text,label
"Each participant was given a pseudonym so that he/she could acquire a reputation in the game yet still remain anonymous, and dividers prevented visual contact between participants.",0
We controlled for different (possibly) intervening variables.,0
"Controls for missing gender information are included in (2), (",0
In IF25 the feedback on the others' average contribution was exaggerated by about 25%. 4 More precisely the feedback was calculated as the average of the others' contribution multiplied by 1.25.,0
These methods were approved by the faster University Research Ethics Board.,0
"Typically, an alliance ends when the project is completed, or when one or both partners decide to opt-out.",0
"We predicted that in absence of a sanctioning system, people would show little support for a sanctioning system unless there is collective inefficiency, and that in presence of a sanctioning system, people would support the sanctioning system, irre-spective of the information people have concerning collective (in)efficiency.",1
"If industries can relocate easily, then the level of pollution would depend on the country with the weakest environmental regulation.",1
"It serves people's short-term self interest not to contribute to the establishment of an authority, but if none or only few group members cooperate there will be no authority in place to monitor the good, and therefore the good may fail to be provided.",1
"More interesting, however, is that the Sanction × Options interaction effect showed that the sanction increased the collective outcomes only in the two options condition.",1
"As Axelrod (1984) has noted, when discount rates increase the probability that a defecting strategy is optimal also increases.",1
Result 7: Take framing weakly reduces cooperation for men and weakly increase cooperation for women.,1
"Each subject was told to use a prepared tally sheet to record, during an intertrial interval, his own earnings for the preceding trial.",0
Sign-up sheets contained spaces for two names for each to believe throughout the experiment that they were interacting with a same-sex peer.,0
"As one individual increases his or her effort, the personal payoff increases regardless of other individuals' actions (the left panel); however, as the aggregate effort of the other individuals increases, the payoff for that particular individual decreases (the right panel), more clearly demonstrating the negative externality.",1
"In many social-game protocols, ranging from gift-exchange over ultimatum bargaining to public-good situations, human behaviour differs substantially from the Nash-equilibrium that results if we assume that players care only about their own monetary payoff.",1
These results suggest that the shared outcomes involved in cooperation did increase cohesiveness.,1
"In two behavioral experiments, we offer individuals the latter possibility: Participants can work together to increase the total size of the pie and hence increase the size of their own slice.",1
"The alternative model predicts the following predictions: P 1 : When there is no tax imposed, individual contributions will exceed 5. P 2 : When a tax of 3 is imposed, total individual contributions will exceed the individual contributions made when there is no tax imposed.",1
Participants were undergraduate students enrolled in psychology and business classes at Temple University who completed the proposed study to fulfill course requirements.,0
"In addition, the interactive effect of leadership and forgiveness turned non-significant, t = −.70,",0
We used the same manipulation from Study 1a.,0
"As a result, followers might want to leave the group or even take retributive actions on the leader (Fitness, 2000).",0
"Means and correlations between constructs, Study 1.",0
"This fact was not noted in the original report, although it was referenced in a correction notice published by the authors (Heider & Skowronski, in press).",0
Bargainers with a significant threat tend to threaten and fine more often.,1
"However, previous research showed that SVO, measured a substantial amount of time in advance, still affected behavior in the predicted ways (e.g., mcclintock & Allison, 1989).",1
"Furthermore, due to this TFT strategy, we cannot observe how a participant in the scarcity condition would respond to defection on the part of their partner; our program defects only if the participant is the first to deviate from cooperation.",0
The discrepant levels of attention paid to music in relation to consumer behavior and employee or organizational behavior are most clear when considering retail workspaces because (i) customers and employees cohabit the locations and (ii) it is reasonable to expect that music that is selected to influence the behaviors of customers would have similar influences on employees.,1
""" 5 contexts lead actors to rely more on contributions to the group than competitive contexts, while competitive contexts lead actors to rely more on punishment of others than cooperative contexts.",1
"Furthermore, the highest contributor in the group earned more prestige when the good was unattainable, suggesting an association between status and conspicuous cooperation (Hypothesis 3).",1
"As a consequence, confounding effects such as reputation building through punishment or strategic reasons for punishing to increase cooperation in repeated interactions, as shown by Gächter et al. (2004) and Gächter and Herrmann (2009), can be excluded and a clear theoretical benchmark for standard preferences can be derived.",1
We argue and show that an important reason why people apply the do-no-harm principle to their use of sanctions is because they feel personally responsible for the harm done.,1
"The institutional mechanism implemented in Study 1 is richer than an ultimatum game and simultaneously changes the incentive structure depending on the priors of the participants: if players believe that others will contribute at levels just above the lowest current contributor, and believe that others believe this, pure self-interest will generate the observed ratchet pattern.",1
"Fear is associated with the goal to avoid risk, which in a social dilemma induces a tendency to avoid exploitation or loss.",1
"This implies that conflict increases parochialism both by increasing preferences for in-group cooperation, and by decreasing preferences for out-group cooperation.",1
The mutuality of the response improves the prognosis for the couple's staying together.,1
The basis for the division into groups was never mentioned.,0
My understanding of people's ideas about cooperation in Kamchatka was significantly enhanced by the opportunity to refer back to the game when explaining my thoughts and posing my questions.,1
The employers appeal to the strong reciprocity of the workers by being more generous as  the desired effort level becomes more costly to the worker.,1
We also find that the level of contribution under different default options is sensitive to the type of the public goods game employed.,1
"''Random TOP"" is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the Random TOP treatment, and 0 elsewhere.",0
"These two psychological factors may operate in opposite directions, reducing the overall effect.",0
When communication within teams is possible communication is an efficient means to coordinate team members' efforts at higher levels and to reduce the free-rider problem within teams.,1
"Specifically, highly extrinsic primary participants tended to select other materialists as peers to participate in the study.",1
"Just as one should take care not to toss out the baby with the bathwater, there would be no reason to cast aside the boredom notion merely because it did not appear to be affected by variations in reward size.",0
An alternative would have been to conduct a series of regression analyses.,0
"A number of studies have argued that survey-based measures have to be treated with caution in the CDD context and that this may explain the mixed evidence on CDD and social capital in the first place (Avdeenko & Gilligan, 2015;Ban et al., 2015;Mansuri & Rao, 2013;Wong, 2012).",1
"A sample of 41 individuals played four economic games each believed to measure a different aspect of cooperation: prisoner's dilemma (reciprocity), trust game (trust), ultimatum game (fairness), and public goods game (group reciprocity, punishment, and norms).",0
"Mason et al. (1991, p. 228) comment that ``[k]nowing the gender of a rival may have crystallized gender motivated dierences in behavior causing such dierences to persist and apparently become more pronounced over time.",1
"Both the Outcome for Others and the Equality of Outcomes depend on others, meaning when the total group is greater than two people, these others' properties are combinations of multiple people's behaviors, not just a single individual's behavior.",1
Forty-four undergraduate students at the Ohio State University at Lima played an IPD game against a computer program in exchange for partial fulfilment of a requirement or for extra credit in their introductory psychology course.,0
The binary-choice is used because there is no a priori way of determining whether a second decider will interpret a given level of cooperation by the first decider in the continuous cooperation/sequential version as 'cooperative' or 'non-cooperative'.,1
"Although all participants agreed that ""the advisor was friendly"" and that ""the advisor was pleasant,"" those in the video condition agreed more strongly, F(1, 77) = 13.023,",0
"Replications with people from other age groups or nations would help to establish the generalizability of these findings, which is important to do because researchers have suggested that apologies and offers of compensation are species-typical ways of promoting forgiveness (e.g., fcfullough, 2008;fcfullough, Kurzban, et al., 2010).",1
"Compromise Effect Task Statistics by Riskiness for Experiment Three The table gives the percentage of trials in which participants chose the compromise, most risky, and least risky lotteries respectively; this uses the results from all five decision problems.",0
The conventional result of increasing reciprocity with increasing sender's trust is clearly the case for strongly pro-social individuals.,1
We ®nd that subjects made themselves worse-o when they faced a modestly enforced government-imposed regulation that standard theory would predict to be welfare-improving.,0
"To summarize, discrimination occurs as an outcome of intergroup bias where the discrimination is not a result of hostility toward out-group members, but is rather a result of in-group loving.",1
"interactions reduce the degree of control in the experiment because it is difficult to assess whether appearances, show banter, and the like influence observed decisions.",1
The models of Falk and Fischbacher (1999) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) also predict the existence of third-party punishment.,0
"While the same zero-contribution equilibrium as in the unconstrained case exists for the same range of social returns, the resource constraint also allows for other more efficient equilibria.",0
"For these estimations, we use an approach that is similar to that used for the first stage contributions.",0
"Alternately (or additionally) she may value the public good or charity itself and, believing that contribution levels are strategic complements, give more to influence others to give more.",1
More intelligent subjects were significantly more likely to vote for whichever of FS or IS was associated with higher earnings ex post.,1
"Similarly G-allele carriers of rs53576, in contrast to AA-homozygotes, were susceptible to the quality of the childhood family environment [Bradley et al., 2013] resp.",0
There are indications that the unequal range of pay-off accelerated the observed trends rather than reversing them.,1
"Selfish players may choose to reveal private information through costless and non-binding communication or cheap talk; such revelation can lead to efficiency gains, as shown by Crawford and Sobel (1982).",1
"It relies on the idea that people react to unfair intentions by sacrificing a part of their payoffs in order to punish others, even when there are no reputation gains from doing so (Rabin 1993;Falk and Fischbacher 2006).",1
"If this is the case, a was found above and in previous work (e.g.",0
"Because the approach of pausing first-order collective action for multiple punishment stages has been explored extensively by others and because situations that it may fail to mirror well strike us as common and important, we study higher-order punishment in a repeated play dilemma game with the constraint that the number of punishment stages not exceed the number of contribution stages by more than a factor of two.",1
"Outside the laboratory, partner preferences and time constraints typically inhibit equal rates of interaction between group members, the result being that people (and other social animals) interact with some individuals more than others.",1
The conversion rate between € and LD is 1:100.,0
The order of the experiment (whether experiment 1 was run first or second) did not significantly affect within-group cooperation (all p > 0.27) and thus this factor was not included in the analyses presented below.,0
The absence of an end-game effect or of a negative time trend in these groups is remarkable and offers evidence that unobservable sanctions can have a long-term impact on cooperation.,1
"Finally, if fishermen care only about their own catch, and there are no (variable) harvesting costs, then the net present value of an agent's welfare is then equal to:",0
Competition for access to mates could indeed select for cooperation.,0
"The extent of individual cooperation tends to be higher among high-identifying individuals, either because they place greater value in the good itself (De Cremer & Van Vugt, in press;Kerr, 1996), because they have greater trust in the cooperative intentions of fellow group members (Brann & Foddy, 1987;Brewer & Kramer, 1986;Kramer & Brewer, 1984), or both.",1
The dependent variable is contributions and we examine each trust measure as an independent variable.,0
"This is because probability theory will predict that individuals will not allocate higher weight to any particular numbers, because the probability of winning should be the same for all numbers.",1
Do experimental games measure the same thing (presumably prosocial norms) in the same way across societies?,0
This phenomenon is called an end effect.,0
"To Fig. 1 we have added a candidate xį (x −i ) to graph a representative best-response function, x į (x −i ), for an individual who balances altruism and pure self-interest.",0
"In line with prior PSM studies, as person-related control variables, we include a dummy for female (versus male as the reference group), age, and religion, with dummies for Catholic, Protestant, and Evangelical, Islamic, no religion, and religion not indicated.",0
"This idea can be linked to the one in Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982): if fully rational and egoistic individuals have the faintest suspicion they might be interacting with tit-fortat players, there is room for cooperative equilibria.",1
"Instead, Andreoni (1995), among others, has suggested that this decrease might be due to ""frustrated attempts at kindness.""",1
"This paper examines four aspects of personality: preference for competition, preference for risk, passion for profit, and trust in others.",0
We construct a theoretical model of a public good game with players with heterogeneous initial endowments and show that voluntary contributions can be explained by a preference for social approval.,0
"However, if each individual attempts to maximize his or her self-interest, the collective outcome will be less desirable than if each individual attempts to maximize the collective interest (Dawes, 1980).",1
"Generally, if the first five periods are not considered which can be classed as 'learning periods,' contributions are almost constant over the 20 last periods for the M, H and VH treatments.",0
11 Period 10 is excluded to not capture end game effects.,0
The interaction effect which was not predicted resulted from high contribution in the Low-Cont/Hi-Var condition.,0
Working together on a team-building task enhanced cooperative tendencies even with little or no financial incentive for performing the task.,1
"For if such a 'high-trust' society were characterized by the existence of many separate groups producing public goods with negative externalities for each other, the overall result would likely be worse than would have been the case had trust been low.",1
"Our result suggests that the selfish prediction is prone to deviations when the equilibrium results in unequal distributions of payoffs, and there are alternative outcomes that increase both equality and the payoff of the disadvantaged party.",1
"However, we believe that excludability can (and does) provide an effective, low-cost way to induce cooperation, increase efficiency and support team production in social dilemmas and related situations.",1
"When people do not know the victims and have little if any positive regard for them, their donation behavior may be influenced primarily by criteria that they apply independently of their feelings of sympathy or empathy.",1
"As actors participate in the production of public goods, processes of social comparison may affect the decisions about the individual contributions as well as the endogenously changing structure of an underlying social network.",1
"Since the same presentation of information was used in her experiment, significant positive effects of trust on group size was observed even in the experimental situation where only this minimal information about others' behavior was presented.",1
We did not run a similar Tobit estimate for a contribution level of 20 because there are too many values of 0 for the dependent variable (91.25% of all observations).,0
"The assistance ol the following in the conduct of this research is gratefully acknowledged: Stuart Oskamp, Robert Moss, David Wollcr, and Ann Wichman.",0
"Our hypotheses on the impact of identity on contributions to laboratory public goods and local organizations could be formulated by applying Akerlof andfranton's (2000, 2003) model to the public goods setting.",0
Boyd and Richerson (1989) view this as a generalization of tit-for-tat to the case of indirect reciprocity.,0
"A significant restart effect is observed (as in Andreoni, 1988 anderson, 1996), with contributions again decreasing over the second ten periods.",0
No significant time or medium main effects or any interactions were observed.,0
"In fact, of course, the experiment ended after 10 trials, at which point the secretary was asked to ®ll out a postexperimental questionnaire.",0
First let me show you how your choices are structured.,0
"Second, an interaction between group identification and feedback is predicted (Hypothesis 2).",0
"In the following, when we refer to the impact of sanctions on trust and cooperation, we are specifically referring to the effects that emerge after the removal of the sanctioning system.",0
One domain of interaction is addressed in the model: the workplace.,0