Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 473 of 1976. (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 26 2 1976 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 2068/75). D.P. Singh	 R.P. Singh	 L.R. Singh	 Rajev Dutta and P.K. Jain	 for the appellants and R. 2. 214 D. Mukherjee and Amlan Ghosh	 for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG	 J. The respondent was initially appointed as an Ac countant 10th July	 1969	 in the Varanasaya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya Varanasi (hereinafter referred to as the University '). On 4th December	 1969	 he was transferred to another post	 that of a "Senior Assistant". In January	 1970	 Dr. Shambhu Nath Singh	 who was the permanent Lecturer in Hindi in the University proceeded on long leave	 and the plaintiff respondent	 being already in the service of the University	 was asked to teach classes for the time being Applications 'were invited for filling up the	 post of Dr. Singh. The advertisement said that the appointment was to be temporary but likely to be made permanent later. The plain tiff respondent	 who was already officiating	 also applied. He was temporarily appointed on 25th February	 1970. On 23rd April	 1970	 the Registrar of the University gave the plaintiff[respondent a notice that his temporary appointment would terminate on 30th April	 1970. The plaintiff respond ent promptly brought his first suit in the Court of Munsif City	 Varanasi	 to restrain the University from appointing any one else in his place; but	 this suit was ultimately dismissed. On 15th July	 1970	 Dr. Singh had resigned from his post so that the permanent vacancy was there to be filled up. At that time	 the plaintiff 's suit	 mentioned above	 was still pending. A Selection Committee of the University interviewed candidates	 including the plaintiff respondent on 2nd November	 1970	 and submitted a list of names for appointment to the post. In this list	 the plain tiff respondents name was placed first. As the Executive Committee of the University was not in session	 it appears that the Vice Chancellor appointed the plaintiff on 1st February	 1971	 on the basis of the recommendations of the Selection Committee. The Vice Chancellor purported to act under Section 13	 sub. section (7) of the Varanasaya Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya Adhiniyam	 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act '). The Executive Committee of ' the University then passed a resolution on 17th or 18th March	 1971	 approv ing what it assumed to be the recommendation of the Selec tion Committee to appoint the plaintiff respondent tempo rarily. It also decided to advertise for the post again. On 10th April	 1971	 the plaintiff respondent was informed by the Registrar of the University	 communicating the decision of the Executive Committee	 that his appointment was to continue only	 upto the end of the current academic session. On 15th May	 1971	 the plaintiff respondent filed his second suit	 now before us	 for a permanent injunction to restrain the appellant University from terminating his services. This suit was dismissed by an Additional Civil Judge. On an appeal it was decreed by the Additional District and Ses sions Judge of Varanasi. The High Court of Allahabad	 in second appeal	 affirmed the judgment and order under appeal before it. The defendant University is now before this Court by grant of special leave to appeal. The case of the plaintiff respondent was: firstly	 that the vacancy in which he was to be appointed being permanent and the procedure of appointment through a Selection Commit tee being meant for permanent appointments	 the plaintiff respondent was actually recommended for 215 a permanent appointment	 but	 there had been an alteration and interpolation in the recommendation of the Selection Committee so as to make it appear that the recommendation was only for a temporary appointment secondly	 that the Vice Chancellor	 in any case	 had the power to make a permanent appointment under Section 13	 sub. section (7) of the Act and he had done so	 thirdly	 that the plaintiff respondent 's ap pointment being complete and permanent	 the Executive Com mittee of the University had no power left to nullify it; and lastly	 that the authorities of the University	 that is to say the Vice Chancellor and the Executive Committee	 had (in the words used by the plaintiff respondent): "xx xx in collusion with one another with a view to put an end to the plaintiff 's services as Lecturer in Hindi in utter disre gard of the statutes and rules and the ap pointment letter issued by the then Vice Chancellor have collusively arranged and made manipulation in the report of Selection Com mittee and resolution of the Executive Commit tee for an order dated 10th April	 1971	 and	 in colourable exercise of power	 are threaten ing to treat the plaintiff 's appointment as continuing till the end of Session but the plaintiff is continuing to discharge his function as permanent lecturer in Hindi and on account of interim injunction granted in suit No. 289 of 1971 for permanent injunction restraining the defendants terminating the services of the plaintiff the defendants have not been able to do any act adverse to the interest of the plaintiff". The Trial Court had held that	 even if there had been an interpolation of the word temporary in the recommendation of the Selection Committee for a proposed appointment	 it did not affect the result because the Vice Chancellor had nei ther the power to make a permanent appointment nor had he done so by means of his order dated 1 st February	 1971	 which merely said that the plaintiff respondent was appoint ed to lecture without specifying whether the appointment was to be temporary or permanent. It appears to us that the Appellate District Court had been very much carried away by the fact that there had been	 in its opinion	 an alteration or interpolation in the recom mendation of the Selection Committee although the Committee had no power whatsoever to determine the nature of the appointment of the plaintiff respondent. The Appellate Court had	 therefore	 reached the conclusion	 which did not really follow from this finding	 that the appointment of the plaintiff respondent was permanent in the eye of law. It also held that the Executive Committee had no power whatso ever to alter or touch the terms of the appointment made by the Vice Chancellor	 which amounted to an appointment on probation for two years. It reached this surprising conclu sion despite the complete absence in the Vice Chancellor 's order of any mention of a probation. The Appellate Court had granted an injunction in the following terms: "The defendants respondents are perma nently restrained from advertising the post of Lecturer in Hindi and from caus 216 ing any interference in the plaintiff 's dis charge of his duties as lecturer in Hindi in the Varanasaya Sanskrit Vishwavidyala by terminating his services or from withholding his salary in pursuance of resolution No. 44 dated 17/18 3 1971 passed by the Karya Kariti ni Parishad of the Varanasaya Sanskrit Vish wavidyalaya and order No. 3 dated 10 4 1971 (exhibit 1 ) passed by the defendant respondent No. 3". The High Court	 in agreement with the first Appellate Court	 had interpreted Section 13(7) of the Act as confer ring the power of absolute appointment to a permanent vacan cy upon the Vice Chancellor. It had repelled the contention that Section 23(1)(g) of the Act gives exclusive powers to the Executive Committee to make appointments of teachers because that power is: "Subject to the provisions of this Act and the Statutes". The power is "23 (1) (g) to appoint the officers	 teachers and other servants of the Vishva Vidyalaya	 to define their duties and the conditions of their service and to provide for the filling of casual vacancies in their posts	 The High Court sustained the injunction, but had modified it considerably by what it called a clarification in the following words: xxx as it is not a yet certain whether the position of the plaintiff respondent at present is that of probationer or a permanent employee	 if for any valid reason the services of the plaintiff are terminated hereafter	 the permanent injunctions granted to the plain tiff respondent by the lower appellate court shall become inoperative and unenforceable". After the High Court had diluted the injunction in a type of case in which the desirability of granting such a relief was very doubtful	 it was perhaps not very necessary for this Court to consider the matter under Article 136 of the Constitution. Nevertheless	 as this Court had thought fit to grant special leave in this case and the High Court 's findings are not unequivocal	 we propose to decide the question of interpretation of Section 13 (7) of the Act and other questions which appear to us to have a bearing on the question whether it is desirable for Courts to interfere by means of an injunction in the affairs of educational institutions. The High Court itself has held that the ordinary power of making appointments of teachers of the University and of defining the nature of appointments and specifying condi tions of service in such cases is vested in the Executive Committee. The emergency powers under Section 13 (7 ) of the Act are obviously intended for certain emergent situa tions necessitating "immediate action". Before they can be exercised it must appear that there is	 in fact	 such a situation as to warrant the exercise of extraordinary powers conferred under Section 13 ( 7 ) of the Act. It is apparent that the Vice Chancellor has to report the action taken to the authority or other body "which in the ordinary course would have dealt with the matter". It seems to us to be rather extraordinary that despite these clear indications of the situation in which 217 and the extent to which the Vice Chancellor may exercise his emergency powers	 it should have been held by the first Appellate Court and affirmed by the High Court that the Vice Chancellor had a power to make an absolute or clear appoint ment without any restriction or obligation to place the matter before the Executive Committee for confirmation. We find that the Appellate Court had gone to the extent of saying that the Executive Committee had "no jurisdiction" or power left to consider the case. We think that this is an impossible view to take in view of the clear meaning of the words used in Section 13(7) of the Act. The object of the provision for reporting the matter to the body which deals with it in the ordinary course could only be to leave the final decision to that body when it does meet. In other words	 the powers of the Vice Chancellor was	 in our opin ion	 confined to making a tentative decision which	 whether he meant the appointment to be temporary or permanent	 was subject to confirmation by the Executive Committee. Until then it was not final. When that body refused to treat the appointment as permanent and to re advertise the post	 it clearly indicated its ;intention to specify the nature of the plaintiff respondent 's appointment which it alone could do. Although we are not satisfied that circumstances existed which justified the use of emergency powers of the Vice Chancellor under Section 13(7) of the Act	 yet	 we do not think it possible to enter upon this enquiry as no argument seems to us to have been advanced on this aspect in the High Court or in the District Courts. We	 however	 think that the first Appellate Court had much too lightly believed that the plaintiff appellant had been a victim of some kind of fraud	 when no such particulars of that fraud or collusion were given as would satisfy the requirements of Order VI	 Rule 4	 Civil Procedure Code	 which lays down: "In all cases in which the party plead ing relies on any misrepresentation	 fraud	 breach of trust	 wilful default	 or undue influence	 and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms	 aforesaid	 particulars (with dates and items if neces sary) shall be stated in the pleading". We do not think it is enough to state in general terms that there was "collusion" without more particulars. This Court said in Bishundeo Narain & Anr. vs Seogeni Rai & Ors. C) (at p.556) as under: "General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Ct. ought to take notice	 however strong the language in which they are couched may be	 and the same applies to undue influ ence and coercion". We have already set out the general allegations of alleged collusion by which the plaintiff respondent seemed to imply some kind of fraud. He indicated no reason for this and made no specific allegation against any particular person. (1) ; 	 556 218 Apart from some suspicion surrounding the alleged alter ations in the recommendation of the Selection Committee	 which did not have as the Appellate Court rightly held the power to determine the nature of appointment of the plain tiff respondent	 nothing more seems to have been proved here at all on the findings of fact recorded. It is in evidence that the Selection Committee itself was presided over by the Vice Chancellor. It is true that the alterations have not been initialed. But	 considering the most unsatisfactory and haphazard manner in which the records of this University had been kept (we have examined the original records)	 we would not be surprised if the actual proceedings were	 quite honestly	 recorded in this fashion. If the Vice Chancellor	 who presided	 had any actual prejudice or animus against petitioner	 he would not be a party to placing the plain tiff 's name first let alone the recommendation for a tempo rary appointment of an employee whose worth must be known to him. There was nothing to prevent a Selection Committee from making a particular recommendation of this kind. It certainly had no power to make the appointment which vested only with the Executive Committee. But	 its powers of recom mendation were not fettered. At any rate	 no rule was shown to us as to how it should send its report. Furthermore	 if the Vice Chancellor was prejudiced against the plaintiff respondent and had even altered records	 he could not have passed an order of appointment without even clearly specify ing that the appointment was temporary. The original order on the record shows that the petitioner was appointed with out specifying whether he was being appointed permanently or temporarily. Obviously	 if the Vice Chancellor did not have the power to make a permanent appointment	 as we think he did not	 we do not think that it would have made a differ ence even if he had purported to make a permanent appoint ment which would have been invalid. However	 on the exact terms of the order of the Vice Chancellor	 it could not be said that he had passed any order for a permanent appoint ment. The resolution of the Executive Committee	 which was also presided over by the Vice Chancellor	 could not be said to be dishonest or collusive. We think that the first Appellate Court was unduly swayed by what it thought was a dishonest interpolation in the report of the Selection Committee. The result of the consideration of the applicable provi sions and the pleadings and findings of fact in the case before us is that we think that the plaintiff respondent has failed completely to show that the resolution of 17 18th March	 1972	 of the Executive Committee	 which had the final power to appoint and to specify conditions of service	 under Section 23(1)(g) of the Act	 could be said to be either collusive or inoperative. We would also like to observe that	 in a matter touching either the discipline or the administration of the internal affairs of a University	 Courts should be most reluctant to interfere. They should refuse to grant an injuction unless a fairly good prima facie case is made out for interference with the internal affairs of an educational institutions. We presume that the plaintiff respondent has been work ing as a result of the injunction granted to him. We	 however	 see no justification for continuing the injunction. We	 therefore	 allow this appeal to the 219 extent that we withdraw the injunction. This means that the parties are left free to adjust their differences. If	 upon the strength of any facts subsequent to the institution of the suit now before us	 the plaintiff has acquired any new rights which have been infringed he is free to seek relief. We make this observation as it was stated on his behalf that he claims some rights on the strength of subsequent facts too. As those are not before us	 we can say nothing about them. The result is that we allow this appeal and set aside the decree and order of the High Court and restore those of the Trial Court. The parties will bear their own costs throughout. M.R. Appeal allowed.

A permanent lecturer 's post fell vacant in the appellant University	 and the Executive Committee which ordinarily made the appointment under section 23(1) (g) of the Varanasaya Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya Adhiniyam	 1956	 not being in session	 the Vice Chancellor exercised his emergency powers under section 13(7) of the Act to appoint the respondent on the recommendation of a Selection Committee of the University. Later	 the Executive Committee	 when apprised of the ap pointment	 refused to treat it as permanent and decided to re advertise the post. The respondent 's suit for permanent injunction against the termination of his services was dismissed by the Trial Court but decreed on appeal. On second appeal	 the High Court upheld the decree. The respondent contended that his appointment by the Vice Chancellor	 made under section 13(7)	 was permanent and could not be nullified by the Executive Committee as its resolution was collusive and inoperative. Allowing the appeal	 the Court	 HELD: (1) The extraordinary power under section 13(7) of the Act are intended for certain emergent situations necessitat ing "immediate action. " The Vice Chancellor has to report the action taken to the authority or other body "which in the ordinary course would have dealt with the matter" The object of such a report is to leave the final decision to that body when it does meet. The Executive Committee had the final power to appoint and to specify conditions of service under section 23(1)(g) of the Act. The powers of the Vice Chancellor were confined to making a tentative decision which was subject to confirmation by the Executive Commit tee. [216 G H	 217 B C] (2) It is not enough to state	 in general terms	 that there was "collusion" without particulars. By general allegations of alleged collusion	 the plaintiff respondent seemed to imply some kind of fraud	 but no such particulars of that fraud or collusion were given as would satisfy the requirements of Order VI Rule 4	 Civil Procedure Code. [217 E F] Bishundeo Narain & .Anr. vs Seogeni Rai & Ors. ; at 556	 applied.