Summarize the following court judgment. minal Appeal No. 126 of 1961. Appeal from the judgment and order dated May3	1961 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 381 of 1960. O. P. Rana	 for the appellant. The respondent did not appear. April 25. The judgment of the Court was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL J. Raja Kamlakar Singh of Shankargarh	 U.P. took a lease from the District Board	 Allahabad	 with respect to the realisation of bayai and bazaar dues on the sale of commodities in the bazaar of Shankargarh. Bachchoo Lal was his employee to collect these dues. On April 13	 1959	 Bahadur Singh 	 a peon of the Raja Sahib	 asked Shyam Lal Kurmi	 P.W. 2	 who had sold two bullock load of linseed to Mewa Lal	 respondent 2	 in that 360 bazaar	 to accompany him to the Munim in order to pay the bayai dues there. Mewa Lal asked Shyam Lal not to pay those dues. The peon	 however	 took Shyam Lal to Bachchoo Lal	 appellant	 at the grain godown. Mewa Lal	 armed with a lathi	 came there and on Bachchoo Lal 's asking him as to why he was creating obstruction in the realisation of the dues	 filthily abused him and threatened to break his hand and feet and kill him. Bachchoo Lal	 thereafter	 instituted a complaint against Mewa Lal	 on obtaining sanction of the District Magistrate for prosecuting Mewa Lal for an offence under section 107 of the United Provinces District Board Act	 1922 (U.P. Act No. X of 1922)	 hereinafter called the Act. The trial Magistrate	 the II Class Tashildar Magistrate of Karchana	 convicted Mewa Lal of the offences under sections 504 and 506	 I.P.C.	 and also of an offence under section 107 of the Act. On appeal	 the Sessions Judge	 Allahabad	 acquitted Mewa Lal holding that proper authority in favour of Bachchoo Lal for prosecuting Mewa La] under section 10 7 of the Act had not been proved	 that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try an offence under section 506	 Part II	 I.P.C. which was triable by a Magistrate of the I Class	 and that the prosecution case under section 504 I.P.C.	 was suspicious. Bachchoo lal filed an appeal against the acquittal of Mewa Lal	 after obtaining the permission of the High Court under sub section (3) of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure	 hereinafter called the Code. The High Court dismissed the appeal repelling the contentions for the appellant to the effect that the appellant	 being the complainant and therefore a party to the criminal case against Mewa Lal	 ought to have been given notice of the appeal by the Sessions judge and also ought to have been given an opportunity to be heard and that such notice and opportunity of hearing were necessary on the principles of natural justice and in view of the fact that section 417 (3) of the Code conferred a 361 substantive right of appeal on the complainant. The High Court further held that though the Sessions judge was wrong in holding that the sanction required by section 182 of the Act had not been proved	 the sanction was in the name of Raja Sahib of Shankargarh and not of Bachchoo Lal and therefore the complaint was not a valid complaint and that the Raja Sahib could not collect Tah Bazari through his agents. It also held that the acquittal of the accused of the offence under section 506 I.P.C.	 was justified and that the acquittal of the offence under section 504 I.P.C. could not be said to be erroneous and that in any case the matter was too petty for interfering with an order of acquittal even if it had taken a different view of facts from the one taken by the Sessions judge. The High Court	 accordingly	 dismissed the appeal. Bachchoo La] has preferred this appeal after obtaining the requisite certificate from the High Court under article 134 (I.) (c) of the Constitution. The State of U.P. is the first respondent and Mewa Lal	 the accused	 is respondent No. 2. Three questions have been raised on behalf of the appellant. One is that the Assistant Sessions judge ought to have issued a notice of the hearing of the appeal to the appellant on whose complaint Mewa Lal was convicted by the Magistrate and against which order of conviction he had filed an appeal. No such notice was issued to him and therefore the order of the Assistant Sessions Judge acquitting Mewa Lal was not a good order. ' The second contention is that the High Court was wrong in holding that the Raja of Shankargarh could not collect the Tah Bazari dues through his agents. The third contention is that Bachchoo Lal had requisite sanction under section 182 of the Act for prosecuting Mewa La] and	 therefore	 the finding to the contrary is wrong. 362 The third contention is correct. The requisite authority under section 182 of the Act is in favour of not only the Raja of Shankargarh	 but also in favour of several of his employees including Bachchoo Lal	 the appellant. We need not express an opinion on the second contention as we do not know the terms of the lease executed by the District Board in favour of the Raja of Shankargarh and as we are not concerned with the civil rights with respect to the manner of collecting the dues which he could collect under the lease. We are	 however	 of opinion that section 107 does not make obstruction or molestation of an employee of the person under contract with the Board an offence. Section 107 of the Act reads "Whoever obstructs or molests a person employed by	 or under contract with	 the Board under this Act in the performance of his duty or in the fulfilment of his contract	 or removes a mark set up for the purpose of indicating any levels or direction necessary to the execution of works authorised by this Act	 shall be liable on conviction to a fine which may extend to fifty rupees. " The section speaks of the obstruction or molestation of two classes of persons. One class of persons consists of persons employed by the District Board under the Act. The Raja of Shankargarh or Bachchoo Lal is not an employee of the District Board. The second class of persons consists of those who are under contract with the Board under the Act. Surely	 the person under contract with the Board is the Raja of Shankargarh and not Bachchoo Lal. Bachchoo Lal is only an employee of the Raja. 363 We did not hear the learned counsel on the merits of the case under section 504 of the Code and accept the finding of the court . below. In view of the considerations mentioned	 no interference is possible with the acquittal of the respondent No. 2 on merits. It is	 therefore	 not necessary to decide the first question raised for the appellant. We accordingly dismiss the appeal.

One Raja Sahib took a lease from the District Board	 Allahabad	. with respect to the realisation of bayai and bazar dues on the sale of commodities in the bazar. The appellant was his employee to collect these dues. A peon of Raja Sahib asked Shyam Lal	 P.W. 2	 who had sold linseed to Mewa Lal	 respondent No. 2	 to come to the Munim and pay the beyai dues. Mewa Lal asked Shyam Lal not to pay those dues. The peon took Shyam Lal to the appellant. The respondent No. 2 armed with a lathi	 came there and on appellant 's asking him as to why he was creating obstruction in the realisation of the dues	 filthily abused him and threatened to kill him. The appellant	 thereafter	 on obtaining sanction of the District Magistrate	 instituted a complaint against Respondent No. 2 for prosecuting him for an offence under section 107 of the United Provinces District Board Act. The trial Magistrate convicted him of the offences under sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and also of an offence under section 107 of the Act. On appeal	 Sessions judge acquitted him of all the charges. Against acquittal	 the appellant filed an appeal to the High Court which was dismissed. On appeal by certificates three contentions were raised by the appellant in this Court: (i) The order of the Sessions judge aquitting Mewa Lal was bad as no notice of hearing of the appeal was issued to the appellant	 on whose complaint the Magistrate convicted him	 (ii) The High Court was wrong in holding that the Raja could not collect the Tah Bazari dues through his agents	 and (iii) that the appellant had requisite sanction under section 182 of the Act	 for prosecuting Mewa Lal	 respondent No. 2. Held that section 107 of the Act does not make obstruction or molestation of an employee of the person under contract with 359 the Board	 an offence. The section speaks of the obstruction or molestation of two classes of persons. One class consists of persons employed by the District Board under the Act. The Raja or the appellant is not an employee of the District Board. The second class consists of those persons who are under contract with the Board under the Act. Surely	 the person under contract with the Board is the Raja and not the appellant. The appellant is only an employee of the Raja. In view of these considerations	 the acquittal of the respondent No. 2 could not be interfered with merits. The appeal	 therefore	 must be dismissed. The appeal was not heard on merits. If was considered not necessary to decide the first contention and the Court did not express any opinion on the second contention as the terms of the lease were not known. The third contention was held to be correct.