text,label
Permitting continuous rather than binary ''all-or-nothing'' contributions significantly increases contributions and facilitates provision.,1
Another point worth noting is that the common resource dilemma paradigm we used was a single-trial setting.,0
Outcome Matrix Applied to Each Round of the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma Game,0
It is thus necessary to control for individuals' attitudes toward risk. 3,0
"Conversely, when switching from short games to long games, participants immediately begin to cooperate at a high level.",1
"Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation (11), but in a fixed social network cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of ""social viscosity,"" even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity (1,2).",1
"In two villages, which had high success in JFM, villagers' social preferences were reciprocity, while in three other villages, which had moderate to low success in JFM, villagers' social preferences were commitment.",0
"The resulting increase in group distinctiveness can be expected to affect group perceptions (Spears et al., 1985;Acorn et al., 1988;fcfonnell et al., 1994) and ingroup favoritism should generally increase with salience of the ingroup (see the meta-analysis by Mullen et al., 1992).",1
"The intuition is that in that case there always exist strategy combinations in which a single (pivotal) player's investment in monitoring causes an increase of the MPCR above 1, transferring the public into a private good and making the investment profitable and, as a consequence, making positive investments in monitoring individually rational.",1
"Marginal effects are shown, with standard errors in parentheses.",0
Two sample trials were also provided to help illustrate the purpose and rules of the game.,0
"Secondly, the experience of conflict may create or deepen ingroup identity, strengthening other-regarding preferences toward in-group members and making it more attractive to cooperate within groups.",1
"Thus, they understand that they need to cooperate among themselves if they want to earn money.",1
"Likewise, in model 4 the net effect of the minimum contribution to the public good in the first round (minf1) remains significantly negative even in the final period. 8",0
Each figure presents a specific communication and voting scenario.,0
"If the goal-transformation hypothesis is correct, then the behavior of proselfs should be affected more strongly by the type of identity that is salient (personal vs. group).",1
"high contributors"" is negative and differs significantly from zero (at a 1%-level), again.",0
"In the game, a leader usually emerged and the leader's pleadings for cooperation were harder to ignore because all the players had experienced the results of greedy play.",1
"Moreover, all previous studies employed repeated prisoner's dilemmas in which conditional cooperation is the most profitable strategy; none have used one-shot dilemmas, in which non-cooperation is the most profitable strategy (but which nevertheless elicit substantial levels of cooperation in general-population participants).",0
Our experiments have led us to conclude that cooperation rates can be radically affected by one factor in particular.. . .,1
The presence of such a leader tends to increase coordination.,1
"An examination of histograms of scores for each condition suggests that people tended to lapse into either full cooperation or full defection in the no communication condition, which greatly increases the variance of the condition.",1
"Participants who have the first turn invest significantly more than participants in downstream positions, using Mann-Whitney tests.",0
"Thus, we compare people who hold the evoked identity to people who are familiar with, but who do not hold, that identity: if identity is important in the current effects, those who do not hold the evoked identity will not be affected by identity-salience manipulations.",1
"The group's average contribution across periods 1-16 (""Contribution P1-16"") has a significantly positive impact on the probability of appointing a leader in period 17 and in period 21.",1
"At the opposite, people do not have a strong adverse reaction to external regulation and follow the elected rules because there is a general and specific trust that others will also follow the rules.",1
The youngest and oldest subject groups displayed higher levels of voluntary cooperation than the middle group which is believed to face more competitions.,0
"The payoff of the lottery ticket depended on the result of a toss of a fair coin with ""heads"" resulting in a payoff of two dollars and ""tails"" resulting in no payoff.",1
The relatively high willingness to invest in local public goods with long-term benefits invites to rethink the optimal level of donor control on aid funds.,1
"Otherwise, if the accumulated gain explains the behaviour of the birds but the one trial gain does not, then the birds are making decisions based on the four trial reward and are playing a mutualism game.",1
"Hence, we propose that darkness should only promote cooperativeness when the interaction partner also cooperates.",0
"If it is considered 'fair' to contribute to a public good, perhaps because others are also doing so, then many people will be prepared to make voluntary contributions.",1
"For any k ∈ {2, 3}, λ > λ, and c ∈ (c * ck (λ), g], r(c) > 0, so that F ck (c, λ ) < F ck (c, λ), so (a) follows.",0
"Thus, a leader who dislikes disadvantageous inequality would tend to opt for NEG as an incentive scheme.",1
"After ensuring that the child was not acquainted with his opponent, the game was explained very carefully to each child.",0
"However, there are also reasons to think that the treatment will lead to low contributions, since the reaction to the comprehension/advice combination may be defensive.",1
"On one hand, these findings partially confirm our speculation vis-à-vis the role of risk taking: reciprocators were not necessarily cooperators under conditions of uncertainty, as some of them chose to cooperate because they could bear a high risk in anticipating the counterpart's goodwill.",1
"For example, resource dilemmas are best resolved when there is communication between group members (Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988), when a sense of group identity or solidarity exists among group members (Brewer & Kramer, 1986), or when education is given regarding the long-term benefits of cooperation (Allison & Messick, 1985; for further reviews see Komorita & Parks, 1995or Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992).",0
"An awareness of God may have also activated the fear of supernatural punishment as a consequence of defecting and not cooperating (Johnson 2005;Johnson and Kruger 2004;Johnson, Stopka, and Knights 2003).",1
"Sessions lasted approximately one hour, and subject earnings averaged £9.05 in the United Kingdom and $12.66 in the United States. 7",0
"It is the combination of chronic, self-protective mistrust with hyperactivated affi liation that leads to inconsistency and increased decisional effort.",1
"Although we expected behaviour in the trustee role to be value-expressive, universalism was not a stronger predictor of behaviour in the trustee role than in the proposer, responder, or truster roles (all contrasts t(1079) < 1.48, all p > .1).",0
"We also found that institutions are associated with the marginal effects of diversity: Diversity reduces contributions to public goods as expected, but only when students come from segregated institutions.",1
Liebrand et al. (1986) concluded that cooperators may place a higher value than individualists on how well an interaction satisfies personal or social behavioral standards.,1
"Because participants generally cooperate withand rarely defect againstcooperators in the iterated PDG, the resulting distribution of the number of rounds participants cooperate tends to be severely non-normal.",1
"For both these reasons, along with the frequently large size of the effects we observe, dynamic partner updating deserves to be considered among the most promising levers for eliciting cooperation between humans, especially in informal settings.",1
We assign α i = 4.5 to these subjects.,0
"In sum, the content analysis of communication provides further evidence that conflict expenditures in OPEN are lower than in the other treatments because subjects discuss and successfully implement turn taking behavior between groups.",1
"Regardless of the sum of the fi ve numbers, there was a complete uncooperative behavior in the one-bad-apple condition (the eff ect of the bad apple).",0
"The results show that uncertainty per se lowers individual but not group contributions, lagged marginal incentives significantly predict contributions, and individuals significantly react to own-deviations from average group contributions.",1
We characterize the relationship between our artifactual and framed field experiments as similar rather than identical because by necessity some differences exist in the two implementations.,0
People who sacrifice on behalf of others like themselves are more prone to the self-interest illusion because they see the benefits as going to people who are like themselves in some salient way.,1
Behavior in the experiment will support the hypothesis that moral opinions are conditional on the behavior of others if subjects report personal normative beliefs increasing in the average contribution level of group members.,1
Any violations of sphericity assumptions were corrected for using the conservative Greenhouse-Geisser correction.,0
Result 3. The choice of receiving feedback about individual earnings rather than about individual contributions is associated with a decrease in one's contribution in the next period.,1
"When the subject is faced with positive contribution to the public good by the computer, cooperative behavior can also be driven by inequality aversion and conditional cooperation.",1
"Generational differences, maturation, and cultural shift imply that stereotype activation should not affect Millennial entitlement because the change in entitlement occurred in the past and is observed retrospectively.",1
The upshot of this discussion is that any equilibrium with co # 0 implies using almost no communication (separation of types) in the first stage.,0
"In contrast, if the negativity bias argument applies to the VCM setting, then these two ratings may produce asymmetric levels of cooperation, as predicted by the hypothesis.",1
"Unless otherwise specified, all subjects who posted a hostage cooperated on the subsequent move, and all subjects who declined to post a hostage defected on the subsequent move.",0
"The similarity between single-player and multi-player versions of the IPD can provide a powerful research model as the reduction from two to one players reduces the number of uncontrolled and interacting variables involved in the prisoner's dilemma (Fantino, 2004).",1
"Because we use two observations per individual, we adjust the standard errors for clustering on individuals.",1
The authors contributed equally to this research.,0
"Collectively, these informal sanctions provide a powerful mechanism for guiding social behavior.",1
"So, ceteris paribus, we expect that Flemish people will not become less but ratherif there is a difference at allmore cooperative in French language contexts: H2.",0
"However, when access is equally distributed, group members will be more willing to act in a way that advances the interests of the group rather than just their own (i.e., they will be more cooperative).",1
"The contextual effects caused by the mean, range, and rank of the distribution confirmed our expectations that these relativity effects are due to some general underlying cognitive mechanisms.",1
The study adds to the existing literature on connection between real-life preferences and preferences in experiments.,0
"Since participants in these studies preferred an alternative that maximized the joint gain of both communities, the results obtained from Studies 3 and 4 also supported these predictions.",0
"Fourth, cooperation and trust are not related to affiliation tendencies, but strongly related to betrayal aversion.",0
"The reasoning is that in high-trust societies, most people already contribute to the public good: The belief that most others can be trusted renders punishment an unnecessary cost to encourage contributions.",1
Their earnings from such a decision would depend not only on their individual extraction but also on the extraction levels that the other members of their group made in that round.,0
"Such patrols not only deter free riding in itself but also generate information needed for the punishment of free riders, which is determined by an executive committee on the group level chaired by the group leader.",1
The gains or losses incurred by the players on each trial are dependent on choices made by both of them between two available behaviors.,1
"Depending on the parametrization, this new game can have egalitarian equilibria as well as asymmetric solutions, leaving one player worse off.",1
"t(94) ϭ 1.78, ns), a significant reduction (Z ϭ 1.98, p Ͻ .05).",0
"Subjects in the Generalized Reciprocity group always faced cooperators: first five Hindus, then five Muslims.",0
"Although the SSRIs are much more selective, chronic treatment with compounds such as fluoxetine and paroxetine, have been found to induce changes in noradrenergic transmission in both animal and human studies (see, for example, Lundmark et al. 1994;Redrobe et al. 1998).",0
"After completing the questionnaire, subjects were debriefed, thanked for participating, and excused.",0
"When players have the option of punishing each other after the contribution stage, the effect of the moral messages on contributions becomes persistent: punishments and moral messages interact to sustain cooperation.",1
When numerical cheap talk was combined with a punishment option there were many cheap talk threats of punishment and cheap talk responses with higher cheap talk contributions.,1
"Based on this belief, the difference between public goods and common-pool resources has often been reduced to frames or different representations of one and the same game.",0
"We again found that social context, this time the level of competitiveness, did not fundamentally change the dynamics of cooperation.",0
"Consider Pruitt and Kimmel's (1977) goal/expectation theory, which states that cooperation is more likely when trust is enhanced, but only if people also have a prosocial orientation (the goal to achieve mutual cooperation), if the trust explanation is true, then people with a prosocial orientation should contribute more when group identity is salient.",1
"It makes no sense to spend large amounts of money for summer salaries, secretaries, computer terminals and research assistants, and then motivate the subjects with microscopic amounts of money (quoted in Kollock 1998:207). 11",0
"Second, deviation from the dominant strategy leads to a higher joint payoff for the group, and enough contributions produce an outcome that is Pareto superior to the dominant strategy equilibrium outcome.",1
"Based on the above reasoning, we predicted that individuals who anticipate pride about acting fairly would be more likely to divide resources between themselves and another in a fair way, whereas those who anticipate regret about acting fairly would be less likely to do so.",1
"In the PD game the players simultaneously choose their moves -C (cooperate) or D (defect), without knowing their opponent's choice.",0
"Cooperative corporate culture can be nurtured by starting small, as Weber (2006)  shows experimentally with a coordination game.",1
"Then ,Z t (x). is evaluated as an average of Z t k (x) over all the 26 couples.",0
"In models based on income differences, if responders care for the utility of the other responder, then in addition to receiving disutility because the take authority has a higher income than they do, they will also receive disutility because the take authority has higher income than their friend does.",1
We did not obtain saliva samples from two participants because these two participants were short-termly recruited and not screened in advance for health and smoking absence (final N = 58).,1
This study's null result is disappointing.,0
"Such a preference structure is consistent with a preference structure that resembles the payoff structure of the Prisoner""s dilemma, DC > CC > DD > CD.",0
The effect of partner type did not differ across treatment groups for the probability of cooperating after a partner defection.,0
Participants were told that a total of 200 lottery tickets would be divided among all participants.,0
"In fact, a recent agent-based simulation also suggests that gossip-based partner selection increases cooperation, whereas the strategy to defect after knowing about free riders' reputation decreases cooperation 18 .",1
"When early humans used dogs as hunting partners, they most likely increased their intake of protein (Koster & Tankersley, 2012;Ruusila & Pesonen, 2004).",1
"Concerning the contributions in the mechanism treatment, Fig. 7 shows rather stable and marginally increasing contributions over the course of time.",0
"Due to this base rate, no conclusive verdict for a no-play option facilitation effect at high base rates can be drawn.",0
"We found that communication still improves group performance even with increased difficulties in communication and limited information about the resource, but the level of benefit for having communication is reduced.",1
A second problem is that many of these experiments gave false feedback to subjects about their partner's choices.,0
"If it is true that antisocial punishment is based on the intuitive system and especially likely executed by individuals with a proneness to sadistic tendencies, then the inhibition of the intuitive system should reduce antisocial punishment in individuals with a proneness to sadistic tendencies.",1
"The def change having occurred prior to the verbal response trial (B 2 ) suggests that negative attitude change, after harm, may inhibit retaliatory behavior  for Group DL and, to some extent, for Group N.",1
"In conservation psychology, the accumulated evidence indicates that people's conservation performance is strongly determined by normative prosocial influences.",1
"During donation choices, peer presence resulted in higher donations and enhanced activity in several social brain regions including the muff, TPJ, precuneus and STS.",1
This finding is consistent with publicly-traded firms making relatively larger investments in environmental performance to assuage the concerns of investors.,1
"A decrease over time is consistent with game-theoretical predictions about conditional cooperation, since individuals are expected to eventually modify their behavior over time to maximize their earnings.",1
"In a highly congested road, for example, at peak hours commuting car drivers are not willing to share the road or let other vehicles use the road space correctly, exacerbating the tragedy associated with the overuse of that road space, even if this is highly inefficient.",1
Members will only observe the total amount invested to the group he belongs.,0
"While the behavior of subjects in the low-reward conditions is more ambiguous, it is congruent with the speculation that persons are not highly motivated to do well in the PD game when earnings are small, irrespective of the extent to which the rewards are equitable.",1
"In contrast, increasing individuals' awareness of their mortality apparently leads them to base their donation decisions on the social desirability of providing help, as reflected in the amount of help provided in the past (Experiments 1-3) and others' preferences (Experiment 4).",1
The first conjecture refers to the potentially positive effect that leadership signaling per se may have in catalyzing cooperation.,1
"Given that our study was run only in one location, we cannot infer much about the effectiveness of sanctions in other locations when using the same weak link technology.",0
"For example, regardless of their own contribution students could not be excluded from the public good that the course generates (i.e.",0
"This implies that there are signs that moving beliefs may have been one of the channels through which priming affected contributions, but this channel seems to be surprisingly weak and statistically insignificant.",1
"If the memory advantage for expectancy-incongruent information is abolished under cognitive load, our ability to successfully engage in social cooperation would be impaired because this type of memory is essential for correcting maladaptive behavior tendencies.",1
"In discussing the nature of prejudice and discrimination, Allport (1958: 78) summarized much evidence and concluded in a generalization that &dquo;on the average, attitudes toward Negroes are less favorable in southern than in northern and western states.&dquo;",0
Supplemental analyses are available from the authors upon request.,0
Tobit Random Effects Regressions on Public Good Contribution: Effect of Disapproval Points in Punishment Treatment,0
We present a novel laboratory reciprocity experiment (the double-dictator game with sorting) and show that failure to account for external motives leads to a significant overestimation of internal motives such as fairness and altruism.,1
Tokens kept have a private value while tokens invested in the public fund generate a 'public good' return by transferring income to the contributor and the rest of the players.,1
"Intuitively it can be expected that the tendency to defect will increase with group size N and costs K, and will decrease with the incentive U.",1
"In line with these predictions, Pellegrini & Long (2002) have observed an initial increase in aggressive competition as adolescents moved from primary to secondary school, and bullying behavior appeared to mediate dominance status during this transition.",1
Isaac and Walker (1988b) present experimental evidence that the ability to talk among group members participating in a public goods game leads to increased cooperation in the form of higher contributions and lower free-riding.,1
"In general, the attribution research and the research on the effect of gender stereotypes and social inferences (Berndt & Heller, 1986;Deaux & Lewis, 1984) has found that a positive relationship exists between conformity to gender role stereotypical behavior and subsequent attributions of masculinity and femininity.",0
"Thus, fewer of the present subjects were likely to make responses they did not understand during the MDG.",0
This conditional behaviour may even inhibit the process of discovering the profitable strategy.,1
"Finally, the results of this study indicate that the traditional transfer paradigms offer sensitive analytical methods for investigating learning processes in schizophrenic and other pathological groups.",0
Tide A. Each unit in trade A will earn 4 cents on each trial if it is matched by a unit from the other person.,0
Attributing human character- istics and motivations to nonhuman agents increases the ability to make sense of an agent's action and reduces uncertainty.,1
We scrutinized the subjects who targeted the highest contributor and why they did it.,0
"Our broad conclusion is that, while social desirability matters, the way it matters subtly depends on the social desirability personality type, and this in turn affects the social and experimental perceptions of what is demanded.",1
"To check whether participants understood the game correctly, they had to complete a quiz.",0
"Finally, a significant difference between the VP1 treatment and the VP2 treatment exists in the final ten periods. 32",0
The results show that cooperation was higher when people could leave bad partners versus when they could not.,1
"Many types of superimposed schedules are possible, including multiple consequences of like or opposite valence, delayed consequences, one immediate and one delayed consequence of like valence, or combined ratio and interval schedules.",0
When the first mover cooperated there is a clear decline in cooperation as scores in perspective taking increase.,1
"Hence, in the opportunity cost effect we have a strict ranking whereby the individual game generates superior replacement players to the group game, and the group game to no information.",0
"Summary of results: The comparative static effects are in the same direction for all methods, but there are differences in magnitudes with the standard method (RT) giving the largest treatment effect.",0
"How did we get into this bind, where the most unspeakable crimes against humanity are not only thinkable but are actually the subject of an on-going serious discussion?",0
"(If commitments are more than just con-  .20 tracts with particular people, but are also prebehavior choices to behave in a particular way, such a correlation will occur even after a switch has been made and the contractual relevance of the people to whom the commitments were made has been removed.)",1
"By contrast, subjects in treatments GIVE and TAKE play a pure one-shot implementation of the game, where follower's responses to the leader decisions are elicited using the strategy method (Selten 1967).",0
"Evidence for the in-group compensation hypothesis comes from the significant three-way interaction between partner group, partner action, and participant identification.",0
"Cook and her colleagues examined another condition of PD/D in which two players were randomly matched in each trial, and found that the positive effect of the opportunity to separate trust and cooperation provided by the PD/D requires that the game be played between particular partners repeatedly.",1
"It might be the case that the resources contributed by the group members be as costly as resources arriving from outside of the community, but when states have limited funds and personnel, and when communities can derive other kind of gains from, say, participation in self-governing systems, such as increase in trust, social networks and ties, the comparison of externally imposed regulation systems to self-governance deserves also a policy level inquiry.",1
Participants were informed that the task would involve two players.,0
"At the opposite extreme of preferences like those shown in (1), he considers the existence of ''egoistic preferences'', that is, individuals for whom the only motivation for donating is their own warm glow, arising from g i :",0
If he wishes to exploit the target he need not resort to trickery-he has coercive strength to use if he wishes.,0
These subjects condition their contribution on the other group members' contributions and their willingness to contribute to the common project increases with the contributions of the other group members.,1
Thus Player 1's announcement choice in the cheap talk game is optimal.,0
"Specifically, with the addition of the G allele on rs237887, self-reported positive emotional reactions significantly decreased (see Figure 1).",1
"Finally, recent ff data implicate right anterior insula in aversive conditioning (Seymour et al., 2004).",0
"It is now well established that imagined contact can facilitate more positive intergroup attitudes and friendship-related emotions (Crisp & Turner, 2009).",1
If all participants adopt the strategy of never using the bus then they will each receive an earning of £25.,1
"But with simultaneous decisions, the risk that others might not cooperate can lead players to defect (the risk-dominant equilibrium).",1
The benefit of the project decreases over time.,0
"In this line of thought, individual utility arise not only from material outcomes but also from the comparison of own and other people's pay-offs.",1
"In an attempt to instrumentally maximise their outcomes, the very same underlying individualistic motive will propel parties to opt for non-cooperation in single-trial PDG interactions, but to choose cooperation in iterated interactions.",0
A natural explanation for the limited capability of a leader's signal to influence followers' beliefs under heterogeneity is the lack of followers' trust in the relevance of the signal to participants who do not share the religion of the leader.,1
"In other words, a dictator is more likely to make a fair offer if he/she expects the audience to observe their choice.",1
"By taking the view that a confluence of individual and contextual factors induces aggressive behavior, we explore how individual proclivities for aggression and environmental circumstances conducive to aggression e neither of which are particularly rare in isolation e must co-occur to create the comparatively rare expression of aggressive behavior.",1
Identities were elicited through short survey questions.,0
"A trigger strategy, s*, can be characterized as a strategy of cooperation that is followed if the following three conditions are met: First, at time t, it must be the case that",0
"Social marginalization or even exclusion is that cost, and unless the personal payoffs for defection are extremely large, few group members are willing to pay that cost.",1
"a ""golden rule of expectations"" does not mean that people intending cooperation are always optimistic about other individuals' intentions, or that people intending defection are always pessimistic about them.",0
"The cell ns for the individuals, interdependence, group-representative, and group-all conditions are for males 11, 18, 9, 11, respectively, and for females 11, 15, 10, 10, respectively.",0
"Consequently, our results indicate that emoticons mainly affect behavior through the communication channel provided with it (feedback as pre-play communication).",1
Assuming others will make the same choice as before seems to us to be the simplest model of others' behavior.,0
"Result 3: Individual cooperation rates are higher at the beginning of RPD games than at the beginning of the sequence of one-shot PD games, particularly for high reasoning ability subjects.",0
An idealistically cooperative voice raised in a context that does not offer substantive advantages for cooperation may not be persuasive.,1
"First, if women were more unconditionally cooperative than men, they should contribute more to the public good than men even when controlling for expectations.",1
Conducting the experiments in the structured and formal setting of an experimental laboratory decreases cooperation among our subjects.,1
"This is to be expected given the plausible assumption that the moralistic punishment by the partners had served to increase participants' willingness to cooperate in Experiments 1 and 2 (consistent with Fehr & Gächter, 2002).",1
"Although punishment may be used to regulate the members of the in-group, the evidence presented here suggests that it is often driven by intergroup biasleading to harsher punishment of out-group members.",1
"Beyond the social dilemma game, it is expected that if happiness is displayed, a cooperative in contrast to a self-interested message will more likely lead to meeting up with the other.",1
"Accordingly, the difference in cooperativity between our Pavlovian and TFT-like players in the first session was similar to that in the second session (Fig. 2b).",0
"In the computer conditions, the experimenter took the participant to a second room and seated him or her in front of a computer workstation with a 21-in.",0
"These 2 features make Jan and Marcia socially interdependent, and the rank order of outcomes available to each of them will constitute a Prisoner's Dilemma.",1
"Here we present a theory of why (and for whom) intuition favors cooperation: cooperation is typically advantageous in everyday life, leading to the formation of generalized cooperative intuitions.",1
"When groups contributed more than 125 total tokens, efficiency was reduced because contributions over the minimum were not returned to individuals and were thus wasted.",1
"This self-regulatory ability requires executive attention, a limited cognitive resource (Engle, 2001).",0
"In a simultaneous PGD, risk-averse prosocials defect more than risk-seeking prosocials do because risk-averse prosocials are more worried about losing their endowments than their risk-seeking counterparts.",1
"Yet, when group identification was high, both leader types appeared to be equally efficient.",1
"When there is no privately provided public good, subjects can cooperate only through paying taxes.",1
"Of primary interest in this context is the latter interaction: block-ofrcd subjects who had participated first in the Paddle Game declined less in cooperativeness than those who had not, and tit-for-tat subjects with prior Paddle Game experience increased more in cooperativeness over trials than those without such experience.",1
• Disparities between WTP/WTA in valuing environmental benefits: The literature on the differences between a willingness to pay for an environmental benefit versus a willingness to accept compensation for giving it up continues to confirm the hypothetical bias and loss aversion effect that we were warned about decades ago.,0
The refined approach builds on key tenets of social identity theory to argue that identity affects cooperation by leadings actors to maximize ingroup outcomes and minimize ingroup inequalities.,1
We propose that it is because task-related and task-unrelated communications activate different norms.,1
"This is evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that the Perfect Strangers treatment affects qualitative behavior, in the sense that it elicits more subjects to focus on the zero contribution response.",1
It is therefore possible that the higher rates of cooperation in PD are (partly) due to the smaller size of the action set.,1
"Hence, it is attractive not to purchase a TV-license, but if too many do so, the good may not be provided at all.",1
The second treatment variable is the information available to subjects.,0
"That is, their utility function takes the form",0
"In this, greater Black cooperation in this social dilemma may in part be the result of coping strategies developed by Black students to overcome social-structural and institutional hurdles faced by students of color.",1
The present results indicate that the failure might not be due to an unrepresentativeness of game situations to typical interpersonal interactions.,0
"Obviously, this enabled us to infer more precisely how the dynamic link in our basic setting affected the results.",0
5. Stability: Groups may be more stable when entry is restricted compared to the other two conditions if subjects are able to generate cooperation.,1
"Gaining from the public good provided by their group, subjects increased their initial budget of 200 Rs by 59%.",1
"This suggests that learning interdependence only as outcomes are experienced over time, as is typical in the real world, may hinder realizations that cooperation will build the trust of others and even increase one's own well-being in the long run.",1
"Specifically, we expect authority contribution leaders to give more than randomly selected contribution leaders both because they recognize the positive influence that they can exert on others and because more of the mechanisms that make contribution leaders influential may be relevant when a local authority leads.",1
The points accrued during the experiment would be traded for lottery tickets with cash prizes between £10 ($20) and £30 ($60).,0
People may voluntarily contribute to a public good because they feel morally obligated to assist others in a common cause or because they realize that contributing will help the group as a whole.,1
Study 1 Mean and Standard Deviations by Experimental Condition,0
"We aggregate the five classes into three categories: very satisfied (score four or five), followed by pretty satisfied (score three) and not satisfied (score one or two).",0
"Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments captures this idea nicely with the notion that people evaluate their behavior in the view of an ""impartial spectator"".",0
"In contrast, the Stranger and Computer condition showed only a trend toward a significant difference (t[92] = 1.73, p = .087),",0
"Policies like the Pigouvian subsidy ignore these non-Nash behaviors, and the result is that inefficient under-extraction is exacerbated in our context.",1
"In RIE3 and RIE5 this investment type accounts, respectively, for 67%, and 51.5% of all decisions; in IIE3 and IIE5, this type accounts, respectively, for 82.8% and 83.1%.",0
"Thus, norms of interpersonal fairness and equality may not only inhibit the responsiveness of identifiable individuals, but also of identifiable group members.",0
"w = 0.01, hypocritical punishment, ΔG 2 (1) = 0.20, p = .652,",0
When designing emotional agents we have shown how the addition of mood can be used to enhance the decision-making aspect of that agent.,1
"Furthermore, we believe that participants who punish cheaters are those who espouse the state of mutual cooperation as a goal and thus might feel guilty for not punishing cheaters and thus failing to promote mutual cooperation.",1
"Clearly, the salience of social categories may be important in order to create cooperation within groups (e.g.",1
"Subjects were given an endowment of 10 tokens, worth 40 pence each. Contributions were doubled and divided equally between the seven subjects in a group.",0
This correction left' the distributions essentially unchanged.,0
"Alternatively, motivational factors may diminish children's cooperative reasoning and actions in the face of personal costs.",1
Both effects should cause increase in public-good provision at least at level 1.,1
"Of these, 14 failed an attention check or to complete the study, leaving a total of n ϭ 386 (133 females, M age ϭ 33.9).",0
In the absence of social interaction this graph should fluctuate around 0; instead we observe a very strong positive relationship between (c 1 i − c 2 i ) and (g 1 i − g 2 i ) with observations lying almost exactly on the 45 • line.,0
The presence of cross-village variability also cautions us when attempting to explain game results by ®tting just-so anecdotal stories that capture key cultural traits or behaviors.,0
"Second, it was concluded that highly threatening situations minimize the effects of idiosyncratic motives, perhaps arousing a common defensive motive.",1
It is easy to conclude that we should want more trust.,0
"om a game theoretic perspective, the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage game is for all subjects to ccntribute $0.",0
"In addition to the money that player i keeps, i receives a fixed percentage of the group's total contribution to the public account, α, where 0 < α < 1 < nα.",0
"Using this and the fact that the gamma function (x + 1) = x! when x is an integer, the left-hand side of (2) could be rewritten as",0
"ANOVA results in Table 2B showed a significant two-way interaction between level and basis of trust, F(2, 160) = 3.02, p = 0.05, h 2 = 0.04.",0
"This was because, in the case of Colombia, their subsistence depends on the fishery, which is not ecologically productive.",1
It was concluded that the high degree of competitiveness typically found in PD game studies may be largely a function of the isolation imposed on the subjects by the experimenter.,1
"Without data on both expectations and contributions, it can be difficult to identify the strategies adopted by participants in economic games, a necessary step to test fully theories of cooperation.",1
"Large coalitions mean few outsiders but, at the same time, high free-rider benefits if the coalition members fully internalize their mutual benefits.",1
"If there were no time value, then there would be no advantage to hiring an agent first (since the other party would respond by hiring an agent instantaneously), and therefore a prisoner's dilemma could not exist.",1
"Second, the absence of an effect of Openness might also be driven by statistical reasons, due to the structure of the MPT model: Parameter e is defined conditional on non-selfish behavior, which leads to fewer trials per person (and hence a lower statistical efficiency) for the estimation of parameter e than for parameter s.",1
"It is the product of an evolutionary game in which intragroup cooperation enhances one's reputation within the group (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008).",1
"If participants in the Public Goods Game exhibit loss aversion, they will react more strongly to the prospect of being punished than to potential rewards; thus making punishment the more effective enforcement mechanism.",1
"The probability of 0.2 is chosen conservatively, since this data generating process gives slightly more noisy classifications than we really have: 32% of the generated data points have two and 4% have three possible levels.",0
"The interpretation of the relative sizes of these two effects, however, has to be made with caution, since effect sizes depend on the parameters used in the experiment, including the cost and benefit for cooperation and the cost and size of punishment.",0
-This test was developed on the present study sample and certainly needs cross-validating (now in progress).,0
"Consequently, the payoffs of free-riders in SFI decrease and over the periods, participants in SFI experience the typically observed collapse of cooperation in repeated social dilemma interactions (Fig. 1).",1
"ecause sacrifice increases the relative price of private production, it can screen freeriders from high-sacrifice groups while inducing the H-types to substitute towards more group investment.",1
"The results of the present study constitute, in a way, a return to the idea that fairness judgments are not affected by dilemma type, although we now suggest that it is the presentation of decisions in the dilemma types that induces the focus.",1
DISCUSSION Our hypotheses were all confirmed.,0
Table 4 summarizes players' choices in the early and later trials.,0
Participants in this sample completed the 7-item DGS.,0
"Of course, young and older adults were both likely to create an obstacle to their partner's goal when they interacted with friends than with strangers.",0
"We find that in the presence of conditional cooperators, common knowledge does enhance efficiency mostly because the advice left in this treatment is more exhortative.",1
"The game master read the instructions twice and I then demonstrated the play with a set of ten, ten shilling coins.",0
"But many indicated an interest in having both players choose D (Table 6), which is closely related.",0
"Further, as the game scenario of the current study equalled classical iterated Prisoner Dilemma Game (PDG) matrices, mentalizing performance was measured implicitly thereby circumventing socially desirable behaviour [18][19][20]24,25].",0
This improves the earnings for those groups but the lowest earnings are not too different and this pulls the overall average earnings down to look more similar across treatments.,1
"In our study, because of the presence of a sanctioning system, it may have occurred to people that group members would defect if it were not for the sanctioning system.",1
"Even though the level of regulation a facility faces does not depend on the overall size of a facility, the two factors are highly correlated.",0
"The maintenance of social norms often depends on external enforcement, as in the absence of credible sanctioning mechanisms prosocial behaviour deteriorates quickly.",1
"Our elicitation was very specific: beliefs about the other three players, paying for exact correctness, and beliefs were elicited before the decision.",0
"Threat of revenge induce more deliberation on punishment and reduces other perverse punishment, which will have a positive impact on cooperation.",1
"Specifically, we used three boxes of different sizes (small, medium, and big), each of which contained a different set of gifts.",0
An important consequence of this increase in average effort is that the aggregate monetary payoff increases by 40% even if one takes the payoff reductions that result from actual punishments into account.,1
There is a strong and significant correlation that those subjects who burn money tend to be also those who expect their counterpart to burn theirs.,0
Colors: Each person in your group has a color.,0
The t-test for significance of differences was T = 8.56 significant with a probability or error less than .0001.,0
"Individual-scale variables like wealth and education may affect the costs of public goods provisioning or the benefits of short-term defection, and so wealthier and more educated individuals who can obtain resources more readily can expect to be more generous.",1
"However, in environments where behavior is shifting, such estimation exercises must be treated with caution.",0
The upshot of these comments is that large churches as well as small churches must create a sense of belonging if they are to mitigate members' free riding tendencies and survive.,1
"Wilcoxonsigned ranks test revealed that participants contributed significantly more in the bonus rounds (Mdn ¼ 7) than in the standard rounds (Mdn ¼ 6), z ¼ 21.66, p ¼ 0.048, one-tailed.",0
"Findings suggest an individual-group continuity effect, rather than a discontinuity effect, within the context of repeated PDG interactions and communications between individuals and groups.",0
This result suggests that language activates group norms in a heterogeneous fashion: if different people's latent identities differ they can respond in very different ways to identical linguistic cues.,1
"Thus, moral judgments were an effective and efficient mechanism for fostering cooperation, solidarity, generosity, trust, and trustworthiness.",1
"The members of such societies have strong incentives to innovate and to make physical and human capital investments, thereby contributing to socio-economic prosperity and overall welfare.",1
"As can be inferred from Table 2, most of these relationships were rather weak (with 6 trivial and 15 small associations).",0
"A player using this strategy cooperates initially, and then plays the same as his/her opponent did in the previous game.",0
"First, the most notable feature of our results is that in all cases the treatment effects are smaller in the replication than in the original study.",0
"Emotional energy is, thus, the result of both the euphoria of contagious public gatherings, the ecstasy of sexual encounters, the bonding of friendly exchanges, and it is an outcome of humiliating experiences, heated arguments, and violent episodes.",1
Violent media may cause viewers to perceive greater anger and less gratitude during a cooperative task and as such be less inclined to cooperate.,1
"When the objective incentives remain identical, these studies showed that framing the dilemma in terms of ""taking from"" instead of ""contributing to"" increases cooperation (Brewer and Kramer, 1986).",1
"This interpretation was supported by the results of Study 2, which directly tested subgroup reputation as a moderating influence on organizational identification.",0
We find differences in the behavior of our experimental participants across the three countries and we find that Hofstede's dimensions help to explain these differences.,0
"Research also shows that when people adopt a more abstract or higher construal level (Trope & Liberman, 2010)-that is, they feel more psychological distance-they show more pro-self-orientation, leading them to engage in behaviors that fit with the social motivation they endorse (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, Shalvi, Sligte, & Leder, 2010).",1
"Heart rate deceleration is a classic physiological index of the orienting response (Graham, 1979).",0
"Although the intention behind this sanctioning system is to make garbage reduction relatively more attractive, the sanctioning system also may unintentionally cause dumping to become more attractive.",1
"Once again, participants felt holier than thou, thinking they were more likely to cooperate (M = 75%) than their peers (M = 63%), paired t(50) = 3.69, p < .001.",0
"Through such mechanisms, a deliberation treatment might increase cooperation in the second stage of a sequential prisoner's dilemma, contrary to the prediction of the SHH.",1
"However, the non-monotonicity between observability and deterrence we observe is troubling, because it suggests that simply increasing the ability to monitor outside threats may not lead to better outcomes, and it leaves us unsure about what level of observability is required to generate better outcomes.",1
All your answers will be treated confidentially and anonymously.,0
Despite the interesting balance of incentives provided by introducing competition in the workplace -on one hand individual workers may exert more effort to win promotion or make more money while on the other overall production might suffer because of the lack of cooperation among workers -there has been remarkably little empirical work estimating the effect of competition on workplace cooperation.,1
La importancia de este problema crece ra ´pidamente debido a la creciente demanda de los escasos recursos en todo el mundo.,0
They were told that they would participate in a number of unrelated experiments and were brought to individual soundproof cubicles.,0
"When everyone has made a choice, the outcome and the choices of the other members of your committee are revealed, and this determines your earnings for the match.",1
"More specifically, the MCL may be higher in the VCM with real-time contributions simply because people tend to contribute more when they are observed, even if the observers' actions are not affected by this monitoring.",1
"These were participants with little or no experience from economic games, because, according to the SHH, there will be a negative deliberation effect on cooperation only for subjects with limited experience from economic games and other ""artificial lab environments"" (Rand et al., 2014).",1
"This earlier experience, we find, causes the players to update their expectations, leading more groups to choose the tipping game compared to the treatment in which groups lack this experience.",1
The negative trend in contributions in blue groups is substantial and statistically significant.,0
"Acting for sacred values, collectively, provides a record of cooperative action and thus offers evidence of cooperative responses downstream.",1
"In other words, acceptance would be more common if the subjects' expectations were met because, although a shared concept of fairness exists, fairness is sensitive to different factors (personal, situational, and social) that influence expectations and fairness perception.",1
"Because the cooperate-cooperate outcome produces more wealth than any other, optional entry will increase social welfare.",1
Locus of control fosters cooperation for internals with high levels of cooperative education because those people are able to use their background as a means towards an end in that they believe that they can influence their desired outcomes.,1
In fecfun all citizens decide simultaneously over punishment p i→k with k ∈ D\{i}.,0
"In an experiment where we alternated rounds of the indirect reciprocity game with rounds of the public goods game, the decisions in the public goods rounds were both directly observable and displayed as information in following indirect reciprocity rounds.",0
competitive individual) task led to less persistence on a subsequent task.,1
"Because there is attention to the content of the choices, WCLD becomes an affective version of TFT rather than a mere mimic.",1
The eight games were played in different rooms to minimize sequential dependencies.,0
"However, as an adaptation of beliefs to feedback is likely to occur, we may expect in line with the adaptive conditional-cooperation conjecture (Neugebauer et al. 2009) that the contributions positively respond to the past continuation-payoff differential.",1
"Thereafter, participants in this condition immediately moved on to the remainder of the study.",0
"The very existence of a government that can promulgate and enforce regulations to deter free riding while acting as a faithful agent of its citizens depends on voluntary pro-social acts such as citizen scrutiny of politicians' actions, self-education about political issues, and making the effort to vote in elections.",1
"This ''voice'' manipulation (Folger, 1977) is the most commonly used manipulation of procedural fairness in experimental studies.",0
"Individually rational and selfish behavior thus leads to Pareto-suboptimal outcomes, rendering the one-shot PD a classic example of a social dilemma [1,2].",1
"Because the profits of having a large herd accrued exclusively to the individual herdsman, whereas the costs in terms of exceeding the carrying capacity of the common were incurred collectively by all herdsmen, each herdsman could gain wealth by grazing increasingly large herds on the common.",1
Our study tests why discounting a belief in free will increases the likelihood of uncooperative behavior.,1
"In the absence of external cooperative incentives, people often choose to rely selectively on others with whom they share a group membership (e.g., Brewer, 2000Brewer, , 2008;;Packer & Kugler, 2017).",1
They produce evidence to support the notion that a greater MPCR distance increases contribution by making the gains from cooperation in the social dilemma more salient for all group members. 18,1
The groups convened in separate adjacent classrooms to prevent communication between groups.,1
"A possible explanation is that the cooperation norm is more salient in the former than in the latter, due to the fact that in ""public,"" everyone observes punishments for norm violations.",1
"The present findings complement this growing literature by showing that people are actually willing to forgive an incident of noise, as long as the partner communicates about noise and clarifies the actual (benign) intentions.",1
(E) BG-PD with low greed (0.10) and low fear (0.10).,0
"Similarly, a pro-social subject (again defined by his decisions in the experimental choice set) would tend to make slower selfish decisions and faster pro-social decisions.",1
"First, the higher the payoff foregone by a freerider when not receiving rewards, the more likely he/she is to act (more) cooperatively in the social dilemma game in order to attract rewards.",1
"We speculate that when members of successful groups made their investment choices, they conformed to an inferred-but illusory-norm of ""cooperativeness"" within the group.",1
"The correlation between contributions and other-team beliefs is lower (Spearman's = 0.31, p < 0.01), but still indicative of a positive relationship.",0
They might be willing to take a certain amount of risk by delaying an immediate benefit for a greater future prospect given what they make of the likelihood of success in a set of prevalent conditions.,0
The instructions are identical for all participants.,0
"However, because condition SQ6 is played after the subject gains much experience with the task, and in particular after experiencing the fifth position in condition SQ5, we anticipate fewer violations of the model in condition SQ6 than in condition SQ in experiment 1. METHOD Subjects.",1
"Using Campbell's (1958) concept of `entitativity', they also assume that the competitive discontinuity between individuals and groups is greater the more members Discontinuity or reciprocity?",0
These associations could explain why previous studies found an effect of Openness on PEB and the present study did not.,0
"We study the evolution of cooperation in a population of 100 agents, each of which updates her strategy according to the myopic best response update rule.",0
"The significant positive coefficient of Negative deviation of j in the first two regressions reveals that the greater the extent of free riding is, the greater is the likelihood and severity of altruistic punishment in the Baseline treatment.",1
It thereby seeks to define the social norm determining the amount to contribute (see e.g.,0
"Applying regressions similar to those used for the take games reveals only weak effects, if at all.",0
"A second and related implication is that when the CPR range ␤ Ϫ ␣ increases beyond a certain threshold, the individual requests will increase too.",1
"Participants were advised that part of the experiment (T2 condition, see below) was not suitable for people with back or knee problems; any participants who said this would not be suitable for them were assigned to another condition.",0
"Under naturally occurring circumstances, search costs and switching costs, as well as fluctuations in individual performance, tend to delay regrouping.",1
"Berkowitz (1960) has demonstrated that unexpected frustrations produce more hostility than expected frustrations and, what is more important for the study reported here, that subjects who expect hostility and receive friendliness will reveal a greater trend toward friendliness than those subjects who have a reason to expect friendliness.",1
An example is the choice between alternative A: 500 points for self and 500 points for other; B: 560 points for self and 300 for other; and C: 500 points for self and 100 points for other.,0
"As a matter of fact, subjects who spend most of the time in group B tend to cooperate quite a bit (52% in T0 and 54% in TP) of the time that they spend in group A. 18 This is a general observation.",0
"We found that when people's mortality was not called to their attention, a need-focused appeal had more influence on their donation decisions than a bandwagon appeal.",1
All subjects who choose to contribute 0 in any case are classified as ''free riders''.,0
"Those two are: 'I participate in all important meetings held in my hospital' and 'I usually take opportunities to discuss work related things in my work break with colleagues', measured on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).",0
Syntax for fitting the model for Study 1 in multifree,0
"Longer cycles allow a better identification of strategies, so as cycle duration increases a larger strategy set is needed to fit a given number of observations.",1
"Similarly, providing feedback on how one's energy use compares with one's neighbors had reduced consumption among American liberals but may have had the opposite effect among conservatives (80).",1
"Evidence suggests that friendships are impaired by social anxiety disorder (SAD) (Rodebaugh, 2009).",1
Support for Result 1 can be found in Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 1 and 2 (all numbers in tables and figures are in shanks).,0
"The game, indeed, deserves special attention since it formalizes many experiences of everyday life.",0
"The purpose of the present study was to examine the predictive capabilities of sportspersonship, moral competence, and emotional intelligence on cooperation in varying competitive conditions.",0
"In the ten sessions, subjects punished other group members a total of 1,270 times; 84.3% of the subjects punished at least once, 34.3% punished more than ®ve times during the six periods, and 9.3% punished even more than ten times.",0
"The rate of cooperation is 56% with time pressure and 54% without time pressure in the replication of Rand et al. 1 (Chisquare 5 0.11, P value 5 0.737).",0
These models suggest that one's desire to help another person depends on one's beliefs about how helpful that other person is.,1
"Player A can then choose whether to 'take' from Player B. If A takes, then Player B loses 50 points while A gains 30 points (thus theft is inefficient, and it is socially optimal to not steal; this part of the game is analogous to a unilateral Prisoner's Dilemma).",0
"Also, when all four fish approached the predator together, it became clear to the observer that they not only approached the predator as synchronized pairs but also initiated flight in pairwise synchronization.",0
This allowed them to condition their minimum proposal on the size of the coalition such that the internalization ratios a(k) may depend on the coalition size.,1
"Once moved, a couple's overtly expressed desire for mutual cooperation will be a realistic option.",0
"They are enforced by the threat of sanctions or the promise of rewards (Kerr, 1995).",0
"By contrast, in the Threshold Uncertainty and Impact-and-Threshold Uncertainty treatments, most (82 and 75%, respectively) contributed less than they pledged, indicating that pledges, like proposals, were used strategically.",0
"The persistence of identity activation may depend on many things, including the strength and complexity of the initial activating cue and the presence of other identity-congruent cues in the environment.",1
"and that perceived criticality significantly predicted knowledge sharing intentions (b 5 1.343, SE 5 .189,",0
"Research on legitimacy of authorities has shown that perceived legitimacy, in particular a shared sense of legitimacy, creates voluntary compliance with norms (ZELDITCH and WALKER 1984;TYLER 1997).",1
No participant was informed about the identity and individual contribution decisions of his group members.,0
"In other words, those subjects who showed a greater parochialism effect for contributing showed a greater self-interest illusion when the gain for their group was a loss for the other group.",1
"How distracting was the memorization task (1 very distracting, 7 not very distracting)?",0
"Active doses were identical to placebo but contained 0.5 mg, 1.0 mg, or 2.0 mg alprazolam.",0
"T = treatment (PG vs. few), P = game period (covariate), D = difference in the deviances of the compared models, df = difference in the number of parameters of the compared models, P = P-value associated with the observed D and df, calculated from the chi-square distribution.",0
The average age of the participants was 19.0 years.,0
"Here we show that, unlike material sanctions, moral judgments do not result in cycles of recrimination and tend to ""crowd in"" interpersonal trust, trustworthiness, and generosity.",1
"Previous research indicates that people who strongly identified with the in-group are more competitive toward the out-group (e.g., Chase, 1992).",1
"This leads to a 'fairness' scenario in which the wealth of richer subjects is invested in their local network, allowing poorer neighbours to gain wealth.",1
"Recently, there has been growing interest in the effect of retaliation on cooperative games with punishment [24,[34][35][36].",0
"Figs. 1, 2, and Table 3 provide support for Results 1 and 2. Fig. 1 depicts the likelihood of punishment as a function of how much an individual's contribution deviated from the average contribution of his peers.",0
"Other probabilities show that the predicted likelihood of pleading an aversion to needles (Y i = 2) is 0.087 higher for females than for males, 0.086 lower for divorced or widows than for singles and 0.051 lower for those who abstained in the 2004 election than for those who voted.",0
Allowing individuals to punish their peers for socially bad behavior can improve cooperation in groups and sometimes allow them to achieve more efficient outcomes in social dilemmas by instilling positive social norms (Ostrom 1990;Fehr and Gaechter 2000;Chaudhuri 2011 provides a recent survey).,1
Our results show that social ties between group members influence both cooperation and norm enforcement -creating substantial differences between M G and SG.,1
"These findings, coupled with the fact that there is widespread mis-reporting of token values are suggestive of why groups are unable to use the 'token revelation' stage for much gain in efficiency.",1
"In addition, results from the laboratory experiments reveal that subjects donate less when they are aware that an individual could have announced support but chose not to do so.",1
"For example, one study showed that when perceived moral levels were lower than participants' actual moral levels, the moral licensing effect resulted in reduction of the frequency of ethical behaviors, and when participants perceived higher moral levels, they showed an increase in ethical behavior [47].",1
"The strategies played by the computer agents included the straightforward strategies always-cooperate and always-defect, the classic strategy tit-for-tat (which repeats its opponent's most recent move), plus two more elaborate strategies that change behavior depending on whether or not they are in power.",0
"Unconditional contribution impacts negatively the probability of being leader, but this result is not robust and is significant only at the 10 % level. 14",0
"Tukey's procedure of multiple comparisons revealed significant differences over 100 trials between Groups I and III (p < .01),",0
"After verbally stating the contingencies described by the various examples, the experimenter said:",0
SES ¼ socioeconomic status of a coplayer; Fairness ¼ probability for coplayer cooperation.,0
"In the standard symmetric independent private values model in which ω i (d i ) = 0, Myerson's (1981) revenue equivalence result shows that, given that the charity never keeps the prize, it maximizes its revenue if it always allocates the prize to the donor with the highest marginal revenue.",0
"Due to random encounters, this initial defection will spread at random throughout the economy.",1
"Of course, second graders also shift to A2 or B2 choices, and as soon as one player does so, the chances are high for retaliation on the part of the other.",1
The public goods game itself went as follows.,0
Cooperative behavior is essential for the success of both individuals and groups.,0
Online Appendix C contains the list of the variables that were coded.,0
"Due to the missing information on individual evasion of other group members, there is no potential for a contagion effect in the baseline treatment.",1
"Information enables players to decide whether to trust the others in the group and cooperate, once they are aware that cooperation can achieve a superior outcome.",1
"Liebrand (1984) and Liebrand and van Run (1985) found that Social value orientation has received considerable attention from social psychologists and has been shown to noncooperators harvested more than cooperators only during the first few trials when the resource was plenti-influence cooperation in social dilemmas (e.g., Kramer,  mcclintock, & Messick, 1986; Liebrand, 1984; Lie-ful. 1 Nevertheless, Liebrand's (1984) and Liebrand and van Run's (1985) results were similar to Loomis et al. brand & van Run, 1985;Liebrand, Wilke, Vogel, & Wolters, 1986;Loomis, Samuelson, & Sell, 1995;Parks, (1995): all subjects significantly reduced their harvests over trials.",0
No such adjustments can be expected for proself persons.,0
"Odds Ratio = 1.31, 95% CI [0.28,6.13]).",0
"For example, past research has shown that individual differences in social value orientation (SVO), a measure of concern for both self and others outcomes in interdependent social interactions (Messick & mcclintock, 1968), is able to predict contribution to public goods (e.g., Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2005. cf. Parks, 1994), even when defection is objectively the most economical course of action (Komorita & Parks, 1996).",1
Each instruction was given by a tape recorder to minimize the interaction between subjects and experimenters.,1
The amount of communication allowed in a game thus appears to be a decisive factor in clarifying and specifying the contradictory evidence on sex differences in cooperation.,1
Each repeated game began with a sequence of 20 games.,0
"In the information treatment (hereafter INFO), subjects received information feedback about the payoffs from the public goods game, broken up to the sum of partners' contributions, and from the guessing task after each period.",0
"Namely, the sequential ordering of the choices that are available to and exercised by interdependent actors, including who makes the opening move, can markedly influence subsequent social decisions.",1
"At the same time, campaigns for blood donation might benefit from clarification about who is eligible to donate and from efforts to reduce fear of the process of drawing blood.",1
"As one can see, accounting for the treatment effect of the incentives inherent in these jobs further reduces the differences in the job category point estimates.",1
These questions highlight the necessity to investigate communicated emotion in social dilemmas.,0
Previous research has shown that behavior aligns with self-interest only when self-interest is salient.,1
"Similar results have been obtained when comparing the IPD and the IPD-MD games in a repeated-game setting, even after an artificially created ""history of conflict"", in which only the between-group pool was available for a certain number of repetitions before the within-group pool was introduced as a third option (Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein, 2012).",0
"Windfall gains (e.g., winning the lottery) may lead to greater altruism, but wealth attained through participation in a market economy may not, since as Melvin Lerner and James Meindl (1981:219) note, ""coming to the aid of a person in need and sensitivity to their deservingness will occur if such responsiveness does not pose a threat to the actor's own deservingness.""",1
"Taken together, our results illustrate the importance of equality as a normative criterion and how the efficacy of communication is reduced in the presence of normative conflict.",1
"However, if categorization does impact trust, why did S. L. Gaertner and Rust's (2000) study and our pilot studies fail to find a significant effect of categorization manipulations on PDG choices?",0
"Observed individual differences in the resting cortisol levels and social memory performance under the social stress condition may be due to individual differences in HPA reactivity, personality traits, and the level of GR/MR expression in the hippocampus [10].",1
The fact that the cooperative robot always followed through with the stated intent should have enhanced the perception of it as trustworthy.,1
"Therefore, these results suggest that as people interact during repeated social dilemmas, over time men become increasingly more cooperative than women.",1
The nature of these arrangements is a topic that will be addressed in depth in Chapter 4.,0
"In contrast, in the treatments with punishment, LOW PUN and HIGH PUN, the payoff to group member i is given by",0
"A linear regression with random effects with RT as the dependent variable shows a marginally significant effect of SVO (B ¼ À0.58, 95% CI [À1.27 to 0.11], P value ¼ 0.1), and a significant effect of trial number (B ¼ À0.01, 95% CI [À0.011 to À0.0091], P value < 0.001, Wald v 2 ¼ 413.20).",0
"In each case, cooperation also seems to decay as the rounds progress, as all lines slope upward (except for the subsidy after the first baseline, in which case there essentially is no voluntary cooperation).",0
Andreoni argues that the comparison between these two provides a clean measure of confusion.,0
"The proportion of contributors in Condition L was 0.560 (28 of 50) compared to 0.567 (17 of 30) in Condition S. Clearly, the difference between these two proportions is nonsignificant.",0
he mode of communication makes a significant difference.,0
"Ostensibly, we were studying the effect of four factors on reactions to the exchange: whether the two participants in a session started with the same or a different number of tickets (balance of initial resources), whether exchange was required or optional (choice), whether the exchange was simultaneous or sequential (timing of exchange), and whether the exchange was face-to-face or indirect (form of interaction).",0
"To predict behavior, we need to know how people psychologically transform these different outcomes into subjective utilities.",0
"In our study, by perceiving the punishment executer to be human, we show that such a rule could emerge spontaneously because the rule benefits the punishment executers themselves.",1
The amount of the stake varied from ¥1 to ¥23.,0
"Thus, two competing tendencies may be operating in this situation, namely, a tendency to maximize personal gain and a tendency to be considerate, fair, and understanding.",0
"The results also reveal that the average harvest behavior in the baseline game positively and significantly affects the harvest behavior in the second game, suggesting some persistence of behavior over the two games.",1
This result is consistent with a previous study which suggests that behaving dishonestly leads to the forgetting of rules [24].,1
"In such situations, therefore, each party should be interested in dissuading the other from making such a response.",0
The third factor had two levels: low or high threshold.,0
The initial resource location was a salient stimulus from which subjects could assess the similarity or difference between the two subgroups.,0
"Situations requiring collective action take ma forms: systems for managing ""common-pool resources,"" such as fisheries, water supplies managed through irrigation systems, or mountain meadows (Ostrom 1990); systems for con-trolling behavior, such as social norms that prchibit exploitative or predatory behavior (Ullmann-Margalit 1977); social changes like revolutions (Taylor 1988;Lindenberg 1989) or more modest changes of public policy (Opp 1989).",0
"When the group boundaries are fixed, as they are in our research, jointness of supply has little direct effect on the provision of the public good.2",1
"Specifically, Earnings from BLUE Group Account = 0.40 x (Total BLUE Group Allocation)",0
"Thus, threats to a group generate increased solidarity (ee + ) within the threatened group, but also hostility (ee − ) against an opponent [72][73][74][75].",1
"Conditional cooperation is markedly enhanced in IRS, where it arises directly from the monetary incentive structure.",0
"REWARDS Two sets of matrix values were used, with one set having payoffs that were 10 times as great as the other (see Table 1).",0
"We will refer to Players 1, 2, 3, and 4 as ""dictators,"" ""receivers,"" ""third parties,"" and ""bystanders,"" respectively, henceforth but note that the neutral terms Players 1-4 were used in experimental instructions (see Supporting Information).",0
"R choice related significantly to a number of measures: M (-.29); Te (-.87); frequency of R choice following prediction of R (.86); frequency of B choice following prediction of B (-.43); R by the other following its prediction (.71 ) ; B by the other following its prediction (-.64); number of R predicted (.82); competitive- ness of strategy (questionnaire, -.47); in- correctness of analysis of optimum strategy ( questionnaire, -.32) ; frequency of R choice following R choice by the other (.79); and R choice by the other (.88).",0
"Greed is felt when one lacks and wants something valuable, irrespective of what others have.",0
"At the end of the experiment, the subjects use their keys to open lettered mailboxes that contain their monetary payoffs in sealed envelopes.",0
"The individual -group discontinuity effect entails that in mixed-motive situations, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG), intergroup interactions are more competitive than inter-individual interactions.",1
"The public-goods literature finds that as groups increase in size individuals become more hesitant to cooperate and less able to coordinate actions (Franzen, 1995;Knez & Camerer, 1994).",1
"In the terminal block of t,rials, nearly 87% of the choices were A, and B, in the original Both Display group while only 1.5% were A, and B, in the second experiment.",0
We deliberately avoid a market frame.,0
Through some mechanismperhaps biological (Trivers 1971) -cooperation on the part of one individual in a dilemma situation enhances the probability that others will cooperate later in that same situation or a similar one.,1
"I felt proud of myself, because thanks to me my two friends talked, and solved their problem.",1
It was our expectation that news stories reporting events which were caused by human agents would temporarily influence a subject's beliefs about the surrounding social universe and hence affect his behavior toward and expectation of the presumed stranger with whom he was paired in the nonzero sum game.,1
"Because you contributed ten (10) points, your kept income is zero (0) points and your total income = 0+7.2=7.2 points.",1
This effect is similar in magnitude to the treatment effect of moving from the VCM to the lotteries.,0
"However, if the responder rejected the proposal, neither participant would earn any money.",0
It is asserted here repeated measures.,0
Results demonstrate that awareness tools providing information about highly cooperative group members encourage participants to trust one another and minimize the risk of being exploited.,1
"Having said that, various features of our design work to inhibit the importance of an experimenter demand effect, including not using a senior PI as the experiment administrator and limiting social interactions between subjects and the administrator to those required to conduct the experiment.",0
"The results of this study suggest that while it is true that people with an altruistic or cooperative orientation will participate more than those with an individualistic or competitive orientation, their participation is likely to be reduced if they observe other membersÕ defection behavior.",1
This study examined the flexibility of prediction and decision making in the face of a partner's differing level of theory of mind.,0
"In particular, proposing a link and cooperating is never part of an equilibrium strategy, for any value of v.",0
"Relying on the same measure of trust, Knack and Keefer (1997) showed that an increase in the level of trust positively affects the annual growth rate of per capita income.",1
"The ability to voice opinions and concerns has also long been identified as a key element of feelings of fairness and justice in the workplace, in a process that has been termed the ""voice effect"" (Folger, 1977).",0
natives and the resulting payoffs may change in time) are interrelated in the sense that the changes in the reward structure and the sequence by which different conflicts are entered depend upon the way previous conflicts were resolved.,1
Note that allowing frequent network updates does not necessarily mean that the network structure actually changes frequently but only that the opportunity for change often exists.,0
"Nonetheless, we feel that it is worthwhile showing that the extra step of instrumenting for received messages does not affect our main conclusion: there is a causal relationship between receiving an explicit threat and cheating on collusive agreements.",1
"However, self-deception could also vary as a function of the situation and may be a facultative mechanism.",1
The uninformed player's payoff comes close to the theoretical prediction in most cases.,0
Self-conscious emotions do this in several ways.,0
"In our opinion, the easiest and most parsimonious way to take them into account in our experiment is by asking directly about satisfaction with other players' behaviour in the CPRG and testing how much it matters vis-à-vis objective characteristics in the second TG.",0
"When people perceive a relationship partner as highly agreeable, they feel more comfortable resolving conflicts (Jensen-Campbell et al., 2002) and are more inclined to solve conflicts through informal mechanisms (rather than including a third-party mediator; Morris, Leung, & Iyengar, 2004).",1
In the PC and DC conditions the subjects were given a chance to form a coalition.,0
"Certainly, strong social bonds make visualizations of others easier, providing a firmer impetus for volunteering.",1
"Impure altruism also resolves the contradictions observed by List and Bardsley if the amount given, G, and the amount not taken, N , are equivalent sources of warm glow.",0
sided Mann-Whitney U-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test; N = 28) and their standard deviation (4.0 in Lf vs. 5.3 in Lr; p N 0.15; two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test; N = 28).,0
"For each sex, two behavioral measures were compared between the PBO group and the two drug groups (OT and AVP): the total number of cooperate choices, and the probability of cooperating in the current round following unreciprocated cooperation in the previous round (pp/CD).",0
"Then, the higher is the contribution of the human player required to achieve the non-cooperative optimum, the lower is the expected proportion of ambiguity averse choices.",1
Studies using the PDG have shown that emotional states and individual differences related to emotional traits influence cooperation.,1
"We have calculated the relative abundance of extortioners, equalizers, and ZD strategies (i.e., the time spent in a δ-neighborhood) divided by the volume of the intersection of that neighborhood with the set of memory-one strategies (A), the average strategy of the population (B), and the average payoff (C).",0
Simulation results indicate the importance of ethical behavior on the long-term financial success of companies as well as the larger industries in which they participate.,0
Punishment is generally lower when the target was the highest contributor in the group and this effect is stronger for actual than for requested punishment.,1
"In this paper, we neither attribute behavioral differences between the 'elite' and the rest of society to endowment differences nor to self selection (a positive correlation between selfishness and endowment); rather we hypothesize in line with Cote et al. (2015) and Heap et al. (2016) that the inequality in the society itself makes elite members more selfish and less generous.",1
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a threshold constraining participants' activities will lead participants to be less holistic in their cognitive orientations than when a threshold is not present.,1
"In 2001, the Court ruled in United States v. United Foods, Inc. the mushroom checkoff program unconstitutional because it was a stand-alone checkoff advertising program and not part of a broader set of economic regulations.",1
"In these experiments, which allow subjects to punish non-cooperators at a cost to themselves, the moderate levels of contribution typically observed in early play often rise in subsequent rounds to near the maximal level rather than declining to insubstantial levels, as in the case where no punishment is permitted.",1
The results suggest that remembering an experience of rejection can trigger anger and ruminating on being rejected can trigger indirect aggression.,1
"Our main goals are to understand whether and when subjects play cooperatively, and also to get a sense of the sorts of strategies that they use.",0
Figure 2 reports the repeated-game data in a similar way.,0
"Thus, we explore a non-parametric distribution-free estimation approach known as the Turnbull estimator, which has been applied in a number of recent CV studies (Carson et al., 1996;Habb and fcfonnell, 1997;Whitehead et al., 1998).",0
more compliant to threats than subjects in the deterrence condition (X -20.6).,0
"On a more general level, the present study generates new insights into the relation between social uncertainty and environmental uncertainty by showing that the way in which people deal with social uncertainty is affected by the uncertainty people may experience regarding environmental information (cf.",1
The participant who is assigned the role of allocator makes a binary choice between Take All and Share Equally.,0
"The presence of such an ''empowered"" leader increases contributions, however, contributions are lower if the leader role is rotated among the group members compared to a situation when the leader is a fixed player.",1
Here A 1 incurs an investment cost of c but there is still a chance p that a loss will occur to A 2 so that A 1 's expected loss from damage from a negative externality is puff.,0
"Since in ordinary papers on dictator games gender is not reported, meta-regression with all data would not be meaningful.",0
Subjects' reaction to punishment suggests that earnings feedback affects negatively their expectations about the contribution of their peers in the following period.,1
"In total, we judged 22 groups with 79 members as accepting the equality norm, 8 groups with 26 members as accepting the equity norm, and 5 groups with 17 members as accepting no norm at all.",0
"Specifically, when anticipated barriers lower the probability of successfully achieving one's interests, individuals should be more inclined to opt for the benefits of competitive actions.",1
"The results of these groups show a crystal-clear picture: Participants overwhelmingly elected the best candidate in the absence of conflicts, but once competitive ''bribes'' were introduced, knowledge-sharing broke down, and the groups failed to pool information and to uncover the objectively best candidate, so an inferior candidate was elected in more than 80% of these elections.",1
"Similar to the main effect of time, post-hoc Bonferroni tests (at p < .05)",0
We can once again interpret these data as demonstrating that in this context it is the social nature of information which influenced behavior toward others.,0
"This impression was reinforced by pair-wise comparisons indicating that participants who underwent the TÀ treatment on study day 1, and who showed relatively reduced number of cooperative responses, significantly increased their cooperative responses after the T + treatment on study day 2, while participants who underwent the T + treatment on day 1 showed similarly high levels of cooperation on day 2.",1
Participants might honestly imagine that they would be generous in a certain situation with hypothetical rewards yet choose selfishly when real rewards are offered.,0
"Numerous environmental policies are generally aimed at creating a variety of valuable public goods and/or maintaining existing resources (open-sea fisheries, ground water, and forest biodiversity) by reducing, for example, the negative externalities of farming such as water pollution.",0
"We consciously chose this minimalistic way of asking for a reaction, since any more explicit request or even the use of the word ""justification"" we considered to be too leading15 .",0
These simulation results thus lend support to our claim that the strength of ties between actors can contribute to the evolution of cooperation in dynamic networks.,1
"Fig. 2. The figure illustrates the set H y,y ∪ J y,y with n = 8, r * = 3, k = 2 where the black dots and the white dots have the same meaning as before.",0
"Participants were allowed to discuss their decisions with the other group members for up to three-minutes, three times during the task, namely, prior to trials 1, 4, and 7. Communication among group members frequently occurs in real-work settings, and has been shown to promote cooperation in social dilemma situations (e.g., Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994;Komorita & Parks, 1995).",0
The difference between the group-representative and group-all condition was interpreted as consistent with a prediction that intergroup contact can reduce competitiveness even when there is conflict and the absence of norms requiring cooperative behavior.,1
"First, despite the asymmetric nature of the best-shot provision technology, heterogeneity can help overcome coordination problems by providing focal points as a coordination tool.",1
"As for the issue of sanctions, we noted earlier that due to trust based in the system, sanctions can increase expectations of cooperation.",1
It might be speculated that even greater manipulation of partner characteristics (perhaps established via pre-experiment communication with a stooge-partner) would affect the game strategies themselves.,1
"Countless experiments suggest, however, that this is not an accurate description of punishment behavior in decentralized sanctioning institutions.",0
"We find that conflict increases cooperation within groups, while decreasing cooperation between groups.",1
"Therefore, if the attribution of intentions turns out to be behaviorally important, the ""consequentialism"" inherent in standard utility models is also in doubt.",1
(1) PPD training was given only in the RAN and TFT conditions.,0
"At the end of the round, subjects were informed of each other's choices and received a payoff corresponding to the action pair.",0
We use an experiment with multiple threshold public goods to show how increasing the number of public goods vying for funding can decrease both total contributions across all goods and the probability that any public good receives enough donations to succeed.,1
These two questions are closely related to the different fairness models.,0
"In the context of the present experiment, the conjecture of ""indecision by indifference"" would imply that subjects that are quoted a monetary reward that is sufficiently close to their maximum willingness to pay would find the decision more difficult and therefore require more time for a decision.",1
"Spurred by this theoretical explanation of the evolution of cooperation, many researchers looking for such signals in humans have focused on involuntary facial expressions of emotion (Boone & Buck, 2003;Brown & Moore, 2002;Frank, 1988;Krumhuber et al., 2007;Mehu, Little, & Dunbar, 2007;Oda, Yamagata, Yabiku, & Matsumoto-Oda, 2009;Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, 2001;Trivers, 1971).",0
"We suggest that the concept of 'spending' more on the environment could be extended to include spending more time through voluntary contributions, and thus we pay particular attention to this variable in the empirical section.",0
"In the present study, we focus on the applied issue as to whether these dilemmas are effectively construed in a different way.",0
The type of prisoner's dilemma game influenced the strength of the observed correlation between discounting and cooperation.,1
The second probes the necessary features of a coordination task by testing two control tasks.,0
"As such, people from different societies will tend to express different preferences and beliefs: one should be able to measure between-group variation.",1
"If a game is to be played many times, consideration of the cooperative choice may increase, since players can attempt to influence their opponent's future behavior.",1
"Using a theoretical model of heterogeneous reciprocity preferences, I derived hypotheses concerning the difference between contributions to in-group public goods in Harmony and Conflict and concerning the effects of general and specific trust, social preferences and in-group bias on these contributions.",0
"For the present purposes, we opted against counterbalancing, due to the demands that this would have placed on the number of different sequential arrangements, as well as a balanced distribution of young and old girls and boys.",1
"The larger this bias, the stronger the effect of ignorance on norm compliance.",1
"A meta-analysis of sex differences in cooperation showed that both men and women's levels of cooperation are different in mixed dyads vs. same-sex dyads and, while it is often assumed that women are more cooperative, female-female interactions seem less cooperative than malemale interactions (Balliet et al. 2011).",0
This forwards the interesting and paradoxical hypothesis that inducing the unpleasant feeling of guilt in a fellow group member may in itself be beneficial because it actually allows one to build a reputation of being a cooperator (cf.,1
"In all three models, the coefficient of the treatment dummy ""last"" is not significantly different from zero, indicating no differences in propensity to cooperate between cumu-lative and last.",0
Results show that tax publicity reduces both the number of evaders and the amount of tax evaded.,1
"Thus even if the correlation between first-and second-mover choices is best explained by a consensus effect, a complete explanation of the data will require some preference element that rationalizes second-mover cooperation.",0
"If a player died during a wave, the character would respawn during the next wave.",1
"On average, all players, independently of the decision protocol, group size, and re-matching procedure, send positive amounts.",0
"While less information leads to more equal contributions, subjects focus on group efficiency in case of full information.",1
The fothfun mechanism thus leads to less cooperation than in the baseline case with no punishment if the detrimental effect of retaliatory punishment is greater than the positive norm-enforcing effect of punishment.,1
"Moreover, excluding incentives related to time preferences could result in an overestimation of investment levels in public goods with long-term benefits.",1
Each individual kept the remainder of the 80-franc endowment that he or she did not allocate to the public good.,0
"In our research, we examined empirically several specific hypotheses drawn from our conceptual analysis.",0
"Importantly, we found that the results of the two studies depart primarily because of differences in cooperation rates in settings with a known end round.",1
All p-values are calculated taking into account the lack of independence in the decisions of each subject (cluster robust standard errors).,0
"However, on ratings of group performance, status and attitudinal similarity combined did lead to increased intergroup differentiation, again unaffected by goal relations.",1
"After the punishment stage, players were informed about the number of points they received (but not from whom) and their final payoff. 4",0
This unpredicted interaction may have happened due to collectiveness created by the community title.,1
"Considering the relatively smaller groups (4 and 10 persons), they find that size only matters when the return on the public good is low, in which case, contributions actually increase in large groups.",1
"And the more a participant contributes, the less he or she earns.",0
"Thus, because an elected leader refl ects the choice of the group and its members, an elected leader will feel strong support from the followers who will bestow on the leader a high sense of social responsibility ( Julian, Hollander, & Regula, 1969;Kenney et al., 1996).",1
"The hypothesis of equal probability of upward and downward movement, given that movement exists,' can be rejected at the 0.0278 level of significance.",0
The resulting GLM swas corrected for temporal autocorrelation by using a first-order autoregressive model.,0
"If so, a denomination's position on the church-sect continuum -which may also be represented by its theological position -may help to explain its members' giving patterns.",1
Ambiguity arises when a decision-maker finds it difficult or impossible to assign a subjective probability to an event.,1
"More specifically, participants influenced by a charismatic leader (i.e., high in self-sacrifice) were found to contribute more money to a charity fund, and this pattern was mediated by perceptions of charisma.",1
3. These different views can be accounted for most simply in terms of the differential experience of the two types in their social interactions.,0
The paying taxes label should then lead to contributions comparable to those participants who do not spontaneously associate the public goods game with teamwork.,1
"However, people seem unwilling to use a commitment mechanism if doing so exposes them to being free ridden.",1
"In a competitive atmosphere, subjects are likely to be concerned with maximizing the 1.",0
"A second experiment demonstrates that when electoral delegation must be endogenously implemented, individuals voluntarily cede authority to an elected agent only when preplay communication is permitted.",1
"d = .92. 3 Due to the modest sample size for examining moderately highly correlated predictors in regression, we examined correlations to determine the most likely predictors of interest for future research.",1
"Consistent with our second hypothesis, which predicts that relationship duration mediates the impact of tie strength on cooperation, we find that both the main effect of tie value and its interaction with the number of tie swaps are diminished, relative to Model 2. The main effect decreases by 64% (from −.069 to −.025), and the interaction with the number of tie swaps decreases by 65% (from .029 to .01).",1
I do not conserve energy because it benefits others at a cost to myself.,1
Other organizations and countries with different organizational structures and cultures must be included before a general theory of knowledge transfer can be written.,0
"As a random-pairings session continues, some of these first-round cooperators get discouraged, and shift to defecting in the first round.",1
"If papers have indicated the exchange rate at the time of the experiment, I have used the dollar equivalent.",0
This equilibrium arises because with more than one person contributing at least one contribution is wasted because that second person would be better off by not contributing.,1
"Inversely, (2) when students have academic curricula with high levels of background knowledge related to the root causes of environmental problems and the related possible strategic options, the cooperative-competitive context does not matter.",1
", because we did not expect impressions to play an important role as an antecedent of cooperative decision-making and cooperative behavior is rather the result of the direct influence of SVO (Heon individuals) or primes (Leon individuals), we did not expect a systematic relationship between cooperative behavior and impressions (Hypothesis 6).",1
"Namely, at the end of a repeated public good contribution game, if a surprise announcement is made that the same group of subjects will play another repeated game, contributions initially jump back to a relatively high level and then decrease again over time.",1
"Subjects who did not see the pool size drop tended to vote against the elimination of free access to the commons, whereas subjects who did see their pool size drop voted to relinquish free access.",1
The game is dynamic as tomorrow's individual and societal capital stock is determined by the sum of the individual efforts today.,0
"If both firms opt for the low Nash equilibrium price, though, market-level profits and wages will be minimized.",1
There is some experimental evidence that groups are better off when punishment is delivered by a central agency than when group members sanction each other (O'GORMAN et al. 2009).,1
"A risk-averse sample item is ""I don't like to put something at stake; I would rather be on the safe side.""",0
"While this combination of asymmetry and heterogeneity is relevant for real-world situations, particularly for international and global public goods, researchers have paid little attention to the potential that such heterogeneity can overcome the coordination problem of a best-shot social dilemma.",0
"We also examine the notion that Invest is seen as the more cautious strategy, and discuss the link between subjective perceptions and choice.",0
An effect of matrices fly obtained on compliance to threats.,0
"Contributions clearly increase in the leverage level of both institutions, irrespective of the treatment.",1
"These variables should capture the economic circumstances of villages, particularly wealth.",0
"Each marker gives you AND the other participant a payoff of 14 cents, irrespective of whether the markers comes from you or the other participant.",0
The MDD group contained 26 women (66.7%) and the control group included 11 women (55.0%).,0
"It has been hypothesized that social learning has played a pivotal role in making human societies cooperative, by favouring cooperation even when it is not favoured by genetical selection.",1
"Because contributions exert a positive externality that is non-rival and non-excludable on anyone who cares about the provision of education material in the local school, we consider them a pure public good from the donor's perspective.",1
"n their interpretation of the way affect functions to alter behavior, Rosenhan et al. comment: Negative affect by definition increases the psychological distance between self and other.",1
"Thus, much like the real world, if harvesters mismanaged the resource during the early stages of the simulation, there was less available during the later stages.",1
"As mentioned above, in condition II, participants had no risk of losing money, which eventually leads to greedy incentives for the participants.",1
"In a first paper, we put Knack and Keefer's conjecture that inequality destroys ""social capital"" to a direct experimental test, but found no evidence whatsoever in support of it: the observed level of cooperation was independent of the implemented degree of inequality (Sadrieh and Verbon).",0
"The greater are others' contributions, the less is one rewarded, ceteris paribus -perhaps because there is little scope for either punishing or rewarding in groups in which all are contributing close to the maximum.",1
But since the payoff for mutual defection is smaller than the payoff for mutual cooperation (fwo) the dilemma arises on what to choose if having in mind also the welfare of the society and not just personal interests.,1
"This interpretation suggests that if the factors that weaken the case for the dominant or competitive choice were eliminated in the repeated-play PD, the prescriptive behavior would be obtained.",1
This conclusion is further supported by the results of a recent study by Evans and Crumbaugh (1966).,0
"A possible transformation of material payoffs into an internal subjective game through the use of information about themselves, their group members, and the incentives of the repeated game may induce cooperative behaviour as a rational strategy in a collective-action setting.",1
The positive and negative changes in the payoff matrices are decreasing and symmetrical for both sets of matrices.,0
This effect operated via increased trust.,0
The males in the all-male dyads exceeded all the others in the use of a &dquo;tit-for-tat&dquo; strategy during the last 50 trials.,0
"Thus, assuming that the second player is rational, she should choose D no matter what the first player chooses.",0
"Here we consider only the net surplus creation, which means that we deduct the opportunity cost of investing.",0
Here the two-way analysis was performed on the averaged favorability of the six interpersonal attitude items.,0
Then the agents' prediction is a weighted sum of the outcomes of the closest patterns.,0
"In China, a person's reputation is enhanced by establishing and maintaining a network of two-person dyadic relationships, known as ''guanxi,'' with more people who themselves have good reputations (17).",0
"Some people hold a strong norm prohibiting helping one person through harming another (Baron, in press-b;Ritov & Baron, 1990;Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991, Experiment 3), even if the benefit outweighs the harm and even if unfairness is not at issue (e.g., when those to be harmed are determined randomly).",0
"Moreover, the kibbutz pays for individual members' consumption of housing, food, utilities and transportation, among other goods.",0
"While it is convenient to think of the contribution level c i as a continuous variable (e.g., allowing to interpret preference parameters in terms of the location and scale of well-known families of truncated density functions), the choices made by real-world players are necessarily discrete.",0
The following two subsections are devoted to explaining the virtuous cycle that reinforces the high contributions that arise throughout the ECP experimental sessions.,0
"19 I focus on equilibrium actions and outcomes instead of equilibrium strategies, since in the experimental data we will not observe the latter.",0
"It appears that, on the one hand, the average amount taken for self is not significantly greater in the 20-person groups than in the 7-person non-communicating groups.",0
"In every session, 10 rounds were played with only punishment and 10 rounds with only reward; the order varied between sessions.",0
"However, the practices underlying these subsistence strategies-and the cultural norms and values that inform them-have undergone dramatic transformations, first through Soviet-era collectivization and cultural construction, then later in response to post-Soviet privatization and Perestroika.",0
"Thus, with the reputation mechanism, there is a clear increase in the level of cooperation, which increases with experience.",1
"In both the minimum-effort game and the public goods game, social interaction implies that subjects' choices of numbers or contributions, respectively, are affected by the choices of their neighbors.",1
"contribute when m=0, always contribute when m=1.5, and contribute 91% of the time when m=0.75.",0
"PSP refers to the avoidance of social rejection, i.e. a protective self-presenter fears social disapproval if he or she does not manage to behave appropriately.",0
"All if games were played for 10 consecutive days consisting of one daily session, of 20 trials each.",0
Increased average contributions with excludability are caused by significantly fewer free riders and more full contributors; see the last column of Tables B2.1 and B2.2 in the Appendix.,1
Note that nonrepresentative samples of certain cultures are not uncommon.,0
"II it was predicted that Ss would exploit an egotistical opponent to a greater extent when future interaction was anticipated than when it was not, but that when the opponent was seen to be self-effacing Lhe reverse would be true.",1
The game will start when everybody finishes the quiz.,0
"First, models of information signaling have shown that sequential giving can have beneficial effects for voluntary public good provision when the common value of the public good is uncertain.",1
"However, we have to recognize that as the subjective probabilities go to zero, the economic impact of choices becomes weak.",1
Monetary rewards were emphasized as incentives for participation.,0
Threat was introduced by providing one or both subjects with a salient punitive capability in the form of a gate which could be closed by one subject to prevent access to the one-lane road.,1
" Sullivan & Lyle questioned the effect of player-player anonymity, emphasizing that the imperfectness of the anonymity might have influenced play.",1
"Further, because direct reciprocity was not possible in our experiments, sharing arrangements were not self-enforcing.",1
"As to the control variables, the number of members is significant and negative, indicating that groups with more members are less likely to be in the zero delinquency category.",1
Materials for both settings were designed in a way that participants could easily enter into the dynamics of the simulations.,0
"For cooperators, focused contrasts indicated that negative moods produced more cooperation (less competition) than either positive or control moods, ts( 77 In short, Study 2 provides further support for our ideas by assessing goals as they ""naturally"" occur, overcoming any potential limitations on varying goals via instructions.",1
"Afterwards, participants were asked to indicate, privately, their individual solution to the task (item 2, Fig. 5a).",0
"Participants could spread their money among four options in the CKTD condition, compared to three in the KTD condition; in order to control for this, the ''relative amount'' column shows the amounts participants kept and invested in taking and defense relative to the sum of investments in these three options.",0
"Forty-five male undergraduates took part in Experiment 2, which varied the strategy of a simulated ""other.""",0
"As is argued in the literature, the effects of these punishments are clear: cooperation is established and maintained Sefton, Shupp & Walker (2002).",1
We used this proportional measure of punishment rather than the raw amounts that participants spent for punishing each trader because the total amount that they spent for punishment varied among participants.,1
"For the participant, the task involved choosing which distribution to accept.",0
We show that these rules induce behavior that has pro-social consequences even in cases where there are strong conflicts of interests among group members and where interactions with free information exchange fail.,1
"That is, when there is no noise, there is an increase in cooperation over successive interactions (at least in the context of TFT and TFT ϩ 1 strategies).",1
"In this section, we focus on the expectationchoice relationship to provide insight into the extent to which expectations influence own choice5 and how this relationship may depend on social value orientations and the personality descriptions of the partner.",0
All experiments were held at fatiofab -a computerized laboratory for interactive decision research.,0
Sequential contributions decrease to the predicted equilibrium level and fall below the greater-than-expected contributions in the simultaneous game.,1
The next two subsections provide tests of our hypotheses above.,0
"But you should also be careful not to ask for too much, because if at the end of the study everyone's requests add up to more than the $1,000 that is in the pool, then nobody, including yourself, will receive anything.",1
"Participants were told that, after filling out the questionnaire, they would be assigned to groups to participate in a decision-making experiment and that this might take a couple of days.",0
"Thus, it is doubtful that social context operates via the social value of benevolence (or the other values) to shape group cohesion.",0
"In scenarios B and P, almost all groups succeeded (10 of 12), and there is no significant treatment effect (H vs. L).",0
"(2) When first in the commitment matrices, choose one in the A matrix.",0
"Many studies have dealt with the efficacy of particular moves by one player in inducing conciliatory or cooperative behavior from another (Pilisuk & Skolnick, 1968;Rapoport & Chammah, 196S;Shure, Meeker, & Hansford, 1965).",0
"Identifying the strategy employed by players engaged in an IPD could also have wider implications for understanding the determinants of social conflicts in general, and help to design effective methods for ameliorating these problems.",1
The individual payoff π i is the following:,0
"Because of the partner design, this yields 18 independent observations for each treatment.",1
The original MGE had a strong effect because it involved allocation of tangible rewards; this implies that mere categorization produces discriminative behavior.,1
The Cahill et al. (unpublished) and Patrick et al. (2010) studies relied on selfreport measures of anger.,0
"In particular, participating in a low-payment choice before making a high-payment choice magnifies the scale of the utility received/payoff from the subsequent task.",1
"In our experiment, we set d to unity.12",0
"Although a principally exploitative relationship between owners and drivers does not necessarily improve intergroup relations, familiarity with intergroup economic ties may explain the lack of ethnic bias in the laboratory game.",1
Participants cooperated more when OP received higher rewards.,1
The point we try to make is that trust is relatively less important in the AG compared to the PG because the removal of the temptation to free ride in the former strengthens incentives to cooperate.,1
Subjects are divided into groups of size 5.,0
"When such conditions exist, there is an intraclass correlation (ICC), and the assumption of independence of observations for regular regression is violated (Hox, 1998;Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998;Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).",1
The latter result is by no means self-evident.,0
"Interestingly, another body of research concerns a situation wherein group discussion does not promote increased cooperative choice (Insko et al., 1987;1988).",0
"The follow-up independent t-tests (Table 1) revealed that MAOA-L carriers exhibited significantly lower beliefs about others' contribution in stage one (P~0:013), stage two (P~0:037), and stage three (P~0:039), but not in stage four (P~0:421).",0
"We find that third parties punished more frequently, severely and less antisocially, resulting in a higher contribution level than that driven by second-party punishment.",1
"Thus, subjects with a stronger VTA response to CC outcomes at baseline experienced the largest OT-induced decrease in VTA response to CC outcomes.",0
"However, it is important to note that the results from a survey of a nationwide representative sample of Swedish parents' attitudes toward child care (Biel et al., 1997) were successfully replicated in experiments similar to those reported here (Eek et al., 1998).",0
Result 3. The threat of inter-period feuds in LF reduces the frequency of altruistic punishment relative to the Baseline treatment.,1
An extension of the model in (1) by adding terms b ih jx hj À y hj j could capture such preferences.,0
"We consider nondivisibility to be the more important factor in determining individual members' willingness to contribute to the provision of the public good, because it directly affects the value of the good to the individual.",1
"To see this, take periods 1 and 2. In period 1 a subject can rely only on his or her intuitive (""home-grown"") beliefs about others' contributions.",0
"The 'degree of imperfection' of this information clearly increases with the size of the group, because it becomes increasingly difficult to decompose the responses of other subjects into their reactions to the simultaneous changes in the contributions of their counterparts.",1
"The development of inequality aversion relatively early in childhood is particularly interesting in the light of ethnographic evidence that suggests a strong role of egalitarian ""instincts"" in human evolutionary history.",0
"The increase in average contributions for the US region in RN (29.8) relative to ON (26.7) is due to the fact that, in ON, 64% of American participants opted for the principles of future polluter-pays and equal percentage reduction of current  emissions, both of which are synonymous with the smallest public good contribution; conversely, in RN, 62% of Chinese participants selected the principles of equal per capita entitlement to emissions and historical polluter-pays, the equity principles that denote the largest contributions for the US region.",1
Fig. 3. Distribution of actual and expected transfers in the dictator game.,0
"In contrast to experiments where reputation is information about behavior in previous periods of the game, our experiment contains an endogenous reputation system.",0
Our findings also showed that participants' scores on a Prosocial value domain derived from Rokeach's terminal values were indicative of their cooperation preferences in the PGGs.,1
"To investigate this, we calculated for each participant the monetary consequences of his or her decision for the group (see also Table 1).",0
"It may well be that if a group fails in establishing the public good, a self-sacrificing leader may be evaluated as poor since his or her efforts did not prevent the group from failing.",1
Payoff structure for the modified Iowa gambling card-selection task,0
"Because we conjectured that the opportunity for punishing would have a larger impact if subjects could learn about the behaviour of other group members, we repeated the basic public goods gameÐwith and without punishment opportunity, depending on the treatmentÐfor six periods.",1
"Consequently, emotional responses from past exchanges influences the behavior of actors in the future.",1
Our studies suggest that sometimes coordination can be easily promoted by simply pointing out to people that certain information is available to all people involved.,1
The analysis of variance further revealed that all subjects anticipate that with a leader the distribution of harvest outcomes over the group members will be more equitable than in the first part of the experiment.,0
Tooby & Cosmides (1996) propose that the establishment of stable and friendly relationships between group members favoured the exchange of help when needed and thus reduced the risks of the situation described by the banker's paradox.,1
The main aim of this article was to investigate to what extent groups use reputational information to assess the suitability of candidate members.,0
It is possible that people's ability to estimate the equal choice may decrease as the number of others with whom they are sharing a nonpartitioned resource increases.,1
The mixed-motive interdependence situation was presented to participants in the form of a decision-making task.,0
Virtually all instances of social exchange in the ancestral environment were likely face-to-face.,0
"In other treatments, participants know the amount of the potential loss but have no information about the probability of the loss and its potential reduction through contribution.",0
"Importantly, the minor differences we observe are not systematic.",0
"It is important to keep in mind that a carefully drawn, well articulated theory is indispensable in drawing scientific conclusions from experimental observations.",0
"Lastly, because greedy people are never satisfied with their current state of affairs, it is likely that this affects their wellbeing in a negative way.",1
The rationale for this finding is unclear.,0
The consequence of these two evolutionary forces is that in equilibrium strong reciprocators and purely selfish humans coexist.,1
which is ultimately an empirical question.,0
"We find that contributions are 56.6% higher when group composition is different across both public goods dilemmas as compared to when composition is the same across the two public goods dilemmas (M 1 = 17.7,",1
"The procedure in the leader treatment was similar except that in this treatment, one of the participants was selected to be the leader for all rounds to be played in that treatment.",0
"Hypothesis 1b: In fragmented villages, there will be higher frequencies of cooperation in H-H/M-M than in H-M.",0
"In the case of defaults, an endowment effect may be at work: people may perceive the default option as something they possess and, thus, place more value on it.",1
"Thus, if the default effect is partly explained by information conveyance, we expect to find it less pronounced when the default contribution can be a randomly drawn number over the support of choices in the game.",1
"If one (or more) of the players is ""competitively oriented,"" he continues to exploit the other player or players until they must respond with self-protective noncooperation as well.",1
Rather than imitating an other who adopted a noncontingently cooperative strategy subjects exploited the simulated other.,0
"Our results show that emotion-regulation knowledge is itself neither positive nor negative, but can facilitate the objectives of individuals whose interests are in doing harm as well as those interested in benefiting the greater good.",1
"From the pool of 105 one-shot PDG players, we selected 64 players whose pictures were without photographic deficiencies; faces that were not entirely framed or faces that were partly covered by hair, garments, eyeglasses, or hands were excluded.",0
"The deviation of actual from the predicted (minimum number of) s = 10 observations is (33 − 29)/33 = 12.1% which seems small enough to consider Hypothesis 1 reasonably accurate and, formally, we cannot reject that the share of subjects with β i > 0.5 is the same as the share of subjects offering s = 10 (p = 0.580, Fisher's exact test).",0
"[nc The intelligent management of common resources (e.g., groundwater, fish, wildlife, forests) raises some thorny issues for social scientists.",0
"First, the task of learning and familiarization was harder, since the first choice of rules occurred before subjects had any experience interacting in a VCM with or without punishment.",1
"Thus, representatives successfully advanced the interests of their constituencies when bargaining with persons who did not have constituencies of their own.",1
One possible reason for the difference between these two studies is that learning effects are more likely to overwhelm the effects of pair IQ in longer games; this may be related to the finding that worker IQ is a stronger predictor of performance in the early months on a new job while IQ's predictive power for worker performance weakens after years spent in the same job (Hunt 1995).,1
Unconditional contributions by round and VCM round contribution type.,0
"If imperfect information reduces the incentive to match others' contributions, both the matching rates of actors with relatively high marginal benefit functions and those with relatively low marginal benefit functions will tend to fall.",1
"Thus, nobody will ever know what you have done.",0
"Potlatches and other excessive public charitable displays suddenly begin to make sense when they are viewed as selfpresentation strategies (default, 1992).",1
"Finally, looking at a group average measure of connectivity that we calculated, we find high correlation with individual cooperative behaviour.",0
"This finding is reminiscent of Sniderman et al. (2004), which found that perceived threat to safety was the least important predictor of hostility towards immigrants in the Netherlands.",0
The inclusion of asynchrony allowed a player to act independently of his opponent; this provided an opportunity to double-cross him.,1
"Variations on these early dominant strategy public goods games have been conducted in the laboratory under many different assumptions about utility functions and technology, different subject pools, asymmetric endowments and preferences, different information conditions, different public good mechanisms, variable group sizes, and so forth.",0
"The second insight is that the inefficiency observed in heterogeneous groups is not only due to the inefficiently low levels of contribution, but also due to a relative underuse of rewards.",1
"Since the motorization of fishing boats in the early 1930s, competition among fishing units for access to the shiroebi stock has become a chronic problem.",1