental musters will be applicable to those employees only to whom tickets have been issued; but such inclusion is not an essential characteristic of an employee. Let us now see if such a distinction is consistent with the Standing Orders as a whole. Standing Order No. 3	 which classifies employees	 defines a probationer in cl. (c) and says that a probationer means an employee who is appointed in a clear vacancy on probation for a period not exceeding twelve months	 etc. Standing Order No. 4 does not require the issue of a ticket to a probationer; yet a probationer is an employee. It is thus obvious that the Standing Orders do make a distinction between `employees ' and ` workmen '	 and there may also be employees who have no tickets. Some of the Standing Orders apply to workmen only	 e. g.	 Standing Orders 12	 13	 14 and 15. Other Standing Orders apply to all employees	 whether they are workmen or not. Standing Order No. 16 falls in the latter category ; it applies to all employees. Standing Order No. 8 (b)	 we think	 makes the position still more clear. It says " Any employee	 who after marking his attendance or presenting his ticket	 card	 or token	 as the case may be	 is found absent from his proper place of work during working hours without permission or without any sufficient reason	 shall be liable to be treated as absent for the period of his absence. " If every employee has to have a ticket	 it is difficult to understand why this Standing Order should make a distinction between an employee who marks his attendance and another who presents his ticket	 card or token. Such a distinction is easily understandable when some employees do not possess a ticket	 card or token	 473 so that they merely mark their attendance; while those who possess a ticket	 card or token present it. It has been suggested that Standing Order No. 4 is not exhaustive in the matter of issue of tickets; it talks of an issue of a ticket to every permanent workman	 a card to every badli workman	 a temporary ticket to every temporary workman	 and an apprentice card to every apprentice. It does not prescribe the issue of a pass or token	 though the definition of a 'ticket ' includes a pass or token. The suggestion further is that Standing Order No. 2 (a) itself authorises the issue of tickets to other employees	 so that there may be one kind of tickets issued to workmen under standing Order No. 4 and another kind of tickets to other employees under Standing Order No. 2 (a). On this view	 it	 is suggested that the alternatives mentioned in Standing Order No. 8 (b) really amount to an option given to an employee either to mark his attendance or present his ticket. It is	 however	 difficult to understand the necessity of an option of this kind when every employee must have a ticket	 particularly when the exercise of such an option is likely to defeat the very purpose for which tickets are issued in an industrial establishment. We do not	 however	 think that the case of the respondent is in any way strengthened by holding that Standing Order No. 2 (a) itself authorises the issue of tickets to employees other than workmen. Even on that construction	 the failure of the Company to issue tickets under Standing Order No. 2 (a) will not deprive the employees of their real status as employees and of the benefit of the Standing Orders. The direction for the issue of tickets will	 in that view of the Standing Order	 be an enabling provision only and not an essential characteristic of an employee. Further	 Standing Order No. 4 provides for the surrender of tickets issued thereunder but Standing Order No. 2 (a)	 if it is construed as enabling the Company to issue tickets	 makes no provision for the surrender of tickets when the employee ceases to be an employee. This absence of any provision for surrender applicable to such tickets 474 clearly implies that issue of tickets is not contemplated by the Standing Order No. 2 (a) itself. On behalf of the respondent	 however	 the main argument has been of a different character. It has been argued that there need not be one set of Standing Orders for all employees	 and the Standing Orders in question being confined to those employees to whom tickets had been issued	 the respondent who had no ticket was outside their purview	 and the result was that the Company had committed a breach of the statutory provision in section 30 of the local Act in the sense that no Standing Orders had been made in respect of the respondent and employees like him to whom tickets had not been issued. It hag been argued that	 therefore	 no action could be taken against the respondent either under the Standing Orders or even under the ordinary law of master and servant. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. We have pointed out that the Standing Orders themselves make a distinction between 'employees ' and `work men '	 and there may also be employees who have no tickets. To hold that the Standing Orders apply to those employees only to whom tickets have been issued will make employees synonymous with workmen a result negatived by two separate definitions given in Standing Order No. 2. The central Act as well as the local Act contemplate the making of Standing Orders for all employees in respect of matters which are required to be dealt with by Standing Orders. The Standing Orders in question were not objected to as being defective or incomplete by workmen	 and they have been approved by the appropriate authority and they must be construed with reference to their subject or context. In the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary	 it should be held that they apply to all employees for whose benefit they have been made. We see no compelling reasons for holding that the Standing Orders do not apply to the respondent. In our view	 and having regard to the subject or context of the Standing Orders	 the words whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters " in Standing Order No. 2 (a) do 475 not lay down any essential characteristic of employee and are applicable only in cases where tickets have been issued to an employee. The essential content of the definition of an employee is employment in the Office	 Mains Department	 eta.	 of the Company either at Nagpur or Wardha	 and that of a workman the necessary declaration by the Company which would entitle him to a ticket under Standing Order No. 4. There is also another relevant consideration which must be borne in mind in construing the Standing Orders in question. Section 30 of the local Act imposes a statutory obligation on the employer to make	 Standing Orders in respect of all his employees and a breach of the statutory obligation involves a criminal liability. That being so	 the court would be justified	 if it can reasonably do so	 to construe the Standing Orders so as to make them consistent with the compliance of the said statutory obligation. We are not unmindful of the principle that in construing a statutory provision or rule	 every word occurring therein must be given its proper meaning and weight. The necessity of such an interpretation is all the more important in a definition clause. But even a definition clause must derive its meaning from the context or subject. In Courts vs The Kent Waterworks Company (1)	 the question for consideration was the interpretation of the appeal clause in an Act for Paving	 Cleansing	 Lighting	 etc.	 of the Town and Parish of Woolwich (47 Geo. III	 Sess. 2	 cap. By the 16th section of the statute	 " the commissioners are to make rates upon all and every the person or persons who do or shall hold	 occupy	 possess	 etc.	 any land within the parish ". The statute also gave a right of appeal to any person or persons aggrieved by any rate. 	 but the appeal clause required the person or persons appealing against a rate to enter into a recognisance; the question was if this requirement was intended to exclude corporations from the purview of the ap. peal clause	 as corporations	 it was urged	 cannot enter	 into a recognisance. In interpreting the appeal clause	 Bayley J. observed (1) ; ; 476 "But assuming that they cannot enter into a recognizance	 yet if they ire persons capable of being aggrieved by and appealing against a rate	 I should say that that part of the clause which gives the appeal applies to all persons capable of appealing	 and that the other part of the clause which requires a recognizance to be entered into applies only to those persons who are capable of entering into a recognizance	 but is inapplicable to those who are not." The same principle of interpretation was applied in Perumal Goundan vs The Thirumalarayapuram Jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi (1)	 in construing the Explanation to O. XXXIII	 r. 1	 of the Code of Civil Procedure	 which says inter alia that " a person is a pauper. . when he is not entitled to property worth one hundred rupees other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject matter of the suit ". The question was if the aforesaid provision applied to companies. It was held that it would be wrong to construe the provision to mean that only persons who possess wearing apparel can sue as paupers. We are of the view that the same rule of construction should apply in the present case	 and the words " whose names and ticket numbers are included in the depart. mental musters " occurring in Standing Order No. 2(a) should be read as " whose names and ticket numbers	 if any	 are included in the departmental musters " and should apply in the case of those employees only who possess tickets and whose ticket numbers are capable of being entered in departmental musters; they are not intended to exclude employees who do not possess tickets or to whom tickets have not been issued and consequently whose names only are so entered. The learned Judges of the High Court were influenced by the circumstance that in an earlier case D. C. Dungore vs section section Dandige Miscellaneous Petition No. 134 of 1954 decided by the same High Court on September 23	 1955) the Company took tip the stand that the Standing Orders applied to employees to Whom tickets had been issued a stand different from and inconsistent with that taken in the present case	 (1) Mad. 477 It may be pointed out	 however	 that 1). C. Dungore of the earlier case was not an employee within the meaning of the relevant Act	 and there could be no Standing Orders in respect of his conditions of service. Moreover	 in the matter of construction of a statutory provision no question of estoppel arises	 and the learned Judges had pointed out that the respondent himself thought that the Standing Orders applied to all employees. We have rested our decision as to the applicability of the Standing Orders not on what the appellants or the respondent thought at one time or another	 but on a true construction of the Standing Orders themselves	 including the definition clause in Standing Order No. 2(a). We take the view that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent. This is really decisive of the appeal	 because if the Standing Orders apply to the respondent and his service has been terminated in accordance with Standing Order No. 16(1)	 the writ application which the respondent made to the High Court must fail. The learned Attorney General appearing for the appellants addressed us on the scope and ambit of article 226 of the Constitution	 and he contended that even if the respondent had been wrongfully dismissed by his private employer	 the proper remedy was by mean		; of a suit and not by invoking the special writ jurisdiction of the High Court. These contentions raise important questions	 but we do not think that we are called upon to decide them in this case. Lastly	 it has been urged oil behalf of the respondent that even if we hold that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent	 we should remand the case to the High Court for a decision on merits of other points raised by the respondent	 because the question whether the Standing Orders apply or not was treated as a preliminary issue by the High Court and no decision was given on other points. We asked learned Advocate for the respondent what other points remain for decision oil his writ application	 once it is held that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent and 6 478 his service has been terminated in accordance with Standing Order No. 16(1). Learned Advocate then referred us to Standing Order No. 18	 which provides for penalties for misconduct	 and submitted that the provisions thereof have not been complied with by the appellants. He particularly referred to cl. (e) of Standing Order No. 18 and submitted that the order of suspension passed against the respondent was in violation of the safeguards mentioned therein. The short answer to this argument is that no penalty for mis conduct has been imposed on the respondent under Standing Order No. 18. The Company paid his salary to the respondent from the date of suspension to January 31	 1956	 which also showed that no order was passed by way of punishment for misconduct. The Company chose to terminate the service of the respondent in accordance with Standing Order No. 16	 and did not think fit to proceed against the respondent for any alleged misconduct	 and it was open to the Company to do so. So far as Standing Order no 16. is concerned	 all the requirements thereof have been complied with. That being the position	 no other point remains for decision in the present case. The result	 therefore	 is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court dated September 26	 1956	 are set aside and the writ petition of the respondent is dismissed. In view of the stand which the appellants had taken in the earlier case with regard to the Standing Orders	 we think it proper to say in this case that the parties must bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.

The services of the respondent	 an employee of the appellant company	 were terminated in accordance with the Standing Orders of the company	 approved by the appropriate authorities under the provisions of the 	 and the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act	 1947. Standing Order NO. 2(a) defined " employees " as " all persons . employed in the Office or Mains Department or Stores or Power House or Receiving Station of the Company . whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters ". The Standing Orders also defined the term " workman " and provided that every workman should have a ticket. No ticket had been issued to the respondent by the company	 and consequently his ticket number was not included in the departmental muster. The respondent challenged the validity of the order terminating his services by an application made before the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution on the grounds	 inter alia	 that the Standing Orders in question were confined to those employees only to whom tickets were issued	 and that as no ticket was issued to him he was not an employee within the meaning of the Standing Orders which did not therefore apply to him and	 consequently	 the termination of his services under Standing Order No. 16(1) was illegal: Held	 (1) that the words " whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters " occurring in Standing Order NO. 2 (a) should be read as " whose names and ticket numbers	 if any	 are included in the departmental musters "; Cortis vs The Kent Water Works Company ; ; ; and Perumal Goundan vs The Thirumalarayapuram jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi	 Mad. 624	 applied. (2)that under the Standing Orders	 in which a distinction is made between 'employees ' and 'workmen '	 while every workman must have a ticket	 there may be employees who may have no tickets the possession of which is not an essential characteristic of an employee; and	 (3)that the Standing Orders apply to all employees for whose benefit they have been made. 464 Accordingly	 the Standing Orders were applicable to the respondent and the termination of his service in accordance with Standing Order No. 16(1) was valid and	 therefore	 the application made by him to the High Court must fail.