rajpurkar/squad huggingface dataset:
Title: The_Blitz

The last major attack on London was on 10/11 May 1941, on which the Luftwaffe flew 571 sorties and dropped 800 tonnes of bombs. This caused more than 2,000 fires. 1,436 people were killed and 1,792 seriously injured, which affected morale badly. Another raid was carried out on 11/12 May 1941. Westminster Abbey and the Law Courts were damaged, while the Chamber of the House of Commons was destroyed. One-third of London's streets were impassable. All but one railway station line was blocked for several weeks. This raid was significant, as 63 German fighters were sent with the bombers, indicating the growing effectiveness of RAF night fighter defences.

Question: When was the last major attack London saw?
Answer: 10/11 May 1941

Question: How many tonnes of bombs did the Luftwaffe use on London?
Answer: 800 tonnes

Question: How many casualties were inflicted?
Answer: 1,436 people were killed and 1,792 seriously injured

Question: What was the damage done to London's streets?
Answer: One-third of London's streets were impassable

Question: What showed RAF night fighter effectiveness was increasing?
Answer: 63 German fighters were sent with the bombers
Title: The_Blitz

German air supremacy at night was also now under threat. British night-fighter operations out over the Channel were proving highly successful. This was not immediately apparent. The Bristol Blenheim F.1 was undergunned, with just four .303 in (7.7 mm) machine guns which struggled to down the Do 17, Ju 88, or Heinkel He 111. Moreover, the Blenheim struggled to reach the speed of the German bombers. Added to the fact an interception relied on visual sighting, a kill was most elusive even in the conditions of a moonlit sky.

Question: How was the British night fighter operations faring?
Answer: were proving highly successful.

Question: How did the Bristol Blenheim F.1 perform against German aircraft?
Answer: was undergunned, with just four .303 in (7.7 mm) machine guns

Question: What did interception rely upon?
Answer: visual sighting

Question: How did the Bristol Blenheim F.1 compare to German aircraft speed?
Answer: struggled to reach the speed of the German bombers
Title: The_Blitz

The Boulton Paul Defiant, despite its poor performance during daylight engagements, was a much better night fighter. It was faster, able to catch the bombers and its configuration of four machine guns in a turret could (much like German night fighters in 1943–1945 with Schräge Musik) engage the unsuspecting German bomber from beneath. Attacks from below offered a larger target, compared to attacking tail-on, as well as a better chance of not being seen by the bomber (so less chance of evasion), as well as greater likelihood of detonating its bombload. In subsequent months a steady number of German bombers would fall to night fighters.

Question: What performed better during night fighting?
Answer: The Boulton Paul Defiant

Question: How could aircraft engage bombers when fitted with a turret?
Answer: engage the unsuspecting German bomber from beneath

Question: What benefits did attacking from below offer?
Answer: larger target, compared to attacking tail-on, as well as a better chance of not being seen by the bomber
Title: The_Blitz

Improved aircraft designs were in the offing with the Bristol Beaufighter, then under development. It would prove formidable, but its development was slow. The Beaufighter had a maximum speed of 320 mph (510 km/h), an operational ceiling of 26,000 ft (7,900 m) and a climb rate of 2,500 ft (760 m) per minute. Its armament of four 20 mm (0.79 in) Hispano cannon and six .303 in Browning machine guns offered a serious threat to German bombers. On 19 November, John Cunningham of No. 604 Squadron RAF shot down a bomber flying an AI-equipped Beaufighter. It was the first air victory for the airborne radar.

Question: What was the max speed of a Beaufighter?
Answer: 320 mph (510 km/h)

Question: What is the operational ceiling of the Beaufighter?
Answer: 26,000 ft (7,900 m)

Question: how many machine guns did the Beaufighter include?
Answer: six .303 in Browning machine guns

Question: What day was the first victory the RAF had with airborne radar?
Answer: 19 November
Title: The_Blitz

By April and May 1941, the Luftwaffe was still getting through to their targets, taking no more than one- to two-percent losses on any given mission. On 19/20 April 1941, in honour of Hitler's 52nd birthday, 712 bombers hit Plymouth with a record 1,000 tons of bombs. Losses were minimal. In the following month, 22 German bombers were lost with 13 confirmed to have been shot down by night fighters. On 3/4 May, nine were shot down in one night. On 10/11 May, London suffered severe damage, but 10 German bombers were downed. In May 1941, RAF night fighters shot down 38 German bombers.

Question: What was the most losses the Luftwaffe suffered on any mission?
Answer: one- to two-percent losses

Question: How many bombers hit Plymouth on Hitler's birthday?
Answer: 712

Question: How many bombs hit Plymouth on Hitler's birthday?
Answer: 1,000 tons of bombs

Question: On May 3/4 how many German bombers were lost?
Answer: nine

Question: How many German bombers were shot down by the RAF in May?
Answer: 38 German bombers
Title: The_Blitz

The military effectiveness of bombing varied. The Luftwaffe dropped around 45,000 short tons (41,000 t) of bombs during the Blitz disrupting production and transport, reducing food supplies and shaking the British morale. It also helped to support the U-Boat blockade by sinking some 58,000 long tons (59,000 t) of shipping destroyed and 450,000 long tons (460,000 t) damaged. Yet, overall the British production rose steadily throughout this period although there were significant falls during April 1941, probably influenced by the departure of workers of Easter Holidays according to the British official history. The British official history on war production noted the great impact was upon the supply of components rather than complete equipment. In aircraft production, the British were denied the opportunity to reach the planned target of 2,500 aircraft in a month, arguably the greatest achievement of the bombing, as it forced the dispersal of industry. In April 1941, when the targets were British ports, rifle production fell by 25%, filled-shell production by 4.6%, and in smallarms production 4.5% overall. The strategic impact on industrial cities was varied; most took from 10–15 days to recover from heavy raids, although Belfast and Liverpool took longer. The attacks against Birmingham took war industries some three months to recover fully from. The exhausted population took three weeks to overcome the effects of an attack.

Question: The Luftwaffe used how many short tons of bombs during the Blitz?
Answer: 45,000 short tons

Question: The Luftwaffe helped the U-boats by sinking how much shipping?
Answer: 58,000 long tons

Question: How did the British production fare as a result of all the bombing?
Answer: overall the British production rose steadily throughout this period

Question: What was the greatest achievement of the bombings?
Answer: British were denied the opportunity to reach the planned target of 2,500 aircraft in a month

Question: How long was the recovery of industrial cities from raids?
Answer: most took from 10–15 days
Title: The_Blitz

The air offensive against the RAF and British industry failed to have the desired effect. More might have been achieved had the OKL exploited their enemy's weak spot, the vulnerability of British sea communications. The Allies did so later when Bomber Command attacked rail communications and the United States Army Air Forces targeted oil, but that would have required an economic-industrial analysis of which the Luftwaffe was incapable. The OKL instead sought clusters of targets that suited the latest policy (which changed frequently), and disputes within the leadership were about tactics rather than strategy. Though militarily ineffective, the Blitz caused enormous damage to Britain's infrastructure and housing stock. It cost around 41,000 lives, and may have injured another 139,000.

Question: How could have more been achieved in the air offensive?
Answer: had the OKL exploited their enemy's weak spot

Question: What did the disputes in the OKL tend to be about?
Answer: about tactics rather than strategy

Question: What was the Luftwaffe incapable of doing?
Answer: an economic-industrial analysis

Question: How many casualties did the Blitz ultimately cause?
Answer: cost around 41,000 lives, and may have injured another 139,000
Title: The_Blitz

The relieved British began to assess the impact of the Blitz in August 1941, and the RAF Air Staff used the German experience to improve Bomber Command's offensives. They concluded bombers should strike a single target each night and use more incendiaries because they had a greater impact on production than high explosives. They also noted regional production was severely disrupted when city centres were devastated through the loss of administrative offices, utilities and transport. They believed the Luftwaffe had failed in precision attack, and concluded the German example of area attack using incendiaries was the way forward for operations over Germany.

Question: What helped increase the Bomber Command's offensives?
Answer: the German experience

Question: What did the RAF conclude?
Answer: bombers should strike a single target each night and use more incendiaries because they had a greater impact on production than high explosives

Question: What caused the most production disruption?
Answer: when city centres were devastated through the loss of administrative offices, utilities and transport.

Question: What did the Luftwaffe fail?
Answer: failed in precision attack

Question: What did the experience of German's using incendiaries mean?
Answer: using incendiaries was the way forward for operations over Germany.
Title: The_Blitz

Some writers claim the Air Staff ignored a critical lesson, however: British morale did not break. Targeting German morale, as Bomber Command would do, was no more successful. Aviation strategists dispute that morale was ever a major consideration for Bomber Command. Throughout 1933–39 none of the 16 Western Air Plans drafted mentioned morale as a target. The first three directives in 1940 did not mention civilian populations or morale in any way. Morale was not mentioned until the ninth wartime directive on 21 September 1940. The 10th directive in October 1940 mentioned morale by name. However, industrial cities were only to be targeted if weather denied strikes on Bomber Command's main concern, oil.

Question: What was the critical lesson Air Staff ignored?
Answer: Targeting German morale, as Bomber Command would do, was no more successful.

Question: Aviation strategists disputed over what? 
Answer: that morale was ever a major consideration for Bomber Command.

Question: What did 16 of the Western Air Plans not mention?
Answer: morale as a target.

Question: When was morale finally mentioned?
Answer: ninth wartime directive on 21 September 1940

Question: When were industrial cities to be targeted?
Answer: if weather denied strikes on Bomber Command's main concern, oil.
Title: The_Blitz

AOC Bomber Command Arthur Harris did see German morale as a major objective. However, he did not believe that the morale-collapse could occur without the destruction of the German economy. The primary goal of Bomber Command's offensives was to destroy the German industrial base (economic warfare), and in doing so reduce morale. In late 1943, just before the Battle of Berlin, he declared the power of Bomber Command would enable it to achieve "a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable." A summary of Harris' strategic intentions was clear:

Question: Without what could morale collapse occur according to Arthur Harris?
Answer: without the destruction of the German economy.

Question: What was the primary strategy for Bomber Command offensives?
Answer: to destroy the German industrial base (economic warfare), and in doing so reduce morale

Question: Arthur Harris announced that Bomber Command would enable economic warfare to achieve what?
Answer: "a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable."
Title: The_Blitz

A converse popular image arose of British people in the Second World War: a collection of people locked in national solidarity. This image entered the historiography of the Second World War in the 1980s and 1990s, especially after the publication of Angus Calder's book The Myth of the Blitz (1991). It was evoked by both the right and left political factions in Britain during the Falklands War when it was embedded in a nostalgic narrative in which the Second World War represented aggressive British patriotism successfully defending democracy. This imagery of people in the Blitz was and is powerfully portrayed in film, radio, newspapers and magazines. At the time it was a useful propaganda tool for home and foreign consumption. Historians' critical response to this construction focused on what were seen as over-emphasised claims of righteous nationalism and national unity. In the Myth of the Blitz, Calder exposed some of the counter-evidence of anti-social and divisive behaviours. What he saw as the myth—serene national unity—became "historical truth". In particular, class division was most evident.

Question: What view became popular of the British people in WWII?
Answer: people locked in national solidarity.

Question: When did this popular view come to be?
Answer: in the 1980s and 1990s, especially after the publication of Angus Calder's book The Myth of the Blitz (1991).

Question: Political factions in Britain supported what view of Britains in WWII?
Answer: aggressive British patriotism successfully defending democracy.

Question: What was the Historians' critical response to this view?
Answer: over-emphasised claims of righteous nationalism and national unity.

Question: What did Calder try to expose in his book?
Answer: some of the counter-evidence of anti-social and divisive behaviours
Title: The_Blitz

In the wake of the Coventry Blitz, there was widespread agitation from the Communist Party over the need for bomb-proof shelters. Many Londoners, in particular, took to using the Underground railway system, without authority, for shelter and sleeping through the night there until the following morning. So worried were the Government over the sudden campaign of leaflets and posters distributed by the Communist Party in Coventry and London, that the Police were sent in to seize their production facilities. The Government, up until November 1940, was opposed to the centralised organisation of shelter. Home Secretary Sir John Anderson was replaced by Morrison soon afterwards, in the wake of a Cabinet reshuffle as the dying Neville Chamberlain resigned. Morrison warned that he could not counter the Communist unrest unless provision of shelters were made. He recognised the right of the public to seize tube stations and authorised plans to improve their condition and expand them by tunnelling. Still, many British citizens, who had been members of the Labour Party, itself inert over the issue, turned to the Communist Party. The Communists attempted to blame the damage and casualties of the Coventry raid on the rich factory owners, big business and landowning interests and called for a negotiated peace. Though they failed to make a large gain in influence, the membership of the Party had doubled by June 1941. The "Communist threat" was deemed important enough for Herbert Morrison to order, with the support of the Cabinet, the stoppage of the Daily Worker and The Week; the Communist newspaper and journal.

Question: What was the communist party agitated over?
Answer: the need for bomb-proof shelters.

Question: What did Londoners use for bomb-shelters?
Answer: Underground railway system

Question: What did Morrison warn he couldn't do?
Answer: that he could not counter the Communist unrest unless provision of shelters were made.

Question: Who did the Communists blame for the damage in the Conventry raids?
Answer: the rich factory owners, big business and landowning interests

Question: What was Morrison forced to do in response to the Communist Party?
Answer: the stoppage of the Daily Worker and The Week; the Communist newspaper and journal.
Title: The_Blitz

The brief success of the Communists also fed into the hands of the British Union of Fascists (BUF). Anti-Semitic attitudes became widespread, particularly in London. Rumours that Jewish support was underpinning the Communist surge were frequent. Rumours that Jews were inflating prices, were responsible for the Black Market, were the first to panic under attack (even the cause of the panic), and secured the best shelters via underhanded methods, were also widespread. Moreover, there was also racial antagonism between the small Black, Indian and Jewish communities. However, the feared race riots did not transpire despite the mixing of different peoples into confined areas.

Question: The success of the Communists helped what political group?
Answer: British Union of Fascists (BUF)

Question: Where did anti-semitic attitude spread primarily?
Answer: particularly in London

Question: What was one the rumors that Jews were doing in regard to shelters?
Answer: secured the best shelters via underhanded methods

Question: What was feared would happen when different races were mixed in shelters?
Answer: race riots
Title: The_Blitz

In other cities, class conflict was more evident. Over a quarter of London's population had left the city by November 1940. Civilians left for more remote areas of the country. Upsurges in population south Wales and Gloucester intimated where these displaced people went. Other reasons, including industry dispersal may have been a factor. However, resentment of rich self-evacuees or hostile treatment of poor ones were signs of persistence of class resentments although these factors did not appear to threaten social order. The total number of evacuees numbered 1.4 million, including a high proportion from the poorest inner-city families. Reception committees were completely unprepared for the condition of some of the children. Far from displaying the nation's unity in time of war, the scheme backfired, often aggravating class antagonism and bolstering prejudice about the urban poor. Within four months, 88% of evacuated mothers, 86% of small children, and 43% of school children had been returned home. The lack of bombing in the Phoney War contributed significantly to the return of people to the cities, but class conflict was not eased a year later when evacuation operations had to be put into effect again.

Question: What was another reason for populations moving?
Answer: industry dispersal may have been a factor

Question: How much of London's population left?
Answer: Over a quarter

Question: What locations saw an increase in populations?
Answer: south Wales and Gloucester

Question: How much of the population returned in four months?
Answer: 88% of evacuated mothers, 86% of small children, and 43% of school children

Question: How many evacuees were there?
Answer: 1.4 million
Title: The_Blitz

In recent years a large number of wartime recordings relating to the Blitz have been made available on audiobooks such as The Blitz, The Home Front and British War Broadcasting. These collections include period interviews with civilians, servicemen, aircrew, politicians and Civil Defence personnel, as well as Blitz actuality recordings, news bulletins and public information broadcasts. Notable interviews include Thomas Alderson, the first recipient of the George Cross, John Cormack, who survived eight days trapped beneath rubble on Clydeside, and Herbert Morrison's famous "Britain shall not burn" appeal for more fireguards in December 1940.

Question: What are the audiobooks with wartime recordings?
Answer: The Blitz, The Home Front and British War Broadcasting

Question: What are some of the things included in these recordings?
Answer: period interviews with civilians, servicemen, aircrew, politicians and Civil Defence personnel, as well as Blitz actuality recordings

Question: What is one of the notable recordings included?
Answer: Thomas Alderson, the first recipient of the George Cross, John Cormack, who survived eight days trapped beneath rubble on Clydeside

Question: What is a second recording that is of note?
Answer: Herbert Morrison's famous "Britain shall not burn" appeal for more fireguards in December 1940.
Title: Endangered_Species_Act

The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA; 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.) is one of the few dozens of United States environmental laws passed in the 1970s, and serves as the enacting legislation to carry out the provisions outlined in The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The ESA was signed into law by President Richard Nixon on December 28, 1973, it was designed to protect critically imperiled species from extinction as a "consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and conservation." The U.S. Supreme Court found that "the plain intent of Congress in enacting" the ESA "was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost." The Act is administered by two federal agencies, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).

Question: Which president signed the Act into law?
Answer: Richard Nixon

Question: On what day was the Endangered Species Act signed?
Answer: December 28

Question: What did the Supreme Court cite as the intent of Congress in enacting the Endangered Species Act?
Answer: to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost

Question: Which two federal agencies administer the Act?
Answer: the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

Question: In what year did the Endangered Species Act become law?
Answer: 1973
Title: Endangered_Species_Act

One species in particular received widespread attention—the whooping crane. The species' historical range extended from central Canada South to Mexico, and from Utah to the Atlantic coast. Unregulated hunting and habitat loss contributed to a steady decline in the whooping crane population until, by 1890, it had disappeared from its primary breeding range in the north central United States. It would be another eight years before the first national law regulating wildlife commerce was signed, and another two years before the first version of the endangered species act was passed. The whooping crane population by 1941 was estimated at about only 16 birds still in the wild.

Question: What was the historical range of the whooping crane?
Answer: central Canada South to Mexico, and from Utah to the Atlantic coast

Question: What two issues caused steady decline in the whooping crane population?
Answer: Unregulated hunting and habitat loss

Question: What was the estimated population of the whooping crane in 1941?
Answer: 16 birds

Question: How many years after the noted absence of the whooping crane from its breeding range did the first law regulating wildlife commerce pass
Answer: eight years