Summarize the following court judgment. Appeals Nos. 1003 and 1004 of 1964. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 7	 1963 of the Bombay High Court	 Nagpur Bench in Civil Revision Applications Nos. 294 and 295 of 1962. section T. Desai	 G. L. Sanghi and O. C. Mathur	 for the appel lant (in both the appeals). C. B. Agarwala	 section K. Gambhir and Ganpat Rai	 for respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals). R. N. Sachthey	 section P. Nayar for R. H. Dhebar	 for the res pondent No. 3 (in both the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri	 J. These two appeals	 by special leave	 are directed against the judgment of High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Nagpur Bench)	 dated January 7	 1963	 allowing two Civil Revision applications Nos. 294 of 1962 and 295 of 1962	 filed by Paramsukhdas	 a respondent before us. The High Court	 by this judgment	 quashed orders dated April 9	 1962	 in the Land Acquisition Cases No. 189 of 1961. and No. 190 of 1961 (as amended subsequently on July 6	 1962) and remitted the matter to the Court of the Civil Judge	 Akola	 for a fresh decision on merits with advertence to the remarks in the judgment. The High Court further directed that Paramsukhdas be allowed to be impleaded as a non applicant in the two proceedings and all parties will be allowed to amend their pleadings or make fresh pleadings with respect to the alleged compromise as filed before the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 232 of 1960. Mr. section T. Desai	 the learned counsel for the appellant	 con tends: (1)That the High Court has no jurisdiction under section 115. to interfere with the orders of the Civil Judge	 dated April 9	 1962; 364 (2) That Paramsukhdas	 respondent No. 1	 is not a person interested in the compensation and is not entitled to be impleaded as a party to the references under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act	 1894	 (I of 1894) hereinafter referred to as the Act 	 (3) That	 if at all	 no revision but appeal lay to the High Court. Before dealing with the above contentions it is necessary to state the relevant facts. Sunderlal	 appellant	 owned some land (field No. 22) in Monza Umari	 Taluq and District Akola. This field had been leased to Khushal Singh under a registered lease for 5 years commencing from April 1	 1954. The field was acquired by the Government. The Land Acquisition Officer made his award on January 30	 1960	 and assessed the total compensation at Rs. 26	105.58	 and apportioned the amount equally between Sunderlal and Khushal Singh. On February 17	 1960	 the Land Acquisition Officer noted the following regarding Khushal Singh: "2. Khushalsing s/o Tolaram (a) According to letter No. 154 / 60 of 15th February 1960 from the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) Khamgaon	 and the attachment order issued by that Court	 in C.S. No. 4 B/1958	 the amount to be paid to Khushalsing Tolaram be kept in Revenue Deposit. (b) One Sunderlal minor guardian father Madanlal Harjimal	 of Akola	 has presented an objection petition against this payment. " Sunderlal filed an application for reference under section 18 of the Act	 claiming more compensation and also complaining in regard to the apportionment of the amount of compensation between him and Khushal Singh. According to him	 Khushal Singh was not a protected tenant and his period of lease having expired	 he was not at all entitled to any portion of the amount of compensation. A reference under section 18 was made on June 27	 1961	 and this reference was numbered Land Acquisition Case No. 189 of 1961. Khushal Singh also applied for a reference and he claimed enhancement of compensation and challenged the basis of apportionment adopted by the Land Asquisition Officer. The Collector made the reference and it was numbered Land Acquisition No. 190 of 1961. Before we deal with what happened before the Civil Judge	 it is necessary to give some facts about the litigation between Sunderlal and Khushal Singh. 'On July 21	 1956	 Sunderlal filed a suit (Civil Suit No. 133 B of 1956) against Khushal Singh for rent due on January 1	 1955	 and January 1	 1956	 in the	 Court of Civil Judge	 Akola. On July 22	 1957	 the Civil Court referred the matter to the Revenue Court under section 16 A of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act	 1951. On July 25	 1958	 the Sub Divisional Officer	 Akola	 answered the reference 365 Revenue Case No. 79 of 1957 58) holding that Khushal Singh was not a protected lessee. On appeal	 the Deputy Collector. Akola	 held	 on October 8	 1959	 that Khushal Singh was a protected lessee. The Bombay Revenue Tribunal confirmed the order of the Deputy Collector on March 22	 1960. Sunderlal filed a petition before the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. It was numbered Special Civil Application No. 232 of 1960. On February 8	 1961	 a compromise petition (Civil Application No. 163 of 1961) was filed in the High Court	 in Special Civil Application No. 232 of 1960. It was stated in. the compromise petition that Khushal Singh did not wish to dispute Sunderlal 's contention that the land was leased for horticulture purposes and that he had not acquired the status of a protected lessee	 as defined in the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act	 1951. Khushal Singh further stated that he had no objection to the quashing of the orders of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal dated March 22	 1960	 and of the Deputy Collector dated October 8	 1959. On March 11	 1961	 Paramsukhdas filed an application (Civil Application No. 246 of 1961) in the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 232 of 1960	 claiming to be heard. He alleged that he had obtained a decree against Khushal Singh and started execution proceedings for Rs. 20	013/ and the amount of Rs. 13	644.27 ordered to be paid to Khushal Singh as compensation had been attached by him for the satisfaction of his decree. He alleged that Khushal Singh and Sunderlal had mala fide entered into an agreement and had filed a compromise application asking for quashing of the orders of the Revenue Courts with the sole object of setting at naught the attachment and execution of his decree. He prayed	 therefore	 for leave to appear in the case as a party vitally interested. He further prayed that the compromise application should not be entertained and	 should be dismissed in the interest of justice. It appears that on March 20	 1961	 this application came up for hearing before the High Court. Paramsukhdas	 however	 took three weeks ' more time from the High Court	 which was granted to him. It further appears that Paramsukhdas withdrew the said amount of Rs. 13	644 27 towards satisfaction of his decree. On April 18	 1961	 he filed another application (Civil Application No. 365/61) wherein he stated that he had withdrawn the amount and alleged that he was now an interested party	 and	 therefore	 he should be joined as a party. On the same date	 his Advocate	 Mr. Sohoni gave an undertaking in the following terms: "Mr. Sohoni undertakes to hold the moneys withdrawn 'by his client subject to the orders of this Court 'on this application." On August 3	 1961	 the High Court disposed of Civil Applica tion No. 163 of 1961	 Civil Application No. 246 of 1961 and Civil Application No. 365 of 1961. The High Court held that in L/S5SCI 10 366 the circumstances "we do not consider it advisable to proceed in this matter ourselves. The parties will be at liberty to file the compromise petition in the Civil Court where proceedings are pending on reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act." The High Court	 in order to safeguard the interests of the parties	 kept these proceedings pending till the decision on the	 compromise petition by the Civil Court. The compromise petition was directed to be returned to Sunderlal. On September 18	 1961	 Sunderlal and Khushal Singh filed applications for compromise in both the Land Acquisition references. Paramsukhdas filed applications under 0. XXII r. 10	 read with section 151	 C.P.C.	 praying that his name be substituted or added as an applicant. He alleged that the compromise was fraudulent and that Khushal Singh was abandoning the case	 and as an attaching creditor	 he was entitled to be added a party to the case. Both Khushal Singh and Sunderlal objected	 and by two orders dated April 9	 1962	 the Civil Judge rejected the applications of Paramsukhdas. He framed the issue: "Whether Paramsukhdas can be permitted to be substituted or added as a party to these two references." He held that admittedly Paramsukhdas had not approached the Land Acquisition Officer in the proceedings in which the award was passed on January 30	 1960. He had not appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer as a person interested in the land or the compensation that would be determined by the authorities. He further held that under the circumstances Paramsukhdas was not one of the persons interested in the acquired land before the Collector	 and he also could not be one	 of the persons interested in the objections under section 20.(b) of the Act. After referring to Manjoor Ahmad vs Rajlaxmi Dasi (1) and Abu Bakar vs Peary Mohan Mukherjee (2)	 he hold that the scope of the reference under section 18 was limited and new questions not covered by the reference could not be entertained. He reviewed his orders on July 6	 1962	 but nothing turns on that in the present appeals. Paramsukhdas filed two revisions	 Nos. 294 and 295 of 1962	 before the High Court on June 30	 1962. On August 22	 1962	 Sunderlal filed an application for withdrawal of Special Civil Application No. 232 of 1960. The High Court	 on September 24	 1962	 ordered: "Allowed	 main petition dismissed as withdrawn. No costs.". Before the High Court a preliminary objection was raised in Civil Revisions Nos. 294 and 295 of 1962	 that revisions were not competent because appeals lay against the orders of the Civil (1) A.I.R	 1956 Cal	 263. (2) I.L.R. 367 Judge. The High Court overruled this objection. Regarding the 	claim of Paramsukhdas to be added as a party	 the High Court ;held that his application showed that he was not claiming any interest in the lands themselves but was only claiming an interest in the compensation for the land which had been deposited in the Court for payment to the persons concerned	 and as such was a person interested	 as defined in section 3 (b) of the Act	 and he. would	 therefore	 be entitled to claim that he should be allowed to join as a party. Mr. Desai contends that an attaching creditor is not interested in the amount of compensation as compensation. His interest	 he urges	 is only to get moneys belonging to the judgment debtor in enforcement of his rights	 and accordingly he is not entitled to be made a party to the reference under section 18 of the Act. He further contends that the Court in hearing a reference under section 18 of the Act can only deal with an objection	 which has been referred and cannot go into any matter beyond the reference. He con cludes: if this is so	 even if Paramsukhdas is ordered to be added a party he would not be able to challenge the compromise between Sunderlal and Khushal Singh. The learned counsel for the respondent	 Mr. C. B. Agarwala	 controverts these submissions. 	He says that Paramsukhdas is a person interested in the objection within section 20	 and is a person affected by the objection within section 21 of the Act. He also relies on 0. XXII r. 10(2)	 C.P.C.	 which is made applicable by section 53 of the Act. Before examining the authorities cited at the Bar	 it is necessary to examine the scheme and the provisions of the Act insofar as they are relevant to the question of determination of compensation	 the question of apportionment of the compensation	 and the question as to the persons who are entitled to be heard. Section 3(b) defines the expression "person interested" as follows: "the expression person interested includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act	 and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if be is interested in an easement affecting the land. " It will be noticed that it is an inclusive definition. It is not necessary that in order to fall within the definition a person should claim an interest in land	 which has been acquired. A person becomes a person interested if he claims an interest in compensation to be awarded. It seems to us that Paramsukhdas is a "person interested" within section 3(b) of the Act because he claims an interest in compensation. But before he can be made a party in a reference it has to be seen whether he comes within s	 20(b) and s.21 of the Act. L/S5SCI 10(a) 368 The scheme of the Act seems to be to first deal with persons who are interested in land. These persons are heard under section 5A of the Act. The ordinary meaning of "the person interested in land" is expanded by section 5A(3)	 for the purposes of this section	 to include a person who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation. It would be strange to come to the conclusion that the Legislature is keen that a person claiming an interest in compensation should be heard before the land is acquired but is not interested in him after the land is acquired. On the contrary	 it follows from section 5A(3) that a person claiming an interest in compensation would be one of the persons whose interests are meant to be safeguarded. It appears from sections 6 to 10 that a person claiming an interest in compensation is not expressly mentioned. But in section 11 he is expressly mentioned	 and it is directed that the Collector shall inquire into respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award. Section 12 makes the award final and conclusive as between persons interested	 i.e.	 including persons claiming an interest in compensation. Under section 14 the Collector has power	 inter alia	 to summon the parties interested. Under section 18 any person interested can claim a reference. A person claiming an interest in compensation would also be entitled to claim a reference. After a reference is made the Court is enjoined under section 20 to determine the objections	 and serve	 among others	 all persons interested in the objection. A person claiming an interest in compensation would	 it seems to us	 be a person interested in the objection if the objection is to the amount of compensation or the apportionment of compensation	 and if his claim is likely to be affected by the decision on the objection. Section 21 restricts the scope of enquiry to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection. But it does not follow from section 21 that there is any restriction on the grounds which can be raised by a person affected by the objection to protect his interests. The restriction that is laid is not to consider the interests of a person who is not affected by the objection. Section 29 deals with apportionment of compensation	 if there is agreement	 and section 30 enables the Collector to refer disputes as to apportionment to the Court. From the above discussion it follows that a person claiming an interest in compensation is entitled to be heard under sections 20 and 21 of the Act. The provisions of the Act	 including sections 20 and 21	 do not prescribe that his claim to an interest in compensation should be "as compensation"	 as urged by Mr. Desai. This is really a contradictory statement. For	 a fortiori	 he has no interest in land	 and compensation is given for interests in land. He can never claim compensation qua compensation for what he claims is an interest in the compensation to be awarded. This is not to say that a person claiming an interest in compensation may not claim that the compensation awarded for the acquired land is low	 if it affects his interests	 369 In the view we have taken we are supported by some autho rities. Shah	 J.	 speaking for the majority in Grant vs State of Bihar	(1) observed: "The right of the State of Bihar arose on May 22	 1952 when the title to the land vested in it by virtue of the notification issued under the Bihar Land Reforms Act. There is nothing in the Land Acquisition Act which prohibits the Collector from making a reference under section 30 for determination of the title of the person who has since the date of the award acquired a right to the compensation. If after a reference is made to the Court the person interested dies and his title devolves upon another person	 because of inheritance	 succession	 insolvency	 forfeiture	 compulsory winding up or other form of statutory transfer	 it would be open to the	 party upon whom the title has devolved to prosecute the claim which the person from whom the title has devolved could have prosecuted. In Promotha Nath Mitra vs Rakshal Das Addy(2) it was held that a reference made by the Collector under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act at the in stance of a proprietor of land may be prosecuted by the purchaser of his rights after the award at a revenue auction. If the right to prosecute a reference by a person on whom the title of the person interested has devolved be granted	 there is no reason why the right to claim a reference of a dispute about the person entitled to compensation may not be exercised by the person on whom the title has devolved since the date of the award. The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act is that all disputes about the quantum of compensation must be decided by resort to the procedure prescribed by the Act; it is also intended that disputes about the rights of owners to compensation being ancillary to the principal dispute should be decided by the Court to which power is entrusted. Jurisdiction of the Court in this behalf is not restricted to cases of apportionment	 but extends to adjudication of disputes as to the person who are entitled to receive compensation	 and there is nothing in section 30 which excludes a reference to the Court of a dispute raised by a person on whom the title of the owner of land has	 since the award	 devolved. " In Golap Khan vs Bholanath Marick(3) an attaching creditor was directed to be made a party to the reference under the Land (1) ; (2) (3) 370 Acquisition Act	 before the Civil Court. Mookerjee	 J.	 observed: "The petitioner was entitled to be added as a party	 not under Rule 10	 but on the ground that he was a person interested in the subject matter of the litigation and that no order ought to have been made for its disposal without any opportunity afforded to him to establish his claim." In Siva Pratapa Bhattadu vs A.E.L. Mission(1) an attaching creditor was held to be a person interested within section 3(b) of the Act. Mr. Desai relies on Manjur Ahmed vs Rajlakshmi(2) but in that case the point decided by the Court was different. It was held there that if a party to a land acquisition proceeding before the Collector had not obtained a reference under section 18 of the Act	 its representative could not do indirectly what they did not do directly	 i.e. they could not be added a party in a reference pending at the instance of other parties in order that the nil award against the party might be reversed and in order that they might be awarded a share of the compensation money. Here no such point has been raised. It has not been urged before us that Paramsukhdas was a party before the Collector and that having not applied for a reference under section 18 he is now debarred from being added as a party. The case of Gobinda Kumar Roy Chowdhury vs Debendra Kumar Roy Chowdhury(3) was also decided on the same lines. Similar view was reiterated in Mahammad Safi vs Haran Chandra(4). Both these cases had followed Abu Bakar vs Peary Mahan Mukerjee(5). Maclean	 C. J.	 observed as follows in Abu Bakar vs Peary Mohan Mukerjee(5). "If we read that section in connection with section 20 and section 18	 I think it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Legislature intended that all that the Court could deal with was the objection which had been referred to it; and this seems to be a view consistent with commonsense and with the ordinary method of procedure in civil cases. The zemindar here could	 if he liked	 have raised the objection as to the whole com pensation for the trees being given to the tenants	 but he did not do so. He must	 therefore	 be taken to have accepted the award in that respect; and it would be little less than dangerous if we were to hold that the Judge to (1) A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 307. (2) A.I.R. 1956 Cal. 263. (3) C.W.N. 98. (4) (5) 371 whom only one objection was referred could go into all sorts of questions and objections which had not been referred to him. " These three cases are distinguishable inasmuch as they are dealing with the cases of persons who having a right to seek a reference failed to claim that reference but ought to raise the point in a	 reference made at the instance of another party. The case of Karuna Sindhu Dhar vs Panna Lal Paramanik(1) also does not assist the appellant. The High Court held in that case that as Rajmohan never claimed the entire compensation money before the Collector	 the Land Acquisition Judge was not entitled to vary the awards by a declaration that Rajmohan alone was entitled to get the compensation. It seems to us that Paramsukhdas was clearly a person in terested in the objections which were pending before the Court in the references made to it and that he was also a person whose interest would be affected by the objections	 within section 21. He was accordingly entitled to be made a party. In the result we uphold the order made by the High Court in this respect. Mr. Desai says that at any rate direction should be given that Paramsukhdas should not be entitled to challenge the compromise entered into between Sunderlal and Khushal Singh. We are unable to accept this submission. Paramsukhdas is entitled to raise all points to protect his interests which were affected by the objections. It is also in the interest of justice that there should not be multifarious proceedings and all points arising which are not expressly barred under section 21 should be gone into by the Court. This leaves only the two points regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court. In our view	 the High Court is quite right in holding that the orders of the Civil Judge	 dated April 9	 1962	 were not awards within section 54 of the Act. The awards had still to be made. If no appeal lay	 then the revisions were competent and the High Court was right in entertaining the revisions because the Civil Judge had either refused to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him or had acted with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs in favour of Respondent No. 1; one hearing fee. Y.P. Appeal dismissed.

The land of the appellant was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act	 1894 and the compensation was apportioned between the appellant and his lessee. The appellant claimed that be was entitled to the whole of the compensation while his	 lessee claimed a larger share. At their instance	 references were made to the Civil Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act	 But	 before the references were made	 the respondent	 who was a decree holder against the lessee	 attached the lessee 's share of the compensation amount in execution of his decree. Subsequently the respondent withdrew the lessee 's share of the compensation amount in execution of his decree. The appellant and his lessee	 filed a compromise petition before the Civil Judge and the respondent also applied to be impleaded as party to the References. The Civil Judge dismissed the respondent 's applications. The respondent thereupon	 filed revision petitions in the High Court. The High Court	 held: (1) that the respondent was a person interested in the compensation within the meaning of section 3 (b) of the Land Acquisition Act and was therefore entitled to claim that he should be allowed to join as a party; and (ii) that the revision petitions were competent. In appeal	 this Court	 Held: (i) The respondent was a 'person interested ' within section 3(b) of the Act	 because	 he was claiming an interest in the compensation. He was also interested in the objections which were pending before the Court in the references made to it and was a person whose interest would be affected by the objections. within section 21 of the Act. Accordingly	 he was entitled to be made a party. [367H; 371C D] The definition of 'Person interested ' in section 3 (b) is an inclusive definition and in order to fall within it it is not necessary that a person should claim an interest in the acquired land. It is sufficient if he claims an interest in the compensation to be awarded. A person claiming art interest in the compensation would be a person interested in the objections to be determined under section 20 of the Act	 if the objection is to the amount of compensation or the appor tionment of compensation	 and if his claim is likely to be affected by the decision on the objection. Under section 21 the interest 	 of a person who is not affected by the objection are not to be considered but if he is affected	 there is no restriction on the grounds which can be raised by him to protect his interest. Therefore	 a person claiming an interest in the compensation is entitled to be heard under Ss. 20 and 21. The sections do not prescribe that his claim to an interest in compensation should be as 'compensation '. A person who has no interest in land can never claim compensation qua compensation	 for what he claims is an interest in the compensation	 to be. 363 awarded. That is not to say that a person claiming an interest in the compensation may not claim that the compensation awarded for the acquired land is low	 if it affects his interests. [367G H; 368D H] Grant vs State of Bihar ; 	 followed. Golap Khan vs Bholanath Marick	 	 Siva Prasad Bhattadu vs A.E.L. Mission	 A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 307 approved. Manjoor Ahmed vs Rajlaxmi Dasi	 A.I.R. 1956 Cal. 263 Abu Bakar vs Peary Mohan Mukherjee	 I.L.R. 	 Gobinda Kumar Roy vs Debendra Kumar Roy Mahammad Safi vs Haran Chandra and Karuna Sindhu Dhar vs Panna Lai Paramanik 	 distinguished. (ii) The High Court was right in holding that the orders of the Civil Judge were not awards within the meaning of section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act; and as they were not awards and no appeals lay	 the revisions were competent and the High Court was justified in interfering as the Civil Judge refused to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him. [371F]