Summarize the following court judgment. Civil Appeal No. 1499 of 1985. From the Judgment and order dated 18.9.84 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in C.W.P. No. 155/84. K. Parasaran 	 Attorney General. A. K. Ganguli and A.K Chakravorty 	 for the Appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI 	 J. This appeal by special leave is directed against 679 two orders made by a division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh 	 one dated 24th July 	 1984 and the other dated 18 September 1984 	 in so far as they direct the Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to file an affidavit setting out what action has been taken by the State Government towards implementation of the recommendation contained in paragraph 16 of the Report of the Anti Ragging Committee. The impugned orders are in our opinion wholly unsustainable and ordinarily we would not have taken time to deliver a reasoned judgment and merely set aside the impugned orders with a brief observation	 but we think it necessary to state in some detail our opinion in regard to the directions given in the impugned orders 	 because we find that this is one of those few cases which demonstrates what we have often said before that public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the legislature. D It appears that the Chief Justice of the High Court received a letter dated 4th April 	 1984 	 from the guardian of a student of the Medical College in Shimla complaining about the ragging of freshers by senior students within as also outside the college campus and the hostel. The guardian of the student had annexed along with his letter to the Chief Justice a letter dated 25th March	 1984 received by him from his son. The Division Bench of the High Court presided over by the Chief Justice treated these two letters as constituting the Memo of Writ Petition but directed that these two letters should not be placed on the record of the proceedings in view of the request made in paragraph 6 of the letter of the guardian that the identity of the writer should not be disclosed on account of fear of reprisal and for the self same reason the Division Bench ordered that the identity of the student and the guardian should not be disclosed in the proceedings. The Division Bench treating the two letters as a writ petition registered them as Civil Writ Petition No. 155 of 1984 and issued notice to the State Government 	 the Principal of the Medical College Simla 	 the Himachal Pradesh University and the Director of Health Services 	 Government of Himachal Pradesh who were arrayed as respondents Nos. 1 to 4. On receipt of the notice of the Writ Petition 	 the Government of Himachal Pradesh filed an affidavit setting out the steps which the H 680 State Government and the college authorities had taken to check the ragging of freshers by senior students. The Director of Medical Education cum Principal of the Medical College 	 Simla also filed an affidavit opposing the admission of the Writ Petition on the ground that the college authorities had taken various steps for the purpose of curbing the evil of ragging and in fact had taken action On at least two occasions awarding punishment to the students who indulged in ragging by suspending them for a period of 4 to 6 months 	 The Division Bench 	 on a consideration of this material placed before it 	 came to the conclusion that the practice of ragging was prevailing in the Medical College 	 Simla on a noticeable scale and that ragging took the form of subjecting freshers including female students to inhuman and humiliating treatment degenerating even into physical violence and that the college authorities had not been able to effectively control ragging with the result that the college administration had lost confidence of a sizeable section of student 	 parents and well wishers as regards its capacity to deal with the problem of ragging. The Division Bench accordingly gave various directions which included a direction to the State Government to constitute a committee consisting of the Vice Chancellor of the Himachal Pradesh University and the Secretary to the Government 	 Health Department 	 interalia 	 to make "recommendations in regard to the curative	 preventive and punitive measures to be adopted by the college authorities to control and curb the evil of ragging and the machinery to be set up to enforce these measures. " This Committee which we shall for the sake of convenience refer to as the Anti Ragging Committee 	 was to complete its work and submit its report within a period of six months from the date of its constitution. The Anti Ragging Committee submitted its Report to the High Court on 26th June 	 1984. The Report contained various recommendations intended to control and curb the ragging of freshers by senior students in the Medical College and its hostel. We are concerned here with only one recommendation namely that contained in paragraph 16 of the Report which was in the following terms: "In quite a number of States in the country there are Acts on ragging which make ragging a cognizable offence 681 and prescribe the types of punishment commensurate with the crimes committed. The Himachal Pradesh Government could be suggested to initiate such a legislation as early as possible. Pending such a legislation by the State Government	 the University authorities could think of incorporating some provisions relating to ragging in the relevant ordinance of Discipline in the Ordinance of the University. The Division Bench by its order dated 24th July	 1984 gave directions for implementation of the various recommendations made in the Report and so far as recommendation contained in paragraph 16 of the Report was concerned	 the Division Bench said: "The Chief Secretary to the State Government will file an affidavit within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of the writ setting out the action proposed to be taken on the recommendation contained in paragraph 16 (First Part) of the relevant portion of the Report." Though this direction ostensibly did no more than call upon the Chief Secretary to inform the Court as to what action the State Government proposed to take on the recommendations to initiate legislation for curbing ragging	 it was	 in fact and substance	 intended to require the State Government to Initiate legislation on the subject. If this direction were merely an innocuous one intended to inform the court whether the State Government intended to take any action on the recommendation to initiate legislation against ragging	 no objection could possibly be taken against it	 because it would leave the Government free to decide whether or not to initiate legislation in regard to ragging without mandatorily requiring the State Government to do so But as the subsequent event would show	 what the Division Bench intended to achieve by giving this direction was not just to obtain information as to what the State Government proposed to do in the matter but to actually require the State Government to initiate legislation against ragging. That is why	 when the Chief Secretary in deference to this direction filed an affidavit stating	 inter alia	 that the State Government had "taken notice of the recommendation to initiate legislation in this behalf	 if found necessary and so advised"	 the Division Bench was not satisfied with this statement of the Chief Secretary and declined to close the proceeding so far as this particular aspect was concerned and proceeded	 inter alia	 to reiterate in its order dated 1 8th September 1984: 682 "The Chief Secretary to the State Government will file an affidavit within a period of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of the Writ setting out the further action taken in the direction of the implementation of the recommendation contained in paragraph 16 (First Part) of the relevant portion of the Report of the Anti Ragging Committee. " When this direction was given by the Division Bench	 it clearly implied that what the Division Bench wanted the State Government to do was to initiate legislation against ragging and for this purpose	 time of 6 weeks was granted to the State Government The State Government thereupon preferred the present appeal with special leave obtained from this Court. We may point out	 even at the cost of repetition	 that the direction given by the Division Bench in its order dated 24th July 1984 and reiterated in its order dated 18th September 1984 was not an innocuous direction issued merely for the purpose	 of informing the Court as to what the State Governing proposed to do in regard to the recommendation in paragraph 16 of the Report to initiate legislation against ragging. The Division Bench would have been certainly justified in enquiring from the Chief Secretary as to what action the State Government proposed to take in regard to the recommendation of the Anti Ragging Committee to initiate legislation on the subject of ragging. Such enquiry could have been legitimately made by the Division Bench for the purpose of obtaining information on a matter which the Division Bench regarded	 and in our opinion rightly	 as necessary for eradicating the evil practice of ragging which is not only subversive of human dignity but also prejudicially affects the interests of the students and the discipline in the Campus and no exception could have been taken to it because it would have left the State Government free to decide whether or not to initiate any legislation on the subject and not mandatorily required the State Government to initiate any such legislation. If such only were the purpose of the direction issued by the Division Bench and the Division Bench did not intend anything more	 the Division Bench would have closed the proceedings when the Chief Secretary intimated in his affidavit that the State Government would initiate legislation in this behalf "if found necessary and so advised". But despite this statement made by 683 the Chief Secretary on behalf of the State Government	 the Division Bench persisted in reiterating its direction that the Chief Secretary should file an affidavit within a further period of 6 weeks setting out the further action taken by the State Government in the direction of implementation of the recommendation contained in paragraph 16 of the Report. This persistence in reiterating the direction to file an affidavit setting out the action taken by the State Government towards implementation of the recommendation to initiate legislation against ragging	 clearly shows that what the Division Bench intended was not merely to obtain information as to what action the State Government proposed to take but to obligate the State Government to take action by way of initiation of legislation against ragging. The direction given by the Division Bench was really nothing short of an indirect attempt to compel the State Government to initiate legislation with a view to curbing the evil of ragging	 for otherwise it is difficult to see why	 after the clear and categorical statement by the Chief Secretary on behalf of the State Government that the Government will introduce legislation if found necessary and so advised	 the Division Bench should have proceeded to again give the same direction. This the Division Bench was clearly not entitled to do. It is entirely a matter for the executive branch of the Government to decide whether or not to introduce any particular legislation. Of course	 any member of the legislature can also introduce legislation but the court certainly cannot mandate the executive or any member of the legislature to initiate legislation	 howsoever necessary or desirable the Court may consider it to be. That is not a matter which is within the sphere of the functions and duties allocated to the judiciary under the Constitution. If the executive is not carrying out any duty laid upon it by the Constitution or the law	 the Court can certainly require the executive to carry out such duty and this is precisely what the Court does when it entertains public interest litigation. Where the Court finds	 on being moved by an aggrieved party or by any public spirited individual or social action group	 that the executive is remiss in discharging its obligations under the Constitution or the law	 so that the poor and the under privileged continue to be subjected to exploitation and injustice or are deprived of their social and economic entitlements or that social legislation enacted for their benefit is not being implemented thus depriving them of the rights and benefits conferred upon them	 the Court certainly can and must 684 intervene and compel the Executive to carry out its constitutional and legal obligations and ensure that the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community are no longer subjected to exploitation or injustice and they are able to realise their social and economic rights. When the Court passes any orders in public interest litigation	 the Court does so not with a view to mocking at legislative or executive authority or in a spirit of confrontation but with a view to enforcing the Constitution and the law	 because it is vital for the maintenance of the rule of law that the obligations which are laid upon the executive by the Constitution and the law should be carried out faithfully and no one should go away with a feeling that the constitution and the law are meant only for the benefit of a fortunate few and have no meaning for the large numbers of half clad	 half hungry people of this country. That is a feeling which should never be allowed to grow. But at the same time the Court cannot group the function assigned to the executive and the legislature under the Constitution and it cannot even indirectly require the executive to introduce a particular legislation or the legislature to pass it or assume to itself a supervisory role over the law making activities of the executive and the legislature We are	 therefore of the vie that the Division Bench was clearly in error in issuing a direction to the Chief Secretary to file an affidavit within 6 weeks setting out the action taken by the State Government with a view to implementing the recommendation contained in paragraph 16 of the Report. There is also one other error into which the Division Bench of the High Court seems to have fallen. The Division Bench of the High Court treated the letter of the guardian of the student along with the letter addressed to the guardian by the student as constituting a memo of Writ Petition. This was certainly within the jurisdiction of the High Court to do	 since it is now settled law that this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution and the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution can treat a letter as a Writ Petition and take action upon it. We may of course make it clear that it is not every letter which may be treated as a Writ Petition by the Supreme Court or the High Court. It is only there a letter is addressed by an aggrieved person or by a public spirited individual or a social action group for enforcement of the constitutional or legal rights of a person in custody or of a class or group of persons who by reason of poverty	 disability or sociallity 685 or economically disadvantaged position find it difficult to approach the court for redress that the Supreme Court or the High Court would be justified	 nay bound	 to treat the letter as a Writ Petition. There may also be cases where even letter addressed for redressal of a wrong done to an individual may be treated as a Writ Petition where the Supreme Court or the High Court considers it expedient to do so in the interests of justice. This is an innovative strategy which has been evolved by the Supreme Court for the purpose of providing easy access to justice to the weaker sections of Indian humanity and it is a powerful tool in the hands of public spirited individuals and social action groups for combating exploitation and injustice and securing for the under privileged segments of society their social and economic entitlements. It is a highly effective weapon in the Armour of the law for reaching social justice. : to the common man. The Division Bench was	 therefore	 certainly right in entertaining the two letters as a Writ Petition and no exception can be taken to it	 but it was wholly in error in directing that these two letters on which the Division Bench acted should not be placed on the record of the proceedings and the identity of the guardian and the student should not be disclosed It is difficult to see how any proceedings can be entertained by the Court keeping the petitioner before it anonymous or his identity secret. If the identity of the petitioner is not disclosed	 how would the respondent against whom relief is sought ever he able to verify the authenticity of the petitioner and the credibility of the case brought by him. It would be contrary to all canons of fair play and violative of all principles of judicial propriety and administration to entertain a Writ Petition without disclosing the identity of the petitioner	 though the court knows who the petitioner is. We are	 therefore	 of the opinion that the procedure adopted by the Division Bench was wrong and the Division Bench was not justified in directing that the two letters on which action was initiated by the Division Bench should not be kept in the record of the proceedings and that the identity of the guardian and the student should not be disclosed. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the orders dated 24th July	 1984 and 18th September	 1984 in so far as they direct the Chief Secretary to file an affidavit setting out the action taken by the State Government in implementing the recommendation contained in paragraph 16 of the Report of the Anti ragging Committee. There will be no order as to costs of the appeal. N.V.K. Appeal allowed.

The Chief Justice of the High Court received a letter from the guardian of a student of the Medical College in Simla complaining about the ragging of freshers by senior students within as also outside the college campus and the hostel. The guardian of the student had annexed along with the said letter to the Chief Justice 	 a letter received by him from his son. The Division Bench of the High Court presided over by the Chief Justice treated these two letters as constituting the Memo of Writ Petition 	 but directed that these two letters should not be placed on the record of the proceeding in view of the request made by the guardian that the identity of the writer should not be disclosed in the proceedings. The Division Bench registered the two letters as a Writ Petition 	 and issued notice to the State Government	 and the Principal of the Medical College. After bearing the respondents the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the practice of ragging was prevalent in the Medical College on a noticeable scale and that ragging took the form of subjecting freshers including female students to inhuman and humiliating treatment degenerating even into physical violence 677 and that the college authorities had not been able to effectively control such ragging. It gave various directions which included a direction to the State Government to constitute a Committee Anti Ragging Committee to go into the question and make recommendations in regard to the curative 	 preventive and punitive measures to be adopted by the college authorities to control and curb the evil of ragging. Anti Ragging Committee recommended that the State Government could initiate legislation which makes ragging a cognizable offence an l prescribe punishment commensurate with the crimes committed. When the matter was taken up again for hearing the Division Bench directed the State Government to file an affidavit indicating the action taken on the Report. An affidavit to the effect that the State Government had 'taken notice of the recommendations to initiate legislation this behalf if found necessary and so advised	 was filed on behalf of the State Government. The Division Bench further directed the State Government to initiate legislation against ragging and for this purpose granted the State Government 6 weeks ' time. In the appeal by the State , to this Court it was contended that the Court could not give directions to the State Government to initiate legislation on ragging Allowing the Appeal. ^ HELD. The Division Bench was clearly in error in issuing a direction to the Chief Secretary to file an affidavit within 6 weeks setting out the action taken by the State Government with a view to implementing the Committee 's recommendation. [684] 2. The direction given by the Division Bench was really nothing short of an indirect attempt to compel the State Government to initiate legislation with a view to curbing the evil of ragging. [683C] 3. It is entirely a matter for the executive branch of the Government to decide whether or not to introduce any particular legislation. But the Court certainly cannot mandate the executive or any member of the legislature to initiate legislation , howsoever necessary or desirable the Court may consider it to be. That is not a matter which is within the sphere of the functions and duties allocated to the judiciary under the Constitution. [683E F] 4. If the executive is not carrying out any duty laid upon it by the Constitution or the law , the Court can certainly require the executive to carry out such duty and this is precisely that the Court does when it entertains public interest litigation. [683F] 678 section When the Court passes any orders in public interest litigation , the Court does so not with a view to mocking at legislative or exhaustive authority or in a spirit of confrontation but with a view to enforcing the Constitution and the law , because it is vital for the maintenance of the rule of law that the obligations which are laid upon the executive by the Constitution and the law should be carried out faithfully and no one should go away with a feeling that the Constitution and the law are meant only for the benefit of a fortunate few and have no meaning for the large number of half clad half hungry people of this country. [684B C] 6. It is now settled law that this Court under Article 32 , and the High Courts under Article 226 , can treat a letter as a Writ Petition and take action upon it. It is not every letter which may be treated as a Writ Petition by the Supreme Court or the High Court. It is on , y where a letter is addressed by an aggrieved person or by a public spirited individual or a social action group for enforcement of the constitutional or legal rights of a persons who by reason of poverty , disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position find it difficult to approach the court for redress that the Supreme Court or the High Court would be justified , nay bound , to treat the letter as a Writ Petition. There may also be cases where even a letter addressed for redressal of a wrong done to an individual may be treated as a Writ Petition where the Supreme Court or the High Court considers it expedient to do so in interests of justice. This is an innovative strategy which has been evolved by the Supreme Court. It is a highly effective weapon in the armoury of the law for reaching social justice to the common man. [684G H; 685A C] 7. The Division Bench was , certainly right in entertaining the two letters as a Writ Petition , but it was wholly in error in directing that these two letters on which the Division Bench acted should not be placed on the record of the proceedings and the identity of the guardian and the student should not be , disclosed. It would be contrary to all canons of fair play and violative of all principles of judicial propriety and administration to entertain a Writ Petition without disclosing the identity of the petitioner, though the court , knows who the petitioner is. [685D F] 
2320	A Hindu died bequeathing all his properties to his mother absolutely by a will executed three days before his death. In the will he stated his age to he 19 years, and that he was thereby disposing of his entire properly, movable and immovable, in favour of his mother. After his death, the nearest reversioner under the law as it then stood, filed a suit for a declaration that the will was not valid because it was executed by the testator when he was a minor and when he was not in a sound disposing state of mind. The mother of the testator (legatee) contened the suit and asserted in her written statement that when he executed the will the testator was a major and was in a sound disposing state of mind. The suit was compromised By the compromise, the reversioner admitted that testator when he executed the will was a major and was in a sound disposing state of mind, that the will was valid and genuine, and the testalor 's properties were divided between the reversioner and the legatee There was a decree in terms of the compromise. Thereafter, the reversioner and the legatee conducted themselves as the absolute owners of their respective shares of the property. The legatee executed settlement deeds in favour of her daughters with respect to part of the land received by her under the decree. The daughters took passion of the properties accepting their mother as their absolute owner. After the death of the legatee, the appellants. who were the sons of those daughters obtained a deed of surrender from their mothers accepting the legatee as the absolute owner of the properties. They then filed a suit against the respondents. who were the descendants of the reversioner who filed the first suit contending that the compromise decree in the first suit was collusive. that the testator was not a major nor of sound disposing state of mind when he executed the will, that the will did not. cover all the properties of the testator and that the appellants were in any event entitled to those properties with respect to which there was an intestacy. as the sisters sons of the last male holder under the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act of 1929. The respondents contested the suit and case notice to the appellants to produce the original will alleging that it was in the posses 293 sion of the appellants, but the appellants denied the allegation, and the respondents, thereupon, relied upon a certified copy of the wilt produced from the records of the court filed in the first suit. The trial court dismissed the suit and the High Court confirmed the dismissal in appeal. In appeal to this Court, it was contended inter alia: (1) that the burden of proof that the will was validly executed by the testator and that he was a major at the time of executing it was upon the respondents ,red that they failed to discharge that burden; and (2) that there was an intestacy with respect to a portion of the land and that the appellants were entitled to it. HELD:(1) (a) As the lower Courts held that the appellants deliberately withheld the original will, its certified copy could be admitted as secondary evidence of its contents under 8. 65 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But the High Court was not justified in presuming under section 90 of the Evidence Act, that the will itself was duly executed and attested. merely because the copy was more than thirty years old and was produced from proper custody. Such a presumption arises only in respect of the original document and not with respect to a copy. [297 H; 298 A, C. D, F] Harihar Prasad vs Must. of Mttnshi Nath Prasad, [1956] S.C.R.1. followed. Munnalal vs Krishobai, A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 15 and Basant Singh vs Bnj Pad, 62 I.A. 180, referred to. But, apart from the presumption. on the oral evidence adduced and from the conduct of the legatee, the High Court was justified, in concluding that the testator executed the will and was at that time in a sound disposing state of mind and in construing the contents of the will as disclosed by the certified copy and holding that it was natural and rational. [298 G; 299 C, F G] Setthava vs Somayajulu, 56 I.A. 146, applied. (b) The respondents who relied on the will had discharged the onus which lay on them, namely, of proving that the testator was a major at the time he executed the will. [299 G H] The statement of the mother of the testator in the written statement of the earlier suit that the testator was a major was not relevant either under section 32(5) or 32(6) of the Evidence Act, because, it was made post litm motam. The words in the sub ,section, namely, 'before The question in issue was raised ' do not mean before it was raised in the particular litigation in which such a statement is sought to be adduced in evidence. They mean before the existence of any actual controversy. When the legatee flied her written statement in the first suit a dispute had arisen as to the age of the testator, and the controversy having existed time when the statement was made; the statement was inadmissible. 1303 B D, F H] Bahadur Singh v, Mohan Singh, 29 I.A. 1 and Kalka Prasad vs Mathura Prasad, 35 I.A. 166, referred to. But, the statement of the testator in the will that he was a major at the time he was executing it was relevant under the sub sections because. 294 the question of age fails within the sub sections as it indicates the commencement of relationship. [303 A] Md. Syedol Arffin vs Yeohooi Gark, 43 I.A. 256, Rama Chandra Dutt vs Yogeshwar Narain Dec, I.L.R. , Oriental Govt. Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. vs Narisimha Chari, I.L.R. , Gulab Tharkur vs Fadali , Prolhad Chandra vs Ramsaran, A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 420, and Mst. Naima Khatun vs Basant Singh, A.I.R. 1934 All. 406 referred. Further the conduct of the appellants and their mothers was consistent only with the fact that it was understood amongst the members of the family that the testator was a major at the time of the execution of the will and that the will was validly made. [303 H; 304 A D] The documents relied upon by the appellants, namely, a memorandum and an endorsement received from the Taluk Office showing that there were no entires relating to the birth of any children in the testators family in the birth register for the year in which the testator stated he was born, were not admissible in evidence as the writers of the documents were not examined to testify to the contents of those documents and to establish that notwithstanding their diligent efforts the original register was not traceable. [301 B D] (2) In face of the expressly declared intention in the body of the will that he was disposing of the entire property it is impossible to hold that the testator desired to hold back a portion thereof from his mother and leave it intestate. merely became, there was discrepancy between the total measurement mentioned in the body of the will and that in the schedule to the will. [304 H; 305 A] 
4751	A news item appeared in the newspaper of which respondent No. 2 was its editor, that while addressing a rally of Judicial Employees ' Welfare Association, the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir denounced and ridiculed the judiciary stating that Justice is being bought in judicial Courts" and that he would never honour the Court 's stay orders because justice could be bought with money. The news item also stated that the Chief Minister expressed his regret to the Chief Justice and other Judges who were present at the meeting	 explaining that the strong words used by him were the voice of his conscience and that he had the greatest regard for the judiciary. The petitioner filed the contempt petition against the Chief Minister. Although a show cause notice was issued under the to the Chief Minister (respondent) on March 18	 1983 no counter affidavit was filed till September 26	 1983. When the contempt petition was called out on that day his advocate accepted the notice on behalf of the respondent. Eventually on November 21	 1983 the affidavit of the Chief Minister dated November 9	 1983 was taken on record. While the Chief Minister denied having made the statements attributed to him	 the Editor asserted that the version published in the newspaper was true. On the question whether the statements published in the newspaper amounted to contempt of court. Dismissing the petition	 ^ HELD: What is involved in this case is criminal contempt and therefore it is necessary to apply the particular standard of proof required to be established in a criminal case. Respondent	 No.1	 on the material placed on record	 cannot be held to be guilty of the charge. [764F] 761 In matters involving allegations of criminal contempt	 the Court has to act both as a prosecutor and as a Judge. It does so to uphold the authority of law and not in defence of a particular Judge. Secondly	 the right of free speech is an important right of the citizen and bona fide criticism of any system or institution is aimed at inducing the administrators of that system or institution to look inwards and improve its public image. Courts do not like to assume the posture that they are above criticism. At the same time though law does not restrain the expression of disapprobation against what is done in or by Courts of law	 the liberty of free expression is not to be confounded with a licence to make unfounded allegations of corruption against the judiciary. The abuse of the liberty of free speech and expression carries the case nearer the law of contempt. Those who criticise the judiciary must remember that they are attacking an institution which is indispensable for the survival of the rule of law but which has no means of defending itself. Therefore	 Judges must receive the protection of law from unfounded attacks on their character. [765H; 766A	 B E; F G] If the Chief Minister said what was alleged in the news item he was in contempt; if he had not	 the Editor had committed a contempt by publishing a false report of a scurrilous speech that was never made. In the face of denial by one and an assertion by the other without more	 it is difficult to decide who is right. On the one hand is the tendency to ridicule the system of justice and malign those who administer it	 on the other is the propensity of the fourth estate for some little sensation and its political involvement. When political considerations pollute the stream of life	 sifting truth from falsehood becomes a formidable and forbidding task. In these circumstances it is difficult to record a positive finding that the allegation that the Chief Minister made the particular statement is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [764D F] Although the petitioners had asserted that the Judges of the High Court were present at one of the functions and that they walked out of the meeting on hearing the abusive language used by the Chief Minister no attempt was made to establish the truth of that assertion. A walkout by Judges of the High Court during the speech of the Chief Minister or soon thereafter would have lent considerable weight to the allegation that the statements made by the Chief Minister were open to grave objection. [764G H] When a Chief Minister makes a formal speech an official record of the speech	 if it were a prepared speech	 or even if it were an extempore speech	 should have been kept. No one taped or took down the speeches of a person as important as the Chief Minister. No written record kept contemporaneously or prepared soon after is cited to contradict the allegation that the Chief Minister scandalised the Courts and assailed the character of Judges. [765B D]