rajpurkar/squad huggingface dataset:
Title: The_Blitz

In June 1940, a German prisoner of war was overheard boasting that the British would never find the Knickebein, even though it was under their noses. The details of the conversation were passed to an RAF Air Staff technical advisor, Dr. R. V. Jones, who started an in-depth investigation which discovered that the Luftwaffe's Lorenz receivers were more than blind-landing devices. Jones therefore began a search for the German beams. Avro Ansons of the Beam Approach Training Development Unit (BATDU) were flown up and down Britain fitted with a 30 MHz receiver to detect them. Soon a beam was traced to Derby (which had been mentioned in Luftwaffe transmissions). The first jamming operations were carried out using requisitioned hospital electrocautery machines. A subtle form of distortion was introduced. Up to nine special transmitters directed their signals at the beams in a manner that widened its path, negating its ability to accurately locate targets. Confidence in the device was diminished by the time the Luftwaffe decided to launch large-scale raids. The counter operations were carried out by British Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) units under Wing Commander Edward Addison, No. 80 Wing RAF. The production of false radio navigation signals by re-transmitting the originals was a technique known as masking beacons (meacons).

Question: The beam was traced to what town?
Answer: Derby

Question: The Bean Approach Training Development Unit were fitted with what kind of transmitter to search for the Knickebein? 
Answer: 30 MHz receiver

Question: In 1940 a German prisoner overheard boasting that the British would never find what system?
Answer: Knickebein

Question: Which RAF technical advisor was the conversation passed onto?
Answer: Dr. R. V. Jones

Question: The first jamming operation was carried out using what machines?
Answer: electrocautery machines
Title: The_Blitz

German beacons operated on the medium-frequency band and the signals involved a two-letter Morse identifier followed by a lengthy time-lapse which enabled the Luftwaffe crews to determine the signal's bearing. The Meacon system involved separate locations for a receiver with a directional aerial and a transmitter. The receipt of the German signal by the receiver was duly passed to the transmitter, the signal to be repeated. The action did not guarantee automatic success. If the German bomber flew closer to its own beam than the Meacon then the former signal would come through the stronger on the direction finder. The reverse would apply only if the meacon were closer.

Question: The German beacons used what frequency band?
Answer: medium

Question: What two letter identifier did the signal have?
Answer: Morse

Question: What system used a separate locations for a receiver and a directional aerial?
Answer: Meacon

Question: When a German bomber flew to close to its own beam what happened to the signal?
Answer: stronger on the direction finder
Title: The_Blitz

In general, German bombers were likely to get through to their targets without too much difficulty. It was to be some months before an effective night fighter force would be ready, and anti-aircraft defences only became adequate after the Blitz was over, so ruses were created to lure German bombers away from their targets. Throughout 1940, dummy airfields were prepared, good enough to stand up to skilled observation. A number[clarification needed] of bombs fell on these diversionary ("Starfish") targets.

Question: Anti-aircraft defenses became better after what?
Answer: Blitz was over

Question: What did they use to lure German bombers away from their targets?
Answer: ruses

Question: What kind of airfields were prepared to stand up to skilled observers? 
Answer: dummy

Question: What was the name given to these dummy airfields?
Answer: Starfish
Title: The_Blitz

The use of diversionary techniques such as fires had to be made carefully. The fake fires could only begin when the bombing started over an adjacent target and its effects were brought under control. Too early and the chances of success receded; too late and the real conflagration at the target would exceed the diversionary fires. Another innovation was the boiler fire. These units were fed from two adjacent tanks containing oil and water. The oil-fed fires were then injected with water from time to time; the flashes produced were similar to those of the German C-250 and C-500 Flammbomben. The hope was that, if it could deceive German bombardiers, it would draw more bombers away from the real target.

Question: Fake fires were used as what kind of technique?
Answer: diversionary

Question: What was injected into the fires from time to time to produce a flash?
Answer: water

Question: Two tanks one of oil, one of water fed what kind of fire?
Answer: boiler

Question: What did these flashes simulate?
Answer: German C-250 and C-500 Flammbomben

Question: What was the purpose of these fires?
Answer: deceive German bombardiers
Title: The_Blitz

Initially the change in strategy caught the RAF off-guard, and caused extensive damage and civilian casualties. Some 107,400 long tons (109,100 t) of shipping was damaged in the Thames Estuary and 1,600 civilians were casualties. Of this total around 400 were killed. The fighting in the air was more intense in daylight. Overall Loge had cost the Luftwaffe 41 aircraft; 14 bombers, 16 Messerschmitt Bf 109s, seven Messerschmitt Bf 110s and four reconnaissance aircraft. Fighter Command lost 23 fighters, with six pilots killed and another seven wounded. Another 247 bombers from Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3) attacked that night. On 8 September, the Luftwaffe returned. This time 412 people were killed and 747 severely wounded.

Question: The bombing of the Thames Estuary cause how many civilian casualties?
Answer: 1,600

Question: How many were killed in the bombing of the Thames Estuary?
Answer: around 400

Question: How many aircraft did the Luftwaffe lose?
Answer: 41

Question: How many German pilots were killed?
Answer: six

Question: How many Air Fleet 3 attacked that night?
Answer: 247
Title: The_Blitz

On 9 September the OKL appeared to be backing two strategies. Its round-the-clock bombing of London was an immediate attempt to force the British government to capitulate, but it was also striking at Britain's vital sea communications to achieve a victory through siege. Although the weather was poor, heavy raids took place that afternoon on the London suburbs and the airfield at Farnborough. The day's fighting cost Kesselring and Luftflotte 2 (Air Fleet 2) 24 aircraft, including 13 Bf 109s. Fighter Command lost 17 fighters and six pilots. Over the next few days weather was poor and the next main effort would not be made until 15 September 1940.

Question: What was the name of the airfield where heavy raids took place?
Answer: Farnborough

Question: How many Bf 109s were lost?
Answer: 13

Question: FighterCommand lost how many fighters?
Answer: 17

Question: How many pilots did Fighter Command lose?
Answer: six

Question: What caused the delay in the effort?
Answer: weather was poor
Title: The_Blitz

On 15 September the Luftwaffe made two large daylight attacks on London along the Thames Estuary, targeting the docks and rail communications in the city. Its hope was to destroy its targets and draw the RAF into defending them, allowing the Luftwaffe to destroy their fighters in large numbers, thereby achieving an air superiority. Large air battles broke out, lasting for most of the day. The first attack merely damaged the rail network for three days, and the second attack failed altogether. The air battle was later commemorated by Battle of Britain Day. The Luftwaffe lost 18 percent of the bombers sent on the operations that day, and failed to gain air superiority.

Question: On September 15 the Luftwaffe made daylight raids on what target in London?
Answer: Thames Estuary

Question: What two targets were the Luftwaffe trying to destroy?
Answer: docks and rail communications

Question: What was the reason to try and draw the RAF into a battle?
Answer: destroy their fighters in large numbers

Question: What was this air battle called?
Answer: Battle of Britain Day

Question: The Luftwaffe lost what percentage of its bombers sent that day?
Answer: 18
Title: The_Blitz

While Göring was optimistic the Luftwaffe could prevail, Hitler was not. On 17 September he postponed Operation Sea Lion (as it turned out, indefinitely) rather than gamble Germany's newly gained military prestige on a risky cross-Channel operation, particularly in the face of a sceptical Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union. In the last days of the battle, the bombers became lures in an attempt to draw the RAF into combat with German fighters. But their operations were to no avail; the worsening weather and unsustainable attrition in daylight gave the OKL an excuse to switch to night attacks on 7 October.

Question: Who thought the Luftwaffe could win?
Answer: Göring

Question: What day did Hitler postponed Operation Sea Lion?
Answer: 17 September

Question: What was the name of the man from the Soviet Union who was doubtful of Operation Sea Lion?
Answer: Joseph Stalin

Question: Who did the Luftwaffe try to lure into battle using its bombers?
Answer: RAF

Question: When did the OKL switch to night raids?
Answer: 7 October
Title: The_Blitz

On 14 October, the heaviest night attack to date saw 380 German bombers from Luftflotte 3 hit London. Around 200 people were killed and another 2,000 injured. British anti-aircraft defences (General Frederick Alfred Pile) fired 8,326 rounds and shot down only two bombers. On 15 October, the bombers returned and about 900 fires were started by the mix of 415 short tons (376 t) of high explosive and 11 short tons (10.0 t) of incendiaries dropped. Five main rail lines were cut in London and rolling stock damaged.

Question: On October 14 how many German bombers attacked?
Answer: 380

Question: How many people were killed?
Answer: Around 200

Question: Who fired anti-defense rounds?
Answer: General Frederick Alfred Pile

Question: How many rounds of anti-defense were fired?
Answer: 8,326 rounds

Question: How many German bombers were shot down?
Answer: two
Title: The_Blitz

Loge continued during October. According to German sources, 9,000 short tons (8,200 t) of bombs were dropped in that month, of which about 10 percent of which was dropped in daylight. Over 6,000 short tons (5,400 t) was aimed at London during the night. Attacks on Birmingham and Coventry were subject to 500 short tons (450 t) of bombs between them in the last 10 days of October. Liverpool suffered 200 short tons (180 t) of bombs dropped. Hull and Glasgow were attacked, but 800 short tons (730 t) of bombs were spread out all over Britain. The Metropolitan-Vickers works in Manchester was targeted and 12 short tons (11 t) of bombs dropped against it. Little tonnage was dropped on Fighter Command airfields; Bomber Command airfields were hit instead.

Question: How much of the short tons of bombs were dropped during the day?
Answer: 10 percent

Question: What two cities had 500 short tons of bombs dropped on them during the end of October?
Answer: Birmingham and Coventry

Question: What was targeted with 12 short tons of bombs?
Answer: The Metropolitan-Vickers works in Manchester

Question: Which was targeted more heavily, bomber or fighter command airfields?
Answer: Bomber Command airfields

Question: Liverpool had how many short tons dropped on it?
Answer: 200
Title: The_Blitz

Luftwaffe policy at this point was primarily to continue progressive attacks on London, chiefly by night attack; second, to interfere with production in the vast industrial arms factories of the West Midlands, again chiefly by night attack; and third to disrupt plants and factories during the day by means of fighter-bombers. Kesselring, commanding Luftflotte 2, was ordered to send 50 sorties per night against London and attack eastern harbours in daylight. Sperrle, commanding Luftflotte 3, was ordered to dispatch 250 sorties per night including 100 against the West Midlands. Seeschlange would be carried out by Fliegerkorps X (10th Air Corps) which concentrated on mining operations against shipping. It also took part in the bombing over Britain. By 19/20 April 1941, it had dropped 3,984 mines, ⅓ of the total dropped. The mines' ability to destroy entire streets earned them respect in Britain, but several fell unexploded into British hands allowing counter-measures to be developed which damaged the German anti-shipping campaign.

Question: What was the Luftwaffe's second primary policy?
Answer: to interfere with production in the vast industrial arms factories of the West Midlands

Question: Who was in command of the Luftflotte 2?
Answer: Kesselring

Question: How many sorties a night was Luftflotte 3 doing?
Answer: 250

Question: What did the Fliegerkorps X concentrate on?
Answer: mining operations against shipping

Question: By April of 1941 about how many mines had been dropped?
Answer: 3,984 mines
Title: The_Blitz

By mid-November 1940, when the Germans adopted a changed plan, more than 13,000 short tons (12,000 t) of high explosive and nearly 1,000,000 incendiaries had fallen on London. Outside the capital, there had been widespread harassing activity by single aircraft, as well as fairly strong diversionary attacks on Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool, but no major raids. The London docks and railways communications had taken a heavy pounding, and much damage had been done to the railway system outside. In September, there had been no less than 667 hits on railways in Great Britain, and at one period, between 5,000 and 6,000 wagons were standing idle from the effect of delayed action bombs. But the great bulk of the traffic went on; and Londoners—though they glanced apprehensively each morning at the list of closed stretches of line displayed at their local station, or made strange detours round back streets in the buses—still got to work. For all the destruction of life and property, the observers sent out by the Ministry of Home Security failed to discover the slightest sign of a break in morale. More than 13,000 civilians had been killed, and almost 20,000 injured, in September and October alone, but the death toll was much less than expected. In late 1940, Churchill credited the shelters:

Question: In September how many railway hits were there in Great Britain?
Answer: no less than 667

Question: By mid November of 1940 how many incendiaries were dropped on London?
Answer: 1,000,000

Question: What did the Ministry of Home Security fail to discover?
Answer: the slightest sign of a break in morale

Question: What locations suffered strong diversionary tactics?
Answer: Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool

Question: About how many civilians were injured in September and October?
Answer: 20,000
Title: The_Blitz

The American observer Ingersoll reported at this time that "as to the accuracy of the bombing of military objectives, here I make no qualifications. The aim is surprisingly, astonishingly, amazingly inaccurate ... The physical damage to civilian London, to sum up, was more general and more extensive than I had imagined. The damage to military targets much less", and stated that he had seen numerous examples of untouched targets surrounded by buildings destroyed by errant bombs. For example, in two months of bombing, Battersea Power Station, perhaps the largest single target in London, had only received one minor hit ("a nick"). No bridge over the Thames had been hit, and the docks were still functioning despite great damage. An airfield was hit 56 times but the runways were never damaged and the field was never out of operation, despite German pilots' familiarity with it from prewar commercial flights. Ingersoll wrote that the difference between the failure of the German campaign against military targets versus its success in continental Europe was the RAF retaining control of the air.:79–80,174

Question: What was the name of the American observer?
Answer: Ingersoll

Question: The American observer said what about the damage to London?
Answer: to sum up, was more general and more extensive than I had imagined.

Question: How many bridges over the Thames were struck?
Answer: No bridge over the Thames had been hit

Question: The Battersea Power Station took how many hits in two months?
Answer: one minor hit ("a nick")

Question: What did German pilots use to gain knowledge of an airfield?
Answer: prewar commercial flights.
Title: The_Blitz

British night air defences were in a poor state. Few anti-aircraft guns had fire-control systems, and the underpowered searchlights were usually ineffective against aircraft at altitudes above 12,000 ft (3,700 m). In July 1940, only 1,200 heavy and 549 light guns were deployed in the whole of Britain. Of the "heavies", some 200 were of the obsolescent 3 in (76 mm) type; the remainder were the effective 4.5 in (110 mm) and 3.7 in (94 mm) guns, with a theoretical "ceiling"' of over 30,000 ft (9,100 m) but a practical limit of 25,000 ft (7,600 m) because the predictor in use could not accept greater heights. The light guns, about half of which were of the excellent Bofors 40 mm, dealt with aircraft only up to 6,000 ft (1,800 m). Although the use of the guns improved civilian morale, with the knowledge the German bomber crews were facing the barrage, it is now believed that the anti-aircraft guns achieved little and in fact the falling shell fragments caused more British casualties on the ground.

Question: British night air defenses were effective to what height?
Answer: 12,000 ft (3,700 m)

Question: By July of 1940 how many guns were deployed in Britain?
Answer: only 1,200 heavy and 549 light guns

Question: What was the practical ceiling of the effective heavy guns?
Answer: 25,000 ft (7,600 m)

Question: What type of light gun dealt with aircraft up to 6000 ft.?
Answer: Bofors 40 mm

Question: What is believed to have caused many civilian casualties from anti-aircraft guns?
Answer: falling shell fragments
Title: The_Blitz

London's defences were rapidly reorganised by General Pile, the Commander-in-Chief of Anti-Aircraft Command. The difference this made to the effectiveness of air defences is questionable. The British were still one-third below the establishment of heavy anti-aircraft artillery AAA (or ack-ack) in May 1941, with only 2,631 weapons available. Dowding had to rely on night fighters. From 1940 to 1941, the most successful night-fighter was the Boulton Paul Defiant; its four squadrons shot down more enemy aircraft than any other type. AA defences improved by better use of radar and searchlights. Over several months, the 20,000 shells spent per raider shot down in September 1940, was reduced to 4,087 in January 1941 and to 2,963 shells in February 1941.

Question: Who reorganised London's defences?
Answer: General Pile

Question: The British were how far below the establishment of heavy anti-aircraft artillery?
Answer: one-third

Question: Who relied on night fighters?
Answer: Dowding

Question: Who's four squadrons shot down more enemy aircraft than any other type?
Answer: Boulton Paul Defiant

Question: How were AA defenses improved?
Answer: by better use of radar and searchlights
Title: The_Blitz

Airborne Interception radar (AI) was unreliable. The heavy fighting in the Battle of Britain had eaten up most of Fighter Command's resources, so there was little investment in night fighting. Bombers were flown with airborne search lights out of desperation[citation needed], but to little avail. Of greater potential was the GL (Gunlaying) radar and searchlights with fighter direction from RAF fighter control rooms to begin a GCI system (Ground Control-led Interception) under Group-level control (No. 10 Group RAF, No. 11 Group RAF and No. 12 Group RAF).

Question: The bombers used what out of desperation?
Answer: airborne search lights

Question: What was considered unreliable?
Answer: Airborne Interception radar

Question: Gunlaying radar and RAF controls combined to create what system?
Answer: Ground Control-led Interception

Question: What used most of Fighter Command's resources?
Answer: the Battle of Britain
Title: The_Blitz

Whitehall's disquiet at the failures of the RAF led to the replacement of Dowding (who was already due for retirement) with Sholto Douglas on 25 November. Douglas set about introducing more squadrons and dispersing the few GL sets to create a carpet effect in the southern counties. Still, in February 1941, there remained only seven squadrons with 87 pilots, under half the required strength. The GL carpet was supported by six GCI sets controlling radar-equipped night-fighters. By the height of the Blitz, they were becoming more successful. The number of contacts and combats rose in 1941, from 44 and two in 48 sorties in January 1941, to 204 and 74 in May (643 sorties). But even in May, 67% of the sorties were visual cat's-eye missions. Curiously, while 43% of the contacts in May 1941 were by visual sightings, they accounted for 61% of the combats. Yet when compared with Luftwaffe daylight operations, there was a sharp decline in German losses to 1%. If a vigilant bomber crew could spot the fighter first, they had a decent chance at evading it.

Question: Who replaced Dowding on November 25?
Answer: Sholto Douglas

Question: What supported the GL carpet?
Answer: six GCI sets controlling radar-equipped night-fighters

Question: How many pilots remained in February 1941?
Answer: 87 pilots

Question: How many number of contacts and combats were there in May?
Answer: 204 and 74

Question: What did a bomber crew need to do for a good chance at evasion?
Answer: spot the fighter first
Title: The_Blitz

Nevertheless, it was radar that proved to be critical weapon in the night battles over Britain from this point onward. Dowding had introduced the concept of airborne radar and encouraged its usage. Eventually it would become a success. On the night of 22/23 July 1940, Flying Officer Cyril Ashfield (pilot), Pilot Officer Geoffrey Morris (Observer) and Flight Sergeant Reginald Leyland (Air Intercept radar operator) of the Fighter Interception Unit became the first pilot and crew to intercept and destroy an enemy aircraft using onboard radar to guide them to a visual interception, when their AI night fighter brought down a Do 17 off Sussex. On 19 November 1940 the famous RAF night fighter ace John Cunningham shot down a Ju 88 bomber using airborne radar, just as Dowding had predicted.

Question: What was critical in the night battles over Britain?
Answer: radar

Question: What concept eventually became successful?
Answer: airborne radar

Question: On what day did airborne radar help intercept and destroy enemy aircraft for the first time?
Answer: the night of 22/23 July 1940

Question: Who was the RAF night fighter ace that used airborne radar to destroy a Ju 88 bomber?
Answer: John Cunningham