Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 501 of 1966. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 23	 1964 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 1985 of 1963. H. R. Gokhale	 A. N. Sinha and D. N. Gupta	 for the appellants B. R. L. Iyengar	 Bisliamber Lal and H. K. Puri	 for respon dent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam	 J. This appeal	 by the Management concerned	 by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Mysore High Court	 dated October 23	 1964	 dismissing Writ Petition No. 1985 of 1963	 and declining to issue a writ of prohibition		 restraining the	 second respondent	 the Industrial Tribunal	 Bangalore 1 from proceeding with the adjudication	 in 1. D. No. 8 of 1963. The short facts	 leading up to the State of Mysore	 making the reference	 which is the subject of adjudication	 by the second respondent	 in I.D. No. 8 of 1963	 are as follows: The appellant is a textile mill	 in Bangalore	 manufacturing cotton	 silk and cotswool piece goods. After the (Act XX of 1946) (hereinafter to be referred to	 as the Standing Orders Act)	 came into force	 the standing orders of the appellant 's establishment were duly drawn up	 and certified by the authorities. Those standing orders	 among other things	 related to the question of leave	 to	 be granted 583 to the workmen. By its order	 dated August 2	 1955	 the Government of Mysore referred to the Industrial Tribunal	 Bangalore	 for adjudication	 an industrial dispute	 raised by certain categories of workmen	 of the appellant company. That reference was numbered as I.C. No. 11 of 1955. The dispute that was referred	 was "Whether the Standing Orders filed by the Management and now certified by the certifying authority be modified as a modification to the existing Standing Orders as amended by the employees through their association in the light of the views and as indicated in the Annexure to this notification". The Industrial Tribunal	 Bangalore	 made an award	 Exhibit M 6	 on September 25	 1956	 whereby the Tribunal directed the addition of certain clauses	 in the Certified Standing Orders of the appellant company. There is no controversy	 that paragraphs 50 to 70	 of Exhibit M 6	 deal with privilege leave	 sick leave and casual leave	 which could be availed of	 by the workmen. Exhibit M 5 is a copy of the Certified Standing Orders of the Management company. After the amendments	 effected to those Standing Orders	 in pursuance of the award	 Exhibit M 6	 clauses 1	 2	 3 and 4	 of Order 9	 of Exhibit M 5 deal with festival holidays	. leave with wages	 medical leave and casual leave	 respectively. The award	 Exhibit M 6	 after publication in the State Gazette	 on October 18	 1956	 came into operation on November 18	 1956	 under the provisions of section 19(3)	 read with section 17A(1)	 of the (Act XIV of 1947) (hereinafter referred to	 as the Act). The first respondent began to make certain claims	 for revi sion of the provisions	 regarding leave	 and as the appellant was not willing to concede those. claims	 the first respondent appears to have approached the State Government	 to refer the dispute	 regarding this matter	 to the Tribunal	 for adjudication 	 but	 the State Government	 by its order	 Exhibit M 2	 dated October 10	 1962	 declined to refer the matter for adjudication. In the said order	 the Government is of the view that	 as compared with leave facilities	 provided for	 in similar major industries	 in Bangalore	 the leave facilities then granted by the Management to the workmen of the appellant company	 cannot be considered to be inadequate	 and	 therefore	 the issue raised	 by the workmen	 does not merit reference	 for adjudication. But	 nevertheless	 later on	 the State Government	 referred for adjudication	 by its order	 dated March 20	 1963	 the following matters	 to the second res pondent: "Whether the workmen of Bangalore Woollen	 Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Ltd.	 are entitled to the following leave benefits: (a) Privilege leave for one month in a year with pay. 584 (b) Casual leave of 12 days in a year with pay. (c) Sick leave of 30 days in a year with full pay less E.S.I. benefits. If not	 to what reliefs they are entitled to" This reference	 out of which the present proceedings arise	 was registered as I.D. No. 8 of 1963. From the questions	 referred to above	 it will be seen that the dispute	 that was referred	 for adjudication almost exclusively relates to the question of privilege leave	 casual leave	 and sick leave	 which are already provided for. in the Standing Orders	 of the Management	 Exhibit M 5. The first respondent has placed its demands	 in respect of this question	 before the Industrial Tribunal	 and the Management have also placed their points of view	 on these matters. It is not necessary to refer to the pleas made	 either by the appellant 	or the first respondent	 regarding the merits of the claim	 which has not been adjudicated	 by the Industrial Tribunal. But the Management raised two preliminary objections	 to the jurisdiction	 of the Industrial Tribunal	 to entertain and adjudicate upon the questions	 referred by the State Government. Those two preliminary objections were to the effect: (i) The award	 Exhibit M 6	 dealing with leave and other facilities	 not having been terminated by the first respondent	 by issue of a notice	 as contemplated under section 19(6) of the Act	 continues to be in force and	 therefore	 the question of leave cannot form the subject matter of adjudication. (ii) The question regarding leave facilities	 having been provided for	 in the Certified Standing Orders	 framed by the company under the Standing Orders Act	 any modifications to those provisions	 as is now sought to be done	 can only be in the manner provided for	 in the Standing Orders Act	 and cannot form the subject of adjudication	 by the Industrial Tribunal	 under the Act. The Workers ' Union met these contentions by stating that the various representations	 made by it	 to the Management. as well as the presentation of a Charter of Demands	 amounted to notice of termination of the Award and that	 notwithstanding the Standing Orders Act	 when an industrial dispute was raised	 regarding matters which might be covered by the Standing Orders of the Management	 by the workmen and such a dispute was referred	. for adjudication	 under the Act	 by the Government concerned	 the Tribunal had full jurisdiction to adjudicate upon that dispute. These two questions have been answered	 by the Industrial Tribunal	 against the Management	 by its order	 dated August 26	 1963. The High Court	 in its order under attack	 has also agreed 585 with the findings	 recorded by the Tribunal. In considering the first objection	 both the Tribunal and the High Court have gone into the question as to whether the notice	 contemplated under section 19(6) of the Act	 should be in writing	 or	 whether it can be 	oral	 and have expressed the concurrent view that such notice can be oral also; but the ultimate finding	 recorded by the Tribunal	 and accepted by the High Court	 is that the various correspondence	 that passed between the Management and the Union	 will clearly show that the Union has terminated the Award. On .the second objection the Tribunal	 whose findings have	 again	 	been accepted by the High Court	 has held that the scope of the Standing Orders Act is very limited	 and that there is really no conflict	 between the Act and the Standing Orders Act. It is the further view of the Tribunal that	 in spite of the provisions	 contained in the Standing Orders	 framed by the company	 under the provisions of the Standing Orders Act	 it is nevertheless open to a Tribunal	 to adjudicate upon those matters	 when the question is referred to it	 as an industrial dispute	 under the Act. In this appeal	 on behalf of the Management	 Mr. H. R. Gokhale	 learned counsel	 has raised the same two contentions	 relating to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate upon the dispute	 in question. In respect of the first objection	 that the award	 Exhibit M 6	 has not been terminated by a written notice	 under section 19(6) of the Act	 counsel urged that the views	 expressed by both the Tribunal	 and the High Court	 that there could be a notice	 given even orally terminating the award	 is not correct. No doubt. the findings	 in this regard	 that there can be an oral notice	 given under section 19(6) of the Act	 has been sought to be supported	 by Mr. B. R. L. Iyengar	 learned counsel	 appearing for the Union. In our opinion it was not really necessary either for the Tribunal or for the High Court	 to embark upon	 and express an opinion	 on the question	 as to whether the notice of termination of an award	 under section 19(6)	 of the Act	 can be oral	 because. so far as we can see	 the Union has not raised any plea that the termination of the award	 Exhibit M 6	 in this case	 has been brought about	 by its giving an oral notice to the Management. On the other hand	 the specific plea of the Union	 on this aspect	 was that the various representations	 made by it	 to the Management	 as well as the presentation of the Charter of Demands. amounted to a notice of termination of the award. The various representations and the Charter of Demands	 referred to	 by the Union	 are the representations and charter given in writing	 to the Management	 on various matters. Therefore	 we express no opinion	 on this case	 as to whether the termination of an award	 can be brought about by an oral notice being given	 under section 19(6)	 of the Act. We will then consider the _question	 as to whether there has been a termination of the award	 Exhibit M 6	 in the manner pleaded by the Union. It cannot be over emphasized that an 586 intimation	 claimed to have been given	 regarding the termination of an award	 must be fixed with reference to a particular date	 so as to enable a Court to come to the conclusion that the party	 giving that intimation	 has expressed its intention to terminate the award. Such a certainty regarding date	 is absolutely essential	 because	 the period of two months	 after the expiry of which	 the award will cease to be binding on the parties	 will have to be reckoned	 from the date of such clear intimation. It is also necessary to state that	 in this case	 the High Court and the Tribunal	 have proceeded on the basis that the decision of this Court	 in The Workmen of Western India Match Co. Ltd. vs The Western India Match Co. Ltd.(1)	 supports the proposition that an inference of an intention to terminate an award or a settlement	 can be gathered from the various correspondence that passed	 between the Management and the Union. That decision	 in our opinion	 does not lend any support to such a view. From the facts of that case	 it is seen that there was a settlement	 between the parties	 on April 29	 1955	 and there was a Charter of Demand	 given by the workmen	 on January 25	 1957. On January 14	 1953	 the Government of West Bengal referred	 to the Industrial Tribunal concerned	 for adjudication the demands made by the workmen. Earlier to that date	 on March 29	 1957	 the management had sent a reply to the Union that the Charter of Demands	 of January 25	 1957	 could not be considered	 inasmuch as the settlement of April 29	 1955	 had not been validly terminated	 under the Act. In answer to that communication	 the Union wrote	 on April 8	 1957	 that the various representations	 made by it	 to the management and the representation of the charter of demands	 amounted to a notice of termination of the settlement. In dealing with this point	 it will be seen that this Court observes that no formal notice	 as contemplated by section 19(2)	 of the Act	 has been given by the Union. But	 this Court	 ultimately	 held that though no such formal notice was given	 the letter of April 8	 1957	 written by the Union	 could itself be construed as notice	 within the meaning of section 19(2)	 and therefore the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim	 as the reference was made	 by the State Government	 long after the expiry of two months	 from April 8	 1957. It will therefore be seen	 that this Court treated the letter	 of April 8	 1957	 written by the Union	 as amounting to a notice of intention to terminate the settlement. in the instant case	 we specifically desired Mr. lyengar	 counsel for the Union	 to state which was the particular letter	 or representation	 made by the Union	 which could be considered to amount to a notice of termination of the award. Learned counsel stated that he relied upon the letter	 dated June 26	 1961	 written by the Union	 to the Management	 as amounting to a notice	 given by his client	 intimating its intention to terminate the award	 Exhibit M 6. In view of this stand	 taken by the counsel for the Union	 we are not referring to the events that took place	 subsequent to this ; 587 date	 viz.	 June 26	 1961	 excepting to state that	 ultimately	 the State Government	 referred the present dispute	 for adjudication	 to the Industrial Tribunal. We have already stated that the award	 in I.C. No. 11 of 1957	 remained in operation	 till November 18. 1957	 under section 19(3)	 of the Act	 but notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation	 of the award	 under sub section (3)	 the said award will continue to be binding on the parties	 unless it is terminated	 in accordance with section 19(6)	 of the Act. Even during the period	 when this award was in operation	 i.e.	 within; November 18	 1957	 the workers made certain demands	 as mentioned in their letter	 dated October 28	 1957. The demands referred to	 in the said letter. related to various claims. made by the Union. In particular	 item 3	 of Annexure A	 to the said letter	 related to certain claims	 made by the several employees	 regarding privilege leave and casual leave. On September 19	 1958	 there was a settlement	 arrived at	 between the parties	 under Exhibit M 3. It is only necessary to note clause 5 of this agreement	 whereby the Staff Association withdrew the demands	 in respect of the various claims	 made on October 28	 1957	 including the claim made	 for privilege leave and casual leave. The Staff Association also agreed that	 for a period of three years	 commencing from January 1	 1958	 they would not raise any dispute regarding any of the subjects covered by Annexure A to their original demands	 which included also the claim for privilege leave and casual leave. No doubt there is a reservation	 regarding gratuity	. with which we are not now concerned. Therefore	 it will be noted that though a claim was made	 in respect of leave	 on October 28	 1957	 the Union withdrew that claim	 under the agreement	 M 3	 and they also agreed not to make any demands	 for three years. This is a settlement	 arrived at. by the parties	 and this settlement will be binding on them. unless it is terminated. in accordance with section 19(2) of the Act. On August 1.4	 1961	 the Union issued a notice	 Exhibit W 3 to the Management	 under section 19(2) of the Act	 stating that the settlement	 of September 19	 1958	 will stand terminated	 and cease to be binding	 after the expiry of two months. from the date of receipt of that letter	 by the Management. it is in between September 19	 1958	 the date of the settlement M 3 and August 14	 1961	 the date of the notice W 3	 terminating the settlement	 that the letter	 dated June 26	 1961	 relied on by Mr. Iyengar	 as amounting to a notice of termination of the award	 %	as sent by the Union. No doubt	 in this letter	 the Union has	 among other matters	 claimed leave facilities. as stated therein. That claim related to privilege leave	 casual leave and sick leave. Even this letter does not	 as such	 intimate the Management	 of the Union 's intention to terminate the award	 Exhibit M 6. Mr. Iyengar. learned counsel	 urged that the very fact that the Union has made claims	 in this letter	 regarding leave facilities which are inconsistent with the award 	 Exhibit M 6	 will clearly show that the Union is not standing by the award. From the facts. mentioned 588 above	 it will be clearly seen that the parties have entered into a settlement	 on September 19	 1958	 and one part of the agreement is that the Union is withdrawing its claim regarding leave facilities and it has also agreed not to raise any disputes	 regarding that matter	 for a period of three years. This settlement is binding	on both the Management and the Union	 and will continue to be binding	 until it is terminated	 in accordance with section 19(2)	of the Act. Notice of intention to terminate the settlement was given on August 14	 1961	 and	 under section 19(2) of the Act	 the settlement will cease to be binding	 after the expiry of two months	 i.e.	 on October 14	 1961. This letter	 written on June 26	 1961	 long before the issue of the notice	 on August 14	 1961	 terminating the settlement	 under section 19(2)	 is	 in our opinion	 of no avail. Unless the settlement is terminated	 the Union had no right to make any demands regarding leave facilities*	 as it has purported to do	 on June 26	 1961. Therefore	 in our opinion	 this letter cannot be considered to be a notice	 given by the Union	 expressing its intention to terminate the award. Apart from the fact that :it does not convey any such intention	 it is also invalid	 inasmuch as it has been given	 even before the settlement was terminated. From this	 it will follow that when there is a subsisting award	 binding on the parties	 the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to consider the same points	 in this reference. Normally	 this conclusion	 arrived at	 by us	 may be enough to dispose of this appeal 	 but the second question	 relating to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal	 functioning under the Act	 to adjudicate upon a dispute	 which may result in the modification of the Standing Orders. framed by the management. under the Standing Orders Act	 has also been adjudicated upon by the Tribunal	 and the High Court and the correctness of those findings	 have been canvassed. before us. If	 later on	 there is a proper reference to the Tribunal	 the same questions may arise	 for consideration; and therefore. we shall proceed to express	 our views on that aspect also. The contention of Mr. Gokhale. learned counsel for the appellant	 is that the Management	 after the coming into force of the Standing Orders Act	 had framed standing orders which have been certified	 by the Certifying Officer. Those Standing Orders	 originally framed	 made provision for the grant of privilege leave	 sick leave	 casual leave and other allied matters. The Award	 Exhibit M 6	 dealt with the claim of the workmen	 in this regard	 and gave certain directions. Those directions have been incorporated	 by the Management. by amending the Standing :Orders and the provisions regarding leave. 	 are all to be found in those Standing Orders Exhibit M 5. The Standing Orders Act	 as the various provisions therein will show	 is a self contained statute	 imposing obligations on the Management and also conferring rights. on the parties concerned. for the framing of and 		effecting modifications	 in the Standing Orders. The manner in 589 which the modification is to be sought	 is also indicated	 in the Act. In this connection	 learned counsel referred us to the interpretation	 placed upon item 5	 in the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act	 by this Court	 in The Bagalkot Cement Co. Ltd. vs R. K. Pathan(1)	 that it is open	 to the authorities functioning under the Standing Orders Act	 to make substantive provisions for the granting of leave and holidays	 along with conditions in respect of them. Mr. Gokhale pointed out that the Standing Orders Act placed an obligation	 on the management	 to have the Standing Orders certified; it imposes a duty on the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority	 to adjudicate upon the reasonableness and fairness of the Standing Orders 	 a right has been given. both to the workmen	 and the management	 to apply to the Certifying Officer to have the Standing Orders modified; there is provision for appeals; penal provisions are provided	 for failure to submit draft standing orders	 or for modifying standing orders	 otherwise than in accordance with section 10; and	 finally	 jurisdiction is given under section 13 A	 to the Labour Court	 constituted under the Standing Orders Act	 to entertain any dispute that may be referred to it	 by the employer or workman	 regarding the application	 or interpretation of a standing order. These provisions	 according to the learned counsel. clearly show that the Standing Orders Act is a self sufficient statute. by if any provision made. in respect of leave. in any Standing Orders	. requires modification. the only procedure to be adopted by the party concerned. is as indicated in the Standing Orders Act. In respect of all matters which are to be so dealt with. regarding industrial establishments. to which the Standing Orders Act applied	 the Industrial Tribunal	 constituted under the Act	 will have no jurisdiction to entertain a claim or adjudicate upon the same. When two statutes. as in this case. the Act and the Standing Orders Act	 more or less deal with some common matters	 the proper and reasonable view to hold will be that the Act can be invoked only in respect of industrial establishments which are not governed by the Standing Orders Act. Mr. Gokhale also pointed out that under such circumstances	 the remedy to be adopted is the one	 under the Standing	 Orders Act; and this is also to be deduced from the views	 expressed by this Court. in certain deci sions	 to which he has drawn our attention. Mr. lyengar	 learned counsel for the Union	 on the other hand	 points out that the Act and the Standing Orders Act. have been enacted for different purposes; the scope of an adjudication	 under the Standing Orders Act	 counsel points out	 is only regarding the fairness or reasonableness	 of standing orders. The Standing Orders	 certified under the Standing Orders Act	 are no doubt binding on the parties and	 in individual cases	 it may be possible for a workman to apply for a modification of a particular Stand (1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 697. 590 ing	 Order or raise a question	 regarding the application or interpretation of a Standing Order	 and refer it to the Labour Court. But	 counsel points out. that does not mean that there cannot be a larger question	 by way of an industrial dispute. raised by the Union	 or the workmen	 as a body	 concerned	 which will necessitate an adjudication	 by the Industrial Tribunal	 under the Act. In this connection	 counsel drew our attention to the fact that the Act and the Standing Orders Act	 were amended by a common Act the Industrial Disputes (Amendment And Miscel laneous Provisions) Act	 1956 (Act KXXVI of 1956). This Amending Act made provision for	 adjudication	 by the certifying authority and the appellate authority under the standing Orders Act	 	Upon the reasonableness and fairness of standing orders. It made :a provision	 giving a right to a workman also to apply to the Certifying Officer	 to have the standing orders modified. Section 13A	 regarding reference being made to the Labour Court	 by a workman or an employer	 in respect of the application	 or interpretation of a standing order	 was also incorporated	 by the Amending Act. Side by side with these amendments	 made to the Standing Orders Act	 various amendments were effected	 in the Act also. Provisions regarding the constitution of the Labour Court	 as well as the Industrial Tribunals	 and matters over which they have jurisdiction	 as enumerated in the particular Schedules to that Act	 were also made. An adjudication	 made by the Labour Court	 or the Industrial Tribunal	 is binding on the parties	 referred to	 in section 18 of the Act. No doubt section 13A	 of the Standing Orders Act	 enables an employer or a workman	 to refer to the Labour Court	 any question relating to the application	 or interpretation	 of a standing order. But the same Amending Act has incorporated	 in the Second Schedule to the Act	 item 2	 relating to 'the application and interpretation of standing orders '	 over which the Labour Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon. 'Similarly	 counsel points out	 the Industrial Tribunal	 constituted 	under the Act	 has been given jurisdiction to deal with matters	 referred to	 in the Second and Third Schedules to the Act. 'Leave with wages and holidays ' is item 4	 of the Third Schedule to the Act	 over which jurisdiction has been given only to the Industrial Tribunal. If the contention of the appellant is accepted	 it will mean. that in respect of a similar question	 covered by the standing orders framed by a company	 the Labour Court	 which is denied jurisdiction	 under the Act	 will be competent to adjudicate upon the same. Therefore	 counsel points out	 that the matters	 	covered by the standing orders	 in respect of the various items contained in the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act	 can no doubt	 be dealt with	 in accordance with the provisions contained therein; but a general or a larger controversy regarding those matters	 can certainly form the subject of an 'industrial dispute '	 as that expression is defined in the Act	 and	 if that is so	 the Industrial Tribunal will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon those matters	 when a reference is made	 by the State Government. 591 We are in agreement with the contentions of Mr. Iyengar	 on this point. The scheme of the Standing Orders Act	 has been dealt with	 by this Court	 in three of its reported decisions: Guest	 Keen	 Williams	 Private Ltd. vs P. J. Sterling(1); The Bagalkot Cement Co. Ltd. vs R. K. Pathan(2); and Salem Electricity vs Employees( '). Therefore	 we do not think it necessary to cover the 	around over again. Those decisions have also noted the amendments effected to the Standing Orders Act	 by the Amending Act XXXVI of 1956. Those are the decisions	 which have been referred to	 by Mr. Gokhale	 in support of his contention that the observations made	 therein	 will show that after the amendment of the Standing Orders Act	 in 1956	 no industrial dispute can be raised	 under the Act	 in respect of the matters covered	 by the Standing Orders Act	 and that the remedy of the parties concerned	 will only be	 as laid down	 therein. On a perusal of those decisions	 we do not find that any such proposition	 has been laid therein. On the other hand	 we will presently show	 that in the latest decision of this Court	 the question	 as to whether there can be an industrial dispute	 raised	 which can form the subject of an adjudication	 under the Act	 has been specifically left open. In Guest	 Keen	 Williams	 Private Ltd. vs P. J. Sterling(1)	 the Management had framed standing orders which had been certified	 under the Standing Orders Act. On the basis of those standing orders	 certain workmen were voluntarily retired	 at the age of 55 years	 and the dispute	 regarding this matter	 was referred to the Industrial Tribunal	 under the Act. The order of the Management was set aside	 and reinstatement of some of the workers	 was ordered. An objection was raised	 on behalf of the Management	 before this Court	 that the reference	 by the Government	 itself	 was bad	 on the ground that section 7 of the Standing Orders Act makes the standing orders binding	 between the employer and his employees	 and	 till those standing orders	 are modified	 the parties	 will be governed by those standing orders	 and the legality of the action	 taken by the Management	 on the basis of the standing orders	 cannot form the subject of a reference	 under the Act. But this Court	 after referring to the scheme of the Standing Orders Act	 observed that before the Standing Orders Act was amended	 in 1956	 if the employees wanted to challenge the reasonableness	 or fairness of any of the standing orders	 the only course was to raise an industrial dispute in that matter	 but that this position was altered	 by the amendments made	 to the Standing Orders Act	 by which it bad been made obligatory	 on the part of the Certifying Officer	 and the Appellate Authority	 to adjudicate upon the reasonableness and fairness of a standing order	 and a right had been given to the workman also. to apply (1) ; (2) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 697. (3) ; 592 for the modification of any standing order. This Court further observed	 at p. 358: "The standing orders certified under the Act no doubt become part of the terms of employment by operation of section 7; but if an industrial dispute arises in respect of such orders and it is referred to the tribunal by the appropriate government	 the tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with it on the merits. According to Mr. Gokhale	 these observations will clearly indicate that the view of this Court is that prior to 1956	 the questions regarding standing orders	 could form the subject of an industrial adjudication	 under the Act	 and he wants us to draw the inference that	 after 1956	 the view of this Court is	 that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal	 in such matters	 has been taken away. We are not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel	 for	 this Court	 in the above decision	 had no occasion to consider the provisions of the Standing Orders Act	 in relation to the Act. In fact	 there is no reference at all to the amendments effected in 1956	 to the Act. The next decision is The Bagalkot Cement Co. Ltd. vs R. K. Pathan(1). In that decision	 this Court had to consider	 again	 the effect of the Standing Orders Act	 prior to its amendment	 in 1956. No doubt the amendments	 effected in 1956	 are also adverted to when considering the scheme of the Standing Orders Act. In particular	 the scope of item 5	 of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act	 to the effect 'conditions of	 procedure in applying for	 and the authority which may grant. leave and holidays '	 came up for consideration. The contention	 on behalf of the Management	 appears to have been that the jurisdiction. conferred on a Certifying Authority	 under this clause	 does not empower the said Authority to deal with the substantive question of the extent and quantum of leave and holidays. It was further contended that the said clause only required the Standing Orders to provide for conditions	 subject to which	 leave and holidays could be granted	 as well as the procedure	 in respect thereof. In short	 it was contended that the quantum of leave and holidays	 to be granted to workmen	 was outside the purview of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act and	 as such	 they could not be included by the Certifying Officer	 or the Appellate Authority	 in the Standing Orders. This contention was rejected	 by this Court	 and it was held that the substantive provisions	 for the granting of leave and holidays	 along with conditions in that respect	 could be provided for	 in the Standing Orders	 under cl. 5	 of the Schedule. It will be noted that this decision was also concerned	 solely with the question of the jurisdiction of the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority	 under the Standing Orders Act	 in relation to the standing orders	 which came up for consideration	 before them. In this decision also this Court did not have occasion to 593 consider whether those matters could form the subject of an industrial adjudication	 under the Act. Mr. Gokhale	 no doubt	 relied upon the observation	 at p.710	 to the following effect: "It is not disputed that the claim for leave and holidays can become the subject matter of an industrial dispute and if such a dispute is referred for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal	 the Tribunal can fix the quantum of holidays and leave. What the Tribunal can do on such reference is now intended to be achieved by the Standing Orders themselves in respect of industrial establishments to which the Act applies. We have noticed that the Certifying Officer as well as the appellate authority are	 in substance	 industrial authorities and if they are given power to make provision for leave and holidays as they undoubtedly are given power to provide for termination of employment and suspension or dismissal for misconduct	 there is nothing inconsistent with the spirit of the Schedule or With the object of the Act." and attempted to persuade us to hold that in respect of all the matters	 covered by the standing orders	 exclusive jurisdiction is vested only in the authorities	 constituted under the Standing Orders Act. Though	 prima facie	 the above observations may appear to give some support to this contention of Mr. Gokhale	 in our opinion	 those observations must be limited to the question that this Court was considering	 in that case	 which. again. was with reference to the powers of the authorities	 under the Standing Orders Act	 as well as the rights of the parties	 with reference to those standing orders. But	 at any rate	 as we shall presently show	 in the later decision	 the question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal	 in such matters	 has been specifically left open. We then come to the decision of this Court	 in Salem Electricity vs Employees(1). In that case	 the appellant had framed standing orders and got them certified	 in or about 1947. under the Standing Orders Act. In 1960	 the appellant made an application	 before the Certifying Officer	 for amendment of certain standing orders. By virtue of the proposed amendment	 the management wanted to have two sets of standing orders. to govern the relevant terms and conditions of its employees. Both the Certifying Officer	 as well as the Appellate Authority	 declined to modify the standing orders	 as desired by the management. The question that arose for decision was it short one	 as to whether the rejection of the application of the management	 was justified or not. This Court	 again	 considered the scheme of the Standing Orders Act	 both before and after its amendment in 1956	 and held that in regard (1) L J(N)6SCI 12 594 to the certification of the standing orders	 the Standing Orders Act provided for a self contained 'code	 and ultimately held that the refusal of the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority	 to modify the standing orders	 was perfectly justified. Here	 again	 this Court had no occasion to consider the position of standing orders	 framed under the Standing Orders Act	 in relation to an industrial dispute that may be raised	 and referred for adjudication	 under the Act. In fact	 that no decision was intended to be given	 on that aspect	 is made clear by the learned Chief Justice	 when he observes	 at p. 506: "It may be that even in regard to matters covered by certified Standing Orders	 industrial disputes may arise	 between the. employer and his employees	 and a question may then fall to be considered whether such disputes can be referred to the Industrial Tribunal for its adjudication under section 10(1) of the . In other words	 where an industrial dispute arises in respect of such matters	 it may become necessary to consider whether	 notwithstanding the selfcontained provisions of the Act	 it would not still be 	open to the appropriate Government to refer such a dispute for adjudication. We wish to make it clear that our decision in the present appeal has no relation to that question. In the present appeal	 the only point which we are deciding is whether under the scheme of the Act	 it is permissible to the employer to require the appropriate authorities Under the Act to certify two different sets of Standing Orders in regard to any of the matters covered by the Schedule. " None of the above decisions lend support to the contentions :of the learned counsel for the appellant that	 after the amendment .effected in 1956	 to the Standing Orders Act	 the Industrial Tribunal will have no jurisdiction	 under the Act	 to adjudicate upon any disputes in relation to matters	 covered by the Standing Orders	 framed under the Standing Orders Act. Further	 accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant	 will be to practically wipe out the existence of the Act	 so far as industrial establishments	 governed by the Standing Orders Act	 are concerned. The Legislature	 in 1956	 amended	 .by the same Act viz.	 Act XXXVI of 1956	 both the Act and the 'Standing Orders Act. Schedules were also incorporated in the Act	 and. in particular	 the same item. which is referred to in section 13A	 of the Standing Orders Act	 is again referred to	 as item 2. of the Second Schedule to the Act	 over which the Labour Court has jurisdiction. Item 5	 of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act	 as interpreted	 by this Court. gives jurisdiction to the authorities under that Act	 to frame standing order	;. with reference 595 not only to the procedure for rant of leave and holidays	 but also in respect of the quantum of leave	 and allied matters. The Legislature	 in item 4 of the Third Schedule to the Act	 dealing with 'leave with wages and holidays '	 has conferred jurisdiction	 In that regard	 on the Industrial Tribunal. The Standing Orders Act which	 has for its object	 the defining	 with sufficient precision	 the conditions of employment	 under the industrial establish ments and to make the said conditions known to the workmen employed by them	 has provided more or less a speedy remedy to the workman	 for the purpose of having a standing order modified	 or for having any question relating to the application	 or interpretation of a standing order	 referred to a labour Court. But there is no warrant	 in our opinion	 for holding that merely because the Standing Orders Act is a self contained statute	 with regarded to the matters mentioned therein	 the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal	 under the Act	 to adjudicate upon the matters	 covered by the standing orders	 has been	 in any manner	abridged or taken away. It will always be open	 in a proper case	for the Union or workmen to raise an 'industrial dispute '	 as that expression is defined in section 2(k) of the Act	 and	 if such a dispute is referred by the Government	 concerned	 for adjudication	 the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court	 as the case may be. will have jurisdiction to adjudicate	 upon the same. But	 it must also be borne in mind that an 'industrial dispute ' has to be raised by the Union	 before it can be referred and	 it is not unlikely that a Union must. be persuaded to raise the dispute	 though the grievance of a particular workman	 or a member of the Union	 be otherwise well founded. Even if the Union takes up the dispute	 the State Government may	 or may not	 refer it to the Industrial Tribunal. The discretion of the State Government	 under section 10 of the Act	 is very wide. It may be that the workmen. affected by the standing orders	 may not always	 and in every case	 Succeed in obtaining a reference to the Industrial Tribunal	 on a relevant point. These are some of the circumstances for giving a right and remedy	 to the workman	 under the Standing Orders Act itself	 but there is no indication	 in the scheme of the Standing	 Orders Act	 that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal	 to entertain an 'Industrial dispute '	 bearing upon the standing orders of in industrial establishment	 and to adjudicate upon the same	 has any manner been abridged	 or taken away	 by the Standing Orders Act. Therefore	 on this aspect	 we are in agreement with he conclusions	 arrived at	 by the Industrial Tribunal	 and the High Court. But	 in view of our finding on the first point	 that the award	 Exhibit M 6 'had not been terminated. it follows that the reference. made by the State Government	 dated March 20	1963	 in his case	 is incompetent	 and the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same	 in I.D. No. 8 of 1963. In the result	 the order :of the High Court is set aside	 and a writ of 596 prohibition	 restraining the second respondent	 from proceeding_ with the adjudication	 in I.D. No. 8 of 1963	 will issue	 and the appeal allowed	 to that extent. Parties will bear their own costs	 in this appeal. G.C. Appeal allowed in part.

The Standing Orders of the appellant 's establishment	 duly certified under the 	 dealt	 inter alia	 with provisions relating to leave to be granted to the workmen. In I.C. 11 of 1955 the Industrial Tribunal by its award modified the said standing orders and made provisions for certain kinds of leave. The award came into operation on November 18	 1956 under section 19(3) read with section 17A(7) of the . On further disputes arising the parties entered on September 19	 1958 into a settlement under section 12(3) of the whereby in return for the revision of the scales of pay	 the workmen agreed that for a period of three years commencing from January 1	 1958	 they would not raise any dispute on certain matters including leave. This settlement was terminated by the workmen by notice dated August 14	 1961 under section 19(2) of the . In 1963 the State Government again referred to the Industrial Tribunal an industrial dispute between the appellant and the workmen. This dispute was registered as I.D. No. 8 of 1963 and the questions referred related to privilege leave	 casual leave and sick leave. The appellant urged before the Tribunal that it was not competent to hear the reference because (i) the earlier award in I.C. 11 of 1955 which dealt with matters relating to leave had not been terminated by a notice under section 19(6) of the ; (ii) the Standing Orders in question could be modified only by the procedure under the Standing Orders	 Act and not under the because the former Act was self sufficient in regard to the matters covered by it. The Tribunal and the High Court both rejected the appellant 's objections	 whereupon	 by special leave	 appeal was filed in this Court. On behalf of the workmen it was stated that notice of termination of the earlier award under section 19(6) of the Industrial disputes Act had been given by them in a letter dated June 26	 1961. HELD:(i) When there is a subsisting award binding on the parties the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the same points in a fresh reference. In the present case the earlier award had not been terminated and the reference was therefore incompetent. [588D] The letter of June 26	 1961 could not be treated as a notice under s.19(6) of the terminating the earlier award in I.C. 11 of 1955 because it did not convey any such intention. Moreover it was written while the settlement of September 19	 1958 by which the workmen had bound themselves not to raise any dispute regarding leave facilities for three years was still in force	 for the notice of. termination of the settlement under section 19(2) was given by the workmen only on August 14	 1961. Until the said settlement was terminated the union of workmen had no right to make demands about leave facilities as it purported to do on June 26	 1961. [587G 588C] 582 The Workmen of Western India Match Co. Ltd. vs The Western India Match Co. Ltd.	 ; 	 referred to. (ii) The Standing Orders Act which has for its object	 the defining with sufficient precision. the conditions of employment	 under the industrial establishments and to make the said conditions known to the workmen	 has provided more or less a speedy remedy to the workmen	 for the purpose of having a standing order modified or for having any question relating to the application	 or interpretation of a standing order. referred to a labour court. But there is no warrant for holding that merely because the Standing Orders Act is a selfcontained statute with regard to the matters mentioned therein	 the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under the Act. to adjudicate upon the matters covered by the standing orders	 has been in any manner abridged or taken away	 It will always be open in a proper case	 for the union or workmen to raise an 'industrial dispute ' as that expression is defined in section 2(k) of the 	 and if such a dispute is referred by the Government concerned for adjudication the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court as the case may be will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same. [595B D] Guest	 Keen	 Williams.	 Private Ltd. vs P. J. Sterling	 ; 	 The Baualkot Cement Co. Ltd. vs R. K. Pathan	 [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 697 and Salem Electricity vs Employees. 	 distinguished.