Summarize the following court judgment. Civil Appeal No. 1153 of 1975. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated the 29th November 1974 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore Writ Petition No. 117 of 1973. section V. Gupte	 K. R. Nagaraja for the Appellant. Shyamla Pappu (Mrs.) for Respondent No. 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gupta	 J. on the application of the appellant the Regional Transport Authority	 Mandya	 granted him. a contract carriage permit on February 8	 1972	 valid for the entire State of Karnataka. The grant was cancelled by the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal by its order dated August 19	 1972 on appeal preferred by the third respondent	 Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court of Karnataka at Ban galore challenging the order of the Appellate Tribunal. The High Court dismissed the petition by its order dated November 29	 1 974 agreeing with the Appellate Tribunal that the Regional Transport Authority	 Mandya	 had no jurisdiction to grant permits valid throughout the State of Karnataka in view of the first proviso to sub section (1) of section 45 of the (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The correctness of that decision is questioned by the appellant in this appeal by special leave. Section 45(1) with its first proviso which is the only part of the section relevant for the present purpose is in these terms: General provision as to applications for permits. 30 "45 (1) Every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles: Provided that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying within the same State	 the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies	 and in case the portion of the proposed route or area in each of the regions is approximately equal	 to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to keep the vehicle or vehicles :" As its marginal note indicates	 section contains a general provision regulating applications for permits. The proviso	 quoted above	 lays down that where the applicant for a permit proposes to use his vehicle in two or more regions in the same State	 the application must be made to the Regional Transport Authority within whose jurisdiction the major portion of the proposed route or area lies. The appellant had asked for a contract carriage permit that would be valid throughout the State of Karnataka which meant that he proposed to use his vehicle in all the different regions lying in the State. The second proviso to section 44(1) of the Act lays down that the area specified as the region of a Regional Transport Authority shall not be less than an entire district	 or the whole area of a Presidency town. In the State of Karnataka there are 19 Regional Transport Authorities	 one for each district in the State. In terms of the first proviso to section 45 (1)	 an application for an inter regional permit that the appellant was asking for had to be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region that included the major portion of the proposed area. The question debated before the appellate tribunal and the High Court was whether the area lying within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority	 Mandya	 was larger than the area within the region of any other Regional Transport Authority in the State	 and in that context the meaning of the term 'area ' in the first proviso to section 45 (1) arose for consideration. According to the applicant for the permit	 'area ' in section 45 meant the extent of motorable tract in the region	 and the Regional Transport Authority	 Mandya	 agreeing with this interpretation of the word 'area ' found that the 'Mandya Region has more motorable roads than any other district in the State". The appellate tribunal and the High Court both refused to accept this meaning of 'area ' which they held to mean plain geographical area and as the Regional Transport Authority	 Mandya	 was admittedly not the largest district in that State	 the High Court dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the decision of the appellate tribunal that the grant of permit was without jurisdiction. Before proceeding to consider the merits of the rival contentions as to the meaning of the word 'area ' in the first proviso to section 45(1)	 it would be helpful to refer to certain other provisions of the Act which seem to be relevant in this context. The appellant had asked for a contract carriage permit. Section 2(3) defies a contract carriage as a motor vehicle which carries passengers for hire or reward under a contract for the use of the vehicles as a whole either on a time basis or 31 from one point to another	 and in both cases without stopping to pick up or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract. A motor vehicle is defined in section 2(18) as a mechanically propelled vehicle 'adapted for use upon roads '. Section 49 lays down the particulars that an application for a contract carriage permit shall contain	 and the 'area ' for which the permit is required is one of the matters that the application must state. The word route which has been used in association with 'area ' in section 45(1) is defined by section 2(28A) as "a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another." Section 2(1) defines 'area ' as follows: " "area"	 in relation to any provision of this Act	 means such area as the State Government may	 having regard to the requirements of that provision	 specify by notification in the official Gazette;" The terms and expressions defined in section 2 will apply only if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context as the opening words of the section indicate. The first proviso to section 45 (1) speaks of the route or area proposed in an application for a permit and	 as such	 there can be no question here of the State Government specifying the area. Clearly	 the definition of area in section 2(1) has no relevance in this context. The question therefore remains to be answered	 whether 'area` in section 45(1) has been used in the wider sense of geographical area	 or it means only the area of motorable roads ? The section uses both the words	 'route ' and 'area '	 whichever is applicable in a given case. A route as defined is a line of travel between two termini on a highway	 but the idea of a route as a notional line that the definition suggests has not been consistently maintained in the Act. In Dosa Satyanarayanamurty etc. vs The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corpn. (1) this Court observed: "There is no inherent in consistency between an "area" and a "route". The proposed route is also an area limited to the route proposed. " A similar observation was made in C.P.C. Motor Service	 Mysore vs The State of Mysore(2) that in the scheme of the Act	 by the word "route" is meant "not only the notional line but also the actual road over which the omnibuses run". Of course	 it would not be correct to say that the Act recognizes no distinction between 'route ' and 'area '. A route may mean not only the notional line of travel between one terminus and another	 but also the area of the road over which the motor vehicles ply	 yet the two terms are not interchangeable; as pointed out in C.P. Sikh Regular Motor Service etc. vs The State of Maharashtra	(3) "a route is an area plus something more". This "something" is the notional line of travel between two termini which distinguishes a route ` from an area simpliciter. The first proviso to section 45(1) speaks of "route or area" apparently making a distinction between them to cover applications relatable to either. A contract carriage does not ply along a fixed route or routes but over an area	 which is why an application for a contract carriage permit has to contain a statement as to the proposed area. (1) (644). (2) [1962 Supp. (1) S.C.R. 717 (725). (3) ; 32 All the decisions to which we have referred above have taken the view that by area is meant the road	 the physical tract	 over which the motor vehicles ply without reference to any notional line of travel. Of course	 this meaning was given to the word 'area ' in the context of the provisions of the Act considered in these cases	 in none of which section 45 came up for consideration. We do not however find any reason to think that 'area ' in section 45 ( 1 ) has a different connotation. Except that the territorial jurisdiction of the regional transport authorities is fixed in terms of geographical area districtwise in the State of Karnataka 'area ' in that wider sense is irrelevant to the purposes of the Act. Counsel for the respondent	 Mysore State Road Transport Corporation	 Bangalore	 built an argument on the provisions of section 12 of the Act that the meaning of 'area ' is not restricted only to the area of motorable roads in a region. Section 42 prohibits the use of a transport vehicle in any public place except in accordance with the conditions of a valid permit. A transport vehicle includes a motor vehicle used for the carriage of passengers [section 2(33) and section 2(25). Public place has been defined by section 2(24) of the Act as "road	 street	 way or other place	 whether a thoroughfare or not	 to which the public have a right of access	 and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage". lt was argued that a contract carriage which does not ply on a fixed route could be used in any public place which need not necessarily be a road; this	 according to counsel	 indicated that the word area occurring in section 45(1) meant geographical area and not motorable roads only. We do not find it possible to accept this contention. Assuming that a contract carriage could be used in places which are not really roads	 the fact remains that a contract carriage being a motor vehicle is intended for use upon roads	 and any casual use of it in places other than roads is not decisive on the interpretation of the word area. The prohibition against the use of transport vehicles in public places which are not roads serves to repel a possible claim that for using a motor vehicle in places which cannot be called roads no permit was necessary. We hold therefore that the word area in the first proviso to section 45(1) of the Act means the area of motorable roads within the territorial jurisdiction of a regional transport authority. The Regional Transport Authority	 Mandya	 held that it had within its jurisdiction the largest area of motorable roads in the State of Karnataka	 and this finding has not been disturbed by the appellate tribunal. The appellate tribunal thought that the expression "motorable roads" was vague as the area comprising of motorable roads would be changing from time to time"	 but the jurisdiction of a regional transport authority to grant an inter regional permit depends on the existing area of motorable roads when an application for a permit is made. In the course of arguments before us doubts were expressed on the reasonableness of a provision which requires an application for an inter regional permit to be made to the regional transport authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies when section 63 of the Act provides elaborate checks and lays 33 down conditions for the validation of permits for use outside the region in which it has been granted. It was submitted that in view of the provisions of section 63 there was no point in insisting on the application being made to the Regional Transport Authority of any particular region. We see the logic of this submission	 but this is a matter of policy on which the court has no say. However	 the policy itself does not appear to have been stated very clearly. On the provisions as they are it is difficult to say that the construction put forward on behalf of the third respondent is altogether implausible. It is also true that there can be practical difficulties	 whichever interpretation was adopted. This being the position we should have thought that instead of leaving the law in such a slippery state	 the State should clarify it by appropriate legislation so that the law may be clear and easily ascertainable by the concerned section of the public. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order including the order of the Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal is set aside. We make it clear that all we have decided in this case is that the Regional Transport Authority	 Mandya	 had jurisdiction to issue the permit to the appellant	 whether the permit satisfies the other conditions of a valid inter regional permit did not arise for consideration in this appeal In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. S.R. Appeal allowed.

Section 45(1) of the 	 a general provision regulating applications for inter regional route permits within a State requires an application to be made to the appropriate Regional Transport Authority mentioned in the proviso thereto namely	 either to the Regional Transport Authority of tho region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies or to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to keep the vehicle or vehicles in case the portion of the proposed route or area in each of the regions are approximately equal. The appellant applied for a contract carriage permit that would be valid throughout the State of Karnataka	 which meant that he proposed to use his vehicle in all the nineteen regions	 to the Regional Transport Authority	 Mandya	 who granted him on 8 2 1972 a contract carriage permit valid for the entire State of Karnataka. The permit was granted as Mandya region has more motorable roads than any other district in the State. On appeal preferred by the State Road Transport Corporation	 taking the view that geographically Mandya region was smaller in area and	 as such	 the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority	 Mandya was ousted	 the permit granted to the appellant was cancelled by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal by its Order dated 19 8 1972	 resulting in a writ Proceedings before the Karnataka High Court which was dismissed. On appeal by Special Leave	 the Court	 ^ HELD: (1) The word "route" which has been used in association with "area specifically notified by the State Government". However	 the terms and "a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another". Section 2(1) defines "area" as "area specifically notified by the State Government". However	 the terms and expressions defined in section 2 will apply only if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context. Tho first proviso to section 45(1) speaks of the route or area proposed in an application for a permit and	 as such	 there can be no question of the State Government specifying the area. The definition of "area" in section 2(1) has therefore no relevance in this context. [31B D] (2) section 45 uses both the words "route" and "area" whichever is applicable in a given case. A route as defined is a line of travel between two termini on a highway	 but the idea of a route as a notional line that the definition suggests has not been consistently maintained in the Act. [31D E] (3) A route may mean not only the notional line of travel between one terminus and another	 but also the area of the route over which the motor vehicles ply	 yet the two terms are not interchangeable. "A route is an area plus some thing more." This "something" is the notional line of travel between the two termini which distinguishes a route from an area simpliciter. The first proviso to section 45(1) speaks of "route or area" apparently making a distinction between 29 them to cover applications relatable to either. A contract carriage does not ply along a fixed "route or routes" but over an "area" which is why an application for a contract carriage permit has to contain a statement as to the pro posed area. [31G H] Dosa Satyanarayanamurty etc. vs The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corpn.	 (644). C. P. C. Motor Service	 Mysore vs The State of Mysore	 [1962]Supp. (1) S.C.R. 717 (725). C. P. Sikh Regular Motor Service etc. vs The State of Maharashtra	 [1975] (2) S.C.R. 10	 followed. (4)The word "area" in the first proviso to section 45(1) of the Act means the area of motorable roads within the territorial jurisdiction of a regional transport authority. Except that the territorial jurisdiction of the regional transport authority is fixed in terms of "geographical area "district wise in the State of Karnataka "area" in that wider sense is irrelevant to the purpose of the Act. [32 B	 F] (5) The jurisdiction of a regional transport authority to grant an inter regional permit depends on the existing areas of motorable roads when an application for a permit is made. [32 G] [On the question of the reasonableness of a provision which requires an application for an inter regional permit to be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region where the major portion of the proposed route or area lies	 the Court observed that this was a matter of policy but added that the policy has not been stated very clearly	 and that instead of leaving the law in such a "slippery state	 the State should clarify it by appropriate legislation so that the law may be clear and easily ascertainable by the concerned section of the public.] 
3383	Samples of cow 's milk were taken by the concerned officers from 6 out of several cans carried by the appellant in a truck and were sent for analysis. Finding the samples adulterated, the appellant was prosecuted for an offence punishable under section 16 read with section 7 of the . Both the trial Court and the first Appellate Court treated the sales of six samples as forming part of the same transaction constituting one single offence. The High Court, in revision, held that the sale of each sample constituted a distinct and separate offence, that the appellant was, therefore, liable for 6 different offences, and remanded the case for re trial of the appellant for 6 offences. Dismissing the appeal to this Court, ^ HELD: (a) The acts prohibited by section 7 include manufacturing for sale, storing, selling or distributing any adulterated article of food. Hence, not only is the act of storing for sale an offence, but also the act of selling out of the adulterated article of food so stored. The definition of sale" in section 2(xiii) includes sale for analysis. Therefore	 where samples are taken for analysis from different receptacles	 whether at one and the same time or at different times	 each taking constitutes a distinct and independent sale	 because	 each sample would be taken for determining	 by analysis	 whether the article of food in a particular receptacle is adulterated or not. The taking of each sample would be necessary and justified	 because	 it may be that the article of food in one receptacle is adulterated while in the other it is not	 or	 the nature and degree of adulteration may vary from receptacle to receptacle. It is only where samples are taken from the same receptacle at one and the same time or within reasonable proximity of time that it may not be possible to say that the taking of each of those samples constitutes a distinct and separate sale. [984 F	 H	 985 B G] Fecitt vs Walsh 	 applied. (b) In Shankar Lal Agarwalla vs Corporation of Calcutta	 A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 611	 the 3 prosecutions against the accused were not for three different transactions of sale constituted by taking samples from three tins of ghee	 but were for three acts of storing adulterated ghee	 and so the decision is not relevant. But observations contra therein that the taking of sample from different receptacles at the same time from the same place for analysis	 constitutes only one offence	 are incorrect. [986 G	 987 A D]