Summarize the following court judgment. minal Appeal No. 191 of 1967. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 14	 1967 of the Rajasthan High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 720 of 1965. B. D. Sharma	 for the appellant. The respondent did not appear. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri	 J. Hari Ram	 respondent	 filed a complaint against Lala Ram	 appellant	 alleging that Lala Ram had attacked him 899 with a Kassi on June 10	 1964	 at about 6 p.m. Poonaram	 who was standing there prevented the blow from falling on Hari Ram by receiving it on his hand. The respondent	 however	 made a second attack and inflicted an injury on the left shoulder of Hari Ram. Hari Ram and Poonaram got themselves examined by the Civil Assistant Surgeon of the city and the injury report was submitted alongwith the complaint. The learned Magistrate acquitted the accused. Hari Ram filed an application under section 417(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code for leave to appeal against the order of the Magistrate. Leave was granted by the High Court	 and thereupon Hari Ram filed the appeal. The High Court accepted the appeal and convicted the appellant	 Lala Ram	 under section 324	 I.P.C.	 and sentenced him to four months ' rigorous imprisonment. The attention of the High Court was not drawn to the Proba tion of Offenders Act	 1958	 during the hearing of the a peal but subsequent to the delivery of the judgment an application was filed under section 561 A	 Cr. P.C.	 read with sections 3	 4 and 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act. It was alleged in the application that the appellant was 20 years old and the High Court should have given him the benefit of the Probation of the Offenders Act. The High Court did not accede to this application. The appellant having obtained special leave from this Court	 the appeal is now before us. The main contention of law which arises before us is whether the appeal to the High Court was filed within limitation. The application for leave to appeal to the High Court under section 417 (3) against the order of acquittal of the Magistrate	 dated August 31	 1965	 was filed on November 1	 1965. It was claimed by the applicant that two days were necessary for obtaining the certified copy of the order of the Magistrate and the applicant was entitled to deduct these two days taken for obtaining the certified copy of the order of the Magistrate. There is no doubt that the application would be in time	 if these two days are deducted. But the learned counsel for the appellant contends that section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act is not attracted to applications under section 417(3)	 Cr. P.C. Section 417(3) and (4) read as follows "417. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub section (5)	 the	 State Government may	 in any ease	 direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a	 High Court. (3) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court	 on L5SupCI/70 12 900 an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf	 grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal	 the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. (4) No application under sub section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal. It is contended that the period of 60 days mentioned in s.417(4) is not a period of limitation within the meaning of s.12(2) of the Limitation Act. Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act reads as follows : "12(2) In computing the period of limitation for an 	appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment	 the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the	 time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree	 sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded. " The learned counsel says that what s.417(4) provides is a prohibition and it bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with the application if a period of 60 days has expired from the date of the order of acquittal. In our opinion there is no force in these contentions. In Kaushalya Rani vs Gopal Singh(1) this Court	 while dealing with the question whether s.5 of the Limitation Act applies to applications under s.417(3) described this period of 60 days ment ioned in s.417(3) as follows: "In that sense	 this rule of 60 days bar is a special law	 that is to say	 a rule of limitation which is specially provided for in the Code itself	 which does not ordinarily provide for a period of limitation for appeals or applications. " This Court further observed "Once it is held that the special rule of limitation laid down in sub section (4) of section 417 of the Co de is a especial law ' of limitation	 governing appeals by private prosecutors	 there is no difficulty in coming to the con clusion that s.5 of the Limitation Act is wholly out of the way	 in view of s.29 (2) (b) of the Limitation Act." (1) ; 987. 901 This Court approved the judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Anjanabai vs Yashwantrao Dauletrao Dudhe(l). The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court had observed in Anjanabai 's case "Sub section (4) prescribes a period of limitation for such an application. It states that no such application shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of the order of acquittal. This period of limitation is prescribed not for all appeals under the Criminal Procedure Code	 or even for all appeals from the orders of acquittal. It is prescribed only for applications for special leave to appeal from orders of acquittal. It is therefore a special provision for a special subject and is consequently a special law within the meaning of s.29(2) of the Limitation Act. " It is quite clear that the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court and this Court proceeded on the assumption that s.417(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code prescribes a period of limitation. The learned counsel	 however	 contends that there was no discussion of this aspect. Be that as it may	 it seems to us that s.417 (4) itself prescribes a period of limitation for an application to be made under s.417(3). It was not necessary for the legislature to have amended the Limitation Act and to have inserted an article dealing with applications under s.417(3)	 Cr. P.C.; it was open to it to prescribe a period of limitation in the Code itself. The learned counsel also suggests that the word "entertain" which occurs in s.417 (4) means "to deal with or hear" and in this connection he relies on the judgment of this Court in Lakshmi Rattan Engineering Works vs Asstt. Commissioner Sales Tax (2). It seems to us that in this context "entertain" means "file or received by the Court" and it has no reference to the actual hearing of the application for leave to appeal; otherwise the result would be that in many cases applications for leave to appeal would be barred because the applications have not been put up for hearing before the High Court within 60 days of the order of acquittal. In the result we hold that the application under s.417(3) to the High Court was within time. The learned counsel then contends that the High Court should not have interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the Magistrate. He has taken us through the evidence of Poonaram who was injured and the statement of P.W. 3	 Ananda	 who was present and who seems to be an independent witness. We agree (1) I.L.R. [1961]Bom.135	 '137. (2) ; 902 with the High Court that the Magistrate was not entitled to reject the evidence of the eye witnessess. No reason has been shown to us why we should interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the High Court. The learned counsel further contends that no offence was committed because the accused had a right of private defence of property. Assuming that he had a right of private defence of property he had ample opportunity of having recourse to the authorities and there was no need for the appellant to have taken the law into his own hands. The only question that remains now is the question whether the benefit of s.6 of the Probation of Offenders Act should be extended to the appellant. In spite of opportunity being given no good proof has been furnished to establish that the appellant was at the relevant time under the age of 21 years. For the aforesaid reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed. R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.

An application for leave to appeal to the High Court under section 417(3) Code of Criminal Procedure against an order of acquittal by a Magistrate dated August 31	 1965 was filed on November 1	 1965. It was claimed that two days were necessary for obtaining the certified copy of the order of the Magistrate. The application would be in time if these two days were deducted. The High Court accepted the appeal and convicted the appellant. In appeal to this Court against his conviction the appellant contended that the period of 60 days mentioned in section 417(4) was not a period of limitation within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act and that the sub section barred the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with the application if a period of 60 days had expired from the date of the order of acquittal. HELD : The application under section 417(3) to the High Court was within time. Section 417(4) itself prescribes a period of limitation; it was open to the legislature to prescribe a period of limitation in the code itself. In the context of section 417(4) the word "entertain" means "file or receive by the court" and it has no reference to the actual hearing of the application for leave to appeal; otherwise the result would be that in many cases applications for leave to appeal would be barred because the applications have not been put up for hearing before the High Court within sixty days of the order of acquittal. [901 D F] Kaushalya Rani vs Gopal Singh	 	 987	 Anjanabai vs Yeshwantrao Daplatrao Dudhe	 I.L.R. (1961) Bom. 135	 137 and Lakshmi Rattan Engineering Works vs Asstt. Commissioner Sales Tax; 	 	 referred to.