Summarize the following court judgment. Civil Appeal No. 3482 of 1984. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 8th May	 1984 of the Patna High Court in Second Appeal No. 182 of 1978. Jayanarayan	 Miss section Agarwal D.S. Mehra and R. P. Singh for the Appellant. Lal Narain Sinha and D. P. Mukharji for the Respondent. After hearing counsel for the parties we are clearly of the view that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained for two reasons. Firstly	 the High Court had earlier remanded the case to the trial court and called for a finding from the trial court on the question of partial eviction. The trial court while recording its finding was of the view that the question of partial eviction should be considered in the light of the requirement of the landlord as deposed to by him. In doing so	 the High Court failed to take into account the proviso to Section 12 (1) (c) of the Bihar Building (Lease	 Rent & Eviction) Control Act of 1977	 which in terms enjoins that what is necessary to be considered is the 'reasonable ' requirement of the landlord and whether it would be 'Substantially ' satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the premises. The Court has therefore	 in the first instance	 to determine the extent of the premises which the landlord "reasonably" requires. Determine it objectively and not on the basis of his ipse dixit or his mere desire to occupy as much as he wants. But the Court has to furthermore apply a test as to whether such requirement	 as the Court considers reasonable	 will be 'substantially ' satisfied (not fully satisfied) by ordering partial eviction. This vital aspect has been 640 altogether overlooked by the trial court. Secondly	 since the High Court had directly called for a finding from the trial court itself	 the High Court should have scrutinized the said finding with special reference to the question of partial eviction even on facts as the finding of the trial court standing on its own (not confirmed by appellate court) is not conclusive on facts even in a second appeal. This is so because the High Court had called for a finding of fact from the trial court bypassing the appellate court and thus deprived the right of appeal to the District Judge (last court on facts) which	 for aught we know	 might not have agreed with the trial court and may have considered the question from the point of view indicated by us	 viz	 giving full effect to the concept of reasonable extent of the requirement from the perspective of 'substantials ' satisfaction of such requirement as considered to be reasonable objectively. Only in case the District Judge would have agreed with the finding of the trial court then it may have become a finding of fact which was binding on the High Court in second appeal. Besides the question as to the connotation of the word 'substantial ' was itself a substantial point of law there being no decision of the Patna High Court on this specific point. Other Acts in various States do not embody the concept of "substantial" satisfaction. These decision would therefore be of no avail in the context of the facts of the present case. In these circumstances	 it cannot be said that the finding of the trial court	 which is not the final court on facts	 is conclusive and immune from the scrutiny of the High Court even in a second appeal. We therefore	 allow appeal	 set aside the decree of the High Court and remand the case to the High Court to decide the question fresh after considering the evidence on record in the light of the aforesaid observations. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. In the meantime there will be stay of dispossession. The High Court is requested to expedite the hearing of the case.

In a second appeal filed by the appellant tenant against an eviction order	 the High Court remanded the matter to the trial court and called for a finding on the question of partial eviction. The trial court while recording its finding was of the view that the question of partial eviction should be considered in the light of the requirement of the landlord respondent as deposed to by him. The High Court accepted the finding of the trial court without scrutinising it and dismissed the appeal accordingly. Hence this appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal. ^ HEID: (1) The High Court should have scrutinised the finding of the trial court with special reference to the question of partial eviction even on facts as the finding of the trial court standing on its own (not confirmed by appellate court) is not conclusive on facts even in a second appeal. This is so because the High Court had called for a finding of facts from the trial court bypassing the appellate court and thus deprived the right of appeal to the District Judge (last court on facts) which might not have agreed with the trial court. [640 A B] (2) The High Court as well as the trial court failed to take into account the Proviso to section 12 (1) (c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease	 Rent & Eviction) Control Act 1977	 which provides	 inter alia	 that where the court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation	 the Court shall pass a decree accordingly. Therefore	 the court has	 to determine; 639 (i) the extent of the premises which the landlord "reasonably" requires. Determine it objectively and not on the basis of his ipse dixit or his mere desire to occupy as much as he wants; and (ii) whether such requirement as the court considers reasonable	 will be 'substantially ' satisfied (not fully satisfied) by ordering partial eviction. [639 G H] The Court remanded the case to the High Court to decide the question afresh after considering the evidence on record in the light of the aforesaid observations. [640 F]