Summarize the following court judgment. Appeal No. 372 of 1956. Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 18	 1956	 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 43 of 1955. G. C. Mathur	 for the appellant. G. P. Singh and K. P. Gupta	 for the respondent. section P. Sinha and P. C. Agarwala	 for Intervener No. 1. Radheylal Agarwala and P.C. Agarwala	 for intervener No. 2. Frank Anthony and M. I. Khowaja	 for Intervener No. 3. 1960. October 26. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO J. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the Allahabad High Court. The respondent is carrying on the trade of hulling rice	 milling grains and extracting oil in village Nandganj within the area of Gaon Sabha Barapur. He obtained licences for the three trades under the United Provinces Rice and Dal Control Order	 1948	 as also under the Uttar Pradesh Pure Food Act	 1950. Further the Gaon 83 of Rs. 8/ on each mill within its jurisdiction and the respondent had been paying that as well. In 1953 the District Board	 Ghazipur	 in which district the village is situate	 enforced bye laws for the regulation and control of flour	 rice and oil mills in the rural areas of the district under which a licence has to be obtained by such mills on payment of Rs. 20/ as licence fee per year per mill. When the respondent was served with a notice to take out a licence for each mill and to pay the licence fee	 he objected to the legality and validity of the levy and thereafter filed a writ petition in the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. His contention in this connection was three fold	 namely (i) After the constitution of Gaon Sabha Barapur under the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act	 No. XXVI of 1947	 the District Board had been divested of its power and jurisdiction in the matter of regulation and control of trade under the relevant provisions of the U. P. District Boards Act	 No. X of 1922; (ii) the respondent had paid the necessary licence fees under the U.P. Rice and Dal Control Order	 1948 and the U. P. Pure Food Act	 1950 and could not be asked to pay the licence fees over again under the District Boards Act; and (iii) in any case the levy was too high and not in proportion to the actual and probable expenses which the District Board would have to incur in controlling or regulating trade and was meant to augment the general revenues of the District Board. The writ petition was heard by a learned Single Judge of the High Court who appears to have dismissed it in limine by a reasoned judgment negativing all the three contentions raised by the respondent. The respondent then went in appeal and the Appeal Court allowed the appeal holding that in view of section 111 of the Panchayat Raj Act	 the District Board had lost its power to make bye laws for the regulation and control of trade under section 174 of the District Boards Act. The Appeal Court was further of the view that the levy was not out of proportion to the expenses to be incurred by the District Board in the matter of regulation and control and was not a tax. It did not decide the third point raised on behalf of the 84 respondent. The District Board then applied for a certificate to appeal to this Court	 which was granted and that is how the matter has come up before us. The main question which falls for consideration in this appeal is whether the view of the Appeal Court that the District Board has lost its power to make bye laws under section 174 of the District Boards Act for regulation and control of trade in view of section 111 of the Panchayat Raj Act	 is correct. Learned counsel for the appellant puts his argument on this point in two ways. In the first place	 he urges that the Panchayat Raj Act does not contain any provision by which the Gaon Sabha or the Gaon Panchayat has been given the power to regulate or control trade and therefore even if the Panchayat Raj Act is to prevail over the District Boards Act	 where the two deal with the same matter	 this particular power remains in the District Board as it is not included within the powers exercisable by Panchayats under the Panchayat Raj Act. In the alternative	 he urges that the intention of the legislature was not that those provisions of the District Boards Act which are common in the two Acts should be repealed by necessary implication	 and therefore the District Board 's power to control and regulate trade would remain whatever may be the provision of the Panchayat Raj Act. We shall therefore examine the first contention raised on behalf of the appellant under this head	 for if the Panchayat Raj Act has not provided for the control and regulation of trade by the Gaon Sabha or the Gaon Panchayst	 there will be no question of any inconsistency between the District Boards Act and the Panchayat Raj Act and therefore no question of the later Act (i. e.	 the Panchayat Raj Act) prevailing over the earlier Act (i. e.	 the District Boards Act). Section 91 of the District Boards Act provides for what may be called compulsory duties of District Boards and cl. (q) of this section lays down that every board shall make reasonable provision within the district for regulating offensive	 dangerous or obnoxious trades	 callings or practices. Section 106 of the District Boards Act gives power to the Board to charge a fee 85 to be fixed by bye law for any licence	 sanction or permission which it is entitled or required to grant by or under the District Boards Act. Section 174 gives power to the District Board to frame bye laws consistent with the Act and with any rules framed by the State Government for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health	 safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the area and for the furtherance of the administration of the district under the Act. In particular	 power is given by section 174 (2) (k) to the District Board to frame bye laws for regulating slaughter houses and offensive	 dangerous or obnoxious trades	 callings or practices and prescribing fees to defray the expenditure incurred by it for this purpose. It is not in dispute that the District Board has power under these provisions to frame bye laws for regulation of these trades	 (namely	 hulling rice	 milling grains and extracting oil). Therefore	 unless this power is taken away expressly or by necessary implication by any provision of the Panchayat Raj Act	 the District Board would be entitled to frame the bye laws which it did in 1953 and charge licence fees thereunder. Turning now to the Panchayat Raj Act	 we find that section 15 of this Act provides for what may be called the compulsory duties of a Gaon Panchayat while section 16 provides for what may be called its optional dutiee	. Section Ill gives power to the prescribed authority to make bye laws for a Gaon Panchayat within its jurisdiction consistent with the Act and the Rules made thereunder for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health	 safety and convenience of persons residing within the jurisdiction of a Gaon Panchayat and for furtherance of the administration of Gaon Panchayats under the Act. The prescribed authority in this case is the Executive Committee of the District Board (see	 section 56 of the District Boards Act) which may be assumed for present purposes to be different from the District Board as such. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that reading sections 15 and 16 together with section 111 it is obvious that regulation or control of trades	 callings and practices is not within the purview of the Panchayat Raj Act. There 86 is no doubt that neither section 15 nor section 16 contains any provision corresponding to section 91(q) of the District Boards Act. Therefore	 prima facie the Panchayat Raj Act has nothing to do with the regulation or control of offensive	 dangerous or obnoxious trades	 callings or practices and this power of the District Board is unaffected by anything in the Panchayat Raj Act. Learned counsel for the respondent	 however	 urges that though there is no specific provision relating to such regulation or control in the Panchayat Raj Act in sections 15 and 16	 this matter of regulation and control is impliedly covered by el. (c) of section 15 of the Panchayat Raj Act	 which enjoins on a Panchayat the duty to make reasonable provision for sanitation and taking curative and preventive measures to remove and to stop the spread of an epidemic. It is urged that sanitation ' must be given a very wide meaning and that meaning will include the regulation of offensive	 dangerous or obnoxious trades. It may be that on the widest meaning of the word " sanitation " such regula. tion may be included in it; but looking to the scheme of the District Boards Act as well as the Panchayat Raj Act	 it is	 in our opinion	 not correct to give the widest possible connotation to the word " sanitation " in cl. (c) of section 15. Section 91(m) of the District Boards Act provides for " public vaccination	 sanitation and the prevention of disease "; but in spite of this entry relating to sanitation there are other provisions in section 91 which deal with what would be covered by " 'sanitation " if it were to be given the widest possible meaning as	 for example	 cl. (e) relating to construction and repair of public wells	 etc. and drainage works and the supply of water from them ; el. (n) relating to provision of a sufficient supply of pure and wholesome water where the health of the inhabitants is endangered by the insufficiency or unwholesomeness of the existing supply	 guarding from pollution water used for human consumption and preventing polluted water from being so used; cl. (r) relating to dissemination of knowledge on such matters as disease	 hygiene	 sanitation	 etc. This will show that the word " sanitation " in cl. (m) of section 91 is not used in its widest sense. 87 Similarly in section 92 (which provides for optional duties of District Boards)	 cl. (c) refers to reclaiming unhealthy localities; and cl. (i) to conserving and preventing injury or contamination to or pollution of	 rivers and other sources of water supply	 which matters would be covered within the wide meaning of sanitation. It is obvious therefore that when the word " sanitation" is used in the District Boards Act it is used in a restricted sense. Similarly in the Panchayat Raj Act cl. (c) of section 15 mentions " sanitation ". Clause (g) relates to regulation of places for the disposal of ' carcases and of other offensive matters which would clearly be covered by " sanitation " in its widest sense and would have been unnecessary if sanitation was to be given its widest meaning in this section. Clause (k) of section 15 provides for regulation of sources of water supply for drinking purpose which would again be included within the widest meaning of the word " sanitation ". Clause (r) provides for allotment of places for storing manure which would again be embraced within the widest meaning of the word " sanitation " and need not have been separately provided for	 if sanitation in cl. (c) had the wide meaning urged for it on behalf of the respondent. Further section 16 (which deals with discretionary functions of a Gaon Panchayat) provides in cl. (c) for filling in of insanitary depressions and levelling of land a clause which would be unnecessary if " sanitation " has the widest possible meaning. Clause (1) of section 16 provides for regulating the collection	 removal and disposal of manure and sweepings and making arrangement for the disposal of carcases of animals	 which again would be covered by el. (c)	 if sanitation is to be given the widest possible meaning. Clause (m) provides for prohibiting or regulating the curing	 tanning and dyeing of skins within 220 yards of the abadi	 which again would be covered by the word " sanitation " if it had the wide meaning urged on behalf of the respondent. It would thus be clear that both in the District Boards Act as well as in the Panchayat Raj Act when the word " sanitation " has been used it has not been used in its widest sense; it seems to have been used in its ordinary meaning i. e.	 the improvement of sanitary 88 conditions specially with regard to dirt and infection and would thus be confined to matters of conservancy and drainge and the like. In the context therefore of both the District Boards Act and the Panchayat Raj Act	 it seems to us that the word " sanitation " as used in section 91 of the District Boards Act and A. 15 of the Panchayat Raj Act is confined to its ordinary meaning in relation to conservancy and drainage and the like with reference to the necessity of avoiding dirt and disease and cannot be given such a wide meaning as to include control or regulation of trades	 callings or practices. Section 18 of the Panchayat Raj Act gives a clear indication that it is the ordinary meaning that is intended by the word " sanitation " in cl. (c) of section 15. Section 18 deals with improvement of sanitation and provides that a Gaon Panchayat may by notice direct the owner or occupier of any land or building	 to close	 remove	 alter	 repair	 cleanse	 disinfect or put in good order any latrine	 urinal	 water closet	 drain	 cesspool 'or other receptacle for filth	 sullage water	 rubbish or refuse and so on; to cleanse	 repair	 cover	 fill up	 drain off	 deepen or to remove water from a private well	 tank	 reservoir	 pool	 pit	 depression or excavation therein which may appear to be injurious to health or offensive to the neighbourhood; to clear off any vegetation	 undergrowth	 prickly pear or scrub jungle; and to remove any dirt	 dung	 nightson. manure or any noxious or offensive matter therefrom and to cleanse the land or building. It must therefore be held that the Panchayat Raj Act does not provide for control and regula tion of trades	 callings or practices like section 91 (q) of the District Boards Act. It is however urged that even though sections 15 and 16 do not specifically deal with control and regulation of trades	 callings or practices	 section Ill is in very general terms and gives powers to the prescribed authority to frame any bye laws relating to promotion or maintenance of health	 safety and convenience of persons residing within the jurisdiction of a Gaon Panchayat. It is true that these words in section III are of wide amplitude ; but they cannot	 in our opinion	 be widened 89 beyond the duties imposed on a Gaon Panchayat or Gaon Sabha under as. 15 and 16 or any other provi. sion of the Panchayat Raj Act. The bye laws framed under section 111 which are for the promotion or maintenance of health	 safety and convenience have also to be in furtherance of the administration of Gaon Panchayats under the Act. Therefore if Gaon Panchayats have administrative functions under as. 15 and 16 or any other provision of the Act	 bye laws can be framed under a. 111 for these purposes in order to further the administration of Gaon Panchayats. But	 if as we have held	 Gaon Panchayats are not invested with the duty to control and regulate trades	 callings and practices	 there can be no question of framing bye laws in that behalf under section 111 on the basis of the wide words used therein. The power to frame bye laws under section 111 is	 in our opinion	 conditioned by the duties and functions imposed on a Gaon Panchayat under sections 15 and 16 as well as other provisions of the Panchayat Raj Act. It is not in dispute that there is no other provision of the Panchayat Raj Act which imposes a duty on Gaon Panchayats to control or regulate trades	 callings or practices and therefore the power under section 111 does not extend to prescribing bye laws for that purpose. The only other section to which our attention is drawn is section 37(d) by which a Gaon Sabha has been given the power to impose a tax on trades	 callings and professions	 not exceeding such rate as may be prescribed. This in our opinion has nothing to do with the regulation of trades	 callings and practices and levying of licence fees in that behalf. What this provision refers to is what is provided in item 60 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and not fees properly so called. We are therefore of opinion that as the Panchayat Raj Act does not provide for control or regulation of the nature mentioned in section 91(q) of the District Boards Act	 there is no question of the power of the District Board under section 174 to frame bye laws and to prescribe fees in that behalf being taken away by section 111 of the Panchayat Raj Act. It seems that this aspect of the matter was not argued in the High Court at all and it 90 appears to have been assumed there that the Panchayat Raj Act also provided for the same matter as was covered by section 91(q) of the District Boards Act and it was probably on that basis that the High Court held that section Ill of the Panchayat Raj Act prevailed over section 174 of the District Boards Act. In the view we have taken it is not necessary to consider the alternative argument raised on behalf of the appellant in respect of this point. This brings us to the point which was not considered by the Appeal Court	 though the learned Single Judge had dealt with it and held against the respondent. That contention is that certain fees are being levied on the respondent in respect of these mills under the U. P. Rice and Dal Mills Control Order	 1948 and the U. P. Pure Food Act and therefore the District Board cannot levy any further licence fee under section 91(q) of the District Boards Act read with section 174. As pointed out by the learned Single Judge	 the fees levied under the Control Order of 1948 which depends for its existence on the Essential Supplies Act and under the U. P. Pure Food Act are for different purposes of those Acts. The fee charged by the District Board is for regulation of obnoxious trades and the purpose of this regulation is different from the purpose for which fees are levied under the Essential Supplies Act and the Pure Food Act. Under these circumstances we see no reason for striking down the regulatory provisions made under the District Boards Act and the licence fee charged thereunder. The fact that there may be some overlapping between the regulatory provisions made under the U. P. Pure Food Act and those made under the District Boards Act can have no relevance on the validity of the bye laws and the licence fee charged under them. In this view of the matter	 the appeal is allowed	 the order of the Appeal Court set aside and the writ petition dismissed. However	 as the point on which the appellant has succeeded in this Court was not specifically raised in the High Court	 we order the parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.

The appellant framed bye laws for the regulation and control of flour	 rice and oil mills under which a licence had to be obtained on payment of licence fee for running a mill. The bye laws were framed under section 174 of the U. P. District Boards Act	 1922. The respondent contended that the bye laws were ultra vires and void as the District Boards had been divested of their powers to regulate and control trade under the District Boards Act on account of section III of the P. P. Panchayat Raj Act	 1947	 which operated in the same field. Held	 that the bye laws had been validly made and that the District Boards were not divested of their powers to regu late and control trade under the District Boards Act	 1922	 by the provisions of U. P. Panchayat Raj Act	 1947. Section 91(q) of the District Boards Act cast a duty on the District Boards to make provisions for regulating offensive	 dangerous or obnoxious trades	 callings or practices and section 174(2)(k) specifically empowered District Boards to make bye laws in this respect. There was no similar duty or power conferred upon Village Panchayats under the Panchayat Raj Act and consequently the question of the later enactment prevailing over the former did 82 not arise. The reference to "sanitation" in section 15(c) of the Panchayat Raj Act did not cover regulation and control of trade. Though the word " sanitation " in its widest connotation was capable of including this	 it was not used in its widest sense in section 15(c) but only in its ordinary sense in relation to conservancy	 drainage and the like. Section III of the Panchayat Raj Act was in general terms	 but bye laws could be framed under it only in respect of the functions and duties imposed upon a Gram Panchayat under sections 15 and 16. Held	 further	 that the licence fee charged by the District Board could not be struck down on account of fees being charged from the respondent in respect of his mills under the U. P. Rice and Dal Mills Control Order	 1948	 and the U. P. Pure Food Act. The licence fee charged by the District Board was for the regulation of obnoxious trades and the purpose of this regulation was different from the purpose for which fee was charged from the respondent under the Essential Supplies Act and the Pure Food Act.